

The Unconscious Experiencer: *Bhokṛtva* in the *Pramāṭṛbheda* of the Trika

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1 Introductory

The exegetes¹ of the non-dualist Trika school of Śaivism—here principally the Kashmirian author Abhinavagupta (ca. 975–1025 AD) and his immediate² predecessors and followers—have extended inherited doctrines to formulate a paradigm of a complex self.³ In some of its manifestations, this self exhibits paradoxical abilities, such as being simultaneously unconscious yet also an experiencer. These unique characteristics are defended with epistemological argument, attacking rival schools of Sāṃkhyas, Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas, and various schools of Buddhism, and recent scholarship is demonstrating the extent to which this transformed the Śaiva non-dualist doctrinal positions, as substantial material was borrowed and incorporated from other systems.⁴

Despite much recent work, for most readers, the opponents' theories concerning the nature of the self—Buddhists propounding its absence, schools of Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and Vedānta that postulate a self that is primarily a seer (*draṣṭṛ*), a witness (*sākṣin*), a knower (*jñātr*), or a cogniser (*upalabdhr*)—are much more well known,

¹I would like to thank Kei KATAOKA and Christopher WALLIS for corrections to an earlier draft.

²These constitute the following disciplic succession: Somānanda (ca. 900–950 AD) → Utpaladeva (ca. 925–975 AD) → Lakṣmaṇagupta (*fl.* ca. 950–1000 AD) → Abhinavagupta → Kṣemarāja (ca. 1000–1050 AD). For this chronology see SANDERSON (2007:411ff.).

³Two independent Śaiva systematisations—[1.] the Kālī centered Krama, and [2.] the non-dualist *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*—influenced and informed this exegesis; SANDERSON (2007:427–434) calls it a “Krama-influenced, Pratyabhijñā-based exegesis of scripture in the Trika.” There is also a lesser influence from [3.] the Spanda system and [4.] the dualist *Śaivasiddhānta*. Of these Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* is frequently cited on matters of epistemology, while the *Śaivasiddhānta* is adduced rarely without qualification, unless the context happens to be a commonplace Śaiva teaching with limited doctrinal implications. This exegesis presents itself as an exposition of revealed Śaiva scriptures called Tantras that comprise a system called the *Mantramārga*, or the Path of Mantras. See GOODALL & ISAACSON 2011 for an up to date, general survey. The term *Mantramārga* is becoming the preferred term for what some secondary literature still refers to as Tantrism.

⁴See TORELLA (1994:introduction) for the substantial borrowings of Buddhist doctrine. Considering Somānanda's hostility to Bhartṛhari in his *Śivadrṣṭi* but his disciple Utpaladeva's adoption of many *Śabdādvaita* positions in his foundational works of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* system, TORELLA has suggested the possibility that Somānanda was only aware of only the first *Kāṇḍa* of Bhartṛhari's *Vākya-padīya*, a possibility that is reevaluated in NEMEC (2011a:59–67).

while the Śaiva voice remains less familiar.⁵

Before we can understand the Trika's doctrine of a self that can be an unconscious experiencer, we must unravel the internal dynamics driving this claim. To do this, two central tenets of the Trika system therefore need to be evaluated, with a perspective that seeks to contrast the Trika against the Sāṃkhya sources from which it has inherited the mental triplex of the *buddhi*, *ahamkāra* and *manas* (and much terminology), and, with a view to differentiate the Trika from its Saiddhāntika Śaiva rivals.⁶ Firstly, the Trika's self is an experiencer (*bhoktr*) of experiences or qualia (*bhoga*) that can be pleasant, painful, and vexing or indifferent (depending on how one interprets *moha*).⁷ These qualia belong to the self, and not to the mental mechanism, as would be the case for the Sāṃkhya. The Trika's self is also an agent (*kartr*). This specifically intends to establish that the self must be the consumer of the fruits of karmic retribution (*karmavipāka*) that it is responsible for.⁸ Secondly, the Trika's self is also a complex of seven types of perceivers (*pramātr*) which are located within a series of paths (*adhvan*), primarily the path of the *taṭtvās*, or reality levels, and the associated path of the *bhuvanas*, or the worlds, which constitute the primary ontological ranges of medieval Śaivism. Only one of the seven perceivers can be the locus of self-awareness and identity at any given moment. Which perceiver this is depends on the type of object that is being cognised. In an ordinary cognition by the lowest type of perceiver the self is thereby refracted into a phenomenological hierarchy that is made up of these seven apperceptive grades. The lower three of these perceivers are furthermore distinguished by the presence or absence of three limitations or defilements (*mala*): [1.] limitation of individuation (*āṇavamala*), [2.] limitation by karmic retribution (*kārmamala*), and [3.] limitation by *māyā* (*māyīyamala*). In accordance with a redefini-

⁵For sustained, ongoing work on self as understood in the dualist Śaiva Siddhānta see WATSON (2006, 2013 etc.).

⁶See *Mataṅgapārameśvara* VP 6.4cc–5ab for a more general Śaiva definition of the self: *paśur ātmā samuddiṣṭaḥ kṣetrī kṣetrañña eva ca | śarīrī ceti ruddhātmā bhoktā ca paribhāṣyate*.

⁷This triad of *sukha*, *duḥkha* and *moha* has been accepted from the Sāṃkhya, where it is understood to represent the experiential aspect of the three *guṇas*, see, e.g., *Yuktidīpikā* 17c. The translation of *moha* is problematic. In Vācaspati's elaboration in the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* (13.2, 1.17–28: *atra ca sukhaduḥkhamohāḥ parasparaṃ virodhinaḥ svānurūpāṇi sukhaduḥkhamohātmakāny eva nimittāni kalpayanti | teṣāṃ ca parasparaṃ abhibhāvyabhibhāvabhāvān nānātvam tad yathā strī rūpayauvanakulaśīlasampannā svāminam sukhākaroti | tat kasya hetoḥ | svāminam prati tasyāḥ sukhārūpasamudbhavāt | saiva strī sapatnīr duḥkhākaroti | tat kasya hetoḥ | tāḥ prati tasyā duḥkharūpasamudbhavāt | evaṃ puruṣāntaram tām avindat saiva mohayati | tat kasya hetoḥ | tat prati tasyā moharūpasamudbhavāt anayā ca striyā sarve bhāvā vyākhyātāḥ*), a beautiful, young and modest woman of good family brings pleasure to her husband (*sukhā-kr*), pain to her co-wives (*duḥkhā-kr*), and she 'leaves indifferent, stupefies, frustrates, confounds, vexes' or 'beguiles' other men (*mohayati*). The Saiddhāntikas are quite aware that this triad derives from the Sāṃkhyas, see, e.g., Aghoraśiva in *Mṛgendravṛttidīpikā* 2.14b: *evaṃ tarhi kāpilā manyante puruṣo hy akartā svabhāvanirmalas tasya vivekajñānāt pūrvaṃ parārthaṃ pravṛttāv asvatantvatvāt paramakāraṇam prakṛtir eva mahādādirūpeṇa sukhaduḥkhamohātmanā svakāryeṇātmanā bhogyatayā darśayati sa eva saṃsāra ity ucyate |*

⁸In view of the widespread notion of the triple nature of *bhoga* mentioned above, I have, on the whole, avoided translating derivatives of the root *bhuj* with words related to the English verb 'enjoy'.

tion⁹ of the *Mālinīvijayottara*,¹⁰ these are considered to be three forms of foundational ignorance.

Kṣemarāja summarizes the non-dualist Śaiva view of the self as follows:

Svacchandatanthroddyota 5.88 (K_{ED} p. 76, Ś₁ 149r^v):
 tathā hy ayam ātmā [1.] saṅkocābhāsasatattvāpūrṇammanyatāt-
 3 manehābhilāṣāśabdoktenāṇavena malena, [2.] śubhāśubhavāsanā-
 tmanā vividhajanmāyurbhogadena kārmeṇa, [3.] tatprabhavena
 6 ca kañcukapuryaṣṭakasthūlabhūtātmanāñjātikatrividhadehatadāśra-
 yavicitrabhuvanabhoktavyārthasārthapratītibhājā māyākhyena male-
 na ca valitaḥ | yataḥ sarvasyaiva [1.] saṅkucito 'bhiṣvaṅgādīmāyo
 [2.] 'ntarullekhaśatākīrṇaḥ [3.] kṛśagaurādirūpo 'mukatredaṃ jānā-
 9 mītyādipratītisiddha evāyam arthaḥ |

2 °satattvā°] em. SANDERSON, °tattvā° K_{ED} Ś₁ 7 saṅkucito] K_{ED}, saṅkuciti + + +
 Ś₁ 8 'mukatredaṃ] conj. ISAACSON, 'mutredaṃ K_{ED}, muddhedaṃ Ś₁

To explain, the self is enveloped by [1.] the defilement of individuation, designated here¹¹ by the word yearning, which is the erroneous conviction that one is incomplete,¹² which has as its essence an appearance of contraction, [2.] by the defilement of karmic retribution, which is made up of positive and negative latent impressions, and which grants the enjoyment of various births and life-spans,¹³ [3.] and by the defilement called Māyā¹⁴, deriving from that [impurity of karmic retribution], which occasions the cognition of a plethora of objects to be experienced in the threefold body with its various genera of embodiment, [the threefold body] which is constituted by [a.] the [five] cuirasses (see page 213), [b.] the ogdoad of the subtle body, and [c.] the body of the coarse elements, and in diverse worlds which are the substrates [of the body]. For this matter is established by everyone's personal experience such as: "I who am contracted, subject to yearning and so on, who am overcome with hundreds of internal impressions, who appear to be lean and pale and so on, in such and such a place,¹⁵ know this."

⁹The three *malas* were originally imagined to be substantial defilements, see GOODALL (1998), ACHARYA (forthcoming).

¹⁰The *Mālinīvijayottara* is the root scripture the TaĀI seeks to explain.

¹¹In the SvaTa, the text being commented on. Cf. SvaTa 3.177a: *nimittam abhilāṣākhyam*.

¹²TaĀI 9.65a: *apūrṇammanyatā ceyam* TaĀI Viv ad loc: *apūrṇammanyatāṇavamalalakṣaṇā*.

¹³Or: "various births, life-spans and experiences".

¹⁴The Trika's exegetes also commonly use the ĪPK 3.2.5ab definition of *māyīyamala*: *bhinnavedyaprathātraiva māyākhyam*.

