The Īśvarapratyabhijñākārīka of Utpaladeva
with the Author's Vṛtti
Critical edition and annotated translation

RAFFAELE TORELLA
To Raniero Gnoli
The Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā of Utpaladeva with the Author’s Vṛtti

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This second Edition differs only slightly from the first one (IsMEO, Rome 1994). Basically, I have limited myself to correcting a not negligible number of misprints, kindly pointed out by colleagues and students. Among them, I wish to thank first of all J. Bronkhorst, then M. Hattori, F. Sferra, A. Pelissero and C. Pecchia. Heartfelt thanks I also owe to Malgosia Sacha.

I take the opportunity to express my gratitude to the many reviewers of this book. Some of them (J. Bronkhorst, J. W. de Jong and M. Hattori) have proposed alternative translations of some passages. In order to illustrate the grounds of my translation of I.5.18 and I.5.21 (and vṛtti), I wrote a detailed letter to the now greatly lamented Professor de Jong, who, in his reply, declared himself fully convinced. The remarks of Professor Hattori concerned basically the same points; he also corrected and integrated the last part of fn.20, p.117 (see below).

Several objections were raised by my colleague and friend Professor Johannes Bronkhorst in his thorough review article published in *Asiatische Studie / Études Asiatiques* (L, 3, 1996, pp. 603-621), which have induced me to re-examine carefully some thorny points of this not easy work. I do agree that his interpretation of aлокādi (vṛtti on I.7.10) is better - and plainer - than mine. It is to be said, however, that this does not affect the overall meaning of the passage concerned: "The light etc. [perceived in a certain spot] means the absence of something else [in the same spot]..." (Bronkhorst), versus: "The sight [of a light] etc. ..." (mine). After having attentively checked the other points questioned by my learned friend, I remain convinced of the correctness of my own translation.

In his capacity of Director of the Editorial Committee of IsIAO (ex IsMEO), Professor Maurizio Taddei took a significant part in making the re-edition of this book possible. To our greatest sorrow, this outstanding scholar, and dear friend, came to a sudden and untimely end in February 2000. I wish to dedicate this Indian edition to his memory.

Rocca Priora, October 2001

RAFFAELE TORELLA
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I should like to express my gratitude to IsMEO for accepting this book for publication in the Serie Orientale Roma, founded by Giuseppe Tucci. In paying tribute to the memory of Prof. Tucci – my paramaguru – I must also acknowledge him as the first western scholar to realize the importance of the Kashmiri Śaiva tradition and to promote its scientific study. I ideally place this work at His feet.

I thank IsMEO and the University of Rome “La Sapienza”, whose financial support enabled me to make several journeys to India in search of MSS of Utpaladeva’s works.

Then, I express my gratefulness to the Libraries that allowed me to photograph and use their MSS for this edition: Research and Publications Department, Srinagar (A.K. Reina, Assistant Director), Oriental Research Institute and MSS Library, Trivandrum (Dr. K. Appukuntan Nair and Dr. T. Bhaskaran, former Directors; P.L. Shaji, MSS Assistant) and Oriental Institute Library, Baroda (Dr. R.T. Vyas, Director). I heartily thank Pandit Dinanath Shastri, Srinagar, who generously put at my disposal his private collection of MSS, then destroyed during Muslim disorders in Srinagar.

Special thanks are due to Felicity B. Lutz for her valuable assistance in the English version of this book, and to my student Francesco Sferra for preparing the Indexes and helping me very much in correcting the proofs.

Finally, I wish to thank Raniero Gnoli with whom I discussed many passages of this work. To this extraordinary scholar – and gentleman – I dedicate this book.

Rocca Priora, October 1993.

RAFFAELE TORELLA
INTRODUCTION

In the complex and varied cultural panorama of ninth-century Kashmir we find all the major components of the religious-philosophical tendencies in India at the time and, together with these, some particular situations that led to new developments, which were also later to spread very far from their place of origin. The tradition of Buddhism (rooted in Kashmir since very ancient times) is present both with the realist schools and the Vijñānavāda, and culminates in the great cultural prestige of the so-called ‘logical school’, which seems to elude too definite a collocation within one or other of the great Buddhist currents to which, by turns, contemporary followers or opponents and modern scholars assign it. The Brahmanic elites were still engaged in elaborating or perfecting their reply to the doctrines of Dignāga and Dharmakīrtī, whose cirkulation in Kashmir was to be further stimulated by the presence of Dharmottara, summoned by King Jayāpīḍa to his court (Ṛājataraṅgini 111V.5.498). Thus works of great importance were composed that had a major influence throughout India, such as the Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and the Nyāyabhūṣana of Bhāsarvajña. Then, still in the Brahmanic sphere, though pertaining to another side, there was the spread of Vedāntic schools apparently independent of Śaṅkara, each of them being distinguished by a particular configuration of the elements common to them all (Brahman, māya, avidyā, vivarta, etc.) and indicated by a variety of denominations. There are various evidences of the activity of Mīmāṃsaka schools. In addition to this, a tradition of studies in literary criticism and aesthetics flourished during this period (Ingalls 1990: 1-10), and was to constitute the major cultural branch of Indian aesthetics. Lastly, there was an equally important tradition of studies in grammar and general linguistics, in which the legacy of Bhartṛhari seems to have a prominent place.

Corresponding to this ‘high’ cultural tradition on the religious plane, there was – obviously with the exception of the Buddhists – the smārta

1 Cf. citrabrahmavādin (ŚD VI.3b), sphulīngātmavādin (ibid. 10c) etc.
dimension of Brahmanic orthodoxy, characterized by the ancient popular 
devotion to Śiva and Viṣṇu, and to the pantheon connected with them. A 
series of texts, linked to the cult of Śiva and Viṣṇu, were already becom-
ing stratified probably a couple of centuries before the period under con-
sideration (but some are definitely much older). These express ideals and 
thrusts that are absent in the Brahmanic sphere, mainly since they have 
been consciously excluded because of their non-conformity to existing 
social and religious structures, or even their possible disruptive force. 
These texts give voice to a need for a more direct participation in the 
experience of the divine, no longer seen as a transaction managed by 
specialized personnel with a view to obtaining clearly defined and cir-
cumscribed benefits – culminating in an impersonal liberation projected 
into an indefinite future – but as a transfiguration here and now of the 
whole person, whose components, including the purely physical, become 
the very protagonists of the path of liberation and not the unwelcome 
extras. In this framework, and by carefully observing the nature of these 
texts and of their addressees, it becomes immediately clear that we 
cannot propose a scheme of interpretation centring on the polarities 
Brahmanic orthodoxy - popular thrusts, or ritualism - ecstatic anti-ritualism. 
In general, the Tantric adept, as Sanderson (1988: 662) has correctly 
described him, is in actual fact a hyper-ritualist, who does not cancel the 
inherited ritual but replaces it, often only by modifying, enriching and 
making it more complicated2. He sometimes goes as far as to transform 
it into a labyrinthine religious play, the highest and most complex ex-
ample of which is perhaps the Śaivasiddhānta ritual, analyzed in such a 
masterly manner by Hélène Brunner (see Bibliography). The ritual ele-
ment rests on a basis that is broadly shared both by Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva 
Tantrism, even in the currents that are ideologically more far-removed 
from each other.

In ninth-century Kashmir the Vaiṣṇava school of Pāñcarātra and the 
various currents of Tantric Śaivism had begun to follow different paths. 
The Pāñcarātra was already heading towards an inexorable decline which 
was gradually to lead to its disappearance from Kashmir and its firm 
transplantation in the South of India. However, this was not without 
producing as its final fruits some original figures of thinkers poised bet-
ween the Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva faith, such as Vāmanadatta (cf. Torella 
1994) and Utpalavaiṣṇava, aware of the affinity of the two tradi-

2 In any case, never totally negating it (cf. Sanderson 1990: 77, 82-83).
tions, which appears also, on the scriptural level, in a line of Pāncarātra
texts marked by non-duality.

The Śaiva tradition, which would continue to characterize social and
religious life in Kashmir, is for its part far from being unitary and if the
skein of texts, subdivisions and orientations is now beginning to be
unravelled, we are particularly indebted to a series of penetrating studies
by Alexis Sanderson\(^3\) – to which I refer here. What is evident is the
presence in Kashmir during this period of a sharp distinction between a
dualist tradition and a non-dualist one with extremist tendencies. The
former, the so-called Śaivasiddhānta, which embodies a kind of 'normalized',
mild, Tantrism – so much so that some scholars tend even to
exclude it from the Tantrism proper – perpetuates many of the social and
religious institutions of the 'orthodox' order which it aims to replace: it
basically accepts the caste system, prefers to understate the non-vedic
nature of their Āgamas and tends to identify with the establishment, in
maintaining a marked separation between pure and impure. It creates a
self-sufficient and all-pervasive ritual system, which, integrated by yoga,
leads the individual soul by degrees on a journey towards itself and the
reappropriation of its own true nature of Śiva: the last station is the
achievement of the state of liberated Śiva, for ever distinct from the
other monads of liberated individuals and from the supreme Śiva, who
alone performs the five functions on the cosmic plane.

Opposed to the Śaivasiddhāntins in many respects, the non-dualist
Śaivas follow the teachings embodied in another great division of the
Śaiva Āgama, that of the Bhairava Tantras, in which the terrific form of
the God – at least in the most radical texts – expresses first and foremost
the overthrow of the behavioural norms, conventions and distinctions
through which an attempt is made to give a definite and recognizable
structure to reality – fragile fences that the Power of the God, his Śakti,
sometimes superordinate to him, now derides now disrupts. The adept
enters into harmony with this Power, or rather he is possessed by it,
through practices and behaviours that here and there reveal their more or
less remote rooting in the practices of the Kāpālikas, who challenge what
the Indians see perhaps as the horror par excellence, the macabre fre-
quentation of the cemeteries, where they evoke the terrible Mothers by
eating putrefying human flesh etc. Some divinities of important Bhairava
Āgamas still display the animal features and hideous attributes, as well

\(^3\) See Bibliography; cf. also Dyczkowski 1988\(^2\).
as the names, that link them to this ancient substratum (cf. Sanderson 1988: 670, 674-75). At other times, instead of this (or alongside this), we find that sex is resorted to as the central moment of the rite: the adept worships the Goddess by offering her a cup containing the kundagolaka, or mixture of sperm and female secretions that the ritual union with his partner has just produced. Gradually relieved of its original burden of antinomianism and orgiastic transgression – and later totally eliminating the funerary aspect (Sanderson 1985: 202) –, this mobilization of energies through practices that challenge the current concept of purity and tend towards the overflow of the powers of the senses becomes the characteristic of the so-called kaula way (kaulapракriyā) to liberation.

Several of the Bhairava Tantras are kaula in nature, especially the Yāmalas, but also, though to a softened and subtler degree, the so-called Trika Tantras. Among them an older stratum may be distinguished, consisting of the Siddhayogesvarimata, the MV and the Tantrasadbhāva, in which the term trika does not yet appear and which feature the essential doctrines but not the awareness of forming a group or school4, as is the case for the later Devyāyāmala, Trikasadbhāwa, Trikahṛdaya (or śāra), Niśisamcāra etc.5.

Somānanda (875/900-925/950)

This ‘school’ (with the scriptures that are linked to it in various ways, such as those of the Krama) would probably have been destined to remain one of the many Kashmiri Tantric schools whose names we hardly know and whose outlines are blurred, had it not been for the development, mainly within it, of the first seeds of what was to become the

4 Cf. Dyczkowski 1988: 187 n. 189. On the three phases in the development of the Trika see Sanderson 1986: 170 n. 6; etc.

5 In the light of current knowledge, it is not easy to define what is really meant by one Tantra belonging to a particular ‘school’. Every Tantra contains a mass of elements – at times even contradictory to one another – a portion of which may be shared also by Tantras belonging to different currents that are sometimes even far-remoted from each other ideologically. For instance, cf. the long, important passage on the ‘voids’ etc. in chapter I (praśnayogādhikāra) of the Tantrasadbhāva (MS, National Archives, Kathmandu, No.A363, f.8a 1.6 – f.11b 1.1) – an old and ‘radical’ Trikatantra of the Vidyāpitha –, that is present almost verbatim in a ‘mild’ Bhairavatantra, in many respects close to the Śaivasiddhānta, like the SvT (IV.234-296), belonging to the lower Mantrapitha.
flowering of an extraordinary series of works and masters that between the ninth and twelfth centuries constituted one of the highest achievements of Indian speculation and spirituality of all time. The complex work of exegesis of the scriptures\textsuperscript{6}, the reformulation of their teaching and the organizing and hierarchizing of their contents indicate first and foremost its decision to emerge into the open, to escape from the dimension of a restricted circle of adepts – which is what must have been the original nature of these schools – and to offer itself implicitly as an alternative to the dominant Śaivasiddhānta, or at least to establish itself within it as a non-extraneous element (or rather as an element which, though not intended to constitute the whole, was able to give it its ultimate significance). In order to do this it was necessary to extract a homogeneous though varied teaching from the diverse texts; to purge it, without changing its essential nature, of all that it was felt could not be proposed to a wider circle – in other words, of all that was bound to create an instinctive and insurmountable resistance – by attenuating the sharper points or removing every actually concrete aspect, and finally translating it into a discourse whose categories were shared by its addressees and engaging in a dialogue that would not be afraid to confront rival doctrines.

Vasugupta and Kallata with the doctrine of the Spanda, on the one hand, and Somānanda, on the other, were the first to undertake this task. The former chose a plan that was more closely connected with spiritual experience, the latter one that was more in terms of conceptual elaboration (though his work is clearly based on direct experience\textsuperscript{7}, which is sometimes visionary and ecstatic). But both the teachings and the tone of the SS and SK and of the SD are perfectly compatible: Somānanda is certainly aware of the doctrines of the Spanda which echo here and there in the SD (even the term spanda is to be found\textsuperscript{8}), they all implicitly refer

\textsuperscript{6} The first to take this path must have been the philosophers of the Śaivasiddhānta. Sadyojyotis and Vyākhyāni (cit. SD III.13cd-14) were certainly Somānanda’s predecessors (though their date cannot be fixed more precisely). Earlier than Somānanda is probably also Brhaspati, the author of the Śivatansūstra repeatedly quoted by Abb. in the TA, who is coupled with Sadyojyotis in the introductory stanza of Rāmakantha’s commentary on the Moksakārikā.

\textsuperscript{7} Cf. the \textit{vrtti} on ĻPK IV.16, sāksātkrtaparamesvarabhaṭṭārakākāraṁ bhaṭṭa-śrisomānandapādaṁ.

\textsuperscript{8} SD VII.19a, 24b.
to the authority of the VBh⁹. A late tradition (Chatterji 1914²: 25 n.3) even includes Somānanda (along with the other masters of the Pratyabhijñā) in the spiritual line descending from Vasugupta. Somānanda knows and criticizes (for his Śākta tendencies) Pradyumna Bhāṭṭa, who comes immediately after Kallāṭa in the Spanda lineage. I will not dwell here on the Spanda school, to which an exhaustive monography has recently been devoted (Dyczkowski 1987), except to say that its teachings, which had already emerged as a post-scriptural elaboration, were subsequently re-elaborated, especially by Kṣemarāja, and incorporated in the synthesis of Abh.'s Trika, not without being to some extent strained and depersonalized¹⁰.

All the scant information we have on Somānanda indicates his close relationship to the Trika and the Krama. At the end of the ŚD he himself informs us that he belongs to the Tryambaka (or Teramba) maṭhikā founded by the son of Durvāsas, who was asked by Śiva himself to save the secret doctrine from oblivion. This is the same Tryambhaka who in the TĀ is considered the depositary of the non-dualist Śaiva tradition, in other words especially the Trika¹¹. We learn from Abh. that he wrote a commentary—now lost—on the Parātrimsikā, which belongs to the ekavīra form of the Trika. A surviving passage of the Kramakeli of Abh., quoted and commented on by Jayaratha (TĀV III p. 192), mentions Somānanda as a disciple of the Krama teacher Govindarāja, who, before dying, passed on to him the doctrine of the Kālis taught in the Devīpāñcaśatikā; this doctrine was transmitted by Somānanda, through his spiritual line, down to Abh. (ibid. p. 194).

The only work by Somānanda that has come down to us, the ŚD (cf. Gnoli 1957, 1959), is considered to be the first of the Pratyabhijñā school. In this difficult, discordant but fascinating work, he alternates expositions of a non-dualist doctrine that is felt to be still very near to its

⁹ Kṣemarāja connects the Spanda, first of all, with the Krama (SN p. 74 evam copakramopasamhārayor mahārthasamputikāram darśayan ...) and, secondly, with the Trika (Śadardha) and the Mata (p. 49, 47). The concept of spanda (Sanderson 1988:695) is present in the Jayadrathayāmala and in other texts linked to the Kāli cult.

¹⁰ See, for instance, in the ŚSV the superimposition on the ŚŚ of the doctrine of upāyas, which Abh. had derived from the MV.

¹¹ TĀV vol. 1 p. 28 nikhilaśāstropaniśadbhūtasya sadardhakramavijñānasya traiyambhakasantānanadvārena avatārakavat; TĀ XXXVI.12 tryambhakāmardakābhikhyasārīnātha advaye dvaye / dvayādvaye ca nipūnā kramena sivaśāsane (Jayaratha: advaye iti trikakulādau).
scriptural sources – though these cannot be clearly distinguished –, logical justifications, visionary tirades and summary dismissals of opposing doctrines; he presents an exceedingly long and malevolent demolition of the theories of the Grammarians. The central nucleus is the powerful and effective affirmation of Śiva as the only reality: he does not render the universe so pale that it is transformed, as in the contemporary Vedāntic schools, into an indefinable play of shadows, but illuminates it from within and constitutes its life. In this universe where everything is penetrated by Śiva nothing remains in the margins, all is mirrored even in the humblest thing and the whole nature of Śiva is present in it (ŚD III.18ab svanisthe śivatā deve prthivyādāv api drśam) – directly, just as gold is directly gold in the jewel, though it assumes a particular form. The doctrine of the sarvasarvātma vāda is the other face of the ekaśivatā. Though this was already a long-standing concept¹², here it acquires very special importance and implications because it serves as the theoretical context for the experience of the Tantric adept who has set out on the path of the expansion of consciousness and energy: the object, though maintaining its own identity, must not act as a dam, nor oppose itself rigidly, but allow itself to be bent and, finally, uprooted, become an integral part of this free flowing.

The principal argument in favour of this doctrine clearly derives from the Vijnānavāda. If there were a real difference in nature between consciousness and things, the phenomenon of knowledge would be impossible, because things, whether they have a concrete form or not (atoms), cannot become the object of consciousness (IV.30). No relation between things themselves would be possible, if they did not share one and the same principle (V.1); this principle is precisely consciousness, which exists equally in all things (V.12). ‘Being’ is, actually, being united with the manifestation of consciousness (cidvyaktiyogitā; cf. IV.29; IV.7ab sarvabhāveṣu cidvyakteḥ sthitaiva paramārthatā). Thus everything is pervasive, incorporeal and endowed with will, like consciousness (V.4). If things can be efficient, it is because they ‘want’ one particular action that is peculiar to them (V.16,37). And if they want it, they must also know it, in other words be conscious – first and foremost,

¹² This conception is already referred to in the Mahābhāṣya (Wezler 1982). See also Wezler 1992.
of themselves. All things are in all conditions knowing their own self (V.105ab sarve bhāvāḥ svam ātmānam jānantah sarvatah sthitāḥ). And that self, continues Somananda in a visionary crescendo, is the same as mine, as that of other subjects: "The jar knows by my own self. I know by its self; I know by the self of Sadāśiva, Sadāśiva knows by my self ..." (V.106 ab). All things have the essence of all others, because every thing has the form-nature of all things. Everything is in everything, with the various configuration of forms. I have the nature of the jar, the jar has mine. In knowing himself through the different things, Śiva resides autonomously, being constituted by the manifestation of consciousness and differentiated in the manifold differentiations (V.107cd-109). Once it has been established that everything has the nature of Śiva, the question of the unity and multiplicity of the universe becomes pointless, and so does the question of its reality-truth; even as regards the so-called 'erroneous' cognition there is no real falsity (mithyāvā), because even in the eyes of the opponent it has, anyhow, some kind of efficiency (IV.18-20). Though the world of ordinary experience (vyavahāra) is said to be unreal, the reply is that the Lord is also manifest in unreality (III.77). But what is then the nature of manifested things, which on the one hand are limited and, on the other, enjoy a state of expansion, being united with the supreme pacification of Śiva (V.6)? Like everything that exists, they are states in which Śiva freely manifests himself (IV.47). It is true that they have power, they are śakti, but, as everyday experience also shows, having power, or being able to do something, does not mean being independent. If they are saktis, Śiva is the possessor of these saktis, though being inseparable from them; he is the only real śakta in ways as infinite as his powers (IV.4-5). If they are states (avasthā, bhāva), he is their substratum.

We are, therefore, in a markedly śaiva or sāmbhava context, in the sense that the Power — though being inseparable from Śiva (III.2cd) — is subordinate to him. Once this premise is established, it is possible to let it take the stage and see it rise in many points of the work to the role of

13 The subject cannot be insentient even with regard to the mere 'being' or 'standing' (V.14).
14 And also in pain (V.9).
15 If things were in themselves totally independent, the unification (anusamdhāna) of their cognitions would be impossible (ŚDVṛ p. 147).
16 Cf. (punning on the root bhū-) IV.51ab tasmāt svayam svabhāvāvam bhāvair bhāvam bhaved bhavah.
protagonist\textsuperscript{17}. Somānanda, following the teaching of the Trika, distinguishes a triad of powers – *icchā, jñāna* and *kriyā* – (connected with the level of Sakti, Sadasiva and Īśvara respectively), which in fact are never really separated from each other. Prior to them, at the top of the Saktitattva plane, there is a moment in which they are completely mingled and about to unfold: this is the state called *unmukhitatā*, *unmukhya* 'protraction' or *prathamā tuṭiḥ* 'first moment (of the will)' (I.18cd), 'wave' (SDVr p. 16 *taranga, ārumī*). When these powers are totally dissolved in unity with Śiva, we have the supreme state, characterized by the supreme lysis (*nirvṛti*) and the conscious beatitude (*cidrūpaḥlāda*). But in no case can one speak of Śiva as quiescent or isolated (*śānta, kevala*) (III.87b-88), insofar as devoid of power (III.90ab)\textsuperscript{18}, nor can one speak of cessation of the perception of the self, since Śiva would then be insentient (*jadci;* III.90cd-91ab). His turning to creation – and more generally to his five functions – springs out of his own joy (*āmoda*); he plays at concealing himself and assumes the nature of māṇḍa down to the Earth (I.32). Thus it cannot be said that the universe is 'imagined' as Śiva, or vice versa, because the one is directly the other (III.83). Just as gold is not 'imagined' as such neither in the simple jewel of solid gold nor in the earring in which the work is so refined as to set aside, as it were, its nature of pure gold, so Śiva is 'formed, arranged' (*klpta*) as universe – in the sense that he has become such, or freely presents himself in this form (ŚDVr p. 133, *klptaḥ sampannah svayam sīhitah*; *kalpanā* is, on the contrary, imagining something where it is not (III.87c-91ab). Therefore, the nature of Śiva is present in everything, whether we know it or not (VII.1cd). Even differentiation has Śiva as its essence\textsuperscript{19}, hence there is not really a bond nor, consequently, liberation (III.72). Furthermore, it is the very belief in the actual existence of bond and liberation that constitutes the basic impurity (VII.87cd). All the ritual prescriptions, *śāstras* and teachers only serve the purposes of everyday life and are in any case a way in which Śiva manifests himself (III.48-49ab). Ritual bathing,

\textsuperscript{17} This is anything but an isolated case in the Śaiva scriptures and treatises (see also, in the Pāñcarātra tradition, the *Lakṣmiṭantra* etc.).

\textsuperscript{18} If we admit the reality of Śiva's state of inactivity, we are obliged to admit that, in spite of everything, the three powers are present in it; it is precisely this meeting of the three powers that constitutes the requisite of reality (III.56).

\textsuperscript{19} Even if in Śaiva scriptures themselves we sometimes find the unreality of the world affirmed, there is no real contradiction here, since this is merely a device to promote detachment (III.95cd).
offering to the fire, pūjā etc. (VII.87 ff.) are external forms whose core is
the awareness that everything is resolved in Śiva. He who worships, he
who is worshipped and the act of worship are in reality all one – Śiva
(VII.94cd). The Śiva principle, whether it is known or not, does not
suffer any real obstruction (VII.1 ff.). Fire, whether externally perceived
or not, still generates light, and gold, if it is not known, does not there­
fore become a stone. All this is doubtless true; it is true that the gem of
desires remains such even if it is not known, but only if man knows it as
such can he enjoy its effects (VII.4). The same may be affirmed regard­
ing individuals’ identification with Śiva. It has been said that even a fire
that is not known generates light, but so much more will be generated by
a fire aptly arranged for this purpose, such as a lamp in a house
(VII.10cd ff.). Thus a means must be taught whereby the attained aware­
ness of the nature of Śiva produces visible effects in the souls
(VII.12ab). This means is represented by logical argumentation, the
scriptures and the teacher20 (VII.5cd). The ŚD condenses all this.

It is therefore easy to imagine on which arguments in particular
Somānanda challenges the opposing doctrines. First of all he attacks all
those who in various ways claim that the external world is unreal, espe­
cially the various types of Vedāntins (VI.3 ff.), who consider it as an
illusory manifestation (vivarta) of Brahman, caused by nescience, or the
Vijñānavādins (VI.33-34) who affirm the reality of knowledge but make
unreal objects arise from it and, moreover, do not admit a subject of this
knowledge – whereas every action, and therefore also the action of
knowing, is necessarily dependent on an agent subject. The thesis of the
Śaktivādins is also rejected for a similar reason: they consider Power as
the sole reality, without taking into account that a power, even though it
is supreme, is implicitly dependent on a subject that possesses it. Then
there are those who admit agent subjects but make each of them an en­
tity that is separate and distinct from the Lord; those who sharply divide
bond and liberation, like the followers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (VI.28cd);
and those who claim a Brahman devoid of consciousness, and hence
jāda (VI.29). Even those who claim the reality of the external object,
like the hāhyavādin Buddhists, are wrong because they do not admit a
unifying principle of reality, and thus make the passage from the moment
of sensation to the moment of mental elaboration impossible (IV.80cd

20 Cf. p. XXXVII.
ff.), and likewise the operation of *apoха*, through which they seek to elude the universal.

It is essentially on the basis of these arguments, used either in isolation or together, that the opposing doctrines (apart from those already mentioned, Jaina, Pāнcarātra, Śaivasiddhānta, Sāмkhya etc.) are gradually dismissed. Several of these objections are concentrated in the criticism of the doctrines of the Grammarians – namely of Bhartṛhari – which differs from the others for its disproportionate length (the whole of āhnika II) and its aggressive, sarcastic tone.

These Grammarians who think themselves so clever – says Somānanda quoting passages from the VP and the *vrtti* – claim that the supreme Brahman is to be identified with Paśyanti-vāc, but the latter at the most is identifiable with the power of Knowledge, that corresponds to the plane of Sadāsiva – definitely not to the highest plane. In fact, as the word itself says, Paśyantī ‘sees’ something. But what is the nature of its objects? If we say that they are externalised images that it itself has produced, we must ask ourselves whether they are real or unreal. In the first case the distinctive feature of this philosophy is lacking, namely seeing the manifestation as illusory (*vivarta*); the unreality of what it sees would have repercussions on it, rendering it *asatyā*, which is inadmissible. If the cause of this perceiving unreal things is nescience, it is the latter that must be established as being real or not: if it is real, then Paśyantī is contaminated by it; if it is not real, it is not understood how there can be a relation between a real thing and a unreal one. The same is also true of its creation. Moreover, this nescience can be seen neither as an attribute of Paśyanti (for the above-mentioned reasons); nor of something else, since nothing real exists apart from it; nor is it to be considered as independent, because then it would be impossible to suppress it. Neither can avidyā be imputed only to the middle level, because in any case it is Paśyantī that is the cause of it. If Paśyantī is to be identified with the *sphota*, we must ask ourselves how words, unreal as they are, can manifest it. No means of knowledge can prove its existence, since for you nothing is real except it. Even the belief that pronouncing a correct word leads to heaven results in attributing to the only reality that can be its subject characteristics which are contrary to its nature, such as the desire for particular fruitions, etc. It is not possible to posit as the highest reality that which, because of its very nature, always remains – however you put it – an instrument of action (*vāc*). Not even identifying the *sabdātattva* without beginning and end with Parā Vāc makes sense, since this means identifying the object (sound) with the in-
strument (voice). If, then, Paśyantī is said to be only a proper noun and hence to escape all the criticism concerning the fact of seeing, etc., and that it is only the feminine ending that counts — which is intended to express its being the power of Knowledge —, the reply is that, if it has nothing to do with seeing, it is insentient and therefore cannot be the power of Knowledge either. Then, the attributes that a verse assigns to Paśyantī are criticized one by one. And so on in this vein, until his final outburst: But why on earth have you left the sphere of grammar and taken it into your heads to deal with a field which is not yours, like philosophy?

**Utpaladeva (900/925-950/975)**

Though Somānanda is unanimously recognized as the founder of the Pratyabhijñā, the school was not to be named after him or his work, but after the work of his disciple Utp. The term pratyabhijñāna occurs only once in the ŚD (IV.120a) and has no pregnant meaning, since it is used as an argument to demonstrate the essential unity, or possibility of unification, of cognitions (against Buddhists etc.). If, on the one hand, it is true that the ĪPK are a ‘reflection’ of the ŚD, as Abh. says, on the other hand it is undeniable that they contain important novelties, not so much in the basic doctrine as in the far more aware and acute determination of the aims proposed, the ways of attaining them and the ambit addressed.

First and foremost Utp., being perhaps actually aided by the negative example of the ŚD, decides not to mix registers. The ĪPK is to be a purely theoretical and rigorously argued work, though based on a scriptural background. The authority of the revelation must not be superimposed on the rational demonstration, and for this reason it is allotted a specific space, the third Adhikāra. Unlike what occurs here and there

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21 avibhāgā tu paśyantī sarvatah samhṛtakramā / svarūpajyotir evaṁtaḥ sūkṣmā vāg anapāyīṃ i. This verse, frequently quoted, is included (with reserve) by Rau — along with the entire passage to which it belongs — in the kārikā text (1.167); Iyer, instead, takes it as a quotation given in vṛtti.

22 ĪPV I p. 7 śrīsomānandatāhasya vijñānapratibimbakam.

23 Cf. ĪPVV III p. 400 jñānakriyādhiṣṭhānayaugalena tattvārthasamgrahasaṁhitena svaprakāśe 'pi yuktyupabṛmhite nirūpate “svatah” ity amśah pūrtaḥ, āgamādhiṣṭhāna
in the SD, any emotional colouring is banished. This does not mean that Utp. was solely a logician: the extraordinary intensity of his hymns, which were to be collected in the SSĀ and are still recited daily by the brahmins of Kashmir, proves it. In a sense Utp. inaugurates what was to become a salient feature of the whole Trika in Abh.’s synthesis: namely, the tendency not to constitute a monolithic doctrine and a world of religious experience to oppose en bloc everything that does not coincide with it (as in the ekāntin trends) but to distinguish planes, that are hierarchically ordered but in which the ‘higher’ does not automatically cancel the ‘lower’ (as Somānanda had already said, Śiva is everywhere, even in differentiation, pain and hell). This is the perspective of the paramādvaita, such an elevated viewpoint that it does not fear what is different from itself, is not put in a critical position by it, is not forced to make a choice. If we take the IS, then we find a still different face. Were it not for its certain attribution, we would never suspect that the refined Naiyāyika speaking here is the same person as the Śaiva theologian of the ĪPK or the bhākta of the SSĀ.

But let us return to the ĪPK and, firstly, let us see how Utp. determines the choice of his opponents. The most important feature is that the Śaivasiddhāntins virtually disappear, at least as direct targets, and the stage is dominated by his critique of Buddhism. This is a message Utp. addresses to his dualist cousins, whom – as will be seen more clearly in Abh. – the Trika does not intend to defeat, but to use as a basis for its emergence from the dimension of a restricted circle and for its establishment in the stratum of social normality, by internalizing, or in any case circumscribing, its own specific difference. The fact that the MV – that is, a text containing distinct dualist lines (Chatterji 1914: 10, Sanderson 1992) and as such is venerated also by the Siddhānta – was chosen by Abh. (following his master Śambhunātha ?) as the basic text for the

\[ \text{tam eva artham upodhalayatā "śāstratah" ity ayam.} \] Here Abh. is referring to the well-known passage of the Kiranāgama, Vidyāpāda IX.14b.

24 We should recall, on the other hand, that the very starting point of Pratyabhijñā theology is the state of devotion, the mahēśvarasya dāsyam mentioned in the first verse of the ĪPK. Cf. SSĀ XV.4 etc.

25 It is only the last verse that enables us to see it in the right perspective.

26 This attitude is aptly outlined by an oft quoted verse: antah kaulo bahih śaivo lokācāre tu vaidikah / sāram ādāya tistheta narikelaphalam yathā /// (cf. Sanderson 1985: 203-205; id. 1988: 699)
Trika is a clear indication of this attitude\(^{27}\). Choosing Buddhism, and particularly its logical school, as number one enemy means reinforcing the undeclared alliance with the Śaivasiddhāntins, who see Utp. siding with them against those who had already been the opponents of Sadyojyotis (see for instance the first chapter of his \textit{Naresvaramaparikṣā}) and were to be the opponents criticized by Nārāyaṇakanṭha and especially by Rāmakanṭha, who displays a particularly vast knowledge of their works and doctrines. This lengthy examination and criticism of the teaching of the Buddhist logicians resulted in, or at least was accompanied by, the peculiar phenomenon of a more or less conscious absorption of their doctrines and their terminology, that was to leave substantial traces in the structure of the Pratyabhijña\(^{28}\). This may have been a deliberate choice by Utp.: to increase his own prestige by assuming the ways and forms of a philosophical school which was perhaps the most respected and feared, even by the many who did not agree with it. But certainly one must also view this in the light of the complex relationship with the Nyāya.

The Nyāya was also given a wide berth as an opponent. This, too, is probably part of the manoeuvre to place the Trika in a broader Śaiva context, seeing that the Śaiva faith was known to be pre-eminent among the Naiyāyikas. It is probably for this reason that we see Utp. assuming a Naiyāyika guise in the ĪŚ (Abh. also dealt with the philosophy of this school in the \textit{Kathamukhatilaka}, now lost\(^{29}\)). Against the realism of the Nyāya, that claimed the reality of the external object and the actual existence of concepts such as relation etc., Utp. sets the criticism of the Bud-

\(^{27}\) According to Abh., the Trika – and consequently the MV, which is its essence – represents the essence of the entire Śaiva tradition and not of the sole non-dualism (TĀ 1.18 \textit{daśāṣṭadaśavastabhinnam yac chāsanam vihoh i tatsāraṁ trikaśāstram hi tatsāraṁ mālinimatum //}).

\(^{28}\) I will not dwell on this point, which I have already dealt with elsewhere (Torella 1992). Also Somānanda presents and criticizes themes and doctrines of Buddhist \textit{pramāṇa} tradition (inference, the universal as exclusion of the other, instantaneous; cf. in particular SD IV.68 ff., V.44 ff. – within a general criticism of the inference placed outside the context of \textit{ekāśivatā –, VI.77 ff.}) and refers, more or less explicitly, to two verses by Dharmakīrti (PV III.282 in SD I.45 and PV III.354 in SD VI.39). In the SD we find peculiar terms of Buddhist logic, such as \textit{svalaksana} (IV.71a), \textit{apoha} (VI.76c), \textit{svārthānumāna} (V.55a), \textit{parānumāna} (V.61c) etc., but they are always referred to the opposing doctrines, without showing any trace of conditioning or appropriation (as it is in Utp. and Abh.).

\(^{29}\) Cf. ĪPVV I p. 20.
dhist logicians, but only to show that they would easily get the better of its relatively ingenuous realism if the Pratyabhijñā did not intervene to support it. After letting the Buddhist logicians demolish the Nyāya categories, he shows how the Buddhist alternative is in fact equally inadmissible. It does overcome the Nyāya, but remains as though suspended in mid air, since it is proved – in its fragmented and isolated universe – to be incapable of accounting for the network of relations and the circularity of the world of human experience. So – Utp. seems to say, and later Abh. was to put this more explicitly – one might just as well accept the view of the Nyāya in the sphere of the *vyavahāra*, on condition that one sees through it the pervasive presence of Śiva as constituting its dynamism and internal coherence. It could equally well resolve the inconsistencies of the Buddhist view and render them acceptable. In this way, Utp. achieves the result of both showing the superiority of the Pratyabhijñā to Buddhism and warning the Nyāya not to count too much on its forces alone, detached from those of the new Śaiva theologians.

Another important aspect of the strategy of Utp.’s Pratyabhijñā is the glaring reversal of Somānanda’s attitude towards Bhartrhari, who, from being a punctiliously criticized and even derided opponent, becomes one of the major inspirers to throughout the ĪP (as I have sought to point out in the notes to the translation), and in particular in one of its essential doctrines. I am referring to the identification in Śiva of the dual *prakāśa-vimarsa* pole – the first understood as the motionless cognitive light that constitutes the basic fabric, the founding structure of reality, of the ‘given’; the second as the spark that causes this luminous structure to pulsate by introducing self-awareness, dynamism, freedom of intervention, of self-assertion, thus expressing in theoretical terms what is the nature of an unpredictable divine personality, like that of the violent and loving Śiva handed down in the Scriptures and with whom Utp. dialogues in his mystical hymns. *Prakāśa* forms, together with a large group of synonyms or quasi-synonyms (from the roots *bhā-, pratibhā-, bhās-, avabhās-, abhās-, pratibhās-, prath-*) a close-knit constellation...

30 The fact that the Pratyabhijñā shows at one time the influence of the Buddhists and of Bhartrhari does not appear as a contradiction, if we take into account the undoubted relations and mutual exchanges between the doctrines of the Buddhist schools (Mādhyamika, Vijñānavādin, logicians) and the doctrines of Bhartrhari (cf. e.g. Lindtner 1993).

31 To these must be added another key term, *sphur-*, where the light is enriched by a ‘vibrant’, dynamic, connotation – which makes it into the intersection point with the doctrine of the Spanda.
of ‘luminous’ terms indicating the notions of being manifested, emerging from the dark, coming to consciousness or, more in general, of being the object of knowledge and finally simply ‘being’, whose use was already firmly established especially in Vedāntic and Buddhist (particularly logical) contexts; prakāśa and synonyms frequently occur in the VP.

Apart from isolated and uncertain cases in the Śaiva scriptural tradition (cf. Dyczkowski 1987: 233 n. 10; cf. also ŚD II.83d, 84c), vimarśa in the pregnant sense Utp. attributes to it, cannot but derive from Bhartrhari’s teaching, especially if we consider its link with light, on the one hand, and the word on the other. Of course, I am referring here to the two very famous and most quoted stanzas I.131-32 of the VP, whose influence, though extending over the whole structure of the Pratyabhijñā, we find concentrated in particular on two closely connected aspects. One (ĪPK 1.5.19) concerns the only way deemed possible to account for a common fact in everyday experience, such as the immediate and seemingly thoughtless action that still achieves its purpose - namely, that of affirming the presence of a subtle reflective awareness even within the sensation or movement captured at its most direct and undif-

32 Vimarśa has been translated in various ways and there are good reasons for each of them: ‘cogitazione, pensiero’ (Gnoli), ‘prise de conscience’ (Silburn), ‘self-consciousness, freedom, determinate consciousness’ (Pandey), ‘raissaisissement infini’ (Hulin), ‘Betrachtung, Urteil’ (Frauwallner), ‘self-representation’ (Sanderson), ‘prise de conscience active, libre activité de la Conscience’ (Padoux) etc. The translation ‘reflective awareness’ that I have generally adopted - drawn from Matilal 1968a, who however uses it to translate anuvyavasāya (also Dyczkowski uses it frequently) – seemed to me broad enough to be adapted to the different contexts and meanings in which the term is used. Being neither too precise nor too vague, it permits me not to disseminate the text of different expressions for the same term. Vimarśa is accompanied by a series of terms deriving from the same root with different preverbs (para°, pratyava°, ava°, ā°). A differentiation between them might be attempted by identifying a more intimate and analytic element in vimarśa, a more instantaneous and indefinite element in parāmarśa, one more characterized by introjection and return to the subject in pratya-vamarśa. However, the close reading of the texts of this school indicates that, even if these different nuances are in principle not unfounded, they are largely used as interchangeable terms. Another important notion, closely connected with vimarśa – and probably first introduced by Utp. –, is that of camatkāra ‘astonished, wondrous, savouring’ (see below p. 118 n. 23). It could be defined as a vimarśa enriched with a strong aesthetic connotation.

33 See below p. 125 n. 41.
ferentiated moment. The other aspect regards the two solemn general formulations (1.5.11 and 13) that define vimarśa (pratyavamarśa in the vṛtti) as the essential nature of light (avabhāsa; prakāśa in the vṛtti) and indissolubly link consciousness (citi etc.), reflective awareness (pratyavamarśa) and the supreme word (parā vāc).

The presence of Bhartrhari, not only in the substance of these doctrines but often also in their verbal formulation, could not be more direct – even if the vṛtti of VP does nothing to emphasize the apparently very general meaning of the verse but, on the contrary, seems to do its utmost to keep it down to earth. In making this doctrine one of the crucial points of the Pratyabhijñā, Utp. appropriates another prestigious tradition, that of the Grammarians, and Bhartrhari in particular, whose teaching on the all-pervasive power of the word is, moreover, connected with a very ancient speculative trend, which also continues in the Agamic tradition close to Utp. This is incorporated with no effort in the philosophy of the Pratyabhijñā, enriching it with implications, and – something that must not be underestimated – it furnishes a further, penetrating argument in the dispute against the Buddhist logicians, one of whose basic theses was precisely the absolute otherness of direct sensation from determinate knowledge. However, it is true that the criticism of the tripartition of the word held by Bhartrhari (cf. below p. 120 n. 26) remains – according to what appears from the passages of the ūtka sketchily quoted by Abh. in the ĪPVV. But it seems to slip into the background, compared to the general acceptance of Bhartrhari’s teaching as a whole. One might even say that Utp. criticizes the tripartition also because this, though unanimously recognized by the contemporary exegesis of the VP and explicitly mentioned by Bhartrhari himself, appears

34 This conception is not to be referred solely to Bhartrhari – as will be seen later on – but may also be considered as a development in philosophical terms of the experience of the ‘effervescence of all Powers’ (sarvasaktivilolata), described in Chapter I of the ŚD and, in turn, derived by Somānanda from the scriptures (first of all, the VBh).

35 See below p. 120 n. 26.

The question of the identification of the author of the vṛtti on the first two Kāndas of the VP – indicated in the colophons as Harivṛṣabha – with Bhartrhari himself is still to be considered an open one (see the recent contributions by Aklujkar 1972,1993 and Bronkhorst 1988,1991, for and against this identification respectively). In the course of this work I shall provisionally accept the thesis of identity, which seems to me the more likely and which, above all, has always been accepted by the Indian tradition.

XXV
to him not in line with the general plan of the VP, to which a quadripartition like the Śaiva one would be more suited. The mention of a supreme form of Paśyantī made in the vr̥tti on the ŚD (p. 38) – which Somānanda had not taken into consideration –, even if later Utp. considers it included in the criticism of Somānanda, might be understood as Utp.’s airing of a hypothesis of fourth level in Bhartrhari himself. An indirect confirmation might be represented by the explicit equivalence that his disciple Rāmakanṭha (Spandakārikāvivṛtti p. 153) establishes between śabdatattva and Parāvāc, which, therefore, does not coincide with Paśyantī but of which the latter is an emanation. Moreover, Rāmakanṭha seems inclined not to underline the illusory nature of the Śabdādvavādins’ vivarta, but he considers it simply as a different way of denoting that process of the Lord’s articulation in the multiplicity of the universe which the Śaivas call sāktiprasara ‘flowing of the Power’ (ibid.).

At any rate, it is clear that we are far removed from the attitude of Somānanda37, who minimizes even that aspect which by contrast was to strike Utp. so forcefully – namely, the inevitable presence of language at the heart of every cognitive activity (ŚD II. 19-20)38. And I like to think that the vidvad6 Utp. places in front of Bhartrhari’s name when, in ŚDVṛ p. 84, he quotes in full a verse of the Saddhātusāmikṣa, which Somānanda is fiercely attacking at the time, is a kind of veiled apology, 37 Furthermore, the conception of the Absolute that results from an overall view of the VP appears close to that of the Pratyabhijñā. Positions such as that expressed in the Śādhanasamuddeśa (vv. 39-41) could easily have been subscribed to by Somānanda himself (who refers only to the Kānda I), even if we do not read it in the light of Helārāja explanation (Prakīrṇakapratkāśa I p. 262 ekam eva samvinnayam param śabdabrahma tathā tathāvasthitam iti kārikārthah). The very notions of avidyā and vivarta, examined in the whole of the VP, seem to escape Somānanda’s criticism. Avidyā, in fact, is not a principle extraneous to Brahman but a sakti (VP I Vṛtti p. 9) and, as such, does not weaken but rather accentuates Brahman’s centrality. Similarly, the term vivarta (and related forms) seems to be used by Bhartrhari to underline the continuity of Brahman in the manifold world of manifestation rather than to signify a de-realization of the latter. Somānanda, however, is certainly not the only one to interpret Bhartrhari in this way; while some of his early critics, like Jayanta or Santaraksita-Kamalāśīla, show they are at least aware of the problems in interpreting these key-terms, the later Vcdāntins will not seem to have any doubts about reading them in the light of the subsequent Śāṅkārian doctrines.

38 The verse figures as an objection that Somānanda essentially pass over.

39 Quotations of this work attributed to Bhartrhari (Iyer 1969: 9-10), now lost, are also to be found in the Spandapradīpikā (pp. 4, 22). Of the two different titles
a timid dissociation from what he finds himself commenting on with the devout diligence of a disciple.

A further original contribution by Utp. to the philosophy of the Pratyabhijñā is the doctrine of the ābhāsas. Somānanda had not developed his own idea of the ontological status of the manifested world, but had only asserted strongly and repeatedly its reality (satyatā) and its having the nature of Śiva (sivarūpatā). Things are ‘states’ (avasthā, bhāva) of Śiva, and their emergence is due solely to his will, brought about by nothing other than a natural overflowing of energies, whose characteristic feature is ‘joy’ (āmoda) as well as ‘play’ (krīdā). Utp. includes the world of manifestation in his great luminous metaphor. Every aspect of reality is a light; it is a reflection in the mirror of consciousness and has its ultimate reality in consciousness.

By combining elements drawn from the Vaiyākaraṇa and the Buddhist pramāṇa tradition, Utp. presents these ‘manifestations’ (ābhāsa) as having the nature of universal (in fact, each one of them is connected with a word). They can appear in isolation or aggregated around a dominant manifestation and are provided with a single or complex causal efficiency, on the basis of a compatibility that has its ultimate foundation in the law of Necessity established by the Lord. United among themselves, thus becoming more and more particularized and, finally, combined with three manifestations endowed with a special individualizing force – space, time and form – they constitute the world of everyday experience. It is easy to glimpse in this conception elements drawn from the Vijñānavādins (consciousness as the receptacle of everything that is gradually manifested), from the Vaiyākaraṇas (the idea of a hierarchy of universals) and from the logical-epistemological school of Buddhism (cf. Torella 1992: 332 ff.). In this case, too, the word ābhāsa as a philosophical term, was not invented by Utp., but was commonly used in the Vedāntic and Buddhist schools. It also occurs in the ŚD40, but, even

that are attributed to it – Šabdadhātusamikṣā in the ŚDVr and Šaddhātusamikṣā in the Spandaprādīpikā (Dhātu⁰ is only the abbreviated form: cf. Gaurinath Shastri 1959:61, who traced out one more quotation from this work). the right one is most probably the latter (which, besides, better lends itself to be abbreviated), as can be deduced from Utp.’s commentary: dhātusatkopagamāḥ hhedāvāde ‘pi ... This work may possibly have been an examination of the six Vaiśeṣika categories (even though I am not aware of any other occurrence of the term dhātu in the sense of padārtha), or (J. Bronkhorst’s personal communication) of the six dhātus mentioned in Buddhist works, such as the Śiksāsamuccaya.

40 Cf. I.33c, II.21c, III.78b, IV.98c, VI.58d etc.
when it does not appear in a context where explicit reference is made to opposing doctrines (various kinds of *vivarta*), its use seems to be merely sporadic and casual, and in any case devoid of a precise technical connotation. In one respect, *ābhāsa* is not distinguished from *prakāsa* (and related terms), and the two terms often seem interchangeable (*svābhāsa*, *svaprapkāsa* etc.; cf. ŚŚA I.1c *śivābhāsaḥ*). In another (namely, in its more technical use, as in the so-called *ābhāsa* theory), though the essential unity of nature remains, *ābhāsa* is seen as a particle, an individualized and extroverted form of the ‘great light’41, ‘cut out’ in it. This fragmentation of the light is accompanied by, and also presupposes, an analogous descent of consciousness to the state of fragmented subjectivity of the manifold individual subjects (the true subject is *avicchinnābhāsa*; cf. ĪPV II p. 138); see in particular Abh.’s commentaries on ĪPK II.3.1-2. The relation between consciousness and *ābhāsa* is that between the mirror and the reflected image, subtly analyzed in Chapter III of the TĀ (cf. also MMP pp. 147-53). The ontological status of the *ābhāsa* is therefore a mixture of autonomy and heteronomy, without its basic reality ever being called into question: reality is precisely being manifest (ĪPK I.4.14 and *vṛtti*; cf. APS 5ab *evam apy avabhāsānusaktī sattocitā bhavet*). Though he never explicitly repeats Somānanda’s extreme formulations (‘the jar exists, knowing itself’), by using a typically Vijnānavāda argument, Utp. underlines the necessarily common nature of consciousness and its object: only that which is itself light, i.e. sentience42, can shine in knowledge; to say that something is insentient is like saying it is inexistent (APS 13ac). Even when an *ābhāsa* is viewed as external – as ‘this’ – the ‘this’ continues to have its foundation in the I; it may also be said that the reflective awareness of something in terms

41 In this case the Śaiva tradition interprets *ābhāsa* as ‘limited light’, by attributing to *ā* the meaning of *īṣat*; in this sense, the supreme Śiva is *nirābhāsa* (ĪPVV III p. 271).

42 Among the rare passages in the Śaiva scriptures that explicitly touch on and philosophically elaborate this point, see that of the *Ucchusmaḥhairava* (cit. ŚSV p. 4; Torella 1979: 39): “How is it possible, O Dear One, that these be objects of knowledge, without being also subjects of knowledge. It is for this reason that impurity does not exist.”, and of the *Kālikākrama* (cit. ŚSV pp. 57-58; Torella 1979: 112): “Knowledge shines within and without, in various forms, and there is no existence of object that is outside knowledge. The whole world is, therefore, constituted by knowledge, and no entity is perceived without knowledge. Knowledge has the same nature as the object. [...] The single nature of knowing and the knowable comes out of their mutual implication in the cognitive act.”
of separation, of ‘this’, has been fully achieved only when it rests in its innermost being, thus becoming the reflective awareness ‘I’ (APS 15). It is the same light of the self that is manifested as self and as other (APS 13cd).

Conceiving of the supreme reality as an absolute I is another innovation made by Utp. (cf. Dyczkowski 1990), though in my opinion there are no substantial differences between this and Somananda’s dynamic Self-Śiva which underlies the whole universe and express himself in it. Utp. is the one who chose to use this word regardless of the associations generally attached to it in Indian thought, being aware of the fact that the risk of a reification that has always weighed heavily on the word ātman was even more negative, and that this makes it less suitable for expressing the unpredictable overflowing of the divine personality. The term ‘I’ is implicitly aimed against the two conceptions that are, after all, closest to the Pratyabhijñā and which it most aspires to differentiate itself from: the consciousness devoid of a subject of the Vijnanavada and the static ātman-brahman of the Vedānta. “The resting of the light in itself, or the supreme condition of the I, is absolute independence from every other, autonomy (svātantrya), agency, Lordship “ (APS 22cd-23).

I will not present in detail all the argumentations Utp. develops in the Jñāna° and in the Kriyādhikāra (regarding which I refer directly to the translation and notes). They mainly take the form of a debate with the Buddhist logicians and also betray, as has been pointed out, their strong influence. Utp.’s constant preoccupation is to show, in every context he deals with, the need for a single, dynamic subject that unifies and animates the discontinuity of reality and constitutes the substratum of every limited subject, as well as of every form and activity of everyday life.

This I or Consciousness is, on the religious plane, Śiva. In his highest form, the supreme divine personality is solely ‘I’ – consisting of consciousness and beatitude – in whom all the principles are contained though in a state of complete dissolution. He is present throughout the ṚPK as the ultimate essence of every reality and is also directly mentioned here and there, even if the stage is generally occupied by a less extreme form of him, which balances between transcendence and immanence. In fact, being an expository work, which requires an object to teach and a recipient of this teaching, it cannot but deal with that form of the God which is open to the world of manifestation, whilst firmly remaining its sovereign. On the supreme plane there is only the I resting in his fullness and no trace of the knowable remains; even the Pratyabhijñā has to withdraw from this plane, leaving it in the background. In
the various models of tripartition that the ŠPK presents, following in the wake of the Trika (aham, aham-idam, idam; suddha, suddhāsuddha, suddha; para, parāpara, aparā), this more accessible form of the God is connected with the second level. It is mainly indicated as Maheśvara, Īśvara, Īśa, Prabhu, whereas the supreme form is often given the name of Śiva or Paramesvara, but there certainly are exchanges between these two series – which indirectly points out the fact that it is a question of a sole reality and that every distinction of degree and figure is purely instrumental to the expository requirements.

After leaving the sole force of independent argumentation to work in the first two Adhikāras, Utp. – though in a subordinate way, as may be seen from the disproportion between these sections – allows revelation to take the floor43, being aware that there is a marked limit beyond which experience and reasoning no longer suffice (cf.ŠPK II p. 213). And thus in the first āhnika of the Āgamādhikāra he goes on to describe the principles that constitute reality – from Sadāsiva to the Earth – without expressly mentioning Śiva or Śakti but considering them, or so it appears, as fused in the figure of the supreme knowing subject (III.1.1c), of

43 Utp. does not name any of the scriptural sources of the ŠPK. Abh. in ŠPK II p. 231 expressly mentions the Šadardhasāra (see below p. 193 n. 13, probably the same as the Trikahrdaya (or Trikasāra) quoted for the first time by Bhāskara in the Šivasūtravrāttika (p. 31) and then, repeatedly, by Abh., Ksemarāja and Jayaratha (Dvivedi 1983: Upodghāta pp. 39-40). The nature of this text – belonging to the so-called second stratum of the Trika scriptures, but also quoted by Abh. as an authority for the Krama cult of the twelve Kālīś – indirectly confirms Utp.'s position in the Saiva tradition. According to Jayaratha's explanations (TĀV III p. 194), the Krama doctrine taught in the Devīpañcaśatiṣṭa, as well as the Trikadhāsāra, had been handed down to Abh. through the lineage deriving from Somānanda – that is, through Utp. and Laksmanagupta (the latter, in particular, also being his teacher in the Pratyabhijñā). In a definitely Krama context Ksemarāja (PH p. 20) quotes as an authority a short passage from the lost Īptyākā, and a Krama flavour can be noticed here and there in the SSĀ (see e.g. chapter VIII). Regarding a passage from the vṛtti on ŠPK IV.5, vastutah śakтивिकās viśvam, Abh. names the Śrimangalalāśāstra as being the source; and, in fact, elsewhere (ŚDVr p. 107) Utp. textually quotes the passage of this Tantra which Abh. alluded to. The Mangalā (or Sarvamangalā) is included in the list of Bhairavatantra given by the Šrikanṭhisamhitā. Abh. (ŠPK II p. 228) also mentions the Raurava (but with reference to a doctrine referred to but not accepted by Utp. ; see also the quotations from the Kālottara in the ŚDVr) and, in particular, the MPĀ, a text belonging to the Śaivasiddhānta but whose peculiar emphasis on the role of knowledge (presented as a more prestigious alternative with respect to ritual) is well-known.
the Īśitṛ (III.1.2 vṛtti). Abh. (ĪPVV III p. 258) identifies this supreme principle, which is apparently placed at the top of the scale of tattvas and not beyond it, with the sivatattva. By integrating, as seems possible, the scant indications of the ĪPK with what Utp. says in his commentary on the ĀD, one can state it is the sivatattva that presents itself as constituted by all the tattvas (p. 22 sarvattavamayaṭāya śivatattvāvasthānam). Still according to the ĀDVṛ, it is the supreme Lord Śiva, endowed with the two powers of consciousness and lysis, or light and beatitude (p. 23 svarupānapriściṭacinnirvṛttirūpaśaktidvayah prakāśānandamayaḥ pūrnah paramesvarah śivah prasṛtah); he assumes the form of the various principles, beginning with Śakti (ĀD I.29). Cf. ĪPK IV.14ac sarvathā tv antarāśināntatabhūtvahnaṁ śivas cidānandaghanah; ĀDVṛ p. 106 evam suvarṇavat parameṣvara eva pūrvoktechaḍāśaktimāṁ tathā tattvabhuvana-kāryakaranādiprudrāvaitavyena [...] sthitah; in ĀD III.21d and in the vṛtti he is called sivatattva. In passages like these, we seem to witness the overlapping and merging of Śiva seen as the first or last tattva and of the highest divine personality who is beyond the very dimension of tattva – even if supreme – containing and transcending all the tattvas without exception. This impression is reinforced when Utp. passes from the noetic register of the ĪPK to the emotional register of the bhakti in the ŚŚA.

A great deal of space is devoted to the structure of the limited subject in the second āhnika of the Āgamādhikāra. The divine subject (pati) – whose body is constituted, as it were, by the universe – is counterposed with the ‘beast’ (pasu), the fettered soul, in its various forms depending on the maculations that characterize it. In the conception outlined by Utp. there are two components from different sources: the hierarchy of subjects – which is a peculiar element of the Śaivasiddhānta44 – and a version of the three maculations which, though deriving from the analogous doctrine of the Śaivasiddhānta, has an utterly monistic qualification. The ānava, maīyā and kārma maculations45 completely lose their original nature of ‘substances’ that physically obstruct the self of the pasu from without and resolve themselves into erroneous attitudes of the individual consciousness46. The ānava maculation, with its

44 Which Abh. was to take up through the MV.
45 On the different denomination of the three maculations in dualist and non-dualist schools cf. Sanderson 1992:286 n.23.
46 Cf. MV I.23cd malam ajñānam icchanti; ŚŚ I.2 (a)jñānam bandhah . Cf. TĀ I.22 ff.

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obliterating the one or the other of the components of subjectivity (con-sciousness and freedom, bodha and svātantrya) determines that identity crisis onto which the other two are grafted: the māyic one – which causes the I to see the world of objects as separate from himself – and the karmic one – which makes him consider his own actions as the causes of the series of rebirths, miring him in the samsāra. The cause of all three is the power of māyā, which has its roots in the very will of the Lord (III.2.5 vr̥tti). The individual knowing subject, variously contami-nated by these three maculations, is then distinguished according to the four levels which he tends to identify with (void, vital breath, mind and body) and the conditions (avasthā) in which his experience of reality may take place (waking, sleep and deep sleep, corresponding to direct perception, to mental costruct and to partial or total suspension of all activity and knowledge). The fourth state, in which duality is overcome, corresponds gradually to the conditions of Vijñānākala, Mantra, Mantreśvara and Iśa; the state beyond the fourth is the one in which every trace of the knowable is dissolved in the absolute I of Śiva.

As we have seen above, the limited subject tends to identify with four aspects progressively higher in rank, which are however still included in the sphere of the objects: the body, the mind, the vital breath and the void. Their predominance causes the eclipse of the two components of his authentic subjectivity, consciousness and freedom (bodha and svātantrya-kartrtā). Liberation, therefore, consists in inverting this relation – namely, in the consciousness-freedom establishing themselves at the centre of the individual, while pushing the components of the fictitious I in the margins⁴⁷ – and takes on the form of a knowledge that is ‘characterized by penetration in it’ tatsamāveśalaksanam (IPK III.2.12d). Here we have one of the key words of the Kashmiri Tantric tradition, which, furthermore, possesses the particular feature of allowing one to glimpse the succession, or rather, the coexistence of two different conceptions of the individual I’s escape from his limits. In fact, in samāveśa the meanings of ‘to enter, to penetrate into’ and ‘to be penetrated, possessed by’ coexist, thanks to the dual transitive and intransitive sense of the root viś-⁴⁸. In the earlier stages of these schools the term must doubtless have been mainly used to mean the loss of individual identity and the paroxysm of energies which derive from being possessed by the

⁴⁷ Cf. TĀ I.173cd-174ab and Jayaratha’s commentary.
⁴⁸ Cf. Sanderson 1986: 177 n. 33; on this term see also Hara 1966.
terrible divinities linked to the funerary and sexual transgressions, evoked in the Kāpālika rites\textsuperscript{49}. In the later phase represented by the Trika and the elaboration of its teachings, the prevalent use of the term in its active meaning sometimes appears as a conscious declaration of new intentions – even a kind of \textit{damnatio memoriae} of a past that has become uncomfortable for those aiming at new integrations\textsuperscript{50}. Utp. uses \textit{āviś-} with the active meaning in the first of the final verses of the ĪPK (‘... entering in the Śiva nature ...’). Also in the first verse of the ŚD\textsuperscript{51} \textit{samāviśṭah} is definitely active, but, since it is referred to Śiva, the result is that it is my form that is penetrated by the God. As Utp. explains, it is Śiva who has become one with my form, in the sense that he has entered realities such as the vital breath etc., which in themselves are not different from the other inert things such as the jar and so on, in order to make them into centres of individual conscious life; indeed, the more intensely he penetrates them, the more the extraordinary powers emerge (p. 3 \textit{yāvatī yā ca mātrayā samāvesas tāvanmātrasiddhisambhavah}). And, therefore, he who seeks these powers must increasingly deepen this ‘entry’ into himself. However, Utp. concludes, we can imagine that both Śiva and man enter and ‘are entered’, since the movement towards unity is the same in both. These considerations have left their mark in the way Abh. develops the laconic text of the \textit{kārikā, tatsamāvesā}\textsuperscript{6}, which is only glossed in the \textit{vṛtti} with \textit{tacchaktisamāvesa}. Abh. says (ĪPVV III p. 327) that this word is intended to refer to the two forms of liberation in

\textsuperscript{49} In the Śaivaparibhāṣā \textit{āveśa-samāvesa} is considered to be the form of liberation peculiar to the Kāpālikas (Sanderson 1985: 213 n.90, Brunner 1992: 46-47 n.65, Brunner 1986: 518-19). Says Śivagrayogin (p. 342): \textit{kāpālikāh samāvesena sāmyam upagacchanti / tathā hi – yathā grahāḥ puruśesv āviśanti tathēśvaragunā muktesv āviśanti}; what makes such a conception of liberation unacceptable in the eyes of a Śaivasiddhāntin is its dangerous resemblance to possession by evil spirits and the subject’s loss of identity and autonomy (p. 346 \textit{tathā sati bhūtāviśṭasyeśtvātantryāpattyā puruśārthatvāyogāt}). These themes had already been touched on in the older dualistic Śaiva tradition (cf. Paramokśanirāsakārikā v.13b \textit{āveśenāsvatantratā}; Rāmakantha’s \textit{nikā p. 286 bhūtāviśṭasyeśa pumso muktāv avesvātantryam evesvarasamatet}; ibid. p. 283 anyais tu tadā parameśvaragunaiḥ svārayasthair eva siddhah samāviśyate grahāir iva puruṣa ity āveśapaksah).

\textsuperscript{50} This process reaches its completion with Kṣemarāja, for whom \textit{samāvesa} as a technical term seems to have lost any specific identity (PH p. 45 \textit{samāvesasa-māpattādiparyāyah samādhīḥ}).

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{asaṃdrūpasamāviśṭah svātmanātmanivāraṇe / śivah karotu nijayā namah śaktyā tatātmane //}.

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life. In the one case it has the meaning of ‘complete and perfect entry into the own true nature’ (satyasvarūpe samyag ā samantāt praveśa-lakṣanam; active meaning) and corresponds to the state beyond the fourth in which the adept, after becoming aware of the supreme nature of the I, becomes as though withdrawn from the knowable which formed his fictitious identity. By contrast, in the other the various components of the levels of the limited subject are gradually penetrated by the elixir of the I, until they become, so to speak, transfigured, removed from their nature of knowable realities. This experience, which corresponds to the fourth state, can be extended further, until it flows into the state beyond the fourth, where the components of limitation, including samskāra, are totally dissolved and incorporated in the I. The passive sense of the second explanation of samavesa and its relation with the above passage of the ŚDVr become evident from what Abh. adds later (ibid. p. 330), this time apparently referring to tacchaktisamavesa⁰ in the vṛtti: tasya samviddhamah šaktivesāḥ samyag aviśanto vibhūtir utthāpayanti (cfr. above n. 49)⁵².

The fourth state and the state beyond the fourth can be attained through the practices centred on the vital breaths, described in the Āgamas. Utp. briefly touches on this point at the end of the Āgamādhikāra. The duality of the prāna and apāna that characterizes the waking and dream states is overcome with the entry into the samāna, which suspends and unifies them, corresponding to the state of deep sleep. The subsequent level, represented by the udāna, marks the end of the limited condition, which culminates – with the all-pervasive presence of the vyāna – in the supreme condition of Śiva.

⁵² Therefore, there is a difference between the two turyātītas delineated by Abh. The first pertains to the jñānin, who reaches it instantly thanks to an intense and flashing ‘peak experience’; the second, by contrast, pertains to the yogin and is the fruit of the repeated practice of this samāveśa. Here the adept does not halt when his self enters into the nature of Śiva; this is merely his starting point. He slows down this identification and intensifies it at the same time, extending it gradually to all the levels of the fictitious I (body, mind etc.), which the jñānin, on the contrary, only abandoned. This second turyātīta, reached in two stages – says Abh., following Utp.’s tīkā – pertains to the viśesadarśanas, namely to the schools that prevalently teach a śaktadvaita, i.e. that stress the ‘power’ element in the self (p. 331). These are opposed by the sāmānyadarśanas, which place the emphasis on the subject in his transcendence and whose form of turyātīta – the one described first – tends to cancel the knowable and aims for pure consciousness (this is the vyatireka-turyātīta

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In the *Tattvasamgrahādhikāra* the path to liberation passes through the overcoming of the activity which, throughout the ĪPK, is considered as the very core of the condition of limited subject: the *vikalpa* – the dualizing, discursive thought, that unfolds through antinomies and organizes reality in terms of separation – in all its forms. The two different methods taught by Utp. give the same result – liberation in life – the one by the gradual attenuation and elimination of mental constructs through the cultivation of their opposite (*nirvikalpa*), the other by allowing them to flow and progressively purifying their contents. I shall return to these later.

The whole of Utp.'s work, however, is built around teaching the 'recognition' of the Lord, which also the two above-mentioned forms are part of (ĪPVV III p. 354 *pañcabhīh [the last five stanzas] pratya-bhiṣmapāvijñāmakam mokṣatattvam*). This new and easy way is merely the triggering in the devout of an act of identification, which does not reveal anything new but only rends the veils that hid the I from himself; a cognition is not created but only the blur that prevented its use, its entering into life, is instantly removed. The way by which the master creates the premises for this to occur may, on the contrary, be gradual: this is what Utp. does with his work, which aims through a series of arguments at bringing to light the powers of the I and those of the Lord, until identification is triggered. The practice of such a linear (*avakra*) path is enough to enter into the nature of Śiva and achieve the condition of liberated in life, which may also be accompanied by the extraordinary powers (ĪPVV I p. 111 *īśvarapratya-bhijñākṛto 'bhuyudayo jīvanmuk-tivihūtīlakṣaṇaṁ*). This 'penetration' still presupposes a body and, in any case, a state in which the distinction between the I and Śiva has not yet been dissolved. This occurs within everyday reality just as it is. The light of liberation does not cause its colours to fade, does not cover them but brightens them, performing the miracle of eliminating otherness whilst maintaining the richness of individual flavours.

Says Utp.:

“Dwelling in the midst of the sea of the supreme ambrosia, with my mind immersed solely in the worship of You, may I attend to all the

to which the *avyatireka* of the *viśeṣadarśanas* is opposed). Utp. and Abh.’s inclinations lie towards the latter.

53 *ĪPV* II p. 258 *dehipāte tu paramesvara evaikarasah iti kah kutra katham samāvesaṁ*.

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common occupations of man, savouring the ineffable in every thing.” (ŚŚĀ XVIII.13)

“May my desire for the objects of the senses be intense, O Blessed One, like that of all other men, but may I see them as though they were my own body, with the thought of differentiation gone”. (VIII.3)

“May I aspire to liberation by worshipping You, without withdrawing from experience and the world, and without even seeking the dominion [of the extraordinary powers], but becoming intoxicated with the abundant liquor of devotion”. (XV.4)

The householders of Kashmir, whose desire for an intimate experience of communion with the absolute, though profound, withdrew before the abysses of transgression and loss of identity, were not to remain indifferent to the insinuating message of the Pratyabhijñā.

THE FUTURE OF THE PRATYABHIJÑĀ

If Utp.’s teaching did not remain an isolated, though brilliant, fruit of the Śaiva tradition, this is probably due to Abh., who took it to constitute the theoretical and speculative side of his great synthesis of the principal currents of non-dualist Kashmir Shaivism. The privileged position that the Pratyabhijñā occupies in the paddhati of the Trika (in the broad sense), not only in the treatment of the bimbapratimbavāda in the third āhnika of the TĀ, but in the work as a whole – as well as, in various ways, in the MVV, the PTV, the Paryantapaṅcāśikā etc. – was so to speak the sounding board that amplified and spread its teaching. It is virtually impossible not to find traces of the characteristic themes of the Pratyabhijñā in the Śaiva authors who came after Abh., as well as in later scriptures such as those of the Tripurā (Yoginīhrdaya, Tripurārahasya etc.). The doctrine of the ābhāsas, consciousness as the synthesis of prakāśavimarsa, ahantā, camatkāra, the four levels of the limited subjectivity occupy – either isolated or combined – an important place even in some Vaiśṣava scriptures, like the Ahirbudhnyasamhitā and the Laksmitantra. Nor must one think that this influence was limited to Kashmir, since it was very strong also in south India, where the Trika, Krama and Tripurā schools were widespread (Sanderson 1990:80-82). This is also evident from the inclusion of the Pratyabhijñā in the SDS of the Southern Indian Mādhava (14th c.) and the presence of MSS of works by Utp. and

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Somananda in southern scripts (for example, it is to be noted that the only complete MS of the IP vrtti is in Malayalam characters).

The doctrine of the upāyas, stated briefly and as though in passing in the MV (II.20-23), is taken up again with great emphasis by Abh. and comes to constitute one of the main structures of the Trika, serving as a device to incorporate diverse spiritual traditions in this great synthesis, without levelling away their individuality. I will spare the reader yet another exposition of the doctrine of the upāyas (just as I spared him that of the tattvas) and confine myself to some considerations particularly on the first two: the non-means (anupāya) and the divine means (śāmbhava). Firstly, we must remember that, according to Abh., there is no real difference between anupāya and śāmbhava — the former only representing the higher plane of the latter — and that the śāmbhava is the sole ‘direct’ means (sāksāt, TĀ I.142a), whereas, of the two others, the ānava is only a means of access to the sākta and the sākta to the śāmbhava (142b and Jayaratha’s commentary). In the non-means the adept immediately establishes himself at the centre of the supreme consciousness without the need of a jumping off point. The teaching of a master pronounced once only, or a series of arguments, or faith in the scriptures are sufficient (TA II.49ab). Even if these causes may be endowed with succession, the phenomenon they trigger is not; in fact, in particularly privileged cases, it may arise by itself, without any of these detonators. The intensity of this state of penetration is such that even a mere chance encounter with a subject who has entered it may in certain cases determine instantaneous liberation (II.40). Everything appears dis-

54 Which shows that the early Pratyabhijñā texts continued to be studied also independently of Abh.’s interpretation.

55 One of the most concise and clear enunciations is to be found in the Tantroccaya: (anupāya) p. 161 tatra sa paramesvaraprakāśah kasyacid avirataprabandhatayā punar upāyanarapeksatayā bhāti ekavāram gurucaranam ādṛśam samyag avadhārya; (śāmbhava) p. 163 kasyacit tu paramesvaraprakāśas tadādyām svātantryaśaktau nirjñātyām prakāśate [...] ahamsvātantryasaktihāsitaviśvābhāsaḥ paramesvaro vibhur eko nitya iti muhur muhur bhāvayan sa eva; (sākta) p. 165 yasya tv ittham apy avikalpakah samāvēso nodeti sa savikalpabhāvanayā sattarkāpyāḥ samskurute vikalpam; (ānava) p. 167 yas tu sattarkena na nirmalāsvabhāvam āsādayati tasya dhīyānādikum ucayate.

56 TĀV I p. 182 sa eva parām kāśṭhām prāptaḥ cânupāya ity ucayate.

57 The expression ‘non-means’ is not to be taken literally; it alludes to the far more subtle nature of this means — which, however, remains such — with respect to the others (cf. TĀ II.2-3 and Jayaratha’s commentary).
solved in the Bhairavic fire of consciousness to him who has entered this state (II.35).

While this kind of samāveṣa⁵⁸ concerns the innermost aspect of consciousness, in the divine means the stress falls on its power of Freedom (TSā p. 10, Tantroccaya p. 163), or its manifesting as the universe. Here there is indeed a means-end relation, though in a very subtle form. The adept can start from any aspect of the knowable, taken in its dimension that is closest to consciousness and not yet differentiated from it, and see it as an image reflected in a mirror – distinct but inseparable from its support. This experience, strictly devoid of discursive representations characterized by the scission between subject and object, rests on the Lord’s power of Volition, in which the manifestation is still completely enclosed within the desire to create: “All is born of me, is reflected in me, is inseparable from me” (TĀ III.280ab). Unlike the anupāya where everything happens in an instant, once and for ever, this experience is to be repeated essentially the same and progressively extended to all the aspects of reality (TĀ III.274 ff.). Through repetition and succession (TĀV II p. 1 sāmbhavopāyaṁ krumaprāptam, TĀ III.271a bhūyo bhūyah, Tantroccaya p. 163 muhur muhuh) the adept reaches liberation in life, the fourth state. One can only speak of liberation in life with respect to the divine means; in the anupāya it cannot even be said that one is somehow liberated from something; in it, means and end coincide (TĀ III.272-73).

The Pratyabhijñā is traditionally connected with the anupāya. Abh. does not say this explicitly; he just refers, towards the end of the treatment of the anupāya, to two authorities: the Ürmimahāśāstra and masters such as Somānanda etc. Regarding the latter, Jayaratha’s commentary only mentions the ŚD and quotes the well-known passages VII.101cd and VII.5-6, the second of which, moreover, also appear through in the final stanza of Āhnika II of the TĀ. In fact, it is Somānanda who expressly mentions ekavaram (VII.5c), which constitutes one of the essential features of the anupāya (which always takes place sakṛd ‘once and for ever’). The central teaching of the Pratyabhijñā seems less extreme: we might say a sāmbhavopāya in the broad sense which leaves room within it for both experiences – sovereignty

⁵⁸ Even though the modern authors sometimes tend to use upāya and samāveṣa as synonyms, an obvious distinction between them remains (cf. TSā p. 9 pāra-meśvara samāveṣo nirupāyaka eva, etc.).
and complete dissolution in the I, *turya* and *turyātiśa*, seen as forms of liberation in life. The end of the Pratyabhijñā is, indeed, *jīvanmukti* (IPVr on IV.16 *etatparīśilanena śivatāśeṣā jīvann eva mukto bhavati*) - a condition which Abh. does not connect with the *anupāya* but with the *śāmbhava* (Tā III.272). The Pratyabhijñā furnishes a series of preliminary arguments to the act of recognition, which, though with a different intensity, is at the basis of both the *anupāya* and the *śāmbhava*. In fact, also the *anupāya* requires ‘purification through the composition of a series of arguments’ (TĀ II.49a *yukti-pracarya-sastraṁ mārjanavāsat*)\(^{59}\), and, in the ambit of the *śāmbhavopāya*, Jayaratha (TĀV I pp. 239-40 on TĀ I.216) notes that it is only thanks to the teaching that leads to the recognition of the true nature of the self that these practices can be productive, while those same states exempt from discursive representations which from time to time are spontaneously produced in the unaware and fettered subject (*pāṣu*) remain sterile.

Also the practice outlined in ĪPK IV.11, with its emphasis on *vikalpa-pahāṇa* and *krama*\(^{60}\), is typically *śāmbhava*. Kṣemarāja in PH p. 40 makes this clearly understood by quoting this passage to illustrate an experience he defines *vikalpa-āniṣcicchintaka-tvāna praśamayam*, which echoes the definition of *śāmbhavasamāvesa* in MV II.21.

But in the ĪPK other means are also taught. If we want to read it in the light of Abh.’s systemization, we will have to classify as *ānava* the practices and experiences centring on the vital breaths hinted at in III.2.19-20 and recognize in the experience described in IV.12 – “He who, having all as his essence, thus knows: ‘All this multiform deployment is mine’, he, even in the flow of mental constructs, attains the state of Maheśa” – the elements that characterize the *śāktopāya*, i.e. the progressive purification of discursive representation and its transfor-

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\(^{59}\) Abh. is referring here, according to Jayaratha (TĀV I p. 41), to the recognition of the identity of the individual self and of the Lord, attained through the demonstration of his own theses and the invalidation of opposing ones, and therefore precisely to the ĪPK. The later Śaiva tradition was to connect the name of Utp. with the work of constituting these logical arguments; cf. *Mahānayaprakāśa* (Trivandrum) III.64b *yukti-attra-vivicca-śanaḥ*.

\(^{60}\) This gradual process of attenuation and elimination of the *vikalpa* – explains the *vṛtti* – is grafted onto an experience in which the creation of the Lord appears in all clarity and devoid of *vikalpa*, since the idea of differentiation does not arise (*bhedānudayaḥ vikalpojñitā spastavabhāṣā ca*; cf. IPV I pp. 34-35). Thanks to this practice the adept becomes *anavaratani-vikalpaka-saṁvedanaratnamālāḥ bhūṣitahṛdayaḥ* (ĪPVIII III p. 389).
mation into pure reflective awareness (Śivopādhyāya is explicit in concluding his commentary on VBH 109, p. 95, where this verse is quoted as an authority: iyam śākti bhūḥ).

