The book gives an exhaustive study of "Pratyabhijna Karika of Utpaladeva", the basic text on "The Doctrine of Recognition", which is faithfully interpreted mostly in the light of the author's own Vritti, so far as available, and the Notes by the earlier traditional teachers, as given in the printed texts from the marginal notes found in the manuscripts, supported by quotations from the commentaries by Abhinavagupta and Bhaskaracharya. It is furnished with a comprehensive Introduction, prose order of the Karikas with short comments, English translation, Foot-notes, etc. Pratyabhijna Karika is indeed very difficult for a student of average understanding, so much so that he does not go beyond a few Karikas or pages of the book. The available translation by Dr. Pandey too does not seem to be helpful. The main object of this work, is to clarify the original ideas with fidelity to the sense of the Karikas, as intended by the teacher.

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INTRODUCTION

(A) General

Kashmir Shaivism: Its three main divisions: There are three main divisions of the Kashmir Shaivism corresponding to the division of its literature into three Śāstras: (1) the Āgama Śāstra, (2) the Spanda Śāstra and (3) the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra. A brief history of the development of these Śāstras is given below.

Shaivism is the earliest and the most prevalent cult. Śiva-Śakti cults were in vogue along with the Vedic faith in every part of India from very ancient times, and in Kashmir before the time of Ashoka. The history of the introduction of Shaivism in Kashmir is shrouded in mystery. In fact, it flourished there from the dawn of history. The facts furnished by Kalhana in his Rājaratanginī, the chronicle of the kings of Kashmir, indicate the wide prevalence of the Śaiva cult in the valley from an early period, and that it occupied the first place among the Hindu cults of the valley. From time to time various philosophical doctrines reached Kashmir from outside which had their impact on the philosophy that had grown there among the followers of Śaiva cult. Buddhism was welcomed by Kashmiris long before the Christian era, and Kashmir became its stronghold since the time of Ashoka (273–232 B.C.). Here was convoked an Assembly of the Buddhist theologians which recognised the Mahāyāna as superior to Hinayāna school of Buddhistic thought. In spite of the phenomenal success of Buddhism in Kashmir for a few centuries, Śaivism continued to be the vital force.

The revival of Śaivism came in Kashmir from the seventh century A.D., and in the 8th and 9th centuries Buddhism gradually disappeared. In the 9th century, it was the sage Vasugupta, who revealed the Śiva-Śūtras which form the bedrock of the whole superstructure of
Kashmir Śaivism. The Śiva-Sūtras do not only enunciate the fundamental concepts of Kashmir Śaivism, but also show a way to practical realization. This line of thought was developed by two ācāryas Bhaṭṭa Kallāta (circa 9th century) and Somānanda (contemporary of Vasugupta, 850—900 A.D.) in two different directions. While Kallāta handed down the doctrines as a system of religion, Somānanda supplied the logical reasoning in their support and thus founded a system of Advaita philosophy of the Śaivas on the basis of what was at first taught as a system of faith. This development resulted into the emergence of the three different forms of Kashmir Śaivism: (1) the Āgama Śāstra, (2) the Spanda Śāstra and (3) the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra, corresponding to the three broad divisions of its literature. The whole literature comprising its three divisions is known as Trika Śāstra. The Āgama Śāstra is regarded as of superhuman authorship and of eternal existence. It is said that in course of time, Āgama Śāstra disappeared from the world and was revived again by Shrikanṭa, the incarnation of Śiva, the promulgator of Shaiva Āgamas. The sage Durvāsa was inspired to spread the knowledge of the Shaiva Āgamas which was handed down to the later ages by his three mind-born sons and their successors. The same (Āgama Shastra) was taught in the later ages by Vasugupta and his successors. The Śiva Sūtras revealed by Vasugupta lay down both the philosophical doctrines (jñāna) and the practices (kriya) of the system as revelations believed to have come down (āgama) through the ages, being handed down from teacher to pupil. Generally speaking, the Āgama Shastra gives the rudiments of Kashmir Shaivism, and shows the path of practical realization by means of the processes of Yoga system, known as Śaiva-Yoga or Śaiva-saṁāvesā. The school of Yoga Shaivism prescribes the various yogic methods of Saṁhyam (concentration of mind) for achieving lower and higher siddhis (occult powers) and the glories of liberated life. These methods are called Śāmbhavopāya, Śāktopāya and Āṇavopāya. The Āgama Shastra gives an exposition of these three methods of realization which is the main theme of the whole Trika Shastra. The Śiva-sūtras form the most important part of the Āgama Shastra from the Trika point of view. The Spanda Shastra, being the second system, was started
by Kallata, the pupil of Vasugupta, who most likely composed the *Spanda Sutras*. The same was carried on by Kallata’s successors, Pradyumna Bhaṭṭa, Prajiñājuna, Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa and Bhāskara. The Spanda Shastra gives a comprehensive exposition of the three Yogic methods of realization (the mystical *upāyas*). The Pratyabhijñā Shastra, being the third system, was started by Somānanda, the author of *Śivadṛṣṭi*, and was carried on by the line of his disciples,—Utpaladeva, Lakṣmanaagupta, Abhinavagupta, and the later teachers. It lays stress on the theoretical method of realization, viz., the pursuit of knowledge and reason alone, necessary for liberation, and excludes the Yogic methods to a subordinate position. It, thus, primarily represents the philosophy proper of the Trika Shastra.

**Agama Shastra:** Shaivāgamas - Among the works belonging to Shaivāgama class, there is a number of Tantras, of which the following comprise chiefly the Agama Shāstra of Kashmir: *Mālinī Vijaya* or *Vijayottara*, *Svācchanda*, *Vijñāna Bhairava*, *Ānanda Bhairava* (lost), *Mrigendra*, *Matanga*, *Netra*, *Naiśvāsa*, *Svāyambhuva*, *Rudra-yāmala*, *Vidyārṇava* etc. Most of these had existed long before the appearance of the Triks.

**Tantra Shastra** is mostly Sadhana Shastra. Usually, every Agama consists of four sections or *Kāṇḍas*: (1) *Vidyā* or *Jñāna Kāṇḍa*, (2) *Yoga Kāṇḍa* (3) *Kriyā Kāṇḍa* and (4) *Caryā Kāṇḍa*. Kashmir Shaivāgamas are mainly dogmatic treatises interspersed with philosophical speculations and logical reasoning. Being mostly devotional, they teach the various methods and practices of Shaiva Yoga, among other theological matters. *Tantraloka* of Abhinavagupta, an encyclopaedia of Tantric doctrines, gives the summery of *Advaita Tantras* which existed in Kashmir in the author’s time. Tantras are broadly divided into Sadhanā, Siddha and Philosophy.

*Mālinī-vijayottara-tantram* is, according to Abhinavagupta, the most important Agama treatise for the Trika. It is an earlier treatment of the same subjects, more or less, as are dealt with in the *Tantraloka*. Like the most Agama texts, it is a conversation between Shiva and Shakti. Mālinī Vijaya describes the Shaiva Yoga of the Trika sys-
em. The Tantra is said to be the briefest resume of a large Tantra called the Siddha-Yogīśvarī-Tantram consisting of nine crore verses interpreting Śaivaistic teachings in the light of Bheda, Abheda and Bhedabheda. Mālinī Vijayottara is stated to be the last part of this Tantra. Like all Tantras, this also treats of incantations, their philosophy, initiation, bodily discipline, etc. It is said that the adorer becomes the adored himself by following the prescribed methods. He comes to feel his close kinship with nature. To him both the animate and the inanimate are glowing with divinity. The world is not an illusion to the Tantric adorer. Mālinī Vijayottara Tantra is the source of the conceptions of the three upāvas (methods of liberation), namely, Ānavopāya, Śāktopāya and Śāmbhavopāya, as dealt in the Shiva Sūtras and also incorporated in the Āgāmādhikāra of Pratyabhijñā Śāstra, besides those of different types of creations, like, Vijñānakāla, Sakala, Pralayākala, Vidyēśvaras and so on. This Tantra is also the main source of the first eleven Tattvas of the Shaiva system in addition to the twenty-five Tattvas of the Sāṅkhya. The original sources of the contents of this Tantra have not yet been traced by any scholar, in the earlier literature. In Tejopaniṣad we, however, have a reference about “Ānavam Shambhavam Shāktam”. About the time of authorship of this Upaniṣad we are not in a position to say anything. At any rate we know that the Upaniṣad does not belong to the older group.

Śvacchanda Tantram: This voluminous Tantra consisting of 3780 verses, is a dialogue between Shiva as Śvacchanda Bhairava and Shakti as Bhairavi ‘Śvacchanda’ literally means ‘own will’ and is thus a synonym of ‘Śvātantra,’ i.e., self-dependence or freedom of will. Like Mālinī Vijayā and its offshoot Tantrāloka of Abhinavagupta, Śvacchanda Tantra deals with the same principles as are treated of in the former two works, but in a peculiar strain of its own. In its philosophical parts, it gives an exposition of thirty-six Tattvas not as merely abstract principles but as great cosmic facts, picturing them in symbols and in forms of exquisite poetry and painting them, as it were, on a most gigantic scale, over and against the background of an equally gigantic cosmic canvas. The Tantra prescribes a form
of *Yoga-dhyāna* for the aspirant who is directed to concentrate his mind, in ecstatic meditation, on this awe-inspiring and, at the same time, irresistibly attractive scene, which presents a great drama of life and action, not just in one world and universe, but in countless universes scattered all over boundless space and moving about in equally unbounded time. The whole work pulsates with a profound sense of realization of All-independent will, *Svachchanda*.

*Sūnyatā* plays an important part in certain schools of Buddhist thought. The Tantra describes the six states of *Sūnyatā* and explains the conception of the ultimate *Sūnyatā* as the Transcendental Being (Anuttara, Para, or Viśvottirṇa), the highest and last Reality, which is, in reality, *Aśūnya*, (*aśūnyam aṇuṇyaṃ ityuktaṁ*), i.e., not 'voidity' or 'emptiness' in the ordinary sense of the term, but a positive being (*Sattā mātra*) from which emerge infinite universes and annihilate into it. It is this Śūnya which contains in itself everything and which materializes itself in the concrete form of this physical and subtle universes (*tatra tatra paraṁ śūnyam sarvaṁ vyāpa vyavasthitam; tadeva bhavati sthūлом sthūlopaḍahi-vyavasthitam;*). The final reality is both transcendental as well as immanent (*saratvatam paraṁ tattvaṁ sarvaṁ vyāpi vyavasthitam*). Hundreds and thousands of universes as well as all Śāstras, all arts and sciences, all moral and spiritual disciplines, even all magic, are included in the *Tattvas* (*bhuvanāni vicitrāni śataśōtha sahasrasālaḥ, tattvābhyyantara-samsthāni śāstrāni vīvidhāni ca*). While the universe is so vast, the Jiva is infinitely small, like a mathematical point (Lit. a hundredth part of the hundredth part of a tip of hair), but he is capable of infinite expansion.

**Vijnana Bhairava** This work is also a text of the Āgama Śāstra, being a conversation between Śiva as Bhairava and Śakti as Bhairavi. *Vijnāna Bhairava* is regarded as the essence of another Tantra, the *Rudra Yāmala*. Its main topic is *Yoga-dhyāna*, of which it prescribes no less than 112 forms. As its contribution to philosophy, *Vijnāna Bhairava* explains how it is due to Śakti that Śiva appears in the forms which

1. A Descriptive Analysis of KSTS, pp. 35–36.
2. See Ind. p. 37; bālagra-saṭabhāgasya, saṭadhā kalpitasayatu, tasya sūkṣmataro jīvaḥ, sa cānantyāya kalpate.
are conditioned by space and time.

Para-Trimshiks: It being a collection of of thirty odd verses taken from the Rudra Yamala Tantra, also belongs to the Āgama Śāstra. Its importance lies in the fact that it is perhaps the earliest work on the mystery of the Sanskrit alphabet (vonṇa-mālā). It is really what may be called the 'cosmic phonetics', and is intimately connected with the doctrine of the four stages in the manifestation of speech, viz. Parā Paśyanti, madhyamā and Vaikhāri. Man as Paśu, i.e., 'creature in bondage', is ordinarily acquainted with the Vaikhāri, the physically articulated speech, alone. The three other forms (stages) of speech are hidden in the 'cave' (guhā), i.e. heart. The verses give the relation between the articulated speech and the hidden mystery of the inarticulated sound, and its connection with the thirty-six principles of creation (Tattvas), treated as Spandās, i.e. speeding vibrations.

Siva-Sutras: The Sūtras are believed to be a Rahasyāgaṇaṣṭhāstra-samgraha, being the work of Śiva Himself. They, therefore, form a part of the Āgama Śāstra to which is attributed divine authorship. According to tradition, recorded by Kṣemarāja, the Sūtras were found, by the sage Vasugupta, inscribed on a rock at the foot of Mahādeva mountain, about 12 miles from Srinagar.

The Śiva Sūtras are a protest, first, against certain later schools of Buddhism, preaching the nihilistic doctrine of 'no Ātman', in direct opposition to the Buddha himself, who nowhere says that 'there is no Ātman'. He, on the contrary, states that to say that 'there is no Ātman' would mean preaching the doctrine of the nihilist (Uccheda-vāda). (See Saṁyutta Nikāya, Vol. IV, 400-401). Secondly they are a protest against the doctrine of dualism. This explains why the very first Sūtra so emphatically declares that, not only the Ātman most certainly is, but that man's consciousness, in its essential nature, is in itself the Ātman (caitanyam ātmā) and that the Ātman itself is Śiva, the great Lord, Maheśvara, nothing else (Ātmaiva Śivah). While

the Śiva Sūtras thus begin with a highly philosophical declaration, they constitute a practical treatise which tells how to realize, in direct experience, the philosophical truths enunciated therein. This practical aspect of the Sūtras is called 'Upāya', i.e., 'means of approach' and each of the three divisions of the Sūtras gives 'an exposition of a way of approach (upāya-prakāshana).'

The basic ideas of the Śiva Sūtras are the same as we have in the Āgamas of the Trika, i.e., the unfoldment of the three means of liberation, Śāmbhava, Śāktra and Āpaya the Malas (impurities), etc. It is stated that Śrikantha, an incarnation of Śiva, appeared once before Vasugupta in a dream and told him, 'There exists a sacred lore under this big stone. Reveal it and teach to those who deserve a favour.' Śiva wished to do a favour to the suffering humanity by the revelation of the tradiditional sacred lore which unfolds the three means of emancipation: 'devīta-darśanādhivasā-prāye jīva-loke rahasya-
sampradāyo mā vicchedi.' On awakening, the sage found the Sūtras engraved on a big stone known in kashmir as Śiva Pala which is said to exist on the Mahādeva hill with the side, containing the engravings, remaining inverted after they were revealed to Vasugupta. The Sūtras are divided in three sections, dealing with the three means of liberation. Guru Vasugupta taught them to his disciples Kallaṭa and others-Kallaṭa taught them to Kṣemarāja who added a commentary, called Vimarśini, to the Sūtras.

(2) Sanda-Shastra: Spanda Kārios These compositions are the earliest and only original texts belonging to the Spanda Shāstra division of the Trika. They constitute the basis on which the entire Spanda literature developed. Regarding their authorship, there are two views one that they are by Vasugupta himself, and the other that Kallaṭa composed

4. Ibid pp. 10—11
5. See, J. C. Chatterji, Kashmir Shaivism; p. 8; Paranjyoti, Śaiva Siddhānta;
M. V. T., KSTS XXXVII, Introduction,
If, 20-23, also p. 112 fn 13;
P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar, Shiva Sūtra Vimarśini (Tr.).
them. Utpala Vaishnava, on the strength of the 53rd Kārikā, not found in the recension of Kṣemarāja, attributes their authorship to Kallaṭa, while Kṣemarāja attributes them to Vasugupta, probably on the authority of the 16th verse of the Spanda Nirñaya found in his recension. The Kārikās, seem, in fact, to be the work of Kallaṭa. The Spanda Śāstra lays down the main principles, as enunciated in the Śiva Śūtras, in a greater detail and in a more amplified form, without giving philosophical reasonings in their support. In fact, the Spanda system owes its origin to the Śiva Śūtras and concerns itself with their elucidation and popularisation. The author describes Spanda as that power of consciousness which infuses life into the physical senses. An object when sensed has no basis apart from consciousness. Spanda Kārikās (verses) are 51 in number in which the fundamental principles of Śaivism, as aphoristically given in the Śiva Śūtras, are epitomized. The literature that developed on these Kārikās are (1) Vṛtti by Kallaṭa, (2) Vṛtti by Rāmakāṇṭha, (3) Pradīpikā by Utpala, (4) Spanda Sandoha by Kṣemarāja and (5) Spanda-nirñaya also by Kṣemarāja. The idea underlying the Spanda Śāstra is that Śiva's Spanda (energy) out of its own nature manifests on the background of its own pure Self the whole universe comprising the thirty-six categories from the earth upto Śiva. According to this doctrine, the world is a play of energy, force or vibration, which is in conformity with modern Science, and not an illusion, the result of error in preception as the Vādāntins suppose; their doctrine that 'Viśvam yan na tad eva brahma,' is rejected.

The discovery of the concept of the 'Spanda' in the Trika Śāstra is, indeed, most important from the point of view of modern science. The word 'Spanda' is derived from the root meaning 'to throb', 'to move, and seems etymologically to be the same word as English 'speed, (cf. Dutch, Old English, 'schood'). But, in the context of the Trika Śāstra, 'Spanda' means 'speeding with pulsation and rhythm'. 'Spanda, has the same meaning also in expressions like 'prāṇa-spanda', i.e., 'life pulsation'. It has been known in India since the Vedic age that

6. The Spanda-Karika, KSTS VI,
The Spanda-nirñaya, KSTS XLII, with Eng. Tr.
everything in the universe of objects is only a 'system of ceaseless goings' (jagati) (yat kī añ ca jagatyām jagat—Īśāvāsyopani. ad 1). Even the hardest, heaviest, the apparently stand-still, mass of matter, in this physical universe, is just a volume of 'pulsating, throbbing, waving, vibrating flowings' (Spanda-nihśyandah, SK, 19). In these circumstances, the discovery of modern physics that 'matter' is only 'waves of various lengths,—without there being any essentially 'solid, hard stuff in matter'—is really a re-discovery of what the Trika Śāstra conceived centuries ago as the 'Spanda'.

(3) Pratyabhijna Shāstra: (its emergence) Whereas Vasugupta and Kallāta (beginning of the 9th century A. D.) are the promulgators of Āgama and Spanda branches of Trika Śāstra, which stress 'its faith, fact and practive discipline' necessary for realization, Somānanda (towards the close of the 9th century) and Utpaladeva (in the first half of the 10th century) are the founders of the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra, the philosophy proper of the Trika. Abhinavagupta (990-1015 A. D.) combines both the aspects of the Triks, its faith (rituals and practices) and philosophy. He is, indeed, the greatest exponent of the system as a whole. The later teachers, Kṣemarāja, Yogarāja, Jayaratha, Shivasānti, and Bhaskaracārya (1200-1800 A. D.), mostly commentators, follow Abhinavagupta in expounding the various doctrines of the school. The following is the whole of Pratyabhijñā literature given in chronological order (pd. in KSTS—Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies):

śivādṛṣṭi (śd) by Somānanda (the first text on the system—9th cent A. D. KSTS-54; Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā Kārikā (PK) with Vṛtti - short commentary (Pvr) by Utpaladeva 10th Cent. (St KSTS-34); Utpaladeva, had written a Tikā (commentary) on his Pk which is irrecoverably lost. Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarshini (Pvi), a short commentary (called also Laghu-vimarśini) on Utpaladeva’s Pk, by Abhinavagupta 11th cent.) (KSTS-22 & 33); Īśvar - Pratyabhijñā Vīrti - Vimarshinini (Pvi) (called also Brahmati-vimarśini), a long commentary on Pk

TRIKA SHASTRA—TANTRALOKA & TANTRASARA

*KSTS* 60, 62, 69; *Tantraloka* (TA) by Abhinavagupta, a voluminous work. (pd with commentary of Jayaratha 1180 A.D. in *KSTS*—in 12 volumes); *Tantra-Sāra* by Abhinavagupta (*KSTS*—17); *Paramarthasa*ra of Abhinavagupta (pd. with commentary of Yogarāja 1060 A.D. in *KSTS*—7) *Pratyabhijñā—hrdaya* by Kṣemarāja 1040 A.D. *KSTS*—3). Besides the above, there are: one chapter, Canto VIII, on Pratyabhijñā-darsana in *Sarva-darshana-saṃgraha* (SDS) of Madhava-cārya 14th cent. (pd. in the Vidyabhawan Sanskrit Granthamālā No 113, Varanasi); a Commentary of Bhāskarācārya (1780 A.D.) on *Prati* ed by K. C. Pandey and K. A. Subramania Iyer, (pd in the Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhawan Texts, Nos. 82 and 83, 2 volumes, Allahabad). Upaladeva's *Siddhārya*, comprising three treatises: *Īśvara-Siddhi, Ajāta-pramāṇa-siddhi* and *Sambhandha-siddhi*, (*KSTS*—34) is another allied work on the system.

**Trika Shastra:** The texts enumerated above under Pratyabhijñā Śāstra mostly include those expounding the so-called Trika Śāstra, i.e., which treat of all the three branches of Kashmir Shaivism: Āgama Śāstra, Spanda Śāstra and Pratyabhijñā Śāstra, the philosophy proper of the Trika, or those which deal with the three mystical Upāyas, practical disciplines necessary for realization, called Śāṁbhavopāya, Shāktopāya and Ānavopāya which are initially prescribed for liberation in Āgama Śāstra. The Pratyabhijñā Śāstra is a 'new approach', easy way or means to the realization of the reality, i.e., the way of knowledge and reason, say, the intellectual pursuit alone, without any supernatural processes practical discipline, i.e., Śāiva-Yoga (called also Śāiva Samāvēśa) to which aspect there is no stress in the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra proper, viz. in the works of Somananda and Upaladeva, the pioneers of the school, although these matters are also incorporated in their works from the Āgama Śāstra, but they are relegated to a subordinate position and not treated as an essential part of the Pratpabhijñā system which is said to be a new and an easy way (*_sugata eṣāṁ mārgo navo_*). The works dealing with Trika Śāstra also treat of the philosophical aspect of Pratyabhijñā, the glimpses of which are given below:

**Tantraloka and Tantra-sara:** The *Tantraloka* is the most voluminous work by Abhinavagupta and forms an encyclopaedia of the *Trika*
The Tantra-sāra, by the same author, is just a brief summary of the Tantrāloka. While the Tantrāloka is composed in an abstruse language and in a metrical form, the Tantra-sar is written in easy prose and is considerably short. The Tantra-sāra is, in fact, an excellent introduction to the Tantrāloka. Both these works indicate the role of Abhinavagupta as an exponent of Trika śāstra. The first chapter of Tantrāloka, which is chiefly philosophical, opens with an explanation of the first two Śiva Sūtras and defines the key word 'Caitanya,' saying 'caitanyam iti bhāvāntāḥ shabdāḥ svātantrya-mātrakam' (TA I, 28). Thus Caitanya means not any particular state or states of consciousness, but consciousness in general, consciousness as such, free from all limiting conditions, free absolutely from an objective context, viz., anything to depend upon, like the body, the mind, etc. Caitanya is just Self-dependence (Svātantrya-mātra). It is 'cit-kriya citi-kārtītyā,' i.e. absolute liberty and autonomy of consciousness, as Utpaladeva says. This Caitanya is emphatically declared to be the Ātman, the one nuclear core in every personality, the one central point of reference in each and every experience, the deepest depth of the subconscious in each vividly conscious personal ego. The Tantrāloka I gives also definitions and explanations of various other terms. The next four chapters of the work deal, in detail, with the same three upāyas (methods of realization), which constitute the three sections of the Śiva Sūtras. According to Abhinavaguptas' view, the three means described are those of Abheda, Bhedābheda and Bheda respectively. Pratyabhijñā has been treated as another way of realization, a way of reasoning (tarka), requiring no practice of any kind (Anupāya mārga). This, Abhinavagupta says, is the highest of all the methods (tato 'pi paramam jñānam upāyādi..vivarjitaṁ...anuttaram - iḥoc- yāti). The work also deals with various philosophical topics like time, space, the nature and division of the thirty-six principles (tattvas), from the principle of solidity (earth) to Śiva, the one All-benign Lord (devāḥ sa ekaḥ shivaḥ), who ever shines through all the principles and their infinite combinations and permutations, shines in the form of a condensed mass of the supreme spiritual effulgence (esa anvitaṁ rupam bhāti poram prakāshaṁ nibiḍam, TA, 9, 1). The two chapters (11 and 12) of the work, deal with the principle of Māyā and
its five off-shoots, Kalā, Rāga, Vidyā, Niyati, and Kāla, which, acting as ‘veils’, make one all-pervading Śiva appear as divided in the form of each microcosm. Another chapter (13) which is also of same philosophical significance, treats of the conferment of powers (śakti-pāta) by Śiva, on his devotees. The rest of the work deals with various ritual practices and forms of worship.

Pratyabhijna-hṛdaya: This is a small work by Rājañaka Kshemaraṇa in which the contents of Pratyabhijña Śāstra are summarised, with a stress on Āgamic tenets of the Trika and Śaiva Samvāda (the Śāivayoga). A brief idea of this work is given as follows: Citi (consciousness) being absolute or self-dependent (Svatantra), is the ultimate cause of this universe. By the power of its own will (svacchā), it unfolds the universe upon its own screen (svabhita). This universe is manifold (nānā) in consequence of the separation of mutually related objects and subjects (from one another). The subject, whose essential nature is limited citti (citiśāṅkocātmā), is a microcosm. Citta (the sense organ) is nothing else than citi descended from the stage of Cetana and passed into a state of limitation due to the object of perception (cetya-sāṅkocīn). That citta especially constitutes the real nature of the Māyā-pramātā (limited subject). He is one Ātman, being Śiva whose essence consists in cit. He is of two-fold form, one as light (Prakṛtā rūpa) and the other as the limited manifestation (sāṅkocāvabhasavat). He is three-fold being covered by three impurities (malas), Āṇava, Māṇya, and Kārma. He is of four-fold constitution, because he is composed of the void, (Śūnya), the life (Prāṇa), the subtle body consisting of mind, senses, etc. (śūryaṇaka) and the body (Śavīra). The seven pentads, i.e. the thirty-five Tattvas from Śiva to the earth, make up his nature. In consequence of the limitation of the Śaktis of the Māyā-pramātā (Ātman), he becomes the mala-covered saṁsārin, i.e., takes a succession of births. Like the Lord (Śiva), he carries out the five processes of the universe, viz., emanation, (sraṣṭā), reabsorption (saṁśartī), stabilization (suḥāpakāti), enveloping (vilaya-hārītī) and dispensing grace (anugrāhītī). Underlying these there exist five other secret processes, viz., manifesting, enjoyment, meditation, seeding and dissolution. To be a saṁsārin means being led astray by one’s own shaktis when one is ignorant of the authorship of the fivefold process. In the following Śūtras, the teacher sets forth a meditative process (Saṁvēsa) for achieving divine realization which ‘saves during life-time’ from Saṁsāra (cycle of births and deaths). In the process of Saṁvēsa (Saṁādhi) citta becomes citi by directing itself inwardly to the stage of Cerena.
CHAPTER I

PRELIMINARY

Preamble; Evolution of the Studies of the Pratyabhijna Literature; Glimpse of the present study.

The attention of modern scholars was drawn to what is known as the "Pratyabhijna System of Philosophy" very late in the annals of Indological research. Before the literature on the subject, distinguished as "Pratyabhijna Literature," was discovered in Kashmir by Dr. G. Buhlar in 1876 A.D., the system had remained sealed in manuscripts or in the hearts of a few traditional Pandits, and was studied but little by modern scholars till very recent times. Among the students of this system of philosophy, J. C. Chatterji, P. T. Srinivasa-Iyengar, L. D. Barnett, Reo Emil Baer (German Indologist) and his English translator, F. Kurt Leidecker (American Scholar) and K. C. Pandey get the credit of setting out earlier on their literary expedition and discovering new coasts of knowledge in this domain of study. The information given by these noted scholars, the pioneers of this branch of study serves as beacon-light in the present study.

The first notice of Pratyabhijna: We get the earliest notice about the Pratyabhijna Shastra in the well-known publication, Sarvadarsana Samgraha of Madhavacharya, a collection of all the systems of Philosophy, edited by Pt. Ishvarachandra Vidyasagara and published for the first time in the Bibliotheca Indica in 1858 A.D. It reviews, perhaps in the gradually ascending order of importance from the Vedanta point of view, the sixteen most important philosophical systems, including the three Shaiva systems, Nakulisha-Pashupata, the Shaiva system and the Pratyabhijna Darshana current in Southern India in the 14th century A.D. Though not of much importance in itself, it aroused interest among the modern scholars in the so-called minor systems of thought and was translated into English by E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough. In this work, the Pratyabhijna System appears as the eighth system and the Vedanta system of Shankaracharya as the sixteenth or the final system. The Vedanata
is thus given the highest place among the sixteen systems described.

**Discovery of Pratyabhijna literature by Dr. Buhlar** Nevertheless, until about the year 1876 A.D., the Pratyabhijna Shastra remained unknown to the modern scholars. In the year 1875 A.D., however, Dr. G. Buhlar who proceeded under the orders of the Government of India on a tour to Kashmir, Rajputana and Central Asia in search of Sanskrit manuscripts discovered in Kashmir the works composed by Kashmiris under the general name “Shaiva Shastra”. He collected a number of manuscripts and divided some portions of these referring to the Philosophy of the Shaivas into two classes according to the two great Shaiva Schools of Kashmir: Spanda Shastra of Vasugupta and the Pratyabhijna Shastra of Somananda and Utpaladeva. Dr. Buhlar points out in his Report that the Pratyabhijna system “appears to be pure idealism and an application of Shankaracharya’s principles to the Shaiva philosophy.” He further brings to notice the remarks of Prof. Gough in his prefatory note to the translation of the Shaiva-dharshana in Sarvadarshana Samgraha, “Prof. Gough has shown that the Kashmirian Shaiva philosophy bears the close resemblance to the Shaivism of the Southern India.”

**Publication of the ‘Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies’**: The first impulse to the study of the Pratyabhijna literature was given by the publication of “Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies” started by the Kashmir Research Department early in the present century, from 1902 when its activities began. The literature of Kashmir pertaining to the Shaiva School particularly attracted the notice of J. C. Chatterji, the first Director of the Department, who was the foremost scholar to devote himself to its study from 1904. He brought to notice in his first report that ‘There is a rich literature in Kashmir belonging to the Shaiva School of Philosophy of which very little is known to the outsider. It is a most interesting school...Manuscripts of this school should be made public by the Department.’ Accordingly the Department carried on the editing and publishing of the Shaiva literature and during the period of the last half century brought out 89 volumes of “Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies”, which include almost the whole of Shaiva literature. Among the works published by the Department, the following comprise the Pratyabhijna Shastra: Shivadrshti of Somananda, the first and the basic work on the system by its originator; Ishvara Pratyabhijna Sutras (or Karikas) by Utpaldeva,
the systematiser of the philosophy, with short Commentary called Vimarshini; by Abhinavagupta, the expounder of the system, in two parts: Part 1 and Part 2; a long Commentary on Pratyabhijna Sutras called Vivratti-Vimarshini by Abhinavagupta, in three volumes: Vol. I, Vol. II and Vol. III; Pratyabhijna Hrdaya; Siddhitrayi and Pratyabhijna Karikavrtti. In addition to these works, the below-mentioned works contain the tenets of the Pratpabhijna school, embedded in a mass of other matters of Kashmir Shaiva cult:- Shiva-sutra-vimarshini by Vasugupta with Commentary by Kshemaraja; Tantraloka, a comprehensive work on diverse subjects pertaining to Tantra Shastra (the scriptures of Shaivas) by Abhinavagupta, with commentary, in several volumes; and Parmarthasara of Abhinavagupta.

Pioneering Studies: This literature began to attract the attention of scholars early in the present Century. In the year 1910 there appeared the Paramarthasara of Abhinavagupta (Sanskrit text and English translation) by L. D. Barnett in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland (PP. 707-747) in which we, for the first time, find an English presentation of the principles of Shaiva school of Kashmir. Dr. Barnett observes, in his Introduction to this work, ‘In my “Notes on the Shaiva Siddhantam” published last year (in 1909) in Le museum, I called attention to the fact that the living faith of the majority of modern Tamils is in almost every respect, and certainly in all essentials, the same doctrine that was taught in Kashmir about the beginning of the eleventh century by Abhinavagupta; and I endeavoured to indicate what, in my opinion, the links are which join the modern theology of the South to the ancient teachings of the North, and ultimately to the school which is represented by the Shvetashvatara Upanisada. In further illustration of this view I now present the Parmarthasara of Abhinavagupta.’

In the year 1912 was published the translation of Shiva Sutra Vimarshini by P. T. Srinivasa Ayangar. This important work, in the early days of the studies of Kashmir Shaiva Shastra, acquainted the scholars with the system of Shaivism as a form of the Yogic system. In his introduction to the work the scholar calls attention to the fact that Shiva Sutras do not represent any manual of philosophy, since they merely deal with certain forms of Yoga and propound a Tantric creed.

The work, namely ‘Kashmir Shaivism’ (in English), being a brief
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introduction to the history, literature and doctrines of the Advaita Shaiva Philosophy of Kashmir, by J. C. Chatterji, appeared in the ‘Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies’ in the year 1914. J. C. Chatterji is well known as the author of ‘Indian Realism’ and ‘India’s Outlook on Life.’ In Kashmir Shaivism, the learned scholar distinguishes the Shaiva Philosophy from a system of Shaiva faith. He writes - ‘While Kallata may be said to have handed down the doctrines as a system of religion, Somananda supplied the logical reasoning in their support and made a system of Advaita Philosophy of what was at first taught as a system of faith and thus founded Pratyabhijna Shastra...which is so named after the Pratyabhijna Sutras...’

In the year 1936 appeared the work namely ‘Abhinavagupta’—An Historical and Philosophical Study (Ph. D. thesis) by Dr. K. C. Pandey, which gives a brief presentation of the various doctrines of Pratyabhijna Philosophy as expounded by Abhinavagupta in his two commentaries on Ishwara Pratyabhijna Karikas and his other works on the subject. Mention may also be made of the publication of Bhaskari, Vols. I and II, a Commentary on the Ishvara Pratyabhijna Vimarshini of Abhinavagupta, edited by K. A. Subramania Iyer and Dr. K. C. Pandey. This work was greatly needed for the proper understanding of abstruse text and the polemics of abhinavagupta in his Vimarshini, and the credit of discovering this important commentary in Kashmir and getting it published under very difficult circumstances goes entirely to Dr. Pandey. Bhaskaracharya, the author of the commentary lived by about the 18th century, being six generations ahead of his present successor. As regards the Abhinavagupta’s contribution to this philosophy, Dr. Pandey remarks in his work mentioned above, “The Philosophical system of Kashmir, with Abhinava’s contribution to it, left out of consideration, loses most of its importance...It is not possible for us to attribute the authorship of any particular theory to Abhinava as we can do to Kant or Hegel.” Among all the scholars of this line, Dr. Pandey has devoted himself entirely to the study of Abhinavagupta’s Philosophy and Rhetoric. In his scholarly introductions to Bhaskari Vols. I and II, he has taken great pains to bring out some outstanding points of Pratyabhijna philosophy. Volume III of Bhaskari, presenting an English Translation of the Ishvara Pratyabhijna Vimarshini in the light of the Bhaskari (Commentary), with an outline of History of Shaiva Philosophy, by K. C. Pandey, also appeared in the year 1954.

Another work namely ‘The Secret of Recognition,’ viz. Pratyabhii-
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jna Hrdaya, translated into English by Kurt F. Leidecker from its original translation in German by Reo Emil Baer, was published in the year 1938 in Adyar Series No. 18. It contains in its introductory pages a note by S. S. Suryanarayan Shastri on the comparative study of the Pratyabhijna system and the Shaiva Siddhanta of South India. As regards the origin of this line of philosophy in Kashmir the scholar produces the following evidence in his Note No. 36 (in his work): “We might make mention of the tradition according to which Shankara in his travels came near Kashmir. The activity of this greatest of India’s monists falls into the first half of the ninth century and comes, therefore, at the same time as the appearance of Vasuguupta (cf. Chatterji, K. Sh. P. 23). Hence it is not improbable that he imparted the impetus to the monistic movement in Kashmir (cf. Farquhar, O. R., L. I., P. 198).”

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan devotes a chapter (No. 10) in his ‘Indian Philosophy,’ Vol II, to the Pratyabhijna system. It is clear that this eminent scholar noticed this as one of the notable doctrines. He remarks that ‘the development of Shaivism in the extreme south of the country as well as in the extreme north, that is in Kashmir, is a wonderful example of India’s cultural unity’.

In addition to the work done by scholars mentioned above, we cannot afford to ignore the important contributions made to the study of this subject by some writers on Indian philosophy, as, for instance, M. M. Gopi Nath Kaviraja who has contributed a few articles on the subject in some leading papers, Prof. Lachhmi Dhar gives a brief description of the Pratyabhijna Philosophy in his book namely, The Birth place of Kalidasa.” C. Hayavadana Rao makes casual remark about some of the doctrines of this system in his Introductory Vol. I of the Srikara Bhashya of the Vedanta Sutras.

Object of the present study. It is apparant from the above that the subject has been studied by so many scholars heretofore, but so far no attention seems to have been devoted to a serious study of the origin and development of this system of Philosophy. It is the first attempt to trace the origin of the various doctrines of this school from the philosophic ideas in the Vedic hymns and the Upanishadas and the Buddhist sources. These studies have revealed that the system has evolved, of course, from the same fountain-head where all other schools of Indian Philosophy, the Sankhya, the Vaisheshika, the Vaivyakarana, the Vedanta, and so on, had their origin. With the ex-
ception of its specific differences in some view points from the Buddhist and the Vedanta systems, some additions and alterations made in certain theories existing in the older systems and some tenets and technical expressions derived from the Shaivagamas (scriptures of the Shaiva school), the system is not fundamentally different from the Vedanta.

The earlier studies do not differentiate the philosophical content from the theology or dogmas of the Shaiva School. Attempt has been made for the first time to treat of the philosophical content (or Philosophy proper) of the Pratyabhijna system almost apart from the dogmas of the Shaiva cult. It appears that the system of Philosophy presented in the Pratyabhijna literature has not so far been understood in its proper context. In the present study the various tenets of the system have been properly co-ordinated with great fidelity to the original. In these studies the two lines of development of the system have been noticed, one, the earlier stage represented by the work of Somananada, known as the founder of the school, The second, the later stage as represented by the doctrines taught by Utpaladeva, the disciple of Somananda, and further elaborated by Abhinavagupta.

An attempt has been made to review in brief all the allied philosophic movements in the East and the West, making comparison and contrast of the various doctrines of the Pratyabhijna School with the allied doctrines of other systems to arrive at a clear position which this system of thought occupies in the domaine of Indian and Western Philosophy. It has been brought out that the system has indeed made a radical revision or reorientation of Indian and Western systems of Philosophy.

From the earlier studies it has been noticed that some of the opinions of scholars do not accord with facts. It is not possible to agree with Doctor Pandey in holding that the great Shankaracharya, the expounder of the Vedanta system, had any share in the preaching or practice of Tantric Philosophy; not to speak of its having an influence on the Pratyabhijna system. The statement of Dr. Paranjyoti that Shankaracharya was an adherent of the Shakta sect or that his Advaita system is influenced by Tantric theory is far from true. The view held by Dr. Lachmi Dhar that the Pratyabhijna system was known to Kalidasa and that Abhijnana Shakuntala is an allegorical representation of this philosophy has no bearing on the facts. The attempt made by the learned scholar in attaching philosophical
significance to some common words and ideas occurring in Kalidasa's Shakuntala is rather far-fetched. It has been established on textual evidence that the Pratyabhijna system of philosophy originated in the ninth century A.D., which is, beyond any doubt, posterior to Kalidasa's date by a period of four centuries. All such controvertial view points have been discussed at proper places in this work.

And lastly, the writer has also sought to understand the scientific values of the Pratyabhijna metaphysics which, in its essence, is a deep study of man possessing highest potentialities and supreme inheritance. Human soul (Atman), according to the Pratyabhijna system, is endowed with creative power, viz. powers of comprehension and action and sovereignty of will. It is absolutely free (Svatantra) in creating a world for itself. The system does not only interpret the world as it is, as all other systems of philosophy generally do, but its point is to change it and to change it into a new world, a better and happier world for mankind. It has laid an emphasis on the need of "recognition" (Pratyabhijna) of 'Self' (Atman), viz. the supreme inheritance of man. The more we realise in ourselves the supreme and free nature of 'Self' (Atman), by taking aid of certain processes of intuition, moral discipline and spiritual training in addition to experience and reason, the more powers of knowledge and action (Jnana Shakti and Kriya Shakti) we manifest and exercise through our mind and body. The necessity of supersensuous experience for Self-realization is recognised owing to the limitations of man's sense and reason. The modern psychologists have also admitted: "the conscious Self of each of us...does not comprise the whole of consciousness or of the faculty within us. There exists a more comprehensive consciousness, a profounder faculty within us, which for the most part remains potential only." (Human Personality, by F.W.H. Myers P. 13). According to the system, Pratyabhijna, 'recognition' of Self-the profounder faculty within us, is prescribed for the service of man as a means of attaining all that is of highest value.

Thus the system lays down the psychological basis for the elevation of human personality.

