Also available from Bloomsbury

The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Indian Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art, Arindam Chakrabarti
The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Indian Ethics, Shyam Ranganathan
The Collected Writings of Jaysankar Lal Shaw: Indian Analytic and Anglophone Philosophy, edited by Jaysankar Lal Shaw
An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Christopher Bartley

Indian Epistemology and Metaphysics

Edited by
Joerg Tuske

Bloomsbury Academic
An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

BLOOMSBURY
LONDON • OXFORD • NEW YORK • NEW DELHI • SYDNEY
Contents

Contributors

Introduction: Indian Epistemology and Metaphysics  Joerg Tuske 1

Part I  Knowledge, Language, and Logic

  1 Epistemology, Metaphysics, and Logic in Prācīna Nyāya and Buddhist Philosophy  Claus Oetke 13
  2 Fallacies and Defeaters in Early Nyāya  Stephen H. Phillips 33
  3 Jayarāśi and the Skeptical Tradition  Eli Franco 53
  4 Jainism: Disambiguate the Ambiguous  Piotr Balcerowicz 75

Part II  Consciousness and the External World

  5 Proofs of Idealism in Buddhist Epistemology: Dharmakīrti's Refutation of External Objects  Birgit Kellner 103
  6 Materialism in Indian Philosophy: The Doctrine and Arguments  Pradeep G Gokhale 129
  7 Śāṅkha: Dualism without Substances  Ferenc Rúzsza 153
  8 Śāiva Nondualism  Raffaele Torella 183
  9 An Indian Debate on Optical Reflections and Its Metaphysical Implications: Śāiva Nondualism and the Mirror of Consciousness  Isabelle Ratié 207

Part III  Universals and Momentary Existence

  10 A Road Not Taken in Indian Epistemology: Kumārila’s Defense of the Perceptibility of Universals  John Taber 243
  11 The Role of Causality in Ratnākṛti’s Argument for Momentariness  Joel Feldman 271

Part IV  Self, No-Self, and Self-Knowledge

  12 Self or No-Self? The Atman Debate in Classical Indian Philosophy  Alex Watson 293
Contributors

Piotr Balcerowicz, of no nationality (which he emphasizes), is professor of philosophy and Indian studies, currently based in Warsaw, Poland. He specializes in the Indian philosophical tradition, with emphasis on epistemological thought and Jainism. He teaches Indian philosophy and Indian religion, as well as intercultural relations, conflict resolution, and contemporary history of South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. He has published extensively on Indian philosophy and religion, especially Jainism, but also on the Middle East and Central Asia and Afghanistan. Since 2002, with his NGO Education for Peace, he has been involved in various development cooperation projects in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burma/Myanmar, and Africa.

Joel Feldman was born in New York City in 1968. He received a BA from Hampshire College in 1994 and a PhD in philosophy from the University of Texas at Austin in 2003. He is currently associate professor of philosophy at Rider University, where he has been teaching since 2004. He is coauthor of Ratanakrit’s Proof of Momentariness by Positive Correlation: Transliteration, Translation, and Philosophical Commentary (2011).

Eli Franco is the director of the Institute for Indology and Central Asian Studies, Leipzig University, and a member of the Saxon Academy of Sciences. He has published extensively on various traditions of Indian philosophy, especially on Lokāyata and the Buddhist epistemological tradition. He is the author of Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief: A Study of Jayādī’s Scepticism (1987 and 1994); Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth (1997); The Spitzer Manuscript: The Oldest Philosophical Manuscript in Sanskrit (2004); Dharmakīrti on the Duality of the Object (2014); and (with Miyako Notake). His editorial work includes Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and Its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies (1997; with Karin Preisendanz); Yogic Perception, Meditation and Altered States of Consciousness (2009); From Turfan to Ajanta. Festschrift for Dieter Schlingloff on the Occasion of his Eightieth Birthday (2010; with Monika Zin); Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis, Proceedings of the 4th International Dharmakirti Conference (2011; with Helmut Krasser et al.); and Historiography and Periodization of Indian Philosophy (2013).

Jay L. Garfield is Kwan Im Thong Hood Cho Temple Professor of humanities and head of studies in philosophy at Yale-NUS College, professor of philosophy at the National University of Singapore, recurrent visiting professor of philosophy at Yale University, Doris Silbert Professor in the humanities and professor of philosophy at Smith College, professor of philosophy at Melbourne University, and adjunct professor of philosophy at the Central University of Tibetan Studies. Garfield’s most recent books include Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy (2014); Madhyamaka and Yogācāra: Allies or Rivals? (2015; edited, with Jan Westerhoff); The Moon Points
Šaiva Nondualism
Raffaele Torella

"Nondualism" being a correlative term, we should start by defining "dualism." Not dualism in general, however, but the particular dualism of the Tantric Šaiva tradition of medieval Kashmir, starting probably around VII c., with which nondual Šaivism competes and from which it ultimately derives. This is evident from the anti-dualist tension we can find in the (comparatively) late Kaula scriptures, while no anti-nondualist tension can be detected in the early Šaiva scriptures (Sanderson, 1992, pp. 307–308). Cf., among others, statements like the one Kṣemarāja puts in the mouth of the supreme Śiva himself at the outset of the Śivasūtra-vimarśīni: "Now that mankind is mostly adhering to dualist views the secret tradition should not break." Or in the maṅgalaṣṭotra of Kṣemarāja’s Netraṇatra-uddāyota: "In order to do service to the world he illustrates this Netra, a Šaiva (tantra) in unity with the three states, burning the fuel of dualism, overflowing with the nectar of supreme nondualism, eliminating the blindness of dualism-cum-nondualism."

As far as ontology is concerned, dualism is characterized by a definite position regarding a few crucial points: in primis, relationship between the supreme God and individual subjects, and between the supreme God and the manifested world (cf. Sanderson, 1992). The individual souls (ātma) are potentially endowed with the same powers as the Lord (apart from the cosmogonic one), but in the saṃsāra condition these powers are partly or totally inhibited by three kinds of impurity (māla), conceived of as "physically" covering the individual soul. An analogously physical action, that of ritual, is required for the soul to get rid of such impurities. Once the process of liberation is achieved, an eternal distinction remains between the liberated souls (muktaśivas) and Śiva. Śiva and the universe belong to two different orders. Even though the Lord pervades the universe, the universe comes from a different source, usually called māyā; from it the universe arises and finally dissolves. Their basic otherness is also demonstrated by the fact that Śiva is often shown to entrust a minor god, Ananta, with the task of creating and governing the material world. It is to be added that ontological dualism is significantly flanked by epistemological dualism, less openly declared but clearly presupposed, which hinges on the unbridgeable gap between knowing subject and knowable object. If we look at full-fledged nondualism as expressed in the works of the four great masters Somānanda, Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta, and Kṣemarāja, we
find complete coincidence between Śiva and the individual soul; the material world is the free manifestation of Śiva himself; māyā is not an autonomous reality, but a power of Śiva; the impurities (maśa) are by no means substantial realities, but erroneous attitudes of the subject based on his lack of knowledge; the opposition knower-known is only provisional, and finally everything shines as absolute 1-ness.

