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Indian Epistemology and Metaphysics

Edited by
Joerg Tuske

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Śaiva Nondualism

Raffaele Torella

"Nondualism" being a correlative term, we should start by defining "dualism." Not dualism in general, however, but the particular dualism of the Tantric Śaiva tradition of medieval Kashmir, starting probably around VII c., with which nondual Śaivism competes and from which it ultimately derives. This is evident from the anti-dualist tension we can find in the (comparatively) late Kaula scriptures, while no anti-nondualist tension can be detected in the early Śaiva scriptures (Sanderson, 1992, pp. 307–308). Cf., among others, statements like the one Kṣemarāja puts in the mouth of the supreme Śiva himself at the outset of the *Śivasūtra-vimarsinī*: "Now that mankind is mostly adhering to dualist views the secret tradition should not break."¹ Or in the *maṅgalastotra* of Kṣemarāja's *Netratantṛa-uddhṛta*: "In order to do service to the world he illustrates this *Netra*, a Śaiva (tantra) in unity with the three states, burning the fuel of dualism, overflowing with the nectar of supreme nondualism, eliminating the blindness of dualism-cum-nondualism."²

As far as ontology is concerned, dualism is characterized by a definite position regarding a few crucial points: *in primis*, relationship between the supreme God and individual subjects, and between the supreme God and the manifested world (cf. Sanderson, 1992). The individual souls (*aṇu*) are potentially endowed with the same powers as the Lord (apart from the cosmogonic one), but in the saṃsāra condition these powers are partly or totally inhibited by three kinds of impurity (*mala*), conceived of as "physically" covering the individual soul. An analogously physical action, that of ritual, is required for the soul to get rid of such impurities. Once the process of liberation is achieved, an eternal distinction remains between the liberated souls (*muktasīvas*) and Śiva. Śiva and the universe belong to two different orders. Even though the Lord pervades the universe, the universe comes from a different source, usually called *māyā*; from it the universe arises and finally dissolves. Their basic otherness is also demonstrated by the fact that Śiva is often shown to entrust a minor god, Ananta, with the task of creating and governing the material world. It is to be added that ontological dualism is significantly flanked by epistemological dualism, less openly declared but clearly presupposed, which hinges on the unbridgeable gap between knowing subject and knowable object. If we look at full-fledged nondualism as expressed in the works of the four great masters Somānanda, Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta, and Kṣemarāja, we

find complete coincidence between Śiva and the individual soul; the material world is the free manifestation of Śiva himself; *māyā* is not an autonomous reality, but a power of Śiva; the impurities (*malā*) are by no means substantial realities, but erroneous attitudes of the subject based on his lack of knowledge; the opposition knower-knowable is only provisional, and finally everything shines as absolute I-ness.

As a worldview based on reason and revelation (*yukti* and *āgama*), Śaiva nondualism is expected to have its roots in Śaiva scriptures. Indeed, one of the most popular division of the Śaiva scriptures (cf. *Tantrāloka* [TĀ] I.18) presents three sets of texts, characterized by dualism, dualism-cum-nondualism and nondualism, promulgated by Śiva, Rudra, and Bhairava, respectively, in the number of ten, eighteen, and sixty-four. The scrutiny of what is extant from the sixty-four Bhairavatantras risks disappointing the seeker for unequivocal nondualist lines. As Sanderson (1992) and Törzsök (2014) have shown, even the very occurrence of terms like *advaita*, *advaya*, and so on hardly refers to straightforward affirmation of ontological and epistemological nondualism, but rather concerns ritual practice. A practice is termed “*advaita*” when it programmatically rejects the mainstream Brahmanical opposition between what is in itself pure (normal, socially acceptable, clear, etc.) and what is impure (abnormal, despised by the generality of Hindu society, obscure, etc.). The impure is also often felt as more effective, quickly transformative, although directly or potentially dangerous. We can envisage several pairs of opposite terms, which can roughly be reduced to two: ritual in a pure environment (pure ingredients, pure behaviors, defense of self-identity) versus ritual in an impure environment (impure ingredients, illicit practices, possession); and ritual versus knowledge. This is not to be taken in a too schematic way: within the same school, different kind of attitudes can be detected (for one, see the knowledge temptation found in a Saiddhāntic text such as the *Matāṅgapārameśvara*) or the unwillingness to get rid of rituals in a champion of the primacy of knowledge over ritual, like Abhinavagupta.

The main question might also be formulated in the following terms: does *advaitācāra* necessarily presuppose a noetic nondualist framework? This seems particularly true for the Kaula tradition within nondualist tantras. Then, why are statements expressing ontological and epistemological nondualism so rare even in the Kaula texts, or at least in the early ones?³

It is an undoubted fact that in the economy of a Tantric scripture ritual holds by far the most prominent position. The (mostly theoretical) division into four *pādas* (*kriyā*, *caryā*, *jñāna* or *vidyā*, and *yoga*) has given the commentators the occasion to delve into the relationship among these four domains. According to Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha's commentary on the *Migendāra-tantra* (*yogapāda*, pp. 1–2), the ideal order is *vidyāpāda*, *kriyā*-, *yoga*-, and *caryā*-. Without *vidyā*, which is the means to describe the own nature of the individual soul, the bonds and the Lord, which shows the extent of all paths, defines the rank of Mantras, Lord of Mantras, and so on, it is impossible to bring about initiation successfully. Therefore, the *vidyāpāda*, which provides knowledge of all this, should be expounded first in a thoroughly detailed way in order to describe the own nature of the individual soul, the bonds, and the Lord. Then, also the *kriyāpāda* has to be taught in order to present the procedure of the different kinds of initiation along with their various limbs. Now, however, even if they know both knowledge and ritual

action, the various kinds of initiands (*sādhaka*, *putra*, etc.) cannot bring about the performing of their respective activities as they have been taught to them unless they know their own inner self by virtue of repeated practice of perfect absorption, and so on. That is why the *yogapāda* follows along with the description of the various limbs, such as *prāṇāyāma*, in order to impart knowledge about yoga. And, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha adds (*caryāpāda*, p. 207), without *caryā*, consisting of the practice of what is prescribed and the avoidance of what is forbidden, the adept cannot obtain the desired results without obstacles.

Rāmakaṇṭha in his commentary on *Matāṅgapārameśvara* (*vidyāpāda*, p. 567) gives a partly different picture.

Caryā and *yoga* are not possible without knowledge, for neither *yoga* (in the sense of *samādhi*) nor *caryā*, which has previously described, are possible if their respective aims are unknown. Knowledge, however, is not sufficient to liberate the soul from the bonds, basic impurity, etc.—which are substances—without the factual action performed by initiation.... Therefore, only initiation is the (direct) cause of liberation, because knowledge and the other factors are seen to be applied only within the context of initiation.⁴

The subordinate position of knowledge with respect to ritual may explain the absence of explicit nondualistic statements in nondual scriptures. On the other hand, we can admit that an anti-dualist attack, seen as an attack on the Brahmanical or semi-Brahmanical establishment, is much more effective if it concerns praxis rather than mere knowledge. The need for philosophical awareness comes only later, that is, when nondual Śaivism engages in a śāstric discourse with adversaries (within and without the Tantric context). This happens in concomitance with the emergence from the dimension of restricted circles, and the attempt at establishing itself in the stratum of social normality, by internalizing, or in any case circumscribing the specific differences. We can hypothesize that the first step after negating the pure-impure opposition in ritual and behavioral contexts is to elaborate on the basic equality of all by stressing the presence of Śiva in the universe. For this purpose, stating that the all is pervaded by Śiva may prove not to be sufficient as this is also upheld in Saiddhāntic circles. There is no impurity since Śiva “is” the universe. This is precisely what will constitute the core of Somānanda's teaching.

In explaining the sameness of all with the universal Śiva-nature, Abhinavagupta (TĀ IV.274) refers to a passage on *samatā* from a comparatively early Trika scripture, the *Trikaśāsana*, quoted in full by Jayaratha in the *Viveka* thereon: “There is sameness of all beings and, by all means, of all conditions. There is sameness of all philosophies and, by all means, of all substances. All the stages are the same, and also all the lineages, all the goddesses, and by all means, all the classes.”⁵ The *locus classicus* for Somānanda's concept of universal *samatā* because of everything having the same Śiva-nature is *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* [ŚD] I.48, to be read in the light of Uṭpaladeva's comments:

Thus, it is firmly established that the Śiva-nature is the same for all entities. A differentiation in them in terms of higher, lower, etc. may be maintained only by those who are ready to think anything true.