Pratyabhijna Philosophy has also been understood as a correct interpretation of the Indian Philosophy, or in other words, a proper
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evaluation of Indian culture. It will be noticed that Indian culture is indeed human culture. The Pratyabhijna system has laid a great emphasis on "Freedom" (Svatantrya) of man, and "Freedom" and human culture are considered one and the same thing. It has revealed the law of humanity and the essentials of human society, viz. Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. The doctrine of human equality and universal brotherhood has originated from all the religious schools. The Christian doctrine basis its ethics on the notion: 'God is the father of human race, men his children, owe Him an account of their acts... Love of God, the father of all men, is to be translated into the accomplishment of the law of neighbourly love, that is to say, the love of all men.' Likewise the Muslim doctrine teaches the universal brotherhood and the love of one's fellow men. The same doctrine of universal brotherhood and world peace is taught in the Sikh religion. Buddhism has its dogma of universal love, altruism and non-violence. The Pratyabhijna Philosophy, which is indeed a revaluation of Indian Philosophy, has also recognised universal brotherhood and equality of all men, as it has aptly established the fact that it is one Universal Soul which lives in all mankind. These truths are now admitted as the essentials of human culture. The highest objective of the Indian Philosophy is the peaceful existence and welfare of the whole human race. This is best expressed in the Ishavasyopanishada 6 & 7 :

वशिष्ठ सर्वोपरि मूलान्यात्मन्येवात् पद्यति। सर्वभूतात् चाल्मान् ततो न विजयं स्वच्छः।
(He who sees all creatures in himself, himself in all creatures, does not show abhorrence to any one 6.) (Knowing all living beings to be one's own self, seeing the unity of mankind, how can there be delusion, suffering or sorrow ? 7). Lasting peace of mankind (Vishva-shanti) is the sumnum bonum of the Upanishads which is also the aim of every religious doctrine. In the words of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, what we need is "a recognition of those supreme ends of life to which science and organization, discipline and obedience are to be harnessed." Human culture that the Indian philosophy teaches is 'an evolution of man towards his emancipation, his liberation from material dangers, his advance to a state in which all the sublìme germs of which he is the chosen vessel may develop—Art, Science, the social idea, the philosophic idea......' It is therefore a mistake to suppose that Indian Philosophy is in contradiction with all the causes of human progress, Science, Technology and the idea of Society. The recent events have shown that Indian
Philosophy or Indian culture has done the greatest service to mankind otherwise all humanity would have been menaced with destruction. It is, in fact, leading the world to real peace and progress.

The major part of this work is primarily based on the direct study of the texts on the subject. The earlier works by various scholars have been drawn upon firstly for supplying the needs of the general readers and secondly for a critical and comparative examination of different views held.

**Glimpses of the present Study**:—The main body of the treatise is divided into three parts, Part I—“Origin and Development of the Pratyabhijna System”, Part II—“Exposition of its doctrines” and Part III—“Its place in Indian and Western systems of Philosophy.”

**Part I (Origin and Development)**:—At the very outset of this part, the controvertial viewpoint of some scholars are discussed with reference to (1) the name of the system, (2) the time of the existence of the Pratyabhijna Philosophy, according to Dr. K. C. Pandey, (3) the time of the existence of the system, according to Dr. Lachmi Dhar, (4) The connection of this Philosophy with Shankaracharya’s school of Vedanta and (5) a tradition in Kashmir about the differences between the Pratyabhijna Philosophy and the Vedanta system. All these discussions bring out the following results:

(i) **The name of the system** :—Dr. Pandey prefers to call this system ‘Trikā’ as he says, in his book “Abhinavagupta” (An Historical and Philosophical Study), “It is a misnomer to call this system of Philosophy ‘Pratyabhijna’ or ‘Spanda’ as much as it would be to call India ‘Calcutta’ or ‘Bombay’.” Dr. Pandey does not seem to be differentiating the ‘Pratyabhijna’ as ‘Philosophy proper of the Trika system’ (as Pt. Madhusudan Koul puts it in his perface to Ishvara Pratyabhijna Vimarshini Vol. I); Trika is the name of the non-dualistic system of Shaiva cult of which ‘Pratyabhijna’ is the Philosophical part. It is the latter part only which can be called the “Pratyabhijna Philosophy,” but the whole Trika system cannot be called the “Trika Philosophy,” Sixty four systems of the Shaiva cult have been enumerated in the Shaiva scriptures which include Trika as one of them. These are all the religious systems but not the philosophical schools. Pratyabhijna is the name given by Utpaladeva to this philosophical system which is treated of by him in his work “Ishvara Pratyabhijna Karikas (Sutras).” But before Utpaladeva
gave this name to the system, it appears to be called "Shaiva Darshana" as is apparent from the title of the Somananda's work "Shivadrshti." This system must have been known as Pratyabhijnja system in the later ages as it is so called by Madhavacharya in his Sarvadarshana Samgraha in the 14th century A.D. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan also calls it the Pratyabhijnja system in his 'Indian Philosophy' (Vol, II) for the said reason. Dr. Pandey brings to notice elsewhere that the system is also known as Svatatraya-vada and Abhasavada, but these are the names of the various doctrines of the system and as such can not be the names of the whole system. The system is also generally called "Kashmir Shaivism", the name given to it by J.C. Chatterji, because all writers on it belonged to Kashmir. It is however, concluded that the system, which we mean a philosophic system, cannot be called by any other name, Trika, Spanda, Svatatrayavada or Abhasada or a more general name Shaiva system, except the Pratyabhijnja system.

(ii) Emergence of Pratyabhijnja School:—The Pratyabhijnja system arose in Kashmir in the second half of the ninth century A.D. Somananda was the founder of this school, as he, for the first time, briefly laid down its main doctrines in his work 'Shivadrshti.' Utpaladeva, the disciple of Somananda, who lived in the tenth century A.D., was the systematiser of the Philosophy. He formulated the doctrines taught by his teacher in his Ishvara Pratyabhijnja Karikas (or Sutras). The well-known Ahhinavagupta, who flourished towards the eleventh Century A.D., made this philosophy intelligible in his two commentaries (one short and the other long) on Pratyabhijnja Karikas, namely the Vimarschini and the Vivrti-vimarschini. He, therefore, occupies the same position in this realm of thought as the expounder of the system like the great Shankaracharya in the domain of Vedanta.

(iii) Its connection with other systems of Indian Philosophy:— The Kashmir Shaivas claim that the system, which they generally call by the name "Trika" is the highest monistic system based throughout on the sacred authority of Shaivagamas, to which they ascribe divine origin and eternal existence. They do not at all recognise the authority of the Vedic scriptures; but they aim at refuting the view points of the Vedanta and other systems evolved from the Vedic sources. They assign superiority to the Pratyabhijnja system which, in their view, is the only perfect and correct system transcending all other systems of philosophy. It will be clear from the following pages that in its main doctrines the Pratyabhijnja
system is not fundamentally different from the Vedanta, as initially set forth in the Upanishadas, which are the fountain-head of all the systems of thought in India, the Sankhya, the Vaisheshika, the Vaiyakarana (the Gremmarians' School), the Buddhist, and the Vedanta and so on. It will be observed that there is a common theme in all these philosophical systems in India. The same is the central theme in the Pratyabhijna system, or, as a matter of fact, of any other Shaiva system in India. These systems, however, differ from one another in holding different points of view, in propounding some new doctrines of their own and also adopting different nomenclature, viz. technical terms. The Shaivaites, the originators of the system, have incorporated most of the ideas from the Sankhya, the Vaiyakarana, the Buddhist and the Vedanta systems and have presented their various doctrines in a technique of their own, based upon certain tenets derived from Shaivagamas, which distinguish the Pratyabhijna system from the other systems.

**Religious and Philosophical Background:** Part I of the work further gives a study of the religious and philosophic background which brought about the emergence of Pratyabhijna school in Kashmir. The evidences show that there existed in Kashmir in very ancient times a polytheistic religion, which included, among many other primitive types of worships, the worship of the aboriginal deities such as God Shiva, Vinayaka, Various Vedic and Puranic Gods, and even the worship of the Buddha as an Autar. We learn that Shiva worship occupied the first place among the Hindu cults of the valley from the earliest times. While a number of old cults and religious practices flourished in Kashmir, at times, various religious and philosophical doctrines reached there from outside its boundaries. Buddhism, a historic movement, spreading far and wide, was also welcomed by Kashmiris near about the time of Ashoka (273-232 B.C.). Kashmiris became active participants in the Buddhist ideology since that time. Nagasen (150 B.C.), the reputed author of Milinda-Panha, is said to be a Kashmirian. Kumaralabdha, one of the four luminaries of Buddhism, is also known to be a Kashmiri. Nagarjuna, a native of Berar, stayed to study in Kashmir for long. ‘Ashvagosha is said to have been brought by Kanishka (78-102 A.C.) from Patliputra to Kashmir to function as the Vice-President of the Great Buddhist Council held in the Kundala-Vana-Vihara (near about the present Harwan water reservoir) in Kashmir.’ (Research-I P. 4). Dr. Pandey writes that ‘Buddhism had a strong hold in Kashmir since the time of Ashoka. It was in Kasmira that Kanishka
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convoked an assembly of the Buddhist theologians.....Its existence was particularly felt by the Shaivasa when Kanishka made a gift of Kasmira (Kanishka-puram) to Buddhist church and Nagarjuna came to power and began to spread Buddhism. The aggressive attitude of Nagarjuna is referred to by Kalhana and by Varadaraja in his Shivasutra-vartika.' (History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western, Vol. I, Chapter by Dr. Pandey, P. 381) Buddhism and Brahmanic cults, however, existed peacefully side by side in Kashmir for centuries before Kalhana’s time (cf. Chronicle of the Kings of Kashmir, Introduction P. 9). Heun Tsang who, visited Kashmir during the years 630-645 A.D., and Ou-Kong, who visited the valley during 759-763 A. D. witnessed Buddhism flourishing in the country and being patronised by the rulers. Inspite of the phenomenal success which Buddhism had in Kashmir, Shaivism continued to be a vital force from the past. A revival of Shaivism, however, came in Kashmir from the seventh century A.D. Shankaracharya (780-812 A.D.) is said to have visited Kashmir to give a final blow to Buddhism there. Eighth and ninth centuries of the Christian era seem to have witnessed a religious upheaval in the valley of Kashmir (Introduction to Ishvara-Pratyabhijna Vimarshini, P. I.), as a result of which Buddhism appears to be disappearing and the old Hinduism, particularly Shaivism, taking hold of the people. Consequently, Kashmir was the meeting-ground of the various philosophical currents at the time of the rise of the monistic Shaivism (History of Philosophy Eastern and Western, Vol. I, P. 381, Chapter by Dr. Pandey). In the ninth century A.D., there existed a concourse of various religious and philosophical ideas as professsed by Buddhists and the followers of other orthodox creeds: the Vaidyakas, the Shaivas, the Shaktas, the Vaiyakaranas (Grammarians), the Sankhyas, the Naiyiyikas, the Vedantins and upholders of the Yoga systems. It was from all these prevailing ideas that the Pratyabhijna system of Philosophy emerged in the Shaiva-fold in the valley of Kashmir. The work further gives a brief survey of the earlier speculations and philosophical doctrines in the Vedas, the Upanishadas and the Buddhist sources and also in the various systems of philosophy prevailing in the valley before the emergence of the Pratyabhijna school. From these studies it is concluded that the origination of the Pratyabhijna school was, in fact, nothing new but only a logical development of the philosophic and religious ideas already existing in Kashmir.

Development of the Pratyabhijna system:-- Part I of the work further gives a brief history of the development of the Pratyabhi-
jna system on the basis of the Shaiva literature. It distinguishes the two stages of its development viz., (1) the earlier stage as revealed in the teachings of Somananda in his work Shivadrshhti, (The name of the Somananda's system appears to be still "Shiva Dharshana" by which any Shaiva System was generally called in ancient days. Somananda refutes all the other systems, not only of Vaidyakas but also different schools of Shaivas and Shaktas and introduces in his work new trends of thought and view-points which were later on systematised by his pupil Utpaladeva.) and (2) The later stage of its development in the final form as formulated by Utpaladeva in his work, the Ishvara Pratyabhijna Karikas or Sutras. These were expounded by Abhinavagupta in his two commentaries, one short, called Vimarshini, and the other long, called Vivrtti Vimarshini. At the later stage Utpaladeva evidently names the system as the "Pratyabhijna Darshana" indicated by the title of his work "Ishvara Pratyabhijna Sutras." The work gives next a brief history of the pioneers of the system and their attainments and works.

Part II "Exposition of its Doctrines":- In this part attempt is made to expound the various tenets of Pratyabhijna system from the first-hand study of the original texts. The doctrines of the system in the earlier and the later stages of development are separately treated in two different sections. A free translation of the ideas given in the relevant texts, Shivadrshhti and Ishvara Pratyabhijna Karikas and Vimarshini, etc. has been given in proper context for a faithful representation of various doctrines of the system. All these doctrines are put together in the present work in such a manner as to form a compact whole of the Pratyabhijna Philosophy. No attempt has been made to give the literal translation of the Sutras or the commentaries. On the other hand, clear exposition of the doctrines is aimed at by interpreting as much of the comprehensive and difficult texts as possible. It may be stated here for the information of the readers that the English translation of the Ishvara Pratyabhijna Vimarshini by Dr. K. C. Pandey has already appeared in "The Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhawana Texts," (as No. 48)

Brief idea of Somananda's doctrines:- Somananda's work Shivadrshhti consists of 7 chapters (Ahnikas), the purport of which is as follows :- Chapter I of the work explains why and how the Ultimate Cause Shiva materializes in a concrete form of the universe consisting of diverse
animate and inanimate objects. Shiva constitutes the ‘essence and identity’ (Self) of every being; He abounds in bliss and consciousness and is all-pervasive. (गृहीम्भ सर्वभावेभु शुरुनिद्रार्थं विचित्रितम्) He is an unrestrained stream of ‘Will’ (free will) and a spontaneous flow of ‘Cognition’ and ‘Activity’. (अनिवल्क्ष्याप्रसरं प्रसर्द इतु क्रिया शिवं) (Shivadrshhti—1, 2)

This benign principle - Shiva-Tattva, the Ultimate Reality, is eternal and endless. (शिवतत्वं नित्यमन्तकम्) From his native characteristics bliss (Nirvrti) and consciousness (Chit), comprising his transcendental state, stream forth sovereignty of ‘will’ and powers of ‘knowledge’ and Action, (Iccha shakti, jnana shakti and kriya shakti), From them emanate thirty six Tattvas (the principles of creation) from which evolves the whole universe consisting of diverse creation. Somananda, like Schopenhauer, the German Voluntarist, postulates the doctrine of ‘Will as the (first) cause of everything’, ‘Will’ as a force of spontaneity (urgency), instinct and spring of life. Power of ‘Will’ (Iccha shakti) is the initial or the basic power, the root cause of all creation. Schopenhauer holds that the chief place in Philosophy belongs not to the intellect, but to the ‘will’—

“A motion and spirit that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thoughts,
And rolls through all things,”

In this doctrine of ‘sovereignty of will’ Somananda represents the voluntaristic tendency of thought. The teacher next explains Shiva’s Transcendence and Immanence. His Transcendence, called Para or Annutara dasha, is that state in which He exists in the plenitude of his powers (shaktis) of will, cognition and action. His immanence, called Apara dasha, is that state in which He transforms Himself in diverse limited objects of the universe. Somananda further describes the first process of creation and its subsequent processes and the final process of diversified creations. In this doctrine a controversy is raised and Somananda answers all the objections.

In Chapter II of the work, Somananda enunciates and refutes the theory of Vaiyakaranas (Grammarians) according to which the Pashyanti Vak (the Transcendental word) is the ultimate cause of the universe. This chapter gives a long controversy with the Grammarians regarding this doctrine in which are brought out the essential characteristics of the Ultimate Cause, viz. the powers of will, knowledge
and action, which make it potent to evolve the creation. The Grammarians' theory, Shabdabrahmavada, is thus refuted. According to Somananda, the Para, the primordial state of Pashyanti Vak is the Ultimate.

In Chapter III of Shivadrshti is rejected the view upheld by the Shakta viz. Shaktyadvayavada, according to which Shakti (Power) independent of Shiva as Shaktiman (One possessing Power) is the Supreme Cause. Attacks are also directed against Dualistic Shaivas and the followers of Yoga Philosophy. In Chapter IV of his work Somananda criticises summarily a number of other systems, such as, the various schools of Buddhism and the monistic Vedanta, the Jainism, the Sankhya, the Nyaya, the Vaishehika and so on. He thus distinctly refers to the various schools of thought prevailing in his time, all of which he considers illogical and unsound, and makes a rationalistic approach to the problem concerning the Ultimate Reality according to the points of view of the School of the Monistic Shaivas which he represents. In Chapter V, Somananda demonstrates the identity in nature of all animate and inanimate objects in this diverse world and gives proofs in support of the Monistic doctrine. Somananda brings here a controversy. An objection is raised: if we admit all that exists is one Shiva, there arise the impossibilities of practical life. Somananda explains that, notwithstanding every thing in nature being identical, all the acts of practical life are real since they proceed from the self-dependent power (Svatantrya Shakti) of the Ultimate Being (Lord) who materialises himself in the form of all the created beings. There arises no question of violating the practice of the world and our duties with regard to it. It cannot, therefore, be assumed that virtue (dharma) and vice (adharma) cannot affect pure Shiva in the form of Jiva; the books and teachers are not necessary for imparting knowledge to omniscient Shiva in the form of a disciple; and so on. All these essentials of practical life are real and not useless (Shivadrsti III). Just as a Yogin does not get himself divided in the various bodies created by him by his power of Tapas, the Lord does not undergo division by the various objects of superior, middle and inferior classes created by him like an ocean by ripples and waves (Shivadrshti III 36 & 37). In canto VI of the work Somananda considers all other systems objectionable, being faulty or deficient. In the last Chapter of his work, he gives the sumnum bonum of his system, stating that Recognitive realization (Pratyabhijna) only enables a person to attain extraordinary powers and ultimately
leads him to final beatitude. The Recognition is the means of realizing Shiva as immanent in the universe by the process of simultaneously perceiving (drashta) and recalling (smarna) the characteristics existing eternally in Him and not unrealised before (Nanamubhutaḥ) (Ibid. IV, 118, 119 & 120.)

Somananda says, whether Shiva is realized or unrealized, there is no cessation of His nature. Whether fire is known or not known, it will not cease to give light and heat; if a piece of gold remains unknown, it will not change into a piece of stone. (Shivadrshiti VII,1—2) But if the nature of fire is known that it gives light and heat, its knowledge enables us to make proper use of it for lighting our houses and other purposes. विष्णुवाचः प्रसादात् करोत्वस्यीत समाप्तिः वृक्ष्य ज्ञानारसीष्ठि गृहेः (Ibid. 10-11.)

Similarly by knowing the value and the qualities of the gold we can make proper use of it. Thus if the nature of Shiva-Atman (Self) is known, proper use of His powers—iccha, jnana and kriya—will enable us to accomplish our desired objects. According to Somananda, in the words of Dr. Pandey, the realization consists 'not in the actualization of the potential; nor in the attainment of something new; nor in knowing what was unknown before; but in penetrating through the veil, that makes the Maheshvara appear as the individual, of which every one is immediately aware, and in recognising the Maheshvara in the individual. He holds that the individual is essentially free; freedom is the inner being of the individual. But it is hidden by the veil of ignorance. The ignorance has to be removed to recognise it, to realise it as identical with the Reality, (Dr. Pandey, Introduction to Bhaskari, Vol. II pp. v and vi)

Utpaladeva’s approach to the Pratyabhijna Philosophy: Utpaladeva’s work—Ishvara Pratyabhijna Karikas (Sutras)—is divided into four sections—Adhikaras. The first section—Jnanadhikara deals with Cognition; the second section—Kriyadhikara treats of Activity; the third section—Agama-dhikara discusses the 36 principles (Tattvas) of Shaiva school; and the fourth section - Tatvvarthasaamgraha-dhikara relates to the essential nature of the Supreme Being and recapitulates the doctrines expounded in the foregoing Adhikaras. In all 16 Añnikas (cántos) of the work cover all the four sections.

In Añnika I of Section I of the work, Utpaladeva follows his teacher in attributing the powers of Action and Cognition, or the same
in reverse order, to the Self, the Ultimate Cause (called in his system Mehesvarya) as His two primary powers. Later he assigns the Sover-
reignty of Will (साधारण्) also as another primary power to the Ultimate
Cause. All creation from an atom to a mountain, all that lives or
can be said to exist in any form, in the form of sentient or insen-
tient object, microcosm or macrocosm, is endowed with these two
characteristics (यो हि जानाति च करोति च सत्तिवति ) In the Introduc-
tory verse (I, 1) of his work Utpaladeva says, "...Wishing to help
men I set forth the Pratyabhijna Philosophy which is the means of
attaining all that is of highest value". (The original line is quoted on P. 7)
On this point the teacher introduces a discussion. The Purvapakshin
questions, when Atman (Self) is the self-luminous Mehesvarya, the
Ultimate Being, Actor and the Knower, where arises the occasion for
His Recognition or realisation? All talk of establishing or rejecting
the existence of such an eternal and conscious Being is in vain.
(केदिर ज्ञातिव वात्सन्यादिविदिष्टे सहप्रदेरे। अजजार्जमा निषेध या सिद्धि वा
विद्वत्त कः: 1, 2.) The Uttarapakshin, the teacher, answers the question :
although Atman is self-luminous, yet His real nature is not manifest
due to His own deluding power (साय निमोहिनी शक्ति ). It, however,
becomes manifest by his own perceiving power (हृद्विक्षयातिस्क शक्ति )
which remains hidden from awareness due to his innate delusion. It
is the Recognitive insight (Pratyabhijna) which revives this perceiving
power. (किंतु मोहयशादिमन्दिरुपयुपलचिते शक्तिवाग्निकरोऽस्यं प्रत्यमिहिलोद्दर्थे
13.) The Purvapakshin questions again, the perceiving power can be
possible with regard to sentient beings only; how is it to be assigned
to insentient objects? The teacher answers the question : the existence
of insentient objects depends upon sentient beings, for it is an admit-
ted fact that the life of all living things comprises 'Knowledge' and
'Action.' Thus in their very manifestation the insentient objects are
also endowed with these two characteristics. Again, the Purvapakshin
questions, how is the existence of Knowledge and Action as two
primary powers of Atman to be proved? The teacher says, Out of
these two, Knowledge is self-established (स्वतः सिद्धम् ) whereas Action
(which is also self-establishe (स्वतः सिद्धा ) is associated with a body
(किया-कायात्मकात्मक ) and is thus perceptible to other perceivers; and
it is through Action that others' Knowledge can be inferred. In this
manner all the objections with regard to Recognition are waived. (Ref. Pratyabhijna Sutras 1, 4 and 5.)

In the next two Ahnikas (Cantos 2 & 3) the teacher introduces another discussion to refute the theory of Buddhist Saugatases, according to which the perceiving Self is not a permanent being. The theory of the Saugatases is based on their doctrine of General Momentariness. Utpaladeva rejects the theory mainly on the ground of the phenomena of remembrance, and establishes the existence of permanent Self. He says, if we do not admit a persisting Self, the settled order of the world will not be possible. In the state of General Momentariness, even perception is impossible, since the three notions occurring in this experience viz. 'I', 'awareness' and the 'object', belonging to three different moments of time, can not be joined together in one identical relation. The Buddhists have no reason to suppose that these three notions do not involve three successive stages. On the other hand, we are conscious of our identity that we persist in all our changing states of consciousness, and though our ideas are continuously changing with the changing objects, we remain unchanged all the same, and this shows that in knowing ourselves as pure 'awareness', we are successively connected with the changing objects. The existence of a permanent entity persisting in the changing states of consciousness is established as a matter of our common experience, as it is this persisting entity Self which, in the later state of remembrance, remembers an object which he perceives in the previous state. On this point the Purvapakshin states that 'it is the residual trace or impression (Samskar) that causes remembrance. Therefore, it is unnecessary to assume the existence of another superfluous entity, Atman'. Utpaladeva replies this point saying that one perception, say, the perception of sight differs from another, say, the perception of taste. As stated by the Purvapakshin (Baudhha), remembrance of previous perception arises from the residual trace or impression (Samskar) which is supposed to be the common ground of perceptions without recourse to a persisting self. By such an assumption it follows that one impression (Samskar), say, the impression of sight-perception should cause the remembrance of a different perception, say, taste-perception and vice versa. This evidently leads us to impossibilities, unless we admit the existence of a persisting Self.

Who experiences different states of consciousness.

After proving the existence of a permanent Self (Atman), called
Glimpses of the Present Study.

Mahesvara, Utpaladeva states that He is endowed with three powers, viz. the power of Remembrance (Smarana Shakti), the power of Knowledge (Jnana shakti) and the power of Differentiation (Aphohana shakti) which are the three forms of Cognitive Power (Jnaratva shakti), the first Primary power assigned to the Self. The Power of Remembrance (Smarana Shakti) is that power by virtue of which Atman who experiences the perception of an object in one state, remembers the same in another state. In the latter state the Self is rememberer (smarata). In the absence of remembrance also the self still exists possessing the power of Remembrance (Smarana shakti), as one of his powers or faculties. The power of remembrance is fully discussed in Ahnika 4. The power of Knowledge (Jnana shakti) functions in making objects manifest externally in the form of their perceptions which existed within in the form of self-consciousness. By virtue of this power the Self takes out for separate manifestation only certain things from the unlimited mass which lies merged in it (स्वरूपपाइन्यममाभासायति). The real nature of objects, according to the system, is Prakasha (manifestation) (प्रक्षेत्र एव अचर्याति स्वरूपम्) which is innate in Jnana shakti. From this point of view objects are real against the Vijnana-vadin’s theory that they are the transformation of our Vasana (desires) and do not have separate real existence. The processes (Vritis) of mind (Antah Karana) viz. will (iccha), Knowledge (Jnana) and action (Kriya) function by the power of Knowledge (Jnana shakti). The power of Knowledge is explained in detail in Ahnika 5. The power of Differentiation (Aphohana shakti) is that power of Self which enables Him to manifest one object, say, a jar (ghata) different from any other object, non-jar (aghata), or the appearance (Prakasha) of an object different from its disappearance (Aprakasha). The doctrine concerning the power of differentiation is expounded in Ahnika 6. After explaining the functions of these three powers, Utpaladeva proves that they rest in one substratum, the lasting Self (Atman), the Maheshvara. This is established on logical grounds in Ahnika 7. Maheshvara is assigned the sovereignty of will (माहेश्वर्यं) or Volitional power (Iccha shakti) as its another Primary power. Somananda has treated this as the first or basic power in Shivadrshti I. This power, माहेश्वर्यं, is explained by Utpaladeva in Pratyabhijna Sutras (Ahnika 8) in a novel way. Here he introduces two new theories, (1) Svanatrya-vada and (2) Abhasavada which are explained elsewhere in this chapter.
Section 2 (Kriyadhidikara) of the work deals with Kriya-shakti (the power of physical Activity), the second primary power of the Ultimate Reality. The whole creation or, in other words, manifestation is the result of the Kriya shakti; as under the operation of its three laws, viz: the law of Division (विभाजन), the law of perception (मान तत्काल), and the law of Causation (कारण कारण) it turns into a constituent power (निर्माण शक्ति) which brings into existence the whole cosmos. In section I of Kriyadhidikara, Utpaladeva discusses the nature of Kriya-shakti. In regard to this, the Purvapakshin questions: Kriya involves succession (krama) causing plurality which is contrary to the nature of Self Who is, in essence, devoid of plurality, according to the Monistic Doctrine of Shaivas. The Uttrapakshin, teacher, answers as follows:—Action (Kriya) involves plurality on account of the function of काल शक्ति (principle of time). Plurality is the result of perception of an object at different moments of time:— खल: सृष्टि संचारस्तत्तप्रणालि जन्म व ए। श्रीतीवं बाथ तत्तत्वः क्रम एव संस्करः। Self possessing the Kriya-shakti as one of His primary powers is unaffected by Kala-Shakti and is thus free from the nature of plurality. The teacher explains plurality also by the theory of Manifestation (Abhasa-vada), which is a quite new theory in the Pratyabhijna Philosophy. According to this theory, Atman or Maheshvara (Lord) is the Manifester of diverse manifestations (चिन्त्राभासकलः प्रस्तो) in the form of various objects of this universe. The Kala Shakti of this Lord (Atman) differentiates various manifestations at different moments of time as distinct entities. By this theory of manifestation (Abhassavada) are also explained the relations of Plurality and Unity (Bhedabheda), the relation of ‘Subject,’ ‘awareness’ and the ‘object’ (Pramata, Pramana and Prameya) and the relation of Cause and Effect (Karana karaya), in conformity with the doctrine of Monism (Advaita). Ultimately there exists Unity in Plurality (Bhedabheda). This is the first or the fundamental law of Kriya Shakti of which the other two laws, the law of Perception and the law of Causation, are derivatives or corollaries. These three laws are comprehensively discussed, in three separate sections of Kriyadhidikara, in Utpaladeva’s work. Thus in this system One Lord is both the Manifester subject (Aham) and the manifested object (Idam). The manifested world is analysed into thirty-six Categories (or principles of Creation) called Tattvas, from Shiva, the highest principle, to the earth, the principle of solidity.
GLIMPSES OF THE PRESENT STUDY.

Part III, Agamadhihikara, of Utpaladeva’s work treats of different supernatural elements as derived from the dogmas of the Agama-shastra. After describing the thirty-six Categories of Abhasa-vada, it gives the pure and impure creation of perceivers (Pramatas); the bondage (Samsara) and freedom (Svatantrya); the impurities (Malas)—Anava (the innate impurity), Mayiya (the impurity caused by the principle of limitation—Maya) and Karmiya (impurity in the shape of lack of knowledge of right and wrong actions); the different states of perceivers, viz. Jagarat (waking), Svapana (dreaming), Sushupti (dreamless sleep), Turya (fourth state) and Turyatita (beyond the fourth state); released souls (Pati) and the other perceivers (Pasu); common creation; the two classes of Samsarins (worldly men); four methods of realisation for liberation (freedom), Shambhavopaya, Shaktopaya, Anavopaya and Anupaya and so on. (The fourth and fifth states given above are those of the Yogin’s intuition).

Part IV, Tattva-samgrahadhikara, the last part of the Utpaladeva’s work, recapitulates all the important doctrines of the Pratyabhijna system as discussed in the first three parts of the work and explains further the essential nature of the Highest Being which is the Self of all living beings (स्वातंत्र्य विभिन्न ज्ञात्वमेव एव महे महात्मा:). The sumnum bonum of this system is to ‘recognise’ the supreme and free nature of Self realizing that all this world is one’s own creation (सर्वत्र विभिन्न तत्त्वं द्वितीय विधानतं). Thus fully knowing one’s Self and its highest potential powers of Cognition and Action, one thinks and acts in a right manner to see all his desired objects accomplished. (एकत्वासारे सत्यायत्निकते तथा। ज्ञात्वमेव विभिन्न तत्त्वं परिधानतं।) (Ishara Pratyabhijna Sutras IV, 1.) The gratification one feels by realizing one’s self as supreme and free soul is best described by Utpaladeva by the example of the proverbial maiden (in Ahnika IV, 2) of the work: ‘A certain damsel, hearing of the many good qualities of a particular gallant, fell in love with him and agitated by her passion and unable to suffer the pain caused by his absence from her, wrote to him a love letter describing her condition. He at once came to her; but when she saw him, she did not recognise in him the qualities she had heard about; he appeared much the same as any other person and she found no gratification in his society. Soon, however, as she recognised those qualities (in him) as her companion now pointed them out, she was fully gratified. Similarly one cannot get
the real happiness unless one recognises the nature of Supreme Self in one's individual self.’ (तैलेश्वर्याविविधातास्ततत्त्वज्ञान: स्थितोऽपवित्तनेकेनाम लोकसमान एवमपरिच्छेत न रन्न्यथा। लोकस्य तथा...) When one recognises one's profounder Self, he feels that he has attained what is of highest value, as he will not be wanting anything because of his former inferiority complex, since he finds that his own profounder faculties, now-recognised, are there to provide him what he wants and to lead him to final beatitude. Utpaladeva says, at the end, that he has set forth this Ishvara Pratyabhijna “in order that common man may have the transcendental power (Siddhi) without much effort.” (जनस्यायतनसिद्धिग्रहम...इश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञनयुग्लोकलोच्छोपदिता)

Part III “Place of Pratyabhijna in Indian and Western systems of Philosophy”:- This part of the work reviews the allied philosophical movements in India and the West as represented by (1) the Shaiva systems of India; (2) The Vedic and Buddhist Systems of Indian Philosophy; and (3) the Western Schools of Philosophy. A comparison and contrast is made between the various doctrines of the Pratyabhijna system and the allied doctrines of other schools to indicate the distinctive features of this system and in what respects it transcends the other systems.

Philosophic Movements in India and the West :- In the development of philosophical thought in India there arose two main movements, the Vedic and the non-Vedic. The Vedic movement grew within the ambit of Vedic scriptures and the non-Vedic movement developed from the Shaivagamas, Shaiva scriptures. The former movement started sometime between second and third millenium B.C. when Aryans settled in this country and produced their literature, known as the Vedic literature. Some hymns of the Rig-veda, the oldest of the Vedas, and the later Vedic literature, the Upanishadas indicate that various speculations were held by the Vedic Indians regarding the origin and nature of creation. The Shaiva movement in India dates from centuries earlier than the Vedic movement. The inscriptions of Mohenjo-daro and Harappa have revealed that the Shaiva cult was in vogue as far back as 3000 B.C. Sir John Marshall says, “Amongst the many revelations that Mohenjo-daro and Harappa have had in store for us, none perhaps is more remarkable than the discovery that Shaivism had a history going back to the Chalcolithic age or perhaps even farther still. The philosophical specula-
tions seem to have also been growing among the Shaivas who lived side by side with Vaidyakas and Baudhas long before the Christian era. In Europe, the philosophic conceptions started in Greece with the question ‘what constitutes the primordial natural force-principle,’ from about 600 B.C., when Thales declared water to be the first principle—the Universal Substratum, Prima Materia of all things, of which the other bodies are mere modifications.” Thales was followed by other Greek philosophers, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Pythagoras and so on who in the beginnig held materialistic conception of the Universal Substratum or the Prima Materia of all things. It is said that Philosophy has its origin in the Greek race; but the Greeks themselves supposed their early teachers to have imbibed wisdom at the eastern fount.

Indian Philosophy (Vedic and Buddhist) :-) It is difficult to indicate with any degree of certainty the different stages in the development of thought in India. But it is certain that long before the composition of the hymns of the Rig-veda, Indo-Aryans had outstripped the primitive simplicity of thought and had developed the conception of gods as forces behind the natural phenomena. From the cosmogonic hymns, or the hymns of creation, which we find in the tenth Mandala of the Rig-veda, it is evident that the Vedic Indians produced deep philosophical speculations expressing their growing curiosity to know the origin and nature of creation. N. Mukharji, the author of “A Study of Shankara” is justified to state, “It is therefore that the question that man has asked in all ages and in every clime, has found expression in the hymns of the Rig-veda not in its primitive simplicity but with timeless and universal moulding that the vision of a poet or seer could give it.” In the words of the Vedic seer को बहुः वेद क इह प्रवीचन्तू कृतः चानाता कृत mumhni (Who knows truly? Who shall here declares, whence it has been produced; whence is this creation?) we find the primitive inquiries made in the hoary ages regarding the Ultimate Cause of this creation, which are indeed the beginnings of the philosophical thinking in India. In the Vedic movement, in fact, various tendencies or currents of thought appear growing and changing, Naturalism, Anthropomorphism, Monotheism and finally Monism. The Vedic thinkers were led to suppose that there is one divinity, one superior power, which they called by various names and spoke in various ways: इन्द्रे मित्रे बहुमानिमाद्वयो विश्वः समुपष्टों गुरुमानाः। एकः सदिद्धा वद्धः वदन्वयन्ति यन्म्.
such monotheistic ideas later gave rise to various speculations about the nature of this divinity or Godhead, the Ultimate cause of life and existence in an individual (microcosm) and in the universe (macrocosm) around, as we find in the Upanishadas, the later literary product of the Vedic age, which are the fountain-head of the Monistic doctrines. It is from this ultimate source that Shankara's system of Vedanta and the Pratyabhijna Philosophy developed in the Vedic and non-Vedic folds respectively.

It is said that the philosophic spirit grew in India from the age of the Buddha, before the country had developed any philosophy proper on rational basis; It is, however, apparent that Philosophical speculations had already grown in the Vedic age as indicated by some philosophic hymns in the Rig Veda and the Upanishadas. Rational thinking originated when Buddhists questioned about the different speculations of the Vaidyakas. The earliest philosophic doctrines, such as Vijhana-vada and Kshanka-vada evolved from Buddhists. Later on the speculations of the Upanishadas assumed different forms in various systems of philosophy which developed in post-Vedic ages. Definite doctrines and different philosophic theories evolved from various schools of thought, such as, Dvaita (Dualism), Advaita (non-dualism), Vishishtadvaita (modified non-dualism) and Dvaitadvaita (Unity in difference). The last theory ultimately culminated in the non-dualistic doctrine of Shankracharya.

Shaivistic Philosophy: It has been stated above that the Shaiva cult was in vogue as far back as 3000 B.C., centuries earlier than the Vedic age. The history of Shiva-worship in India shows that it is of pre-Aryan origin. There are numerous references in Vedic literature which show that worship of Shiva was in vogue in the country in the Vedic age. Some of the references clearly indicate that this form of worship was gradually borrowed by Aryans from non-Aryans. Round this Shiva-worship there grew a mass of literature belonging to Shiva-shakti cults, which is known as “Agamas and Tentras”. It developed through ages side by side with and possibly independent of the Vedic scriptures. Shaivas seem to have borrowed most of the ideas from the scriptures of the Vaidyakas. Consequently, in a place like India, where different school's of thought had grown in the Vedic fold, development of similar schools within the ambit of Shaiva fold was but inevitable. Shri S. G. Sakharpekar mentions, in his address on “Shaivagama”
Western Philosophy:- The earliest Greek speculators, like the first Indian thinkers, were the physical philosophers, who assigned the Cause of the universe to various original substances like elemental water, air, fire, or all the four elements, or atoms. Some assigned it to abstractions like numbers or 'One' as the beginning of all things, or one God or one Finite or Infinite being and so on. Various other schools conceived the Ultimate Cause as pure Being, the one universal essence; subjective conception; or the totality of thought. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel finally represent the three idealistic movements of the later Western Philosophy. Fichte's Subjective Idealism explains that the object-tree and its image is the modification of my mind; Schelling's Objective Idealism states that both the ego and object (tree) are existences equally real but they are nothing less than manifestations of the Absolute; and lastly Hegel's Absolute Idealism explains that the only thing really existing is the idea—the relation. The ego and object (tree) are but two terms of the relation and owe their reality to it. These idealistic trends in the Western philosophy were followed by the later rationalistic speculations and gradually the Schools of Positive Philosophy and the Scientific Philosophy came into existence. The criterion of philosophical quests was realized as is put in the words: "Knowledge of the lowest kind is the ununified knowledge; Science is partially-unified knowledge; Philosophy is completely-unified knowledge." In this conception, philosophy is the 'knowledge of the highest degree of generality' which is its definition in the simplest and the clearest form. The end of Philosophy was thus understood the achievement of the unification of knowledge. Further scientific inquiry into various physical
phénomena revealed certain primary truths, or general laws of nature, such as, 'the Indestructibility of Matter', 'the Continuity of Motion' and 'the Persistence of Force' of which the last is the Ultimate and the others derivative. The truth that force can neither arise out of nothing nor lapse into nothing was also observed and it was found that all phenomenal changes are direct or indirect results of the 'Persistence of Force'. But this truth can never be more than partially proved. Herbert Spencer who represents this trend of thought in the Western Philosophy, however, felt the existence of some Unknown Reality of which Matter, Motion, and Force are but symbols. The force was ultimately accepted as the beginning and the first cause of things, the matter and motion being the other symbols of the same Unknown Reality. Why he names this as some Unknown Reality, it is because of this deepest, widest and most certain of all facts—that the power which the universe manifests to us is inscrutable. While generalising all phenomenal changes under one 'Unknown Reality', he thinks that Spirit and Matter are its two aspects. He says, "... though the reality of subject and object renders necessary to us these antithetical conceptions of spirit and matter, the one is no less than the other to be regarded as but a sign of the Unknown Reality which underlies both". According to him 'the universe, whether physical or psychical, whether as mind or matter, is a play of force; mind, life and matter being each varying aspects of the one cosmic process from the first cause'. Thus we find, in the Western Philosophy, two contending problems, the Idealism and the Realism, the earlier and the later trends in the Philosophy.

Pratyabhijnā's Approach to the problem of the Ultimate Cause:—

As stated above the monistic currents of thought grew in India from the Vedic movement. The doctrine of Monism is for the first time established beyond any dispute in the principal Upanishadas, which are agreed to one root Principle Brahman. Though absolute unity was aimed at in them in a general way, there was difference of opinion as to the nature of this one Ultimate Reality. It was difficult to grasp the real idea of unity in view of all our knowledge of the universe resting on duality in opposition to unity. But this universe was viewed in three different standards by three classes of philosophers who followed different schools of thought in the later ages. In the technical terms used by J. C. Chatterji in his 'Indian Realism', the
Nyaya-Vaisheshika systems viewed it in the ‘Realistic Standard’, the Sankhya-Yoga systems in the ‘Psycho-dynamic Standard’ and the Shankara’s School of Vedanta in the ‘Polynymic Standard’. While the first two classes of philosophers represented the two stages of realistic thought, the third school followed the idealistic philosophy of ever-changing names and forms. The first class of thinkers was that of physical philosophers like Gotama and Kanada, similar to those we meet in the Western philosophy in Thales, Anaximenes and Leucipus; and the second class is that of practical psychologists like Kapila and Patanjali. The first class believed in the existence of external realities constituting the universe and the second named the Conscious and Dynamic principles as ‘Purusha’ and ‘Prkrti’ from which all creation is evolved. The third class of philosophers which is represented by Shankaraacharya aimed at the Upanishadic Monism by teaching absolute Idealism. They attempted to identify subject and object and prove the phenomenal character of the world thus reducing the facts of life to unreal manifestations. Corresponding to this thought in the Indian Philosophy we have the School of Neo-Platonists in the Western Philosophy. It is first from Kashmir that opposition was levelled against Shankara’s Idealism or Illusionism. The Pratyabhijna Philosophy set out to correct the irrational tendency of Shankara’s Philosophy by uprooting its cause in the earlier doctrines of the Buddhist systems, like Kshanika-vada and Vijñana-vada. In this school the conception of the Ultimate Reality, Maheshvara, changed from that of Brahman of Vedantins symbolising only pure Universal Consciousness. The Ultimate Reality in the Pratyabhijna System included Prakasha and Vimarsha as its two aspects, which symbolise respectively the Universal Consciousness and Physical or Material Activity. In the Spinoza’s system in the Western Philosophy, there is but one infinite substance that is God, ‘the cause of all things’. Viewed under the attributes of infinite substance, God is “natura naturans”; viewed as a manifestation, as the modes under which his attributes appear, He is “natura naturata”. He has two infinite attributes ‘extension’ and ‘thought’. Extension is visible thought and thought is invisible extension. They are the objective and the subjective phases of which God is the identity. Everything is a mode of God’s attribute of extension; every ‘thought’, wish, or feeling, a mode of His attribute of thought. Prakasha and Vimarsha represent in the Pratyabhijna Philosophy the
two aspects of the Ultimate Reality symbolised in Spinoza's system in terms of thought and extension. Thus to translate the Ultimate Reality called Maheshvara in terms of 'Universal Consciousness', as Dr. K. C Pandey has done, is not correct, as it denotes only one of its two aspects—Spirit or Subject, but not the other—Matter or Object. The Pratyabhijna conception of the Absolute Reality is that which includes both Subject and Object or Spirit and Matter. The various animate and inanimate beings, subjects and objects, thought and physical activity, mind and body, and the world around us are all real in the Ultimate Being. Shankara's system is not realistic in regard to the physical aspect of this universe which he declares as unreal or illusive, admitting pure Consciousness (Chit) alone to be real. The Pratyabhijna system transcends the earlier systems in making distinction between subjects and objects as two kinds of sentient and insentient waves in the ocean of the Ulimate Reality.