The teaching of the Pratyabhijñā, in both its aspects of philosophical elaboration and spiritual achievement, was transmitted by Abh. and his disciple Kṣemarāja, thus influencing the diverse currents of Tantric Śaivism which, either explicitly or implicitly, were to tend to model their theoretical structure upon it.

The case of Kṣemarāja deserves special mention. With the PH he composes a kind of catechism, of Pratyabhijñā in nuce, addressing the many who would have been unable to deal with the dialectical subtleties of the major work (the IPK and its commentaries). In the PH – a work perhaps modest in itself, but important because of its wide circulation and the influence it exerted especially over the Śaiva-sākta schools of South India (cf. Mahēśvarānanda; the texts connected with the Tripūra school etc.) – we witness a kind of apotheosis of the Pratyabhijñā: from a single school accepted and valued within the great synthesis of Abh.'s Trika it ends up by constituting the very framework, in which Kṣemarāja also inserts teachings from other schools, especially the Krama.

**The Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā and its Commentaries**

The IPK – which made the name of Utp. famous – must have been an early work, given the fact that all his other philosophical writings presuppose it and contain specific references to it.

His other works include the following. ŚDVṛ, named Padasaṅgati in the third introductory verse (Mahēśvarānanda calls it by this name in the MMP), which has come down to us only up to IV.74. ĪŚ and vṛtti: a demonstration of the existence of the Lord written from a Naiyāyika viewpoint, arguing against Mimāṃsā, Sāṁkhya and Buddhists. SS and vṛtti: the exposition of his own conception of relation against the oppos-

61 Cf. the vṛtti: parāmarśamātrān aśeṣān vikalpān sampādayataḥ. See also the commentaries on this verse by Abh. (ĪPP III p. 393 vikalpā avikalpā bhavanti) and by Kṣemarāja (PH p. 28 śuddhavikalpaśaktiṃ ullāsayanti).
62 The Yoginīthrdaya-Setubandha and Lakśmīrāma’s commentary on the Parātrimsikā call it Śaktisūtra.
63 On the possible connection of Utp. with the Krama see above p. XXX n. 43.
ing theories, especially the Buddhist ones (see below pp. 95 ff.). APS: restatement of his conception of subjectivity and its relation with object, first expressed in the ĪPK\textsuperscript{64}. The SSĀ deserves a separate mention\textsuperscript{65}: twenty mystical hymns composed by Utp. at different times during his life and later collected and ‘edited’ by his disciples\textsuperscript{66}. In them, moments of exaltation alternate with moments of discouragement, enriching and cracking the mask of the impeccable theologian of the major works\textsuperscript{67}.

Utp. devoted two commentaries to the ĪPK, a short one (vṛtti) – edited and translated here – and a long one (vivṛtti or ṭīkā)\textsuperscript{68}, of which only fragments have come down to us (Torella 1988). Neither of these is really and truly a word for word commentary. The vṛtti confines itself to presenting the content of the stanzas in another form and briefly pointing out its implications; the vivṛtti takes the kārīkās and the vṛtti as its starting point and often develops into far-reaching excursuses. The link between the sūtras and the vṛtti is a particularly close one. Despite the fact that they are presented as being artificially differentiated, they substantially constitute a single work, since – according to Abh. (ĪPVV I pp. 16, 183) – they were composed at the same time. Proof of this lies in the fact that the namaskāra, present in the sūtras, is not repeated at the beginning of the vṛtti, whereas it is in the ĥīkā (ibid. pp. 2-3). This makes the vṛtti specially important for grasping the ‘original’ meaning of

\textsuperscript{64} The commentary that Utp. certainly composed on this work (see MMP p. 133) has not come down to us.

\textsuperscript{65} Śāstraparāmarśa v. 8 (cit. Pandey 1963: 163 n. 3) “There are, it is true, everywhere thousands of rivers of beautiful verses, but none of them resembles the divine river of the Stotrāvalī”.

\textsuperscript{66} Two other verses attributed to him, but not included in the SSĀ, are quoted in the Mahānayaprukāśa of Śītikantha p. 12 (yat kimcit eva bhūtānām bhavāvaranam prati / na kimcid eva bhaktānām bhavādvaranam //; sarvasamvinnadibhe-dādhinnaviśrāntimūrtaye / namah pramatvapuse śivacaitanyasindhave //, see also Bhāvopahāravivarana p. 43); Yoginihrdayadipikā p. 287, after quoting the latter verse as belonging to the Parāpañcāśikā, quotes another one (yatra yatra militā maricayah / yatra tatra vihhur eva jṛmbhate //) and attributes it to the Stotrāvalī (is it that by Utp.?).

\textsuperscript{67} The MS given as ‘Mantrasāra by Upaladeva’ in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Library, indicated by Rastogi (1979:134) as a possible unpublished work of Utp., actually contains the PTLV. of Abh., whose second verse says, in fact, sadāgamapraṇāḥṣu bahuḍhā vyākṛtam trikam / śirinadutpaladeviyam tantrāsāram tu vanyate //.

\textsuperscript{68} Its length must have been equivalent to 6000 or 8000 ślokas (Torella 1988: 141).
the stanzas. In the śikā, which was composed later on, we already find multiple interpretations of the same verse, all considered equally possible but evidently being the outcome of further reflections.

The kārikās, the vṛtti and the śikā represent three distinct and relatively autonomous stages in the exposition of the Pratyabhijñā doctrine and, accordingly, it is as though Utp. has taken three different roles (bhūmikā) - kārikā, sūtrakāra, vṛttikāra and śikākāra (IPVV I pp. 2-3) - almost three different persons, capable of dialoguing and disputing with each other, and yet remaining within the higher unity of the granthakāra or sāstrakāra. The kārikās, the vṛtti and the śikā are seen by Utp. in the śikā - as we can gather from the IPVV - as respectively linked to the three planes of Paśyantī, Madhyamā and Vaikharī on which the Supreme Word (Parāvāc) is articulated. On the supreme plane the essence of the doctrine still lies in the consciousness of its author Utp., undivided from Śiva, and it is given the name of 'heart', precisely because of its quintessential nature. On the Paśyantī plane it takes the form of sūtra, insofar as a differentiation begins to be outlined (āsūtranā), which is necessary if it is to become an object to be taught and explained to other men. Then, on the Madhyamā plane, the essence is disclosed (unmīlita) in the vṛtti and finally, on the Vaikharī plane - which corresponds to the vivṛti - having now become clear through the refutation of the opponents' possible objections, it is fully differentiated and thus accessible to the comprehension of all (IPVV I p. 16).

To this distinction between the planes of the doctrine corresponds the diversity of levels in the recipients of the teaching. Both the sūtras and the vṛtti are aimed at those who are not impregnated with the latent traces of their earlier adhesion to other doctrines. The study of the sūtras-vṛtti as a whole prepares them for the subsequent phase which consists in the study of the sūtras alone, independently of the vṛtti. On the contrary, those who are under the influence of erroneous conceptions deriving from the profession of different doctrines, are obliged to follow the whole course beginning with the śikā. When the śikā has removed these errors, they can have access to the sūtras accompanied by the vṛtti, and subsequently to the sūtras taken alone, until they reach the heart of the doctrine in identity with the consciousness of the sāstrakāra (ibid.).

Abh. devoted two of his most important works to the doctrines of Utp. The one (Vimarsīṇī) is a commentary on the stanzas alone, the other (Vivṛtivimarśīṇī) a commentary on the vivṛti or śikā, which, as we have seen, was in its turn a commentary of the complex kārikās-vṛtti. No commentaries predating Abh.'s have come down to us, even though an
exegetic tradition must already have existed (cf. İPVV II p. 210), which was probably only oral. From Abh.'s sporadic annotations we come to know that the texts of the Pratyabhijñā were already beginning in his time to present some doubtful readings and variants for some points were already circulating.

Information on the chronological order of Abh.'s two commentaries is contradictory. What would appear to be the more natural sequence - first the lengthy commentary on the tikā and then a reduction of the vast and varied material to a smaller size and a more concise and incisive form – seems to be confirmed by what Bhāskara says at the beginning of his sub-commentary (I p. 3). But Bhāskara has not proved to be a reliable source in this respect, since he later (Bh I p. 316) does not hesitate to invert the order. However, a passage from the İPVV, which unequivocally mentions the Vimarsini, is decisive on this point.

Abh.'s contribution to the Pratyabhijñā - in the light of what can be inferred from the hints at and quotations of the tikā contained in the İPVV and other passages of the tikā which have been handed down to us in various ways – appears far less original than is generally thought. Despite the inevitable difficulty in reading a text like the İPVV, which is an extensive and diffuse commentary on a work that has not come down to us, it seems clear that the majority of the themes and subjects that Abh. touches on find their direct correspondence – or at least their starting point – in Utp.'s tikā. In fact, the İPV itself, which according to Abh. is intended to be a commentary on what the kārikās are in themselves, accomplishes its task through a carefully gauged and considered systematization of a rich speculative material whose early origin is to be glimpsed in the tikā. In his interpretation of the stanzas Abh. essentially echoes the interpretation or interpretations of Utp., sometimes enriching them with new arguments. He only diverges from Utp. in four instances

69 The later authors often refer to one or the other of the three texts (İPK, vr̥tti and vivṛtti) only by the mention 'iti pratyabhijñāyām'.

70 On this basis Pandey 1963: 32 maintains the priority of the İPVV.

71 The first passage, too, was incorrect in considering the ŠDVr as the first of Utp.'s works, whereas, on the contrary, it often refers to the İPK and its commentaries.

72 III p. 230 anenaiva āsayena asmābhīḥ śaṭravimarsīnヴィyām ekarasatvena idam śuṭram vyākkhyātam, iha tu yāvadgati vicārayitum ittham vībhāgena apeksā vyākkhyātā.

73 İPV I p. 39 asmākam tu śuṭravyākhyāna eva udyamah.
(I.3.4b bhrānter arthaśhitīḥ katham; I.4.4ab naiva hy anubhavo bhāti smṛtau pūrvo ’rthavat prthak; I.7.1c akramāṇantacitrāpurā; II.4.10d sthīrāsvārthakriyākāram) – in the last instance this is explicitly declared; see p. 179 n. 14 – but in none of them is the overall thread of discourse significantly altered. Discrepancies are sometimes to be found between the text of the kārikās and vṛtti as has been established here on the basis of the MS tradition and Abh.’s quotations from it. This is often due to the fact that these are not actual quotations, but paraphrases, which sometimes expand and sometimes contract the text; at other times, it is a question of errors that have crept into the MS tradition of the IPVVV or of errors already present in the text of the vṛtti that Abh. had before him (see the Apparatus).

That the IPV of Abh. ended up by eclipsing all the other commentaries – including those by Utp. himself74 – and that it has become established as the standard commentary, thanks both to its intrinsic quality and to its author’s great prestige, may also be seen from the fact that it is the only one for which sub-commentaries were composed, such as the vyākhyā of Bhāskarakantha or the anonymous commentary in the Madras Government Oriental MSS Library75, and others only extant in fragmentary MSS, like the IPV-vyākhyā in Trivandrum Library (No.15413C) or the IPV-anvayadipikā (by one Śādhānanda?) in Mysore Library (No.B.187 of the old Catalogue)76.

74 This is proved by the scant MS tradition of these works (only one complete MS of the vṛtti and a short fragment of the tika have come down to us) and the very few quotations from them. While Kṣemarāja and Jayaratha (obviously, besides Abh.) show their knowing the tika, also independently of the IPVVV, the only mentions of the vṛtti I am aware of are in late works and by authors belonging to South India (Maheśvarānanda and Kṛṣṇadāsa; see text notes p. 1 n. 9 and p. 63 n. 218.

75 I have learnt from N. Rastogi that the edition of this text was prepared long ago by K.C.Pandey and himself, but its publication has been as yet stopped by problems concerning precisely this joint authorship.

76 There are also at least two other (late) commentaries on the kārikās alone, one by Nāgānanda in the Adyar Library (No.28. B. 24, mentioned in Raghavan 1981: 31) and the other by the Kashmirian Bhaṭṭāraka Sundara (IPKaumudi; Research Department Library, Srinagar, No.1083). The colophon of a MS of the vṛtti (see below p. LIII) mentions Bhaṭṭāraka Sundara as he who would have composed a commentary to take the place of the final part of Utp.’s vṛtti (missing in all the Kashmirian MSS). During my last visit to Srinagar, I tried – without success – to see the MS of the Kaumudi, possibly misplaced.
BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

The ĪPK with Utp.’s vṛtti has been edited in the KSTS (see Bibliography); the text of the vṛtti, corrupt in many points, breaks off at the beginning of III.2.9. The text of the kārikās is obviously included also in the two editions of the ĪPV and in that of the ĪPVV.

The kārikās have been integrally translated into English (twice: Pandey 1954, together with the ĪPV; Kaw 1975-76); partially – Jñānādhikāra and āhnikā I of the Kriyādhikāra – into German (Frauwallner 1962). The vṛtti has never been translated.

If I chose to quote the ĪPV according to the edition which also contains Bhāskara’s sub-commentary, it was not because of my considering it the more correct (it is rather the opposite!), but only in order to be able to give a single reference for both texts.

XLV
ABOUT THIS EDITION

This edition is based on nine MSS (and the comparison with the incomplete text edited in the KSTS). Of these, eight are in Śāradā script and are indicated with the letters from Gh to T (the MSS K Kh G are those used for the KSTS ed.; the reference to them is limited to the readings quoted in the foot-notes of that edition). The ninth MS, marked with the siglum T, comes from Kerala and is in Malayalam characters.

A first division is to be made between the MS T — on the one hand — which is the only one complete and generally gives better readings, and the Śāradā MSS — on the other — which all break off at the same point (beginning of the vṛti on III.2.9), have lacunae and corrupted passages and, in general, less satisfactory readings (cf. text notes Jñānādhiṅkāra 35, 41, 59, 72, 92, 279, 293, 371, 384, 388, 381, 408, 417, 461; Kriyā° 8, 89, 148, 151, 155, 167, 170, 181, 186; Āgama° 9, 39, 46, 64, 74, 77; etc.).

Moreover, within the Śāradā MSS (dating from XVII to XIX century) we can distinguish between a very homogeneous group of seven — Gh N C Ch Jh Ň T (to which we may add K Kh G) — and J. This MS, though sharing many of the features common to the seven others, is the only one that shows a considerable amount of readings identical with, or sometimes similar to, those only found in T (cf. text notes Jñāna° 53, 105, 237, 242, 263, 281, 322, 383, 404, 427, 432, 444, 445, 449; Kriyā° 21, 43, 70, 87, 116, 120, 130, 159, 165, 218; etc.).

Already on the basis of these first considerations it is possible to attempt to outline a stemma codicum, bearing however in mind the factors of uncertainty determined by the peculiar features of the Indian MS tradition, and particularly of the Kashmiri one. The transmission of texts in Śāradā script (as pointed out by Bühler 1877) is normally the work not of simple scribes or devotees, unaware of the content of what they are copying, but of learned pandits, of scholars, who mostly do not limit themselves to passively copying the MSS, but compare them with others, record various readings in the margin, choose between alternative readings found in the exemplar, make – explicitly or not – emendations of their own. Moreover, in the case in question, they often have before
them – besides other MSS of the *vr̥tti* – also other commentaries on the ĪPK, first of all the ĪPV which seems to be felt as the standard one, as the inclusion in the text of glosses drawn from it and sometimes the partial or complete reproduction of its colophons shows (see below)¹. In spite of these difficulties, met with in any contaminated tradition, the picture that comes out is relatively clear, at least in outline.

We start from a work which probably did not have a large circulation and was reproduced in few copies. The scrutiny of the extant MSS permits us to assume an archetype [a] in Śāradā characters, complete, which however some corruptions have already crept into (at least those indicated in *Jñānādhikāra* text notes 92 and 167, *Kriyā* 155 and 205)². This MS, or a faithful apograph of it, was brought from Kashmir to

¹ N even reproduces large portions of the ĪPV in the margin and between the lines. In other cases (Kh G) it is the *vr̥tti* that may be found in the margin of a MS of the ĪPV.

² Abh. in the ĪPV had already noticed various readings in the MSS of the *vr̥tti* at his disposal.
Kerala, probably around XII-XIII century when the Trika school spread over South India. T derives from it, although not directly. The exemplar of T (which belongs to XVIII century) was already in Malayalam script, for some mistakes in T can be explained as misreadings of Malayalam characters. The good quality of T is a further example of the high standard of the Kerala MS tradition. From [a] at least another MS also derives, which was probably the only one that later survived Muslim invasion, although with the loss of the last portion; we shall refer to it as the hyparchetype [b]. From [b], incomplete and with a certain number of corruptions but still relatively correct, derive J and the hyparchetype [c]. In this manner it is possible to explain, on the one hand, the many readings that J, alone, shares with T and, on the other, the still more substantial affinity of J with the other Śāradā MSS. As regards the latter, which constitute a very compact family, we may assume a common ancestor, i.e. the hyparchetype [c], which further corruptions have crept into. Besides these corruptions shared by the whole family, there are some others that are peculiar to single MSS or groups of them. Probably, it would be possible to go farther on and identify genetic connections within the family K Kh G Gh N C Ch Jh Nh T, too. But, at this point, the contamination of the MSS and the scribes’ work of collation and emendation makes this attempt rather complicated and its result, anyhow, doubtful. These considerations and, above all, the awareness that such further investigation is bound not to have any direct bearing on the establishment of the text have induced me to refrain from it.

For this edition the testimony of IPVV, which sometimes quotes literally, sometimes paraphrases or simply gives the contents of the vṛtti, has been largely made use of. Since it mostly proves invaluable in confirming or discarding a reading, choosing among equivalent ones, or even helping to restore passages corrupt in all MSS, I have decided to include it in the critical apparatus on a par with the MSS, though being well aware that in so doing I have departed from the established usage of classical philol-

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3 A passage from the Jñānādhisthikāra seems particularly fit to illustrate the progressive corruption from [a] to the above group of Śāradā MSS (cf. text note 405): °jñānānubhavena na bhinnasyātītasya rūpyajñānasyāprāmāṇyam (correct reading, only found in T), °jñānānubhavena bhinnasya rūpyajñānasyāprāmāṇyeye sā J, °jñānānubhave jñānasyāprāmāṇye sā N, jñānasyāprāmāṇye sā Gh Ch (°syād ) Jh Nh T (C Jh then corrected into the reading J).

4 See, for instance, the isolated concordances of single MSS with correct readings only found in T (T Jñāna° n. 253; C Jñāna° n. 395; Ch Jh Kriyā° n. 118; etc.).
ogy. But I have preferred to put together in a single apparatus what (MSS and testimonia) is in this case equally important for the constitution of the text, so that the reader is not compelled to continually go from one apparatus to the other.

Abh.'s commentary composed around 1015 represents the oldest evidence for our text – older than any extant MS. This constitutes its unique importance; however, I have made a cautious use of it and followed it only when I could find some kind of support in the MSS. For in many a case, even when IPVVV seems to quote literally, it is apparent from the MSS evidence that Abh. is giving a text either approximately remembered, or reworded, or mixed with his own glosses. In these cases, if all the MSS agree on a different but equally satisfactory (and often more concise) reading, I have accepted the latter.

I have followed the division of the text into *adhidaksas* and *adhnikas*, as in the IPV and IPVV, though the MSS vary greatly on this point, some of them even showing no division at all. I have given the colophons in the simplest form, like that often found in T. There is some doubt as regards the *Tattvasamgrahādhikāra*, which is taken by the IPV as consisting of a single *ādhnīka* whilst the IPVV divides its commentary on the *adhidāra* into two *vīmarṣas* (third and fourth, first and second being devoted to the two *ādhnikas* of the *Āgamādhihikāra*). In the respective introductions the IPVV refers separately to 15 (IPVV III p. 355) and 3 *ślokas* (ibid. p. 400). Considering that no MS of the *vṛtti* shows a division into two *ādhnikas* and that this division might have been introduced by the *ṭīkā* – which the IPVV directly refers to –, I have taken this *adhidāra* as a unitary section.

In the text, < > angle brackets enclose what has been added to the transmitted text by conjecture; [ ] square brackets indicate editorial deletions. No mark has been used for conjectural emendations of transmitted readings; they are acknowledged as such and accounted for in the Apparatus. *Sandhi* has been normalized.

5 IPV II p. 280 [...]*āgamārthasamgraham ślokāṣṭadaśakena darśayati “svātmaitava sarvajantūnāṁ” ityādīna “upalenaṇopādītā” ity antenaikāśāṅnikena.
6 Of the MSS, only J T correctly divide the *Āgamādhihikāra* into two *ādhnikas*.
7 In fact, it is only C N that mention the name of the *Tattvasamgrahādhikāra*.
8 I have only occasionally dealt with the peculiar varieties of *sandhi*, scribal mistakes etc. in the Śāradā and Malayalam MS tradition.
The MSS K Kh G are described in KSTS Ed. as follows: "(K) Ms. belongs to Pandit Harabhatta Shastri. On Kashmiri paper in Sharada character. Size 10" × 6". It is in the Talapatra form. (Kh) and (G) Ms. – These are, in fact, the Manuscripts of the Ishvarapratyabhijna-Karakas with the Vimarshini and their margins contain the Vrtti in question. The Ms. (Kh) belongs to Rajanaka Maheshvara. In Sharada character, on old Kshmiri paper. Correct. Size 1/4 foolscap, paper-bound. The (G) Ms. – Got on loan from Pandit Rama Kokila, a well known Pandit of Srinagar. Size 1/4 foolscap, bound in leather, almost without mistakes, on old Kashmiri paper, in beautiful Sharada character." (p. 3). The printed edition is referred to in the Apparatus as E.
measuring cm. 18.7 × 14.1. It has been profusely annotated by a different hand with single glosses or long passages (mostly drawn from the IPV) between the lines and often entirely covering the margins. There is only a division into adhikāras; within each of them the numeration of the kārikās is continuous. Between ff. 35 and 40 there are a few pages without glosses. A passage based on the IPV is inserted in the text between f. 2a line 8 and f. 2b line 6.

Beginning: (The first page is missing) ṭheśvare ājadātmā ... (kār. 1.1.2).

End: same passage as in Gh; then the remaining kārikās without commentary. Finally: samāpteyam pratyabhiñā / śubham astu sarvajagatām.

C

Research Department Library, Srinagar, No. 892.

The MS is on paper, written in Śāradā characters, consisting of 23 folios numbered on the verso from 1 to 23, mostly with 21 lines per page (sometimes 17-19), measuring cm. 25.6 × 17.1. Sporadic corrections and glosses by other hands in the margins. There is only a division into adhikāras; within each of them the numeration of the kārikās is continuous; sometimes a different hand notes the end of the āhnika in the margin.

Beginning: om namah śivāya.

End: same passage as in Gh; then the remaining kārikās without commentary. Finally: tattvasamgrahādhiṅkāraḥ // iti śrīmadutpaladevacāryaviracitā pratyabhiñāvṛttiḥ samāpto (sic) śivāya namah // āditaḥ ślokāni 190.

Ch

Research Department Library, Srinagar, No. 1672.

The MS is on paper, written in Śāradā characters, consisting of 30 folios numbered on the verso from 1 to 22 only, measuring cm. 25.2 × 16.5. It is divided into three portions written by different hands, apparently in different periods.

First part: ff. 1-11a. 13 lines per page. It begins with: om namo gurave / om. Some glosses by different hand in the margin only in few pages. The vṛtti on each kārikā is introduced by atra vṛttiḥ. Division into āhnikas. The colophons are as follows. iti pūrvapaksavṛttiḥ; paradarśanānupappatiḥ; smṛtiśaktinirūpanām caturtham.
Second part: ff. 11b-22b. 14-18 lines per page, neither glosses nor corrections. F. 13 is missing, lacuna from $\text{š}k\text{ā}l\text{ā}spār\text{s}āt$ (vṛtti I.5.14) to ātmasabdāc cāham iti (vṛtti I.5.17). Colophons: iti śrīmadācārīyābhīnavaguptaviracitāyāṃ prayābhījñāśūtravimārsīnīyāṃ jñānasaktinirūpanāṃ pāñcamam āhnikam; iti śrīmadācārīyābhīnavaguptā$^\circ$ etc. apohāsaktinirūpanam saṣṭham āhnikam. The colophons of the six āhnikas are derived from IPV; the portions of ślokas found at the beginning of each āhniκa also come from the opening ślokas in the IPV. No division between āhnikas VII and VIII.

Third part: ff. 23-31a. 23-28 lines per page. Some glosses in the margins drawn from the ĪPVV. Neither division into āhnikas nor numeration of verses. End: same passage as in Gh; then the remaining kārikās without commentary. Finally: sampūrṇeyam (sic) prayābhījñāśāstram.

J

Research Department Library, Srinagar, No. 1662.

The MS is on paper, written in Śāradā characters, consisting of 37 folios numbered on the verso from 1 to 37, with 21 lines per page, measuring cm. 13,4 × 16,9. Corrections in the margins or between the lines, generally tending to replace the readings that J shares with T with those found in the other Śāradā MSS. The numeration of the kārikās is continuous, but there is a division into āhnikas within each adhikāra; the colophons are derived from the IPV.

Beginning: om namaḥ śivāya.

End: same passage as in Gh; then, kār. III.2.10.

Jh

Research Department Library, Srinagar, No. 860

The MS is on paper, written in Śāradā characters, consisting of 22 folios numbered on the verso from 1 to 24, with 16-17 lines per page (from f.13 onwards, 20 lines), measuring cm. 21,9 × 14,8. F. 17 (from II.3.1 idam etādrg ity evam to II.3.7 aviruddhāvabhasānām eka$^\circ$) and f. 20 (from II.4.9 kramena janayed ghaṭam to vṛtti II.4.9 tataḥ parti$^\circ$) are missing. Some folios are misplaced. Notes and corrections by different, much more recent, hands in the margins and between the lines. The numeration of the kārikās is continuous; no division into āhnikas.

Beginning: om namaḥ mahāṃśyeśvaryai // om namaḥ śivāya saśivāya śivadāya namaḥ namaḥ.
End: same passage as in Gh; then the remaining kārikās without commentary. Finally: śrīmatsundarabhaṭṭārakena pratyabhijñāvṛttiḥ sampūrṇikṛteṣu śubham astu devādīnāṁ mānusyakītānāṁ ।

Ñ

Research Department Library, Srinagar, No. 2352

The MS is on paper, written in Śāradā characters, consisting of 16 folios numbered on the verso from 1 to 16, with 22 lines per page, measuring cm. 26 × 17.9. Neither division into āhnikas nor numeration of verses. Rare corrections in the margins.

Beginning: om sṛgurur jayati om sṛmān paramaśivo jayatitamāṁ ॥

End: same passage as in Gh; then the remaining kārikās without commentary. Finally: tattvasamgrahādhikāraḥ iti śrīmadutpaladevācāryaviracitā pratyabhijñāvṛttiḥ

Ṭ

University of Baroda, Central Library, Sanskrit Division, No. 807.

The MS is on paper, written in Śāradā characters, consisting of 56 folios numbered on the verso from 1 to 55 (no number on the last folio), with 12 lines per page. Neither division into āhnikas nor numeration of verses. Rare corrections by other hand in the margins.

Beginning: om sṛgaṇesāya namah om namah śivāya (to be noted: f. 14a in the margin: om namo bhagavate vāsudevāya).

End: same passage as in Gh; then the remaining kārikās without commentary. Finally: sampūṛṇeyam pratyabhijñāśāstram / śubham astu / śivāyom namāḥ.

T

Oriental Research Institute and Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum, No. 8900A.

The MS is in palm-leaves, written in Malayalam characters², consisting of 21 folios (corresponding to ff. 4-24 of the whole codex), with 11-12

² P.L. Shaji, MSS Assistant, provided me with a devanāgarī transcript. The collation of the MS, however, is based on my own reading of the Malayalam text. In this connection, I would like to tell a very instructive story, which should caution against

LIII
lines per page, measuring cm. 27.2 × 7.5. According to the information kindly supplied by P.L. Shaji, the MS was collected by Ramasubha Shastri, Kadinamangalam, from Chirakkal Palace Library on 9/9/1941. On paleographic evidence, it is not later than XVII-XVIII century. The ĪPVr begins on f. 4b, l.2, after an incomplete anonymous work dealing with the theories of error. The palm-leaves have become dark, especially at the edges, from which small fragments are missing here and there; in some places they have been eaten by insects. No numeration of verses; there is a division into āhnikas, with some inconsistencies (prathamam āhnikam; dvitiyam ... etc.; iti jñānādhihikāraḥ; navamam āhnikam; dasamam āhnikam; kriyādhihikāre ṭrtiyan; dvādasamam āhnikam; kriyādhihikāraḥ; āgamādhihikāre prathamāhnikam; āgamādhihikāraḥ; neither division into āhnikas, nor mention of the title for the last adhikāra). The MS often has voiceless stops instead of (correct) voiced stops, evidently due to the absence of the latter class of sounds from the scribe's own language (i.e. Malayalam).

Beginning: kathamcid āsādyā .... (kār.I.1.1)

End: samāpteyam iśvarapratyahhi dhīnāvrttiḥ //bhṛūnām abhayaprado bhavahhayākrandasya hetus tato hṛṛdhāmni prathitabhīravarucām īśo 'ntakasyāntakah / bheraṃ vāyati yas suyoginivahas tasya prabhur bhairavo viśvasmin hharanādikṛd vijayate vijnānarūpāḥ parah / śubham.

The sigle E in the Apparatus refers to the printed edition.

the widespread practice of working with South Indian MSS using devanāgarī copies. Prof. H. Alper (whose untimely death in 1987 saddened all of us) came across this MS, too. Having realized its importance but not knowing Malayalam script, he asked for and obtained — through the good offices of Prof. K. Kunjunni Raja — a transcript by a pandit of Madras. When Alper came to know that I was already working on the ĪPVr, he was so kind as to send me his transcript. The comparison of the pandit's transcript and mine was startling. The differences were so many as to make me doubt about my actual understanding of Malayalam. Thus, I carefully checked some portions of both transcripts with my photographs of the original MS. It soon became clear that the astute pandit — besides definitely having an imperfect knowledge of Malayalam script — had prepared his transcription keeping the KSTS Ed. before him: sometimes he (badly) copied from the MS, sometimes found it more practical to copy from the printed edition. Also his transcription of the last portion of the vṛtti, not available in the KSTS Ed., is very inaccurate and full of mistakes.

3 This verse is quoted in MMP p. 173 and ascribed to Kṣemarāja.
ईश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञाकारिका:  
वृत्तिसहिता:

झानाधिकारः

प्रथममाहिक्कम्

कथचिदासाय महेश्वरस्य

वायं जनस्याप्युपकारमिच्छन् ।

समस्तं संपत्समवापत्तेतुं

तत्पत्तभिज्ञामुपपावधायमि ॥ १ ॥

परमेश्वरप्रसादादवेदः  

अहमेका-  

किसंपदा लजजमानो  

जनमपीममरिलं  

सवस्वामिनं  

वक्ष्यम्-

१ sampat omitted in C.  २ parameśvaraprasādād eva cit. and commented on in ĪPVV I p. 24; cf. also ibid. p. 38 vrtau ca gurubhūtāraka 'pi parameśvaraśabdena nirdisthā.

३ The compound is partly cit. and commented on ibid. p. 21 vrtau ca sūcito 'yam artho "dāsyaśaksmih" ity anena l dāśyaprabhāvā lakṣmyah samastāḥ sampadāḥ paramēśvaramprasādāt labdhā yeyeti; on the same page cit. (from the titkā) atyantadurlabham dāsyam.

४ aham ekāksampadā lajjamānō cit. ibid. p. 27.  ५ janam api mān: janasamipam E Gh Š Ch J H N T, which probably derives from ĪPV I p. 33 upasārdhaṃ samipārthaḥ. tena janasya parameśvaradharmaśamipatākaraṇam atra phalam (sa and ma are almost identical in sāradā script).  ६ sva°: svam T N J.  ७ vaksyamānapāyena cit. ibid. p. 32.
रोपनीयम् "प्रत्यभिज्ञापयामि ॥ तस्यापि परमार्थलाभेन परितुष्येयम् ॥ ॥

कर्तिर ज्ञातिर स्वात्मन्याभिविषिद्धि महेश्वरे ।
अजहातमा निषेधधिवा सिद्धिवा वा
विदध्यत कः ॥ ॥

सर्वेषा स्वात्मः "स्वार्थविषिद्धिसमाध्रयस्य तत् स्वार्थसाधनायथानुपपरया ॥ ॥
कोडीकृतसिद्धिनः स्वप्नकाशयस्य प्रमात्रेकवपुषः ॥ ॥
पूर्वसिद्धस्य पुराणस्य ज्ञान क्रिया च ॥ स्वसंवेदनसिद्धम् ॥
एवेश्वर्यः, "तेनेवरस्य सिद्धिन निराकरणे च जहानामेवोधमकः ॥ ॥

9 tasyāpi paramārthaḥ cit. ibid. p. 30; cf. the paraphrase ibid. yena asyāpi labhena tasyeyam; paritushyeyam cit. and commented on ibid. pp. 33-4. The whole passage is quoted in Kṛṣṇadāsa’s Anuttaratriṃśikālaghurttivimarśini (ORI and MSS Library, Trivandrum, MS No. C2108 D, f. 152b).
10 sarvesām svātmānuḥ cit. in IPVV I p. 50; svātmānuḥ is indicated as a subjective genitive depending on jñānam kriya ca (kartari esā sasthi / tatkartrkam hi jñānam karanam ca, na tu sambandhasaṣṭhi).
11 sarvārthasiddhiḥ cit. ibid. p. 49; "samāśrayasya results from the paraphrase ibid. p. 52 sarve tasmāt pramātār anye ye 'rthāh tesām ya siddhī prakāsāmānaṇāt, tasyā yataḥ sa pramātā nibandhanam viśrāntiṣṭhānam vīmaṛśaṁipataya samāśrayaḥ."
12 sarvārthā omitted in E.
13 krodikrtasiddheḥ cit. and commented on ibid. p. 67 krodikrtasiddhikatvam yad uktaṃ vṛttva ādīsiddhatvasphutika-ranābhuprāyena ... tena pramatrā svātmāno nijasya rūpaṣya siddhī prakāsāḥ prameya-siddhyuva krodikrtā krodopalakṣitaḥidayarāpyatam gatā krtā hrdavyanmikṣerti arthah.
14 pūrvasiddhasya cit. ibid. p. 67.
15 pūrṇaḥsya commented on (and differentiated from the close pūrvasiddhasya) ibid. p. 51 idaṃ deśakālusvarūpaṇiṣamārūdham prathanam ya-sya nilasukhādikasya tasya bhāvas tannisedhopalakṣitaḥ san pramātā prakāśate ca prākaśiṣṭha ca prakāśīṣyate ceti yāvat / ata eva pūrṇaḥ pūrvasiddhas hetu na paryāya, pūrṇo 'pi hi na pūrvasiddhaḥ piśāca iva, pūrvasiddho 'pi na pūrṇaḥ dhūma iveti ubhāyok-tih.
16 T omits eva.
17 tena cit. ibid. p. 50.
18 jadānām evodyamah cit. ibid. p. 49 and commented on p. 78.
किंतू मोहवशायविषम् ६४ष्टेश्यपपुलक्षिते ॥ १.१ ॥
शक्तगविष्करणेन प्रत्यभिज्ञोपद्धते ॥ ३ ॥
केवलमयः ३६वसंवेदसिद्धस्य ३२शिवरस्य ३६मायायामोहाद्
२५आहदयकमतवाद् ३२असाधारणप्रभाविज्ञानरूपणेन ६४हनिःशयः
रूपं ३६प्रत्यभिज्ञानमात्रम् ६६उपद्धते ॥ ३ ॥
तथा हि जहृतानां प्रतिष्ठा जीवदायया ॥
ज्ञानं किया च भूतानः जीवतां
जीवनं मत्म ॥ ४ ॥
२२सर्वानां ६४जहाजहभेदेन ६५विनिष्ठम् । ३०तत्र जडस्वरूपम्
३४जीवनिष्ठा सिद्धः, जीवतां पुनर्जीववर्तव ३२जीवनं ज्ञानक्रिये
एव ॥ ४ ॥

19 svasamvedanasiddhasya cit. and commented on ibid. pp. 79-80 svasamvedanasiddhasya ity api vrttau gaunam drastavyam sukha디ivat anapahnarniyatam nirupayitum. 20 E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T omit api. 21 Cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 80 maha-yakto vyāmohah. 22 ahrdayagamativat cit. ibid. p. 80, where it is remarked that this causal ablative glosses the locative anupalaksīte, which is therefore a nimittasaptanī. 23 The compound is paraphrased and commented on ibid. p. 86 asādhārayam anisvare yad asambhāvyam jñātvakartrtvādi, tad eva abhijñānam ekadharmāttmakasvarūpamukhena anunidharmacitravastusvarūpapravesābhīyupāyah, abhitah svarūpasarvasvasavikāraṇa vastra jñāyate yeneti, tasya khyāpanena prathānāya. This confirms "abhijñāna" T Gh N J Jh T instead of "abhijñāpana" E C N and "abhijñānākhyānakhāpyāpanena Ch. 24 Cf. ibid. p. 86 "iyam" iti drthasaabdena, "pratyabhijñā" iti bhāvasādhanam niścayasaabdena. 25 Quoted as pratyabhijñāmātram ibid. p. 87. 26 upadarsyate cit. and commented on ibid. p. 87 atas tadvyavahāramātram api neha sādhaye, api tu upāmsu cchannam sthitam sat, upa samipe iti hrdayasamgamanenā pradhānatayā darśyate ... tena vrttau sātūranārenāiva "upadarsyate" ity uktaṃ. 27 vastānām cit. ibid. p. 88. 28 Cit. ibid. p. 95 vrttau ca jadājadabhedapadam. 29 dvaividhyam: dvaividhye C Jh T. 30 tatra cit. ibid. p. 96. 31 jivanā: jiva T; cf. ibid. p. 97 "anena" iti jadānām antarāle jivanisatādānirāpanena. 32 Cf. ibid. p. 97 "jivanasambandham" ity anena kriyāsambandho 'tra pratyutthinimitam iti hrdi nidhāya samāsakribhadditēṣu sambāṇdabhāḥdhanam iti manyamanāh satrantam jīvacchabdam sādhymānāvuparatajīvanakriyāvadabhidhāyakam sācyati । jīvatām ity upakramya jīvanam jñānakriye ity ekavacanena samvidaihyam pāramārthikam āha. jīvanam jñānakriye eva cit. ibid. p. 104. E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T invert: jivanam jīvavītam. 33 Gh N add yo janāti karoti ca jīvatīta ucyate, being a gloss drawn from IPV I p. 67.
11.5

तत्र ज्ञान स्वतः सिद्ध किया कायाधिकारी सति ।
परेक्ष्युपलक्षेत तथायन्त्रान्मृत्तेते ॥ ५ ॥

जीवतां किया कायारिवर्त्तिनीभूतान्त्रापि पत्यक्षा ,
ज्ञानमात्रवेंद्र परत्रौपसिद्धतःतिरति सिद्ध एव
स्वसंवेदनंसुविद्यतया । ० स्वपरिवोद्धरव्रोहै । पत्येय 
आलमा, तत्स्य मायाशक्तया निस्मृत्तसिद्धानाद् 
एवं विमति: ॥ ५ ॥

इत्युपोऽना: ॥

इति ज्ञानाधिकारेम प्रथममाधिक्कम् ॥

34 tatra: tathā T. 35 Instead of jīvatām ... ātmavedyam T, E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T have a text that is evidently corrupt: tatrāpi pratyakṣā(b) (pratyakṣa° C Ch) jñānam ātma- samvedyam. The text of T is supported by ṢPVV: jīvatām cit. p. 103; kriyā is mentioned p. 104; kāyaparispandaparyantibhūtā appears through the paraphrase p. 104 kāyasanda- rupatvam prāptā sati and p. 105 vṛttau ca ayam arthab pūrvavasthāsamabhavasūca- kacvipratyayaprayogena (referring to °paryantibhūtā) svikrtā; anyatatrāpi can be understood from p. 104 ... yat pramātvayatirikiṣya pramāntantarasya darśanasparśanasphuta- pratyāvaseyīti. 36 api omitted in Gh. 37 Cit., in a slightly different form, ibid. p. 108 sidhayatiī api vṛttau svaprakāṣatāmnaprādhāmaya. 38 Cf. ibid. p. 108 etac ca vṛttau “siddha eva na tu sādhyaḥ” ity anena darśitam (na tu sādhyaḥ being most probably a gloss). 39 °samvedyatayā: °siddhatayā E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T, equally good. 40 Cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 111 tasya iti karmāni ca kartari ca slesena śaśtiḥ / yah svaparaya- ahamātra-pratyayatayā nirbhāsanayo yā 'ta eva sa māyāsaktiśohitair mārkhaṇa vima- naye utkarūpa-puruddhena rūpena abhimanyate, sa eva ca śvaro vāpratipadāyate tasyāvai- sarvari kārtirvāt / ubhayatra māyāsakikram āvaranāvabhāsanam hetuḥ. 41 °pratyeya: 
°pratyaya E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 42 atma: svāmā J. 43 evam vimātiḥ: eva vimātiḥ E, also possible; eva vi... T; evamītī (then corrected to eva vimātiḥ) Gh; evam iti N C Ch J Jh N; eva mitiḥ Ch; evam probably cit. ibid. p. 111 and glossed with vāsyamānapūrva- paksarūpâyata. 44 Omitted in E C N; upadghātah is glossed ibid. p. 112.
ननु स्वल्पकानाभासं ह्यामेकं परं पुनः ।
साभिलापं विकल्पात्यं बहुधा
नापि तद्वृत्यम् ॥ १ ॥

नित्यस्य कस्यचिद् द्रष्टुस्तत्त्वान्वाभासतः ।
अहंप्रतिरत्येऽशरीरायस्यायिनी ॥ २ ॥

ह्यामेकं स्फुटं नित्याभासस्वल्पकानाभासं निर्विकल्पकं ते
कथयस्ति । अपरं तु शब्दार्थभाषणं स्मृतिसाधयोत्प्रेक्षाधिभुवेकं
विकल्पं संज्ञाम् । उभयमपेतनं युजयते बोधरूपज्ञानतिरिक्त-
स्पान्यस्य समंज्ञितत्या तत्सनायुपलब्धे । कोस्सौ रितरूपः
आत्मा । साभिलापाह्यप्रत्येऽनापि शरीराधिकवेद्यवस्तूतीणोऽ
वेदयिता न कश्चिद्लोकार्यवर्धायिते ॥ १-२ ॥

45 T adds atha purvapakṣah (Ch om pūrvapaksatayeti). 46 nityasya: anyasya T.
47 avabhāsa: avabhāsam T J, but cf. ibid. p. 118 tata eva sphuṭo desakālākārāniyo
tra artho bhāti. 48 nirvikalpam is probably to be preferred to nirvikalpam T (cf. ibid.
p. 116, where it is said that in the tīkā the form vikalpam is used in order to indicate,
by the agent suffix, the autonomy of this function and the fact that it does not require a
permanent entity as a subject; however, in the case of nirvikalpaka, the suffix might al­
so be understood as a mere samāsanta). 49 samjñām: samjñakam Jh. 50 The quotation
(from the tīkā) ibid. p. 118 āha “ubhayam api evam” ity anena prakāreṇa bodharūpam
iti creates some doubt about the reading etan, on which, however, all the MSS agree.
51 ĢPVV I p. 119 quotes as vṛtti only bodhātiriktasya, which, however, might be a deli­
berate abbreviation by Abhinavagupta. 52 tasya: asya T; tasya cit. and commented on
ibid. p. 119 tasyā ity ātmano ’nupalabdheh, tasyeti vā ubhayasya anyasambandhītayā anu­
palabdhir iti vṛttiyojanaḥ (the meaning does not change; a twofold interpretation of the
kārikā had already put forward ibid. p. 115). 53 sthirarūpa: sthira E Gh N C Ch Jh N,
equally good. 54 Cf. ibid. p. 121 vṛttāv api sahaśābdena ahampratīt abhilāpāvyabhici­
cāro darsitah and p. 120 nanu ahampratītavāsade saḥhilāpagramānam viṣeṣanam vṛttāu
kimartham iti. 55 vedayitā na vedaḥitā T Gh Ch J Jh N. 56 kaścit cit. ibid. p. 119;
lokād cit. ibid. p. 120.
तत्त्वप्रयत्नस्वरूपस्य समृद्धिस्तदनुरोधिनी । कथं भवेन्न नित्यं स्यादात्मा यथानुभवकः ॥ ३ ॥

श्लोकः ।

सत्यप्रयत्नस्वरूपस्य हेक्षत्वस्तुपु ।

समृद्धिः ॥ ४ ॥

अर्थं ॥

रासायनिक ।

नानवस्फोटम् ।

नानवस्फोटम् ॥ ४ ॥

67 satya apy atmani omitted in Ch. 68 'pi only found in T: asato 'pi cit. ibid. p. 126. Cf. the paraphrase of the whole passage in the tīkā, cit. ibid. p. 126 "katham sā nāṣtaḥ Svayam visavat" iti. 69 yadi cit. ibid. p. 126 yadiśabde-

69 yadi cit. ibid. p. 126 yadiśabde-

na athasabdasya sambhavatvam dyautyavatvam aha.
yatoh hi paurvānubhavarsakarakat srmotisambhav: 1
yayevamantarhanā kośarḥ: sptāt svāyiṇnātmanas 1 51

anubhavār sārkarasārcarā 56 ch smotiṣyamāna tān
paurvānubhavam 57 anukūrvataye vācagāhītvishay 58 tamanubhavābhāsāpati 1
59 evamātmaśāyayena knightupayoγināa sārkarāsasyātmadadeśapadajīkāraṇat
54 teṇe vac chсид: 1 51

tatbhinnēṣu dharmēṣu tattvārūpāvivēśotat: 1
sārkarat srmotisiddhi śpāt śmrta

ḍṛṣṭav kālīpita: 1 61

54 sūkhudukhānānirbhinnadhammaś 55 aṣṭamānepi ātmanoś 56 nupayoγo
bhinnēr 56 dharmaśśābhinnasya 56 anupajātāvivekāśyam smṛitaścōṇya
pūtote: 1 43 dṛṣṭārce kālpānāmaḥ saṃmētātma śrmartita: 1 61

70 ca omitted in J. 71 anukuryat eva: anukuryat E Gh N Ch J Jh N T, anukuryata C. 72 tam anubhavam abhāsāyati: tam anubhavam avabhāsāyati E C N, tam anubhavam abhāsāyati eva Ch, tam anubhāvayati T. The reading accepted (Gh N J Jh) agrees with the quotation ibid. p. 126. 73 evam: yady evam Ch. evam corrected to eva Gh. 74 Cit. ibid. p. 126 “tenaiva ca” iti samśāreṇa; ca omitted in N. 75 sukhaduhkhām cit. ibid. p. 131. 76 dharmāṣṭrayatvena: dharmatvena T T. 77 nupayoγo: nupayoγo E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T; cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 132. 78 dharmair, omitted in E N and added in the margin in C, cit. ibid. p. 131 “bhinnair dharmaś saṃbhinnasya” iti alabadha-
tadhāvamāyasi yāvat. 79 anupajātām: anujātām N. 80 Cit. and commented on ibid. p. 132 (avyāprihet) iti aḥuvrihi depending on ātmano), where a portion of the whole passage is also paraphrased “svrtaḥ avyāprteh” iti vṛttigrantham saṣṭhīantam ātmāno viśesamatvena hetuṣaṃmucayagarbham vyācaṣte / asambhimatvena anupajātaviśeṣat-
vāt pratisamdhāv ātmano nupayoγah sṛtav avyāpattavāc ca. 81 tad draṣṭravat cit. ibid. p. 132.
12.7

अथार्थस्य यथा रूपं धते बुद्धिस्तथात्मनः।
चैतन्यमजहा सैवं जाह्ये नार्थप्रकाशता॥ ८ ॥

अथार्थस्य यथा रूपं धते बुद्धिस्तथात्मनः।
चैतन्यमजहा सैवं जाह्ये नार्थप्रकाशता॥ ८ ॥

स जाह्ये यथा विषयरूपं ६० च्यायां धते
तथात्मनोपि चैतन्यच्यायम्। ६५ अतोसार्थप्रकाशः।
तथा च ६६ तस्यार्थस्वरूपमेव स्यात्। ६० एवं जान एवं सदिपे
नार्थस्य संबन्धितः, अनुपपत्ते। किंया तु ६३ न स्वरूपेनासितं
नार्थ-संबन्धितया॥ ८ ॥

82 cit: jñānacit T. 83 cetyadharmā cit. ibid. p. 136. 84 ātmana iva nityatādiprasangah cit. ibid. p. 135. 85 jñānam buddhiḥ cit. and commented on ibid. p. 154. 86 cchāyām cit. ibid. p. 154. 87 āto 'sāv arthaprakāṣāḥ cit. and commented on ibid. p. 154 “atah” iti ubhayacchāyādhatāḥ / asau buddhiḥ / arthasya prakāṣās tathālaparyanto ‘dhigama ity arthah. 88 tathā ca: tathāpi Ch; tathā ca cit. ibid. p. 174 vṛttav tathāpi arthe na anena abhyupagamavādāḥbhidhāyinā (cf. also p. 158). 89 tasyāḥ cit- svarūpaśāt syāt cit. ibid. p. 174. 90 evam cit. and commented on ibid. p. 176 evam iti sūradvayoktābhir yuktibhīḥ yah prasanga uktah, tādviparyāyena anyātārūpya anyāyāt- tasya jñānasya siddhir ity arthah. 91 sad api cit. and commented on ibid. p. 176 sad api iti vṛttav apiśabdāt uttāra-vākāśādānārthah / apiśabdhi kāmakārūpam sattve tāvād anvāvasargam dyotayān anyasāya tu sattvam api na adhyāntam sakyam iti prakatayati. 92 Even though it is not found in any MS (nānāsambandhitāya E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T, nānāsya sambandhinah T), nānāsya sambandhi is the reading that the context seems to require. This is confirmed by the quotation ibid. p. 182 tad aha “na anyasya” iti “sambandhi” iti tādāmyasyamasavāyādīnety arthah. Then the IPVV cites the words that the tīkā uses to gloss anyasya: “anyasya” iti vṛttim vivṛtnoti pāthapūrvakaṃ “ātmākhasya” iti “vastunah” iti. 93 na omitted in E. 94 na: nāpy T. The last sentence
of the vr̥tti is recalled at the beginning of the ĪRVV on the following kārikā (ibid. p. 183): svarūpena anyasambandhitayā ceti ... / yuktyā pramāṇavyāpārena bādhītatvam svarūpatata uktaṃ "na sāpy ekā kramikā" iti, anyasambandhitayā tu uktaṃ "ekasya kramikā katham bhavet". 95 T omits api, which is confirmed by the quotation ibid. p. 183 kriyāni na yuk-tā iti vṛttir vyākhyātā. 96 pūrvāparihātāvavaiṣṭā (cf. ŠDvṛ p. 91) kārakavyāpārarūpā paraphrased ibid. p. 184 kārakasya phalasiddhihetubhitakriyāṇīmattasya svakriyāpeksaya vā kartuḥ sambandhi tatsumavāyī tattāmā vā vyāpāro rūpām svam lakṣanaṃ yasyāḥ. sā kriyā āyām sambandhino bhāgāḥ pūrvāparihātāh kramavṛttāvahā iti yāvat. 97 aikākāraśāyāpāra T Ch. 97 na omitted in E. 98 Cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 191 ekā katham kramikā iti sūtram sputayātītām vṛttīvā krāmakrtvam vyācāste / anekākālaspraskrītvam hi kramikata / ekaḥ ca tatkālo tatkāloṣē catē katham bhavet, tatadatadā vā kālāv ekam katham bhavet iti svarūpata tāvad aikyāṃ kriyāyāṃ bādhītam. 99 Cf. ibid. p. 193 āśravabhādhakariesīram sūtrām sūtrāyāṃ vyācāste vṛttikrtī "nāpi kālakramavyāpī ca" iti / cakārāv anyonyaśvānudhyotakau. 100 Cit. ibid. p. 194 kevalam gamana iva ādīna vr̥ttigranthena, p. 196 parasakām iti (cit. by the tīkā, which comments on it). 101 9ūpā: 9ūpām T. 102 kāyādinām ... mātraṃ paraphrased ibid. p. 195. 103 tu omitted in T J N. 104 Ch omits anyasya. 105 kriyāvāca na kriyākaśānbandhah kuścit cit. ibid. p. 198; kriyākāraśādyā E Gh N C Ch Jh N T.
12.10 भावातेः \(^{106}\)नायष् \(^{109}\)वस्थूलोऽ ज्ञातेयम् \(\| 10 \|\) निषिद्धस्यानेकरुपत्वार्थसिद्धस्यान्यापेश्यणात्।

पारतन्यायायोगाच्च tents कर्त्तिपि कर्त्तिपि: \(\| 99 \|\) सङ्केठो द्विष्ठो न। \(^{104}\)चङ्केनात्मनोभयाविभस्थित्यिर्यक्ता। \(^{106}\)न चद्द्वयोः सिद्धयोर् \(^{106}\)अन्योन्यापेश्यात्मा नापि स्वामाण्त्रनिष्ठयोः।

111 नारतन्यरूपः सङ्केठोः। ततो \(^{112}\)यथा ज्ञात्तवं कर्त्तिपि तथा कर्त्तिपि। \(^{113}\)इति कथमात्मा सर्वेष्वरे इति \(\| 99 \|\)।

114 इति ज्ञाताधिकारे द्वितीयमाधिकम्।

\(^{106}\) Cf. ibid. p. 198 nānyad iti atra pūrvasya heturām vṛttāv uktam bhinnasya vyātiriktyasya asya sambandhasya kriyāyāt iva anupalambhādi ity anena: T omits asya. \(^{107}\) Instead of vastūnām T has an almost illegible word (perhaps iha, which would be equally good). \(^{108}\) Cf. ibid. p. 203 ekatvam hi abhinnarūpaṇavam, tadviruddhena ca bhinnarūpatvena vyāptam dvayor yugapatsvarūpasarasvasvena avasthānam; \(\text{\°sthitir E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T.}\) \(^{109}\) na ca dvayoh cit. ibid. p. 204. \(^{110}\) anyonyāpeksa\(^{5}\) cit. ibid. p. 204; E Gh N Ch J omit \(\text{\°aśma.}\), \(\text{\°apeksanāpi C N, °apekṣe T.}\) \(^{111}\) pāratantryarūpaha cit. and commented on ibid. p. 204 tena “pāratantryarūpah sambandha” ity atra itham yojanā - pāratantryam bhavat api sambandho na siddhyatit. \(\text{\°svarūpah T.}\) \(^{112}\) yathā ... kalpitam ... kārttṛtvam api cit. ibid. p. 206. where the whole passage is commented on. \(^{113}\) iti katham ātma sarvesvarah cit. ibid. p. 206; mahēśvarah T. \(^{114}\) T adds iti purvapako, Ch iti pūrvapaksavi-vṛtih, J iti pūrvapaksanirūpanam.
तृतीयमाद्विकम्

सत्यं किंतु स्मृतिज्ञानं पूर्वानुभवसंस्कृतेः ।
जातमप्यात्मनिष्ठं तननाधारानुभववेदकम् ॥ १ ॥

"पूर्वानुभवसंस्कारप्रबोधजन्मापि स्मृतिर्
"स्वरूपसंवेदिकावै नु तु पूर्वानुभवात् वेशाभावात्
ध्यानवास्थापिका घटते ॥ २ ॥

इक्सवाभासैव नान्येन वेद्या रुपहसैव हक् ।
रसे संस्कारजतवः तु तत्तुलयत्वं न तहतिः ॥ ३ ॥

सत्यं हि ज्ञति: "स्वरूपसंवेदनेन स्वानन्यसविवेधेयः
सरसज्ञानयोगः" अन्योन्यवेदनेःन्योन्यविधयवेदनमपि
स्यत् तत्तच
"इन्द्रियनियमाभावः । पूर्वानुभवसः संस्कारजतवें
तत्त्तसाध्यमाण्त

115 T adds atha paraśu sanānupapattinirūpaṇam. 116 pūrvānubhasamskāra-prabhodhajanmāpi cit. ibid. p. 210; "prabhodha" omitted in T (in Gh it is added under the line); ॐjāpi E. 117 ātmamātraniṣṭhatvāt cit. ibid. p. 210. 118 Cf. ibid. p. 211 tat katham uktaṃ "ātmansāhasvarūpasyamvedikāva" iti (from the tīkā). On the same page the compound is cit. in a slightly different form: vṛttau ca "svavisayasyamvedikai" iti; svasamvedakaiva Ch. 119 na tu vyavasthāpikā ghaṭate cit. ibid. p. 213; "vyavasthāpikā" T; "vyavasthāpita" N. 120 "āvesāhhāvāt: "āvesāt J. 121 sarvā hi jñāpitāt cit. ibid. pp. 216 and 222; sarvāpi T. 122 Cf. the quotation from the tīkā ibid. p. 215 svasamvedanaikarūpayatvāt, glossed with svasamvedanam ekam rūpam yasya iti; "svārūpā. Cf. ibid. p. 229 svasamvedanaikarūpā ... ya kācit hi jñāpitā, sa anyasamvidvedayā na bhavatīti and the quotation from the tīkā ibid. p. 222 "jñānam jñāntaravedyām na bhavati" iti. 123 "rūpānanya"; "rūpā nānya" E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 124 "vedyā: "svamvedyā" E. 125 anyonyavedane anyonya-visayavedanam api syāt cit. ibid. p. 229; anyonyavedane omitted in N Ch Jh: anyonya-svamvedane E Gh (added in the margin) C J N T. 126 tatas ca cit. ibid. p. 230. 127 Cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 230 iti indriyanīyam hīṣyeta. 128 Cit. ibid. p. 214 upucāra iti vṛttau sphaṭikṛtih "samsārāvatvena" iti; "samskaratvena C. 129 Cf. ibid. p. 253 āha "śaśrṣyamātraṁ" iti, perhaps cit. through the tīkā; Ch omits tat".

11
13.2 न तु पूर्वानुभवावगतः, तदभावात् तत्सार्थ्यमपि नावसेयम्
|| 2  ||

अथात्तद्विषयत्वेषपि समृतस्तदवसायतः ।
हष्टाल्मबन्तता भान्त्या तद्वेदसमञ्जस्म् । 3 ।
13.0 न चापि भान्त्या पूर्वानुभवं तद्विषयं "13.1 " नृधुक्तो रजनयं
13.9 इवासंविद्यामाधवसरस्यस्तिति समृतस्तद्विषया । 3 ।

समृतितैव कथं तावद् भान्तेश्वार्थसिद्धिः कथम् ।
पूर्वानुभवसंस्कारार्थस्य च किमिष्ठ्यते । 4 ।
13.4 पूर्वानुभवाप्रकाशात् तद्विषयं 13.5 संप्रमोक्ष्ययवसायमात्रात्मृतित्वं
न युक्तम् । न च भान्त्या । 13.6 पूर्वानुभूतार्थविवर्तयस्मान्, ।
13.7 पूर्वानुभवस्तर्थेषु च तद्विन्योगक्रेपभयाम् । 13.4 भान्ते: संस्कारजत्वे
को । 13.8 ग्रहः । 4 ।

130 na ca cit. ibid. p. 236 asamañjasam iti vṛttau vyākhyātam neti samastavākyārtha-
nisedhena / cakāreṇa āśāṅkādyotakena atha iti vyākhyātam. 131 E omits ca. 132 suktau cit. ibid. p. 236. 133 T reads iti vā, which, if corrected to itīvā, would be equally acceptable. 134 The whole sentence up to the danda cit. ibid. p. 238. 135 Āsāpramose: āsa mprasamose C. 136 pūrvānubhūtārtha cit. ibid. p. 239, where this point is dwelt on at length; cf. in particular na asyām [smṛttau] kincit prakāśate yena vaiparityam āśāṅkate / etadartham eva vṛttau pūrvānubhūtāgraṇaḥ anumāṇavikāpanaḥ dāvā ita āpūrva prakāśa-
tānirākaratātāparyena prayuktam. 137 pūrvānubhavāsāpraśe ca tadbhinnayogakṣemāyā paraphrased and commented on ibid. p. 240 purvānubhanāśprāsā ʿsāṛṣyam anāveṣās ca saptamāḥ hetuvṛte nirdiṣṭo vṛttau bhinnayogakṣematve sadhya iti vivrnoti “tatah” iti / yogy ābhalabbaḥ, iha tu tadupalakṣitām prakāśalakṣānām svarūpām. kṣemām labdhapariraksanam, tadupalakṣitas tu iha visayāmśah / tadubhayaṁ anubhavat bhinnam smrtēh prakaśasya apūrva viṣayasya ca avastūvat iti. T omits ca. 138 bhrānteḥ samsākāra-jāte ko grahaḥ cit. ibid. p. 240; p. 241 Abh. records a different reading (ity anye patanti): ājarōgaḥ. 139 grahaḥ: bhramah G Ch (in T bhramah, deleted. precedes grahaḥ); hetuh K C N.
140 adhyavasāya eva cit. ibid. p. 242. The whole passage is paraphrased and commented on pp. 242-43 bhrāntyā bhramarūpapna upalakṣito yo visayavavyasthāpaka uktaḥ, so 'dhyavasāya eva, na tu svamsamvit / nāpi svasya prakāśamanaśa rūpasya samvit nir-vikalparūpā. E (but not G) Gh omit svā. 141 sa ca cit. ibid. p. 243, where the rest of the vṛttī is also paraphrased, sa tarhi adhyavasāyo jado vyavatisthāpayiśte bāhye 'rthe ta-sya aprakāśarūpatvāt / yadi tu tatra prakāśarūpāh svāt, yogina iva tatra pūrvavminn arthe vikalpanīyābhimate sphutatayā pūrvapraķāśah svād iti na smṛtī śā, nāpi adhyavasāyutā bhaved anuvahavākaraṇatvāt / atha na bāhye 'sau prakāśo yena anuvahavāraṇatvam, nāpi sarvatahāva aprakāśo yena jadaḥ, kimtu śvamani svolekhe ca śvākāre prakāśarūpā eva asau, tarhi punar api arthe bāhye jada eveti bāhyārthavasthāyā hetuḥ svāt / sā hi svamvinīṣṭhā bhavati, na tu kadācit jādanisthiti / bhramarūpapna ca yad abhāvahāhyāyor ekikaranam, na tena bāhyasya kimcī sprstam tattvāsṛṣe bhrānta-viśayat 1 na hi raja-tajñānena satyavajatasya śuker và vyavasthā kācid iti tātpravṛtya vṛttīyarthah / evam sūtre vṛttau ca adhyavasāyamātraspasya rūpasu dūṣitam, taddvārena tu smṛtyahdhyavasāyasvayeti / aitācraṇam eva vṛttau vikalpopalaṅkāraṃ upkṛṣṭaṣvikalpasyāpi pūrvānubhavopajīvanatra vṛttavastu 'ītātvar ēvēti. 142 ośtrātm only found in T. 143 jñānāni svātmāmātācit. in the tīkā (Torella 1988: 144); cf. also ṢāmV V I p. 253. 144 vivasvamanātātācyā cit. in the tīkā (Torella 1988: 144). 145 aparastamadhyāti: nāparasamvedyāni E Gh N Ch Jh T, na parasamvedyāni C N, na parasparasamvedyāni T. I have accepted the reading as quoted and glossed ibid. p. 255: see also the tīkā (Torella 1988: 144). 146 teṣām cit. ṢāmV V I p. 268. 147 anyonya° cit. in the tīkā (Torella 1988: 150); cf. ṢāmV V I p. 268 vṛttāu visayasamghatānayāḥ prādhyāyāḥ ... and the tīkā (Torella 1988: 150) vṛttau ca visaya-samghatānāpexyayā śaṣṭhiḥ; samghatānā°: samghatānā° E Gh C N T (also possible). 148 paramārtha° cit. ibid. p. 269 and in the tīkā (Torella 1988: 151).
136 पदेशपरिन्तो लोकन्यायहारः 146कथम् ॥ ६ ॥

न चेवन्तः कृतान्ततिविच्छवरुपो महेश्वरः ॥
स्यादेकरिच्छद्धपुराणसम्सतिष्ठपोहनशक्तिमान् ॥ ७ ॥

"146चित्तलमेव विष्वरूपमोतिरिक्तस्वानुपपते, अशेषपदा-
र्थ्यानाममन्योन्यानुसंधानम्। अस्यैव ज्ञाना" दिकः: शक्तयः ॥
मतः स्त्रितिंत्समपोहनं चेति ह्युक्तम् ॥ ७ ॥

144 इति ज्ञानाधिकारे तुलियमादिकम्॥

चतुर्थमादिकम्

स हि पूर्वानुभूतार्थोपलब्धा परतोडथि सन् ॥
विमृशान्स इति स्वेदी स्मरतीत्वपदिशये ॥ १२ ॥

144"प्रचादिपि पूर्वानुभूतार्थः" 146 नृव्वितृत्वत् 146पूर्वानुभूतार्थः

\[149 katham\ cit. \text{IPVV I p. 272.} \]
\[150 citatvam\ eva\ and\ ato \text{tiriktasya cit. in the tīkā (Torella 1988: 152); riktasya Ch.} \]
\[151 Cf.\ the\ quotation\ in \text{IPVV I p. 276 vṛttikṛd āha aśeṣapadārthaḥjānānāṁ\ anyonyānusamdhānām\ citatvam\ iti.} \]
\[152 asyaiva\ cit. \text{ibid. p. 285.} \]
\[153 ādikāh: ādi T. \]
\[154 C Ch J T add\ paradarṣanānupapatih. \]
\[155 pascād\ api\ cit. \text{in} \text{IPVV II p. 4.} \]
\[156 \text{anubhavīttrvārī: anubhavīttrvāy E C N ("tvāt is also the reading of Kh").} \]
\[157 \text{The whole passage (from pūrva\textsuperscript{2})\ is paraphrased and partly cit. (through the tīkā) ibid. p. 4 “tasya ekasya pūrvānubhūtārvena yah pratyavamarṣah” iti ubhayakāla-
samśparśī “atra” iti pānupuryāṣṭakadehādadu smakucitasya “pūrvānubhūtārthāsampraharaṁśurūpā। smṛtir nāma vyāpārah” iti sambandhah iti ekatvāt hi sa ubhayakālaśprk iti kar-
tṛtaiva ca vibhutā svavirītām iti vṛttiyojand: p. 11 atra iti vṛttipadam; p. 13 vṛttāu ca
uktam vibhoh iti. vibhoh kartuh Ch.} \]
प्रकाशास्पमोषणम, तस्येकर्ष्य विभोः: कर्त्तूः स इत्यत्र पूर्वानु-भूतवेन प्रत्यवर्मः: समृतिनाम न्यायार्: || 9 ||

भास्येच्छ स्वकालेष्थात्त पूर्वाभासितमामृतन् ।
स्वलक्षणं घटाभासमात्रेणाधारिष्ठतल्मना । ॥ 2 ॥

14.1 समृतिनामवत्या स इति पूर्वानुभूतं स्वलक्षणं परामृ-शन्नाभासयत्वेष । 
14.2 अन्यथा । 16.0 प्रकाशितस्य । 16.1 परामर्शो न कृतः: यथा । 16.2 स्वसत्ताकाल एव च, । 16.3 तेन स्मरणकाले
16.4 नास्त्यायाभासो न दुर्योगित । कदाचित्त त्वर्धितावशाशान् 
घटकल-चन्द्रन्यूत्तादिभि । 16.6 न्यत्मैकाभासस्य-प्रेक्षायाम् । 16.9 स्तवताभासाः: 
16.7 अन्याया तु । 16.8 स्वर्त्तामनाभिष्ठित्वेन तथेव । 190 । अतिशयछ । 19.0 निरतन- 
राविहित्येवेतससतु । 19.2 दृष्टार्थः । 19.3 प्रत्यक्षिकारः एव ॥ 2 ॥

158 smrtiṣaktyā cit. ibid. p. 19. 159 anyathā cit. in ṢPVV II p. 22. 160 prakāśitasya cit. and commented on ibid. p. 22 pūrva-prakāśitvena tat-prakāśanā-nulagnah katham pārāmarśo bhavet / yati ca na bhavet pūrva-prakāśitvena pārāmarśanam, tat sat iti bāt-
pārākāśapārāmarśo na syāt/tena "prakāśitasya" iti vṛttau prakṛtyarthē ca pratuyārthe ca bharah kartavyah; cf. also p. 31. 161 pārāmarśo; pārāmarśo 'pi Ch. 162 sva-satākālas eva ca cit. ibid. p. 31; ca omitted in J. 163 tena cit. ibid. p. 23. 164 Cf. ibid. p. 23 tathā hi nāse arthena smrter na dosañ āvijñāvē vā na posah; na dusyati cit. ibid. p. 25, 
where the whole argumentation of the vṛttī, as developed in the tika, is summarized. 165 o-sattāo; o-sattvao Gh N J Jh T T. 166 o-anvatamao cit. ibid. p. 29 ghaṭabhāsasabdhāḥ sātrey kevalābhāsopalaksana-arthaḥ iti vṛttau vyākhya-tam anyata-mapadena. 167 My conjectural 
emendation for asyāsphutāvābhāṣah Gh N C J Jh Š T T, asyāh sphutāvabhāṣah E Ch. 
The emendation is suggested by the arguments in ÎPV. ṢPVV and in the tīkā (Torella 1988: 154-55. 168-69) and by the (probable) gloss sputhā eva added to the following 
tathāiva in Ch J T (see also the tīkā: taddā sputhā evābhāṣah; Torella 1988: 155). The reading 
asyāh sphutāvabhāṣah, to which asyāsphutāvabhāṣah might be reduced by assuming 
the omission of the visarga before samyoga, could only be acceptable if we took asyāh 
as referring to smṛti (which does not seem likely). 168 anyadā tu cit. ibid. p. 29 and in the 
tīkā (Torella 1988: 155). 169 sarvānmanārihitvena: sarvārihitvena J. 170 T J (and Ch, 
in the margin) add sputha eva (being probably only a scribal gloss of tathā eva). 171 Cf. 
ibid. pp. 29-30 antarāyati sāntaram karotiiti antaraṁ vijñāyamśa malam, tadabhāvo nai-
rantaryam; atisayānirantarō cit. in the tīkā (Torella 1988: 155). 172 Cf. ibid. p. 30 ane-
na drṣṭārthaśabdo vyākhya-tah. 173 o-pratyakṣikāra cit. ibid. p. 29.
न च युक्त स्मृतेष्वेदेः स्मर्यमाणस्य भासनम्।
तेनेकत्य भिन्नकालानां संविदा वेदितेष्व सः॥ ३॥

पूर्वानुभूतत्वानि१७४नुभूवेन सह १७५तात्कालिक१७६स्मृतिप्रकाशे
स्मृत्यभिन्ने एव १७६प्रकाशात्मिन्नस्य प्रकाशात्मानन्तानु-
pपपते। एवं १७६चालुभवस्मृत्यादि१७६संविदामेक्यं स एव चात्मा
वेदकः। १७०तथा हि ॥ ३॥

नैव ग्रन्थवो भाति स्मृतौ पूर्वस्थतव पृथक्।
प्रागनवृहृभमहिमित्यात्मारोहणभासनात्॥ ४॥

स्मृतौ समर्यमाणो१७४नुभूतानि च यथा पृथ्वभुतो। १७५भाति न
tथानुभवः स्वात्मन एवाहनस्पयेयस्यानुभृवमयत्वोन प्रथनात्,
१७३यस्मानेककालोशवेदोश्यः स एवात्मा ॥ ४॥

योगिनामिप्य भासन्ते न हि दशो दर्शनात्ते।
स्वसंविदेकमानास्ता भार्यम् मेयपदेशिपि वा ॥ ५॥

१७४सर्वाञ्जानामिपि १७५प्रमातृतरगतगतौपमंथः स्वसंविद्यावेदास्व-

१७४ Cf. ibid. p. 34 anubhavena saha arthah smaranād abhinnaḥ iti vrtyā tātparyadyavam sautram vyākhyātam. १७५ tātkalikaः: tātkalike Ch. १७६ smritiprakāṣe cit. ibid. p. 33; T omits सम्र्ति and reads स्मृति. १७७ prakāṣād bhinnasya cit. ibid. p. 34; cf. p. 33 prakāṣād bhinnasya mā bhūt prakāṣamānataḥ; prakāṣyamānataः T. १७८ ca only found in T T. १७९ सम्बिदम्: सम्बिदः N. १८० tathā hi cit. ibid. p. 37. १८१ ‘नुभुता’: ‘nubhūto T G. १८२ ‘भाति: ‘vahhati T. १८३ yās ca cit. ibid. p. 40; anekakālo, cit. ibid. p. 41, is quoted on the same page in a slightly different form (probably meant to clarify its meaning) nanu ca samvidah kālasparśa eva nāṣti katham vrtyih anekakālagata iti / anekakālagata-
tesa vedyesu yad unmahatvatvam, īvānmatrād eva sa bodho ‘nekakāla iti upacārena acarya-
... tu dūnumkaḥa ca ekah svasamvedanapramātā. १८४ Cf. ibid. pp. 43-4 nanu yogi
kriyāsaktiprakarsavān api iha darsāne, tat katham jñānāsaktiprakarsamsātram asya vrtyai
nirāpitam; cf. also ibid. p. 47 sarvajñagrahānām ... १८५ pramātirantaragatopalambhāh
cit. ibid. p. 42.
भाषा: 186स्वाम्यारूढः एव भासेरन्, 187अतः तेषाः 188योगिनां परात्मतापतिरीव 189तत्त्वम्। प्रमेयक्षणयायम् अपि190 घटादिवत् 191प्रतिस्विचेन शुद्ध192भोधात्मना प्रृपण 193अवभासेरन् यदि 194तथा संभवेत् ॥ ५ ॥

स्मर्यते यद् हसासैन्मे सैवमित्यागं भेदतः ॥ ६ ॥

194मया दशमिताप्रमाणतत्त्वानेतरमिताया एव स्मृतोविवेक्य 195कथनम् 196एवेत्येवमनुभोजस्वी ममाभूदिति भेदेनापि 196निर्देशः: २०० ॥ ६ ॥

या च पश्याम्यहमिम घटोस्यातिरि चावसा ॥
मन्यते समवेत सांप्यवसातिरि दर्शनम् ॥ ७ ॥

पुर:सिथताधिबिकल्पनेष्वि घटमिम पश्यामिम घटोस्यातिरि वा प्रमाणमयेव 201दर्शनं प्रत्यवमृष्यते ॥ ७ ॥

186 svātmārūḍhā eva cit. ibid. p. 47 and in the tikā (Torella 1988: 158). bhāseran cit. ĪPVV II p. 52; abhāseran E, avabhāseran K G Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 187 atāsa ca: ata eva T. 188 yoginām paramatmāpattir eva cit. in the tikā (Torella 1988: 158) (as paramāḥ, which is also the reading of Kh G J). 189 tattvam cit. and commented on in ĪPVV II p. 47 “tattvam” iti vīvṛtti “paramātmavedakaḥ” ity anena tattvam paramātmavedakartham ity arthah (cf. Torella 1988: 158, n. 54) [...] sarvajñagrahanam prāgupakṛntapurasamvedanopakramāh paramātmavedakaparyāyātm itish bhavah. 190 api: eva va T, also possible. 191 prātisvikaṇa cit. ibid.: p. 52. 192 bodhātaḥ rūpāna bodhena E, but cf. the paraphrase ibid.: p. 52 ayam ca atra bhāvah svasmin svasmin sarṣane yādṛṣam bodhasya suddha-rūpam ... . 193 Cit. (as bhāseran) ibid.: p. 52. 194 T omits tathā, but cf. ibid. p. 53 yadi tathā iti na tu etat sambhavatīti; tadā Ch. 195 mayā drīṣṭam cit. ibid.: p. 54. 196 In T “darsanam” is added under the line; 197 parāmarsanā T; 198 amikā Gh N. 199 Cf. ibid.: p. 54 kathanaśabdena (from the tikā). 200 etad omitted in T. 199 T adds drīṣṭo, being probably a gloss. 200 Ch adds smṛtār vyākaranam eva. 201 The text cit. ibid. p. 55 is a little different: ity evam vrtau vyākhyāto “darsanam eva tat pratyavamrśyate” iti vacanena.
I 4.8  
	तनसया दृढ़तेः द्रष्टोक्तः तस्मादृष्टोक्तः स इत्यामृतस्त्यपि ।

gābhgyaḥ dekātābhinnāṅkāh । भास: प्रमातिरः ॥ ८ ॥

तस्माद् २०२५ कर्मकर्मशीर्षपुरः साराया स्मृतो विकलपमार्ते वा

२०३५ गालानुवक्तो विनापि स इत्ययमिति वार्षिकः २०४५ निर्देशेन

२०५५ सर्वेऽकं प्रमातृतीलीनावं ब्राह्मणानुभावकृ । २०६५ मायाकृतिविचिंध्वनावभासाय ।

२०७५ अः । २०८५ प्रकाशेते ॥ ८ ॥

इति ज्ञानाधिकारे च तत्त्वाधिकिरः ॥

प्रमातिरः ॥

वर्त्तमानावभासाय । २०६५ । भावानामवभास्यनम् ॥

अन्तःस्थितत्वतामेव घटते बहिरात्मना ॥ ९ ॥

प्रत्यक्षे २१०५ सस्यावदर्शुना स्मरणावभासः प्रमात्र २१०५ नूत्तरानावभासेव

सतां युक्तः ॥ ९ ॥

202 Cf. ibid. pp. 57-8 vivrtāv api ... dyk pradhunyena parāmrśyate / smarane 

pratyaksādhyavasāye ca āduranam eva puraksārapārvadīśabdair darśitam. 203 In Ch "pu-

rāmarṣa" is added after drk under the line. 204 nirdeśena: "nirdeśe T N C Jh N T; in 

Gh "na is added in the margin. 205 sarvatraika: sarvatrātraika T. 206 Cf. ibid. p. 62 
nanu māvākratavicchedāv iti yad uktam ... . 207 Cf. ibid. p. 57 apiśabdo bhinnakramah. 

bhinnāv api ekatā abhasate iti vṛtyanuṣārenā vā yajunā. 208 prakāśete: prakāśeta J. 209 It 
is out of question that bhāvanām is the original reading of the kārikā (cf. vṛtti: 

arthandm). Bhāskara holds, instead, that the text which Abh. had in front of him had bhin-

nānam, glossed by him with vicchinānam. Also the editors of Bh accept this thesis. I 
would say that the text commented on by Abh. also had bhāvanām and that bhinnānam - 
as well as the further explanation vicchinānam - are meant to elucidate the sense of 

bahirātmanā; bhāvanām is simply understood in yesām ... teṣām ... bhinnānam etc. (IPV 
I p. 196). Furthermore, bhāva is mentioned in the paraphrase in IPV II p. 68 atyaka-

samvidābhedasyaiva bhāvasya kalpitapramātrapeksyā vicchedena yat prakāśanam ... (it 
is worth noting that bahirātmanā is here paraphrased as vicchadena prakāśanam; as bhe-

denāvabhāsaḥ in the vṛtti). 210 Cf. ibid. p. 68 vṛtāv apiśabdo yāvacchabdaḥ ca sūtraśeṣat-

vena pathitāh. 211 "antar": "antara" N C N.
प्रागिवार्थोऽपकाशः स्यात् पकाशात्मतया विना ।
न च पकाशो भिन्नः स्यावाल्मार्थस्य

पकाशतः ॥ २ ॥

प्रमात् १९२ संज्ञपकाशस्वरूपं विना ॥१३॥ यथादृ घटोऽस्य नावभा-
tस्तथा ॥१४॥ ज्ञानकालेश्वपि स्यात्, ॥२१॥ पकाशमानता चार्थस्य पकाशः
स्वरूपभूतो न तु भिन्नः ॥ २ ॥

भिन्ने पकाशे चाभिन्ने संकरो विषयस्य तत् ।
पकाशात्मा पकाशोऽस्तो नापकाशस्य
सिद्धयति ॥ ३ ॥

पकाशं ॥२६॥ मात्रं चार्थैऽविन्नं सर्वार्थसाधारणं ॥२४॥ तस्य घटोऽस्य
पकाशोऽस्यमयं पत्रसैवेति विषयनियमो निर्भिन्नन्दनः । तस्माद्
॥२१॥ अर्थस्य सिद्धः पकाशात्मातयत्ता ॥ ३ ॥

२१२ साम्ज्ञा: "साम्ज्ञाका" त, साम्ज्ञा E. २१३ यथाः: यदा न C न T. २१४ ज्ञानकाले:
ज्ञानज्ञाने J. २१५ Cf. ibid. pp. 68-9 तथा ca vrttih - svarūpabhūto yah prakāśah so 'rtha-
sya prakāśamānata, na tu tasmād arthād bhinnah san prakāśah, so 'rthaśya prakāśamāna-
tā yuktet; p. 69, where a slightly different interpretation is given. utra pakse vrttir evam
netavyā - arthasya yā prakāśamānata, sa prakāśo 'nuhhvah. na tu asau prakāśamānata-
tāmā prakāśo 'rthaśya svarūpabhūto 'rthaśvarūtramagnah. The passage ibid. p. 75 nanu
prakāśamānata svarūpabhūtā ghatasya iti vṛttai kim etat, although presenting itself as a
literal quotation is only a further variation on the same theme. २१६ Cf. ibid. p. 77 vṛttai
mātraśabdena abhinnavamātram vyākhyātām, sarvārthādhārānavena samkaraśa-
kāyāh pithābandhah kṛtah. २१७ Cf. ibid. pp. 77-8 "tasya" iti prakāśamātrasya "visaya-
nyamato nirnibandhanah" na kena ātētā upapadyate iti sambandhah / viṣayaniyama-
sya ākāram darsayati "ghatasya" ity ādīnā. In J tasya is followed by prakāśamātrasya,
which is precisely the gloss of ÍPVV; ghaṭapradāśo J; T does not repeat ayam. २१८ Cf.
ibid. p. 78 trītyapadosya artham prakāśātmatāśabdena vṛttai vyācāste "arthaśya siddhih"
itti | "tā" iti vyākhyātam "tasmāt" ity anena; artha° E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T; prakāśāyat-
tā T.
15.4 तत्त्वाकर्षितकामाभासो बाद्यं चेवन्मायापेत्।
न बधिनस्य बोधस्य विचिराभासहेतुता॥४॥

जडानाम्। २२७अभासास्मातेव: सा च ॥ २२५अभासाभासहेतुता।
तत्त्वयो बोधास्मातेव ॥ २२७यो एकमेवात्र तत्त्वम।
किरोदेष्टिपि २२४केमेण विशिष्ट्वमाणोऽधिवाससत्तोऽध्यमप्रकाशामां
हेतुत्या बाद्यमध्यमूहयेदिन्धिर्यवत्॥ ५॥

न वासनाप्रभोक्तोऽश्च विचिरोऽहेतुतामित्।
तत्त्वापि तत्त्वाधर्म्य वैचित्त्वं किं निबन्धनम्॥ ५॥

२२५विचिराभासास्मातोऽश्च न ॥ २२५बोधाभिन्नः।
तत्त्वापि वैचित्त्वं को हेतुः। न ततो बाद्य एवायित्वं भिन्नाभासहेतुः॥ ५॥

स्यादेतदवधासेषु तेष्वेवावसिते सति।
न्यवहारे किमनेन बाद्यनानुपपतिना॥ ६॥

आभासास्मातेव ॥ २२४अर्थयवहारः। ते च भासास्मातेवः सन्तुः
का ॥ २२६श्चति। ततिं बाद्यन कार्यः ॥ २२६तावता ॥ २२७लोकायत्राः

219 अभासानाति: avabhāsanānātait T, Jh has abhāsanātṛahetutaitaiva then corrected to abhāsanānataitaitaiva. 220 sanā° omitted in C Ñ. 221 abhāsātmataitaitaiva: abhāsanānataitaitaiva E C, abhāsataitaitaiva Kh G Gh N T, bhāsataitaitaiva Ch, abhāsatāmaiva J, abhāsataitaitaiva corrected to abhāsātmataitaitaiva Jh, bhāsanānataitaitaiva Ñ. 222 ekam omitted in E Ch. 223 ta-syāviśeṣe 'pi cit. ibid. p. 82; tasya viśeṣa° T. 224 kramena viśyayamāno 'rthe cit. and commented on ibid. p. 89 “kramena” iti vrtau kramo ‘pi na niyath, api tu bāhubhir bheda-dair abhāsān viśiṣṭān karo iti viśyayamānasabdam vṛtti gatam tātparyena vācaśe ... yo ‘rthāśabdō vṛtau ... 225 vicitra°: citra° C Ñ. 226 na omitted in T. 227 Cf. ibid. p. 89 “bodbhavilakṣana” iti aprakāsānātāvad eveti āśayah. 228 arthair cit. ibid. p. 130. 229 kṣatīkṣ: kṣitī J. 230 tāvat: tāvatī eva T. 231 Cf. ibid. p. 130 teṣu [abhāseṣu] samāpte vīyavahāre ... .