¹⁵K_{ED} here reads *amutra + idaṃ*. *Amutra* normally contrasts with *iha*, "here", so that the meaning should be "over there", or more commonly "in the next world," an inappropriate sense for a description of direct personal experience, the core formulation of which is usually: *aham idaṃ jānāmi*, "I know this". This is also implied by the evident correlations of the sequences 1–3 and a–c. My initial emendation to this was *amuko 'treḍaṃ*, "I, who am so and so, here...". I have in-

While the model of the self that emerges is therefore a unique one, we can also see that the categories being scrutinized appear to correspond to those of the Sāṃkhya (see table 1 for a comparison, though the Śaivas would contest this equivalence, of course). This does not mean that we must assume a direct borrowing of these categories from contemporaneous Sāṃkhya works. In particular, the idea that the self is an actual experiencer (*bhoktr*), is also prominent in what remains of the Pāśupata Atimārga precursor to the Śaiva Mantramārga. For example, the expression *cetanatvād bhoktrtvāt tanmayatvāc* is repeated five times in Kauṇḍinya's *Pañcārthabhāṣya* 5.39 to qualify the *puruṣa*. This Pāśupata conception of experiencerhood was not limited to the enjoyment of karmic retribution, however, since in commenting on 5.3 Kauṇḍinya cites a verse providing *nirvacana*-etymologies defining the *ātmā*,¹⁶ where *atti viṣayān*, “it consumes the objects of experience”, seems intended as a paraphrase of *bhoktriva*. As for the idea that the self is an agent, Kauṇḍinya does not use the term *kartṛ* in his commentary to 5.3. But he does cite a verse giving a string of specific agentive-suffix nouns with designate agents of specific cognitive actions attributed to the self:¹⁷ “It is the listener, the toucher, seer, taster, smeller, thinker, ‘speaker’, knower etc.”. In this list the ‘speaker’ could perhaps also be taken as a non-cognitive agent. But since all of the others seem intended as subvarieties of witnessing (*sākṣitva*), we should presumably rather interpret *vaktṛ* as some form of a ‘cognising verbaliser agent’. In a summary verse Kauṇḍinya then cites a number of synonyms for the self, none of which however conveys a primary meaning of agency: *puruṣaś cetano bhoktā kṣetrajñāḥ pudgalo janaḥ | aṅgur vedo 'mrtaḥ sākṣī jīvātmā paribhūḥ paraḥ ||*. Only later, at 5.35, in an argument concerning the apportioning of karmic retribution, does Kauṇḍinya imply that the self is an agent.¹⁸

2 The Direct, Agentive Experiencer

Despite such an obvious inflow of Sāṃkhya ideas and material, the early Mantramārga was at odds with the Sāṃkhya long before the non-dualist Śaivas of the Trika school entered their most intense (and perhaps also most aggressive) hermeneutic phase. One of the most significant departures from the Sāṃkhya is the idea that an experiencer must also be an agent. In the post scriptural period this was already defended by Sadyojyotis (ca. 650–750¹⁹), the earliest known commentator of the dualist Śaivasiddhānta, who is also roughly a contemporary of the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* (ca. 680–720), the most important commentary to the *Sāṃkhyakāri-*

stead adopted a reading suggested by H. ISAACSON (personal communication): *amukatra*, which eliminates the unnecessary repetition of “I, who am so and so”.

¹⁶*Pañcārthabhāṣya* 5.3: *yad āpnoti yad ādatte yac cātti viṣayān punaḥ | yac cāsya satataṃ bhāvāḥ tasmād ātmeti saṃjñitāḥ ||* (Cf. also *Līngapurāṇa* 1.70.96)

¹⁷*Ibid.*, *sa ca śrotā spraṣṭā draṣṭā rasayitā ghrātā mantā vaktā boddhā ityevamādih*

¹⁸*Pañcārthabhāṣya* 5.35: *tac ca duḥkhaṃ nānyo 'nubhavati kartaivānubhavati*, “And that suffering is experienced by [its] agent alone, not by another.”

¹⁹For this date see SANDERSON (2006).

	TRIKA		SĀMKHYAKĀRIKĀ
i)	conscious (<i>cetana</i>)	~	conscious (<i>cetana</i>)
ii)	consumer/experiencer (<i>bhokṛ</i>)	~	experiencer (<i>[mahadādi]bhokṛ</i>)
iii)	agent (<i>karṛ</i>)	≠	non-agent (<i>akarṛ</i>)
iv)	[seven perceivers (<i>pramātr</i>)		[witness]
	1. <i>sakala</i>	~	<i>draṣṭṛ</i>
	2. <i>pralayākala</i>	~	(+ <i>prakṛtilaya</i> PYŚ)
	3. <i>vijñānākala</i>	~	(+ <i>videha</i> PYŚ)
	4. <i>mantra</i> , 5. <i>-īśa</i> , 6. <i>-maheśa</i>		[<i>kevalaḥ puruṣaḥ</i>]
	7. <i>śiva</i>		⊙

Table 1: The Trika’s *aṇu* and the Sāṃkhya *puruṣa*

kā.²⁰ Sadyojyotis argues that experience is a kind of action, which implies that the experiencer must be a kind of agent.²¹ This he uses to support the inherited Śaiva scriptural doctrine of the self’s agency (*karṛtva*), and he attacks the Sāṃkhya idea that experience is not direct, but that: “Experience is the reflection of the self in the experienced, like [the reflection] of the moon in water.”²² Despite this, it is also evident that the doctrine he defends, at least as far as the three internal organs— [1.] the mind or *manas*, the [2.] intellect or *buddhi* and [3.] personalization or *ahaṃkāra*—are concerned, is in many respects derivative. He defines experience as follows:

In brief, the intellect, that has assumed the form of the object of cognition such as happiness etc.,²³ is the object of experience (*bhoga*). Experience (*bhoga*) is a manifestation of the experiencer’s awareness—tinged by the object of experience—in the object of experience (*i.e.* the

²⁰See e.g. *Bhogakārikā* 99cd: *akarṛtvābhyupagame bhokṛśabdo nirarthakaḥ*, “If it is accepted that the self is not an agent then the word ‘consumer’ is meaningless.” Aghoraśiva comments: *bhoga-syāpi kriyātvād bhokṛtvenaiva puṃsaḥ karṛtvaṃ siddhyati*, “Because consuming too is an action, the self’s status as an agent is established just through its being a consumer.” The idea was so important that Sadyojyotis repeats it with different wording at *Tattvasaṃgraha* 16: *vyartham bhokṛtrabhidhānam vyartham ca tataḥ pradhānacariṭam vaḥ | nari karṛtvavivihīne na ca bhoga ihāprayojake dr-ṣṭaḥ ||*

²¹We are fortunate to have Sadyojyotis’ *Bhogakārikā*, where he discusses the relationship between the categories of the *bhokṛ*, *bhoga* and the *bhoga* in depth. See especially BOCCIO (2002).

²²Refutation of the Sāṃkhya view of *bhoga* in *Bhogakārikā* (75cd): *bhogye bhogaḥ prabhoś chāyā yathā candramaso jale*.

²³*Sukha*, happiness is a standard example for an internal object of cognition, while *nīla*, a blue thing, is a standard example of an external object of cognition.

buddhi).²⁴

Aghoraśiva expands this to mean that the experiencer (*bhoktr*) here intends the self functioning as a synthesizer (*anusamdhātr*) of cognitive events. It manifests an awareness that is tinged by the intellect that has itself ascertained the object of cognition as pleasurable etc. This awareness takes the form: “I am experiencing pleasure” etc.²⁵ Such composite experiences are qualia (*bhoga*) for the Saiddhāntikas.²⁶

The *manas* or *citta* has a dual role, because it functions as the instigator (*pravṛttikāraka*) or controller (*adhiṣṭhātr*) of the external senses²⁷ and simultaneously is also responsible for the internal function of attention (*saṃkalpa*).²⁸ Since, for the Saiddhāntikas, attention is both an action and a cognition that is ever-present in the self,²⁹ it must be different from the products of the intellect and the personalization, because these, being merely forms of grasping, namely of the grasped (*grāhya*) in the case of the intellect, and of the grasper (*grāhaka*) in the case of personalization respectively, are both purely cognitive (*pratyaya*).³⁰

The functioning of personalization results in effort (*saṃrambha*), the intellect achieves determination (*adhyavasāya*) of a cognised object, and experiencerhood is the defilement of individuation (*āṇavamala*), which takes the form of mistakenly believing non-self to be self.³¹ As is evident, much of this has direct antecedents in the Sāṃkhya system, Sadyojyotis’ major departure (besides minor ones, such as counting the three *guṇas* as *tattvas*) comes with the incorporation of the Śaiva five cuirasses (*kañcuka*) as enablers of the self’s cognition.

The *Yuktiḍipikā*, to the contrary, suggests that the self must be a non-agent because it lacks the property of being productive (*aprasavadharmitvāt*),³² which, con-

²⁴ *Tattvasaṃgraha* of Sadyojyotis 15: *buddhir viṣayākārā sukhādirūpā samāsato bhogyam | bhogye bhogo bhoktuś cidvyaktir bhogyanirbhāsā ||*

²⁵ Aghoraśiva *ad loc*: *tataś ca bhoktur anusandhātuḥ puruṣasya, bhogye buddhyākhye sukhādyadhyavasāyarūpe, sukhy ahaṃ duḥkhy ahaṃ iti bhogyanirbhāsā bhogyoparaktā cidvyaktiḥ saṃvidudbhavaḥ sa bhogo mantavyaḥ.*

²⁶ See BOCCIO 14–15 for a discussion of *Bhogakārikā* 64cd–65ab where Sadyojyotis distinguishes two types of *bhoga*.

²⁷ *Mrgendratāntra* VP 12.9.

²⁸ *Cf. Mataṅgapārameśvara* VP 13.81–2.

²⁹ For the Śaivasiddhānta *caitanya* is considered to comprise both action and cognition. See *Mrgendratāntra* VP 2.5ab: *caitanyaṃ drṅkriyārūpaṃ tad asty ātmani sarvadā |*, similarly *Bhogakārikā* of Sadyojyotis 130cd: *drṅkriye sarvaviṣaye sarvagatvād aṅor mate ||*

³⁰ *Laghuṭīkā* to the *Tattvasaṃgraha* of Sadyojyotis 8bcd: *tatrecchāśabdena saṃkalpākhyam (M^Y, saṃkalpākhyam avadhānaṃ P_{ED} FILLIOZAT) ekāgratāparaparyāyam ucyate | tac ca drṅkriyātmakativād buddhyahaṅkārakāryād grāhyagrahakaparāmarsātmano bhinnaṃ, tayoh pratyayarūpatvād | ato yasyaitat kāryaṃ tan mana iti manaḥsiddhiḥ.*

³¹ *Laghuṭīkā* to *Tattvasaṃgraha* 12ab: *...bhoktrtvena puṃstvamalenānātmādāv ātmābhīmānarūpeṇa...*

³² The compound *prasavadharmin*, a *karmadhāraya* with the suffix *-in*, is here a *śiṣṭaprayoga* usage in place of the expected *bahuvrīhi prasavadharman*. BHATTACHARYA (1993:205, and fn. 15) has shown that already Vācaspati saw fit to explain this apparent solecism by arguing that the suffix is meant to convey ‘constant production’ (*nityayogam*), a meaning which could not be derived from the

versely, is the hallmark of matter.³³ The property of being productive intends for the Sāṃkhya specifically motility and transformation, both of which cannot be detected in the self.³⁴ Agency lies not with the self but with the evolutes of primal matter. Īśvarakṛṣṇa does, however, admit that his non-agent self is an experiencer, or *bhokṛ*, when he advances the existence of experiencerhood as a proof for the existence of a self. Since both manifest (*vyakta*) and unmanifest matter (*avyakta*) are insentient it is impossible that they could experience each other. Therefore, once we have identified matter as a thing to be experienced, we can establish that a correlated sentient experiencer of it must also exist, and this can only be the conscious self.³⁵ Evidently, the Sāṃkhya conception of experiencerhood differs considerably from that of the Śaivas.

