

RAFFAELE TORELLA

To Raniero Gnoli

The Iśvarapratyabhijñākārikā of Utpaladeva with the Author's Vṛtti

Critical edition and annotated translation

RAFFAELE TORELLA



Corrected Edition: Delhi, 2002 First Edition: Roma, 1994

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ISBN: 81-208-1867-9

Also available at:

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS

41 U.A. Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi 110 007 8 Mahalaxmi Chamber, 22 Bhulabhai Desai Road, Mumbai 400 026 236, 9th Main III Block, Jayanagar, Bangalore 560 011 120 Royapettah High Road, Mylapore, Chennai 600 004 Sanas Plaza, 1302 Baji Rao Road, Pune 411 002 8 Camac Street, Kolkata 700 017 Ashok Rajpath, Patna 800 004 Chowk, Varanasi 221 001

FOR SALE IN SOUTH ASIA ONLY

Printed in India
BY JAINENDRA PRAKASH JAIN AT SHRI JAINENDRA PRESS.
A-45 NARAINA, PHASEJ, NEW DELHI 110 028
AND PUBLISHED BY NARENDRA PRAKASH JAIN FOR
MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED,
BUNGALOW ROAD, DELHI 110 007

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PREFACE

This second Edition differs only slightly from the first one (IsMEO, Rome 1994). Basically, I have limited myself to correcting a not negligible number of misprints, kindly pointed out by colleagues and students. Among them, I wish to thank first of all J. Bronkhorst, then M. Hattori, F. Sferra, A. Pelissero and C. Pecchia. Heartfelt thanks I also owe to Malgosia Sacha.

I take the opportunity to express my gratitude to the many reviewers of this book. Some of them (J. Bronkhorst, J. W. de Jong and M. Hattori) have proposed alternative translations of some passages. In order to illustrate the grounds of my translation of I.5.18 and I.5.21 (and *vrtti*), I wrote a detailed letter to the now greatly lamented Professor de Jong, who, in his reply, declared himself fully convinced. The remarks of Professor Hattori concerned basically the same points; he also corrected and integrated the last part of fn.20, p.117 (see below).

Several objections were raised by my colleague and friend Professor Johannes Bronkhorst in his thorough review article published in Asiatische Studie / Études Asiatiques (L, 3, 1996, pp. 603-621), which have induced me to re-examine carefully some thorny points of this not easy work. I do agree that his interpretation of alokādi (vṛtti on I.7.10) is better - and plainer - than mine. It is to be said, however, that this does not affect the overall meaning of the passage concerned: "The light etc. [perceived in a certain spot] means the absence of something else [in the same spot]..." (Bronkhorst), versus: "The sight lof a light] etc. ..." (mine). After having attentively checked the other points questioned by my learned friend, I remain convinced of the correctness of my own translation.

In his capacity of Director of the Editorial Committee of IsIAO (ex IsMEO), Professor Maurizio Taddei took a significant part in making the re-edition of this book possible. To our greatest sorrow, this outstanding scholar, and dear friend, came to a sudden and untimely end in February 2000. I wish to dedicate this Indian edition to his memory.

Rocca Priora, October 2001

RAFFAELE TORELLA

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I should like to express my gratitude to IsMEO for accepting this book for publication in the Serie Orientale Roma, founded by Giuseppe Tucci. In paying tribute to the memory of Prof. Tucci – my paramaguru – I must also acknowledge him as the first western scholar to realize the importance of the Kashmiri Saiva tradition and to promote its scientific study. I ideally place this work at His feet.

I thank IsMEO and the University of Rome "La Sapienza", whose financial support enabled me to make several journeys to India in search of MSS of Utpaladeva's works.

Then, I express my gratefulness to the Libraries that allowed me to photograph and use their MSS for this edition: Research and Publications Department, Srinagar (A.K. Reina, Assistant Director), Oriental Research Institute and MSS Library, Trivandrum (Dr. K. Appukuntan Nair and Dr. T. Bhaskaran, former Directors; P.L. Shaji, MSS Assistant) and Oriental Institute Library, Baroda (Dr. R.T. Vyas, Director). I heartily thank Pandit Dinanath Shastri, Srinagar, who generously put at my disposal his private collection of MSS, then destroyed during Muslim desorders in Srinagar.

Special thanks are due to Felicity B. Lutz for her valuable assistance in the English version of this book, and to my student Francesco Sferra for preparing the Indexes and helping me very much in correcting the proofs.

Finally, I wish to thank Raniero Gnoli with whom I discussed many passages of this work. To this extraordinary scholar – and gentleman – I dedicate this book.

Rocca Priora, October 1993.

RAFFAELE TORELLA

INTRODUCTION

In the complex and varied cultural panorama of ninth-century Kashmir we find all the major components of the religious-philosophical tendencies in India at the time and, together with these, some particular situations that led to new developments, which were also later to spread very far from their place of origin. The tradition of Buddhism (rooted in Kashmir since very ancient times) is present both with the realist schools and the Vijñānavāda, and culminates in the great cultural prestige of the so-called 'logical school', which seems to elude too definite a collocation within one or other of the great Buddhist currents to which, by turns, contemporary followers or opponents and modern scholars assign it. The Brahmanic élites were still engaged in elaborating or perfecting their reply to the doctrines of Dignaga and Dharmakirti, whose circulation in Kashmir was to be further stimulated by the presence of Dharmottara, summoned by King Jayāpīda to his court (Rājatarangiņī IV.5.498). Thus works of great importance were composed that had a major influence throughout India, such as the Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhatta and the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa of Bhāsarvajña. Then, still in the Brahmanic sphere, though pertaining to another side, there was the spread of Vedāntic schools apparently independent of Sankara, each of them being distinguished by a particular configuration of the elements common to them all (Brahman, māyā, avidyā, vivarta, etc.) and indicated by a variety of denominations¹. There are various evidences of the activity of Mīmāmsaka schools. In addition to this, a tradition of studies in literary criticism and aesthetics flourished during this period (Ingalls 1990: 1-10), and was to constitute the major cultural branch of Indian aesthetics. Lastly, there was an equally important tradition of studies in grammar and general linguistics, in which the legacy of Bhartrhari seems to have a prominent place.

Corresponding to this 'high' cultural tradition on the religious plane, there was - obviously with the exception of the Buddhists - the smārta

¹ Cf. citrabrahmavādin (SD VI.3b), sphulingātmavādin (ibid. 10c) etc.

dimension of Brahmanic orthodoxy, characterized by the ancient popular devotion to Siva and Vișnu, and to the pantheon connected with them. A series of texts, linked to the cult of Siva and Vișnu, were already becoming stratified probably a couple of centuries before the period under consideration (but some are definitely much older). These express ideals and thrusts that are absent in the Brahmanic sphere, mainly since they have been consciously excluded because of their non-conformity to existing social and religious structures, or even their possible disruptive force. These texts give voice to a need for a more direct participation in the experience of the divine, no longer seen as a transaction managed by specialized personnel with a view to obtaining clearly defined and circumscribed benefits - culminating in an impersonal liberation projected into an indefinite future - but as a transfiguration here and now of the whole person, whose components, including the purely physical, become the very protagonists of the path of liberation and not the unwelcome extras. In this framework, and by carefully observing the nature of these texts and of their addressees, it becomes immediately clear that we cannot propose a scheme of interpretation centring on the polarities Brahmanic orthodoxy - popular thrusts, or ritualism - ecstatic anti-ritualism. In general, the Tantric adept, as Sanderson (1988: 662) has correctly described him, is in actual fact a hyper-ritualist, who does not cancel the inherited ritual but replaces it, often only by modifying, enriching and making it more complicated². He sometimes goes as far as to transform it into a labyrinthine religious play, the highest and most complex example of which is perhaps the Saivasiddhanta ritual, analyzed in such a masterly manner by Hélène Brunner (see Bibliography). The ritual element rests on a basis that is broadly shared both by Vaisnava and Saiva Tantrism, even in the currents that are ideologically more far-removed from each other.

In ninth-century Kashmir the Vaisnava school of Pāñcarātra and the various currents of Tantric Śaivism had begun to follow different paths. The Pāñcarātra was already heading towards an inexorable decline which was gradually to lead to its disappearance from Kashmir and its firm transplantation in the South of India. However, this was not without producing as its final fruits some original figures of thinkers poised between the Vaisnava and Śaiva faith, such as Vāmanadatta (cf. Torella 1994) and Utpalavaiṣṇava, aware of the affinity of the two tradi-

² In any case, never totally negating it (cf. Sanderson 1990: 77, 82-83).

tions, which appears also, on the scriptural level, in a line of Pāñcarātra texts marked by non-duality.

The Saiva tradition, which would continue to characterize social and religious life in Kashmir, is for its part far from being unitary and if the skein of texts, subdivisions and orientations is now beginning to be unravelled, we are particularly indebted to a series of penetrating studies by Alexis Sanderson³ – to which I refer here. What is evident is the presence in Kashmir during this period of a sharp distinction between a dualist tradition and a non-dualist one with extremist tendencies. The former, the so-called Saivasiddhanta, which embodies a kind of 'normalized', mild, Tantrism - so much so that some scholars tend even to exclude it from the Tantrism proper - perpetuates many of the social and religious institutions of the 'orthodox' order which it aims to replace: it basically accepts the caste system, prefers to understate the non-vedic nature of their Agamas and tends to identify with the establishment, in maintaining a marked separation between pure and impure. It creates a self-sufficient and all-pervasive ritual system, which, integrated by yoga, leads the individual soul by degrees on a journey towards itself and the reappropriation of its own true nature of Siva: the last station is the achievement of the state of liberated Siva, for ever distinct from the other monads of liberated individuals and from the supreme Siva, who alone performs the five functions on the cosmic plane.

Opposed to the Saivasiddhāntins in many respects, the non-dualist Saivas follow the teachings embodied in another great division of the Saiva Āgama, that of the Bhairava Tantras, in which the terrific form of the God – at least in the most radical texts – expresses first and foremost the overthrow of the behavioural norms, conventions and distinctions through which an attempt is made to give a definite and recognizable structure to reality – fragile fences that the Power of the God, his Sakti, sometimes superordinate to him, now derides now disrupts. The adept enters into harmony with this Power, or rather he is possessed by it, through practices and behaviours that here and there reveal their more or less remote rooting in the practices of the Kāpālikas, who challenge what the Indians see perhaps as the horror par excellence, the macabre frequentation of the cemeteries, where they evoke the terrible Mothers by eating putrefying human flesh etc. Some divinities of important Bhairava Āgamas still display the animal features and hideous attributes, as well

³ See Bibliography; cf. also Dyczkowski 1988².

as the names, that link them to this ancient substratum (cf. Sanderson 1988: 670, 674-75). At other times, instead of this (or alongside this), we find that sex is resorted to as the central moment of the rite: the adept worships the Goddess by offering her a cup containing the *kundagolaka*, or mixture of sperm and female secretions that the ritual union with his partner has just produced. Gradually relieved of its original burden of antinomianism and orgiastic transgression – and later totally eliminating the funerary aspect (Sanderson 1985: 202) –, this mobilization of energies through practices that challenge the current concept of purity and tend towards the overflow of the powers of the senses becomes the characteristic of the so-called *kaula* way (*kaulaprakriyā*) to liberation.

Several of the Bhairava Tantras are *kaula* in nature, especially the Yāmalas, but also, though to a softened and subtler degree, the so-called Trika Tantras. Among them an older stratum may be distinguished, consisting of the *Siddhayogeśvarımata*, the MV and the *Tantrasadbhāva*, in which the term *trika* does not yet appear and which feature the essential doctrines but not the awareness of forming a group or school⁴, as is the case for the later *Devyāyāmala*, *Trikasadbhāva*, *Trikahṛdaya* (or °sāra), *Niśisamcāra* etc.⁵.

SOMĀNANDA (875/900-925/950)

This 'school' (with the scriptures that are linked to it in various ways, such as those of the Krama) would probably have been destined to remain one of the many Kashmiri Tantric schools whose names we hardly know and whose outlines are blurred, had it not been for the development, mainly within it, of the first seeds of what was to become the

⁴ Cf. Dyczkowski 1988²: 187 n. 189. On the three phases in the development of the Trika see Sanderson 1986: 170 n. 6; etc.

⁵ In the light of current knowledge, it is not easy to define what is really meant by one Tantra belonging to a particular 'school'. Every Tantra contains a mass of elements – at times even contradictory to one another – a portion of which may be shared also by Tantras belonging to different currents that are sometimes even farremoted from each other ideologically. For instance, cf. the long, important passage on the 'voids' etc. in chapter I (*praśnayogādhikāra*) of the *Tantrasadbhāva* (MS, National Archives, Kathmandu, No.A363, f.8a l.6 – f.11b l.1) – an old and 'radical' Trikatantra of the Vidyāpīṭha –, that is present almost verbatim in a 'mild' Bhairavatantra, in many respects close to the Śaivasiddhānta, like the SvT (IV.234-296), belonging to the lower Mantrapīṭha.

flowering of an extraordinary series of works and masters that between the ninth and twelfth centuries constituted one of the highest achievements of Indian speculation and spirituality of all time. The complex work of exegesis of the scriptures⁶, the reformulation of their teaching and the organizing and hierarchizing of their contents indicate first and foremost its decision to emerge into the open, to escape from the dimension of a restricted circle of adepts - which is what must have been the original nature of these schools - and to offer itself implicitly as an alternative to the dominant Saivasiddhanta, or at least to establish itself within it as a non-extraneous element (or rather as an element which, though not intended to constitute the whole, was able to give it its ultimate significance). In order to do this it was necessary to extract a homogeneous though varied teaching from the diverse texts; to purge it, without changing its essential nature, of all that it was felt could not be proposed to a wider circle - in other words, of all that was bound to create an instinctive and insurmountable resistance - by attenuating the sharper points or removing every actually concrete aspect, and finally translating it into a discourse whose categories were shared by its addressees and engaging in a dialogue that would not be afraid to confront rival doctrines.

Vasugupta and Kallata with the doctrine of the Spanda, on the one hand, and Somānanda, on the other, were the first to undertake this task. The former chose a plan that was more closely connected with spiritual experience, the latter one that was more in terms of conceptual elaboration (though his work is clearly based on direct experience⁷, which is sometimes visionary and ecstatic). But both the teachings and the tone of the ŚS and SK and of the ŚD are perfectly compatible: Somānanda is certainly aware of the doctrines of the Spanda which echo here and there in the ŚD (even the term spanda is to be found⁸), they all implicitly refer

⁶ The first to take this path must have been the philosophers of the Śaivasid-dhānta. Sadyojyotis and Vyākhyāni (cit. ŚD III.13cd-14) were certainly Somānanda's predecessors (though their date cannot be fixed more precisely). Earlier than Somānanda is probably also Brhaspati, the author of the Śivatanuśāstra repeatedly quoted by Abh. in the TĀ, who is coupled with Sadyojyotis in the introductory stanza of Rāmakantha's commentary on the Mokṣakārikā.