Specific doctrines of Pratyabhijna:—Svatantrya-vada or the Universal Voluntarism is the chief doctrine of the Pratyabhijna system. It means the doctrine of 'self-dependence' or the 'sovereignty of Lord's will' which 'imparts the impetus to the process of the world'. In the earlier systems three main theories are propounded to account for the process of the creation, viz. (1) the Realistic or Creationist view (Arabhbavada), (2) the theory of transformation (Parinama-vada) and (3) the theory of Manifestation (Vivarta-vada). The Pratyabhijna Philosophy proves them unsound. According to the first theory there exist nine classes of realities out of which everything in the universe is formed. It does not give any reason how Effect comes out of the cause in which the former does not exist before it comes into existence. According to the second view Cause brings out Effect, after it undergoes complete destruction. For instance, milk is transformed into curds after it no longer exists in that form. Seed changes into plant after it is completely merged in the soil. Milk is the transformation of the grass consumed by cattle. But when the Parinama-vada strictly postulates that Effect appears only after the destruction of its Cause, it has failed to explain the following instances. The birth of a babe takes place not after the destruction of its Cause, the parent; the creation and multiplication of bacteria do not involve the destruction of the former bacterium. According to the third theory, Vivarta-vada,
which is upheld by Shankaracharya, all effects are the product of Maya, the Nescience, and not real. On the basis of this theory, the world is superimposed on the only Reality which is Brahman, and is thus supposed to be phenomenal, illusive and dreamlike in character. According to the Pratyabhijna Philosophy, the theory is the result of irrational and unscientific thinking. It is absurd to think all the facts of experience as the product of the fictitious principle, Maya. Pratyabhijna, it may be remarked here, vehemently argues against the Shankara's theory of Mayavada (Idealism or Illusionism) and holds it fallacious. Pratyabhijna makes a realistic and rational approach to the problem and postulates a new theory Svatantrya-vada to replace the earlier theories which are held all objectionable. On the basis of this new theory it is due to the sovereignty of the Lord's Will that Effect evolves from Cause. It is the Lord's Self-dependent Power (Svatantrya-shakti) that multiplies effects from a single cause without destroying itself (the cause). The production of species from parents, expansion and growth of cells from a single cell, creation and multiplication of bacteria from the first bacterium—all these are examples of the Svatantrya-shakti of the Supreme Cause. The Universal Voluntarism is the only explanation that rational thinking can give to the wonderous creative power in Nature. It may be pointed out that Fichte's idealism in the West is, in the first instance, distinctly marked by the doctrine of Will. By this doctrine Fichte sought to convince Germans that in will lay man's divinity. Schopenhauer's doctrine of "Will as the cause of everything"—Will as a force of spontaneity and sense of effort, an impulse, instinct and spring of life, a supernatural power, however, exactly corresponds to Svatantryavada of the Pratyabhijna system.

Another theory the Abhasavada, the theory of Manifestation, allied to the Svatantryavada, has also been coined in this system for the explanation of the Doctrine of Monism. This is not in fact much different from Shankaracharya's Vivarta-vada. Almost similar to Vivarta-vada, Abhasavada also holds the world-objects as manifestations or Abhasas. The only difference between the two theories lies in the point that the Abhasas in the Pratyabhijna Philosophy are real in nature, whereas those in the Shankara's System are fictitious and illusive or dreamlike and hence unreal. The system holds that it is the very nature of Parama Shiva, the Supreme Cause, to manifest Himself in
diverse forms of the universe. We cannot question why the fire burns. To burn is the very nature of fire. So we cannot question why Shiva manifests himself in the form of the universe. It is incorrect to say that the Lord transforms Himself into various objects of the world, for such an assumption involves the division of the Lord into parts which leads to many objections. So the theory of Manifestation (Abhasavada) postulates that as to burn is the very nature of fire, so to manifest externally what lies within is the very nature of the Self. The manifested objects are real as they exist in the Supreme Reality. The manifested world appears on the background of Self (Svabhavat). Thus we have two aspects of the Supreme Self, Prakasha and Vimarsha. The one stands as the substratum of the manifestations and the other is the process of manifestations going upon this substratum. The latter aspect is also known as Svatantrya Shakti because it does not depend upon anything else, but represents the principal power of the Supreme Self (Parama Shiva). The change in the Ultimate Reality is a different arrangement of the ever-existing material in the Self. The transcendental state (Para or Annuttara avastha) of the Supreme Self is pure Consciousness unaffected by material change and his immanent state (Aparavastha) is that which is visible in the changing world: (विश्वास्तरः विश्वतीर्थिः संविभिः). Abhasavada (the theory of Manifestation) appears as one of the elaborate doctrines having its own specific features in the Utpaladeva's system, similar to Vivarta-vada in the Shankar's system. Both the theories are the later development in the Indian philosophy. It will be observed that Bhadrayana, the author of the Vedanta Sutras, as well as Somananda, who were the original thinkers, made a realistic approach to the problem of the universe. Both of them prove the world to be the actual transformation of the Supreme Reality (Maheshvara or Brahman) by instances like clay changing into pots or gold into ornaments and so on. Another example of the creation of the world like the creation of a Yogin or an individual in dreams, as produced in both the systems of Somananda and Bhadrayana to illustrate the emanation of the universe from the Absolute Reality, cannot prove that idealism is first thought in them. It simply illustrates that the Ultimate Being possessing wonderful powers undergoes change in various ways and yet remains one changeless and eternal Supreme principle. The idealism is the later growth in the Vedanta system and the
Pratyabhijnâ Philosophy, as Shankaracharya as well as Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta appear to have been under the influence of the Buddhist Phenomenalism. It may be possible that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta were directly under the influence of Shankara's philosophy as has been noticed by Dr. Buhlar and Dr. Gough.

Bhadarayana and Somananda, the founders of the earlier Vedanta and Pratyabhijnâ systems, even admit the diversity (Bheda-bhava) in the nature in respect of diverse objects, sentient and insentient, as well as the absence of diversity - non-qualism (Abheda-bhava) - in relation to One Ultimate Reality being the only principle of life and growth in all the created beings. The Upanishads which are admittedly the common reservoir of both the systems impress this very fact that one Universal Self is immanent in the cosmos consisting of great elements, luminous planets, etc. and in every form of life and growth and the subtle powers of seeing, hearing and so on.

The doctrine of Tattvas is another important doctrine which occurs in the Pratyabhijnâ System. It is given also in other forms of Shaivism with slight variations in its interpretation. As already stated above the earlier systems of thought in India, like the Sankhya, the Vaisheshika and the Yoga systems made a realistic approach to the problem of the Universe. The Sankhya system enumerates twenty-five Tattvas, categories of creation. These are, of course, mentioned originally in scattered forms in the various Upanishads and are picked out by the Sankhya philosophers and put in a connected system. These are incorporated in total by the Shaivists in their system, who further added eleven more Tattvas to bring the total number of Tattvas to thirty-six. This is the advance that Shaivists have made in inventing all the essential principles of creation. The atomic theory of the Vaisheshika System is the result of a still deeper analytical treatment of the objective reality, the matter, the grosser Tattva. On the other hand the Yoga School pursued its explorations in the direction of the study of the nature of the Spirit.

The doctrine of Tattvas is one of the interesting doctrines of the Pratyabhijnâ Philosophy, which is concerned with the ultimate constitution of this universe. The Parama Shiva (the Ultimate Reality) stands above all the categories (Tattvas). It is the Transcendental state of the Ultimate, the Supreme Consciousness (Para samvit), free from qualities
(Nirguna) and beyond all the categories (Tattvatita). It contains in itself the power of Manifestation (Its Prakasha aspect) in which state it is called Shiva Tattva. The whole universe from microcosm to macrocosm imbibes the Cognitive power (Jnana Shakti or Jnatintratva Shakti) from the Prakasha aspect of the Parama Shiva or the Shiva Tattva. It also contains in itself the power of Perception (Its Vimarsha aspect) in which state it is called Shakti Tattva. This Tattva implies the Power principle or Energy which transforms into matter. The universe imbibes the power of physical activity (Kriya shakti or Kartratva Shakti) from the Vimarsha aspect of the Parama Shiva or the Shakti Tattva. In the third Tattva, the Sadashiva Tattva, the internal state of pure knowledge (Jnana) is manifest in predominance without any taint of activity and change (Kriya). This Tattva represents the Sattva aspect of Shiva, hence also it is called Sadakhyta Tattva. In the fourth Tattva, called the Ishvara Tattva, the external state of Kriya Shakti (power of activity) becomes predominant. Ishvara Tattva implies the ‘opening out’ (bahir unmesha). It is called Unmesha as the world evolves from it, i.e. becomes externally manifest while the Sadashiva Tattva represents the ‘closing in’ (Nimesha), i.e. in which the universe dissolves itself, or in which all manifestations merge. The fifth Tattva, the Shadavidya Tattva (True or pure Knowledge) is the principle of correlation in the universal experience. It is in essence the state of pure knowledge in which there is no distinction between subject and object. This state of experience is also called Parapara, i.e. the state of unity of the Transcendental (Para) and non-Transcendental (Apara) states (Parapara dasha). These five Tattvas are known as the five principles of subject object.

The next Tattva is called the Maya Tattva, the principle of Limitation and Differentiation. The Maya Shakti dissolves Prakasha and Vimarsha aspects of the Parama Shiva and the perception of the world now becomes distinct in the process of evolution. The Maya Tattva represents the experience or power that differentiate objects from subjects. The next five Tattvas which are the offshoots of Maya Tattva, are called respectively Kala (कला), Vidya, Raga, Niyati and Kala (कल) which cause limitation to the universality of action, Knowledge, interest, place and time in relation to various jivas (individuals). The Maya Tattva is in itself the connecting link between Omnipotence and limited action, Omnisience and limited knowledge, perfection and limited interest, Omnipresence and
limited place, and eternity and limited time. Thus Kala (कला) represents in various limited beings (individuals) the limitation in regard to authorship, or the faculty of doing things, or accomplishing arts; Vidya the limitation with regard to knowledge of particular objects (faculty of Knowing and thinking of objects); Raga the limitation in regard to interest, that which attributes qualities to perceivers (Pramatas) and objects perceived (Prameya); Niyati the limitation in regard to presence in space, that which causes restriction by confining a perceiver to a particular space; and Kala (कला) the limitation in regard to presence in time, that which fixes the durations in the acts of perceivers.

The following twenty-five Tattvas are those which are given in the Sankhya system. Purusha and Pradhana (प्रधानति) are respectively the individual subject and the limited individual object. The latter is the root cause of all subsequent division into capacities (Karanas) and objects (Karyas). The thirteen capacities (Karanas) consist of the three capacities of mental operation - Undetermined thought (मन), Determined thought (बौद्धिक) and Self-arrogation (आत्मकार); the five powers of sense perception - Hearing (श्रेण्य), Feeling of touch (त्तक), Sight (चेतु), Taste (रसना) and Smell (प्राणम्); and five capacities of Action - Expression (बोध), Handling (पाणिन्), Locomotion (पाद), Rejecting refuse (फायु) and Sexual function (उपस्थ). The ten Karyas are the ten material elements which consist of five physical factors or great elements namely: Vacuity (आकाश), Air (आयु), Fire (अग्नि), Water (जल) and Earth (पुष्ठी) and the five subtle elements (तत्त्वान्त्र) - Sound (शनि), Touch feeling (स्पर्श), Colour (रूप), Flavour (रस) and Odour (थंब). 

From the above it is clear that the doctrine of Tattvas gives an elaborate analysis of the Universal Energy, “Primordial natural force-principle” or the Prima Materia of all things which is transformed into various principles (Tattvas) that bring about the whole creation. This is indeed a definite advancement in the Scientific Philosophy of the West as represented by Herbert Spencer. V.S. Naravane has, in one of his articles on the subject in the Monthly “Kashmir”, pointed out that the list of categories may not sound very convincing now, in the light of modern scientific advances. But the entire conception
is highly dramatic. Reference is invited to the chart facing P. 35 for the easy grasp of the doctrine of Tattvas.

The Pratyabhijna, a Monistic system, is indeed a realistic school of thought as it has condemned outright the Shankara's idealism and the nihilistic doctrines of Buddha and all such theories in the various forms of escapism and negation. Dr. K. C. Pandey brings into notice (in his Introduction to Bhaskari Vol II) that the system is the synthesis of the realistic, idealistic, voluntaristic, absolutistic and mystic currents of thought then prevailing in Kashmir. This diverse approach emphasizes that Reality is many-sided. Why so many approaches are made to understand the underlying principle of life is because the problem baffles the thought of the man as he tries to know more of it. N. Mukherji explains, in the Introduction to his work "A Study of Shankara", why it is necessary to study the problem as a whole from various points of view. "The life or the universe is synthesis and any comprehensive view of either must be in the form of a synthesis. The Darshanas, therefore, attempted to understand the nature of man and his relation to the universe as a whole and accepted no arbitrary, conventional or limited application. Again, the whole is not a mere mathematical aggregate of parts and it is not possible to have a conception of the whole merely by knowing the separate parts. In the case of the universe, even the parts can never be known exhaustively. If, however, the whole is comprehended, the parts are comprehended. If the concept of man is comprehended, each individual man is comprehended. To know the whole truth about the smallest atom of matter - the scientist must know the infinite self in whom all things eternally are. To know the whole truth about the subjective self the philosopher must know the objective world as it is in itself. To know the whole truth about the Infinite self the theoclastic must comprehend the Finite in whom the Infinite finds his expression. In fact Science, Philosophy and Religion are three phases of fundamentally inseparable human thought and experience. For Truth is the fundamental thing sought by Science, Philosophy or Religion from its particular standpoint and is the same in every case, so that one form of truth cannot be antagonistic to another without stultifying itself. Darshana a term more comprehensive than philosophy - implies a search for the deepest truth - an inquiry after the permanent underlying reality of all phenomena..."
GLIMPSES OF THE PRESENT STUDY

To sum up, the Indian Philosophy has not been understood in its true sense owing to the predominance of the idealistic trend of thought later on introduced into it by Shankara's school of Vedants. But it can be understood correctly, as a realistic branch of Philosophy, in the light of the Pratyabhijna system which is indeed free from any irrational thinking like Mayavada or Adhyasavada (Illusionism).

A birds'-eye view of pratyabhijna metaphysics: The chart facing this page gives a graphic representation of the central doctrine of the Pratyabhijna Philosophy, the whole cosmogonic theory taught in the system, bringing its scientific value to a pointed notice. In this the Maheshvara—Supreme Being, the Ultimate Cause, is compared with nutritional fluid in the earth which transforms itself into the tree of cosmos and which runs as sap through its every branch, leaf, flower, fruit, etc. This is called Shiva-rasa or Chit-rasa. And what makes it to grow into this Cosmos? Pratyabhijna gives the answer:- It grows by the 'Sovereignty of His will', technically called Maheshvarya (माहेश्वर्य) or Svatantrya Shakti, which is the force that impels, the force of spontaneity (urgency), instinct and spring of life. The Creative power of Maheshvara has a two-fold nature,—Prakasha, the power of manifestation, and Vimarsha, the power of perception. Prakasha, represented by Shiva, and Vimarsha, represented by Shakti, constituting two-fold nature in Shiva-rasa, shoot forth first into a common stalk and further sprout into two branches, the former growing into the branch of Cognitional power (Jnaratva Shakti) and the latter into that of power of Action (Kartratva Shakti). The two branches distinguish one as subjective branch, perceiving or thinking subject and the other as objective branch, what is external to the mind. These two branches correspond respectively with Universal Consciousness and Universal Energy in the universe around us. The subjective branch of Cognitional power (Jnaratva Shakti) further shoots forth into three distinct branches, one the power of Remembrance (Smarna shakti), second the power of Knowledge (Jnana shakti) and third the power of Differentiation (Aphohana shakti). This gives the psychological expansion of Jnaratva Shakti of Maheshvara, viz. the Universal Consciousness.

The objective branch, the power of action (Kartratva Shakti), is operated upon or governed by three laws of Relation,—one the Law of
36 Tattva (Categories or Principles of Creation)

Constituent Power

Kriya Shakti now turns into Nirmana Shakti (Creation Factor)
Division caused by Kala Shakti (Time Factor)
A power of Maheshwara

Objective Branch (What is External to the Mind)

Subjective Branch (Perceiving or Thinking Subject)

Objective Branch (What is External to the Mind)
Division, the relation of Plurality and Unity (Bhedabheda), second the Law of Perception, the relation of Perceiver, ‘awareness’ and the object perceived (Mana tat phala meya) and third the Law of Causation, the relation of Cause and Effect (Karya Karana). The power of Action (Kartratva shakti or Kriya Shakti) now turns into Constituent power (Nirmana shakti). The Division in Kriya shakti is caused by the time factor (कालशक्ति) which is also one of the powers of Maheshvara. The objective branch, having grown into Constituent power (Nirmana Shakti), now shoots forth thirty six branches i.e. Tattvas (categories) or principles of creation. All these have already been explained in the foregoing pages. This gives the Physical expansion of Shakti or Kriya Shakti of Maheshvara, the Universal Energy. From these evolved Tattvas emanate the whole universe consisting of innumerable subjects and objects, sentient and insentient beings, suns and moons, stars and planets, rivers and mountains, trees and plants, flowers and fruits, and what not. This emanation of the Universal Being (Maheshvara) into the cosmos is the function of His power of Will (Tat samarthyam svatantryam). It is this image, visible body of the Lord Maheshvara, Bhairava (formidable) having wonderous powers, as represented by the chart, which the Shaiva adorer worships in the following verse: श्रावणां चिदस्यौँ चाकार्यस्य-मुनानाम्। जगत् रूपतव्यो वन्दे भविष्यं भ्रंरवं वघु।

Turning away first from the macrocosm to look at the microcosm, which exists everywhere around us and within us, there exists a permanent Self (Atman), or soul, in every individual being which is endowed with the three potential powers (Shaktis) of will, cognition and action (इच्छा, ज्ञान विक्रिया). The first power is technically called Svatantrya Shakti (Sovereignty of his Will) which is the impetus behind all his creative thought and activity. The soul is also the substratum of the powers of Remembrance (Smarna shakti), Knowledge (Jnana-shakti) and Differentiation (Aphohana shakti). All these powers in man collectively comprise human personality; and all human progress depends upon the elevation of human personality in respect of the said powers.

In relation to the macrocosm, i.e. the universe around the individual beings, the said powers are indispensable to all creative activity in Nature outside. This creative activity on the part of the Universal Being permeating the universe, accounts for the emanation of infinite sentient
and insentient beings from its two aspects, Shiva (the Supreme Consciousness) and Shakti (the Universal Activity, force or energy). The latter materialises in the form of the Ultimate Substance of which the physical universe is constituted. And this emanation is explained as due to the Sovereignty of Will attributed to the Supreme Being, known technically as Maheshvarya (महेश्वर्य), which in relation to an individual being is generally called Svatantrya Shakti. The Pratyabhijna assumes all volitional, cognitive and conscious-physical acts at the empirical level as essential for the existence of the universe. It will thus be seen that the conception of the macrocosm in the system is based on a very deep study of the microcosm.

It is evident from the above that the position of Pratyabhijna is perhaps unique in the treatment of spirit and matter as two distinct realities presenting in the universe in innumerable forms of animate and inanimate objects or, in other words, sentient and insentient entities. These two realities, however, ultimately unify and resort to a single Reality, the Absolute Being (Maheshvara), of which these are two aspects. Thus the diversity in the cosmos as emanating from unity is apt to fit in with this Monistic system. Spirit and matter are both dynamic in this system, as the spirit is characterised by knowledge and matter by activity or presentment of force (Kriya or Shakti). Will is the static centre of all activity of the soul, while intellection and physical activity are its dynamic aspects.

The Pratyabhijna Philosophy, it may be remarked, probes deeply into the nature of things in the universe both in regard to its psychological and physical aspects. It has gone to the extent of establishing not only that plants and trees are endowed with life just like all kinds of living beings, but soil and water out of which they grow, may even all kinds of matter, which according to the modern science are but unconscious and dead, also possess a continuous life-force or conscious life-activity. The valuable studies of astronomers, mathematicians and physicists have revealed the foundation stones and the dimensions of the universe and have thus enriched mankind by their demonstration of the power and sweep of the human intellect. But all such scientific investigations have remained practically wanting in this aspect of study—the study of life in the universe. It is only recently that attempts have been made to explain 'life'. The main emphasis of science is now changing from
the study of the elementary forces and simple particles to the complexities of living textures. The Philosophy started its quest mainly in the direction of the study of life. While tracing the beginning of Philosophy (in the Introduction to the History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western) Maulana Azad has brilliantly explained the objective for which the Philosophy has stood from time immemorial. He says, 'Philosophy is the quest for finding out the meaning of life and existence'. He further adds, 'Two questions arose in the mind of man, as soon as he began to think, what is the meaning of his life; and what is the nature of the universe he sees all around. The beginning of systematic speculation marked the birth of philosophy. The pilgrims of philosophy did not succeed in securing the object of their quest but they have in the course of their journey obtained something else of great value: in their search for philosophy they discovered science. Science has brought to man new power but has not given him peace...'. The Maulana, therefore, suggests: 'The time has now come when philosophy should turn its attention towards the problems of human peace.' It will, however, be noticed that Indian Philosophy, if properly understood in the light of Pratyabhijna system, has already revealed a knowledge of paramount importance conducive to the human peace and progress. A proper study of the Pratyabhijna system will perhaps lead to a better understanding of 'man's nature' or, in other words, revaluation of man's estimate of himself.

**Human values and cardinal virtues according to Pratyabhijna:**

Pratyabhijna is mainly a school of Spiritual Pragmatism which has seriously taken up the cause of the mental, moral and spiritual elevation of humanity. All its doctrines - spiritual, epistemological, ethical and moral - have a practical bearing upon human interests. It has also in a way sought the material advancement of human beings with the sole objective of making them prosperous and happier. It has taught, on such a rational and scientific basis, the unity of life in the universe, the unity of all living beings and the unity of mankind (स्वातंत्र्य स्वेत जन्तूनामक एवं मंडळ:). It has laid emphasis on equality and universal brotherhood of mankind, irrespective of diversity of caste, creed, colour and nationality and has recognised 'freedom' (Svatantrya) and superiority and dignity of human being. All these essentials are indeed the ideal of a modern democratic society. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan has brought to
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pointed notice the fact that 'our religions have proclaimed from the very beginning that each human individual is to be regarded as a spark of the divine'. This is mainly the teaching of the Upanishadas as well as the sermons taught by the Buddha.

The Pratyabhijna is ultimately a means of accomplishing the fulfilment of one's all the desired objects. Man's desires are different; one aspires to higher things in his life, other to purely spiritual satisfaction and raptures. There are still others whose sole ambition in life is to attain what is of highest value to man. The Pratyabhijna is meant for all. "Svatantrya" (freedom) in the system is the sole avenue to all those things, viz. the fulfilment of all the aspirations of man. Pratyabhijna, however, lays stress on the awareness of the highest ideal or real progress a man should seek to attain, the ignorance of which is indeed the main cause of human misery and suffering. We are often mistaken what is really not progress, for progress. To quote the words of our saint Rashtra-pati Dr. Rajendra Prasad: 'We are apt to be carried away by many things...on account of their glamour and their shine. And we are very often misled into thinking that all that glitters is gold. But that is not always so. I believe we have really to define what is progress, and I personally do not always feel that what we call progress is always progress. I sometimes wonder if in speaking of progress, we are not mistaking what is really not progress, for progress". Pratyabhijna reveals what is of highest value to man; and what is of highest value to man is what is conducive to the good and benefit of one and all.

The ideal of liberation in the system is quite different from that of other Indian systems; to a Pratyabhijna philosopher it means 'freedom' (Svatantrya): 'The individual is essentially free, freedom is the inner being of the individual'. So also does the law of Karma play a different role in the Pratyabhijna ethics, as the school has recognised 'Sovereignty of Will' (Iccha shakti) and 'Action' (Kriya shakti) as means of accomplishing all the desired objects. It does not believe in the fate of man being rigid and unchangeable. It condemns those who do not stir to bring a change in their lot for better and happier life. It does not recognise disinterested action (nishkama karma) as a way or aim and object of Self-realization, as it denotes 'want of will' which is contrary to success. The philosophy of 'action' taught in the system, which perhaps accords with
the Socialist idea of "action", is unique in the whole domain of Indian Philosophy. In accordance with the Western ideal, it does not also recognise a life of non-attachment to or renunciation of the world as it is considered to be too ascetic and other-worldly to be of any good to humanity.

The system believes in some ethical matters like non-violence or non-injury (Ahimsa). The supreme value and importance of non-violence for our moral life have of-course been insisted upon in the same strain as has been done in other Indian systems of thought. Ahimsa is one of the basic principles of fellow-feeling and reciprocity on which morality must be based. Of all the vices that may pollute the life of a man, cruelty and killing are perhaps the worst. The sooner this fact is admitted and Ahimsa recognised as a cardinal virtue by people all the world over, the better for mankind. From the days of Upanishadas our country not only taught the essentials of human culture, like liberty, equality and fraternity of all mankind, but also recognised non-violence (Ahimsa) as its first essential. Buddhism preached Ahimsa as the highest virtue. *Any kind of exploitation of man by man, treated as himsa, is condemned by the system as a sin.* To exploit others is, in its view, to exploit one's own self.

Though Pratyabhijna believes in the unity and equality of human beings, it is equally conscious not only of their inequalities but also of their limitations and infirmities. Men are not all equally intelligent, or equally good, or equally trustworthy. Men have limitations of sense and reason and suffer from inferiority complex. Their infirmities are not few but many, such as 'injustice, intemperance, cowardice and ignorance' (as is pointed out by Plato) and all kinds of wickedness and baseness.—"vileness, wildness and cussedness in the nature of man" as Dr. S. Radhakrishnan points out, which bring about their destruction. Pratyabhijna brings into awareness these limitations and infirmities of man (Pashubhava), which it calls the *man's fetters* (Pashas) or *impurities* (Malas) to bring him to the path of righteousness by absolving himself from these which is, in its view, the way to immortality and liberation. Pratyabhijna has recognised 'the supremacy of the moral law, the law of truth and love' (in the Gandhi's words). The world stands in need of a soothing philosophy like Pratyabhijna, in these days of material crisis; for, in the prophetic words of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, "... within each incarnate soul dwells the good-conscious-
ness which we must seek out and awaken. When mankind awakes to the truth, universal brotherhood will follow,...One whose life is rooted in the experience of the Supreme, spontaneously develops love for all creation. He will be free from hatred for any man...He will boldly work for a society in which man can be free and fearless...He will oppose terror and cruelty...He will give voice to those who have no voice..." At another place Dr. Radhakrishnan says, "Men must use the instruments of science for the improvement of the conditions of life, for the fault is not in science and technology. What is demoniac is in the nature of man. If we wish to cure this element of vileness, wildness, cussedness, in the nature of man, it is essential for us to mobilize the great spiritual resources of mankind. The cure for that is to restore the truths of the spirit to the central place in the minds of men. Let those truths of the spirit sway the minds of men, transform the lives of men. The truths of the spirit are liberality, understanding, freedom. ... Let us, therefore, send out...a message to this groping, uncertain, discontented world: that love and not hatred, that freedom and not fear, that faith and not doubt, have in them the healing of the nations. If we carry out these principles in our daily life and in our international relations, out of the anguish of the world will be born a new unity of mankind, a unity in which the ideals of the spirit will find safety and security." Pratyabhijna has indeed shown to mankind a new way (Navo-margo) to human peace and freedom.

Role of Religion and supernatural in Pratyabhijna:- The West has its philosophy almost distinct from its religion, while in India we do not have philosophy separate from theology. Zeller says, "Indian Philosophy never lost contact with religion and never became independent". In this country religion has led to philosophy, and for this reason the technical terms employed for metaphysical principles are the words which are commonly used in religious literature as names of gods and goddesses. Shaivism or Shaiva Darshana (Shaiva Philosophy) as the very word indicates, is an outgrowth of Shaiva religion which recognised Shiva as the highest God. It will be admitted that the originators of the Pratyabhijna Philosophy were the devotees of God Shiva (Maheshvara) and his concert Shakti and naturally they employed the various names of these divinities to represent the different metaphysical principles in the Pratyabhijna system. Thus, we find the term Maheshvara applied for the
Ultimate Reality, *Maheshvarya* for 'the Sovereignty of Will' ascribed to the Ultimate Being (Maheshvara), *Shiva* stands for the Cognitive Power and *Shakti* for the power of action and so on. It may also be noticed that in the Vedanta system the Ultimate Reality is named *Brahman* by the originators of the school, since they were the worshippers of God Brahma, the creator or the God of Knowledge (Vedas). The word Brahman is used by the Vedantins for the Ultimate Reality in the neuter gender, while the Shaivas use the word Maheshvara for the same principle in the masculine gender. This system of nomenclature in any school of Indian Philosophy is unlike that in the Western Science or Metaphysics in which we find the technical terms often used after the names of the scientists who discovered certain scientific principles and laws of nature. For instance, in Electrical Science, the terms: *volt* for an unit of electro-motive-force, *ampere* for unit quantity of electrical energy flowing in an electrical circuit, *watt* for the unit of power, *ohm* for the unit of resistance in any medium and so on are used after the names of the scientists conspicuous for their discoveries in this branch of Science. There is, of course, a number of other technical terms employed in the system taken from a stock of common words, not necessarily used in religious nomenclature. For instance, *Prakasha* is used in the particular philosophic sense as Self-manifestation or Self-consciousness in which the objects are merged in Self and *Vimarsa* as power of perception in which objects have distinct reality of their own.

Although it is not possible to set any form of Indian Philosophy free from the dogmas of religion, in the pratyabhijna system metaphysics plays a primary role, and theology or religion is relegated to a subordinate position. It may, therefore, be pointed out that though the Pratyabhijna system is a purely philosophic system founded on reason and scientific values, it has not totally divorced itself from theological matter. The main work on the System entitled "the Pratyabhijna - Sutras" includes one Section, Section III Agamadhikara, which deals with the dogmatic and theological matters of the Trika cult, such as pure and impure creations, devine hierarchy, bondage and release, impurities (Malas), common creation, creations called Vijnanakevala, Pralayakala, Sakala, Vidheshvaras, two classes of Samsarins, the different states and mystical methods of liberation (Shambhavopaya etc.) (see below) and so on as incorporated in the sytem from Agama Shastra. It will, however, be noticed that
philosophical interpretations have been given in the system to these supernatural matters.

The Shaiva Yoga: According to the metaphysical point of view the Pratyabhijna (Recognition) leads a person to become aware again of the fact that the individual being (Pashu) is identical with the Universal Being (Pati, Shiva or Maheshvara) or, in other words, to know the supreme nature of 'self'. In the Vedanta and other schools of Indian Philosophy knowledge (Jnana) of the identity of the individual soul (Atman) and the Universal Soul (Brahman) is generally considered the highest ideal. In the Pratyabhijna system Parama-shiva, the Ultimate Being, who is aware of His Transcendental nature in that state, while adopting the limited form of an individual being (Pashu-bhava) by the sovereignty of His will (Satantrya Shakti), forgets (loses the awareness of) His real nature by His own deluding power (Maya Vimohini Shakti) and becomes limited in his powers of thought and action thus turning into an inferior being (Pashu). The Pratyabhijna enables him to recognize his own supreme nature already known to him before his individuation and thus restores in him his higher and deeper powers already innate in him. "Recognition" (Pratyabhijna) is distinguished from "knowledge" (Jnana) in the sense that in the former state the identity of the individual being and the Supreme Being (or, in other words, the knowledge of the supreme nature of 'self') is not, in reality, unrealized before (Nananubhutah) but is only forgotten; and this is revived in the state of "Recognition"; while realization in the form of mere "knowledge" (Jnana), according to the point of view of the Vedanta system, is lacking before its attainment. This is one important point of difference between the Pratyabhijna and the Vedanta system.

The state of realization said above, according to the point of view of the Trika system, of which the Pratyabhijna Shastra is a manual of Philosophy, cannot be achieved without recourse to a supernatural process (experience) known in the system by a general name the "Shaiva Yoga" or "Shaiva Samavesha." Trika system prescribes various Yogic methods of Samyama (intuition) i.e. 'intense concentration, contemplation and meditation' to attain the 'Pratyabhijna' realization or the 'Recognition' insight which is the means of all the highest human achievements (समस्त लंपत समवालस्ति-हेतुम्) These are variously called
Shambhavopaya (or Ichopaya), Shaktopaya (or Jnanopaya) and Anavopaya (or Kriyopaya). These methods develop in the Yogins (respectively) the powers of will, thought and physical activity. Although the Pratyabhijna system lays down the basis of this intuitive experience, viz. the system of Yoga, yet it claims to have ultimately revealed another new method (Navo margo) of intellectual pursuit, i.e. the pursuit of knowledge and reason at the empirical level, which it calls Anupaya (a processless method), that is, which does not need any Yogic - physical and mental - processes at all. The Yogic methods have, indeed, been incorporated in the Pratyabhijna system from the Trika Shastra and have been considered by the great authorities like Abhinavagupta as indispensable for realization. Abhinavagupta was himself a born Yogin (Yogininibhu) who constantly practised Shaiva-samavesha in his life.

The Yogic system was known in India from remote ages, not only as the means of developing human personality, but also as a wonderful aid to scientific observation. It is well-known that our great thinkers of the past entered deeply into the very core of things by means of Yogic processes. This yogic system has proved of greater value in attaining to heights in the sphere of knowledge than the modern scientific methods of "well-trained and keen sense-observation, experimentation and inductive thinking" having claim for the achievements of today. By practising the threefold Yogic method taught in Trika Shastra a person is said to manifest his profounder faculty and to get omniscience, all-penetrating grasp, along with many other supernatural powers. The following powers are mentioned by Patanjali in his Yogasutras (Chapter III) which a Yogin can and does manifest: - 'Knowledge of the past and future' (Psychometry and premonition) (Sutra 16), 'Knowledge of one's previous births' (18) 'Understanding of other people's minds' (Telepathy) (19) 'Disappearance (Invisibility of the body)' (21), 'Knowledge of the worlds' (26) 'the Knowledge of the starry regions' (27) 'mastery over the elements' (28) and so on.

Yoga is now generally understood as a method of attaining occult powers or magical power, because its right significance is lost in our time. For this reason even the value of Shaiva Yoga (Shaiva Samavesha) dealt with briefly in the Pratyabhijna Shastra cannot be understood...
now. It is difficult to follow even the comprehensive exposition of Shaiva Yoga and the Yoga technique given by Abhinavagupta in the different chapters of Tantraloka, under the headings: Anupaya, Shambhavopaya, Shaktopaya, Anavopaya, Chakrodaya, Kalatattva, Deshadhva, etc. The Kashmir school of Yoga Shaivism is still an obscure subject. No investigation seems to have been made in this direction by modern inquirers. Even none of the scholars has made any attempt to translate the Tantraloka of Abhinavagupta which comprehensively deals with the methods of Shaiva Yoga. It will be desirable if some scholar takes up an intensive and extensive study of the Yoga system of Kashmir Shaivism and sets himself to the task of translating completely the particular literature on the subject, viz. Tantraloka and Tantrasara of Abhinavagupta which are already published in several volumes in the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies. Attention of the scholars is drawn to the "Preliminary Note on Yoga" by Dr. L.D. Barnett prefixed to the well-known work Lalla-Vakyani (Asiatic Society Monographs, Vol. XVII, published in 1920) which gives the general account of the tenets of the Yoga system. The following is the brief information on the Yoga system based on the Dr. Barnett's Note.

"In Yogic theory the human body is conceived as a miniature copy or replica of the world without it; the forces by which this microcosm is controlled at the same time operate upon the macrocosm outside, and thus by certain physical and mental processes the Yogi can win for himself not only supernatural powers over his own body and mind but also a miraculous control over the universe, culminating in the complete translation of his soul into the highest phase of Being, the Absolute (usually conceived as Supreme Shiva) for ever and ever." In the human body there are numerous nadis (nerves) among which three are of supreme importance, Sushumna, Ida, and Pingala, which descend from the brain into the pit of the abdomen. It is stated that between the pudendum and naval is a 'bulb' (Kanda), into which the nadis debouch. These three nadis are in immediate conjunction, Ida being on the left hand of Sushumna, and pingala on the right. Sushumna rises vertically from the pelvis region along the vertebral column as far as the Brahma-randhra (the upper extreme of Sushumna and of the inner nadi enclosed in Sushumna); there it bends round the right of the Ajna circle (see below) and passes up into the
left nostril. In the centre of Sushumna is a nadi called chitra, ... There are six chakras or circles, which are conceived as being of the form of lotuses, attached at intervals to Sushumna. In the abdomen is situated the first circle called Muladhara, or simply Adhara, and is imagined to be a lotus of four digits in width, situated two digits above the anus and two digits below the penis. In the pericarp of this lotus is a triangular space on which dwells the Kula-Kundalini (or simply Kundalini), who is the Shakti or Chit-Shakti, the power of spirit, the creative force of the universe. A little distance above Muladhara, at the base of the penis, is the second circle, Svadhishthana. The third circle is Manipura, by the naval. The forth circle is Anahata, situated in the heart. Above Anahta, and situate in the throat, is the circle Visuddha. The sixth circle is Ajna situated between the eye-brows, which contains the mystic force called akshara-bija. Above all these circles is the highest of all, Sahasrara, situated at the base of the palate. The object of Yogic contemplation is to absorb the Kundalini in the micro-cosm, representing the macrocosmic Energy, into Sahasrara typifying the absolute ... In order to effect this transit of Kundalini through Sushumna and the Brahma-randhra into Sahasrara, the nadis must, by the exercise of pranayama, be blocked up with air introduced into them by inspiration (puraka) and retained in them (kumbhaka). The final expiration of this retained air is called rechaka. By performing the mystic exercises, the Kundalini shakti, i.e. the power of spinal cord is roused in its six centres (chakras); thus the Sadhaka (Yogi) attains supernatural subtle powers of soul. When the Kundalini is stimulated to a supreme effort by long Yogic exercise, the soul enters into the realm of the Absolute, in which it is merged into the infinite bliss of Parameshvara. It has been suggested that the chakras and other terms of Yogic anatomy correspond more or less to real parts of the human body, and the following identifications are proposed: - Sushumna: the spinal cord; Ida: the left sympathetic cord; Pingala: the right sympathetic cord; Chitra: the grey matter of the spinal cord; Brahma-randhra: the central canal of the spinal cord; Muladhara: the sacral plexus; Manipura: the epigastric plexus; Anahata: the cardiac plexus; Vishuddha: the laryngeal or pharyngeal plexus; Ajna: the cavernous plexus; Sahasrara: the Medula oblongata. For details of the Shaiva Yoga, see the Dr. Barnett’s Preliminary Note on Yoga referred to above; Shakti
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and Shakta by Woodroffe and Vatulanatha Sutras.

Recently some psychologists have started the study of man and his spiritual nature with the modern scientific method. This has given rise to a new branch of Psychology, known as Parapsychology which is indeed one of the youngest sciences. It deals with the deeper and supernormal nature of man. It originated in the great movement, known as Psychical Research. Psychical Research is a scientific investigation into such rare, odd and strange phenomena which defy human intellect. Much progress has not been recorded as yet in the study of occult powers attained by man by practising Yogic methods.

It was in 1882 that a Society for Psychical Research was formed in England to investigate into the nature of such phenomena with the help of purely scientific method. As a result of the work of this society we are in possession of a vast scientific knowledge which throws a flood of light on the deeper nature of man. Psychical Research is now both a field and a laboratory science. There are Departments and Chairs of it in some well-known universities of the world, such as Cambridge in England and Duke in America. Psychical Research or Parapsychology has penetrated human nature more deeply than any other science, pursuing the modern scientific method, has so far done, although human nature still remains vastly unexplored. The achievements of the society and of the individual investigators in their inquiries into the abnormal phenomena, such as Telepathy or Clairvoyance, Retrocognition, Precognition or Premonition, Telekinesis etc., are indeed the mere beginnings of Parapsychology. Supernatural powers achieved by a Yogi need a thorough and deeper investigation. Modern psychologists and scientists cannot afford to neglect their investigation in this direction. "A comparative study of Indian Psychology and Western Psychical Research is really overdue", says Dr. B. L. Atreya (of Benaras Hindu University) in his paper (Presidential Address) read in the Psychology Section of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1951. Emphasising the great purpose of "Comparative study of Western Psychical Research and Indian thought" for the service of mankind today, Dr. Atreya, while concluding his address, aptly remarks, "we have arrived, I venture to say, at such a juncture in the history of civilisation that a comparative study of Psychical research and Indian thought should be pursued in right earnest. It will, I think, unite the East and the West, the past and the present, science and religion, more than any other activity of mankind has so far done."
CHAPTER II

SOME CONTROVERSIAL VIEW POINTS

Pratyabhijna System indigenous to Kashmir; the name of the
System; the time of its existence; its connection with Shankar-
achary’s School of Vedanta; and its differences from the Vedanta
System.