The non-dualist Śaivas manipulate these categories into a quite different set of assumptions. Kṣemarāja explains that experiencerhood arises from the defilement of individuation, which is regularly interpreted as that form of ignorance that leads to the mistaken belief that one is incomplete (*apūrṇaṃmanyatā*),³⁶ as follows:

Svacchandatanthroddyota ad 4.127cd (Ś₁ fol. 83^v): śarīreṇa yat kṛtaṃ śarīrair yad arjitaṃ kiṃcit tatraiva yā viśayatvenāsaktiḥ kiṃcin me syād ity abhiṣvaṅgas tad etan malakāryam apūrṇaṃmanyatātmakāṇa-vamalothhāpitaṃ bhokṛtvam |

The state of being an experiencer (*bhokṛtva*) is a product of defilement (*mala*), that is to say, it arises from the limitation of individuation (*āṇa-vamala*), which has as its nature the belief that one is incomplete—a limited attachment to whatever is produced by one's body, or to whatever is accumulated by one's body, as objects of enjoyment—that takes the form of the hankering: 'May I have a little bit!'

bahuvrīhi compound alone. The *Yuktidīpikā* (p. 180) is content to simply explain it as a possessive: *prasavārtho dharmah, prasavadharmah so 'syāsti (cf. Pāṇ. 4.3.120) iti prasavadharmī.*

³³ *Yuktidīpikā* p. 180: *akarṛbhāvo 'prasavadharmitvāt |*

³⁴ *Yuktidīpikā* p. 180: *kaḥ punar asau prasavārtho dharmā ity ucyate | prasandanapariṇāmau | niṣkriyatvād akarteti yāvat tad idam aprasavadharmitvād akarteti |*

³⁵ *Yuktidīpikā: puruṣo 'sti bhokṛbhāvāt ||17c|| iha sukhaduḥkhamohātmakatvād acetanaṃ vyaktam avyaktam ca | tasmād asya paraspāreṇa bhogo nopapadyate ity avaśyaṃ bhokṛā bhavitavyam | yo 'sau bhokṛtā sa puruṣaḥ |.* The *Mātharavṛtti* adds an example invoking the consumption of food as a parallel. *iha madhurāmlatiktalavaṇakaṭukaṣāyāḥ ṣaḍ rasāḥ | etaiḥ ṣaḍbhī rasair yuktaṃ bhojanam dṛṣṭvā bhokṛtā sādhyate | asti bhokṛtā yasyedaṃ bhojanam | evam idaṃ vyaktāvyaktam dṛṣṭvā sādhyāmo 'sty asau paramātmā puruṣo yasyedaṃ bhokṛtur vyaktāvyaktam bhogyam iti |* "There are, in this world, six flavours: sweet, sour, bitter, salty, pungent, and astringent. When one sees food prepared with these flavours, the existence of a consumer can be established. In the same way, when we see manifest and unmanifest matter we can establish that there exists a self, the Puruṣa, for whom, as an experiencer, this manifest and unmanifest matter is the thing to be experienced." The same example is also given in Gaudapāda's *Bhāṣya*.

³⁶ Non-dualist commentators use a standardised set of expansions for the three defilements (see e.g. NeTUdd 16.56): [1.] *āṇava* = *apūrṇaṃmanyatā*, erroneous belief that one is incomplete, [2.] *kārma* = *śubhāśubhādīsamskāra*, positive and negative karmic latencies, [3.] *māyīya* = *bhinnavedyaprathā*, manifestation of differentiated objects of cognition.

As such, it is not an ultimately existing reality, but an entity that is synthesized in Bhairava—or non-dual consciousness—, an event that incidentally is not considered in any way to impair or alter the fact that he remains the totality.³⁷

This agentive experiencer then enjoys or suffers experience (*bhoga*), that is, the fruits of karmic retribution (*vipāka*). Karma, for Abhinavagupta, depends on an agent because it is an action. It can be considered a product of the aforementioned defilement only metaphorically:

TaĀI 9.98cd–100ab (K₁ fol. 65^v, K₂ fol. 367^v–368^r, B₁ fol. 237^v, K₄ fol. 98^{rv}):

- 3 *kiṃ ca karmāpi na malād yataḥ karma kriyātmakam ||*
kriyā ca kartṛtārūpāt svātantryān na punar malāt |
yā tv asya karmaṇas citraphaladatvena karmatā ||
 6 *prasiddhā sā na saṃkocaṃ vinātmani malaś ca saḥ |*

5 *karmatā*] K_{ED}K₁K₂B₁, *karmatām* K₄

Moreover, karma itself does not evolve from defilement, because karma is essentially action, and action arises from autonomy that consists of agency, but not defilement [which is neither an agent nor independent].³⁸ Karma's [essential] nature of being activity, which is generally acknowledged to be the production of differentiated effects,³⁹ is not possible in the self without contraction, and that [contraction] is defilement (*[āṇava]mala*).

This introduces the important concept of contraction (*saṃkoca*),⁴⁰ which characterizes the relationship between the supreme self, Bhairava, and the limited self.⁴¹ The limited self is a contraction of the plenary powers of Bhairava.⁴²

³⁷*Mālinīvijayavārttika* 1.745cd–46ab: *abhinno bhagavān eṣa bhairavo bhogyabhokṛtām || ātmany evānusandhāya sarvadā pūrṇaviḡrahaḥ*, “This undivided Lord Bhairava, cognitively synthesizing in himself the state of being an experiencer of objects of experience, is always endowed with a plenary body.”

³⁸Jayaratha *ad loc*: *malād ity akartṛtātmakāsvātantryarūpād ity arthaḥ*.

³⁹Taking *citraphaladatvena* as a predicative instrumental rather than as a causal instrumental.

⁴⁰*Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* 3.2.5: *tatra svarūpasya nimīlanaṃ saṃkocaḥ*, “There contraction is a veiling of the own-form.”

⁴¹*Tantrāloka*viveka 1.5 : *bhedapradhānaṃ tattadanantābhāsasambhinnaṃ saṃkucitātmārūpaṃ naratvam*, “‘Individuality’, which is determined by differentiation, which is interpenetrated with infinite appearances, and is a contraction of the self...”

⁴²*Tantrāloka* 13.213: *ajñānarūpatā puṃsi bodhaḥ saṃkocite hṛdi | saṃkoce vinivṛtte tu svasva-bhāvaḥ prakāśate ||* “When the heart is contracted, the soul’s knowledge is ignorance, but when contraction ceases, its own nature shines forth.” Jayaratha *ad loc*: *iha hṛdi sārabhūte vimarśātmani rūpe saṃkocite guṇībhāvam āpādite yaḥ puṃsi parimitāmany apūrṇākhyātirūpo bodhaḥ saivājñānarūpatā tena sahaikatvam ity arthaḥ*. For Abhinavagupta’s views on these kinds of erroneous cognitions see NEMEC 2011b: 250ff.

Because the contraction of Bhairava into the limited self is brought about by the defilement of individuation (*āṇavamala*), Abhinavagupta admits that, defilement, as an enabling factor, might, in a transferred or figurative sense (*upacāra*) be said to cause karma.




Figure 1: Contraction and the *malas*

The contracted agentive experiencer imagines that karmic fruition, either positive, negative, or delusional, is experience, and thereby he exists in various forms such as gods, or humans etc.

- TaĀI 9.100cd–101ab (K₁ fol. 65^v, K₂ fol. 367^v–368^r, B₁ fol. 237^v, K₄ fol. 98^v) with *avataraṇikā*: *tēna saṃkocaṃ vināsyā na tattatphaladā-*
 3 *ne sāmārthyam | saṃkoca eva mala ity asya tatkāraṇatvam upacaritam,*
saṃkucito hi bhoktā śubhāśubhādyātmakaṃ bhinnaṃ sat phalam āt-
 6 *mani bhogyatvenābhimanute yena devamanuṣyādivicitrarūpatayāsyā-*
vasthānam |
vicitram hi phalaṃ bhinnaṃ bhogyatvenābhimanyate ||
bhoktary āmani teneyaṃ bhedarūpā vyavasthitih |

2 *vināsyā na*] K_{ED}K₄, *vinā*⟨*nā*⟩ *syā* B₁ 2 *tattat*^o] K_{ED}K₄, *tat*^o B₁ 3 *eva*] K_{ED},
eva ⟨*ca*⟩ K₄ 3 *ity asya*] K_{ED}, *iti yasya* B₁, *iti asya* K₄ 4 *sat phalam*] K_{ED}K₄,
saphalam B₁ 6 *āsyāvasthānam*] K_{ED}, *āvasthānam tad āha* B₁K₄

Therefore, without contraction [of the self], it (karma) has no capacity to produce differentiated effects. Defilement is none other than contraction, therefore its causality towards it (karma) is [intended] in a figurative sense, for the contracted experiencer (*bhokṭṛ*) misconstrues (*abhi-man*) the fruition—given as differentiated, and as good and bad etc.—, to be an experience in himself, whereby he exists in various forms such as gods, humans etc. ‘For the diverse fruit, differentiated, is misconstrued to be what is experienceable (*bhogyatvena*) in the experiencer who is [misconstrued to be] the self. From this derives this differentiated existence.’

This very specific Śaiva understanding of the term *bhokṭṛ* as a direct agentive experiencer, that is to say, as an actual and immediate experiencer of karmic retribu-

tion, must therefore be distinguished from that of other schools of thought. This becomes evident if we contrast it with the more familiar notion that the self might be an experiencer only indirectly, apparently, or metaphorically. Several varieties of this view are expressed in the surviving works of the Sāṃkhya system and in presentations and refutations by opponents. In the most common version of this doctrine, the Sāṃkhya is at pains to deny that the self's status of being an experiencer implies that the *puruṣa* has undergone a transformation. Instead, it consists merely of the kind of experience one has when witnessing a reflection arising in a mirror (*pratibimbodaya*). This theory has been discussed in most detail in ASANO (1991).⁴³

Even though the Śaiva Mantramārga⁴⁴ has a long and complex history of assimilating, adapting and criticising the tenets of the Sāṃkhya, the details of which remain to be uncovered,⁴⁵ we should not, in the present case, assume a direct influence from the Sāṃkhya without further evidence. This is because, as we have seen, *bhoktrva* is a topic already in the Pāśupata Atimārga precursor to the Mantramārga, and from the *Pañcārthabhāṣya* of Kauṇḍīnya we can trace it back even further into the *Śvetāśvatara* and the *Kaṭha* Upaniṣads etc.⁴⁶ The idea that the individual is an experiencer or enjoyer thus predates the Mantramārga by a considerable amount of time. The triad of the experiencer-experience-experienced (*bhoktr–bhoga–bhogya*), too, that is common in the Mantramārga, occurs already in the *Vākyapadīya* of the grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari, another work that was influential in the formative period of non-dualist Śaiva doctrine. Since, however, it is there found in the opening section, where Bhartṛhari is comparing his conception of Brahman with the ultimate stages of other schools of thought without explicitly identifying them, it is not certain whether he is here alluding to the *Śaṣṭitantra* of Vārṣagaṇa (ca. 300),⁴⁷ or perhaps even to the Pāśupatas, or some other group.⁴⁸ It is therefore possible that some Sāṃkhya-like ideas are derived from

⁴³See also SAITO (2011), QVARNSTRÖM (2012).