Vṛtti: This is the meaning: Starting from Paramāśiva down to all objects, such as a jar, etc., the Śiva-nature is the same, in the sense that it is neither more nor less, and it is definitely present in everything with no exception (*nirata*), since the nature of full consciousness is never exceeded. Due to such experience of unity with the Śiva-nature, everything possesses a marvellous and indefinable (*kāpi*) state. Thus, since everything has intimate unity with the Śiva-nature, we can speak of things as differentiated into higher, lower, etc., of their having a pure or impure nature, etc., only on account of our non-awareness of such intimate unity. This may take place in people just owing to mere belief, that is, without sound reasons. In things there is no purity or impurity whatsoever.⁶

The purity-impurity issue often emerges in Abhinavagupta's works. In TĀ XV.163cd-164ab he is confronted with a dubious statement found in the very core text of the TĀ, the *Mālinīvijayottara-tantra* [MVU]: "One should not think that there may be anything that is not purified by it [the *arghapātra*]. By it, everything is purified and what is impure becomes pure."⁷ After quoting this passage, Abhinavagupta points out that "impurity is to be considered as such only from the point of view of limited souls and their teachings, for everything resides in its own state either after a previous (impure) state or after a pure state."⁸ Later on in this chapter (417cd-418ab), Abhinavagupta takes up the issue again: "The Lord in the MVU has not prescribed the purification of the two sacrificial ladles in order to suggest that essence of purification is none other than full perception of the true reality."⁹

But the MVU also has passages in which the opposition purity/impurity is negated, like the well-known XVIII.74: "Here there is neither purity nor impurity, nor deliberation about what may be eaten or not, neither duality nor nonduality, and not even adoration of *linga*, and so on."¹⁰

The passage is commented on at length by Abhinavagupta in TĀ IV.212ff. "Even if we consider things as existing externally," Abhinavagupta continues, "purity and impurity are not comparable to [existing objects, like] the blue colour. Purity and impurity are qualifications pertaining to the knower depending on whether he perceives the object as united with consciousness or not."¹¹

This point had been anticipated by Jayaratha in his *Viveka* on TĀ IV.221cd-222ab:

In fact, we do not deny the practical use in everyday life of the notion of purity and impurity, but we point out that purity and impurity are not properties of the object, for it is the knower who ascertains "this is pure, this is impure." Had purity and impurity been properties of the object, something impure could never become pure, and vice versa, because what is blue could not ever become non-blue.¹²

This echoes Utpaladeva's ŚD *Vṛtti*, quoted above (*na tu vastūnāṃ śuddhir aśuddhir vā kācit*). Abhinavagupta's position can be summarized by his own words: "Impure is what has fallen away from consciousness: therefore everything stands pure if it has achieved identity with consciousness."¹³

Among the most quoted statements on the matter found in Trika scriptures stands *Vijñānabhairava* 121 *kiñcijñair yā smṛtāśuddhīḥ sā śuddhīḥ śambhudarśane | na śucir hy aśucis*. The meaning of this verse, whose readings are much fluctuating both in manuscripts and in quotations, I find most likely is: "What men of limited knowledge traditionally¹⁴ consider as impurity, this in the Śaiva worldview is taken as purity. For purity cannot become impurity [or vice versa]."¹⁵

We may close this topic by referring to the position of another important Trika Kaula tantra, the *Virāvali*, now lost. The passage is quoted in TĀ IV.242: "The life principle is what sets in motion all entities; nothing exists that is destitute of such life principle. Whatever is destitute of such life principle you should consider as 'impure'.¹⁶ Needless to say, for Abhinavagupta the life principle (*jīva*) is the supreme light of consciousness. He concludes: "Therefore what is not exceedingly distant from consciousness brings about purity."¹⁷

This may be compared to an analogous statement (in fact, many more could be quoted) already found in an early nondualistic text, the *Spanda-kārikā* by Bhāṭṛa Kallata (or, for some, by Vasugupta), particularly referring to the domain of language: "There is no state in words, meanings and mental elaborations that is not Śiva."¹⁸ "No state," says Kṣemarāja in *Spandanirṇaya* p. 48, is meant to include the initial, medial, and final parts of all these realities.

The coincidence of Śiva and the world might be taken in an "illusionistic" sense, as in some Advaita Vedānta or Vijñānavāda approaches. If having the nature of Śiva in a sense "enhances" the reality of the world, in another it risks derealizing it, that is, flattening its multifarious aspects and finally making it fade altogether. Realizing the ultimate Śiva nature might lead to the very disappearance of the universe as such.

Since its very beginnings nondual Śaivism tackles this crucial issue. According to Somānanda, it cannot be said that the universe is "imagined" as Śiva, or vice versa, because the one is directly the other. Just as gold is not "imagined" as such neither in the simple jewel of solid gold nor in the earring in which the craftsmanship is so refined as to set aside, as it were, its nature of pure gold, so Śiva is "formed, arranged" as universe—in the sense that he has become such and such, that is, freely presents himself in this form. An original and very subtle treatment of the issue can be found in the SD, which is worth quoting in full. The passage hinges on the distinction between *klṛpti* and *kalpanā*: Śiva is not just conceived (*kalpita*) as having the form of the world, and vice versa, but he is indeed (auto-)formed (*klṛpta*) as having the form of the world.

It is not mental construction that operates as regards this [universe] consisting of the Earth principle, etc., since the [Śiva principle] is formed precisely in this manner. If something is conceived of as different from what it is, then we can speak of mental construction. But is that [Earth, etc.] conceived of differently from what it is? If [mental construction] concerns something real,¹⁹ then mental construction is just a word [without content].

Vṛtti—We cannot say that, with respect to the multitude of entities that are perceived as having the form of earth, etc., the fact of having Śiva as their own form is a mental construction. For in actual fact it is the very Śiva principle that is formed having earth, etc., as its own form. If something that does not possess a

certain form is ascertained as possessing that form, as in the case of fantasy, then this would be a [case of] mental construction, i.e. this would be something constructed mentally. But, since everything is directly Śiva himself, the earth, etc., are in actual fact nothing but Śiva, [so] will the earth, etc., be “mentally constructed” as being Śiva? The meaning [of the rhetorical question] is: they are not! If we speak of mental construct with regard to [the cognition of] the earth, etc. which are really so [i.e. of the nature of Śiva], then “mental construct” in the present case is just a verbal expression.²⁰

Utpaladeva's *Vṛtti* adds some welcome clarifications:

On certain occasions, one can mentally construct the presence of real fire with respect to a fire represented in a picture or to the red colour found in the Aśoka flower, etc. Śiva is formed having the earth, etc. as his form; he has really assumed such a form, namely, he spontaneously presents himself as such: this is the meaning. Mentally constructed would be said of somebody /something that is only assumed arbitrarily to be such. There is a difference between the meaning of these two words—namely, a) autonomously being by oneself formed in a certain way (*klpti*), i.e. one's becoming such and such, referring to somebody /something that is autonomously formed in that form, and b) being mentally constructed (*kalpanā*) as being such and such—in the sense of merely imagining as being such and such somebody/something that instead by himself/itself is not so. Those who are not acquainted with such a difference are indeed to be worshipped: this is to be taken in a derisory sense.²¹

The Śiva-nature embraces everything (ŚD VI.127 ab *tato jñeyā śivatā sarvagocarā*). Somānanda further specifies that the world's having the nature of Śiva involves that all objects, like the jar, have the same powers as Śiva (*icchā, jñāna, kriyā*) and possess sentience (*sacitṛvam*). Somānanda denies that Śiva may be destituted of his powers even when he is not active, that is, in his transcendent and quiescent state (*śānta*). Incidentally, this proves that even insentient objects may not be without the powers of Śiva.

If you admit that the nature of Śiva exists in the quiescent state and in the gross state as well, then, tell me, what is the state of quiescence? Does it not possess any reality for you? If it is real, then there indeed is within it the meeting of such three powers.

Vṛtti—[Obj.]: If we admit—*yatra* is to be taken in the sense *abhyupagama* “admitting”—that the Śiva-nature which is present in the quiescent state is to be considered the same as the Śiva-nature in the gross state, i.e. when Śiva takes the form of the universe, then please tell me what is the state of quiescence, i.e. the state in which Śiva is there [alone]? According to you, quiescence too is a real entity, and a real entity is made of the fact of existing (*sattīamayam*), and the fact of existing, of being, is the fact of being the agent of the action “to be,” and agency, which has freedom as its essence, belongs to consciousness, possessing the powers of will, etc. Therefore, every real entity is Śiva.²²

Being is, actually, being united with the manifestation of consciousness (cf. ŚD IV.29b *cidyaktyogitā*; IV.7ab *sarvabhāveṣu cidvyakteḥ śhītaiva paramārthatā*). Thus everything is pervasive, incorporeal, and endowed with will, like consciousness (V.1). If things can be efficient, it is because they “want” one particular action that is peculiar to them (V.16, 37). And if they want it, they must also know it, in other words be conscious—first and foremost, of themselves. All things are in all conditions knowing their own self (V.105ab *sarve bhāvāḥ svam ātmānam jñāntaḥ sarvataḥ śhītāḥ*). This dignifies all levels of reality, including the surface level, made of human transactions and related verbal behavior, in a word “*vyavahāra*.”