As a worldview based on reason and revelation (yuvtti and āgama), Śaiva nondualism is expected to have its roots in Śaiva scriptures. Indeed, one of the most popular division of the Śaiva scriptures (cf. Tantrāloka [TĀ] 1.18) presents three sets of texts, characterized by dualism, dualism-cum-nondualism and nondualism, promulgated by Śiva, Rudra, and Bhairava, respectively, in the number of ten, eighteen, and sixty-four. The scrutiny of what is extant from the sixty-four Bhairavatantras risks disappointing the seeker for unequivocal nondualist lines. As Sanderson (1992) and Törzsök (2014) have shown, even the very occurrence of terms like advaita, advaya, and so on hardly refers to straightforward affirmation of ontological and epistemological nondualism, but rather concerns ritual practice. A practice is termed “advaita” when it programmatically rejects the mainstream Brahmanical opposition between what is in itself pure (normal, socially acceptable, clear, etc.) and what is impure (abnormal, despised by the generality of Hindu society, obscure, etc.). The impure is also often felt as more effective, quickly transformative, although directly or potentially dangerous. We can envisage several pairs of opposite terms, which can roughly be reduced to two: ritual in a pure environment (pure ingredients, pure behaviors, defense of self-identity) versus ritual in an impure environment (impure ingredients, illicit practices, possession); and ritual versus knowledge. This is not to be taken in a too schematic way: within the same school, different kind of attitudes can be detected (for one, see the knowledge temptation found in a Śaivaśāktic text such as the Maṭāgāpāramaśvara) or the unwillingness to get rid of rituals in a champion of the primacy of knowledge over ritual, like Ābhinavagupta.

The main question might also be formulated in the following terms: does advaitācārā necessarily presuppose a noetic nondualist framework? This seems particularly true for the Kaula tradition within nondualist tantras. Then, why are statements expressing ontological and epistemological nondualism so rare even in the Kaula texts, or at least in the early ones?

It is an undoubted fact that in the economy of a Tantric scripture ritual holds by far the most prominent position. The (mostly theoretical) division into four pādas (kriya, carya, jñāna or vidya, and yoga) has given the commentators the occasion to delve into the relationship among these four domains. According to Nārāyaṇakāntah’s commentary on the Māgendra-tantra (yogapāda, pp. 1–2), the ideal order is vidyāpāda, kriyā-, yogo-, and carya-. Without vidya, which is the means to describe the own nature of the individual soul, the bonds and the Lord, which shows the extent of all paths, defines the rank of Mantras, Lord of Mantras, and so on, it is impossible to bring about initiation successfully. Therefore, the vidyāpāda, which provides knowledge of all this, should be expounded first in a thoroughly detailed way in order to describe the own nature of the individual soul, the bonds, and the Lord. Then, also the kriyāpāda has to be taught in order to present the procedure of the different kinds of initiation along with their various limbs. Now, however, even if they know both knowledge and ritual action, the various kinds of initiants (śādhuqa, putra, etc.) cannot bring about the performing of their respective activities as they have been taught to them unless they know their own inner self by virtue of repeated practice of perfect absorption, and so on. That is why the yoga pāda follows along with the description of the various limbs, such as prāṇāyāma, in order to impart knowledge about yoga. And, Nārāyaṇakāntah adds (caryāpāda, p. 207), without caryā, consisting of the practice of what is prescribed and the avoidance of what is forbidden, the adep cannot obtain the desired results without obstacles.

Rāmakṛṣṇa in his commentary on Mātaṅgapāramaśvara (vidyāpāda, p. 567) gives a partly different picture.

Caryā and yoga are not possible without knowledge, for neither yoga (in the sense of samādhi) nor caryā, which has previously described, are possible if their respective aims are unknown. Knowledge, however, is not sufficient to liberate the soul from the bonds, basic impurity, etc.—which are substances—without the factual action performed by initiation.... Therefore, only initiation is the (direct) cause of liberation, because knowledge and the other factors are seen to be applied only within the context of initiation.

The subordinate position of knowledge with respect to ritual may explain the absence of explicit nondualistic statements in nondual scriptures. On the other hand, we can admit that an anti-dualist attack, seen as an attack on the Brahmanical or semi-Brahmanical establishment, is much more effective if it concerns praxis rather than mere knowledge. The need for philosophical awareness comes only later, that is, when nondual Śaivism engages in a Śaivaśāktic discourse with adversaries (within and without the Tantric context). This happens in concomitance with the emergence from the dimension of restricted circles, and the attempt at establishing itself in the stratum of social normality, by internalizing, or in any case circumscribing the specific differences. We can hypothesize that the first step after negating the pure-impure opposition in ritual and behavioral contexts is to elaborate on the basic equality of all by stressing the presence of Śiva in the universe. For this purpose, stating that the all is pervaded by Śiva may prove not to be sufficient as this is also upheld in Śaivaśāktic circles. There is no impurity since Śiva “is” the universe. This is precisely what will constitute the core of Somānanda’s teaching.

In explaining the sameness of all with the universal Śiva-nature, Ābhinavagupta (TĀ IV.274) refers to a passage on samatā from a comparatively early Trika scripture, the Trikaśāstra, quoted in full by Jayarāśi in the Viveka thereon: “There is sameness of all beings and, by all means, of all conditions. There is sameness of all philosophies and, by all means, of all substances. All the stages are the same, and also all the lineages, all the goddesses, and by all means, all the classes.” The locus classicus for Somānanda’s concept of universal samatā because of everything having the same Śiva-nature is Śiva-dēśi (SD) 1.48, to be read in the light of Utpaladeva’s comments:

Thus, it is firmly established that the Śiva-nature is the same for all entities. A differentiation in them in terms of higher, lower, etc. may be maintained only by those who are ready to think anything true.
Vṛtti: This is the meaning: Starting from Paramāśiva down to all objects, such as a jar, etc., the Śiva-nature is the same, in the sense that it is neither more nor less, and it is definitely present in everything with no exception (niyata), since the nature of full consciousness is never exceeded. Due to such experience of unity with the Śiva-nature, everything possesses a marvellous and indefinable (kāpi) state. Thus, since everything has intimate unity with the Śiva-nature, we can speak of things as differentiated into higher, lower, etc., of their having a pure or impure nature, etc., only on account of our non-awareness of such intimate unity. This may take place in people just owing to mere belief, that is, without sound reasons. In things there is no purity or impurity whatsoever.8