20
रिवाणालेले हे देवोऽन्तःरिध्यतमिक्षावशाद् बहःः।
योगीव निरुपादानमयादां प्रकाशयेत्।

चित्रदैवते इश्वरत्वत् २३४स्वातमरूपतया २३५उपपन्नाभासनम्
अनन्तशक्तितवाद् २३६इच्छाशासन् २३७मृदादिकारण विनेत्र
बायत्वेन २३८घटपटातिकम् २४०अर्थरसिः प्रकाशयेत्।

अनुमानमनोभातपूर्वैः नैवेष्टमनिद्रियम्।
आभातमेव बीजादेवभासाधितुवस्तुन्।

पूर्वा २४१वभातान्त्रिकथां इव २४२अर्थच २४३नान्तरीयकार्यदर्शन-

232 Cf. ibid. p. 130 bāhyās cārthah sāvayavaniravayavohhayavilaksanā viruddha-
dharmādhyāyasādikam dāsanan āvalambya pramānābādhitah ... "niravayavās ca
paramānurūpam 'rithah pramānābādhitō bahuhhir bahuhhir prayatnāh satkayogādikam
vikulpya" iti vrittigranthasya yojanā. T reads yugapadarthadikṣatkayogā Eva (yugapa-
whether it was in the original text or not - is anyhow understood; cf. Vimsatikā 12ab
śatkena yugapad yogāt paramānōḥ sadamsatā). 233 Ch adds iti syāt. 234 āśvaratvāt: āśva-
rāt T; cf. ĪPVV II p. 146 "hi" iti yata evam devatvāt cidāṁ ma ... 235 svātmaraṇapatayā
cit. ibid. p. 146. 236 upapannābhāsanam: upapannāvabhasanam T, upapannābhāsārūpam
E Gh C Ch J Jh N T, upapannābhāsām rūpam N. I have accepted the reading quoted and
glossed ibid. p. 146 tasya yad abhāsanam, tat tāvad upapannam na prayatnasādhyam;
tadabhedinaś ca bhāvarāṣeḥ prakāśātmavrād upapannābhāsanam iti. 237 ācchā: ācchādi
E Gh N Č Ch J Jh N T. 238 mṛdādi: apūra T. 239 ghatapatādikam: ghatādiṁ T.
240 artharaṃśim cit. ibid. p. 155. 241 āvabhāta: āvabhāsa E Gh N Č Ch J Jh N T T, but
cf. ibid. p. 156 prathamam sūtraḥhāgam gāmyamānārthanirūpānena spuṣṭayati vṛttikrt
"pūrvāvabhaṭṭa" ity ādinā “anumanam” ity antena i “pūrvāvabhaṭṭāntahātshhitah” iti. 242 arthe:
artho E Gh N Č Ch N T, arthe T. The reading arthe, required by meaning, is only found
in Jh, as a correction of a previous arthe; J has arthe, then corrected to artho.
243 nāntarīyaka cit. ibid. p. 156, where the rest of the sentence is paraphrased: pūrvāvāb-
dopādāne ’pi hi antahśhitavasya avarakahaludvīttrv vyāgyā / na ca vimarsanāmātām
anumānam, api tu pratipravṛttiyyagavastunīscaryārūpam, ity āha “nāntarīyaka” ity ādi.
On the meaning and the necessity of tattaddēśakālādiyojanayā see also ibid. p. 162.
15.8 बशात् तत्तदेशकालादियोजनया विमार्शनमनुमानम्। इन्द्रियम्
२४४अप्यनुसीयते किंचिन्मात्र निमित्त तत्च बीजाध्याभासाद्
२४४आभासितमेव। ॥ ॥

आभासः पुनराभासाद्वाह्यास्यासीत् कार्यचन ॥
अर्थस्य नैव तेनास्य सिद्धिर्मायुनानात्। ॥ ॥

२४६घटाध्याभासाद् बाह्यस्यानुपपत्तेनासीताभासः। २४७तत्सत्र
नानुमानादिपि सिद्धः। ॥ ॥

स्वामिनिःत्वायसंथथथ्य भावजातस्य भासनम्।
अस्त्येव न विना तस्मादिच्छायाः प्रवर्तते। ॥ ॥

विदात्त्वस्तेश्वरस्य २४४आत्मनीवाभेदनार्थश्चवपि पकाशोसर्थयः
न्यथा प्रतिभासमानार्थः २४६कविषयो निर्मृत्ततमयो विमर्श इद्दारूपो
न स्यात्। ॥ ॥

स्वभावमवभासस्य विमर्श विरुद्धयथा।
पकाशश्रीर्थपरकरोपि स्फटिकादिज्ञापमः। ॥ ॥

पकाशस्य २४५मृृदु आत्मा प्रत्यवमर्शः। २४५विना २४५अर्थः
भेदिताकारस्य २४५अप्यस्य स्वच्छतामात्रं न त्वजायत् २४४चमत्कृः
तेर्भाबात्। ॥ ॥

244 apy omitted in C. 245 abhāśītam: abhātam T. 246 ghatādi° cit. ibid. p. 165 vṛttau
167. 249 °eka° cit. ibid. p. 167 ekasabdena avāsyam esantyaniyantaritavyā icchaya bhavi-
tavyam ity aha. 2arthakālaśūna° G Ch, also possible. 250 mukhya ātmā cit. ibid. p. 175.
251 tam vinā cit. ibid. p. 175. 252 arthabheda° cit. ibid. p. 175 “arthā” iti i bhedita-
grahanena pratikarma vyavasthāmātmaṃ sidhyatva atah. na tu ajādyam. 253 apy. only found
in T T, is cit. ibid. p. 177 sūtre vṛttau ca ayam apiśabdah svabhavāntarasamuccayārtha
iti vāvat. 254 camatkṛter abhavat cit. ibid. pp. 177-9.
ताल्पर्येणोवितस्त्रेन जहातः स हि विलक्षणः।

254 आत्मद्रव्यस्य 256 भावात्मकमपेतजहार् 257 भेदकेत्या विमानर्थं 258 मुखं रूपमुक्तम् चैतन्यं 259 विशिष्टकितिशिरिरिति।

सा चैतन्यक्रिया चितिकर्त्तेत्॥ १२॥

चिति: प्रत्यवमार्तिमा परावाक्स स्वरसोदिता।

स्वातन्त्र्यमेतमुखं तदेशवर्य परमात्मनः॥ १३॥

254 अभिन्नावाच्याया वाग् 256 एषा 257 नित्यचित्तवरूपस्वेदनानात्

258 परतत्त्वः, भावात्मरापेश्च शुद्धमेतं स्वातन्त्र्यमेश्च संस्कारम्।

॥ १३॥

सा स्फुरत्ता महासत्ता देशाकालाविशेषिणी।

सैषा सारत्याः प्रोक्ता हृद्यं परमेष्ठिनः॥ १४॥

254 स्फुरनकृत्ता स्फुरणकृत्ता 256 अभावप्रतियोगिनी 258 अभाववाच्यायाः सत्ता भवता भवनकृत्ता 259 नित्या देशाकाला-

260 स्पर्शात् सैव 261 प्रत्यवमार्तिमा चितिकियाष्टकिति।॥ २६०॥


261 ahinnavācyā cit. ibid. p. 190. 262 esā: anyā E. 263 nityā: nityā N, omitted in T; cf. ibid. p. 195 aham iti yat nityam citsvaripam taddesakālākārakṛttayām ādyāntābhyyām śūnyam nityodīōm. 264 aparatantrā: aparatantrā E Gh N C Ch Jh N T, paratra G.

265 E Gh N C Ch Jh T (in Ch sphurattā is corrected to sphuradṛputā); cf. ibid. p. 206 vṛttāv api sphuradrūputā. 266 abhāvapratiyoginī: abhāvapratiyoginī T, bhāvapratiyoginī Kh. Ch has abhāvā° corrected to abhāvā°; abhāvapratiyoginī is cit. and commented on ibid. p. 201. 267 abhāvā: bhāva° T. 268 nityā: nityā cit. ibid. p. 201. 269 āsparśat: āsparśā T. 269 pratyavamasātmāḥ: pratyavamarśā C N. 270 sā visvātmah: sāro visvātmanaḥ 'pi T.
विश्वात्मन: परमेश्वरस्य स्वात्मं प्रतिष्ठानुपातः ्हदयमिति ततः तत्रात् निगण्यते। ॥ १४ ॥

आत्मानमत एवायं हेयीकुर्यां पृथिविष्ठिति।
हेयं न तु तदोन्मुखयात् खण्डग्रतास्य
व्यतन्त्रता ॥ १५ ॥

२७३। एतात् श्रुद्धस्वात्त्यवाश्यवाश्यवेगः। ्हृदयेन लघुप्रतिष्ठा वर्ष्
२७४। अवैति, अपि त्वज्ञात्मात्मानमिनिपत्तमभावता हेयीकरोति।
भिन्नश्रुद्धस्थापेश्वरे ज्ञानकर्त्ता मलायेत्। ॥ १५ ॥

स्वात्त्यामुक्तमात्माः स्वात्त्यावायाध्यात्मः।
प्रभुरीशाशिवलिंकपैलिनक्तय न्यवहार्येत्। ॥ १६ ॥

२७६। अतं एव अवैति कीस्थायो लक्षणपूर्णात्मात् स्वात्त्यायात्।
२७७। तदान्तर्गतमेव बेदक्षमात्मानम् ईश्वरः इति वेदितेपेते मानमादि-
विकल्पे परमेश्वरः ॥ २७८। आभासयति भावनादिवहारार्थम्। ॥ १६ ॥

नाहन्तदिपरामर्शभेदवायाध्यायन्तात्मः।
अह्रमृत्युत्यैवाः सुष्टिसिद्धावृत्तयात्। ॥ १७ ॥

वर्तमानप्रात् २७६भावे नाहप्रत्ययमृग्यस्य प्रमेयवेते नेतृत्वात्। विम-
षभेदे चाभासभेदे च प्रमातेवशवरशवदें सृष्टोहेकर्परामर्शप-
मायाक्षेत्र विभो: सैव भिन्नसंवेद्यमोरा ।
कथिता झानसंक्लपाध्यवसायादिनामभिः ॥ १८ ॥
पकाशात्मनः २४४परेश्वरस्य मायाक्षेत्रा स्वात्मरूपृ । ३४५विविश्वं
भेदनाभास्यते ॥ २४६तनः सैव ३४७चित्त्रीत्तन्मू ॥ २४६अध्यक्षम ॥
२४०तस्येव भिन्नसगाभात्वस्य स्मृति ॥ २४१संक्लपोध्यवसायो
मनोवृत्तिविषुवर्त्तेश्चित्र ॥ २४७चित्तिरेव ॥ १८ ॥

साक्षात्कारक्षेत्रेऽप्ययति विमर्शः कथमन्यथा ।
धार्मानुपपौषेत पतिसंधानवर्जितम् ॥ १९ ॥

२४३साक्षात्कारक्षेत्रनालेश्चित्रीत्तथपत्यवर्ष्यसिद्धित सूक्ष्मः ,

281 pacatyaśivācyo 'rthah / yathāhuh kriyāgurājītisambhandhādisadbair na kriyādaya
cyante pacatyaśivācyo 'rthah / yathāhuh kriyāgurājītisambhandhādisadbair na kriyādaya
cyante pacatyaśivācyo / pacatyaśivācyo 'rthah / yathāhuh kriyāgurājītisambhandhādisadbair
282 only found in T. 283 pradītis tvasty eva: pradīti<h>svasyaiva T. 284 Cf. ibid. p. 218 yatah pratyagāmā vṛttau paramesvaram iti kathitah. 285 viśvam bhedenābhāṣyate cit. ibid. p. 218; avabhāṣyate T. 286 tataḥ: tada T. also possible. 287 citir: citikriya T. 288 J adds api. 289 adhyākṣam cit. ibid. p. 217. 290 tasyaiva bhinnasya cit. ibid. p. 218. 291 The rest of the vṛtti is paraphrased ibid. p. 218 nanu pratyagatmano manovrttih samkal-292 The quotation ibid. p. 218 is a little different: iti vṛttau darsayati "citiṣaktih" iti. 293 saksākārakṣanajānāne E Gh N C Ch Jh N T.

I 5.19 २५४ वाचनधायनादौ शीघ्रकिया तत्तद्द्वस्यमानदेशायुपादितसाजिहासा-
नुसंधानेन हि भवेत् ॥ १९ ॥

घटोषयतित्वध्यवसा नायरुपातिरेरकिणि ।
परेशशिक्तिरात्रावेव भास्ते न तिबदनत्या ॥ २० ॥

२५५ अयमिति घटः इति २५६ बध्यवसायो भिन्नपकाशामननाम-
रूपः २५७ तिरिक्तशिष्ठितशिष्ठि २५६ मय एवा २५८ तेजमेरेदेन ३०० अबभास्ते ॥ २० ॥

केवलं भिन्नसंबव्यदेशकालानुरोधतः ।
ञ्जानस्मृत्यवसायादि सक्रम प्रतिभास्ते ॥ २१ ॥

चितरवस्य मायाशक्ति भिन्नं घटादि संबेदं तत्तद्देशकाल-
भिन्नं पकाश्यते ३०१ यस्याभेदेनाब्दमेतमाद् ३०२ विभिन्नदेशकाला-
३०३ दिना ञ्जानस्मृत्या भास्ते ॥ २१ ॥

इति ञ्जानाधिकारं पञ्चममविधिकम् ॥

294 The rest of the vrtti is cit. and commented on ibid. pp. 232-3 aha dhāvanasya ādipadasya ca prakārārthasya vyākhyānyāya yat śīghrapadam, tasya vyāvartyam āha "kriyāpi" iti śāyandānanādi dhānakātrasātārtraśānāzhāndikā va i [...] / anay at deśarūpam yat dravyam, ādipadena śuśkapāṭādikṣo goṇah, yadi vā anayadesam anayavabhāva ca yat dravyādi, tadvāśaya iti "tad āha" iti etad vastu drsyaṁānaśādēna āhety arthah / an-
usandhānaśādāṃ vivṛtā "tādṛcchāyōjanena" iti laksane trīyā / idam īstām idam iṣya-
re iti idam ca ena yāmay iti hānopādāneccchānām anusandhānena upalaksitam yad esaṁyaty-
vam, tena vinā "tāl" iti hānam upādiham ca pratiśānam yad, tat na upapadyate iti sam-
bhandah. 295 ayam iti gūta iti cit. ibid. p. 241. 296 vā: ca T. 297 ārtrīka: ārtrīka
E Gh N C Ch J H N T. 298 naya cit. ibid. p. 244. 299 ātmeva: ātmaiva Gh N C Ch J H N T. 300 avabhāsate: abhāsate Gh N C Ch N, bhāsate J. 301 Cf. the quotations from the
śīkā, glossed ibid. p. 271 "hodhyasaśāstambhā" iti karmāṃ saṃśṭhī bodhyam avaśūhuṁ, bodhah svam rápam tadekālinam karotiti yāvat / "artha" iti añca vyākhyāyām kārtāri saṃśṭhī, bodhēṣyati tu karmān. 302 Cf. ibid. p. 272 evam ca atra yojanā: jñānadrīṇipataya ekājītyavat 'pi viḥịnh masteredśakāładānā uparaktam jñānam api jñānāntarātāmratam ca smaranād anyad ābhāsate iti samastasūtravṛttītparyam samksipya [tīkākṛt] ... . 303 Cf.
ibid. p. 269 esa ca artho vṛttikṛta sprsta ādipadena; p. 270 desākālapadasya ca atra pakṣa
apalaksanatvam vyākhyātām.
प्रकाशयात्मन् यहांति  
पराव्रुपत्वात्  
सभिलापि  
स्वभावभूतः  
प्रत्येकसे  
निर्देशयो न  
च  
अतः  
प्रतियोगि-  
संधवः  
।  ।  ।

तथा हि  
भिन्नयोगवहासो हि स्मायूहाघट्योद्धयोः ।  
प्रकाशयेव नान्यस्य भैदिनस्त्वब्धासनम् ।  ।  ।

प्रकाशद्  
द्वितीयस्य भिन्नस्य प्रतियोगिनि प्रकाशः  
अनवभासेन प्रकाशे  
तर्वः  
स्यात्  
तथा  
अनाभासे  
न्योहनायोगादिकलपताहानि:  
।  ।  ।

I 6.3

तदत्तत्त्वपतिभाषाजा मात्रवात्तद्वयपोहनात्
तनिन्द्रणामनःको हि विकल्पो घट्ट इत्ययम्। ॥ ३ ॥

प्रमातृ ३२ एव स्वतन्त्रस्याल्पनांऽनन्तः ३५ तदत्तत्त्वभासः ॥ ३ ॥

तदपोहनेन घट्ट इति निर्देशो विकल्पो नाम न्यापारः। ॥ ३ ॥

चितत्वं मायया हित्वा भिन्न एवाभासितं यः।
देहे बुधवधु पाणे कलिपते नभसीव वा। ॥ ४ ॥

प्रमातृत्वनाहिमिति विमश्चन्यान्यपोहनात्।
विकल्प एव स परपतियोग्यबासं। ॥ ५ ॥

चित्तत्वस्येवेश्वरस्य मायाशक्त्या भेदः ॥ ३६ वभासितिः शरीरे
बुधवः ॥ ३७ आन्तरे वा स्पर्शस्त तदुच्छिं वाकास्तः इव शूल्यो एव
३८ विकलिप्तेः हिमिति प्रमातृत्वनां विमश्च। ॥ ३९ तत्तदभासमानार्थी-
राक्षी ॥ ३४ पतियोग्यपोहनकरणाद। ॥ ३६ घटोऽयिमितवद विकल्प एव। ॥ ३३० ॥

॥ ४-५ ॥

kt u.

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एवं समृतौ विकल्पे वाष्प्यपोहनपरायणे ।
ज्ञाने बाष्प्यन्तराभासः सिद्धत एवेति निरिच्छतम् ॥ ८ ॥
सर्वसंवित्सु ३४६-सर्वार्थविभासः प्रमादशेषमिनिन्यतत्ववद् ३४६-आनु-रूप्येण प्रकाशमानः ३४६-सदा सिद्धत एव ॥ ८ ॥

किंतु नैसर्गिको ज्ञाने बहिराभासनात्मनि ।
पूर्वानुभववर्णस्तु सिद्धत: स समरणादिः ॥ ९ ॥

३४२-ज्ञाने बहिराभासनरूपे ३४३-सहज एव ३४४-चित्तवस्थान्त-रथी ३४४-विभासः । समृत्यादौ नु ३४६-पूर्वानुभवात्मा । अत एव समृतिः संस्कारजोच्यते ॥ ९ ॥

स नैसर्गिक एवारित विकल्पे स्वैरचारिणि ।
यथाभिमतसंस्थानाभासनातु बुद्धिगोचरे ॥ १० ॥

३४६-स्वतन्त्रस्तु विकल्पशीत्यक्षुराद्यागोज्ञरमपि बुद्धिविषयता ३४६-पाद-नेन यथार्थि पूर्वानुभूतत्वाविश्वार्थिनेन नवमेव तं तमर्थाभासयति सन्विशेषः ३४६-विशेषं च । ३५०-तत्रासार्थः सहज एवारित ॥ १० ॥

अत एव यथाभिषेकस्मृतसेवितानां जीव महेश्वरः।
ञानिते स्फुते एव सिद्धे सर्वोपरि जीवित्वः॥ ॥

अपूर्वार्थनिर्माणजातं ३६० सामार्थ्य च ॥ ३६२ विकल्प एव सर्वस्य
सर्वशतिं सर्वकर्त्तव्यं ॥ ॥

इति ज्ञानधिकारे षष्ठमाह्दिकम्॥

सप्तमाह्दिकम्।

या चैत्य पतिभा तत्त्वदार्थकारणमूषितः।
अक्षमान्तिप्रत्यूपः प्रभुता स महेश्वरः॥ ॥

तत्त्वदार्थकारणविन्दुलितः ॥ ॥

थूर्तस्वितकालविधायकमान्तिचिन्तय आत्मसंहः प्रभुता
अनेकस्वितोत्सवेऽधकप्रभमान्तिसिद्धेमुपलोक भावेनादः। का-
यकारणातदा ॥ ॥

361 C adds *kriyā*. 362 ca cit. ibid. p. 336. 363 ca sphaṭam: sphaṭam 1, cāsphaṭam
N. 364 ca omitted in T. 365 ābhāsa: avābhāsa TJ, but cf. ibid. p. 341 ābhāsaeva ātā
ti vṛttigrantham... 366 sarvasamvitkālayāpi cit. ibid. p. 341. 367 Cf. ibid. p. 342, where
the exposition of the kār. merges with that of the vṛtti: ... api tu tās tā nilasukhādi-
visayesu vibhinnā yā samvido niścayāntāh, tāny eva mukhāni upāyās tair
nadisrotahshāṇīyair nentyamāṇaḥ āhāvāhenaiva aham ity ekamhāsamvitsamudre yadā
ābhīmukhyena visrāntim yānti, tadda esam jñāteyam parasparām svāsvanitākārya-
kāranabhadvādíva samanvayo vyavahārāmā upapattiyā ghatate. 368 8vyavahārao. 8vyav-
ahāram N.
...


बाध्यबाधकभावोद्पि स्वात्मनिष्ठाविरोधिनाम्।
झानामयुद्वियेकपमातृपरिनिष्ठते: || 6 ||

भिन्नस्वाभासमात्रनिष्ठानं झानानं को विरोधः, ततकथं
बाध्यबाधककल्पम्। एकप्रमातृविश्रान्तो तु युक्तस्मि || 6 ||

विविक्तभूतलझानं ठट्टाभावमिति भथा।
तथा चेच्छुकितकालानं रूप्यझानानाप्रमात्ववित् || 7 ||

इह भूतले घटो नास्तिति घटाभावानं केवलभूतलझानमेव
शून्यभूतलस्य घटाभावरूपत्वात्। तथेव यदि शुकितकार
रजतयोपरिपरसरत्मत्वाच् छुकितकालां रजतभावानामिति
प्रत्येकं बाधकम् || 7 ||

\[377\] atra cit. ibid. p. 368 “atra” ity asya vyākhyānam “pūrvānubhave” iti. \[378\] smṛti-
svarūpa iva pramāṇam i smṛteh omitted in C N. \[379\] The whole sentence is paraphrased and commented on (with some literal quotations) ibid. pp. 368-9 pūrvānubhavekāla eva
samānantarāksane smṛte udbhavo nāsti; smṛtisamaye tu pūrvāsane yadi anubhavah
prakāṣeta vahndhīmayor iva, grhyetāpi kāryakāraṇābhāvah, smṛtpūrvāsane tu na
kathamūd anubhavasya prakāṣah, na tu atra smṛtikāla eveti mantavyam sahabhāvena
prakāṣe kāryakāraṇa-tvāsiddheh et adartham api ca vṛttau pūrva-grhāṇanam i smṛte
na kāryalīyata yatah pūrvāsya anubhavasya āhāso nāsti yena tasya smṛtim prati
kāraṇābhāvaḥ siddhyet iti vṛttisangatiḥ. pūrva\(^{3}\) pūrvārtha\(^{3}\) T. \[380\] Cf. ibid. p. 372 vṛttau
cā vivṛttau ca “svaś ca abhāsaś ca” iti “svaś ca visayaś ca” iti yojyam.
\[381\] mitir: \[382\] Ch Jh (this is also the reading found in IPV and IPVV). \[383\] chukti\(^{2}\) Gh N Ch J Jh T. \[384\] rajatābhāvajñānam: rajatajñānapramāṇitāvedanam J, omitted
in E Gh N C Ch Jh N T. \[384\] pratyaksam: pratyakṣa\(^{2}\) E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T; cf. ibid. p. 381 atra āha “tac ca” iti pratyakṣam eva hādhakam.
१७.८

नावं गुद्धस्थलज्ञानात् सिद्धयेत् तस्याघातात्मता ।

न तूपलिभिधय्योगस्याय्यत्राभावो घटात्मनः ॥ ८ ॥

केवलभूतलज्ञानावृत्तलस्याघातात्मता सिद्धयति , न तु तत्राधारे
भिन्नो दर्शनयोगकोषपि घटे नास्तीति ॥ ८ ॥

विषिकं भूतलं शस्वज्ञावानं स्वालमनिषिद्धेते ।

tतकथं जातु तज्ञानं भिन्नस्याभावसाधनम् ॥ ९ ॥

भूतलम् ॥ ३४४॥अभूतलविषिकं सदैव तत्तकथं तज्ञानं कदा-

चिदेव ॥ ३४५॥ तत्र भिन्नघटाभावं साधयते । भिन्नघटविषिकताः

च ॥ ३४६॥ भूतलस्य कादाचिन्तकं रूपं स्यादं घटसहिततापि कदाचिन्-

त्त्वस्वरूपं भवेत् , न त्वेवम् । पदार्थः द्राबेव स्वालमपरिनिषिद्धोऽ

॥ ३४६॥ साहित्यं न तदतिरिक्तमुभयात्मकम् ॥ ३५६॥ एकरूपम् । ज्ञानमेकं

॥ ३५०॥ नूर्यायाभासांस्याय्यत्मकम् ॥ ३५८॥ एकाभासज्ञानान्तराः

॥ ३५५॥ भावरूपम् ।

वस्तु पुनः स्वालमनिषिद्धेऽज्ञेऽपरिचितन्तीति न वस्तुबलेन

॥ ३६३॥ पदेशदर्पनात् प्रदेशसिद्धवद्वद्दर्पधावनसिद्धः । उभयो ॥ ३५४॥भासे-

कज्ञानात्मककारायः ॥ ३५८॥ भावात् स्यात् । न चैवं न्यवधानेन

॥ ३६४॥ प्रदेशदर्पनात्वदेव ॥ ३५८॥ तात्सिद्धः ॥ ९ ॥

कित्तवालोकाचयोऽन्धस्य स्पर्शोऽद्रितादिको मृदुः।
तत्रासित साधयेतस्य स्वञ्जानमघटात्माम्। ॥ १० ॥
पदेशेष्वालोकःौऽपूर्वं सन्तमसे मृदुमुखादिकं स्पर्शं वा
घटरुपस्धरीभवात्मकमनुभूतालोकादिभ घटाभावःत्रासितं,
घटो नास्तिति ॥३६४०वयवहरतुः युक्तम् ॥ १० ॥

पिशाचः स्यादनालोकोऽप्पालोकाभ्यन्तरे यथा।
अहस्यो भूतलस्यान्तरनिषेधं: स सर्वथा ॥ ११ ॥

न चेवमालोकस्य पिशाचायन्त्वत् ॥४००० तत्रा पिशाचनिषेठप्रसङ्कः।
स छायायो ॥४०१५वयवेदपि यथा। ॥४०२मृकोऽक्षरस्यायन्त्वतनिश्चायन्त्वतालोकयन्तरे।
तत्ततस्य ॥४०३अन्यन्त इवास्मचमचतेशपि
४०४नाद्यन्तायादानीशिद्धं। ॥ ११ ॥

एवं रूप्यविदाभावरूपः शृङ्खलितमतिर्भवेत्।
न त्वान्यरज्जन्तस्तः स्यादप्रामाण्यवेदिका। ॥ १२ ॥

श्रुक्तित्तानेन रज्जनानाभावस्य दिक्षितं, तदानीत्तनशिक्तण
४०५ज्ञानानुभोवेन न भिन्नस्यातीतस्य रूप्यज्ञानस्याप्रामाण्यम्। ॥ १२ ॥

398. o pūram: o prasaram E (Kh o pūram) Gh N C Ch J H N T. 399. vyavahartum: vyavaharanam Gh. 400. tatra cit. ibid. p. 389 ... iti trídhā tatraśabdo vyākhyātah; tatrāpi E.
401. 'nyatve: 'nyathāive Kh; cf. ibid. p. 389. anyatvam sampyamantam yat vṛttv āuktam.
402. mṛdgolakasyāpy: bhūgolakasya N Ch J H T, bhūgolasya E Gh C J N. 403. anyamata: anyatra C. 404. nādṛśyatvād abhāva: nādṛśyatvābhāva E Gh N Ch J H T, na drṣyatvād abhāva C N. 405. jñānānubhāvāna bhinnasyātītasya rūpyajñānasyāprāmānyam: jñānasyāprāmānye sā E Gh N T (this is also the original reading of C J H, then corrected to jñānānubhāvāna bhinnasya rūpyajñānasyāprāmānye sā; the latter is the reading of J), jñānānubhāve jñānasyāprāmānye sā N, jñānasyāvad aprāmānye sā Ch.
धर्म्सिद्धेषाय भवेदुः बाधा नैवानुमानतः।
स्वसंवेदनसिद्धा तु युक्ता सैकप्रभातृजा॥ १३॥

शुक्लकाशानकाले च न पूर्व रजतान्नमसितः।
ततः सध्वं न सिद्ध इति नानामानेन बाधा ,
एकप्रभातृधिङ्गख्य हर्षव-संवेदने त्वेकदेशाद्वभ्ययुभयं ४०४ःजानयसंबन्धभासनात् सिद्धाति।
पश्चात् ४०४ःसंवादः पत्यक्षसंवेदने पूर्वख्यायि तत्स्य ४१०ःभासनादेकं
प्रमाणितरदलन्यायेति भवति। संवादोपयेकः ४११ःप्रभातृः॥ १३॥

इत्थमत्यर्थमिष्ठ्वनार्थावभासाखिते विभो।
समलो विमलो वापि न्यवहारोऽनुभूयते॥ १४॥

मायाशक्तया भेदविषयोऽय सवी न्यवहारस् ४१२ःतथाज्ञानिनां
शुद्धोऽज्ञानाध्यायां ४१३ःतु मलिनस्ततत् ४१४ःमिष्ठ्वनार्थावभासाभाजि
भगवति ४१५ःसंवायते ४१६ःन्यवहान॥ १४॥

इति ज्ञानाधिकारे सप्तमापादिकम्॥

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406 °maya° omitted in C. 407 °svasamvedane: 8samvedane E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T.
408 °jñānamvasambhandhubhāsanāt: "jñānam asambaddham E Gh J Jh, °jñānasambaddhā°
N, °jñānasambaddham Ch T, °jñānam asambaddham corrected to 8jñānasambhandha-
sambaddham C, °jñānasambaddham corrected to jñānam asambaddham Jh. 409 °samvadah
pratyakṣasvasamvedane: samvāda pratyakṣe svasamvedane E Gh C Ch J Jh N T.
samvāda pratyakṣe svasamvedane N. 410 °hāsanād: abhāsanād E Ch N T. 411 °pramātr°:
°mātr° J. 412 "tathājñānānām: tathā jñānānām E. but cf. ibid. p. 405 tathājñānānām iti
vṛttav samastam padam. 413 tu omitted in C N. 414 "vihinna°: °vihinna° E C N.
415 sambhāvyate cit. and commented on ibid. p. 405 sambhāvyate iti vṛttav uktam
mūdhānām jaghiti tathābhīmānāhāhāve 'pi uktopadesapariśilanadiśā prakāśate eva ayam
arthah iti darśayitum. 416 °nubhavena: 'nubhavane N.
अष्टममाद्विकम्

तत्कलिकाक्ष्यसामक्ष्यसापेक्षा: केवलं कवचित् ॥
आभासा अन्यथान्यन्त्र तवन्धान्धतमसादिषु ॥ १ ॥
आभासा: कदाचित् सत्तनिहितपत्यक्षाक्षिण्यता गहरे:यमिति
४१५न्यवाहाहेतवः, अन्धतमसादी तु पूर्वानुभोटिथिनः ॥ १ ॥

विषेषोथर्यवभासस्य सत्ताम् न पुरूष कवचित् ॥
विकल्पेषु भवेद्भावविभूतार्थगमिभु ॥ २ ॥
स्मृत्यपक्षारूपेषु पत्यक्षप्रसःपतारितिषु
४१६स्वतन्त्रेषु वाणयेषु
४१६विकल्पेषु काल्ययूरूपयेष्वथार्थवभासो ४२२न्तस्तुल्य एवाव
रिथत: ॥ २ ॥

सुखादिषु च सौख्यादिहेतुपिच्छ च वर्षुपूर्न
अवभासस्य सद्भावेस्पत्यतीतवात् तथारिथित: ॥ ३ ॥
सुखुल:खाद्यावासस्तसाधनाभासार्थ सदेवान्त: सत्तोऽपि न
tथाहादादिमयां रिथिति कुर्वल्यपत्यतीतवाद् बहिस् ४२२न्तनामभावात्
४२३न्तल्वार्षिष्टानां च तथाकारित्वात् ॥ ३ ॥

417 vyavahāraḥetavah: vyavahāraḥetor E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T; vyavahāra" cit. ibid.
p. 408. 418 svatantarēṣu vānyēṣu: asvatantrēṣu vānyēṣu C Gh N T, asvatantrēṣu nēṣu N,
vā svatantrēṣu vānyēṣu J, vā svatantrēṣv anyēṣu T. 419 vikalpesu omitted in Gh.
420 6viṣyēṣṇ: 6viṣesēṣṇ J. 421 'nta: 'nta eva T. 422 Cf. ibid. p. 410 (perhaps from the
 tikā) tadanīm ity anena hi varmaṇātā bāhyanisthaiva iti darsitam. 423 tadātvasiṣṭānām: tathātva avisiṣṭānām T; cf. ibid. p. 410 tadatvam vartamānātā.


8.4

गाढमुलिलख्यमाने तु विकल्पे सुखादिके ।
तथारथिधिस्ततथैव स्यात् स्फूर्तमस्योपलक्षणात् ॥ ४ ॥

424 कुस्तिच्चतु पयलविशेषयत् । 425 स्वपनात्विकल्पबलिसिर्तं
स्फूर्तमेव सुखादि । 426 जानं विकासादिहितः ॥ ॥

भावाभावाभावाभासाः बाध्नेपाधिचिरिष्यते ।
नात्मा सता तत्स्तेषामानंतराणा सतां सदा ॥ ५ ॥

427 सर्वेषामाभासाः । 428 भावाभवविषयाणामवहीरूपत्तेः द्विप सता-
स्तयेव स्मृत्यादौ , बाधतवं हि लेषामुपाधिन्य स्वरूपम् । अभावा-
429 भास्यान्तः सतायामपि । 430 बहिर्भावात्थात्वम् ॥ ॥

आन्तररतानु प्रमात्रैकये नैैष भेदनिवनधना ।
अर्थिक्यमानि बाध्नेऽसा मिनाभासभेदतः ॥ ॥

अन्तररता सर्वेषामेव नीलसुखाया । 431 भासाः । 432 सदा सत्तेः द्वि
प्रमात्रमात्ररूपत्वात् कार्यकारणादिभेदाः । 433 श्रया नार्थिक्या , प्रमा-
तृभेदे । 434 सपि । 435 बौद्धाक्षरियास्तवतिदेबनाभासभेदंभासाः
अन्तरिक्षाय । 436 भिद्यते रूपाब्धानाम् ॥ ॥

424 kutaścit: cit. ibid. p. 410. 425 svaítantra: cit. ibid. p. 410 svaítantragrahanam sma-
raññirākaranāya. 426 jā́tum could also be considered as being compounded with sukha
dhi with the meaning of 'multitude, collection', without this involving a notable variation of
the general meaning. 427 sarvesāṁ abhāsāṁ: bhāvābhāvāvabhāsāṁ (which is the
same as the first pāda of the kār.) E Gh N C Ch Ā T, bhāvābhāvāvabhāsāṁ corrected
to sarvesāṁ abhāsāṁ Jh. 428 bhāvābhāvavaisayānāṁ is paraphrased and commented on
ibid. p. 412 nanu evam vṛttāv abhāsānāṁ bhāvābhāvāvīṣayatvena katham uktah ... and
pp. 414-15 nanu ca abhāsā vīṣayāh, yato grāhyāh, tāt katham tesām vṛttān bahu
vīṣayīnā vīṣayītvam darsitam. 429 ṣabhaśāsya: ṣabhāvasya N. 430 babhařābhavā: babhařā
bhāsāt T; cf., in a similar context, ŚDV 130 hāhye prakāṣanaḥ bhāvāvāvīṣayatvam bhā
daḥ āvajñātaḥ ... 431 ṣabhaśāsya: ṣabhāsāyasya T (also possible). 432 saṅgā saṅgṭe: saṅgṭe
sattvā ā 'vātattvā ē G v ā tā ā vābhāvāvāvīṣayatvena katham uktah ... and
pp. 414-15 nanu ca abhāsā vīṣayāh, yato grāhyāh, tāt katham tesām vṛttān bahu
vīṣayīnā vīṣayītvam darsitam. 429 ṣabhaśāsya: ṣabhāvasya N. 430 babhařābhavā: babhařā
bhāsāt T; cf., in a similar context, ŚDV 130 hāhye prakāṣanaḥ bhāvāvāvīṣayatvam bhā
daḥ āvajñātaḥ ... 431 ṣabhaśāsya: ṣabhāsāyasya T (also possible). 432 saṅgā saṅgṭe: saṅgṭe
sattvā ā 'vātattvā ē G v ā tā ā vābhāvāvāvīṣayatvena katham uktah ... and
pp. 414-15 nanu ca abhāsā vīṣayāh, yato grāhyāh, tāt katham tesām vṛttān bahu
vīṣayīnā vīṣayītvam darsitam. 429 ṣabhaśāsya: ṣabhāvasya N. 430 babhařābhavā: babhařā
bhāsāt T; cf., in a similar context, ŚDV 130 hāhye prakāṣanaḥ bhāvāvāvīṣayatvam bhā
daḥ āvajñātaḥ ... 431 ṣabhaśāsya: ṣabhāsāyasya T (also possible). 432 saṅgā saṅgṭe: saṅgṭe
sattvā ā 'vātattvā ē G v ā tā ā vābhāvāvāvīṣayatvena katham uktah ... and
pp. 414-15 nanu ca abhāsā vīṣayāh, yato grāhyāh, tāt katham tesām vṛttān bahu
vīṣayīnā vīṣayītvam darsitam. 429 ṣabhaśāsya: ṣabhāvasya N. 430 babhařābhavā: babhařā
bhāsāt T; cf., in a similar context, ŚDV 130 hāhye prakāṣanaḥ bhāvāvāvīṣayatvam bhā
daḥ āvajñātaḥ ... 431 ṣabhaśāsya: ṣabhāsāyasya T (also possible). 432 saṅgā saṅgṭe: saṅgṭe
sattvā ā 'vātattvā ē G v ā tā ā vābhāvāvāvīṣayatvena katham uktah ... and
pp. 414-15 nanu ca abhāsā vīṣayāh, yato grāhyāh, tāt katham tesām vṛttān bahu
vīṣayīnā vīṣayītvam darsitam. 429 ṣabhaśāsya: ṣabhāvasya N. 430 babhařābhavā: babhařā
bhāsāt T; cf., in a similar context, ŚDV 130 hāhye prakāṣanaḥ bhāvāvāvīṣayatvam bhā
daḥ āvajñātaḥ ... 431 ṣabhaśāsya: ṣabhāsāyasya T (also possible). 432 saṅgā saṁgṭe: saṁgṭe
sattv...
चिन्मयत्वेः वभासानामान्तरेऽव रिथितः सदा ।
माययाभासमानानां बालबाल्व बहिरपप्सौ ॥ ७ ॥

विकल्पे योष्यमुल्लेखः सोषिप बालः पृथकपथः ।
प्रमाणकाल्ययमान्तर्य ततो भेषो हि बालता ॥ ८ ॥

विकल्पे घटाधुलेखस्वसकराध्ययोगोपरोभिप पृथ्यभासाद् बालः
एव ॥ ४४ ॥

"pratyakṣa" cit. and commented on ibid. p. 422. 438 prakāṣyamānesu: prakāṣamānesu E Gh. This is also the reading cit. ibid. p. 421, but all the argumentation that accompanies it presupposes prakāṣyamānesu: “ata eva” iti yato 'bhimānamātrasāram māṣīyam ābhāsate svātantryam esām nilādīnām, tato vṛttau pāratantryam esām nīrūpi-
tam. svātantryam tu na sṛṣṭam iti dārsayati “antarnta” iti svatantrasya va hi pradhān-
kriyāyām tannītihsvādhvāmānasābhāyānirāsopayogipaśādikarṇāpratīcareva svātan-
tryam niṣṭhāvṛttau svātantrasya evam pi prasāradhāya bhāya (ṭīṭhād) eva iti.

437 pratyakṣa cit. and commented on ibid. p. 422.
438 prakāṣyamānesu: prakāṣamānesu E Gh. This is also the reading cit. ibid. p. 421, but all the argumentation that accompanies it presupposes prakāṣyamānesu: “ata eva” iti yato 'bhimānamātrasāram māṣīyam ābhāsate svātantryam esām nilādīnām, tato vṛttau pāratantryam esām nīrūpi-
tam. svātantryam tu na sṛṣṭam iti dārsayati “antarnta” iti svatantrasya va hi pradhān-
kriyāyām tannītihsvādhvāmānasābhāyānirāsopayogipaśādikarṇāpratīcareva svātan-
tryam niṣṭhāvṛttau svātantrasya evam pi prasāradhāya bhāya (ṭīṭhād) eva iti.

439  "avatīrkti" T. 440 "bahirabhāṣa" cit. ibid. p. 422. 441 tadāpi cit. ibid. p. 423 and glossed with pratyaksatve "pi. 442 T adds iti. 443 ahamvimarṣa cit. ibid. p. 426. 444 ca omitted in E Gh N C Ch Jh N T. 445 bahyata omitted in E Gh N C Ch Jh N T T. 446 sukhaḍēs tu cit. ibid. p. 429, where also ghaṭādīnām is mentioned. 447 ekāntah Ch.

39
The text of the vr̥tti in E Gh N C Ch Jh N T appear at first sight corrupted and full of gaps: *ullekhasya sukhaduhkhadlnam cesvarasya saksatkdrarupo bauddhah prakdsah.* I have accepted integrally the text of T, even though one would expect an explicit reference to *bahirdrmanda*, the addition of *lajjda* is indirectly confirmed ibid. p. 430 “atadrupac ca” iti lajjda hi na sukham, na duhkham, cittavrttivisesas ca. The text of J is very close to T (only, it omits *lajjda* and reads saksatkdrara). I have conjecturally restated *hi na vyavaharah*, my conjectural emendation: *hi na vyavaharah* T, *vyavahara* E Gh N C Ch Jh N T. *ekas ca: eka eva E (eka ca also in K Kh). *ca omitted in E Gh N C Ch Jh N T.* 455 paramatma* cit. ibid. p. 433. 456 ākhyena: ākhyo T. 457 āsamjñaśyāhamvimsanam: āsamjñaakasyāhamvimsarasa J.
विमर्शनमेव "शुद्धे ज्ञानिकरे, भिन्नाभिन्नकार्यगते त्वीश्वरस्य शुद्धा भिन्नार्थविषये तु पुंस: सत्वरजो-बृतिरुपे प्रकाशप्रृतिसंस्कृते तमसा संकृते अशुद्धे एव"

इति ज्ञानाधिकारेष्टममाधिकरम्

इति ज्ञानाधिकारः

458 सुध्दे: viśuddhe T. 459 gates tv isvarasya: gatve tv isvarasya C Ch Jh N, gatve (corrected to gate) tv isvarasya Gh, gatam tvēsvarasya N, gataveśvarasya corrected to gate tv isvarasya J. 460 Cf. ibid. p. 437 evam ahantāyāhil śuddhasuddhatvam vyākhyāya, asuddhatvam vyācaṣṭe. 461 visaye tu: visayatve E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 462 samkucite: samkocite T.
क्रियाधिकारः

प्रथममाहिकम्

अत एव यदप्युक्तं किया नैकस्य सक्रमाः
एकत्यादि प्रतिक्षितं तदेकस्य समर्थनात्
एकादीत्वसमर्थनादेकसंबंधी व्यापार एक एवेति क्रिया-
प्रयपूर्तादिः

सकमत्रं च लोकिक्याः कियाः कालशक्तिः
घटते न तु शास्त्रत्याः प्राध्याः स्यात्
पभोरिव

मायाशक्तेर्भिन्नभावाभासानां किया कालशक्तिवशेषत् सक्रमाः
न तत्तत्त्वश्रवस्तुपानादिनिधनाः प्रभोः 'सवभावभुता

कालः सूर्यविसंचारस्तल्पपाबिजनम् वा
"शीतल्याच्च वाण तत्तल्याः कम एव
स तस्माः

"सा सा प्रसिद्धा किया कालः "शीतादि वा तदुपलक्षितः"

1 svabhāva° : svaprābhava° T. 2 sitosne : sitosnam T; sitosne is also quoted in MMP p. 131. 3 There is a direct allusion to sa sa in IPVV III p. 6: adisahdopattam ca yat sûtre tat sanksepavarttavā vipsayā vyākhyātām. 4 sitādi : sitādir T N. 5 upalaksita° : upalaksita° T.
नवाभासामानवाभाजोपाधि

क्रमे 'एव वासो तस्ये - इ 1.3
वोपयोगात् इ 311

क्रमो भेदाभ्रो भेदोऽप्याभाससदसर्वतः।
आभाससदसर्वे तु चित्राभासाकृतः प्रभोः। इ 4।।
अन्योऽप्याभासमूहं भिन्नभावावभासवैचिचिचिचिचिचि
क्यक्यिव च प्रभोः। 10भावेषु क्रमेऽतु। इ 4।।

मूर्तिचिचिचिचिचि देशकममाभासयत्यत्सोः।
कियाचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचि कालकममपीवरः। इ 5।।

"अनेकस्यान्योंयभेदाभासदेशकमः। कियामुक्लेन कालक-মोसिप। एकर्ष-य तु भास्य तत्ततजन्मसताः। कियाभेदात् कालकम एव। इ 5।।

सर्वाभासभेदोसिप भवेत् कालकमाकर।।
विच्छेन्नभासः शून्यावेंशाभोविकारसः।
नो सकुटः इ 6।।
सर्वेन 'अर्थे विचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचि भवाम: शून्यवेहादेवेव प्रमाईः कालः।

6° avabhāsānaḥ: bhāsāna Ch. 7° bhūtah: bhūta T. 8° eva vāsau: evāsau E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 9° Cf. ibid. p. 11 vruttau bhinnāvabhāsāvaicitryaśahādbhyām na
gumsakaikaśeṣo 'tra dvayasya upayogitām darśayati. 10° bhāvesu cit. ibid. p. 11. 11° Cf. be paraphrase ibid. p. 12 anekasmin vastiṣṇi desakramo ghrāṅganavat, kālakramo
mahākāramallikādivat / ekasmīmsa tā na desakramo dūratāder abhāvāt / vaitatāyam api
ūmsānām I tad ekatra kālakrama eva pacyamānāmrapahalavat iti vṛttitātparyam. 12° kriyāmu-
khena cit. ibid. p. 15. 13° ekasya cit. ibid. p. 16. 14° vapi vairāṇama: parināma E Gh N
C Ch J Jh N T (cf. Nirukta 1.2.8-9 9a bhāvavikāra bhavantī tu smāha bhagavān
varsayānāh jāyate 'sti vairānamate vardhāte 'paksīyate vinaśyati). 15° arthe is referred to
ibid. p. 20 sūtrānupāttam arthapadam vruttau praksipya ....
II.6 कमाभासः हेतुः स हि प्राक्कालो न तथा तदानीः भास्ते समृति विहायः स्वर्यत्मानापेक्षया चासो भूतभविष्यते न्यख्वरति। सक्रृधिभातस्य तु भासनक्रियाविचेष्टेदाद् आवृत्तिगणनाभावात् नात्मनीवार्थेवापि कालभेदः॥ ६॥

देशकमोदपि भावेषु भावित मातुर्मितात्मनः ।
स्वालमेव स्वात्मना पूर्णा भावा
भान्तमितस्य तु ॥ ७॥

परिमितं प्रमातारमपेक्षयं भावास्तो न्योन्यं च भिन्ना
दूरादिव्यपदेशभाजस्य, प्रकाशोक्षङ्कितत्वेन। त्वीश्वरस्य न क्वावप्य-प्रकाशसंभवात् परमाणावपि। प्रकाशं धनस्य ॥ ६॥ नात्मो भिन्नं
दूरं वान्योन्यायते ॥ ७॥

किंतु निर्माणशस्त्रिः साप्येवविद्वु इशितुः ।
तथा विज्ञातुविशेषभेदो यदवभास्यते ॥ ८॥

एवं पूर्णतया प्रकाशानस्य अपि परमेश्वरस्य सैधा सृष्टि-
II 1.8

शक्तिर्ज्ञातःकोसेवकाया भावः स्वतोऽन्योऽन्य च "विभागोऽन्यसीपणो तथा असंपूर्णतिरिस्तीरोधीयोऽसीपणो तथावसायनो तस्य स्वरूपसिद्धिरसिद्धिरोधीयोऽसीपणो तथा असंपूर्णतिरिस्तीरोधीयोऽसीपणो तथावसायनो तस्य स्वरूपसिद्धिरसिद्धिरोधीयोऽसीपणो तथावसायनो तस्य स्वरूपसिद्धिरसिद्धिरोधीयोऽसीपणो तथावसायनो तस्य स्वरूपसिद्धिरसिद्धिरोधीयोऽसीपणो तथावसायनो तस्य स्वरूपसिद्धिरसिद्धिरोधीयो

इति क्रियाधिकारे प्रथममाहिष्कम्

द्वितीयमाहिष्कम्

क्रियासंबन्धसामान्यात्मकाण्डाचकलाबुद्धिः।
सत्याऽकतन्योगाध्यमकानेकाश्रयय दकतः।)

"सत्याऽकतन्योगाध्यमकानेकाश्रयय दकतः"

तत्तैकमान्तरऽतत तदेवन्द्रियवेधातः।
संपाप्यायानेकता याति वेशकालस्वभावतः।

अभिन्नमेव 36तत्त्वमातः32 बहिराभासभेदशेषकालस्वभावमेव 34संभेदयेव34के कर्षलक्षणाभासानामकरणेकत्वातः)

39 Cf. ibid. p. 29 anena vibhāgāvasāyena .... 30 na ca cit. ibid. p. 26. 31 tasya omitted in E Gh N C Ch Jh N T. 32 Cf. ibid. p. 29 kriyāutra drstānītvena upātta. 33 satyāḥpāsāḥ cit. ibid. p. 36. 34 sarvadopayoginām : sadopayoginām T, but cf. ibid. p. 29 "sarvadopayoginām" iti sthairyam uktaṃ "arthavattvena" iti arthākriyopayogah. 35 T adds tatraikam (that is, the first two words of the kār.). 36 Cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 45 antarabhinnam tattvam samvinmātratayā, māyāparamāтуः punah antarhakāranābhāsāt bāhyakaranābhāsāc ca bahirbhedāt vastu phalata ekānekaṃ / anekatve hetuḥ "bahih" ity āditi vṛttisambhātī; J has etat instead of eva. 37 bahih cit. ibid. p. 45. 38 "sambhedayaṃ kākakasvalaksanābhāsānām : "sambhedabhāsānām Jh T. 39 "eka" : "eka" E Gh N C Jh.
II 2.3

तदुद्यालम्बना एता मनोःनुवयवसायि सत्।
करोति मातृियापारम्यः कर्माविकल्पना: || 3 ||

40 मध्यस्यथयतन्तवहिस्ततवविषया मानसः कियाविकल्पना:
41 प्रमातृ्यापाररुपः || 3 ||

स्वायमनिष्ठा 42 विविक्ताभा भवाव एकपातरि।
अन्योन्यान्ययूपक्षयुजः संबन्धधीपदम् || 4 ||
राजः पुरुष इत्यादिसंबन्धधियोऽन्त: समन्त्यादैक्यं बहि:
43 संबन्धधिभेदं चालम्बनं || 4 ||

जातिविवयवभासानां बहिरन्न्येकरुपतामः।
व्यक्तयादेशभेदं चाप्यालम्बनं विकल्पः || 5 ||
गावस्येत्र इति च मतयो बहिरपि गोमात्रेक्षयनपुरुष-
विशेषाकाराभासादैक्यं स्वल्कणावयवाभासबहुतं च परामृष्ठिनः
|| 5 ||

कियाविवर्णविषयः 45 कारकाणां समन्वयः।
अवन्धविविधमदावान्यालम्बा दिगादिधी: || 6 ||

काण्ठस्थालीदेवदत्तदलानां पचतीर्यत्न: समन्त्यादू बहिर्भेदाच्चचै-
कानेकविषया कियांभित:। देशाल्क्रमोस्पितं 46 भावानवसम्बह्-

40 Cf. ibid. p. 47 kayor madhyastham mano vrttau uktam iti šankitvā grāhaya-
grāhakayor iti darśayati. 41 pramāṭra: mātra E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 42 vivikābhā :
vivikā vā E, vivikātā (but in Malayalam script t and bh are rather similar) T.
43 sambandhi: sambandha E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 44 kārakānām : kāranānām Gh N C Ch J Jh T. 45 Cf. ibid. p. 62 evam kriyām ekānekarūpaṁ upapāda vṛttigranthasya “matih” ity antasya .... 46 E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T add bhāti, which is very probably to be expunged.
वधिमद्वारपाणामयोन्यापेशः ४७ संबन्धभेद ४८ एव तथा ४९ एवेकानेकमयः। जातिन्द्रयक्रियासंख्याधिमतयः सर्व्य एव संबन्धविशेष-समवायविषया एव ॥ ५०॥

एवमेवार्थसिद्धः स्थानमातुरथक्रियाधिनः।
भेदभेदवतार्थन तेन न भानितरीढ़ी ॥ ५१॥

४७एकानेकरूपेऽव क्रियादिभिरेवमाधासानुग्रुणरूपः प्रमातुः
तदर्थिनोश्रथक्रियासंवादः। ततो न तदबुधयो भान्तः; ॥ ५२॥

इति क्रियाधिकारे द्वितीयमाध्विकम्॥

तृतीयमाध्विकम्

इवमेतादिगत्येवं चहसाद् न्यवतिन्नते।
वस्तु प्रमाणं तत् सोशिष्य स्वाभासोशिष्यवदयः ॥ ५३॥
सोशिष्यस्त्वताविक्षिपीतम् देशाकालाध्येदिन।
एकाभिधानविषये मितिर्वस्तुन्यवाधिता ॥ ५४॥

यदायता हि ५५वस्तुन: स्वरूपेण नित्यताविशेषणेः ५६वः

४७ sambandha: samanvaya E Gh NC Ch J Jh T, but cf. ibid. p. 61 yā dikkālabuddhī. sāpi ... samhandharūpatvapradhānaiva. ४८ eva: evam T. ४९ eva omitted in T.
५० In the KSTS Ed. of IPV (vol. II pp. 57-8) fn. 110 is constituted by a long passage drawn most probably from the tikā, where the beginning of the vṛtti is quoted: tad āha vṛttau ekānekārūpaḥ kriyādibhir iti. ५१ vastunāh and vīṣeṣanāir cit. ibid. p. 77. ५२ vā: yā E.
"न्यवस्थायमानता स प्रमातः स्वत्वेनापूर्ववस्त्रव"वभास एव रिधतः प्रमाणम्। च एव चाभासोस्यथमिति नित्य इति वा तथैव पृथक्तयाभिनववेन च प्रमात्यपारूहो सिमसरूपतामपन्नो। विसर्भेदानुसारेर्कानवशदवाच्ये पृथक्पृथुच्ये तिरुकुन्देशादिभेदे तस्मिन्नाभात एव सामान्यरूपे वर्तुनि स्वकार्थिक्रिया।प्राप्ते प्रमाणान्तरेण "अवाधित्"वैश्यर्थी प्रमिति: प्रमातृपायार: ॥ १-२ ॥

यथार्थचे यथार्थित्वं यथान्युत्पत्ति सिद्धते।
आभासोपार्थं एकरिन्ननुसांधानाधिते ॥ ३ ॥
एकरिन्ने ६० एव चैकप्रत्ययभूम्यसामयोपपादिते "वर्तुनि स्वेच्छावशादिर्वित्वानुरूपाध्य नैपुर्णवशादवाभासभेदः ॥ ३ ॥

53 A reference to vyavasthāpyamānātā can be found ibid. p. 74 pramātrādhinaivam tasya prakārtikartum vrtau nicprayogah. 54 avabhāsa eva sthitah cit. and commented on ibid. p. 76 "avabhāsa eva sthitah" iti vṛttipadaiv ābhāsavyayisirikam na anyat sthitam rūdhham satyam kimapi asti - iti vadadbhir abheda ukta iti yāvat. 55 sa eva cābhāsa 'yam iti nitya va cit. and commented on ibid. p. 77 nanu "vastunā viśeśanaiv" iti upakāntā vṛttiḥ, tata evam vṛtyantarena bhāvitaya" idam iti" nityam iti va", tat pumniredeśe ka āsayah / ayam iti āha "ābhāsa eva" iti / "sa eva cābhāsah" iti hi vṛttigrahaṇe ya ābhāsah pramānaivena uktah, tam eva atinikātām apektṣa nirdesah pramānaprameyayor abhēdām tāttvikam ācaṣte ity arthah. In the KSTS Ed. of the IPV (vol. II pp. 69-70) fn; 46 is constituted by a passage from the tīkā, where the same phrase from the vṛtti is quoted: tad eva darsitam vrtau sa eva cābhāsa 'yam iti nitya iti vṛtī. 56 vimarsābhēdanaivā śārvekaikāsahābdavācye paraphrased ibid. p. 78 iyata vimarsāviśeṣe aṇuśari eva vāṣyam ya ekaikah śābdas tadvācya iti vṛtīv. 57 prāpote: prāpte E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 58 abādhitā: abādhitā Ch T. 59 oṣthairyam T. oṣthairyam T. oṣthairyam G h N. 60 eva cit. and commented on ibid. p. 107 vṛttav eva pariṣṭhita eva āyukti ei eva ekavām tatra na na yuktam ity acaksanena. 61 vastuni cit. ibid. p. 108.
62 E puts tathā hi at the beginning of the vṛtti. 63 ॐadibhiḥ : ॐādayah T, ॐādibhiḥ corrected to ॐādayah J. 64 yathā : yadā T; abhäsā vibhidyante T (and IPV, Bh, IPVV): avabhäsā bhidyante E Gh N C Ch J N T. 65 ॐavibhedinah : ॐvibhedinah Gh N Ch T. Also the text commented on by Bhāskara has ॐvibhedinah and on these grounds the editors of Bh claim that this was the original reading. The correct reading, on the contrary, is certainly ॐavibhedinah, as one can gather from the IPVV and from the IPV itself, if rightly understood, and as is evident from the thread of the argumentation. Lastly, the vṛtti (tathā bhidhyamāno 'pi desakālabhedam na sprātai) removes any doubt on this point. 66 'vadhītsaḥ : tathāyathā T, tathāvāyāhsa J; cf. the quotation (from the tīkā) ibid. p. 110 avaḥītsaḥ iti rucyādibhedatrayāśrayenety arthah. 67 Cf. ibid. p. 109 “tryaśra” [from the tīkā] iti dvigur matvarthiyajuntah. 68 vā : ca E Gh N C Ch J N T. 69 ॐurdhvatuḥ : ॐurdhva E Gh N C Ch J N T. 70 pratibhiḥ : bhavati E Gh N C Ch J N T, bhāti J. 71 tu omitted in E Gh N C Ch J N T. 72 tavādīs tu : taddhitavastu T. 73 tārnatādi : tārnatādī E, tārnatāpi Gh N C Ch J N T. 74 iva : ॐbhāvaḥ E Gh N C Ch J N T. 75 In the KSTS Ed. of the IPV (vol. II p. 90) fn. 112 is constituted by a passage of the Aṣṭasāhasri (that is, Utp.'s tīkā), where this phrase from the vṛtti is quoted: ata eva vṛttau sa ca desakālabhedam tathā bhidyamāno 'pi na sprātai; desaḥ na sprātai cit. in IPVV III p. 110. 76 The whole sentence (from tathaiva) is quoted in a passage from the tīkā which constitutes fn. 114 of the KSTS Ed. of the IPV (vol. II p. 91). The text is the same as the one I have established, except for ॐmātraḥ (see below fn. 81, reading J) which should probably be expunged. 77 sann ity : sanctity T.
आभासभेदाद्वृत्तृत्तिया नियतार्थिकिया पुनः।
सामानाधिकरण्येन पतिभासाधिकर्येनाद्विनामः।

एकरिमलन्नेत्र स्वल्पक्षे प्रत्याभासं नियतिशक्रया कार्य
नियमितं तथाभूतानेतकार्योक्ता भासभेदाधिकरणमेकं च।

सामानाधिकरण्याभासवशादि वस्तु ॥ १०२ अनेकस्येकता हि सामानाधिकरण्यम् ॥ ६ ॥

पृथक्कृपकाशान्भोतदा सागरे सया ॥
अविरुध्भावभासानेमकऽकारः तत्तैः कथितः ॥ ७ ॥

भिन्नः प्रदीप्प्रभा १०३ अविभागेनावभासते नदीप्प्रवहारस् १०४ च सिन्धुबुधः पानके च ते ते रसाः, तथा शौक्यमहर्षः
१०४ पदवादा १०४ भासा: परस्परानुपवेशकश्चमा: न तु नीलाः
पीताध्वभासासततस्तदेकः कऽद्रव्याभासभावेन कल्पनेन प्रत्यक्ष
१०६ एव । १०७ तदेतत् सामानाधिकरण्यम् ॥ ७ ॥

तत्त्वविशिष्टे वहयादी कार्यकारणतोष्णातः ॥
तत्त्वादवार्थतात्त्वात्मा प्रमाणदेवकता महतः ॥ ८ ॥

१०६ कदापिदा १०६ देशार्थभावाभाविर्भचन्नस्वलक्षणः १०८ परिवर्षेशत्वागेन १०८ एकसमान्यरूपावभासाः १०८ एव एव १०८ तेलोक्यत्रेका
पितगामितवेन निजप्रमाणादेकस्मादेव विशिष्टकारः १०८ कारणोत
ग्नः हृद्दृश्यः १०१ भागिनिश्वदवच्यता १०१ दिस्वभावसिद्धः ॥ ८ ॥

१०१ anekasyaikata cit. ibid. p. 114. १०२ avibhāgenañavabhāsa : avibhāga ābhāsan
t; avibhāgana cit. ibid. p. 117. १०३ ca only found in T, but cf. ibid. p. 117, where the
two ca in the sentence are referred to. १०४ patātvādā : ṣatādī J. १०५ avabhāsāh :
ābhāsāh J T. १०६ eva omitted in T N J. १०७ tād etat : tat E Gh C Ch Jh N T, etat N J.
१०८ kadācit cit. (perhaps from the tīkā) ibid. p. 121. १०९ Cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 121
vṛttau desakālabhāsav eva ṣaṅkṣeṣaya kasmād uktāt. १०५ ṣura pā : ṣvaṁrāṇa T. १११ Cf.
ibid. p. 124 avasthitārūpam hi tatra ekam sāmānya ity upapāditaḥ / ekam
ekaikasāmānyasvarūpam upapādyā ... . ११२ ṣatra omitted in E (but found in Kh).
११३ Cf. ibid. p. 124 yenaiva prathama-prathamaprajnëna pramāṇena bhāṣvarasanniveśa-
vācesvarūpam aṣāṇḍya avyabhācitāḥ gṛhitam, tenaiva tralokya trākāle ca bhāṣvar-
rūpasanniveśa upapāditaḥ tadauṣaṇāvyabhācīritwam niścitaḥ iti na tatra pramāṇāntarop
cyogah. ११४ kāraṇatosaḥ : kāraṇordhva T. ११५ ārdhva bhāgaṇī T. ११५ ārdhva bhāga-
gāmi T. ११६ nādena iti vṛttigatena.
II 3.9

sā tu dēśa

116vinaśyābhāṣantarabhinnā svālakṣāne. 117

talākāliki pravṛtti: svaparābhīnadvayānumanat: II 9 II

116kāyaparvṛtti: puṇḍeṣaśakalādipākṣānātāhāriyena 120svāl-

ākṣena eva tad 122ārthinīya prayāṇamsmūhañci. 122

ānumaṇādipī 122dhrīmipākṣānātiṣṭhitādipī pravṛtti: II 9 II

dūrāṇitikatapāyānānānānātāṃ

bāṣṇāntaraṃ
dobhāvyānānānyāyaṭāpi yā II 10 II

bījnāvabhāsaḥ-cāyāyaṇānāmāpi muhāyaṃvābāsataḥ.

ekapākṣānātiṣṭhitāśākyādakālekaṃvānimānānāta. II 11 II

123dūrāṇitikākinīsfūtākṣāntāvāsitābhārāntāḥ. 124-uṇāśe vaṁā

śaṃcāya-cāyāyaṇāmādipī 122tanmuḥāvābijāvaḥpāṭākṣānānām126

kāyaḍu.

ārthānām. 127-ekamā. 127-abadhānāmā. II 10-11 II

ārthākīyaṇāpi saḥjā

nārāṇānaṃśaṃvāyu]

nīyatā sa hi
tenaṃ puraṃ
dakṣāyaṇākoṣānītā

bhetet. II 12 II

129-ulakṣaṅguṭhādānānābāṣṭhātōyāvāntetāv, 130abha-

bāṣṭhāvāntetāv, 131-tāṣṭya āśvānāṃ
dakṣāyaṇākoṣānītā

nīyatāya. II 12 II

117 vādika: vādhika E. 118 kāya: kārya E Gh N Č Ċ N, kāya corrected to kārya J. 119 bhedasāhiyena: bheda eva sāhiyena T. 120 svalakṣāna eva tad: svalaksane etad E Gh N Č Ċ Jh N Ċ T. 121 arthitayā: arthatayā N. 122 T adds hi. 123 dūrāntikādī-

sphuṭāspluṭātavādinā: dūrāntikādīsu sphuṭāspluṭātavādinā Gh N Č Ċ T, dūrāntikādīsu sphuṭāspluṭātavādinā E Č Ċ J N, dūrāntikādīsu sphuṭāspluṭātavādinā Jh. 124 bhaṁra-

taścaparavēna vābhāṣāya: bhaṁraścaparavēna vābhāṣāya T, bhaṁraścaparavē vābhāṣā-

sasya Ā, ca gatvarābhāṣāya J. vābhāṣasya cit. ibid. p. 150 (perhaps through the ikād). 125 tāmkhyā: tāmkhyā cit. ibid. p. 150. 126 akhyā: akhyā N. 127 akyām omitted in N. 128 abādhitam : apaḥādhitam E Č Ċ Jh N Ċ T, upaḥādhitam Ch, api ādhitam corrected to apaḥādhitam J. 129 Cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 151 ulēkhā eva ghatādyāsas teṣām, bāhya-

sya svalakṣānasasya ya arthākriyā tāṣyā virāhe 'piṭī vrityarthaḥ. 130 asvābhāvīkatvād: svābhāvīkatvād E Gh N Č Ċ Jh N Č T. 131 tasyā: asyā E (tasyā K).
रजते२४कविमामोपि शृंकतो न रजतंतथिति।
उपाधिदेशासंवादाद् द्विचन्द्रेष्यपि नभोसन्यथा॥१३॥

रजते शृंकतो च रजता२४वर्मक्षेण रजततवेष्यपि पुनः
शृंक्तदेशासंगति२४बाधेनोपाधिदेशासंवादभावात् तदविद्विदर्थैर्यादेश्व भान्ता
। द्विचन्द्रेष्यपि २४६नभोदेशासंवादान्निध्यमा॥१३॥

गुणे: श्लोकादिभिधेयो जात्यादिभिरभिन्नता।
भावानामितथ्येकत्र प्रमाद्युपपद्यते॥१४॥

भावानां शब्दरूपां२४६संस्तानाांदिना भदक्षेपो जात्यादिना च
२४६एकताक्षेपोनुभूयमानः प्रमातैकये घटते। अन्योन्य२४६भदलय-वर्त्ताप्यनुसंस्कार्यनं॥१५॥

विद्वैचिचिच्यिचिच्चस्य समभिभिन्नतलोपपमे।
विद्वैभाव्यावंसंपर्शं परमार्थसतीस्वरे॥१५॥
प्रमातिरि पुराणे तु सर्वत्राधामतिरविग्रहे।
किं प्रमाण नवाभास: सर्वप्रमितिभागिनि॥१६॥

१४०অপুরুষভাসস্রস্তথাস্তনান।१६নিত্যাভাসিন: প্রমাতুর্ন

132 °eka° : °aikya° E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ T. A fluctuation between these two readings is also found in the editions of Abh.'s commentaries (°eka° in the two editions of the IPV, confirmed by the Bh: °aikya° in the IPVV). The vṛtti seems to presuppose °eka° and so also does the IPVV, though it begins precisely with rajatayā yadyapi śuktirajatasya aikyam vimśyate. But these are simply two ways of formulating a concept that is basically the same. 133 Cf. ibid. p. 152 "rajate" iti satyarájate, "śuktau ca" iti rajatvena adhyavasitavyam, "dvicandre 'pi buddhir mithya" iti vṛttiyojana. 134 "avamarśa° : °vimarśa° E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ T. 135 °bādhenaopādhi° : °bādhaneṇopādhi° E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ T, bādhena nopaṭaḥ corrected to bādhaneṇopādhi° J. 136 nabhodesa° cit. ibid. p. 153. 137 °samsthāna° : °samsthā° T C Ch J Jh Ñ T; cf. ibid. p. 158 samsthānasya guna­tvam eva vidhyate. 138 ekāṭātkeṣo: ekatādikṣeṇa J. Cf. ibid. p. 159 nantu akṣepo 'nubhāya­te. 139 Cf. ibid. p. 160 vṛttau bhedavyavashtaiva upasamhrṭa, api cit. ibid. p. 160. 140 apūrvābhāṣya: apūrvārthābhāṣya T. 141 nityāvabhisahinah : nityābhāṣinah J; nityāvabhisahinah cit. ibid. p. 163.
प्रमाणोपयोगः। तत्तत्प्रामाण्यत्वस्य कार्यम् स प्रमाणमन्यत्स्य स्वान्त तु स्वात्मणः सदा सिद्धस्य, केवलं विभु: प्रमितो स्वातत्त्वयात् प्रमातेत्। ते ते विचित्रा विश्वाभासाः<br>तार्किकायिनि वैपर्येयोपपद्यन्ते। ॥ ॥

अप्रवर्तितपूर्वोऽसः केवलं मूढलाभशायः।

शक्तिप्राक्षेत्रेशाशास्त्रविवेचनः पञ्चम्यते।

मायायामोहवशायः केवलमारमानाल्मनि प्रमात्रुप्ये विश्ववादी-व्यवहारो यो न प्रविष्टं स शुद्धवादत्त्वादिघेतुपदर्शनेन

भावनायुपदेशाय साध्यते। ॥ ॥

इति क्रियाधिकारे तृतीयमाधिकरम्। ॥ ॥

142 अवभसानम्: अभसानम् T, अभसानम् corrected to अवभसानम् N J.