If the opponent asks why there is acceptance and rejection [of the doctrine maintaining the Śiva nature of everything], [we reply] because he manifests himself in this way. Or, [because] everything serves the course of ordinary life. [Obj.]: But the ordinary course of life has nothing to do with actual reality. [Reply.]: You should know that the own form [of anything] is related to actual reality. [Obj.]: The ordinary course of life is never [related to actual reality]. [Reply.]: [It is], since the Lord manifests himself in this way inasmuch as he takes the form of the appearing of the unreal [too].

Vṛtti—[Obj.]: How is it possible that there are upholders and opponents [of a certain doctrine]? For there can be no different worldviews, given that there is only one Śiva. [Reply.]: What has been said earlier, namely that this is just meant to defeat those who maintain a different view [with respect to the view that all things have the same Śiva nature], this too holds true because it is Śiva himself who manifests himself in this way. Alternatively, we may say that everything, i.e. speaking pro or contra the authoritative doctrine [i.e. maintaining the Śiva nature of everything], serves the ordinary course of life. [Obj.]: But the ordinary course of life, being informed by non-perception of identity with Śiva, has nothing to do with the real. [Reply.]: On the contrary, what shines according to its own form is indeed real, a reality which derives from its having [ultimately] Śiva as its own form. [Obj.]: But the ordinary course of life is never real; on the contrary, it is just illusion. [Reply.]: Even the unreal has the Lord as its own form, since it is the Lord that manifests himself in the form of the appearing of the unreal. Precisely owing to this, according to the principle expressed in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*, even the unreal, inasmuch as it is being manifested, has consciousness as its own form. With this specification only: something is called “unreal” when it is not manifested externally.²³

The absolute identity of Śiva and the universe, being the outcome of his free self-expression, involves a reinterpretation of the role and status of *māyā*. The latter is seen by the Sāiddhāntic scriptures as an irreducible counterpart of Śiva, from which the universe emanates and finally dissolves. This status is still conspicuously present in the MVU, where *māyā* is defined in the following terms: “*Māyā* is one, pervasive, subtle, without parts, receptacle of the universe, with neither beginning nor end, non-Śiva, sovereign, imperishable” (I.26 *sā caikā vyāpīnī sūksmā niṣkalā jagato nīdhīḥ | anādyantīśīvēśāṁ vyavahīnā ca kathyate ||*). The reading *aśivā* (*anādyantīśivā-?*) is

apparently the original, also shared by other Śaiva scriptures and Saiddhāntic treatises; it is moreover presupposed by the term with which Abhinavagupta glosses it in the TĀ, that is, *jaḍā* (cf. a thorough analysis of this passage in Sanderson [1992, pp. 300–306; see also Vasudeva [2004, pp. 182–184]). This does not prevent Abhinavagupta from choosing instead the reading *śivā* while discussing the same passage in MVUVārttika, this being just one of the many occasions in which he tries to reinterpret nondualistically the not few dualistic statements found in the MVU. The otherness of *māyā*, according to Abhinavagupta and all nondual Śaivism, is only apparent: “*Māyā* is the power of the god, inseparable from him, the freedom to make differentiation appear. In fact, this [appearing of differentiation] is caused by it” (TĀ IX.149cd–150ab *māyā ca nāma devasya śaktir avyatiṛekīṇī || bhedābhāśasvātāntrīyaṃ tathāhi sa tayā kṛtāḥ* |). This echoes Utpaladeva’s statement: “By the power of *māyā* of Parameśvara, whose essence is light, the world—which consists of his own self—is manifested as differentiated.”²⁴

The role of *māyā* as material cause of the universe, stated by Saiddhāntic scriptures, is rejected. As the central text of nondual Śaivism, Utpaladeva’s ĪPK says: “Indeed, the Conscious Being, God, like the yogin, independently of material causes, in virtue of his volition alone, renders externally manifest the multitude of objects that reside within it” (Torella, 2002, p. 116).²⁵ Not only does Śiva not need a material cause, but according to ŚD III.80–82ab, he is the material cause himself as well as the efficient cause and the noninherent cause.

Despite the strong emphasis on the reality of the world as self-expression of the Lord, we may come across opposing statements about the status of the manifested world in the scriptures and in the works of exegetes, but these need not concern us too much. As Somānanda says:

There is no fault as regards the intention of the [scriptural] sentences expressing the worthlessness of the universe, the aim of whose statements being that of arousing dispassion, etc. A multiplicity of the consciousness principle cannot be admitted.

Vṛtti—There is no contradiction [in our view] with sentences—also uttered by Śiva—like “the universe is unreal, similar to a bubble,” because there is no fault in them, expressing as they do the goal of dispassion, of non-egoity, etc., inasmuch as their final aim is to prove that everything possesses the nature of the one Śiva. Nor, on the other hand, does the fact of maintaining that everything is Śiva involve a plurality of the consciousness principle.²⁶

Just as the universe ultimately coincides with Śiva, so there is no real difference between Śiva and the individual subjects (*Spandanirṇaya* p. 48 *jīvaśivayor vāstavo na ko ’pi bhedah*). The individual I is no other than the I of Śiva. Conceiving of the supreme reality as an absolute I, which is destined to become one of the central and most peculiar tenets of nondual Śaivism, is due to Utpaladeva, whose ĪPK and commentaries constitute the basis of the Pratyabhijñā philosophy, the very core of the philosophical dimension of nondual Śaivism. However, there is no substantial difference between Utpaladeva’s I and Somānanda’s dynamic Self-Śiva which underlies the whole universe and express himself in it. Utpaladeva is the one who chose to use this word and concept regardless

of the negative associations generally attached to it in Indian thought, being aware of the fact that the risk of a reification that has always weighed heavily on the word *ātman* was even more concerning, and that this makes it less suitable for expressing the unpredictable overflowing of the divine personality. Somānanda remarks: “Once an action has been accomplished along with its result, immediately after, the will for another action arises, the infiniteness of the powers of Śiva being the cause for this. These powers, which are perennially present, flow according to their own being. Therefore, Śiva is one whose nature is ‘flowing.’”²⁷ The term “I” is implicitly aimed against the two conceptions that are after all closest to the Pratyabhijñā and which it most aspires to differentiate itself from: the consciousness devoid of a subject of the Vijñānavāda and the static *ātman* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (or the *ātman-brahman* of the Vedānta). As Utpaladeva puts it in the *Aṣṭadāpramāṭṣiddhi*: “The I-ness is the resting of the light in itself; this resting in itself is freedom in that dependence from any other reality is excluded, it is agency in the primary sense, Lordship.”²⁸

Utpaladeva’s ĪPK is very clear about the basic identity of the individual subject and Śiva, but at the same time accounts for the difference that can be seen in ordinary reality, and the way to become fully aware of such identity. The divine subject (*pati*)—whose body is constituted, as it were, by the universe—is counterposed with the “beast” (*paśu*), the fettered soul, in its various forms, depending on the impurities that characterize it. In the conception outlined by Utpaladeva there are two components coming from different sources: the hierarchy of subjects—which is a peculiar element of the Śaivasiddhānta, but also included in Trika texts, like the MVU—and a version of the three impurities which, though deriving from the analogous doctrine of the Śaivasiddhānta, has an utterly nondualistic qualification. The *ānava*, *māyīyā*, and *kārmā* impurities completely lose their original nature of “substances” that physically obstruct the self of the *paśu* from without, and turn out to be erroneous attitudes of the individual consciousness.²⁹ The *ānava* impurity, with its obliterating the one or the other of the components of subjectivity (consciousness and freedom, *bodha* and *svātantrya*) determines that identity crisis onto which the other two are grafted: the *māyīc* one—which causes the I to see the world of objects as separate from himself—and the *kārmīc* one—which makes him consider his own actions as the causes of the series of rebirths, mirroring him in the *saṃsāra*. As Somānanda says, it is the very belief in the actual existence of bond and liberation that constitutes the impurity (VII.cd *na me bandho na me mokṣas tau malatvena saṃsthītau*). The cause of all three is the power of *māyā*, which has its roots in the very will of the Lord (ĪPV III.2.5 and *Vṛtti*). The individual knower, variously contaminated by these three impurities, is then distinguished according to four levels which he tends to identify with (void, vital breath, mind, and body) and the conditions in which his experience of reality may take place (waking, sleep and deep sleep, corresponding to direct perception, mental construct, and partial or total suspension of all activity and cognition). The fourth state, in which duality is overcome, corresponds gradually to the conditions of Vijñānakāla, Mantra, Mantreśvara, and Īśa: the state beyond the fourth is the one in which every trace of the knowable is dissolved in the absolute I of Śiva in which the individual I finally merges.³⁰ The aim of the “new and easy” way expounded by the Pratyabhijñā school is merely to trigger an act of identification in the devotee, which does not reveal anything

new but only rends the veils that hid the I from himself: a cognition is not created, but only the blur that prevented its use, its entering into life, is instantly removed. In Abhinavagupta's words, commenting on the penultimate stanza of *ĪPK*:

There is a fascinating young girl, increasingly enamoured of a heroic character merely on hearing his many qualities praised; beside herself with passion and unable to bear the pain of separation from her beloved, she informs him of her state, sending him messages of love. But once she encounters him [without knowing who he is] as he passes fleetingly by, the sight of him, notwithstanding everything, does not penetrate her heart, because now that his qualities are not manifest he seems to be a man like any other. But when, thanks to the words of a go-between, she becomes aware of that man's celebrated qualities, she instantly enters a state of fullness. In the same way, the manifestation of the self, even though it shines constantly as Lord of all, does not determine any state of fullness until one is aware of its qualities. When, however, through the words of a master or by other means, awareness of the greatness of Maheśvara arises, characterized by omnipotence, omniscience, etc., the state liberation-while-living made of absolute fullness is immediately achieved.³¹

The centrality of knowledge in the path to liberation had already been emphasized by Somananda in the *SD*. It is true that the Śiva principle, whether it is known or not, does not suffer any real obstruction (VII.1ff.). Fire, whether externally perceived or not, still generates light, and gold, if it is not known, does not therefore become a stone. All this is doubtless true; it is true that the gem of desires remains such even if it is not known, but only if man knows it as such can he enjoy its effects (VII.4). The same may be affirmed regarding individuals' identification with Śiva. It has been said that even a fire that is not known generates light, but so much more will be generated by a fire aptly arranged for this purpose, such as a lamp in a house (VII.10cd ff.). Thus, a means must be taught whereby the attained awareness of the nature of Śiva produces visible effects in the souls (VII.12ab). This means is represented by logical argumentation, the scriptures, and the teacher (VII.5).

All in all, Somananda does not go beyond a powerful affirmation of the identity of Śiva and the universe, the task of defining their relationship being assumed only later by his disciple Utpaladeva, who starts precisely from where Somananda had stopped. The latter had not developed his own ideas about the ontological status of the manifested world, but had only asserted, strongly and repeatedly, its reality (*satyatā*) and its having the nature of Śiva (*śivārūpātā*). Things are "states" (*avasthā*, *bhāva*) of Śiva, and their emergence is due solely to his will, brought about by nothing other than a natural overflowing of his energies, whose characteristic feature is "joy" (*ānanda*) as well as "play" (*krīḍā*). In the sixth chapter of the *SD*, Somananda attacked those that in various ways claim that the external world is unreal, especially various types of Vedāntins (VI.3ff.), who consider it as an illusory manifestation (*vivarta*) of Brahman, caused by nescience, or the Vijnānavādins (VI.33–34), who affirm the reality of consciousness but make unreal objects arise from it, and, moreover, do not admit an agent subject of this consciousness, whereas for Somananda every action, and therefore also the action

of knowing, is necessarily dependent on an agent subject. Even those who claim the reality of the external object, like the Buddhist *bāhyavādins*, are wrong because they do not admit a unifying principle of reality, and thus make the passage from the moment of sensation to the moment of mental elaboration impossible (IV.80cd ff.), and the same holds for the operation of *apoha* through which they seek to elude the universal.³² The later construction of the ontological-epistemological edifice of Pratyabhijñā by Utpaladeva has to be seen within the context of his appointing precisely the Buddhists as the main adversaries.³³ While for Somananda the Buddhists are opponents just like many others, they are given a special status in the work of Utpaladeva, for whom they, admired and attacked in an equally strong way, are so to speak the most intimate enemies. The criticism of their positions is to Utpaladeva of a substantial help in building and refining the Pratyabhijñā philosophy. This also holds for the model chosen for defining the relationship between Śiva and the world. Instead of resorting to one or another Brahmanical model, Utpaladeva basically refers to the Vijnānavāda doctrine explaining the emergence of the external world by the multifarious awakening of latent impressions within consciousness. Just as the *ākāras* of the Vijnānavāda³⁴ do not have any separate existence from the consciousness in/from which they emerge, likewise for Utpaladeva the objects are nothing but "reflections," or "manifestations" (*ābhāsas*) in the mirror of supreme consciousness.³⁵

The objects that are manifested in the present can be manifested as external only if they reside within.

Vṛtti: Even in direct perception, however, the manifestation of objects as separate is admissible only if they are absorbed in the cognizer.

... Seeing that ordinary worldly activity can be accomplished on the basis of such "manifestations" alone, what sense is there in wanting to resort to an external reality other [than consciousness], which is not supported by reason?³⁶

While the Buddhist model is clearly visible in Utpaladeva's conception, the former, as usually occurs in his philosophical strategy, acts only as a raw material to be aptly modified and adapted to an utterly different worldview: thus, the impersonal consciousness of the Vijnānavāda is substituted by the dynamic I-ness of Śiva, and, consequently, the divine will takes the place of the mechanical emergence of the *vāsanās*.³⁷ This is shown in all evidence in the verse already quoted: "Indeed, the Conscious Being, God, like the yogin, independently of material causes, in virtue of his volition alone, renders externally manifest the multitude of objects that reside within it."³⁸ The multitude of objects (*arthajāta*) is described by Abhinavagupta (*ĪPV* I p. 184) as *ābhāsavāicitryarūpa* "consisting of the multifariousness of reflections."

Utpaladeva presents these "reflections-manifestations" as having the nature of universal (in fact, each one of them is connected with a word). They can appear in isolation or aggregated around a dominant manifestation, and are provided with a single or complex causal efficiency,³⁹ on the basis of a compatibility that has its ultimate foundation in the law of necessity established by the Lord. United among themselves, thus becoming more and more particularized and finally combined with three manifestations endowed with a special individualizing force—space, time, and form

From what has been said so far, we see that Utpaladeva envisages in consciousness/Śiva a dual pole, *prakāśa-vimarsa*—the first understood as the motionless cognitive light that constitutes the basic fabric, the founding structure of reality, of the “given”; the second as the spark that causes this luminous structure to pulsate by introducing self-awareness, dynamism, freedom of intervention, of self-assertion, thus expressing in theoretical terms what is the nature of an unpredictable divine personality, like that of the violent and loving Śiva handed down in the scriptures and with whom Utpaladeva dialogues in his mystical hymns. The two polarities are not to be seen as separate realities, but merely as two sides of a coin, like Śiva and Śakti: reflective awareness is the very own nature (*svabhāva*) of light (ĪPK I.5.1.1; see above). *Prakāśa* forms, together with a large group of synonyms or quasi-synonyms, a close-knit constellation of “luminous” terms indicating the notions of being manifested, emerging from the dark, coming to consciousness or, more in general, of being the object of knowledge and finally simply “being,” whose use was already firmly established especially in Vedāntic and Buddhist contexts (on the metaphor light/knowledge, see Watson [2014]); *prakāśa* and synonyms frequently occur in the *Vākyaṇādiya*. Apart from isolated and uncertain cases in the Śaiva scriptural tradition,⁴⁴ *vimarsa*,⁴⁵ in the pregnant sense Utpaladeva attributes to it, cannot but derive from Bhartṛhari’s teaching, especially if we consider its link with light, on the one hand, and the word, on the other. I am referring to the two very famous and most quoted stanzas *Vākyaṇādiya* I.131–32, whose influence, though extending over the whole structure of the Pratyabhijñā (and nondual Śaiva philosophy as a whole), we find concentrated particularly on two closely connected aspects. One (ĪPK I.5.19) concerns the only way deemed possible to account for a common fact in everyday experience, such as the immediate and seemingly thoughtless action that still achieves its purpose—namely, that of affirming the presence of a subtle reflective awareness even within the sensation or movement captured at its most direct and undifferentiated moment. “Even at the moment of direct perception there is a reflective awareness. How otherwise could one account for such actions as running and so on, if they were thought of as being devoid of determinate awareness?” (cf. Torella, 2002, p. 125).⁴⁶ The other regards the two solemn general formulations that define “*vimarsa*” as the essential nature of light and indissolubly link consciousness, reflective awareness, freedom, and the supreme word:

The essential nature of light is reflective awareness; otherwise light, though “coloured” by objects, would be similar to an insentient reality, such as the crystal and so on. (Cf. Torella, 2002, p. 118)

Consciousness has as its essential nature reflective awareness; it is the supreme Word that arises freely. It is freedom in the absolute sense, the sovereignty of the supreme Self. (Cf. Torella, 2002, p. 120).⁴⁷

The importance of Bhartṛhari in the structure of Śaiva nondualism may not be undervalued. This may be surprising if we think how he had been heavily attacked by the very father of the Pratyabhijñā, Utpaladeva’s guru Somananda (cf. Torella, 2009). In order to undermine the discontinuous universe of the Buddhists, Utpaladeva decides to avail himself precisely of Bhartṛhari’s main doctrine, the language-imbued nature

(these too derived from Buddhism)—they constitute the world of everyday experience. It is easy to glimpse in this conception elements drawn from the Vijñānavādin (consciousness as a receptacle of everything that is gradually manifested), from the Vaiśeṣika and Vaiśeṣikas (the idea of a hierarchy of universals) and more generally from the Buddhist *pramāṇa* tradition. In this case, too, the word *ābhāsa* as a philosophical term—from which Utpaladeva’s doctrine draws its most widespread denomination (*ābhāsavāda*)—was of course not invented by him, but was commonly used in the Vedāntic and Buddhist schools. It also occurs in the ŚD, but, even when it does not appear in a context where explicit reference is made to opposing doctrines (various kinds of *vivarta*), its use seems to be merely sporadic and casual, and in any case devoid of a precise technical connotation.

In one respect, *ābhāsa* is not distinguished from *prakāśa* (and related terms), and sometimes the two terms seem interchangeable (cf. *svābhāsa-svaparakāśa*). In another (namely, in its more technical use, as in the so-called *ābhāsa* theory), though their essential unity of nature remains, *ābhāsa* is seen as a particle, an individualized and extroverted form of the “great light,” “cut out” in it. This fragmentation of the light is accompanied by, and also presupposes, an analogous descent of consciousness to the state of fragmented subjectivity of the manifold individual subjects (the true subject is *avichinnābhāsa*; cf. ĪPV II p. 125); see in particular Abhinavagupta’s commentaries on ĪPK II.3.1–2. The relationship between consciousness and *ābhāsa* is that between the mirror and the reflected image, subtly analyzed in chapter III of the TĀ.⁴⁸ The ontological status of the *ābhāsa* is therefore a mixture of autonomy and heteronomy, without its basic reality ever being called into question⁴⁹ (ĪPK I.5.4 *Vṛtti*). Though Utpaladeva does not explicitly repeat Somananda’s extreme formulation (“the jar exists, knowing itself”), by using a typical Vijñānavāda argument he underlies the necessarily common nature of consciousness and its object: only that which is itself light, that is, sentience, can shine in knowledge. “If it were not essentially light, the object would remain non-light as before [the cognitive act]; and light is not differentiated [from the object]: being light constitutes the very essence of the object.”⁵⁰ The object cannot receive such “light” from outside: light must already be the very self (*ātman*) of the object, its own form (*svatūpabhūta*; cf. *Vṛtti* thereon). The being of the object consists in its becoming manifest: *prakāśamānatātmikā satīā* (*Vivṛti* on ĪPK I.5.1; Torella, 2007c, p. 934). To say that something is insentient is like saying it is nonexistent (*Ajāḍapramāṭṛsiddhi* 13ac). Even when an *ābhāsa* is viewed as external, as “this”—the “this” continues to have its foundation in the I; it may also be said that reflective awareness of something in terms of separation, of “this,” has become fully achieved only when it rests in its innermost being, thus becoming the reflective awareness “I” (*Ajāḍapramāṭṛsiddhi* 15).⁵¹ It is the same light of the self that is manifested as self and as other (*Ajāḍapramāṭṛsiddhi* 13cd). So light, in its essence, is the knower itself: it is the contact with the knower’s light that, so to speak, kindles the latent, inner luminous nature of the object. Thus, if it is true that both subject and object are essentially light, we are not allowed to say that the light-knower is the light-object, but only the other way round. To explicate this concept, Utpaladeva in the *Vivṛti* (Torella, 2007c, p. 936) makes a rare exception to his usual dislike for quotations: for the second time, he cites a passage from the *Bhagavadgītā* (now, VII.12d *na tv ahaṃ teṣu te mayi* “But I am not in them, [whereas] they are in me”).

objective reality leaving an impression of its likeness on the mirror of consciousness." On the contrary, the competing doctrine known as *nirākāravāda* maintains that "our consciousness is clear like a clean slate and does not depart an inch from its intrinsic purity even when it apprehends the external reality. Consciousness is an amorphous substance and remains so in all its activities. It is like light and reveals the object with its form and qualities without undergoing any morphological articulation in its constitution." (p. 77)

The essential of Utpaladeva's position is expressed in two terse stanzas of the *ĪPK*, defining *pramāṇa*:

The means of knowledge is that thanks to which the object is situated within its own confines "this thing, with these characteristics." This means of knowledge is an ever freshly arising light related to a subject. This light, whose essence is the inner reflective awareness of that which is thus manifested, becomes—as regards the object without spatio-temporal differentiations, etc., and expressed by a single name—knowledge (*mīti*), [provided it is not] invalidated.⁵⁴

Among the many aspects of this complex definition (for which I refer the reader to Torella [2002, pp. 161–163]) one may be considered particularly significant: the non-differentiation between the means of knowledge and its result (*pramāṇa* and *pramā* (*mīti* in the *kārikā*). Utpaladeva's starting point is once again a Buddhist doctrine. The distinction between *pramāṇa* and *pramā*—the Buddhist epistemologist says—is only the outcome of the analytic consideration of a reality, cognition, which is in itself one. The two terms which are thus foregrounded cannot in any case represent a relationship of cause and effect—because this would require the actual otherness of the two terms—but at most a relation of establisher-established (*vyavasthāpya-vyavasthāpaka*), with a division of roles within the same reality. While up to this point Utpaladeva shares the Buddhist view, he strongly departs from it regarding the concept of "function, activity" (*vyāpāra*) performed by the elements occurring in cognition. *Vyāpāra* is denied by the Buddhists, who consider every distinction on this basis completely imaginary (in the act of piercing with an arrow the arrow may be attributed at will a variety of *vyāpāras*, like that of *karṭṛ* or *karaṇa* or *apadāna*); furthermore, *vyāpāra* conflicts with their doctrine of momentariness. Cognition, Dharmakīrti concludes (*Pramāṇavārttika* III:308 ab), only "appears" to be endowed with a function. Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta's reply that *vyāpāra* not only exists but constitutes the very essence of *pramā*, and the non-differentiation of *pramāṇa* and *pramā* hinges on this: *vyāpāra* is not a different reality from the subject that acts and from the instrument that is set in action. All this has already been essentially contained in the laconic *pramāṇavyāpārah* that follows *pramītiḥ* in the *Vṛtti*. For his part, Abhinavagupta goes on to say (IPV II pp. 69ff.) that this does not mean that *pramāṇa* and *pramā* are simply two ways of saying the same thing; the cognitive light that is the essential nature of both is turned toward the external object in the *pramāṇa*, whereas in the *pramā* it is turned inward as pure determinate awareness, contracted due to the influence of the object assumed in it, having as its essence the word.

But our practical reality is apparently made of concrete objects, belonging to a specific time and space, having a particular form, not of single or multiple manifestations

of knowledge, which is meant to demolish one of the main foundation stones of the Buddhist edifice, the unsurpassable gulf between the moment of sensation and that of conceptual elaboration, representing, as it were, the very archetype of the Buddhist segmented reality. The omnipervadence of language is the epistemological version of the omnipervadence of Śiva, and at the same time calls for integration into the spiritually dynamic Śaiva universe.