The purity-impurity issue often emerges in Abhinavagupta's works. In Tā XV.163cd-164ab he is confronted with a dubious statement found in the very core text of the Tā, the Mālāmūlayavottara-tantra [MVU]: "One should not think that there may be anything that is not purified by it [the ārghapātra]. By it, everything is purified and what is impure becomes pure." After quoting this passage, Abhinavagupta points out that "impurity is to be considered as such only from the point of view of limited souls and their teachings, for everything resides in its own state either after a previous (impure) state or after a pure state." Later on in this chapter (417cd-418ab), Abhinavagupta takes up the issue again: "The Lord in the MVU has not prescribed the purification of the two sacrificial ladles in order to suggest that essence of purification is none other than full perception of the true reality."9

But the MVU also has passages in which the opposition purity/impurity is negated, like the well-known XVIII.74: "Here there is neither purity nor impurity, nor deliberation about what may be eaten or not, neither duality nor nonduality, and not even adoration of linga, and so on."10

The passage is commented on at length by Abhinavagupta in Tā IV.212ff. "Even if we consider things as existing externally," Abhinavagupta continues, "purity and impurity are not comparable to [existing objects, like] the blue colour. Purity and impurity are qualifications pertaining to the knower depending on whether he perceives the object as united with consciousness or not."11 This point had been anticipated by Jayaratha in his Viveka on Tā IV.221cd-222ab:

In fact, we do not deny the practical use in everyday life of the notion of purity and impurity, but we point out that purity and impurity are not properties of the object, for it is the knower who ascertains "this is pure, this is impure." Had purity and impurity been properties of the object, something impure could never become pure, and vice versa, because what is blue could not ever become non-blue.12

This echoes Utpaladeva's ŚD Vṛtti, quoted above (na tu vastiāṇām svādhīn asvādhīn vā kācit). Abhinavagupta's position can be summarized by his own words: "Impure is what has fallen away from consciousness: therefore everything stands pure if it has achieved identity with consciousness."13

Among the most quoted statements on the matter found in Śrīka scriptures stands Vīrāṇabhairava 121 kimpicīṣaṁ viśmtāśuddhiṁ sā śuddhiṁ śambhudsārance na sutrīhy āsūtī. The meaning of this verse, whose readings are much fluctuating both in manuscripts and in quotations, I find most likely is: "What men of limited knowledge traditionally consider as impurity, this in the Śaiva worldview is taken as purity. For purity cannot become impurity [or vice versa]."15

We may close this topic by referring to the position of another important Tākula tantra, the Vīravallī, now lost. The passage is quoted in Tā IV.242: "The life principle is what sets in motion all entities; nothing exists that is desitute of such life principle. Whatever is desitute of such life principle you should consider as 'impure.'16 Needless to say, for Abhinavagupta the life principle (jīva) is the supreme light of consciousness. He concludes: "Therefore what is not exceedingly distant from consciousness brings about purity."17

This may be compared to an analogous statement (in fact, many more could be quoted) already found in an early nondualistic text, the Spanda-kārikā by Bhāṭa Kallāta (or, for some, by Vasugupta), particularly referring to the domain of language: "There is no state in words, meanings and mental elaborations that is not Śiva."18 "No state," says Kṣemarāja in Spandanirṇaya p. 48, is meant to include the initial, medial, and final parts of all these realities.

The coincidence of Śiva and the world might be taken in an "illusionistic" sense, as in some Advaita Vedānta or Vījñānavada approaches. If having the nature of Śiva in a sense "enhances" the reality of the world, in another it risks derelimiting it, that is, flattening its multifarious aspects and finally making it fade altogether. Realizing the ultimate Śiva nature might lead to the very disappearance of the universe as such.

Since its very beginnings nondual Śaivism tackles this crucial issue. According to Somānanda, it cannot be said that the universe is "imagined" as Śiva, or vice versa, because the one is directly the other. Just as gold is not "imagined" as such neither in the simple jewel of solid gold nor in the earring in which the craftsmanship is so refined as to set aside, as it were, its nature of pure gold, so Śiva is "formed, arranged" as universe—in the sense that he has become such and such, that is, freely presents himself in this form. An original and very subtle treatment of the issue can be found in the ŚD, which is worth quoting in full. The passage hinges on the distinction between kālpa and kalpanā: Śiva is not just conceived (kalpita) as having the form of the world, and vice versa, but he is indeed (auto-)formed (kṛpta) as having the form of the world.

It is not mental construction that operates as regards this [universe] consisting of the Earth principle, etc., since the [Śiva principle] is formed precisely in this manner. If something is conceived of as different from what it is, then we can speak of mental construction. But is the [Earth, etc.] conceived of differently from what it is? If [mental construction] concerns something real,19 then mental construction is just a word [without content].

Vṛtti—We cannot say that, with respect to the multitude of entities that are perceived as having the form of earth, etc., the fact of having Śiva as their own form is a mental construction. For in actual fact it is the very Śiva principle that is formed having earth, etc., as its own form. If something that does not possess a
Being is, actually united with the manifestation of consciousness (cf. ŚD IV.29b cidbyaktyigotitā; IV.7ab sarvabhaveṣu cidvyaktyeṣa sthitaiwa paramārthaṭā). Thus everything is pervasive, incorporeal, and endowed with will, like consciousness (V.1). If things can be efficient, it is because they “want” one particular action that is peculiar to them (V.16, 37). And if they want it, they must also know it, in other words be conscious—first and foremost, of themselves. All things are in all conditions knowing their own self (V.105ab sarve bhāvāḥ svam ātmanām jānante sarvataḥ sthitāḥ). This dignifies all levels of reality, including the surface level, made of human transactions and related verbal behavior, in a word “vyavahāra.”

If the opponent asks why there is acception and rejection [of the doctrine maintaining the Śiva nature of everything], [we reply] because he manifests himself in this way. Or, [because] everything serves the course of ordinary life. [Obj:] But the ordinary course of life has nothing to do with actual reality. [Reply:] You should know that the own form [of anything] is related to actual reality. [Obj:] The ordinary course of life is never [related to actual reality]. [Reply:] [It is, since the Lord manifests himself in this way inasmuch as he takes the form of the appearing of the unreal [, too].