In this chapter we shall take up some controversial view points
with regard to the Pratyabhijna system and bring out its distinctive
features.

Pratyabhijna System Indigenous to Kashmir :- Dr. Pandey
presumes that Pratyabhijna Philosophy was not indigenous
to Kashmir but was introduced and developed by the two ancestral
lines which came to Kashmir from outside. He says, according to the
ending verses of Shiva-drashhti, the Shaivagamas were brought to Kashmir
by Samgamaditya, the fourth ancestor of Somananda who is
stated to have come there from Kailasa. It is also stated by Dr.
Pandey that Atrigupta, the renowned Shaiva philosopher of Kanauj and
the earliest known ancestor of Abhinavagupta, was brought to Kashmir
by king Lalitaditya sometime after 740 A.D. On the basis of these
two references Dr. Pandey is of the opinion that “for building a monistic
system of its own Kashmir needed men and material which were supplied
by the two ancestral lines which came to Kashmir from outside.” This
finding of Dr. Pandey is hardly acceptable in view of the fact that Kashmir
was from ancient times the seat of learning and the philosophic
knowledge was no innovation there. The Pratyabhijna system was only
a logical development of the philosophicel ideas prevailing in Kashmir at
the time of its origination.

To those who think that the Pratyabhijna or Trika Darshana and its
teachers were brought to Kashmir from outside, it may be questioned
that before its emergence in Kashmir where else did it originally exist
wherefrom it was brought to Kashmir by the ancestors of Somananda
and Abhinavagupta. So far as the mythological origin of Shaivagamas
from Shrikantha or Bhairava in Kailasa (the abode of Shiva) and their spread in Kashmir by the fourth ancestor of Somananda are concerned, it may be noted that these are not the historical facts but are intended to give sanctity to Shaivagamas. Actually we have no trace of the system outside Kashmir before Somananda's time.

On Page 11 of his work "Abhinavegupta" Dr. Pandey accepts, on the authority of Tantraloka, Commentary, III, 194, that Abhinavegupta learnt Trika Darshana from Lakshmanagupta, a native teacher of Kashmir, and not from any outsider or his descendent or disciple. This is also corroborated by the statement of Pt. Madhusudan Koul in his Introduction to Ishvara Pratyabhijna Vimarshini, Vol. II, P. 7, (quoted by Dr. Pandey in his "Abhinavegupta", P.5) who says: 'He received instruction in the Pratyabhijna Shastra from his father Lakshmanagupta...Dr. Pandey objects that 'Lakshmanagupta, though undoubtedly a teacher of Abhinava in Pratyabhijna, was certainly not his father' and therefore he says that it requires correction'. In this remark Dr. Pandey himself admits that Lakshmanagupta did not belong to Abhinavegupta's immigrant ancestral line but was born from some other native family of Kashmir. It is however certain that Lakshmanagupta, the teacher of Abhinavegupta, learnt the Pratyabhijna system in Kashmir and not outside. Jayaratha, the commentator of Tantraloka, states in clear terms in the following verse, that the Pratyabhijna Darshana (the Monistic system of Kashmir) emerged and flourished in Kashmir, and it is from this country that it spread in other parts of India:

श्रीहोमानन्दपादभृतिसुभवराप्रयोगसारैविषयं
लध्वायं यत्रैव सम्पत्तिमिनि गतनामीश्वराहितवादः ।
कर्मरूपः असूर्य प्रकटपरिमलो रूपयन्नवंदनशान्
दर्शोनयसमिसिन्नहो चुस्म गृहिमरक्तस्वरभंवन्यात्म

In this verse it is explicitly stated that the originators of this monistic system were the natives of Kashmir, namely Somananda and others. Just as saffron is indigenous to Kashmir, so is this system of philosophy. It was not to be found elsewhere before its origination in Kashmir (दर्शोनयसमिसिन्नहो). While it spread from Kashmir (कर्मरूपः प्रसूर्य) it was received and held in high esteem by the people of other countries as an unique thing like saffron. (Refer in this connection Dr. Pandey's "Abhinavegupta" Pages 83--84)
The name of the system: Attention is drawn to para 4 under the same heading on the foregoing pages 9 and 10, in which it is concluded that the system, by which we mean a philosophic system, cannot be called by any other name, Trika, Spanda or Shaiva system, except the Pratyabhijna system. Dr. Pandey, however, prefers to call the system as 'Trika'. He has given the various reasons why the system is called the Trika, "As stated in Paratrtrimshika, the system as a whole is called the Trika in Shaiva literature since it deals with the triple principle Shiva, Shakti and Anu; or Pati, Pasha and Pashu; or Nara, Shakti and Shiva; or Para, Apara and Parapara; or it is called Trika for the reason that its chief authority is the triad consisting of the three chief Agamas-Siddha, Namaka and Malini (Tantraloka 1, 36), or for another reason that it included all the three systems broadly speaking Bheda, Abheda and Bhedabheda. It is also called Trika for the reason that it teaches the three-fold method of Agamic realisation-Shambhavopaya Shaktopaya and Anavopaya." As is apparent, in this wider sense it is not possible to say that Trika is a system of philosophy. It is true that Pratyabhijna and Spanda are parts and very important parts of the Trika system, but severally they do not present the whole of what Trika represents. If there is any part which can be said to be of philosophical import in the true sense, it is the Pratyabhijna Shastra, not any other branch of Trika system, Spanda etc. This part can be called the "Pratyabhijna Philosophy", but Spanda Shastra cannot be called the "Spanda Philosophy", nor, as a matter of fact, the whole system as "Trika Philosophy". Dr. Pandey again states, in the Introduction to "Bhaskari", "This monistic system of Philosophy is called the Pratyabhijna Darshana on the basis of the title 'Ishvara Pratyabhijna' which Utpalacharya gave to his Karikas. But before Madhavacharya gave this title to the system in his Sarvadarshana Samgraha, it was known as Svatantrya-vada, a name by which it is referred to by Abhinava-gupta in his Vivriti Vimarshini." (I.P.V.V., Vol I, P.9) Svatantrya-vada could not have been a popular name of the system as it is only one of the doctrines included in the Pratyabhijna Philosophy.

Again, J.C. Chatterji has stated that "on the Trika there were many treatises each of which was called a Shastra, but these works do not represent so many different systems but only treatises on the various aspects of the same system of thought". Evidently J.C. Chatterji
could not differentiate the Pratyabhijna Philosophy from the whole system represented by the ‘Trikā Shastra.’ Dr. Kurt F. Leidecker also states in his Notes to the Translation of Pratyabhijna Hṛdaya that ‘the Trikā, Spanda as well as the Pratyabhijna are the designations of one and the same system and that distinction made by Dr. Buhler between the Spanda and the Pratyabhijna is erroneous’. The learned doctor is not only incorrect to suppose that Trikā, Spanda and Pratyabhijna represent one and the same system, but also fails to notice that Pratyabhijna is the only ‘Philosophy proper of the Trikā’, whereas Trikā is the name of the whole system of religious cult with different branches, evolved from Tantric and Agamic dogmatism. It may be pointed out that Spanda branch of Trikā has for its main subject matter the three mystical ways to the realization of the divine Shakti, viz. the Shambhava, the Shaktā and the Anava. They are mere dogmatic statements of the fundamental principles of the Spanda system. The Spanda literature which grew on the basis of Shiva Sutras do not represent any manual of philosophy as the Pratyabhijna Shastra does. Metaphysical reasoning is the essence of a philosophical system. It is to this philosophical content of the system that Utpaladeva gives predominance in his whole work (Karikas) and treats of the Agamic tenets in a few Sutras only of Agamadhisthaka (part III of his work), thus relegating the religious dogmatism to a subordinate position.

This system of philosophy is also commonly known as “Kashmir Shaivism.” Shaivism or Shaiva system is a more comprehensive term representing all the dualistic, non-dualistic and dualistic-cum-non-dualistic systems evolved from Shaivagamas and Shaiva Tantras. Shaiva system means any system based on Shaiva Tantras or Agamas. Sixty - four systems of the Shaiva cult are mentioned in the Shaiva scriptures of Kashmir which include Trikā as one of them. Pratyabhijna is the philosophical content of the Trikā, as it is so-called by Utpaladeva the originator of the system.

The time of its existence :- (Dr. K. C Pandey’s view:) Dr. K. C, Pandey states, in his Introduction to “Bhaskari” Volume II (P. iv), that “Somananda represents himself to be the 19th descendent of Tryambaka...Therefore, if we follow the traditional method of allowing twenty-five years of each generation, we will have to admit that a period.
of four hundred and fifty years intervened between Tryambaka, the propagator of the monistic Shaivagamas, and Somananda (who lived in the 9th Century A.D.)." It may be admitted that the Agamic tenets, which are included by Somananda in his Shivadrshhti amidst the philosophical contents, are derived by him from the earlier monistic Shaivagamas, said to have been first propagated by Tryambaka, as such their traditional knowledge indeed goes back to the hoary past; but it is not possible to agree with Dr. Pandey's conclusion: "the philosophic tradition, therefore, which Somananda systematises (represents), goes back to about the end of the 4th Century A.D." Dr. Pandey, however, admits that "Somananda is the first to make a definitely rationalistic approach to the problem of the Ultimate Reality. He distinctly refers to the various prevailing schools of thought and rationally proves the unsoundness of their theories." He indeed refutes and criticises so many systems by contradicting their various theories and puts in nutshell his own new philosophical viewpoints and thus brings a radical change to the prevailing philosophical thoughts of the time. We can, therefore, say that it is Somananda who laid the foundation-stone of a new system, known as the Pratyabhijna School of Kashmir and not the particular Philosophic tradition existed before his time.

Prof. Lachhmi Dhar's View:- Prof. Lachhmi Dhar attempts to prove, in his book entitled the "Birth-Place of Kalidasa," that the Pratyabhijna Philosophy existed in Kalidas's time (in the 5th Century A.D.). Firstly, according to him, 'Shaivism followed by Kalidasa is a Monistic Philosophy which is no other than the Pratyabhijna Philosophy of Kashmir.' Secondly, as he says, 'Kalidasa propounded the Philosophy of Pratyabhijna in his works, particularly Shakuntala...which is the allegorical representation of this philosophy.' The reasons given by Prof. Lachhmi Dhar need be examined with reference to these two points. There is no evidence in Abhijnana Shakuntala or any other work of Kalidasa to show that the Pratyabhijna system existed in his time, nor any reference to the doctrines of the system in his works.

It can be admitted that Kalidasa was a worshipper of Shiva and followed Shaivism of non-sectarian type, but there is no reason to agree with Dr. Lachhmi Dhar's remark: "We shall find that the
type of Shaivism represented by Kalidasa is the same that Madhavacharya describes as the 'Pratyabhijna Darshana' or Recognitive System, which is the Kashmirian Shaivism.' Pratyabhijna as a distinct system with a name to it originated in the ninth century, A. D. being then taught for the first time by Somananda and his disciple Utpaladeva and not by any earlier teacher at the time of Kalidasa or before him as supposed by Prof. Lachhmi Dhar. Kalidasa lived in the fifth Century A.D. five centuries earlier than Somananda. Prof. Lachhmi Dhar says that the Pratyabhijna system was known to Kalidasa, because "the Shaivism of Kalidasa was essentially monistic in its character." It may be noted that it is the monistic doctrine of the Upanishadas which was known to Kalidasa and by which he was influenced as is stated by Dr. Hiller Brandt and some other scholars, and not by the Pratyabhijna system.

The next point which Prof. Lachhmi Dhar tries to make in his book is that there was no 'total dearth of ancient monistic Agamas in Kashmir'. This point does not go to prove that the system of Pratyabhijna Philosophy existed in Kalidasa's time. The only work which can be said to be a monistic Agama that has come down to us is the Shivadrshti of Somananda and this did not exist in Kalidasa's time. But even assuming that there existed various ancient Shaivagamas, monistic or any other kind, the existence of any connected system of philosophic thought such as the Pratyabhijna, earlier to Somananda, directed against the rival theories of other schools of thought, such as the Buddhists, the Vedantins etc. is not proved. Somananda was the first to collect together all the philosophic thoughts from the various systems as well as the agamas and give it a skeleton form of a distinct philosophy which was later on systematised by his pupil, Utpaladeva.

Here is an important point that needs consideration. Apparently Prof. Lachhmi Dhar is correct to say, on the basis of the verses Nos, 1270–1274, 1283–1286 and 1294–1295 of Nilamata Purana as quoted by him in note No. 123 given in his book 'The Birth-Place of Kalidasa', "Now whatever may be the original form of Shaivism in Kashmir, it cannot be denied that in very early centuries Monistic Shaivism .... representing the Pratyabhijna doctrine is already existent in the Nilamata (Purana) which in its present form is assigned the date sixth or seventh centuries A.D., at any rate earlier than the revival of Vedantism by
the great Shankara. The central idea underlying these verses is briefly given as follows: "Brahma admonishes Indra that he must recognise (हस्तिनास्तोति) Shiva as the only Supreme Lord (सत्वं भगवान्). Cause of all causes (कारणकारणम्); this great Lord (भगवान्) is the supreme Actor (अन्वन्नुभुति) and the supreme Knower (अन्वश्वेति) (स एव सर्वक्षेत्रं सर्वभूतं सर्वभूतं); who by His free will, creates the universe consisting of sentient and insentient beings (यद्वर्षायं जगद्वर्षि तत्तत्सारं) Whose, i.e of the Lord (प्रभो). 'Creeper of power (शक्तिजना) blooms forth (शून्य) and manifests itself as the universe... (सर्व शक्तिजना से सत्यं) Indra and Brahma act (सम्बंधं चारीयो शाश्वतं) under His command'; (स्वरूपं चारीयो शाश्वतं) From Indra's prayer to Shiva in Nilamata as quoted by the Scholar in his book, the following relevant points may be given: Indra says, that the Lord of Lords sustains the three worlds by his Maya Shakti (meaning the 'wonderous power of the Lord') (मायावृत्तं जगतं तथ). He has no motive for his acts of creation other than his own innate desire (सं कार्यं न विचारते). Moha or Delusion is produced by Shiva's own Shakti, Maya Shakti; and so on. The question arises, - Do these ideas only comprise the main doctrine of the Pratyabhijna philosophy? We admit that these ideas play a prominent role in the system, but they represent not only the central theme of the Pratyabhijna philosophy but also that of the Vedanta system. If such is the case, what are the distinctive features of the two systems of Philosophy by which they differ from one another? Perhaps it escaped the notice of Prof. Lachhmi Dhar. All these ideas are initially taught in the Upanishadas, and it is from this fountainhead that these ideas are incorporated in the Nilamata Purana as in the Vedanta and Pratyabhijna systems. There is nothing new in the ideas given in the above-mentioned verses of Nilamata which existed earlier than the emergence of the Pratyabhijna system. These ideas are not the distinctive features of the Pratyabhijna philosophy which, besides, is essentially something more and somewhat different from them. In reference to the central theme common in the Pratyabhijna system and the Vedanta, readers' attention is drawn to Chapter III, part ii (Survey of the earlier speculations and doctrines), in which most of these common ideas are traced in the Vedas, the Upanishadas and other earlier philosophic literature grown from Vedic and Buddhistic thought. Therefore, to denote the full implication of the Pratyabhijna in these ideas which existed
earlier, is not quite sound. These ideas have possibly been incorporated by shivaists in some shaivagama texts from the Vedic sources and also by Kashmirians in the Nilamata, either directly from the shaivagamas or from the vedic sources. It will be shown in this work that the system while incorporating these ideas undoubtedly made some additions and alterations to the earlier doctrines of the upanishadas and thus made a radical revision or reorientation of the Vedanta system. Regarding this the reader's attention is drawn to the last topic dealt with in this chapter.

**Prof. Lachhmi Dhar's point that Shakuntala is an allegorical representation or dramatisation of Pratyabhijna Philosophy:**

Prof. Lachhmi Dhar has also tried to prove in his book (The Birth - Place of Kalidasa) that 'Kalidasa propounded the Pratyabhijna Philosophy of Kashmir' in his works, particularly Shakuntala. He says, 'Kalidasa was a follower of the ancient Pratyabhijna Philosophy of Kashmir and that the beautiful drama of love between Dushyanta and Shakuntala is also a beautiful allegory on the tenets of the Pratyabhijna Philosophy of Kashmir...'. He further says that: 'in order to popularise this Pratyabhijna Philosophy in its early days of promulgation, Kalidasa hits at the happy device of writing an allegory on the basis of the love story of Shakuntala in the Mahabharata'. We shall now try to discuss how far Prof. Lachhmi Dhar's view stands.

We find that the learned Prof. has strained the specific philosophical ideas in some of the common words occurring in Shakuntala which are used in technical sense in the Pratyabhijna system and twisted the tenets of the system in the various love incidents of the drama. In support of this he has given neither positives nor parallels. There is no evidence in Abhijnana Shakuntala or any other work of Kalidasa to show that he wrote Shakuntala as an allegorical representation of the Pratyabhijna Philosophy with the specific object of popularising it 'in its early days of promulgation'. From some words, such as 'Abhijnana' etc. used by Kalidasa, we have no reason to infer that Shakuntala is an allegory on the tenets of this philosophy. For instance, Kalidasa did not use the word 'Abhijnana' to denote any philosophic significance as we find in the technical term 'Pratyabhijna' used in the system. Prof. Lachhmi Dhar, however, says, 'The word 'Abhijnana' or 'Pratyabhijna
which occurs so frequently in the drama, should be taken in its philosophic sense. The poet has given us an important suggestion in using the word ‘Abhijnana in such a prominent place as the title of the book itself-Abhijnana Shakuntalam which should signify in its philosophic sense the drama dealing with the ‘recognition of Divine Shakti’ or, in other words, realization of God’. In this connection we may remark that the word ‘Abhijnana’ or ‘Pratyabhijnā’ in ordinary sense means ‘Recognition’. The word represents the experience in which direct perception (drṣṭa) is associated with memory (Smarana), and ordinarily the word is used with this meaning in our every-day life.* For instance, we say ‘here is Devadatta; I recognise him to be the same person whom I met some years ago in Burma’. Recognition takes place by perceiving some sign which recalls the memory of the object previously perceived. In the drama of Shakuntala, the recognition of the heroine by the sign of the finger-ring no doubt plays an important part; hence the word ‘Abhijnana’ is used by Kalidasa in the title of the book to denote this implication. But this word ‘Abhijnana’ as used in Shakuntala cannot convey the philosophic significance of the term ‘Pratyabhijnā’ occurring in this system of philosophy. In this case also ‘Pratyabhijnā’ means ‘Recognition’ in which the association of direct perception (Anubhava) with memory (Smṛti) is necessary, but these two processes relate to the realization or ‘recognition’ of Divine Shakti. † So to attach this significance to the word ‘Abhijnana’ is evidently far-fetched.

We shall now follow how Prof. Lachhmi Dhar twists the Philosophy of Pratyabhijnā in amongst the love incidents of Shakuntala. He writes, “it is highly probable, that the idea of allegorical representation of the Pratyabhijnā tenet on the basis of a love story, was suggested to the mind of Kalidasa by a love-metaphor of a similar character

* समरणातुभवस्था सामान्याभिकरणप्रक्ष:।
संस्कृतोऽन्तःश्रुतव्यवस्था च प्रत्यभिज्ञः प्रकृतिलित:।
(I. P. V, Vol I, P. 20 Foot-note)

† तत्त्व सहेयार्थस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञः—
प्रतीपमात्स्थितिभूमिकुये ब्राह्मणे प्रकृतम्: प्रत्यभिज्ञः।
हस्तसंभवायेवैक्यें स्थिते नस्तुपथवाते।
तत्त्वं सा प्रत्यभिज्ञानाल्ल प्रबायमिति स्थित:॥
(I. P. V, P. 19-20)

हस्तसंभवायेवैक्यें स्थिते नस्तुपथवाते।

भारत्सत्त्व अयोगायेवैक्यें स्थिते नस्तुपथवाते॥

(Shivadrshiti IV, 119-20)
that might be current among the teachers of the Pratyabhijna Philosophy in his day and employed to illustrate the novel point of the Pratyabhijna, as we note that the metaphor of love, was employed by Utpala who reaffirmed the Pratyabhijna doctrine and who might have borrowed that love metaphor from the ancient sources and traditions of that philosophy in Kashmir, as previously known to Kalidasa.” It may be questioned why Kalidasa did not make any explicit reference, in Shakuntala or any other work, to the Pratyabhijna Philosophy which he intended to popularise? If he knew this Philosophy and deliberately invented the allegory in Shakuntala on the basis of its tenets, he should have clearly declared it in the drama, and preferably at the outset of it. Prof. Lachhwani Dhar presumes that the incidence of the recognition of the heroine by the perception of the finger-ring bringing to the mind of Dushyanta the recollection of his former love, indicates that Kalidasa must have known the Pratyabhijna Philosophy in which the ‘Recognition’ of the Divine Shakti is similarly caused by the direct perception (Anubhva) of some of its aspects associated with the recollection (Smrti) of its other aspects.† But this supposition is baseless, as there can be no motive in his remaining silent about the system of thought which Kalidasa meant to propagate in Shakuntala. From the coincidence of a love metaphor in the Pratyabhijna Philosophy and that of a similar character in Shakuntala, with the distinct incidence of Recognition, it cannot be concluded that the latter is borrowed by Kalidasa from the ancient sources and traditions of that philosophy in Kashmir, and has not originated from his mind. It is moreover presumed by Prof. Lachhwani Dhar that the same love-metaphor was employed by Utpaladeva in the tenth century A.D. to illustrate the novel thought of the Pratyabhijna as it might have been current among the teachers of the philosophy from the days of Kalidasa † or even

† ैसौरप्युपाधिशैलौपनस्तस्तत्वेः सिद्धोपघनितके
कान्तोलोक समान एवमपरिश्रावो न रत्नु पथा।
लोकस्येण तथानब्लिस्तुप्त्युः स्वायमपिनिविश्वेश्वरो
नैवाल्ननिजामिवाय ददिशनमविमित्तिक्षोऽहित।
(I. P. V Vol II, P. 273-4)
किन्तु भ्रमिज्ञानसर्गनिःस्नीं शापो नियतिपत्ते
...... आयथवा ईश्वरोऽतुरागो-भ्रमिज्ञानमपेत्ते
कथमिवेतूः तथा प्रत्यभिज्ञातमस्मां पश्यामि।

(Shakuntala)
before him. The learned Professor has profusely compared the incidents in Shakuntala with many different ideas in the Pratyabhijna philosophy, such as the comparison of the dramatic ‘Shrishti’ with the universe stated to be ‘the expression of divine love’, Dushyanta and Shakuntala (the hero and the heroine) with Shiva and Shakti, Shakuntala appearing ‘big with child’ with Shakti carrying and developing the seed of Shiva’s iccha (desire) to create the universe and so on, and on the basis of mere analogies concludes that Shakuntala is the dramatisation of this philosophy. But it may be noted that the philosophy of Pratyabhijna can hardly be woven into a drama by such comparisons.

All the above proves that the Pratyabhijna System which appeared in Kashmir in the ninth century A.D. as a distinct School of Monistic philosophy did not exist in Kalidasa’s time, in the fifth century A.D., as there is no positive evidence to show that this philosophy was known to Kalidasa. On the other hand he is known to be an Advaita-vadi Vedantin as is affirmed by some scholars like Hiller Brandt who are of opinion that he was influenced by the philosophy of the Upanishadas and Bhagvata Gita which existed long before him. \( ^{†} \) Dr. Keith also remarks in his History of Classical Literature (P. 10) that “much more ingenious is an effort to fix his (Kalidasa’s) home in Kashmir and to trace in his poetry an adumbration of the Pratyabhijna Shastra of that Land……. We must, however, admit that in Kashmir, where Kalidasa is supposed to have been born and bred up, there already existed various doctrines of the Shaivias, the Buddhists, the Sankhya, the Vedantins and other schools that gave an impetus to the development of a tendency of thought from which emerged the Pratyabhijna system with distinctive features of its own, in the nin’h century A.D. That this system is indeed the Logical continuum

\( ^{†} \) “In spite of being a devotee of the Muse, Kalidasa shows a thorough acquaintance with the Darshanas or systems of Indian Philosophy. His writings are saturated with profound devotion for his favourite deity, Shiva and other gods of the Indian mythology……. Even a cursory view of his works will show that he was influenced by the philosophy of the Upanishadas and the Bhagvata Gita. He was an Advaita-vadi Vedantin, though he recognised the value of other systems of Philosophy as for as they harmonised with his own. Kalidasa appears to be a monotheist than monist…..”

(Hiller Brandt’s “Vaishnavism and Shaivism” V. I, P. 169)
of the earlier philosophic tendencies of the thinkers of the Land is indicated by a mention of numerous prevailing schools of thought in Shivadrshiti of Somananda who does not agree with their points of view.

The connection between the Pratyabhijna System and the Shankaracharya's School of Vedanta:-- There are two versions of the connection between the Pratyabhijna Philosophy and the Shankaracharya's system. One is according to Dr. Buhler's "Report" which says: 'This system (Pratyabhijna) does not appear to be older than the end of the ninth century A.D. and because it is of so late a date, it seems to be most probable that its resemblance to Shankaracharya's doctrines cannot be purely accidental. The connection between Shankaracharya's school and the Pratyabhijna points also to a Kashmirian tradition which asserts that the great Acharya of the South came to Kashmir and was vanquished in a disputation by the chief exponent of Pratyabhijna doctrines.' Thus, according to Dr. Buhler's point of view, it is possible that Shankaracharya's System of Vedanta may have somewhat influenced the Pratyabhijna School. Another version of the incident may be read from Dr. K. C. Pandey's account in his thesis: "Abhinavagupta" (An Historical and Philosophical Study, pp. 88-90). He writes that the decline of Buddhism had started in Kumaril Bhatta's time (750 A.D.). Shankaracharya visited Kashmir some time in the second decade of the ninth century A.D. after giving his final blow to Buddhism in the rest of India. The influence of Shankara's Tantric philosophy on the Trika is so great...This visit of such a great person (Shankara)...purged the local faith of its Buddhistic element and strengthened the position of the new Tantric creed. (Ref. Shankara Digvijaya Chapter XVI,54-80.)

We come to know from Dr. Buhler's account that Shankaracharya visited Kashmir and held a discussion with 'the chief exponent of Pratyabhijna doctrines (Abhinavagupta)' in which the former was vanquished. According to tradition in Kashmir, Shankara preached his idealistic philosophy as expounded in his Vedanta Sutra Bhashya wherein Maya-vada or Adyasavada is one of the prominent doctrines. But this philosophy did not appeal to Kashmirian philosophers like Abhinavagupta. Further investigation in this connection establishes that this supposed discussion between Shankaracharya and Abhinavagupta never actually took place because the former flourished in 778-820 A.D., while the
latter lived towards the eleventh century A.D. But even if the supposed disputation took place between Shankaracharya and some one else, the only bearing that it has on our subject is that, according to tradition, the superiority of Kashmir Shaiva Philosophy had to be admitted by Shankaracharya. But, there exists no internal evidence to this effect in any of his main works. According to the Shankara Digvijaya of Madhava, which is noticed under a slightly different name "Sukshma Shankara Vijaya" in Dr. Aufrecht's catalogue, we have a different account of the disputation between Shankaracharya with some person named Abhinavagupta outside Kashmir who was a Shakta contemporary of Shankaracharya. This namesake of Kashmirian Abhinavaguptacharya belonged to Kamarupa (Assam). He was a great opponent of the monistic theory of Shakara. He is stated to have engaged Shankaracharya in a controversial discussion (Shastrartha) when the latter reached Assam in the course of his Digvijaya. In that he was defeated and so he became a disciple of the victor. This information is given by Dr. Pandey in his book "Abhinavagupta," p. 2. But regarding these accounts we have got no reliable evidence. It cannot also be supposed that it is this account which somehow became current in Kashmir under different circumstances.

From Dr. Pandey's version of the connection between the two systems, it is evident, not that Shankaracharya's Philosophical thought was rejected or refuted by Kashmirian Philosophers, but his Tantric Philosophy, which he propagated in Kashmir, influenced the Trika System. In this connection it may be remarked that the well known historical Shankaracharya, the expounder of the Vedanta Sutras and the Upanishadas, never upheld, preached or practised any kind of Tantric Philosophy in his System (Darshana). The internal evidence from his main works, the Brahma Sutra Bhasya and the Upanishada Bhashya, shows that neither the Tantra technique, nor the Tantric doctrine was ever known to Shankaracharya, the great Vedanta Philosopher. The occurrence of some philosophical ideas and technical terms as common in Shankaracharya's Dakshinamurti Stotra (D.M.S.) and Ishvara Pratyabhijna Vimarsini, (I.P.V.), as pointed out by Dr. Pandey in certain quotations from both these works on pages 88–89 of his thesis on "Abhinavagupta," do not show the influence of any Tantric philosophy on Pratyabhijna, as we are familiar with these ideas and terms in the early Upanishadas.
and also in Bhadarayana’s Brahma Sutras. It is not understood what specifically Tantric is in these ideas which represent more or less the Vedantic thought.

The common idea underlying D.M.S., S.2 and I.P.V., I, 182 * is that “the object world is manifested (Prakashyate) by Chidatman (the Supreme Soul) by the power of his will (Ichha vashat) like the creation of a Yogin without any extraneous substance.” This evidently is a doctrine of the Upanishads which is incorporated by Badarayana in his Vedanta System in Brahma Sutra II, i, 25 — “देवादिवदुर्वापलोके” Shankaracharya in his commentary on the sutra, explains that creating the world, in the case of Brahman, is the same as the creation of Gods, Yogins and others in their ordinary experience from mere will (Sankalpa). There is nothing specifically Tantric in the terms Maya, Sveccha, Chidatma and Iccha. The common idea contained in D.M.S., Commentary (2), S, 13 and I.P.V., I, 39 † is that the Supreme consciousness (Chetana) is endowed with Knowledge (Jnana) and Activity (Kriya). These are the very life of the universe, or, in other words, are potent to create the universe. This idea is initially found in Shvetashvatara Upanishada, “पराशिशक्षि विविधवौ षयं स्वाभाविको ज्ञान बल क्रिया च” Sv. Up. VI, 8. As regards the common expression “Satta

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* कीजस्यातिरियांकुर्यो जगादिं प्राक्षिविक्षिप्य पुनः मूल्या कल्पना देशा काल कलना विचिथ्यचिथ्री तस्मै श्री गुरु मूर्तये नम इव श्रीदात्तुण भूताये ||

D. M.S., S.2, and

† ज्ञानः क्रये जगतु कदाती हस्यते चेतनाभये योगीं निरुक्तावचनमथजानं प्रकाशयेत् ॥

I.P.V., I, 182

D.M.S., Comm(2),S.13 and

I.P.V., 1,39
sphuratta" found in D.M.S. commentary (2), S. 13 and I.P.V., I, 207 ¶, it may be remarked that in Weber's Indica Studien IX, Page 163, we find that 'Satta' (existence) occurs in Nrsimha Tapani Upanishad and Ramatapani Upanishad 287. 'Sphuratta' in the sense of 'manifestation' is often used in Vedantic texts. Finally the common idea underlying D.M.S., Commentary (2), S. 50 and I.P.V., I, 29 § that Knowledge (Jnana) and Activity (Kriya) are innate in the Supreme Being, occurs in Shvetashvatara Upanishad, as already shown in the item 2 above.

From these quotations given by Dr. Pandey, it is rather evident that there is a close resemblance between the doctrines of the Vedanta and Pratyabhijna systems, as has also been observed by Dr. Buhler in his 'Report'. It may be pointed out that Tantra Shastra has incorporated a large stock of doctrines and technical terms from the Vedic and Agamic sources, which seems to be the possible basis of Dr. Pandey's observations. It appears certain that the doctrines and technical terms mentioned in the quotations referred to by Dr. Pandey are borrowed by Tantra Shastra from the Upanishads which are definitely the earlier source of the Vedanta and other systems, not that these doctrines are initially taught in Tantras. Besides, Tantras mainly teach Tantric processes by virtue of which they represent a distinct school, but Dr. Pandey has not been able to trace any such doctrine either in the Shankara's Vedanta or the Pratyabhijna System. In fact, he quotes no reference from the Shankarachary's main works, about the occurrence of any Tantric idea or expression. This want of internal evidence from his works shows that he never preached any kind of Tantric Philosophy, not to speak of the influence of that over pratyabhijna.

† तस्माद सत्य स्फुरत्त च सर्वार्थायुष्यते

द्रा स्फुरत्त महा सत्य देशकालाविरोधयते

D.M.S. Comm. 2, S. 13

ः स्फुरत्त महा सत्य देशकालाविरोधयते

I.P.V., I, 207

$ स्फुरत्त यत्ष्ठम् तस्य केवलम्

D.M.S. Comm. (2), S. 50.

कंतीर भावरि स्वात्मवावदिवलिते महेरे

I.P.V., I, 29
The reference to a verse from Saundarya Lahari to prove that Shankaracharya accepted the authority of Tantras does not appear satisfactory for the reason that there is doubt regarding the Adi-Shankaracharya’s authorship of this Stotra. Saundarya Lahari is a devotional poem, addressed to the Goddess, abounding mainly in the rhetorical descriptions of her sublime beauty and Tantric and Yogic ideas with the exception of a few verses containing some common Vedantic thoughts. It appears that these ideas are not at all the product of a philosophic genius like Shankaracharya. According to A. Avalon, the translator of ‘Ananda Lahari’ (Wave of Bliss), Shankara’s authorship of such like Tantric works is a hotly discussed point among scholars which is still unsettled. (Refer to the Introduction to ‘Ananda Lahari’). A. Avalon does neither favour nor refute the point that “Adi-Shankara”, the Vedanta Philosopher, was also the author of the Tantric works. He says, ‘Amongst other matters yet to be determined is the age of Adi Shankara himself’. There can, therefore, be no reliance on this work for evidence to prove that Shankaracharya had any inclination towards the Tantric practices prevalent in Kashmir or elsewhere and to support or propagate the Tantric creed in any of his genuine works. As regards ‘his establishing Shri-chakra in some of his Mathas’, it is possible that perhaps some name-sake of the great Shankaracharya, the Vedanta Philosopher, following the Tantric creed, may have established Shri-chakra in certain Mathas, as we hear of numerous Shankaracharyas following diverse philosophic and religious creeds who are known to have occupied the sacred ‘pithas’ (seats of learning) in several Mathas in southern India associated with the name of the great Shankaracharya. Moreover, Dr. Pandey gives no evidence to prove that Adi-Shankaracharya established Shri-chakra in any Matha.

We, therefore, agree with Professor Buhler’s view and conclude that the Pratyabhijna system is greatly influenced by Shankara’s Vedantic doctrines and not that Shakaracharya taught any Tantric philosophy which influenced the Pratyabhijna system. For similar reasons as put forth above, we cannot also agree with Dr. Paranjoti in holding the view, in her thesis on the Shaiva Siddhanta, that “Shankara was an adherent of the Shakta sect, and his system of Advaita, though to all appearances independent of Shakta Agamas, is yet
influenced by the Tantric theory.” It is unfortunate that these Scholars do not base their conclusions on evidences from Shankara’s main works on the Vedanta system which he represents in the Indian Philosophy. There is hardly anything to show in Shankara’s Brahma Sutra, Bhashya and the Upanishada Bhashya that his system of Advaita is influenced by the Tantric theory.

Differences between the Pratyabhijna Darshana and the Vedanta System, according to tradition:— Through the invaluable efforts of Dr. Pandey, Bhaskari, an easy commentary on Ishvara Pratyabhijna Vimarshini of Abhinavagupta and the most important work on the Pratyabhijna Philosophy, believed to be lost, was unearthed which is now available in print. Bhaskaracharya, the author of this commentary, was perhaps the last teacher of this system who lived seven generations ahead of the present descendants of his family known as Rajanakas or Rajdans in Kashmir. Bhaskari not only furnishes a traditional interpretation of the abstruse text of Ishvara Pratyabhijna Vimarshini, but also brings out outstanding differences, according to tradition, between the Pratyabhijna Darshana and the Vedanta Philosophy, in a discussion between the adherents of the two systems given in its Introduction. In this discussion a distinct line of demarcation is drawn between the two systems which are shown differing widely from one another. The origin of the Pratyabhijna system has been traced from Goddess Vak, Vagishvari (Goddess of Learning), since eternity and it is stated to be traditionally handed down from Mathika Gurus. According to the Shaivas, it is itself the sacred authority and sanction for the followers of Mathika Gurus and needs no other authority. The Shaiva adherent says that the Vedantins have got no faith in the Mathika Gurus. They accept the Shruti, the Vedic scriptures, only as their sacred authority. The Shaivas are, therefore, prohibited to take part in discussions (Shastrartha) with the Vedantins. On this point Bhaskaracharya introduces a long discussion between a Vedantin and a Shaiva adherent [the follower of Pratyabhijna System] as follows :-

† Mathika Gurus:— ‘Matha’ means a hut in Mahabharata. In Rajatarangini, III, 460, occurs ‘Pashupatanam Mathah’. In Rajatarangini VI, 87 and 308 occurs ‘Vidyarthinam matha’. ‘Vidya-matha’ is stated to be the name of a college in Kashmir, Rajatarangini III, 476, Brahman’s College in Kashmir.

[Note from O. Bohtlingh und R. Roth - Dictionary]
The Vedantin opens the argument with a question to the Shaiva, how is it that a discussion on sacred matters is allowed to be held between a Shaiva and a Buddhist and not between a Shaiva and a Vedantin? The Vedantin is much superior to the Buddhist, as the latter, in his definition of the Supreme Cause, stops short at Buddhi Tattva (the principle of determined thought, Reason) which is even lower than Maya Tattva (the principle of Limitation) of Shaivas. On the other hand, the Vedantin goes higher in his definition of Brahman which is perfectly in accord with the definition of Sadashiva, the third principle of the Shaivas. In reply to this the Shaiva puts a counter-question. On what authority do the Vedantins hold Brahman equivalent to Sadashiva? According to the Vedantins, Brahman is existent (Sat), Conscious (chit) and Tranquil (Shanta) as the Shrutis declare:

‘सचिदानन्दः श्रद्धा’; ‘यक्षी देवः सम्प्रूढेऽगुहः सवर्मव्यापी सवर्मृतान्तरत्वा !
सवा-(कर्म-)यत्थः सवर्मृतान्तिवासः शातीचित्ता भेटवलो निगुः गुः।’
“एकमेवान्ध्विषीयं श्रद्धा नेह नानास्थिष्टिकिरचन”

Brahman is All-pervading, Absolute, transcending all forms (Rupa), devoid of plurality and the substratum (Adhishthan) of this world which is superimposed upon it. It is free from the diversity of three kinds, technically called Sajatiya, Vijatiya and Svagata, i.e., there is nothing like nor unlike Brahman, nor is it in itself diverse in nature. This definition is accepted by the Shaivas for their third principle, Sadashiva or Sadakhyya Tattva. Shiva and Shakti, the first two Tattvas, are higher than this Tattva (Sadakhyya). Below these are thirty-three Tattvas beginning from the principle of Ishvara and ending with the earth, the principle of solidity. Brahman is spoken of as Auspicious (Shiva) but lacks in Vimarsha (Power of perception related to objects). Aham-vimarsa(self-perception, viz. self-consciousness) and Prakasha(manifestation) are the distinctive characteristics of the first Tattva, viz. Shiva. Brahman is a little lower than this. It is of the nature of changeless or inactive consciousness (Shanta Chit). Vimarsha implies changing nature (Kshobhatvam) and activity (Kriya), viz. Its innate power of expansion into cosmos. This Vimarsha is lacking in Brahman as it is contrary to Its tranquil (Shanta) or inactive nature. Vimarsha of Shaivas is, according to the Vedantins, a form of Vikalpa, i.e. a superimposition.
But this view is not right (न नतु युक्तः), since by accepting Vimarsha as Vikalpa (Superimposition), an unlike characteristic (Vijatiya Dharma) attaches to Brahman; to wit, the world, according to the Vedants, is Vikalpa, i.e., mere illusion, hence unreal, and Brahman is the only real entity. Thus it implies attributing unlike characteristics (Vijatiya Dharma) to Brahman, on which the world is superimposed, which is illogical. Hence, the Vedants will have to accept Vimarsha as a real characteristic of Brahman which gives Him the changing nature (Ksobhatvam), and not a Vikalpa (mere illusion). Prakasha in relation to subjects implies Aham-Vimarsha (self-perception, viz. self-consciousness) which is therefore the distinctive characteristic of self (svabhava bhutah eva), whereas in relation to objects, it is of the nature of their becoming manifest (Prakasha):

(प्रकाशस्य हि स्वतिष्ठानोपरिपक्वति विमर्श: स्वभावमृत एव; ज्ञात्वतिष्ठानोपरिपक्वति विमर्शो... परमार्थतं: सौर्य सेतृनः प्रकाश रस्माय एव।)

According to the Shaivas, Shiva is all powerful, viz. He has got in Himself the changing nature (Kshobhatvam), i.e. the potentiality of changing Himself into the form of the world just as fire is endowed with the nature of burning. It cannot be supposed that something extraneous causes in Shiva the nature of changing into the form of the world, as Vedants do in attributing Nescience (Maya) to Brahman for causing the manifestation (superimposition) of the world in Himself. The Shaivas do not attribute any thing extraneous to cause the potency of burning in fire, but it has got by nature in itself the power of burning. The Vedants do not accept any ‘real power’ belonging to Brahman.