Utpaladeva, referring to an enigmatic statement in the *Bhagavadgītā* (XV.15b),⁵² had identified three powers (*śakti*) in the Lord: Cognition, Memory, and Exclusion. His aim is to show that cognition, memory, and exclusion, which constitute the very basis of the knowledge process in the human mind, are indirectly also a proof of the coinciding of the individual subject with universal consciousness. None of these phenomena can be really explained and their complex functioning accounted for satisfactorily in merely "mechanic" terms, as first of all the Buddhists do.

On the contrary, such a world of practical experience will become possible if all the various cognitions—direct perception, memory etc.—have only one intrinsic nature, being in essence consciousness only. Of this [*ātman*], namely the Supreme Lord, whose essence is all, these cognitions represent the various and multiform powers of knowledge, etc. The world of practical experience would otherwise be impossible.⁴⁸

... if there were no Maheśvara who contains within himself all the infinite forms, who is one, whose essence is consciousness, possessing the powers of knowledge, memory and exclusion.⁴⁹

As the starting point for a broad presentation of the position of Śaiva nondualism regarding epistemology we may take Utpaladeva's affirmation of the basic identity of the I, consciousness and any cognitive activity.

Therefore the real nature of cognition would not be respected if it were presented in terms of objectification "here is this cognition"; consciousness (*bodha*) in fact is illuminated only by itself and is able to shine autonomously merely as I ... The same consciousness is called cognition, when it is turned outwards, towards objects, and is [apparently] differentiated because of them. When instead it is turned inwards, then it is called the knower.⁵⁰

For the knower consists only of the light of I, while cognition is nothing but the light of the I turned towards objects, without any additional form of its own other than this.⁵¹

A valid cognitive process is based on the attainment of "conformity" between the "apprehended object" (*grāhya*) part and the "apprehending subject (or cognition)" (*grāhaka*) part. Utpaladeva's discourse is based on full acceptance of the epistemological scheme provided by Dignāga: the twofold aspect of cognition.⁵² The "apprehending cognition" part assumes the form of the "apprehended object" part; the cognitive process consists precisely in the conformity or likeness (*sārūpya*) between the two.⁵³ In the classical definition by Mookerjee (1935, p. 77), this doctrine, known as *sākāravāda*, holds that "knowledge of external reality is made possible by virtue of the

or ensembles of manifestations. Utpaladeva is well aware that the primary aim of philosophical reflection is to account for ordinary experience, and in ordinary experience we are indeed confronted with what the Buddhists call a “unique particular” (*svakṣaṇa*). Thus, also in this case, Utpaladeva starts from a well-known Buddhist doctrine, but his own elaboration of the concept of *svakṣaṇa* takes a fairly different direction.⁵⁵ For the Buddhist epistemologist the starting point is the particular; perception grasps it in its entirety but is also inexpressible and uncommunicable; many different ascertainties (*viśaya*) may stem from this single perceptual content, each of them capturing a part of it and connecting it with a word, which therefore denotes a certain *sāmānya* (universal) (or rather the negation of what is other than that feature). For Utpaladeva, each *pramāṇa* grasps an individual *ābhāsa* (which is a *sāmānya*), expressed by a determinate word, depending on a determinate reflective awareness, or grasps (in the perception itself and not in a later cognitive act) a group of *ābhāsas* coordinated by the Lord’s power of necessity around a dominant *ābhāsa*, which allows the perception to remain unitary. The group of *ābhāsas* taken in its totality ultimately corresponds to the Buddhist *svakṣaṇa*. The two conceptions are after all not so much opposed to each other: Utpaladeva’s *svakṣaṇa* clearly derives from the *svakṣaṇa* of the Buddhists, but with a significantly inverted perspective. The difference in the treatment of the important theme of “vividness” or “dimness” of a cognitive act by the Buddhists and the Śaiva philosophers depends on the different assumptions above (Torella, 2002, p. 147, n. 2; 2007b, pp. 546–548, 556–561).

The individual subject can cognize, remember, and exclude only if it is conceived of as inscribed within an eternal and, at the same time, dynamic universal I-ness, that is, Śiva.

Notes

1. p. 1 *dvaitadarśanādhivāsitapraye jīvaloke rahasyasampradāyo mā vicchedīti*.
2. p. 1 *yad dvaitendhanadāni yac ca paramādvaitamītenocchalat | dvaitādvaitādgandhakārahaṇaṃ dhāmatrayaikatmakam śaivam netram anugrahāya jagato 'mutraitad uddiyotate || 4 ||*
3. I might quote not more than two texts showing straightforward nondualistic statements, the *Ucchuṣmatantra* and the *Kālikākrama*. “How is it possible, o Dear one,” says a stanza of the former (quoted by Kṣemarāja in the *Sivasūtravimarsinī* p. 8; and the *Svacchandoddyota*, vol. II p. 55, ad VII.249) “that these can be object of knowledge without being [at the same time] subject of knowledge? Object of knowledge and subject of knowledge constitute a single reality. That is why there is no impurity.” (My understanding of this verse considerably differs from Bisschop and Griffith [2007, p. 4]) (*yāvan na vedakā ete tāvan vedyāḥ katham priye | vedakam vedyam ekam tu tattvaṃ nāsty asūcis tataḥ ||*). Several verses from the lost *Kālikākrama* are quoted by Kṣemarāja again in the *Sivasūtravimarsinī*. For example: “Knowledge shines in various forms, externally and internally. Without knowledge there is no existence of object, therefore the world is made of knowledge. Without knowledge things cannot become object of cognition. From this it ensues that knowledge constitutes the essential nature of the object” (p. 118 *tattadrūpatayā jñānaṃ bahir antaḥ prakāśate | jñānā*

ṛte nārthasattā jñānarūpaṃ tato jagat || na hi jñānād ṛte bhāvaḥ kenacid viṣayīkrītaḥ | jñānaṃ tadatmatām prāptam etasmiād avasiyate ||). The *Kālikākrama*, being quoted for the first time by Kṣemarāja, is likely to be a post-Abhinava scripture. The date of the *Ucchuṣmatantra* (on this problematic title, see Sanderson [2009, p. 194; Hatley, 2007, pp. 275–281] is unsettled).

4. This is meant to nuance the statement found in XXVI.53cd: *mokṣo vātha catuṣṭayāt* “Liberation comes from the tetrad” (*Vṛtti*: “from all the four *pādas* taken together, not just by one of them”). However, the *Matanāgāpārameśvara* (*kriyāpāda*, V.3cd–4ab) clearly says that a guru is expected to be expert in all the four domains.
5. *samatā sarvabhāvanāṇāṃ vṛttināṃ caiva sarvasaḥ | samatā sarvadarśināṃ dravyāṇāṃ caiva sarvasaḥ || bhūmikanāṃ ca sarvasām ovallināṃ tathaiva ca | samatā sarvadevināṃ varṇānāṃ caiva sarvasaḥ ||*
6. *evam sarvapadārthānāṃ samaiva śivatā śhitā | parāparādibhedo 'tra śraddadhānāir udāhṛtaḥ || Utpaladeva's Vṛtti: paramasiṁvāt prabhīrti ghaīādyānītānām api padārthānām samaivānyūnānatirikṭā ca śivatā pūṇācīdrūpānatirekān nīyatā sarvesāṃ tathā sāmānyāśvadanāt kāpi śhitiḥ syād ity arthaḥ | evam ca sarvasya śivarūpasāmāsyāt tadakhyātimayaśuddhyasūddhirūpaparāparādibhedo bhāvanām uktaḥ | tatra śraddhāmātreṇopopattirahitena jantūnāṃ, na tu vastūnām śuddhir aśuddhir vā kācit.*
7. XVI.52 na cāsarṇasodhitam vastu kiñcid apy upakalpayet | tena śuddham tu sarvaṃ yad aśuddham api tac chuci ||
8. aśuddhatā ca vijñeyā paśūtacchāsanāśayāt || svatādvasthyāt pūrvasmād athavāpy upakalpitāt |
9. 417cd–418ab *tattvasaṇḍarśanān nānyat saṃkārasyāstī jvītam || iti vaktum sruvāśīṣaḥ śrīpūre na samaskarot.*
10. *nātra śuddhir na cāśuddhir na bhakṣyādvivācāraṇam | na dvaitam nāpi cādvaitam liṅgapūjādikaṃ na ca ||*
11. TĀ IV.244cd–245ab *bahīḥ satsv api bhāveṣu śuddhyasūddhī na nīlavat || pramāṇīdharmā evāyaṃ cidāikyānāikyavedanāt |*
12. *na hi vāyaṃ śuddhyasūddhivyavahāram apahnumahe, kiṃ tu “te vastudharmatayā na bhavataḥ” ity ucyate, pramāṇā hi vyavasyati—idam śuddham idam aśuddham iti, vastudharmatve hi anyor aśuddham na kadācid api śuddhyet śuddham api vā nāśuddham syāt, na hi nilam anīlam api kadācid bhavet.*
13. TĀ IV.240cd–241ab [...] *aśuddham saṃvidas cyutam || saṃvittādvāitmyam āpānam sarvaṃ śuddham ataḥ śhītam |*
14. Śivopādhyāya glosses: *dharmasāstraśrāñāḥ*.
15. See above n.12.
16. *sarvesāṃ vāhako jīvo nāstī kiñcid ajīvakam | yat kiñcij jīvarahitam aśuddham tad vijānata ||*
17. 243ab *tasmād yat saṃvidō nātīdure tac chuddhim āvāhet*. For a wider treatment of the purity/impurity issue in Śaiva Tantrism, see Torella (2015).
18. II.4ab *tasmāc chabdarthacintāsu na sāvasthā na yā śivaḥ |*
19. That is, if it presents something just as it really is.
20. III.82cd–83 *na prthivyaḍike tasmin kalpanā sampravartate || tathātvenaiva kṛpatvāt tad atat [tad atat em.; cf. Torella, 2014, p. 593] kalpitam kiṃ, saye nāmāstu kalpanā. Vṛtti—na ca prthivyaḍirūpatayā prāṭhyamāne bhāvajāte śivarūpitā kalpitā bhavati, vastuśhītyaiva prthivyaḍirūpeṇa (1 delete vā; cf. Torella, 2014, p. 593) śivatattvasyaiva kṛpatvāt. atadrūpaṃ tad rūpaṃ yadavasiyate yathā manorājyādi, tadā tat kalpanā kalpyamānam bhavet. yāvātā sāksāc chiva eva sarvaṃ iti vastuśhītyā prthivyaḍi*