Vyṛti—[Obj:] How is it possible that there are upholders and opponents [of a certain doctrine]? For there can be no different worldviews, given that there is only one Śiva. [Reply:] What has been said earlier, namely that this is just meant to defeat those who maintain a different view [with respect to the view that all things have the same Śiva nature], this too holds true because it is Śiva himself who manifests himself in this way. Alternatively, we may say that everything, i.e. speaking pro or contra the authoritative doctrine [i.e. maintaining the Śiva nature of everything], serves the ordinary course of life. [Obj:] But the ordinary course of life, being informed by non-perception of identity with Śiva, has nothing to do with the real. [Reply:] On the contrary, what shines according to its own form is indeed real, a reality which derives from its having [ultimately] Śiva as its own form. [Obj:] But the ordinary course of life is never real; on the contrary, it is just illusion. [Reply:] Even the unreal has the Lord as its own form, since it is the Lord that manifests himself in the form of the appearing of the unreal. Precisely owing to this, according to the principle expressed in the śvaparpratyabhijñā, even the unreal, inasmuch as it is being manifested, has consciousness as its own form. With this specification only: something is called “unreal” when it is not manifested externally.25

The absolute identity of Śiva and the universe, being the outcome of his free self-expression, involves a reinterpretation of the role and status of māyā. The latter is seen by the Saṅgdhāntic scriptures as an irreducible counterpart of Śiva, from which the universe emanates and finally dissolves. This status is still conspicuously present in the MVU, where māyā is defined in the following terms: “Māyā is one, pervasive, subtle, without parts, receptacle of the universe, with neither beginning nor end, non-Śiva, sovereign, imperishable” (I.26 sā ca iti vyāpīti stūpyata niṣkāmatyajagataniḥ | anādīyatantāśeṣanī vyayahīna ca kahyate |). The reading aśīvā (anādīyatantāśeṣa) is
of the negative associations generally attached to it in Indian thought, being aware of the fact that the risk of a reification that has always weighed heavily on the word ātman was even more concerning, and that this makes it less suitable for expressing the unpredictable overflows of the divine personality. Somānanda remarks: “Once an action has been accomplished along with its result, immediately after, the will for another action arises, the infiniteness of the powers of Śiva being the cause for this. These powers, which are perennially present, flow according to their own being. Therefore, Śiva is one whose nature is ‘flowing.’” The term “I” is implicitly aimed against the two conceptions that are after all closest to the Pratyabhijñā and which it most aspires to differentiate itself from: the consciousness devoid of a subject of the Viśnunāvāda and the static ātman of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (or the ātman-brahman of the Vēdānta). As Upaladeva puts it in the Ajānapramāṇatsiddhi: “The 1-ness is the resting of the self in itself; this resting in itself is freedom in that dependence from any other reality is excluded, it is agency in the primary sense, Lordship.”

Upaladeva’s IPK is very clear about the basic identity of the individual subject and Śiva, but at the same time accounts for the difference that can be seen in ordinary reality, and the way to become fully aware of such identity. The divine subject (pātī)—whose body is constituted, as it were, by the universe—is counterposed with the “beast” (pātī), the fettered soul, in its various forms, depending on the impurities that characterize it. In the conception outlined by Upaladeva there are two components coming from different sources: the hierarchy of subjects—which is a peculiar element of the Śaivasiddhānta, but also included in Tīkā texts, like the MVU—and a version of the three impurities which, though deriving from the analogous doctrine of the Śaivasiddhānta, has an utterly nondualistic qualification. The ādīvara, māyā, and kārma impurities completely lose their original nature of “substances” that physically obstruct the self of the pātī from without, and turn out to be erroneous attitudes of the individual consciousness. The ādīvara impurity, with its obliterating the one or the other of the components of subjectivity (consciousness and freedom, bodha and svātāntarya) determines that identity crisis onto which the other two are grafted: the māyic one—which causes the I to see the world of objects as separate from himself and the kārmic one—which makes him consider his own actions as the causes of the series of rebirths, miring him in the samsāra. As Somānanda says, it is very much that the actual existence of bond and liberation that constitutes the impurity (VII.11 na me bandha na me mokṣaś tu mahatvāna samśītāḥ). The cause of all the three is the power of māyā, which has its roots in the very will of the Lord (IPV III.2.5 and Vṛtti). The individual knower, variously contaminated by these three impurities, is then distinguished according to four levels which he tends to identify with (void, vital breath, mind, and body) and the conditions in which his experience of reality may take place (waking, sleep and deep sleep, corresponding to direct perception, mental construct, and partial or total suspension of all activity and cognition). The fourth state, in which duality is overcome, corresponds gradually to the conditions of Viśnunākala, Mantra, Mantrēśvara, and Īśa: the state beyond the fourth is the one in which every trace of the knowable is dissolved in the absolute I of Śiva in which the individual I finally merges. The aim of the “new and easy” way expounded by the Pratyabhijñā school is merely to trigger an act of identification in the devout, which does not reveal anything
new but only rends the veils that hid the I from himself: a cognition is not created, but only the blur that prevented its use, its entering into life, is instantly removed. In Abhinavagupta’s words, commenting on the penultimate stanza of IPK:

There is a fascinating young girl, increasingly enamored of a heroic character merely on hearing his many qualities praised; beside herself with passion and unable to bear the pain of separation from her beloved, she informs him of her state, sending him messages of love. But once she encounters him [without knowing who he is] as he passes fleetingly by, the sight of him, notwithstanding everything, does not penetrate her heart, because now that his qualities are not manifest he seems to be a man like any other. But when, thanks to the words of a go-between, she becomes aware of that man’s celebrated qualities, she instantly enters a state of fullness. In the same way, the manifestation of the self, even though it shines constantly as Lord of all, does not determine any state of fullness until one is aware of its qualities. When, however, through the words of a master or by other means, awareness of the greatness of Maheśvara arises, characterized by omnipotence, omniscience, etc., the state liberation-while-living made of absolute fullness is immediately achieved.  

The centrality of knowledge in the path to liberation had already been emphasized by Somānanda in the ŚD. It is true that the Śiva principle, whether it is known or not, does not suffer any real obstruction (VII.1ff.). Fire, whether externally perceived or not, still generates light, and gold, if it is not known, does not therefore become a stone. All this is doubtless true; it is true that the gem of desires remains even if it is not known, but only if man knows it as such can he enjoy its effects (VII.4). The same may be affirmed regarding individuals’ identification with Śiva. It has been said that even a fire that is not known generates light, but so much more will be generated by a fire aptly arranged for this purpose, such as a lamp in a house (VII.10cd ff.). Thus, a means must be taught whereby the attained awareness of the nature of Śiva produces visible effects in the souls (VII.12ab). This means is represented by logical argumentation, the scriptures, and the teacher (VII.5).