143 तत्तप्रामाण्यवतः: तत्प्रामाण्यवतः E Gh N Ch Jh T, तन्मयात्वतः T, तान्मयात्वतः corrected to तत्तप्रामाण्यवतः J. 144 विभुहः: प्रभुहः N. 145 विचित्रविभवसोसमसित्म: विचित्रविभवसोसित्म केवलमारमानाल्मनि प्रमात्तुप्येष्वादी-व्यवहारो यो न प्रविष्टं स शुद्धवादत्त्वादिघेतुपदर्शनेन भावनायुपदेशाय साध्यते। ॥ ॥

146 तदिच्छातो। 147 अवभसामाणा: अभसामाणा T. 148 सवरुपभ्रम्सः: सवरुपभ्रम्स ca E Gh N C Ch Jh N T. 149 मयासक्तिसात् सितः: मयासक्तिसात् सितः T. 150 तस्यावः: तस्यावः तस्यावः तस्यावः तस्यावः तस्यावः corrected to तस्यावः तस्यावः तस्यावः तस्यावः तस्यावः तस्यावः तस्यावः तस्यावः N J. 151 E Gh Ch N Jh N T add पुरातनी, which is probably a gloss; sadā पुरातनी C. 152 उपादिषये: उपादिषये E, उद्दिषये G Kh. 153 हजाजमा omitted in T. 154 उपादिक्षरः: उपादिक्षर J. 155 उपादशानु-पपत्तेः: उपादशानु-पपत्तेः, conjectural emendation for उपादशानुपपत्तेः E Gh N C Ch Jh N T and उपादशानुपपत्तेः T. 156 The phrase भावानंदयुपदेशय, found in all MSS. is apparently corrupt (unless one takes it as a, rather unlikely, 'samāhāravandvād vaformed by bhāvanādi and upadesa); sādhyate: bhāvyate T.
चतुर्थमादिकम्

एष चान्तिशकितवावेंगमाभासयत्यमून्।
भावानिच्छाबशवेशा क्रिया निर्मूलतास् सा || 1 ||

प्रमाता चिद्योऽलन्तशकितरीशवरः स्वेष्चावशात् १४७तथा
तान्भावान् १४७आभासयेत्। सैव १५४तच्छाशकितनिर्मातुतारुण्या
क्रिया तस्य || 1 ||

जहस्य तु न सा शकितः सत्ता यदसंतः सतः।
कर्तुर्कर्मतवतस्वेव कार्यकारणता ५६०ततः || 2 ||

१६१जहँ पधानपरमाणुबीजादि तु न शक्तिमस्तो निर्माणे,
कर्तुर्वमेव हि कारणतं कर्मतेव १६२च कार्यत्वं न
त्वन्यत् || 2 ||

यदसत्तदसस्युक्ता नासतः सतस्वरूपता।
सतोशपि न पुनः सतालामेनाधीनःथ चोचयते || 3 ||
कार्यकारणता लोके सान्तार्थपरिवर्तिनः।
उधेयान्न्यबवेशतरं तस्य कस्यापि शकितः || 4 ||

असतः सतस्वभावता विरूढः सतस्य १६३सिद्धः।
सिद्धस्यवान्तवाहिन्यान्तः करणहयवेशवतापादनः १६४वेरणगोपादनम्
|| 3-4 ||

१५७ tathā tān bhāvān : tathā tadbhāvān T, tān ābhāsān E Gh N C Ch Jh N T.
१५८ ābhās(a)yet : bhās(a)yet J, avabhās(a)yet T. १५९ ca omitted in E Gh N C Ch Jh N T.
१५२ tatah : yatah N. १६१ jadam : jada T. १६२ ca : hi T. १६३ siddhā cit. ibid. p. 188.
१६४ - isvareṇa : isvara T.
एवमेका किया सैणा सक्रमान्तरहितःस्थितिः ।
एकस्वयंत्रघातारसहिष्णूरुपपादिता ॥ ५ ॥

सैणा क्रियान्तरहितःस्थितिरुपतया सक्रमाप्येकस्य स्वविस्तारः
दृश्य कर्तुराभासचछायाः ॥ ५४॥

बहिःस्तस्येव तत्कार्य यवन्तर्यादेश्यः ।
प्रमादपेश्य चोक्ता द्वयी बायान्तरस्थितिः ॥ ६ ॥

अर्थस्य बायनापादनं १६५ कार्यान्तः, ततो बायन्ता कार्यं
चैकाः पेश्या प्रमादारः ॥ ६४॥

मातैव कारणं तेन स चाभासान्यस्थितो ।
कार्यस्य स्थितिः एवेकस्तदेकस्य क्रियो ॥ ७ ॥

एव प्रमादेतेव कारणं ॥ ७२स च बायना ॥ ७३॥

क्रियास्थिति अन्तरकार्याभस ॥ ७४॥

१६५ bhede 'py aikyena : bhadenaikatvena E Gh N C Ch Jh N T, bhede 'py ekārvena J; cf. ibid. pp. 189-90 abhāshabhavedyoge 'pi ity ariyah. १६६ caikasya : caikyasya T.

१६७ kārnavam omitted in E Gh N C Ch Jh N T. १६८ apeksaya : apeksā E Gh N C Ch Jh N T. १६९ apeksya : apeksā Ch. १७० T adds tatas tasyaiva kārva <n>, which is very probably a gloss. १७१ ṢPV (confirmed by Bh) and ṢPVV read kriyodita (c and d are rather similar in sarada script). १७२ sa ca : sarva° T. १७३ āntara° : abhyantara° E C J N. १७४ krame : kramo E Gh N C Ch J N T.
अत एवाङ्कुरेश्पीष्टो निमित्तं परमेश्वरं ।
तदन्यस्यापि बीजादेहेन्तुता नोपपद्यते ॥ ८ ॥

¹⁹⁴ बाध्याभाससतीपादनमुत्पादनन्यितत चिद्मुप्स्वैव कारणता ततो
उपकारादौ निमित्तकारणत्वेवेश्वरः कैशिवदिष्टं, न च चापि बीजादे-
वेत्ताद्वैतः कारणता निरनुसंधानस्य युक्ता ॥ ८ ॥

तथा हि कुम्भकारोऽसावैश्वर्येऽव न्यवसः
ततन्मूदादिसंस्कारकमेण जनयेदम् ॥ ९ ॥

कुम्भकाररूपः प्रमातारि कारणेष्टिष्टेष्टि मूदादिसंस्कार-
रा ¹⁹⁵ पेश्वा घटस्वेश्वरकृतिनिनितिसंज्ञामय्यदया न स्वभावेन ॥ ९ ॥

योगिनार्यमि मृद्वीजे विनेवेच्छावशोन तत् ।
घटादि जायते तत्तत् ¹⁹⁵ स्थिरस्वार्थक्षयाकरम् ॥ १० ॥

मूदादिन्येक्ष्ये योगिनामिच्छामात्रेण घटादिः स्थिरस्व घटाध्यर्थ-
क्रियाकारिणश् ¹⁹⁵ च निर्वृत्ति: ॥ १० ॥

योगिनिर्णयानाठावे प्रमाणान्तरनिनिष्ठते ।
कार्यं हेतुं स्वभावो वात एवोप्यते मूलजः ॥ ११ ॥

अत एव कार्यं स्वभावो वा तदृत्यतिग्धेन योगिनिर्मित-
त्वाभावनिनिविवाहे हेतुवाभासः । ¹⁹⁶ तान्निष्ट्ये पुनरीस्ववर-
नित्यं ¹⁹⁶ पेश्वश्च हेतुतता स्तापः ॥ ११ ॥

¹⁷⁵ bāhyābhāsataḥ : bāhyataḥ E (bāhyābhāsataḥ Kh G).
¹⁷⁶ apecsā : apecsayā J T.
¹⁷⁷ sthirāsaḥ : sthirasa T. ¹⁷⁸ ca nirvṛttih : cittavyṛttih corrected to ca nirvṛttih J.
¹⁷⁹ tannisçaye : tannisçayena J. ¹⁸⁰ apecsayā : apecsā yā T.
भृगूसतत्त्वप्रमाणेकवाद्याभासार्थितो भवेत् ।
परोक्षार्थप्रयथितेक्षुभासार्थि नूतनम् ॥ १२ ॥
कार्यमन्यथिचार्यरथिन्मन्यथप्रमाणतुगात् ॥
तद्भासारसताभासादेव लघुधिपतः परः ॥ १३ ॥

१६४ अवहं भासास्त्रक्षणपूर्वकोशि जायमानो धृभासो दूरादृ ॥
१६५ नियतिशाक्त्या कृतसामाधर्यवन्याभासादेव १६३ तदेशात्तत्त्वो प्राप्ता
मात्रात्तरसाधारणात् तस्येव सौररथिचार्येन गतकः, जातुरूढः
धृभाससतद्दृष्टिया १६४ भासस्य १६३ अत्यन्तपरिश्रयि १६४ तत्त्वमात्रा
न्तरगादु धृभासादेव परोक्षादिपि १६४ पूर्वकत् कृताधिपतियात्
॥ १२-१३ ॥

अरिमन्तीदेशमस्ततिः कार्यकारणतापि या ।
साप्तेश्वविहिणानां जहानां नोपपदयते ॥ १४ ॥

अरिमन्तीदेश १६४ भवत्ताति नियतं पौर्वं भृतिकारोहि
न्युदयपरकार्यकारणयोरप्रस्ततिः पूर्वस्य १६० सामथर्यं परस्य सतेति
स्यात् कार्यकारणभाव: । १६५ तच्चापेषाः १६२ रहितानां जहानां न

eva jāyahānas tasyaiva gamakah, jātārūdhās tu dhūmābhāsād eva jāyahānas tasyaiva
gamakah iti pūrva sambandha iti vṛttiyojana. 182 niyati° : niyata° C. 183 tad° : tat-
tad° J. 184 ṭramārā° : ṭramānā° N. 185 ᷇avāḥbāṣaya : ṭāhābāṣaya corrected to
189 bhavati cit. ibid. p. 219 bhavatisabdha ... vṛttiyojana. 190 sāmarthye : sāmarthyam
E Gh C N, sāmarthye corrected to sāmarthyam T, sāmarthya N. Cf. ibid. p. 218, where
the two meanings implicit in the Buddhist formula asmin sati idam asti are clearly
distinguished: atraiva ca sūtre purva:sāmarthye parasasya sateti pūrvasāmarthya parasya
satteti paksāv api sūcitāv eva. 191 tat cit. ibid. p. 227 nanu vṛttau sa iti vaktavye katham
“tat” iti nirdesah / ... na atra kāryakāranabhāvah parāmśrayate, api tu tālakṣanarvāna
sammato viśiśṭāh sattvabhūto vākyārthā iti bhāvāh. 192 ṭaḥitānam° : ṭhiṇānām N.

58
युक्तम्। एतावदेतत्स्यात् पूर्वस्य सामर्थ्यं परस्य सत्ता न चेवं। किचिदुरुक्तं स्थाद्। न च पूर्वस्य सामर्थ्यलक्षणः स्वभावः। परस्तरुपः।। 14।।

न हि स्वात्मेकनिष्ठानामनुसंधानवर्जिनाम् । सदस्ततापदेश्येष सप्तम्यथः। पुकल्प्यते।। 15।।

सदस्तता कार्यं कारणमप्यत्त्पर्यन्तिस्तं जडमुनसंधानशृणुष्यं नान्यापेक्षस्वभावं तत्स्य न्यत्र। पुधानापेक्षामयो गुणविभक्त्यथं घट्ते।। 15।।

अत एव विभक्त्यथः। प्रमाणेकसमाश्रयः । क्रियाकारकभावाः युक्तो भावसमन्वयः।। 16।।

एकप्रमाणसंगमस्तु क्रिया कारकभावाः विभक्त्यथेस्तु भूमिबी-जोदकादिनां समन्वयो युक्तो न तु। शुष्कोःस्यः कार्यकारणं।। 16।।

परस्परस्वभावतः कार्यकारणयोरपि। एकत्रमेव भेदे हि नेत्रान्योन्यः।। 17।।

कार्यकारणयोर्योन्यपतेपेश्येकतेत्र स्यानं तद्वातः।। 17।।

193 sāmarthyam : sāmarthye T; cf. ibid. p. 226 etad vastu vrtaur vivariṣyate / katham pūrvasya sāmarthyam parasya sattā. 194 Cf. ibid. p. 223 tatra hi pūrvasya sāmarthyam nāma svabhāvah sa parasya sattārūpo neti vakṣyate. 195 pradhānā and gunavibhakti cit. ibid. p. 231. 196 oḥbhāvah : oḥbhāvākhyaḥ E. 197 oṣvabhāvatā : oṣvārupatā Kh G (this is also the reading of the IPVV and the two editions of the IPV).
एकात्मनो "विभेदः कृया कालकेमानुग।
स्वतः कालकेतेवैव तथापरिणमतत्॥ १८॥
एवं अक्षरभावस्य भेदम् स्थितिः परिणामः कालकेलितः
क्रियैव, ततः परिणामे स्वतन्त्रस्य शक्तिमतः कर्तृतैव हेतुता
॥ १८॥
च युक्तं जहस्तैवं भेदाभेदविरोधतः।
आभासभेदादेक्तः पिद्धायनितु युज्यते॥ १९॥
जहस्याभिन्नाल्लो भेदनं । अवर्तिथेविरोधाध्यक्तम, स्वच्छे
विदात्मन्येकर्मिन्नेवमनकपतिविब्य मधारणाविरोधायुज्यते॥ २०॥
वास्तवेशपि रिद्देकल्ले न स्वाभासभिन्न्योः।
चिकियलिङ्गैकल्क्स्तपरामर्षिन्य कियां कियां || २०।२॥
एकस्तिशिक्तव्येष्मः । अक्षरमादः आभासभेदो न घटते,

198 vibhedaś ca : vibhedena N Ch J T, vibhede 'pi corrected to vibhedena Gh.
199 kramānuḍa : vibhaginī Gh N Ch T. 200 The readings of the third pada fluctuate:
hetoh syāt karrtrtaivayam E Ch T, hetoh syāt karrtraivaivam Gh, hetuh syāt kartrtaivevam
N, hetoh (corrected to tathā) syāt karrtraivaivam C, hetoh syāt kartrteivaivam J N, tato
'nyat karrtraiveyam T, tathā syāt karttraivaivam IPV, tathā syāt kartrtā vaivam IPV.
Except for hetoh, tā vaivam and 'nyat, all the other readings might be admissible. As it is
impossible to ascertain the original reading, I have decided to accept the reading of IPV,
which was definitely the one Abh. had in his text (this is also confirmed by Bhāskara).
201 ekasvabhāvasya : ekasvabhāve sya J. 202 Cf. ibid. pp. 238-9 nanu evam pratibimbagrahane
jadasya virodhāt cidātmana eva ekasya bhedena sthitir ity etat yujyate, jadasya
tv evam ayuktam; abhinnasya bhedasahitir hi virudhēttī vṛttāni kmi iti prātibimbadhāranam
darśētām. 203 avasthīter : avasthīte N. 204 dhāranena : "dhāranā" T. 205 akasmād, my
correction: ekasmād E T, ekah sadā G Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. Cf. ibid. p. 248 vṛttāu "akas-
smāt" iti nimittasya alabhād iti bhāvah; cf. also ibid. p. 249 nirnimittavāt in the parāph-
srase of the tīkā. 206 ābhāsahhede cit. ibid. p. 248, where the whole sentence is
commented on: ābhāsahheda ity ādinā vedyaqatam rūpam uktam itad visayatvena yat
kriyātvam nāma karrtrādhāyakam, tat na ghatāte iti brahmagatam rūpam uktam.

60
न च तत्र क्रियात्मक । यदा तु स पिदाम्या नृत्याचिकीर्ष्या परामृस्तु बहिराभासप्ति तदा ॥ २०॥

II 4.20

तित्तासोरेव्विंधवेऽवेतुता कर्त्तव्या किया ॥ २१॥

चिद्यपुष्पं स्वतन्त्रस्य विशवास्या नृत्याचित्विंधवेऽवेतुता कर्त्तव्यारूपाः सैव क्रियाशकि ति इत्य चिद्यपुष्पम् कर्त्तव्येऽवेतुता कर्त्तारूपाः सैव क्रियाशकि ति इत्य चिद्यपुष्पम् कर्त्तव्येऽवेतुता कर्त्तारूपाः सैव क्रियाशकि ति ॥ २२॥

इति क्रियाधिकारे चतुर्थमाहिकम् ॥

इति क्रियाधिकारे ॥

207 cikīraṣayā parāmrśan cit. ibid. p. 250, where the rest of the sentence is also commented on: vrityartham vyākarotī "atra" hi vṛttigranthe / ābhāsanā ca kriyā tasyā ādyā eva parāmarśo lakṣaṇam / sa eva hahikaranātmakābhāsanāparyantarā / tena trayam etad upakrame bhāsāmānam api dviyam eva, vastutas tu ekam api tātparyam. 208 tad cit. ibid. p. 248 "tar" ity ābhāsahedasya ghatanaṁ kriyāvat. 209 judasyāpi : judasyāśāpyāpi T (also possible); judasyā cit. ibid. pp. 248 and 250. 210 Cf. ibid. p. 252 tadābhāṣāsa ca iti svātanaēvābhāvasya nimittam ukta icchāhāvā iti saṅgatiḥ / iyatā vṛttir ubhayathā gamiṭā bhūhasāyogena yat svātanaēvam tasya abhāvat. 211 akartvyam : akartkvam E; akartvyam cit. ibid. p. 248. 212 The reading of T is not clear (pramaveṭaś). 213 tam cit. ibid. p. 248 tam iti jadām. 214 tena tena : tena T Gh N J. 215 "ādīnā : "ādī" E Gh N C Ch J H N T. 216 sa cit. ibid. p. 248 sa iti pramāṭā. 217 tathā : tāda Ch. 218 sthātum : kartum E Gh N C Ch J H N T; sthātum is also confirmed by the quotation of this passage (cidvapusah ... "rupā) in MMP p. 39. 219 kriyā mukhyā : mukhyā kriyā N. 220 nākartoṣakam : nākartoṣakam N Ch Jh, nākartoṣakam corrected to nākartoṣakam J. 221 "upacārataḥ : "upacārāt E C N, "upacārataḥ corrected to "upacārāt J.
आगमाधिकारः

प्रथमाधिक्रियः

एवमन्तरभिवृत्तिः क्रिया कालक्रमानुगा ॥
मातुभेव तदन्योन्याविन्युक्ते ज्ञानकर्मणी ॥ १ ॥

'प्रमातुरन्तःस्थिततया ²आत्मनो बहिष्कार एव क्रमः' नुगता
क्रियेन्ति 'परस्पराविरहिते 'तया ज्ञानक्रिये ॥ १ ॥

किंतु आन्तरदशोद्रेकात् सादायंत तत्त्वमार्थितः ।
बहिभावपरेः तु परतः पारमेश्वरम् ॥ २ ॥

ईशितरन्तरभिःस्थिततवन्तभावप्राधान्ये पुनः सादायंत तत्त्वम्,
अपरं बहिभावोद्रेकादेश्वरम् ॥ २ ॥

ईश्वरो बहिरुपेयो निमेशोऽन्तः सदाशि: ।
सामानाधिकरण्यं च सदविवाहिमेदिधियोऽ ॥ ३ ॥

उन्मेषिनिमेयों बहिर्नत्त:स्थितिः ⁹एवेश्वरसदाशिवः, बाध्य:नतरयोऽर्
⁶वेयवेदकयोऽर्किभिन्त्रात्मविश्रामन्तरभेदात् सामानाधिकरण्येनेव विश्व-
महिमिति विज्ञातामनो ¹⁰मतिः 'शून्यविद्या ॥ ३ ॥

¹ pramātuḥ and kriyā cit. in ÍPVV III p. 260 vṛttāu pramātuḥ kriyā iti sam-
handhaśaṣṭhi, na tu bahiskaranāpekṣayā kartari. ² ātmano, omitted in T. cit. ibid. p. 258.
³ anugataḥ : anugatah T. ⁴ Cf. the quotation from the tīkā ibid. p. 259 tad etad darsya-
ti "parasparāviraha" ity ādina. ⁵ tasya omitted in C N. ⁶ iṣitūr cit. ibid. p. 265. ⁷ eva
omitted in E Gh. ⁸ āntarayor : abhyantarayor E Gh J. ⁹ vedavyedakayor omitted in T.
इदमभावोपपननां वेदभूमिमपेयुषाम्
भावानां बोधसारवधायास्ववलोकनानात्

भिन्नवेदभूमाविदन्तया द्रव्यतामापादितानामः 12अपि भावानां
चिन्मात्रसारवधायाहिंदिमिति ततवः 13प्रतिपति: शुद्धताज्ञापिः

अत्रापरतवं भावानामानात्मत्वेन भासनात्
परताहन्तयाच्छादात् परापरवर्त्स हि सा

अनेकान्तामते 14अपरबमहन्तया सर्वस्य वेदस्याच्छादनानात्
15परततिः परापरवर्त्सेशा

भेदधीरेव भावेशु कर्तरौधायात्मनोधिपि या
मायाशक्तयेव सा विद्यत्यन्ये विद्येश्वरा यथा

बोधकर्तृत्तमययापि भेदेन विद्येश्वरां विद्येश्वरि केचित्
मायाशक्तिरपयेशा विद्या 16एव। संसारोक्ताण्त्वात् ततर्त्वा
मनोविद्येश्वरविद्येश्वराः

तस्येवर्यस्वभावस्य पशुभावे प्रकाशिका।
विद्याशक्तिरित्रोधानकरी मायाभिधा पुनः

संसारिणाम् 17अस्यस्य 18स्वात्मन: 16प्रतिभिज्ञान: 20विद्यया,
पशुः 21भावो 22मायया

\[12\text{ api only found in T (cf. ibid. p. 274) vedyadasām angikratvatām api; anyhow, not strictly necessary).} \]
\[13\text{pratipattiḥ : pratipatti\textsuperscript{9} T (but the omission of visarga before a sibilant is frequent in Malayalam script).} \]
\[14\text{aparatam cit. ibid. p. 275.} \]
\[15\text{paratā cit. ibid. p. 275.} \]
\[16\text{eva omitted in Ch Jh. Gh ṇ C Ch J ṇ T put a danda before tatrasthā.} \]
\[17\text{aisvaryasya : aisvaryena T.} \]
\[18\text{śvāmanah : ātmanah E Gh ṇ C Ch J Jh ṇ T.} \]
\[19\text{pratyabhijñānām : pratyabhijñāne E Gh ṇ C Ch Jḥ ṇ T.} \]
\[20\text{vidyāya : vidyā E C ṇ, vidyāya corrected to vidyā G T.} \]
\[21\text{bhāvo : bhāve E Gh ṇ C Ch J Jh ṇ T.} \]
\[22\text{māyāya : māyā E C ṇ, māyāya corrected to māyā G T.} \]
भेदे त्वेकरसे भातेसहन्तयानात्मनीकिते।
शून्ये बुद्धौ शरीरे वा मायाशक्तिविरंजुम्भते॥८॥

यदा भाव भेदेनेन्दनया नैव भासनेशहंमिति प्रमातुचेन नैव च वेदादिः। तदा नैविपर्ययद्वयेहेतुर्मयायासक्तिविर्महिनी नाम नैव-भोर्विजुम्भते॥८॥

यशच प्रमाता शून्यादिः प्रथमेऽन्यतिरेकिणि।
माता ये मेयः सनू कालादिपुचकबेविष्टिः॥९॥

यशच नैवितिरिक्तपमेयजाते प्रमाता शून्यादिः स इदमिति वेद्य एव वस्तुः काला३४५०७१८: पञ्चाभिषः नैव च परतन्त्रीकृतः।
तत्र कालाद्वारंमना३५६८०७१८: भासेन तत्स्य भूतविविध्यतेःः भवजः, नियते: नैव कार्यकर्मफलनियमः, रागातोगाभिषेवः, विद्याकलाभ्यामचिदात्तमोस्वतन्त्रस्यापीपीज्ञानकिमेः चित्स्वातन्त्र्यरुपेः॥९॥

23 eva: omitted in T, evam Ch Jh T, evam corrected to eva J. 24 ca omitted in T; ca dehādih cit. and commented on ibid. p. 285 ekavacanāntam iti vṛttai dehādi iti etadupekṣayā cakāreṇā sāphatavat vākyabheda 'tra aṁta ity āśayena evam uktam. 25 viparyayadvayahetur vībhur yaddvayahetur Ch ṇ, vībhur yaddvayahetur (corrected to viparyaya) Jh, vībhur yaddva (corrected to yaddvaya)hetur T; viparyayadvayahetur cit. (from the ātika) ibid. p. 280. 26 vībhur vijrhmbhate vijrhmbhā E N C Ch Jh ṇ T, vībhur vijrhmbhā Gh J; vijrhmbhate cit. ibid. p. 280. 27 vyatirikto: vyatirikte T. 28 ṣādyaiḥ: ṣādibhih J. 29 ca omitted in T. 30 Cf. ibid. p. 288 ... tat kim vṛttāv āḥāsapatena. 31 ṣamḥavah: ṣāhavah T (equally good). 32 After kārya T adds ṣākara, as, indeed, meaning would require. However, according to what Abh. seems to say (ibid. p. 290), kārana is to be considered as understood in kārya and is not directly mentioned: niyātim vyākaurt yā vṛttih, tām vivrutot "kāryakāranabhāvas ca" iti i kāryalaksanaśabdena tadbhāva ucyate. Cf. ibid. p. 290 karmataphalaniyamavāyākhyāne siddhe ... and pp. 290-91 vṛttai karmaśabdena cet kriya, tadā phalam tatkṛta atmaṁvartī samākāraḥ, atha sa eva karmaśabdena tadā phalam svargādini. 33 I adds iti.
त्र्योगिताधिकरणम् मेयं पर्यायं तत् कार्यं करणालमकमः ।
तस्याविभागरूपमेक्स प्रधानं मूलकारणमः ॥ १० ॥
त्र्योदशविधा "चात्र बाध्यान्तः करणावली ।
कार्यवर्गित दशधा स्थूलसूक्ष्मत्वभेदतः ॥ ११ ॥

कार्याणि कथित । शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसंगन्धानि सूक्षमत्वेन
तन्मात्रंज्ञानिः पद्ध, अन्योन्यवृहद्य स्थूलानि पृथियादि-
संज्ञानि तान्येव पद्ध । श्रोत्रवाक्षिणिजिद्वानासिकां
इति पद्ध बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि, वाक्पाणिपादपायू । वास्तान्त्रियानि पद्ध कर्मेन्द्रियाणि,
मनोबुद्धेयकाराराइति विद्यान्तः करणामिति त्र्योगिताधिकरणम्
कार्यं करणात्मनः प्रधानस्य मूलभूतकाविभागदशा प्रधानानां
॥ ११ ॥

इत्यागमाधिकरणे प्रथमाधिकिर्मम् ॥

द्वितीयामाधिकिर्मम्

तस्तैतत्तमात्तमात्रेऽर्थस्तो र्तन्यतेवतः ।
भिन्नप्रमेयपरसे बाध्यविष्णु व्यवसितो ॥ १ ॥

शृण्ये पूर्णश्चत्तमेकस्त्यतितसूक्ष्मदेह एव वा प्रमात्माते

34 °karaṇa° : °kāraṇa° N J N. 35 cātra : cātha E Gh N C T. 36 dvidhā : dvidhāni
dasādhā T. 37 gandhāni : °gandhākhyāni E, °gandhātmukāni T. 38 T adds ca. 39 anyo-
nyavāhena, my conjectural emendation : anyonyasampatvaḥ na T, anyonyavāhahisam-
handhena E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 40 °samjñāni tān eva : °samjñatān eva T; tān eva
cit. ibid. p. 299. 41 E adds °ghrāṇa°. 42 °nāsikā° : °nāsikā° ca T, °nāsiketi Gh N C Ch
J Jh N T. 43 °upasthākhyāni : °upasthānī N C Ch J Jh N T. 44 manobuddhyahamkāra :
mano buddhir ahamkāra T, manobuddhyahamkāra Gh C Ch T. 45 °karaṇa°: °kāraṇa° N Ch
T. 46 °atmake 'ryantasūkṣma°, my correction (cf. ibid. p. 306 upadānāhhatābhidhānāya
ayantasūkṣmagrahanam ...) : °ādyarthe sūkṣma° E Gh C J, °ādyarthasūkṣma° N Ch Jh
N T, °ātmake sūkṣma° T.
III 2.1 स्थितावन्यपमेयसचवारे स्मोडिणन्दाता, भिन्नपमेयमां ४७भासे सर्ग–
स्थितिहेतु ब्रह्मविन्युः ॥ १ ॥

एष प्रमाता मायान्ध: संसारी कर्मवंतन: ।
विद्याभिखानपत्तेव्यवस्थितवनो मुक्त उच्चते ॥ २ ॥

मायेष्वाचन्यायदपाना ४४नियत्या कर्मविधीन: संसारी, विद्यावशाद
४६आत्मतत्त्वविद्याय व मुक्त: ॥ २ ॥

स्वाहान्नरुपेशु भावेशु प्रमाता कथयते पति: ।
मायातो भेदिषु कलेशकर्मादिकबुधः: पशुः ॥ ३ ॥

ऐश्वर्यदेशायां प्रमाता विश्वं शरीरतया पश्यन् पति:,
४०पुस्तवारस्थायां तु रागादि४१कलेशकर्मविपाकाशै: परीतः: पशुः
॥ ३ ॥

स्वातन्त्र्यहानिवोधसय स्वातन्त्र्यसप्यपोधेत ।
द्विधाणवं मलिमिं द्वस्वरुपापहानित: ॥ ४ ॥

४७स्वतन्त्र: बोधः: ४६परमाधः: तथारुपतवादेव पूर्णः: । तस्य
स्वातन्त्र्यादेव तथेत्यथयां स्वातन्त्र्यं विना बोधः४८मात्रनिम्तां
बोधतां विना स्वातन्त्र्यमात्रनिम्तां वा पूर्णतवाभवेन परिमिततवाद
द्विधाणुवं तातिकस्वरुपपविवर्षाण्मलिमवः ॥ ४ ॥

४७ अब्हासे: ४८ अद्धारे: त।; आह. इ. ब. प. ३०८ सूत्रे या एवमर्थाह प्रसाराशबद्ध, सा
अहसासपदेन वर्त्ताव विविधाय। ४८ नियत्य: कर्माधिनाः: नियतिनियतिन: ए घ. न. च ज
ज. ह. न. त। (अर्थे संभव: अतिन्तरितवहिंगः: अतिमातस्वहिंगः: अतिमातिस्वहिंगः: अतिस्वहिंगः: न।;
आह. इ. ब. प. ३११ नानु अतिमातत्त्वम प्रत्युता हयांम ... इति संक्षुवा अहा “अन्मां” इति
शस्त्रिषांनादो: यार्व वर्त्ताव इति अर्थाय। ५० अतिमातत्त्वस्वहिंगः: अतिमातिस्वहिंगः: अतिस्वहिंगः: न;
आह. इ. ब. प. ३१२ क्लेसाकर्मवपाक्षिक्यायायुक्तो स्वपानम। ५२ स्वतात्रित्वो: स्वतात्रित्वो: ए घ. न. च ज
ज. ह. न. त।; आह. इ. ब. प. ३१३ “स्वतात्रित्वो बोधा” इति इतत्त्वम। ५३ परमार्थाह: परा-
मार्थाताह त। ५४ “मात्रा” इ. ब. प. ३१६ विवर्णित द्विधाणुवं तातिकस्वरुपपविवर्षाण्मलिमवः ॥ ४ ॥
भिन्नवेद्यपथात्रेव मायांयं जन्मभोगदम्।
कर्त्तर्योधोधे कार्म तु मायाशक्त्येव तत्त्रत्यम्॥ ५ ॥

"अत्रेव द्विधाणवे वेद्येभिन्नमापि भेदेन यद्य भाति
तदातोधेपि विश्वासाद् नामना "मायायं मलम्। अहेतुनामपि
कर्मणां जन्मादि हेतुभावविषयविश्वासादवोधात्मककर्तृक्षणार्थ कार्मम्।
तन्मलत्रयनिर्माणेन प्रभोर् ६०इच्छा मायाशक्तिरूप्यते॥ ५ ॥

शुद्भोधात्मकवेदेपि ६१वेषां नोत्तकर्तृता।
निर्मिता: ६२स्वातमनो भिन्ना भर्ती ते
कर्त्तात्मत्यात्॥ ६ ॥

६३वेदानुपरकतबोधानामपि पूणकर्तृतव ६४शृण्यत्वाद्
स्वरूपान्यत्तेन प्रभुणा निर्माणम्॥ ६ ॥

नोधाविदिलक्षणेक्येपि ६५तेषामन्योन्यभिन्नता।
६६तथेवरेणज्ञात्वेते च विज्ञानकेवला:॥ ७ ॥

शुद्भोधानां ६७ बोध्यत्तनित्यत्वादर्थेव भेदेः प्योन्यभेदस्।
६८तथेवेशवरेन।
III: 2.7 निर्माणान्वयथा। ते च ४०सांख्यपुरुषप्रयाया विज्ञानकेसवा
इत्युच्चन्ते। ॥ ॥

शुन्यायाबोधरूपस्तु कर्तारः पल्लवकलः।
तेषां कार्ममलोप्यस्य मायीयस्तु विकलिप्: ॥ ॥

४०शुन्यप्राणाद्रूपधुर्ताॅ कर्मसंस्कारोऽप्यस्य, मायामलस्तु वेद्य-
योगायोगाभ्यां विकलिप्: ॥ ॥

बोधांमापि कर्तृकृषोऽज्ञां कार्ममलक्ष्योऽ।
भिन्नवेद्यज्ञां मायामलं विदेशवर्त्तम ॥ ॥

५०कर्तृक्तायोगेश्वपि बोधानां कर्मोत्तीर्णाणां विदेशवर्त्तेवपि
भिन्नवेद्योऽयोगान्मायामलम्इ। अस्तयेव। पुर्णकर्तृकृत्वाभावाद
ईश्वरादिभिन्नः अनयोन्यं च ४३पूर्ववदन्त यस्मात्वर्तम्
४४अपि स्यात्। ॥ ॥

70 sāmkhyapurusaprāyā, though not directly quoted, is diffusely commented on ibid.
p. 320. 71 E Gh C Jh N have vijñānakalā (vijñānakalā N Ch T), but Abb. gloss (ibid.
p. 322) refers explicitly to the reading vijñānakevalā. 72 itī only found in T. 73 sūnya°
: sūnye E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 74 bodha° : deha° E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T; bodha° is
confirmed by the quotation from the tīkā, ibid. p. 323 "bodhatātirārakārena", which
presupposes bodharūpātītikramaṇa. 75 api, omitted in Gh N C Ch J Jh N T, is put after
tesām in T. 76 °jusām : "yuṣām Gh T. 77 kartrā° : kartrā° E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T, kar-
trtva° E. 78 karma° : kārma° E; cf. ibid. p. 324 kārmasamskāravikalāśa samsārotirn-
tvāt. 79 vidyēśvaratve pi: vidyēśvarākhyānām E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T, but cf. ibid. p.
325 bodhayogena vidyāsparśah, kartrtayā ca īśvarateti "vidyēśvaratve pi" ity atra vṛtti-
vākye darśitam. 80 oyogān : bhāktvena E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T (also possible). 81 The
edited text of the vṛtti stops at this point, where all the available sāradā MSS break off.
From here onwards the only source (besides IPVV) is T. 82 īśvarād bhinnā, my correc-
tion : īśvarābhinnā T. 83 pūravad ata cit ibid. p. 325. 84 Cf. ibid. p. 325 āpiśabdasya
bhinnakramatām darśayann asambhāvyam esām tāvad anuvamt, tath tu nyāyabalāyātām
bhaved api ity etat dyotayati.
The gender of mala fluctuates between masculine and neuter; see also above II.2.8 kārma mala (kārma Gh ĪPV ĪPVV, karma° N C N T) and II.2.9 māyā mala (°mala Gh ĪPV ĪPVV). 86 Cf. ibid. p. 328 tat vṛttau prathamānirdeśena nirdiśtya api śūnyādeh paścād gunatāpradārasanena vivṛtam. 87 My conjectural emendation for kartratmano bodho yad upasarjanavāste T, evidently corrupt. The expected meaning of the sentence is sufficiently clear. 88 bodhamayātām āpannasya cit. ibid. p. 331.
III 2.13 तात्विकारसितात्तै वेदाभावः संस्कारस्य संभवेच्छयो 66अरुपक्तेन 
अनुपलक्ष्यत्वात् । 66तातेतव सांख्यपुरुषादिशेषः: || 13 ||

साधारामान्तरी वृत्ति: प्राणादिपरिका मताः ।
जीवात्मायाथवा प्राणेश्वरता पुर्विष्टकारिमका || 14 ||

एवं एव शून्यप्रमाता 66सर्वद्रिष्टिशकतसाधारणजीवावश -
प्राणादिपरिभ्रम्यक्तिर्जीवार्थः, तासास्मिन्द्रियशक्तस्तीनमाहन्तया सह 
पुर्विष्टकर्मथवा प्राणाहत्याय प्रमात्तत्वेन पुर्विष्टकर्ता || 14 ||

तात्विकारसितात्तै पोक्तं सौपुत्रं प्रलयोपपमः ।
सबेदयमपवेद्यां च मात्मामलयापुरुषमः || 15 ||

शून्यप्रमाता 66सितात्तै वेदाभावान्नायामलाभावः , 63प्राणादौ सुख-
स्पर्शदिवेश्योगान्नायामलेक्तः प्रलय इव सौपुत्रं पदम् || 16 ||

मनोमात्रपथेच्छयशिख्यवेतेन विभिन्मतः ।
स्पष्टावभासा भावानां सृष्टिः रथ्यनपद मतम् || 16 ||

चक्षुरार्दीन्द्रियशक्तियुक्तावपि मनःशक्त्येव हृष्टरुपाधाभासेवः

89 My conjectural emendation for arūpatve vā° T. 90 tāvataiva cit. ibid. p. 333, where the rest of the sentence also seems to be confirmed by the quotation from the tīkā : “tāvataiva” iti vṛttigatam evakāram vyākhyaum darśayatī “sāmkhyapuruśānām ca” iti / viśeṣam tu aha “kevalam” iti. 91 The compound is paraphrased and interpreted, following the tīkā, in two different ways (ibid. p. 335) : pūrvavyākhyaṃ vṛttau evam vigrahah - sarvendriyaśaśtaḥsāhāranam jīvanāḥkhyam yat pranāṇādikriyāpañaḥcakam prāṇādvivihāga-
kāraṇahūtām tasya vyāpāra-pañcakasya praraṇātikāh aham iti samrabhalaṅkaṇā vṛttir 
vasya śūnyasya, sa tathā uktah / idānīm tu evam vigrahah - sarvendriyaśaśtaḥnām 
sādāraṇam jīvanābādavācyam prāṇādvivihānam praraṇalakṣānaṃ antarvṛttiśabda-
vācyam tat yasyeti; tad dhi tasya sambandhi tasya eva kārstvāt, na tu tāsām kāraṇātvād 
iti. 92 sthitau cit. ibid. p. 338. 93 prānādau cit. ibid. p. 338 “prānādau” iti vṛttau “sthi-
tau” iti pūrvakam yad vaiyadhikaranyena tad apekṣāniyam.
रसृष्टिरणोऽ स सूचेय कालान्तरानुवृत्तितः। १५॥

सर्वाष्ट्रगोचरात्वेन यथा तु बाध्यतत्त्व स्थितः।
साधारणी सर्वप्रमातृणां स जागरः। १६॥

सर्वानेन स्थितिरजगराः तत्त्रापि पूर्ववद्ध्वि
चन्द्रादिभानि: १७॥

हेया त्रयीयं प्राणादे: पाधार्यात् कर्तृतागुणे।
तद्भणोपचयङ्गप्रायसुखजः खाद्योगतः। १८॥

एतति जागरस्वप्नसुपरितानि प्राणादेयत्त्वे नामभिम्न्यमानस्योः
द्रेकात् स्वात्त्वस्यपापासाध्यायाः, स्वात्त्वस्य मात्राया।
उपाध्यः सुखस्थायस्थत्यैव न्यूनता दुःखद्वायः। सर्वभोगात्मा संसारो
बन्धः। १८॥

प्राणापापनमयः प्राणः प्रत्येकं दुःखजाग्मोः।
तत्ज्ञेवालमा समानार्थः: सौष्ठुप्ते विषुवरित्वः। १९॥

स च प्राणात्मयः स्वप्ने प्राणापापनस्प्राप्प्रस्राध्यात्
गरेश् दुःख सुष्प्ते। १००॥ तयोरपि विषुवतीव रात्रिदिनयोः: साप्ते
१०१ न्यूनताधिकयोधात् समानसंख्यः। १९॥

94 कालान्तरासूचेय किंवद्। 95 पूर्ववद्ध निविद्यानुवृत्तितः। 96 मे कोरर्तनिमान सप्तौ साधारणी सर्वप्रमातृणां स जागरः। १६॥

एतति जागरस्वप्नसुपरितानि प्राणादेयत्त्वे नामभिम्न्यमानस्योः
द्रेकात् स्वात्त्वस्यपापासाध्यायाः, स्वात्त्वस्य मात्राया।
उपाध्यः सुखस्थायस्थत्यैव न्यूनता दुःखद्वायः। सर्वभोगात्मा संसारो
बन्धः। १८॥

प्राणापापनमयः प्राणः प्रत्येकं दुःखजाग्मोः।
तत्ज्ञेवालमा समानार्थः: सौष्ठुप्ते विषुवरित्वः। १९॥

स च प्राणात्मयः स्वप्ने प्राणापापनस्प्राप्प्रस्राध्यात्
गरेश् दुःख सुष्प्ते। १००॥ तयोरपि विषुवतीव रात्रिदिनयोः: साप्ते
१०१ न्यूनताधिकयोधात् समानसंख्यः। १९॥

94 कालान्तरासूचेय किंवद्। 95 पूर्ववद्ध निविद्यानुवृत्तितः। 96 मे कोरर्तनिमान सप्तौ साधारणी सर्वप्रमातृणां स जागरः। १६॥

एतति जागरस्वप्नसुपरितानि प्राणादेयत्त्वे नामभिम्न्यमानस्योः
द्रेकात् स्वात्त्वस्यपापासाध्यायाः, स्वात्त्वस्य मात्राया।
उपाध्यः सुखस्थायस्थत्यैव न्यूनता दुःखद्वायः। सर्वभोगात्मा संसारो
बन्धः। १८॥

प्राणापापनमयः प्राणः प्रत्येकं दुःखजाग्मोः।
तत्ज्ञेवालमा समानार्थः: सौष्ठुप्ते विषुवरित्वः। १९॥

स च प्राणात्मयः स्वप्ने प्राणापापनस्प्राप्प्रस्राध्यात्
गरेश् दुःख सुष्प्ते। १००॥ तयोरपि विषुवतीव रात्रिदिनयोः: साप्ते
१०१ न्यूनताधिकयोधात् समानसंख्यः। १९॥
III 2.20

मध्योर्ध्वगम्युदानाख्यस्तुर्यर्गो हुतभुक्तम्: ॥
विनाामकलमनेशो व्यानो विश्वाल्मकः परः ॥ २० ॥

१०४पाणापाणयोः पार्श्वद्वितियंकपवाहविच्छेदनेनकत्तमापादोध्वर-रूपमध्यमार्गप्रवाहेणेक्षमनन्दः उदानः ॥ १०३मध्यनेत्रतिव १०४उद्वर-भाक्तवादविनधर्मां तुर्यदशायां ॥ १०५तुर्यतिते दिव्यकाला१०६नवच्छेदो पूर्णेऽवहानं हितवाचनिर्मिर्धारास्थे व्यानसंजः ॥ एतच्च दशाद्रुयमपादेयं १०५प्राणमकणे: परमेखवर१०६कल्पतवेनारस्थानात् ॥ २० ॥

इत्यागमाधिकारे द्वितीयमाध्विकम् ॥

इत्यागमाधिकारः ॥

102 Cf. ibid. p. 350 katham prānapānau madhye ārdhvena ekatāpannau pravahata iti vṛttau bhanitam ... prānapānayoḥ ca katham vyatirekena tiryakpravāha uktah : pārśvad-vaya° cit. (from the tīkā) ibid. 103 The comparison with the third eye is developed ibid. p. 350-51. 104 Cf. ibid. p. 350 turyādilaksanam ārdhvabhātvādītī vibhāgah. 105 Cf. the paraphrase of the parallel passage of the tīkā ibid. p. 352-53 “turyāttapade tu” iti prāvanavāyāpārasamsparsanah, desakālabhedāpeksam gamanam pravahaman, desa-kālāv api ca atra ahaṁtākāmātrasārajātāu, na tu kathamcid bhinnāv itī. 106 anavucchēde (or anavucchēdena), my correction for anavucchēda° T. 107 Cf. ibid. p. 353 “prānasaktih” ity ādi parameśvaronmesāmātrarūpā cety arthah. 108 kalpa° cit. (through the tīkā) ibid. p. 353 “kalpaśabdena” iti vṛttigatena / kalpaśabdan svabhāvavācī.
IV 1

तत्त्वसंग्रहाधिकारः

स्वात्मैव सर्वजन्तूनामेक एव महेश्वरः ।
विश्वरूपोऽहमिदमित्यखण्डामर्श्चूर्हितः ॥ १ ॥

एकः 'प्रथमोपादेयतुर्युद्धशायाम् अखण्डतग्राहकाखण्डतःग्राह्यः
तन्मेलनायमतकारोप्यूर्तिः साधारण एव सर्वप्रणालामात्रा विश्व-
रूपो महेश्वरः ॥ २ ॥

तत्र स्वसृष्टेवभागे 'बुद्धचार्य ग्राहकार्मना ।
अहंकारपरार्मस्यन नीतमनेन तत्
॥ २ ॥

महेश्वरस्य जूम्भामयेश्वरिनिन्त्यंतरस्यद्विपरार्मस्य ग्राह्यः

1 Cf. ibid. p. 357 vad āha "ādibhūtimāyām" iti prathamopādeyatā tataḥ prabhṛti ma-
lavigalanārāmbhāt. 2 My conjectural emendation for "grāhyohamkāra" T. Abh. ibid. p.
357 refers to the 'long compound' (mahāpadam) in the vṛttī, quoting very concisely pas-
sages from the commentary devoted to it by the tīkā, integrated with his own glosses. It
appears that the last word is upābrhmhitah and that therefore the reading T is corrupt;
in T the compound ends with grāhya, which might be theoretically admissible if the fol-
lowing word 'hamkāra did not give rise to considerable perplexity. The words that Abh.
expressly quotes are: akhanditagrāhaka, akhanditagrāhya, melanā, upābrhmhitā. It is worth
quoting the whole passage: akhanditagrāhaka ity ādikam vṛttīgam mahāpadam vyācaste
"yat tat" iti / anena grāhakapadam vyākhyātam, akhanditapadam vyācaste "yatā" ity ādi-
nā "akhandita" ity antena / "tathā" ity ādinā grāhyapadam vyācaste, "tatra" ity ādinā
tadvīṣaśanam "akhanti" iti / "tayoh" ity ādinā melanāpadam / tayor iti grāhaka-
grāhya-yoh / "paraspara" iti akhanditapadena grāhakasya grāhakāntarat, grāhyasya
grāhyāntarat na viccheda iti darsitam, amunā tu parasparato 'pūṭi / upābrhmhitapadam vi-
vrnoti "nirākānksā" ity antena. This permits us to establish the general sense with suffi-
cient precision; there remains the doubt as to what exactly the word preceding melanā
must be. My hypothesis is tan (on the basis of tayoh, which seems referred to it in the
3 IPV (KSTS) IPVV and E read buddhyādi.
स्वस्वरूपापरिज्ञानमयोष्णेकः पुष्मान्वः।
तत्र सृष्टौ कियानवौ भोगो दुःखसुखातः। ॥ ३ ॥
एतदेव विश्वामनं: परिमित्वकरणप्रत्यभिज्ञानमुच्यते। एवं
चानेकबुद्धिप्राणादिकङ्गदगतापरांकारयामशः। परापरिज्ञानसंबः।
पर्यगालमानो बहवः, तेसू प्रमातृपुषु महेश्वरेण स्वानल्यः।
स्वक्रियःकर्तृतानुसारणिः निर्मिता। स एव भोग आनन्दलेखार्यः।
सृष्टिसंहितः: कियाल्लल्यमा दुःखरुपः। किया दुःखं च वक्ष्यते। ॥ ३ ॥

विध स्वरूपेषु भावेषु पत्तुञ्जलिः कियां च या।
प्रायातुलीये ते एव पशोः: सर्वं रजस्तमः। ॥ ४ ॥

6 ईश्वरस्य ज्ञानकिये ते मायाया सहिते पशोः: सर्वः
रजस्तमांसि। ॥ ४ ॥

4 The same expression cit. (from the tīkā) ibid. p. 359 in the introduction to the following verse: vedyākadeśe 'pi ity ādi. 5 T has "khandanatapara", "khanda" and "apara" (aparāparasabdena is most likely a mistake for aparāsabdena) are quoted ibid. p. 360, "gata" is my tentative emendation for "nata", evidently corrupt. In the same passage "aneka" and "parijñāna" are also quoted: "anena" iti vṛttigranthena / khandasabdena atidirghagonāsāsaragatābhinnajīvate khandikarane khandakhandānām prthagījñatvam punar ekībhāvapattāv ekajīvatī dhvanaī anuttam aparāpara(read aparā)sabdena ca parimitatvam darsitam / anekatvaparijñāne tu svasabdenaiva ukte. 6 The lack of commentary on the particularly important first pāda may induce one to question the integrity of the vṛtti. However, the content of the first pāda might be considered as already explained above (cf. III.2.3).
भेदस्थिते: शक्तिमतः शक्तितत्वं नापदिस्यते ।
एषां गुणानं करणकार्यत्वपरिभाषिनाम् ॥ ५ ॥
सत्तररस्तमसा च भेदेनावभासनान्न शक्तियपदेशः शक्ति-
शक्तिमतोर्पेदात् । वस्तुनुः ७ शक्तिविकासो विश्वम् ॥ ५ ॥

सत्तानन्दः क्रिया पत्युस्तदभावोपिः सा पशोः ।
द्वयात्मा तद्रजो दुःखं ’श्लेषिसत्तमोमयम्’ ॥ ६ ॥
ईश्वरस्यानयनतकृत्वा चर्मकारूपः क्रियोक्ता परमप्रकाशा-
नन्दमयो न पत्यगात्मनस्तु तौ पकाशानन्दो श्राथाभूतो सत्तमुच्यते ।
तद्भावश्च तमः , सत्तमसी पकाशानन्दतदभावरूपः दे अपि
श्लेषात्मनी १०(रजः) । पशो रजः सज्जया क्रिया च दुःखं
चोच्यते ॥ ६ ॥

येष्प्यासामयिकेन्दन्तपरामर्शभुवः पशोः ।
ते विमिश्रा विभिन्नाश्च तथा विज्ञावभासिनः ॥ ७ ॥
ये चैते महेश्वरयेदेशशब्दसंकेतानुसंधानं विनापि पकाशय
परामर्शसारस्तवाद् ॥”बालदशायामिनेदमथिनिद्वस्य भावाःः
, ते” १९” नेकाः

7 Cf. ibid. p. 363 “āgame” iti śrimangalāsātre; the ōtā is probably referring to the
well-known ardhaśloka of the Mangalāśstra (or Sarvamangalā) saktayo 'syā jagat
kṛtān, echoed by the vr̥tti. 8 ślesi°, which in E and in the two editions of IPV stands
alone, is to be taken as compounded with the following sattvatamo°, as we can gather
from the vr̥tti and the other commentaries (only Bh., II p. 291, refers it to
rajaḥ); tat-
tatytamano° corrected to sattvatam° T.° 9 Cf. ibid. p. 366 atra hetuḥ pārimitāyam, tatrāpi
grāhyatāpūdunam. 10 The context seems to require the addition of rajaḥ. 11 Cf. ibid. p. 367
na kevalam sadyojātabhālāder gocarkāryah ...; cf. also ibid. p. 368. 12 Cf. the quotation
(from the ōtā) ibid. p. 368 “aneka” ity ādipadena svalaksanātmānaḥ, “prthak” ity ādīnā
tu sāmānyalaksanārūpā nirdīṣṭāḥ.
My conjectural emendation for *svalaksanātmānam* T, meaningless in this context (see also fn. 12). After some perplexity (*nānākāraś* might seem connected with *citra* and in this case the text should be modified at several points to yield a satisfactory meaning) I have fully accepted T, taking *nānākāraś* as a gloss of *vibhinnaś* and referring to the *sāmānyas*. My conjectural emendation for ye T. Following Abh.’s commentaries one would expect here something like *viśesasāmānyatmano*, but Utp.’s intention is certainly different and *sāmānyatmano* continues the line of interpretation begun in the preceding verse, where *vibhinna* refers to the universals. The sense of *sāmānyatmano*, which occurs also in the *tīkā*, is clearly explained *ibid.* p. 370 “sāmānyatmanah iti svālaksanarūpā api sabdāgocarikāryatvena sāmānyātma eveti prāg eva uktam asakrt.

Abh. points out (*ibid.* p. 370) that according to the *vṛtti* the expression *tattadvibhinnaśamjñābhīḥ* in the *tīkā* refers both to the objects and the subjects: “tattadvibhinna” ity ādīnā sautram vṛttāv api ubhayathā yojitam. *kṣetra* cit. and commented on *ibid.* p. 379 vṛttim vyācāste “atra” iti kṣetraśabdhā īśānām vādatā taccāṅgā vartanām nāsti vikalpanaśaktit ity uktam. *vikalpana* (or *vikalpa*), my correction (vikalpanaśakti occurs many times in the parallel passage *ibid.* p. 379): vikalpa T. In T the last *aksara* is not clearly legible, fluctuating between *te* (as in the *devānāgarī* transcript ) and *nte*. But meaning requires pradarśyante. *sabdāmayah* cit. and commented on *ibid.* p. 380. Cf. *ibid.* p. 380 etac ca vaksyate “samsāro viśrāntah” samsaranasya heyatām aha “bandharaṇa” iti.
23. upajīvinī : upajīvānī T. 24. ajñātayā : ajñātayā N (also found in E, IPV and IPVV). 25. āpi : sa T. 26. All the editions of the kārikās have ērūpayā (also found in C Ch Nf T) instead of ēcitrīyā T Jh N, but all the commentaries presuppose the latter (IPV kakārādivarna-vaiicitryā, IPV astāṣ tahābhedasahasra-vaiicitryā). 27. sāmānyarūpān cit. and commented on ibid. p. 382 nanu niyatadesakāla eva svatantravikalpe 'pi ābhāsante arthāh, tat katham vṛttau "sāmānyarūpān" ity uktam ētath ca pariharati "sāmānyarūpāvatvāna" iti śmrtivishayo vikalpyamāṇo 'pi na svottāhāpidesakālayāy, kintu nirūdhasaṃkālayāy eveti svalaśaṁnātā, tena svarṣṭa-desakālābhāsamelanā eva arthāḥ svāstantra-svāstakalajīvanā eva vikalpaśaktau, na tu nirūdhava eva ca suka ca desakalābhāsaśāv ētath ētāt pārta-pārta-pārta-āttām. 28. āparījñātayā, my correction: āparījñātayā T. 29. Cf. the quotation (from the tikā) ibid. p. 382 "tattat" ity adina "śamskṛta" ity antena sāmāsapadeśa ētāt pārta-pārta-pārta-āttām. 30. sā, my correction : sa T. 31. cit. ibid. p. 384 "svāstakalābhāsaśāv ētath ētāt pārta-pārta-pārta-āttām. 32. cañcalatām, my conjectural ed: cañcalataram T (ā and ra are very similar in Malayalam script). 33. cit. ibid. p. 386 "vikalpakṛtyāyā" iti vṛttyā sūtre "vikalpakṛtyāyā" iti bhavvhrīhaḥ āyaṃ śaktim viśiṣṭāty, ity ātha. 34. caithā sāraḥ : caithā sāraḥ T. 35. āvabhāsanāt ētāt pārta-pārta-pārta-āttām (which would be acceptable and even give a better meaning, but all the MSS and the editions of the commentaries agree on ēvabhāsanāt). 36. cit. ibid. p. 387 sāragasāya pramārśādharānyādicintā kā upayūyate iti cet pramārśāhityena prameyasya śṛṣṭi na anyathā bhedāvabhāsabhājanam vinā tad anupapatter iti. 37. śṛṣṭi, my correction : śṛṣṭeś T.

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The text is doubtful and my restoration is only tentative. Here the second part of the kārikā is glossed (cf. ibid. p. 388 evam ślokārdham vyākhyātām, which concludes the gloss of the first half). T reads tantrāntarāntarodhayatketrajñāvāyāparavikalpa-nirhṛtasaparaśilpanena. I correct tantrā to tatrā on the basis of the quotation ibid. p. 388 tadvṛttim “tatrāntara” ity ādiḥkam; antarāntarā is confirmed by its mention in the tīkā “yady api” iti i “sahabhave ca antarāntara” iti yuktam iti bhāvah / “tathāpi” iti na atra vikalpasrster antarāntarā sambhava uktah, kintu tannirhṛāsasya. In the same compound, after kṣetrajña, T has some aksaras deleted and corrected, which are read in the transcript as vāpdraka. Actually, T has vikalpāpāra, where the part ikalpa is deleted and va is corrected to vya, thus forming the word vyāpāra followed not by kalpa but by vikalpa; vikalpanirhṛāsa occurs many times ibid. p. 389. Then I read parisīlanena instead of parisīlpanena T (my conjecture is supported ibid. p. 389 tam eva ca vikalpanirhṛāsam yadi parisīlayati ... 41 sarvo : so ‘ham E. According to Bh (II p. 305), sarvo, found in the text of IPV commented on by him, would be the corruption of the original reading sargo, graphically rather similar in sāradā script. In his opinion sargo would fit the context better (ayam sargo, that is, the creation of the vikalpa of which it is question), but the decision is left to the reader’s sensitivity (sahrdayā atra pramanām). However, a close examination of the vṛttī induces me to think that the original reading was precisely sarvo (which is not directly glossed, but which lends itself to not being glossed). I would even add that Abh.’s commentaries may allow one to suppose that his text had precisely the corrupt reading sargo (he would gloss it, in fact, with vikalpaśṛṣṭih), then returned, by a further corruption or correction, to the original one which was in front of Bhāskara. Accordingly, Abh.’s interpretation of vibhava is also different from the vṛttīs. But another hypothesis may also be put forward. Bhāskara records and immediately discards a further reading so ‘ham (kutaprāy ādarṣe “so ‘ham” ity api pātho ’sti, sa tu na yuktah). This reading, found in E, is accepted by Śivopādhyāya in the Vijñānabhairavavṛtti (p. 95) and fiercely defended against the upholders of the other two (ibid. p. 96) ye tu “sarvo mamāyaṃ, sargo mamāyaṃ” ity ādipāṭhāntaram kalpayanti te pāṇḍitam manyāḥ ... mūḍhāḥ). The
first *pāda* of the *kārikā*, in this form, would refer to the two aspects of ‘recognition’ (*pratyabhijñādvaidham*), connected by him with the vv. 109-10 of the *Vijñānabhairava*. According to Śivopādhyāya, this would be the reading commented on by Abh. (*pratyabhijñāvimarśinikāreṇa*); and indeed IPV II p. 305 (and almost in the same terms IPV III p.393) says: *na hi sah pratyagātā nāma paśuḥ kaścid anyo 'ham, api tu pari-grhitagrāhyakarakaśikā: saikāghanah paro yah sa evāham sa cāham eva ...*. But this may also be a mere digression of Abh., not directly dependent on the text of the *kārikā*. Lastly, *sahṛdayaḥ atra pramāṇam*. 42 Cf. ibid. p. 395 “cidānandaghana” iti sautram ahampraśitaḥ pūrṇāyāṁ” itiyata vyākhyātām. 43 *paśy an yathepsităn arthān : jānan yathepsităn paśyan C N* (this is also the reading of IPV, IPV and Bh), *paśy an yathepsităn ātmā Ch Jh T* (ātmā then corrected to arthān in T). The text of E T N is the one presupposed by all the commentaries. 44 This word in T is difficult to read. Among the various options "nibhrta (or "nirbhṛta) seems to me the only one that may furnish an acceptable meaning (the transcript has "nivṛtam).
इति प्रकटितो मया सुघट एष मार्गो नवो
महागुरुभिरुच्यते स्म शिवहृदिष्टात्ते यथा ॥
तव निवधत्वपदं भवनकर्त्त्वतामार्थनो
विभाव्य शिवताम्यमनिन्दामाविसनिध्ययति ॥ १६ ॥

यत्र यथाविश्वेत्र एव व्यवहारे प्रत्यभिज्ञामात्रात् शिवतालाभः ॥
सोशयमवक्र एवाभिनवो मार्गः ॥४४ साधारणकृतामनास्वरभव्यक्ताकामा-
रेभ्यसोस्मानन्दपदेः शिवहृदिष्टामनि प्रकरणे निर्दिष्टो मया
युक्तिनिवन्धनेन हदयंगमिकृतः। एठत्तपरिशीलनेन शिवतावेशाज
जीवन्नः ॥४५एव मुक्तो भयति ॥ १६ ॥

तैस्तैरप्पेयुपायाचित्रेयस्यनत्तन्या: रिध्दीलोप्यन्तिके
कान्तो लोकस्मान एवमपरिज्जातो न रन्तुः यथा ॥
लोकस्येष तथानवेशिक्षितगुणः स्वाल्मायि विश्वेश्वरो
नैवालं निजवैभवाय तद्वियं
तत्पत्यभिज्ञोविदिता ॥ १७ ॥
कान्तहृदिष्टात्तेन ईशवरपत्यभिज्ञोपपादनीया चापूर्वकन्तला च
॥ १७ ॥

⁴⁵ Cf. ÍPVV I p. 38 tikākāro 'pi "sāksātkṛtparamesvarākāraih" iti vakṣyati. ⁴⁶ eva
cit. in ÍPVV III p. 403 "jīvanmukto na samśayah" ity ādīsu āgāmasthānesu niyamārtha-
vākhyāṇāya vṛttau ya evakārah ... । adbhūtarvam api ca evakāreṇa sūcita asya upa-
dēsasya.
जनस्यायतनसिद्धचर्चमुदयाकरसृणुनाः
ईश्वरप्रत्यभिभेयमुत्पलेनोपपावितः ॥ १८ ॥

सुलभोक्त्य सिद्धिमार्गः प्रदर्शितः ॥ १८ ॥

इति तत्त्वसंग्रहाधिकारः ॥

॥ समाप्तेयमीश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञावृत्ति: ॥
TRANSLATION
SECTION I. KNOWLEDGE

CHAPTER I

1. Having in some way\(^1\) attained the state of servant of Maheśvara and wishing to offer assistance also to the whole of mankind, I shall – by giving it logical justification – make possible the awakening\(^2\) of the recognition of the Lord, which brings about the achievement of all success\(^3\).

– I who have obtained, thanks to the benevolence of the Supreme Lord\(^4\), the benefits that derive from being His servant\(^5\)– a state it is very difficult to achieve – being ashamed of my solitary success, shall, by the method that will here be described, enable the whole of mankind to recognize their Lord, in order to gain my complete fulfilment through the attainment also by them of the Supreme Reality. – 1 –

2. What intelligent being could ever deny or establish the cognizer and agent, the Self, Maheśvara, established from the beginning (ādisiddhe)?

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\(^1\) I.e. in a way that eludes all description.
\(^2\) I have thus tried to render the various meanings that Utp. gives to the one verb upapādayāmi (cf. ĪPV I pp. 31-32; cf. also the closing verse of the ĪPK). The main meaning of the causative here is samarthācarana, i.e., to act in such a way as to bring about the production of a certain action (in this case the awakening of recognition).
\(^3\) Thus, following the order that appears most obvious, I refer the compound sama-stasampatsamavāpihetetum to prayabhījñām, but, as Abh. points out on the basis of the ṭikā and the vṛtti, it not only qualifies tatpratyabhījñām but also dāsyam. The compound, which is implicitly understood as tatpurusa in the vṛtti, is the object of intricate interpretations, sometimes as tatpurusa and sometimes as bahuvrīhi, in the ĪPV.
\(^4\) Or also, as Abh. suggests (see text note 1), «thanks to the benevolence of the master».
\(^5\) Cf. the vigraha of the compound (see text note 3).
11.2  – The Self of all beings, the substratum of the establishment of all objects\(^6\), who embraces the establishment of himself\(^7\) – since otherwise it would be impossible to establish all the various objects – self-luminous, whose nature is uniquely that of cognizer, formerly\(^8\) established, ‘ancient’, possesses knowledge and action. Sovereignty (aiśvaryaṁ) is established through inner awareness. Therefore only the foolish strive to establish or deny the Lord. – 2 –

3. However, since He, though being directly perceived (drṣṭe 'pi), is not discerned for what He is because of delusion, precisely for this reason, by bringing His powers to light, the recognition (pratyabhijñā) of Him is shown.

– However, since the Lord, though established through inner awareness\(^9\) (svasamvedanasiddham), does not enter the sphere of full and defi-

\(^6\) According to Abh. (see text note 11), this is to be understood as meaning that the cognizer constitutes the final stage (viśrāntisthāna) of the cognitive act, at which the revelation of the object (prakāśa) becomes reflective awareness (vimāśa).

\(^7\) The cognizer becomes implicitly conscious of himself, of his being light', precisely through perception (the 'illumination' of the object); indeed, the illumination of the object – its perception – presupposes a light into which it enters, a light that by definition is not its own but pertains to the subject.

\(^8\) The being established of the subject always 'precedes', as an a priori condition of knowledge, and for this reason eludes any objectification that attempts to capture it, so to speak, from behind. That would be like trying to step ahead of one's own shadow, as a well-known verse of the Trikahrdaya (quoted in ŚSV p. 4) puts it. Abh. (ĪPVV I p. 51) gives the example of inferring fire from smoke, which, indeed, implies that it is always the smoke that is already established first: the difference being that the priority of the self is ad infinitum (yadā yadā upakramah tadā tadā pūrvasiddhatvam ity eso 'tra paramārthah). This is precisely what the nearness of pūrva-siddha to pūrṇāna signifies, which taken singly may apply to various things (see text note 15); the same theme will be taken up again later.

\(^9\) The expression svasamvedanasiddha interprets and orientates, by limiting its meaning, drṣṭe in the kārikā, which, insofar as it is passive, seems to degrade to the status of object He who is the subject par excellence, the Lord. But, Abh. notes (see text note 19), this expression, too, is, in the strict sense of the word, inadequate, as the fīkā itself has pointed out (nāpi svasamvedanasiddhatvam ātmanah); it can be accepted only if understood in a metaphorical sense, as expressing the undeniability of the experience of the I. The theme of the absolute impossibility of objectifying the I, Śiva, recurs with particular insistence in the work of Utp. Cf. ĪPVV III p. 162 yat prameyīkṛto 'smiī sarvyo 'py ātmanī lajjate / katham prameyīkūraṇam sahaṁ tan māheśvaram // 'Everyone feels ashamed in himself at seeing that he is transformed into an object of cognition; then, how might the Great Lord stand this ?'
nite knowledge (ahrdayāṅgamaṭvāt)\textsuperscript{10} because of the delusion caused by māyā, His mere 'recognition'\textsuperscript{11} is here shown – in the form of the acquisition of unswerving certainty - through the illustration of that sign of recognition that is represented by the faculties peculiar to Him\textsuperscript{12}. – 3 –

4. Indeed, the foundation of insentient realities rests on the living being; knowledge and action are considered the life of the living being.

– There are two kinds of reality: insentient and sentient. The establishment of an insentient nature rests on the living being; the being such of the living, i.e. life, is represented precisely by knowledge and action. – 4 –

5. Knowledge is self-established (svatah siddham); action, when it manifests itself through a body, becomes cognizable also by others. Thanks to it, knowledge in others can be guessed.

– In living beings action, when it reaches the final stage of bodily movement, also becomes directly perceptible in other subjects\textsuperscript{13}; knowledge, which is in itself capable of self-perception, becomes evident (prāsidhyati) also in others precisely through action\textsuperscript{14}. Therefore, the Lord,

\textsuperscript{10} Lit.: 'does not reach the heart', i.e. the plane of vimarśa which alone makes a cognition fully accomplished and effective (cf. ĪpVV I p. 80).

\textsuperscript{11} The reality of the Self is not therefore 'known' – as happens with any object in phenomenal reality, which, not shining itself, needs to be illuminated by consciousness – but is simply 'recognized'. Moreover, this act of recognition is not something that was not there formerly and must be brought into existence, but eternally present and merely concealed, it is only 'shown' (darśyate) as predominant, by placing it near (upa)t in contact with the heart (ĪpVV I p. 87 see text note 26). Thus Abh. intends to remove the act of recognition from the sphere of the vyavahārasādhana as well (cf. p. 173 n. 3). In fact, there may not be anything asiddha in the Lord, not even as regards any aspect of vyavahāra (prakhyā-upākhyā, jñāna-abhidhāna) concerning him, for in this case even the establishment of the smallest portion of the knowable would become impossible (ĪpVV I p. 87 tadasiddhau prameyalesasyāpi hi na kācit Siddhir ity uktam).

\textsuperscript{12} That is, above all, the powers of knowledge and action.

\textsuperscript{13} This means that action, as an inner reality (vimarśa), inseparable from knowledge, is also self-established. The possibility of objectification only regards its extreme phenomenal form of bodily movement.

\textsuperscript{14} If action is examined first in the vṛtti, thus reversing the order of the kārikā where knowledge is mentioned first, this is because action is the means by which knowledge (from which it is inseparable) can be inferred in others (ĪpVV I pp. 104-105). That bodily action, and the use of the word, presuppose knowledge is a gene-
the Self perceived as 'T in oneself and others, is established insofar as it is directly experienced through inner awareness. Because of the obscuring of his true nature caused by the power of māyā, the Self is thus erro-

rally recognized fact; cf. for instance Dharmakīrti's Santānāntarasiddhi 1-2 (Kitagawa 1955: 58; Sticherbatsky 1969: 64). But to infer knowledge means to objectify it and it is for this reason that Utp. in the kārikā and in the tīkā prefers to resort to other expressions, such as to conjecture, suppose, guess etc. (cf. āhanam tarkanam sambhava-

stoṣanam ibid. p. 101). The problem, however, arises again and is given an elaborate solution in ĪPVV I pp. 105-108. Abh. begins by stating that since it is a question of an inference founded on the svabhāvahetu (see below p. 179 n. 17) – that does not aim to make known an object not formerly known, but only to rid it of erroneous conceptions – the real basic self-luminosity of knowledge and of the subject is not contradicted. After a series of objections and replies, following the line of argument in the tīkā, the conclusion is reached: a certain level of objectification in inferring knowledge in another body is undeniable, but this applies only to the initial and medial stages, whereas in the end (paryante) knowledge appears in all its luminosity, at unity with the subject making the inference, as happens at the conclusion of every cognitive act. In saying prasidhyati the vr̥tti intends to express the emergence of the natural self-luminosity of knowledge and to exclude the possibility of its being a luminosity induced by the subject, as is the case for the common object of knowledge (siddham bhavati, na tu sādhyam).

15 I.e. in the way that will be described in the following chapter. In understanding tasya both as objective and subjective genitive (it is Abh. himself who underli-

neas this, see text note 43), the Self becomes both the object and the subject of the error: the Self in its freedom is mistaken about itself. Indeed, every reality, even error, has the Lord, the Self, as its ultimate source.
CHAPTER II

1-2. [Objection]¹ There is one type of cognition² in which the particular reality (svalaksana³) appears and another type of cognition,

¹ In the whole of āhnika II a Buddhist pūrṇavāpasin is speaking; his arguments are broadly speaking those of the Buddhist logicians, that gradually become more specifically vijñānavādin, saūrāntika etc. The target of Buddhist criticism here are some ātmavādins whose (various) positions are only partially shared by the Šaiva ātmavādin. One might almost say that Utp. sometimes uses the Buddhists' own weapons to demolish doctrines which, though apparently closer to the Šaiva positions, remain, however, extraneous to what is their core and essential tenor. In the text the word 'Objection' refers to the Buddhists and the word 'Reply' refers to the ātmavādins.

² I have understood ekam ... param here in the plainest sense, which is also the one explained in the vtṛti. Abh. (IPVV I p. 114) lists three possible interpretations, and the one accepted here is the third. The second, which Utp. adopts in the fikā, takes ekam as 'single, undifferentiated', in this sense referring to direct experience (anubhava) as opposed to the vikalpa, which assumes different forms (memory, imagination, doubt etc.). The only differentiation in direct experience is the one deriving from the variety of its objects. Thus param, apart from 'another' correlated to 'one', is also to be understood as 'subsequent', in the sense that the vikalpa always depends on a previous direct experience.

³ The svalaksana - which Dharmottara understands as a karmadhāraya 'unique character, unique reality' (NBT p. 70 svam asādhitānām laksanānām tatvām svalaksanām) - is, for the Buddhist logicians, the object of direct perception. Dharmakīrti (no definition of svalaksana is found in the extant works of Dignāga) describes it as follows: capable of causal efficiency, dissimilar from everything else, not being the object of words and not being known in the presence of signs that are different from it (PV III.1-2); and that which, owing to its being far or near, determines a difference in the form that appears in cognition (NB I.13). The svalaksana - says Moksākaragupta (TBh p. 11) - is something real, unique, determined by a space, a time and a form which are peculiar to it; he gives the example of a particular jar, capable of containing water, with a definite place, time and form, directly present to knowledge, devoid of differentiation into many properties, different from what belongs to the same or a different class. The svalaksana strictu sensu is an absolutely undivided reality; it is an instant (NBT p. 71 pratyaksasaya hi kṣana eko grāhyah). The term svalaksana is borrowed by the śaiva authors to denote "an entity having a character which is only its own, consisting in a determined place, time and form which 'contract' its own nature" (IPV I p. 86 svam anyānanyāyi svarūpasamkocahāji laksanam desakālākārarūpayam yasya ...). The basic difference
12.1-2 called mental elaboration (vikalpa⁹), inseparably connected with discourse (sābhilāpam), which appears in manifold forms. For neither of the two is there any necessity to posit any stable perceiving subject, since he does not appear⁴ in them. Also the notion of 'I' (ahamprafitih) has in reality as referent the body etc...

- One type of cognition, consisting in the direct perception of the clearly manifested (sphutāvabhāsa⁹) particular reality, is called 'exempt from mental elaborations' (nirvikalpakam); the other type of cognition, on the other hand, which, permeated by the word, appears in the various forms of memory, doubt, fantasy etc., is called 'representation, mental elaboration' (vikalpa⁹). Neither the one nor the other are admissible as depending on another entity distinct from knowledge itself in the form of consciousness, since this other entity is not perceived (tasyānupalabdheh). Who, then, is this permanent Self? Even on the basis of the notion of 'I', which is indissolubly connected with discourse, the existence of a cognizer, who transcends what are simply cognizable realities, namely the body and so on, cannot be ascertained⁵. – 1-2 –

with the Buddhists lies precisely in conceiving of place-time-form not as the intrinsic nature of the thing but as the contingent contraction of an entity whose real nature is, on the contrary, expanded (vikāsitasvabhāva eva, vitatātma; cf. ŚD V.6c), 'open' (cf. IPvV II p. 27). Though appearing as a unitary entity, the svvalaksana, in Utp.'s view, is in fact formed by a number of ābhāsas, i.e. universals, which have become a particular owing to their mutual delimitation and their connection with space and time (Torella 1987: 168-69). In the process of particularization space and time are considered the most essential elements (antaraṅga). If, already in perception itself, the svvalaksana appears as a unitary reality (the world of practical experience is, indeed, made of svvalaksanas), this is due to the unifying power of the mind (anu-samdhāna) which links together a group of ābhāsas by making them subordinated to a predominant one (sāmānādhikaranyā; see below pp. 166-167) Thus the saiva position may be defined ābhāsanikurumbāmakavāda as opposed to the niramsāsavlaksanavāda of the Buddhists (on svvalaksana in the Buddhist pramāṇa tradition see Stcherbatsky 1930: 181-198, Katsura 1991: 135-137).

⁴ The Buddhist logicians acknowledge the validity of non-perception as the criterion for establishing the non-existence of something that could (if present) be perceived (drṣyānupalabdhi); this subject will be extensively taken up again later.

⁵ The Buddhist knows he is laying himself open to an obvious objection: how is it possible to say that no 'I' is manifested in knowledge when, on the contrary, we all usually say « I know, I am happy or unhappy, I am thin or fat». But he has his answer ready: this notion of 'I' does not reveal a permanent subject but refers to the series of distinct moments of cognition (jñānasantāna) and of body (śaṭirasantarantarā) on which apparent personal identity is based. And in any case this experience
3. [Reply] How could we explain memory, which conforms to direct perception when the latter is no longer present, if there were not a permanent self, who is the subject of the perception?

- Since the former direct perception has disappeared at the moment of the memory, the memory, whose essential quality is precisely its dependence on that former perception of the object, could not arise, unless one admits the persistence of the awareness of this perception also at the moment of the memory. And this lasting awareness at different times is precisely the self, the perceiving subject. – 3 –

4. [Objection] Even if we do acknowledge the existence of a self, memory is still not explained, given that the perception no longer exists and that only through it [the perception] does memory have access to the objects formerly perceived. [Reply]. But memory acts on those very things that were the object of the perception...

- Once the direct perception (manifestation) of the object has ceased, the object no longer exists even for memory, since it is assumed precisely through direct perception. Therefore, even if one acknowledges a self consisting in a unitary consciousness, memory finds itself without an object and thus all worldly activity collapses. If, on the other hand, you claim that memory has as its object that of a perception that no longer exists...

5. ...insofar as the occurrence of memory is due to the latent impressions left by direct perception. [Objection] If that is how things stand, what need is there for this useless burden of a permanent self?
From direct perception there derives a latent impression (*samskārah*); the memory arising from this conforms to that former perception and makes that perception—in which the object is immersed—manifest. If things are explained in these terms, why is it necessary to assume a useless permanent subject, since even the supporter of the existence of the self acknowledges the existence of the latent impression and this alone is enough to account for memory?— 5 —

6. If the qualities are separate [extrinsic to the self], then, since the nature of the self remains unaltered, the latent impressions are sufficient to explain the phenomenon of memory. The subject of memory is therefore only a mental construct (kalpitah), as was the subject of the perception.

— The self, even if it is invoked as a substratum of qualities that are distinct from it, such as pleasure, pain, knowledge etc. serves no useful purpose. Indeed, it does not perform any function in the phenomenon of memory, since it does not undergo any modification, seeing that it does not combine with the above-mentioned qualities, which are conceived as separate. Therefore, as in the case of the subject of perception, to say that the self is the subject of memory is purely a mental construct. — 6 —

object, the second (*antarmukha*) is constituted by the self-consciousness (*sva-samvedana*) of this perception. According to the Buddhist, the ātmavādin stakes everything on this continuity of self-consciousness (to which he gives the name of ātman) to explain the phenomenon of memory, and in so doing leaves memory without an object which can only derive from the *bahirmukha* level of the former cognition. Now, if this has completely ceased there cannot be a memory (which corresponds to saying 'that') and, if it is fully present there, there is only a new direct perception. What is required is 'the non-cessation of something that has however ceased (naṣṭasyāpy anāśah)' and this is precisely what the *samskāra* is. Even the ātmavādin cannot refute this either and thus he gives renewed vigour to the Buddhist's attack, which is expressed in the second part of the *kārikā*.