The Shaiva puts another question to the Vedantin: Are Jivas and Brahman inseparate or separate (किं प्रयत-मते जीव-ब्रह्म नोरिक्ष्यं बुरैैैं भिन्नत्वं बोऽ?) If the Vedantin says that Jivas are separate from Brahman, the Shaiva remains silent, since according to his system also Jivas (Pashus) are separate from Shiva though in reality their nature is the same as that of Shiva. In case the Vedantin holds that Jiva and Brahman are identical, the Shaiva demands from him a textual authority from Sruti. The Vedantin quotes the following Srutis in support of his point of view “अक्षरमात्मा ब्रह्म”, “सत्यं चित्तम”, “तत्त्वं सत्यं चात्मक”, The Shaiva says, the followers of the Pratyabhijna Darshana have also got the same goal and come to prove the same result, the identical relation of Jiva and Ishvara.
The Vedantin demands from the Shaiva a textual authority from his own scriptures in support of this tenet. The Shaiva says, the Pratyabhijna Darshana does not need any authority to stand upon. Recognition (Pratyabhijna) is in itself sufficient for the realization of this end, the unity of Jiva and Ishvara. It is a new path (Margo navo) to this realization. The Vedantin retorts, Recognition cannot be applicable to the realization of the unity of Jiva and Ishvara, as in this case there occurs no simultaneity of the present perception (Anubhava) and the past perception, i.e. the present perception is not associated with the memory of the past perception (Smarana), indispensable to the process of ‘Recognition’, since Atman is self - manifest in both the states, past and present (मातभासवादकीवर्णरूपः प्रथ्यभिज्ञात्वन दुःखः). The shaiva says, it is true that Atman is perceived in the past (Bhato) as well as at present (Bhasamanashcha). Owing to forgetfulness (Vismrti) innate in his own nature of self-dependence (Svantra), Atman lacks in Lordliness (Ishvaratva) which is, however, regained by the intuitive experience ‘Recognition.’ In everyday life, this forgetfulness takes place even in the things which are actually before us, as in the famous example of the Vedantins - ‘Where is the tenth boy?’ the counter being the tenth in the group, forgets to count himself when he counted nine boys only standing in his presence. (भासमात्वायामान विस्मृतिजीवतत्वान्यथा दिशस्मस्मस्मस्मस्मिन्यथेन तत्मस्मधीत्यपददशायोगात्)

Lordliness (Ishvaratva) is of two kinds, Para and Apara, the former is that which relates to the Transcendental Self and the latter pertains to the immanent self, i.e. the limited perceiving selves (subjects) in relation to this object-world. Para is characterised by Aham-Vimarsha or Aham-Paramarsha (i.e. manifestation of self-‘I’) and Apara by Idam-Vimarsha or Idam-paramarsha (i.e. perception of ‘this’-object world). In practical life individual self is dependent upon Aham-vimarsha, perception of self (as denoted by Aham-‘I’) i.e. self-consciousness, as well as Idam-vimarsha perception of object (denoted by Idam-‘this’), which is the counterpart (pratityogi) of the former, hence it lacks lordliness. In this connection the Vedantin says, that Jiva is of the nature of Vikalpa, fiction or illusion, विविद्यप्रत्येक: विविधत्व i.e., on its Aham-paramarsha is superimposed its counterpart Idam-paramarsha. The Shaiva asks, how can Brahman be of the nature of Vikalpa, while Vedantins themselves admit Brahman assuming the form of Jivas, according to the Sruti,
'यथा विस्फोटिला...' i.e. 'Jivas evolve from Brahma as sparks from fire' 'वानिकपन्नायें' It also explains the plurality of Jivas in conformity with the non-dualistic doctrine of Vedanta. This doctrine is also supported by another Shruti, * (The Self transforming Itself in diverse creation assumes various names and forms). From this it is clear that Jiva is of the nature of Brahma. If the Vedantin supposes that Brahma lacks the Paramarsha Shakti, viz. the Power of differentiating subjects from objects, then Jiva also lacks it. Thus its very existence as Jiva becomes null and void. But as we find that a spark has by nature the power of burning which is originally innate in fire from which the spark evolves; so does Jiva imbibe the Paramarsha Shakti from Brahma or Shiva who is endowed with It initially. The Vedantin objects to this point and says that Vimarsha comes to Jiva by adopting Upadhi (body) † (Upadhi means something that conditions limitation to holding capacity.) The Shaiva questions, can smoke be produced from water in an Upadhi (pitcher) of wood? It is, of course, right, that the Upadhi (body) renders Jiva limited in powers, but the power of perception (Vimarsha) cannot be the result of adopting an Upadhi (body). The Vedantin replies that he accepts Maya Shakti as a principle that divides Brahma into limited forms. On this point the Shaiva puts the question: Is Maya Shakti innate in Jiva or Brahma? If the Vedantin says, Maya Shakti is innate in the former, then the division into Jiva and Brahma is impossible, since Maya Shakti which causes this division is not, in that case, innate in Brahma. ‡ In case Maya Shakti is supposed to be innate in the latter (Brahman), then its purity is impaired by limitation which is inconsistent with the nature of Brahma (Shiva). § On this inconsistency the vedantin says that in essence Maya is not a real thing: ¶ What is it then, the Shaiva asks? The Vedantin answers, it is of the nature of illusion, i.e. which causes one to manifest itself in the form of many. What is the characteristic

* “अनेन जीवनायुप्रतिष्ठे नामस्ये व्याकरचाणः”;
† “सनु वेदायुपाणिता सात्राः सुतुतिता”;
‡ “आश्चर्यविविधसङ्गमाभिः निर्विभावितिरिच्य संबलता पूर्व सिद्धतासो न नश्चिनम नाभयो भवति नार्थ गोवर्धः”;
§ “अन्योऽप्रविधानाताश्रयसंभविष्ठ वष्ठ भासतेत्तमः। मायाध्रेद्रिति ततोद्युपांपवेदाणिनः संततिः। माया कस्य शिवस्य तद्हिनश्चता नवाभुः”;
¶ “भाया परमाध्यता: किर्मण तु नविष्ठान” (Refer Bhaskari PP.10-15)
[rupa] of this Maya? If the Vedantin says, it is of the nature of ignorance, the Shaiva asks, in that case, is it something of a positive character (bhavarupam) or of a negative character (abhava rupam) i.e. characterised by the absence of knowledge (Jnan-abhava-rupam)? The latter alternative cannot be accepted as in the absence of knowledge, there will be no manifestation of diverse objects. It must have some positive characteristic causing diversity of objects, since we learn in the Vedas "Indra assumes many forms by Maya". (इन्द्रो मायामिः पुरुषं ईष्यते). Moreover, pure Brahman cannot be the cause of the impure world, which is of the nature of illusion, and not real like Brahman. Thus if Brahman, which is a real entity, is presumed to become illusive world, it will be reduced to nothingness (Abhavapuram). In case of the former alternative, i.e. if it is admitted that Maya is ignorance of a positive characteristic (Bhava rupa), the Shaiva questions, what is the nature of this positive entity (Bhava)? The Vedantin replies, it is inexplicable (Anirvachya). The Shaiva questions again, how do you call it Maya, then? The Vedantin replies: 'Inexplicably' (अनिवच्चनायतनया इति). The Shaiva says, then Maya is the same as Brahman, since the Shruti declares: "from Whom all expressions cease" (यतोथवाचौनिन्तः वर्तते) The Sruti refers to Brahman. The Vedantin retorts if Maya is admitted as a positive entity (Bhava rupa) having ignorance as its characteristic (Ajanana rupa and is the same as Brahman, what is objectionable in it? (नन्तु स ब्रह्मं व-भवतु का हालिः) In reply to this, the Shaiva says that the Vedantin has arrived at the Shaiva's own point of view, since he (the Vedantin) also admits Brahman as the substratum (Adhishthana) of the universe and also indirectly accepts Maya and Brahman as identical, having the power (Shakti) to assume the form of this world (Jagat). The Shaiva states further that, according to him, Maya is power (Shakti) of Brahman (Shiva). The Vedantin asks, what is the nature (rupa) of the Maya Shakti? The Shaiva replies, its nature is the same as that of Self or Brahman (स्व्यम्बर भूता). The Vedantin questions again, what necessitates the assumption (Kalpana) of another attribute (Shakti) in Brahman? The Shaiva replies, it is so because Maya alone is not the Shakti of Brahman. The Vimarsha, power of perception relating to objects, is also a power (Shakti) of Brahman, the sentient Being (Cit-rupa), since Vimarsha is
innate in His consciousness (chit-amsa) existing in Buddhi, the principle of reason (buddhabindu tattva). But contrary to this doctrine, the Vedantin assumes that a veil (Avarnam) hides the real nature of Brahman, the Supreme Consciousness in an individual being (Jiva) (jiva-abhyam abhava-vyapaya).

This veil is caused by Maya (Mayakrtam), as the shruti declares: (jiva-abhyam abhava-vyapaya tattvavijnana). From this point, The Shaiva draws a corollary, the part of Brahman which is circumscribed by Jivatva (limitation innate in Jiva) is veiled, and the part not so circumscribed is free from this veil: “तत्र च ब्रह्मचार जीवत्वात्माकालभागे नाबरणमेवैति”. In the Shaiva technique, the Vedantin’s point means that the part of Brahman which is not veiled is characterised by Prakasha (Power of Manifestation) alone and lacks Vimarsha (Power of perception); but according to the Shaiva Prakasha without Vimarsha is like an unreal entity (prakasha-vimarsha-vimarshah-sa-vanah) and hence null and void.

From the above discussion, the Shaiva comes to the logical conclusion that ‘Pakasha’ or in other words Ahum-Paramarsha (Manifestation of Self) only is equivalent to Vedantin’s Brahman. According to the Srutis as quoted by Vedantins, ‘स ऐसू’ (Chhandogya Up. VI, 2,3), ‘तत् च चै’ and ‘सच्छार्था’, so on, Ikshana (seeing or thought) i.e. mere manifestation of self (स ऐसू त्वावह-परमर्शा:) is attributed to Atman before the creation, viz. in its precosmic state, when no other entity existed. Pratyavamarsha or Vimarsha state is the changing state of Brahman, opposite to its state of rest (or tranquility) (Shantatvam) which lies in its Prakasha aspect.

The Supreme Being (Shiva) Who is all powerful (Shakta) manifests Himself in the form of this universe in His changing state (Paramarshtam), as the water in its disturbed state assumes the form of waves. In this instance, the insentient water is lacking Paramarsha, viz. reflection or consciousness related to itself and other than itself, which is the nature of Self only: ‘स्वपर बिशाया पारमपर्यं रहितं’.

On this point the Vedantin questions, ‘although the water is lacking Paramarsha (perceiving power or consciousness) i.e. the power of perceiving subjects and objects, it possesses Prakasha i.e. the power of manifesting itself and other than itself (नन्द स्वपर दर्शनशिर्त्यं सम्बन्धे). The Shaiva disagrees
with the Vedantin on this point. He says, Praksha (Manifestation) without Vimarsha (Perception) is of the nature of mere reflection (परामर्शं रहितं दर्शनं हि प्रतिसंकालितस्पर्शः) as we see in insentient objects like glass or a piece of marble. The same thought is given in Pratyabhijna Sutra:

“स्मारणमवभावस्य विमर्शं विद्ययथा,
प्रकाशोऽर्पयशोऽपि स्फर्तकालितज्ञोपम।”

Knowledge of everything in this world, according to the Shaiva, is the result of blending of unlimited (aparimita) Aham-paramarsha (manifestation or consciousness of 'Self') with the limited (parimita) Idam-paramarsha (perception of objects). The blending of these two processes is indeed indispensable for luminous knowledge. The Vedantin, on the other hand, tells to the Shaiva that according to him (Shaiva) Svanubhava (individual perception) is the prerequisite for the phenomena of knowledge. It is true, the Shaiva says, that not only Jiva but also Brahman (Shiva) is characterised with Svanubhava (individual perception) and their identity is realised by Aparoksha Jnana (direct perception or knowledge) as denoted by "Aham brahmam" (I am Brahman).

On the other hand, Paroksha Jnana (indirect perception or knowledge) implied in "Asti Bhrama" (Brahman is) also denotes the existence of Brahman. These two kinds of knowledge, Paroksha Jnana and Aproksha Jnana (direct and indirect knowledge) and the Vimarsha (of Shaivas) do not depend upon another experience Anubhava which, according to the Vedantin, is of the nature of Vikalpa (Superimposition or Nescience). According to the Shaiva, everything is cognised by the powers of Praksha and Vimarsha independent of any such experience as Anubhava or Svanubhava which is not at all required in the phenomena of knowledge.

Here the Shaiva means by Svanubhava that experience which, according to Vedantin, is characterised by Vikalpa or Nescience. But Svanubhava in its true sense, i.e. Vimarsha, according to Shaiva, is rather indispensable to all kinds of knowledge. The Shaiva says that the powers of Praksha and Vimarsha are self-illuminating and do not need illumination from any other source, viz. experience, as there is no need of showing one lamp by another. The Vedantin questions on this point, Praksha alone
is self-illuminating, how is Vimarsha to be such? The Shaiva replies to this objection, Prakasha without Vimarsha is meaningless. The Vedantin objects here, how do you then say that the Sadashiva Tattva [principle] which is equivalent to the Vedantin's Brahman is lacking in Vimarsha. The Shaiva explains that Sadashiva Tattva is the line of demarcation between Shiva Tattva in which Aham-paramarsha [Self-manifestation or Self-Consciousness] is unblended with Idam-paramarsha (object-perception) and Ishvara-Tattva in which the former is blended with the latter. Here Aham and Idam denote 'I' and 'This' in the universal sense as different from the limited individual Aham and Idam which are lower than Maya Tattva. In other words, Aham and Idam in the universal sense, as implied in this relation, belong to the principle of Shuddhavidya and do not come under the limitation of Maya.

The Vedantin demands from the Shaiva a textual authority from the Vedic scriptures in support of the doctrines upheld by the latter, since according to the former the Vedas are sacred, being uttered by God Brahma. In reply the Shaiva says, we quote the authority of the Agamas in support of our doctrines, and not that of the Vedas. The Vedantin asks, in Agama Shastra who has seen Ishvara as Actor (Karta)? In reply to this the Shaiva puts a counter-question, who has seen Him so in the Vedas? The Vedantin responds, Sanaka and other seers have seen Ishvara as Actor in the Vedas. The Shaiva says the 'Mathika Gurus' and others have seen Him so in the Agamas. Why is the Vedantin not satisfied with the sacred authority of Agamas? The Vedantin says, this is not the authentic authority (Pramanyam) according to him. The Shaiva questions, how is then the authority of Sanaka and other seers accepted by them as authentic with regard to the Vedas? The Vedantin replies, because it is so accepted by eminent persons. The Shaiva also considers himself justified in saying that the authority of Mathika Gurus is accepted by great seers like Durvasa and others. Why the Vedantin is not satisfied with their authority? The Vedantin says it is accepted by a limited few only and that is not enough. The Shaiva rejoins, certainly it is so, because the sacred doctrines are not meant generally for all, but for the few only. Anything reasonable stated even by a boy is acceptable to us (the Shaivas) as authentic, nor to speak
of a highly sacred Šāstra which is a potent means of achieving the Supreme beatitude, and anything unreasonable spoken even by Brahma should not be accepted, as Vasiṣṭa says:

"Yukti yuktam-upādeyam vacanam bālakādapi,
Śeṣam transamiva tyājyam - apiyuktam padma-janmana."

Thus ends the discussion (Shastrarthā) between the Vedāntin and the Shaiva. In this discussion, Bhāskarācārya tries to bring into light the main points of difference between the two systems, the Pratyabhijñā and the Vedānta, and also to establish the superiority of the former over the latter. Obviously the two systems are not poles asunder. The Pratyabhijñā and the Vedānta systems can hardly be dissociated from one another. The Kashmir Shaivas do not, however, accept the authority of the Vedic scriptures, but strictly assert that the fountain-head of their doctrines is the Shaivāgamas. But it is evident that the Pratyabhijñā system is more or less affiliated to the Vedic systems. The Vira Shaiva School accepts the sacred authority of the Vedas besides the Āgamās. The above controversial discussion shows that the Pratyabhijñā is opposed to the later system of Shankara's Vedānta which differs greatly from the earlier Vedānta system taught originally in the Upaniṣads. As a matter of fact, the Pratyabhijñā philosophy is mostly in accord with the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, and the two systems differ from one another in minor points only.

The differences between Kashmir Shaivism (Pratyabhijñā system) and the Vedānta and the distinctive features of the former are well brought out in an article on the subject by Prof. B. N. Pandit published in J. & K. University Review (Vol. II, No. 1) of May, 1959. He writes: 'There is no doubt that there is sufficient accord and similarity between the principles of the Vedānta of Gaudapāda and Shankara, on the one hand, and those of the Shaivism of Kashmir, on the other. But, in spite of this accord and similarity, these two schools are as different from each other as are so many of the other schools of Indian Philosophy. For that matter, there is accord and similarity on many points between Shaivism and Buddhism or Shaivism and Sānkhya Philosophy. But that does not mean that Shaivism is identical with any of those schools of Philosophy.'
There are so many points common to Kashmir Shaivism and the Vedānta. As regards the fundamental differences between these two schools, Prof. Pandit writes that the Shaivas argue as follows: ‘According to the Vedanta the universe is false; it has only a visionary existence like that of a mirage. The cause of this visionary appearance of the universe is a sort of ignorance, called Avidya. That Avidya has no beginning. It has been working through eternity but can be ended by means of true knowledge or Vidya. The powers of Avidya are to be admitted, but cannot be explained ... In reality the soul was ever the Absolute Brahman itself, but on account of Avidya it considered itself as different from the Brahman; and now when this Avidya vanishes, the soul realizes its true nature as Absolute Brahman. This realization is the real liberation and this is the final goal of human life. In reality there is nothing like a soul, or the universe, or any sort of bondage or liberation. All this is false and visionary and appears to exist because of Avidya. This Avidya also is not a real thing. Only the Absolute Brahman is real. He is tranquil and calm like space. His nature is Sat. Chit and Ananda, that is existence, consciousness and bliss.

The Shaivas raise objection to this view on the following points: ‘If Avidya is false, it cannot be the cause of this universe which has been existing from times immemorial. How can a thing, which is false and unsubstantial, bring into existence anything full of substance? It is not clear as to whom this Avidya involves. It cannot involve Brahman which is ever pure, all knowledge and all bliss. Now it could involve a limited soul, but no limited soul, according to the Vedānta, does ever exist. It is only the Brahman which exists. So Vedanta leaves this problem unsolved. Again, when this Avidya is apparent, is well known and is conceived also, then how is it that it cannot be explained? A true philosophy should explain such an important topic. If this remains unexplained, the foundation of the whole Vedāntic theory remains unexplained. A thing which has an end must have beginning also. So this Avidya also must have some beginning and must have some cause. To say that it is beginningless and inexplicable is to betray one’s lack of deep insight. It also amounts to self-deceit and incapability in teaching. Space-like tranquility of the Brahman may mean his emptiness and lifelessness. When the Brahman is calm and ineffable like pure space,
then what is meant by his consciousness and bliss? Space is never blissful and is never conscious. A conscious element is always active, because consciousness itself is a subtle activity. If the Brahman is conscious, it cannot be passive like space; and if it is like that, then it cannot have consciousness as its nature. Blissfulness also presupposes some sort of stir, though not a stir in the physical sense. It may be a subtle stir of consciousness. But Vedanta does not admit any sort of stir in the space-like Brahman.'

'How can a person dispense with the universe as something visionary and absolutely false? ... In the view of the Shaivas, the universe is not absolutely false. It is true ... The universe exists. It always existed in the all-pervading form of Shiva. Shiva has pure luminosity and pure consciousness as his form. Luminosity is not the luminosity of the light waves known to physicists. It is that luminosity by which consciousness makes itself always known to itself ... In fact, such consciousness is by itself luminous in nature and that luminosity is by its nature conscious and thus these two are only two names of one and the same substance and that substance is God or Parameśvara. His luminosity is called as Shakti or his energy. As has been said above, this energy of Shiva is a sort of stir in him...

There is a constant succession of ideas going on in one's mind. If one is mentally supervigilant, then he can have the experience of this pure stir of consciousness in-between any two ideas of the mind. This stir is the most important nature of the absolute Shiva. It is a sort of vibration, ...† In fact, it is a sort of constant inward and outward vibration-like activity of the consciousness. It is named as Spanda in Shaivism. Because of this Spanda, the Absolute Shiva always feeling his transcendent as well as his universal aspects. His transcendent aspect is felt by him through the inward stir of that Spanda and his universal aspect is felt by him through its outward stir. Which of these two aspects of the Lord can be called true and which can be called false? Both are true in reality. Therefore the Lord is not lifelessly tranquil like space... But he exists and exists as Shiva and therefore is always full of energy, which is a divine stir within his soul. That stir is always making this universe of limited subjectivity and objectivity appear in

†"Sā sphuralā mahā sattā, deshakāvishēṣāṇi, Saiṣā sārataya proktā, hṛdayam parameśhinah."
countless forms. Every soul is a hero in this divine drama of Shiva and has to reach the conclusion of this drama by shaking off his self-imagined ignorance and by realizing his nature as Shiva the Absolute. This is precisely the view of the Shaivaistic philosophers of Kashmir.

‘Gaudapāda has realized this nature of the self and there are clear hints to this effect found in his Kārikas. Shankara also has at places expressed this view and so has Bādarāyana. Upaniṣads also have preached this energetic nature of the Brahman. But, in spite of all this, this view-point has not been clearly discussed by any of the Vedāntists. All the major works on Vedānta have emphasised the falsehood of the universe and the passive tranquility of the Brahman. There are two points of view expressed in the Upaniṣads regarding the nature of the Brahman. One is the positive approach according to which it has been preached that everything is Brahman, I am Brahman, thou art that, and so on. The other approach is the negative approach, according to which it has been taught that the Brahman is not this, He is not that, He transcends all the objective elements, and so on. But it is this latter approach which has become popular with the authors of the major works on Vedānta. This one-sided view of the truth popularised by the Vedāntists has been responsible for all the criticism made on the Vedānta by other schools of Indian philosophy. Some have called the Vedāntists as hidden Buddhists. There is so much confusion in the Vedāntic exposition of the Truth... The Shaivaistic style of the exposition of the Truth is, on the other hand, free from all confusion,... It is thus clear that Kashmir Shaivism is an independent school of thought and is very distinct and different from the Vedānta or any other Vedic or non-vedic school of Indian philosophy...

* "Sā ca māyā na vidyate. (Gaudapāda Kārikā)
† "Sarvam Khalvīdam brahma,"
+ aham brahmaḥ śivam it-tvam-ast, (Upaniṣad)
‡ "Sa neti neti ṛmā" (Upaniṣad)
Shankara's interpretation of the Upaniṣads and the Brahmāṇḍas. Rāmānuja was followed by Ācāryas (teachers) like Nimbāraka, Mādhava, Vallabha, and Caitanya, and many other saints and writers who helped the cause of humanity by advocating bhakti in one from or the other. They were also obliged to criticise Shankaraśārya. Vallabhaśārya (1473 - 1531 A.D.) tells us that he was asked by the Lord Krishna to appear in the world and to offer a correct interpretation of the Upaniṣads and the Brahmāṇḍas, as these sacred works were misrepresented by Shankaraśārya. Accordingly he taught a system of Vedānta known as the Shuddhādvaita. It clearly shows that the non-duality as taught by the Upaniṣads can be very well explained even without the help of Māyā, which appears in the system of Shankara. The writers of the works on Pratyabhijñā school also revelled in vehemently criticising Shankaraśārya’s theory of Māyā and other points of difference. Like the schools of Rāmānujaśārya and Vallabhāchārya, Pratyabhijñā system is therefore a criticism of Shankara’s school of thought in the Vedānta as well as Buddhist phenomenalism which appears to be the possible basis of Shankara’s idealism. (Ref. the system of Vallabhāchārya by Prof. G. M. Bhatt, the Cultural Heritage of India - I - P. 797)
CHAPTER III

RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHIC BACKGROUND

1. Religious beliefs of the earliest inhabitants of Kashmir; Religious upheavals in the valley; Śaivism and Buddhism; The origin of philosophic spirit in Kashmir (under the impetus of Buddhism);

2. Survey of the earlier philosophical speculations and the doctrines evolved from the Vedas and the Upaniṣādas and different Brahmnical schools as well as Buddhists.

In the present chapter we shall trace the religious upheavals in the valley from the earliest times and survey the earlier philosophical speculations prevailing there before the rise of the Pratyabhijñā system.

Religious beliefs of the earliest inhabitants of Kashmir:

The geographical position of Kashmir, situated as it is in the midst of high mountains, shows that it might have long remained secluded and so unaffected by any external influence. But, it seems that while a number of old cults and religious practices flourished in Kashmir, at times different religious and philosophical doctrines reached there from outside its boundaries. Various evidences point to the fact that the inhabitants of Kashmir professed both kinds of Aryan and aboriginal beliefs from very ancient times which prevail even at the present day. This consisted in the performance of the Vedic rites and recitations of Vedic prayers as well as the worship of the aboriginal deities Shiva, Viṣṇu and their Shaktis. According to the Nilamata Purāṇa*, there existed in Kashmir in very ancient times a polytheistic religion, which included, among many other primitive types of worship, the worship of the aboriginal deities such as God Shiva, Geneśa or Vināyaka, various Vedic and Purānik gods, and even the worship of the Buddha as an

*This is the earliest extant work in Kashmir and is supposed by Dr Buhlar to be the record of the time not older than the sixth or seventh century A.D.
Autar (incarnation). The account of the creation of Kashmir by Prajapati Kashyapa from the lake Satisara (the lake of Sati-goddess Durga) according to the Nilamata Purāṇa, mentions that the original inhabitants of Kashmir were Piśācas who can be identified with aborigines. We are told that the men of four castes (Āryans) were introduced into Kashmir by Kaśyapa (from India). This evidently shows that when Āryans and aborigines following their particular creeds came in contact with one another, each of them gradually adopted the religion of the other.

Religious upheavels in the Valley:- Dr. Sunil Chandra Ray states in his work: "The Early History and Culture of Kashmir" (Chapter VI, PP. 140 ..), 'The earliest inhabitants of Kashmir probably cherished some aboriginal beliefs, the details of which are not traceable now. The snake-cult or Nāga worship seems to have been established in the valley from a remote period and undoubtedly had been one of the earliest religions of the land. In the third century B.C., Buddhism seems to have made some headway into Kashmir, converted a large number of people and overshadowed the Nāga cult which ultimately sunk into oblivion. Among Hindu gods, Shiva either originated or entered the valley sometime before the faith of the Sākya prince made its entrance and was later followed by Visnu, Surya and other Brahmnical gods and goddesses.' Various evidences produced by the scholar show that Buddhism was in a thriving state in Kashmir from the 3rd century B.C. up to the last days of the Hindu rule. Buddhism, however, seems to have been overshadowed by the growing Vaiśnava and Shaiva faith which became predominant in the valley in the centuries following the Karkota period (ending 855 A.D). The history of the introduction of Shaivism in Kashmir is shrouded in mystery. Archaeologists have discovered traces of Shiva worship in the proto-historic Harappa culture. It is not known, whether the Shiva of Kashmir was an immigrant from the neighbouring Indus Valley or was of local origin. The facts furnished by Kalhana in his Rajatarangini, the Chronicle of the kings of Kashmir, however, indicate, in the main, the wide prevalence of the Shaiva cult in the valley from an early period. There are innumerable references to the foundations of Shiva shrines and erection of temples in honour of Shiva.

In reference to the above-said observations of Dr. S. C. Ray,
in the first place, it may be noted that, as stated by H. H. Wilson in his Essays on the Hindu History of Kashmir, "originally, no doubt, it (the religion of Kashmir) was ophite or snake worship but this is a part of the Hindu ritual and the Nagas are included in the orthodox pantheon. The adoration of the Shiva was soon engrafted upon this, even if the two rites were not originally identified".  

† In the second place, it will be noticed that there are numerous references in Vedas, Brahmanas, Upaniṣads, epics and Purāṇas, as pointed out by the scholars like Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, C. Hayavadana Rao, R. W. Frazer and Dr. Hardayal, which show that Shiva worship was in vogue in India in the Vedic age. ‡ Some of the references clearly prove that this form of worship was gradually borrowed by Aryans from non-Aryans. In fact, Shiva worship seems to have been prevalent in India from the age of the Indus Valley Civilization, even before 3000 B.C., as the statues of Shiva have been unearthed in the excavations of Mohenjodaro and Harappa. It will be observed further that in the Rājatarangini, Kalhana connects the reigns of his first two rulers of Kashmir, Gοnαrdo I and Dαmodarα I, with the time of the Great Bhārata war. It is mentioned that the two rulers went to Mathura and took part in the war against Krishna and were assassinated. If we believe Kalhana, communication must have existed between Kashmir and the plains of India from the days of Mahābhārata. It will not therefore be hazardous to assert that Indian culture along with the various forms of religion then followed in the country, including Shiva worship, must have entered the valley by the time of the Great Bhārata War, which is generally believed to have occurred around B. C. 1000.

Shaivism and Buddhism: As is evident from the above, there can be no doubt that Shiva as a popular deity must have been widely worshipped in the valley from remote period. As the first reference to Shiva worship in the Rājatarangini, Kalhana writes that there was a shrine

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† Quoted in the Article: 'A Survey of the origin of the people of Kashmir by H. N. Koul Part II, in "Kashmir Today" (Sept. 1958)  
‡ See Indian Philosophy by Dr S. Radhakrishnan; Shrikara Bhāṣya on Vedānta Sutras, Vol I, Introduction, by C. Hayavadana Rao; Indian Thought Past and Present by R. W. Frazer; The Boddhisatva Doctrine by Dr. Har Dayal.
of Vijayesha even in pre-Ashokan days. Ashoka himself built two temples of Shiva Ashokeshvara and was the devotee of Bhutesha (Shiva). There are numerous references to the foundations of Shiva shrines and erection of templas in honour of Shiva. Shaiva faith became predominant in the valley in the centuries following the Karkota period. Avantivarman (855-883 A.D.) was the devotee of Shiva. Shaivism received patronage from the Utpalas, who succeeded the Karkotas. It also flourished under the second Lohara dynasty. Shiva Shrikantha was regarded in the valley as the promulgator of Shaivagama Shaivism which included within itself the Pashupata cult. Kalhana refers also to the Tantric cult which is closely connected with Shiva worship. When Buddhism entered into Kashmir some time before the reign of Ashoka (272-232 B.C.), there already existed a religion, the prominent feature of which was the worship of ‘God Shiva in company of his female consort Paravati or Shakti’. In this form of worship God Shiva and his Shakti, adored as father and mother of all creation, symbolize the two generative principles of the universe, viz. male and female cosmogonic principles. Thus Shiva worship and Shakta faith are closely associated with one another.

It is commonly believed that the Buddhist period in Kashmir follows from the third century B.C. with the reign of Ashoka, but the new faith seems to have obtained a footing in the valley much earlier, since it was prevalent there in the time of the native king Surrendra who ruled some time after the Buddha but before Ashoka. The Ceylonese chronicle Mahavamsha preserves an account of the introduction of Buddhism in the valley by Majjantika (Madhyantika) who was sent to Kashmir by Ashoka to propagate the new faith. This fact is recorded also by the Tibetan writer Taranath who says that Madhyantika found twelve Viharas in existence at the time of his arrival. We learn from Kalhana that Kashmir formed a part of the empire of Ashoka, who was a follower of the Buddha. It is in the reign of king Ashoka that Buddhism spread all over India and flourished in the valley by the side of the ancient Shaiva faith. Kashmir was a great centre of Buddhism under the Kushanas. It was under the auspices of Kanishka, the Kushana ruler, that the Great Buddhist Council was held in Kashmir. It seems that in the beginning the religious policy of Buddhists was non-interfering and the Brahmans of Kashmir did not feel its advent seriously. The Nilamata Purana records that in Kanishka’s
reign (125-160 A.D.) excesses were committed by the Buddhists under the lead of the famous Buddhisaatva Nagarjuna. We further learn that Buddhists defeated the learned classes of people in Kashmir by preaching their own nihilistic doctrines. In consequence, the 'time-honoured ceremonies' followed by Kashmiris had to be suspended. The Nagas, perhaps a class of the original inhabitants of the valley, were greatly provoked and with their help one Brahmana, named Chandradeva, finally restored the traditional customs and freed the land from the plague of the Bhikshus (Nilamata Purana 424-429). Even after this incident the Buddhist cult was there in a very flourishing condition. As recorded by Kalhana, Meghavahana, Lalitaditya and many other rulers or the members of the royal families built monasteries and stupas there. This fact is in full accord with the report of the Chinese pilgrim, Ou-kong. That Buddhism was patronised equally along with other orthodox creeds by the rulers of Kashmir, is evident from the gifts and endowments made by Kashmirian rulers, especially by king Lalitaditya, and by the members of their courts. The worship of Buddha was recognised in Kashmir from ancient times, as is evident from Nilamata Purana which mentions the Buddha's birthday as a great festival (Ref. verses 809-816). The thriving State of Buddhism in Kashmir after Kushana ruler Kanishka is testified by archaeological evidence, and that, during the reign of Karkotas, i.e. during the 7th and 8th centuries A.D., is also attested by the evidence of the Chinese travellers Heun Tsang (who visited Kashmir during the years 631-633 A.D.) and Ou-Kong who came to Kashmir in 759 A.D. They spent many years in the valley in pilgrimages to holy sites and in studying Sanskrit. Both of them witnessed Buddhism flourishing in the country. All this shows that Buddhism and Brahmanic cults existed peacefully side by side in Kashmir for centuries before Kalhans's time (cf. Chronicle of kings of Kashmir, by Dr. M.A. Stein, Introduction, P. 9).

Origin of Philosophic spirit in Kashmir (under the impetus of Buddhism): It has been said above that Buddhists existed in Kashmir for many centuries and lived peacefully along with Brahmans who were the followers of Shiva-Shakti cults from very early times. Consequently the exchange of views on religious matters between the two sects was inevitable. The influence of Buddhistic thought upon the people of Kashmir was so great that during the eighth and ninth centuries of
Christain era the ancient Shaiva faith was gradually vanishing as is observed by Pt. Madhusudan Koul in his introduction to Ishvara Pratyabhijna Vimarshini (P. I). A religious upheaval, however, came in the ninth century A. D. which brought about the wani g of Buddhism and revival of ancient Shaiva faith in the country. It will be observed that Buddhists initiated a critical view in matters which were so far believed only as gospel truths. The various philosophical doctrines evolved from Buddhists, such as Vijnanaavada and Kshanikvada, were already known in Kashmir. Under the impetus of the Buddhistic thought, various schools of philosophy developed in the valley (as did in the rest of India) among the non-Buddhists, viz. Brahmanas, Vaidyakas, Shaivas and Shaktas. The people were also well versed in the doctrines of Vaiyakarnas (Grammarians), Sankhyas, Nayayikas and the Yoga system which had come into the valley from India through ages. Consequently, in the ninth century A.D. there existed a concourse of various religious and philosophical currents converting the valley into a battle-ground at the time of the rise of the Pratyabhijna system.

As has been observed above, Shiv-Shakti cults were prevalent in every part of India long before the Vedic age. In course of time there grew a mass of literature of these cults, known as 'Agamas and Tantras', side by side with and possibly independent of the Vedic scriptures. Consequently in a place like India where different schools of thought grew gradually in the Vedic fold, there developed similar schools within the ambit of Shaiva fold. Shri S. G. Sakharpeker mentions in his address on 'Shaivagamas', delivered in the Seventh All-India Oriental Conference, held in 1933, that before the arrival of Shankaracharya on the religious stage, the Agamavadins of Shaiva school were separated into different schools, viz. Mahapashupatas, Shaiva Siddhanta, Nipala-Pashupatas, Kashmir Shaivas and Vira-shaivas. These different Shaiva sects held varied philosophical theories, such as Dvaita (Dualism), Advaita (non-dualism), Vishishta-dvaita (modified non dualism) and Dvaita-dvaita (dualism-cum-monism) like similar schools in the Vedic fold.

Survey of the earlier philosophical speculations and doctrines:-
As has been stated above, the rudiments of every system of philosophy in India originally existed in the Vedas, the Upanishads and the Buddhist sources, which subsequently developed in different systems with some additions and alterations. These germinal ideas constitute the common
theme or skeleton of various systems, of course, including the Pratyabhijna system. They, however, differ from one another in propounding some new doctrines of their own and coining different nomenclature. As observed above in Chapter II (P. 54), the main ideas constituting the central theme of the Pratyabhijna Philosophy are traced by Dr. Lachmidhah in the verses Nos. 1270-1274, 1283-86 and 1294-1295 of the Nilamata Purana.* Dr. L. D. Barnett, while bringing to notice the similarity between ‘modern theology of South India’ and ‘the ancient teachings of the north’, endeavoured to indicate what, in his opinion, the links are which join the two, and ultimately both of them to the school which is represented by the Svetasvatara Upanisad.† Some verses occurring in this Upanisad, such as VI-7, 8 & 9 and IV-10‡, indeed, give almost the same or similar ideas as are contained in the above-mentioned verses of Nilamata Purana representing the central theme of the Pratyabhijna System. As a matter of fact these are the common ideas which connect the Pratyabhijna system with the Vedanta school. Pt. Suryanarayana shastri § and some other scholars of his view think that the Svetasvatara-Upanishad and Kaivala-Upanishad have probably grown under the shadow of Agamas, as is indicated by the sectarian title given to the Ultimate Cause (Shiva), symbolised generally by the term Brahman in the Upanishads. It will be clear from the following that the above ideas not only occur in these two Upanishads but are also scattered in various other Upanishads as well as in the hymns of the Rig-veda. These ideas will, therefore, be traced out from the Vedas and the Upanisads in a systematic order as follows:—

*The main ideas contained in these verses are as follows:—

‘Indra must ‘recognise’ (abhijñātah) Shiva as the only Supreme deity (Maheshvarah), Cause of all causes (Kārana kāranam), all-doer and all-knowner (sarva karma ca sarvajñashcā) (1270-1271), who by his free will (iccha) creates the universe comprising animate and inanimate objects. This is the creeper of power (Shakti-lata) of the Lord (Prabho) which manifests the world from itself (Jagad bhaṣayate-bhavat (1272-1273). The Lord brings into existence (Lite supports) the three worlds by his Maya (wonderous power) (Mayā-dhṛata jagat-traya) (1283). Shiva has no extraneous motive for his acts of creation etc. other than His own nature (Tava kāryam na vidyate) (1285). He is the eternal witness (sākśhi-vasthidhāt) (1286). Moha or delusion is produced by Shiva’s own Shakti, namely Maya Shakti (lavaiva mayaya mohitena) (1294) Indra has known this Supreme Lord (Shambho) only by his favour (Prassannosi dhruvam Shambho ena jñātosi vai mayā) (1294).

Foot Notes Continued on Page 85.
Ah. 1, i

वपोधात्: (प्रत्यभिज्ञकारिकायं झानाचिकारे प्रथममाधिकम्)

1. Meaning and Purpose of Pratyabhijñā:

कथाचिदास्य महेश्रस्य दास्य जनस्याच्युतकारस्यच्छलने।
समस्तास्यस्य समाविस्थते ततःतत्त्वभिज्ञायुपापाध्यायम्।

योजना संभिप्तार्थम्:

कथाचित् (परमेश्वरप्रसाददेव 2) अथवा स्वामन! प्रसाददेव") महेश्वरस्य दास्य
(इत्यत्त्वभिज्ञायुपापाध्यायम् अथवा स्वातन्त्र्यान्त: अथवा स्वातन्त्र्यपापाध्यायम्) जासाधा (परमूर्युत: सात्यायित्वा, अथवा स्वायंकल्प)। जनस्य 3 (संपत्तिविनियतयथा सत्मात् पारातत्त्वानि-
(अथवा वैदिकतयथा लोकस्य) उपकारम् अविनिर्गत्व 4, समस्तसंपत् 4
(सदा भक्त्यं तत्स्य तत्स्य स्वातन्त्र्यसंपत्त: रूपायमिद्वः तद: 1, परमार्थि: 6 तस्य) समवानत: 4
(समस्य: 'भावविभि: - विभाविभि: सौंप हेतु: ताम्) तत् (तस्य
महेश्वरस्य, स्वामन: वा) - प्रत्यभिज्ञायुपापाध्यायम् (संपाद्यायम्)।

Trans.: Somehow (viz by the grace 6 of the Lord, the Self), having
myself become a deserving recipient of the Lord's gift of the highest
knowledge (of Self-recognition) or freedom, wishing to render service
(again to) humanity (suffering from want and dependence on others)
I am setting forth the doctrine of Self-recognition (Pratyabhijñā 8) as
a means of achieving affluence and freedom (svātantrya-sampatti), viz. all
that is of highest value (paramārtha-lōbha).

(Note: A human being suffers owing to dependence on others
(pāratantrya) and inferiority complex. Pratyabhijñā teaches that
freedom (svātantra) is the essential nature of Self. The individual is the
architect of his own fate.)

K 1—1. Prūr (Ud); 2. द्वैते अस्मी स्वामीना सवं यथामिलापितम् इति
दास: तत्स्य साब्ध: (वास्यम्) इत्यन्त हर्सेश्वरुपस्वातन्त्र्यपापाध्यायम् १३ (Pr 1,14)
3. आनंदविश्वेस्वरुपाच्यिनतयथा (Pr 1,15)
(suffering from incessant births and deaths — Ag)
4. समस्ता:— पुराणायन्त: सत्ता: (Bh 1,33); 5. Prūr (Ud) - १, संपर्चिनि;
सिद्ध: (Pr 1,15) ततो विभूति परविभूतिपथ्यन्त:— (Pr 11, 272-73).
2. परापचितवात्यायिनी (Pv II, 275) 3, परापचितवात्यायिनी जीवनमुक्तिमूल्यत (Pv II 272-73)
(i, Prosperity, fortune, success and happiness; ii. both the higher and lower spiritual powers, and iii. the glories of the liberated life).