All in all, Somānanda does not go beyond a powerful affirmation of the identity of Śiva and the universe, the task of defining their relationship being assumed only later by his disciple Utpaladeva, who starts precisely from where Somānanda had stopped. The latter had not developed his own ideas about the ontological status of the manifested world, but had only asserted, strongly and repeatedly, its reality (satyatā) and its having the nature of Śiva (śivarūpa). Things are “states” (avasthā, bhāva) of Śiva, and their emergence is due solely to his will, brought about without other than a natural overflowing of his energies, whose characteristic feature is “joy” (āmoda) as well as “play” (kṛṣṇā). In the sixth chapter of the ŚD, Somānanda attacked those that in various ways claim that the external world is unreal, especially various types of Vedāntins (VI.3ff.), who consider it as an illusory manifestation (vīrūpa) of Brahma, caused by nescience, or the Vijñānavādins (VI.33–34), who affirm the reality of consciousness but make unreal objects arise from it, and, moreover, do not admit an agent subject of this consciousness, whereas for Somānanda every action, and therefore also the action of knowing, is necessarily dependent on an agent subject. Even those who claim the reality of the external object, like the Buddhist bhātyāvādins, are wrong because they do not admit a unifying principle of reality, and thus make the passage from the moment of sensation to the moment of mental elaboration impossible (IV80cd ff.), and the same holds for the operation of apoha through which they seek to elude the universal.  

The later construction of the ontological-epistemological edifice of Pratyabhijñā by Utpaladeva has to be seen within the context of his appointing precisely the Buddhists as the main adversaries. While for Somānanda the Buddhists are opponents just like many others, they are given a special status in the work of Utpaladeva, for whom they, admired and attacked in an equally strong way, are so to speak the most intimate enemies. The criticism of their positions is to Utpaladeva a substantial help in building and refining the Pratyabhijñā philosophy. This also holds for the model chosen for defining the relationship between Śiva and the world. Instead of resorting to one or another Brahmanical model, Utpaladeva basically refers to the Vijñānavāda doctrine explaining the emergence of the external world by the multiform awakening of latent impressions within consciousness. Just as the akāras of the Vijñānavāda do not have any separate existence from the consciousness in/from which they emerge, likewise for Utpaladeva the objects are nothing but “reflections,” or “manifestations” (abhāsas) in the mirror of supreme consciousness.

The objects that are manifested in the present can be manifested as external only if they reside within.

Vṛtti: Even in direct perception, however, the manifestation of objects as separate is admissable only if they are absorbed in the cognizer.  

... Seeing that ordinary worldly activity can be accomplished on the basis of such “manifestations” alone, what sense is there in wanting to resort an external reality other than consciousness, which is not supported by reason?  

While the Buddhist model is clearly visible in Utpaladeva’s conception, the former, as usually occurs in his philosophical strategy, acts only as a raw material to be aptly modified and adapted to an utterly different worldview: thus, the impersonal consciousness of the Vijñānavāda is substituted by the dynamic I-ness of Śiva, and, consequently, the divine will takes the place of the mechanical emergence of the vāsanās. This is shown in all evidence in the verse already quoted: “Indeed, the Conscious Being, God, like the yogin, independently of material causes, in virtue of his volition alone, renders externally manifest the multitude of objects that reside within it.” The multitude of objects (artha-jätā) is described by Abhinavagupta (IPV 1 p. 184) as abhāsavacitvāyāpu “consisting of the multiformity of reflections.”  

Utpaladeva presents these “reflections-manifestations” as having the nature of universal (in fact, each one of them is connected with a word). They can appear in isolation or aggregated around a dominant manifestation, and are provided with a single or complex causal efficiency, on the basis of a compatibility that has its ultimate foundation in the law of necessity established by the Lord. United among themselves, thus becoming more and more particularized and finally combined with three manifestations endowed with a special individualizing force—space, time, and form.
(these too derived from Buddhism)—they constitute the world of everyday experience. It is easy to glimpse in this conception elements drawn from the Vijnānāvādins (consciousness as a receptacle of everything that is gradually manifested), from the Vaiśekas and Advaitins (the idea of a hierarchy of universals) and more generally from the Buddhist pramāṇa tradition. In this case, too, the word ābhāsa as a philosophical term—from which Utpaladeva’s doctrine draws its most widespread denomination (ābhāsavadā)—was of course not invented by him, but was commonly used in the Vedāntic and Buddhist schools. It also occurs in the SD, but, even when it does not appear in a context where explicit reference is made to opposing doctrines (various kinds of vivarata), its use seems to be merely sporadic and casual, and in any case devoid of a precise technical connotation.

In one respect, ābhāsa is not distinguished from prakāśa (and related terms), and sometimes the two terms seem interchangeable (cf. svabhāsa-svaprajāsa). In another (namely, in its more technical use, as in the so-called ābhāsa theory), though their essential unity of nature remains, ābhāsa is seen as a particle, an individualized and exoterized form of the “great light,” “cut out” in it. This fragmentation of the light is accompanied by, and also presupposes, an analogous descent of consciousness to the state of fragmented subjectivity of the manifold individual subjects (the true subject is avichinñābhāsa; cf. IPK II p. 125); see in particular Abhinavagupta’s commentaries on IPK II.3.1-2. The relationship between consciousness and ābhāsas is that between the mirror and the reflected image, subtly analyzed in chapter III of the TA. The ontological status of the ābhāsa is therefore a mixture of autonomy and heteronomy, without its basic reality ever being called into question (IPK I.5.4 Vṛtti). Though Utpaladeva does not explicitly repeat Somāṇāda’s extreme formulation (“the jar exists, knowing itself”), by using a typical Vijnānāvāda argument he underlies the necessarily common nature of consciousness and its object: only that which is itself light, that is, sentence, can shine in knowledge. “If it were not essentially light, the object would remain nonlight as before [the cognitive act]; and light is not differentiated [from the object]; being light constitutes the very essence of the object.” The object cannot receive such “light” from outside: light must already be the very self (ātman) of the object, its own form (svaśrīnābhāsa; cf. Vṛtti thereon). The being of the object consists in its becoming manifest: prakāśamānatātmikā sattā (Vivrī on IPK I.5.1; Torella, 2007c, p. 934). To say that something is sentient is like saying it is inconstant (Ajājadarpamāṇtrāthyidhī 13ac). Even when an ābhāsa is viewed as external, as “this”—the “this” continues to have its foundation in the I; it may also be said that reflective awareness of something in terms of separation, of “this,” has become fully achieved only when it rests in its innermost being, thus becoming the reflective awareness “I” (Ajājadarpamāṇtrāthyidhī 15). It is the same light of the self that is manifested as self and as other (Ajājadarpamāṇtrāthyidhī 13cd). So light, in its essence, is the knower itself: it is the contact with the knower’s light that, so to speak, kindles the latent, inner luminous nature of the object. Thus, if it is true that both subject and object are essentially light, we are not allowed to say that the light-knower is the light-object, but only the other way round. To explicate this concept, Utpaladeva in the Vivṛti (Torella, 2007c, p. 936) makes a rare exception to his usual dislike for quotations: for the second time, he cites a passage from the Bhagavadgītā (now, VII.12d na tv ahaṁ teṣu te mayī “But I am not in them, [whereas] they are in me”).