śiva eva, śivatvena kiṃ kalpitam bhavati na bhavaty evety arthah. atha satyataḥ sati (satyataḥ sati em.; cf. Torella, 2014, p. 593) tasmīn eva kalpaneti kathyate tadā vastutas tatra kalpaneti nāmaktiḥ.

21. p. 133 citragate vahnau, aśokapuṣpādau rakte vahnikalpanā śobhate kvacid avasare prthivīvādirūpeṇa śivāḥ kṛptāḥ saṃpannaḥ svayaṃ sṭhita ity arthah. kalpitāḥ (kalpitāḥ em.; cf. Torella, 2014, p. 594) punaḥ svayaṃ sa tathā kevalam iśyate tena rūpeṇeti kṛptasya svayamkṛptes tathāsāṃpateḥ, kalpanāyās ca svayam atathābhūtasya tathā saṃbhāvanāmātrārūpāyā ye śabdārthatve na bhedārūḍhās te vandyā ity upahāśaḥ.
22. III.55cd-56 śānte śivatvaṃ sṭhūle 'pi śivatvaṃ yatra varṇitam || tatra kā śāntatā brūhi śānte kiṃ vastuṭā na te | vastuṭā cet tathābhūtasaktitritayasaṃgamah. Vṛtti p. 119 yatrābhūyupagame śānte 'pi śivatvaṃ sṭhūle 'pi jagadrūpātve śivatvam eva varṇitam tatra śāntatā śivarūpātā kā syāt, brūhy etat. śāntam api hi tava vastu, vastu ca sattiṃmayaṃ satiā bhavattī bhavanakartṛtā, svāntanṛyātmakam ca kartṛtvaṃ cidrūpasyecchādīśaktimata itī sarvaṃ vastu śivāḥ.
23. III.76cd-78ab vāditvaprativāditve kasmāc cet tasya tatsthitēḥ || vyavahārāya vā sarvaṃ vyavahāro na vastugah | svarūpaṃ vastugaṃ viddhi vyavahāro na jātucit || tathesvaravyavasthānād avastvābhāsārūpataḥ. Vṛtti—tadāikyē darśanabhedābhāvād vāditvaṃ prativāditvaṃ ca kutaḥ, yad uktam vivādhīhananāyā itī, tad etad api tasyaiva tathā sṭhiteḥ. lokavyavahārāya vā sarvaṃ śāstravāditvaprativādyādi. lokavyavahāras ca tadabhedākṛtīmāyo na vastugataḥ, yat punaḥ svarūpeṇa prakāśate tac chivarūpavastvātmakam eva, vyavahāras tu na kadācit vāstavo 'pi tu bhrama eva, avastv api śvarātmāivastvābhāsārūpeṇa tasyāvasthānāt. ata evesvarapratyabhijñoktāntīyā tad avastv api prakāśamānaṃ cidrūpam eva, kevalam bāhye prakāśanābhāvād avastūcyate.
24. IPK I.5.17 Vṛtti prakāśātmanah paramesvarasya māyāsaktvā svātmārūpaṃ viśvaṃ bhedanābhāsyate.
25. I.5.7 cidātmaiva hi devo 'ntalīsthitam icchāvaśād bahiḥ | yogīva nirupādānam arthajātam prakāśayet ||
26. III.95cd-96ab viśvatucchatvavākṛtānāṃ vairāgyādyarthavādīnām || tātparyeṇa na doṣo 'sti nānācittvaṃ na kalpate. Vṛtti—viśvam asatyaṃ budbudopamam itī śivoktair api vākyaṃ na virodhaḥ, yata eṣāṃ vairāgyanirātmādirūpajñānābhīd hānavatām ekaśivātmāśamarthana- paratvena na doṣo 'sti, na ca sarvasāsvatve nānācittvaprasaṅgaḥ.
27. III.92cd-94ab saphalāyāṃ samāptāyāṃ kriyāyāṃ samanantarām || kriyāntarecchāsāmbhūtis tannimittam anantatā | yato 'sti śivaśaktiṇāṃ tās ca nityam avasthītāḥ || saranty eva svabhāvena tat saratprakṛtiḥ śivāḥ.
28. 22cd-23 prakāśasyātmavīśrāntīr ahaṃbhāvo hi kṛtitaḥ || uktā śaiva ca viśrāntiḥ sarvāpekṣānirrodhataḥ | svāntanṛyaṃ atha kartṛtvaṃ mukhyaṃ iśvaratāpi ca || See also Utpaladeva's criticism of the inert self (of the Nyāya, etc.) in an extant passage of his IPVivṛti: "However, mere acknowledgement that there is a single self (with respect to these two cognitions) does not amount to also affirming its (necessary) sovereignty (aiśvarya), for such a self, if conceived of in terms of detached idleness (audāśīnyāt), cannot act as the possessor of the powers of perception, memory, etc. (ananubhavasam arañāśīśaktimattvāt)" (Torella, 2012, p. 296).
29. On ānava as nescience, see MVU 1.23cd mālam ajñānam icchanti; Śivasūtra I.2 (a) jñānam bandhaḥ.

30. On the alchemic metaphor used by Abhinavagupta (and Utpaladeva), see Torella [2002, pp. XXXII–XXXIV]. In the relevant passages, both the edited texts of IPV and IPVV need significant emendations.

31. IPV II pp. 274–275 yadā nāyakaḡuṇasaṃśravanapraavidhānūrāḡ kāmīni tadadarśanam eva paramupādeyam ākāṅkṣanti divāṇīsam avasāhṛdayā devatopayācitāni dūṭisampreṣaṇāni madalekhaḡvārakātmāmāsthānivedanāni kurvūṇā virahakṣāmībhavadgātralatikā tiṣṭhati, tadā tadupayācitavasāt aśāṅkitam eva savidhavarīni priyatame 'valokite tais tair utkarṣavīṣeṣaiḥ parāmarsapadaḡvīm agacchadbhir janaśādhāraṇatām āpāḡite saṃpannam api priyatāmāvalokanam na hṛdayaṃ pūrṇikaroti; tathā svātmāni viśveṣvare satatāṃ nirbhāsamāne 'pi tannirbhāsanam na hṛdayasya pūrṇatām ādhatte; yataḥ so 'py ātmā viśv ajñatvakartṛvādyapratihatatvasaktīlakṣaṇapāramāīsvaryotkarṣayogena na parāmiṣṭaḥ—tīi bhāsamānaghaḡiādīḡulyavṛttānto jātaḥ, yadā tu dūṭivacanād vā tallakṣṇābhijñānād vopāyāntarād vā tānutkarṣān hṛdayaṅgamīkaraṇanāmiṣṭati, tadā tat kṣaṇam adbhutaphullarāyēnaiva tāvat kām api pūrṇatām abhyeti [...]; tadvad ātmāni guruvacanāḡ jñānakṛiyālakṣaṇasaktvyabhijñānāder vā yadā pā ramāīsvaryotkarṣahṛdayaṅgamībhāvo jāyate, tadā tatkṣaṇam eva pūrṇatātmikā jīvanmuktīḥ.