⁷ Cf. the vṛtti on ĪPK IV.16, sākṣātkṛtaparameśvarabhaṭṭārakākārair bhaṭṭa-śrīsomānandapādaiḥ.

⁸ ŚD VII.19a, 24b.

to the authority of the VBh⁹. A late tradition (Chatterji 1914²: 25 n.3) even includes Somānanda (along with the other masters of the Pratyabhijñā) in the spiritual line descending from Vasugupta. Somānanda knows and criticizes (for his Śākta tendencies) Pradyumna Bhatta, who comes immediately after Kallata in the Spanda lineage. I will not dwell here on the Spanda school, to which an exhaustive monography has recently been devoted (Dyczkowski 1987), except to say that its teachings, which had already emerged as a post-scriptural elaboration, were subsequently re-elaborated, especially by Kṣemarāja, and incorporated in the synthesis of Abh.'s Trika, not without being to some extent strained and depersonalized¹⁰.

All the scant information we have on Somānanda indicates his close relationship to the Trika and the Krama. At the end of the ŚD he himself informs us that he belongs to the Tryambaka (or Teramba) mathikā founded by the son of Durvāsas, who was asked by Śiva himself to save the secret doctrine from oblivion. This is the same Tryambhaka who in the TĀ is considered the depositary of the non-dualist Śaiva tradition, in other words especially the Trika¹¹. We learn from Abh. that he wrote a commentary – now lost – on the Parātriṃśikā, which belongs to the ekavīra form of the Trika. A surviving passage of the Kramakeli of Abh., quoted and commented on by Jayaratha (TĀV III p. 192), mentions Somānanda as a disciple of the Krama teacher Govindarāja, who, before dying, passed on to him the doctrine of the Kālīs taught in the Devīpañcaśatika; this doctrine was transmitted by Somānanda, through his spiritual line, down to Abh. (ibid. p. 194).

The only work by Somānanda that has come down to us, the ŚD (cf. Gnoli 1957, 1959), is considered to be the first of the Pratyabhijñā school. In this difficult, discordant but fascinating work, he alternates expositions of a non-dualist doctrine that is felt to be still very near to its

⁹ Kṣemarāja connects the Spanda, first of all, with the Krama (SN p. 74 evam copakramopasaṃhārayor mahārthasaṃpuṭīkāraṃ darśayan ...) and, secondly, with the Trika (Ṣaḍardha) and the Mata (p. 49, 47). The concept of spanda (Sanderson 1988:695) is present in the Jayadrathayāmala and in other texts linked to the Kālī cult.

¹⁰ See, for instance, in the ŚSV the superimposition on the ŚS of the doctrine of *upāyas*, which Abh. had derived from the MV.

¹¹ TĀV vol. I p. 28 nikhilaśāstropaniṣadbhūtasya ṣaḍardhakramavijñānasya traiyambhakasantānadvāreṇa avatārakatvāt; TĀ XXXVI.12 tryambhakāmardakābhi-khyaśrīnāthā advaye dvaye / dvayādvaye ca nipuṇā krameṇa śivaśāsane (Jayaratha: advaye iti trikakulādau).

scriptural sources - though these cannot be clearly distinguished -, logical justifications, visionary tirades and summary dismissals of opposing doctrines; he presents an exceedingly long and malevolent demolition of the theories of the Grammarians. The central nucleus is the powerful and effective affirmation of Siva as the only reality: he does not render the universe so pale that it is transformed, as in the contemporary Vedāntic schools, into an indefinable play of shadows, but illuminates it from within and constitutes its life. In this universe where everything is penetrated by Siva nothing remains in the margins, all is mirrored even in the humblest thing and the whole nature of Siva is present in it (SD III.18ab svanisthe śivatā deve prthivyādāv apīdrśam) – directly, just as gold is directly gold in the jewel, though it assumes a particular form. The doctrine of the sarvasarvātmavāda is the other face of the ekasivatā. Though this was already a long-standing concept¹², here it acquires very special importance and implications because it serves as the theoretical context for the experience of the Tantric adept who has set out on the path of the expansion of consciousness and energy: the object, though maintaining its own identity, must not act as a dam, nor oppose itself rigidly, but allow itself to be bent and, finally, uprooted, become an integral part of this free flowing.

The principal argument in favour of this doctrine clearly derives from the Vijñānavāda. If there were a real diffence in nature between consciousness and things, the phenomenon of knowledge would be impossible, because things, whether they have a concrete form or not (atoms), cannot become the object of consciousness (IV.30). No relation between things themselves would be possible, if they did not share one and the same principle (V.1); this principle is precisely consciousness, which exists equally in all things (V.12). 'Being' is, actually, being united with the manifestation of consciousness (cidvyaktiyogitā; cf. IV.29; IV.7ab sarvabhāveṣu cidvyakteḥ sthitaiva paramārthatā). Thus everything is pervasive, incorporeal and endowed with will, like consciousness (V.4). If things can be efficient, it is because they 'want' one particular action that is peculiar to them (V.16,37). And if they want it, they must also know it, in other words be conscious – first and foremost,

¹² This conception is already referred to in the Mahābhāṣya (Wezler 1982). See also Wezler 1992.

of themselves. All things are in all conditions¹³ knowing their own self (V.105ab sarve bhāvāḥ svam ātmānam jānantaḥ sarvataḥ sthitāḥ). And that self, continues Somānanda in a visionary crescendo, is the same as mine, as that of other subjects: "The jar knows by my own self. I know by its self; I know by the self of Sadāśiva, Sadāśiva knows by my self ..." (V.106 ab). All things have the essence of all others, because every thing has the form-nature of all things. Everything is in everything, with the various configuration of forms. I have the nature of the jar, the jar has mine. In knowing himself through the different things, Siva resides autonomously, being constituted by the manifestation of consciousness and differentiated in the manifold differentiations (V.107cd-109). Once it has been established that everything has the nature of Siva, the question of the unity and multiplicity of the universe becomes pointless, and so does the question of its reality-truth; even as regards the so-called 'erroneous' cognition there is no real falsity (mithyātva), because even in the eyes of the opponent it has, anyhow, some kind of efficiency (IV.18-20). Though the world of ordinary experience (vyavahāra) is said to be unreal, the reply is that the Lord is also manifest in unreality¹⁴ (III.77). But what is then the nature of manifested things, which on the one hand are limited and, on the other, enjoy a state of expansion, being united with the supreme pacification of Siva (V.6)? Like everything that exists, they are states in which Siva freely manifests himself (IV.47). It is true that they have power, they are śakta, but, as everyday experience also shows, having power, or being able to do something, does not mean being independent¹⁵. If they are śaktis, Śiva is the possessor of these śaktis, though being inseparable from them; he is the only real śakta in ways as infinite as his powers (IV.4-5). If they are states (avasthā, bhāva), he is their substratum¹⁶.

We are, therefore, in a markedly śaiva or śāmbhava context, in the sense that the Power – though being inseparable from Śiva (III.2cd) – is subordinate to him. Once this premise is established, it is possible to let it take the stage and see it rise in many points of the work to the role of

¹⁴ And also in pain (V.9).

¹⁶ Cf. (punning on the root bhū-) IV.51ab tasmāt svayam svabhāvena bhāvair bhāvī bhaved bhavah.

¹³ The subject cannot be insentient even with regard to the mere 'being' or 'standing' (V.14).

¹⁵ If things were in themselves totally independent, the unification (anusamdhāna) of their cognitions would be impossible (SDVr p. 147).

protagonist¹⁷. Somānanda, following the teaching of the Trika, distinguishes a triad of powers – $icch\bar{a}$, $j\bar{n}\bar{a}na$ and $kriy\bar{a}$ – (connected with the level of Śakti, Sadāśiva and Īśvara respectively), which in fact are never really separated from each other. Prior to them, at the top of the Saktitattva plane, there is a moment in which they are completely mingled and about to unfold: this is the state called unmukhitatā, aunmukhya 'protension' or prathamā tutih 'first moment (of the will)' (I.18cd), 'wave' (SDV_r p. 16 taranga, ūrmi). When these powers are totally dissolved in unity with Siva, we have the supreme state, characterized by the supreme lysis (nirvṛti) and the conscious beatitude (cidrūpāhlāda). But in no case can one speak of Siva as quiescent or isolated (śānta, kevala) (III.87b-88), insofar as devoid of power (III.90ab)¹⁸, nor can one speak of cessation of the perception of the self, since Siva would then be insentient (jada; III.90cd-91ab). His turning to creation - and more generally to his five functions - springs out of his own joy (amoda); he plays at concealing himself and assumes the nature of māyā down to the Earth (I.32). Thus it cannot be said that the universe is 'imagined' as Siva, or vice versa, because the one is directly the other (III.83). Just as gold is not 'imagined' as such neither in the simple jewel of solid gold nor in the earring in which the work is so refined as to set aside, as it were, its nature of pure gold, so Siva is 'formed, arranged' (k/pta) as universe in the sense that he has become such, or freely presents himself in this form (SDVr p. 133, kļptaķ sampannaķ svayam sthitaķ); kalpanā is, on the contrary, imagining something where it is not (III.87c-91ab). Therefore, the nature of Siva is present in everything, whether we know it or not (VII.1cd). Even differentiation has Siva as its essence¹⁹, hence there is not really a bond nor, consequently, liberation (III.72). Furthermore, it is the very belief in the actual existence of bond and liberation that constitutes the basic impurity (VII.87cd). All the ritual prescriptions, śāstras and teachers only serve the purposes of everyday life and are in any case a way in which Siva manifests himself (III.48-49ab). Ritual bathing,

¹⁷ This is anything but an isolated case in the Saiva scriptures and treatises (see also, in the Pāñcarātra tradition, the *Lakṣmītantra* etc.).

¹⁸ If we admit the reality of Siva's state of inactivity, we are obliged to admit that, in spite of everything, the three powers are present in it; it is precisely this meeting of the three powers that constitutes the requisite of reality (III.56).

¹⁹ Even if in Saiva scriptures themselves we sometimes find the unreality of the world affirmed, there is no real contradiction here, since this is merely a device to promote detachment (III.95cd).

offering to the fire, pūjā etc. (VII.87 ff.) are external forms whose core is the awareness that everything is resolved in Siva. He who worships, he who is worshipped and the act of worship are in reality all one - Siva (VII.94cd). The Siva principle, whether it is known or not, does not suffer any real obstruction (VII.1 ff.). Fire, whether externally perceived or not, still generates light, and gold, if it is not known, does not therefore become a stone. All this is doubtless true; it is true that the gem of desires remains such even if it is not known, but only if man knows it as such can he enjoy its effects (VII.4). The same may be affirmed regarding individuals' identification with Siva. It has been said that even a fire that is not known generates light, but so much more will be generated by a fire aptly arranged for this purpose, such as a lamp in a house (VII.10cd ff.). Thus a means must be taught whereby the attained awareness of the nature of Siva produces visible effects in the souls (VII.12ab). This means is represented by logical argumentation, the scriptures and the teacher²⁰ (VII.5cd). The SD condenses all this.

It is therefore easy to imagine on which arguments in particular Somānanda challenges the opposing doctrines. First of all he attacks all those who in various ways claim that the external world is unreal, especially the various types of Vedāntins (VI.3 ff.), who consider it as an illusory manifestation (vivarta) of Brahman, caused by nescience, or the Vijñānavādins (VI.33-34) who affirm the reality of knowledge but make unreal objects arise from it and, moreover, do not admit a subject of this knowledge - whereas every action, and therefore also the action of knowing, is necessarily dependent on an agent subject. The thesis of the Saktivadins is also rejected for a similar reason: they consider Power as the sole reality, without taking into account that a power, even though it is supreme, is implicitly dependent on a subject that possesses it. Then there are those who admit agent subjects but make each of them an entity that is separate and distinct from the Lord; those who sharply divide bond and liberation, like the followers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (VI.28cd); and those who claim a Brahman devoid of consciousness, and hence jada (VI.29). Even those who claim the reality of the external object, like the bāhyavādin Buddhists, are wrong because they do not admit a unifying principle of reality, and thus make the passage from the moment of sensation to the moment of mental elaboration impossible (IV.80cd

²⁰ Cf. p. XXXVII.

ff.), and likewise the operation of apoha, through which they seek to elude the universal.

It is essentially on the basis of these arguments, used either in isolation or together, that the opposing doctrines (apart from those already mentioned, Jaina, Pāñcarātra, Śaivasiddhānta, Sāṃkhya etc.) are gradually dismissed. Several of these objections are concentrated in the criticism of the doctrines of the Grammarians – namely of Bhartrhari – which differs from the others for its disproportionate length (the whole of āhnika II) and its aggressive, sarcastic tone.

These Grammarians who think themselves so clever - says Somānanda quoting passages from the VP and the vrtti - claim that the supreme Brahman is to be identified with Pasyantī-vāc, but the latter at the most is identifiable with the power of Knowledge, that corresponds to the plane of Sadāśiva - definitely not to the highest plane. In fact, as the word itself says, Pasyantī 'sees' something. But what is the nature of its objects? If we say that they are externalised images that it itself has produced, we must ask ourselves whether they are real or unreal. In the first case the distinctive feature of this philosophy is lacking, namely seeing the manifestation as illusory (vivarta); the unreality of what it sees would have repercussions on it, rendering it asatyā, which is inadmissible. If the cause of this perceiving unreal things is nescience, it is the latter that must be established as being real or not: if it is real, then Paśyantī is contaminated by it; if it is not real, it is not understood how there can be a relation between a real thing and a unreal one. The same is also true of its creation. Moreover, this nescience can be seen neither as an attribute of Pasyantī (for the above-mentioned reasons); nor of something else, since nothing real exists apart from it; nor is it to be considered as independent, because then it would be impossible to suppress it. Neither can avidy \bar{a} be imputed only to the middle level, because in any case it is Pasyantī that is the cause of it. If Pasyantī is to be identified with the sphota, we must ask ourselves how words, unreal as they are, can manifest it. No means of knowledge can prove its existence, since for you nothing is real except it. Even the belief that pronouncing a correct word leads to heaven results in attributing to the only reality that can be its subject characteristics which are contrary to its nature, such as the desire for particular fruitions, etc. It is not possible to posit as the highest reality that which, because of its very nature, always remains – however you put it – an instrument of action $(v\bar{a}c)$. Not even identifying the śabdatattva without beginning and end with Parā Vāc makes sense, since this means identifying the object (sound) with the instrument (voice). If, then, Paśyantī is said to be only a proper noun and hence to escape all the criticism concerning the fact of seeing, etc., and that it is only the feminine ending that counts – which is intended to express its being the power of Knowledge –, the reply is that, if it has nothing to do with seeing, it is insentient and therefore cannot be the power of Knowledge either. Then, the attributes that a verse²¹ assigns to Paśyantī are criticized one by one. And so on in this vein, until his final outburst: But why on earth have you left the sphere of grammar and taken it into your heads to deal with a field which is not yours, like philosophy?