From what has been said so far, we see that Utpaladeva envisions in consciousness/Siva a dual pole, prakāśa-vimāraṇa—the first understood as the motionless cognitive light that constitutes the basic fabric, the founding structure of reality, of the “given”; the second as the spark that causes this luminous structure to pulsate by introducing self-awareness, dynamism, freedom of intervention, of self-assertion, thus expressing in theoretical terms what is the nature of an unpredictable divine personality, like that of the violent and loving Siva handed down in the scriptures and with whom Utpaladeva dialogues in his mystical hymns. The two polarities are not to be seen as separate realities, but merely as two sides of a coin, like Siva and Śakti: reflective awareness is the very own nature (svabhāva) of light (IPK I.5.11; see above). Prakāśa forms, together with a large group of synonyms or quasi-synonyms, a close-knit constellation of “luminous” terms indicating the notions of being manifested, emerging from the dark, coming to consciousness or, more in general, of being the object of knowledge and finally simply “being,” whose use was already firmly established especially in Vedāntic and Buddhist contexts (on the metaphor light/knowledge, see Watson [2014]); prakāśa and synonyms frequently occur in the Vākyapadīya. Apart from isolated and uncertain cases in the Śaiva scriptural tradition, vimāraṇa, in the pregnant sense Utpaladeva attributes to it, cannot but derive from Bharthari’s teaching, especially if we consider its link with light, on the one hand, and the word, on the other. I am referring to the two very famous and most quoted stanzas Vākyapadīya 1.131-32, whose influence, though extending over the whole structure of the Pratyabhijñā (and nondual Śaiva philosophy as a whole), we find concentrated particularly on two closely connected aspects. One (IPK I.5.19) concerns the only way deemed possible to account for a common fact in everyday experience, such as the immediate and seemingly thoughtless action that still achieves its purpose—namely, that of affirming the presence of a subtle reflective awareness even within the sensation or movement captured at its most direct and undifferentiated moment. “Even at the moment of direct perception there is a reflective awareness. How otherwise could one account for such actions as running and so on, if they were thought of as being devoid of determinate awareness?” (cf. Torella, 2002, p. 125). The other regards the two solemn general formulations that define “vimāraṇa” as the essential nature of light and indissolubly link consciousness, reflective awareness, freedom, and the supreme word:

The essential nature of light is reflective awareness; otherwise light, though ‘coloured’ by objects, would be similar to an sentient reality, such as the crystal and so on. (Cf. Torella, 2002, p. 118)

Consciousness has as its essential nature reflective awareness; it is the supreme Word that arises freely. It is freedom in the absolute sense, the sovereignty of the supreme Self. (Cf. Torella, 2002, p. 120).

The importance of Bharthari in the structure of Śaiva nondualism may not be underestimated. This may be surprising if we think how he had been heavily attacked by the very father of the Pratyabhijñā, Utpaladeva’s guru Somāṇāda (cf. Torella, 2009). In order to undermine the discontinuous universe of the Buddhists, Utpaladeva decides to avail himself precisely of Bharthari’s main doctrine, the language-imbed nature
of knowledge, which is meant to demolish one of the main foundation stones of the Buddhist edifice, the unsurpassable gulf between the moment of sensation and that of conceptual elaboration, representing, as it were, the very archetype of the Buddhist segmented reality. The omnipervaded of language is the epistemological version of the omnipervadence of Śiva, and at the same time calls for integration into the spiritually dynamic Śaiva universe.

Utpaladeva, referring to an enigmatic statement in the Bhagavadgītā (XV.15b), had identified three powers (sākīti) in the Lord: Cognition, Memory, and Exclusion. His aim is to show that cognition, memory, and exclusion, which constitute the very basis of the knowledge process in the human mind, are indirectly also a proof of the coinciding of the individual subject with universal consciousness. None of these phenomena can be really explained and their complex functioning accounted for satisfactorily in merely “mechanic” terms, as first of all the Buddhists do.

On the contrary, such a world of practical experience will become possible if all the various cognitions—direct perception, memory etc.—have only one intrinsic nature, being in essence consciousness only. Of this [atman], namely the Supreme Lord, whose essence is all, these cognitions represent the various and multiform powers of knowledge, etc. The world of practical experience would otherwise be impossible.48

... if there were no Mahēśvara who contains within himself all the infinite forms, who is one, whose essence is consciousness, possessing the powers of knowledge, memory and exclusion.49

As the starting point for a broad presentation of the position of Śaiva nondualism regarding epistemology we may take Utpaladeva’s affirmation of the basic identity of the I, consciousness and any cognitive activity.

Therefore the real nature of cognition would not be respected if it were presented in terms of objectification “here is this cognition”; consciousness (bodha) in fact is illuminated only by itself and is able to shine autonomously merely as I . . . . The same consciousness is called cognition, when it is turned outwards, towards objects, and is [apparently] differentiated because of them. When instead it is turned inwards, then it is called the knower.50

For the knower consists only of the light of I, while cognition is nothing but the light of I turned towards objects, without any additional form of its own other than this.51

A valid cognitive process is based on the attainment of “conformity” between the “apprehended object” (grāhya) part and the “apprehending subject (or cognition)” (grāhaka) part. Utpaladeva’s discourse is based on full acceptance of the epistemological scheme provided by Dignāga: the twofold aspect of cognition.52 The “apprehending cognition” part assumes the form of the “apprehended object” part; the cognitive process consists precisely in the conformity or likeness (sākāra) between the two.53 In the classical definition by Mookerjee (1935, p. 77), this doctrine, known as sākārāvāda, holds that “knowledge of external reality is made possible by virtue of the

objective reality leaving an impression of its likeness on the mirror of consciousness.” On the contrary, the competing doctrine known as nirākārāvāda maintains that “our consciousness is clear like a clean slate and does not depart an inch from its intrinsic purity even when it apprehends the external reality. Consciousness is an amorphous substance and remains so in all its activities. It is like light and reveals the object with its form and qualities without undergoing any morphological articulation in its constitution.” (p. 77)