8 The *kārikā* is parrying an objection that the ātmavādin might raise, this time on behalf of a Vaiśeṣika: the *samskāra* is a quality (*dharma*) of the self, on a par with knowledge, pleasure and pain, and as such presupposes a substratum (*dharmin*) where it inhere (i.e. the self); the *dharmin*, on the other hand, cannot be represented by a *santāna*, because it must be a unitary reality (*eka*) (cf. *IPVV* I p. 130); but if one wishes to preserve the permanence of the ātman one must consider these qualities as separate from him and not able to modify him (this is explained in *IPV* I pp. 92-3 and *IPVV* I p. 130). In this case, however, neither a *samskāra* which does not modify the self, nor a self which is not modified by the *samskāra*, can explain the phenomenon of memory.

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7. If cognition were conscious (citsvarūpa) then it ought to be permanent like the self; if, on the contrary, it were not sentient, how could it illuminate objects?

– If cognition were by nature conscious, then, unable to be associated with time and place – which are qualities pertaining to objects – it would become permanent etc., like the self. If, on the other hand, it were not sentient, how could it illuminate the object? – 7 –

8. [Reply]. Just as the intellect assumes the form of the object, so it assumes the sentience (caitanyam) of the self. [Objection]. In that case it is not sentient, for if it were so, it could not illuminate the object.

9 After confuting those who maintain that the existence of the self is directly perceptible or inferable, the pūrvapakṣin turns to attacking the ‘sovereignty’ (aīśvarya) of the self, i.e. its being endowed with the powers of cognition and action. Cognition as a reality or function distinct from the self is primarily criticized; this is a conception that may be ascribed to the ātmavādins in general but – as we shall see – rejected by the Saivas.

10 This is, of course, the opinion held by the majority of ātmavādins. The reasoning is as follows: the self is nitya, because it is citsvarūpa svaprakāsa, and time can qualify only objects. Abh. (IPVV I pp. 135-6) mentions the positions of the followers of the Sāmkhya (kāpilāṇām tāvat nitya eva asau), of the Mīmāṃsakas (jaininīyāḥ puruṣam samvidrūpa eva sukhdāvasthābhinnam manyante ... cīdrūpaṃśena nityaḥ, avasthāṃśena tu anityo ’sti, this is a doctrine which stems from the Bhāttas, cf. ŚV, Ātmavāda, vv. 26 ff.) etc. The positions of the ātmavādins differ greatly as regards whether the self is conscious or not.

11 If cognition, as distinct from the self, is conceived as being conscious by nature – and such, for instance, is the position of the Vaiśeṣikas and the Prabhākaras – it follows that it, too, is permanent. The contradiction that arises (in the eyes of the Buddhist) and is not made clear in the vṛtti nor, it seems, in the fikā, is pointed out by Abh. (IPVV I p. 103): if both jñāna and atman are nitya, there can be no relation between them, because, according to the Buddhists, the only relation is that of cause and effect, which, indeed, cannot exist between two permanent realities. Abh. (IPVV I p. 134) points out a further consequence: cognition thus having the same properties as the self, would only be another self, and thus the hetu that it represents in the inference of the self would become asiddha.

12 This is the Sāmkhya theory, according to which the buddhi, though itself insentient, cognizes by means of the light that is reflected in it from the purusa. Thus the buddhi would be both insentient and sentient (cid-acit), which is a position the pūrvapakṣin recognizes as untenable (in order for it to be able to fulfill its function in the final analysis it must be sentient and therefore the criticism levelled earlier is valid). The view of the Sāmkhya is inadmissible – it is said, among other, in the IPV and IPVV – because only a clearer thing can receive the reflection of another and the buddhi is certainly no ‘clearer’ than the self.
12.8 The intellect (*buddhih*) is cognition\[13\]. Though it is itself insentient, just as it assumes the reflection of the form of the object, so, in the same way, it also assumes the reflection of the sentience pertaining to the self. Thus [in assuming them both\[14\]], it can illuminate the object. However, [it is replied] it follows that it must be sentient by nature.

Therefore\[15\] cognition, though it exists, is not related to anything else [i.e. to a subject], because this has been recognized as untenable. Action, on the other hand, neither exists in itself, nor as related to anything else.

9. Also action [as a separate reality is logically inadmissible as it] consists in the coming into being of bodies etc. in different places etc. (*tattaddesādijatataḥ*)\[16\] and nothing more, since nothing more is perceived; nor is it tenable that it – being one and also characterized by succession – may be related to a unitary reality.

– Action, too, conceived as one and constituted by various preceding and succeeding parts, consisting in the activity of factors (*kārakaḥ*)\[17\], is not tenable, as it is not possible to attribute unity to something characterized by succession, i.e. that exists in a multiplicity of moments\[18\]. Nor is it admissible that it has a substratum that is both characterized by tem-

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\[13\] The various reasons for this apparently inappropriate identification (of the organ with the function etc.), are extensively analyzed in ÍPVV I pp. 149-50.

\[14\] Cf. text note 87.

\[15\] That is, on the grounds of the arguments put forward in this and the previous *kārikā* from which the conclusion is reached that cognition is neither permanent nor related to a subject.

\[16\] Cf. e.g. TS 706 *desāntaropalabdhes tu nairantaryena janmanah / samānapatravastūṇām gatibhrāntih pradippavat* //.

\[17\] This is an allusion to Patañjali’s famous definition, *kārakānām pravṛttiivīśesah kriyā* (Mahābhāṣya, vol. I p. 258), understood in various ways by generations of commentators (e.g. What is the meaning of *kārakānām*? The subject, the subject and object, all the *kārakas* without distinction? etc.). This is the background to the whole of the *Kriyāsamuddēsa* of the VP, which is, in turn, the reference point for the Śaiva conception of action (cf. the extensive and repeated quotations from this fundamental text in the ÍPVV’s comment on this verse).

\[18\] This is a reply to an implicit objection, formulated in ÍPVV I pp. 186-7: there are, indeed, collective units such as the army etc., but here the various antecedent and consequent parts, linked by a reciprocal relation, exist simultaneously; this is not so in the case of action.
poral succession and is unitary in nature. Action is only 'to go' 'to change' and so on, which is but the assumption on the part of bodies etc. of new states of existence at various and diverse times and places, since nothing else distinct from this is perceived. – 9 –

10. The various things come into being in concomitance with the presence of certain other things: this is what is experienced and nothing more. There is no relation (sambandhah) other than that of cause and effect.

– What is directly perceived is simply that, when a certain preceding thing is present, a subsequent thing comes into being. As was argued in the case of action, no relation of action and factors (kriyākārakasambandhah) exists, since such a 'relation' is not perceived as a distinct entity. There is no connection between things other than that of cause and effect. – 10 –

11. [A relation (sambandha)21, however conceived, is inadmiss-

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19 The difference in nature inherent in the various antecedent and consequent parts determines a difference in nature in the substratum they share (cf. ÍPVV I p. 193).

20 ÍPV I p. 117 summarizes the series of criticisms the pūrvapaksin levelled against the Śaiva statement «the I is sovereign (iṣvara) because it is in union with knowledge and action (jñānakriyāyogāt)». Jñāna is produced (kārya) by its own group of causes, such as the faculty of sight etc.; kriyā does not exist: therefore they cannot be kāryas of the self (nor can the self, by definition, be a kārya of them). And therefore, given that the only relation acknowledged by the Buddhists is that of kārya-kārana, it follows that there cannot be any relation between jñāna and kriyā on the one hand and the self on the other.

21 In presenting the Buddhist criticism of the concept of relation (sambandha) Utp. refers to Dharmakīrti's Sambandhaparīkṣā. The complete text of this short work, and the vṛtti with which Dharmakīrti accompanied it, has only survived in Tibetan translation (the commentaries Sambandhaparīksāṭikā and 'anusāra, respectively by Vinitadeva and Sankaranandana, are also extant only in Tibetan translation). The Sanskrit text of twenty-two of the twenty-five kārikās that compose it can be obtained from Devasūri's Syādvādaratnakāra (see Frauwallner 1934: 261-300) and Prabhācandra's Prameyakamalamārtanda (see Jha 1990). Like Dharmakīrti, after dealing with the concept of relation in various parts of his magnum opus, the PV, felt the need to return to it both organically and concisely in the SP, similarly – and this does not seem merely coincidental – after the ÍPK, Utp. also composed the Sambandhasiddhi (with a vṛtti), a short work in which he outlines the Śaiva conception of relation. Indeed, the critical reference point for the latter is the SP, an ardhasloka...
I 2.11 Ible]\(^{22}\) since, as it rests on the two related terms\(^{23}\), it cannot be unitary in nature; since a thing that is [already] accomplished (siddhasya) cannot 'require' ('apekṣanāt) another and dependence (pāratantrya\(^{9}\)) etc. are not logically tenable\(^{24}\). Thus the agent, too, is merely a mental construct.

of which is even included in the text (4cd ity amisṛḥ svayam bhāvās tān yojayati kalpanā, corresponding to v. 5cd of the SP). Some verses quoted by Abh. in ĪPVV I, without any reference to their source, also come from the SP. It is worth quoting them in full, also because they differ in some places from the form in which the same verses are quoted by Devasūri and Prabhācandra (the latter are in square brackets): bhāvabhedapratityartham samyojyante 'bhīdhyākāh (v. 6b, cit. p. 195), paśyann ekam adṛṣṭasya dārsane tadadārsane / apaśyan [Prabh. apaśyat] kāryam anveti vināpy ākhyātābhir [Prabh. vinā vyākhyātābhir] janāh / dārsanādārsane mukvā kāryabuddher na sambhavāt [asambhavāt] / kāryādiśrutir apy atra lāghavārtham nivesitā // (vv. 13-14, citta. p. 199), ity amisṛḥ svayam bhāvās tān yojayati [misrayati] kalpanā / tām eva cānurundhānaih kriyākārakavācināh / bhāvabhedapratityartham samyojyante 'bhīdhyākāh // (vv. 5cd-6 cit. p. 200), samā ca sarvanirāsamso bhāvah katham apeksate / apeksā yadi [parāpeksā hi; Prabh. inverts the two hemistichs] sambandhaih 'san katham apeksate (v. 3, cit. p. 203), ... tān misrayati kalpanā (v. 5cd, cit. p. 204), dvitve sati [Dev. dvīṣtho sa ca, Prabh. dvīvte sa ca] katham bhavet (v. 2a, cit. p. 205), siddhe kā paratantratā (v. 1a, cit. p. 204). It should be noted that the readings given by Devasūri and Prabhācandra are generally more in line with the Tibetan translations.

22 In Dharmakīrti's opinion the connection between cause and effect is not a relation (as conceived by the realists), since the essential requisite of a relation is the simultaneous presence of the two related terms on which it rests equally - whereas cause and effect must necessarily belong to two different moments in time (cf. PV III.246 asutah prāg asāmarthe ti paścā cānupayogatā / prāgbhāvah sarvahetūnām ...//) - (SP v. 7 kāryakāranabhāvo 'pi tayor asahabhāvatah / prasi-dhyati kathām dvīṣtho 'dvīṣte sambhandhatā kathām //). Thus, the cause-effect relation is, in the final analysis, unreal precisely qua relation, being reduced to a concatenation of presences and absences (anvaya-vyatireka, bhāva-abhāva); cf. SP v. 17 etāvānmaṭra[i.e. bhāvabhāvāvam]tattvārthāh kāryakāraṇagocarāh / vikalpā dārsayanty arthān mithyārthā ghatitān iva //.

23 The fact that it rests on the two related elements is, as we have seen, the essential feature of a relation, as it is commonly understood by the realists: in the opinion of the Buddhist opponent this is a contradiction in terms, but precisely because this is the essential requisite it cannot be abandoned without rejecting the very concept of relation (see SP v.11ab dvīṣtho hi kaścit sambandho nāto 'nyat tasya laksanam).

24 Here, too, a direct reference is made to the SP the first slokas of which are devoted to confuting one by one the various forms in which a relation may be represented. Utp. expressly mentions and criticizes only apekṣā and pāratantrya; the kārikā, however, adds "adī" and the ṅkā shows that this is intended to refer to rūpaślesa, which in the SP is actually examined in v. 2, after pāratantrya and before apekṣā.
A relation is based on two terms (*dvisthaḥ*) and it is not logically tenable for it to rest on both and preserve its unitary nature. Neither is a relation conceivable in the form of a reciprocal requirement (*anyonyāpeksa*) nor in the form of a dependence (*pāratantrya*) of two self-contained things. On the grounds of what has been said, just as the state of cognizer is a mental construct, the same holds good for the agent.

I.e. they already have their own independent existence. Primarily one must distinguish, as Utp. does here, between *apekṣā* and *pāratantrya*, often generically translated as 'dependence'. In *apekṣā* the sense of 'need, requirement, expectation' predominates: the shoot 'requires' the seed (SSVr p. 2 *ankura eva bijam apeksate*); the genitive *rājnah* 'requires' ('depends on') *purusah* (*apekṣā, ākāṅksā*; see ÍPVV I pp. 203-204), without which it would remain incomplete. Dharmakirti's criticism (SP v. 3 *parāpekṣaḥ hi sambandhah so 'san katham apekṣate / samś ca sarvanirāsāmse bhāvah katham apekṣate /*) is taken up again in the *fikā* and then in ÍPVV (I pp. 203-204). If a cause is existent (*sat*) it cannot 'require' anything else; if it is non-existent (*asat*) it cannot 'require' at all; nor can it be said that a thing 'requires' its effect in order to be qualified as a cause, because this is not anything other than its very nature, but is identified with it. If one objects that its nature, though being fully present, may not be realized as such in practical reality (*vyavahāra*), one may reply that, if the *vyavahāra* is cognition and verbalization (*jñāna-abhidhāna*), then it is the subject (i.e. the mind), not the thing, that is directly involved, and therefore he is given the responsibility for establishing such unreal relations (cf. SP v. 5cd *ity amisṛāḥ svayam bhāvāḥ tān misrayati kalpanā*). In the case, then, of *rājnah* (which is *sat*) with respect to *purusah* (also *sat*) there is no reciprocal *apeksā*, but only of the former towards the latter (*IPVV I p. 204 rājnah sataḥ sati eva pumṣi apekṣeti, na tu anyonyāpeksa atra viivaksitaḥ*); therefore it cannot be represented as *sambandha*, which — we know — must be *dvistha*.

The criticism of *pāratantrya* (more precisely 'dependence' as subordination, heteronomy) is outlined in the first verse of the SP (*pāratantryam hi sambandhah siddhe kā paratanratā*). Abh. notes, following in the steps of the *fikā* (ÍPVV I p. 204), that a reciprocal 'requiring' (*anyonyāpeksā*) may well come within the sphere of *pāratantrya*; but this is still not enough to fulfil the prime requisite of *sambandha*, which is that it must be equally present in the two related terms (*dvistha*). In effect, in the relation of *pāratantrya* *anyonyāpeksarūpa* (glossed in the *fikā* with *parasparonmukhatā* and *anyonyam aunmukhya*), like that of wife and sacrificer in the sacrifice or of two lovers making love, one cannot say that the 'expectation' (*umukhatā*) of the one coincides with that of the other. Thus *umukhatā* does exist, but it is not a proof of *sambandha*.

It is the use of language (Dharmakirti notes) — serving as a means of differentiating things — that suggest the existence of relations like that of factors and action. This relation has no correspondence in reality, but is merely the result of the synthesis of discursive thought (*kalpanā*), which, in fact, comes about through lan-
12.11 Thus how is it possible to claim that the Self is the Lord of all?

- 11 -

guage (tām [kalpanām] eva cānurundhānaih kriyākāramakavācinah / bhāvabhedupra-
ñityartham samyojyante 'bhidhāyakāh). The valuation of kalpanā according to Dhar-
mākīrtī can obviously not be shared by Utp. (cf. SSVr p. 5).

28 In ĪPVV I p. 206 it is debated whether the two terms of the simile are on the same plane. In fact, from the previous arguments, in the case of jñātrtva, jñāna is acknowledged and only the existence of a subject is denied (and should the lat­
ter exist, the possibility of a relation between the two is denied), whereas in the case of kartrtva even kriyā itself is denied. It is replied that the example tends to show their equality as regards being kalpita; and it is added that also jñāna is essentially kriyā – because of the verbal root it contains – and that therefore the confutation of kriyā also implies the confutation of that particular kriyā that is jñāna, which places them on the same plane.
CHAPTER III

1. Agreed. However, that form of cognition which is memory, though arising from the latent impression deposited by the former direct perception, is restricted to itself (ātmanistham) and does not know the original perception.

- Memory, though arising from the reawakening of the latent impression deposited by the former perception, because it is restricted to itself exclusively knows only its own form. It cannot be claimed that memory determines the object formerly perceived, since it [memory] does not penetrate the former direct perception. – 1 –

2. A cognition is self-revealing (svābhāsaiva) and cannot be the object of another cognition, just as the cognition of taste is not known by that of shape. The fact that [memory] arises from latent impressions implies its similarity to the former perception, but not its cognition of that (tadgati).

1 The author shows that he partly shares the view that the pūrvapakṣin puts forward regarding memory in the previous āhnika, especially with respect to the importance of the function of the samskāras. He departs from this view, however, when he examines their role, taking into account the impossibility (also recognized by the Buddhists) of one cognition becoming the object of another.

2 Every cognition – and memory is a form of cognition – is svasamvedana and it is in this sense that the expression ātmanistham, which generally refers to insentient realities (jada), must be understood. It is ‘confined, restricted to itself’ in the sense that it is only aware of itself and not of other cognitions (cf. ĪPVV I pp. 210-11).

3 The expression svābhāsa (cf. below p. 161 n. 2, p. 162 n. 4) may be interpreted in various ways and my translation of it has been left deliberately vague. The vṛtti understands it as svasamvedanaikarūpa. Abh. glosses it in the ĪPV in two different ways (abhāsah prakāśamānātā sā svam rūpam avyabhicāri yasyāh; svasya ca abhāsanam rūpam yasyāh, which coincides with the vṛtti); in the ĪPVV he even gives four different interpretations.

4 The samskāra of the former perception is reawakened by a present perception – similar to the other – which gives rise to the memory. The samskāra, therefore, ensures this ‘similarity’ in the memory, but the memory itself has no direct access.
Every cognitive act is by nature only aware of itself (sva-
samvedanaikarūpa) and does not become the object of another cognition: if the cognition of shape could grasp the cognition of taste and vice versa, then the one would perceive the object of the other and in this way every restriction on the activity of the individual senses would cease to exist. Since memory arises from the latent impression left by the former perception it only bears a similarity to that perception but does not have direct cognition of the latter; and, moreover, as there is no cognition of this former perception (tadabhāvāt) not even the similarity to it can be maintained. — 2 —

3. [Some might object that] memory appears erroneously (bhrāntyā) as having as its object something directly perceived (dṛṣṭālambanātā), being reduced, instead, to the only determinative activity directed at them (tadavasāyatah), despite the fact that they have never directly entered its cognitive sphere (atadviṣayatve 'pi). But this objection, too, is inconsistent.

— And it cannot even be claimed that memory has these as its object only erroneously, in the sense that it makes the object of its own determinative activity (adhyavasyati) the former direct perception and its object, which in reality are not experienced, as happens when one states that one sees silver when faced with mother-of-pearl. — 3 —

4. How is it possible to reduce the true nature of memory to this? (smṛṭītāiva katham tāvad). And how is it possible that the establishment to (cannot 'know') the former perception and therefore nor can it, strictly speaking, establish the similarity between the latter and the present perception which has reawakened the samskāra. This, as will be shown later, is an operation that presupposes the I. As one can gather from the vṛtti, and as Abh. (ĪPVV I p. 214) explains, tad in tadgatih has two different meanings, the first of which refers to anubhava and the second to sāḍṛṣya: the first is to be considered the cause of the second: ‘na tadgatih’ ity atra dvāv arthau tacchabdena anubhavasya sāḍṛṣyasya ca parāmarśāt / tatra prathamārtho dvīfiyasmin hetutvena mantavyah. ĪPV I pp. 129–30 defines the question with great clarity (and in this the Sanskrit language is an unrivalled instrument): samskārāt param saviṣayatāmātram smṛteḥ Siddham. natu anubhavaviṣayatvam, nāpy asya viṣayasya pūrvānubhavaviṣayākṛtavat iti niścaya esaḥ.

5 This is once again a Buddhist speaking.
6 The former perception and its object.
7 As ĪPVV I p. 236 (cf. text note 130) explains na negates the whole sentence.
8 The author states the reasons that induced him to consider (in the last pāda of the previous kārikā) the opposing thesis untenable.
of objects (arthasthitih) should come about thanks to error? And, if such is the case, what sense is there in claiming dependence on the latent impressions left by the former direct perception?

- Memory cannot be identified with something that derives only from determinative knowledge (adhyavasāyamatrāt), the object of the former perception being absent (tadviṣayasampramoṣe) because it [the former perception] is not made manifest [in the memory, according to your conception]. Neither can the definite establishment of an object formerly perceived be taken to be due to error. And moreover, [if it is a question of ‘error’] why insist so much on the fact that memory — conceived of as error — arises from the latent impressions, when, on the contrary, it is different from the former direct perception from every point of view (tadbhin-nayogaksemāyāḥ), not coming into contact with it in any way? — 4 —

5. If the determinative knowledge (avasāyasya) is error, how can it then, being insentient, establish objects? If, on the contrary, it is

9 The essential core of memory is the former perception recalled to mind. There is therefore no new cognition and it is only a new cognition that can be imputed for error (cf. ĪPV I p. 239 and text note 136). The vṛtti and, as can be gathered from the ĪPV, also the fikā, leave no doubt as to the meaning that Utp. attributes to the second pāda of the kārikā (bhrānte cārthasthitih katham). It must be pointed out, however, that the interpretation of the ĪPV (I p. 132) is completely different. It essentially says that obviously no establishment of the nature of the object can derive from error, since the former is not manifest in error (if one understands error, as the opponent does, as asat or atmakhyāti), and that on the contrary everyone can see that the organization and functioning of the world of experience depend on memory. Therefore memory cannot be an illusion. This interpretation of the kārikā (misunderstood in Bh.’s commentary) is, in fact, what everyone would give on a first reading, and it anticipates the argumentation that Utp. actually presents further on.

10 In the expression yogakṣema (according to ĪPV I p. 240) yoga (which has the general meaning of the attainment of something not formerly possessed) stands for the object’s own nature characterized by light-knowledge (prakāśa), and kṣema (the preservation of what has been attained) refers to the part-object. Thus these features differentiate smṛti-bhrānti from anuḥhava, since in the former there is no new cognition (I read anopūrvavat instead of apūrvavat) and the object is not really present.

11 The argumentation of this verse presupposes the opponent’s objection, clarified in ĪPV I p. 133: the determination (adhyavasāya) of the former direct perception and its object, which is brought about by memory, establishes a partial similarity of the latter to the perception; and for this one needs to resort to the samskāras. The discourse, therefore, turns to the nature of this adhyavasāya (and
13.5 conceived of as being sentient, how can it, restricted as it is to itself and to its own ideation (nijollekhaniśṭhāt), establish objective reality?

- It is the determinative knowledge (adhyavasāyah) alone that - erroneously - establishes objects, and not its self-awareness\(^\text{12}\) (svasamvīt). If such is the case, it is sentient and - being insentient - how can it cause the establishment of objects? Thus, even if one were to acknowledge it was insentient, [this should be understood in a limited way, that is, in the sense that] it would only be able to make manifest objects pertaining to the past, or illuminate only non-external objects - itself and its own ideation (abāhyasvātmollekhamātraprakāsah) – and, therefore, it could not equally be accepted as the cause of that establishment of objects we are dealing with\(^\text{13}\).

6. Thus, the functioning of the human world – which stems precisely from the unification (anusamdhāna\(^\text{9}\)) of cognitions, in themselves separate from one another and incapable of knowing one another – would be destroyed...

this is what the present kārikā is about) and as ĪPVV I p. 243 underlines (a-dhyavasāyamātṛasya rūpam dūsitam, taddvārena tu smṛtyadhyavasāyasyeti) through the confutation of this conception of the adhyavasāya in general, the form in which it operates in the ambit of memory is also confuted. If the object is illuminated by it, then one cannot define it error; if it is not illuminated, then this means that memory does not have access to the object and therefore it does not make sense to speak of 'similarity'.

\(^\text{12}\) The adhyavasāya is on the one hand insentient (as regards its actual not coming into contact with the object, its being bhrānti), and on the other sentient as regards its self-awareness. But only the first aspect is significant in this case.

\(^\text{13}\) This point is made clear in a passage from the ĪPVV (I p. 243), which due to its importance and clarity I have quoted in full (see text note 141). The adhyavasāya is insentient insofar as it does not illuminate the object it aims at determining. If it does not illuminate the external object (otherwise it would be no different from direct experience) and neither can it be said that it does not illuminate at all (otherwise it would simply be jada), nonetheless, it is acknowledged that at least it illuminates itself and its own ideation. But even this is not sufficient for it to cause the determination of external objects, because precisely as regards the latter (and it is this that counts here) it is insentient. All this criticism of the adhyavasāya aims at reducing its significance in the phenomenon of memory, with the ultimate purpose of making way for the admission of another principle that may consistently explain the point. i.e. the self, as we shall see later.
— Cognitions are restricted to themselves only (svātmamātraparini-13.6
ṣīhitāni) and cannot be the object of other cognitions (aparasamvedyāni)
being by nature [exclusively] conscious of themselves. But then how
would the dimension of human activity and behaviour (lokavyavahārah)
— culminating in the teaching of the absolute reality — be possible, since
this consists precisely in the interconnection between the objects of
knowledge? (anyonyavisayasamghattanāmayah)14. — 6 —

7. ...15 if there were no Maheśvara who contains within himself all
the infinite forms, who is one, whose essence is consciousness, possess-
ing the powers of knowledge, memory and exclusion16.

— The mutual unification of all cognitions of things is [constituted
by] the consciousness principle (cittattvam) whose form is all, since noth-
ing distinct from it is admissible. The powers of knowledge etc. only per-
tain to this consciousness principle. It has been said17: «From me derive
memory, knowledge, exclusion». — 7 —

15 It continues from the preceding kārikā.
16 Cf. ĪPVV I p. 276. The implication of the opponents’ theses is recognized as
untenable (naśyej janasthitih) and it is this untenability that leads to the confirma-
tion of what they sought to deny (prasaṅgaviparyaya), i.e. the Self as the subject of
knowledge and action, unifier and coordinator of the discontinuity of reality. Con-
sciousness is the unification of cognitions both in the sense of ‘becoming one’
(ekībhavana) and of ‘making one’ (ekikarana), 'merging together' (miśrikarana). In
the vṛtti anusamdhāna and cittattvam are in a relation of sāmānādhikaranya since
action and the subject of the action are in reality the same (yuktam eva abhedena
17 Bhagavadgītā XV, 15.
1. The Free One (svairî), the perceiver of the object formerly perceived, continuing also to exist later, has the reflective awareness: ‘that’. This is what is called ‘remembering’.

- The light-perception of the object formerly perceived is not extinguished [at the moment of memory], since he [the knowing subject, the Lord] also continues to exist later as the perceiver of the object formerly perceived. Having here (atra) a reflective awareness of an object in terms of ‘that’ - as formerly perceived - on the part of he who is one, the Lord (vibhuh), agent, is the function called ‘memory’.

2. [He who remembers] must necessarily, having a reflective awareness of (āmrśan) the particular entity (svalaksana) formerly made manifest, make it manifest at the actual moment of the memory

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1 Cf. the classical definition of memory in Yogasūtra I. 11 anubhūtaviśayāsamspramoshah smṛthih.

2 I.e. in the present limited condition, at least according to Abh.’s interpretation which is, in turn, based on the fikā. The subject of memory is thus Śiva himself as had already been suggested in the previous kārikā. This is underlined in ĪPVV II p. 11 sūtravrtyor bhaqavataḥ smārttyavam uttam, tadanūśārāṇa fikyām api and p. 13, where it is excluded that vibhu may be simply taken to mean ‘pervader’, vividhaṃ krtvā bhavatītii vibhūtavam, na tu iha vyāpakatvavam... The phenomenon of memory, though having as its ultimate subject Śiva, the Supreme Consciousness, must necessarily occur on the individual plane, otherwise it would not make sense to speak of a before and after of a perceived object, etc... And this is what the vr̥tti refers to with atra, which is glossed in ĪPVV (see text note 157) «... function of the Lord contracted in the breath of life, the eightfold body, the physical body etc.» and at greater length ibid, p. 11, where the expression samāropitasvātantra, which glos­ses atra in the fikā, is cited and explained.

3 The object of memory is the svalaksana, or the individual entity in space and time. In memory, in fact, there is necessarily an association with a former time and place, otherwise there would be no memory but a general vikalpa (cf. ĪPVV II p. 19 smṛtau hi prāgdeśakālayayo 'vasyam sphurati / anyathā vikalpamātram tat bhavet).

4 Without prakāśa, in fact, there would be no parāmarśa, but - as ĪPVV II p. 18 remarks - the latter should also immediately follow prakāśa, being inseparable
either as a single manifestation 'jar' or as the totality of its components (akhilatmanā).

Thanks to the power of memory (smṛtiṣaktyā) the subject, when having a reflective awareness (parāmrṣan) as 'that' of the particular entity formerly perceived, must make it manifest [in the present] (ābhāsayaty eva), for there could be no reflective awareness of an object made manifest [only in the past] (prakāśitasya); and this manifestation occurs at the very moment of the act of remembering (svasattākāla eva). Therefore it is not erroneous to state that there is the manifestation, at the moment of the memory, of an object, which, however, is no longer present at that moment. At certain times the object appears in the form of a single manifestation, i.e. limited to one of the many manifestations that constitute it, such as — in the case of a jar — 'jar', 'golden', 'individual substance', 'existence' etc., depending on the subject's intentions. In these cases its manifestation in memory is distinct and vivid (sphuta). At
other times, on the contrary (anyadā tu), the object appears in its totality, since this is the subject’s intention: its manifestation is equally distinct and vivid (tathaiva), as in the previous case. And finally, the subject whose mind is intensely concentrated without interruption even directly visualizes the object formerly perceived (drṣṭārtha°).— 2 –

3. It would not be possible to speak of the manifestation of the object being remembered if it appeared as separate from the memory;

just been said. Moreover, the fikā adds, the sāmānyā even when taken singly may be sphuta (compared to others), when it implicitly contains other broader and more generic sāmānyās (e.g. the sāmānyā of the dhava tree, compared to the sāmānyā of tree in general). See Torella 1988: 168-70. The concept of a hierarchy of sāmānyās as regards their extension probably stems from Vaiśeṣika and grammatical speculation.

10 In IPV I p. 160 the degree of sphutatva in this case (where there is a combination of different ābhāsas) is considered greater than the former: i.e. it is ati-sphuta.

11 It is the case that ibid. p. 160 is defined atyanatasphuta. IPV II p. 29, following the fikā, considers it implicit in the expression akhilātmanā in the kārikā, that would therefore be understood as referring in the broad sense to a multiplicity of ābhāsas (bahvābhāsopalakṣanam) and with a further differentiation within it (samagratva and asamagratva). Thus the object would appear in the memory as a combination of many ābhāsas: when the latter do not cover the whole (asamagratva) of the object this is the intermediate level (introduced in the vṛtī by anyadā tu); when, on the other hand, the object is recalled in the totality of its aspects, the memory is so vivid that it closely borders on the direct perception from which it differs only in the fact that its object is a thing ‘already’ seen. The expression drṣṭārtha distinguishes this from other forms in which the object visualized had not been previously seen but experienced in various ways through the revelation of the scriptures, as in the case of the visualization of deities etc.

12 In other words, if the object appeared as external to and distinct from the memory (IPV I p. 163 bhinnatvena bahītrūpatayā), then the requirements for direct perception and not for memory would exist. The object is present in the memory only through the manifestation of the former perception, but it is only in it, i.e. in the past (tadā), that the object bahīr avabhāsate. What is manifested in the present is only the reflective awareness (vimarsana). See Abh.’s lucid formulation of the question in IPV, which may serve as a general definition of memory according to the Pratyabhijñā: pūrvadṛṣṭataiva savimarsā sati idānīntanavimarsaḥbhūmipatitā sa iti vimarsa ucyate (II p. 30). This stanza actually shows how the apparent inconsistency between a (present) vimarsa and a (past) anubhava is only resolved by the 1 which ensures the possibility of unifying the various cognitions occurring at different times. A further clarification is provided by IPV II p. 32. The prakāsa concerning the part-object (arthāmsē) in the former perception belongs to the past; but the prakāsa as grasped by the vimarsa, concerning the part-self (svātmamsē), is not
therefore the unity of cognitions that occur at different times is necessary, and this unity is precisely the knowing subject.  

- And the object formerly perceived, manifesting itself together with the perception in the present 'light' of the memory (tātkālikasmrtriprakāše) (directed at that past time), is necessarily not separate from the memory, since that which is separate from the light cannot shine. There is therefore a unity of the distinct cognitions such as direct perception, memory etc. and this unity is constituted by the self, the knowing subject. To elaborate: - 3 -

4. In fact, in memory the former perception is not manifested separately – like the object – since it appears as resting on the self, as the expression 'I perceived in the past' indicates.

- In memory the former perception – unlike what happens to the perceived object that is remembered – is not manifested as separate (differentiated), since it is the self itself that is manifested – the object of the notion 'I' – whose essence is informed by this perception. And it is precisely that reality present at many different times, known as ‘I’, that is the self.

limited by time (kālānavacchinna eva). Thus the vimarśa in the memory can connect itself with the vimarśa in the perception and, through it, with the former light of the object – in this way meeting both requirements, that is, taking place in the present and not being divorced from prakāśa (tunnāntiyyāvāmarśasahitah punar vimarśas tu idaṁniṁtaṁ).

13 In the perception the object appeared - due to the power of māyā - as if it were separate, external to consciousness. This may not happen in the memory for otherwise it would not be memory (İPVV II p. 34 smaranātāiva na bhavet); in fact, the light of memory embraces, so-to-speak, the object much more strongly (ibid. artham atitamāṁ krodikaroti). However, this is true only to a certain extent: the assumption of externality - in the form of residual traces, as a shadow (ibid. chāyāmātrena) - continues to exist (p. 32 prthagbhāvaprakāśāsbhimāno 'nuvarata), remaining in the object remembered in the background. In underlining this, Utp. also implicitly draws a sharp distinction between the 'external' thing, on the one hand, and perception, on the other: unlike the thing, the latter can never be objectified (see next kārikā). Thus those who think they can do without the I as the unifier of different cognitions, by claiming that memory has access to its object simply by embodying (i.e. objectifying) the former perception of it, are mistaken. In İPV I p. 167 Abh. gives an interpretation of the example concerning the status of the object (arthavat in the kārikā) both as sādharmya⁰ and vaidharmyadrśtānta ; neither of them reflects the interpretation found in the vṛtti.
5. The cognitions [of others] are not manifested [as an object] even in that particular cognition belonging to the yogins. The only means of knowing them is self-awareness. What has just been stated also applies if they are acknowledged as an object of cognition (meyapade 'pi vā).

- For the omniscients, too, the cognitions belonging to other subjects — which can be known only through self-awareness\(^\text{14}\) — must always be manifested as resting on their own self (svātmārūḍhā eva); and, therefore, what in reality occurs (tattvam) is the identification on the part of the yogins with the self of others\(^\text{15}\) (parātmataḥpattā eva). Should one attribute [to the cognitions of others] the nature of cognizable object (prameyakaksyāyām api) such as the jar etc., they would have to be manifested each in its own form of pure awareness (suddhabodhātmanā rūpena), whereas that is impossible\(^\text{16}\). — 5 —

\(^{14}\) I.e. that introspective awareness that one has of every cognition or that every cognition has of itself. This position had also been accepted by Bhartrhari; see the last four verses of the Jātisamuddeśa, in particular v. 106 yathā jyotiḥ prakāśena nānyenaḥbhiprākāśyate / jñānākāras tathānyena na jñānenopaprākhyate (Abh. quotes this verse in another section of the ÍPVV giving a slightly different reading of the second hemistich: jñānarūpaṁ tathā jñāne nānayatrābhiprākāśyate) ‘Just as light is not illuminated by another light, in the same way, the form of cognition is not determined by another cognition’ (transl. Iyer 1971: 62) and v. 110 yato viṣayarūpena jñānarūpaṁ na grhyate / arthārūpavivikṣaṁ ca svarūpaṁ nāvahṛāryate // ‘As the form of the knowledge is not cognized as an object, its form as distinct from that of the object is not grasped’ (transl. Iyer 1971: 63). See also Helarāja’s lucid commentary. For a penetrating analysis of the various theories about ‘knowledge of knowledge’ I refer to Matilal 1986:141-179.

\(^{15}\) This is the most obvious meaning of the text of the vṛtti. According to Abh.’s interpretation (ÍPVV II p. 47, see text note 189), who in turn takes this from the tīkā, tattvam is ‘the being such of the omniscient’ (mentioned at the beginning of the vṛtti), meaning the condition of subject identified with the Supreme I (parātmavedakatvam); thus the meaning of the sentence would be the following: ‘the condition of subject identified with the Supreme I, pertaining to these yogins, means in point of fact the attainment of identification with the self of others.’ On the yogin’s cognition of other minds see Dharmakīrti’s Santānāntarasiddhi vv. 89-93 (Stcherbatsky 1969: 89-92, Kitagawa 1955: 108-10).

\(^{16}\) The nature of every cognition is in the final analysis suddhabodha and it should appear in this form to the yogin’s cognition: but precisely this is impossible, because descending to the condition of veda necessarily entails the flawing of sūd-dhatva (see ÍPVV II p. 52 vasvin vasvin darsāne yādṛṣaṁ bodhasya sūddham rūpam, ... na tādṛṣaṁ niruparāgam vedaṭāṁ parucitajñāne ‘bhveti; cf. also ÍPV 1 p. 183). A similar remark is made by Helarāja, commenting on VP III.1.109: cf.
6. The memory expressed as ‘thus that cognition occurred in me’ is none other than an analysis (vyākaraṇam) in terms of differentiation of the memory expressed as ‘[that thing] was seen by me’.

– The memory presented as ‘thus that perception occurred in me’, in which the cognition is mentioned separately, is nothing more than the analytic exposition of the memory understood as ‘[that thing] was seen by me’, which is characterized precisely by having a reflective awareness of the visual perception as residing in the knowing subject. – 6 –

7. Determinate cognition (avasā) too, in the form of ‘I see this’ or ‘this is a jar’ regards (manyate) the visual perception as being indissolubly inherent in the subject of the determinate cognition (avasātari).

– Also in the determinate cognition of the object in front of one – whether it appears in the form ‘I see this jar’ or ‘this is a jar’ – the visual...

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Prakṛnacakrakāsa I pp. 103-4 ghaṭajñānam iti tu jñānam na jñānarūpānupāti, yato ghaṭajñānagatam, visāyam nirūpya jñānarūpaṃ kimapi tad ity etāvad yadi param nirūpayitum saknoti, na tu sā tadīyā bodharūpātā tasya pratibhāsate parasamvedana iva «But the cognition ‘[This is] the cognition of a jar’ does not come after the form of the cognition ‘[This is a jar]’, for, having brought to the intellect the object in the cognition of the jar, it can at the most bring to the intellect ‘that is some form of cognition’; the awareness character [bodharūpātā] of that [cognition, namely ‘This is a jar’] is not reflected in it as in the case of somebody else’s cognition.» (transl. Aklujkar 1970: 179).

17 This kārikā aims at confuting anyone who might still wish to claim, in presenting the memory as ‘I remember having had this perception’, that the perception appears as the object in the memory (cf. IPV I p. 177).

18 Abh. (IPV. I p. 182) also points out a different interpretation of the kārikā, supported by ‘others’ (anye tu), but he keeps to that of the vṛtti.

19 This kārikā is in reply to the hypothetical objector who might seek to invalidate the principle of the non-objectifiability of cognition (applied here to memory in order to show the need for the I as the fundamental reality), by claiming that the determinate cognition (adhyavasāya, vikalpa) that follows the undifferentiated perception (nirvikalpa) knows the latter as object (cf. IPV I p. 186, IPVV II p. 54). It must be remembered that the adhyavasāya plays an essential role in memory, because memory is not linked directly to the anubhava itself, but to the anubhava as filtered and determined by the adhyavasāya; indeed there is no memory of an anubhava not followed by adhyavasāya (IPVV II p. 54 avikalpīte smaranaśambhavaḥ). The criticism levelled at the adhyavasāya therefore constitutes both an analogical and a direct criticism of memory.
14.7 perception one becomes aware of \textit{(pratyavamṛṣyate)} has the knowing subject as its constitutive reality\textsuperscript{20}. - 7 -

8. \textit{Therefore, when there is the reflective awareness 'that is seen by me, that was seen by me', 'this', 'that', the two elements though divided into perceiving subject and perceived object are manifested within the [true] cognizer (pramātari).}

- Therefore in memory or in generic mental elaboration (\textit{vikalpamātre})\textsuperscript{21} – which both presuppose the reflective awareness of a former perception – only the 'object' part in the form of 'this' or 'that' may be expressly mentioned, even without being intermixed with the word 'perception' \textit{(drksabhānuvedham vināpi)}. Nonetheless, in all cases, the perceiving subject and the perceived object, though\textsuperscript{22} they appear to be separate due to the influence of māyā, are manifested as absorbed within the one cognizer. – 8 –

\textsuperscript{20} The 'I' that is the subject of the determinate cognition is that same 'I' that constitutes the centre of the anubhava, even if the latter may be such that the I does not appear in it ('this is a jar' as opposed to 'I see this jar'). But the absence of the I is only apparent and does not concern the anubhava in itself but a particular aspect of the following \textit{adhyavasāya}, which, depending on the circumstances, may stress the objective (i.e. when one is intent on bringing about some practical activity connected with it) or the subjective element (cf. IPV I pp. 187-8).

\textsuperscript{21} I.e. in the determinate cognition \textit{(adhyavasāya)} that follows the direct perception. In the construction I have followed Abh.'s indications (see text note 202).

\textsuperscript{22} Utp., unlike Abh. (see text note 207), assigns \textit{api} a different place from the one it occupies in the \textit{kārikā}. The separateness of the perceiver and the perceived - Abh. says (IPVV II p. 58) developing Utp.'s remark in the \textit{fikā} - is only apparent as the very use of the dual form shows. On the basis of the \textit{sahavivaksā} principle, in \textit{grāhyagṛhakarabhinnāv arthau} each term refers both to itself and the other; they are interdependent \textit{(anyonyāpeksau)}. For the analysis of a similar use of this grammatical argument see Torella 1987:154-157.
CHAPTER V

1. The objects that are manifested in the present can be manifested as external only if they reside within.

- Even in direct perception\(^1\), however\(^2\), the manifestation of objects as separate\(^3\) is admissible only if they are absorbed in the cognizer (pramātrantarlinānām)\(^4\). – 1–

2. If it were not essentially light, the object would remain non-light as before\(^5\); and the light is not differentiated [from the object]: being light constitutes the very essence of the object.

\(^1\) In this the manifestation of the object is present, unlike in memory etc., in which the direct presence of the object has vanished.

\(^2\) The reference is to an implicit objection to which this kārikā is intended as a reply (cf. IPV I p. 195, IPVV II pp. 67-8). If it has been said that in direct perception the object appears as external, differentiated from the knowing subject, and that in memory (and also in vikalpa etc.) it appears in union with it, how is it possible to claim the dependence of the latter on the former? Indeed, this kārikā establishes the sense in which the ‘externality’ of the object in direct perception is to be understood.

\(^3\) Separate from the māyic cognizer, identified with the mind, the body etc.

\(^4\) The only true cognizer in the absolute sense (paramārthapuramātr, IPV I p. 197), i.e. the Supreme Consciousness.

\(^5\) An object that is external to consciousness does not exist at all, since it would be jāda and what is jāda cannot shine in knowledge; cf. SD IV.29-31, V.12 etc. This principle, which often recurs in Vijnānavāda texts, has a lucid and synthetical formulation in a verse of Prajñākaraṇagupta’s Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (quoted in TBh p. 35) yadi samvedyate nilam katham bāhyam tad ucyate / na cet samvedyate nilam katham bāhyam tad ucyate «If blue is perceived, then how can it be called ‘external’? And, if it is not perceived, how can it be called ‘external’?»; see also TS 1998 ff., etc. Furthermore, the Vijnānavādin says, blue and cognition of blue are never perceived separately (saḥopalambha); therefore, they are non-different. Cf. the well-known passage from the PVin (I.55ab; Steinkellner 1972: 206) saḥopalambhāniyamād abheda nilatadhiyoh, also quoted by Abh. (IPVV II p. 78). For a comprehensive treatment of the inference based on saḥopalambhāniyamā, see Iwata 1991. Among the many examples in monistic śaiva texts cf. the verse from the lost Ucchusmabhairava (cit. ŚSV p. 4) yāvan na vedākā ete tāvad vedyāḥ kathāṃ priye
If it did not have light, i.e. the cognizer, as its own nature, the jar, just as it was not manifest [to the cognizer] at first, would continue not to be so even at the moment of cognition. What constitutes the object’s being manifest (prakāśamānatā) is light insofar as it is its own form (svarūpabhūtāh) and not a separate reality. – 2 –

3. If light were undifferentiated [in itself] and differentiated [from objects], then objective reality would be confused. The object that is illuminated must itself be light; that which is not light cannot be established.

Light, conceived as absolutely undifferentiated [as regards itself] (prakāśamātram) and as differentiated from the object would be common to all objects. In this case the delimitation of objects (‘this is the light-cognition of a jar; this other, of a piece of material’) would have no plausible grounds. Therefore, the establishment (siddhiḥ) of the object depends on its essence being light (prakāśātmātāyattā).

4. [Objection] Since consciousness-light (bodhasyā) being undifferentiated cannot be the cause of a multiform manifestation, all this

I vedakam vedyam ekam tu tatvam nāasty aśucis tataḥ // See also SPṛ I.12 tvādātmakatvam bhāvānāṃ vivadanti na kecana i yat prakāśyadaśāyāto nāprakāśah prakāśate //; etc.

In formulating the Śaiva position, Utp. is implicitly critical particularly of the Buddhist and Kumārila theses. According to the Buddhists (kṣaṇīka-vādān) the manifestation (perception) of the object is understood as a ‘luminous’ moment produced in a chain of moments, e.g. of a jar – a luminous moment determined by a concurrence of causes, such as the operation of the sense of sight, light etc. For Kumārila, on the contrary, an added quality, ‘being manifest’ (prakatātā) occurs in the object, from whose presence a former cognitive act is inferred. In both cases the light is not separate – as Utp. also maintains – but it is found, so to speak, completely resolved within the object (ĪPVV II p. 69 arthaśārīramagnah) and one is unable to understand how a thing can be cognized only by some and not by others. According to Utp. there is an illumination of the thing (whose essence is light) by the light of the subject.

Cf. text note 216.

I.e. it would illuminate all objects indiscriminately.

The preceding argumentations may lead to a Vijnānavādin-like conception. In order to undermine this, Utp. temporarily opposes it with the Sautrāntika criticism (which he agrees with up to a point, at least with the motives for it) and in this context presents their doctrine known, at least in later sources, as anumeyabāhyārtha-
various manifestation lacking in an apparent cause (āksamika°) leads to the inference of an external object [as its only possible cause].

-- The establishment of the being of insentient realities is merely their becoming manifest (ābhāsamānataiva), and this is precisely having manifestation as their essence (ābhāsātmataiva). Their true reality, therefore, lies in the one pure consciousness. The gradually changing manifestation of objects which occurs though there is no diversity in the latter induces one to hypothesize an external object, different from consciousness (tato 'nyam), not shining (aprakāśamānami), as the cause. This reasoning is analogous to that which establishes the existence of the senses10. -- 4 --

5. Not even a varied reawakening of the karmic residual traces can be taken to be the cause [of the multiform manifestations], for in that

vāda (Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha V.2ab sautrāntikamate nityo [°am?] bāhyārthas tv anumīyate, 7ab viṣayatvam hi hetutvam jñānākārārpanakṣami; TBh p. 36 artheyav svarūpena nāsti vedanam 'bhāktam syād arthavedanam' iti vacanāt; SDS p. 94 anumeyam satyam ity āsthiyam viṣheyam anumeyam iti). The bāhyārthānumeyavāda as upheld by Badhanta Śubhagupta is mentioned and criticised in TS vv. 2050-55. If consciousness is abhinna, as the Viṣṇānavādins claim, and no other cause can convincingly explain the emergence from it of the various differentiated images that constitute phenomenal reality, all that remains is to hypothesize the existence of external objects as the source (bimba) of the reflection (pratibimba) present in consciousness. The existence of the external object is strictly speaking only inferable (nityānumeyah; on the proof by the method of vyatireka see TBh p. 35), not directly perceivable, as it is in Vaibhāṣika conception: in cognition only dīkaras figure. Moksākaragupta summarizes the various positions as regards the reality of external object as follows (TBh p. 36): ye 'pi tadārambhakāh paramānavo vaiśesikānām, sāksādadyakṣagocarā vaiḥāṣṭikānām darśane, svākārasamarpanapraṇavānāh sautrāntikānām mate, te 'pi yogācārānām darśane na sambhavanti; see also SDS p. 35 te ca mādhyaṃika-yogācāra-saurāntika-vaibhāṣikāṃ tiṣyābhāj prasiddhā bauddhāḥ yathākramam sarvaśūnyatvabāhyārthaśūnyatvabāhyārthānumeyatvabāhyārthapratyakṣatvatvāvādān ātiṣṭhante. (In Saurāntika epistemology this is to be understood in the sense that the thing, the absolute particular that is the object and cause of the direct perception, is (imperfectly) cognizable only through the filtered image of discursive thought – anumāna in the broadest sense – if, on the one hand, there is absolute otherness between the thing and its mental image – which is sāmānya in nature – there is, nonetheless, an undeniable coordination, too: the one is the cause of the other). Saurāntika criticism does not succeed in undermining the Viṣṇānavādin position, but serves to show the need for a more coherent and comprehensive conception, which is represented precisely by the definitive conclusion (siddhānta) of the Śaiva doctrine.

10 Indeed we do not perceive the senses directly but we infer their existence from the experience of cognition, which only occurs through them (cf. below 1.5.8.).
15.5 A new question would arise: what is the cause of the variety of such a reawakening?

- The varied reawakening of the karmic residual traces does not occur outside consciousness; also what might be the cause of this reawakening is not seen. Consequently the cause of differentiated manifestations cannot be anything but the external object. 

6. That may be (syād etad). [But] seeing that ordinary worldly activity can be accomplished on the basis of such ‘manifestations’ alone, what sense is there in wanting to resort to an external reality other than consciousness, which is not supported by reason?

- Ordinary human activity takes place through objects precisely insofar as they are manifested (ābhāsamānair evārthaih). So what harm could there be in considering them essentially ‘manifestations’ (ābhāsa) and nothing more? In which case there is no longer any need to resort to an external object, since they alone are sufficient to ensure the complete functioning of practical reality (tāvatā lokāyatrāsamaṭe). Furthermore, the external object is contradicted by the criteria of right

11 The argumentation of those who claim the existence of external objects continues with the reply to the expected Vijnānavādin objection. A detailed account of the arguments set forth by the two opponents (Vijnānavādin’s vāsanāvaicitrya and Sautrāntika’s prayayavaicitrya) is to be found in SDS pp. 80-84; Vācaspatimiśra also refers to them in the Bhāmaṭī and Tātāryadipikā (La Vallée Poussin 1901: 190, n. 114). At this point the author takes up the discussion in the first person (but the same thesis with the same arguments might also be put forward by a Vijnānavādin), after having voiced the opposing theses of the bāhyārthavādins. Abh. sees two possible interpretations of the expression syād etad: the partial acknowledgement of the opposing theses and then the exposition of his own, introduced by a kimtu that is to be understood; or the simple addition to the adversary’s thesis of another even more convincing one, his own (the vr̥tti gives the latter interpretation). But, as can be seen, the general meaning remains the same.

12 It is understood by this that the external objects themselves ‘inferred’ precisely as such – i.e. illuminated, brought to consciousness through inference – are inseparable from the light of consciousness which is their essence; for if they were outside it, there would be no knowledge of them (cf. I. 5. 9.). This implication is taken up and developed by Abh. (IPV I, p. 222).

13 After the fundamental negative reason given in the previous lines, additional reasons (abhyuccayabādhaka) are put forward. Utp.’s remarks are the same as those a Vijnānavādin might make; cf. Viṃśatikā 11-15 and vr̥tti, Sthiramati’s bhāṣya on
cognition (*pramāṇabādhitaḥ*): this is so if it is considered as having parts, since this would result in attributing it contrasting qualities etc.; if it is considered as devoid of parts it is still contradicted in various ways (*bahuśah*), because it is simultaneously in contact with the six directions of space, etc.\(^{15}\) – 6 –

Trimśikā I, Ālambanapariksā 1-5 etc. Particularly exemplary is the argumentation in Vimsatikā, often taken up again by later authors (cf. Mokṣākaragupta's TBh, SDS etc.; see also Lévi 1932: p. 52 note 2) and, implicitly, also referred to by Utp. Vimsatikā 11 reads: *na tad ekam na cāṇekam viśayah paramāṇusāḥ / na ca te samhata yaśmāḥ paramāṇur na sidhyati* // «The object is not one; it is not multiple composed of many atoms; and it does not even consist in these atoms agglomerated, since the atom is not established.» The first thesis belongs to the Vaiśeṣikas who consider the object an individual substance (*dravya*), a totality (*avayavin*) formed by a complex of parts. The Buddhist tradition is unanimous in rejecting the *avayavin* as a mere mental costruct (see Milindapaṇīha pp.26-28 (PTS Ed.), Samyuttanikāya I p.135 (PTS Ed.), TS 555-620 and Pañjikā, Pandita Asoka’s Avayavinirākaraṇa etc.). The second thesis may also be ascribed to the Vaiśeṣikas who consider the atoms, imperceptible if taken singly, as being the parts that constitute the *avayavin* (cf. TBh p. 36 ye *pi tadārambhakāḥ paramāṇavo vaiśeṣi-\(^{15}\)kānām ...). The third thesis is upheld by the Vaibhāsikas (see, for example, AK I.35d *saṅcitā daśa rūpinoḥ - Bhāṣya: pañcendriyadhātavah, pañcaviśayāḥ saṅcitāḥ para-\(^{15}\)māṇusanghātavāt*) and, in a modified form, by the Sautrāntikas; the Sautrāntika criticism of the Vaibhāsika conception is expressed in various places in the AKBh. The Vijnānavadā rejects the theory of the agglomeration of atoms, however formulated (*saṅcaya, saṅghāta, samudāya etc.); see bhāṣya on Trimśikā 1, Vimsatikā 12-15 and vrtti, Madhyāntavidhāgārika p.21 (Scherbatsky 1936\(^{2}\): 93-95). One of the Abhidharma passages which lends support to this thesis is *saṅcitālambanāh pañca vijnānakāyāḥ*. This is also quoted by Dignāga (*Vṛtti* on PS I.4ab; see Hattori 1968: 88-89) who endeavours to show how it is possible for direct perception to have a group of entities as object while remaining *avikalpaka*. The same passage is quoted by Manoratanandin in his commentary on PV III.194, where Dharmakīrti’s defence of Dignāga’s controversial statement begins. According to Dharmakīrti, *arthāntarābhisambandhāy jāyante ye 'nāvav 'pare / uktās tē saṅcitās tē hi nimittam jīnānajan-\(^{15}\)manah // «Those other atoms which come into being in close relation [Manorathanaṇandin glosses: 'in close proximity'] to other things [i.e. atoms] are called ‘agglomerated’. They are the cause of the arising of knowledge». In this way Dharmakīrti tries to show that the agglomeration is not a different thing from the atoms themselves. This position, too, expressed from a Sautrāntika standpoint, is, however, altogether unacceptable to a Vijnānavadin like Sthiramati, who concludes his criticism (*Bhāṣya on Trimśikā 1*) by pointing out the internal contradiction: *na hi asaṅcitavasthātah saṅcitavasthāyāṁ paramāṇūnām kaścid ātmātiśayah / tasmād asaṅcitavat saṅcitā api paramāṇavo naivālambhanam.\(^{15}\)

\(^{15}\) A critical allusion to the Vaibhasikas’ *anusamcayoṇavāda*. If the ultimate reality, the atom (*paramāṇu*), has no parts, it is not understood how this can aggregate to
7. Indeed, the Conscious Being, God, like the yogin, independently of material causes, in virtue of His volition alone, renders externally manifest the multitude of objects that reside within Him\textsuperscript{16}.

- It is therefore the consciousness-principle alone that, in his sovereignty, renders manifest as external the multitude of things such as the jar, cloth etc., which are spontaneously manifested as being informed by his very self\textsuperscript{17}. Since his power is infinite, this external manifestation of objective reality takes place through his volition alone without resorting to causes such as clay etc. - 7 -

8. Neither can one speak of inference if the thing that is the object of this has not been formerly directly perceived (anābhātāpūrve). This is also the case as regards the senses, whose direct perception may be said to have occurred through the perception of a reality that has the characteristics of a cause (hetuvastunāḥ), such as the seed etc.\textsuperscript{18}

- Inference is an act of reflected thought (vimarsaṇaṃ) which has as its object a thing that was formerly manifest to consciousness and [as such] is internal to it (pūrva-vabhātāntahsthita eva); it occurs on the basis of the direct perception of an object invariably concomitant with this entity and involves the linking [of this entity] with this or that determinate others, aggregation only being possible through a contact between parts which by definition it does not possess (see e.g. Vimsatikā 11 ff. and vṛtti). See also Dignāga's Alambanaparikṣā vv. 1-5. In the text bahuśaḥ might equally well refer to the previous pramāṇabādhitāḥ.

\textsuperscript{16} Cf. SD I. 44-45ab yoginām icchayā yadvan nānārūpapapattitā / na cāsti sādhanam kimś ca mṛdācchāṃ vinā prabhok / tathā bhagavadicchaiva tathārvena praṇāyate; cf. also III.35-37.

\textsuperscript{17} svatma-rūpayopapannābhāsānam. Upapanna\textsuperscript{a}, according to Abh. (IPVV II p. 146), is intended to underline that this manifestation as Self is not something that has to be proved, but is itself taken for granted and self-evident. This expression in the text may equally well refer to cittatvam: «which is spontaneously manifest as Self» (see text note 236).

\textsuperscript{18} This kārikā and the following one examine inference, since this is used by the bāhyārthavādin to establish the existence of the external object. In stating the inevitable necessity that it should operate on an object which has already been directly present to consciousness (ābhātā) and that therefore, as was shown earlier, is internal and coessential to it, Utp.'s aim is to exclude the possibility that inference might establish the existence of something that is absolutely other than consciousness, i.e. the bāhyārthā. To achieve this he is compelled, as will be seen, to include the concept of sāmānyatodṛṣṭa within the pratyakṣatodṛṣṭa.
time and place\textsuperscript{19}. The senses, too, are inferred only partially and generically (\textit{kincinmātram}), as cause, and this was, in fact, formerly directly present to consciousness, through the perception of the seed etc.\textsuperscript{20}

9. But the object that is outside the light [completely extraneous to it] has not been manifested to consciousness at all; thus its existence cannot be established even through inference.

– There has been no manifestation at all of the object that is outside the manifestation as jar etc., since this would be logically untenable; therefore its existence cannot even be established by inference. – 9 –

\textsuperscript{19} This definition of inference does not only refer to the mode of the cognitive act, but – as is clarified in this last sentence – it is careful to add that it aims at proving the existence of an object that is able to propose itself as the possible object of a purposeful activity (i.e. specified by a definite time and place; cf. text note 243). It is true that the sphere of inference is constituted by the general (cf. NB I. 16), but its ultimate application is to the particular: its ‘usefulness’ consists in permitting one, via an argumentation in which there are only conceptual abstractions, to establish the existence, for instance, of a ‘determinate’ fire, which at this moment cannot be directly perceived, and to act consequently (cf. NBT p. 21 \textit{anumānam ca lingasambaddham niyatam artham darśayati}). As \textit{Hetuinduiṅkā} p. 34 puts it, yat mahānasādāv anagnivyāvṛttam vastumātram prāg anubhūtam na tat taddeśādīsambandhitayāvānumānavikalpena smaryate kintu yatra pradeśe prāg ananubhūtam tatsambandhitayā (cf. Shah 1967; 278, 280; Katsura 1984: 227).

\textsuperscript{20} According to the \textit{bāhyārthavādin} the existence of the external object is inferable from that of the ābhāṣa, just as from the occurrence of perception the existence of the sensory faculty is proved, even though the latter is never directly perceived. We have, therefore, an inference based on the general correlation (\textit{sāmānyatodṛṣṭa}) as understood, for instance, by Jayanta (NM I p. 120 \textit{sāmānyatodṛṣṭam tu yatra sambandhakāle 'pi linga[read lingi]svarūpam apratyaksam nityaparokṣam eva sāmānyato vyāptigrahanād anumāyate yathā sābdādyupalahdyā śrotrādi karaṇam}, which Bh. I p. 231 follows very closely), where the object was and continues to be inaccessible to direct cognition. Utp. replies that in this case it is not the sensory faculty as such, in its particular individuality, that is inferred, but its generic nature of cause (therefore only one of the many ābhāṣas of which it is composed), which it shares with an infinite number of other objects, such as the seed, and in which it had been perceived several times before. Thus, here too, we are faced with a case of \textit{pratyaksatodṛṣṭa}, in which there is perception limited to a general aspect (\textit{sāmānyatodṛṣṭa}, but in the Śaiva sense of the term), with the aforementioned consequences. It must be kept in mind that the terms \textit{pratyaksatodṛṣṭa} and \textit{sāmānyatodṛṣṭa} have been, since Vātsyayana, understood in various ways (see, e.g., \textit{Śārabhāṣya} on \textit{Mimāṃsāśāstra} I. 1.5, NM I pp. 120-21, TS 1441-1454; cf. also Matilal 1985: 29ff; cp. Foreword).
10. The multitude of things cannot but shine resting on the self of the Lord, otherwise that act of reflective awareness which is volition (icchāmarśah) could not be produced.

- As in the self of the Lord, whose essence is consciousness, so also in the objective realities themselves there is a shining without differentiation\(^{21}\), for otherwise reflective awareness, in the form of volition, which necessarily concerns objects that are already shining [to the subject], consisting in the state of creator, could not exist\(^{22}\). - 10 -

11. The essential nature of light is reflective awareness (vimārśam); otherwise light, though 'coloured' by objects, would be similar to an insentient reality, such as crystal and so on.

- Reflective awareness (pratyavamarśah) constitutes the primary essence (mukhya ātma) of light. In the absence of this reflective awareness, light, though objects make it assume different forms, would merely be 'limpid', but not sentient, since there is no 'savouring' (camatkrteh)\(^{23}\). - 11 -

\(^{21}\) The autonomous shining beyond every duality and scission, which is peculiar to the self, is a state that also extends to things when they are immersed in the self (cf. ÍPVV p. 167 ātmani hi nirbhāsamāne tadahhedasthitam katham na nirbhāseta) in such a way that the condition of idantā does not develop.

\(^{22}\) The will to produce something - at every level - presupposes an object that is in some way already present, 'shining', in consciousness (see below p. 126 n. 43). Volition, in order to be such, must be connected with a desired object that 'limits' it from within, that gives it a content. The will of the Lord, therefore, presupposes the shining of the whole of objective reality, which, not being separate from the subject, shines as the I shines (cf. ÍPVV II pp. 166-167). Furthermore, volition, being a particular form of reflective awareness (cf. ŚD II.84-5), is already in itself the proof of the existence of the 'light' with which we know it is inseparably connected (see ibid. p. 167 tena avaśyambhavino vimarśāt tatprakāśo 'numiyate; p. 169 icchādi parāmarśaviśeṣa eva parāmarśāsa ca prakāśasya svabhāvah).

\(^{23}\) Camatkrtei, camatkāra, is one of the key-words of this school. Abh. (ÍPVV II p. 177) says: «Camatkrtei means the act of a person savouring (bhunjanasya), that is, the bliss constituted by the full achievement of fruition». Bhunjāna, Abh. explains later, is he who, engaged in savouring a taste such as sweetness etc., unlike a voracious glutton, lets the experience rest on the cognizing subject, that is, makes the 'subject' part predominate over the 'object' part. Camatkāra, in its highest form, is therefore both the act of savouring and fullness, absolute independence, consciousness devoid of obstacles (avighnā samvit) a savouring which is in the final analysis a savouring of one's own self and of one's own bliss, which eludes every
12. Precisely for this reason the self has been defined as ‘sentience’ (caitanyam) meaning by this the activity of consciousness in the sense of being the subject of this activity. It is thanks to sentiency, in fact, that the self differs from insentient reality.

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screen or intermediation of the world of objects, and even goes beyond that relative and momentary transcendence that one has in the aesthetic experience of poetry and the theatre. The terms with which it is glossed or with which it is closely related may be grouped according to its principal components: cognition, bliss, wonder. The first group includes, for example, vimarsa (pratyavamarśa etc.), carvanā, āsvāda, rasanā, pratiṭiti; the second includes ānanda, nirvṛti, viśṛṅti, laya; the third vismaya, viṅkṣa. This last sense (prevalent in the sphere of rhetoric and aesthetics, and in non-technical use) refers to the wonder and astonishment that accompanies the return of reality to its original ‘virgin’ state, the transfiguration that this type of experience operates on reality in freeing it from the veils of the I and of the mine. Utp. seems to have been the first to use this word pregnantly. However, already vismaya in ŚS (I. 12 vismaya yogabhūmikāḥ), glossed by Kṣemarāja with āścaryamānātā (see also the verse from the Kulaśākuni, cit. ŚSV p. 13, ātmā caivaśmanā jñāto yadā bhavati sādhakaiḥ / tadā vismayam ātmā vai ātmany eva prapaśyati //) and āmoda in ŚD (e.g. I. 7b yadā tu tasya ciddharmavibhāsāmodajrmbhaya) glossed by Utp. precisely with camatkāra, seem to hint at very similar concepts. On camatkāra see Gnoli, 1968: XLV-XLVII, 59-62; Gnoli, 1985: 32 and n. 90; see also Hulin 1978: 343-58, Masson-Patwardhan 1969: 46; id. 1970: 17-8 and notes; Larson 1976.

24 Bhāva can also be understood here in the sense of ‘quality (of the substance self)’; the general meaning is basically the same (cf. n. 25). According to Kātyāyana’s vārttika on P. V.1.119 tasya bhāvas tvatalau (see n. 25), the abstract nominal suffixes (bhāvapratyaya), such as syān in caitanyam, denote an essential quality (bhāva being thus interpreted as guṇa); cf. the remark of Helārāja (Prākrita-prākṛti I p. 194) ittham atra viśeṣanam svarūpena param uparaṇjayaat sūtre bhāvāsahadhena pratipāditam, bhavaty asmāt tena prakāreṇa dravyam iti bhāvah.

25 Being ‘conscious’ is the attribute (dharma) of the substance (dravya, dharmīn ‘self’, that is in fact the dravya par excellence, because everything without distinction rests on him (cf. ĪPV I p. 248). Saying ‘the self is sentience’ (ŚS. I. 1), instead of ‘the self is sentient’ or ‘in the self there is sentience’, means underlining the absolute pre-eminence of this quality over all others (cf. ĪPVV II p. 33 bhāvapratiyaye<na> taddharmapradhānyam darśitam; see also PV I.61-2). In fact, permanence, incorporeity etc. may also pertain to other entities, whereas consciousness only pertains to the self and it alone suffices to characterize it (cf. ĪPV I p. 248,
13. Consciousness has as its essential nature reflective awareness (pratyavamarṣa); it is the supreme Word (parāvāk) that arises freely. It is freedom in the absolute sense, the sovereignty (aśvāryam) of the supreme Self.

— This is the First Word (ādyā vac)\(^\text{26}\), in which the expressible is

\[\text{ŚŚV p. 2). «The suffixes of the abstract -tā and -tvam – says Kātyāyana (vārttika V on Pān. V I 119) – indicate that quality whose presence in the dravya determines the application of the name (yasya guṇasya hi dravye bhāvāt śabdaniyeśas tadabhidhāne tātvau bhavataḥ; one can guess the quotation in a corrupted passage of ĪPVV II p. 186, yad āha madhyamo munih – yasya guṇasya hi ...). In the particular case of caitanya the abstract is particularly significant: cetana, as Abh. says (ĪPV I p. 247), is a kṛdanta and as such its abstract denotes a 'relation' (sambandha) and, through the relation, the two related elements, i.e. the subject and the action of perceiving, of being conscious (eit-). Abh.'s argumentation is implicitly based on the grammatical maxim (see Torella 1987: 158-59) samāsakṛttaddhīteṣu sambandhābhidhānam anyatra rādhyahhinnarūpāvyahhificritisambandhebhyaḥ (Kielhorn 1874: 557; cf. Śrādeva's Brhatparibhāṣāvṛtti 130 and Haribhāskarāgniṇihatī's Paribhāṣābhāskarāh 132 in Paribhāṣāsamgraha pp. 272 and 373-74) «(the abstract nominal suffixes) when suffixed to compounds, to words formed with primary derivational suffixes and to words formed with secondary derivational suffixes, name relations, except (when words of the aforementioned types) are idiomatic or have the same phonic form (as a word expressing a general property or universal), or name an invariable relation» (transl. Hayes 1983: 710). This paribhāṣā is also quoted in Helārāja's Prākritnākaprakāśa on VP III.5.1 (I p. 194) and, in an abridged form (samāsakṛttaddhīteṣu sambandhābhidhānam) ibid. p. 55 on VP III.1.47). Kuṇḍa Bhāṭṭa (who also quotes the same maxim in a slightly modified form) in Vyākaranaḥbhāṣānasāra p. 344 refers to the treatment of the matter by Bhartrhari himself in the MBh fikā (not found in the fragmentary text that has come down to us). Tattvābodhini on Siddhāntakauṃudī 1781 (cf. Hattori 1968:85) even seems to ascribe the authorship of the maxim to Bhartrhari himself. Cf. also, from a different point of view, VP III.1.34.\]

\(^{26}\) The vṛtti does not dwell on the levels of the Word; it mentions only the supreme level (ādyā vac). On the contrary, this subject is developed in the fikā – as is seen from ĪPVV – where the polemic with the Vaiyākaranas, which Somānanda had started in Chapter II of the ŚD (Gnoli 1959; Gaurinath Shastri 1959: 69; Ruegg 1959: 11), is also reproposed. Grammarians (particularly Bhartrhari), as is known, are criticized for having conceived a division of the Word into three levels, instead of four, and for having consequently identified the supreme level with Paśyanti. For a description of the levels of vac see PTV pp. 102-159 (Gnoli 1985: 60-97); Ruegg 1959: 79-81, Gnoli 1959: 55-63, Iyer 1969: 142-145, Aklujkar 1970: 67-75, Padoux 1990: 166-222, Torella forthcoming. Though Bhartrhari is unanimously thought (e.g. in the Śaiva tradition; but cfr. Intr. p. XXVI) to be the upholder of the threefold division, the VP seems to hint at a further level, which may be seen as the supreme form of Paśyanti (VP I vṛtti
undifferentiated\textsuperscript{27}, without beginning or end in that it is constituted by perpetual consciousness, autonomous. This is pure freedom, independent of any other reality, which has the name of ‘sovereignty’. – 13 –

14. \textit{It is the luminous vibrating (sphurattā)}\textsuperscript{28}, the absolute being (mahāsattā)\textsuperscript{29}, unmodified by space and time; it is that which is said to be the heart (hrdayam) of the supreme Lord, insofar as it is its essence.

p. 216, but this interpretation seems more open to doubt) or as parā prakṛti (VP III. 2. 15 etc.); cf. Iyer 1968: 143-5, Aklujkar 1970: 69-70 and n. 6, Aklujkar 1990. Among the Vaiyākaṇṭhas only Nāgęśa (MBhUddyota pp. 40-41; Paramalaghumāṇjusā p. 68 catuvṛdhā hi vāg asti ...; see also his commentary on the Yogasūtra) explicitly maintains the division into four levels. It is to be noted that, four centuries before Nāgęśa, Sāyana in the Rgvedabhāsya proposed, among others, the same interpretation of the verse catvāri vākparimītā padāṇī ..., quoted in the Paśpasā. It would have been very interesting to see how Bhartrhari, whose ēkā on that portion of the MBh is extant (Bronkhorst 1987), interpreted it, but unfortunately he is completely silent on that point. The verse, however, is quoted in the Vṛtti on VP I.159 and interpreted there in terms of tripartition (p. 220).

\textsuperscript{27} Abh. refers to three different interpretations of abhinnavācya given in the ēkā (ĪPVV p. 191): saṣṭhī\textsuperscript{o} or paṅcamīsamāśa and karmadāhāraya, that is, ‘in (or from) which the expressible is undifferentiated’, ‘designated as undifferentiated’.

\textsuperscript{28} Sphurattā and the closely related term spanda are specially fit to designate the highest śakti of Parameśvara due to their paradoxical nature of immovable movement – ‘oscillation sur place’ (Hulin 1978: 290) — kimciccalanam, Abh. says, where kimcit stands for the appearance of movement, agitation in something which is, however, motionless, firm. In ordinary usage, too, the adjective spandavit is referred to one who is firmly established though being full of the freedom of many deliberations. In comparison with spanda, sphurattā (Abh. records the use of this term and concept by Śankaranandana) also contains a ‘luminous, shining’ connotation. One may say mama sphurati ghatah only in the sense that this shining-vibrating which belongs to the I is transferred to the object. Truly speaking, it is the I (whose essence is light) who – partially departing or, in a sense, not departing at all, from his nature of consciousness – shines-vibrates as an object (ibid. p. 200).

\textsuperscript{29} Cf. the concept of mahāsattā in Bhartrhari. «It is being [ṣatta] which, being differentiated according to the object in which it is present, is called the universal. All words are based on that. That is the meaning of the stem and of the root; it is eternal it is the great Soul; it is the meaning of the suffixes -tva and -tal.» (VP III.1.33-34; transl. Iyer 1971: 25-26). Words, whether one accepts the thesis that they denote the universal (jāti, sāmānyā) or the individual substance (dravya), all express, in the end, the pure being in the most general form, the mahāsattā, i.e. the sattā not qualified by any particular content. This is valid not only for nouns - which refer to accomplished realities – but also for verbal roots – which express processes to be accomplished. This, so-to-speak, universals’ universal (mahāsāmānyā), present in all things and embracing even non-being (cf. Prakīrṇakaprayaṣa p. 41 sarvabhāvesu sadṛṣpam sāmānyam anugatam i abhāvasyāpi buddhyaākārenā nirūpanāt), is Brahman itself.
15. Precisely by virtue of this he transforms himself into the reality which is the object of cognition \( (jñeyikuryāt) \); but this object does not subsist independently \[ of the subject \]. If he were to tend towards it\(^{31} \) his freedom would cease.

By virtue of such pure freedom, he knows no object that has any foundation outside himself, but, on the contrary, his power being unrestrained, he transforms his very self, which is not the object of cognition, into cognizable reality. If he had to depend on a cognizable object separate from himself, his state as the subject of cognition would lapse\(^{32} \).

16. The Lord, thanks to his freedom which is absence of duality, by creating a self not devoid of freedom variously representing him in the forms of Īśa etc. renders the carrying out of practical activity possible.

Therefore the Lord, by virtue of his freedom which is perfect fullness characterized by unity with the cognizable object, manifests himself as that particular cognizing subject of that particular moment, representing him in the forms of Īśvara, Śiva, the perceiving subject and so on, acting thus for the purpose of the various practical activities such as creative meditation etc.\(^{33} \).
17. The variety of notions such as 'I' etc., does not entail diversity in the nature of the self, because a self is created precisely as he who lends himself to being the object of the reflective awareness 'I' (ahammrṣyataiva), like action which is expressed by personal endings (tiṇvācyakarmavat).

- He who is the object of the reflective awareness 'I' on the plane of the present cognizing subject does not have the nature of 'this' (idantā), which he should have being the object of cognition. In the diversity of ways in which the self is definitely apprehended and in which he appears to perception, what is expresseded [e.g.] by the word 'īśvara' is the cognizing subject and no other; only, this happens indirectly, through the reflective awareness 'I'. Similarly, that reality, for example, that is creates differentiated representations such as Īśvara, the self etc. Their idantā component makes them able to become the object of meditation, worship, teaching and so on, and, on the other hand, their unveiled ahantā component ensures the attainment of their true nature».

34 The power of freedom of Parameśvara, in the sphere of the general process of the objectification of the self – from which all stems – causes a certain layer to remain as though suspended between the 'I' and the 'this'. 'This' insofar as constructed, 'created' (nirmita) just like any reality posited as external, but unlike these, closer to pure subjectivity and capable of reimmersing itself in it by virtue of the contact with the 'I'. This is the case with notions (and words) such as Śiva, Īśvara, self, cognizer, which are on the one hand an objectified reality, separate from consciousness, and on the other not completely so (ĪPV V II p. 210 na ca utyantam prthak svātmany eva); na ca anīśvaram, Abh. adds elsewhere (ĪPV I p. 272), otherwise meditating on īśvara or anīśvara would be the same thing, which is contradicted by the different fruits that derive from it.

35 The real self, consciousness, is characterized by aham-parāmarśa; on the contrary, reality and denominations such as Śiva, Īśvara, Bhagavān, I etc. are characterized by idam-parāmarśa whose sphere includes the individual parāmarśas (śivaparāmarśa etc.). The issue raised is how a single reality can be the basis on which both creator and created (nirmita) rest. According to Utp.'s reply, as developed by Abh., unification is provided by the aham-parāmarśa which also underlies the notions of Śiva, Īśvara etc. It is the I (aham) in fact – as Abh. says (ĪPV I p. 278-9) – which constitutes the ultimate outcome, the definitive resting place (viśrānti-sthāna) of this kind of cognition (but also, he adds later, of all the others, without distinction); even for the cognition 'blue' the final resting place is the I, though this is more difficult for the average intellect to grasp. This distinction between the two planes is outlined by Abh., following the tīkā, in a passage of ĪPV V (II p. 213). In the case of the, so to speak, primary aham-parāmarśa, from the very beginning (upakrama eva) there is awareness of freedom. In the parāmarśas concerning ātman, Īśvara etc. this is true only as regards the final outcome; at the beginning, on the
15.17 denoted by the verbal form ‘he cooks’, is expressed by the word ‘action’; for, as has been said: «The words ‘action’, ‘quality’, ‘universal’, ‘relation’ etc. do not express [directly] the various actions etc. because they are denoted instead through the verbal form ‘he cooks’ and so on»\textsuperscript{36}. From the words ‘iśvara’ and ‘self’ one reaches the understanding of one’s own self, but only insofar as one contextually has the reflective awareness ‘I’, that is, not directly. The apprehension of the self, however, effectively takes place, just as the object previously perceived is known by memory, through the direct perception\textsuperscript{37}. – 17 –

18. Owing to the power of māyā, for the Lord it has as its object a cognizable reality differentiated [from self] and is called by the names of cognition, imagination, determination etc.