UTPALADEVA (900/925-950/975)

Though Somānanda is unanimously recognized as the founder of the Pratyabhijñā, the school was not to be named after him or his work, but after the work of his disciple Utp. The term *pratyabhijñāna* occurs only once in the ŚD (IV.120a) and has no pregnant meaning, since it is used as an argument to demonstrate the essential unity, or possibility of unification, of cognitions (against Buddhists etc.). If, on the one hand, it is true that the IPK are a 'reflection' of the ŚD, as Abh. says²², on the other hand it is undeniable that they contain important novelties, not so much in the basic doctrine as in the far more aware and acute determination of the aims proposed, the ways of attaining them and the ambit addressed.

First and foremost Utp., being perhaps actually aided by the negative example of the $\dot{S}D$, decides not to mix registers. The $\bar{I}PK$ is to be a purely theoretical and rigorously argumented work, though based on a scriptural background. The authority of the revelation must not be superimposed on the rational demonstration, and for this reason it is allotted a specific space, the third $Adhik\bar{a}ra^{23}$. Unlike what occurs here and there

²¹ avibhāgā tu paśyantī sarvataḥ saṃhṛtakramā / svarūpajyotir evāntaḥ sūkṣmā vāg anapāyinī //. This verse, frequently quoted, is included (with reserve) by Rau – along with the entire passage to which it belongs – in the kārikā text (1.167); Iyer, instead, takes it as a quotation given in vṛṭṭi.

²² ĪPV I p. 7 śrīsomānandanāthasya vijnānapratihimhakam.

²³ Cf. ĪPVV III p. 400 jānakriyādhikārayugalena tattvārthasamgrahasahitena svaprakāśe 'pi yuktyupabṛmhite nirūpite "svataḥ" ity aṃśaḥ pūritaḥ, āgamādhikāreṇa

in the SD, any emotional colouring is banished. This does not mean that Utp. was solely a logician: the extraordinary intensity of his hymns²⁴, which were to be collected in the SSA and are still recited daily by the brahmins of Kashmir, proves it. In a sense Utp. inaugurates what was to become a salient feature of the whole Trika in Abh.'s synthesis: namely, the tendency not to constitute a monolithic doctrine and a world of religious experience to oppose en bloc everything that does not coincide with it (as in the ekantin trends) but to distinguish planes, that are hierarchically ordered but in which the 'higher' does not automatically cancel the 'lower' (as Somānanda had already said, Šiva is everywhere, even in differentiation, pain and hell). This is the perspective of the paramādvaita, such an elevated viewpoint that it does not fear what is different from itself, is not put in a critical position by it, is not forced to make a choice. If we take the IS, then we find a still different face. Were it not for its certain attribution, we would never suspect that the refined Naiyāyika speaking here is the same person as the Saiva theologian of the $\overline{I}PK$ or the *bhākta* of the $SS\overline{A}^{25}$.

But let us return to the IPK and, firstly, let us see how Utp. determines the choice of his opponents. The most important feature is that the Saivasiddhāntins virtually disappear, at least as direct targets, and the stage is dominated by his critique of Buddhism. This is a message Utp. addresses to his dualist cousins, whom – as will be seen more clearly in Abh. – the Trika does not intend to defeat, but to use as a basis for its emergence from the dimension of a restricted circle and for its establishment in the stratum of social normality, by internalizing, or in any case circumscribing, its own specific difference²⁶. The fact that the MV – that is, a text containing distinct dualist lines (Chatterji 1914²: 10, Sanderson 1992) and as such is venerated also by the Siddhānta – was chosen by Abh. (following his master Sambhunātha?) as the basic text for the

tam eva artham upodbalayatā "śāstrataḥ" ity ayam. Here Abh. is referring to the well-known passage of the Kiraṇāgama, Vidyāpāda IX.14b.

We should recall, on the other hand, that the very starting point of Pratyabhijñā theology is the state of devotion, the *maheśvarasya dāsyam* mentioned in the first verse of the IPK. Cf. ŚSĀ XV.4 etc.

²⁵ It is only the last verse that enables us to see it in the right perspective.

²⁶ This attitude is aptly outlined by an oft quoted verse: antaḥ kaulo hahiḥ śaivo lokācāre tu vaidikaḥ / sāram ādāya tiṣṭheta narīkelaphalaṃ yathā // (cf. Sanderson 1985: 203-205; id. 1988: 699)

Trika is a clear indication of this attitude²⁷. Choosing Buddhism, and particularly its logical school, as number one enemy means reinforcing the undeclared alliance with the Saivasiddhantins, who see Utp. siding with them against those who had already been the opponents of Sadyojyotis (see for instance the first chapter of his Nareśvaraparīkṣā) and were to be the opponents criticized by Nārāyanakantha and especially by Rāmakantha, who displays a particularly vast knowledge of their works and doctrines. This lengthy examination and criticism of the teaching of the Buddhist logicians resulted in, or at least was accompanied by, the peculiar phenomenon of a more or less conscious absorption of their doctrines and their terminology, that was to leave substantial traces in the structure of the Pratyabhijñā²⁸. This may have been a deliberate choice by Utp.: to increase his own prestige by assuming the ways and forms of a philosophical school which was perhaps the most respected and feared, even by the many who did not agree with it. But certainly one must also view this in the light of the complex relationship with the Nyāya.

The Nyāya was also given a wide berth as an opponent. This, too, is probably part of the manoeuvre to place the Trika in a broader Śaiva context, seeing that the Śaiva faith was known to be pre-eminent among the Naiyāyikas. It is probably for this reason that we see Utp. assuming a Naiyāyika guise in the ĪS (Abh. also dealt with the philosophy of this school in the *Kathāmukhatilaka*, now lost²⁹). Against the realism of the Nyāya, that claimed the reality of the external object and the actual existence of concepts such as relation etc., Utp. sets the criticism of the Bud-

²⁹ Cf. ĪPVV I p. 20.

²⁷ According to Abh., the Trika – and consequently the MV, which is its essence – represents the essence of the entire Saiva tradition and not of the sole non-dualism (TĀ 1.18 daśāṣṭadaśavasvaṣṭabhinnaṃ yac chāsanaṃ vibhoḥ / tatsāraṃ trikaśāstraṃ hi tatsāraṃ mālinīmatam //).

²⁸ I will not dwell on this point, which I have already dealt with elsewhere (Torella 1992). Also Somānanda presents and criticizes themes and doctrines of Buddhist *pramāna* tradition (inference, the universal as exclusion of the other, instantaneity; cf. in particular SD IV.68 ff., V.44 ff. – within a general criticism of the inference placed outside the context of *ekašivatā* –, VI.77 ff.) and refers, more or less explicitly, to two verses by Dharmakīrti (PV III.282 in SD I.45 and PV III.354 in SD VI.39). In the SD we find peculiar terms of Buddhist logic, such as *svalakṣaṇa* (IV.71a), *apoha* (VI.76c), *svārthānumāna* (V.55a), *parānumāna* (V.61c) etc., but they are always referred to the opposing doctrines, without showing any trace of conditioning or appropriation (as it is in Utp. and Abh.)

dhist logicians, but only to show that they would easily get the better of its relatively ingenuous realism if the Pratyabhijñā did not intervene to support it. After letting the Buddhist logicians demolish the Nyāya categories, he shows how the Buddhist alternative is in fact equally inadmissible. It does overcome the Nyaya, but remains as though suspended in mid air, since it is proved - in its fragmented and isolated universe to be incapable of accounting for the network of relations and the circularity of the world of human experience. So - Utp. seems to say, and later Abh. was to put this more explicitly – one might just as well accept the view of the Nyāya in the sphere of the vyavahāra, on condition that one sees through it the pervasive presence of Siva as constituting its dynamism and internal coherence. It could equally well resolve the inconsistencies of the Buddhist view and render them acceptable. In this way, Utp. achieves the result of both showing the superiority of the Pratyabhijñá to Buddhism and warning the Nyāya not to count too much on its forces alone, detached from those of the new Saiva theologians.

Another important aspect of the strategy of Utp.'s Pratyabhijñā is the glaring reversal of Somānanda's attitude towards Bhartrhari, who, from being a punctiliously criticized and even derided opponent, becomes one of the major inspirers³⁰ throughout the IPK (as I have sought to point out in the notes to the translation), and in particular in one of its essential doctrines. I am referring to the identification in Siva of the dual prakāśavimarśa pole – the first understood as the motionless cognitive light that constitutes the basic fabric, the founding structure of reality, of the 'given'; the second as the spark that causes this luminous structure to pulsate by introducing self-awareness, dynamism, freedom of intervention, of self-assertion, thus expressing in theoretical terms what is the nature of an unpredictable divine personality, like that of the violent and loving Siva handed down in the Scriptures and with whom Utp. dialogues in his mystical hymns. Prakāśa forms, together with a large group of synonyms or quasi-synonyms (from the roots bhā-, pratibhā-, bhās-, avabhās-, abhās-, pratibhās-, prath-)³¹, a close-knit constellation

The fact that the Pratyabhijñā shows at one time the influence of the Buddhists and of Bhartrhari does not appear as a contradiction, if we take into account the undoubted relations and mutual exchanges between the doctrines of the Buddhist schools (Mādhyamika, Vijñānavādin, logicians) and the doctrines of Bhartrhari (cf. e.g. Lindtner 1993).

³¹ To these must be added another key term, *sphur*-, where the light is enriched by a 'vibrant', dynamic, connotation – which makes it into the intersection point with the doctrine of the Spanda.

of 'luminous' terms indicating the notions of being manifested, emerging from the dark, coming to consciousness or, more in general, of being the object of knowledge and finally simply 'being', whose use was already firmly established especially in Vedāntic and Buddhist (particularly logical) contexts; *prakāša* and synonyms frequently occur in the VP.

Apart from isolated and uncertain cases in the Saiva scriptural tradition (cf. Dyczkowsky 1987: 233 n. 10; cf. also SD II.83d, 84c), vimarśa³², in the pregnant sense Utp. attributes to it, cannot but derive from Bhartrhari's teaching, especially if we consider its link with light, on the one hand, and the word on the other. Of course, I am referring here to the two very famous and most quoted stanzas I.131-32 of the VP³³, whose influence, though extending over the whole structure of the Pratyabhijñā, we find concentrated in particular on two closely connected aspects. One (ĪPK 1.5.19) concerns the only way deemed possible to account for a common fact in everyday experience, such as the immediate and seemingly thoughtless action that still achieves its purpose - namely, that of affirming the presence of a subtle reflective awareness even within the sensation or movement captured at its most direct and undif-

³² Vimarśa has been translated in various ways and there are good reasons for each of them: 'cogitazione, pensiero' (Gnoli), 'prise de conscience (Silburn), 'selfconsciousness, freedom, determinate consciousness' (Pandey), 'raissaisissement infini' (Hulin), 'Betrachtung, Urteil' (Frauwallner), 'self-representation' (Sanderson), 'prise de conscience active, libre activité de la Conscience' (Padoux) etc. The translation 'reflective awareness' that I have generally adopted - drawn from Matilal 1968a, who however uses it to translate anuvyavasāya (also Dyczkowski uses it frequently) - seemed to me broad enough to be adapted to the different contexts and meanings in which the term is used. Being neither too precise nor too vague, it permits me not to disseminate the text of different expressions for the same term. Vimarśa is accompanied by a series of terms deriving from the same root with different preverbs ($par\bar{a}^{\circ}$, $pratyava^{\circ}$, ava° , \bar{a}°). A differentiation between them might be attempted by identifying a more intimate and analytic element in vimarśa, a more instantaneous and indefinite element in parāmarsa, one more characterized by introjection and return to the subject in pratyavamarśa. However, the close reading of the texts of this school indicates that, even if these different nuances are in principle not unfounded, they are largely used as interchangeable terms. Another important notion, closely connected with vimarsa - and probably first introduced by Utp. -, is that of camatkāra 'astonished, wondrous, savouring' (see below p. 118 n. 23). It could be defined as a vimarsa enriched with a strong aesthetic connotation.

³³ See below p. 125 n. 41.

ferentiated moment³⁴. The other aspect regards the two solemn general formulations (I.5.11 and 13) that define *vimarśa* (*pratyavamarśa* in the *vṛtti*) as the essential nature of light (*avabhāsa*; *prakāśa* in the *vṛtti*) and indissolubly link consciousness (*citi* etc.), reflective awareness (*pratyavamarśa*) and the supreme word ($par\bar{a}\ v\bar{a}c$)³⁵.

The presence of Bhartrhari, not only in the substance of these doctrines but often also in their verbal formulation, could not be more direct – even if the vrtti of VP³⁶ does nothing to emphasize the apparently very general meaning of the verse but, on the contrary, seems to do its utmost to keep it down to earth. In making this doctrine one of the crucial points of the Pratyabhijñā, Utp. appropriates another prestigious tradition, that of the Grammarians, and Bhartrhari in particular, whose teaching on the all-pervasive power of the word is, moreover, connected with a very ancient speculative trend, which also continues in the Agamic tradition close to Utp. This is incorporated with no effort in the philosophy of the Pratyabhijñā, enriching it with implications, and something that must not be underestimated - it furnishes a further, penetrating argument in the dispute against the Buddhist logicians, one of whose basic theses was precisely the absolute otherness of direct sensation from determinate knowledge. However, it is true that the criticism of the tripartition of the word held by Bhartrhari (cf. below p. 120 n. 26) remains - according to what appears from the passages of the $t\bar{t}k\bar{a}$ sketchily quoted by Abh. in the IPVV. But it seems to slip into the background, compared to the general acceptance of Bhartrhari's teaching as a whole. One might even say that Utp. criticizes the tripartition also because this, though unanimously recognized by the contemporary exegesis of the VP and explicitly mentioned by Bhartrhari himself, appears

This conception is not to be referred solely to Bhartrhari – as will be seen later on – but may also be considered as a development in philosophical terms of the experience of the 'effervescence of all Powers' (sarvaśaktivilolatā), described in Chapter I of the ŚD and, in turn, derived by Somānanda from the scriptures (first of all, the VBh).

³⁵ See below p. 120 n. 26.