⁴⁴See most recently WATSON, GOODALL & SARMA (2013).

⁴⁵One of the most interesting ideas so far is that of TORELLA (1999), who proposes that we should consider two different kinds of Sāṃkhya, one of them a **sāmānyasāstra*. He concludes: “One is a relatively coherent complex of doctrines and beliefs which has become, subliminally as it were, an integral part of Indian tradition, impelled by its intrinsic power and prestige deriving above all from its being the first bold and consistent systemization of the scattered patrimony of upaniṣadic speculations. The other is the Sāṃkhya as a *darśana* trying to put in order or develop, in some way or other, these doctrines, which are perceived as a timeless legacy even by those that are not their direct upholders.”

⁴⁶Cf. *Kaṭhapaniṣad* 3.4, the parable of the chariot: “4. The senses (*indriya*), they say, are the horses; / The objects of sense, what they range over. / The self combined with senses and mind / Wise men call ‘the enjoyer’ (*bhoktr*).” (transl. HUME 1921), and especially the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 1.8–12.

⁴⁷Note that *Māṭharavṛtti to Sāṃkhyakārikā* 73 states that the Śāstra on which the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is based, by which it means the *Śaṣṭitantra*, discussed the categories of the agent, the experiencer, the experienced, and liberation: *kartā bhoktā bhojyaṃ mokṣaś cātra cintyate*.

⁴⁸*Vākyapadīya* 1.4, ed. and transl. W. RAU (1977), *ekasya sarvabījasya yasya ceyam anekadhā | bhoktrbhoktavaryarūpeṇa bhogarūpeṇa ca sthitiḥ ||*, “...[Ohne Anfang und ohne Ende ist das

other schools of thought that have their own complex history of assimilating Sāṃkhya thought.

An immediate question arises. Where is it that this agentive experiencer enjoys or suffers his experiences? To answer this we need to consider the non-dualist Śaiva's systematisation of their scripturally inherited range of ontologies.

3 The *Tattvakrama* as an Artificial Causal Chain

The self proposed by the Trika finds itself located in and against an ontology of six paths (*ṣaḍadhvan*), only one of which is important for us here: the path of the *tattvas*. The lower reaches of the Śaiva *tattvakrama*, or the hierarchy of the principles or reality levels, appear to be an inheritance from the mature hierarchy of principles of earlier Sāṃkhya thinkers. We thus find the individual soul, *puruṣa*, the highest principle of the Sāṃkhya, distinguished from *prakṛti*, matter, and the twenty-three *tattvas* that evolve from it arranged beneath it just as in the Sāṃkhya schema. These are the three mental faculties—the intellect (*buddhi*), personalization (*ahaṃkāra*), and reflection (*manas*)⁴⁹—the five faculties of sense perception (*buddhīndriya*), the five faculties of action (*karmendriya*), the five sensory media (*tanmātra*), and the five gross elements (*mahābhūta*). For the non-dualist exegetes of the Śaiva *Mantramārga*, this individual soul (*puruṣa*), even if isolated from matter or *prakṛti*—the goal of the Sāṃkhya system—is not yet liberated: they do not seek self-realization, but rather god-realization, since only Śiva exists.

To these twenty-five were superadded the five *kañcukas*, cuirasses, that inhibit the individual soul: [1.] limitation by time (*kāla*), [2.] binding fate (*niyati*), [3.] limited power to act (*kalā*), [4.] limited power of knowledge (*vidyā*),⁵⁰ [5.] limited passion (*rāga*). Above them is found primal matter (*māyā*). This reality level, together with all of the principles below it, constitute the black (*asita*), or impure (*aśuddha*), universe (*adhvan*, lit. “path”). Above this black universe is the white (*sita*), or pure (*śuddha*), universe with five *tattvas*: *śivatattva*, *śaktitattva*, *sadāśivatattva*, *īśvaratattva* and *śuddhavidyātattva*, adding up to the commonly encountered list of thirty-six *tattvas*. But what exactly is a *tattva* for the thinkers of the Trika?

In his *Tantrāloka* Abhinavagupta cites a definition from a dualist Saiddhāntika work, the *Mataṅgapārameśvara*, with approval.⁵¹ According to his interpretation, a

Brahman...] und wessen Dasein als des Einen, das aller Dinge Samen enthält, hier vielfältig unter der Gestalt von Genießer, zu Genießendem, und unter der Gestalt des Genusses auftritt,—”. With the notion of the Bhartṛhari's Brahman as the “holder of all seeds” (*sarvabījasya*: comms. *śaktyupagrāhyasya*, *bhinnasaktipracitasya* compare the Yogācāra *bīja*-theory, where the *ālayavijñāna* is said to be *sarvabījaka*, see KRAGH (2006:18, 304).

⁴⁹For these translations see WATSON (2006:62).

⁵⁰Sometimes also labelled as *aśuddhavidyā*, “impure knowledge”, to distinguish it from the higher *śuddhavidyā*, “pure knowledge”.

⁵¹Abhinavagupta has decided to endorse the view of the *Mataṅgapārameśvara* presumably not just because it accorded with his doctrinal agenda, but also because it was influential among his Saiddhāntika co-religionists. The scriptural layer of the Śaiva *Mantramārga* does not present an unanimous

tattva is “that which is recurrent (*anugāmin*) in all of the members of its class”.⁵² A *tattva* is therefore comparable to an universal, or a common property (*sāmānya*).⁵³

Śaiva scriptures arrange these *tattvas* into hierarchical lists: lower *tattvas* are said to be evolutes of higher *tattvas*. This evolution is explained as causation, the relationship between the *tattvas* in this hierarchical model is therefore one of cause and effect (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*): lower *tattvas* are caused by higher *tattvas*, resulting in a fixed order of creative progression (*śrṣṭi*). In view of the complex history of the rivalling streams of Śaiva revelation, such a claim to a firmly established order is beset with problems.⁵⁴ For Abhinavagupta this relationship is first of all affirmed by the scriptural authority of the *Siddhayogeśvarīmata*⁵⁵, the immediate precursor of the *Mālinīvijayottara*, the root scripture his *Tantrāloka* is based on.⁵⁶ This causation is however merely artificial (*kalpita*). From a strict *saṃvidadvaya* non-dualist point of view, Śiva is the only existing cause and agent, and Abhinavagupta therefore distinguishes the causal relationship into two types: an absolute causal relation (*pāramārthikah*) and an artificial one (*kalpitaḥ, śrṣṭaḥ*).⁵⁷ Absolute, or non-artificial causation is established by arguing that true agency (*kartrtva*) can only be grounded in autonomy (*svātantrya*).

TaĀI 9.8 (B₁ fol. 224^v. K₄ exp. 4, 6):
vastutaḥ sarvabhāvānām karteśānaḥ paraḥ śivah |
asvatantrasya kartrtvaṃ na hi jātūpapadyate ||

In reality, the agent of all phenomena is supreme Śiva, who is capable of acting (*iśānaḥ*),⁵⁸ for agency is completely impossible for someone

view of what a *tattva* is. For the exegetical traditions of the Trika that are of concern here, the situation is clearer: the *tattvakrama* is quite simply one of the six ontological paths.

⁵²*Tantrāloka* 10.2ab (B₁ fol. 268^v): *eṣām [em. SANDERSON; teṣām K_{ED}B₁] amīṣām tattvānām svavargeṣv anugāminām |*.

⁵³For a more detailed discussion of the various definitions of the Śaiva *tattvas* see VASUDEVA (2004:189–191). This understanding is also found in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* system, e.g. *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* 3.1.2 p. 192: *bhinnānām vargānām vargīkaraṇanimittaṃ yad ekam avibhaktam bhāti tat tattvaṃ, yathā girivṛkṣapuraprabhṛtīnām nadīsarahaṣāgarādīnām ca pṛthivīrūpatvaṃ abhūpatvaṃ ceti*, “That which is the efficient cause for the [conscious subject’s] collectivisation of distinct groups, [that which] appears as one, undivided, that is [defined as] *tattva*. As for example Earth and Water [respectively in the case] of mountains, trees, cities etc. and rivers, ponds and oceans.”

⁵⁴This relationship is argued for in TaĀI 9.7ff.(B₁ fol. 223^v) Jayaratha introduces the section with ...*kāryakāraṇabhāvātmā tattvānām pravibhāgo vaktavya[h]*, “The demarcation of the *tattvas*, which is based on the relationship of cause and effect, must be stated”.

⁵⁵See Törszök (1999).

⁵⁶*Tantrāloka* 9.7 (B₁ fol. 223^v): *tatraiṣām (tatraiṣām] K_{ED}, tatraiṣā B₁) darśyate drṣṭaḥ siddha (siddha] K_{ED}, siddh[e] B₁)yogīśvarīmate | kāryakāraṇabhāvo yaḥ śivecchāparikalpitaḥ ||*, “In this context is taught the relation of cause and effect, created by Śiva’s volition, of these [*tattvas*], as it is seen in the *Siddhayogeśvarīmata*.”

⁵⁷*Tantrasāra* 8.3–4: *tatraiṣām tattvānām kāryakāraṇabhāvo darśyate sa ca dvividhaḥ: pāramārthikah śrṣṭaś ca*. The *Tantrasāra* is a concise summary of his longer *Tantrāloka*.

⁵⁸For this sense of *iśāna* see *Mālinīvijayvārttika* 1. 173cd–174ab: *kriyāśakteḥ sphuṭaḥ sphāro māyātvaṃ pratipadyate || māyātattvasvarūpe hi śiveśānūti vakṣyate*. See SANDERSON (1992:300ff.) for a discussion of this term.

who is not autonomous.

This draws on the grammarian Pāṇini's definition⁵⁹ of the independent (*svatantra*) factor of action (*kāraka*) as the agent (*kartr*). This autonomy, moreover, is an exclusive property of Śiva who consists entirely of consciousness. It would be contradictory to claim that something could be autonomous and at the same time unconscious.⁶⁰ Without agency, Abhinavagupta claims, there can be no causality.⁶¹ These claims are defended against a Buddhist causal theory that draws on the Buddhist Śāṅkaranandana's *Dharmālaṅkāra*.

Another important claim also derives from the Trika's non-dualism. The autonomous agent Śiva, as the only reality existing at the level of absolute causation, must also himself be the manifestation of the hierarchy of *tattvas*.