32. These themes will be masterfully developed by Utpaladeva, especially in his IPVivṛti (cf. Torella, 2007a).
33. "Through this subtle play of a declared basic disagreement with the doctrines of Buddhist philosophers, a limited acceptance and purely instrumental (or thought to be such) use of them, the masters of the Pratyabhijñā end up being somehow drawn into their orbit. The architecture of the Pratyabhijñā feels the effect of this. The very fact that many problems are posed, more or less unwittingly, in Buddhist terms to a certain extent prefigures their development and reduces possible alternatives as regards solutions." Torella (1992, p. 329).
34. On ākāra, see recently Kellner (2014) and McClintock (2014).
35. The term ābhāsa can be variously translated as "(luminous) manifestation, reflection, appearance, image."
36. IPK I.5.1 vartamānāvabhāsānām bhāvānām avabhāsanam | antalīsthitavātām eva ghaḡate bahir ātmanā—Vṛtti pratyakṣe 'pi yāvad arthānām bhedanāvabhāsaḥ pramāntarāntarīnānām eva satām yuktāḥ (cf. Torella, 2002, p. 111). I.5.6 syād etad avabhāseṣu teṣy evāvasite sati | vyavahāre kim anyena bāhyenānupapattinā || (cf. Torella, 2002, p. 114).
37. See above Somananda's analogous statement. On this point, see Ratié (2010); cf. also Ratié (2014).
38. See also I.6.7 "Thus also in the course of ordinary reality the Lord, entering the body, etc., renders externally manifest by his volition the multitude of objects that shine within him" (tad evaṃ vyavahāre 'pi prabhur dehādīm āvīṣan | bhāntām evāntar arthaḡham icchayā bhāsyed bahiḥ ||). Cf. Torella (2002, p. 133).
39. This causal efficiency is not intrinsic to the object, and consequently may not act as the proof of its truth-reality, as in the Buddhist doctrine, but it is just a particular ābhāsa which may or may not be associated with the other ābhāsas constituting the object, without this affecting their already established intrinsic reality. The same holds for externality (see below).
40. See also Mahārthamajārī-parimāla, p. 147.
41. Nondual Śaivism, and above all Pratyabhijñā philosophy, keeps the concepts of reality (satā) and externality (bāhyatā) rigorously distinct. As IPK I.8.5 says, "Existing

externally is to be considered an accessory condition (*upādhi*) and not the very essence of the manifestations of being and non-being. These, therefore, insofar as they are inner manifestations, always exist" (*bhāvābhāvābhāsānāṃ bāhyatopādhir iṣyate* | *nātmā satā tatas teṣāṃ āntarāṇāṃ satāṃ sadā* ||) (cf. Torella, 2002, p. 148). And again (IPK I.8.7): "Insofar as they are essentially constituted by consciousness the manifestations permanently reside internally; insofar as they are manifested as external owing to the power of *māyā*, they also exist externally" (*cinnmayatve 'vabhāsānām antareva antar eva sthitiḥ sadā* | *māyayā bhāsamānānāṃ bāhyatvād bahir apy asau* ||) (cf. Torella, 2002, p. 149).

42. IPK I.5.2 *prāḡ ivārtho 'prakāśaḥ syāt prakāśātmatayā vinā* | *na ca prakāśo bhinnah syād ātmārthasya prakāśatā* || (cf. Torella, 2002, p. 111). The *Vṛtti* thereon glosses "light" (*prakāśa*) with "cognizer" (*pramāṇ*). See also passages from *Vāmanadatta's Saṃvīṭiprakāśa*, on which Upaladeva's influence is evident (e.g. I.10–12 *yathāgninā samāvīṣaṇ sarvaṇaṃ tad rūpaṃ iṣyate* | *tathā jñānasamāvīṣaṇ sarvaṇaṃ tad rūpaṃ iṣyātām* || *pramāṇapekṣābhāveṣu na hy avasthāvakalpate* | *yatas tataḥ prakāśāntāṃ svayam eva tadātmanā* || *tvadātmakatvaṃ bhāvānāṃ vivadanti na kecana* | *yat prakāśyadaśām yatā nāprakāśaḥ prakāśyate* ||).

43. According to *Vāmanadatta's Ātmasaptati*, the very concept of *viśaya* is groundless unless we admit the ultimate identification of the object with consciousness: II.8–9 *svīkāro viśayīkāraḥ sa tatrodghosyate budhaiḥ* | *yad anyatra prasiddhaṃ tat saṃvīdaḥ kim apohyate* || *saṃvīdaḥ svīkṛtaṃ yac ca na tad viśayasamjñitam* | *yatsvīkṛtaṃ tadātmaiva viśayoktiḥ kva tiṣṭhatām* ||.

44. See also ŚD II.83d, 84c.

45. On this term and its synonyms, cf. Torella (2002, p. XXIV, n. 32).

46. I.V.19 *sāksātkāraḥ saṅge 'py asti vimarśaḥ katham anyathā* | *dhāvanādy upapadyeta pratisaṃdhānavarjitam* ||.

47. I.V.11 *svabhāvaṃ avabhāśasya vimarśaṃ vidur anyathā* | *prakāśo 'rthoparakto 'pi sphaiṭikādīdāpamaḥ* ||. I.V.13 *citiḥ pratyavamarśātmā parā vāk svarasoditā* | *svāntarīyam etan mukhyaṃ tad aīsvaryam paramātmanaḥ* ||.

48. *Vivṛti* introducing IPK I.3.7 (cf. Torella, 2007a, p. 477) *yuyjeta punar etādiśo vyavahāro yady eṣāṃ anubhavasmyādīnāṃ cinnmātrasāratvenaika evātmā syād yasyaiva viśvātmanah paramaśvarasyaitā jñānādikā vicitrāḥ śaktayo 'nyathā tu na syād iti*.

49. IPK I.3.7 *na ced antaḥkṛtānantavīśvarūpo maheshvaraḥ* | *syād ekaś cidvapur jñānasmytṛyopahanaśaktimān* ||.

50. *Vivṛti* on I.3.6 (cf. Torella, 1988, pp. 146–147) *tad idaṃ jñānam iti prāṭitau svaprakāśaikaṛupaṃ jñānam na prakāśitaṃ syāt, bodho hi svāprakāśaikaṛūpo 'ham ity eva prakāśārha aham ity asyaiva prakāśavāditvāt* [?], *sa eva hi yadā tv arthonmukhas tadārthabhedād bhiyāmāna iva jñānavyapadesya* | *yadā tv antarmukhatayā vyavasthitas tadā pramāṇā kathyate*. Then Upaladeva remarks that the Buddhists say the same thing except that they consider the permanence of the subject as being uniquely the product of a wrong superimposition brought about by discursive thought.

51. *Vivṛti* on I.3.6 *ahamprakāśamātrarūpo hi pramāṇā, viśayonmukhāṇāṃ prakāśamātrarūpaṃ tu jñānam nādnīkayarūpaṃ* (cf. Torella, 1988, p. 148).

52. *Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti* p. 4 (ad I.9a) "Cognition arises having two manifestations: it contains the manifestation of itself and that of the object. The self-awareness of both manifestations constitutes the result [of cognition]." (*dvyābhāsaṃ hi jñānam utpadyate svābhāsaṃ viśayābhāsaṃ ca. tasyobhayābhāśasya yat svasamvedanaṃ tat phalam*). On this crucial passage, see recently Kellner (2011).

53. Upaladeva adopts the conception, also upheld by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti—and, more generally, by Sautrāntikas and Vijñānavādins (along with Sāṃkhya and Vedānta)—known as *sākāravāda*. The *nirākāravāda* is followed by Vaiśeṣikas (and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, Mīmāṃsakas and Jaina); cf. Kajiyama (1989). Expectedly, the dualist Śaivasiddhānta is also *nirākāravādin*.

54. II.2.1–2 (cf. Torella, 2002, p. 161) *idam etādig ity evaṃ yadvasād vyavatiṣṭhate* | *vastu pramāṇaṃ tat so 'pi svābhāso 'bhīnavodayaḥ* || *so 'ntastathāvimarśātmā deśakālādyabhedini* | *ekābhīdhānaviśaye mitir vastuny abādhitā* ||.

55. For a detailed discussion, see Torella (1992, pp. 332–336).

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