– By the power of māyā, to Parameśvara\textsuperscript{38} whose essence is light, the world – which consists of his own self – is manifested as differentiated. This very Consciousness, therefore, appears as sensory cognition; precisely this reality which is manifested as differentiated\textsuperscript{39} forms the object of memory, imagination (samkalpaḥ) and determination (adhyāvasāyah). Though\textsuperscript{40} appearing in the form of the functions of the internal sense (manas°) and the intellect (buddhi°), what is acting is in fact none other than Consciousness itself. – 18 –

contrary, there is the condition of dependence peculiar to the ‘this’, insofar as those notions arise marked by objectivity, despite the fact that the aham-parāmarśa is present in them and pervades them from within.

\textsuperscript{36} Untraced quotation. In tenor it may be compared to VP III 6. 1, which Abh. quotes in ÍPVV II p. 215.

\textsuperscript{37} The parallelism is clearly explained by Abh. (ibid. p. 213).

\textsuperscript{38} In departing from what appears to be the plainest interpretation (‘the power of māyā of the Lord’), Abh. (ÍPVV II p. 217) follows the indications in the fikā. In the eyes of the Lord (or rather, of the limited subject in whom he is freely contracted) the world is made to appear as differentiated from the self.

\textsuperscript{39} According to Abh. (ÍPVV II p. 218) tasyaiva bhinnasya is not to be understood as anubhūtasya, which – it is objected – would be all right for smrti and adhyāvasāya, but not for samkalpa (samkalpe tu nava ekavāsya utthāpyate). It means the external object in the broad sense of the word, i.e. that which is subject to the power of māyā.

\textsuperscript{40} The concessive meaning of api refers here, according to ÍPVV II p. 218, to the implicit objection: how can cognition, determination etc. have Consciousness as their essential nature, since they are functions of the intellect, the manas and the senses, which are in themselves insentient (see text note 291)? Cf. SK I. 6-7.
19. Even at the moment of the direct perception (sākṣātkārakṣane 'pi) there is a reflective awareness (vimarśaḥ). How otherwise could one account for such actions as running and so on, if they were thought of as being devoid of determinate awareness (pratisamdhāna°)?

– Even at the time of that cognizing which is characterized by direct perception there is in consciousness a reflective awareness of the object (artha pratyavamarśaḥ), in a subtle form. In fact, a rapid action – such

41 In other words there can be no prakāśa without vimarśa. The two examples given in the kārikā of moments that might be considered as not having discursive articulation – the first moment of direct perception and rapid action – only appear to be so. The discursive articulation is already contained in embryo in the sensorial experience, and so too – still in a 'contracted' (samvartita) form – is the linguistic articulation, inseparably connected with it, for otherwise it would not be able to occur after the perception; similarly, even the most rapid and thoughtless action cannot but contain, however sketchily, an articulated awareness of the ends to be achieved etc. (cf. Hulin 1978: 294-96). In formulating this conception, which may be considered one of the pivots of Pratyabhijñā philosophy, Utp. follows in the footsteps of Bhartrhari (cf. VP I. 131-32 na so 'sti pratyayo loke yah śabdāṇugamād rte i anuviddham īva jñānam sarvam śahdona bhāṣate // vāgrāpata śed utkramed avahodhasya śāsvati / na prakāśaḥ prakāṣeta sā hi pratyavamarśini //) «There is no cognition in the world in which the word does not figure. All knowledge is, as it were, intertwined with the word. If this eternal identity of knowledge and the word were to disappear, knowledge would cease to be knowledge; it is this identity which makes identification [or, in a broader sense, 'reflective awareness'] possible» (transl. Iyer 1965: 110-11; see Matilal 1990: 133-141) and is constantly aware of DharmaKṛt’s diametrically opposed position (cf. in particular PV III. 174-191ab; and, obviously, the well-known definition of pratyakṣa as kalpanāpodham in PS; see Funayama 1992).

42 A potential linguistic articulation (śabdabhāvanā), says Bhartrhari (vr̥tti on VP I.131, p. 188), is present in various degrees in every cognition; it is therefore also present in the cognition devoid of mental elaboration (avikālpajñāna), though only in a contracted and hidden form (samhṛtarūpa). (But at this point one – and first of all a Buddhist – might wonder on which basis it is then possible to draw a distinction between savikalpa and nirvikalpa, and, moreover, what nirvikalpa is. An elaborate answer to these crucial questions is given by Abh. in ĪPVV II p. 239-40; cf. Torella forthcoming). This condition makes the cognition that occurs remain, in one sense, as though it had not occurred, because it is not able to manifest its effects (kārya), namely, to attain the plane of verbal communication and practical use (Vṛśabhadeva’s Paddhati p. 188). That this cognition, however, has occurred is proved by the fact that a suitable occasion (nimitta), such as the subsequent occurrence of a similar cognition (Paddhati p. 189 sadṛṣagrahanāder nimittāt) may reawaken it and render it manifest. Bhartrhari gives the example of a person walking quickly, wholly intent on reaching his destination, who seems not to notice anything that he meets along his path – leaves, clods of earth –, until, some time later, he finds himself faced with a similar
15.19 as reciting, running and so on – necessarily occurs through a determinate awareness (°anusamdhānena)\(^{43}\) of the intention of reaching or leaving this or that place etc. which is seen at that moment\(^{44}\). – 19 –

20. The determinate cognition (adhyavasā) ‘this is a jar’, beyond the linguistic sign and the thing signified (nāmarūpa\(^{0}\)), is the very power of the supreme Lord. It is manifested in the same way as the self and not in terms of ‘this’\(^{45}\).

object and this brings to mind the cognition that he did not previously realize he had had. This is possible, says Bhartrhari, only if we admit the existence within the first perception of a śabdabhāvanā which, after being ‘contracted’ (cf. ĪPVV II p. 226) as it was, has now become fully manifest (vyakta). Then let us consider the case of a sensation taken in its very first moment (Vṛtti p. 170 prathamopanipāti) and not destined to further development. Even the indistinct cognition that derives from it, based on an inner formulation such as ‘this, that’ is made possible only by the presence of a śabdabhāvanā, though in a subtle form. Finally I will quote one last, particularly significant, example from those Bhartrhari gives. This is the analysis of the process that leads from the perception of a group of words to the comprehension of the meaning of the sentence they form. The text of the Vṛtti (pp. 191-92) is ambiguous in some places and I understand it in the light of Vṛṣabhadeva’s interpretation (which is, however, questionable; cf. Aklujkar 1970: 147-48). What appears at first is the indeterminate reality of a series of separate words-meanings, isolated from one another. Subsequently (uttarakālaṃ; Paddhati p. 191 abhinnapadārthaparicchedāḥ uttara-kālam) there is a reflective awareness (pratyavamarśa), namely a determination of the meanings understood from the words (Paddhati ibid. padebhyo 'nubhūtānām arthānām ākāraṇirūpānā) and a coordination (anusamdhāna), namely the ascertainement, with mutual connection, of the meanings obtained from the words (Paddhati ibid. padebhyo 'vagatānām arthānām parasparāvavcchedhenāvadhāranām); finally, the constitution of a single overall meaning (ekadṛṣṭhakaritvam). All this depends on having the word as essence (vāgrūpayām baddham). It is to be noted that pratyayumarśa and anusamdhāna are precisely the two terms on which Utp.’s Vṛtti on this kārikā is centred.

\(^{43}\) Anusamdhāna, to be understood also in the sense of ‘coordination’ of the distinct wills to leave one thing and seek another, present in the act of volition (see text note 294). As stated before (I.5.10), volition is a particular form of reflective awareness; it must include a vimarśa ‘this is that’, though in a generic form, touching the desired object in some way. In this state the powers of volition, knowledge and action are united with the light full of consciousness and bliss (ĪPVV II p. 233 and ŚDVr pp. 91-92). See also ŚD 1.9.11ab.

\(^{44}\) According to Abh. (ĪPVV II p. 233, see text note 294) the expression desādi\(^{0}\) may be understood in two ways: ‘other substances or qualities’ or ‘substances etc. existing elsewhere or of another nature’.

\(^{45}\) The kārikā is to be understood as a reply to an objection which we find made explicit by Abh. in ĪPV and ĪPVV. The objector admits that the determinate cogni-
The determinate cognition 'this' and 'jar', beyond the linguistic expression and the thing signified, which in themselves appear as differentiated [from the subject], consists essentially in the power of Consciousness: it is manifested, like the self\textsuperscript{46}, in terms of non-differentiation. - 20 -

21. However, insofar as they conform to the time and place of the differentiated cognizable reality, [perceptive] cognition, memory and determinate cognition etc. appear to be successive\textsuperscript{47}.

- Differentiated cognizable reality, such as the jar and so on, is made manifest to the Consciousness\textsuperscript{48} as differentiated by this or that time and place due to the power of māyā. [Perceptive] cognition, memory etc., closely resting on this differentiated reality, are manifested at different times and places etc. - 21 -

ulation in the subtle form the previous kārikā spoke of may be considered not separate from the subject or from the 'light', as we have seen, but he wonders how one can continue to claim this once the determinate cognition (adhyavasāya) 'this is a jar' - becomes evident (sphuta) and, on being articulated in words, fully assumes the form of vikalpa. The word 'jar' - like the thing it signifies - is manifested as an objective reality, separate from the light of consciousness, and this cannot but have repercussions on the determinate cognition the very essence of which is the linguistic expression. The meaning of Utp.'s reply is the following. No one has ever said that it is the ordinary manifested word (which is only the lowest level of language) that constitutes the vimarsa; it is, on the contrary, on the same level as any reality that appears as external. This word and the thing it signifies are only the object of unification by a determinative cognition, which is rooted in the Lord's pure power of consciousness (of which it is one of the manifestations). In unifying nāma and rūpa (sabda and artha) determinate cognition remains distinct from them, on another level, retrieving them through the outcome of its very process within the sphere of the T.

\textsuperscript{46} The various notions of self, cognizing subject, Lord etc. shine directly to the consciousness as 'T' (cf. above kārikās 16-17 above).

\textsuperscript{47} One can explain this kārikā, too, as the reply to an unformulated objection, which it is possible to intuit from the thread of the argumentation and with the aid of Abh.'s commentaries. If every form of cognizing - the objector wonders - in the ultimate analysis is resolved in the T, what results is an absolute unity of cognition in which there is no room for spatio-temporal differentiations (which may characterize only the object). And yet this differentiation is evident at every moment of ordinary experience ...

\textsuperscript{48} See above n. 38.
CHAPTER VI

1. The reflective awareness 'I', which is the very essence of light, is not a mental construct (vikalpaḥ), although it is informed by the word (vāgyapuh). For a vikalpa is an act of ascertainment (viniścayah) presenting a duality (dvayākṣepī)¹.

- The reflective awareness concerning the self, the reflective awareness 'I', which constitutes the very nature of light, cannot be called vikalpa even if it is essentially associated with a 'discourse' (sābhilāpo 'pi)² since the word that informs it is the supreme word. Indeed, the vikalpa³ is an ascertainment (niścayah) acquired through the negation of the opposite⁴, and, as regards pure light, there is no possibility of the existence of something that is its opposite⁵. – 1 –

¹ Without a duality of this - non-this, Abh. remarks (ĪPVV II p. 280), how can the functions peculiar to vikalpa be carried out, that is, how and what to unify, divide, imagine?

² Utp. refers here critically to the well-known definition of kalpanā given by Dharmakirti (NB I. 5) abhilāpasamsargayogyapratidhāsā prafīth kalpanā, which in turn derives, with modifications, from Dignāga (PS I. 3d nāmajātyādiyojanā; cf. Funayama 1992). During the discussion of this subject in ĪPVV, Abh. repeatedly quotes passages from Dharmottara, which turn out to be either paraphrases or summaries of passages from the NBT (ad I. 5).

³ On vikalpa in general see Matilal 1986: 313-15. The term vikalpa is analysed in ĪPVV II p. 274 in a few different, but compatible (or even complementary) ways, each of them singling out an aspect of this complex notion. a) vividhakalpanā, to be understood either as putting together what is differentiated in reality (bhinnasyāpi ... yajana) or as conceiving as manifold what is one in reality (ekasyāpi vaśīhyena kalpanā). b) Cutting (klp- in the sense of vicchedana) another form which has been imagined (vividhasya ca śāṅkitasya rūpāntarasya kalpanām vicchedanam). c) After dividing (vibhajya), removing from the other and protecting by making it enter into the cognizer's mind (vi-kal-pa). And later on (p. 281), d) vividham kalpanam, i.e. manifold conceiving, in the sense that at some time it has something being affirmed and something being negated as its object (vidhiyamānaniśidhyamānatayā).

⁴ The main characteristic of vikalpa is that of projecting the object outside the I, of knowing it in terms of separation: 'this'. In analyzing the working of vikalpa, Āhnika VI dwells particularly on its aspect of 'exclusion'. In the avikalpaka state the thing is 'full', just like consciousness, but it cannot become the object of practical

(Notes 4-5 next pages)
2. In fact, the manifestation of two opposite realities is possible in the case of ‘jar’ and ‘non-jar’. On the contrary, the manifestation of a usage as regards cognition, communication and so on (İPV I pp. 309-310 tadavikalpadaśāyām citsvabhāvo *sau ghaṭah cidvad eva viśvaśaṅgirah pūrṇah, na ca tena kecid vyavahārāḥ). For this purpose the subject in the mayīc world has to break into pieces what is full in itself, distinguish and negate: knowing becomes contrasting. Also in this case Utp. appears drawn into the orbit of Buddhist thought. The first formulation of the *apoha* theory is found, as is well-known, in the PS and in the *Nyāyamukha*, though apparently still limited in its application to the ambit of the inferential process and the denotation of words (for the development of the *apoha* theory in Dignāga’s works see Frauwallner 1959: 99-106). The word expresses things as qualified by the negation of the other meanings (*sāhdo ‘ṛtāntaranivṛtti-viśiṣṭān eva bāvān āha*, cit. in PVSV pp. 62-63; the passage comes from the *yṛtti* on PS V.36d, Hattori 1980: 71). Or again: ‘[The word] expresses its meaning through the exclusion of others’ (PS V.1.cd ... svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate). It was, then, Dharmakīrti who extended the application of the *apoha* to all the fields where universals operate, that is, in the broad sense, to the contents of discursive thought (PV I.134 tenānyāpohavisayāḥ proktāḥ sāṃnyagocarāḥ / sābdās ca buddhayās caiva vastuny eṣām asambhavāt //; PVSV pp. 92-93 tasmāt siddāh etat sarve sābdā vivekavisayā vikalpās ca). Therefore, words (or *vikalpas*), do not express universals, undisputedly present in single particular things, - as the Realists maintain - but only a ‘difference’ (*bheda*) through the exclusion of what is other, namely, of all those things which are joined by the fact of having different effects with respect to the thing intended. The intrinsic nature of the thing constitutes its difference, the exclusion of what is other its (potentially) common dimension (PV I.180ab cintyete svātmanā bheda vyārtytā ca samānata); the anyāpoha, after all, is seen to share all the essential characters of the *sāmānyā*, that is, ekatva nityatva pratyekaparīṣamāpti (cf. PS V.36cd; Katsura 1991: 132). Therefore, the word is applied to that difference in which the exclusion of the other has made a common structure appear (PVSV p. 62 ... bhede samānārupa-pratibhāsīny āksiptatadanyavāyānārthāni nivesyata iti). However, it is not a question of two distinct operations (with a relationship of viśeṣa-viśeṣana), Dharmakīrti says – and Jinendrabuddhi will repeat, a few centuries later, in his commentary on the PS (Stcherbatsky 19302: 464) – since the denotation of its own meaning entails by itself the exclusion of others, precisely inasmuch as the nature of its own meaning is the ‘difference’ (PVSV p. 63). But, Dharmakīrti adds a little later (PV I.128), the difference is not a real thing (vastu) – nor is exclusion –: it is only a relative term. Something real would be the form (*rūpa*), but the object of the word is not *rūpa* but *bheda* (*abhāva, viveka*; PV I.185 and PVSV thereon). Almost all the debates of the later Buddhist thinkers, who will attempt to recast the *apoha* theory taking into account the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā criticism, are centred on these points. The current division (Mookerjee 1935:132-33) between ‘negativists’ (Dignāga and Dharmakīrti; for a distinction of their respective positions see Katsura 1991: 142-143), ‘positivists’ (Sāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla: the word expresses firstly
I 6.2 reality that is other and differentiable from light, on the same plane (iva)², is not possible.

a positive entity and only secondly, by implication, the exclusion of the other, TS 1018 tasya ca pratiibimbasya gatav evavagamate i sāmarthyād anyaviśleśo nāsyānyātmakatā yatah // and 'synthetists' (Jñānasrimitra and Ratnakīrti: the word expresses a positive entity qualified by the exclusion of the other; Ratnakīrti's Apohasiddhi p. 59 nāsamahīj apohasadbena vidhira eva kevalo 'bhipratetah / nāpy anyavyārtimatram i kintu anyāpohaviśito vidhiḥ śabdānam arthaḥ, then taken up again by Moksākaragupta) seems too simplistic and fails to grasp what appears as a substantial unity with different formulations (Katsura 1986, Siderits 1986). The Pratyabhijñā position is very close to Ratnakīrti's: the words (and vikalpas) rest on a reality which is mainly affirmative, qualified by the implicit negation of the opposite (IPVV II p. 289 antarliniktrapratiyogabhāvaviśiṣṭavidhipradhāνavastunīṣṭāh; p. 280 vidhau viśrāntatvāt niścayasya). In this process three moments may be singled out: imagining what is other than the object intended, then superimposing it onto the object and lastly negating it. (ibid. p. 289 vikalpayet, āropayet niśedhec ca). Or, according to another formulation: every apprehension includes the superimposition of the manifestations to be excluded and their negation (ibid. p. 290 sarvā prameyēsu pratipattir apohyābhāsāapohanisēdhaṃvāpārāntaḥkārinī).

The countercorrelate of light, its contrary, cannot in fact be either aprakāsamāna - because in this case it would simply not exist - or prakāsamāna - because it would be of the same essence as light (IPVV II p. 279).

⁵ The counter-correlate of light, its contrary, cannot in fact be either aprakāsamāna - because in this case it would simply not exist - or prakāsamāna - because it would be of the same essence as light (IPVV II p. 279).

⁶ Cf. ĪPV I p. 307 bhedinah ... apohanātmakabhedanavyāpārasahiṣṇoh [both Bh and KSTS Ed. read incorrectly vyāpārasahiṣṇoh ]. On the plane of knowable reality it is possible to imagine, with respect to a ‘blue’, a ‘non-blue’ (and what is other than blue indeed exists); why then, on the plane of the knowing subject, imagining a reality other than consciousness should be inadmissible? This objection is put forward by Utp. and Abh. (IPVV II p. 288) and answered as follows. On the plane of prameya, created by māyā and made of a multitude of abhāsas, anekatva and vaicitrya are not surprising, whereas in pure light a reality different (cf. bhinnasya in the vṛttī) from the nature of pramāṇa cannot possibly exist. But even admitting that lights may be differentiated in their nature owing to a differentiation of space and time, nonetheless, just as, when a certain ‘blue’ is ascertained, only yellow etc. are negated - not the other ‘blues’ -, likewise, when a light is ascertained the other lights are not negated. The two parts of this argument unfold what is implicit in dvitiyasya bhinnasya in the vṛttī. Therefore, even if there were a ‘second’ (etc.) light, this would not be subject to exclusion. However, a ‘second’ light is not admissible as a reality (ĪPV I p. 308 na ca prakāsasya svarūpadesakālbhedo yena dvitiyah prakāśa ekasmād apohyate). A ‘second’ light as the product of mental construction cannot constitute a pratiyogin in the same way as ‘being cause, effect, instantaneous’ cannot be considered a pratiyogin with respect to ‘blue’ (IPVV II p. 282 svakalpanākapāpitena dvitiyena na pratiyogiparipūranaṃ kriyate / na hi nāsya kāraṇavākāryavāksanikavādi pratiyogipakṣe vartate, na hi tat prthak kiśicit). See also above n. 5.

⁷ What is needed for two entities to be termed pratiyogin is precisely their opposing each other while remaining on the same plane. My translation makes the
- Otherness with respect to light (prakāṣetaratvam) is not possible, since an opposite reality, second to and distinct from light, called non-light, is not manifested. There being no possibility of exclusion (vyapohanāyogāt), since such an opposite reality does not exist, one cannot, therefore, speak of mental construct (vikalpatā) [with reference to ahampratyaavamarṣa]. – 2 –

Likewise:

3. For we call vikalpa the ascertainment of a certain thing (tan-niścayānām) [e.g.] ‘jar’ arrived at through the exclusion of its opposite (atadvyapohanāt) by the knowing subject only (mātraiva), in whom that and the opposite of that are manifested (tadatpratibhābhājā).

- The ascertainment ‘jar’, brought about by the free knowing subject only within whom lie the manifestations of that [the jar] and its opposite, and that takes place through the exclusion of the opposite: this is the activity called vikalpa. – 3 –

4-5. Having left the plane of Consciousness because of the influence of māyā, that reflective awareness ‘I’ which addresses differentiated realities – e.g. the body, the intellect, the vital breath or that imagined entity, similar to ether – understood as the knowing subject, that reflective awareness, excluding what is other than its object, is a vikalpa, value of iva explicit and in so doing follows Abh.’s commentary. Bh., too, insists on this point (II p. 307) tulyakaksya eva hi pratispardhiyā bhedena purah sthātum śaknoti iti tulyakaksyasety uttam; Abh. (IPVV II p. 282) adds pratiyogirvam hi tat-sthānāpnanatvam.

8 The Buddhist description of vikalpa’s modus operandi thus seems liable to be shared also by the Śaivas. Moreover, on a close scrutiny, it is only within the śaiva context that it may logically stand and elude criticism. Indeed, if one accepts the Buddhist presupposition of things being self-confined, it results that what appears from the cognition of a thing is only that same thing and the awareness of its cognition, and one does not understand where the ‘other’ things and their negation spring from. But this difficulty concerns only the Buddhist (IPV I p. 308 evam sākyah parya-nuyojyo na tu vayam), not the śaiva conception centred in a cognizer who is not bound to the present object and its cognition (IPVV II p. 291 visayataddurśa-nādiपरात्यत्रयम ujjhatā) but is free to dynamically aggregate, separate and merge all the various cognitions. The centrality of the I, which characterizes the śaiva conception, is pointed out by the particle eva in the kārikā (mātraiva) and in the vṛtti (pramātuv eva).
which arises precisely from the manifestation of an opposite reality to be excluded.

- The reflective awareness ‘I’ as the knowing subject, which because of the power of māyā (māyāsaktyā) of the Consciousness-principle itself, of the Lord, addresses realities that are manifested as separate such as the body, the intellect, the interior tactile sensation or that imagined entity which is the void (śūnya), beyond them, similar to ether — this form of reflective awareness ‘I’ is nothing other than a vikalpa, like ‘this is a jar’, since it excludes the various opposite entities that are manifested, such as the body and so on. - 4-5 -

6. The connection, in the case of an entity that is manifested at a certain time (kādācitkāvabhāse), with something that was formerly manifested etc., this connection, too, which occurs thanks to the latent impression, is a mental construct (kalpanā) since it is applied to realities that are manifested as differentiated.

- Within the sphere of the various totally differentiated and discontinuous manifestations such as the body, the void etc., the connection in

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9 In his commentaries Abh. introduces these two stanzas with an objection to which they furnish the reply. The reflective awareness ‘I’ (ahampratyavamarśa) occurs through the exclusion of non-I; is it not therefore a vikalpa itself? The answer is that there are two kinds of ahampratyavamarśa, one is pure and the other is impure; the objector’s remark is pertinent only to the latter, which is the object of the two stanzas.

10 Sparśa (but āntara) is the sensory faculty that reveals the existence of the prāna, just as antahkarana reveals that of the mind and the sense of the I, or sight reveals that of the body. But Abh., in commenting on the ātkā, grasps other meanings of this āntaratvam of the prāna (not to be confused with physical breath), namely its not being directed outwards, its being the essential element and its permeating all the senses (cf. ÍPVV II pp. 295-7).

11 Imagined insofar as, unlike the other realities with which subjectivity is wrongly identified, it cannot be directly known by the internal and external senses (ibid. p. 297).

12 For example, it shares with ether ‘vacuity’ and the fact that it is not a pure non-entity (ibid. p. 297). On the void see below pp. 203 ff.

13 Once again it is useful to resort to Abh.’s commentaries to understand the link between the present stanza and the previous one. The notion of the I (ahampratayaya) is not only to be divided into pure and impure (śuddha – asuddha), but each of these two forms has in turn two aspects: an immediate awareness through a direct internal experience and a mediated one which is the result of a connection
unity (āikyayojana) with former manifestations, with an individuality, with a name, (a connection) made possible by the latent impressions which ensure the internal permanence of the former manifestations, – this connection in unity, which is essentially an activity of the knowing subject (pramāṭtryāpārarūpā), is merely a mental construct and precisely that called ‘recognition’. – 6 –

7. Thus also in the course of ordinary reality the Lord, entering the body etc., renders externally manifest by his volition the multitude of objects that shine within him.

– At the moment of the original creation, as in the course of everyday reality, Maheśvara, by virtue of the power of māyā, by entering the body etc. conceived of as self, creates the [limited] knower and thanks to the power of doer (kartrśaktyā) gradually renders the various objects (anusamdhāna) between several elements. Now in the case of the āsuddha-ahampratyaya (which concerns us here), the direct form (anubhavurūpa) – e.g. ‘I am the body’, namely ‘I am thin’, ‘I am old’ etc. – has already been spoken of and acknowledged as vikalpa (see above kārikās 4-5). But it might be objected that the second form, since it works through unification – ‘that which was previously a child, then an adult, with a determinate name, character etc. is the I – and not exclusion (as was seen in the case of the first), does not have the characteristics of the vikalpa. The present stanza answers this objection by essentially saying that an anusamdhāna that has as its object realities conceived as bāhya and bhimna cannot bring about a real unification as it is polluted by their appearing in the sign of vikalpa. On the contrary, it is on the plane of Sadāsiva where the ‘this’ is not yet bhimna that anusamdhāna brings about a āsuddha-ahampratyaya. However, Abh. concludes (ĪPV I p. 327), in every anusamdhāna, namely in every act of unification we perform in ordinary reality, the light of vidyāśakti (see below pp. 193-194) shines for an instant: each of these may be taken by the limited subject as the first step in the process leading to the overcoming of differentiation and duality.

14 The five activities of the Lord take place not only on a cosmic level but also in everyday reality, which is, in various ways, continually penetrated and supported by them (cf. ŚŚV pp. 10-12, PH pp. 22-26).

15 Utp. glosses icchayā with māyāśaktyā and kartrśaktyā; as Abh. explains (ĪPVV II p. 323) māyāśakti is responsible for the identification of the I with the various seats of limited subjectivity (body etc.), kartrśakti – in the form of kalā and vidyā – for the manifestation of reality as external.

16 I.e. linking the various manifestations with particular subjects and then removing them from those to link them with others and so on (cf. IPVV II pp. 316-7); this pertains to the microcosmic level of the five divine operations (creation, reabsorption etc.). Or, according to another interpretation (ibid. p. 323), gradually connecting on the pure, mixed and impure levels of creation.
16.7 That shine within him externally manifest. Creating is precisely rendering manifest in this way (tathābhāsanam eva). On the contrary, if he does not enter the body etc., then the whole manifestation of objective reality will take place spontaneously and simultaneously in the form of 'I am all this'\textsuperscript{17}. – 7 –

8. Therefore it is definitely ascertained that whether in memory, or in vikalpa – that depends on exclusion –, or in direct perception, the manifestation of the object is internal.

– In every kind of cognition (sarvasamvitsu), all objective manifestation is always shining as absorbed in the cognizer (pramātrsamlīnah) like the consciousness-principle, in an appropriate way (ānurūpyena)\textsuperscript{18}. – 8 –

9. However, in direct perception, which consists in rendering the object externally manifest, [this manifestation] occurs spontaneously (naisargikah), while in memory etc. this is informed by a former perception.

– In direct perception, consisting in rendering the object externally manifest\textsuperscript{19}, the manifestation of the object within the consciousness (cit-tattvasyāntar) is spontaneous (sahaja)\textsuperscript{20}; on the contrary, in memory etc. it has as its essence a former perception, and it is for this very reason that memory is said to arise from latent impressions\textsuperscript{21}. – 9 –

\textsuperscript{17} It is the plane of Sadāsiva-Īśvara.

\textsuperscript{18} When, for example, the cognition appears as 'this is a jar' and there does not seem to be any reason to claim a connection with the subject, even then, on the contrary, the fact that the cognition and its object rest ultimately on the cognizing subject reveals that their nature is essentially consciousness. The expression ānurūpyena seems to refer to the possibility of relative differentiations of degree within a basic identity; see also above I. 5. 10 and vṛtti.

\textsuperscript{19} In the sense of perceiving it as other than self, as 'this'.

\textsuperscript{20} I.e. it does not depend on external factors (former perceptions), but, as Abh. says (ĪPVV II p. 329); it stems from the freedom of the Lord himself (cf. text note 353). Also see PTV p. 221 (svasāmarthyodbhūtā), ĪPVV I p. 114 (svasāmarthyothanirvikalpakajñāna).\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{21} The criterion on the basis of which it is possible to make a general distinction between the various kinds of cognition lies in the spontaneous or mediated manifestation of the object. The object is manifested spontaneously in direct perception, and mediatly in vikalpa (or rather in a certain kind of vikalpa; see the following kārikā), where the manifestation of the object must necessarily pass through the reawakening of a former perception. Therefore we have as homologous terms.
10. It is also spontaneous in the case of the vikalpa that acts autonomously (svairacārini) rendering particular configurations manifest in the mental sphere at will.

- However, the independent (svatantrah) vikalpa\(^{22}\) renders this or that thing manifest, whether new or characterized by a different organization of its parts, making it the object of the mind even if it has never entered the field of the senses such as sight etc.; and it renders it manifest at will without considering its having been previously perceived\(^{23}\). Within the sphere of this form of vikalpa the manifestation of the object is spontaneous, too. – 10 –

11. Therefore, owing to the fact of rendering manifest at will, what is mentally conceived, knowledge and action have been proved to be fully evident (sphute) in every being.

- By virtue of the capacity for creating and knowing objects not formerly experienced, found in the vikalpa, the presence of the power to know and create everything is evident in everyone. – 11 –

\(naisargika\text{-}avyavadhāna\text{-}sphutatā on the one hand and \(samskārāja\text{-}vyavadhāna\text{-}asphutatā on the other (cf Bh I p. 337). The fact of making the object manifest as external, which is mentioned as characteristic of direct perception, does not constitute an equally valid criterion; in fact, as Abh. notes, in the other kinds of knowledge, too, the object is projected outside the I. into the antahkarana.

\(^{22}\) There are two kinds of vikalpa, according to whether it depends or does not depend on a former direct perception. The first kind includes, of course, memory (smrti), determination (adhyavasāya), conjecture (utpreksāna); the second, to which the stanza refers, – the autonomous (svatantra) vikalpa – includes fantasy (manorajya) and imagination (samkalpa).

\(^{23}\) Both kinds of vikalpa work on material furnished by former perceptions. The 'novelty' (navata, apūrvavatvam) which characterizes the object of the vikalpa called 'independent' is not therefore to be found in an impossible 'novelty' of the individual ābhāsa, but in not considering the former manifestation of the object at a particular time and place (which is, on the contrary, essential in the two main kinds of 'dependent' vikalpa – memory and determination) and in the different connection (yojanā) of the individual ābhāsas – different compared to the former experience – with the consequent creation of new arrangements (sanniveśa). The example Abh. gives of this is imagining a white elephant, with two trunks, a hundred tusks etc. Another element that characterizes the autonomous vikalpa is that it comes into being and ceases independently of the subject's will, as the mind's free wandering (see ĪPVV II p. 332; in the compound \(samsīṭhānayojanāmśena\), I. 14, the final na is to be read separately).
Chapter VII

1. And this intuitive light (pratibhā)\(^1\) influenced (ṛūṣitā) by the succession of all the various objects is the knowing subject, which is consciousness devoid of succession and limit\(^2\), Maheśvara.

   – And this light (ābhāsah) variegated (ācchuritah) by the succession of all the various objects is, insofar as it rests internally, the knowing subject, called the ‘self’, which pervades the times of all the cognitive acts (sarvasamvitkālavyāpī) and consists of consciousness devoid of succession and limit; and it is Maheśvara in that it is the creator as regards the cognizable reality that constitutes its ‘body’ (svāngabhūte).

2. Relation (jñāteyam) is possible if things, through the paths of the various and distinct cognitive acts, come to rest on a single knowing subject.

   – Once they have merged and been absorbed (upaliya) into the sea of the single knowing subject through the currents of the many cognitive acts [flowing into him]\(^3\), the different objects are set in the network of

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\(^1\) Pratibhā, which I have translated vaguely as ‘intuitive light’, is the revelation, the presentation of the object to consciousness, its illumination by the light of the subject (prati-bhā), in which in the final analysis it rests. The succession which seems to be projected on the light when the objects shine within it (or rather when it shines as objects) disappears at the moment when the perception of the object as external reality ‘this’, becoming introverted, dissolves and finds its root in the I: ‘I perceive this’; cf. the formulation in APS v. 22, often quoted in Śaiva texts, prakāsasyātmavīsrāntir ahambhāvo hi kīrītaḥ. Pratibhā is here to be understood as synonymous with prakāśa, ābhāsa (cf. I.6.3) and not in the pregnant sense of ‘intuition’. that is, a special, superhuman kind of direct vision (cf. Gopinath Kaviraj 1966: 1-44, Gonda 1963: 318-48, Iyer 1969: 86-92; Tola-Dragonetti 1990).

\(^2\) In his two commentaries Abh. divides the third pāda into akramā (referring to pratibhā) and anantacidrūpah (referring to pramātā). The vṛttī, on the contrary, takes it as a single compound, referring to pramātā.

\(^3\) Or also, following Abh.’s commentary (see text note 367): ‘by the means represented by the currents of the many cognitive acts’, currents that force the objects from the external to the internal plane, into consciousness.
connections pertaining to practical reality (vyavahārasamanvayam), such as, for instance, the cause-effect relation and so on. – 2 –

3. A connection between objects having a spatio-temporal succession and being self-contained is established by their manifestation in terms of unification (sakrdābhāsa°)°. Otherwise, no connection at all is possible.

– Things, both in their own nature and manifestation, are self-contained. A connection between them depends on their simultaneous and unitary manifestation (yugapadekābhāsa°). This undivided [manifestation, i.e. connection] is possible only if absorbed into the knowing subject. – 3 –

4. The perceptions and non-perceptions (pratyaksanupalambhānām), which in themselves concern this or that separate part, may cause the establishment of the cause-effect relation only if they rest on a single knowing subject.

– Perceptions and non-perceptions determine the cause-effect relation and also its establishment (tatsiddhih), [only] once they have entered into a connection with one another (samanvayam āgatyā) through a single knowing subject. If they do not enter into a reciprocal connection (asamanvitāh) perceptions and non-perceptions fade away at the moment

4 Cf. ÍPVV II p. 343 sakrcchabdo bhedanisedhatātparye prayuktuh; ibid. sakrdābhāsaṇa desakālasvarūpābhāsayojanaikeyabhāseṇa. On sakrdābhāsa see also below p. 155.

5 Namely, both in themselves and as regards the cognitions that have them as object, or, as Abh. says, both in perception and ascertainment (see text note 369).

6 Utp. is referring here to the criterion adopted by the Buddhist logicians (Bh attributes it to tarkikādi) to ascertain the existence of a cause-effect relation. This criterion is based on the combination and interrelation of a certain number of perceptions and non-perceptions (cf. PVin II pp. 33-4, HB p. 4, SP 13, PVSV p. 22). Fire, for example, may be considered the cause of smoke since, fire having been perceived, smoke, not initially perceived, is perceived later. Dharmakirti does not explicitly state the number of these perceptions and non-perceptions: though their division into five seems the most likely (this is what Dharmottara in the PVin-fikā, Mādhava in the SDS, and Abh. in the ÍPVV understand), some commentators – Śākyamati, Karnakagomin, Arcata – only recognize three as being essential (see Steinkellner 1967: II, 97 n. 49). The dispute between these two views has been studied in Kajiyama 1963, where the Kāryakāraabhāvasiddhi of Jñānaśrīmitra (a trikavādin) has been translated.
I 7.4 in which they make known one after the other their respective objects, and are not able to display any mutual dependence. — 4 —

5. The self-consciousness (svasamvitth) which in memory is the proof of memory’s very being, that same self-consciousness and nothing else establishes the subsistence of the former direct perception.

— Since [at the time of the memory] the self-consciousness of the former direct perception no longer exists, it is the self-consciousness of the memory and nothing else which establishes the existence of this former perception, as it does for the memory itself. This self-consciousness consists in the knowing subject characterized by the manifestation of a single identical object. The status of effect – acting as logical reason — (kāryalīṅgata) may not be attributed to memory since, as the manifestation of the former perception is no longer present, it cannot be said that a cause-effect relation has been established. — 5 —

7 Here the allusion is to the difficulties inherent in the Buddhist conception of causality; the whole of the fourth āhnikā of the Kriyādhikāra will be devoted to the discussion of this.

8 The argument that memory is the manifestation and proof of the existence and continuity of the knowing subject, already extensively dealt with earlier, is here incidentally taken up once again. It is in effect through memory that the subject may establish that link between perceptions and non-perceptions capable of proving the existence of the cause-effect relation. This connection, as has been seen in the previous kārikā, does not really pertain to the cognitions themselves, but is projected onto them by the subject. The continuity of self-consciousness thus reveals itself in memory. In fact, it is the very same svasamvedana which illuminates the memory that illuminates, makes manifest, the former perception — now no longer existent — on which the memory is based. Abh. lucidly distinguishes this type of argumentation supporting the existence of the self, based on memory (insōtar as it reveals the oneness of self-consciousness), from that also based on memory, put forward earlier (cf. IPV I pp. 363–4).

9 Utp.’s aim here is to reject a possible objection — namely that there is no need to resort to the work of a continuous svasamvedana, but that memory is enough in itself to connect up with the former perception, since by general consensus the effect can lead to the knowledge of the cause. What Utp. does not acknowledge is precisely the admissibility of such an inference, whose logical reason (linga) is represented by the nature of effect (kārya) attributed to the memory: between the perception that occurred in the past and the present memory there is no cause-effect relation, which presupposes a continuity (see text note 379 for the development of this argumentation). Therefore those who invoke memory as the unifier of cognitions which are in themselves separate implicitly finish up by involving precisely
6. Also the invalidating-invalidated relation (bādhyābādhakabhāvaḥ) between cognitions which are restricted to themselves and do not contradict one another (svātmanisthāvirodhinām) may exist only by virtue of their resting on a single knowing subject.

- What contradiction can there be between cognitions which are only directed to the single manifestations that are their own (bhinnasvābhāsasvatmanisthānām) and, consequently, how can one speak of an invalidating-invalidated relation with reference to them? On the contrary, this relation is admissible if they rest on a single knowing subject. – 6 –

7. [Someone might however object that] just as the cognition of an empty surface entails at the same time the cognition of the absence of the jar, so the cognition of mother-of-pearl entails the non-validity of the cognition of silver (rūpyajñānāpramātavait) that knowing subject they wanted to avoid, who, as we have seen, is identified with the continuity of self-consciousness on which memory is based.

10 Or also: «that insist only on themselves (sva°) – i.e. on their own self-awareness – and on the manifestation (ābhāsa°) that is their object», following İPVV II p. 371 svāsmin viśaye ātmani ca svasamvedane (also IPV I p. 365, which substitutes svārūpe for svasamvedane). This is an interpretation that does not basically differ from the text of the vṛtī but constitutes the development of what is there implicit, apparently following the indications in the fikā (cf. İPVV II p. 372 vṛttau vivṛttau ca svās ca ābhāsās ca iti svās ca viśaya ca iti yojyam). Or, Abh. continues, only the ābhāsa (the content of the cognition) may be considered mentioned in this expression, since the invalidation can concern only that and not the 'self-awareness' component (pp. 372-73 atha vā svasamvedanabhāge bādhāsamabhavād ābhāsamātram eva sambhavadbhāham iha nirdhiṣṭam); in this case the svātma° of the kārikā is to be understood in the sense of ābhāsa (p. 373 tadā ca sūtre 'pi svātmagrahanam ābhāsātātparyena yojyam). Abh. (İPV I pp. 265-6) indicates yet another possible interpretation of the kārikā as a whole, which is really rather contrived, but is, in the end, not far removed from the general meaning considered so far. As regards the sense in which the expression svābhāsa is used in the logical schools of Buddhism (grāḥakābhāsa and svasamvedana) cf. Hattori 1968: 101 ff.

11 Also the invalidating-invalidated relation is therefore possible only thanks to the subject's freedom to act on cognitions that are themselves unrelated and therefore incapable, except in a uselessly general way, of being in opposition to one another. According to the Śaiva view, an invalidating condition is one which interrupts the continuation of the result of another (İPVV II p. 372 yat yasya phalānuyrtihāngam karoti, tat tasya bādhakam; cf. Rastogi 1986) which presupposes precisely the continuity and oneness of the knowing subject. See also SD IV.15 ff.

12 This kārikā voices an objection expressed from the point of view of the Buddhist logicians (İPVV II p. 376 dharmottaropādhyāyādīdarśitam), according to
The cognition of the absence of the jar – ‘on this surface there is no jar’ – is precisely the cognition of the empty surface (kevalabhūtalajñānam eva), since the empty surface appears as the absence of the jar. Analogously, one may say that the cognition of mother-of-pearl whom the invalidating-invalidated cognition relation does not need any single subject on which to base itself, but it is the correct cognition that entails by itself alone, implicitly, the non-validity of every other different cognition of its object. The principle is the same – as pointed out in the kārikā – as the one underlying the explanation of the concept of non-being (abhāva) and non-perception (anupalabdhi) given by Dharmottara in the NBT. The cognition of the absence of the jar, though being in itself distinct from that of the empty surface, is essentially connected with it, just as determined cognition is linked to perception and represents its subsequent stage: the same cognitive act embraces both of them (cf. NBT pp. 122-123). Dharmottara here depends directly on Dharmakirti, who had extensively debated the question in several of his works (PV, PVSV, HB, NB). The essential points of Dharmakirti’s conception – which he sharply distinguishes from his teacher Ísvarasena’s adarsānamātra (Steinkellner 1966: 75 ff; 1992: 315) – may be summarized as follows (I refer to HB pp. 21-28*). Non-perception is not a distinct pramāṇa connected with a particular prameya of its own (abhāva), as for instance Kumārila maintains. It consists in a positive perception of something that exists, a perception and object that however are different from the cognizer’s expectation (anupalabdhi, anabhāva, vivaksitopalabdher anyatvat) and in this way reveal an absence. From the positive perception of an ‘other’ thing one may pass to the cognition of the absence of the thing intended only on determinate conditions: first of all, that the two things possess an equal capacity to suscitate a certain cognition (avisistayogatā) and that therefore they are necessarily associated in a single cognitive act, and, furthermore, that for the thing that is the object of negation there subsist all the conditions necessary for its perception (listed in NB II. 13-14). The cognition of the absence is immediate: the perception of the one thing alone entails the determination of the absence of the other (bhāvasiddhir evāparasyābhāvasiddhiḥ). Seeing that a surface is empty – in the classical example – is knowing that the vase is not there (tasya kaivalyam aparasya vaikalyam). If this is possible, it is because it is the very nature of every cognition to define its object contextually by excluding the other (tat paricchinatti tadanyad vyavacchinatti). As Dharmakirti states several times using different arguments, we are not dealing with an inferential process here, by which from the being there of the other we arrive (via mediation) at the not being there of the thing aimed at, because between the two there is no real sambandha on which the relation of linga-lingin may rest (na vai kutāścit sambandhād anyabhāvas tadbhāvagamaka āstah, kim tv anyabhāva eva tadbhāvah). The non-perception therefore directly reveals the absence of a thing (abhāva) and promotes the use (verbalization etc.) of this notion in practice (abhāvavyavahāra). Anupalabdhi may be used as a hetu to establish abhāvavyavahāra, but only when it is a question of illuminating and guiding a torpid intellect (mūdhuprajiputram) that needs to arrive by degrees at a notion that is, on the contrary, immediate in a normal person.
is, at the same time, the cognition of the absence of silver, since there is no mutual identification between mother-of-pearl and silver. And therefore it is the very perception that constitutes by itself the invalidating cognition (*pratyakṣam bādhakam*). – 7 –

8. That is inadmissible. From the cognition of the empty surface all that is proved is merely that this surface is not a jar (tasyāghatātmā), and not the absence on it of a jar that is accessible to perception (upalabdhiyogyasya)\(^\text{13}\).

– From the cognition of an empty surface it is proved that this surface is not a jar, but not that on this substratum there is not a distinct jar, capable for its part [if it were there] of being the object of sight. – 8 –

\(^{13}\)Utp.'s reply is based on the distinction between two types of *abhāva*: *tādāmya*° 'the surface is not the jar' and *vyatireka*° 'on that surface there is no jar' (the two terms recur in *IPV* and *IPVV*; the Navyanyāya would say *samānādhikaraṇa*°-vyadhikaranābāhāvā or anyonya°-samsargābāhāvā, cf. Matilal 1968: 50, 116, 148; or *tādāmya*° – samsargābāhāvā, cf. Jha 1981: 184-187); in the first the possibility of perception has no part, in the second it is essential. The example proposed by the Buddhists would be valid only in the first case, but not in the case that interests them here, in which the negation is not generalized but concerns, according to their own formulation, an object characterized by hypothetical visibility (*drṣyatva*). Its application to *vyatirekābāhāvā* is erroneous for *atiprasāṅga* (*IPV* I p. 374). The same point had already been made by Kumarila in the ŚV (*Abhavapariccheda*, in particular vv. 38-39 and Pārthasarathimisra's lucid explanation in the *Nyāyaratnakara*). Dharmakīrti had also foreseen this possible objection to his own theory: if the reference to the cognition that simultaneously defines its object and excludes that which is other may serve to account for the immediacy of the cognition of absence, what results, however, is a generalized negation concerning all that is other than the object effectively perceived, thus rendering impossible the application of those distinctions (*ekajñānasamsargi, upalabdhiyakṣanapraṇāpta*) mentioned above (HB p. 26* yady ekaparicchedād evaṇavyavacchedadhā sidhyati, survasānyasyāviśesena tatābhāvasiddhir bhavet, na tulyayogāvasthāyaśaiva; upalabdhiyakṣanapraṇāptaśaṇuupalabdhir abhāvasādhaniḥ viśesām ca na vaktavyam, anupalabdhiyakṣanapraṇāptānām api tatra vyavacchedāt). Dharmakīrti replies by referring to the narrow sense in which the term ‘other’ is to be understood in the context of the *anupalabdhi*, as explicitly stated at the beginning (ibid. p. 22* aviśiṣṭayogatārūpayor ekajñāna-samsarginoh parasparāpeksam evānyatvam ihābhhipretam). In conclusion, from the non-perception, as it has been defined, there follows the determination of the absence of something definite in a definite time and place (p. 27 *tasmād yathoktād evānupalambhāt* kunācit kadācit kasyacid abhāvasiddhiḥ).
9. The surface is always a separate and distinct reality (viviktam), since things are self-contained (svātmaniṣṭhitēḥ); and therefore how can the cognition of it sometimes (jātu) lead to establishing the not being there of a thing distinct from it?

– The surface is always separate from what is other than itself and so how can the cognition of it establish only in some cases (kadācid eva) the absence on it of a distinct entity, such as the jar. The separation from a distinct jar (bhinnaghataviviktā) might be an occasional aspect (kādācitkam rūpam) of the surface only provided that also the association with that jar (ghatasahitatāpi) sometimes constitutes its own form. But this is not the case: there are always two things, each self-contained, and the association (sāhityam) between them is not another individual entity which, though distinct from them, comprises both of them (tadatirik-tam ubhayātmakam). However [the objector replies], a single cognitive act in which the two manifestations appear associated (ubhayābhāsasamsargātmakam) constitutes in itself the absence of another cognition in which only one of the two is manifested (ekābhāsajñānāntarābhāvārū-

14 Utp.'s objection serves to induce his opponent to play the last card he was saving, in a sense his most important one, that on which the Buddhist conception of the anupalahādhi rests, and which gives it its originality. In order that the non-perception of a thing A may define its absence, all the conditions of perceptibility must exist (both as regards the thing and the subject), and there must be the positive perception of a thing B (and this is the essential point) which enters into such a relation with A that a single cognitive act must necessarily grasp both of them (NBT p. 101 ekendriyajñānāgrāhyam locanādipramidhānābhimukham vastudvāyan anyo- yāpeksam ekajñānasamsargi kathvate). If this cognitive act takes place and only B is perceived this means that A is absent. It is in this sense that the Buddhist equation – perception of B equals absence of A – must be understood (NBT p. 118 ar-thajñāne eva pratyaksasya ghatusyābhāva ucycate). This is – as we have seen (kārikā 7) – perfectly homologous to the Buddhist explanation of bādhā: cognition of mother-of-pearl equals invalidation of cognition of silver.

15 What guides Utp.’s criticism, here as elsewhere, is his intent to underline the immobility of phenomenal reality (objects, cognitions taken in themselves etc.), in order to make the affirmation of an ‘I’ necessary, as the only source of that dynamism which is present at all levels of practical reality, and which renders it possible. In doing this he cannot but find himself continually disputing with the Buddhists, who in certain respects take the opposite path. Here he denies that sāhitya, ghataśahitatā is something that may be perceived when space is perceived, as its nature; it is not an objective given, it is merely a mental construct (IPVV II p. 384 vikalpanumātram etat). This subject is dealt with extensively by Abh. following on from the tīkā (cf. ibid. p. 383).
pam)\textsuperscript{16}. [A cognitive act] nevertheless [it is replied] delimits the object I 7.9 as being self-contained: the determination of the absence of the jar does not occur as a direct consequence of the datum (\textit{na vastubalena}), as is the case, on the contrary, in the determination of the existence of the place, which depends on the perception of the place. However [the objector says] it can be arrived at through the absence of the effect, that is, through the absence of a single cognition in which the two things are manifested\textsuperscript{17}. Not even this is admissible: it would be a cognition arrived at through mediation (\textit{vyavadhānena prafitih}), whereas the establishment of the [empty] place derives immediately from the sight of it (\textit{pradeśa-darśanād eva})\textsuperscript{18}. – 9 –

10. However, on the surface in question there is a beam of light, or – for the blindman – a soft, warm, etc. tactile sensation: it is these perceptions that establish on this surface the non-identification of their object with the jar\textsuperscript{19}.

\textsuperscript{16} The opponent shows that he is perfectly aware (who can be more so than a Buddhist?) that \textit{sāhitya} does not belong to the sphere of things, but to the sphere of cognitions (cf. e.g. \textit{PV I. 87} \textit{samsṛjyante na bhidyante svato 'ṛthāḥ pāramārthikāḥ / rūpam ekam anekam ca tesi buddher upaplavah}) and reformulates his position in less equivocal terms. Utp.'s reply is developed by Abh. in \textit{IPVV II pp. 384} (\textit{pratītiśayaḥ paryavyast hiti}) – 385. Dharmaśīrī for his part might say that if such an 'association' (\textit{sahītā, samsāra}) is not a given fact (\textit{vastu}), it is however present in cognition and it is reverberated by cognition on the things that gave rise to it (in the background lies the principle expounded in \textit{PV I. 109} \textit{ekapratyayavāmārasaya hetvāḥ dhīḥ abhedīnā / ekadhāhīhetubbhāvaḥ vyakṣīnām āpy abhinīnāvātāvātā,}).

\textsuperscript{17} The Buddhist opponent, put on the spot, thus ends up by presenting the negative judgement «on the surface there is no jar» as an inference, coinciding substantially with the first of the eleven types described in \textit{NB II. 30 ff.} (reduced to three in \textit{HB}), \textit{svabhāvānupalabdhi}; as Kamalāśīla points out in \textit{TSP p. 587} and as results precisely from its formulation in the \textit{vṛtti}, it is resolved in a \textit{kāryānupalabdhi}. The Buddhist has therefore illicitly changed plane and Utp. promptly points this out. Buddhist logic is perfectly aware of the dual level of the negative judgement (\textit{NBT p. 123} \textit{ato drṣṭyanupalambho 'bhāvacitānaṁ kṛtām pravartavati na tu akṛtām karoti abhāvaviveco 'nupalambhat pravrtti 'pi pratyakṣena kṛto 'nupalambhena pravartita ukta iti}) and, as has been seen (cf. above n. 12), admits the presentation of the negation in terms of inference only to demonstrate the \textit{abhinuvyayavahāra} in certain cases. This final shift in perspective is thus equivalent to a surrender.

\textsuperscript{18} This is also the Buddhist position restated so often (cf. e.g. \textit{HB p. 27*} \textit{dārśanānimitum vyavadhānena vinedam astūm tu nāstīti}), that the Buddhist interlocutor ended up, however, by contradicting.

\textsuperscript{19} After criticizing the opposing thesis, Utp. now puts forward his own: it is 'unknown to the ancients' (\textit{IPV I p. 376} \textit{cirantarair aparidṛṣṭām}; Bh. \textit{ibid.}, \textit{ciran-
The verbal formulation and relative behaviour (vyavahartum) ‘there is the absence of the jar on this surface, there is no jar’ can be legitimately brought about by sight or another sense (ālokādi) only once they have directly perceived in the place in question a beam of light or, in the shadows, a warm, soft etc. tactile sensation constituting in the first case the absence of the shape of the jar, and in the second of its tangible form.

11. A pisāca is a different thing from light (anālokah); [nevertheless] being invisible, he may reside within the light, just as he may be within the surface in question: from every point of view (sarvathā) his presence may not be denied.

On the basis of what has been said, the fact that light is a different thing from the pisāca does not entail the negation of its presence within the light. The pisāca is, in fact, invisible and, though it is different from the light, it can reside within the light, in the same way in which it can without any difficulty also reside within a ball of clay. Therefore the absence of the pisāca, as he is not visible, is not proved both from the point of view of the opposing doctrines and of our own.

It is to be noted that here the word āloka is used in the same sentence first in the sense of ‘light’, then in that of ‘sight’. [I was mistaken; see above Foreword]

In the opponent’s eyes, the Śaiva conception runs the risk of making the vyatirekābhāva, which is essential in practical reality, become an undifferentiated tādātmyābhāva, consequently including even the negations of what is imperceptible by nature. Indeed, this verse confirms that the Śaiva and Buddhist theories fully agree on this point.
12. Thus the cognition of mother-of-pearl may appear as the non-being of the cognition of silver; however, it cannot reveal the non-validity of the former cognition of silver.

- The cognition of mother-of-pearl in itself appears as the non-being of the cognition of silver; but through the direct cognition of mother of pearl which takes place at that particular moment (tadānīntana) one does not obtain the non-validity (aprāmānyam) of a distinct cognition of silver that occurred in the past.

13. Not even inference can account for the invalidation of a cognition, due to the property-possessor not being established (dharmaśiddhe)23; on the contrary the invalidation, established on the basis of everyone’s inner experience (svasamvedanasiddhā)24, is coherently explained (yuktā) as deriving from a unitary knowing subject.

- At the moment of the cognition of mother-of-pearl the former cognition of silver no longer subsists. Therefore, since the property-possessor is not established, the invalidation may not be explained in terms of inference25. On the contrary, it is explained (sidhyati) by maintaining that it is in the self-awareness (svasamvedane) – consisting in the unitary

22 The discussion now returns to the invalidating-invalidated cognition relation, after this long digression on the concept of negation has furnished the elements needed to clarify the crux of this relation and its implications.

23 The preceding kārikās have shown that, remaining in the sphere of the Buddhist conception, perception alone is not able to account for the invalidation (bādhā) of a cognition. Nor, this kārikā adds, would a possible Buddhist recourse to inference achieve this purpose. ‘Also’ (api), as Abh. suggests, may also refer to dharmyāśiddher; in this case there would be an allusion to the asiddhi of the reason adduced, as well as of the property-possessor. The dharmyāśiddhi is a form of logical fallacy (hetvābhāsa), included by Dharmakīrti in the asiddha type (NB III.65 dharmyāśiddhāv api asiddhā yathā sarvagata ātmeti sādhya sarvatropalabhyamānāgatvam). On the meaning and translation of the term dharmaśi see Kitagawa 1960: 387.

24 I translate it in this way on the basis of the immediate meaning, which – I believe – remains valid, even if the vṛtti chooses to make a so-to-speak concentric meaning emerge in its place, which contains the analytic explanation of bādhā.

25 In fact, the inference would be as follows: the cognition of silver (dharmin) is faulty (dharma) because of the cognition of mother-of-pearl, or of the cognition ‘it is not silver’, or also because the thing in question becomes the object of two contradictory cognitions (three possible hetus). The fault, as the vṛtti makes clear, lies in the fact that at the moment of the inference the cognition of silver, produced in the past and momentary according to the Buddhists, no longer exists. The fault of asiddhi may also be attributed to the possible hetus (cf. ṚVV II p. 397).
17.13 knowing subject – that the relation constituted by the two cognitions referring to a single object is manifested (ekadesāvaṣṭamhhyubhayājñānamayasambhandhabhāsanāt). The congruence with reality which is subsequently ascertained (paścātsamvādah), and which causes one to say that the one cognition is valid and the other is not, can take place insofar as the former cognition is also manifested in the self-awareness of the present direct perception. The determination of the congruence also depends on the unitary knowing subject26. – 13 –

14. Thus ordinary worldly activity, whether pure or impure27, is experienced as resting on the Lord associated (khacite)28 with the manifestation of greatly differentiated objective realities.

– All practical activity, based on differentiation due to the power of māya, is pure for those who possess such knowledge, impure for those who are blind because of nescience29. It is possible to grasp, through direct experience (sambhāvyate 'nubhāvena), that all this daily practical activity is founded on the Blessed One30, engaged in the manifestation of the various differentiated realities. – 14 –

26 Two stages may be distinguished in the invalidating process: firstly a conflict (virodha) between two cognitions, and then the ascertainment of their congruence with reality (samvāda) on the basis of their ability to produce the expected results etc. Virodha is possible, Abh. continues on the basis of the fikā (ĪPV V II pp. 403-4), only if there is a single and unitary subject of the two cognitions (virodhasya kāraṇam Yad ekāśrayatvam tat sati ekasmin pramāturi jñeyam); similarly, samvāda, taking place only after (paratah) the cognitions, requires the unifying action of the subject. Therefore, since the invalidation depends on virodha and samvāda and these in turn depend on a single cognizer, it follows that the invalidation also depends on this.

27 In the activity of everyday life (vyavahāra) there is an impure aspect, consisting of sales, purchases, quarrels etc., in which the vulgar man is immersed, and a pure aspect, consisting of teaching, meditation, initiation, ritual ceremonies pertaining to the man who has entered on the path of freedom. The value of this division is, however, far from being absolute and diminishes with the gradual elevation of consciousness.

28 Glossed (ĪPV I p. 390, ĪPV V II p. 404) with svuṇūṇaṃsanyathābhāvena uparakte.

29 I.e. sakala, pralayākala and vijñānākala (ibid. p. 406).

30 Practical reality is possible as such in that it is rooted in the Supreme Consciousness and this may be known through direct experience itself (i.e. not through inference). This experience is accessible also to obtuse souls incapable of arriving at it immediately, through meditation and the repeated practice of this teaching. (cf. ibid. p. 405).
Chapter VIII

1. However (kevalam), the manifestations sometimes depend on the direct sensory experience which takes place at that very moment (tātkālikākṣasāmaksya) at other times they do not, as in the case of the blindman, darkness etc.

– Sometimes the manifestations are conveyed by the present direct experience, thus determining the cognition that may be formulated as ‘this is a jar’; on the contrary, in the case of darkness etc. they derive from a former perception. – 1 –

2. On the contrary, there is no difference (viśeṣaḥ) in the intrinsic existence (sattāyām) of the manifestation of the object within the sphere of the mental constructs regarding future, present or past objects.

– In the mental constructs that follow direct perception (pratyakṣa-prṣṭhāpātiṣu), such as memory and conjecture, or in the others that are not dependent on it (svatantra), concerning the three times, the manifestation of the object remains internally the same.

3. Even if pleasure etc. and the causes of the states of pleasure etc. are real (vastuṣu) and their manifestation exists (sadbhaive), nevertheless,

1 Here kevalam introduces a qualification of the general statement that concluded the previous āhṅika: the whole fabric of phenomenal existence has its reality within the Lord.

2 This explains how the ābhāsas differ in clearness or vividness (sphutatva; ĪPV I p. 402-3). The vividness of an ābhāsa depends on its association with the ābhāsa ‘direct experience’. This is missing, therefore, when the subject is in the dark or blind (but not born blind) and is replaced by its reconstruction on the basis of former direct experiences. On the contrary, this is altogether absent in the case of a person who is born blind, unless one acknowledges (ĪPVV II p. 408) that it occurs through the latent traces left by former existences.

3 The ābhāsa ‘blue’ is essentially the same whether it appears associated with the ābhāsa ‘I see’ or ‘I remember’ or ‘I imagine’. Similarly the ābhāsa ‘seeing’ remains essentially the same even if it is associated in turn with the ābhāsa ‘blue’, ‘jar’ etc. In the end everything, without distinction, takes on the form ‘I’ (I perceive, I remember, I imagine. the colour blue; cf. ĪPVV II p. 409).
I 8.3 because they belong to the past, an effective similar condition of pleasure is not produced (tathāsthitih).

- The manifestations of pleasure, pain etc. and those of the factors that cause them, though they always exist internally, do not bring about a state of joy etc. because, due to their belonging to the past [in the case in question], they have no external existence at the present moment and only the manifestations that exist at the present moment (tadātvaviśiṣṭānām) are able to produce the above mentioned state. – 3 –

4. If, however, pleasure etc. is intensely reproduced (gādham ullikhyāmāne) through mental representation, then that same state (tathāsthitih) comes about in the subject, in the same way, since he vividly experiences that pleasure.

- Reproduced through an autonomous mental representation with particularly intense effort, pleasure etc. becomes completely vivid and causes, in the same way, joy (vikāsa) etc. – 4 –

5. External existence (bāhyatā) is to be considered an accessory condition (upadhih) and not the very essence (atmā) of the manifestations of being and non-being. These, therefore, insofar as they are inner manifestations, always exist.

4 Similar to that experienced in the past, when that particular pleasure and its causes were present.

5 The negative, required by meaning and supported by all three commentaries, is based on reading the compound tathāsthitih as tathā-a-sthitih, thus attributing to the negative particle the sense of prasajyapatrisedha (the only one to say so explicitly is Bh I p. 406). Tathā may also not be considered part of the compound that follows, but tathāsthitih must, in any case, appear joined (as it stands for tathā asthitih); however it is only so in Bh’s yojanā and never in the kārikās or quotations in IPV and IPVV.

6 United with the I.

7 I.e. like that deriving from an ‘external’ pleasure.

8 Utp. specifies that it is vikalpa ‘autonomous’ in order to exclude memory, which – like determinate knowledge or judgement – is strictly dependent on direct perception (cf. text note 425). The role of memory is limited to supplying the object for the mental evocation, which having freed it from its ties with a particular past time, place and subject, brings it so vividly back to consciousness that it appears as if it were altogether new (see ibid. p. 411; cf. also kārikā I. 4. 2).

9 On vikāsa (‘expansion’, joy) see Gnoli 1968: 46-47.
— All the various manifestations, concerning both being and non-being, even if they do not appear as external, nonetheless have an existence (sattāstya eva), for instance in memory and so on. The fact that they exist externally is only an accessory condition and not their own form. The same is true of the manifestation of ‘non-being’, even though this [only] has an internal existence (antarhsattāyām api), since it does not exist externally10. — 5 —

6. These manifestations being internal (antaratvāt), insofar as they are one with the knowing subject, cannot have causal efficiency which presupposes differentiation. Even when the condition of externality [of the manifestations as regards the knowing subject] exists, the causal efficiency is differentiated on the basis of the differentiation of the manifestations (bhinābhhāsabhedataḥ).

— Even if all the various manifestations, such as blue, pleasure etc. permanently exist within, nevertheless, precisely because they consist only in the knowing subject, they do not possess causal efficiency, which is based on the differentiation typical of the relation of cause and effect etc. Even if there is the condition of differentiation from the knowing subject, causal efficiency, being linked to the manifestations, is seen to be differentiated according to whether it pertains to the form and so on, conforming with the diversity of the manifestations (e.g. their being mental, sensory etc.)11. — 6 —

7. Insofar as they are essentially constituted by consciousness (cinmayatve) the manifestations permanently reside internally; insofar as they are manifested as external owing to the power of māyā, they also exist externally.

— As their own form is consciousness the manifestations permanently reside internally. One speaks of external manifestation when the things, remaining unseparated from light (prakāśāvatītyatikteṣu) are made

10 Cf. ŚDVr p. 130 tad avasty api prakāśamānam cidrūpam eva, kevalām bāhye prakāśanabhāvād avastu ucyate. See ŚD III.78ab.
11 In other words, this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition: in order for a manifestation to produce a determinate effect a series of specifications and relations with other ābhāsas are also required. On causal efficiency (arthakriyā) see below p. 166.
I 8.7 by the power of māyā to appear (prakāśyamāneṣu)\(^{12}\) externally as the object of direct perception\(^{13}\). But even when they are directly perceptible (tadāpi) they do not cease, for this reason, in the final analysis to be internal. On the contrary, in the case of intending to create and so on (sisrksādau) even things come to be internal. – 7 –

8. Even the mental representation (ullekhah) which occurs in the sphere of discursive thought (vikalpe) is external, because it appears in terms of separation (prthakprathah). Indeed, internality is unity with the

\(^{12}\) By using the causative form the \textit{vṛtti} seeks to underline the heteronomy (pāratantrya) of the manifestations of objective reality which ordinary experience dominated by the power of māyā tends to consider extraneous to and independent of consciousness. On the other hand, grammatical speculation is able to place the correct limits on a statement such as this, which, if taken literally, runs the risk of leading one just as far from the truth as that against which it was advanced. If the responsibility for the action of becoming manifest, of shining (prakāś-) rested solely with the primary subject of the causative (hetu) or, in other words, with consciousness, this would mean that the subject were completely extraneous to the reality of light – and in that case truly bāhyā, or from the Śaiva point of view, a mere nothing. But as Bhartrhari says (cf. VP III. 7. 122-128), the subject of the action induced, in the causative form, can only be someone who possesses the requirements to act as a free agent of it (cf. the passage in Abh.'s lost Śivadrṣṭyālocana quoted in PTV p. 225, preryo 'pi sa bhaved yasya śaktatā nāma vidyate) (Torella 1987: 157-58). The meaning of the causative does not go beyond the, more or less, cogent stimulation of the \textit{hetu} so that the \textit{kārtr} performs the action in question: only what is in itself able to shine or, in other words, that which is essentially light, may be made to appear or shine (cf. also TĀ X. 38-45a). The status of the \textit{ābhāsa} is thus to be found in this delicate balance between svātantrya and pāratantrya.

\(^{13}\) Abh. (ĪPVV II pp. 21-2), following the thread of the \textit{fīkā}, deals at length with the various implications contained in the expression 'as directly perceptible' (pratyaksatvena), and he begins by imagining the surprise of those who expected to see also the \textit{vikalpas} (particularly those termed 'independent') mentioned in this context. Utp. is here primarily concerned with underlining what contrasts with what is commonly accepted – in this case claiming the ultimate internality of what is considered external \textit{par excellence} (the object of \textit{pratyakṣa}) –, whereas the internality of the \textit{vikalpas} is generally taken for granted and thus it is not worth expressly stating it. On the contrary, what has to be demonstrated – and this once again conflicts with the general opinion – is precisely the real externality of the \textit{vikalpas} and this is done in the following stanza. Later this externality ultimately comes to rest on a fundamental internality, which is common to every reality. But \textit{pratyaksatvena} in the \textit{vṛtti} may also have another function: this expression may refer to all types of \textit{ābhāsa} – whether sensory or mental – being directly present to the consciousness, and thus to their indiscriminate \textit{satyatā}. 
knowing subject (pramātraikatmyam), externality is separation from him\(^\text{14}\.

-The mental representation of the jar etc. in the sphere of discursive thought, though not the object of the senses such as sight, is nonetheless external insofar as it is manifested as separate [from the subject]. Indeed, internality is the reflective awareness ‘I’ (ahamvimarśah), externality is the reflective awareness ‘this’\(^\text{15}\). Thus for things - such as the jar and so on - there are two kinds of externality, that is, they are the object of cognition through both the external and internal senses; for pleasure and so on there is one, in that they are cognised only by the internal senses. - 8 -

9. Owing to the will of the Lord mental representations and pleasure etc. are manifested to consciousness as external, in the same way as [also owing to the will of the Lord] the manifestation - in the form of direct perception - of what pertains to the planes of realities perceptible by the eye etc. (akṣyādibhuvām) is external.

-The manifestation (prakāśah)\(^\text{16}\) of mental representations and pleasure, pain, shame etc. that takes place through the mind (bauddhah)\(^\text{17}\) is no different from that which, having the form of direct perception due to the power of the Lord\(^\text{18}\), concerns those realities that can be perceived by the eye, such as shapes etc. - 9 -

\(^{14}\) One must keep in mind the background against which this discussion of the externality of the abhāsa in direct perception and in vikalpa takes place. Indeed externality has been declared the sine qua non condition on which the existence of causal efficiency depends (and it cannot be denied that the vikalpas, too, are able to produce effects); and this dependence is invoked in order to refute the satyata-arthakriyākārītvam identification, upheld by the Buddhists. The vrūti distinguishes between two forms of this general externality, according to whether the abhāsa is the object of both the external and internal senses, or internal only.

\(^{15}\) Or to put it more clearly, becoming conscious of the object in terms of ‘I’ (unity, internality) or of ‘this’ (separation, externality).

\(^{16}\) Once again the problem arises of how to translate the term prakāśa, whilst preserving its density of meaning (light, manifestation, presence to consciousness and therefore also coming to light, perception, knowledge etc.).

\(^{17}\) If this knowing is called bauddha – in spite of the fact, a hypothetical objector notes, the actual grāhaka is in this case the manas – it is because it is concluded by the act of the niścaya, which is pertinent to the buddhi (ĪPVV II pp. 430-31).

\(^{18}\) Isvara is the ultimate source of all manifestations. This is so not only in the case of those that are the object of perception as external objects, which appear more
10. On the basis of what has been said (tad) without a unity of cognitions ordinary worldly activity would not be possible. It is on the unity of light that the unity of the various cognitions is based and this unitary light is precisely the one knowing subject. This has been definitively established.

- Indeed, practical activity is based on the unification (anusamdhānena) of the various cognitions, which are in themselves separate from one another, and the unification of the cognitions is constituted by the light-principle, which is unitary in itself. This unitary light is precisely the knowing subject, one, called the Supreme Self. – 10 –

11. And precisely this knowing subject is Mahēśvara, insofar as he is characterized by indefectible reflective awareness (vimṛśattvena niyatena). In fact, in God this awareness is pure knowledge and action.

- Mahēśvara is the supreme self, whose nature is consciousness, with his own primary indefectible nature constituted by reflective awareness. In this consciousness-principle, called Śiva, whose essence is everything, there is absolutely pure knowledge and action, being none other than the reflective awareness ‘I’ (ahāmvimarśanam eva). In Īśvara, on the contrary, knowledge and action, connected as they are with an object assumed to be partly differentiated (bhinnābhinnā), are to be considered partially pure (suddhāśuddhe). Referring then to an objective reality assumed to be differentiated, as happens on the plane of the individual subject, knowledge and action, informed respectively by sattva and rajas, or in other words by light and activity, contracted by tamas, are called impure.

– 11 –

as independent from the limited subject, but also in the case of those that might seem solely determined by the individual's will, such as mental representations, fantasies etc. Similarly, as Somananda says (see ŚD I. 44 and vrūti), the jar is produced by the potter but only insofar as his creativity is contained within the all-pervading creativity of the Lord.
SECTION II. ACTION

CHAPTER I

1. Therefore, also the objection raised earlier – ‘an action that is both unitary and successive, belonging to a unitary subject is not admissible’¹ – was rejected through the demonstration of the existence of the unitary consciousness.

   – Through the demonstration of the unitary consciousness-principle the activity related to the unitary subject is proved unitary. Thus even the objections against action are found to be confuted. – 1 –

2. Succession pertains to ordinary action, which is dependent on the power of Time; it is not, however, admissible for divine eternal action, as it is not for the Lord.

   – The action of entities that, due to the power of māyā, appear differentiated, is successive, being dependent on the power of Time²; but that action, informed by the awareness of the self, without beginning or end, which is the very essence of the Lord, is not. – 2 –

3. Time is the transit of the sun etc., or the birth of this or that flower and so on, or also heat and cold. Or time, in reality, is nothing but the succession (krama eva) characterized by these elements.

¹ This is the Buddhist objection expressed in kārikā I. 2.9.
² On the power of Time as the cause of the passing from the One to the many the ‘locus classicus’ is VP I. 3 and vṛtti; cf. also III. 9. 46. The distinction between the working of māyāsakti (the differentiation between things, and between things and the subject) and kālaśakti (the introduction of succession into activity) is found in almost the same terms in Helarāja’s commentary on VP III. 3. 83 (akrame ‘pi brahmaṇi bhedāvabhāsanam avidyākṛtam / tairāiva kramāvabhāsanam kālākhyāsvātantryasaktikṛtam); cf. Aklujkar 1970: 122 n. 39; Iyer 1969: 125-26. Abh. (IPVV III p. 10) synthetically defines the power of Time in the following words: bhagavata eva ābhāsānābhāsaprathunāsamartatā.
II 1.3  – Time consists of various actions that are common knowledge in everyday experience\(^3\), or of cold and so on. Or rather, time is the succession itself – characterized by these – which is an accessory qualification (\(^\text{\textdegree}upādhi\text{\textdegree}) of all the various realities in their being manifested as differentiated; time is nothing but this succession, because it is through it that temporal differentiations are established. – 3 –

4. Succession is based on differentiation and this in turn derives from the existence or non-existence of a certain manifestation (\(ābha\text{\textdegree}sadasat-tvatah\)). The existence or non-existence of manifestations depends on the Lord, who is he who determines their multiform appearance.

– The cause of succession in things is the very action of the Lord, directed to the multiform appearance of the manifestations differentiated in their nature and mutually exclusive\(^4\). – 4 –

5. Through the variety of physical forms he causes spatial succession to appear; through the manifestation of the variety of actions the Lord also causes temporal succession to appear\(^5\).

– In the case of many entities, there is spatial succession through the manifestation of mutual diversity and temporal succession through actions. However, with reference to a single entity there is only temporal succession due to different actions such as birth, existence, change etc.\(^6\) – 5 –

\(^3\) The same idea (that the name 'time' is given to those realities able to act as a reference point, or 'measure' for the others) is found expressed in VP III. 9.77 kriyāntaraparicchedaparvrttā yā kriyāṃ prati / nirjñātaparimāṇā sā kāla ity abhidhiyate //. 'That (activity), the measure (of time) of which is well-known and which is employed in measuring (the duration of) any other activity, with regard to (any other) activity, is called time' (transl. Sharma 1972: 101).

\(^4\) This is my translation of the expression "anyonyābhāsāśūnyā", guided also by a passage in IPV (II p. 16), which recurs in almost the same terms in IPVV. Different manifestations may implicate each other, referring to a single substratum, such as 'red', 'jar' etc. or may be completely distinct from each other such as 'jar', 'cloth'; obviously not in the first case, but not even in the second – where the two things, though unrelated, may coexist in a single cognitive act (yugapad evaikaśāνena sphurantā Bh II p. 16) – is there succession. On the contrary, succession is only possible if the manifestations are such that the presence of the one necessarily excludes that of the other, as in the case of autumn and winter.

\(^5\) On kāla / kriyā and desa / mūrti see VP I.1 Vṛttī pp. 2, 9 (and Paddhati pp. 5, 9); see also VP III.7.153 and Helaraja's commentary; Prakṛtinakapakāśa I p. 117.

\(^6\) Together with growth, decline and disappearance they constitute the six modifications of existence (bhāvavikāra; cf. Nirukta I.2.8-9).
6. In all things (sarvatra) the diversity of the manifestations is the source of temporal succession for those knowing subjects such as the void etc., whose light is discontinuous (vicchinnabhāsāḥ), but not for the knowing subject who shines once and for ever (sakrt).

- In every object diversified manifestation determines the appearance of temporal succession [exclusively] for the knowing subject who identifies himself with the void, the body and so on. Indeed, apart from memory, what was manifested in the past (prākālāḥ) does not shine in the same manner at the present moment, and it is with reference to his own present (svavartamānāpeksayā) that the subject may use the notions of past and future in everyday experience. On the contrary, for the [true] knowing subject who shines uninterruptedly once and for ever (sakrdvibhātasya), there is no temporal differentiation, neither in himself nor as regards objects, since, as the shining is never interrupted, it is not possible to speak of repetition. – 6 –

7. Also spatial succession in things is manifested [only] to the limited knowing subject; on the contrary, to the unlimited subject things appear full of his own self, like his own self.

- With reference to the limited subject [only] things appear differentiated from the subject and from each other, and they are said to be far away etc., for the Lord, on the contrary – his essence being solely light – cannot be non-light (aprākārasambhavāt) with respect to anything, not even to an atom. The separation or distance from himself, or between things, does not appear to him who is light and only light. – 7 –

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7 That is, connected with preceding manifestations of the limited subject (cf. text note 17). Only through memory can the former shining of the object be revived, in some way; but this is a totally different question, already dealt with at length above (Uttarādhiṭikāra, āhnikas III-IV).