 $K\bar{a}\eta das$ of the VP – indicated in the colophons as Harivisabha – with Bhartrhari himself is still to be considered an open one (see the recent contributions by Aklujkar 1972,1993 and Bronkhorst 1988,1991, for and against this identification respectively). In the course of this work I shall provisionally accept the thesis of identity, which seems to me the more likely and which, above all, has always been accepted by the Indian tradition.

to him not in line with the general plan of the VP, to which a quadripartition like the Saiva one would be more suited. The mention of a supreme form of Paśyantī made in the vṛṭṭṭi on the ŚD (p. 38) – which Somānanda had not taken into consideration –, even if later Utp. considers it included in the criticism of Somānanda, might be understood as Utp.'s airing of a hypothesis of fourth level in Bhartrhari himself. An indirect confirmation might be represented by the explicit equivalence that his disciple Rāmakantha (Spandakārikāvivṛṭi p. 153) establishes between śabdatattva and Parāvāc, which, therefore, does not coincide with Paśyantī but of which the latter is an emanation. Moreover, Rāmakantha seems inclined not to underline the illusory nature of the Śabdādvayavādins' vivarta, but he considers it simply as a different way of denominating that process of the Lord's articulation in the multiplicity of the universe which the Śaivas call śaktiprasara 'flowing of the Power' (ibid.).

At any rate, it is clear that we are far removed from the attitude of Somānanda³⁷, who minimizes even that aspect which by contrast was to strike Utp. so forcefully – namely, the inevitable presence of language at the heart of every cognitive activity (SD II. 19-20)³⁸. And I like to think that the *vidvad*° Utp. places in front of Bhartrhari's name when, in SDVr p. 84, he quotes in full a verse of the Ṣaḍdhātusamīkṣā³⁹, which Somānanda is fiercely attacking at the time, is a kind of veiled apology,

³⁷ Furthermore, the conception of the Absolute that results from an overall view of the VP appears close to that of the Pratyabhijñā. Positions such as that expressed in the Sādhanasamuddeśa (vv. 39-41) could easily have been subscribed to by Somānanda himself (who refers only to the $K\bar{a}nda$ I), even if we do not read it in the light of Helārāja explanation (Prakīrņakaprakāśa I p. 262 ekam eva samvinmayam param śabdabrahma tathā tathāvasthitam iti kārikārthah). The very notions of avidvā and vivarta, examined in the whole of the VP, seem to escape Somānanda's criticism. Avidyā, in fact, is not a principle extraneous to Brahman but a śakti (VP I Vrtti p. 9) and, as such, does not weaken but rather accentuates Brahman's centrality. Similarly, the term vivarta (and related forms) seems to be used by Bhartrhari to underline the continuity of Brahman in the manifold world of manifestation rather than to signify a de-realization of the latter. Somananda, however, is certainly not the only one to interpret Bhartrhari in this way; while some of his early critics, like Jayanta or Santarakşita-Kamalasīla, show they are at least aware of the problems in interpreting these key-terms, the later Vedāntins will not seem to have any doubts about reading them in the light of the subsequent Sankarian doctrines.

³⁸ The verse figures as an objection that Somānanda essentially pass over.

³⁹ Quotations of this work attributed to Bhartrhari (Iyer 1969: 9-10), now lost, are also to be found in the *Spandapradīpikā* (pp. 4, 22). Of the two different titles

a timid dissociation from what he finds himself commenting on with the devout diligence of a disciple.

A further original contribution by Utp. to the philosophy of the Pratyabhijñā is the doctrine of the $\bar{a}bh\bar{a}sas$. Somānanda had not developed his own idea of the ontological status of the manifested world, but had only asserted strongly and repeatedly its reality $(satyat\bar{a})$ and its having the nature of Śiva $(sivar\bar{u}pat\bar{a})$. Things are 'states' $(avasth\bar{a}, bh\bar{a}va)$ of Śiva, and their emergence is due solely to his will, brought about by nothing other than a natural overflowing of energies, whose characteristic feature is 'joy' $(\bar{a}moda)$ as well as 'play' $(kr\bar{\iota}d\bar{a})$. Utp. includes the world of manifestation in his great luminous metaphor. Every aspect of reality is a light; it is a reflection in the mirror of consciousness and has its ultimate reality in consciousness.

By combining elements drawn from the Vaiyākaraņa and the Buddhist pramāna tradition, Utp. presents these 'manifestations' (ābhāsa) as having the nature of universal (in fact, each one of them is connected with a word). They can appear in isolation or aggregated around a dominant manifestation and are provided with a single or complex causal efficiency, on the basis of a compatibility that has its ultimate foundation in the law of Necessity established by the Lord. United among themselves, thus becoming more and more particularized and, finally, combined with three manifestations endowed with a special individualizing force space, time and form - they constitute the world of everyday experience. It is easy to glimpse in this conception elements drawn from the Vijñānavádins (consciousness as the receptacle of everything that is gradually manifested), from the Vaiyākaraņas (the idea of a hierarchy of universals) and from the logical-epistemological school of Buddhism (cf. Torella 1992: 332 ff.). In this case, too, the word ābhāsa as a philosophical term, was not invented by Utp., but was commonly used in the Vedāntic and Buddhist schools. It also occurs in the SD⁴⁰, but, even

that are attributed to it – Śabdadhātusamīkṣā in the ŚDVr and Ṣaddhātusamīkṣā in the Spandapradīpikā (Dhātu° is only the abbreviated form; cf. Gaurinath Shastri 1959:61, who traced out one more quotation from this work), the right one is most probably the latter (which, besides, better lends itself to be abbreviated), as can be deduced from Utp.'s commentary: dhātuṣaṭkopagamāt bhedavāde 'pi ... This work may possibly have been an examination of the six Vaiśeṣika categories (even though I am not aware of any other occurrence of the term dhātu in the sense of padārtha), or (J. Bronkhorst's personal communication) of the six dhātus mentioned in Buddhist works, such as the Śikṣāsamuccaya.

⁴⁰ Cf. I.33c, II.21c, III.78b, IV.98c, VI.58d etc.

when it does not appear in a context where explicit reference is made to opposing doctrines (various kinds of vivarta), its use seems to be merely sporadic and casual, and in any case devoid of a precise technical connotation. In one respect, ābhāsa is not distinguished from prakāśa (and related terms), and the two terms often seem interchangeable (svāhhāsa, svaprakāśa etc.; cf. ŚSĀ I.1c śivābhāsah). In another (namely, in its more technical use, as in the so-called abhasa theory), though the essential unity of nature remains, ābhāsa is seen as a particle, an individualized and extroverted form of the 'great light'41, 'cut out' in it. This fragmentation of the light is accompanied by, and also presupposes, an analogous descent of consciousness to the state of fragmented subjectivity of the manifold individual subjects (the true subject is avicchinnābhāsa; cf. ĨPV II p. 138); see in particular Abh.'s commentaries on IPK II.3.1-2. The relation between consciousness and ābhāsa is that between the mirror and the reflected image, subtly analyzed in Chapter III of the TA (cf. also MMP pp. 147-53). The ontological status of the ābhāsa is therefore a mixture of autonomy and heteronomy, without its basic reality ever being called into question: reality is precisely being manifest (ĪPK I.4.14 and vṛtti; cf. APS 5ab evam apy avabhāsānuṣaktā sattocitā bhavet). Though he never explicitly repeats Somānanda's extreme formulations ("the jar exists, knowing itself"), by using a typically Vijñānavāda argument, Utp. underlines the necessarily common nature of consciousness and its object: only that which is itself light, i.e. sentience⁴², can shine in knowledge; to say that something is insentient is like saying it is inexistent (APS 13ac). Even when an ābhāsa is viewed as external - as 'this' - the 'this' continues to have its foundation in the I; it may also be said that the reflective awareness of something in terms

In this case the Śaiva tradition interprets $\bar{a}bh\bar{a}sa$ as 'limited light', by attributing to \bar{a}° the meaning of $\bar{i}sat$; in this sense, the supreme Śiva is $nir\bar{a}bh\bar{a}sa$ (IPVV III p. 271).

Among the rare passages in the Saiva scriptures that explicitly touch on and philosophically elaborate this point, see that of the *Ucchusmahhairava* (cit. ŚSV p. 4; Torella 1979: 39): "How is it possible, O Dear One, that these be objects of knowledge, without being also subjects of knowledge. It is for this reason that impurity does not exist.", and of the *Kālikākrama* (cit. ŚSV pp. 57-58; Torella 1979: 112): "Knowledge shines within and without, in various forms, and there is no existence of object that is outside knowledge. The whole world is, therefore, constituted by knowledge, and no entity is perceived without knowledge. Knowledge has the same nature as the object. [...] The single nature of knowing and the knowable comes out of their mutual implication in the cognitive act."

of separation, of 'this', has been fully achieved only when it rests in its innermost being, thus becoming the reflective awareness 'I' (APS 15). It is the same light of the self that is manifested as self and as other (APS 13cd).

Conceiving of the supreme reality as an absolute I is another innovation made by Utp. (cf. Dyczkowski 1990), though in my opinion there are no substantial differences between this and Somānanda's dynamic Self-Śiva which underlies the whole universe and express himself in it. Utp. is the one who chose to use this word regardless of the associations generally attached to it in Indian thought, being aware of the fact that the risk of a reification that has always weighed heavily on the word ātman was even more negative, and that this makes it less suitable for expressing the unpredictable overflowing of the divine personality. The term 'I' is implicitly aimed against the two conceptions that are, after all, closest to the Pratyabhijñā and which it most aspires to differentiate itself from: the consciousness devoid of a subject of the Vijñānavāda and the static ātman-brahman of the Vedānta. "The resting of the light in itself, or the supreme condition of the I, is absolute independence from every other, autonomy (svātantrya), agency, Lordship " (APS 22cd-23).

I will not present in detail all the argumentations Utp. develops in the $J\tilde{n}\bar{a}na^{\circ}$ and in the $Kriy\bar{a}dhik\bar{a}ra$ (regarding which I refer directly to the translation and notes). They mainly take the form of a debate with the Buddhist logicians and also betray, as has been pointed out, their strong influence. Utp.'s constant preoccupation is to show, in every context he deals with, the need for a single, dynamic subject that unifies and animates the discontinuity of reality and constitutes the substratum of every limited subject, as well as of every form and activity of everyday life.

This I or Consciousness is, on the religious plane, Siva. In his highest form, the supreme divine personality is solely 'I' – consisting of consciousness and beatitude – in whom all the principles are contained though in a state of complete dissolution. He is present throughout the IPK as the ultimate essence of every reality and is also directly mentioned here and there, even if the stage is generally occupied by a less extreme form of him, which balances between transcendence and immanence. In fact, being an expository work, which requires an object to teach and a recipient of this teaching, it cannot but deal with that form of the God which is open to the world of manifestation, whilst firmly remaining its sovereign. On the supreme plane there is only the I resting in his fullness and no trace of the knowable remains; even the Pratyabhijnā has to withdraw from this plane, leaving it in the background. In

the various models of tripartition that the IPK presents, following in the wake of the Trika (aham, aham-idam, idam; śuddha, śuddha, śuddha; para, parāpara, apara), this more accessible form of the God is connected with the second level. It is mainly indicated as Maheśvara, Iśvara, Iśa, Prabhu, whereas the supreme form is often given the name of Śiva or Parameśvara, but there certainly are exchanges between these two series – which indirectly points out the fact that it is a question of a sole reality and that every distinction of degree and figure is purely instrumental to the expository requirements.

After leaving the sole force of independent argumentation to work in the first two Adhikāras, Utp. – though in a subordinate way, as may be seen from the disproportion between these sections – allows revelation to take the floor⁴³, being aware that there is a marked limit beyond which experience and reasoning no longer suffice (cf. \bar{I} PV II p. 213). And thus in the first $\bar{a}hnika$ of the $\bar{A}gam\bar{a}dhik\bar{a}ra$ he goes on to describe the principles that constitute reality – from Sadāśiva to the Earth – without expressly mentioning Śiva or Śakti but considering them, or so it appears, as fused in the figure of the supreme knowing subject (III.1.1c), of

⁴³ Utp. does not name any of the scriptural sources of the IPK. Abh. in IPV II p. 231 expressly mentions the Şadardhasāra (see below p. 193 n. 13, probably the same as the Trikahrdaya (or Trikasāra) quoted for the first time by Bhāskara in the Śivasūtravārttika (p. 31) and then, repeatedly, by Abh., Kṣemarāja and Jayaratha (Dvivedi 1983: Upodghāta pp. 39-40). The nature of this text - belonging to the so-called second stratum of the Trika scriptures, but also quoted by Abh. as an authority for the Krama cult of the twelve Kālīs – indirectly confirms Utp.'s position in the Saiva tradition. According to Jayaratha's explanations (TAV III p. 194), the Krama doctrine taught in the Devīpañcaśatika, as well as the Trikadarśana, had been handed down to Abh. through the lineage deriving from Somananda - that is, through Utp. and Laksmanagupta (the latter, in particular, also being his teacher in the Pratyabhijñā). In a definitely Krama context Ksemarāja (PH p. 20) quotes as an authority a short passage from the lost IPtīkā, and a Krama flavour can be noticed here and there in the SSA (see e.g. chapter VIII). Regarding a passage from the vrtti on IPK IV.5, vastutah śaktivikāso viśvam, Abh. names the Śrīmangalāśāstra as being the source; and, in fact, elsewhere (SDVr p. 107) Utp. textually quotes the passage of this Tantra which Abh. alluded to. The Mangalā (or Sarvamangalā) is included in the list of Bhairavatantra given by the Śrīkanthīsamhitā. Abh. (IPV II p. 228) also mentions the Raurava (but with reference to a doctrine referred to but not accepted by Utp.; see also the quotations from the Kālottara in the SDVr) and, in particular, the MPA, a text belonging to the Saivasiddhanta but whose peculiar emphasis on the role of knowledge (presented as a more prestigious alternative with respect to ritual) is well-known.

the Isitr (III.1.2 vrtti). Abh. (IPVV III p. 258) identifies this supreme principle, which is apparently placed at the top of the scale of tattvas and not beyond it, with the *śivatattva*. By integrating, as seems possible, the scant indications of the IPK with what Utp. says in his commentary on the SD, one can state it is the *śivatattva* that presents itself as constituted by all the tattvas (p. 22 sarvattavamayatayā śivatattvāvasthānam). Still according to the SDVr, it is the supreme Lord Siva, endowed with the two powers of consciousness and lysis, or light and beatitude (p. 23 svarupānupravistacinnirvrtirūpašaktidvayah prakāšānandamayah pūrņah parameśvarah śivah prasrtah); he assumes the form of the various principles, beginning with Sakti (SD I.29). Cf. IPK IV.14ac sarvathā tv antarālīnānantatattvaughanirbharah śivaś cidānandaghanah; ŚDVr p. 106 evam suvarņavat paramešvara eva pūrvoktecchādišaktimān tathā tattvabhuvanakāryakaraņādiprakāravaicitryeņa [...] sthitaḥ; in ŠD III.21d and in the vrtti he is called *sivatattva*. In passages like these, we seem to witness the overlapping and merging of Siva seen as the first or last tattva and of the highest divine personality who is beyond the very dimension of tattva - even if supreme - containing and transcending all the tattvas without exception. This impression is reinforced when Utp. passes from the noetic register of the IPK to the emotional register of the bhakti in the ŚSĀ.