Tantrasāra 8.3–4: *tatra pāramārthika etāvān kāryakāraṇabhāvo yad uta karṭṛsvabhāvasya svatantrasya bhagavata evaṃvidhena śivādidharāntena vapuṣā svarūpabhinnena svarūpaviśrāntena ca prathanam |*

Among those [two types of causation] the absolute causal relation is such that it is a manifestation (*prathanam*) of the autonomous Lord, whose intrinsic nature is agency (*karṭṛtva*), with such a body [in the form of the *tattvas*] beginning with [the principles of] Śiva and ending with Earth, [a body that is] different from his own form, but that rests in his true form.

We may summarize the situation that the ordinary, transmigrating self, also known as the *sakala*, finds itself in as follows. Believing himself to be an agent, bound by the three defilements (*mala*) that are forms of foundational ignorance about the self's true status, consuming karmic retribution as an experiencer (*bhoktr*), the self perceives, as a *pramātr*, the twentyfour lower constituents of the hierarchical ontology of the *tattvas* from earth upto primal matter (*prakṛti*).⁶² This limited self, or *puruṣa*, moreover, is constituted by the twentyfifth *tattva* when it is enveloped and inhibited by the next five *tattvas*, the cuirasses (*kañcuka*) mentioned above. The order in which these come into existence is subject to disagreement in the revealed Tantras Abhinavagupta and his followers accept as authoritative. As a consequence, since Abhinavagupta insists that the divinely revealed scriptures must all be literally true, he heuristically gives up on causation as an absolutely stable or invariable phenomenon. The Trika can therefore be said to adhere

⁵⁹ *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.4.54: *svatantraḥ kartā*.

⁶⁰ *TaĀl* 9.9, B₁ 335', K₄ exp. 6: *svatantratā ca cinmātravapuṣaḥ paramēśituḥ | svatantram ca jadaṃ ceti tad anyonyam (anyonyam)] K_{ED}K₄ anyonyam{ca} B₁ virudhyate || Jayaratha comments: svātantryam hi svaprakāśatvam ucyate jāḍyam ca paraprakāśyatvam ucyate na cānayos tādātmyam saṃsargo vā bhaved ity uktam tad anyonyam virudhyata iti |*

⁶¹ *TaĀl* 9.10cd, B₁ 335', K₄ exp. 6: *na karṭṛtvād rite cānyat kāraṇatvam hi labhyate ||*, "Apart from agency no other kind of causality can be obtained".

⁶² See VASUDEVA (2004:192–196).

to a doctrine of indeterminate cause, **aniyatahetuvāda*. This means that the different sequences of evolution can all be equally true. Kṣemarāja justifies this breakdown of causality by appealing to the inherent relation of experiencer and experienced (*bhoktr-bhogyā*) that subsists between the self and the world.⁶³

Svacchandatanroddyota 11.63cd–64ab ...*kañcukapañcakavalitāḥ pu-
māṃso bhoktāro bhogyasāmānyarūpā ca prakṛtir yugapad eva māyā-
taḥ sambhūtā bhoktrbhogyayoḥ parasparāpekṣitvād ato 'tra kalādī-
nām yugapad eva tasmād iti māyātattvād udbhava uktaḥ.*

Souls enveloped by the pentad of cuirasses become experiencers, and, at the very same moment, primal matter, in the form of a generic thing to be experienced, arises from Māyā, because an experiencer and a thing to be experienced mutually presuppose each other. Therefore it is stated [in this Tantra, that the cuirasses] headed by *kalā* arise simultaneously from Māyā.

Some selves engage in limited knowing while being tinged by limited desire (*ra-
jyan vetti*), others are tinged by limited desire while they engage in limited know-
ing (*vidan rajyati*), and as a consequence they imagine the hierarchical position of
these two cuirasses to be different.⁶⁴

Limited selves can, moreover, perceive each others' bodies and intuit, but not
perceive, each others' sentiency. That is not to say that the limited *sakala* soul
cannot be perceived (as an object). It can, but not by another *sakala*. Instead, it
can be perceived by a different kind of perceiver, the *pralayākala*, who in turn is
perceptible as an object to the *viññānākala*, and so on to a depth of seven grades.
This constitutes the sevenfold apperceptive *pramātrbheda* phenomenology of the
Trika that is present in every simple cognition.

4 The Experiencer as Perceiver

The Śaiva agentive experiencer is not helplessly stuck in this hierarchical *tattvakra-
ma* by his subjection to karma. He can actively ascend, either by having his past and
future karmic fruition destroyed by Śaiva mantras in the ritual of initiation (*dīkṣā*),
or by practising the conquest of the reality levels (*tattvajaya*) to master these *tattvas*,
one by one, employing the techniques of Śaiva *Ṣaḍaṅgayoga*.⁶⁵ Different views on
what this ascent means can be found in the various Śaiva scriptures. For Abhina-
vaguṇḍa, following the homologues set out in the *vyāpti* section of the *Mālinīvijā-
yottaratantra*, the relative hierarchical position of the agentive experiencer *vis-ā-
vis* the *tattvakrama* is determined by the class of object he can perceive, and, in
turn, it determines the type of perceiver he is.

⁶³For this relation see especially *Spandakārikā* 29 with the *Vivṛti* commentary.

⁶⁴*Svacchandatanroddyota* 11.63cd–64ab: ...*kaś cid rajyan vetti kaścic ca vidan rajyatītyādiḥ
puṃsām vicitrāpratītikramānusārī kañcukakramo 'nyathānyathā ca sambhāvyaṭe.*

⁶⁵For more detailed account see VASUDEVA (2004:145ff.)

The innovation of a phenomenological perspective reorients the Trika's contemplative or yogic ascent; the lengthy and time-consuming surmounting of levels taught in the dualist Śaivasiddhānta is rejected as an inferior path. Instead of insisting on a gradual ascent along the hierarchy of the *tattvas* that requires the yogin to master each level in turn through introsusception (*samāpatti*) and then transcend it with yogic judgment (*tarka*)—the most important ancillary (*aṅga*) of Śaiva yoga,—the *Mālinīvijayottara* teaches an oblique trajectory through a fifteenfold refraction of reality by seven levels of hierarchically stacked, subjective perceivers (*pramātr*). The seven progressively less pure types of apperceptive perceivers (*saptapramātr*) are [1.] *śiva*, [2.] *mantramaheśvara*, the sovereigns of *mantra* lords [3.] *mantrēśvara*, the *mantra* lords, [4.] *mantra*, [5.] *viññānākala*, those freed from limitation by [remaining only as] consciousness, [6.] *pralayākala*, those freed from limitation by dissolution, [7.] *sakala*, the limited perceiver.⁶⁶ Each one of these forms of witnessing awareness possesses a faculty, a *śakti*, that when active functions as the instrument with which the perceiver is capable of perception. Every perceiver acts as a transcendental subject of the objectivised level immediately below his own. If we add to these fourteen factors (i.e. seven cognisers and seven cognitive powers) also the purely objective level at which things can exist in their own-form (*svarūpa*), we arrive at fifteen refractions (*pañcadaśabheda*) that are present in every ordinary cognition. In Abhinavagupta's non-dualism of consciousness the inert own form must also be a form of consciousness. It differs from the *sakala* experiencers because they possess a much greater degree of self-awareness, something lacking at the level of the quasi-inert own-form, but even this most extrinsic object must be minimally self-aware.⁶⁷

If a *sakala* manages, through yogic or gnostic efforts, to apperceive the self which is perceiving an external thing, he thereby ascends to become the next type of perceiver, the *pralayākala*. If such a perceiver is in turn made into an object of apperception, then the next level of being a *viññānākala* is attained. This process continues, in a reductive series, to the extent of seven apperceivers. At each stage there is only ever one triad of perceiver, perception, and perceived, since the lower perceivers are folded into the own-form, becoming in turn the next thing perceived.

The energies of these seven perceivers are explained as a gradual diminishing and eventual falling away of the limited power of action (*kalā*) and the limited power of knowing (*[aśuddha]vidyā*), which are two of the cuirasses (*kañcuka*) that hinder the soul, and their gradual replacement with *śuddhavidyā*, pure knowledge.⁶⁸

What relation do these types of perceiverhood bear to the self's enjoyerhood?

To explain this, Śaiva exegetes base themselves on the scriptural teaching that the self's experience (*bhoga*) is a type of knowing,⁶⁹ an idea that is not in origin

⁶⁶ *Mālinīvijayottara* 1.14c–17b.

⁶⁷ TaĀI 10.9cd–12ab.

⁶⁸ TaĀI 4.34cd (omitted B₁ fol. 84^v, om. B₂ fol. 37^v): *sattarkaḥ śuddhavidyaiva sã cecchã paramēśituh*, “Correct judgement (*sattarka*) is pure knowledge, and that is the volitional power of God.”

⁶⁹ *Pauṣkarapārameśvara* JP 4.132c: *yato jñānātmako bhogo...*; *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṃgraha* 1.12: *bhogo śya vedanā pumsaḥ sukhaduḥkhādilakṣaṇā | tāṃ samarthitacaitanyaḥ pumān abhyeti karma-*

PERCEIVER (<i>pramātr</i>)	INSTRUMENT OF PERCEPTION (<i>pramātrśakti</i>)	DEFILEMENT (<i>mala</i>)	EXPERIENCER (<i>bhoktrva</i>)	EXPERIENCE	LUCIDITY OF EXPERIENCE
1. Sakala [earth → <i>prakṛti</i>]	<i>vidyā</i> (limited knowing) <i>kalā</i> (limited power of action)	<i>āṇava</i> , <i>kāma</i> , <i>māyā</i>	<i>vipēkabhoktr</i> & <i>viśvabhoktr</i>	vivid, stable, & continuous	waking (<i>jāgrat</i>)
2. Pralayākala [<i>māyāvatva</i>]	<i>vidyā</i> and <i>kalā</i> indistinct	<i>āṇava</i> , <i>kāma</i>	<i>bhogavyogvatā</i>	not vivid, unstable & discontinuous	dreaming (<i>svapna</i>)
3. Vijñānakala [<i>mahāmāyāvatva</i>]	<i>vidyā</i> and <i>kalā</i> fading	<i>āṇava</i>	<i>bhogavyogvatā</i>	totally insensate	deep sleep (<i>susupti</i>)
4. Mantra [<i>śuddhavidyāvatva</i>]	<i>śuddhavidyā</i> emergent, <i>vidyā</i> and <i>kalā</i> latent	○ (<i>adhikāra</i>)	<i>sphuṭabheda</i> , <i>pranāḍhābheda</i>	discontinuation of separation	fourth state (<i>turya</i>)
5. Mantrēsa [<i>īśvaravatva</i>]	<i>śuddhavidyā</i> emergent, latency of <i>vidyā</i> and <i>kalā</i> latent	○ (<i>adhikāra</i>)	<i>sphuṭabheda</i> , <i>apranāḍhābheda</i>	discontinuation of separation	fourth state (<i>turya</i>)
6. Mantramahēsa [<i>sadāśivavatva</i>]	<i>śuddhavidyā</i> emergent, latency of <i>vidyā</i> and <i>kalā</i> absent	○ (<i>adhikāra</i>)	<i>asphuṭabheda</i> , <i>apranāḍhābheda</i>	discontinuation of separation	fourth state (<i>turya</i>)
7. Śiva [<i>śivavatva</i>]	<i>icchāśakti</i> , volitional power	○	universal <i>viśvabhoktr</i>	identical with Śiva	beyond the fourth (<i>turyātā</i>)

Table 2: The *pramātrbheda*

exclusive to Śaivism.⁷⁰ Already the earliest dualist Śaivas must therefore defend the claim that the status of being an experiencer (*bhokṛtva*) is essentially the same as the status of being a knower (*jñāṛtva*).⁷¹ It follows that all of the types of perceivers, merely by virtue of their being knowers, can also be accepted as experiencers. This raises two questions. Firstly, what is the nature of the experience that the various perceivers are subject to? Secondly, the *pralayākalas* and the *vi-jñānākalas* are by definition unaware of external objects. How can they be admitted as experiencers, since they do not even seem to be proper perceivers in the first place?