8 This is a reference – through a śaiva text (Sārṣastasamgraha according to ĪPVV III p. 23, Śivasūtra according to Spandasmādoha p. 25) – to sakrdvibhāta in Chāndogya Up. VIII.4.2. later taken up again by Gaudapāda in Māṇḍūkyakārikā III.36, IV.81; see also PTV p. 199. Consciousness shines ‘once only’ (this is the primary meaning of sakṛt), but as this shining is never interrupted the expression may also be taken in its secondary meaning of ‘constantly, always, once and for ever (cf. Abh.’s explanation in ĪPVV III pp. 21-22; see also ĪPVV II p. 262 sakrechabdona tu ekavāravācīnā sadārthaparyāyena vā vicchedāśāṅkā nivāritā). Sankara similarly glosses sakṛt in the passages quoted above with satatam.

9 Lit. ‘a compact mass of light’ (prakāśaghanasya).
II 1.8  8. Nevertheless, the manifestation of such a differentiation between subject and object of knowledge is the very creative power (nirmāṇaśaktiḥ) of the Lord (iṣituh), who knows thus.

   - The fact that the various entities existing as subject and object of knowledge are determined as differentiated from each other and from Parameśvara (or from the self), is [due to] the creative power of Parameśvara, who, yet, thus shines in absolute fullness, neither does his own permanent form ever in any way cease to exist as a consequence of this determination. – 8 –
CHAPTER II

1. The ideas of action, relation, universal, substance, space and time, which are based on unity and multiplicity, are to be considered real (satyāḥ), because of their permanence and efficacy (sthairyopayogābhyaṃ).

   The ideas of relation etc. are also real manifestations, just like action2, even if they regard both unity and multiplicity [at the same time]3. They can, in fact, be employed permanently with determinate practical results, and as such they are undeniable4. – 1 –

1 This second āhnikā aims at establishing that the categories acknowledged by the bāhyavādins (the reference is particularly to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) are acceptable only if seen from the Śaiva viewpoint. Otherwise they do not stand up to criticism (and the criticism par excellence is that of the Buddhist logicians). Cf. Torella 1992: 328-29.

2 The demonstration of the reality of action was implicit in that of the power of action discussed earlier. In the tīkā (cf. ÍPVV III pp. 36-37) Utp. refers to three different interpretations of the compound satyābhāsa – as karmadhārāya, śaṣṭhitapurusa and bahuvrīhi.

3 The principal objection the Buddhists make to these categories, which they place in the sphere of relative truth, is precisely that of viruddhadharmadhyasa.

4 The truth of a cognition is established here precisely by its not being contradicted by a subsequent cognition (sthairya) and by its leading to expected practical results (upayoga); see Abh.'s lucid formulation (ÍPVV III p. 29), satya eva yataḥ sthiro bādhakenānunmālīyavādavāṃ ca abhisamhitāyāṃ grāmāprāptilakṣānyāṃ kriyāyāṃ upayōgy. The key-term samvāda may be applied both to sthairya and to upayoga (cf. ibid. p. 69, asyām vyākhyāyāṃ bhāvasya arthakriyāṃ kurvata ekānekarūpata ēti kartavyata, ēτy evamāhūta upayoga uktah, sthairyam tu samvādaḥ; uttaravyākhyāne tu sthairyam bādhakābhāvah, upayogas tu samvādaḥ ēti bheda ēti). This may be compared with one of the classical explanations of the term, that given by Dharmottara (NBT p. 17, avisamvādakan jñānam samyagjñānam / loke ca pūrvam upadarśitam artham prāpayan samvādaka ucyate, tadvāt jñānam api svayaṃ pradarśitam artham prāpayat samvādaka ucyate (behind which lies Dharmakirti, PV II. 1 ... arthakriyāṣṭhitih / avisamvādanam...). On samvāda and related terms, such as avisamvādin etc. (and their different acceptions in the Buddhist exegetical tradition) see Katsura 1984: 222-24, Dreyfus 1991, Franco 1991: 49-50, van Bijlert 1989: 122-28.
2. In action etc. (tatra) there is one internal reality (āntaram tat-tvam); this, once it has become the object of sensory knowledge, becomes manifold depending on place, time and the specific shapes it assumes.

- The essential reality (tattvam) – which is by nature absolutely undivided (abhinnam eva) – becomes one and manifold because of the division into internal and external manifestation. [It becomes manifold] because of the multiplicity of the manifestations of the individual realities ("svalakṣaṇa"), constituted as they are by the different combination of external manifestations such as place, time, shape. – 2 –

3. The mind (manas), performing the function of determination following [the direct perception] (anuvyavasāyi), brings about conceptual

5 The vṛtti does not indicate the interpretation to be given of the word tatra. Abh. in his two commentaries suggests three interpretations that he considers equally possible: ‘in action etc.’, ‘given the reality of action etc.’, ‘as regards the unity and multiplicity of action etc.’. The fīkā, from which Abh. quotes the expression evaṁ sati (probably referring to tatra) glossed with vidyāmāne kriyādau tadgate ca satyaye (ĪPV V III p. 45), seems to indicate the second interpretation.

6 A reality, when it is completely identified with consciousness, in other words, when it is only consciousness (cinmātratayā), may not even strictly be referred to as one since the unity-multiplicity opposition only arises at a later stage. This is seen from the vṛtti, from its paraphrase in ĪPV V (see text note 36) and from what Abh. states a few lines earlier in ĪPV V III p. 45 nīlādīnām bhāvānām pāramārthikām yat āntaram samvinmātratālanām tat-tvam, tatra na kalanā kācid abhedaghanāt vād ekatāyā api tatra abhāvāt. The kārīka and the vṛtti become clearer once various levels of meaning have been recognized in the word āntaram. The primary meaning of āntaram is the absolute reality identified with the I; it coincides with the first of the two types of āntaram spoken of in ĪPV V II p. 416 (āntaratvam dvidhā ahan-tayā samśāratayā ca), later articulated (pp. 416-417) and dislocated along the scale of the principles (the highest āntaratvam corresponds to the plane of Paramēsvara): it is called abhinnam in the vṛtti. This absolute āntaratvam constitutes the ultimate foundation from which unity and multiplicity come into being on the phenomenal level. Unity is understood as a relative āntaratvam, which may be taken in more than one way (see ĪPV V III p. 45 yat tu āntaram abhāsāntaratānāmiṣrām antarāntaram, āntaram ca antahkaranamātratāvedyam tat-tvam ekam, tad ekam), and multiplicity is knowability on the part of the external senses, temporality, spatiality etc. Thus it becomes one-many (ekānekaṃ).

7 This is apparently the meaning indicated by ĪPV II pp. 43-44, aindriyaka nir-vikalpake ... / paścādbhāvinam vyavāsāyam niścayatāmakaṃ vikalpakaḥ anuvyavasāya-sabdavācyam. According to ĪPV V III p. 46 anuvyavasāya is the mental operation that occurs after the determinate awareness of the direct experience (anuvyavasāyaṃ sāksātκārvimarṣasya paścādbhāvinam vimarṣam ...). In any case, the term is not used here in the particular sense attributed to it in the Nyāya.
elaborations such as action and so on, which are based on these two and substantiated by the activity of the knowing subject.

- The conceptual elaborations such as action etc., carried out by the mind (mānasyah) and regarding both the external and internal plane – the mind being half way between them – are essentially the activity of the knowing subject (pramātṛvyāpārarūpāḥ). – 3 –

4. Things that are self-contained (svātmaniṣṭhāh) and are manifested separately (viviktābhāh), possess a unity in the sense of mutual connection within the unitary knowing subject. This is the basis of the ideas of relation.

- The various ideas of relation (sambandha) such as that expressed in the phrase ‘the king’s servant’, rest on the unity which derives from the connection on the internal plane (antah samanvayāt) and the differentiation of the two related terms externally. – 4 –

5. The conceptual elaborations of the manifestations of ‘universal’ and ‘individual substance’ also rest externally on unity, as well as on the differentiation of the individual realities and parts.

- The notions of ‘cows’ and ‘Caitra’ have as object, externally too, both the unity of manifestation represented respectively by the general

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8 I.e. ‘on the external and internal plane’ (according to the vṛtti), ‘on unity and multiplicity’ (according to Abh.). The two interpretations are equivalent in the light of the preceding kārikā.

9 As Abh. clarifies very well in the introduction to this stanza in his commentaries, Utp.’s intention here is to reply to the objection that might be raised by a Buddhist: these conceptual elaborations – which is what they are – do not take place at the time of the direct perception but later, when any contact with reality is precluded; therefore they are, in the absolute sense, unreal. In Utp.’s reply it is the continuity and dynamism of the I that guarantees the contact between these two moments of time, thus legitimating the working of the mind.

10 The absolute difference and self-containment of things, which is one of the pivots of Buddhist doctrine and the school of Dignāga in particular, finds its most well-known and rigorous expression in PV I 40ab (later taken up again in PVin: see Steinkellner 1973: I, 40-41) sarve bhāvāḥ svabhāvena svasvabhāvavavasthīteh ...

11 The two terms of the servant-king relation have an autonomous reality on the external level, but they cease to be separate once they are linked in the consciousness of the knowing subject. This does not mean that they become one, because in that case it would no longer be a relation: there is unification in separation (bheda-bheda).
II 2.5 configuration of cow and by the configuration of a particular man seen as a whole, and the multiplicity of manifestations typical of the individual realities (svalaksana°) and the various parts

6. The connection existing between the factors of the action (kārakānāṃ) is based on the awareness of the action (kriya°); the notions of space etc. rest on the connection between limit and limited.

- The notion of action is based on unity-multiplicity, insofar as the various factors that contribute to carrying out the action – wood, saucepan, Devadatta, rice - are internally linked to each other by the verb 'he cooks' and externally differentiated. Also spatial and temporal succession – given the mutual involvement of the objects which act as the limiting and limited element – is merely a particular case of relation characterized in the same way by unity and multiplicity. The notions of universal, individual substance, action, number etc. all rest on inherence (°samavāya°), which is a particular type of relation.

7. Thus the knowing subject who aspires to the production of determinate results may obtain them with an entity that is at the same time both differentiated and undifferentiated. Thus one may not speak of error (bhrāntih) as regards them.

- With the notions that have been discussed so far, that is, action and so on, which are both one and many, the knowing subject has the capacity to obtain the determinate effects he desired (which demonstrates their congruence with reality), accompanied by the continuity and homogeneity (°ānugunya°) of their manifestations. Therefore such notions are not erroneous.

12 The unity-multiplicity tension, which characterizes the series of concepts examined in this āhnika, is not reduced, as it might have seemed so far, to that of internal-external. In actual fact, for the concepts of jāti (universal) and of dravya (understood as individual entity constituted by a complex of parts) the double pole of unity-multiplicity is also to be found at the level of external reality, as the kārikā and vrtti indicate.

13 The notions of action etc., do not, that is, become subsequently contradicted by other cognitions: thus one has the requisite of sthairyā which, together with arthakriyāsamvāda (already mentioned), determines the empirical validity of a cognition.
1-2. The means of knowledge (pramāṇa) is that thanks to which the object is situated within its own confines (vyavatīṣṭhate)1 ‘this thing, with these characteristics’. This means of knowledge is an ever freshly arising light related to a subject (svābhāso ‘bhinvodayah)2. This light, whose essence is the inner reflective awareness of that which is thus manifested, becomes – as regards the object without spatio-temporal differentiations etc. and expressed by a single name – knowledge (mithā). [provided it is] not invalidated.

– The means of knowledge is that on which the setting of the object within its confines depends (vyavasthāpyamānatā), both as regards its mere being and the various possible qualifications such as permanence and so on. It consists precisely in the manifestation to a knowing subject of a new object (apūrvasvastu) as related to him (svatvena). And this very manifestation ‘this’ or ‘permanent’, which thus appears to the subject as separate and new, becomes the object of reflective awareness and finally valid knowledge (pramāṇa), whose stability is not undermined by

1 In the interpretation of the notion of vyavasthā- vyavasthāp- (which refers to the definitive establishment of something, both as regards its intrinsic nature and the other realities in whose context it is situated; ‘establish separately’) – so pregnant with meaning and untranslatable in a single word – I have kept in mind Abh.’s gloss (IPV II p. 68 niyatāṃ prakāśamaryādāṃ na ativartate).

2 Svābhāsa (together with viṣayābhāsa) characterizes the pramāṇa also in the opinion of Dignāga and his school (cf. PSV 1.9a, PS 1.11ab and vṛtti, PS 1.10 in particular). However in Dignāga, and in the Yogācāra view in general, sva refers to knowledge itself seen as the subject, whereas in the IPK it refers to the knowing subject and its centrality (cf. IPV II p. 73 svaṃ svatvena ṛṣabhasamāno ya ṛṣabha ...; Bh ibid. svaṃ – grāhakāśrayamamātāviṣayavāna; Utp.’s vṛtti pramāṇaḥ svaṃ apūrvasvastavabhasah). On pramāṇa as revealing a previously unknown object, cf. the second (and probably complementary) definition of pramāṇa in PV II.5c ajñātārthaprankāśo vā (Katsura 1984: 220, Dreyfus 1991: 25 ff., Franco 1991, van Bijlert 1989: 150-53).

3 According to Abh. (see text note 55), Utp. chooses to make these two terms masculine (in the kārīkā they were neuter), thus making them agree with ābhāsa, to state implicitly the single nature of the means of knowledge and of its objects (both being ābhāsas).
The object of such knowledge – which is an activity of the subject (*pramātrvyāpāraḥ*) – is that entity which is

4 According to the Pratyabhijñā, therefore, there is no differentiation between

the means of knowledge and its result (*pramāṇa-pramāṇa*), as also the Buddhists – but

not only them (cf. Bandopadhyay 1979) – maintain (see for example PS 1.8b-11 and *vrtti*, PV III. 301-319, NBT pp. 79-86, 90-1, TS 1343-60). The Buddhist position on this point is substantially unitary, with a distinction between Sautrāntika and Yogācāra resulting from the admission or non-admission of the reality of the external object. Thus, according to the Sautrāntikas, *prameya* is the external object, *pramāṇa* the assumption by knowledge of the form of the object (*visayākāratā*, *sārūpya*), *pramāṇa* the obtained knowledge of the object (*visayādhigati*). According to the Yogācāra, *prameya* is the appearance of the object to consciousness understood as the appearance of consciousness itself in the form of object (*visayābhāsa*, *visayākāratā*), *pramāṇa* knowledge in the form of subject (*svābhāsa*) or, in other words, the capacity (*yogyatā*) of knowledge to know itself; *pramāṇa*, finally, the self-awareness of knowledge (*svasamvitti*; on *svasamvitti* as the final outcome the two doctrines would agree); see e.g. PV III. 366-7, TP 1346 with the relative paṇḍita and especially PS 1.8cd-10 and *vrtti*, with the notes of Hattori; see also Iwata 1991: 1-20. The distinction between *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa* – the Buddhists say – is only the outcome of the analytic consideration of a reality, cognition, which is in itself one. The two terms which are thus foregrounded cannot in any case represent a relationship of cause and effect - because this would require the actual otherness of the two terms – but at most a relation of *vyavasthāpaka-vyavasthapanā*, with a division of roles within the same reality (NBT p. 82 *na cātā javajanaṅkāvāyanābandhunāḥ*, yenai kalasmin vastuni virodhāḥ svāt api tu vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpanabhāvena tata ekasya vastunah kimcid rūpam pramāṇam kimcit pramāṇaphalam na viruddhyate). And up to this point Śaivas and Buddhists are mainly in agreement (except that the Śaivas admit a relation of the type *hetu-phala*). A proof of this is the fact that Abh., in concluding his argumentation (ĪPV II pp. 73-5, ĪPV III pp. 71-2) – which develops Utp.‘s above-mentioned position – quotes part of a verse from Dharmakirti (PV III.308c tadvāsāt tadyvyavasthamānā). On the contrary, the two positions differ on the concept of ‘function, activity’ (*vyāpāra*), performed by the elements occurring in cognition. *Vyāpāra* is completely denied by the Buddhists, who consider every distinction on this basis completely imaginary (*utpreksita*), so much so that, for example, an act such as piercing with an arrow may be analyzed in various ways, all equally legitimate, attributing to the bow the function (*vyāpāra*) either of *kartr*, or *karana*, or *apadana* (TS 1346 at *utpreksīto bheda vidyate dhanurādivat utpādyot-pādakatvena vyavasthayam tu nesyate // and relative Paṇḍika). But, above all, the impossibility of *vyāpāra* is the direct consequence of the acceptance of the doctrine of momentariness (TSP I p. 488 *ksanikatvena nirvyāpārtavāt sarvadharmanānti*). Knowledge, therefore, only ‘appears’ to be endowed with a function (PV III.308a *savyāpāram ivābhāt*). The reply of Abh. - who, as we have seen, had just quoted with approval the third *pāda* of the same verse - implicitly refers to this statement by Dharmakirti (who in turn depends on PS 1.8cd *savyāpārapraatitavāt pramāṇam phalam eva sat*): *vyāpāram itam aka hi karaṇasya prathamāsūdhayatvāt phalam /
manifested to the consciousness, taken separately\(^5\), as a universal\(^6\), II 3.1-2 devoid of spatial differentiations etc., denoted by a single word in conformity with the specific reflective awareness (vimartsabhedanusari\(^9\)) and endowed with its own causal efficiency (svakarthalriyarprapte). – 1-2 –

3. In an object, though its unity is established by the unifying power of the mind (anusamdhana\(^8\)), various manifestations may be distinguished according to the inclinations, practical requirements and specific experience [of the subject].

– For the object, though it is unitary, having been assumed as such thanks to a single [unifying] reflective awareness (ekapratyavamarśa\(^9\))\(^7\),

vyāpāraś ca vyāpriyamānāt kartur vyāpāryamānāt vā karanād ananyātmaka eva yukta iti mukhyatvena pramānaphalayor abheda eva nyāyayah (ĪPV III p. 72; see also ĪPV II p. 75). Vyāpāra not only exists but constitutes the very essence of pramā, and according to the Śaivas the non-differentiation of pramāṇa and pramā hinges on this: vyāpāra is not a different reality from the subject that acts and from the instrument that is set in action. All this had already been essentially contained in the laconic pramātyāvyāpāraḥ that follows pramitih in the vrutti. But Abh. (ĪPV II p. 75) goes on to say that this does not mean that pramāṇa and pramā are simply two ways of saying the same thing (paryāyatvam); the cognitive light (bodhātmā abhāṣah) which is the essential nature of both is turned towards the external object in the pramāṇa, whereas in the pramā it is turned inwards as pure determinate awareness, contracted due to the influence of the object assumed in it, having as its essence the word.

\(^5\) Prthak prthak, in the sense that the pramāṇa works only on the single abhāṣa (in the form of sāmāṇya). The knowledge of the particular is the result of the subsequent unification of the group of single abhāsas, among which those of time and space have a particular individualizing power. As Abh. notes, the same vimarśa, which is prakāśaprāṇa, sometimes rests on the single abhāṣa - and we have a sāmāṇya -, sometimes combines several abhāsas - and we have a svalaksana; in the latter case it takes the name of anusamadhāna.

\(^6\) On the basis of the interconnection – and in the final analysis of the identity – between vimarśa and sabdana, Utp. is led to state the sāmāṇya character of the object of the pramāṇa, in that it is precisely the sāmāṇya that is expressed by the word (obviously in the Śaiva view).

\(^7\) The particular realities, in themselves completely different from one another, form an apparent unity on the strength of the same judgment that they are able to determine because of their very nature. This concept, even in its formulation, refers back to Dharmakīrti (see e.g. PV I. 109, already quoted, and the vrutti tad api pratidravyam bhidyāmānām api prakṛtyaikaprāyavamarśasyābhedāvaskandino hetur bhavad abhinnam khyāti). This may be applied, mutatis mutandis, both to account for the formation of the idea of class or universal which embraces a plurality of dis-
II 3.3 there are different manifestations depending on the will, practical require-
ment, and experience of the subject. – 3 –

To elaborate:

4-5. Just as the various manifestations are differentiated as ‘long’, ‘round’, ‘tall’, ‘man’, ‘smoke’, ‘made of sandalwood’ and so on, without this entailing a spatial-temporal differentiation, so one also has various distinct manifestations such as ‘being’, ‘jar’, ‘individual substance’, ‘made of gold’, ‘shining’ and so on; each has its own separate efficiency. They are the object of the word.

Given an object unitary in itself, for example a jar, depending on how a subject regards it (avadhitsāvāsāt) what appears to him may be the length, or the triangular, circular etc. shape. What appears of a man may only be his ‘being erected’ if the subject is only looking for a reference point, or a shelter, or shade. ‘Man’ as such, however, appears to those who regard him entirely (nyaksena) seeking the services that concrete realities that may not be strictly reduced to anything other than themselves (as in the context of Dharmakirti’s argumentation), and to account for the syntheses of a group of distinct ābhāsas in the apparent unity of the object which confronts us in practical reality (as in the context of Utp.’s argumentation). The expression ekapratyāvamarsā may be understood either as ‘single, same reflective awareness’ concerning different things, which, owing to this, are assumed as being one (cf. PVSV p. 41 ekam ekākāram prayabhijñānam commenting on ekapratyāvamarsā v. 73a); and as ‘reflective awareness of things as being one’ (ekatvena prayāvamarsāh). The meaning is basically the same. Utp. and Abh. use this expression in both senses.

8 Here, too, there is an evident reference to a remark made by Dharmakirti (PV 1.58 and vṛtti), according to whom a thing that appears to perception as an undifferentiated entity is in fact grasped at the moment of determinate knowledge, depending on which of its components the subject is inclined to foreground (a female body may be seen as an object of desire, a corpse, something to eat; a person may at times be seen as a father and at times as a teacher). A similar remark had already been made by Bhartrhari (VP III.8.64 ācāryo mātulaś ceti yathaito vyapadiśyate / sambandhibhedād arthātmā sa vidhīh paktihbhāvayoh /). See also PVSV p. 41 evam simśapādayo’pi bhedāḥ [...] janayanti anyām vā yathāpratyayam dāhanugrhaḍikām kāṣṭhasāḍhyām arthakriyām.

9 I.e. a svalaśana (see the previous kārikā). The multiplicity of manifestations does not entail the loss of the object’s individuality, the object being a collection of ābhāsas, distinguished by a particular collocation in space and time and by a specific form (ākāra).

9a On the meaning of this uncommon word cf. Vṛṣabhadeva’s Paddhati on VP I.3 (p. 20) nyaksena iti ābhimukhyena kārṣṇyena vā (Abhyankar-Limaye 1965: VII n. 4).
are peculiar to him. To some [smoke] appears as merely smoke, in its general form \((dhūmamātram eva)\); on the contrary, those who are familiar with it \((tadvīdas tu)\) grasp its specific aspect, for example, that it is the smoke from burning leaves, just as an expert is able to grasp the particular features of stones, silver etc. \((manirūpyādiviśeṣa)\) and so on\(^{10}\). However, the object that is manifested with these distinctions is not differentiated as regards space and time. Thus for the object ‘jar’ there is the manifestation ‘being’ — which is in itself different [from the specific manifestation ‘jar’ etc.] — common to all the countless other objects such as cloth etc. and the cause of specific effects such as the determinate awareness ‘is, exists’ which is produced by the mere fact of existing; still, as regards the jar, there may be the manifestation ‘jar’ known by the inner and outer senses and common to every object with a broad base and bulbous shape, and different from the other manifestations, i.e. absent in cloth etc.; or yet another, ‘made of gold’, absent in clay jars etc. This manifestation becomes the object of sensory experience depending on the subject’s practical requirement and so on\(^{11}\). Each of these manifestations is referred to for the practical purposes of communication, by those who aim at obtaining this or that determinate result, with a single word: the word ‘jar’ refers to the manifestation ‘jar’ and not to ‘being’ or ‘made of gold’\(^{12}\). The manifestation ‘Caitra’ common to the different stages of

\(^{10}\) This is an explicit reference to the \(ābhyaśikapratyakṣa\) in Bhartrhari’s formulation \((VP I. 35 \text{ paresām asamākhyaṃ abhyāsād eva jāyate / manirūpyādivijñānam tadvidām nānumānikam }/\).

\(^{11}\) For instance, Abh. explains (IPV II p. 98), he who on seeing a jar thinks of its price will be aware of the manifestation ‘made of gold’. This does not occur at a later stage, as a result of mental elaboration, but at the moment of the direct perception itself \((aṁdriyaka eva); see also below \text{vṛtti} on II.3.7.

\(^{12}\) Cf. the position of Bhartrhari, according to whom a thing, in its intrinsic unity, cannot be expressed by a word (except the pronoun); it may be the object of many words, each referring to one aspect or power \((śakti)\) among the many it is composed of \((\text{Vṛtti} p. 131 \text{apara āhā — yady api vastu na bhinnam sabdārthas tu bhinnah / sabdo hy ekavastuvīśayānām api śakfinām avacchedenopagrahe vartate; on the meaning of \text{apara} in Bhartrhari’s work see Prakṛtikaparākṣa II p. 267, quoted in Aklujkar 1970: 116 n. 5.}). This theme is taken up again and developed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The thing, because of its many aspects, cannot be fully expressed by one word \((\text{PS V.12 bahudhāpy abhidheyasya na sabdāt sarvathā gatiḥ / svasambandhānurūpyena vyvacchedārthaḥkāry asau }/\); cf. Hattori 1980: 70 n. 3, where a relevant passage from Jinendrabuddhi’s PSīkā is also referred to; see also the parallel passage, not extant in Sanskrit, concerning cognition through logical mark, in Frauwallner 1959: 102). The function of the word is only to denote a certain part of the thing through the exclusion of what is other than that \((\text{arthāntaravyāvṛtyā})\)
II 3.4-5 childhood etc. is devoid of place and so on; and what has been said above applies to this, too. Thus causal efficiency is differentiated [for every ābhāsa]. – 4-5 –

6. Things possess a determinate causal efficiency (niyatārthakriyā) depending on the variety of the manifestations they are composed of; and, on the contrary (punah), [a different] one based on their appearing as unitary realities owing to a common substratum (sāmānādhikaranyena). –

– In the unitary particular entity there is a specific effect for every single manifestation determined by the power of Necessity (niyatāsaktya) and [equally determined by Necessity] a single substratum of the different manifestations, which produce – as we have said – manifold effects. The concrete entity (vastu) is such because of the manifestation of this sameness of substratum (sāmānādhikaranyābhāsasvaśāt). In fact, this sameness of substratum constitutes the unity of what is manifold (anekāsyaikatā). – 6 –

tasya vastunah kaścid bhāgo gamyate, quoted in PVSV p. 62). As Dharmakirti points out in a subsequent passage, this does not mean that a thing has ‘parts’ (PV I.135ab ekarvād vasturūpasya bhinnarūpā matih kutah), but only that it appears as associated with various causes of error concerning its nature; a word serves to remove one of these causes (PVSV p. 64 tatraiva ca te sādhās tais tair bhāntikāranaṁ samṛṣṭarūpā ivābhāti yathāsaṃketam vicchedāya vyāpriyante; cf. PV I.50-51).

Dignāga’s statement quoted above is closely related, also in its formulation, to the one found at the beginning of the PS (I.5ab): dharminī 'nekarūpasya nendriyāt sarvathā gatiḥ. They are like the two faces of a coin. And similarly Dharmakirti explains the right way in which this assumed multiplicity of aspects and properties is to be understood (PV III.231; cf. Hattori 1977: 52). See also Torella 1992: 333-35.

13 The kārikā hinges on the ambiguity of the expression niyatārthakriyā, which belongs simultaneously to both parts of the sentence, with a different orientation of meaning. At least this is the interpretation that Abh. gives in ĪPV and ĪPVV: things have a multiplicity of arthakriyās, each one of which is inherent in every ābhāsa that composes them; things, however (punah), also have a unity (and also a unitary arthakriyā), due to the predominance of one ābhāsa over the others and therefore to their appearing according to a sameness of substratum.

14 The ultimate intention of this stanza is therefore, as I understand it, to restate the reality of the unity of the thing which the analysis carried out in the previous stanzas had, in a sense, denied. The meaning of the sentence seems to coincide with that of Abh.’s avataramikā to the stanza (ĪPV II p. 101 nanu evaṃ pratyābhāsam eva vastutve eko ghatātmā na vastu syāt; ĪPVV III p. 113 nanu evaṃ eko 'riho ghatvalohitavādyātmā na vastu bhavet, bhavatī).
7. As in the case of the distinct rays of light in a torch and of the currents in the sea, so in manifestations that are not in contrast with each other the notion of unity (aikyadhīh) is produced by their appearing as unitary entities (ekakāryā).

- The individual rays of light in a torch appear as an undifferentiated whole and the same holds for the currents of rivers in the notion of the sea and for the various flavours in the pānaka. Similarly, manifestations such as ‘white’, ‘big’, ‘cloth’, capable as they are of interpenetrating, lend themselves to the manifestation, in the direct experience itself, of the various unitary things having a single, unitary, effect (*tattadeka-kāryaikadravya*). The same does not happen in the case of other

15 The very elliptical expression used in the *kārikā* (ekakāryā, literally ‘produced by one’) is analyzed by Abh. (*IPV* II pp. 106-7, *IPVV* III pp. 116-7) in its various possible implications, which are substantially analogous to those succinctly indicated in the *vrtti*. When one sees a unitary effect that cannot be traced back to the individual components of a given aggregate, this proves that they form a new complex unity (*ekam vāstu, svalaksana*). The *vrtti* says that certain manifestations, characterized by mutual compatibility, may give rise to ekakārya (= ekakriyā) – namely to a unitary effect – and to ekadravya (= ekavastu, svalaksana) – namely to their appearing as a unitary and individual reality; the notion of their unity is produced by this. One must, however, remember that the individual ābhāsas continue to keep their own specific identity and causal efficiency intact, ready to come to the fore again depending on the attitude of the knowing subject. Ekakārya may also be understood as internal bahuvrihi referring to *ekadravya*: ‘of a unitary substance with a unitary effect’. In this way the expression would be used in the same sense in which it is understood, in an analogous context, by the Buddhist logicians (to attribute unity to different entities on the grounds that they produce the same single effect). Dharmakīrti, too, – as we have seen – makes the (illusory) non-difference of determinate entities derive from their producing a single effect – hence the concept of sāmānya (*PVSV* p. 57 *ekakāryataiva bhāvānām abhedah*). (A somewhat parallel question is to be found in the capacity of a causal complex (*hetusāmagri*) to produce a single effect though being composed of many different causes to which Dharmakīrti does not acknowledge a common svabhāva; see Steinkellner 1971: 184-88). Cf. also TS 201ab *ekakāryopayogivād ekasādhasyasya gocaraḥ*. The reference to TSP p. 59 seems even more pertinent. Here Kamalaśīla (probably bearing in mind *PVSV* p. 68) states that ordinary experience groups together data that are completely heterogeneous and separate, such as a certain shape, colour etc., on the basis of their concuring to carry out a single function (e.g. that of containing water), constructing in this way the unity of a ‘thing’ (e.g. the jar): *ta eva rūpādayah sa-nilādi-dhāraṇārthah kriyākārīnāh samudāyo ghaṭa iti vyapadiśyante*. Returning to our text, it may be added that ekakārya in the *vrtti* definitely has a different meaning from ekakāryā in the *kārikā*: the expression is to be understood as a partial comment on *eka* alone.
II 3.7 manifestations such as ‘blue’, ‘yellow’ etc. This is what we call ‘having the same substratum’. – 7 –

8. Faced with a non-specific manifestation of ‘fire’ etc., a single means of knowledge knows what the outcome or cause of it is, its being hot, its being able to be denoted by this or that word and so on\(^{16}\).

– On a particular occasion (kadācit)\(^ {17}\), when faced with the bare manifestation ‘fire’ in which only the universal ‘fire’ is present, without its particular features consisting in the single individuality (śvālakṣāna\(^ {\circ}\)) delimited by the association with a particular space etc.\(^ {18}\), there is through the means of knowledge operating at that moment – and through that means only – and in a way that embraces the three worlds and the three times, the establishment of the various specific features of its own nature, such as its effect, its cause, its heat, the fact that it goes upwards and is denoted by the word ‘fire’ etc.\(^ {19}\). – 8 –

9. On the contrary\(^ {20}\), it happens differently in the case of the activity

\(^{16}\) Cf. Dharmakīrti’s analogous statement, in a different context: (PV I. 43, 45ab) ekasyārthatvabhāvasya pratyakṣasya satah svayam i ko ’nyo na drṣṭo bhāgah syād yah pramānaiḥ parikṣyate // ... // tasmād drṣṭasya bhāvasya drṣṭa evākhilo gunah ...

\(^{17}\) I.e., following IPVV III p. 121 (kadācit iti jījñāsāvasare), ‘at the moment in which the desire to know appears’.

\(^{18}\) The pramāṇa, in fact, works on the individual ābhāsa, which, as we have seen, is a sāmānya.

\(^{19}\) The statement that a means of knowledge (pramāṇa, which may be generically understood here as a ‘cognitive act’) acts on the individual manifestation may give rise to some difficulties: e.g. (cf. IPV II p. 107) it becomes on these grounds impossible to determine the relation of cause and effect, whose elements being the object of distinct pramāṇas would remain isolated from one another in knowledge. This stanza and the vṛtti reply to this objection as follows: this same pramāṇa (in this case a visual perception) that knows the individual ābhāsa – for example the bright form of fire – at the same time implicitly knows all those other ābhāsas which are set by the power of Necessity (niyatisakti) in invariable concomitance with it; there is therefore no need for another pramāṇa to ascertain the concomitance, valid for every space and time, of that particular bright form with heat etc. This implicit knowledge regards not only intrinsic properties, such as heat, the fact of having as its cause wood and as its effect smoke and so on but also those derived from convention, such as the connection with a certain word and so on.

\(^{20}\) The difference from what was said earlier lies in the fact that the activity set in motion in the subject by the perception of a determinate, particular object requires the combined operation of several means of knowledge (pramāṇasamāhu), whereas
that starts at that moment\(^{21}\) in the subject who aims at producing certain effects, as regards a particular, individual object, differentiated by various, specific sensations of place etc. (deśādikādhyaksāntarabhinne)\(^{22}\), and also [in the case of that activity promoted] by inference.

— On the contrary, the bodily activity of a person (kāyapravṛtthi)\(^{23}\), that may concern only the particular object in association with a whole variety of perceptions (of place, time etc.), in that he aims at producing certain effects, necessarily depends on the concourse of several cognitive acts (pramāṇasamuhād eva). This activity may also be promoted by inference, qualified, of course, by the direct perception of the property-possessor (dharmin). -9-

10-11. Though the particular forms of the manifestation of the objects may be differentiated (bhinnāvabhāsacchāyānām) — in that they are far or near, directly or indirectly perceived by the senses, external or internal, faulty in what is needed to make them known or for other reasons —, their unity is not affected by this thanks to the main manifestation for the knowledge of the same svalaksana a single means (with svasmvedana) is sufficient. This distinction corresponds to that between mere knowing and vyavahāra. (Pramāṇa, as I have already pointed out, may be translated here as 'cognitive act'; it would be misleading to say 'various means of knowing', as they may also be various operations of the same means — even if every pramāṇa is essentially new —). The apparent contradiction is pointed out in ĪPV II p. 114, where three different ways of explaining it are proposed. As regards inference in particular, Abh. (ĪPVV III p. 148) notes that the difference of the object, introducing a temporal differentiation, necessarily also brings about a difference in the nature of the pramanās; indeed, it is not possible to say that the direct perception through which the dharmin is known is one with the inference itself, which knows the fire, in the classical example, only indirectly through the linga.

\(^{21}\) At the moment when the cognition of the svalaksana occurs.

\(^{22}\) Abh. puts forward three distinct interpretations of the compound. In the first (following the order in ĪPVV) taking bhinne as a neuter substantivized adjective (= bhede), one gets 'there being a variety of perceptions', where the locative is taken to mean cause (nimittasaptami); the need for a plurality of pramāṇas stated in the commentaries depends on this. As Abh. notes, the second 'the svalaksana being differentiated by perceptions of time etc.' coincides basically with the first; this is also the meaning attributed to it by the vṛtti. As regards the third interpretation 'the svalaksana constituting — though combined with perceptions of space etc. — an undifferentiated reality within the knowing subject' (adhyaksā–antar–abhinne) — this seems traceable only to Abh..

\(^{23}\) And, one understands, also the other two types of activity, that of the mind and of the word. The translation of arthitayā had been omitted in the first edition (I thank J. Bronkhorst for pointing it out).
II 3.10-11 (mukhyāvabhāsatah) consisting in a single reflective awareness (ekapratyavamarśākhyaḥ)\textsuperscript{24}.

– Even if there may be a differentiation in the particular forms of the manifestation (i.e. as regards whether the objects are near or far etc., evident or not evident etc., external or internal), the unity of the objects is not contradicted, because there is a single reflective awareness forming the primary nature of the various particular manifestations\textsuperscript{25}. – 10-11 –

12. Causal efficiency itself is not intrinsic to things, since it is determined by the will of the Lord. Thus a thing may not be said to be different because it does not possess a certain efficiency.

– Objects, such as the jar etc., when imagined do not lose their nature as a jar etc., even if they lack the ability to produce external effects, because this capacity is not intrinsic to their being (asvābhāvikatvāt), since it is determined by the Lord for every single manifestation\textsuperscript{26}. – 12 –

\textsuperscript{24} Cf. again PV I. 109 ekapratyavamarśasya hetuvād dhīr abhedini ēka-dhīhetuḥbhāvena vyaktinām apy abhinnatā // (on this peculiar statement by Dharmanātha see the critical remarks in Prabhācandra's Prameyakamalamārtanda pp. 469-70; Shah 1967: 143). Abh. interprets ēdhyā in the compound ekapratyavamarśākhyaḥ as prathana, but the general meaning does not change much.

\textsuperscript{25} Thus the avabhāsacchāyās, or the various direct perceptions, the pratibhāsas of the Buddhists – which cannot but differ from one another even if they concern the same object, depending on whether it is near or far, frontal or lateral etc. are contrasted with the mukhyāvabhāsa – or the manifestation not divided up and discontinuous, seen, as it were, from a more elevated vantage point, and of a more general character (sāmānyarūpa) having as its essence the ekapratyavamarśa, that is a single reflective awareness, which recognizes and sanctions the basic unity of the thing through its manifestations; ekapratyavamarṣa, for its part, is contrasted with the individual vimarṣas corresponding to the individual pratibhāsas (or avabhāsacchāyās). This point is dealt with by Abh. in his two commentaries.

\textsuperscript{26} Utp. is aware that the previous kārikā is bound to arouse the Buddhists' opposition; what is particularly unacceptable is that the nature of an external and internal manifestation of an object is basically identical. The Buddhists would say that the reality of an object consists in its efficiency and only the external manifestation is efficient; therefore the two cannot be put on the same plane. In his reply Utp. denies, as he has done earlier, that efficiency constitutes the essential nature of a reality: it pertains to it only under certain conditions – primarily externality (see above I. 8.5ff.) – depending solely on the Lord's power of Necessity. In an earlier passage of the ĪVV (III pp. 30-31) Abh., following in the steps of the tikā, had denied that arthakriyā might be either svarūpa, laksana, or upalaksana of the real thing. On the concept of arthakriyā (already found in the Nyāyabhāsya) and its place
13. Even if the reflective awareness of silver is one, this awareness ‘silver’ referring to mother-of-pearl is not valid, since there is incongruence as regards the place, which has a qualifying function [in the cognition] (upādhidesāsamvādāt); also in the case of the double moon the ether appears differently.

- Even if the cognitions as ‘silver’ of real silver and of mother-of-pearl are in themselves equally real, insofar as in them the reflective awareness ‘silver’ [on which its validity is based] is the same, however the cognition ‘this is (here there is) silver’ referring to mother-of-pearl is to be considered erroneous because of its impermanence (asthairyāt), since it is not congruent as regards the accessory quality – place –, as its connection with the place occupied by mother-of-pearl is later found to be contradicted. Also in the case of seeing a double moon there is no congruence as regards the place, occupied in this instance by the ether.

and accession in Dharmakīrti’s work (it is apparently absent in Dignāga) see Nagatomi 1967-1968, Mikogami 1979, Kano 1991.

27 Abh., as he did for akhyā in the previous kārikā, makes samvāda derive from a root vad- ‘to shine’. Thus samvāda is taken to mean ‘to be correctly and completely (samyak) manifest’ or ‘to be manifest combined with a lasting determinate awareness’ (vimarsānuvrtti) (cf. IPV II p. 126). In translating samvāda in the vrtti I have, however, kept to the current meaning.

28 The extremely laconic style of the vrtti, which I have tried as far as possible to preserve in translation, makes a few additional comments necessary. Firstly, the relationship this return to the subject of error, already dealt with above, has with the preceding stanzas. Abh. says it is a reply to those who contest the role of the vimarsa in the establishment of reality, objecting that thus the notion of erroneous knowledge ends up by being denied. If a thing is such in that it is recognized as such by an act of determinate reflective awareness (vimarsa) – remember the maxim so frequently cited by Abh. bhāvarāśir yathā vimṛṣyate tathā asti – which follows its appearing to consciousness (avabhāsa, prakāśa), then the mother-of-pearl that is mistaken for silver is no less silver than real silver. The stanza in question, containing Utp.’s reply, is inserted at this point. It is true that a vimarsa is in itself valid, but it is not meant to be something momentary, it tends to last, unless that tendency to last is blocked by a further vimarsa. And this is precisely what happens in the cognition examined here ‘this is silver, there is silver here’. A later vimarsa ascertains that the place that qualified the object of the earlier vimarsa (the ‘here’) is different from the one that had been understood: the place that ought to contain the silver is occupied by the mother-of-pearl, the place – in the case of seeing two moons – of the second moon is occupied by the ether. This reasoning rests on the assumption that every concrete object of knowledge (svaika) is mixed with space and time and that therefore the vimarsa must embrace them, too.
14. Thus, both the differentiation of things – due to qualities such as sound and so on – and their non-differentiation – due to universals etc. (jātyādibhih)\textsuperscript{29} – are possible on the basis of the unity of the knowing subject.

– It is a fact of direct experience that qualities such as sound, form, configuration and so on, suggest\textsuperscript{30} the differentiation of things and universals etc. their unity: this is admissible only if the unity of the subject is assumed. The determination of mutual differentiation also depends on the unifying function [of the knowing subject]. – 14 –

15-16. What function can the means of knowledge perform – being a new light (navābhāsah) – as regards the knowing subject, he who exists in the absolute sense, the Lord – like a smooth wall that is the substratum for the painting of the multiform universe –, whose association with non-being would be a contradiction in terms, the Ancient One\textsuperscript{31}, whose nature is perennially manifest (sarvadābhātā), inherent in every cognition?

– The means of knowledge – since it is an ever-new light which establishes the still not established reality of the object – can do nothing as regards the knowing subject, who is uninterruptedly luminous. Since it is the various ever-new manifestations that constitute the various means of knowledge, this light (manifestation) will be, of course, the means of knowledge for what is other, but not the self, which is always established; the Lord is, on the contrary, the knowing subject because he acts freely as regards knowledge. All the various multiform manifestations are pos-

\textsuperscript{29} The doctrine of differentiation and non-differentiation is restated yet again. Objects share both conditions: they are differentiated if one looks at the distinctive qualities of each of them, non-differentiated if one looks at the universal, similarity etc. (\textit{\textit{ādibhih}} refers to \textit{sādṛśya} and \textit{bhedāgrahanu} according to \textit{IPV II} p. 132). These two aspects may co-exist without excluding one another only on the basis of the unity of consciousness.

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{IPV} III p. 160, following in the steps of the \textit{tikā}, considers at length why the word \textit{ākṣepa} 'allusion, suggestion' is used; and concludes \textit{vatah śpuṭam avabhāsanām nāṣṭy alaṅkānam, bhavati ca bhāsanam, tata ity arthah}.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Purāṇa} (literally 'the Ancient One') to be understood here as meaning 'he who existed before (\textit{purā})', before every other thing, beyond time, the eternal etc. This is also how Abh. explains the term (\textit{IPV} III p. 162), relating it to the impossibility of attributing any form of non-existence to the subject, which (non-existence) is in effect the soul of time.
possible in their multiformity insofar as the subject is stable. His volition makes the various objects that are manifest in reality, without lapsing from their own nature of which he is the ultimate essence (tatsārasvarūpābhramṣe), appear and disappear by virtue of the power of māyā. In reality he alone possesses perpetual existence (sattā) independently of every other thing, since it would be contradictory to associate any form of non-existence (previous non-existence, non-existence due to destruction etc.) with him. Even if he is taught in terms of being and non-being, nonetheless his nature as subject remains unaltered, since the teaching would be impossible there not being he who wishes to teach32. – 15-16 –

17. [What in reality happens] is only that the use in practical reality of notions and expressions (viyāvahāraḥ) like 'Lord' etc., which due to the condition of obfuscation was not brought about earlier (apravartitapūrvah), is promoted through the bringing to light of the powers33.

32 I.e. there not being the subject.
33 Utp. says yet again here that what is the true reality, the sovereignty of consciousness, is not something that has to be proved (sādhya), brought to light; it is constantly luminous, it is, in fact, light itself, it is unfading. If anything, it is rather a question of removing that state of obfuscation which prevents the limited subject from recognizing that he and the Lord are basically one and the same. Or, in other words, to call consciousness by its real name, thus making it enter the sphere of everyday existence; discourse and everyday reality are both included in the semantic field of the term viyāvahāra. (It has even been supposed that this extension of meaning derives from the coalescence of two different words viyāhāra 'noun, verbal designation' and viyāvahāra 'practical transactions', both being represented in Pali by the same word vohāra; cf. Bapat 1975. It is also to be noted that viyāhāra and viyāvahāra are usually both translated into Tibetan with the same word tha śāna). It is therefore a question not of demonstrating something new, but of pointing out (pradarśana; cf. IPv 1 p. 87) a reality that has always existed, of calling man's attention to this and thus inducing him to fill the void that followed awareness and to use this latent notion in practical life (viyāvahāraḥ pravarttaye). And this is intended to exclude, in the case of such viyāvahārasādhana referring to the sovereignty of the I, any nuance of apīrva, which is, on the contrary, admitted as being still subtly present in the viyāvahārasādhana referring to an insentient object (cf. ibid). Recognition, which is in fact viyāvahārasādhana rūpam (ibid. p. 39), concerns an entity which, invested from the outset with a valid means of knowledge, is already manifest (maulikadṛḍhapramānaprabhāvaprajñāśamānatāyogini vestumi); the process that leads to the identification of the I with Śiva – which is the specific function of the sāstra – is therefore essentially an inference based on the svabhāvaḥetu, which (as Abh. says, ibid. p. 106) viyāvahārasādhaṇa eva abhidhiyate na tv aprāsidhāpra-
II 3.17 – Only, the use in practical reality of notions and expressions like ‘Śiva’, ‘Lord’ etc. referring to our self which is the knowing subject – which was not brought about due to the total obfuscation caused by māyā – is established (sādhyate) for the purpose of teaching, meditation etc. through bringing to light the reasons that justify it, i.e. the presence in the I of the pure power of freedom etc. – 17 –

sādhanarūpaḥ, thus leaving the basic self-illuminating quality of his object intact. This is what the sacred texts on the knowledge of the Self – the Vedānta, the Siddhānta and the secret tantras – aim at (ĪPVV III p. 179 yavanti hi ātmajñānaśastraṁi śrutiyanassiddhāntarahasyaatanrarūpāṁ, tāṁ ātmanī naiva siddhim aprūrvarūpāṁ racayanti / tasmāt vyavahāramātrasādhanapalāṁ eva tāṁti bhāvah).
Chapter IV

1. And thus, his power being infinite, he makes those things\(^1\) manifest thanks to his volition; and this constitutes his activity, his being creator (nirmātrā).

   The knowing subject, that is essentially consciousness, having infinite power, the Lord, by means of his volition makes those entities manifest in this way. And it is precisely in this power of volition (icchāsaktiḥ) that his activity, that is, his being creator, consists. – 1 –

2. But\(^2\) an insentient reality does not have this power – namely, to confer existence on something that is not\(^3\). Therefore, the relation of cause and effect (kāryakāranatā) is essentially reduced to that of agent and object of the action (kartrkarmatvā).

   But an insentient reality – whether it is primordial matter (pradhāna\(^2\)) or atoms or seed – is incapable of producing something that does not exist. Being cause and effect, therefore, is merely being agent and object of the action and nothing more. – 2 –

3-4. What is non-existent is non-existent and that is that. One cannot predicate the existence of what is non-existent, nor, on the other hand,

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\(^1\) By ‘those things’ Utp., according to Abh. (IPv II p. 152), means that the Lord makes manifest what he had already previously manifested. His work of manifestation is therefore continuous: it does not take place only once and it is uninterrupted (avicchinnena prabandhena).

\(^2\) The examination of the relation of cause and effect begins with the statement of the Śaiva position and the whole chapter is devoted to justifying this.

\(^3\) In the IPv (and similarly in the IPvV) Abh. proposes three distinct interpretations of asataḥ sataḥ. According to the one at the beginning of the Vimarṣini (IPv II p. 153) we have ankurasya sato ’sato vā, with reference therefore to the tārkika (Vaiśeṣika) and Śāṅkhyya positions regarding the existence of the effect in the cause, which is denied by the former and accepted by the latter (in the IPvV III p. 186 bijasyāiva seems to have to be corrected to ankurasyaiva). The second is asadrūpa- sya sataḥ (ankurasya), which may therefore be traced to the interpretation in the vṛtti. The third is asato ankurasya sato vā bijasya.
II 4.3-4 would the existent gain any advantage from obtaining existence [which it already possesses]. If one then points out that in practical reality there is general consensus on the existence of the relation of cause and effect, [then one replies that] it consists in the fact that a thing, that is internally present (antarvāpīra-vādha), becomes, by virtue of the power of that indefinable Being (tasya kasyāpi), the object of knowledge for both senses.

Attributing the nature of existent to what does not exist is contradictory, and it is already established in what exists. [The relation of cause and effect consists in this:] a thing, already present within [the I], is 'created' by the Lord, or in other words, is caused by him to become the object of knowledge for the internal and external senses.

5. Thus, action – which has so far been the subject of discussion (sāśā) –, characterized by succession and manifesting itself both internally and externally (antarbhāsṭhitih), being related to an entity that is unitary (ekasya) and capable of showing both aspects, is proved to be one.

This action, though taking place in succession, being both internal and external, is connected with a unitary reality, the agent, established as such through inner awareness, and with an object that is also unitary,

4 To be more precise: 'that moves about internally'. Viparīvṛt- often recurs in Bhartrhari's work.

5 In saying this, Utp. is referring both to the subject and the object of the action (this is the interpretation in the vṛttī which all the other commentaries also accept, cf. ĪVPV III p. 189 ekasya iti kartuh karmanas ca). Each is unitary in itself and unitary in that it is inserted in a superior unity, that of the cognizer that assumes these two forms (cf. ĪVPV III p. 258 ātmānam eva pramārṣaṃjñām karmabhāvena kartrābha-vena ca avalambambāmāṇā kriyā karmasthāvena kartrstha-vena vā vivicyamānā ekāśrayaival bhavantī vastuta ekaiva).

6 I.e. the two internal and external levels of the action. Both the subject and the object, Abh. explains (ibid. p. 189), can be involved in these two dimensions without losing their unity (ekas ca asaṃ āśrayaḥ saṃvīdṝḍo bhagavān svacchandartvasvach-tvānāḥ sahate eva ubhayam antarbhāhirupam ... karmano īpi antarbhāhiru-bhāyākārāsaḥhatvam parāmārṣābhdētē).

7 All actions primarily rest upon the agent and are therefore called kartrśtha: however, some actions may be particularly connected with the object and they are therefore called karmastha (cf. ibid. p. 190). This division goes back (but from a different angle) to the fourfold one – kartrśthakriya, kartrśthabhāvaka, karmasthakriya and karmasthabhāvaka – mentioned in the MBh (on Pāṇini III. 1. 87, vārtt. 3).
since it is recognized as being one by reflective awareness (aiKYena II 4.5 pratyavamrśyasya), despite the manifold changeable forms of the manifestation. And it is precisely on the basis of this fact — i.e. that its substratum is unitary — that its unity is proved. — 5 —

6. The entity which is [first] internal with respect to another, once it has become external is to be understood as the effect of that other. The two planes of externality and internality are such in relation to the knowing subject.

— For an object the condition of effect is merely its having been made external (bāhyatāpādanam); thus both being external and being an effect are such only in relation to a single reality, and, indeed, it is depending on the knowing subject that one may speak in practical reality of internal and external (antarbahirvyavahārah). [Therefore effect is produced by the knowing subject and none other]7a. — 6 —

7. Cause, therefore, is only the knowing subject, and he in the two modes of manifestation of the effect remains unchanged in his unity8. It is therefore appropriate to say that action belongs to a unitary entity.

— Thus cause is solely the knowing subject, who remains one even if there is succession in the external and internal manifestation of the effect. On the basis of what has been said action is therefore proved to belong to a unitary (and single)9 subject. — 7 —

8. Precisely for this reason Paramesvara is taken as efficient cause as regards the shoot; [however] it is not possible to also consider entities different from him — such as the seed etc. — as causes.

— Considering the fact that producing something (utpādanam) means making it manifest externally (bāhyābhāsatāpādanam), the status of

The action of creating (nirmānakriyā) — Abh. explains (ĪPVV III p. 190) — concerning an object which has the cognizer as its ultimate essence, is at the same time kartṛṣṭha and karmastha.

7a See text note 170.
8 Abh. gives a different interpretation (ĪPV II p. 162): «... since the knowing subject is the cause of the twofold, external and internal, manifestation of the effect ...».
9 Here and elsewhere eka means both ‘unitary’ and ‘one, single’.
II 4.8 cause may be exclusively attributed to the conscious being. For this reason some consider the Lord efficient cause\textsuperscript{10}, but in so doing they become inconsistent in considering inert and insentient realities – such as the seed etc. – which have no intentionality (niranusamdhānasya)\textsuperscript{11} also causes. – 8 –

9. In fact, the potter produces the jar through a whole series of operations to which he subjects the clay etc., following the rule determined by the Lord (aiśvaryaiva vyavasthaya)\textsuperscript{12}.

– Even when it has been ascertained that the cause is a knowing subject, i.e. in this case the potter, nevertheless, for the jar to be produced it is necessary to carry out determined operations on the materials, such as clay, following a criterion that does not automatically derive from the nature of the thing (na svabhāvena) but which is dictated by the restrictive order (maryādayā) created by the Lord, called ‘necessity’\textsuperscript{13}. – 9 –

\textsuperscript{10} The allusion is to the followers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, as Abh. and Bhāskara confirm (IPV II p. 163). They consider the Lord solely as efficient cause, which would be in itself admissible if it did not necessarily also entail the admission of a series of other causes from whose cooperation only effect finally derives. Material cause, auxiliary causes etc. – i.e. in the case of the shoot, seed, water, earth – are all insentient realities from which, in the Śaiva view, the causal function is precluded.

\textsuperscript{11} The term anusamdhāna is used in this school with various meanings. Sometimes it means ‘unification, connection’, often referring to the unifying function of thought which establishes relations between things (it is then glossed with eKikarana), pervading them with its own dynamism. In other cases – as in the whole of this chapter – it has the meaning of ‘intentionality, straining towards a particular objective’. These two levels of meaning may also coexist simultaneously.

\textsuperscript{12} In the IPV Abh. devotes quite a long commentary to this stanza, putting forward different possible interpretations; these reflect the doubts that the establishment of causality as outlined may give rise to. In the case of the potter, who is here used as an example: there is a knowing subject who as such may legitimately assume the role of cause, but how can one then say that cause is always and everywhere the supreme Lord, and, on the other hand, if one accepts this thesis at the outset, what room is there in it for the potter? The stanza may be interpreted in both of these ways, depending on the meaning one chooses to give to the expression aiśvaryaiva vyavasthayā; and also in a third (or even fourth) way, if one takes the optative janayet as being ‘interrogative’ (sampraśna) and not in the sense of ‘obligation’ (niyoga).

\textsuperscript{13} This means that the potter’s kartrtā is not absolute, but made possible by the higher kartrtā of the Lord, on whom the order of things – the operations the potter
10. The various things (tattat), jar etc.,—lasting and able to fulfil the functions that are natural to them (sthirasvārtthakriyākāram)\textsuperscript{14}—may also be produced by virtue of the volition of the yogins alone\textsuperscript{15}, without the need for clay or seed.

—By virtue of the volition of the yogins alone, without recourse to clay etc., things such as the jar may be produced, that endure and are capable of fulfilling the functions of the jar and so on. — 10 —

11. It is precisely because of this that an effect (kāryam) or an essential property (svabhāvah) — which comes into being from that root which is the arising [from a cause] (utpattimūlajah)\textsuperscript{16}—may legitimately constitute the logical reason of an inference only provided that another valid means of knowledge has established that it is not the creation of a yogin.

—Precisely because of this, an effect or an essential property — that implicitly contains a relationship of causality\textsuperscript{17}— are only illusory has to carry out etc.—depends. The potter’s creativity must necessarily be seen within the creativity of the Lord, otherwise one would not understand how clay etc., insentient as they are, can obey the craftsman’s will. See also SD I. 44-45ab and vṛtti.

\textsuperscript{14} My translation conforms to the vṛtti. Abh., though aware of the precise indications in the vṛtti (İPVV III pp. 194-5 sthiram ca arthakriyākāram ceti yojanā vṛtikṛtā kṛtā) takes tattat sthirasvārtthakriyākāram as a single compound (which thus comes to mean ‘able to carry out lastingly the various forms of efficiency that are natural to them’), claiming that his interpretation must also be considered admissible (... iti samāse ‘pi na kascid dosah); we do not know if the fikā authorized this type of construction. On the contrary, according to the vṛtti, tattat is separate and refers to ghatādi and sthirārthakriyākāram is to be understood as a karmadhāraya expressing two qualifications of ghatādi.

\textsuperscript{15} The example of the yogin [which occurs frequently in Indian philosophical literature] was already to be found in the SD (see III. 34b-36a and Utp.’s vṛtti, etc.). See also above I. 5. 7.

\textsuperscript{16} The translation goes back to Abh.’s gloss (İPVV III p. 197 svabhāvo ’pi svabhāvantaraniyato yo jātās tatra utpattir eva kāryakāranabhāvāvimikā mūlam. Cf. the well-known passage from Dharmakirti (PVSV p. 17) siddhas tu kāryakāranabhāvah svabhāvam niyamayat.

\textsuperscript{17} Dharmakirti, as we know, admits only two types of ‘essential connection’ (svabhāvapratibandha; see Steinkellner 1984) between things — or rather between concepts —: identity (tādātmya) and causality (taduṭpatti). Therefore the only inference he considers valid is the one based on svabhāva (Steinkellner 1974, 1992) - anupalabdhi also enters into its ambit (cf. Iwata 1991: 86-88) —, e.g. ‘this is a tree, because it is a śimsapā’ where the concepts are co-extensive, in that the one im-
II 4.11 reasons, if the certainty that this is not the creation of a yogin is lacking. However, even when this certainty exists, the status of logical reason (hetutā) still depends on the necessity instituted by the Lord. — 11 —

explicitly embraces the other and refers to the same thing; or on kārya, 'there is fire there, because there is smoke'. Utp. points out that the svabhāvahetu, too, in the final analysis emerges as being based on causality (taduttpattigarbha), given that the nature of a thing is that which is due to the causes that produced it (cf. above note). Dharmakīrti had already expressed himself in similar terms (PVSV p. 99 śālibijaṁām api sa svabhāva svahetor iti yo na taddhetuḥ so 'tatsvabhāvaḥ syāt; PV I. 38 anvayavyatirekād yo yasya dṛṣṭo 'nuvartakah i svabhāvas tasya taddhetur ato bhinnān na sampbhavāḥ //; cf. Steinkellner 1971: 188 notes 35 and 36). The causal implication, as Abh. observes following the fikā (IPVV III pp. 197 ff.), may be evident to a greater or lesser degree. It is obvious when by virtue of the svabhaṭavahetu 'to be endowed with smoke' one goes back to 'to be endowed with fire'. It is less evident, but equally present, in the case of 'this is a tree, because it is a simsapā'; here it is, in fact, the cause of the simsapā – i.e. its seed – which infuses it with the nature of tree (ibid. p. 202 simsapābhyasya viśistasya yā simsapām prati bijātā simsapākāraṇātā. saiva vrksavatam tatra nivesayati; see also IPV II p. 175 svahetuta eva hi simsapā vrksasvabhāvävyabhicārini jātā; and this cause that produces the simsapā as always united with vrksaṇa depends in turn on Paramesvara's power of Necessity, IPVV III p. 200). It is therefore essential in each case to establish at the outset that the smoke or the simsapā in question are not yogin creations. The inference based on svabhāvahetu as conceived by Buddhists and Śaivas differs in that for the former it does not give rise, strictly speaking, to a new and real knowledge. According to the Buddhist pramāṇa tradition, the very relationship of gamya-gamaka between two essential properties is ultimately unreal, just as is the distinction of a plurality of properties within one thing. 'All this question of inference and object to be inferred' – Dignāga says in a famous passage often quoted, in slightly different forms, by later authors (Randle 1926: 51-54; see also PVSV pp. 2-3, IPVV III p. 200) – 'depends on a differentiation between property and property-possession imposed by the mind, and does not concern the actual external existence'. The difference between the two kinds of inference – besides the operating of two concepts belonging to the same thing in the one case, and to two distinct things in the other – would seem to lie in the fact that the svabhāvahetu can establish only vyavahāra and not vastu (NBT p. 106 tad ayam arthah – vrksavyavahāro 'yam. simspavavyavahārayogyatāt). Abh., commenting on the fikā (IPVV III p. 213), distinguishes between vastuo, vastuyavahāra and śabdavyavahārasadhanana. In the śaiva view vrksaṇa and simspāṇa are two different and in themselves completely autonomous abhāsas, set by the Lord in a relationship of sāmanādhikaranya but not necessarily present to consciousness at the same time. Thus the status of the svabhāvahetu, moving from a real entity towards an equally real entity, comes to be. as it were, enhanced; as Abh. says (IPV II p. 180) referring to the Buddhists, tasmāt sarveṣu svabhāvahetuv śabhāṣabhedam vinā vyavahāramātrasadhanam (vyavahāramātra, that is, sabdavyavahāra; IPVV III p. 213).
12-13. A new (nūtanam) manifestation of smoke etc. derives from a manifestation of fire etc. common to various other knowing subjects, which, though not directly perceived at that moment, is its determining condition (adhipateh). The effect, which is invariably concomitant with

These two stanzas respond to a twofold need. The first is the need to succeed in explaining causality whilst remaining faithful to the equation ābhāsa=vastu (how can one through inference determine the reality of a fire that is anābhāta being the cause of smoke present here and now?). The second need is to obtain this result by distancing oneself from the Vijnānavādins, who, in maintaining that the ābhāsas of the cause and effect must belong to the same individual santāna, risk removing every general value and therefore all practical importance from causality. The solution proposed by Utp., according to how Abh. develops it, is the following. Some subjects present in a certain place (e.g. the kitchen) grasp the relation of invariable concomitance (vyāptigrahana) between fire and smoke, in general, but through the observation of particular cases. Namely, they become one as regards these two ābhāsas, or, in other words, there is a single ābhāsa 'fire' and a single ābhāsa 'smoke' for all the subjects present. This identification is provided by the action of the Lord himself through the power of Necessity (niyatiśakti), and here lies the fundamental difference from the Vijnānavādins. Later, one or more of these subjects finds himself faced with a particular ābhāsa 'smoke' – thus present on his own mental continuum (svasantānavartin) – and, remembering the previously established vyāpti, goes back to a generic ābhāsa 'fire', which is immediately present to other subjects (parasantānavartin): therefore at the moment of the inference the subjects involved are found to be, by the very will of the Lord, unified as regards a particular smoke and a generic fire. In the kārikā bhūyah, understood in the vṛtti as an adjective referring to °pramātr° (cf. vṛtti °pramātrantara°), may also be taken separately as an adverb. In this case it would mean 'also later on', i.e. also at a time subsequent to the grasping of the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire, that is, at the time when the inference is made (Bh II p. 185 bhūyo 'pi na kevalam vyāptigrha­hanakāla eva api tu anumānakāle 'pi'). This double interpretation of bhūyah goes back to the fīkā itself (cf. ĪPVV III p. 216).

Of the four pratyayas 'causal conditions' in the Sautrāntika conception (as outlined in SDS p. 85 te catvārah pratyayāḥ prasiddhā ālambanasaamanantarasa­kahāryadhipatirūpāḥ ...) the adhipatipratyaya is the one most directly responsible for the production and the specific nature of the effect (cf. Madhyamakavṛtti p. 33 yas­min sati yad bhavati tat tasyādhipateyam ity adhipatiprata­yayalamkānam; for instance, it is the organ of sight that is the adhipatipratyaya of the visual sensation, in the presence of a determinate object also able to arouse the sensations of taste, smell etc. (SDS p. 86 caksuso 'dhipatiprata­yād visayagrahanapratinivamah i uditasya jñānasya rasādiśāhāraye prāpte nīyāmakaṃ caksur adhipatir bhāvītum arhasi loke nīyāmakasyādhipatitvopalambhāt). In the AK the adhipatipratyaya is included in a system (see II. 49-55a. 61b-73) formed by six hetus and four pratyayas – the other pratyayas are there hetu°, samanantaræ° and ālambana° – (cf. de La Vallée Poussin 1923-31: I pp. 299-308: for different classifications inside the
II 4.12-13 the cause, is indicative (liṅgam) of the latter being there. On the contrary, a manifestation of smoke different from the one we have spoken of derives solely from the manifestation ‘smoke’ perceived by other subjects, which takes on in this case the role of determining condition.

– The manifestation ‘smoke’ (in the distance etc.), which, though not preceded by the direct presence of the manifestation ‘fire’, arises from the manifestation ‘fire’ common to the various other knowing subjects in that place and endowed with such causal power by the power of Necessity; this manifestation ‘smoke’ is that which invariably makes known the existence of this manifestation ‘fire’. On the contrary, that smoke which derives from other smoke that already exists20 – the manifestation ‘fire’ now being completely extinct –, arises precisely from the manifestation ‘smoke’ present to the consciousness of various other subjects, which, though not being directly perceived at that moment21 [by the subject who makes the inference], is invested [by the Lord] with the role of determining condition22, as we saw in the previous case. – 12-13 –

Buddhist tradition, id.: 1 p. 299 n. 1; see also id. 1928-49: 448 ff. for the hetu-pratyaya theory in the Vijñaptimātratā). The first hetu in the series (kārana°) is identified with the adhipatipratyaya. All dharmas can be kārana° (but not with regard to themselves) in the general sense, in that they do not make obstacle to the causal process; but there is a principal (pradhāna) kārana° which is that responsible for the effective production of the effect - for example, sight or form for the visual sensation or food for the body (AKBh p. 83; see also de La Vallée Poussin 1923-31: 1 pp. 247-248). The adhipatipratyaya in the kārikā therefore would correspond to the pradhānakārana°. Actually, neither Utp. nor Abh. explain what they exactly mean by adhipatipratyaya. In particular Abh. limits himself to pointing out the character of ‘being remote, out of sight’ (IPv II p. 185 tasmai kāryāt so ‘numīyate yataḥ parokṣo ‘sāv adhipatitvād eva, IPvV III p. 215 tac ca vahnyābhāsādi yato ‘numātuḥ parokṣam, tato ‘dhipatipratyaya ity ucyate, etc.). See also n. 21.

20 The reference is to the smoke the shepherd puts into a leather bottle and lets out later. The example, known as the gopālaghatikā, already occurred in SD V.67; see also Karnakagomin’s commentary on the PVSV p. 99.

21 The adhipatipratyaya must necessarily belong to a different (earlier) time from that of the effect (cf. AKBh p. 84, where there is an exposition of the Sautrāntika criticism of the Sarvāstivadins, supporters of the relation of causality between co-existent dharmas; see also PV III.246). And, on the other hand, if it were not parokṣa, it would be the object of direct perception and there would be no need to resort to inference.

22 Each of the elements that enter into the relation of causality plays a role, that does not directly derive from or coincide with its own nature (as in the Buddhist
14. Also the relation of cause and effect conceived as ‘there being this, this other is produced (asmin saññidam asti)\textsuperscript{23} is not admissible for realities that are insentient and as such incapable of ‘requiring’ (apeksā\textsuperscript{o})\textsuperscript{24}.

- A fixed temporal succession of antecedent-consequent, which is expressed in the formulation ‘there being this, this other is produced’, also occurs between things that have no causal connections, such as for instance the rising in the firmament of the constellations of the Kṛttikās and Rohinī\textsuperscript{25}. The relation of cause and effect should therefore be formulated thus: ‘there being the causal power of the thing that precedes, there is the existence of the one that follows’. But this is not possible for insentient realities incapable of requiring\textsuperscript{26}. And even if we understand the meaning of the formula as ‘the causal power of the precedent constitutes the existence of the consequent’, in this way, too, virtually nothing is said; neither can the own nature, characterized by the causal power, of the preceding element appear as the existence of the following one. – 14 –

conception), but is, so to speak, superimposed upon it by the power of Necessity of the Lord, who remains the only true causal agent, the agent \textit{par excellence}. This is also generally valid for the whole sphere of practical reality.

\textsuperscript{23} The Buddhists in general are referred to here. The relation of causality is resolved, in the final analysis, in a fixed temporal concomitance as being the only ascertainable thing (cf. Torella 1979: 397-98, n. 32).

\textsuperscript{24} To the same objection put forward in TS 521 and relative \textit{Pañjikā} – ‘If causality is explained in this way, namely without the intervention of an operation, how can one explain expressions such as ‘the effect depends on (requires) a cause’?’ – the Buddhist replies that it is only a question of turns of phrase: what is called ‘dependence, need’ (apeksā) is merely an invariable immediate succession (ya ānāntaryaniyamah suivāpeksābhidyate).

\textsuperscript{25} The Pleiades and Taurus. This argument is commonly used by the various critics of the Buddhist conception of causality. The invariable concomitance between the rising of these two constellations, a Buddhist would reply (cf. TS 1423-4), rests anyway upon a causal connection, which links the two terms not directly but through their common dependence on a single complex of causes (cf. PV I. 8); in this case, in fact, it would be the same wind (prabhaṇjana) that pushes both constellations consecutively (santatyā).

\textsuperscript{26} I.e. in the sense that the existence of one thing ‘requires’ (apeksā) the existence of another. The concept of apeksā – which is the meaning of the locative case here – contains on the one hand this intentional dynamism (amusamdhāna in the following kārikā: cf. SSVr p. 2 jadasya mirahbisamdheḥ ...), on the other the resting of one thing upon another: IPVV III p. 228 paraniṣṭhārūpā amusamdhānārūpā va saptāmy utthāpitā (directly commenting upon abhiprāya and anyānuṣaṅgitā in the ākā), and yet again \textit{ibid.} p. 229 anyonyalagnataṁtipā apeksaṁ and abhiprāvyakṛtyā.
15. In fact the meaning of the locative case may not be applied to self-contained entities, incapable of intentionality (anusamdhana⁰), whether [cause and effect] are considered existent or non-existent.

– Effect and also cause may be understood as existent or as non-existent: but, whatever the case, they still remain insentient realities, self-contained and lacking intentionality, whose being is independent of other entities. And it is for this reason that the meaning expressed by the endings of the subordinate cases²⁷, whose essence is precisely its dependence on a predominant element, is not applicable to them. – 15 –

16. On the basis of what has been said the only logically admissible relation between things is to be found in the meaning of the case endings, which consists in a relation between the action and the factors of the action (kriyäkäraka⁰) and has as its only foundation the knowing subject²⁸.

²⁷ All the cases are subordinate – excluding, of course, the nominative which is by definition svatantra – (IPVV III p. 231 dvitiyadaya); the kartr presides over and promotes the carrying out of the individual functions of the various kārakas and they all bring about the main action expressed by the verb. But subordination itself presupposes a conscious dynamism, an intentionality which everything that is conceived as jada, as confined in itself, cannot possess, as well as a capacity for unification, for establishing relations, which is all expressed in the single word, anusamdhana, in all its concentration of meanings. However one wishes to conceive this dependence (we have seen that, following the ṛkā, Abh. has distinguished two types, anyonyalagnātārūpā and abhiprāyarūpā), it is precluded from inert and insentient realities. Utp. returns to this subject and develops it further in the SSVṛ (p. 2): na hi jadayoḥ sambandhinor apeksārtho ghatate pāratantryārtho vā / athāpy anyūkura eva bijam apeksate bije vā paratantra bhavati, tadaíattvādes tadātmalābhhasety etad api na samyak; upacāro hy ayam apeksa iva paratantra iveti syāt, na tu jadasya mukhyaivākaṅkṣā prārthana cecchaiva viśisṭā apeksā pāratantryam vā parapravāntuḥ paraśukyaviniyogākanksā svecchācarananirghatanaḥ samkalpaviśeṣa eva samgacchate, alabdhaṁmanaḥ cātmalābhārtham apeksādi kathaye. If the Buddhist premises are accepted – Abh. concludes (IPVV III p. 231) – the relation of cause and effect therefore remains inexplicable, seeing that however one puts it – bije sati anyūkuro ‘nikarasyā bijam etc. – no formulation stands up to a logical examination, as there is no room for assuming the role itself of kāraka.

²⁸ This concept is already formulated in substantially the same terms in ŚD IV. 32ab vinaikatvam ca na bhavet kārakatvam kadacanā; Utp. gives a very succinct commentary on this, referring the reader to the IPK (and commentaries) for a more extensive treatment of the subject: ghatādes ca yad etat svakāryakaranaṁ bhavadhīr iṣyate tac cidekarūpatvam vīṇā na syāt / jadasya nirabhisaṃdheḥ karanaśyogād ity etad api tiṣvarapratyabhijñāyām evotkum.
- The connection between earth, seed, water and so on is correctly understood as the meaning of the case endings consisting in a relation between verbal action and the factors of the action, depending on a single subject, and is not to be identified with some other type of 'dry' (śuṣka)²⁹ connection such as that of cause and effect. – 16 –

17. Even if it is maintained that cause and effect have one another’s very nature, merely the unity of the two is obtained, for if there were any distinction it could not be said that they have the same nature³⁰.

- Even if it is maintained that cause and effect have one another’s form, the only result would be that they are a single thing and not that they constitute a relation. – 17 –

18. The differentiation of a unitary entity is action, occurring in temporal succession. In this way we necessarily return to our thesis of an agent subject, as being that which becomes modified in the various forms³¹.

- The presentation of a single reality in differentiated ways, change, impelled (or ‘measured’) by time, is precisely action. Therefore for an entity free to modify itself, endowed with energy, being a cause means being the agent of the action. – 18 –

19. But this is not possible for an insentient reality, because differentiation would conflict with unity, given the manifold forms of manifesta-

²⁹ The meaning of śuṣka is explained in ĪPVV III p. 234 śuṣkah kārttāma-svātantryalaksanobhayamelanātmakarasāṃśūnyah; i.e. without the ‘juice’ that is represented by conscious dynamism.

³⁰ The previous kārikā concluded the argumentations put forward by Utp. against the Buddhist conception of causality, based on the absolute otherness and isolation of single entities. A different argument must be addressed to the followers of Śāmkhya who, in admitting the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, maintain the continuity and substantial unity of things. But the thesis of the Śāmkhya (also criticized in the IS), as the following kārikā points out, cannot figure as a real alternative to the Śaiva thesis.

³¹ The Śāmkhya conception of causality as the continual modification of a primordial nature (prakṛti, pradhāna) to forms that are constantly new and already implicitly contained in it, in the end, enters into the Śaiva scheme of the kārttā: the modification of the prakṛti is precisely its being the agent of the action of modification. The Śaivas would have no objection were it not for the fact that the prakṛti as conceived by the Śāmkhya – i.e. jada – has no right to assume this role, which is the exclusive prerogative of the conscious being (cf. the following kārikā).
II 4.19 **tion. On the contrary, it is possible in the case of a conscious unitary reality.**

- This is not possible for an insentient reality, because its nature which is single would conflict with its appearing in differentiated forms. On the contrary, it is possible for an absolutely limpid (*svacche*), unitary, conscious reality, because there is no conflict here between its unity and its capacity to receive manifold reflections[^32]. — 19 —

20. **Even if the unity of consciousness is maintained[^33] to be the only ultimate reality, there cannot be action, for two entities divided as regards the nature of their manifestation (*ābhāsabhinnyayoh*), without a preliminary act of thought which grasps and establishes the unity (*eka-tvapārāmarśam*), characterized by the desire to act.**

- Even if one posits the conscious principle as the only reality, a differentiation of the manifestations conceived of as random (i.e. without a cause) is not admissible[^34], and on the other hand there is no action in

[^32]: The I, according to a simile which is very dear to these schools, is like a clear mirror serving as substratum for the manifestation of objective reality. Owing to its absolute transparency it remains unmodified by the apparition of these forms, which are in a sense different from it. It is this very purity that causes what is actually not separate from it to appear, instead, as separate (ĪPVV III p. 243 *etad eva hi tannirmalatvam yat svāmānātiriktasya api attrikasya iva avabhāsanam*). See also SPr 1.54-55 *atyanṭācchasvabhāvatvāt sphāṭikasya yathā svakam / rūpam paroparakasya nityam naivopalabhyate // tathā bhāvasamāyuktam bhagavams tāvakam vapuḥ / atyanṭanirmalatayā prthak tair nopalabhyate // «Just as due to its absolute transparency, the intrinsic nature of crystal, that is continually coloured by other things, is not perceived, so indeed, O Blessed One, your body, that is united with the various beings, due to its absolute limpidity is not perceived without them».  

[^33]: Utp. now turns his criticism to the *santabrahmavdda*, which might avail itself of what is stated in the preceding *kārikā* to propose itself as the definitive truth, able to overcome all the contradictions pointed out in the theories of causality examined so far.  