A great deal of space is devoted to the structure of the limited subject in the second $\bar{a}hnika$ of the $\bar{A}gam\bar{a}dhik\bar{a}ra$. The divine subject (pati) – whose body is constituted, as it were, by the universe – is counterposed with the 'beast' (pasu), the fettered soul, in its various forms depending on the maculations that characterize it. In the conception outlined by Utp. there are two components from different sources: the hierarchy of subjects – which is a peculiar element of the Śaivasiddhānta⁴⁴ – and a version of the three maculations which, though deriving from the analogous doctrine of the Śaivasiddhānta, has an utterly monistic qualification. The $\bar{a}nava$, $m\bar{a}y\bar{t}ya$ and $k\bar{a}rma$ maculations⁴⁵ completely lose their original nature of 'substances' that physically obstruct the self of the pasu from without and resolve themselves into erroneous attitudes of the individual consciousness⁴⁶. The $\bar{a}nava$ maculation, with its

⁴⁴ Which Abh. was to take up through the MV.

⁴⁵ On the different denomination of the three maculations in dualist and non-dualist schools cf. Sanderson 1992:286 n.23.

⁴⁶ Cf. MV I.23cd malam ajñānam icchanti; ŚS I.2 (a)jñānam bandhah . Cf. TĀ 1.22 ff.

obliterating the one or the other of the components of subjectivity (consciousness and freedom, bodha and svātantrya) determines that identity crisis onto which the other two are grafted: the mayic one - which causes the I to see the world of objects as separate from himself - and the karmic one - which makes him consider his own actions as the causes of the series of rebirths, miring him in the samsāra. The cause of all three is the power of māyā, which has its roots in the very will of the Lord (III.2.5 vṛtti). The individual knowing subject, variously contaminated by these three maculations, is then distinguished according to the four levels which he tends to identify with (void, vital breath, mind and body) and the conditions (avasthā) in which his experience of reality may take place (waking, sleep and deep sleep, corresponding to direct perception, to mental costruct and to partial or total suspension of all activity and knowledge). The fourth state, in which duality is overcome, corresponds gradually to the conditions of Vijnanakala, Mantra, Mantreśvara and Īśa; the state beyond the fourth is the one in which every trace of the knowable is dissolved in the absolute I of Siva.

As we have seen above, the limited subject tends to identify with four aspects progressively higher in rank, which are however still included in the sphere of the objects: the body, the mind, the vital breath and the void. Their predominance causes the eclipse of the two components of his authentic subjectivity, consciousness and freedom (bodha and svätantrya-kartṛtā). Liberation, therefore, consists in inverting this relation – namely, in the consciousness-freedom establishing themselves at the centre of the individual, while pushing the components of the fictitious I in the margins⁴⁷ – and takes on the form of a knowledge that is 'characterized by penetration in it' tatsamāveśalakṣaṇam (ĪPK III.2.12d). Here we have one of the key words of the Kashmiri Tantric tradition, which, furthermore, possesses the particular feature of allowing one to glimpse the succession, or rather, the coexistence of two different conceptions of the individual I's escape from his limits. In fact, in samāveśa the meanings of 'to enter, to penetrate into' and 'to be penetrated, possessed by' coexist, thanks to the dual transitive and intransitive sense of the root viś-48. In the earlier stages of these schools the term must doubtless have been mainly used to mean the loss of individual identity and the paroxysm of energies which derive from being possessed by the

⁴⁷ Cf. TĀ I.173cd-174ab and Jayaratha's commentary.

⁴⁸ Cf. Sanderson 1986: 177 n. 33; on this term see also Hara 1966.

terrible divinities linked to the funerary and sexual transgressions, evoked in the Kāpālika rites⁴⁹. In the later phase represented by the Trika and the elaboration of its teachings, the prevalent use of the term in its active meaning sometimes appears as a conscious declaration of new intentions - even a kind of damnatio memoriae of a past that has become uncomfortable for those aiming at new integrations⁵⁰. Utp. uses $\bar{a}vi\dot{s}$ - with the active meaning in the first of the final verses of the $\bar{I}PK$ ('... entering in the Siva nature ...'). Also in the first verse of the SD⁵¹ samāvistah is definitely active, but, since it is referred to Siva, the result is that it is my form that is penetrated by the God. As Utp. explains, it is Siva who has become one with my form, in the sense that he has entered realities such as the vital breath etc., which in themselves are not different from the other inert things such as the jar and so on, in order to make them into centres of individual conscious life; indeed, the more intensely he penetrates them, the more the extraordinary powers emerge (p. 3 yāvatyā ca mātrayā samāveśas tāvanmātrasiddhisambhavaḥ). And, therefore, he who seeks these powers must increasingly deepen this 'entry' into himself. However, Utp. concludes, we can imagine that both Siva and man enter and 'are entered', since the movement towards unity is the same in both. These considerations have left their mark in the way Abh. develops the laconic text of the kārikā, tatsamāveśa°, which is only glossed in the vrtti with tacchaktisamāveśa°. Abh. says (ĪPVV III p. 327) that this word is intended to refer to the two forms of liberation in

In the Śaivaparibhāṣā āveśa-samāveśa is considered to be the form of liberation peculiar to the Kāpālikas (Sanderson 1985: 213 n.90, Brunner 1992: 46-47 n.65, Brunner 1986: 518-19). Says Śivāgrayogin (p. 342): kāpālikāh samāveśena sāmyam upagacchanti / tathā hi — yathā grahāh puruṣeṣv āviśanti tatheśvaragunā mukteṣv āviśanti; what makes such a conception of liberation unacceptable in the eyes of a Śaivasiddhāntin is its dangerous resemblance to possession by evil spirits and the subject's loss of identity and autonomy (p. 346 tathā sati bhūtāviṣṭasyevāsvātantryāpattyā puruṣārthatvāyogāt). These themes had already been touched on in the older dualistic Śaiva tradition (cf. Paramokṣanirāsakārikā v.13b āveśenāsvatantratā; Rāmakanṭha's tīkā p. 286 bhūtāviṣṭasyeva pumso muktāv asvātantryam eveśvarasamateti; ibid. p. 283 anyais tu tadā parameśvaragunaih svāśrayasthair eva siddhah samāviśyate grahair iva puruṣa ity āveśapakṣaḥ).

This process reaches its completion with Kṣemarāja, for whom samāveśa as a technical term seems to have lost any specific identity (PH p. 45 samāveśasa-māpattyādiparyāyaḥ samādhiḥ).

⁵¹ asmadrūpasamāviṣṭaḥ svātmanātmanivāraṇe / śivaḥ karotu nijayā namaḥ śaktyā tatātmane //.

life. In the one case it has the meaning of 'complete and perfect entry into the own true nature' (satyasvarūpe samyag ā samantāt praveśalaksanam; active meaning) and corresponds to the state beyond the fourth in which the adept, after becoming aware of the supreme nature of the I, becomes as though withdrawn from the knowable which formed his fictitious identity. By contrast, in the other the various components of the levels of the limited subject are gradually penetrated by the elixir of the I, until they become, so to speak, transfigured, removed from their nature of knowable realities. This experience, which corresponds to the fourth state, can be extended further, until it flows into the state beyond the fourth, where the components of limitation, including samskāra, are totally dissolved and incorporated in the I. The passive sense of the second explanation of samāveśa and its relation with the above passage of the SDVr become evident from what Abh. adds later (ibid. p. 330), this time apparently referring to tacchaktisamāveśa° in the vṛtti: tasya samviddharmāḥ śaktiviśeṣāḥ samyag āviśanto vibhūtīr utthāpayanti (cfr. above n. $49)^{52}$.

The fourth state and the state beyond the fourth can be attained through the practices centred on the vital breaths, described in the $\bar{A}gamas$. Utp. briefly touches on this point at the end of the $\bar{A}gam\bar{a}dhik\bar{a}ra$. The duality of the $pr\bar{a}na$ and $ap\bar{a}na$ that characterizes the waking and dream states is overcome with the entry into the $sam\bar{a}na$, which suspends and unifies them, corresponding to the state of deep sleep. The subsequent level, represented by the $ud\bar{a}na$, marks the end of the limited condition, which culminates — with the all-pervasive presence of the $vy\bar{a}na$ — in the supreme condition of Siva.

Therefore, there is a difference between the two turyātītas delineated by Abh. The first pertains to the $j\bar{n}\bar{a}nin$, who reaches it instantly thanks to an intense and flashing 'peak experience'; the second, by contrast, pertains to the yogin and is the fruit of the repeated practice of this samāveśa. Here the adept does not halt when his self enters into the nature of Śiva; this is merely his starting point. He slows down this identification and intensifies it at the same time, extending it gradually to all the levels of the fictitious I (body, mind etc.), which the jāānin, on the contrary, only abandoned. This second turyātīta, reached in two stages – says Abh., following Utp.'s tīkā – pertains to the viśeṣadarśanas, namely to the schools that prevalently teach a śāktādvaita, i.e. that stress the 'power' element in the self (p. 331). These are opposed by the sāmānyadarśanas, which place the emphasis on the subject in his transcendence and whose form of turyātīta – the one described first – tends to cancel the knowable and aims for pure consciousness (this is the vyatireka-turyātīta

In the *Tattvasamgrahādhikāra* the path to liberation passes through the overcoming of the activity which, throughout the IPK, is considered as the very core of the condition of limited subject: the *vikalpa* – the dualizing, discursive thought, that unfolds through antinomies and organizes reality in terms of separation – in all its forms. The two different methods taught by Utp. give the same result – liberation in life – the one by the gradual attenuation and elimination of mental constructs through the cultivation of their opposite (the *nirvikalpa*), the other by allowing them to flow and progressively purifying their contents. I shall return to these later.

The whole of Utp.'s work, however, is built around teaching the 'recognition' of the Lord, which also the two above-mentioned forms are part of (IPVV III p. 354 pañcabhih [the last five stanzas] pratyabhijnātmakam moksatattvam). This new and easy way is merely the triggering in the devout of an act of identification, which does not reveal anything new but only rends the veils that hid the I from himself; a cognition is not created but only the blur that prevented its use, its entering into life, is instantly removed. The way by which the master creates the premises for this to occur may, on the contrary, be gradual: this is what Utp. does with his work, which aims through a series of arguments at bringing to light the powers of the I and those of the Lord, until identification is triggered. The practice of such a linear (avakra) path is enough to enter into the nature of Siva and achieve the condition of liberated in life, which may also be accompanied by the extraordinary powers (ĪPVV I p. 111 īśvarapratyabhijñākrto 'bhyudayo jīvanmuktivibhūtilakṣaṇaḥ). This 'penetration' still presupposes a body and, in any case, a state in which the distinction between the I and Siva has not yet been dissolved⁵³. This occurs within everyday reality just as it is. The light of liberation does not cause its colours to fade, does not cover them but brightens them, performing the miracle of eliminating otherness whilst maintaining the richness of individual flavours.

Says Utp.:

"Dwelling in the midst of the sea of the supreme ambrosia, with my mind immersed solely in the worship of You, may I attend to all the

to which the avyatireka- of the viśeṣadarśanas is opposed). Utp. and Abh.'s inclinations lie towards the latter.

⁵³ ĪPV II p. 258 dehapāte tu parameśvara evaikarasaḥ iti kaḥ kutra kathaṃ samāveśah.

common occupations of man, savouring the ineffable in every thing." (ŚSĀ XVIII.13)

"May my desire for the objects of the senses be intense, O Blessed One, like that of all other men, but may I see them as though they were my own body, with the thought of differentiation gone". (VIII.3) "May I aspire to liberation by worshipping You, without withdrawing from experience and the world, and without even seeking the dominion [of the extraordinary powers], but becoming intoxicated with the abundant liquor of devotion". (XV.4)

The householders of Kashmir, whose desire for an intimate experience of communion with the absolute, though profound, withdrew before the abysses of transgression and loss of identity, were not to remain indifferent to the insinuating message of the Pratyabhijñā.

THE FUTURE OF THE PRATYABHIJÑĀ

If Utp.'s teaching did not remain an isolated, though brilliant, fruit of the Saiva tradition, this is probably due to Abh., who took it to constitute the theoretical and speculative side of his great synthesis of the principal currents of non-dualist Kashmir Shaivism. The privileged position that the Pratyabhijñā occupies in the paddhati of the Trika (in the broad sense), not only in the treatment of the bimbapratimbavāda in the third $\bar{a}hnika$ of the $T\bar{A}$, but in the work as a whole – as well as, in various ways, in the MVV, the PTV, the Paryantapañcāśikā etc. – was so to speak the sounding board that amplified and spread its teaching. It is virtually impossible not to find traces of the characteristic themes of the Pratyabhijñā in the Saiva authors who came after Abh., as well as in later scriptures such as those of the Tripurā (Yoginīhṛdaya, Tripurārahasya etc.). The doctrine of the ābhāsas, consciousness as the synthesis of prakāśavimarśa, ahamtā, camatkāra, the four levels of the limited subjectivity occupy – either isolated or combined – an important place even in some Vaisnava scriptures, like the Ahirbudhnyasamhitā and the Laksmītantra. Nor must one think that this influence was limited to Kashmir, since it was very strong also in south India, where the Trika, Krama and Tripurā schools were widesprad (Sanderson 1990:80-82). This is also evident from the inclusion of the Pratyabhijñā in the SDS of the Southern Indian Mādhava (14th c.) and the presence of MSS of works by Utp. and

Somānanda⁵⁴ in southern scripts (for example, it is to be noted that the only complete MS of the **Ī**Pvṛtti is in Malayalam characters).

The doctrine of the upāyas, stated briefly and as though in passing in the MV (II.20-23), is taken up again with great emphasis by Abh. and comes to constitute one of the main structures of the Trika, serving as a device to incorporate diverse spiritual traditions in this great synthesis, without levelling away their individuality. I will spare the reader yet another exposition of the doctrine of the upāyas555 (just as I spared him that of the tattvas) and confine myself to some considerations particularly on the first two: the non-means (anupaya) and the divine means (śāmbhava). Firstly, we must remember that, according to Abh., there is no real difference between anupāya and $\dot{sambhava}$ – the former only representing the higher plane of the latter⁵⁶ – and that the $\dot{sambhava}$ is the sole 'direct' means (sākṣāt, TĀ I.142a), whereas, of the two others, the āṇava is only a means of access to the śākta and the śākta to the $\dot{s}\bar{a}mbhava$ (142b and Jayaratha's commentary). In the non-means⁵⁷ the adept immediately establishes himself at the centre of the supreme consciousness without the need of a jumping off point. The teaching of a master pronounced once only, or a series of arguments, or faith in the scriptures are sufficient (TA II.49ab). Even if these causes may be endowed with succession, the phenomenon they trigger is not; in fact, in particularly privileged cases, it may arise by itself, without any of these detonators. The intensity of this state of penetration is such that even a mere chance encounter with a subject who has entered it may in certain cases determine instantaneous liberation (II.40). Everything appears dis-

⁵⁴ Which shows that the early Pratyabhijñā texts continued to be studied also independently of Abh.'s interpretation.