The *sakala* perceiver, bound by all three defilements, can unquestioningly be accepted as a consumer of karmic retribution. For non-dualist Trika theorists his *bhokṛtva* can be considered real to the extent that the individual, limited self (*aṇu*) is itself real. The reality of the individual self is merely a contraction of the singular, universal self that is Bhairava. This universal self is therefore the only absolutely real experiencer of the hierarchy of the reality levels that constitute the universe as the *bhogyā* which is itself an embodiment of Bhairava.⁷² Bhairava, however, evidently cannot be the experiencer of the three defilements (*mala*), since these are not *tattvas* but merely forms of ignorance specific to the limited self. The *sakala* perceiver's *bhokṛtva* is dependent on the functioning of the defilement of karma (*kārmamala*), he can rise to the status of being a perceiver beyond the level of the *pralayākala* only once he has been freed from it. To guarantee that ordinary Śaiva initiates, who practise neither yoga nor gnosis, will be liberated after death, this karmic defilement needs to be destroyed. In the ritual of Śaiva initiation a relinquishing of the state of being a *bhokṛ* in all future births and on all levels of the universe is therefore effected by an intervention called the disjunction (*viśleṣa*).⁷³

taḥ ||

⁷⁰The *Yogasūtra* 3.35 teaches similarly that *bhoga* is the non-discernment of *sattva* and *puruṣa*.

⁷¹See also, e.g., *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* of Rāmakaṇṭha 5: *bhokṛtvaṃ hi jñāṛtvaṃ ucyate tad eva ca pāramāṛthikam ātmano rūpaṃ...*

⁷²*Svacchandatanroddyota* 4.96ab (Note here the intertextuality with Śivopādhyāya's commentary to the *Vijñānabhairava* 56): *evaṃ caikaiko 'pi pramāṛ bhāvo vā vastutaḥ ṣaḍadhvasphārarūpapārameśasaktimayādihāntaparāmarśasārāhaṃtāviśrāntisatattvaḥ parabhairavarūpa eva*, "In this way, each and every perceiver or thing is in reality only supreme Bhairava, whose nature is repose in I-ness which is the essence of the *parāmarśa* of the syllabary beginning with 'a' and ending with 'ha' which itself is constituted by the power of the supreme Lord who has extended himself into the six [ontological] paths." Here the expression *ādihānta* (*a+ādi+ha+anta*), lit. "the phonemes from 'a' to 'ha'", is here a variation on *ādikṣānta*, "the phonemes from 'a' to 'kṣa'", and designates *māṛkā*, cf. *Svacchandatanroddyota* 1.31cd: *māṛkāṃ paśūnāṃ ajñātāṃ (em. ajñānāṃ P_{ED}) viśvamātarāṃ sarvamantratanrajanānīm ādikṣāntām iti*. On *māṛkā* as the 'unkown mother' see VASUDEVA (2004:1–1ii). See also *Paramāṛthasāra* 5: *tatrāntar viśvam idaṃ vicitratanukaraṇabhuvanasantānam | bhokṛtā ca tatra dehī śiva eva grhītapaśubhāvaḥ ||*

⁷³For a concise account see NeTaUdd 4.5cd–6ab, see especially: *...samāpteṣu bhogeṣu bhokṛtvā-bhāvarūpaṃ viśleṣākhyam saṃskāraṃ kṛtvā...* See also *Siddhāntasārapaddhati* (ed. SANDERSON) A fol. 23r2–25v3, B fol. 31v3--34v2: *bhogābhāve māyāpāśād bahirniṣkramaṇarūpaṃ viśleṣaṃ saṃbhāvya...*

Since Śiva, as the highest experiencer, lacks the defilement that renders the individual subject to karmic retribution, we cannot consider him to be an enjoyer of this kind. Nevertheless, he is accorded the attribute *bhoktr* both in early scriptural sources, e.g. in the *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṃgraha*,⁷⁴ and in early exegesis, e.g. in the *Śivasūtra*,⁷⁵ or in the *Spandakārikā*.⁷⁶ The Saiddhāntika author Aghoraśiva, when commenting on such a scriptural passage, avoids potential doctrinal incoherence by glossing *bhoktr* as a synonym for “protector” (*rakṣaka*) in these contexts. This interpretation is based on one of the two possible meanings of the root *bhuj* given at *Dhātupāṭha* 7.17: *bhuja pālanābhyavahārayoḥ*.⁷⁷ Elsewhere he cites the *Parā-khyatantra* which states that Śiva’s enjoyerhood is merely a figurative usage.⁷⁸ The *Parā-khyatantra*, however, does not belong to the earliest phase of the Śaivasiddhānta, and earlier commentators of this tradition do not recourse to this justification.

Non-dualist authors, on the other hand, are not compelled to adopt this strategy. In their metaphysics, the whole of existence can be explained as the bodily self-experience of Śiva who is simultaneously both the embodied universe and also its experiencer. In the *Svacchandatantra* as interpreted by Kṣemarāja, for example, Śiva’s bipolar manifestation is inscribed iconographically in a visualisation of Umāpati who represents both the universe as the object of enjoyment, and who is simultaneously also the enjoyer of the universe. The left half of his body is the enjoyed (for *vāma* also means “agreeable”, Kṣemarāja: *aśeṣabhogyopabhogātmata-yā vāmam ardham*) and the right side of his body is the enjoyer.⁷⁹

In this way both the lowest *sakala* perceiver and the highest Śiva perceiver can both be considered experiencers, albeit of different kinds. But what about the other perceivers, most of which also exist beyond the defilement of *kārmamala* but lack the universality of Śiva?

Since, as we have seen, the Śaivas claim that experiencers are knowers, it is

⁷⁴ *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṃgraha* 18.38: *śivo dātā śivo bhoktā śivaḥ sarvam idaṃ jagat | śivo yajati sarvatra yaḥ śivaḥ so 'ham eva tu ||*

⁷⁵ *Śivasūtra* 1.11: *tritayabhoktā vīreśaḥ*.

⁷⁶ E.g. *Spandakārikā* 29: *tena śabdārthacintāsu na sāvasthā na yā śivaḥ | bhoktaiva bhogyabhāve-na sadā sarvatra saṃsthītaḥ || Vivṛti: sāvasthā nāsti yā śivamayī na bhavati, tataś ca bhoktaiva īśva-ro bhogyabhāvena tītatavyavasturūpatayā sadā sarvatra saṃsthītaḥ*.

⁷⁷ *Mrgendrapaddhatiṭkā* of Aghoraśiva IFP transcript no. T 1021 p. 145: *śivo bhoktaiva sarveṣāṃ rakṣakaḥ | bhokteti bhujīḥ pālana eva vartate*.

⁷⁸ *Parā-khyatantra* 2.99ab: *adhikārī sa bhogī ca layī syād upacārataḥ*. See e.g. Aghoraśiva ad *Ratnatrayaparīkṣā* 30: *tasya cādhikārādayo 'vasthā aupacārikā ity uktam—adhikārī sa bhogī ca la-yī syād upacārataḥ iti |*

⁷⁹ *Svacchandatantrodyota* 10.1009ab (Ś_{BE} 237^v, Ś₁ 309^f): *tasya ca bhagavato viśvabhoktuḥ—*
2 ***bhogasthānam samastam vai tatrastham vāmbhāgataḥ | vāmbhāgato vāmaṃ dehārdham***
āśṛitya tatraiva sthītam samastam bhogasthānam aśeṣabhogyopabhogātmata-yā vāmam ar-
4 *dham, dakṣiṇam tu bhoktrrūpam evārdham | evaṃ ca bhoktrbhogātmakaviśvaśarīro 'yaṃ bha-*
gavān ata eva sahasrabāhucaraṇādirūpaḥ ||

2 *samastam*] K_{ED}, *samaste* Ś_{BE} Ś₁ 2 *vāmaṃ*] K_{ED} Ś₁, *vāma*° Ś_{BE} 4 *bhoktrrūpam*] K_{ED} Ś_{BE},
bhoktrrūpam Ś₁ 4 *evārdham*] *conj.*, *eva* K_{ED}, *evārtham* Ś_{BE} Ś₁ 4 °*bhogātmaka*°] K_{ED} Ś₁,
°*bhogātmaka*° Ś_{BE}

evident that the higher perceivers must also enjoy some kind of experience. Abhinavagupta therefore discusses its nature several times. In the context of elaborating the phases of lucidity, he proposes that the hierarchical position of the perceivers is linked to the clarity and vividness of their experience:

When, for an [ordinary *sakala*] experiencer [1.] the form is vivid, stable and continuous, that is the waking state, for that same experiencer [2.] its opposite is dreaming, which is the experience of the *pralayākala*, [3.] total unawareness is deep sleep, which is the experience of the *viññānākala*, [4.] the process of ceasing to differentiate [one-self] from the object of experience, which is the fourth state, is the experience of the *mantra* etc., [5.] the experience of things as non-different from Śiva is the state beyond the fourth, which is all-transcending.⁸⁰

To the three perceivers in the white universe Abhinavagupta assigns the kind of experience one has in the fourth state of lucidity (*turya*). More specifically, for the Trika, these three levels of experiencerhood involve a balancing and gradual equation of subjectivity and objectivity, which when completed results in the attainment of the highest level of the *śivapramātr* (see VASUDEVA 2011:294–297).