6. प्रतन, बतूम, शक्तिपात, 7. परमेश्वर: निम्नायण (Bh 1, 3)

8. The term "Pratyabhiṣija" is used, for the first time, in philosophic sense by Buddhists. According to them the special feature of knowledge ('sānā', the Pali form of 'sajñā', meaning the 'conceptual knowledge') is the recognising ('paccabhiṣijñā'), the Pali form of pratyabhiṣija' by means of a sign ('abhiṣānena', the Pali form of 'Abhiṣijñā'). According to another explanation, a recognition takes place by the inclusion of the totality of the aspects of a thing. (See History of Indian Philosophy by S. N. Dass Gupta, P. 98)

Somānandā uses the term Pratyabhiṣija, for the first time and once only, in his Śivadṛṣṭi, in a special philosophic sense, for the realization of the identity of this world, consisting of multiple objects—sentient and insentient, with the Supreme Being (Reality), by means of the processes of perception or direct observation (dṛṣṭa) of one of His aspects, viz. His prakāśhamaṇata (omnipresence), and remembrance (smarṣa) of His other aspects, His sarvajñata (omniscience) sarvashaktimatta (omnipotence), etc., as known from scriptures—

\[ \text{समै एकत्र शैन्य व्यविधितमः} \]
\[ \text{दृष्टान्तेऽश्च रेस्थे तदुपपचं} \]
\[ \text{तथा सा प्राचीनमात्र स एवाक्षेति रेस्थित: II} \] (Śd IV, 118-120)

In recognition the processes of perception (dṛṣṭa) and remembrance (smarṣa) are associated or unified.

Utpaladeva uses the term Pratyabhijñā in the sense of revealing the powers of Self—powers of knowledge and action (dṛkkrīyātmikā shakti) :-

\[ \text{शक्तिविविधकर्मनिवृत्तिप्राप्तिः प्राचीनभूमिप्रदेशेति I} \] (Pk I, 3)

Abhinavagupta explains the term Pratyabhijñā as follows:-

\[ \text{बा] तथा सहस्त्रश्रवथ 'प्रत्यंभी' प्रतीपसत्वभिमुखोबृंहां प्रकाश: प्रत्य} \]
\[ \text{भीषा} \] प्रतीपसत्व इति - स्वामाभवसो हि न अनन्तस्तुपर्वों शब्दितिर्भ्रकाशास्त्रवात् \]
Abaya pratiyam jñātayāpi vismṛtṣeṣev jñādintṣeṣev puṇa: ācmāmukṣeṇ n tu samayamāṇyavṛddhismitu stutvaceṇ jñānam pratyabhijñāna... (Pv-I, 20 Fn. 44)

[Pratyabhijñā cha mahat-bhūtāntarāntarāntarāntaraṇaṁ, sat brahman eva iti pratisambhāveta ācmāmukṣiṁ smṛti stutvaceṇ jñānam...]

Recognition consists in the unification of what appeared before with what appears now, as in the judgement ‘This is the same Chaitra, (known before).’

(The Lord as possessed of supreme power is known from the Purāṇas, Siddhāntas. Agamas as well as reasoning, inference, etc. and the Self is a fact of everybody’s direct experience. Recognition (Pratyabhijñā) arises when the two experiences, the knowledge of the Lord as Supreme Power and the awareness of one’s own Self, are unified in one’s experience: ‘Certainly I am that very Lord’).

The experiences of direct perception (āsrīta) and remembrance (smarata) are unified in the experience of ‘recognition’:—

Smaraṇanubhavah ṣaṁāṇaḥpiṣādetyagghādi: ।
Sanskāro’tvayjñāna cha pratyabhijñā prakāśita ।

(Pv I, 20 Fn)

Pratyabhijñā is, therefore, ‘Recognition of Self as Maheshvaram (the great Lord), because he possesses the powers of knowledge and action’—
When Atman (Self) is already a fact of everybody’s experience, as possessing powers of action and cognition and having freedom (svātantra) to use his powers, which sensible person (other than a Baudhha, Vaiśeṣika, and Saṅkhya, according to whom Atman is not sentient) would deny or establish the existence of such a being?

Thus it is established that Maheshvara is the Self of all creatures, since all their activities follow from their powers of will, knowledge and action (which constitute their divine inheritance).

K 1 ctd — तद्यथः प्रमादः खानकयाश्च किंयोगादुः इत्यः (Pv 1, 43)

2, खान किया च स्वसंबद्धनसिद्धमेवेव, (Pvr); तद्यथः प्रमादः खान-किया-शिक्षियोगादुः इत्यः (Pv 1, 43); स चायं स्वतंत्रः। स्वतंत्रः च अस्य अनेके मेंदे मेंसे मेदिते च अन्तर्संबंधः अस्मेदनम् —इत्यः — तद्यथः अस्य पारस्यर्वतः मुल्यामानन्द्वर्यं रूपम् —इत्यः — (Pv 1 31); (3) Bh I, 55
Powers of Atman, Maheshvara, Self of sentient & insentient

Though the powers of Self are already known, yet they are hidden from awareness due to delusion or forgetfulness (moha); Pratyabhijñā is, therefore, set forth to reveal those powers of Self.

Maheshvara is the Self of all sentient and insentient:

तथाहि जडमूतानां प्रातिध्व जीवदाभ्या ।
शानं क्रिया च मूतानं जीवतां जीवनं मतम् ।।

योजना :- तथाहि (दस्यत्स निकल), जडमूतानां प्रक्रिया (अवस्थानम्) जीवदाभ्या (‘जीवनं’ प्रमातारसाधक्य सत्ताति)। शानं क्रिया च जीवतां मूतानं जीवनं मतम् ।

Ques. This world comprises multiple objects of experience, sentient and insentient. It is only sentients who possess powers of knowledge and action; Insentients do not either possess the power of knowledge, or the power of action. How is it then possible to establish that Maheshvara is the Self of all?

Ans. It is an evident fact that the existence of insentients depends upon sentient beings; and (the powers of) knowledge and action are admitted to be the very life of living beings (sentients).

K 3 1, शक्तयांविभिन्नम् अस्थायाणा—प्रभाबिभजनपनक्ष्यपयापनेन (Pv)
(i.e. revealing the extra-ordinary powers or profounder faculties of Self).

कथं शक्ते: – हक्कितयोतिकाया (शक्त्या) ‘आविभिन्नरणेन’...
( bringing into awareness higher powers of comprehension (हक्क) and action (क्रिया)
( Pv I, 37 )

मोहपसाराग्मायवेत
( If is the mere removal of the veil of obscuration, moha or māyā ).

Note - Pratyabhijñā, therefore, means to become aware again of the (profounder) powers of Self (Mahēśvara), which are not unknown before (nānānubhūta-pūrvah) but which are obscured by the veil of moha or māyā.
(In this view the sentient objects also possess the essential characteristics of Maheshvara.)

तत्र ज्ञानं स्वतः सिद्ध किया कायाभितासती।
परेक्षुपरशेषेत तथान्यह्यातीसहुवये। नमः।

योजना:— तत्र (तथोऽन्निक्रिययोऽष्टुष्टे) ज्ञानं स्वतः सिद्धम्। किया छावि (स्वतः सिद्ध, सा) कायाभितासती परेशूपलशेषेत। तथा (कियाया)

K 4 1, तेषां 'जड़मृतानां' विश्वज्ञेनुसार, मात्राक्षत्रा ईश्वराक्षत्रा जाध्यं प्राप्तिनां 'अवस्थां' प्रभावारमभिषिया 'प्रतिश्व' तत्रमात्राराशिक्षवेन अवस्थानं, ततो जड़ा नाम 'न पुष्करं' सन्ति।

(Pv I, 41-42)

The commentator says that the sentient objects, though they are essentially of the nature of sentience (consciousness), yet they are reduced to the state of insentience by the power of the Lord called Māyā Śakti. They, therefore, have their being only as related to and dependent upon sentient subjects. Hence sentient objects do not have independent existence.

2, संस्कारं च जीवनाखं तत्तथ ज्ञानिक्रियायां, गो हि जानाति च करोति च स मृतं—इष्टवते। तदः ज्ञानिक्रियाश्वासांत्योमाद, ईश्वरं—इष्ट

(Pv I, 43)

The subject is characterised by life, that is the act of living which consists of knowing and doing. For, only he is said to be living who knows and acts. Therefore, the individual subject is the Lord, because he possesses the powers of knowledge and action. The Lordliness (Maheshwarya) is essentially the possession of these two powers in relation to all objects.
Powers of Atman, Maheshvara, Self of sentient & insentient

Ques. How do you establish the existence of powers of knowledge and action in the individual subject due to which he can be said to possess lordliness (Maheshvarya)?

Ans. Out of these two powers, the power of knowledge is self-established; and the power of action (Which is also self-established), is perceptible to other perceivers, as it is associated with a particular body. From that (action) the presence of (the power of) knowledge in others is inferred.

In the cognitive experience such as 'I know', there is consciousness of its association with a stir (samvrambha-yogali) also. This stir (samvrambha or spanda) is called Vimarsha. It is the power of action. Therefore, says the commentator, internal power of action, like that of cognition, is self-established and self-shining. That very internal power of action, because of its inherent power, enters into body, through the vital air and 'the group of eight' and being of stirring nature in itself, become directly perceptible as physical action in the sphere of Māyā. That physical action, when seen in another person's body, logically makes us infer the presence of the power of knowledge (jñāna) which is its essential nature.

(The group of eight)—comprises five pānas, the group of sense organs the group of organs of action and Buddhi (mīnd).
Ah. I, II

The Prima Facie View—the Existence of Atman Refuted :-

The Buddhist Saugata refutes the view of Shaivatma-vadin that there exists a permanent subject (Self):

ननु स्वल्प्वणामास्य खानमेक परेण एनः ।
सामिलायु विकर्तव्यं बहुःराणापि तदरुपम्ह ॥

निन्यस्य कस्यचिद्रक्षः-स्थस्यात्रावभासतः ।
इष्टं - प्रतीतितरयेषाः शरीराः विवसायिनः ॥

योजना :- ननु स्वल्प्वणाः-आभास्य खानमेकः (निन्यस्यक्षण) एकम्,
पुनः परम् (अन्यतम) सामिलायु (शब्दनक्षण सह बनते) विकर्तव्यस्य
(स्वल्प्वणक्षण) बहुः (स्मृतिसंशयोरेषांतर्दिष्टे), तत् इष्टम् अधि निन्यस्य
कस्यचिद्रक्षः (िष्टम् न (अभवण्ट), तश्च अन्यत्म शब्दनअभासतः, एष अधि प्रतीतितरायि
शरीराः विवसायिनः (वारितः)

(Saugata Purvapaksin says, it is not right to say that there
exists a permanent self-luminous Self. There are only the chains of
indeterminate and determinate cognitions, but there is no substratum of
the cognitions, nor any permanent being as cogniser apart from
the fleeting cognitions.)

Trans:— (There are only two kinds of cognitions); one is
(indeterminate) cognition, which manifests itself in its essential nature
(svalaksanabhamsam jnanam) characterised by the limitations of time,
space and form" (Being self-confined it is not applicable to others3)
It is one (ekam), i.e. has no variety3. The other (param) is the
determinate cognition (vikalpakhyaam), which admits of linguistic ex-
pression (sabhilapam). It is of many kinds (bahudha) such as

1) स्वरूपसंकोच भागेर ‘लक्षणा’ देशकालाकार - सप्त यं यत्र स्वरूपसंकोच भागेर
प्रकाशनम् अन्तमुखं गमस्त बहुःखेन स्वरूपत्वारिष्टा खाने। Pv, I, 54;
2) ‘स्वरूपानूपकारिष्ट’ । Ibid.
3) ‘एक’-विवचत मेवेंद्रपि एकाल्प्वण स्वरूपे । Ibid.
4) ‘सामिलायु’-आभिलापिन संज्ञापत्वाः शब्दनक्षण सह बनते। Ibid. 55
Shaiva objections to Saugata View

remembrance, doubt, imagination, etc.)⁵ Neither of these two (chains of cognitions) belongs to a permanent perceiver (Self), because none such is experienced. As regards the I-consciousness (aham-pratitiḥ) (which persists in different experiences like “I am thin” (kṛṣṇaḥ) “I am happy” (sukhyaham) and so on, it has reference only to (cognitions pertaining to) the body (or mind), etc.⁶ & ⁷

The Śaivatma-vādin says:— (At the time of remembrance) when the direct perception ceases to exist, how can there arise memory, which closely follows the direct perception, if the perceiving Self were not permanent?

K 2–5  

6.  शारीरसत्तानो वा क्षोभम्...जानसत्तानो वा सुख्यहम्—दत्त प्रतीति: ।

7.  जानसेन्क स्यादामनत्यस्य—स्वल्पव्यायामेव नित्यकल्पं ते कथयितः ।

उभमन्येनल्ल युक्ते बोधितम्यात्मात्मविकल्पयस्य संबन्धितत्वा, तत्स्यभुपच्छेदः; कोमो निश्चय धर्मम् ?

6.  समितिलोकवेदनाभिः शारीरादिक—बौद्धसन्तिकोणि वेदिता न कविष्ठलोकनिष्ठाति ।

K 3–1.  ‘तदनुरोधिनी’–पूवानुमन्वायुष्मयं (i. e. which retains the nature of the former direct perception)

Pṛṣṭhaśāstra—वयमनस्तरसतिं, अपेक्षसहितं यानु (which closely follows the direct perception; which depends upon the direct perception).

Bh

Bhūnavanavakāla eva śvātī prabhāvam (the light of the former perception is the chief characteristic in rememberance).

Pṛṣṭhaśāstra 1, 60

2.  स्त्रियास्त्रियोऽवनुसभन्तात्मलयं...स्त्रियास्त्रियेत् यदि तदांि तदनुमतबोधे नानार्कं, 

वहन अनेक—कालपश्यायो बोधः स एव प्रासाधनसाधिता (How can there arise memory, if the knowledge of the former direct perception would not turn up in the later experience—i. e. remembrance. The knowledge which lasts in different times—former and the later—that is the experiencing Self).
Prime Facie View—Existence of Self Refuted

(The Śaiva means to say that remembrance arises, because the Self (Ātman) persisted from the former direct perception to the later remembrance as witness (dṛṣṭā or sākṣi). The experience of remembrance, in fact, shows that the knowledge of the former direct perception is retained in the permanent perceiving Self, which is revived in the later experience of remembrance).

सत्यप्रामाणिः द्रवः नाशालस्वारा द्रवस्वतुपुरिः।
स्मरितं केनान्ति यथेवानुभवस्ततपदेव सा ॥ ॥

योजना:— (प्रात्र सिद्धान्तिनं पुरवंशकालारं पुरुषस्तिः) आत्मानि नाति प्राप्ति, हृद (हृतमः) नाशालस्वारा द्रवस्वतुपुरिः केन स्मरितं? प्रायः यव: (विषये)
प्रात्रमः: तपस्येव सा (स्मरिति: ) ॥

(The Saugata replies the Śaivātma-vādin:—) Even if there exists a permanent Self, the direct perception having ceased to exist, how can there arise memory of things, experienced through that (preception)? (The Saugata himself gives the reason for the rise of memory:) He says, remembrance depends upon (refers to) the same thing (as its object) that was the object of the former direct perception. (For this reason, the Saugata thinks that, although the direct perception of the former time does not exist at the time of the later remembrance, it can still be the object of the remembrance (asato-rūthānu- bhavasya viṣayena sā viṣaya-vati), as such there is no need of assuming the existence of Ātman.

K 4–1. वेदान्तात्मिक सत्यप्रामाणिं श्रवणाचारनासात्...सा स्मरितं निहितयथे विद्ये Prv
Even if there exists Self, the essential nature of which is knowledge, but the former perception together with its object is absent in smṛtī. Hence, in the absence of the object, smṛtī also cannot arise. The Saugata replies here, smṛtī can have as its object that which was the object of the former direct perception, though it is not existing then: (“प्रात्रमः सेवनानुभवस्तिः तपस्येः सा विषयवती”)


The Saivātma-vādin objects to this point: He thinks that residual trace is a quality and, therefore, needs a substratum. That substratum is the Self. The Saugata replies to this objection:

**K 5–1.** कथा न नापुष्प्यम् प्रामुनब्ध्विमंग्व विष्वयती इत्यय हेतुमाह। 

2. अनुमाबलकाराकः संस्काराः स्वति तद् पुर्वानुमुनब्ध्वेनकथ्याः। 

3. अनुपस्योर्यन्त् भास्यक्यण्यः किंम्। 

What will the permanance of Ātman do here, which is useless?

4. संस्कारस्यायाम्बादः व्यंज्ञानांकरणोऽसेवं च सिद्धे। (स्यते:) 

**K 6–1.** सुभूम्ब्रानादिर्भिः वर्थस्यारवतेनभास्याम्बनी नोपोषोलो भिन्नस्मिनस्मान्यापुरुषभावायाते। 

Ātman is supposed by the Ātma-vādin to be the substratum of attributes or qualities (dharmaḥ) like pleasure, pain, cognition, etc., including residual traces, yet it is unaffected by them. It can be concluded from this that a permanent Self has nothing to do with remembrance which functions by residual traces only. So it is useless to suppose the existence of a permanent Self.
Prima Facie View—existence of Self Refuted

Qualities (dharmas) (like pleasure, pain, cognition as well as the residual traces) are different from (the supposed) Ātman (Self), because the essential nature of that (Ātman) is admitted by Ātmavādin to remain unaffected by them (the residual traces and other qualities) (tat-svarūpa-aviseṣatāḥ). As remembrance is admitted to take place by residual traces only (without recourse to a permanent self as remember), so the rememberer is a mere fancy just like the perceiver.

शान्तं च चिस्त्वरूपं चेलटमात्रं किमात्मवद्।
श्रवापि जहमेतस्य कर्मयथप्रकाशतान्॥ १७।

गोजना:—(प्राप्तम्: शान्तवक्ति निराकरेऽरतिः) शान्तं च चिस्त्वरूपं चेलू, किं तद्व शारस्तवत् श्रमित्रम् ?
श्रवापि एतद् (शान्तं) जहम्, (तत्-) एतस्य श्रव्यप्रकाशता
कर्म स्पष्टः ?

(After refuting the existence of a permanent Self, the Saugata now refutes its possession of powers of knowledge and action. He first examines the power of knowledge:—)

The Saugata says, if the power of knowledge be admitted to be of the nature of sentiency (citsvarūpam), then is it transient like Self? But, if it is admitted to be insentient, how can it make the objects manifest?

K 7–1. तेन वया प्राप्तम् किमतिव्यः; तथा जानमापि किमात्मवम्, उपमोरपि श्रमित्रायथायें
नुपपापायायेन परायायोगमात्रम् इति।

प्र 1 69Fn

तद्पि कस्मात् न श्रमित्रम् ? न च इवरोधमित्रयो कश्चित् स्ववम्यः; कार्यकार्यायायायो हि
ग्रस्तोऽनायः; तत् श्रास्त्रोऽजानं शक्तिश्रेरिस्याचारम् श्रवणम् श्रवणम्

प्र 1, 69

चिस्त्वरूपं अन्योऽरतिः…प्राप्तम् इत्य श्रमित्रायथाविरास्यः।

This line also implies that both Ātman and knowledge (Jñānam) (both of them being citsvarūpa) will be admitted as two separate permanent entities, in that case, it is not possible to assign one (Jñāna-śakti) as a quality to the other (Ātman).
Saugata Refutes Shaiva doctrine

13

(Bh 1, 109)

(2. Another idea which seems to be in the mind of the teacher, is that insentient Buddhi can have no capacity to manifest objects, even if it receives the reflection of Caitanya from Atman, just as a mirror receiving reflection of the flames of a burning fire, cannot have the capacity to burn. So in that case also we shall have to admit that Buddhi is itself sentient by nature, not that it is so because of the reflection of Caitanya of Atman. Buddhi is to be admitted as sentient; otherwise how can it manifest objects?

(Bh 8-1. जानं बुझिः सा जानाः यथा विमुष्यत्वच्छाया धेरते सत्यात्मनोऽपि चैतन्य- च्छायाममोऽसुरध्र्यकायः तथा ध सत्या विस्तृतप्रभुत्वा स्वायत्। Pnr)

Pvi I, 78 Fn
Prima Facie View—Existence of Self Refuted

(But even the theory of reflection does not alter the Saugata’s view against the permanence of Self. He thinks that it is not possible for Buddh to receive reflection of sentiency from a source (Self) whose existence is not proved. With this idea in his mind he says:—)

Thus, the Buddh shall have to be admitted itself as sentient, for in an insentient thing there cannot be the capacity of making the objects manifest (Jādyat nārtha-prakāśatā).

किर्याप्रबंध कायादेशसः दृष्टादियजाता।
नायत झुप्पू न सावेष्क क्रिमीकर्ष्यो चौविता। भा 111

योजनाः— किया श्रेणि कायादेशः श्रव्यस्य, तत्तद्वेशादि—जाताता, न श्रव्यः,
श्रेणीः (प्रत्यादर्शयाम् तः नुपलब्धः।)। सा एका क्रिमिका श्रेणि च न एक्ष्या अविष्टः।

कियाप्रिप कत्री कायादेशसः, श्रव्यवशेषे परिपापादी श्रव्यवशेषे, दुर्गा
देशहृदये, तेन कायदुपचारे: पदार्थस्य ते ते च ते देशादये: तेषु जाताता—वदुवेशितुद्वक्तियतहः
प्राप्तुमां भवति, नवीतो न भवति। कुटे ? श्रेणीः (प्रत्यादर्शयाम् नुपलब्धः
लघुकरित्।

Bha I, 114

(Having examined the power of knowledge (ज्ञानं), the Saugata now examines the power of action:)

Action also belongs to objects like body, etc., as it appears to be produced, as it were, from them (objects) in their association with different places, times and forms. For, nothing else is perceived.

The view that it (action) is one and successive and belongs to one (agent) is not also sound.

K 9-1. केवलं गमनपरिशासामाधिक्षा स्या किष्या, कायादोशि तु मन्दिरनदेशकालगतः—
Pvr पुनस्ततामातमेतदत्तिरिक्ष्याम् नुपलमभावः।
एवं तद्वेशात्तया तत्तावलं तद्वेशात्तया च भावं एवं भावं।

Pvr

Pvr 1, 81

2. नापि कालकार्याय चैवक्ष्माभवः तत्त्वं प्राप्तं भवतः।
Pvr प्रत्येककाल-स्वभावः ति क्रिमिका, एक्ष्या तत्त्वं तत्त्वादन्तरित कथा
स्थाप्तं इति।

Pvr 1, 83 Fn
Having thus examined both, the power of knowledge and power of action, the Saugata now refutes the relation that may be supposed to exist between them and the Self (Atman), so that by attributing these two powers to him, he may be said to be omniscient (sarvajna) and omnipotent (sarva-karta).

Only this much is perceived that certain things exist before, and the other things come into being later. (According to the Saugata's view) there is no relation other than that of cause and effect (The Saugata means to say that even this relation cannot exist between Knowledge or Action and the Self for the apparent reasons).  

The commentator gives the following reasons regarding the absence of any relation between knowledge or action and the Self:—

1. Because, the Self (Atman) cannot be spoken of as the effect of knowledge or action;

2. Because, the knowledge is the effect of things necessary for its rise; and—

3. Because, there is no separate thing called action. Bh III, 30.
Prima Fuerie View—Existence of Self Refuted

Having thus refuted the arguments in support of the relation that may be supposed to exist between the powers of knowledge and action and the Self, the Saugata now argues against it in general as well as in special terms.

As a rule, relationship refers to two things (dve-sthah). And that which exists in two must have multiplicity of forms (aneka-rupah). (It is not right to think that one Atman is connected with both in relation). An established thing (i.e. a thing having independent existence-siddha) does not need another (anyonyapeka). Nor is it related to another by relation of dependence (paratantra). Therefore, just as knower is a mere supposition and not real, so is actor also.

K 11-1. Explained according to Pr.

See, Kaw, R. K., The Doctrine of Recognition, pp 107ff 115ff (for Ah. I, i) and pp 123ff (for Ah. I, ii)
Ah I, iii

The refutation of the prima facie view—Permanence of Self (Ātman) established:

The Śaivātma-vādin refutes the Saugata's reasoning against the doctrine that there exists a permanent subject (Self):

सत्यं किन्तु स्मृतिं ज्ञातं तत्वं न संस्कृतं श्रातस्य-निष्ठम् तत्त्वं न तद्विति।

योजना:— सत्यं १, किन्तु स्मृतिं ज्ञातं तत्वं न संस्कृतं श्रातस्य-निष्ठम्, चार्धिक श्रातस्य-वेदकं ततू न (भवति)॥

The Śaivātma-vādin says,—True (satyam) (I quite agree with certain points stated in the prima factae). Although, it may be admitted, that remembrance arises out of the residual trace of the former perception (pūrṇāntah-saṁśkṛteḥ jātaḥ-api), yet, being self-confined (atma-niṣṭham—i.e., resting in itself), as every cognitive experience is, it cannot make the former perception known (ātī-anubhava-vedakam tat na bhavati), (that is to say, remembrance has no scope to cognise directly the former perception).

The Saugata questions with regard to this point. He says, because remembrance originates from residual trace, it will have to be admitted that remembrance has the former perception also as its object, viz., it has direct cognition of the former experience. To this point the Śaivātma-vādin says:

तुक्सहासासात् नाम्येष वेद्या रूपदृशयो दूक् ।
रसे संस्कारास्त्रव नु तत्तृत्त्वम न तद्गति।॥

K 1—1. पूर्वसमस्थात् मया तावत् वषु ग्रज्जोकस्वयम् । Pü

2. पूर्वसामस्यंस्ववर्गवीज्ञापि स्मृतिरात्मातन्निष्ठत्वात्सामस्ववश्वसंस्कृतकं न
   तु पूर्वसामस्यास्यासामस्यात्मात्स्वत्वात्स्मतात्त्विकाः च घटते । Pvr
Permanance of Self established

योजना:— ¹ दृष्टि (आनंद) स्व-आभास एवं ² (स्थव्रकाशा एवं भवति); प्राचीन वेदया: न (भवति)³, (का तथा?) रुप-दृष्टि रसे दृष्टि ² ¼ (यथा रसे दृष्टि रुपदृष्टि वेदया न भवति तथा); (स्पष्टं: पूर्वानुबंध) संस्कारजत्वं तु तत्त्वलथं ⁵ (पूर्वानुबंध तुत्त्वलथम् भवति); न तु तद्गतिः ⁶ (पूर्वानुभव भवति: न भवति)।।

Perception is self-luminous (द्य-स्वभासित) it cannot be the object of any other experience, say remembrance, (नायेना-वेदया) just as the perception of colour cannot be the object of the perception of taste (रुप-द्रेष्वया द्यक रसे) The fact that remembrance arises from residual trace only makes it similar to the former perception (i.e., direct experience) in respect of having the same object (तत-सुल्यतम), but the former perception does not come within the range of remembrance (नातद-गतिः). In remembrance there is no direct cognition of the former perception (नातद-वागतिः). In fact, the former perception does not shine in remembrance, i.e., the experience of former perception does not recur in the later remembrance, but the latter has only the similarity or likeness of the former (तत-सुर्यय-मात्रम).

N. B.—Bhāskari text reads 'संस्कारजत्वं' in place of 'संस्कारजत्वं' as in KSTS and Pvr. In this commentary, the Kārika reads 'स्वभावजत्वं तु तत्त्वलथं न तद्गति:' and it is explained as follows:-

संस्कारजत्वं तु तत्त्वलथं भवति, तद्गतिः—पूर्वानुभवसांतु न भवति, अव च तद्गतिः—तत्त्वलथावसांतपि न भवति इति।। Bhā I, 130

K2—1. न तु मा भूतं पराविविधं स्वीकारो, यस्तु संस्कार-महेंद्रभवन्तो—वेद्यास्विद्धनं यम अवनभोभवत—इति स्मृताद्वनुभवस्य अवभाष: स कि नाजूक्कर्मिण्य-हृदयाश्च ैव तसदिकरणहेतुत्तत्या दृष्टिकरणं सुवर्णम............

(Pv I, 93 Fn)

2. सर्वं हि जतिः: स्ववेतनेक्षको, Pvr, स्वप्रकाशात्वं ज्ञानस्य भवते, 
Pv I, 95
3. नायेनाविष्क्रेण Pvr 
4. वरस्त्रवान्येऽगो-योविष्क्रेणाणि-प्रशोष्यविविधम् स्वास्तमेवं नियमभावः। Pvr 
5. पूर्वानुभवसंस्कारजत्वं तसादृश्यमात्रं। Pvr 
6. न तु पूर्वानुभवावगति: तदभवावतु तसादृश्यस्य नावेष्यम्। Pvr
The Saugata now urges the following view against the objection of the Śaivātma-vādīn:

प्रभावधिशिष्य्दर्दिष्यः स्मृतेत्तदवसायतः।
३३।

योजना:— यथ। स्मृते: अतद्विपयते (पूर्वाःनभव तदविषय श्रस्ते, श्रवण, पूर्वाःनभव तदविषयायावगमते, श्रवण, न तावनुभवतदिशिष्यो विषयो यथा: स्मृते:) श्रवण, तद् (पूर्वाःनभव तदविषय: कर) अवसायतः (श्रवणसायतः, श्रवण, निःशचयातु) स्मृते: द्ृष्टान्तं यन्ता (पूर्वाःनभव अश्वलम, श्रवण, द्ृष्टिशिष्यो) अश्वलम्, तत् एवं श्रमन्नजस्म (युतितुपन्तं न भवति)।

The Saugata says:— Although remembrance does not have the former perception or its object as its object, (a-tat-visayatve api), yet, since smṛtti (remembrance) has the knowledge of both, the perception and its object, (tad-avasāyataḥ), it must, therefore, be admitted to be resting upon them illusively (dṛṣṭālambanatābhāntya). (Saugata thinks, it is because that remembrance, being a form (process) of determinate knowledge (vikalpa-rūpa), cognises the invisible past perception and its object, and, therefore, it must be of illusive nature. Since there is neither the former perception nor its object as the object of remembrance, yet, there being the consciousness of both, this must be due to smṛtti being illusive in nature.)

The Śaivātma-vādīn refutes the Saugata’s view:— (He says,)

This view is quite incongruous (tad-etad-asmanjasam).

The Śaivātma-vādīn contradicts the Saugata view:

स्मृतत्वैव कयं तावद् भारतेशवार्षिकविभिन्नतिः कयम्।
पूर्वःनभवसंस्कारापेक्षा च किमिन्तीत्वम् ॥४॥

K 3— 1. न चापि भारत्वा पूर्वाःनभवं तद्विषयं शुक्ती रजतविषयवशेष्ट्वानम-ध्ववस्तवति स्मृतिशिष्यवा। Pvr

यावत श्मृतिविशिष्यक्षयः पूर्वाःनभवकामसमध्ववस्तवति स्मृतिशिष्य: तदविषय: च श्रवण-स्यति, तदपि इव भारती-स्ववाता,.......
Pvr I 97-98

न तद्विषयं नापि तद्विषयः स्मृतेविषयः, तदापि लु उभयम् श्रवणसीयते, श्रमन्नजस्म: स्मृते। Pvr I, 98
Permanence of Self established

योजना:— (स्मृति;) भ्रान्ते: लावत्, स्मृतितेव कथम्? अर्थस्थितिः च कथम्? पूर्वानुभवसंस्कारपेक्षा च किम् इति इच्छयते?

If it is thought to be an illusion (bhrānte), how can it have the essential nature of remembrance (smtitaiva katham)? How can the order of real objects be established on the basis of illusion (arthasthitih katham)? Moreover, why should it be supposed to depend upon residual trace, left by the former perception (pūrvānubhava-saṁskārapakṣa ca kim itiṣyate)?

As to the point said by the Saugata that there is similarity between remembrance and the former perception, since both, the former perception and its object, are determinately cognised by remembrance, and this similarity is due to residual trace, the āśvāttha-vādin states that the use of the word 'similarity' in this connection has no significance. He, therefore, argues:-

भान्ति का चावसायस्य न जडान्धिषयस्थिति:।
ततोजाइये निजेलख-निन्धळाचारंस्थितत्त:।

योजना:— (स्मृति;) अभ्रसायस्य भान्ति काये 1 च (अत एव जडंसवामवे), जडाध
विषयस्थिति: n2 (भरवति), ततः (तद्व) अभ्राईये, निज-उलेखनिन्धळात् (निर्द ज स्वसंवेदनम् 'उलेखनम्' स्वाकारः: इति-इम्यति एषा परिनिन्धासो-निन्धासो-अवसारं
गता स्मृति:), ततः (स्मृत्यवयस्यायत) अर्थस्थिति: n3 (विषयस्य व्यवस्थापन न
भरति)।

If the knowledge of remembrance be supposed to be illusive in its nature and, therefore, lacking sentience or self-luminosity (avasāyasya bhrāntitve ca), it cannot manifest (establish) the real objects (jaśad viśayasthitth na).

If the knowledge of remembrance be supposed to be illusive in its nature and, therefore, lacking sentience or self-luminosity (avasāyasya bhrāntitve ca), it cannot manifest (establish) the real objects (jaśad viśayasthitth na).

K 4— 1. पूर्वानुभवाकाशालिषयस्यस्मृतिः व्यवसायस्मृतिः न युक्तम्।

प्रत्यय विषयस्य अस्मृतिः कृंचनू काल मध्ये मुम्पितस्वथेव न पूर्णः: प्रमोहण-प्रहारः: पुनः प्रकाशनेन लाभातिः स्मृतः: सुल्क रूपः थैन आन्त्यरेस्मूहः
विवेयः: तदेता वृत्तस्वतायेन उच्छसितः प्रवनुभवो न प्रकाशते तिष्ठयोष्टिः नैव प्रकाशते अनितु समयः प्रकरण उपित इवासी जातः: इति। प्र् I. 100 F n

न च प्रवनुभवो विषयप्रकाशनात्मना निष्ठूसेवाया भ्रान्तं: किचिदंपि साधृष्यम प्रस्तिः। प्र् I, 100
Illusiveness of Smṛti-Saugata view-refuted

Even though it be accepted to be self-luminous, sentient, (aṇḍa), yet its self-luminosity being confined to illuminating (making manifest) itself (nijollekha-nigṛṭhāḥ), it cannot establish the order of external objects (tataḥ arthasthitīḥ na).

The Saugata might think, that part of remembrance which refers to the indeterminate cognition (consciousness) of itself is not illusive in nature, on the other hand, that part of it which refers to the determinate cognition of object in contradistinction to indeterminate cognition of itself, involves illusiveness. Hence, remembrance is an error and, so, non-luminous (jaṇa) in relation to its object. On this point the āivātmic-vādin thinks that whether we take into consideration that aspect of remembrance which refers to the determinate cognition of the objects (being jaṇa) or the other aspect of remembrance which pertains to the indeterminate cognition of itself (which is confined to illuminating itself), it cannot, in any case, manifest (or establish) the order of real external objects.

The āivātmic-vādin arrives now at his own point of view. From the above discussion, it is evident that even though we may agree with the Saugata that there remains the residual trace (saṁskāra) of the former perception, yet remembrance cannot originate from it, for, then all kinds of cognitions (jñānānī) will be dissociated from one another. The established order of the world depends upon the unification of cognitions of all kinds, which figure in remembrance in association with one another. So remembrance is indispensable to practical life. Even the direct perception of Self ‘I’ is impossible without remembrance of one’s conventional self which depends upon the unification of the conscious-

K 5— 1. इह स्मृते:……स्वसवेदानांसह (हस्तिनि नितिकल्पानि – Fn) प्रकाश-माने न भानिता, तत्र वापरिवृत्ताभावात्, यस्य तत्र प्राविद्यवियते स्वाकारः स विपरीतत्वा प्रस्वाकारार्थने प्रविद्यवियता—हि तत्र प्रबङ्खे भानिता Pu 1, 102

2. प्राविद्यवाद्य एव भान्त्या विषयव्यवस्थापको न तु संचित, स च ज्ञेष्क्षमयं व्यवस्थाया हेतु। Pu 1

3. अथ तु तमू प्राविद्यवाद्यः स्वसवेदानां स्वाकारः वा प्रविद्यवाद्य प्रज्ञ-त्वमू प्रस्त्रा:ः एवमपि……कथ विषययत्व व्यवस्थापनं व्यवहायेत्वसंपादन-सामध्यम्? Pu 1, 102
ness of the former and the later states of consciousness. If we are to believe as the Saugata states that all cognitions are self-luminous but they mutually differ and do not know one another, then they will be like dumb and deaf and hence insistent in relation to one another. So the teacher states his point of view in the following two concluding verses of this *Aṣṭāṅga*:

एवम्योऽयम्मिनांतां परस्परवेदिनाम्।
जानानां नुसंधान-जन्मः नशयेजजनतिथिः।।

न चेदन्तः कृतान्तः विशवर्तः महेश्वरः।
स्यादेकशिक्षः दुःस्मृयोहन-शक्तिमानः।।

योजना:— एवम् योऽयम्मिनांतां परस्परवेदिनाम् जानानां नुसंधान-जन्माः
जनतिथिः: नशयेत्, कृतान्तः विशवर्तः चिन्ता:।
जानः-स्मृयो-प्राप्तः-शक्तिमानः।
एकः महेश्वरः: न चेतः स्यादः।।

The teacher says:— All human transactions originate from the unification of various kinds of cognitions (like, perception, remembrance, etc.) (*jñānānām-anusandhāna-janmā*), although they mutually differ (*anyonya-bhinānām*) and cannot know one another (*aparastapa-vedinām*);

if we deny the existence of One great Lord, a permanent subject, the Self of all, (*ekaḥ maheśvaraḥ na cet syāt*), who is essentially of sentient nature (*cida-vapuḥ*), who holds within Himself the whole form (manifestation) of this infinite universe (viz, the innumerable objects of the world) (*antaḥ kṛta-ananta viśvarūpaḥ*), and who possesses the powers of cognition, remembrance and differentiation (*jñāna-smṛty-apohana-saktimānaḥ*), all this human transaction will come to an end (*janasthitiḥ naśyet*).

K6, 7 — 1. 'जनस्या' लोकस्ये या काजन् 'स्थितिः' व्यवहारः सा सर्वजनानां यत्
‘अनुसंधान’—एक-विभाव्य-सातोपथमुर्तिभावतः
तथा भावताः। तथा हि-
स्मरणनिबः सर्वाव्य-व्यवहाः। *Pūr I*, 103, 104

2. जानानि स्वत्समाश्च-परिनिर्दिष्टानि स्वसंविद्यपतया नायपरस्वविद्या
लेखाम्योऽयविविधसंहुतामहाय: 
...लोकक्षयबाहरः कथम्। *Pūr*, 6

3. चित्तवेत्तानि विशवविद्यतोऽतिरितस्यातुपपत्ते।
श्रोतवादं ज्ञानानाम-
न्योऽश्चानुसंधास्मस्येव ज्ञानादिका: कथत:। *Pūr*, 7
It is an established fact that there exists one eternal Supreme Lord (Maheśvara), the Self (samvid) that is the basis of unification of all kinds of cognitions, and that includes the whole objective world within itself, the world comprising sentient and insentient beings. It is, therefore, implied that this samvid is not only the Supreme Consciousness but is also the Ultimate Substance, Prima Materia of all things:

\[ P\nu \text{ I, 107.} \]

Abhinavagupta explicitly refutes the doctrine of Vijñāna-vādins and some Vedāntins that the Supreme Being is of the nature of consciousness (cit, vijñāna) only. The Pratyabhijñā holds that this One great Lord (Maheśvara), who is essentially of sentient nature (cid-vapaluḥ), samvid, contains within Himself the endless objective world (antaḥ-krṣāntana-viśva-rūpāḥ). Being of such nature He is the Universal Substratum, the source of all the material objects. The objects are, as it were, heaped in it (vedya-rasāḥ tena krodikṣātaḥ), or are merged in it:

\[ \text{ग्यत एक एत ग्रसो,—हि एकत्वत्व सर्वो बेदवारिष्ट: तेल कोडीक्रतः,—हि येवदपि अनि- छतः अत्सीकार्यं। } \text{Ibid.} \]

He, in whom indwell all the objects, as identical with it, isolates some objects and makes them manifest, emerged, as it were, from the ocean of light (prakṛti), by the sovereignty of His will. This is called His power of Knowledge (Jñāna-ṣakti):

\[ \text{ग्यत: स्वरूपत्वः विदितम् आर्यराजिम् अपरमिन्द्र भिन्नकार्यम् आत्मनिष्ठ परिगृह्य, कौच- } \\
\text{देव अर्थ-स्वरूपार्थ उन्मर्यम् आभासयति……सेवा ज्ञान-शक्तिः। } \text{P\nu \text{ I, 107, 108.}} \]

When the consciousness pertaining to some particular object has once been manifested in the form of its perception and, on some later occasion, it is revived in the form of the idea recalled, His another power comes into play which is called the power of Remembrance (Smarana-ṣakti):

\[ \text{तेन कृत्वा ज्ञानं ग्ुहौत्तमं यत् संवेदनं वहिमुखम् अभ्युतं, तस्य यत् ग्रहस्मं } \\
\text{वित्स्वरूपतवं तत् कालान्तरोदग्निप्रवेद्यास्तु स्वात्मगतं तद्विषयविषये वहिमुखवं परामुखति, इति एव ज्ञाति-शक्तिः। } \text{P\nu \text{ I, 109.}} \]
Permanence of Self established

In this process nothing new is manifested, but the things, ever existing in the ocean of consciousness, emerge from it:

नवं न फिकित्रं गृहापातं स्मृतं वा स्मातः। 
Ibid.
उत्तमाभाससर्वसर्वं च विस्तृतवर्णं बहुभुद्वलन्तत् तच्छायायतुरुगातर । 


That power, which isolates the manifestation of some particular object from the Supreme Consciousness, in which all the objects are devoid of any distinction that is caused by their association with time, place and form, and makes it distinct from the rest in the form of determinate cognition (vikalpa-rūpa vijñāna) owing to an impression of some past experience (vāsanā mitra) roused by varying nature of His will (viciśrechha-prabodhitā), is called His power of Differentiation (Aphāna-śakti):

एष एव परितंश्चवनात् परिच्छड उज्ज्वते, 
tadavābhāsanāsāmanthām śrṇyoḥpanāvahita:।
Pv I, 110

वेशकालविशेषावच्छवदश्यत्वन विचित्रे चाप्रवेणितावभास- 

-नेद्रावासनामाण्डपपादित- 

विकल्प-हूँविज्ञाना अपराह-शक्ति:। 
Ibid., 71 Fn

All the worldly transactions are performed by this triad of powers.