One of the most concise and clear enounciations is to be found in the Tantroccaya: (anupāya) p. 161 tatra sa parameśvaraprakāśaḥ kasyacid avirataprabandhatayā punar upāyanirapekṣatayā bhāti ekavāram guruvacanam īdṛśaṃ samyag avadhārya; (śāmbhava) p. 163 kasyacit tu parameśvaraprakāśas tadīyāyāṃ svātantryaśaktau nirjñātāyāṃ prakāśate [...] ahaṃsvātantryaśaktibhāsitaviśvābhāsaḥ parameśvaro vibhur eko nitya iti muhur muhur bhāvayan sa eva; (śākta) p. 165 yasya tv ittham apy avikalpakaḥ samāveśo nodeti sa savikalpabhāvanayā sattarkarūpayā saṃskurute vikalpam; (āṇava) p. 167 yas tu sattarkeṇa na nirmalasvabhāvam āsādayati tasya dhyānādikam ucvate.

⁵⁶ TĀV I p. 182 sa eva parām kāṣṭhām prāptaś cānupāya ity ucyate.

The expression 'non-means' is not to be taken literally; it alludes to the far more subtle nature of this means – which, however, remains such – with respect to the others (cf. TĀ II.2-3 and Jayaratha's commentary).

solved in the Bhairavic fire of consciousness to him who has entered this state (II.35).

While this kind of samāveśa⁵⁸ concerns the innermost aspect of consciousness, in the divine means the stress falls on its power of Freedom (TSã p. 10, Tantroccaya p. 163), or its manifesting as the universe. Here there is indeed a means-end relation, though in a very subtle form. The adept can start from any aspect of the knowable, taken in its dimension that is closest to consciousness and not yet differentiated from it, and see it as an image reflected in a mirror – distinct but inseparable from its support. This experience, strictly devoid of discursive representations characterized by the scission between subject and object, rests on the Lord's power of Volition, in which the manifestation is still completely enclosed within the desire to create: "All is born of me, is reflected in me, is inseparable from me" (TĀ III.280ab). Unlike the anupāya where everything happens in an instant, once and for ever, this experience is to be repeated essentially the same and progressively extended to all the aspects of reality (TĀ III.274 ff.). Through repetition and succession (TĀV II p. 1 śāmbhavopāyam kramaprāptam, TĀ III.271a bhūyo bhūyah, Tantroccaya p. 163 muhur muhuh) the adept reaches liberation in life, the fourth state. One can only speak of liberation in life with respect to the divine means; in the anupāya it cannot even be said that one is somehow liberated from something; in it, means and end coincide (TA III.272-73).

The Pratyabhijñā is traditionally connected with the anupāya. Abh. does not say this explicitly; he just refers, towards the end of the treatment of the anupāya, to two authorities: the $\bar{U}rmimah\bar{a}s\bar{a}stra$ and masters such as Somānanda etc. Regarding the latter, Jayaratha's commentary only mentions the $\hat{S}D$ and quotes the well-known passages VII.101cd and VII.5-6, the second of which, moreover, also appear through in the final stanza of $\bar{A}hnika$ II of the $T\bar{A}$. In fact, it is Somānanda who expressly mentions ekavaram (VII.5c), which constitutes one of the essential features of the anupāya (which always takes place sakrd 'once and for ever'). The central teaching of the Pratyabhijñā seems less extreme: we might say a $s\bar{a}mbhavop\bar{a}ya$ in the broad sense which leaves room within it for both experiences – sovereignty

⁵⁸ Even though the modern authors sometimes tend to use *upāya* and *samāveśa* as synonyms, an obvious distinction between them remains (cf. TSā p. 9 pārameśvara samāveśo nirupāyaka eva, etc.).

and complete dissolution in the I, turya and turyātīta, seen as forms of liberation in life. The end of the Pratyabhijñā is, indeed, jīvanmukti(ĪPVṛ on IV.16 etatparisīlanena śivatāveśāj jīvann eva mukto bhavati) - a condition which Abh. does not connect with the anupāya but with the śāmbhava (TĀ III.272). The Pratyabhijñā furnishes a series of preliminary arguments to the act of recognition, which, though with a different intensity, is at the basis of both the anupāya and the śāmbhava. In fact, also the anupāya requires 'purification through the composition of a series of arguments' (TĀ II.49a yuktipracayaracanonmārjanavaśāt)⁵⁹; and, in the ambit of the śāmbhavopāya, Jayaratha (TĀV I pp. 239-40 on TĀ I.216) notes that it is only thanks to the teaching that leads to the recognition of the true nature of the self that these practices can be productive, while those same states exempt from discursive representations which from time to time are spontaneously produced in the unaware and fettered subject (paśu) remain sterile.

Also the practice outlined in IPK IV.11, with its emphasis on vikal-pahāna and krama⁶⁰, is typically śāmbhava. Kṣemarāja in PH p. 40 makes this clearly understood by quoting this passage to illustrate an experience he defines vikalpam akiñciccintakatvena praśamayan, which echoes the definition of śāmbhavasamāveśa in MV II.21.

But in the IPK other means are also taught. If we want to read it in the light of Abh.'s systemization, we will have to classify as ānava the practices and experiences centring on the vital breaths hinted at in III.2.19-20 and recognize in the experience described in IV.12 – "He who, having all as his essence, thus knows: 'All this multiform deployment is mine', he, even in the flow of mental constructs, attains the state of Maheśa" – the elements that characterize the śāktopāya, i.e. the progressive purification of discursive representation and its transfor-

⁵⁹ Abh. is referring here, according to Jayaratha (TĀV I p. 41), to the recognition of the identity of the individual self and of the Lord, attained through the demonstration of his own theses and the invalidation of opposing ones, and therefore precisely to the IPK. The later Saiva tradition was to connect the name of Utp. with the work of constituting these logical arguments; cf. Mahānayaprakāśa (Trivandrum) III.64b yuktitattvavicakṣaṇaiḥ.

This gradual process of attenuation and elimination of the vikalpas – explains the vṛtti – is grafted onto an experience in which the creation of the Lord appears in all clarity and devoid of vikalpas, since the idea of differentiation does not arise (bhedānudayād vikalpojjhitā spaṣṭāvabhāsā ca; cf. ĪPV I pp. 34-35). Thanks to this practice the adept becomes anavaratanirvikalpakasaṃvedanaratnamālābhūṣitahṛdayaḥ (ĨPVV III p. 389).

mation into pure reflective awareness⁶¹ (Śivopādhyāya is explicit in concluding his commentary on VBh 109, p. 95, where this verse is quoted as an authority: *iyaṃ śāktī bhūḥ*).

The teaching of the Pratyabhijñā, in both its aspects of philosophical elaboration and spiritual achievement, was transmitted by Abh. and his disciple Kṣemarāja, thus influencing the diverse currents of Tantric Śaivism which, either explicitly or implicitly, were to tend to model their theoretical structure upon it.

The case of Ksemarāja deserves special mention. With the PH he composes a kind of catechism, of Pratyabhijñā in nuce, addressing the many who would have been unable to deal with the dialectical subtleties of the major work (the IPK and its commentaries). In the PH – a work perhaps modest in itself, but important because of its wide circulation and the influence it exerted especially over the Śaiva-śākta schools of South India (cf. Maheśvarānanda; the texts connected with the Tripurā school etc.⁶²) – we witness a kind of apotheosis of the Pratyabhijñā: from a single school accepted and valued within the great synthesis of Abh.'s Trika it ends up by constituting the very framework, in which Kṣemarāja also inserts teachings from other schools, especially the Krama⁶³.

THE ĪŚVARAPRATYABHIJÑĀKĀRIKĀ AND ITS COMMENTARIES

The IPK – which made the name of Utp. famous – must have been an early work, given the fact that all his other philosophical writings presuppose it and contain specific references to it.

His other works include the following. SDVr, named *Padasangati* in the third introductory verse (Maheśvarānanda calls it by this name in the MMP), which has come down to us only up to IV.74. ĪS and *vṛtti*: a demonstration of the existence of the Lord written from a Naiyāyika viewpoint, arguing against Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya and Buddhists. SS and *vṛtti*: the exposition of his own conception of relation against the oppos-

⁶² The Yoginīhṛdaya-Setubandha and Lakṣmīrāma's commentary on the Parātriṃśikā call it Śaktisūtra.

⁶¹ Cf. the vṛtti: parāmarśamātrān aśeṣān vikalpān sampādayataḥ. See also the commentaries on this verse by Abh. (IPVV III p. 393 vikalpā avikalpā bhavanti) and by Kṣemarāja (PH p. 28 śuddhavikalpaśaktim ullāsayanti).

⁶³ On the possible connection of Utp. with the Krama see above p. XXX n. 43.

ing theories, especially the Buddhist ones (see below pp. 95 ff.). APS: restatement of his conception of subjectivity and its relation with object, first expressed in the $\bar{I}PK^{64}$. The $SS\bar{A}$ deserves a separate mention⁶⁵: twenty mystical hymns composed by Utp. at different times during his life and later collected and 'edited' by his disciples⁶⁶. In them, moments of exaltation alternate with moments of discouragement, enriching and cracking the mask of the impeccable theologian of the major works⁶⁷.

Utp. devoted two commentaries to the $\bar{I}PK$, a short one (vrtti) - edited and translated here – and a long one (vivrti) or $t\bar{t}k\bar{a})^{68}$, of which only fragments have come down to us (Torella 1988). Neither of these is really and truly a word for word commentary. The vrtti confines itself to presenting the content of the stanzas in another form and briefly pointing out its implications; the vivrti takes the $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}s$ and the vrtti as its starting point and often develops into far-reaching excursuses. The link between the $s\bar{u}tras$ and the vrtti is a particularly close one. Despite the fact that they are presented as being artificially differentiated, they substantially constitute a single work, since – according to Abh. ($\bar{I}PVVI$ pp. 16, 183) – they were composed at the same time. Proof of this lies in the fact that the $namask\bar{a}ra$, present in the $s\bar{u}tras$, is not repeated at the beginning of the vrtti, whereas it is in the $t\bar{t}k\bar{a}$ (ibid. pp. 2-3). This makes the vrtti specially important for grasping the 'original' meaning of

⁶⁴ The commentary that Utp. certainly composed on this work (see MMP p. 133) has not come down to us.

⁶⁵ Śāstraparāmarśa v. 8 (cit. Pandey 1963: 163 n. 3) "There are, it is true, everywhere thousands of rivers of beautiful verses, but none of them resembles the divine river of the Stotrāvalī".

Two other verses attributed to him, but not included in the ŚSĀ, are quoted in the Mahānayaprakāśa of Śitikaṇṭha p. 12 (yat kimcit eva bhūtānāṃ bhavāvaraṇaṃ prati / na kiṃcid eva bhaktānāṃ bhavadāvaraṇam //; sarvasaṃvinnadībhedābhinnaviśrāntimūrtaye / namaḥ pramātṛvapuṣe śivacaitanyasindhave //, see also Bhāvopahāravivaraṇa p. 43); Yoginīhṛdayadīpikā p. 287, after quoting the latter verse as belonging to the Parāpañcāśikā, quotes another one (yatra yatra militā marīcayaḥ / tatra tatra vibhur eva jṛṃbhate //) and attributes it to the Stotrāvalī (is it that by Utp. ?).

The MS given as 'Mantrasāra by Utpaladeva' in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Library, indicated by Rastogi (1979:134) as a possible unpublished work of Utp., actually contains the PTLV of Abh., whose second verse says, in fact, sadāgamapravāheşu bahudhā vyākṛtaṃ trikaṃ / śrīmadutpaladevīyaṃ tantrasāraṃ tu varṇyate //.

⁶⁸ Its length must have been equivalent to 6000 or 8000 ślokas (Torella 1988: 141).

the stanzas. In the $t\bar{t}k\bar{a}$, which was composed later on, we already find multiple interpretations of the same verse, all considered equally possible but evidently being the outcome of further reflections.

The $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}s$, the vrtti and the $t\bar{t}k\bar{a}$ represent three distinct and relatively autonomous stages in the exposition of the Pratyabhijñā doctrine and, accordingly, it is as though Utp. has taken three different roles (bhūmikā) - kārikā° or sūtrakāra, vṛttikāra and ṭīkākāra (ĪPVV I pp. 2-3) - almost three different persons, capable of dialoguing and disputing with each other, and yet remaining within the higher unity of the granthakāra or śāstrakāra. The kārikās, the vṛtti and the ṭīkā are seen by Utp. in the ṭīkā - as we can gather from the IPVV - as respectively linked to the three planes of Pasyantī, Madhyamā and Vaikharī on which the Supreme Word (Parāvāc) is articulated. On the supreme plane the essence of the doctrine still lies in the consciousness of its author Utp., undivided from Siva, and it is given the name of 'heart', precisely because of its quintessential nature. On the Pasyantī plane it takes the form of sūtra, insofar as a differentiation begins to be outlined (āsūtraņā), which is necessary if it is to become an object to be taught and explained to other men. Then, on the Madhyamā plane, the essence is disclosed (unmīlita) in the vṛtti and finally, on the Vaikharī plane - which corresponds to the vivṛti -, having now become clear through the refutation of the opponents' possible objections, it is fully differentiated and thus accessible to the comprehension of all (ĪPVV I p. 16).

To this distinction between the planes of the doctrine corresponds the diversity of levels in the recipients of the teaching. Both the $s\bar{u}tras$ and the vrtti are aimed at those who are not impregnated with the latent traces of their earlier adhesion to other doctrines. The study of the $s\bar{u}tras$ -vrtti as a whole prepares them for the subsequent phase which consists in the study of the $s\bar{u}tras$ alone, independently of the vrtti. On the contrary, those who are under the influence of erroneous conceptions deriving from the profession of different doctrines, are obliged to follow the whole course beginning with the $t\bar{t}k\bar{a}$. When the $t\bar{t}k\bar{a}$ has removed these errors, they can have access to the $s\bar{u}tras$ accompanied by the vrtti, and subsequently to the $s\bar{u}tras$ taken alone, until they reach the heart of the doctrine in identity with the consciousness of the $s\bar{a}strak\bar{a}ra$ (ibid.).

Abh. devoted two of his most important works to the doctrines of Utp. The one (Vimarśinī) is a commentary on the stanzas alone, the other (Vivrtivimarśinī) a commentary on the vivrti or tīkā, which, as we have seen, was in its turn a commentary of the complex kārikās-vṛtti. No commentaries predating Abh.'s have come down to us, even though an

exegetic tradition must already have existed (cf. ĪPVV II p. 210), which was probably only oral. From Abh.'s sporadic annotations we come to know that the texts of the Pratyabhijñā⁶⁹ were already beginning in his time to present some doubtful readings and variants for some points were already circulating.