The special problem posed by the *pralayākala* and the *viññānākala* perceivers is treated separately. As we have seen, in neither of these two phases of perceiverhood is the self capable of directly cognising objects in the universe. The *pralayākala* is still bound by *kārmamala* and therefore potentially a *bhoktr* of a kind comparable to the *sakala* soul, but *viññānākala* perceivers, on the other hand, should not be agentive experiencers of this kind, since for them this defilement is lacking.⁸¹ To solve this problem, both of these higher perceivers are, as a pair, accorded a special deferred status of agentive experiencers. Abhinavagupta raises this problem in the context of a defense of the idea that the status of being a cognisable object (*vedyatā*, lit. to-be-known-ness) is a property of objects (*bhāvadharma*):

Tantrāloka[*viveka*] 10.132cd–133ab (B₁ fol. 276^r, K₈ exp. 54):

- 2 ***nanv asti vedyatā bhāvadharmaḥ kiṃ tu layākalau ||***
 manvāte neha vai kiṃcit tadapekṣā tv asau katham |
 4 *pralayākalaviññānākalau hi prasuptabhujagaśūnyasamādhisthayogi-*
 prāyatvān na kiṃcij jānīta iti tayor veditr̥tvam eva nāstīty āścaryaṃ ta-
 6 *dapekṣāpi kathamkāraṃ vedyatā bhāvadharmaḥ syāt.*

4 °bhujaga°] K_{ED}K₈, °bhujā° B₁ 5 tayor] K_{ED}, om. B₁K₈ 6 °apekṣāpi] B₁K₈, °apekṣayāpi K_{ED}

⁸⁰*Tantrasāra* 9.51: *kiṃ ca yasya yad yadā rūpaṃ sphuṭaṃ sthiram anubandhi taj jāgrat, tasyai-va tadviparyayaḥ svapnaḥ yaḥ layākalasya bhogaḥ, sarvavedanaṃ suṣuptaṃ yo viññānākalasya bhogaḥ, bhogyābhinnīkaraṇaṃ turyaṃ mantrādīnāṃ, sa bhogaḥ bhāvānāṃ śivābhedaḥ turyātītaṃ sarvātītaṃ.*

⁸¹See *Mālinīvijayottara* 1.22cd–24ab.

Let us admit [then] that to-be-known-ness is a property of objects. But the *pralayākala* and the *vijñānākala* perceive nothing in the universe, how could it (to-be known-ness) be dependent on their perceiverhood?⁸² The *pralayākalas* and the *vijñānākalas* are more or less like yogins in a void-trance, they are like sleeping serpents. Because of this they do not know anything, and as a consequence these two cannot possess perceiverhood. Therefore it is strange, that a to-be-known-ness (*vedyatā*), depending on their perceiverhood (*tadapekṣā*), somehow should be a property of objects?

He responds by claiming that their experience is constituted by their *bhogayogyatā*, or competence for experience. *Yogyatā* literally designates a sort of suitability, congruity or propriety, and various translations are current for different contexts.⁸³ I have translated it here in a more narrow śāstric sense as competence because Abhinavagupta interprets it here as a not yet activated, latent capacity, that is, as a synonym of *śakti*.⁸⁴

The idea of *bhokṛtva* as *bhogayogyatā* is not unique to the Trika. GOODALL (1998:262–263) has shown that the dualist Saiddhāntika author Rāmakaṇṭha discusses two types of *bhokṛtva*: [1.] a specific form that is the “state of having a taste only for enjoyment” (*bhogaikarasikatva*) that derives from passion (*rāga* or *moha*), and [2.] a generic type that is a “fitness for experience” (*bhogayogyatva*) that occurs in the *pralayākala*.⁸⁵

Abhinavagupta’s understanding of *yogyatā* can be seen already in the *Vākyapadīya*. For Bhartṛhari *yogyatā*, restricted by actual utterance (*abhidhā* = *vinīyoga*),⁸⁶ is the relation between word and meaning.⁸⁷ OGAWA (1997) has demonstrated

⁸²Jayaratha: *tad* ≈ *tayor vedīrtvam*.

⁸³See, for example, RENO (1944:66): « application virtuelle, conditions propres à une application »; RAU 1977: “Angepasstheit”; OBERHAMMER 1991: “Eignung”, etc.

⁸⁴For *yogyatā* as *śakti* see OGAWA (1997). See also TILLEMANS (1997:164): “Perhaps certain Mīmāṃsaka currents of the time had themselves made a rapprochement between *śakti* and *yogyatā*.”

⁸⁵Cf. *Kīraṇatantra* 3.2ab: ***bhokṛtvaṃ nāma yat proktam anādi malakāraṇam*** | *Vṛtti: yad etad bhokṛtvaṃ asmābhiḥ prāguktam tad anādi | yato malakāraṇam uktaṃ tato malasyānāditvāt tad apy anādi | etad uktaṃ bhavati—anyad evāsmān mohajanitād bhokṛtvād bhogayogyatvalakṣaṇam etad bhokṛtvaṃ | pralayākale vidyate na tu vijñānakevale karmābhāvāt | tasya karmavanmalo ’pi kāraṇam pariṇatamalasya pralayākalasyāpi parameśvarānugrāhyatvān na tat sambhavati yataḥ | (cf. Goodall & co. (2008:372)).* See also Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha commenting on *Mṛgendratāntra* 8.88: ***yogyatā bhogayogyatā tu vayahkālādi deśakālavayovasthādyupalakṣitam arhatvam***.

⁸⁶Cf. *Vākyapadīya* 2.405, OGAWA (1997:508) translates as follows: *kriyāvvyavetaḥ sambandho dṛṣṭaḥ karaṇakarmaṇoḥ | abhidhāniyamas tasmād abhidhānābhidheyayoḥ* ||, “The relation between instrument (*karaṇa*) and object (*karman*) is observed to obtain through action. Therefore [the relation between] *abhidhāna* (i.e., *śabda*) and *abhidheya* (i.e., *artha*) is restricted through [the action of] *abhidhā*.” RAU: “Man sieht, dass das Verbum mitten in der Verbindung von Werkzeug und Objekt steht. Das Aussprechen ist daher die genauere Bestimmung von Wort und Bedeutung.”

⁸⁷*Vākyapadīya* 3.3.29: *indriyāṇām svaviṣayeṣv anādir yogyatā yathā | anādir arthaiḥ sabdānām sambandho yogyatā tathā* || RAU: “Wie die Sinnesorgane eine anfangslose Angepasstheit an ihre [je weiligen] Sinnesobjekte besitzen, so ist die anfangslose Verbindung der Wörter mit [ihren] Bedeutungen eine Angepasstheit.”

that Bhartṛhari's conception of *yogyatā* was originally formed in the context of the *kāraka* theory. A word (*abhidhāna* = instrument relative to *abhidhā*) and its meaning (*abhidheya* = object relative to *abhidhā*) are related to each other by the action of *abhidhā* (*Vākyapadīya* 2.405). Since Bhartṛhari takes word and meaning as instrument and object, he also presupposes the participation of an agent, an *abhidhātṛ*. This role is fulfilled, as OGAWA (1997:507) notes, by the verb, since a verb is treated as the agent (*karṭṛ*). The speaker, on the other hand, is responsible for the activating utterance that orients a word towards a particular meaning, an activity designated by terms such as *praṇidhi* and *vinīyoga* and explained as *pravaṇīkaraṇa*, *ukti*, *abhisamdhāna*.

Abhinavagupta similarly considers the *pralayākala* and the *vijñānākala* to possess an intrinsic relation with the object of cognition through *yogyatā*: the objects are suited to a future cognition by the awakened *pralayākala* or *vijñānākala* experiencer. What is lacking in the present moment is a cognitive activation by the agent (*karṭṛvinīyoga*), that is, the experiencer is not currently—because of a trance-like cognitive dormancy—directing or applying his cognitive faculty towards the object, and therefore no cognition is taking place. But just as the grammarians admit that something might function as a cause based on mere potentiality (*yogyamātratā*),⁸⁸ so also Abhinavagupta accepts a potentiality for *bhoga*, actualised only in the future, as a sufficient reason to categorise the *pralayākala* and the *vijñānākala* perceivers as experiencers. For the *pralayākala* and the *vijñānākala*, objective reality will, at the moment of their awakening, attain the status of being actually cognisable (*prakarṣeṇa vedyatām yāsyati*), whereas currently, in their stupor, it possesses this status merely by fitness (*yogyatāmātreṇa vedyatām yāsyati*).⁸⁹

Abhinavagupta's claim is motivated only in part by his need to establish cognitive closure by exhausting the function of each type of perceiver in the Trika's *pramātrbheda*, for it also follows from the Trika's *saṃvidadvaya* view that even apparently insentient things are really conscious. There is therefore no reason to deny that even these two beings possess at least nominally a certain kind of knowing and experiencing. Abhinavagupta attributes to them a deferred condition of knowing and agentive experience, a condition that, although it is oriented to a future event, can affect their status in the present. All *pralayākalas* and the *vijñānākalas* will at some point invariably be awakened by Śiva from the stupor that isolates them, they are classified as *bhotsyamāna-*, “to be awakened”.⁹⁰ They will then be assigned roles as either limited *sakala* souls or as *mantras*, *mantrésvaras* or *mantramahésvaras*.⁹¹ This is, incidentally, their only chance for liberation, for in their isolation they are stuck, and are unable to either ascend or descend on their own. Let us consider as a final passage Abhinavagupta's argu-

⁸⁸See OGAWA (1997:505).

⁸⁹*Tantrāloka*viveka 10.140cd–145ab: *etasya layākalāder etad bhāvajātam svabodhāvasare prakarṣeṇa na tv idānīm iva yogyatāmātreṇa vedyatām yāsyati...*

⁹⁰TaĀI 10.133cd–134.

⁹¹TaĀI 10.135ab.

ment that intends to make this plausible by introducing a parallel scenario that is experientially verifiable:

- Tantrāloka* 10.140cd–145ab (B₁ fol. 277^r, K₄ fol. °11^{rv} exp. 92, 93):
ataḥ prabhotsyamānatve yānayoḥ bodhayogyatā || 140
 3 *tadbalād vedyatāyogyabhāvenaivātra vedyatā* |
tathā hi gāḍhanidre 'pi priye 'nāśaṅkitāgatām || 141
mām draḅṣyatīti nāṅgeṣu sveṣu māty abhisārikā |
 6 *evaṃ śivo 'pi manute etasyaitatpravedyatām* || 142
yāsyatīti sṛjāmīti tadānīm yogyataiva sā |
vedyatā tasya bhāvasya bhokṛtā tāvatī ca sā || 143
 9 *layākalasya citro hi bhogaḥ kena vikalpyate* |
yathā yathā hi saṃvittiḥ sa hi bhogaḥ sphuṭo 'sphuṭaḥ || 144
smṛtiyogyo 'py anyathā vā bhogyabhāvaṃ na tūjjhati |

Therefore, because their status is one of beings to be awakened [from their trance in the future], these two possess a competence for knowing. In their case, the status of being a cognisable object is [admitted as a property of objects as] a result of a fitness for the status of being a cognisable object based on that [competence for knowing].⁹² To give an example: A woman who is keeping a rendez-vous with her lover, even though her lover is [still] fast asleep, can barely contain herself [thinking]: “He will see me who has arrived unexpectedly!” In the same way, Śiva also thinks: “This will be known by him, therefore I create [it]”.⁹³ At that moment,⁹⁴ the status of being cognisable is simply fitness,⁹⁵ and the experienterhood of the object is of the same kind,⁹⁶ for who can fathom the strange experience of the *pralayākala* and the *viññānākala*? To whatever extent there is awareness, to that extent there is experience, [whether it be] vivid, not vivid, suitable for memory, or otherwise, but [irrespective of these attributes] it does lose not its status of being the thing-to-be-experienced.⁹⁷

⁹²Jayaratha *ad loc.*: *ataḥ samanantaroktān nyāyād anayoḥ pralayākalavijñānākalayoḥ prabhotsyamānatve prabubhutsudaśāyām, samanantaram eva veditṛtvasyāvaśyam abhivyakter, yā bodhe yogyatā pātratvaṃ tadapekṣayā ca yogyatārūpataiva vedyatāpi dharādau sambhavaṭīti ko nāmātra viḡhaṭānāvakaśaḥ* ||.