ग्रन्ते शक्तिमाण विद्वे ब्यवहारः। 
Ibid.

It is that Self, who directly perceives (janati), remembers (smārti) and determinately cognises (vikalpayati) through the various limited subjects.

स एव हि तेन तेन बुध्या जानाति, 

-स्मरि विकल्पयति च। 
Pv I, 111.

And innumerable and varied are the ways in which the powers of Knowledge, Remembrance and Differentiation function.

एतस्य च ज्ञातिदिवस्तीत्तैं श्रवण्यक्रारो वैचित्यविकल्पः। 
Ibid.

This function of His powers, in variety of ways, is called His Svātantra (self-dependent power) (tat samarthyam svatantryam).*

*See, Kaw, R. K., The Doctrine of Recognition, pp 131ff.
Ah. I, iv

स्मृतिशक्तिनिरूपणम् (प्रत्यक्षानासाकारिकायां ज्ञानाधिकारे चनुर्धमालिकृतम्)

**Power of Rememberance :-**

It has been proved, in Ah. I, iii, that the Self (Ātman) is a permanent being, who is endowed with the powers of Remembrance, Knowledge and Differentiation. In the actual order of conscious activity, the power of knowledge (Jñāna-Śakti) precedes the power of Remembrance (Smaruṇa-Śakti), and the power of Differentiation (Apohana-Śakti) is antecedent to the both and is their very essence. Remembrance is already introduced as an evidence in support of the existence of the Self as a permanent being, against the contrary view held by the Buddhist Saugata. In this Ahnīka, the power of Remembrance (smṛti-Śakti) is first dealt with in a greater detail. Remembrance brings the various cognitions in association with one another and is the cause of all determinate knowledge. The Self (Ātman) is the substratum of remembrance (smṛti) and hence the rememberer (smarta). In the former experience (the direct perception), he receives its residual trace (samskāra) which subsequently causes the phenomenon of remembrance, Smarāṇa, the remembering Self, is not the fleeting experience or the phenomenon of remembrance itself, but it is a permanent being behind the experience, who possesses the power of remembrance. Even without experiencing the phenomenon of remembrance, that being exists. He is not only Smarta but has also so many other powers and lasts as a permanent being even in the absence of their functions. He is the common substratum or nucleus (keśāra) of all these powers.

In the first Karikā, it is explained how the Self functions in the experience of smṛti :-

स हि पूर्वामुन्ताभोपलब्धा परतोषिप सन्।
विमृद्धेः इति स्वरेण स्मृतियुपविद्रष्टे ॥ ११॥

योजना :- हि (यस्मात्), स्वरे (स्वतन्त्र:) स परतः (स्मृतिकाले) भ्रम सन्, पूर्वामुन्ताभो-उपलब्धाً (अनुपारितित्वमा)' स' इति विमृद्धान् स्मरितं इति भ्रम-विद्रष्टे (कथयते)।
The Self is free to recall (svairi sa vimaśan) in the state of remembrance (smṛti-kāle), the knowledge of the object perceived previously. Having perceived the object in the former experience (pūrva-nubhūtartha-upalabdha), he recalls the same to memory at a later time (paratah) and determinately knows: ‘it is that same object’ (sa iti vimaśan samrati). (It is because the Self exists in all the states, i.e., in past, present and future experiences as samvid (consciousness) that is not limited by time—kāla-vichhedā-sūnyāḥ).

Now the question arises that smṛti, being vikalpa (determinate knowledge), cannot make the object manifest in its real nature. The direct experience which cognises the object in the past perception, becomes a matter of past time at the later time of remembrance. The subsequent remembrance cannot, therefore, make the former perception manifest, because one cognitive experience cannot be known by another (jñānasya jñānatarena asaṃvedyavat), and because the former cognitive experience (direct perception) ceases to exist at the time of the later remembrance (asattvacc). Thus the knowledge, ‘I remember this’, is mere illusion, since the object is not manifest in remembrance. The teacher answers this objection as follows:

भास्क्येच च स्वकाले स्त्रित्वृवभासितमान्यान्।
स्त्रिलक्षणं घटाभासमांशेण अखिलात्मना।

योजन: (स्वरी स) अशाश (सामवायत्सृवृववच्चया), पूवभासितमस्व लक्षणस्यः।
स्वाज्ञायांनुसर्गिर (स्वहस्तक्त्वोक्ष्यागि-लक्षणस्य) भामायान स्वकाले
स्वरकाले (स्वलक्षणस्य) घटाभासमांशेण अश्च अखिलात्मना (स्ववासांमिश्रितं वपुष) भास्करे

K 1—1. ‘पूववृवृवस्थय अविशय’ स उपलब्धत्वाश्च (सृवृवमुखो बोधस्य) परतः
स्मृतिकालेपि अश्च वेव।। ‘स्वरी स्त्रक्त्व: स्मरिति सवः’... पृ I, 118

2. पवचार्य: पूववृवृवृवतार्थूर्मवित्तया पूववृवृवृवृवार्थांशकारांशमोषणां तत्कथा-
कथा विश्वास: कंतः स इत्वा पूववृवृवृवतार्थ ास्वथावस्म: स्मृतिमां व्यापरः।

Pvī
The subject (Ātman) knows determinately (smṛṭaryā-taksātyā), by the power of remembrance (arthat—smṛtya-saṃkṣātyā), that the object that was made manifest to him before, i.e., in the former experience (piṛvarbhāṣītām), becomes manifest again (bhasayet-eca), at the subsequent time of remembrance (sva-kale—saṃrāṇa-kale), either as mere manifestation of itself (svaḷakaṭaṇam), say as jar (ghatā bhasa-matraṇa), or as comprising the entire group of attributes (akhillād manā).

The Self recollects, at the later time, the former manifestation (ābhāsa) of the object previously perceived, either in its indistinct form, or in the distinct form as unification of the manifestations of the object associated with time, place, etc., viz., the object becomes manifest along with all attributes of time, place and so on.

By the expression ‘svaḷakaṭaṇam’, the teacher means that the manifestation of the object perceived in the past experience reappears, in the later remembrance, as a new manifestation, giving up its indeterminate universal character identical with the Supreme Consciousness and thus becoming limited (sainkucitāh) in that state.

The expression ‘akhillād manā’ implies that the knowledge of the former perception and that of the later remembrance are unified in the later state.

The question arises, the expression ‘svaḷakaṭaṇam’ denotes that, in remembrance, the picture of the object comes by itself without recourse to the perception. Hence it may be observed that there is a clear difference in the formation of the two experiences, perception and remembrance, as in the former the object is present and in the latter the picture of the object occurs itself without recourse to the perception. The teacher replies this objection in the following Kārikā:-

K 2—1. वेदांशयवर्षीय मुद्कालो घटाभासस्य केवलस्य स्वालक्षणापतिते हेतु दशितः।

इन्द्रेदेव स्मृतः त्रिभविचारिव बुधुः श्रीशतिः वाभवतु स्मुतवादम्।...।Pv I, 126

2. स्मृयायस्या स इति पूर्वेन्तुभी स्वालक्षण पराश्रामवाष्येवास्याः प्रकाशितस्य परामार्गो न इति: स्मातु स्ववलक्षणा एव तेन स्मृयायस्या न उपयतिः। कक्षितश्चितावतान्वन्याः स्ववलक्षणस्य तथा स्मृयायश्च कामीमार्गीः।

स्मृयायाचारस्याः स्मुतवादाः (श्रीगितालंग्न) स्ववलक्षणात्यविवेन तथाविशय- निर्जनाविवेचेतस्य दृष्टांत्याल्यस्योक्तम्।।।।।Pv
If we say that the object of remembrance, i.e., the past perception, is different from the knowledge of remembrance, then it is not proper for the former to shine (or recur) in smṛti (smṛti-viṣayasya arthasya smṛteḥ bhede, smaryamanasya bhasanam na ca yuktam). We must, therefore, admit that there is unification of cognitions, associated with different times, i.e., the time of the former perception and that of the later remembrance (tena bhinnā-kalānam samvidam aikyam). And, that subject is the knower of these cognitions (veditā esa saḥ).

K 3—1. रमणज्ञातु भिन्नभेदन वहीहृपताय यदि सोऽयों मासेत ‘सम्य-माणasy’ च यत् ‘भासन’ तदेव न स्वात्त मयमाणेष्व तत् न स्यात्।

Pr I, 128

2. पूर्विनेद्वृत्तवाचार्येऽनुभवेन सह तत्वालिकस्मृतिवद्वारे समवासमान्; समुद-भिन्न एव प्रकाशितिभिन्नस्त्र प्रकाशमानतापूप यत्। एवंवचारब्रह्म-समुदविदस्विद्विद्येव स एवामा वेदकः, तथाहि। Prv
Knowledge of Past Perception Rests in Self

On this point, another objection is raised:— If the light of the object externally manifested by the later remembrance is not other than the former perception itself, why should we not simply say that the former experience is the object of remembrance? What is the use of this odd and uncommon expression ‘unification of cognitions’ (aikyena tu alauki-kena ko-arthaḥ)? To this objection, the teacher explains as follows:—

नेव हानुभवो भाति समुती पूर्वो अवन्त्वान्तरः।
प्रागस्मुवृत्तमहिमितवाल्मारोहणां-भासनात्॥४॥

योजना—समुती पूर्वो हानुभवो अवन्त्वान् (अनुभूतः अवन्त्वान्) पृष्ठक (-भूतो) नेव भाति हि, कस्मात् कारणात्? ‘प्राग सन्भूतम् अहम्’ इति (प्रत्ययस्य) प्रात्मा-
आरोहणां (आत्मात् विशिष्यना, तेन हेतुना) भासनात्॥।

एवं दृष्टान्तदय योजना। हि—हस्तान्तः समुती पूर्वः हानुभवः पृष्ठक नेव भाति,
कथम्? अवन्त्वान्—यथा प्रागः अयः: पृष्ठः भाति स्म नेवमनुभवः: इति। प्रात्मा-
अनुभवगतस्य भात्मानानुस्पर्स्य विद्वृत्तमहिमितवाल्मारोहणस्य साध्यनात् वेदवृत्तान्त्वानूत्त्वम् इति
एका योजना। अयः दृष्टियथा। समुती पूर्वाः हानुभवो न पृष्ठभाति। कथम?
अवन्त्वान्—यथा प्रागः अयः: समुती न पृष्ठः भाति तथा हानुभवोष्पिनि न भाति
इति। अयः न साध्यम् दृष्टान्त्वानूत्त्वम्, न भानुस्पर्स्य सामान्यचर्येऽष्पिनि साध्यनात्।

Bh I, 167.

It is not that the former perception shines separately in remembrance
(smṛtau purva-anubhavo prthak naiva bhatti hi), as the object (shines in
perception) (arthavaṭ). It shines as the knowledge (pratyayam) expressed in
words: "I experienced it before", because it shines only as resorting to
the subject, i.e., the knowledge of the past perception is carried to the
later remembrance as resting in the Self (prag-anvabhyam-aham iti-ātmaro-
hanabhāsanam).

The self, experiencing the former perception and retaining in itself
the knowledge of the same, persists in remembrance. In smṛty the ob-
ject does not stand externally as in the perception, but the knowledge
of the past perception (of the object) remains unified with the conscious-
ness that persists from the previous experience to the later. In this
manner the knowledge of various cognitions is unified in the lasting
consciousness, the permanent Self.
A very important point is made here for discussion. Objection is raised to the point that the former experience (direct perception) does not shine apart from the object in remembrance, as in perception the object shines separately. Even in perception, the object (jar) does not shine separately, exactly as perception does in remembrance. But, in reality, both of them do shine separately, according to their individual nature. In both the cases, it is a common point that, in one view, even the object does not shine separately in perception as perception does in remembrance; in another view, they (i.e., the object in perception as well as the perception in remembrance) do shine separately from the subject. This view is supported, by the opponent, with the evidence that the Yogins get insight into their own remote past and future experiences, as separate from their consciousness (samvid), so they do also the knowledge of others' minds. He says, as the experiences of others become the object of Yogin's knowledge, so his own remote past and future experiences may also be the object of his knowledge. The teacher explains this point as follows:-

योगिनामपि भासते न दृशों दर्शनान्तरे।
स्वात्मज्ञानक्रमानास्ता भासित मेयपदे द्वपि वा।।

योजन—योगिनामू क्रिपु दर्शनान्तर (परंतिविविष्यो ज्ञानविवेशो:) दृशः (परकीयाः-
दृशः) न भासते, तस्य स्वात्मित्वम—एकामाना (स्वात्मज्ञानक्रमानास्ताः)
भास्ति; द्विं (प्रमेयक्रमामू) क्रिपम वा (स्वात्मात्मक्रमात्मित्वाद्-
भास्तिर्)।।

Even in the particular kind of knowledge of Yogins, the experiences of others (darśanantaram) do not become manifest as such (i.e., as others' experiences) (yoginam parakīvāḥ dṛśaḥ na bhāsante); but they

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K 4—1. स्मृती स्मर्यमाणोऽनुमूलायं यशा पृथ्वयो भासति न तथानुभवः स्वात्मन
एवाहत्तप्रत्येक्यस्मुनुभवमयतेन प्रत्येकात्, यथापवने आकाराद्विभयेऽय: स एवात्मा

'ग्रह्यम्'—इत्येव स्मायो य 'प्रात्माः' पृथ्वयपरसविविन्धस्यस्यभावः तत्र यत्
'ग्रहोहण' विषयम्: तेन हेतुतं पृथ्वयपरसिद्धार्थया: स्वप्रकाशया 'भासनातु'.......

Pu 1, 132
shine as unified with their own Self (Ātām), consciousness (Samvid) (sva-samvid-ekamanāḥ). Even at the level of objects, the experiences of others are one with the self-consciousness of the Yogin (meya pade api vā).

A Yogin in no case, has recourse to an object for getting the knowledge of his own remote experiences, past or future, or the knowledge of others' experiences. When a Yogin calls to his mind the knowledge of others' experiences, it is nothing but the part and parcel of his own self-consciousness, although he does not acquire this knowledge as a result of his direct cognition of others' experiences. Similarly, he gets the knowledge of his own remote past or future experiences or other subtleties of his life not apart (prthak) from his own self-consciousness. This unification of the knowledge of others' experiences with the Yogin's self-consciousness (samvid), as it were his own personal knowledge, shines as prakāśa or bhānam (effulgence) of his Self (soul). In all cases, viz, in the case of ordinary men as well as Yogins, the knowledge of the former experiences (perceptions) is unified in their Self, the lasting consciousness, not that the former experiences play the role of object in remembrance and, hence, stand apart from the rememberer (the Self). As a matter of fact the Self is the knower of different cognitions or experiences and has the power of recalling the knowledge of remote experiences, past as well as future, of himself as well as others.

It may be admitted, the opponent says, that, in certain exceptional cases, like Yogins, the former experience (perception) does not shine apart from the subject in remembrance, as it is resting on his self-consciousness (aham-bhāva), but in the case of common people, the cogni-

K5—1. सर्वज्ञानामेषि प्रमाद्धरमतिपलम्भा। स्वसंबिज्ञानवेद्यस्ववभावः। स्वात्मा-गृह्वा एवामातिरतः ।

‘योगिना’ यत् एतत् ‘दर्शनन्तर’ भावावद्भवेत। (भृतात्मावनाप्रकर्षपर्यंतम्) परिच्छलियो ज्ञानविशेषः। तत् ‘दूसरः’ इति उपलब्धयो (परकीयः) न भावति (वेदान्तया) प्रव 1, 135

2. प्रमेयकविवायायमेषि घटादित्रव्यात्मातितिविश्वेत बोधेनावभासेऽरन् यदि तथा समभेदः। प्रव

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tions are not unified in their self-consciousness; they resort to the objects perceived externally as denoted by the word “this”. To this objection the teacher replies:

स्मर्यते यद्यमणीमें सैवमिस्थि प्रेते।  
तद्यथाकरणमेववायया मया दृष्टमिति स्मृते। ॥१६॥

योजना—‘यत् दृष्ट मे प्रासीत’ इति (एवदेवमनुबोधसी ममामृदित) सा एव  
दृष्टा (प्रनुमग्न) एवम् भेदत: अपि स्मर्यते, ‘मया दृष्टम्’ इति श्रस्या स्मृते:  
तद्यथाकरणम् (व्याख्यानम्)। एव।

The particular experience in which one remembers, ‘I had that perception before’, and in which the former perception appears apart from remembrance as its object (yad dṛṣṭaḥ me āsīt iti sa evam bhedātah api  
śmṛtyat), is only an analysis of the process of remembrance: ‘it was  
seen by me before’ (mayā dṛṣṭam iti asya śmṛtyeḥ tad-vyākaraṇam eva).

It is the experience of common people that a person remembers  
that he had the knowledge of the past perception just as (evam) he re-
members it now (on the later occasion). This later knowledge, i.e., the  
knowledge of the later remembrance, is a different exposition (vyāka-
raṇam) of the past knowledge, i.e., the knowledge of the former per-
ception, as is denoted by the words: ‘mayā dṛṣṭam iti’. This shows  
that the knowledge of the former perception is one with the knowledge  
of the later remembrance, i.e., they are unified in self-consciousness.

Another objection is raised by the opponent: he says, if one looks  
at things indeterminately without taking special notice of anything parti-
cular determinately, there is no remembrance of any particular thing  
possible, just as when one looks at trees, plants, grass and leaves on  
the way while going to some place. So long as there is no determi-
nate perception of anything, i.e., so long as the indeterminate knowledge

K 6— 1. मया दृष्टमिति प्रमाणान्ततदसंपन्नविभासितिकाया एव स्मृतेविभवक्य  
कथनमेवदेवमनुबोधसी ममामृदिति भेदेनापि निर्देशः। Pv  
स हि न पूययमः दृष्ट काँचित मन्यते—‘यत् दृक् मे प्रासीत’ इत्येवम्, अपि तु  
यत् स्मर्यते एवं-भूतमायि यत् स्मरण कस्यचित् विश्वेषकामस्य, तत् स्मृतेवया-  
करणम् Pv 1, 138-39
All determinate knowledge arises from indeterminate in Self of a thing does not shine as determinate: 'this' (object), there can be no remembrance of it. The opponent wants to lay stress again on the point that the former perception is separate from remembrance and, as such, it has to be accepted as the object of the latter. The teacher replies to this objection as follows:

या च पश्चायमयमिम घटोपायमिति वावसा ।
मय्यते समवेत्ता साध्वसातारि दशानम् ॥७॥

योजना—'श्रात्म इम पश्चायमिम, 'श्राय घट:' इति वा श्रवसा (कोषें, अध्य-वमाय:) या मय्यते, सापि श्रवसातारि (प्रामालं) समवेत्ता (प्रमालौमये)  दशानम् —निर्विकल्पकम्म श्रुत्न्वसायम् (प्रावमृूँः) ।

Whether one takes the form of determinate knowledge (experience) to be as expressed in: 'I see this' or 'this is the jar', (aham imam paśyami ghato ayam iti va avasa manyate), it is one with the knowing subject, the self-consciousness, (sa api avasātari—pramātari—saṃvatam-dar-śanam), resting in it as determinate knowledge (nirvikalpakam anubha-vanam).

The teacher means to say, whether the knowledge be determinate or indeterminate, it is ultimately indeterminate being unified in the knower. The determinate knowledge of the former perception, as a matter of fact, rests on the knowing subject in the form of indeterminate knowledge, and, in the later state (remembrance), it is revived again as determinate knowledge. All cognitions are, therefore, inseparable from the Self and are invariably dependent upon it.

K 7— 1. पुरिारियतापविकल्पनेतिपि घटमिं पश्चायमि घटोपायमिति वा प्रभारु-मय्यमेव दशान वात्वमृूँः। Pūr

श्रवसा: श्रवसा, समवेत्तम इति श्राङ्गभावभाव। श्रवसातारि इति स्तवंवेत्तय-मुः बोधारमनि अहस्तात्सपेदेक इत्यथे। ‘दशान’ इति निर्विकल्पमुन्मुभावम। दशानदेव: श्रवसासात। श्रत एव श्रात्मज्ञा विकल्पाया: श्रवित्विशेषा: तद्विद्यान्त-शारीरस्वातु इति दशानम्।......Pūr I, 144-45
The teacher sums up the topic in the last Kārikā, as follows:—

तत्स्मया दृश्ये दृष्टोऽयं स इत्यामृत्वयि
प्राणप्राहकताभिकार्याः भाटः प्रमातिरि ॥२॥

योजना—‘मया दृश्यते’, ‘मया दृष्टं’, ‘श्रयं’, ‘स’ इति तत्-प्राण-प्राहकता-
भिन्नी भ्रमां (एक) प्रमातिरि भाटः (एक प्रमातिरि एव प्राणभ्रम्य-प्राणभ्रमकी-
मायाकतिविच्छिन्नो-प्रवसतो अभिय प्रकाष्ठते) ॥

The perceiver (subject) experiences various cognitions in the orders denoted by the expressions: ‘is seen by me’ (or ‘I see’), ‘was seen by me’ (or ‘I saw’), ‘this’ and ‘that’. (tān maya dṛṣṭaye, mayā dṛṣṭaḥ, ayam, sa). They fall into two categories, as knowers (grāhaka) and the known (grāhya). Both of them shine in the subject, in their essential nature (tāt-grāhya-grāhaka-tva-bhinnau arthau eka pramātari bhūtāḥ)

All objects are manifested by the Supreme Self in two main divisions, the limited perceivers (grāhaka) and the objects perceived (grāhya), which are ultimately identical (abhinnu) with Him.

Abhinavagupta divides all cognitions into twenty-two categories (dvā-
vimśatibh-samvedana-bhedāḥ), according to the differences in the various experiences of the perceiver (Pramātā). A perception (anubhava) is of two forms: (1) sometimes it is preceded by self-consciousness, which remains predominant in it. In this case the stress is on the subject as denoted by ‘maya-dṛṣṭaye’, it is still at the level of indeterminate knowledge; (2) sometimes the subject perceives the object primarily; in this case stress is laid on the object as denoted by ‘ayam iti’. It assumes the form of determinate knowledge of the object. In this case also there is the light of self-consciousness. Remembrance consists of two experiences, the past perception (purvānubhavaḥ) as denoted by ‘dṛṣṭa iti’ and the later experience as denoted by “sa iti”. As every perception is of two forms, so remembrance consisting of two experiences (anubhavas) falls into four categories, (iti catvāroḥ smaraṇa-bhedāḥ). Recognition is the unification of the two experiences: remembrance (smaraṇa) and perception (anubhava). Recognition, therefore, falls into eight categories, since the four categories of remembrance will multiply into eight because of the two different forms of perception. These eight categories are further multiplied by two, since each of them has two forms according as the
former or the later experience predominates \( (pūrvāpara-vīśrāntikṛtāt pratyekam dvidhā-bhedacca ṣoḍahādḥa) \) Thus recognition has sixteen forms. Adding up the two forms of perception, the four forms of remembrance and the sixteen forms of recognition, there are twenty-two forms of cognition \( (tad ete dva-vihiṃsatīḥ samvedana-bhedāḥ) \). See (Pv I, 147–48.)

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K 8—1. तस्माद दुःखपरामोघऽपृषः सराया स्मृती विकल्पामार्गे व दुःखबद्वानेव विनापि स इत्ययमिति वायुपातानिविधोन सर्वैवक्रमापातलीलाविव……प्रकाशये। Pvr

इह स्मृति: श्रुणुमयं जोडीकरोति (स्वास्त: करोति) हर्षुक्तम्। श्रुणुलक्ष्यं हिङ्गा, परामोघमेदातु कदाचित् (ब्रह्मसागववहुमाते) स्वत्तपरामोघौपूर्वकम् धार्मिकतय वत्र स्वय धार्मिसंक्रामान्तता ‘मया दृष्ट्यते’ इति, कदाचित्तु……अर्थादियो प्रति आग्रहहिंदोषो वा ‘प्रयम’ इति……एवमुख्यानुभवे प्रशंक स्मृतिरपि द्वाध्यारस्मायी (दृष्ट्य इति स इति च उपायपरामर्शमयी) उदेश्यि, इति चतवारः समाभंदे; २० अनुभवेदो श्रुणुसंयंहर्व प्रत्येकसिद्धान्तमिच्छेतुभयेष्मेऽद्यसमाज्ञानेन एतत्वेद्व्येद्वाते श्राहशी, पूर्वपरिभावितवत्तता तु प्रशे मिहामेदाचाच यौप्पणा। तदेवे हानिकारक: संबदनमेदे। तेतु च ग्राह्यं……प्रयत्नराशि:……मायाप्रभाता……स च ग्राह्यः इति उच्यते।……ग्राह्यपेन ग्राह्यकूपेन योजितो चट्रायिवहेदाहित्वस्मातो श्रद्धाः वेद्यी प्रमातिरि विषुप्रकाशलापे भवतः प्रकाशये। Pv I, 147–49.

See Kaw, R. K., The Doctrine of Recognition, pp 138ff.
Ah. I, v

Power of knowledge:

In Pratyabhijñā, Jiñāna-Śakti (the power of knowledge) means the faculty of cognition, comprehension, conscious activity and the light of the Self (Prakāśa). The power of perception (anubhava) is a form of power of knowledge (jiñāna-śakti rūpāḥ), on which depends the power of Remembrance (Smaraṇa-śakti).

In this Ahnika, the teacher lays down the doctrine that all the objects directly perceptible to the perceiving subjects (Pramātā) exist in their real nature within the Self (Ātman) and are projected outward as manifestations (abhasāḥ). Jiñāna-Śakti functions in making objects manifest externally in the form of their perceptions, which, in reality, indwell in self-consciousness. By virtue of this power, the Self takes out for separate manifestation only certain things from the unlimited mass which lies merged in it (svaṁpad-unmagnam-abhāsayaśti), that is to say, it isolates some objects and manifests them externally, emerged, as it were, from the ocean of light (prakāśa) of consciousness.

In kārikā 1, the teacher explains the nature of perception (anubhava), which is the very 'life' of remembrance, determinate knowledge, etc. (smaraṇa-vikalpadinam anubhava eva jivitam) —

वर्तमानावभासानां भावानामव्यासानम्।
अतःस्विन्तत्वत्यार्थं पदते भविरात्मना ॥१॥

योजना संकेतपाख्यति :— वर्तमानावभासानां भावानाम (व्यासासम्) अततत्त्वोऽवि-
वत्मू भविरात्मना वद्भासासम् एव पदते ।

शाब्द स्थायमभिप्रायः। परमार्थते: स्वप्रभूत्य स्वस्थित्यस्वेनस्मृतिः भावाविचारं स्वत: भेदेन यविदम् इति भास्य तत्तत्वतत्ववत्तथा स्वतात्-
नामेव सतां भवति, य ततः क्युणानाम्, यथा मृत्युवस्थायं चतुर्थम् युगयत्वेत स्विन्तत्वीव निः
वद्यवत् प्रहणम्, न ति मुद्दी निर्गतो घट: किमिन्न भवति, मृत्युस्य सङ्गोऽस्मृतम्
कल्वात्, इति तद्दत्त:स्विन्तेव तदविचारानामेव न तु तदविचारात्मकोऽभासानं
External manifestation of objects which exist within Self

The external manifestation of the objects, which are directly perceptible (as separate from the perceiver) (vartamanā-avabhasanam bhavanam-avabhasanam), can only be possible on the ground that they exist within the Self (antaḥ-sithitavatam eva).

In support of the same thought, the teacher says:

प्रागित्वार्योप्रकाशः स्याप्रकाशार्पमतया विना।

न च प्रकाशो भिन्न: स्यादातमार्थ्यः प्रकाशता।

योजना:- प्रकाशार्पमतया विना (प्रामातस्मा - प्रकाशर्वगुप्तता विना) प्रथः प्रामुढः ह्रद (अग्रहणकऽले ह्रद) प्रकाशः स्यात् (ग्रहणकऽले पिप)। (स्वार्थः) प्रकाशः (अर्थः - स्ववृष्टिः) भिन्नः: न च स्यातु; (अर्थः) (अर्थमः) प्रकाशता अध्ययः स्वार्थः (भवति)।

अर्थमतः सिद्धिधार्थः:- प्रकाशार्पमतया विना-प्रकाशार्पमतया प्रकाशार्पमतया स्वार्थः प्रकाशार्पमतया स्वार्थः प्रकाशार्पमतया विना, प्रथः प्रागित्वः अग्रहणकऽले ह्रद ग्रहणकऽले प्रकाशः च नवतः जायते प्रकाशार्पमतया स्वार्थः प्रकाशः च नवतः जायते प्रकाशार्पमतया स्वार्थः प्रकाशः च नवतः जायते। ननु प्रकाशार्पमतयां तृतीयः स्वार्थः भान्य भवतु च देह-कल्पनायायिना इत्यत्र श्राहे ‘न च’ इति। प्रकाशः: भिन्नः: न च स्यातु; तथा च अर्थः दुस्तश्रविध्वेदमेवयूक्त भिूयते: सम्बन्धायोगादिद्धिः भावः। अर्थः प्रकाशार्पमतया - अर्थातृर्यो स्ववृष्टि भवति। Bh I, 203

K I—1. प्रत्यक्षेपितो यावदर्थनां भेदनाभासः प्रामातस्मानावादमेव स्तां युक्तः।

Pvr

tato म्या प्रमातुः स्वतिर्निश्चितं नास्मि प्रवव्यवः (प्रवव्यवस्या) ततु परमा वः-

प्रमातिर्ती शुद्धिविन्याये ‘अन्तःस्थितवत’ तेन सह एकार्थमेव भ्रुवण्भविद्वातेव

‘घट्टे’ प्रमाणन उपवन्ते; Pvi I, 153-4, see also Fn. 11
If the object were lacking the light of the subject, it would remain unmanifest (arthāḥ prakāśatmatāyā vīm-āprakāśasāḥ syāt), even as it was before (prāg-īva). The light of the subject cannot be different from that of the object (na ca prakāśo bhinnāḥ syāt). The light of the subject is, therefore, the very essence of a thing (prakāśata arthasya ātma).

It is not possible to say that knowledge pertaining to an object is separate from the light of the subject (self-consciousness). If we think that the knowledge of an object is apart from that object, say a jar or cloth, then it will not be possible to cognise it. Unless the knowledge of each one of the different objects rests on the subject (svatman), practical life would become impossible. The teacher, therefore, holds the view that knowledge is one, not diverse, and it is not apart from the object. To prove this, the teacher says:-

भिन्ने प्रकाशो चाभिन्ने संकरो विपश्यस्तत्।
प्रकाशार्थम् प्रकाश्योऽस्योऽन्यप्रकाशस्तः सिद्ध्यति। ॥ ३॥

योजना:— (शारम-५) प्रकाशो (स्विपश्यस्य) भिन्ने भिन्ने च, ततु। विपश्यस्त (विपश्याणाम्) संज्ञा: (संज्ञार्णता स्यात्)। प्रकाशोऽर्थाँ प्रकाशार्थम्; प्रकाशकाश्च (प्रकाशरहितो विषयः) न सिद्ध्यति। तस्मादचर्चितं: प्रकाशार्थार्थम् भवति।।

एवमसंक्षेपः—प्रकाश-वाने, भिन्ने—स्विपश्यस्य भिन्ने सति, तथा भिन्ने अथैः एव प्रकाशः, भिन्ने च सति, विपश्यस्त, जातवेकवचनम्, तेन विपश्याणामित्यथः। संज्ञा:—संज्ञार्णता, एकज्ञाने संविपश्यश्र्याणात्, प्रप्रकाश:-प्रकाशरहितो विषयः न सिद्ध्यति, यत: प्रकाशार्थम् अर्थः प्रकाशो भवति इति। Bh I, 208-9

K 2—१, प्रमाणसंप्रकाशस्वरूपतिः विना यथादि चतोस्य नावमधास्तत्वा ज्ञान-कलेवपि स्यात्, प्रकाशार्थम् चार्थ्यस्य प्रकाशः स्वरूपमूलो न तु भिन्नः। पुरी

‘शारम’ इति शारामुद्रशी,...... प्रतश्च इदम् उपत्तता शारामुद्रम्—अर्थस्य स्वरूपं प्रकाशार्थमतयोऽप्रकाशप्रभावितेन शारामुद्रशी: प्रकाशश्च यदि चतोमय: पृथिव्यः तदा प्राप्तम:—स्ववार्ष्यश: शारमुद्रशी: प्रकाशार्थमयौर्भुवस्य तत्त्वमा इति वितस्य अध्यापितस्य ‘नात्मेतु जनस्यित्वा’ इत्यत्र। तस्माद् एक एव प्रकाशः। पुरी I, 158, Fn 12
If the light of the subject be different from the object (bhinne prakāśe) and remains as one in itself (abhinne ca), i.e., if it remains without variety or distinction in respect of different objects, it would result, then, in the confusion of one object with another (saṅkaro viśayasya tat). Therefore, the object, that is made manifest, has the light of the subject as its essential nature (prakāśyo 'rtho prakāśātmā). For, what is not light, i.e., what is not known by a perceiver, cannot be said to exist (aprakāśa ca na siddhyate).

An objection is raised against the above-said view by the Bāhyārthānumeya-vādin (Pūrvapakṣin), a school of Buddhists, who believe in the existence of insensible external objects. According to them, all the worldly transactions, connected with Pratīti (perception), are dependent upon determinate cognition and that is possible only because there is the direct perception of an external object which has the nature of mere reflection of Pratyti-vijñāna (consciousness) that is changing and momentary, but the Vijnāna (bodha) remains really as one. So the Purpakṣin says:—

तत्तदाकस्मिकामासी बाह्ष् बौद्धनामपयेतू।

न हृष्यनस्य बोधस्य विचित्राभासहेतुतहां।

योजना:—प्रभिन्नस्य (प्रभिचित्रस्य) बोधस्य विचित्राभास हेतुतहां नहः (सं-भवति, or युक्तः), (अतः) तत्त तद् दाकस्मिकामासी: (दाक्ष्येहूदृढःब्हवामासः) बाह्ष्मू प्रभिन्नामपयेत् चेतृ? (चेदिति निपातो—यदि बाह्ष्स्माथवादिना उच्चयते—

Prima facie view:—If the light of consciousness (bodha) be assumed to be without diversity in itself, it cannot be the cause of variety in manifestation (in determinate cognition) (abhinnasya bodhasya vicitrvbhlsa

K 3—1. प्रकाशमात्र चार्याद्भिन्नं स्वविश्वाभारणं तस्य घटस्य प्रकाशोज्ययं परस्य्येकतिः विषयविययो नितिन्वितन:। तत्नांश्च्चिद्भ: प्रकाशोत्सव्यतता। Pāṇ.भुः स्वात्म-नात्मव्यवसायाम्। चिद्भ: नौलाश्चाकार-शृः Pāṇ. III, Fn 36, P 159.

‘न च प्रकाशः प्रकाशाद्भिन्नः: न च प्रकाशोह्यंति; यदि प्रकाशतेव घटस्य वर्गः: सव घटस्य हत्तवादि विधववः: प्रकाशः चिद्भः; तस्मात् प्रकाशोह्यं—बोधाभिन्नं एवायं चिद्व राश्यत्। Pāṇ. I, 163. Fn. 56, 58
hetuṭā na hi). Therefore, this variety in manifestations, being without any perceptible cause (i.e., mere accidental affections), leads to the inference of external objects (tat tad-akasmikabhāso bāhyam anumāpayet).

The Pūrvapakṣin further says:-

न वासनाप्रसब्दोऽज्ञ विचित्त्रो हेतुतामियात् ।
तत्त्वापि तत्प्रबोधस्य वैचित्ये कि निवर्धनम् ॥५॥

योजना :— विचित्र: वासनाप्रसब्द श्रवः (प्रर्थिभासवैचित्ये) तस्य (वैचित्यस्य) हेतुतां न ह्यादृ श्चिप; तत्—प्रबोधस्य वैचित्ये निवर्धनं किम् ?

Prima facie continues :-

The rise of Vāsana (vāsana-prabodhaḥ), being of diverse nature (vīcitraḥ), cannot be (assumed to be) its cause (na hetuṭām-iyāt) (i.e., Vāsana, according to the view of the Vijñāna-vādins, is nothing else but the residual trace of impressions—samskāra, so it cannot be taken to be the cause of variety in manifestations.) For, then the question will arise, ‘What is the cause of variety in the rise of vāsana (tat-prabodha-sya vaicitre kim nibandhanam)?

K 4—1. ज्ञातामाभासमातस्व सत्तासिद्धः सा चाभाससमातवेव । तत्सः बोधमान्ग्रे‌-मेवात्र तत्सः, तत्सांविन्यित्वेपि क्रोणां बहिष्कष्ठाःकरोणांतहस्तरस्यमकालां वर्तवाय नाभासमयैवदिचित्रयत् । Pvr

‘आकक्षिमकामासो’—प्रज्ञातहृद्युद्धनामासः: Pvr I, 164, Fn. 65

चेदिति निराही बाह्यार्थवादिना सम्बाह्यामातनानासाय, ………..न च विविधाव्रो-भाव-कम्भ आकक्षिमकरो- vigilant उक्तस्तल एकान्तन बाह्य एव हेतुतयानुमोहे हितसः।

Pvr I, 164 Fn. 66

‘तत्त्वाकक्षिमकामासो’— can better be translated as “those accidental affections”, i.e., variety in manifestation of objects.

K 5—1. विचित्रवासनाप्रशोभो न वोधादिभिः: तत्त्वापि वैचित्ये को हेतुस्ततो बाह्य एवाहो भिन्नाभासस्ततो:। Pvr

एवं वासनानां तुद्रोध्येत्तत्ता च विचित्रानाम् घनुपपतितेऽव । तत्त्वच विचित्रतत्वेतृ, श्रमयो वोधं: (विनमरम—Fn) तस्य आकक्षिमकामास—(जामम—Fn)मेद्देतृ-स्वानुपपत: बाह्योर्वोज्जुमेव: सम्भव्यते—हितः यदि बाह्यार्थवादिना उच्यते,……...

Pvr I, 175-6
Existence of ext. objects—Bāhyārtha-vādin’s reasoning annulled

The teacher denounces the point of view of the Pūrṇapakṣin who upholds the separate and independent existence of external objects. He first weakens the supposition of the Pūrṇapakṣin in the following Kārikā:

स्यादेतेव व्यवहारे तेषवावसिते सति।
व्यवहारे किमस्येन बाह्यानुपपत्तिना ॥६॥

योजना:— स्याद एतत्, व्यवहारे तेषु एव श्रव्यामसेवु श्रव्यसिते (समाप्ते) सति, अन्येन अनुपपत्तिना बाह्येन किम्?

Refutation of the Prima Facie:

(The teacher says:—) It may be so (There may be the possibility of admitting the existence of objects) (syad-etad), (but there is another possibility also, that is,) since all transactions are performed by means of the various manifestations (vyavahare teṣu eva avabhavesu avaste sati), what is then the use of admitting the external objects (anvena bhavyena kim), whose existence cannot be established by any reason (anupapattinā)?

In the Vimarsini, various reasons are given to establish the existence of external objects, according to Bāhyārtha-vādin The teacher is not inclined to accept the Bāhyārtha-vādin’s view, since, according to Pratyabhijñā, it is the nature of the light of consciousness (Prakāśa) to manifest various objects, as different from one another. The following Kārikā gives the explanation about the existence of external objects:

विद्यास्येव हि देवोज्ज्ञ: स्वतविच्छिन्नवशाश्चरी:।
योगीव निर्पदानामय्यावतां प्रकाशयेत ॥१॥

योजना:— विद्यामा देव एव हि योगी इव अर्थ: स्वतमू पर्यपन्नम्
निश्चिपानामू इच्छावशाश्च बर्मे: प्रकाशयेत् ॥

K 6—1 श्राभासामानेववयाख्यायेतमार्थेव चष्ट्रासात्सका: सतं का क्षति। ततुक्षि
बाह्येन कार्य तावतं लोक-यात्रा-समाप्ते। बाह्यांवयाय: प्रामाण्याधिक: सावय-
वो विश्वसामायास्वदे: निरवववशाप दिक्-पुष्ट-योगावेदबहुः। Pνf

K 7—1 नितीसमेवेश्वरवायाख्यायेतमा-ष्ट्रायोपत्तानमाभास-ष्ट्रापानमानात-शक्तिवादाविच्छ-
दि-वशाद-युद्धादिकारण जीनेव बाह्यबन्धन घट-पदातिकारण्यानि प्रकाशयेत्। Pνf

(contd. on P. 42)
The teacher states his doctrine as follows:—

The Self (Atman) who is the Lord (deva), the Supreme Being, whose essential nature is sentience (ciddatmā), manifests externally all the objects (arthā-jātān bahīk prakṛśayet), which are within him (antaḥ sthitam), by the sovereignty of His will (iccā-vaṣāt), without requiring any material cause (nirupadānam), like a Yogin (yogī ivā) (who brings into existence innumerable objects he desires to create, by the mere power of his will, without recourse to any extraneous substance).

Since the teacher admits that the power of freedom of Samvīd is the only cause of manifestations of objects, he refutes the possibility of inference regarding the existence of external objects, against the Buddhist opponent’s point of view, in the following Kārikā 8:

(There are two ways in which the external phenomenon can be explained by inference: (i) Should we follow the analogy of jar, etc., reflected in a mirror, in the case of appearance of variety of reflection in the light of consciousness (jñāna) and suppose some external objects as the cause of variety, different from the mirror of vijñāna, (ii) or follow the illustration of Yogi and represent the power of freedom of samvīd to be the only cause? This is doubtful. Therefore, the teacher refutes the possibility of inference with regard to external objects in Kārikās 8, 9 and 10.)