Information on the chronological order of Abh.'s two commentaries is contradictory. What would appear to be the more natural sequence-first the lengthy commentary on the $t\bar{t}k\bar{a}$ and then a reduction of the vast and varied material to a smaller size and a more concise and incisive form – seems to be confirmed by what Bhāskara says at the beginning of his sub-commentary (I p. 3)⁷⁰. But Bhāskara has not proved to be a reliable source in this respect, since he later (Bh I p. 316) does not hesitate to invert the order⁷¹. However, a passage from the $\bar{I}PVV$, which unequivocally mentions the $Vimar sin\bar{t}^{72}$, is decisive on this point.

Abh.'s contribution to the Pratyabhijñā – in the light of what can be inferred from the hints at and quotations of the $t\bar{t}k\bar{a}$ contained in the $\bar{I}PVV$ and other passages of the $t\bar{t}k\bar{a}$ which have been handed down to us in various ways – appears far less original than is generally thought. Despite the inevitable difficulty in reading a text like the $\bar{I}PVV$, which is an extensive and diffuse commentary on a work that has not come down to us, it seems clear that the majority of the themes and subjects that Abh. touches on find their direct correspondence – or at least their starting point – in Utp.'s $t\bar{t}k\bar{a}$. In fact, the $\bar{I}PV$ itself, which according to Abh. is intended to be a commentary on what the $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}s$ are in themselves accomplishes its task through a carefully gauged and considered systematization of a rich speculative material whose early origin is to be glimpsed in the $t\bar{t}k\bar{a}$. In his interpretation of the stanzas Abh. essentially echoes the interpretation or interpretations of Utp., sometimes enriching them with new arguments. He only diverges from Utp. in four instances

⁶⁹ The later authors often refer to one or the other of the three texts (ĪPK, vṛtti and vivṛti) only by the mention 'iti pratyabhijnāyām'.

⁷⁰ On this basis Pandey 1963: 32 maintains the priority of the IPVV.

The first passage, too, was incorrect in considering the SDVr as the first of Utp.'s works, whereas, on the contrary, it often refers to the IPK and its commentaries.

⁷² III p. 230 anenaiva āśayena asmābhiḥ sūtravimarśinyām ekarasatvena idaṇi sūtraṃ vyākhyātam, iha tu yāvadgati vicārayitum itthaṃ vibhāgena apekṣā vyākhyātā.

⁷³ ĪPV I p. 39 asmākam tu sūtravyākhyāna eva udyamaņ.

(I.3.4b bhrānter arthasthitiḥ katham; I.4.4ab naiva hy anubhavo bhāti smṛtau pūrvo 'rthavat pṛthak; I.7.1c akramānantacidrūpā; II.4.10d sthirasvārthakriyākaram) — in the last instance this is explicitly declared; see p. 179 n. 14 — but in none of them is the overall thread of discourse significantly altered. Discrepancies are sometimes to be found between the text of the kārikās and vṛtti as has been established here on the basis of the MS tradition and Abh.'s quotations from it. This is often due to the fact that these are not actual quotations, but paraphrases, which sometimes expand and sometimes contract the text; at other times, it is a question of errors that have crept into the MS tradition of the ĪPVV or of errors already present in the text of the vṛtti that Abh. had before him (see the Apparatus).

That the IPV of Abh. ended up by eclipsing all the other commentaries – including those by Utp. himself ⁷⁴ – and that it has become established as the standard commentary, thanks both to its intrinsic quality and to its author's great prestige, may also be seen from the fact that it is the only one for which sub-commentaries were composed, such as the *vyākhyā* of Bhāskarakantha or the anonymous commentary in the Madras Government Oriental MSS Library⁷⁵, and others only extant in fragmentary MSS, like the IPV-*vyākhyā* in Trivandrum Library (No.15413C) or the IP-anvayadīpikā (by one Sādhānanda?) in Mysore Library (No.B.187 of the old Catalogue)⁷⁶.

This is proved by the scant MS tradition of these works (only one complete MS of the *vṛtti* and a short fragment of the *ṭīkā* have come down to us) and the very few quotations from them. While Kṣemarāja and Jayaratha (obviously, besides Abh.) show their knowing the *ṭīkā*, also independently of the ĪPVV, the only mentions of the *vṛtti* I am aware of are in late works and by authors belonging to South India (Maheśvarānanda and Kṛṣṇadāsa; see text notes p. 1 n. 9 and p. 63 n. 218.

⁷⁵ I have learnt from N. Rastogi that the edition of this text was prepared long ago by K.C.Pandey and himself, but its publication has been as yet stopped by problems concerning precisely this joint authorship.

There are also at least two other (late) commentaries on the kārikās alone, one by Nāgānanda in the Adyar Library (No.28. B. 24, mentioned in Raghavan 1981: 31) and the other by the Kashmirian Bhaṭṭāraka Sundara (ĪPKaumudī; Research Department Library, Srinagar, No.1083). The colophon of a MS of the vṛṭṭi (see below p. LIII) mentions Bhaṭṭāraka Sundara as he who would have composed a commentary to take the place of the final part of Utp.'s vṛṭṭi (missing in all the Kashmirian MSS). During my last visit to Srinagar, I tried – without success – to see the MS of the Kaumudī, possibly misplaced.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

The $\overline{I}PK$ with Utp.'s *vṛtti* has been edited in the KSTS (see Bibliography); the text of the *vṛtti*, corrupt in many points, breaks off at the beginning of III.2.9. The text of the $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}s$ is obviously included also in the two editions of the $\overline{I}PV^{77}$ and in that of the $\overline{I}PVV$.

The kārikās have been integrally translated into English (twice: Pandey 1954, together with the IPV; Kaw 1975-76); partially – Jñānādhikāra and āhnika I of the Kriyādhikāra – into German (Frauwallner 1962). The vṛtti has never been translated.

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⁷⁷ If I chose to quote the ĪPV according to the edition which also contains Bhāskara's sub-commentary, it was not because of my considering it the more correct (it is rather the opposite!), but only in order to be able to give a single reference for both texts.

ABOUT THIS EDITION


This edition is based on nine MSS (and the comparison with the incomplete text edited in the KSTS). Of these, eight are in Śāradā script and are indicated with the letters from Gh to Ţ (the MSS K Kh G are those used for the KSTS ed.; the reference to them is limited to the readings quoted in the foot-notes of that edition). The ninth MS, marked with the siglum T, comes from Kerala and is in Malayalam characters.

A first division is to be made between the MS T – on the one hand – which is the only one complete and generally gives better readings, and the Śāradā MSS – on the other – which all break off at the same point (beginning of the *vrtti* on III.2.9), have lacunae and corrupted passages and, in general, less satisfactory readings (cf. text notes *Jñānādhikāra* 35, 41, 59, 72, 92, 279, 293, 371, 384, 388, 381, 408, 417, 461; *Kriyā*° 8, 89, 148, 151, 155, 167, 170, 181, 186; *Āgama*° 9, 39, 46, 64, 74, 77; etc.).

Moreover, within the Śāradā MSS (dating from XVII to XIX century) we can distinguish between a very homogeneous group of seven — Gh N C Ch Jh N T (to which we may add K Kh G) – and J. This MS, though sharing many of the features common to the seven others, is the only one that shows a considerable amount of readings identical with, or sometimes similar to, those only found in T (cf. text notes Jñāna° 53, 105, 237, 242, 263, 281, 322, 383, 404, 427, 432, 444, 445, 449; Kriyā° 21, 43, 70, 87, 116, 120, 130, 159, 165, 218; etc.).

Already on the basis of these first considerations it is possible to attempt to outline a stemma codicum, bearing however in mind the factors of uncertainty determined by the peculiar features of the Indian MS tradition, and particularly of the Kashmiri one. The transmission of texts in Śāradā script (as pointed out by Bühler 1877) is normally the work not of simple scribes or devotees, unaware of the content of what they are copying, but of learned pandits, of scholars, who mostly do not limit themselves to passively copying the MSS, but compare them with others, record various readings in the margin, choose between alternative readings found in the exemplar, make – explicitly or not – emendations of their own. Moreover, in the case in question, they often have before

them – besides other MSS of the *vṛtti* – also other commentaries on the IPK, first of all the IPV which seems to be felt as the standard one, as the inclusion in the text of glosses drawn from it and sometimes the partial or complete reproduction of its colophons shows (see below)¹. In spite of these difficulties, met with in any contaminated tradition, the picture that comes out is relatively clear, at least in outline.



We start from a work which probably did not have a large circulation and was reproduced in few copies. The scrutiny of the extant MSS permits us to assume an archetype [a] in Śāradā characters, complete, which however some corruptions have already crept into (at least those indicated in *Jñānādhikāra* text notes 92 and 167, *Kriyā*° 155 and 205)². This MS, or a faithful apograph of it, was brought from Kashmir to

¹ N even reproduces large portions of the IPV in the margin and between the lines. In other cases (Kh G) it is the *vrtti* that may be found in the margin of a MS of the IPV.

² Abh. in the IPVV had already noticed various readings in the MSS of the vrtti at his disposal.


Kerala, probably around XII-XIII century when the Trika school spread over South India. T derives from it, although not directly. The exemplar of T (which belongs to XVIII century) was already in Malayalam script, for some mistakes in T can be explained as misreadings of Malayalam characters. The good quality of T is a further example of the high standard of the Kerala MS tradition. From [a] at least another MS also derives, which was probably the only one that later survived Muslim invasion, although with the loss of the last portion; we shall refer to it as the hyparchetype [b]. From [b], incomplete and with a certain number of corruptions but still relatively correct, derive J and the hyparchetype [c]. In this manner it is possible to explain, on the one hand, the many readings that J, alone, shares with T and, on the other, the still more substantial affinity of J with the other Śāradā MSS. As regards the latter, which constitute a very compact family, we may assume a common ancestor, i.e. the hyparchetype [c], which further corruptions have crept into. Besides these corruptions shared by the whole family, there are some others that are peculiar to single MSS or groups of them³. Probably, it would be possible to go farther on and identify genetic connections within the family K Kh G Gh N C Ch Jh N T, too. But, at this point, the contamination of the MSS and the scribes' work of collation and emendation⁴ makes this attempt rather complicated and its result, anyhow, doubtful. These considerations and, above all, the awareness that such further investigation is bound not to have any direct bearing on the establishment of the text have induced me to refrain from it.

For this edition the testimony of IPVV, which sometimes quotes literally, sometimes paraphrases or simply gives the contents of the *vṛtti*, has been largely made use of. Since it mostly proves invaluable in confirming or discarding a reading, choosing among equivalent ones, or even helping to restore passages corrupt in all MSS, I have decided to include it in the critical apparatus on a par with the MSS, though being well aware that in so doing I have departed from the established usage of classical philol-

³ A passage from the Jñānādhikāra seems particularly fit to illustrate the progressive corruption from [a] to the above group of Śāradā MSS (cf. text note 405): ^ojñānānubhavena na bhinnasyātītasya rūpyajñānasyāprāmānyam (correct reading. only found in T), ^ojñānānubhavena bhinnasya rūpyajñānasyāprāmānye sā J, ^ojñānānubhave jñānasyāprāmānye sā N, jñānasyāprāmānye sā Gh Ch (^osyād) Jh Ñ T (C Jh then corrected into the reading J).

⁴ See, for instance, the isolated concordances of single MSS with correct readings only found in T (T Jñāna° n. 253; C Jñāna° n. 395; Ch Jh Kriyā° n. 118; etc.).

भुरुपस्वरुभनगरुव्नभुः ३५१िन १ भुउभवयुग थमक्ष भावि ब सुन् भंभभच्यः भुष्टिचः ५भण्डनीनउ याक्नाउँ ॥ प्रकान्थन्न अन्य अभिनं सथार्यनाम क्ट्काना भिश्चिक उउक्थभग्डम् ॥ कर्का मन्दर वा वा विश्व विश्व विश्व विश्व नुधलम्बरूष्यभारुभाषनभभन्नस्य गरुभभिचिउः ध्रक्षन्थन्त्रभूः न्भिक् भविभयभग्र इडनथिकीण नच्चिर्धक्षिमक्षणक्षभः भाउरयवस्थावाउः स्थाव अः अभवं अचा नरवभम् व भण्यनभवनग्थरभा ध्च नुरुव्यभवमन्भ कर् भवमन्धक्ताभवाउका अर्थ नैमर्डरेतमा। उसेरेत्र वर्मामा



ogy. But I have preferred to put together in a single apparatus what (MSS and testimonia) is in this case equally important for the constitution of the text, so that the reader is not compelled to continually go from one apparatus to the other.

Abh.'s commentary composed around 1015 represents the oldest evidence for our text – older than any extant MS. This constitutes its unique importance; however, I have made a cautious use of it and followed it only when I could find some kind of support in the MSS. For in many a case, even when IPVV seems to quote literally, it is apparent from the MSS evidence that Abh. is giving a text either approximately remembered, or reworded, or mixed with his own glosses. In these cases, if all the MSS agree on a different but equally satisfactory (and often more concise) reading, I have accepted the latter.

I have followed the division of the text into adhikāras and āhnikas, as in the $\bar{I}PV$ and $\bar{I}PVV$, though the MSS vary greatly on this point, some of them even showing no division at all. I have given the colophons in the simplest form, like that often found in T. There is some doubt as regards the Tattvasamgrahādhikāra, which is taken by the $\bar{I}PV$ as consisting of a single $\bar{a}hnika^5$ whilst the $\bar{I}PVV$ divides its commentary on the $adhik\bar{a}ra$ into two vimaršas (third and fourth, first and second being devoted to the two $\bar{a}hnikas$ of the $\bar{A}gam\bar{a}dhik\bar{a}ra^6$). In the respective introductions the $\bar{I}PVV$ refers separately to 15 ($\bar{I}PVV$ III p. 355) and 3 ślokas (ibid. p. 400). Considering that no MS of the vrtti shows a division into two $\bar{a}hnikas^7$ and that this division might have been introduced by the $t\bar{i}k\bar{a}$ — which the $\bar{I}PVV$ directly refers to —, I have taken this $adhik\bar{a}ra$ as a unitary section.

In the text, < > angle brackets enclose what has been added to the transmitted text by conjecture; [] square brackets indicate editorial deletions. No mark has been used for conjectural emendations of transmitted readings; they are acknowledged as such and accounted for in the Apparatus. Sandhi has been normalized⁸.

⁵ ĪPV II p. 280 [...] āgamārthasaṃgrahaṃ ślokāṣṭadaśakena darśayati "svātmaiva sarvajantūnām" ityādinā "utpalenopapāditā" ity antenaikenāhnikena.