⁹³Jayaratha *ad loc.*: *etasya layākalāder etad bhāvajātaṃ svabodhāvasare prakarṣeṇa na tv idānīm iva yogyatāmātreṇa vedyatām yāsyatīty ato hetor grāhyagrahakarūpatayā parasparānūrūpaṃ yugalam idaṃ nirṃṇomīty evaṃ bhagavāñ chivo 'pi parāmrśatīti* |

⁹⁴In the state of being a Pralayākala or Viññānākala, Jayaratha *ad loc.*: *tadānīm pralayākalādyavasthāyām.*

⁹⁵Jayaratha *ad loc.*: *yogyatayaiva vedyatā bhāvadharmā ity arthaḥ* |

⁹⁶I.e. a mere fitness, or competence. Jayaratha *ad loc.*: *tāvatīti sukhaduḡkhādyanubhavarūpapra-rohāvasthāvilakṣaṇayogyatāmātrarūpaivety arthaḥ* |

⁹⁷Jayaratha *ad loc.*: *citro hītyādi* | *bhogo hi deśakālāvasthāsvālakṣaṇyādivaicitryeṇa nānāvidho bhokṛtīṇām vyavatiṣṭhate yathā sphuṭa eva sukhaduḡkhādyanubhavo bhoga iti na niyantum ucitam*

In this way, the actual experience of the *pralayākala* and the *viññānākala* perceivers is removed from their current state of being by two degrees. Firstly, they are experiencers only in the remote sense that they possess fitness for experience. But secondly, this fitness is itself contingent on their eventual awakening. In their current trance state, however, they only possess a fitness to be awakened. Therefore their fitness to experience depends on their fitness to be awakened. Abhinavagupta does admit that he considers the experience of the two higher experiencers counter-intuitive or strange (*citraḥ*). Jayaratha even calls the claim that experiencerhood could depend on a future contact with experience unprecedented.⁹⁸ Surely we do not commonly call a child an old man simply because at some future time he will be old?⁹⁹

Abhinavagupta therefore extends the scope of his simile to demonstrate that ordinary language usage does endorse the varieties of experience he has posited.

Tantrāloka 10.145cd–147ab (B₁ fol. 277^r, K₄ fol. °11^r exp. 92, 93):

gāḍhanidrāvīmūḍho 'pi kāntāliṅgitavigrahaḥ ||

- 3 *bhoktaiva bhanyate so 'pi manute bhokṛtām purā |*
utprekṣāmātrahīno 'pi kāṃ cit kulavadhūṃ puraḥ ||
sambhokṣyamāṇām drṣṭvaiva rabhasād yāti saṃmadam |
 6 *tām eva drṣṭvā ca tadā samānāśayabhāg api*
anyas tathā na saṃvitte kam atropalabhāmahe |

3 *bhokṛtām*] K_{ED}K₄ *bhokṛtā* B₁

Someone who is unconscious in deep sleep, his body embraced by his beloved, is still called an enjoyer (*bhokṛt*), and he himself [when awakened] considers it a past enjoyerhood.¹⁰⁰ Even someone lacking bare imagination (or expectation),¹⁰¹ just at the sight of an ele-

asphuṭe 'pi tathābhāvāt | evaṃ bhāvītāyām asphuṭatare 'pi yogyatāmātreṇa bhaved eva bhogavyavahāras tattadbhoktraucityena tathā tathā bhogopapatteḥ ||

⁹⁸Jayaratha *ad loc*: *nanu kim idam apūrvaṃ paribhāṣyate bhāvibhogasambandhanibandhanā bhokṛteti |*

⁹⁹Jayaratha *ad loc*: *na hi bhāvanāsthavirabhāvena bālo 'pi sthavira ity anupacaritaṃ yuyate vaktum iti.*

¹⁰⁰Jayaratha *ad loc*: *na kevalaṃ mūḍhadaśāyām eva yogyatāmātreṇa bhokṛtḥbhogyatā (bhokṛtḥbhogyatā] B₁K₄ ac, bhokṛtḥbhogyabhāvo K_{ED}K₄ pc) bhaved yāvad amūḍhadaśāyām apīty (apīty] K_{ED}K₄ pc, ity B₁K₄ ac) āha—, “The relation of enjoyer-enjoyed can arise through mere fitness not just in an unconscious state, but even in a conscious state. Therefore he says—”*

¹⁰¹GNOLI comments that the expression *utprekṣāmātrahīno 'pi* appears to be the opposite of what is expected here. GNOLI (1992:258) fn. 5: “Invece di *-hīno 'pi* ci si aspetta, nel primo pāda, una qualche parola dal significato esattamente contrario: e così traduco.” Therefore he translates: “Taluno, giovandosi della sua fantasia e nulla di più, al solo vedere una bella donna pensa al suo futuro possesso e diventa d’un subito ebbro di gioia.” We could produce this sense by emending to something like *utprekṣāmātradhīr api* or *utprekṣāmātraniṣṭho 'pi*. However, all the MSS available to me transmit the cpd. unanimously, and it is also possible to interpret the verse’s *api* adversatively: If even such an unimaginative man feels passion, how much more so would an imaginative man (or a *viññānā-*

gant woman who is about to be loved¹⁰² before him, becomes intensely aroused.¹⁰³ Another man, even though he might be of similar disposition, seeing the same woman at the same time, [does] not [react] like that. O consciousness! Whom shall we blame for this?




Figure 2: *Bhokṛtva* and the Isolated Perceivers

On the basis of this distinction of *bhoga* into the two modes of actualised (*prakarṣeṇa*, *prarohēṇa*) and potential (*yogyamātreṇa*), it is permissible for the non-dualist Śaivas to consider even these two *layākala* perceivers as agentive experiencers through their deferred status of enjoyerhood. The process described by Abhinavagupta is given schematically in figure 2.¹⁰⁴

The *Mālinīvijayottara*, the scripture expounded in the *Tantrāloka*, is innocent of nearly all of the elaborate ratiocination Abhinavagupta imposes on its much simpler presentation of the doctrine of the *pramāṭṛbheda*. But against the historical background depicted, it would not have been possible for him to simply ad-

kala) do so. This verse is meant to explain metaphorically how the *viññānākalas*, who abide in bare consciousness (TaĀI 9.92ab: *viññānakevalī proktaḥ śuddhacīnāmātrasamsthitaḥ*), can be experiencers, while the previous verse described the *pralayākala*s, who exist in a kind of stupor.

¹⁰²The future middle participle here expresses immediate futurity.

¹⁰³*utprekṣeti kulavadhūviṣayaḥ (kulavadhūviṣayaḥ] K_{ED}K₄, kulavadhū + + + viṣayaḥ B₁) saṃkalpaḥ (saṃkalpaḥ] K_{ED}B₁, sakalpaḥ K₄) | sambhokṣyamāṇām ity adṛṣṭavaśāt kariṣyamāṇasambhogām ity arthaḥ | ata eva rabhasād avalokanasamanantaram evāvegavatābhilāṣeṇa (evāvegavatābhilāṣeṇa] K_{ED}K₄pc, evāvegatābhilāṣeṇa B₁K₄ac) labdhalābha iva saṃmadam sambhogasamucitām ānandamayātām iyād yenāśya bhokṛbhāvo bhavet ||...*

¹⁰⁴**Vk/Pk** is the Viññānākala or Pralayākala. **M** stands for the Mantra-, Mantreśvara and Mantramaheśvara perceivers. **By** is *bodhayogyatā*, fitness to be awakened. **B** is *bodha*, the awakened state. **Vy** is *vedyatāyogyatā* the fitness for possessing objects to be known, and **V** is *vedyatā*, the possession of objects to be known. **Bhy** is *bhogayogyatā*, the fitness for experience and **Bh** is *bhoga*, experience. **T-0** is the moment of awakening, where all of the shifts in status occur.

mit that the self is not, even in some of its more extreme phases, an experiencer. To do so, would be to deny scriptural authority. Rather, he found it more parsimonious to accept a tenuous, doubly removed, remote experiencerhood. This, of course, brings him dangerously close to the Sāṃkhya theory of remote experiencerhood. To shore up his at first sight implausible justification he developed an heuristic scenario pinpointing familiar differentials in the experience of a love relationship to serve as a commonplace *dṛṣṭānta*. The model of the Śaiva experiencer that has emerged from these materials is a complex one, and one that has been refined by the sustained effort of systematizers. In the passages cited above, Abhinavagupta's exegesis is less concerned with either an asseverative or harmonizing engagement with scriptural sources, but rather with an heuristic approach that seeks to adduce similes based on commonplace scenarios that make his systematisations appear plausible and convincing.

More needs to be said, in this context, about the enjoyerhood that the Trika accords to the next three perceivers, the *mantras*, the *mantrēśvaras* and the *mantramahēśvaras*. This is a topic for a future paper that focusses on the precise roles played by agency (*karṭṛtva*) and authority (*adhikāra*) in the constitution of the Trika's self.

Abbreviations

- K₂ *Tantrāloka*. Śrīnagar acc. no. 1054-III, 190 fol., Śāradā, only the *Tantrāloka*.
- K₄ *Tantrāloka*. Śrīnagar acc. no. 1792, Śāradā, the *Tantrāloka* with the *Viveka* or *Vivecana* commentary of Jayaratha.
- K₅ *Tantrāloka*. Śrīnagar acc. no. 2081, Śāradā, the *Tantrāloka* with the *Viveka* or *Vivecana* commentary of Jayaratha.
- K₇ *Tantrāloka*. Śrīnagar acc. no. 2201, Śāradā, only the *Tantrāloka*.
- K₈ *Tantrāloka*. Śrīnagar acc. no. 7771 & 7772.
- B₁ *Tantrāloka* with the *Viveka* commentary of Jayaratha. Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin HS or 12 434, Śāradā, only the *Tantrāloka*.
- Ś₁ *Svacchandatanrodhyota*. Śrīnagar acc. no. 1054-II. Śāradā. 411 fol.
- Ś_{BE} *Svacchandatanrodhyota*. Berlin Hs Or 11 255, Śāradā. Accessed on microfilm dated 27.10.99.

<i>conj.</i>	conjecture
<i>corr.</i>	correction
<i>em.</i>	emendation
<i>om.</i>	omitted
{x}	deletion
(<i>kimcit.</i>)	<i>kimcit</i> supplied
+++	illegible <i>akṣaras</i>
<i>x</i> → <i>y</i>	citation ranges from <i>x</i> to <i>y</i>
†...†	obeli enclose corrupt passages that the present editor cannot improve upon

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