The essential of Utpaladeva’s position is expressed in two terse stanzas of the IPK, defining pramāṇa:

The means of knowledge is that thanks to which the object is situated within its own confines “this thing, with these characteristics.” This means of knowledge is an ever freshly arising light related to a subject. This light, whose essence is the inner reflective awareness of that which is thus manifested, becomes—as regards the object without spatio-temporal differentiations, etc., and expressed by a single name—knowledge (mīti), [provided it is not] invalidated.54

Among the many aspects of this complex definition (for which I refer the reader to Torella [2002, pp. 161–163]) one may be considered particularly significant: the non-differentiation between the means of knowledge and its result (pramāṇa and pramāṇa (mīti in the kārtika). Utpaladeva’s starting point is once again a Buddhist doctrine. The distinction between pramāṇa and pramāṇa—the Buddhist epistemologist says—is only the outcome of the analytic consideration of a reality, cognition, which is in itself one. The two terms which are thus foregrounded cannot in any case represent a relationship of cause and effect—because this would require the actual otherness of the two terms—but at most a relation of establisher—established (vyavahārya-vyavasthāpaka), with a division of roles within the same reality. While up to this point Utpaladeva shares the Buddhist view, he strongly departs from it regarding the concept of "function, activity" (vyāpāra) performed by the elements occurring in cognition. Vyāpāra is denied by the Buddhists, who consider every distinction on this basis completely imaginary (in the act of piercing with an arrow the arrow may be attributed at will a variety of vyāpāras, like that of kartri or karana or apādāra); furthermore, vyāpāra conflicts with their doctrine of momentariness. Cognition, Dharmakirti concludes (Pramāṇavārttika III.308.3b), only "appears" to be endowed with a function. Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta replay that vyāpāra not only exists but constitutes the very essence of pramāṇa, and the non-differentiation of pramāṇa and pramāṇa hinges on this: vyāpāra is not a different reality from the subject that acts and from the instrument that is set in action. All this has already been essentially contained in the lasonic pramātrtyyāpāral that follows pramātitya in the Vṛtti. For his part, Abhinavagupta goes on to say (IPV II pp. 69ff.) that this does not mean that pramāṇa and pramāṇa are simply two ways of saying the same thing; the cognitive light that is the essential nature of both is turned toward the external object in the pramāṇa, whereas in the pramāṇa it is turned inward as pure determinate awareness, contracted due to the influence of the object assumed in it, having as its essence the word.

But our practical reality is apparently made of concrete objects, belonging to a specific time and space, having a particular form, not of single or multiple manifestations
or ensembles of manifestations. Upaladeva is well aware that the primary aim of philosophical reflection is to account for ordinary experience, and in ordinary experience we are indeed confronted with what the Buddhists call a "unique particular" (svakāya). Thus, also in this case, Upaladeva starts from a well-known Buddhist doctrine, but his own elaboration of the concept of svakāya takes a fairly different direction. For the Buddhist epistemologist the starting point is the particular; perception grasps it in its entirety but is also inexpressible and uncommunicable; many different ascertainment (niścaya) may stem from this single perceptual content, each of them capturing a part of it and connecting it with a word, which therefore denotes a certain sāṁanya (universal) (or rather the negation of what is other than that feature). For Upaladeva, each pramāṇa grasps an individual abhāsa (which is a sāṁanya), expressed by a determinate word, depending on a determinate reflective awareness, or grasps (in the perception itself and not in a later cognitive act) a group of abhāsas coordinated by the Lord's power of necessity around a dominant abhāsa, which allows the perception to remain unitary. The group of abhāsas taken in its totality ultimately corresponds to the Buddhist svakāya. The two conceptions are after all not so much opposed to each other: Upaladeva's svakāya clearly derives from the svakāya of the Buddhists, but with a significantly inverted perspective. The difference in the treatment of the important theme of "vividness" or "dimmness" of a cognitive act by the Buddhists and the Śaiva philosophers depends on the different assumptions above (Torella, 2002, p. 147, n. 2; 2007b, pp. 546–548, 556–561).

The individual subject can cognize, remember, and exclude only if it is conceived of as inscribed within an eternal and, at the same time, dynamic universal I-ness, that is, Śiva.

Notes

1. p. 1 dvaitadārśanādhivāsatapriyā jivaloke rahasyasampradāyo mā vicchediti.
2. p. 1 yad dvaitendhanadāhi yac ca paramādvaitātyāntemocchalaḥ |
dvaitādvaitadārśanaḥkharaharaṃ dhānmatayāśikṣāmaṇaḥ śaivaṃ netram anugrahyāya jagaṃ 'nunatrait uddyotate || 4 ||
3. I might quote not more than two texts showing straightforward nondualistic statements, the Ucchṣumṇaṭantra and the Kālikākrama. “How is it possible, o Dear one,” says a stanza of the former (quoted by Kṣemarāja in the Śivasūtravimāsini p. 8; and the Svachchandodihota, vol. II p. 55, ad VII.249) “that these can be object of knowledge without being at the same time] subject of knowledge? Object of knowledge and subject of knowledge constitute a single reality. That is why there is no impurity.” (My understanding of this verse considerably differs from Bispoch and Griffith [2007, p. 4]) (jāvan na vedāk ete tāvan vedāya kathāṃ priya | vedakam vedāya ekam tu tattvam nāsy aśicus tataḥ ||). Several verses from the lost Kālikākrama are quoted by Kṣemarāja again in the Śivasūtravimāsini. For example: “Knowledge shines in various forms, externally and internally. Without knowledge there is no existence of object, therefore the world is made of knowledge. Without knowledge things cannot become object of cognition. From this it ensues that knowledge constitutes the essential nature of the object” (p. 118 tatttrāpyataḥ jñānānāṃ bhūti antaḥ prakāṣeṇa | jñānād
30. On the alchemic metaphor used by Abhinavagupta (and Upaladeva), see Torella [2002, pp. XXXII–XXXIV]. In the relevant passages, both the edited texts of IPV and IPVV need significant emendations.


33. “This will be masterfully developed by Utpaladeva, especially in his IPVṛṣṭi (cf. Torella, 2007a).

34. On akāra, see recently Kellner (2014) and McClintock (2014).

35. The term abhāsa can be variously translated as "luminous" manifestation, reflection, appearance, image.


37. See above Somnandana’s analogous statement. On this point, see Rāti (2010); cf. also Rāti (2014).

38. See also I.6.7 “Thus also in the course of ordinary reality the Lord, entering the body, etc., renders externally manifest by his volition the multitude of objects that shine within him” (tad evaṃ vyahārāḥ āṃ praṇabhāḥ deśāḥ āśivaḥ | bhaṃtal evānār arthāgahām icchāya bahāsayā bhaiḥ |). Cf. Torella (2002, p. 133).