श्रुतातमनानात्मपुरूषं नेवेर्क्षितसिद्धिमपि।
श्रुतातन्त्रे बीजाधिरामातात्मपुरूषं नेवेर्क्षितसिद्धिमपि।

योजना: अनुमा-मना नेव इति, हरिद्रयमु श्रुतातन्त्रे
(किभीतथैव कारणम्—अथात्—अनुमाने दिशित सिद्धिमपि), (कुल: ) बीजादे: 
हेतुवस्तुन्तः श्रुतातसातुः।

'एव'-कारण इति—सर्वशास्त्रशास्त्रपन्न संविद्धम्
सर्वान्तःनिर्णयम् धार्मिक-सिद्ध हि ततः ह्यं वा इति इत्यतः।

Pv, i. 185

K 8—1 पुर्वश्रुवस्त्रात्रःसिद्धित एवायो नास्तिको भूमिकशरीरार्थ-दर्शन—वचारलक्ष्य:-

श्रुवतं श्रुतात्मपुरूषं नेवेर्क्षितसिद्धिमपि।

Pv (contd. on P. 43)
(The teacher says:) Inference is not possible with respect to things which have not been previously perceived (anābhata-pūrve). As for the senses, they, of course, have been cognised (as cause of external objects) to some extent (abhātasya eva kimecaṁ-mātram), because of the cognitions of manifestations (i.e., perceptions) of things like seed, etc., which are (recognised to be) of the nature of cause (bijadeḥ hetu-vastunāḥ ābhasāṁ).

तत्त्वस्य तैव तेनास्य सिद्धिनाप्युत्तमानः \[1.9.11\]

योजना:— पुनः, तत्त्वस्य तैव तेनास्य सिद्धिनाप्युत्तमानः।

एतमहि श्लोकं दृष्टे (8 ओ 9) योजना। पद्यते: श्रवणामहि, श्रवणात् श्रवणेति। कुत्? चिन्ता: हेतुवस्तुन्त: श्रवणात्।

(The teacher further says:) There has never been, in any way, the manifestation of the object that is outside the light of consciousness (abhāsād bahyasya arthasya abhāsād katham ca naiva āsīt), i.e., the object that is outside the light of consciousness never becomes manifest (externally) in any way. Therefore, its existence cannot be proved even by inference (tena asya arthasya sidāhīḥ anumānataḥ api na).

यत्त्वविचिन्तिनां तत्त्वस्य विकल्पपर्यं, विकल्पपर्यं-प्रातानुभूते नोदेति (Pv, i, 186 Fn), इत्ययययो पूर्वानुभूतेऽवेत्, न हि तत्रवाचिन्तिति विचिन्ते श्रवणात्। पद्यते: हेतुवस्तुन्त: तत्त्वात्।

K 9—१ चतुर्बाह्यस्य-तत्त्वस्य-अनुपपत्तेऽनासीद्-तत्त्वस्य नानामात् अर्थस्य तैव तेनास्य सिद्धिनाप्युत्तमानः।

(Thenceforth) the teacher says:...
The teacher, therefore, lays stress on the principle that every thing external indwells in the Self:

स्वामिनः सत्यम् सत्यम् भावजातय स्वसत्यम्।
सत्ययेव न विना तस्मादिन्न्यामारः प्रवत्तते॥१०१॥

योजना:— स्वामिनः सत्यमस्त्यम् एव (सत्यमीनीवामेदेन वर्तमानस्य) भावजात-
स्य सत्यम् अस्तित, तस्माद् विना इच्छामयः: (इच्छायो निर्मातुतामयो विन-
यमारः) न स्वातः।

रघुदत्र संस्करः। स्वामिनः—विमर्शाद्विशेषप्रयोगाय अस्तित भ्रमावादानहतपाचितस्वातः,
सत्यमस्त्यमस्त्यमस्त्यमस्त्यमस्त्यमरित सतः, सत्यां भावजातस्य-भावरथे, सत्यसत्यमस्ति,
तस्मादिनः—तस्यायति समवस्तुः विना, इच्छामयः—“करवाविधय” इति इच्छायो विमारयो न
प्रवत्तते निर्विपययावत् Bh. I 241

(The teacher says :-) The mass of the so-called objects is manifested only as resting within the Lord (Self) (Svaminah atma-samsatrya eva bhava jatasya bhasanam astit). Without that there cannot be the rise of will, which is a kind of the determinate consciousness (amarasa), i.e., the first conscious activity in the process of making externally manifest the objects from within (tasmad vina icchamarsah na syat).

The teacher believes that the process of creation or emanation from the Lord follows the illustration of potter who proceeds producing externally pots, etc., from his reflective desire (icchamarsah) And the act of creation cannot be possible without this reflective desire on the part of the Lord. The opponent questions here: How can the reflective desire (paramara) being a vykapa (a determinative process) be attributed to the Lord, who is of the nature of pure consciousness? The teacher says on the point:

K 10—1 चिनि विद्वत्त्वं विवेशरस्य-भास्यावासे मे-अर्थकाव्य यो रक्षकोस्यस्यप्रति-
भास्मानाप्रत्यक्षस्य निर्मातुतामयो विनय संस्कर: इति। Pv

तस्माद स्थितम् श्रवणःस्थितं भाव-जातं—विना तत्त्वमय स्थिताय परामर्शस्य
प्रमोगात् हि। Pv, i, 196
Sentience or autonomy of consciousness nature of Self.

स्वभावमव्यभास्यजिम्मम् विद्वृतस्यथाः।
प्रकाशोपरिन्दोप्यस्मे स्फोटिकादिजडोप्यस्मः।

योजना:— अवभासया (नामप्रकाशया) स्वभावम् (मुख्यं उपयोगः) विद्वृत्तः।
अस्य अर्थ-उपरस्तोऽपि प्रकाशः स्फोटिकादि जडोप्यस्मः (स्यात)।

It is known (viduṣ) that sentience or autonomy of consciousness (vimarśa or āmarśa) is the very nature of the light of the subject (avabhāsasya svabhaśvaṁ), for, otherwise, though there be the reflection of external objects in it (anyathā artha-uparaktopi prakāsaḥ), yet this light would be merely like insentient crystal and the like (sphatikādi-jaṭopamaḥ).

The teacher, now, lays stress on sentience of the Self or freedom of consciousness, as follows:-

अर्थात् एवं चैतन्यं चित्रित्या चित्तिकूँत्ता।
तात्पर्यं विवेदेत् स्वभावं हि विलक्षणः।

योजना:— अर्थात् एवं नामप्रकाशं चैतन्यं (चैतन्यं) चित्रित्या (चैतन्यं-क्रिया), चित्रित्या
कूँत्ता (स्वात:...चैतन्यं...चैतन्यं), (ततः) तात्पर्यं उदितः (उक्तः); तत (चैत
न्यं-स्म) स जडादं विलक्षणं हि।

अर्थां संकेतः—अर्थ एवं-अवभासया विमर्शव्यभास्यते, चित्रित्या-चित्रित्या
कूँत्ता-तात्पर्यं हेतुना नामप्रकाशं चैतन्यमुदितः—“चैतन्यमार्गम्” हिति यूँ विवेदेत्

K 11—प्रकाशया मुख्यं नामप्रकाशं कार्यवस्तुं विना-अर्थं-वेदिताकार्यः प्रस्य
स्वभावमार्गम् न तु-अर्थां चमक्कृतेऽभावः।

‘अर्थांव नामप्रकाशं नामप्रकाशं’ हिति हिन्दीविशेषं स्वविशेषं प्रमाणं-स्वमेव-प्रमाण्यादि
चैतन्यं प्रभुसमस्तेन न तु प्रतिरिख्यते कार्यत्वं, स्फोटिकादि हि गृहीत-प्रति
विद्वृत्तं तथावृद्धिक निर्दोहः प्रमाणतत्त्वं धर्येत्, हि निर्विवेदको अवहम्मुद्रं
विवेदेत्। न्याय तु वस्तुनिर्देशं विद्विचारिको-प्रमाणतत्त्वं-तात्पर्यं-अप्रभुसमस्तं
विवेदिन्तः। न्याय तु वस्तुनिर्देशं विद्विचारिको-प्रमाणतत्त्वं-तात्पर्यं-अप्रभुसमस्तं
विवेदिन्तः। न्याय तु वस्तुनिर्देशं विद्विचारिको-प्रमाणतत्त्वं-तात्पर्यं-अप्रभुसमस्तं
विवेदिन्तः।

K 12—अर्थांव नामप्रकाशं नामप्रकाशं जंगलावमेत् विद्विचारिको
मुख्यं उपयोगः न्यायं न्यायं कार्यवस्तुं-चैतन्यं चित्रित्या करूँ विवेदिन्तः।

प्रयत (संस्क. P 46)
Therefore (ata eva), i.e., vimarsa being the very nature of the light of the subject, the Self is sentiency (caitanyam), the implied sense of which is said to be the sentient activity (cit-kriya tatparyena-udita), the liberty or sovereignty in respect of conscious activity (cit-karttya). It is, therefore, said, in Agamas, that the Self (Atman) is distinct from the sentient (jadat sa hi vilaksana).

It is now arrived at that the essential characteristics of the Self (Atman) are light or luminosity (Prakasa) and thought (Vimarsa) and, as such, it is distinct from the sentient. The question arises here, how is the existence of insentients to be explained, if non-luminosity (a prakasa) and lack of thought (a-vimarsa) be attributed to them, which distinguish them from the sentient. With this question in mind the teacher says:-

चित्रित: प्रयवमशात्मा परा-वास्तवसोदिता।
स्वातिकमेतमुख्यं वेदवयं परमात्मन्। १२७।।

योजना:— चित्रित: प्रयवमशात्मा (प्रयवमशात्मा-वल्लोकारणं ग्राह्म-स्व-भावं, विभाषतः हि सव सह: परमपि आत्मा करोति, आत्माप्रां च परीकरोति... ...)
परा (पूर्णवत्तिन: परा) बाकी (ब्रह्मनिधिम) शब्दपति प्रयवमेठोन इति च बाकी
स्वरसोदिता (स्वरसोदिता विद्युत्पत्ति ग्रन्तमिति-स्वदोिता), एततु स्वातिकमेऽ तत्
परमात्मनः गुष्ठमेऽ ऐश्वयम्।

चित्रितवाच च हि हर्थत, स्वातिकं संयोजनवियोजनानुसारान्वमरिधिम प्रयवम-मात्तायासेव (चिताबेव) जडवतु प्रयविधा प्रयवमेठोम पुरस्त्रज्ञेत्र-प्रकाश-सारत्म प्रयव-पुष्च-प्रकिष्ठम् इति। Piv, 5, 202

यथा जडः स्वातिकमानिष्ठ: संयोजन-वियोजनादि-स्वातिकमरित्वं: नेत्रमात्रा
इत्ययः। Ibid, Fn

K 13—1 प्रभवमनाचायथा भागमेयानात्यस्विशचलायनेन-श्रात्यक्ता एतत्-भाव-वास्तवानेत्रेषु गुष्ठमेतस्वातिकमरिधिमशास्त्रम। Piv
(see P. 47)
The creative thought is the very life (nature) of sentiency (citih pratyavamarsa). It is the Transcendental Word (par-a-vak), which ever shines with its self-dependent sentient nature (svarasodita). It is the freedom of consciousness (svatantryam etat). It is the chief power of the Supreme (mukhyam tad-aisvaryam paramastmanah).

The teacher further states the characteristics of the citih, as follows:-

सा सृजना महासत्ता देशकालाविशेषणी।
संयो गारत्या प्रोक्ता हृदयं परमेश्वरः॥ २७॥

शोजना:—सा सृजना (सृजरक्तं तता....भवनकर्ता-विश्वविस्तार: वितितिक्रिया-शक्ति), महासत्ता (विश्वजीवनम्). देशकाल-प्रविशेषणी (प्रस्तावंगी), सा एव सारत्या परमेश्वरः. (परमे पदे लिधः: गढ़न: हृदयं (प्रतिष्ठाश्रयानि विकृत्तम्) प्रोक्ता (आगमेषु अभिधीयते)॥ सक्रुणं स्वदेशम्, 'सारम्' िति यत् ग्रुच्छ, हृदयं च नाम प्रतिष्ठाश्रयानि उच्यते,

"महासत्ता महादेवी विश्वजीवनमुच्यते.......")

चिति: वितिक्रिया तत्स्या: प्रत्यवम्बः: (स्मर्तिलमा Fn) स्वाम्य-चमकालक्षण आत्मा समार्थ: (Pv, i, 204)..... विषमोऽहि सर्वः: प्रमर्गः अवतीर्थिति, आत्मानां च परीक्षीति उभयम् एको-करोति,..... प्रत्यवम्बादश्रय अतर्भिषला- पारम्य-वादन-स्वाभाव:। Ibid. 205

पूर्वतां परा', विदित विस्वम् श्रवलयविधृतविध्रूधा ज्ञाता सत्तम् प्रमस्तिता (सदोदिता Fn) नित्या श्राद्धमेव, (पू-पालनपुरणयो)। Ibid. 205-6

K 14—1 सृजनाय सृजरक्तं तता ग्रामाभुविक्रियाय: ग्रामाभ-व्यापिनि सत्ता भवति। भवनकर्ता तत्स्या देश-कालास्तां च सन्तप्रत्यवम्बः (प्रस्तावंगी-शक्ति)। सा विद्वानमनः: परमेश्वरस्य योगस्थतिक्रिया हृदयम् िति तत्र तथाग्रे मनो विद्व्याते।

सक्रुणं-स्वदेशम्...स्वदेशं च किष्ठ्वेत चलनम्, एवं च किष्ठ्वेत्—यत् श्रवलयविधृतविध्रूधा िति। किष्ठ्वकलनं च यदि स्वश्वप्राभतरास्त्रमणं तत् चलनमेव न किष्ठ्वच्च....॥ Pv, i, 208, Fn 347

सत्ता च भवनकर्ता तता स्वभविक्रियाय स्वात्मन्यम्। ‘सारम’ िति यत् ग्रुच्छ पूय तत् हेमेव विषमः-शक्ति, जान्या-प्राकानां यत् प्रकाशोतनकं पूय.......॥ हृदयं च
It is the eternal stir (sa sphurattā), the Supreme Reality (maha-sattā). It is beyond the limitations of time and space (deśa-kāla-aviśeṣṭa). This (citi), being the essence of all (sāra), is spoken of as the heart (i.e., the resting place) of the highest Lord (Self) (proktā hydayam paramesṭhiṇah).

Citi being of such nature, in reality, no distinction can be made between the sentient and the insentient. With this idea in mind, the teacher says:-

श्रात्मानमत एवां ज्ञेयो-कुर्मत्वायथस्वर्णितः।
शेषं न तु तदोन्मुख्यातू ब्रह्मचारियः स्वतन्त्रता।।१५१।।

योजना:—श्रात एव श्रापम् (विमार्शः प्रकाशात्मा परमेश्वरः) श्रात्मानम् (स्वात्मानम्) ज्ञेयो कुर्मावत् (प्राणेयमपि ज्ञेयो करोति), शेषं न तु पृथ्वी-स्सिद्धिः, तद् श्रापमुख्यातू श्रास्य स्वतन्त्रता (श्रात्मानम्-श्रात्मान: श्रापम्) ब्रह्मचारियः (प्राण्यापीनतं नाम पार्तश्च्रापम् श्रास्य श्रामीयाेत)।

Because of this stir (spanda) or the power of creative thought (vimarsa-sakti), therefore (ata eva), He (the Self) makes himself as the object of knowledge (ayam jīyai kuryat). The objects have no separate existence (jīyayam tu na pythak-sthitī). If it be contrary to that (tad-aumukhyāt), his freedom would be lost (shattered), (asa svaśattattā khandeta).

नाम द्रविष्टायमानमुख्ये,......तस्यापि विमार्शणावितः इति विश्वस्य परमे परमे-तितित्थो विश्वस्य हंदेयं विमार्श्वयं परमश्वात्मकम्.......। Pv, i, 209-12

K 15—1 एततौ ज्ञेयान्त्वक्त्वायथात् नैप तदा पृथ्वीं लघुप्रतिष्ठावस्तु-श्रावेत श्रामि तु प्राणेयमात्मानमानन्यन्यन्त्र श्रास्याबायथायं हेतु-करोति, प्रत्येकापिनतदेव ज्ञेयो हेतुमये प्रकाशात्मकम्। Pv 7

प्रकाशात्मक प्रकाशात्: स्वात्मान्त्वक्यपप्तवात् श्रावेयमपि ज्ञेयीकरोति इति......

नेत्र एवेन कुलं: संभावनां प्रकाशात्म ज्ञेयो करोति ? इति श्राह पृथ्वी प्रकाशात् बहुत-मूल्यं तथा स्वर्णं यथा तात्तुकं ज्ञेयं नेत्र भवेत।......यदि व्यतिरिक्तं ज्ञेयं स्वात्... ...

तेत् व्यतिरिक्त-विप्रप्तमुख्येवन श्रास्याबायथालं नाम पार्तश्चरपम् श्रास्य श्रामीयाते। पार-तत्वं च स्वात्मानम्-विवर्तम्। Pv, i, 214-15
The teacher said above that Citi (sentience) is eternal and shines independently (svarasodita—svarasena cidrūpa atān astamātā—sadodita). It is para-vāk. Para means infinite or all pervading (pūrnatvat para) and vāk implies that this world existed first in the Transcendental Word which is identical with thought (vakti viśvam alapati prayavamarṣena iti vāk). All the limited perceivers included in the category of objects (bhava-raśau) also derive their limited powers from the Citi. This Citi is absolute existence (maha-sattā), unaffected by the limitations of time and space. The world is the expansion of the maha-sattā, hence it is also called sphurattā. It is the sāra (essence) of all that exists. It is also said to be hrdayam (heart) of the Transcendental Self. Hrdaya implies, in the Āgamas, the supreme power of Vimarśa (idam eva hrdayam vimarśa-rūpam). This power of thought or reflective activity (Vimarśa-sākti), called also ‘parā-vāk-sākti-mayam’, is ultimately the origin of all. Although the Supreme Self possesses innumerable powers, yet it is His power of Vimarśa that mainly brings forth objects from Himself, which are not apart from Him (avyatirikta). The Lord (Self) manifests Himself in two ways, one in the form of sentient objects which are full of power of freedom (svātantra-yuktatābhāsana) and the other in the form of insentient objects laching power of freedom (svātantra-sūnyatābhāsana). Both the kinds of objects, being identical with the Self, are manifested by Him by virtue of His power of Vimarśa, which is His chief power (vimarśa-sākti-balā...saiva pradhānam).

On the point of creation of the sentient and the insentient, the teacher further says :-

स्वातन्त्र्यांत्रिक शास्त्रान् स्वातन्त्र्याद्वित्यायात्मनः।
Pramūrīवाहिनिकपरिन्यासाय व्यवहार्येन् ॥ १६॥

योजना :— अद्वित्यात्मनः (महेश्वरस्य) स्वातन्त्र्यानु स्वातन्त्र्यं—अभुक्तस् (युक्तस्)
शास्त्रानम् (ईशादिरव्: ) निम्मीयं, प्रमुर-ईशादिसंकल्पै: व्यवहार्येत् (व्यवहारण
योजनति भावानादि व्यवहारार्थं—भवता—जगत्-व्यवहारार्थं)

K 16—1 श्रत एव ब्रह्मविवाहलक्षण-पूर्णतांत्यात् स्वातन्त्र्यात्म-उदातनस्ततमेव ब्रह्म-
कात्मा सशक्तात्मकः गुरु वेदिता इत्येवमादि-विकल्पैरामास्यति भावानादि-व्यव-
हारार्थं इति। Pṛ

(contd. on P. 50)
From the freedom of His own (i.e., of Himself), who is one without a second (advaitatmanah svatantrayāt), creating Himself (in the form of various subjects and objects, as separate from Himself), thus not losing His freedom svatantrya-amuktam ātmānām nirmaya), the Lord (Supreme Perceiver) carries on the transactions of the world by the desires of the created beings like Iṣā and others (iśādi-saṁkalpai vyavahārayet).

The 2nd line of this Kārikā implies that besides the ordinary objects (nīla, pīta, etc.) the Lord creates from Himself Iṣā, Śiva and other gods as objects of worship and meditation, etc., who are also possessed of freedom (svatantrya-yukta), in other words, who are not devoid of freedom (svatantrya-amukta).

Here the opponent raises the question: It is said that Iṣā and other gods, who are the created beings, and, as such, as good as insentient objects like stones, etc., are of the order of “this”, viz. being reduced to the level of objects. They should, therefore, be lacking freedom. The Pūrva-pakṣin asks, how do you account for the freedom of these gods and other created beings? The teacher explains, in the following Kārikā, how the created beings like Iṣā and other gods are not devoid of freedom (svatantrya-amukta):

न च केवलं नीलादिकुलमेव जैयं, यावत्त अस्त्यकर्त-कर्त्तुं स्वमाव स्वातं-व्येण, श्रापरित्यक्तेव सन्ततृं धारमां निर्मैः व्यवहारेण ध्यातोपासनार्थनीपदेशादिना योजयति हि यह श्रमध्यैव तथ्य नातु इति संवर्धनः। प० ५, २१५-१६

K 17—1 वर्तमान-प्रमात्मावेन-प्राहित-प्रत्यवृत्त्वस्य प्रमेयत्वेन-उदत्तातिमितमेव च धारमां जैयं वा प्रमात्मेव ईशव-वद्वेन सुष्टोपपराम्रेव व्यवहारेन केवलं यथा शारिदिश्वेत्वेन जियादाय उच्चते पचत्यादिविचतु पचत्याविद्वेदुष्मेन इत्यभिस्मात्तु, ईशव-वद्वेद-वामात्मावदात् चाहिमिति परामुर्गान-नात्मानम् प्रबैति न साक्षात् प्रतितिस्तु अस्त्येष्व स्वतंत्र अत्मस्मुनन्तमेव-प्रातुत्सी प्रति सूक्ष्मेन। प० ५ (contd. on P. 51)
(The teacher says): The Lord, the Supreme Self, does not become different in the form of (different) gods like Iṣā and other created beings (na asya anyatatmanah) because of the difference in their mental attitudes, saukalpas or vimarṣa, (ahamtadi-paramarṣa bhedā) Their freedom is intact, because the mental attitudes of these created beings, gods and others, are one with 'I-Consciousness' of the Supreme Self, i.e., with the Universal Consciousness (asya sṛṣṭeḥ aham-mṛgaśyatayāvā), just as the consciousness of the meaning of a noun, derived from a root, rests on the consciousness of the action, represented by personal termination (tinvācyā-karma vat).

On the basis of this idea, even the so-called insentient objects are also not devoid of svātantra, for the existence of the object is not apart from the existence of the subject. When we say: ‘nilam idam’ (this is the blue object), we mean to say; “aham vedmi—nīlam idam’’ (I know this is the blue object). The essential characteristic of svātantra is aham-parāmarṣa (self-consciousness), devoid of which even the insentient objects do not exist. Thus, there ultimately exists no gulf between the subject and the object.

It has been established above that all thoughts of all the created beings, in reality, rest in one pure “I-Consciousness” (aham-paramarṣa), which is the essence (tattva) of all cognitions. This aham-vimarṣa has perception and remembrance as its main powers, and perception has variety of forms, such as certainty (nīraya), doubt (samśaya), etc. The teacher now explains how one and the same thought (aham-parāmarṣa) functions in variety of forms corresponding to various kinds of objects:

अहम् ईश्वरः यः वरामोह यथै ईश्वरः प्रातम भाषा शिव ईश्वरः प्रातम भाषा शिव ईश्वरः प्रातम सत्य यथै प्रातम भाषा शिव ईश्वरः प्रातम सत्य यथै प्रातम भाषा शिव ईश्वरः प्रातम सत्य यथै प्रातम भाषा शिव ईश्वरः प्रातम सत्य यथै प्रातम भाषा शिव ईश्वरः प्रातम सत्य यथै प्रातम भाषा शिव ईश्वरः प्रातम सत्य यथै प्रातम भाषा शिव ईश्वरः प्रातम सत्य यथै प्रातम भाषा शिव ईश्वरः प्रातम सत्य यथै प्रातम भाषा शिव

Pv, i, 219-21
Power of Knowledge

योजना :— विभोः (परमेशवर्ष) सा (श्रुतिविश्वसंतर्पित चिति:) माया-शक्त्या मिन्न-संबंधयोगिच्छा (सती) (मेंदेन श्रावायस्त्रेये), (सा एव चिति:) ज्ञानस्वक्षालयाव-सात्यादिः यन्त्र-नाममिः: कथिता।

( The teacher says:) The same power of Vimarśa or Citi of the Lord (Supreme Self) which is aham-vimarśa-mayi (characterised as self-consciousness) (sa vibho ciitih), by coming within the range of various objects, which are separated from Him (the Lord) by His power of Maya (māyā ṣaktvā bhītva-samvedya-gocana), is called by different names such as perception (jñāna), imagination or thought (saṅkalpa), etc., (assuming the various forms of determinate consciousness) (jñāna-saṅkalpa-padhyavasayādi anekā-nāmābhīḥ kathir). The teacher further states:—

साक्षात्कारक्रणोष्मित्यस्तिं विमर्शं कथमस्यरथः।
धाबनायूपपञ्चत्व प्रतिशंकावं विजितम्। १८९१।

योजना :— साक्षात्कारक्रणं (नित्तिक्ट्विज्यास्त्रक्रणं) उपविनिमर्शं: सन्यित्यं, अनन्यं धावनादिः-प्रतिशंकावं-विजितम् (अनुसंचारित्व बिना) कथम् उपबोठं ।

K 18—१ प्रकाशात्मन्त्य: परमेशवर्ष मायाशक्त्या द्वारं मिन्न द्वारास्ये, तत: 'सैये' चिति: ज्ञातनमध्यकान्त, तथेश्व मिन्नस्य-भाभामस्य सरस्त: संकल्पो-उपवसायो मनो-वुद्धिवृत्ति-हृदत्वेनापि चित्रितर्वेदित।

ततो ज्ञानास्तिनायो भिन्नः तत्स्य गगव्य-स्व-भमवाभमेयं संविज्ञानय: अनुसंचारित्व: शिक्षय इति उक्तः, संशयावर्धन भिन्ना नौलादिव-विचित्रत्व: च इति सर्वम्
क्षणिणदत्म (अनुसिद्धम)।

Pv, i, 224

K 19—१ साक्षात्कार-श्वायं-ज्ञानेदं प्रचितोप्रत्यवेश्योऽसिते सूक्ष्मसः, ताचन-धारव-नादो श्रृव्याक्ष्या तत्तदुस्सव्यान-श्वायवा-वपवित्साजित्वासानुसारित्वान न हि भवितित।

Pv,

प्रथमतमंये-साक्षात्कारलक्षणं (वायः, Pv, i, 225 Fm), नित्तिक्ट्व-विज्यास्त्रक्रणं
विचित्रत्वां:। साक्षात्कारः-प्रत्यवेश्यनित्तिक्कल्पः (Ibid. 228, Fm)। तत्सत्वां
सन्यित्य साक्षात्कारं प्रत्यवेशी: (Ibid. 228)।

(contd. on P. 53)
At the time of indeterminate experiences (like the first moments of experiences of boys, etc.) also, there exists the determinate consciousness (sākṣaṭkāra-kṣaṇe api vimarśaḥ asti), otherwise (anyatha), how can there be the possibility of running, etc., if there were no determinate consciousness (not even in a subtle form, in such experiences)? (dhiśvanadi prati-sandhāṇa-varjītam katham upapadyeta).

The Pūrvapakṣin questions here, Vimarśa or Pratyavamarśa cannot be admitted to be present in the first experiences (sākṣaṭkāra-kṣaṇe), as, for instance, in the case of small boys learning the meaning of such expressions as ‘gām anaya, naya, ..’, but the first experiences in their case must be due to the remembrance arising from the impressions (sāṃskāra) of such experiences which they had in their previous lives (atha bālaśya praj-janma-anubhūta-saṃketa-smyreḥ evam). In reply to this, the teacher says: Vimarśa, the determinate knowledge, is the essential nature (svabhāva) of Citi (Self-Consciousness). Even in the first experiences of boys (prathama anubhāva samaye) or in the acts of speaking, running quickly, etc., Vimarśa is present. It cannot be supposed to be entirely lacking, even though it may be present in a subtle form.

The Pūrvapakṣin states, it may be possible that the subtle determinate consciousness be present in the indeterminate in certain cases, as shown above; but, in other cases, the determinate consciousness is explicitly present, because of its grossness and also being denoted by certain indicator words which appear as separate from the subject like other external objects. The question arises, how can the indicator words be held as one with or non-separate (aprthakbhūtaḥ) from the light of the subject, i.e., indeterminate consciousness? In reply to this question, the teacher says:-

विकल्पों हि प्रत्यक्षय व्यापारः........न च व्यापारः तदति मिन्नो युक्तः, तत्-स्वरूपमूर्ति हि स: । भवतु वा क्षणमात्रस्रव्या: साक्षात्कारः तत्तपि ग्रहित विभवः, अवश्य चेततु—अर्थयथा इति यदि स न र्यातु, तत् एकाभिमंडलनिन जवातु गच्छन, त्वरितो च वर्णान्त पठनः, दृढः च मन्नपुस्तकं वाचयनः, न श्रीभिमत्तेव गच्छन्, उच्चार-येत, वाचयेत ता........। Pū, i, 228-29
The determinate knowledge (adhyavasāya) such as expressed by the words “this is the jar”, is the potency of the highest Lord (Self) (ayam ghaṭaḥ iti adhyavasā pareśa śaktiḥ), which is beyond the name and form (nāma-rūpa-atirekini), and always shines as one with the Self (atmeva-abhedena bhāsate) and never apart as object denoted by the word “this” (na tu idantaya bhāsate).

The teacher clearly says that even the determinate knowledge, expressed by the words “this is the jar” rests in the indeterminate consciousness.

Although all cognitions rest in one indeterminate consciousness or ‘I-Consciousness’ (aham-vimarsa), yet they appear, at the objective level, in diverse forms of determinate knowledge. This is what the teacher states in the concluding Kārikā:—

K 20—1 प्रयम्वित्व घट इति वा-घ्रवबसायो मिन्न-प्रकाशमान-नाम-रूपातिरिक्त- चित्तिश्यातिमय ऐव-प्रात्मेवाभेदेन भ्राभासते इति । Pvṛ

...घट: इति य: स्मृत: वाह्य: स प्रकाश-विचिन्तत्वमावी विमयः इति । सोऽति हि स्मृत: शब्दोऽयं चतु वृत्तमित्र ऐव भावः । तो नाम-रूप-लक्षणी शब्दाचारां एक-रूप-तया चोव्यम्’ इत्येवहूँ ऐव परामुखती प्राथज्ज्याविशंकित: या, सा परमेवरथितः विमयार्थः अर्थस्वतः ऐव प्रार्थमिन्तत्वनिविष्णुवेन भावः, न तु कदाचित् इत्यत: ऐव-विष्णुवेन भावः...... । Pv, i, 232-33
One Citi assumes diverse forms

केवले भिन्नबिन्न देशकालायुग घाटी:।
शास्त्रसूत्रसारादि संसङ्क्रम प्रतिभासले॥२१॥

योजना:— (यथपि अर्कमेयत संबितत्वम्), (परं तु तत्) केवले भिन्नबिन्न (विषय) देशकाल-अनुरोधतः (ती अनुसंधान—च्छायामार्गेण अवलम्ब, अवर्तित—
विभिन्न-देशकालादिना) शास्त्र-सूत्रसारादि (अद्वेदन) संसङ्क्रम प्रतिभासले।

Though Citi (Consciousness) is one and devoid of diversity (akramā),
yet, owing only to the affection by temporal and special limitations of
the variety of objects (bhinna samvedhyā deśa-kāylanuṛdhataḥ kevalam),
it assumes diverse forms (becomes sakram) as perception (jñāna), remem-
brance (smyti), determinate knowledge (avasāya), etc (jñāna-smytya-avasāyādi
sakramah pratibhāsate).

K 21—चित्तसूत्रम् मायाज्ञया भिन्नो घटादि संबितं ततदृश्कालभिन्नं प्रकाश्यते,
वस्तःसदेव-अनेकेन्द्रभिन्नदेशक-कालादिना शास्त्रसूत्रादि अवभासले इति। Puṛ

अर्कमेयर संबितत्वम्, किंतु द्विषाक्तिभावात् भिन्नदेवन भावितानि यानि वेदया
नितेषां सूतिसेद्भको यो भूरातुष्व-दैत्यत्वादिदि: देवा: किंतु-भेदकृत्वम् विरोধग्रन-
कालयुगं: कालं: ती अनुसंधान—च्छायामार्गेण अवलम्ब, शास-स्मरणाद्यवसायानं
स्वाभावः इव भावित.......। Pu, i, 234-5

*See Kaw, R. K., the Doctrine of Recognition, pp 147 ff
Ah. I, vi

Power of Differentiation :-

The power of Differentiation (Apohana-śakti) is indispensable to all determinate knowledge (vikalpa). Differentiation (apohana) is a determinative process (vikalpa) which implies certainty (vinisca) between two different things of contrary nature, such as between fire (vahni) and non-fire (a-vahni). In determinacy many images are constructed in the mind and one particular manifestation is differentiated from all else, which was first doubted. The determinative process begins with the selection by the mind (manah) of some points out of the mass reflected on the Buddhi. It is like carving an image out of a big stone. It consists in a reaction of the mind on the sense data recorded (to speak figuratively) on the Buddhi, in making a selection of certain group of points from the whole mass, in adding to the selected something from the old store of memory and in giving it a definite shape and name. By virtue of Apohana-śakti, the perceiver is capable of determining or ascertaining the manifestation of one object as different from that of another. It upholds both the former two powers, the powers of Remembrance and Knowledge (tad ubhaya anugrahī opohana-śakti). The determinative process (vimarsa or vikalpa) applies only to the worldly things, which are of the nature of diversity (Maya), to whatever is related to speech. It cannot apply to the Self (Atman) or the self-consciousness (aham-pratpavamarśaḥ), the essential nature of which is light (prakāśatma), although it is embodied in speech (vag vapuh), but that is the transcendental speech (parā), the inner speech which is one with saṁvid (saṁvid-rūpaveśa) and ever shines within (antara avabhāsamānaḥ); it is different from that sound which is of the nature of an object and, as such, is the object of the sense of hearing.

1. बिविधा कल्पना बिविधधर्मेन च शास्त्रितस्य कल्पोन्यथवच्छेदनं विकल्पः ।
   \(Pv\), i, 240


3. विवर्ण्युपात्त श्रीन्द्रास्तात्तृ शब्दाद्य एव भूतवभास्मानः सन्तिद्युपवेशी शब्द-नाटकामिलापो वागित्यन्नेतीः ।
   \(Pv\), i, 239-40
The teacher, in the first Kārikā, says that the nature of determinacy cannot be attributed to self-consciousness:—

प्रहृ त्र्यवम्यं यः प्रकाशात्स्मापि वारवूः।
नासी विकल्पः स हाक्तो द्वयाक्षोपी निचित्तचयः। 11।

योजना:— प्रहृ त्र्यवम्यं, यः प्रकाशात्स्मा वारवू प्रयतः, (स्वभाव-सूतः सन्)
प्रस्तवकल्पः (प्रपोहन-समुपदन्तं जानं) न (भाबिः), स हमाक्षोपी (छठाषष्टयोद्वीयो-
जनयोजस्वयं एक: प्रतियोगी-निपेंष्युन्वयेन) निचित्तचयः उक्तोहि ।

The Self-consciousness (aham-vimarśa), whose very life or essence is light (i.e., that of consciousness) (prakāśatmā), even though it is embodied in the transcendental speech (vag-vapūh), is not the determinate knowledge (nasau vikalpah), because determinacy is certainty (viniścayah) that implies two objects (different from each other, say jar and non-jar) (dvayukṣepi).

भिन्न्योरवभासो हि स्वाइयत्।
प्रकाशेवेव नान्योष्य भविन्तस्वभासनसम्। 12।

योजना:— (कदाचित्) भिन्न्यो: छठाषष्टयो: हृयो: (विषययो:) प्रब्धास: स्वाइ
हि, प्रकाशस्य इव तु भेदिन: (प्रकाश-भिन्न्यो:) अन्यस्य (अप्रकाशस्य) अवभासं न।

It so happens that there appears manifestation of both jar and non-jar, which are essentially different from one another (bhinnayoravabhasah) (in place of one and the same object), due to imperfect perception, and the perceiver determines or ascertains it to be the manifestation of one

K 1—1. प्रकाशस्यस्यप्रमहिमिति परवायुप्रत्ययन्तस्माभिव्यवविवशेषपि स्वभावसुतः प्रत्यव-
म्यां न बिकल्प हृत्युच्चितेत्, स हि प्रतियोगिनिपेंष्युन्वयेन निचित्तचयो न चाच च प्रतियोगिनी-
सम्भवः।

यदि वारवू:—कस्मान्त् बिकल्पः? प्रहृ—नायस्य बिकल्पलक्षणमसितः, तथा—
विब्रिधा कल्पना विब्रिधावें च शक्रुतस्य कल्पमयस्यथ्रव्यवच्छल्वपि बिकल्पः, विनिष्ठवतं
च वाहिन्यंस्याभावनानं समारोपिनिः सति भवतं, द्वियं वहुःविहित्रुपमालिपितः,
तेन (हेतुना) बिकल्पोन्ति तत्च इत्यक्षरम् निचित्तवमस्य—प्रतशच व्यपकोहिवत्यं
भवति।

Pv, i, 240-41
object as different from another), but nothing else shines like the light of consciousness (subject), which is different from that (i.e., which is not light) (prakāśasya iva tu bhediniḥ anyasya avabhāsanam na)

The act of determinacy cannot, therefore, apply to the Self (Atman) which is of the nature of light (prakāśa), since nothing contrary to light (a-prakāśa), viz. of the nature of darkness, shines. Differentiation is not possible in respect of such entities as prakāśa (light) and a-prakāśa (darkness), which are contrary in nature, since the latter does not shine. For this reason, the essential nature of the Self, which is sentient (cit) and luminous (prakāśa), is only self-consciousness (aham-pratyavamarṣaḥ) and not determinacy (vikalpa).

The Pūrvapakṣin asks the teacher to elucidate the process of differentiation, since we have not even heard of the name of a-ghaṭa, not to speak of its rejection. How can the impression or idea (vāsanā) of non-jar arise on perception of jar? In reply to this question, the teacher says:-

K 2—1. प्रकाशात्र-दितियस्य भिन्नस्य प्रतिबोगिनोप्रकाशात्तरस्यावबालामास्य प्रकाशतरस्य न स्वात् तस्यानन्दायें व्यपोहिनायोगादिक्लपेताहारति:। Pu

....गतो घटाठ्याहोद्वजर्वायास्य संभावनातो समारोपः सावकाशी-भस्वतिः, घटकत्वम् सत्यार्गे निषेधलक्षणोपोहिन्यापारः—हि तदनुग्रहिता विकल्पस्यम् घट हर्षस्य तिरस्वस्य, .......न च तद्रकाशी तत्त्वम्, तद्विकल्पस्य कर्मविभि वुष्ट्टो तत् प्रकाशतरस्य न विकल्पस्या प्रकाशतरस्ये मेधितानुतुष्कविकाशयोगाहारता-त्वम्मेदन्यायारासहिः। प्रकाशतरस्य न लवणां नास्ति, तद्भवे कस्यपोहिन्याः । .......यस्मात् एवं, ततो द्वाराभावायोहार्यमभवे विकल्पस्यामाभावात् चिन्मावे परामाहौर्मानि श्रद्धामिति प्रस्तवतत्व एवं, न तु विकल्पः। Pu i, 242-43
Process of determinacy and Vikalpa

The subject, who experiences both the manifestations of 'this' and 'not-this' (with respect to one and the same object) (tad-atat-pratibhayabhajamatri), feels the certainty of this (tan-nisacayamam) by rejecting 'not-this' (atat-vyapohanai), and that is spoken of as Vikalpa (the determinate cognition as is denoted by the expression 'this is jar' (ayam ghatat iti).

When the determinate knowledge of ghati arises, i.e., when an object, say 'jar', is perceived with certainty, it serves some practical purpose (vyahara). The term "a-ghata" denotes various and numerous cognitions of different objects, which are rejected in the act of differentiation to get the determinate knowledge (vikalpa) of a particular object "ghata". On the other hand, in the state of indeterminacy (avikalpa-daasayam), the object "ghata", in its nature of Cit (consciousness), remains as one with the Universal Consciousness, and, as such, it serves no practical purpose of the world.

The Purvapaksha questions here, why cannot the process of determinacy or differentiation apply to self-consciousness (aham-vimarsha), as, in this, the consciousness of the objects other than the Self (an-aham-vimarsha) gets negated? The teacher replies:

K 3—1. तत्-प्रतिमाः घटासंस्कृतप्रतिमाः च घटासास्मां प्रभात्ते सेवते (इति तेन)।

2. प्रभातेऽर्थ स्त्रतन्त्रस्थित्वतत्त्वस्वस्पात्तुयपोहनेन घट इति निष्पगोर विकल्पी नाम व्यापारः।

एवं च तत्-प्रतिमां घटासमस्म श्रत्वप्रतिमां च घटासास्मां प्रभात्ते-सेवते
तावत्, .....

Pv, i, 244
The Self-consciousness (aham-iti-vimarśaḥ) that gives up its sentient nature by the power of obscurcation (cit-tatvam mayaya hitva) and shines distinctly as limited subject (pramātytvena-avabhāti yaḥ) within the limitations of the body, the intellect, the vital airs or the supposed voidness (dehe buddhay atha prane kalpite nabhasīva va), is determinate cognition (vikalpa). It is because it differentiates itself from others (anya-vyapohanaḥ). Vikalpa (determinacy) owes its being to the manifestation or awareness of another thing which is of opposite nature (sa para pratiyogī-avabhassajāḥ).

(Trans. (4) and (5))

K—4&5 (1) चित्तवस्येवेदवरस्य माया-शब्दवा भेदासासिनि शरीरे बुद्धवत्रे स्वयः तत्ततोऽवश वाकायो इव शून्ये एव कल्पितेद्धिमित्रग्रामात्र-भाषेन विमयः तत्तव-भासामानवरात्रिदित्योगप्रिसत्तकरणात् घटोप्यविशिष्टविकल्पं एव। Pv
dharmātmacarṇaḥ—शुभो मायैयस्त्व, तत्र शुभो य: सत्तप्रावृः]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]}