[^34]: The multiplicity and diversity of manifestations cannot be conceived of as being purely random, because the order and regularity of reality would remain inexplicable. The multiplicity must therefore have a cause and this cause cannot be anything but action. However, in the conscious principle as understood by the Vedāntins (*sāntabrahman*) action is by definition absent, and — as the *vritti* explains — every insentient reality is incapable of action. Action, as the bridge between the one and the many, must necessarily contain as a precondition an awareness of the not absolute otherness of the two terms, in order that these may play the roles - which are distinct yet intimately coordinated —, for example, of *kartr* and *karma*. As Abh.
this conscious principle. If, however, it renders externally manifest through an act of determinate thought combined with a desire to act in this way, then action is possible. On the other hand, an insentient reality cannot even be the agent of the action of being – 'it exists, is' – since it does not possess the freedom that is manifested through 'wanting to be' (bubhāṣāyogena). Thus the ultimate truth in this regard is that the knowing subject, and he alone, 'causes' the insentient reality 'to be' (bhāvayati), or, in other words, appears in various forms such as mount Himācala and so on.

21. Therefore causality, agency, action are nothing but the will of Him who wishes to appear in the form of the universe, in the various manifestations of jar, cloth and so on.

- The very will of Him who is free and has consciousness as His nature to appear as universe constitutes His being cause as regards the universe, in the form of agency; and this is the power of Action. In this way action in the primary sense (mukhya) – i.e. the desire to act – belongs uniquely to the agent, one, whose essence is consciousness.

says (ĪpV II p. 205), action, which is single, could not be the svabhāva of two things, if these were utterly different form one another. This moment of unity occurs in the first attempt towards action (cikīrṣā), when the object is still completely immersed in the I. It must be pointed out that Abh.'s commentaries give three or four different interpretations of the karikā, according to whether ābhūsabhinmayoh is made to depend on cikīrṣā, parāmārṣa or kriya respectively; however, these interpretations are not incompatible and, on the contrary, broaden the implications of the meaning as a whole.

35 Action, Abh. explains, following the fikā (see text note 207), is the 'rendering manifest' (ābhāsanā), whose essential feature is constituted by the very first impulse of thought and will to act (parāmārṣa – cikīrṣā or icchā) which already contains in embryo the future manifestation and externalization (cf. SD I. 19-20a and vṛtti).

36 A certain action may be attributed to an insentient reality (SDVt p. 159 ghato 'ṛthakriyām udakāharanādikām karoti), only in a figurative sense; strictly speaking it would not be permissible even to say that it 'is', unless one takes into account that this satta that practical experience ascribes to it is in reality śivatākhyā; see above, Introduction pp. XV-XVI. This point is developed by Utp. in the vṛtti on SD IV. 32b-33a, where Somānanda solves in the same terms the problem of the attribution in discourse of the qualification of kāraka (and thus of case endings) to entities that are by definition non-existent, such as the antelope's horn etc. Bhartrhari would have faced the problem by referring to the distinction between mukhyaśattha and vastvartha, on the one hand, and upacārasattā and sabdārtha, on the other. On the related question whether (kārakas') agency presupposes animation see Cardona 1974.
II 4.21 There is no object of action without an agent: action, in fact, is attributed to the object etc. only in a figurative sense, through the agent. All the other karakas may even be absent from the sentence, but the presence of the subject is enough to ensure the carrying out of the verbal action, and, vice versa, even if all the other karakas are present the absence of the subject alone makes the action impossible (IIPVV III p. 253; cf. VP III. 7. 101-2 and Helarāja’s commentary). Cf. SPr II. 54 prakāśate samvid ekā tadanyat tu prakāśyate ī prakāśyam ca bhavet karma tace ca kartrā vinā katham // «Consciousness alone shines; that which is other from it is illuminated. What is illuminated is the object, and how can the object subsist without a subject?». 

37 All the other karakas may even be absent from the sentence, but the presence of the subject is enough to ensure the carrying out of the verbal action, and, vice versa, even if all the other karakas are present the absence of the subject alone makes the action impossible (IIPVV III p. 253; cf. VP III. 7. 101-2 and Helarāja’s commentary). Cf. SPr II. 54 prakāśate samvid ekā tadanyat tu prakāśyate ī prakāśyam ca bhavet karma tace ca kartrā vinā katham // «Consciousness alone shines; that which is other from it is illuminated. What is illuminated is the object, and how can the object subsist without a subject?». 

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SECTION III. REVELATION

CHAPTER I

1. On the basis of the preceding argumentations (evam), action, which consists of an internal and external level, subject to temporal succession, pertains to the knowing subject alone: therefore cognition and action are inseparable from one another.

1 This is the sense that is expressly indicated by Abh. (IPVV III p. 257).

2 This knowing subject is, first and foremost, the supreme knowing subject, Paramesvara, but also every limited subject, insofar as Śiva is his model and ultimate essence. What the kārikā expounds is therefore the śivatattva (IPVV III p. 258 śivatattvalaksanasya parapramātur); all the tattvas, from Sadāśiva and Īśvara (see the following kārikā) are his modes of being, or so-to-speak internal modifications, he is the sole reality (ibid. p. 257 śivatattvam hi sarvadārthānām vapuh, p. 263 śivatattvam eva ekam vastusat). Utp. does not place this supreme reality (called īśīr in the following kārikā) beyond the scale of the tattvas, but at the top of it, as the union between śiva and śakti. His powers are absolutely pure (cf. above I.8.11) in that they are without object. If at the pati level the subject sees the world as his own body (III.2.3, IV.1.4), at the paramapati level we cannot even speak of the knowable (IPVV III p. 367 paramapatau tu bhagavati prameyakathāiva naasti, ibid. p. 266 na ca śiva pade viśvam kīcchit). All the universe is completely dissolved into the I; śivatā is precisely the plane where only the ‘I’ exists. At various points in the ŚDVṛ a (not constant) distinction is made between Śiva on the one hand and Paramaśiva (or Paramēśvara) on the other seen as the all-inclusive form (p. 3); elsewhere (p. 27) the God is expressly said to assume the form of the thirty-six principles, all indistinctly understood as kārya (... tattvarūpam sattrimśattattvasamkhyam kāryam rūpena bibharti). It must be borne in mind, however, that what Utp. primarily intends to do in this work is to render explicit the teaching of his master Somananda. Bhāskara (Bh II p. 211 ff.) distinguishes between prakriyāśāstra (IPK is one of these), whose aim is to describe the nature of the tattvas (tattva-svarūpakathana), and sārasāstra (e.g. the Mālinīvijaya), devoted to the teaching of the supreme non-duality. According to the latter, within Sadāśiva – since it has the nature of sāntabrahman – there is not a full contact with Śakti; thus Śakti is posited as a separate principle (the thirty-fifth) above Sadāśiva and is to be united with Śiva (the thirty-sixth) distinct from Sadāśiva. Though in reality Śiva and Paramaśiva are one single thing, Anāśritaśiva refers to his specific nature (svārūpanārdeśa) and Paraśiva refers to his pervading the whole scale of principles. However it is not
III 1.1

- Action, subject to temporal succession, is nothing but externalization; it pertains to the knowing subject, the self, which resides within. Thus cognition and action are mutually inseparable in him. — 1 —

2. But by virtue of the pre-eminence of the internal state there is, at the beginning, the Sādākhya principle⁵; then, with the predominance of externality, the Pārameśvara principle.

- But when in the Lord (īsituh), between the planes of internality and externality, internality has pre-eminence, there is the Sādākhya⁴ principle; then, with the increase in externality, there is the principle of Īśvara⁵.

- 2 —

3. Īśvara is opening outwards (unmeṣaḥ), Sadāśiva is closing inwards (nimesaḥ)⁶; True Science (sadvidyā) is the state of the notions of ‘I’ and ‘this’ having an identical substratum.

legitimate — Bhāskara continues — to make it into a thirty-seventh principle, because vyāpра and vyāpaka cannot be placed on the same plane, namely, vyāpaka cannot be collocated in the same series as the vyāpya, though higher up (the same applies to those who posit a further thirty-eight principle). The fact that the description given by the prakriyāśāstra stops at the śivatattva may be explained, again according to Bhāskara, in two ways: either they were only aiming at giving a differentiated description of the tattvas, without intending to proclaim the supreme non-duality (to which in any case they constitute a way of access); or they do not mention a reality beyond the tattvas in order not to exposc it to objectivization.

⁵ ‘Principle’ (tattva), according to Abh.’s definition (ĪPVV III p. 264, IPV II P. 219), is a reality that extends, as a unifying element, to a set of distinct entities, such as earth for hills, mountains, countries etc., or water for lakes, rivers, seas. See as regards this MPĀ. vidyāpāda. V. 3-4 and Rāmakaṇṭha’s commentary. Cf. also the (implicit) etymological interpretation that Utp. gives of it (ŚDVṛ p. 27) viśvuprapaṅcatananaksama ‘capable of extending the deployment of everything’; there is yet another definition in TP 73. The tattva refers to the objective dimension of a certain plane of reality, that is, to the content and quality of the experience of the subjects who pertain to those levels (ĪPVV III p. 274 vedyabhāvanistha dasā tattva-svarūpā tadavabhāsāyitrīṣuddhamārtrvedyavastusādhanā).

⁶ Abh. (IPV II pp. 217-8) gives more than one explanation of the word Sādākhya: the derivative with vyddhi has here the meaning of ‘that is in sadākhya’ (cf. Pāṇini IV. 3. 53), where sadākhya means the plane on which the notion of ‘being’ (sat) first appears; or of ‘what is the meaning of Sadākhya (understood as a synonym of Sadāśiva)’. The word Sadāśiva, again according to Abh. (ĪPVV III p. 264), means that the nature of Śiva does not cease to be present, even if the object begins to arise.

⁷ Nimesa refers to the moment in which the ‘this’, which in Suddhavidyā becomes fully evident and faces the I (still, of course, in the sphere of consciousness...
Iṣvara and Sadāsiva are respectively opening outwards and closing inwards, the condition of externality and internality. Pure Science (śuddhavidyā) is the plane of him who, having all things as his essence, thinks ‘I am this universe’, where the two terms have the same substratum (sāmānādhikaranyena)\(^7\), without any differentiation between external and internal, cognizable object and cognizing subject, both resting on the sole reality which is pure consciousness. – 3 –

4. [The latter principle is called sadvidyā] for in this things, having reached the plane of object of cognition and the level of ‘this’, are known by what is their true reality, as their essence is consciousness.

– Things, though they have become cognizable object in the form of ‘this’ on the plane of cognizable reality differentiated [from the subject], are known by their true reality in the terms of ‘this is I’, insofar as their essence is none other than consciousness; this is the sense conveyed by the adjective ‘pure’ [in Pure Science]\(^8\). – 4 –

and non-differentiation), is still evanescent and veiled by the I which completely overcomes it, as at the dawn of creation or the twilight of cosmic dissolution. The I-this relation is reversed in the Iṣvara principle; the ‘this’ in Sadāsiva and in Iṣvara are related to one another in the same way as a sketch is related to a finished painting. There is no real differentiation between the Sadāsiva. Iṣvara and Śuddhavidyā principles; the ‘identical substratum’ which, according to Utp., characterizes Śuddhavidyā is also an essential element for the first two, which show the disequilibrium between subject and object though they have unity as their common basis (in the one case – cf. IPVV III p. 266 – it is idam that is projected in aham and vice versa).

The texts seem to be quite in agreement on this, though there are certain discrepancies in the description (IPVV III p. 266 asau vyāpāro vidyākhyāḥ i ubhāv api ca tadvyāpāramayau paramaśivanāthasya ekaghanam aiśvaryaṃ; IPV II p. 222 taddhīsthāndrayagatam karaṇaṃ vidyātattvam āha; PTV p. 224 bhagavatsadāśiveśadāśā śuddhavidyāmayī; etc.).

\(^7\) Sāmānādhikaranya is, in grammatical terms, ‘co-referentiality’, having the same case, such as the subject and nominal predicate of a proposition. The plane of māya is characterized by the opposite condition, prthagadhisthānaraṇa: subject and object appear as two realities unrelated to one another: ‘they have a different substratum’.

\(^8\) Abh. (IPVV III p. 273) refers to the MPĀ to define the nature of Śuddhavidyā. Indeed, the tenth pātala of MPĀ’s vidyāpāda (with Rāmakanṭha’s vṛtti) is devoted to the vidyātattva. Vidyā is the basic component of human knowledge, which takes place through the various forms assumed by the buddhi (determination, memory, intuition and so on) (vṛtti p. 311 adhyavasāyasmitipratibhedādipratyayabhedabhinnā buddhir api yayā vedyate sā vidyā tat param karaṇam); Vidyā embraces it entirely,
5. Here there is imperfection (aparatvam) on the one hand – because things are manifested as other than the self –, perfection (paratā) on the other – because they are veiled by the I. This is in fact the perfect-imperfect state (parāparadasa).

– Here there is imperfection because there is the notion of ‘this’, perfection because all the cognizable is veiled by the I: this is therefore the perfect-imperfect condition. – 5 –

6. Others maintain that Vidyā is the idea of differentiation with respect to things, present in the one who is, however, for his part, [fully] in the sense that it ‘knows’, is aware of, all forms of cognition (X.5 sāsannātiva satatam sarvāngālingane ksamā / na tathā prākrī buddhir bhīrāngā yatas tu sā //). However, Vidyā is bound to the limited human condition (X.20a pauruṣam bhāvamāĀśritya), and, as such, it illuminates the ordinary cognizable reality (X.15b vedyāthapratipādikā) but it cannot reveal the highest principles (X.20d na śivāthapradāyikā). This task pertains to Śuddhavidyā, which transcends the plane of māyā but acts on the plane of the limited subject, since it is only in him – not in the akāla subject and still less in the mukta –, in his consciousness, that the whole universal deployment, from the lowest plane, is the object of knowledge (X.23 śivādyavaniparyanto yo ‘yam adhvātivistrīṭah / sa sarvas ca citau jñeyo nāśivatvād vimucyate //).

9 Or in other words, as Abh. comments (IPV II p. 227), ‘in the two principles (Bh: Sadāsiva and Īśvara)’.

10 Cf. IPV III p. 274 aparatvam apūrṇataḥ anyākāṅkṣitvam idam iti, paratvam pūrṇatvam aham iti.

11 According to a conception that Utp. does not present as his own (Abh., IPV II p. 228, attributes it to the Rauravāgama), Śuddhavidyā is the principle in which differentiation appears, restricted, however, only to the sphere of the object: the subject, in other words, without declining from its own total absorption in pure consciousness (therefore no identification with a mind, body etc.) regards the object as other than himself. It is the condition of the Vidyēśvaras – which we will return to later – who, omniscient and omnipotent, face a reality considered other than themselves. It may be added, again on the basis of Abh., that what differentiates this conception from that of the preceding kārikā is that there Vidyā represents in the sphere of the consciousness ‘I-this’ the predominance of the I which veils the ‘this’; whereas here it is the predominance of ‘this’ veiled by the I. The introduction of differentiation determines a certain assimilation with māyā (the Raurava and other texts in fact call Śuddhavidyā also by the name of Mahāmāyā); cf. Rauravāgama, vidyāpāda, IV. 28b māypari mahāmāyā sarvakāraṇa-kāraṇam, a māyā, however, which is not fully developed (apprūḍha) because the ‘this’ in it is incapable of developing in the sense of full duality, veiled as it is by the I (the ‘purity’ of Śuddhavidyā consists precisely in this). Mahāmāyā
an agent having consciousness as his essence, as in the case of the Vidyesvaras: this idea of differentiation is similar to that caused by the power of māyā.

– Some consider Vidyā as the view of everything as differentiated [from the I], pertaining however to a subject [fully] endowed with consciousness and agency. This Vidyā is also the power of māyā. Being beyond the flow of existence, the Mantreśvaras and the Vidyesvaras reside there.  

7. The power of Vidyā reveals in the state of ‘beast’ (paśubhāve) the true nature as Sovereignty; the power of māyā, on the contrary, conceals it.

is sometimes (cf. e.g. PTV p. 225) considered a distinct tattva – between Māyā and Suddhāvidyā – in the need to assign an abode to the vijnānakevalas, which on the hierarchical scale of subjects occupy an intermediate position between the pralayašalas and the vidyesvaras etc., located respectively in Māyā and Suddhāvidyā; in other texts it is, on the contrary, included in Suddhāvidyā or in Māyā, depending on which of its aspects – mentioned above – one wishes to refer to (see Sataratnasamgraha II. 24-27 and comm., SDVy p. 25; see also Dvivedi 1983: Upodghāta, 139-141).

12 IPVIII III p. 277 explains, following the fikā, the co-presence in this principle of the Mantreśvaras and Vidyesvaras on the basis of the essential unity of Mantras and Vidyās (suddhinddipardmarsasdrasabdarāśikalāśarāravena); the difference is that in the former mukti, samvedana and saktimat predominate, while in the latter siddhi, vācya and śakti predominate.

13 The conception expressed in this kārikā (attributed by Abh., IPV II p. 231, to the Śaḍārduḥsāra, a text of the Trika school) seems to be that favoured by Utp., since it is not introduced as pertaining to ‘others’ (ibid. anye ity anukteh). Abh. formulates it in the avataranikā to the IPV as follows: in Sadaśiva the differentiation is not evident, icchāśakti is in action; in Īśvara the differentiation is evident, the śakti is jñāna; in Suddhāvidyā (literally ‘in the Vidyesvaras’) the differentiation is not only evident, but also fully developed (prarūḍha) – but only as regards the plane of the knowable, subjectivity is untouched – kriyāśakti is in action. After that, with the differentiation which also embraces the sphere of the I, one enters the sam­saric world, the realm of māyāśakti. Vidyāśakti is also in action on this plane, having the opposite function from that of māyā; that is, it discloses true reality to the yogins and the jñānins in whom the error of differentiation has been overcome and survives only in the state of karmic impulse. The parallel avataranikā in IPV contains some variants and seems more in line with Utp.: jñānaśakti in Sadaśiva and kriyāśakti in Īśvara (as in SD II. 1); a residual trace of kriyāśakti constitutes, on the contrary, the power of Suddhāvidyā, also called Mahāmāyā.
III 1.7  – In beings in the flow of existence there is the recognition of the self as Sovereignty thanks to Vidyā\textsuperscript{14} and the state of ‘beast’ through the action of māyā. – 7 –

8. On the contrary, when absolute differentiation appears, and the void, the intellect or the body – which are other than the self – are considered as ‘I’, it is then that the power of māyā displays itself.

– When things appear exclusively as ‘this’, as differentiated [from the subject], and entities such as the body and so on appear as the cognizing subject – the ‘I’ –, then the power of māyā called ‘obfuscating’\textsuperscript{15}, which is the cause of these two errors, displays itself in the Lord. – 8 –

9. That cognizing subject identified with the void etc. who faces a cognizable reality assumed to be separate [from himself], such a subject – who is in fact himself an object\textsuperscript{16} – is enveloped by the pentad constituted by Time etc.

\textsuperscript{14} On vidyāśakti and its degrees cf. ŠDVṛ pp. 31-32, 25; see also below III. 2. 3.
\textsuperscript{15} Abh. (ĪPVV III p. 285) quotes a passage from the Rudrayāmalasāra (māyā vimohinī nāma kalāyāh kalanam sthitam), to which the vṛtti probably alludes.
\textsuperscript{16} All the various planes – from the body to the mind and finally the void – with which a person believes he can identify his own subjectivity and which he opposes to an objective reality considered ‘other’, are on the contrary, in the final analysis, part of it, as they too are objects compared to the authentic subjectivity constituted by consciousness (cit). But if in one way they are not identical to consciousness they are however an expression of it, there not being anything substantially other than consciousness and that does not ultimately merge with it. The error is therefore a double error, paradoxical like the nature of māyā which lies at its basis: identifying consciousness, the I, with what is not consciousness is māyā, but it is māyā too which causes what in reality is not different from consciousness to appear as other than it. In order that the reality of the object may be conceived as being differentiated from the I a degradation of the I is necessary. Without this identity crisis the I, in its fullness, could only embrace the whole as his own self and the word ‘this’ could not be uttered.
\textsuperscript{17} The manifestation of the present, characterized by vividness and clarity, is the point of reference for conceiving a past and a future. The seat of the experience of time, Abh. adds (ĪPVV III p. 287), is primarily the empirical subject and only secondarily things, which receive their temporal colour from the time of the subject with whom they are associated.
\textsuperscript{18} Utp. himself, according to what Abh. reports (ibid. pp. 290-1, see text note 31), acknowledges two interpretations of the expression karmaphala: ‘the action and
- That cognizing subject identified with the void etc. who faces the whole of cognizable reality conceived as separate [from the self], is, in fact, himself the object of cognition as 'this' and is conditioned by the five principles, Time and so on. From Time he derives, through the manifestation of the present, the existence of the past and of the future\(^\text{17}\); from Necessity the strict concatenation of [cause with] effect and of action with its fruit (\textit{karmaphalaniyamah})\(^\text{18}\); from Attachment the yearning for fruition; from Science and Force this subject - who, however, is not identified with consciousness nor is he free – derives a partial knowledge and activity, essentially constituted by consciousness and freedom. – 9 –

10-11. \textit{Cognizable reality, distinct in products and instruments, appears in twenty-three forms; it has a single, undivided, radical cause, the pradhāna. The series of internal and external instruments has thirteen aspects; the class of products, divided into gross and subtle, has ten.}

- The products are divided into two groups. Five are constituted by sound, tangible shape, colour, taste and smell and are called \textit{tanmātra} because of their subtle nature\(^\text{19}\); by combining them one has the gross ele-

\(^{\text{17}}\) and relative \textit{vrtti} – is present not only in ether, but also in air, fire, water and earth. Thus two distinct conceptions emerge. According to the first every gross element possesses only one single quality and, if we perceive others, this is due to its combining or connecting (\textit{samparka, sanniveśa}) with other elements. Abh. (IPVV III p. 299) quotes, with reference to this, a line from the MPĀ. \textit{ksubhītāt sparsātan-mātrād dvigunō vyūhato marut} (not found in the published text; but cf. \textit{vidyāpāda}, XX. 1cd-2ab \textit{yat tat prāk sparsa-tanmātram tāmasam samudāhram / tātksobhād abhavad vāyur dviguno vyāhalakṣanah}), which he glosses with \textit{pūrvabhūtāntara-vyūhayogā}. This is the thesis of the ancient Sāmkhya, which will be later supplanted

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ments called earth etc., of which there are also five, and they are essen-
tially no different from the former (tāny eva)\textsuperscript{20}. The ear, the skin, the
eye, the tongue and the nose are the five instruments of cognition; the
voice, the hands, the feet, the excretory and genital organs are the five
instruments of action. The internal organ is threefold: the mind, the in-
tellect and the sense of the I. This cognizable reality, composed of
products and instruments and divided into twenty-three forms, has a
single and undivided plane called \textit{pradhāna}, which constitutes its radical
foundation. –10-11–

in the classical Sāmkhya by the thesis of the accumulation of qualities (ether has
sound, air has sound and tactile sensation, and so on, until one reaches earth which
possesses all five), which is that generally accepted in the theoretical section of the
Āgamas (e.g. \textit{Kālottara, Pauśkara} etc.) and presupposed by ritual. Furthermore this
accumulation is generally explained as deriving from the fact that the individual
tanmātra generates the relative mahābhūta not in isolation, but by associating itself
with the other tanmātras in various ways (see \textit{Pauśkaragama, pumstātvapatāla}, II.
243-4, cit. in \textit{Śaivaparibhāsā} p. 125; MPĀ, vidyāpāda, XVIII. 102-104ab, etc.).

\textsuperscript{20} This seems to mean that the gross elements do not have a different reality
from the essential qualities that compose them, combined and separate (cf. the frag-
mentary quotations from the \textit{āikā} on this point in the \textit{vṛtti}, cited by Abh., ĪPVV III
pp. 299-300, ‘tāny eva’ iti \textit{vṛttim vyācaṣte ‘tāny eva ca’ ityādinā ‘nātu vastvantaram’). 
This principle is clearly formulated in TĀ IX. 289: «In this regard the earth etc., as
is attested by direct perception, are nothing but an aggregate of qualities, neither,
separate or different from them, does any subject appear that may be called earth
and so on». 

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CHAPTER II

1. Such being the structure of reality\(^1\), Rudra is the deity that presides over the state in which this\(^2\) subjectivity exclusively subsists; Brahma and Viśnu\(^3\) reside in the flowing of the differentiated cognizable reality.

– Rudra is he who presides over the condition of pure [limited] subjectivity represented by the void or by an extremely subtle body formed by the puryaṣṭaka\(^4\) — in other words, over the condition in which there is a reabsorption of every other cognizable reality. Brahma and Viśnu preside over the manifestation of differentiated cognizable reality, the former causing creation and the latter continuity. – 1 –

2. This cognizer blinded by māyā, bound by the karma, is immersed in the samsāra; but once Science (vidyā) has made him recognize his own nature as Lord, then, his essence being solely consciousness, he is called ‘liberated’.

– The māyic cognizer who is identified with the void and so on, depending on the karma because of the law of necessity\(^5\), is in the power

\(^1\) This is how I understand tatra — not glossed by Utp. — in conformity with Abh.’s interpretation.

\(^2\) ‘This’, i.e. the limited subjectivity described in III. I. 9.

\(^3\) Brahma, Viśnu and Rudra along with Īśvara, Sadāśiva and Anāśrita are the so-called Kāranas or Kāraneśvaras, the hypostases of Śiva situated on the various planes of reality in an order of increasing ontological dignity. Each of these deities presides over (adhiṣṭhā-) a plane of reality, brings his devotees to this plane and, vice versa, becomes directly present to those who are absorbed into the contemplation of that level of reality (IPVV III p. 305). Abh., commenting on the fikā, connects them with forms of knowledge, levels of the word and locations in the human body. Brahma is associated with the first moment of cognition and manifestation (prāthamakālpikī srṣṭiḥ), with the first effusion of paśyanā in the form of pratibhā and his locus is the heart; Viśnu is associated with the continuing of cognition, as in memory and dream, with madhyamā and vaikhāri, his locus is the throat; Rudra with the reabsorption of all discourses, the first step into the supreme word and his locus is the palate.

\(^4\) On the puryaṣṭaka see below pp. 204-205.

\(^5\) That the principle of ‘necessity’ is at the root of the karma is stated in the fikā
of the samsāra. With the recognition of the true reality of the self attained thanks to Science he is free. – 2 –

3. The cognizer is called ‘lord’ (patiḥ) when things appear to him as constituting his own body. When they appear to him differentiated due to māyā, the subject, polluted by the various contaminations, by the karma etc., is called ‘beast’ (paśuh).

– On the plane of sovereignty (aiśvarya°) the cognizer who sees the universe as his body is ‘lord’ (patiḥ). On the plane of limited individuality (pumstva°) the subject, enveloped by contaminations – attachment and so on⁶ –, by actions, by the ripening of the fruits that derive from them and the latent impulses determined by them, is a ‘beast’ (paśuh). – 3 –

4. Consciousness that is devoid of freedom and, vice versa, freedom devoid of consciousness: these are the two forms of maculation – so called because it obliterates one’s own true nature – called ānava⁷.

– The absolute reality is free consciousness; only insofar as this is its essence is it in perfect fullness. Since it thus wills, in virtue of its very freedom [there is the ānava maculation which is twofold]: ‘maculation’ insofar as it involves error as regards the self’s real nature and ‘twofold atomicity’ insofar as consciousness becomes limited with the loss of its fullness, creating a subjectivity in which only the light of consciousness subsists without freedom, or only freedom without consciousness. – 4 –

5. There being the ānava⁸ maculation (atraiva), the apparition of a cognizable reality differentiated [from the subject] constitutes the maculation called māyā; that, then, which in a subject endowed with agency, but lacking the full light of consciousness, determines births and ex-

on the following kārikā, as may be gathered from ĪPVV III p. 312 āha ‘niyatā’ iti niyatir yataḥ karmano mūlabhumih; see also vṛtti on III. 1. 9.

⁶ All these elements, i.e. the contaminations (kleśa) – avidyā, rāga, asmitā, dvesa and abhinivesa – and so on, are listed in Yogasūtra II. 3 ff.

⁷ The fundamental maculation, ‘concerning the anu’ (ānava), or the reduction of consciousness to a minimal, ‘atomic’, state (anu).

⁸ The maculation ānava, which is often simply called ‘maculation’, is necessarily the basis of the other two and is, in the course of recovering consciousness in its fullness, the last to disappear.
periences is the karmic maculation. All three are solely the work of the power of māyā.

- When, there being this twofold ānava maculation, cognizable reality, though in reality not separated from the subject, appears differentiated from him, there is, on the basis of this other error, the maculation known as māyic. The karmic maculation, which pertains to the agent devoid of the light of consciousness, is due to the error of considering the cause of births and so on the actions, which on the contrary – as has been established – are not causes⁹. The Lord’s will to create these three maculations is called the power of māyā. – 5 –

6. Those who do possess pure consciousness but not the agency to the highest degree (uttamakārtṛtā) are created by the Lord as separate, distinct from the self, due to their being devoid of agency¹⁰.

- Some subjects, though having a consciousness not stained by the cognizable, are created by the Lord as different from what is their true nature, because they are devoid of the full agency. – 6 –

7. Though having the same characteristics – consciousness etc. – these subjects are differentiated from one another because of a particular will of the Lord: they are the Vijnānakevalas¹¹.

⁹ The error on which the karmic maculation is based is therefore that of attributing to the actions and karmic impulses determined by them the status of cause as regards birth, length of life, quality of fruitions etc. Actions, being insentient realities (jada), cannot, according to the conception expounded in the Kriyādhikāra, be the cause of any thing whatsoever; the sole real cause is the agent, the Lord.

¹⁰ This is, in particular, a reference to the Sāmkhya conception of the puruṣa in the state of kaivalya (cf. ĪPVV III p. 319). The use of the expression ‘are created (nirmita) by the Lord’ points out how all these various maculations and levels of subjectivity are merely a ‘construct’ created by the free dynamism of Consciousness.

¹¹ Here begins the description of the various categories of subjects. Utp. expressly mentions the Vijnānakevalins, the Pralayakevalins, the Vidyeśvaras and the Sakalas, implicitly referring to the more classical division (see MV I. 15 ff.) which lists seven levels of subjectivity – Śiva, Mantramahēśvara, Mantrēśvara, Mantra, Vijnānākala, Pralayaśakala and Sakala – (see e.g. TP, MrĀ, TĀ, PH etc.). There are variations in the texts as regards the attribution and location in the scale of the principles; in the latter case this ambiguity is often due to the confusion between ontological plane and field of action. Besides this there are other divisions, based on different criteria (e.g. the well-known one of the Svāyambhūvāgama in kevala, sakala and amala; see Śataratnasamgraha I. 34); cf. Dvivedi 1983: Upodghāta. 134-35. As
Ill 2.7 – These subjects characterized by the pure light of consciousness are differentiated from one another, though there is no differentiation as regards their attributes of consciousness, permanence etc. This occurs because they are created thus by the Lord and for no other reason. This class of subjects, corresponding more or less to the puruṣas of the Śaṅkhya, has the name of Vijnānakevala12. – 7 –

8. The agents that are identified with realities other than consciousness, such as the void etc., are the Pralayākalas13. Karmic maculation also pertains to them; on the contrary, māyic maculation may or may not be present (vikalpitah).

– The Pralayakevalins assume as I the void, the prāṇa etc., not grasping their having consciousness as true nature. In these limited souls the karmic impulses are also present; on the contrary, the māyic maculation regards the ŚD, first (I. 31) vidyā, vidyeśa, mantra and mantreśvara are mentioned, then (I. 41c-43) pasa, śānta, kevalesa kevalasambhu, pralayakevalin and vijnānakevalin. The division of the subjects – mostly, as has been said, into seven classes – may be considered the common heritage of Shaivism in the broad sense, whilst keeping in mind the remark of Jayaratha (TĀV vol. VII pp. 7-8), according to which this differentiation between subjects is particularly appropriate to the dualist schools such as the Siddhānta (siddhantadarśanādisamucitam).

12 The state of Vijnānakevala (or Vijnānākalas), Abh. explains (IPVV III p. 322), may be attained through a special initiation aimed only at going beyond the path of māyā without there being any conjunction with the supreme reality, or through the creative meditation (bhāvanā) of the puruṣa in the state of isolation, without the karmic bond, according to what is expounded in the Gītā; or through concentration (dhāranā), contemplation (dhyāna) and absorption (samādhi) that have as their object the path of māyā as far as this point of deployment. The attainment of this state is therefore a special kind of experience (bhogaviśesa). It is for this reason that one may speak of its being similar to the state of the Śaṅkhya puruṣas but not absolutely identical to it.

13 ‘Devoid of kalā because of dissolution’ where ‘dissolution’ is generally the state of total absorption pertaining to deep sleep, and ‘kalā’ stands for the various principles that constitute the faculties and products (IPV II p. 152), listed above, III. 1. 10-11. The māyic maculation is present in the state of savedyasaṃsupta, in the state of deep sleep in which the traces of objective reality still remain; this is the level of identification with the mind (buddhi). In the state of apavedyasaṃsupta, to which the identification with the void and the prāṇa corresponds, every cognizable reality is completely swallowed up and with it the māyic maculation, which just consists in the apparition of a cognizable object differentiated from the subject. These states are analyzed in the following kārikās.
may or may not be present, depending on whether there is connection with cognizable reality or not. – 8 –

9. A class of subjects identified with consciousness and endowed with agency experiences cognizable reality as differentiated; the karmic maculation having disappeared, the māyic maculation is present in them. They are the Vidyeśvaras.¹⁴

– There are subjects who have transcended the karma and are identified with consciousness, being also endowed with agency.¹⁵ These, though having the nature of Vidyeśvara,¹⁶ continue to be affected by the maculation of māyā, being in relation with a differentiated cognizable

¹⁴ The Vidyeśvaras are a group of eight deities headed by Ananta, whom Śiva invests with determinate functions; in particular, they are called to cooperate in the liberation of the limited souls, acting as intermediaries in the teaching of Śiva, etc. They employ another class of subjects as their instruments, the seventy million Mantras; they are identified, as some texts indicate explicitly (see MrV, vidyāpāda, p. 46, TĀV vol. VI p. 55; cf. also ĪPVV II p. 405), with the class of the Mantramahēśvaras. It may be useful to mention the clear description given by the Moksakārikā of Sadyojyotīḥ and the relative vṛtti of Rāmakāṃṭha (particularly II 73-94), obviously without wanting to impose it in every detail as the norm for the whole śaiva tradition. In this the terms vidyā and mantra — and consequently Vidyeśvara and Mantreśvara — are interchangeable; the Vidyeśvara-Mantreśvaras are however divided into a higher group of eight headed by Ananta (which we can therefore call Mantramahēśvaras) and a lower group (apradhāṇa) of a hundred and eighteen, composed of the hundred Rudras etc. The higher Mantreśvaras are situated ontologically below kriyāsakti. After them, but still above māyā, come the seventy million Mantras, they too are divided into two parts, one half impelled directly by Śiva and the other by the Mantreśvaras. Then follow the hundred and eighteen Mantreśvaras which are mantraprayojakas but have an inferior status, as they are situated within māyā — and are consequently sakalas, just as the first two groups are niskalas. Regarding their functions, the higher Mantreśvaras are distinguished from the lower ones since only they perform the five activities of creation etc. in the māyic world. All the Mantreśvaras and the Mantras together attain supreme liberation once Ananta ceases to exist, which happens after he has completed the five activities, at the beginning of the mahāpralaya. As regards the discrepancies between the texts it may be remembered, for example, that the PH places the Mantramahēśvaras in the saddāśivatattva, SvT X. 1060 and TP I. 10 vṛtti place the Vidyeśvaras in the īśvaratattva, etc.

¹⁵ Unlike the Vījñānākālas.

¹⁶ The term Vidyeśvara expresses, according to Abh. (ĪPVV III p. 325), the contact with knowledge and sovereignty (vidyā-bodha and īśvaratva-kartrtvā). These subjects however — unlike the nature of Śadāśiva and Īśvara, on which level dif-
III 2.9 reality. They do not possess the full faculty of action and are therefore distinct from the Lord and one another\textsuperscript{17}, as has been previously seen; therefore, they too must be considered limited souls (\textit{anutvam}). – 9 –

10. All the beings that are immersed in the flowing of existence, starting from the gods, are affected by the three maculations: but of these it is precisely the karmic maculation that constitutes the sole direct cause of the samsāra.

– The beings in the power of the samsāra, from the gods to immobile things, have all three maculations: but it is only the karmic maculation that is responsible for setting in motion the samsāra. – 10 –

11. \textit{And this consciousness-principle constituted by agency (\textit{kartṛtā°)}, reinforced by kalā, being limited, comes to be – in the individual who is identified not with consciousness but with the void etc. – in a subordinate position}\textsuperscript{18}.

– In the beings immersed in the flowing of samsāra this consciousness-principle, constituted by agency, in the sphere of insentient realities [assumed as subject] such as the void, the \textit{prāna} and so on, corroborated differentiation is not yet manifested – conceive the objects of their knowledge and action as different from themselves due to the māyic maculation; they are, rather, similar to the Lord of the dualist doctrines.

\textsuperscript{17} See MrĀ, \textit{vidyāpada}, IV. 5.

\textsuperscript{18} The consciousness-principle (\textit{cittattvam}), supreme consciousness, in its fullness is constituted by the interpenetration of \textit{bodha} (luminous, cognitive principle) and of \textit{kartṛtā} or \textit{vimarsā} (dynamic principle which is expressed in the activity of the I). The maculation called \textit{ānava} is responsible for the fragmentation of this unity by suppressing either one or the other of these two components (cf. above \textit{kārikā 4}). In the samsāric world \textit{cittattvam} is found devoid of the \textit{bodha} aspect and reduced to only \textit{kartṛtā}, but no longer a full \textit{kartṛtā} (and not even an ‘almost’ full one, as it was for example in the Vidyeśvaras). It has now become a shadow of its former self and is only partially revitalized by the contribution of the \textit{kalā} principle, ‘the partial agency’. The consciousness-principle, thus limited, in the individual is therefore found in a decidedly secondary position, superseded by the whole concretion of inert realities with which the I is erroneously identified. In the verse (\textit{kalodbhālatam ... cittattvam}) there is an obvious echo of passages form the scriptures; cf. v. 1. 10 of the Svāyambhuvāgama (Government Oriental MSS Library, Madras. MS. 16797) \textit{kalodbhālatacaitanyo vidyādarśita-gocarah rāgena raṇjitaś cāpi buddhyādikaranair tatah /} and the substantially identical one of the \textit{Tantrasadbhāva} cit. in SSV p. 37 (ad III. 3); cf. also \textit{Kiranāgama} l. 16. On the \textit{kaṇcukas} (\textit{kālā} etc.) see Torella 1998.
by the power of kalā pertaining to the Lord, is limited, being placed in a subordinate state. And therefore the status of limited soul occupies here a pre-eminent position. – 11 –

12. The pre-eminence, in the conscious self, of agency and consciousness, with the consequent subordination of insentient realities such as the void, constitutes knowledge whose distinctive feature is the absorption in it (tatsamāveśa)\(^{19}\).

– On the contrary, when this same void etc. comes to be in a state of subordination as regards the consciousness whose essence is agency, then in the subject thus substantiated by this consciousness there is a knowledge characterized by the absorption in the power of that. – 12 –

13. When the seat of agency – Ṭ – is the void, understood as the absence of the mind etc., where only the karmic impulses exist (samskāramatrini) without any evidence or form, there is the state of the absence of the knowable\(^{20}\).

– When there is a subjectivity characterized by the identification of the I solely with the negation of the mind, the prāṇa and so on\(^{21}\), then in the state of deep sleep, which means residing exclusively in the above-

\(^{19}\) On samāveśa see Introduction pp. XXXII-XXXIV.

\(^{20}\) This verse describes the state of apāvedyasausupta ‘deep sleep devoid of the knowable’ which represents the plane of the identification of the I with the void. The void is here the negation of every reality that is the object of knowledge including the mind and the prāṇa, which is experienced, apart from in deep sleep in the strict sense of the word, also in the state of cosmic dissolution, stupefaction, or in the deepest states of samādhi. However, one can only speak metaphorically of there not being the knowable: in fact it does not entirely disappear (the śaiva texts often remind us that there can never be the complete annihilation of what exists) but it is rather reduced to the shadowy and vacillating state of samskāra.

\(^{21}\) Abh. explains (ĪPVV III p. 333) that the negation (nisedha) already appears on the plane of aham-idam which extends as far as Īśvara (śivatattve īśvarānte); it is caused by the introduction of the idam, which precisely entails negation as differentiation (bhedaṇarūpam) from the consciousness and between objects. While consciousness remains predominant and negation performs only a subordinate role, we have as subjects the Mantramahēsas and the Vījñānakalas, which are differentiated on the grounds of possessing or not possessing vimarsa. On the contrary, when negation predominates there is the sūyaṇapramātr, which the present śloka is referring to; finally, when the objects predominate, there is the subject Sakala.
Ill 2.13 mentioned state, there is the absence of the knowable, in the sense that the karmic impulses, though they exist, are imperceptible since they are devoid of form. The difference from the Śāmkhya purusa lies precisely in this. – 13 –

14. It is the inner activity (āntarī vṛtti) of the sensory faculties, it is that which sets in motion the various breaths, the prāṇa and so on; it is called ‘life’, whose essence is the eightfold body. Or the subjectivity identified with the breath of life (prāṇa) has as its essence the eightfold body (puryaṣṭakātmikā).

– Precisely this knowing subject identified with the void – in which there exists an inner dynamism, the driving force of all the various breaths, prāṇa and so on, which is called ‘life’ and is common to all the sensory powers – is called ‘living’ (jīva). These sensory powers combined with the I constitute the eightfold body. Or it is formed by the subject inasmuch as it is identified with the prāṇa. – 14 –

22 The kārikā identifies āntarī vṛtti with śūnyapramātr (ĪPVV explains that the identification is only metaphorical, in actual fact the real relationship is one of cause and effect); the vṛtti places āntarī vṛtti (antarvṛtti) in a bahuvr̥ihī referring to śūnyapramātā. The fīkā and ĪPVV explain that this bahuvr̥ihī may be understood in two ways. In the first, antarvṛtti is the very dynamism of subjectivity – present in the śūnyapramātr – that sets in motion the vital dynamism (jīvana) common to the sensory powers, a dynamism which is that of the five functions of the breaths of life whose differentiation it is the cause. In the second, with a subtle distinction, it directly denotes the vital energy that is common to all the sensory powers and sets in motion the various breaths. The mention of antarvṛtti in bahuvr̥ihī (depending on śūnyapramātā) is particularly pregnant; Abh. remarks that it aims at removing the role of cause from the sensory powers and leading them back to their total dependence on the agent who is the sole true source of their dynamism. The classical passage on this in SK I. 6, which the ĪPVV does not fail to quote.

23 Cf. ĪPVV III p. 334 tām vṛttim jīvanalakṣanām ... utthāpayan jīva ity ucyate.

24 The limited individuality, the ‘living’ (jīva), the transmigrating nucleus, therefore corresponds to the plane of the identification of the I with the void (śūnyāḥanta) or the prāṇa (prāṇāḥanta). It consists in a body called ‘eightfold’ (puryaṣṭaka), or, according to another traditional etymology, the ‘ogdoade that is in the body’, a kind of subtle body that forms the deep structure of the person and determines his continuity as the vehicle of the I in transmigration and the depository of the karma etc. There are various opinions on its composition: from eight elements – five tānmātras. manus, buddhi and ahāmkāra (sec Kālottarāgama XVII 4cd-5ab. SK III.17; see also Śāmkhyakārikā 40 and Gaudapādabhāṣya) -, which is probably the most widely
15. When the subject rests exclusively on these planes, this is the state of deep sleep — similar to cosmic dissolution — which may or may not be affected by the maculation of māyā, depending on whether the knowable is present or absent (savēdyam apaśvedyam ca).

— On the plane of the identification with the void, since there is no knowable reality, the maculation of māyā is absent. On the plane of the identification with the prāṇa etc. the state of deep sleep, which is similar to cosmic dissolution, is affected by the maculation of māyā, since in

credited conception, to thirty (Rāmakantha’s Kālottaravṛtti p. 126; see Torella 1979: 376, notes 35, 36); some texts are collected in Dvivedi 1983: Upodghāta, 132-133, note 3. In Utp.’s opinion, as gathered from ṢIPVV III pp. 334-336, the pūryāstaka referring to the subjectivity identified with the void (sūnyāhantā) is constituted by the ‘pentad’ — the inner group of powers common to all the senses, which gives rise to the five particular breaths and makes the body’s machine function; it therefore includes the class of breaths (as what is impelled), the class of the sensory faculties (as what impels) and the sūnyāhantā (as that presiding over the whole) (sa preryam prāṇādīvaram prerakam ca indriyavargam adhiṣṭhātrīm ca sūnyāhantām ākṣipya varṭamānah pūryāstakah ity utkāh). But, as is noted, the current conception is that of the pūryaṣṭaka as connected with the prāṇāhantā (prāṇāhantāpake sarvasya abhimatam pūryaṣṭākāvasthānam). In this case one has: the pentad of breaths, combined with the three classes of faculties (those of knowledge, of action and the antahkaraṇa) impelled by the ahamkāra which, however, is not included in the number since it presides over it (prāṇādīpaṇcakam ahamkāraparam ahamkāreṇa preryāmānām, na tena samam ganānārham api tu tenādiṣṭhitam ... karanātmanā vargamatraṇa sahitam paṇcakam samvedapadhānātvān adhiṣṭheyam prāṇādirūpaṁ aham ity evam pramātrabhāvena adhiṣṭhitam pūryaṣṭakam). However, the picture that emerges from Abh.’s remarks is not completely clear. In conclusion Abh., still guided by the fikā, says that there is a ‘most subtle’ body (sūksmatama; is it the one connected with sūnyāhantā?), which is merely the rough sketch of the subtle body (peḷaḍaśārirasya hi tad āśītrānāmātram); and a body sthūlātama (the physical body). The transmigrating body is only the intermediary one between the two (madhyamā), in which there are also the tanmātras. Nevertheless, there is no real difference between the above-mentioned conception and the conception of the pūryaṣṭaka composed of five tanmātras plus the three components of the antahkaraṇa, since the sparśatanmātra also embraces the five breaths (sparśatanmātreṇa prāṇādīsvikārāt).

The similarity consists in the fact that both in the state of cosmic dissolution and in deep sleep the constituent elements of the person (the body and so on), like those of external reality, no longer exist. But this non-existence is real in the case of cosmic dissolution, whereas in deep sleep there is merely the loss of the consciousness of them, which may come about through an effort of will in the case of the samādhi, through ingesting a certain substance as in drunkenness, through exhaustion as in sleep. The state of deep sleep is also distinguished from dissolution by its brevity (cf. ṢIPVV II p. 265).
Ill 2.15 this state there is relation with the knowable, such as the contact with pleasure and so on. – 15 –

16. The clearly manifested (spaṣṭāvabhāsā) creation of things in the mental sphere alone which are mistaken for objects of the senses, is called the dream state.

– The dream state for the limited soul is the creation of objects – which appear in the sphere of consciousness as if they were really being seen, etc. –, a creation that occurs through the power of the mind alone without the action of the powers of the senses such as sight etc.; this creation is the work of the Lord. And this is an illusion inasmuch as this perception, e.g. of a form, common to other subjects, after having lasted as such [for the length of the dream], does not continue later. – 16 –

17. The creation which is stable, in that it is the object of all the senses and external, common to all knowing subjects, is the waking state.

– The creation which occurs thanks to the powers of all the internal and external senses is the waking state. Here too, as in the dream state, illusion may occur, in the form of seeing two moons etc. – 17 –

18. This triad is to be abandoned, since, as the prāṇa etc. predominate and, consequently, [authentic, free] agency becomes subordinated in it, there is union with pleasure and pain, essentially consisting in the attenuation or intensification of this.

– These waking, sleeping and dream states are to be abandoned since in them the prāṇa etc. – presumed to be the self – are pre-eminent and

26 As the memory, for example, of having slept ‘well’ shows.
27 It is not the limited subject who is responsible for these images, since some are unwelcome and others, that would be welcome, are linked with other times and places (see ĪPV II p. 226).
28 In line with the conception of illusion as apiṁnakhyāti the illusion of the dream does not lie in the perception itself but in its lack of permanence.
29 According to Abh. (ĪPVV III p. 340, ata eva āgamaṣu avasthānām api anyonyānupraveśo bahuśākha uktaḥ), this is a hint at the conception according to which there exist within every single state various planes and aspects corresponding to its merging with other states. In the waking state as perception the dream state as illusion is present etc. (cf. ŚSV pp. 11-12, MV II; in particular see TĀ X.227bc ff. and TS IX where both ĪPK III. 2. 16-17 and MV II are commented on).
freedom is reduced. A slight (mātrayā) increase in freedom means pleasure, joy etc., and thus a decrease in freedom is pain, aversion and so on. The samsāra constituted by all the fruitions is the bond. – 18 –

19. The vital breath, constituted by rising and falling breath, is present in everyone in the dreaming and waking state. In deep sleep the breath called samāna is present, consisting in the interruption of those, in a way similar to what occurs during the equinoxes.

– And that self identified with the vital breath, in the form of inhalation and exhalation, or rising and falling breath (prānāpāna30), is present in the waking and sleeping states30. When these two breaths become equal (sāmye)31, like day and night at the equinox (viṣuvatī-

30 The prāna in the broad sense of the word (breath, vital energy, life) is a function, a mode of consciousness itself (cidvritti; prāk samvit prāne parinatā, said the Tattvārthacintāmani, cit in ŚSV p. 68 etc.), capable of transmitting life to realities such as the body, which are in themselves inert and insentient (jāda). This undifferentiated vibration (sāmānyaparispanda) is manifested in five fundamental forms which include the whole range of states of consciousness. Rising and falling breath (prāṇa in the narrow sense of the word and apāṇa) characterize the state of ordinary consciousness (waking and sleeping). They incessantly travel from the heart to the dvādaśāntu in opposite directions: the prāṇa, flowing towards the exterior (is 'day', 'sun'), represents the tension towards the object, the apāṇa ('night', 'moon') represents the tension towards the subject (cf. ĪPVV III pp. 342-343). The dualistic opposition between prāṇa and apāṇa is the same as that which pervades ordinary consciousness. Now one now the other predominates, just as in the days of the year night prevails over day and vice versa. This perpetual play of opposition is suspended in the state of deep sleep: in the savedyayasaṃsupta when in the interval between prāṇa and apāṇa there is a momentary rest in the place of the heart, in the apavedyayasaṃsupta throughout the duration of deep states of obnubilation, torpor etc. If this suspension of the prāṇa-apāṇa flow is immediately plausible for the apavedyayasaṃsupta where by definition the pole of objective reality disappears, it is legitimate, however, to ask oneself – as does Abh. (ĪPVV III p. 346), following the fikā – how this happens for the savedyayasaṃsupta, too. The flowing of the prāṇa – is the reply – does not depend on the mere presence of the cognizable (vedyamātra) but on its appearing as separate from the subject, and the cognizable that is present in this state (sensations of pleasure etc.) is such that it appears, so to speak, to be one with the subject (grāhakād avicchinnam iva).

31 In the kārikā cheda therefore has the double meaning of 'interruption' (viccheda) – of the breaths as opposites – and 'equality'. At this point – which corresponds to the plane of the Pralayākālas – the breath is precisely referred to as 'equal' (samāna). It does not, however, represent the definitive eclipse of prāṇa and apāṇa – which would entail going beyond phenomenal existence – but only a momentary

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II 2.19 va)\textsuperscript{32}, due to their increasing and decreasing being blocked, the breath is called \textit{samāna} (‘equal’). – 19 –

20. \textit{Flowing upwards through the middle path, the breath is called udāna; it is in the fourth state and is made of fire, it corresponds to the Vijñānakalas, the Mantras and the Lord}\textsuperscript{33}. The supreme breath is the vyāna, whose essence is all.

stasis in which they remain in the state of \textit{samskāra}, ready to manifest themselves once more. They still have to be truly surpassed.

\textsuperscript{32} In his commentaries Abh. expounds two distinct traditional etymologies of \textit{viśuvat}: ‘capable (vat) of pervading (viṣu)’ and ‘that sets in motion (suva)’ the distinction (vi=vīśeva) or the imbalance of duration between day and night’. Bh. finds this second interpretation obviously contradictory, seeing that he insists against all likelihood on glossing \textit{prerayati} (with which Abh. explains \textit{suvati}) with \textit{nivārayati}. The difficulty may perhaps be overcome by understanding that \textit{viśuvat} sets in motion the imbalance only insofar as, there being a momentary balance, the imbalance must necessarily follow. The passage from the \textit{Kālapāda} (another name for the \textit{Kālottara}) cit. in ĪPVV III p. 343 may be understood in this sense: \textit{sāmyam vaiśamyaśanakanam viśuvat santutam smritam} (this \textit{ardhaśloka}, not included in the \textit{Sārdhatrisati\textit{kālottara}}, probably comes from another of its many versions). The image of the \textit{viśuvat} is not merely incidental but is taken from the Šaiva scriptures, where the systematic projection of external time, with all its subdivisions (including the \textit{viśuvat}) in the individual dimension, is frequently found, with the consequent identification of cosmic time with ‘prānic’ time; in particular see \textit{Kālotarāgama} (\textit{sārdhatrisati}) XI. 1-10 and X. 22-23 with the relative \textit{vṛtti}, SvT VII. 168 ff.; for another use of \textit{viśuvat} see for example SvT II. 316-334a; cf. SSP III pp. 358 ff., \textit{Śaivīgamaparibhadhāśāmcantarī} (transl.) p. 276. Similar conceptions are to be found in the Buddhist Kālacakra school: \textit{Vimalaprabhā}, passim, Nadapāda’s \textit{Sekoddeśatikā} pp. 42-44; on \textit{viśuvat} – but understood as taking place \textit{lagnodavyābhisamdhau} – see \textit{Vimalaprabhā} p. 178.

\textsuperscript{33} It appears from the fragmentary indications in the ĪPVV that the \textit{fikā} suggests two interpretations of the compound \textit{vijñānakalamantreśo} – a \textit{karmadhāraya}, as is explicitly said, and not a \textit{dvandva} (which would have required the plural). The most obvious one is ‘the Vijñānakalas and the Lords of the Mantras’; the other, adopted by Abh., is ‘the Vijñānakalas, the Mantras in the broad sense of the word (i.e. Mantras, Lords of the Mantras and Great Lords of the Mantras) and the Lord (Abh.: the Lord Sadāśīva)’. From the \textit{fikā} quotations one would obtain, more precisely, ‘Vijñānakalas, the Mantras, the Lords of the Mantras and Īśvara’, where Mantreśvara (Lord of the Mantras) derives, according to the \textit{tantra} method, from \textit{mantra} and \textit{īśa}, to which, however, an individual meaning is also assigned (cf. ĪPVV III p. 352, \textit{nanu atra vyākhyaṁ mantreśvarāḥ kena samgrhitāḥ / mantrapadena tajjñāfiyavād īṣapadena samānavācyatākṛtena tantranyāyēneti}).
[The breath is referred to as] *udāna* because – after accomplishing the unification of the *prāṇa* and the *apāṇa* through the interruption of their flow along the two sides and transversely – it rises (*udgamanāt*) flowing upwards through the middle path\(^{34}\). This breath – which flows in the fourth state\(^{35}\), similar to the middle eye, has the quality of fire because it rises upwards. The breath ceases to flow in the state beyond the fourth – this being the state of fullness and as such devoid of spatio-temporal delimitations\(^{36}\) and entering a state of absolute fullness takes the name of *vyāṇa*. These two states are to be attained since in them the energy of the *prāṇa* appears as essentially constituted by the supreme Lord\(^{37}\). – 20 –

\(^{34}\) The middle path is the *susumnā*; the two side paths are *idā* and *pingalā*.

\(^{35}\) The breath *udāna* rises, therefore, along the *susumnā* burning every duality (*ĪPV* III pp. 350-1 cites some of them: creation and reabsorption, *prāṇa* and *apāṇa*, day and night, birth and death, aversion and attachment). The fourth state – together with the state beyond the fourth – constitutes going beyond ordinary existence. In this state differentiation dissolves like melting butter, the *idantā* is veiled by the I as on the Sadāśiva and Īśvara levels. The objective realities with which the I had identified himself are themselves transformed on contact with the I which is finally recognized as endowed with the divine qualities of sovereignty, permanence etc., so that they continue to subsist, but as though they have ceased to be objects; they are compared to copper which on contact with mercury is transformed into gold. In the state beyond the fourth state the difference is only one of intensity; the quality leap has already been achieved. The state beyond the fourth state, in which only the 'pervading' breath (*vyāṇa*) subsists, is the stabilization of the fourth, the differentiation is now completely dissolved, the *idantā* dispelled; remaining within the terms of the simile suggested by Abh., even the gold into which the various levels of subjectivity have been transformed – from the body to the void – as it is increasingly permeated by the mercury wears away and finally dissolves, these realities only surviving in the residual form of *samskāra* (cf. *ĪPV* III pp. 327-8, 331, 350; *ĪPV* II pp. 257-8, 270-1, 275-6).

\(^{36}\) In fact the flowing presupposes spatial and temporal change, whereas the transfourth is the state of absolute simultaneous fullness.

\(^{37}\) Literally 'similar to the supreme Lord'. But my translation is in conformity with Abh.'s gloss (see *cit* note 108), which in turn appears to follow Utp.'s indications.
SECTION IV. SUMMARY OF THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES

1. The very Self of all creatures is Maheśvara, one, whose form is all, full of the undivided consciousness ‘I–this’.

   – The one, full of the ‘savouring’ (camatkāra) of the undivided perceiving subject, of the undivided perceivable object and of the fusion of the two, in the fourth state which is to be sought first, the Self common to all living beings, whose form is all, is Maheśvara. – 1 –

2. There (tatra), realities such as the mind etc., which are included in the sphere of the ‘this’ freely created [by the Lord] (svasrśedambhāge), are caused by him to be considered as the fictitious I (ahamkāra) as being the perceiving subject.

   – This universe springing forth as constituted by the free expansion (jṛmbhā) of the supreme Lord, realities that are created as the object

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1 The translation refers to the most immediate and general meaning of the text of the kārikā. The far more complex explanation given by the vṛtti depends on considering the two terms of the expression aham idam first separately and then together.

2 The above note has already mentioned how this interpretation has been arrived at. As Abh. explains (see text note 2), we have here the reflective awareness of the perceiving subject as not distinct from the other subjects, i.e. of the fundamental unity of the subject beneath the apparent fragmentation; the same applies to the object; and finally the awareness of the ultimate non-otherness (melanā) of subject and object.

3 Because starting from this the maculation begins to dissolve (see text note 1).

4 The text, which remains doubtful, seems to contain a double interpretation (tantra) of tatra in the kārikā (which I have translated in a deliberately vague manner): maheśvarasya jṛmbhāmaye 'smin nirgate and tasmin idantāparāmarṣe. This would coincide with the brief references in IPVV III p. 358 to the tīkā, which evidently gave this type of interpretation: tatra iti vaiyadhikaranayena vivṛtya sāmānādhisaharanayena vivṛnoti (i.e. tatra taken alone or agreeing with bhāge). Abh. in his two commentaries also follows the line of the simultaneous double function of tatra, which he refers in both cases to Maheśvara: ‘Maheśvara being the self, the part ‘this’ is created by him upon a substratum constituted by himself’ (thus in the first case
of perception – the mind, the breath, the void – in the sphere of the reflective awareness 'this', precisely these realities, which represent a part of the knowable, are caused to be considered as the fictitious I and are, on the strength of this, transformed into the limited perceiving subject. – 2 –

3. The individual subjects considered as being many are the fruit of the non-recognition of their true nature. In them action and beatitude are created, that is, the fruition characterized by pleasure and pain⁵.

– It is precisely the rendering limited of that whose essence is all which is called 'non-recognition'. And thus the awareness of a limited subjectivity attributed to multiple and fragmented realities, such as the mind, the breath and so on⁶, is called absence of the perfect knowledge of the supreme subjectivity. The individual selves are many; in them – who are manifested as knowing subjects – Maheśvara creates his own beatitude and activity, which are themselves inherent in the only real agency. This is precisely the fruition which is called pleasure, since it consists in a particle of [divine] beatitude, and pain, since it is an infinitesimal fragment of [divine] activity. The fact that activity is pain will be explained later. – 3 –

4. In the limited subject sattva, rajas and tamas correspond to knowledge, activity and, thirdly, māya⁷, in the Lord – for whom things represent his own body (svāṅgarūpeṣu).

tatra is a locative absolute with sati understood, in the second, it is a locative depending on svārasṭa⁹).

⁵ The capacity for fruition that the Lord instils in the various limited souls is therefore a reflection created by him of the powers of beatitude and activity, which are, on the contrary, innate in him. They are therefore kalpita. Beatitude and activity are not a different thing from jñāna⁹ and kriyāsakti, prakāśa and vimarsa (ĪPVV III p. 359).

⁶ Abh. explains this point (ibid. p. 360) by using the example of a long serpent (gonāsa), whose body is pervaded by a single life (jīvatva), capable, however, of being divided into many distinct partial vitalities which animate the individual parts of the same serpent when it is cut into pieces; and also capable of becoming one again.

⁷ The power of māya is that which on the Sadāśiva-Īśvara plane determines the appearance of idantā within the consciousness (ĪPVV III p. 361). It is a further expansion of kriyāsakti; indeed, in Abh.'s words (ibid. p. 366), it is the kriyāsakti itself in which, however, instead of samharana predominating (srṣṭi predominates in jñānaśakti) śūnyatā or niśedha predominates, i.e. the mutual delimitation of subject

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IV 4

The knowledge and activity of the Lord, together with māyā, become sattva, rajas and tamas in the limited subject. – 4 –

5. Owing to the state of differentiation, these qualities (gunañām), which are transformed in the faculties and in the products, cannot be considered as powers inherent in a subject who is the possessor of them.

– Since sattva, rajas and tamas are manifested as distinct [from the subject], the term powers may not be applied to them, in that there is no differentiation between the power and the possessor of the power. In actual fact everything is an expansion of the power(s).

6. In the Lord there is being, beatitude, activity. In the limited subject there is that, the absence of that and the two together. The latter constitute rajas, which is pain and is composed of sattva and tamas intermixed.

– In the Lord, the infinite agency, whose essence is ‘savouring’ (camatkāra), is called activity and consists of supreme light and beatitude.

and object. This power does belong to Śiva but, as the formulation of the kārikā points out, it is not on the same plane as the powers of knowledge and action, since it is connected with differentiation (cf. ibid. p. 361).

This kārikā is intended to be a reply to those who want to take the parallel between knowledge, activity, and māyā, on the one hand, and sattva, rajas, and tamas on the other, too far, by considering the latter ‘powers’ of the limited subject just as the former are powers of Śiva. Utp. replies that this cannot be so, because the limited subject looks on them – and on all the deployment of phenomena that evolves from them and is imbued with them – as other than himself, whereas the power is by definition not separate from the subject who possesses it. In the limited subject knowledge (prakāśa) etc. are not spontaneous (naisargikya) and autonomous functions, but require the contribution of other factors – e.g. the senses – in order to be performed, which are all penetrated by and derived from the gunas. This is why they are called gunas, i.e. ‘qualities, components’, but also ‘subordinate, auxiliary elements’ (cf. ÍPVIII III p. 362).

What has been said so far is only valid, however, within the limits of the world of differentiation. Once the subject recognizes his own true nature, the objective world ceases to appear in the guise of otherness and it is then that all the principles become what they effectively are, his ‘powers’.

What is referred to here, as the vṛtti makes clear, is the guna rajas, constituted by the presence of sattā as prakāśa-ānanda (the guna sattva) and by its (their) absence (the guna tamas).

These qualities of the Lord are involved with one another and in the final analysis are identified with one another (cf. ÍPVII p. 289 yā sattā bhavanakartṛnā
On the contrary, in the individual self this light and beatitude, which have become knowable realities, constitute sattva. Their absence is tamas. Sattva and tamas – or light-beatitude and their absence – though two distinct entities, are mutually united to form rajas. In the limited subject activity and pain are called rajas. – 6 –

7. Those realities which in the Lord are the object of an unconventional reflective awareness in terms of 'this', those, mixed and separated, are thus manifested in various ways.

– The things that constitute this universe (ye caite), which are to Maheśvara – as in the case of the child – indicated by the meaning of the word 'this' (reflective awareness being the very essence of the light), without the connection with [or: the consideration of] the conventional linguistic expression 'this' coming into play, those very things appear – since they were created thus by God – as particular realities (svalaksana) thanks to several manifestations having the same substratum (sāmānādhi-karanyena) and in many forms insofar as they are universals each taken singly.

8. On the contrary, in the individual subject, those entities that are manifested separately become the object of mental elaboration in the sphurattarūpā ... saiva ... camatkārarūpā saṁ ś i kriyāśaktir ucyate ... svātmaviśrāntirū-patvāc ca saiva ānandah). In the paśu the guṇa sattva corresponds to the sattā and ānanda aspect in the Lord.

12 'On the plane of the limited subject' is understood.

13 Some form of parāmarśa is inseparable from the pure light of cognition, as reflective awareness reactive to it, an act of appropriation on the part of the I. On this level, on which the 'this' is conceived purely and simply as a negation of the I (ĪPVV p. 367), things are the object of parāmarśa only in terms of 'this', without any other differentiations. And furthermore it is specified that this parāmarśa is also free from any contact with the conventional linguistic expression 'this', since the word – which is, as we know, inseparable from it – is still at a level transcending every articulated language, similar rather to a silent nod of the head. An example that clarifies this is the dim and undifferentiated awareness of (and reaction to) what is other than itself and that surrounds it, that the newborn child is presumed to have.

14 See the following kārikā.

15 Kārikā 7 has defined the status of the object in relation to the Lord. But Abh. (ĪPVV III p. 367) makes it clear that it is not the supreme Lord in this case, since at the level of Paramāśiva one cannot speak of any objectivity whatsoever, this only beginning to emerge when he assumes the nature of Sadāśiva and Īśvara (indeed the
IV 8 *sphere of memory, imagination and so on, and have a variety of distinct names.*

- The entities that are manifested separately, that is, the universals\(^{16}\) are shown by the limited subjects – thanks to the power of mental elaboration (*vikalpanaśaktya*)\(^{17}\) – as the object of inner reflective awareness through various names such as ‘jar’, ‘silvery’, ‘white’, ‘cloth’, ‘cart’ and so on. The limited subjects, conditioned by the experience of these objects, then also make themselves the object of various denotations such as ‘I am thin’, ‘I am happy or unhappy’. In memory this function of mental elaboration takes place in the wake of the previous direct experience; in the various forms of imagination etc. it is, on the contrary, autonomous\(^ {18}\). It is precisely this manifestation of a differentiation between perceiving subject and object perceived, substantiated by the word\(^ {19}\), which constitutes the bond of the samsāra in the limited soul. – 8 –

9-10. *The creation that pertains to him is not also common [to other subjects] and is dependent on the creation of the Lord. It occurs in the limited subject – essentially identical to the Lord – in virtue of the very plane of the Lord (pāti\(^{o}\), īśvaradaśā) corresponds to these). Kārikā 8 expounds how the object appears on the plane of limited subjectivity.

\(^{16}\) Of the two kinds of object, particular (*svalaksana*) and universal (*sāmānya*), only the latter (cf. text note 16) is taken into consideration here, because the word, which in this kārikā is shown as that which accompanies and renders possible discursive thought, has as its content precisely the sāmānya, i.e. the ābhāsa taken separately (see above II. 3. 2).

\(^{17}\) *Vikalpana* is, as has been seen, that characteristic function of discursive thought that proceeds to define the object through the evocation and negation of what is other than it. In this the essential role is played by the word, as the Buddhists show by the conception of the *apoha*.

\(^{18}\) See above I. 8. 1 ff.

\(^{19}\) Many śaiva texts insist on the fundamental ambivalence of the word, which permeates every level of human activity. The powers of the word, often conceived as the powers that preside over the various alphabetical classes, may lead man to freedom or enmesh him even more in the samsāra. To remain within the terms of the discourse of the *vrtti*, they may increase the dichotomies of the *vikalpa* but they may also, if correctly polarized, gradually re-absorb the *vikalpa* in pure reflective awareness – pure insofar as it is not dualizing (the two possible ways of overcoming the *vikalpa* will be dealt with at some length later). ĪPVV III pp. 379-380 refers to some of the classical passages of these speculations with quotations from the SK. the *Timirodghāta* (the explicit attribution to this text is contained in SSV p. 7) and the MV, to which the SS, at least, can be added.
power of the Lord, ignored, however, as such\textsuperscript{20}, which aims at preventing the resting on the self, unstable, whose nature is vital energy, diversified in the multiplicity of the various phonemes, coinciding with the activity of mental elaboration (vikalpakriyayā).

— The individual subject — whose nature is identical to that of the Lord — creates, thanks to the power of the Lord not recognized as such, objects in the form of the various universals\textsuperscript{21}, not perceptible on the part of the other subjects and modelled on the direct experience of objects that may be experienced by everyone. And this power of the Lord, aimed at obstructing the resting on authentic subjectivity, takes the name of māyā; it contains the infinite number of all the various phonemes — K etc. —, it is continuously in motion in the form of vital energy, it carries out the function called ‘mental elaboration’. In this way it creates the objects internally. — 9-10 —

11. The creation of the Lord may be common or not common to all subjects (sādhārano ‘nyathā ca), manifesting itself [in both cases] in all clarity. With the suppression of the mental constructs, resulting from concentration on a single point, the plane of the Lord is gradually reached\textsuperscript{22}.

\textsuperscript{20} As we saw earlier, also the limited subject possesses an innate power of creation which is in essence no different from that of the Lord, since the individual himself is essentially identical to the Lord although he ignores or has forgotten this identity. This power of creation, limited by non-awareness, remains restricted to the individual sphere: what is created are images, feelings, ideas etc., which depend more (as in the case of memory) or less (as in fantasy) on the objects in the phenomenal world created by the Lord. These two kinds of objects and of creations are distinguished by being the last ‘common to all subjects’, the others are ‘not common’ i.e. not able to be experienced except by the limited subject who creates them. But the power of creation is essentially the same.

\textsuperscript{21} The object of the mental elaboration (vikalpa etc.) is not the sāvakṣaṇa, but the sāmānya, which is not attached to a definite time and place.

\textsuperscript{22} Or: ‘... becomes the object of the reflective awareness [‘I am this universe’] peculiar to the condition of Īśvara’. The creation of the Lord is therefore twofold. On the one hand it constitutes the world of objective existence, regarding which all subjects are coordinated: on the other — restricted to a single individual — it constitutes the sphere of dream and error, such as the mistaken sight of two moons, which as far as clarity and immediacy are concerned is on the same plane as the other (cf. III. 2. 16); cf. ÍPVV III p. 386 aśīvarasya sargasya spaśṭavahhasatvam, ata eva avikalpyateti rūpam. This interpretation of the first part of the kārikā and in particular of the expression sādhārano ‘nyathā ca is that suggested by the vṛtti, but not the only possible one. For instance, one may understand, as appears from the
On the contrary, the creation of the Lord is common to all cogniz­
ing subjects — since they are born within it — or also limited to only one subject like that which is manifested in dream, in error and so on, where it concerns a single subject. Permeated only by the reflective awareness of ‘I am this universe’, this creation of the Lord is free from mental constructs (vikalpojñhitā) — since no differentiation arises within it — and it is manifested in all clarity (spaśṭāvabhāsā ca). On this plane, by applying oneself and intensely cultivating those moments when the mental construct becomes attenuated, which occur sporadically (antarāntara) while the activity pertaining to the limited subject is taking place, the beings in the power of the samsāra gradually attain, through

₂³ In the sense that the creation of the object is parallel to that of the subject. Reality, in effect, is constituted by the interaction of determinate levels of subjectivity with the corresponding levels of objectivity (see e.g. PH pp. 6-7).

₂⁴ The absence of the split between subject and objective reality constitutes the cardinal difference between Isvara’s creation and the pasū’s creation (IPVV III p. 388 ‘bhedaṅudayāt iti / anena āśvarasya sargasya pāśavāt sargat vailaksanyam darsitam; see also II p. 329); and it is precisely for this reason that the creation of the Lord does not represent a bond. However, it must be considered, Abh. continues (ibid.), that in the pasū’s creation two levels may be distinguished, and whereas the first only shows the emergence of differentiation, with the māyic and ānava maculations, it is the second, presided over by Brahma (cf. III. 2. 1) and consisting in the various psychic and mental activities (pratyaya), that directly causes the karmic maculation and binds to the samsāra.

₂⁵ Dharmākṛiti defines the type of knowledge that pertains to the yogins in similar terms: PV III. 281 prāguktaṁ yogināṁ jñānaṁ teśām tadbhāvanāmayam / vidhītaṅkalpanājalam spaśtam evāvabhāsate; see also PVin I. 28 and the following passage in prose (Steinkellner 1972: 203).

₂⁶ I.e. the vikalpa.
the emergence of the state of the Lord in all its fullness, the dissolution of the state of limited individuality. - 11 -

12. *He who, having all as his essence, thus knows: «All this multiform deployment is mine», he, even in the flow of mental constructs, attains the state of Mahēśa.*

- Also the individual subject who - though continuing to produce mental constructs deriving precisely from the power of the Lord - has become fully aware of his own nature as Lord - ‘Mine is this multiform deployment of the samsāra’ - this subject, too, who permeates the universe without any differentiation and transforms all the mental constructs into pure reflective awareness, attains the state of Mahēśvara. - 12 -

13. *The liberated soul looks at the ‘common’ cognizable reality as being undifferentiated from himself, like Mahēśvara; the bound soul, on the contrary, looks at it as absolutely differentiated.*

- Cognizable reality is the same for the bound and the liberated soul; however, the bound soul knows it as absolutely differentiated and the liberated soul as the body of his very self. - 13 -

14. *But when he is completely full of the infinite series of principles dissolved in him, he is Śiva, solely consciousness and bliss, having as his body the supreme syllable.*

- But when the cognizable is entirely dissolved within him and there is the full consciousness of the I, the state of Śiva is attained. - 14 -

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27 This is an alternative path to that expounded in the previous kārikā; both are directed to the same aim which is to free from the bond of the vikalpas. In the first the vikalpas were gradually suppressed by fixing the nirvikalpa (cf. PH pp. 39-40; ĪPVV III p. 386 avikalpakaparāgrhitaṃpāṭavaṃcātaivaśayaikāgraṭāvulambanena); here, on the contrary, their inclusion - and transfiguration - in the sphere of the totality of consciousness is taught.

28 I.e. the so-called objective reality (cf. IV.11) facing both the liberated soul and the bound soul.

29 Unlike the situation expounded in the previous kārikā, where the cognizable subsisted though in a state of non-differentiation with the I - a state that Abh. compares to that of the plane of Sadāsiva-Īśvara -, here one cannot even speak of cognizable reality, as it has now been dissolved and absorbed in the I without a trace. This is the state of the supreme Śiva.
15. Thus seeing the true reality of what is his own self and the knowledge and action that pertain to him, he knows and creates objects as he wishes.

- Having thus recognized as Lord his own self full of the infinite powers of knowledge and action once the signs of recognition represented by the powers have come to light, he sees and creates all things at will. – 15 –

* * *

16. Thus this new, easy path has been explained by me as the great master expounded it in the Śivadrṣṭi. Thus he who, putting his feet on it, brings to light in the self the nature of creator of the universe whose essence is the nature of Śiva, and is uninterruptedly absorbed in it, attains perfection.

- Within the course of ordinary reality, in its various forms, solely in virtue of an act of recognition (pratyabhijñāmātratā) is the state of Śiva attained. This new path, devoid of tortuosity, was indicated in the treatise that bears the name of Śivadrṣṭi by the venerable Somānanda, who had direct experience of the form of the blessed Parameśvara; I have here furnished a logical justification of this path, thus causing it to enter the hearts of men. He who by applying himself intensely to this enters into the nature of Śiva, becomes in this very life a liberated soul. – 16 –

17. Just like the beloved, who after much insistence finally stands in the presence of the maid in love, though he is there before her he does not give her any pleasure until she recognizes who he is – as he seems just like other men until that moment –, so for mankind the self, who is yet the Lord of the world, cannot manifest his own glory until his qualities have been brought to light. For this reason the doctrine of the recognition of the Lord has here been expounded.

- The example of the beloved shows that the recognition of the Lord must be awakened30 and that its fruit is extraordinary. – 17 –

30 Utp. uses the causative form of the root upapad–, as he has done before, in his oscillation between the meanings of 'awaken', 'render possible', and 'justify logically' (cf. also the following kārikā).
18. *In order that the ordinary man too can attain perfection (siddhi) IV 18* effortlessly, Utpala, son of Udayākara, has explained with arguments (upapāditā) this recognition of the Lord.

– This easy path to perfection has thus been shown. – 18 –

Here ends the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvṛtti.
ABBREVIATIONS

Abh. Abhinavagupta
AK Abhidharmakośa
AKBh Abhidharmakośabhāṣya
APS Ajadapramāṭrisiddhi
Bh Bhāskarī
HB Hetubindu
İPK Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā
İPV Īśvarapratyabhijñāvīmaṣṭī
İPVV Īśvarapratyabhijñāvīmaṣṭīvīmaṣṭī
ĪS Īśvarasiddhi
KSTS Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies
MMP Mahārthamañjaripaṇīrmaṇa
MPA Matangapārṇeśvaraṇagama
MrĀ Mrgendrāgama
MrV Mrgendraśātri
MV Mālinivijaya
MVV Mālinivijayaśātri
NB Nyāyabindu
NBT Nyāyabinduśātri
NM Nyāyamañjarī
PH Pratyabhijñāḥṛdaya
PS Pramāṇasamuccaya
PTLV Parātrimsīkālaghuvṛtti
PTV Parātrimsīkāvīvaranā
PV Pramāṇavārttika (PV I = Svārthānumāṇa, PV II = Pramāṇasiddhi, PV III = Pratyakṣa. PV IV = Parārthānumāṇa)
PVSV Pramāṇavārttikasvārūṭti
PVin Pramāṇaviniścaya
ŚD Śivadṛśī
ŚDVṛ Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti
ŚŚ Śivasūtra
ŚSV Śivasūtravīmaṃśi
ŚŚĀ Śivastotrāvalī
ŚV Ślokaśātri
SK Spandakārikā
SN Spandanimaya
SS Sambandhasiddhi
SSVṛ Sambandhasiddhivṛtti
SP Sambandhaparikṣā
SPr Samvītparākṣā
SDS Sarvadarśanasamgraha
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<td>Utpaladeva</td>
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<td>VBh</td>
<td>Vijñānabhairava</td>
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<td>VP</td>
<td>Vākyapadiya (the kārikās are quoted according to Rau’s edition)</td>
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