39. This causal efficiency is not intrinsic to the object, and consequently may not act as the proof of its truth-reality, as in the Buddhist doctrine, but it is just a particular abhāsa which may or may not be associated with the other abhāsas constituting the object, without this affecting their already established intrinsic reality. The same holds for externality (see below).

40. See also Mahāprajñāpāramitā-pramala, p. 147.

41. Nondual Saivism, and above all Pratyabhijñā philosophy, keeps the concepts of reality (sattā) and externality (bhāya) rigorously distinct. As IPK I.8.5 says, “Existing
externally is to be considered an accessory condition (upādhi) and not the very
essence of the manifestations of being and non-being. These, therefore, insofar as
they are inner manifestations, always exist" (bhāvabhāvabhāvabhāsānāṁ bhāyatopaṭādhir

And again (IPK I.8.7): "Insofar as they are essentially constituted by consciousness
the manifestations permanently reside internally; insofar as they are manifested
as external owing to the power of āyatā, they also exist externally" (cīnmayatā
tāvākṣāśānam antareva anta eva sthitāḥ sādā | māyāyābhāsāmānāṁ bhāyatāvād bahīr

42. IPK I.2.5 prāg īvārtho "prakāśāḥ syāt prakāśātmatayā vinā | na ca prakāśo bhinnāṁ
syād atmātmyasa prakāśatā ||" (cf. Torella, 2002, p. 111). The Vṛtti thereon glosses
"light" (prakāśa) with "cognizer" (praṃāṭ). See also passages from Vāmanadatta’s
Śaṅkīprakāśa, on which Upaladeva’s influence is evident (e.g., I.10–12 yathāgnīṁ
samāvijñāṁ sarvam tadātām ākhyate | tathā jñānasamāvijñāṇaṁ sarvam tadātām
ākhyate || pramāṇatāpaksabhāvēva | na anyasthānākhyate | yatas tato prakāśāntaṁ
svayam eva tadātāmann | tvadātmanukrayat bhīvānanāṁ vividantu na kecāna | yat
prakāśayādaśaṁ yāti nāpṛakāśaṁ prakāśāyate ||

43. According to Vāmanadatta’s Āçārapuṭṭa, the very concept of visaya is groundless
unless we admit the ultimate identification of the object with consciousness: II.8–9
svākhyā visvākhāṁ kaśa tatrotāḥ bhūtyāḥ | yady anyatra prasiddhaṁ taṁ svākhyāṁ
cūki apokhyā | svākhyā svākhyāṃ yāc ca na tad visvāyahimāṇaṁ | yāsvisvākyam
tadātāmaiva visvākhyāṁ kva tathāhām ||

44. See also SD II.83d, 84c.


46. I.V.19 sākṣātākāraṁ ṣyaḥ piṣti vimaraṁ katham anyathā | dhāvanāyān upapadetya
pratissmādahnavartijām ||]

47. I.V.11 svābhāvam avabhāsāya vimarṣāṁ vidur anyathāḥ | prakāśo ‘taḥparantaka
‘mpī sahaśiddhiupayantaḥ | I.V.13 citiṣṭiṣṭ pratyavaranārūṁ pare vāk vārasoditaḥ |
svaṅtyaṁtaṇ etan mukhyam taṁ aśvāryaṁ paramātmanāṁ

48. Vīsṇu introducing IPK I.3.7 (cf. Torella, 2007a, p. 477) yujyeta punar elādhārya vyavahāro
yady eṣāṁ anubhavasmyādcaiṁ cīnmayatāścāryavatṝa evabhāyaḥ svābhāvaḥ
svābhāvītaḥ paramesvarasvayaṁ jñānādānāḥ vicītṝāṁ saṁtakṣaṁ ‘nyāthā tu na svādhyāt.

49. IPK I.3.7 na ca antaḥkāryānantaśvāvyābhāsāraḥ maheśvarāḥ | svābhāvaḥ kṣetvā
jñānamayopahānṣaśākṣāmāṁ ||

50. Vīsṇu on I.3.6 (cf. Torella, 1988, pp. 146–147) tad idaṁ jñānam iniḥ itilaktam
svapraṇāsirāśaṁprājanāṁ na prakāśāīn svābhāvāḥ bhūtyāḥ bohīṁ ho svapraṇāsirāśaṁ
‘harm ity eva prakāśāhaḥ aham ity asaya prakāśāvadātāva || sa eva hi yadd tu arthakramakṣa
svābhāvāḥ bhadraḥbhāvāḥ sva jñānamāṁ prakāśāvadātāva || yadd tu antarmukhātāḥ
vyavahārāḥ tadā pramātāṁ kathaye. Then Upaladeva remarks that the Buddhists
says the same thing except that they consider the permanence of the subject as being
uniquely the product of a wrong superimposition brought about by discursive thought.

51. Vīsṇu on I.3.6 ahnopakāśātmatāmāṁ prājanāṁ hi pramātāṁ, prāyanukmaktaḥ

52. Pramāṇasamuccaya-वṛ्त्ति p. 4 (ad I.9a) "Cognition arises having two manifestations: it
contains the manifestation of the object and that of the object. The self-awareness of both
manifestations constitutes the result [of cognition]," (dvābhāsāṁ hi jñānam upapadate
svābhāsāṁ visvābhāsāṁ ca tasyabhāvabhāsāya yat svasamvedanām tat phalam). On
this crucial passage, see recently Kellner (2011).

53. Upaladeva adopts the conception, also upheld by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti—
and, more generally, by Sautrāntikas and Viśīnavāsins (along with Sāṃkhya
and Vedānta)—known as sākāravāda. The nirākāravāda is followed by Viśīnavāsikas
and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, Mīmāṃsakas and Jaina); cf. Kajiyama (1989). Expectedly, the dualist
Śaivaśādhanā is also nirākāravāda.

54. II.2.1–2 (cf. Torella, 2002, p. 161) idam etadā bhī ṣya evam yadvasāḥ vyavatvētāya
vā | vastu pramāṇāṁ tat so ‘pi svabhāsāḥ bhīvadvadāya || so ‘ntasthāvīravīrātmā
dēśakālādyābhedāṁ | ekabhūdhanavajya mitr vastuny abhāditā ||

55. For a detailed discussion, see Torella (1992, pp. 332–33).
Translators and studies