⁶ Of the MSS, only J T correctly divide the *Āgamādhikāra* into two *āhnikas*.

⁷ In fact, it is only C N that mention the name of the *Tattvasamgrahādhikāra*.

⁸ I have only occasionally dealt with the peculiar varieties of *sandhi*, scribal mistakes etc. in the Śāradā and Malayalam MS tradition.

THE MANUSCRIPTS¹

Gh

The MS belonged to the personal collection of Pt. Dinanath Shastri, Srinagar, who, with great kindness and generosity, allowed me to photograph it. This MS no longer exists, having been destroyed along with the entire collection in the course of the recent Muslim desorders in Srinagar (Dinanath Shastri's personal communication).

The MS is on paper, written in Śāradā characters, consisting of 28 folios numbered on the verso from 1 to 28, with 16 lines per page, measuring cm. 21.4×17.6 . On the first page the *vṛtti* on the first seven $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}s$, omitted in the text, was added in the margin and on a small streap of paper pasted in the left margin; the hand is apparently the same.

Beginning: om namah sarasvatyai // om namah pratyakṣasva-rūpāyātmane //

End: kartṛyoge 'pi bodhānām karmottīrṇānām vidyeśvarākhyānām bhinnavedyabhāktvena māyāmalam // Then, kārikā III.2.10.

There is only a division into adhikāras; within each of them the numeration of the kārikās is continuous. Rare corrections in the margin.

N

Research Department Library, Srinagar, No. 824.02.

The MS is on paper, written in Śāradā characters, consisting of 48 folios numbered on the verso from 2 to 49, with 11 lines per page,

¹ The MSS K Kh G are described in KSTS Ed. as follows: "(K) Ms. belongs to Pandit Harabhatta Shastri. On Kashmiri paper in Sharada character. Size 10" × 6". It is in the Talapatra form. (Kh) and (G) Ms. – These are, in fact, the Manuscripts of the Ishvarapratyabhijna-Karikas with the Vimarshini and their margins contain the Vrtti in question. The Ms. (Kh) belongs to Rajanaka Maheshvara. In Sharada character, on old Kshmiri paper. Correct. Size ¹/₄ foolscap, paper-bound. The (G) Ms. – Got on loan from Pandit Rama Kokila, a well known Pandit of Srinagar. Size ¹/₄ foolscap, bound in leather, almost without mistakes, on old Kashmiri paper, in beatiful Sharada character." (p. 3). The printed edition is referred to in the Apparatus as E.

measuring cm. $18,7 \times 14,1$. It has been profusely annotated by a different hand with single glosses or long passages (mostly drawn from the $\bar{I}PV$) between the lines and often entirely covering the margins. There is only a division into *adhikāras*; within each of them the numeration of the *kārikās* is continuous. Between ff. 35 and 40 there are a few pages without glosses. A passage based on the $\bar{I}PV$ is inserted in the text between f. 2a line 8 and f. 2b line 6.

Beginning: (The first page is missing) *heśvare / ajaḍātmā ... (kār. 1.1.2).

End: same passage as in Gh; then the remaining kārikās without commentary. Finally: samāpteyam pratyabhijāā / śubham astu sarvajagatām.

C

Research Department Library, Srinagar, No. 892.

The MS is on paper, written in Śāradā characters, consisting of 23 folios numbered on the verso from 1 to 23, mostly with 21 lines per page (sometimes 17-19), measuring cm. 25.6×17.1 . Sporadic corrections and glosses by other hands in the margins. There is only a division into adhikāras; within each of them the numeration of the kārikās is conţinuous; sometimes a different hand notes the end of the āhnika in the margin.

Beginning: om namah śivāya.

End: same passage as in Gh; then the remaining kārikās without commentary. Finally: tattvasamgrahādhikāraḥ // iti śrīmadutpaladevācārya-viracitā pratyahhijñāvṛttiḥ samāpto (sic) śivāya namaḥ // āditaḥ ślokāni 190.

Ch

Research Department Library, Srinagar, No. 1672.

The MS is on paper, written in Sāradā characters, consisting of 30 folios numbered on the verso from 1 to 22 only, measuring cm. 25,2 × 16,5. It is divided into three portions written by different hands, apparently in different periods.

First part: ff. 1-11a. 13 lines per page. It begins with: om namo gurave / om. Some glosses by different hand in the margin only in few pages. The vṛtti on each kārikā is introduced by atra vṛttiḥ. Division into āhnikas. The colophons are as follows. iti pūrvapakṣavivṛtiḥ; paradarśanānupapattiḥ; smṛtiśaktinirūpaṇaṃ caturtham.

Second part: ff. 11b-22b. 14-18 lines per page, neither glosses nor corrections. F. 13 is missing, lacuna from °śakālāsparśāt (vṛtti I.5.14) to ātmaśabdāc cāham iti (vṛtti I.5.17). Colophons: iti śrīmadācāryābhina-vaguptaviracitāyām pratyabhijñāsūtravimarśinyām jñānaśaktinirūpaṇam pañcamam āhnikam; iti śrīmadācāryābhinavagupta° etc. apohaśaktinirūpaṇam ṣaṣṭham āhnikam. The colophons of the six āhnikas are derived from ĪPV; the portions of ślokas found at the beginnning of each āhnika also come from the opening ślokas in the ĪPV. No division between āhnikas VII and VIII.

Third part: ff. 23-31a. 23-28 lines per page. Some glosses in the margins drawn from the IPVV. Neither division into āhnikas nor numeration of verses. End: same passage as in Gh; then the remaining kārikās without commentary. Finally: saṃpūrṇeyaṃ (sic) pratyabhijāāśāstram.

J

Research Department Library, Srinagar, No. 1662.

The MS is on paper, written in Śāradā characters, consisting of 37 folios numbered on the verso from 1 to 37, with 21 lines per page, measuring cm. 13.4×16.9 . Corrections in the margins or between the lines, generally tending to replace the readings that J shares with T with those found in the other Śāradā MSS. The numeration of the $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}s$ is continuous, but there is a division into $\bar{a}hnikas$ within each $adhik\bar{a}ra$; the colophons are derived from the $\bar{I}PV$.

Beginning: om namah śivāya.

End: same passage as in Gh; then, kār. III.2.10.

Jh

Research Department Library, Srinagar, No. 860

The MS is on paper, written in Śāradā characters, consisting of 22 folios numbered on the verso from 1 to 24, with 16-17 lines per page (from f.13 onwards, 20 lines), measuring cm. 21,9 × 14,8. F. 17 (from II.3.1 idam etādṛg ity evaṃ to II.3.7 aviruddhāvabhāsānām eka°) and f. 20 (from II.4.9 °krameṇa janayed ghaṭam to vṛṭti II.4.9 tataḥ pari°) are missing. Some folios are misplaced. Notes and corrections by different, much more recent, hands in the margins and between the lines. The numeration of the kārikās is continuous; no division into āhnikas.

Beginning: om namo mahāmāyeśvaryai // om namaḥ śivāya saśivāya śivadāya namo namaḥ.

End: same passage as in Gh; then the remaining kārikās without commentary. Finally: śrīmatsundarabhaṭṭārakeṇa pratyabhijñāvṛttiḥ sampūrṇīkṛteti śubham astu devādīnāṃ mānuṣyakītānām /.

Ñ

Research Department Library, Srinagar, No. 2352

The MS is on paper, written in Śāradā characters, consisting of 16 folios numbered on the verso from 1 to 16, with 22 lines per page, measuring cm. 26×17.9 . Neither division into āhnikas nor numeration of verses. Rare corrections in the margins.

Beginning: om śrīgurur jayati om śrīmān paramaśivo jayatitamām // End: same passage as in Gh; then the remaining kārikās without commentary. Finally: tattvasamgrahādhikāraḥ iti śrīmadutpaladevācāryaviracitā pratyabhijāāvṛttiḥ

Ţ

University of Baroda, Central Library, Sanskrit Division, No. 807.

The MS is on paper, written in Śāradā characters, consisting of 56 folios numbered on the verso from 1 to 55 (no number on the last folio), with 12 lines per page. Neither division into āhnikas nor numeration of verses. Rare corrections by other hand in the margins.

Beginning: om śrīgaņeśāya namaḥ om namaḥ śivāya (to be noted: f. 14a in the margin: om namo bhagavate vāsudevāya).

End: same passage as in Gh; then the remaining kārikās without commentary. Finally: sampūrņeyam pratyabhijnāśāstram / śubham astu / śivāyom namaḥ.

Τ

Oriental Research Institute and Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum, No. 8900A.

The MS is in palm-leaves, written in Malayalam characters², consisting of 21 folios (corresponding to ff. 4-24 of the whole codex), with 11-12

² P.L. Shaji, MSS Assistant, provided me with a devanāgarī transcript. The collation of the MS, however, is based on my own reading of the Malayalam text. In this connection, I would like to tell a very instructive story, which should caution against

lines per page, measuring cm. 27.2×7.5 . According to the information kindly supplied by P.L. Shaji, the MS was collected by Ramasubha Shastri, Kadinamangalam, from Chirakkal Palace Library on 9/9/1941. On paleographic evidence, it is not later than XVII-XVIII century. The IPVr begins on f. 4b, 1.2, after an incomplete anonymous work dealing with the theories of error. The palm-leaves have become dark, especially at the edges, from which small fragments are missing here and there; in some places they have been eaten by insects. No numeration of verses; there is a division into āhnikas, with some inconsistencies (prathamam āhnikam; dvitīyam ... etc.; iti jñānādhikāraḥ; navamam āhnikam; daśamam āhnikam; kriyādhikāre trtīyam; dvādaśamam āhnikam; kriyādhikārah; āgamādhikāre prathamāhnikam; āgamādhikāraḥ; neither division into āhnikas, nor mention of the title for the last adhikāra). The MS often has voiceless stops instead of (correct) voiced stops, evidently due to the absence of the latter class of sounds from the scribe's own language (i.e. Malayalam).

Beginning: kathamcid āsādya (kār.I.1.1)

End: samāpteyam īśvarapratyabhijnāvṛttiḥ //³ bhīrūṇām abhayaprado bhavabhayākrandasya hetus tato hṛddhāmni prathitabhīravarūcām īśo 'ntakasyāntakaḥ / bheraṃ vāyati yas suyoginivahas tasya prabhur bhairavo viśvasmin bharaṇādikṛd vijayate vijnānarūpaḥ paraḥ / śubham.

The sigle E in the Apparatus refers to the printed edition.

the widespread practice of working with South Indian MSS using devanāgarī copies. Prof. H. Alper (whose untimely death in 1987 saddened all of us) came across this MS, too. Having realized its importance but not knowing Malayalam script, he asked for and obtained – through the good offices of Prof. K. Kunjunni Raja – a transcript by a pandit of Madras. When Alper came to know that I was already working on the IPVr, he was so kind as to send me his transcript. The comparison of the pandit's transcript and mine was startling. The differences were so many as to make me doubt about my actual understanding of Malayalam. Thus, I carefully checked some portions of both transcripts with my photographs of the original MS. It soon became clear that the astute pandit – besides definitely having an imperfect knowledge of Malayalam script – had prepared his transcription keeping the KSTS Ed. before him: sometimes he (badly) copied from the MS, sometimes found it more practical to copy from the printed edition. Also his transcription of the last portion of the vrtti, not available in the KSTS Ed., is very inaccurate and full of mistakes.

³ This verse is quoted in MMP p. 173 and ascribed to Ksemarāja.

TEXT

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I 1.1

ईश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञाकारिकाः वृत्तिसहिताः

ज्ञानाधिकारः

प्रथममाह्निकम्

कथंचिदासाद्य महेश्वरस्य दास्यं जनस्याप्युपकारमिच्छन् । समस्त'संपत्समवाप्तिहेतुं तत्प्रत्यभिज्ञामुपपादयामि ॥ १॥

^२परमेश्वरप्रसादादेव ^३लब्धात्यन्तदुर्लभतद्दास्यलक्ष्मीर् ^४अहमेका-किसंपदा लज्जमानो ^५जनमपीममखिलं ^६स्वस्वामिनं ^७वक्ष्यमा-

¹ sampat omitted in C. ² parameśvaraprasādād eva cit. and commented on in ĪPVV I p. 24; cf. also ibid. p. 38 vṛṭṭau ca gurubhaṭṭārako 'pi parameśvaraśabdena nirdiṣṭaḥ. ³ The compound is partly cit. and commented on ibid. p. 21 vṛṭṭau ca sūcito 'yam artho "dāsyalakṣmīḥ" ity anena / dāsyaprabhavā lakṣmyaḥ samastāḥ sampadaḥ parameśvara-prasādāt labdhā yeneti; on the same page cit. (from the ṭīkā) atyantadurlabhaṃ dāsyam. ⁴ aham ekākisaṃpadā lajjamāno cit. ibid. p. 27. ⁵ janam apīmam: janasamīpam E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T, which probably derives from ĪPV I p. 33 upaśabdaḥ samīpārthaḥ, tena janasya parameśvaradharmasamīpatākaraṇam atra phalam (sa and ma are almost identical in śāradā script). ⁶ svaº: svaṃ T Ŋ J. ˀ vakṣyamāṇopāyena cit. ibid. p. 32.

I 1.1 णोपायेन 'प्रत्यभिज्ञापयामि 'येन तस्यापि परमार्थलाभेन परि-तुष्येयम् ॥१॥

कर्तरि ज्ञातरि स्वात्मन्यादिसिद्धे महेश्वरे । अजहात्मा निषेधं वा सिद्धिं वा

विदधीत कः ॥ २ ॥

¹⁰सर्वेषां स्वातमनः ¹¹सर्वार्थसिद्धिसमाश्रयस्य तत्त¹²त्सर्वार्थसाध-नान्यथानुपपत्त्या ¹³कोडीकृतसिद्धेः स्वप्रकाशस्य प्रमात्रेकवपुषः ¹⁸पूर्वसिद्धस्य ¹⁹पुराणस्य ज्ञानं क्रिया च । स्वसंवेदनसिद्धम् ¹⁶एवैश्वर्यम्, ¹⁰तेनेश्वरस्य सिद्धौ निराकरणे च ¹⁶जडानामेवोद्यमः ॥ १॥

⁸ pratyabhijñāpayāmi cit. and commented on ibid. pp. 23, 31-2. ⁹ tasyāpi paramārtha° cit. ibid. p. 30; cf. the paraphrase ibid. yena asyāpi lābhena tuşyeyam; parituşyeyam cit. and commented on ibid. pp. 33-4. The whole passage is quoted in Kṛṣṇadāsa's Anuttaratrimśikālaghuvṛttivimarśinī (ORI and MSS Library, Trivandrum, MS No. C2108 D, f. 152b). 10 sarveṣām svātmanah cit. in ĪPVV I p. 50; svātmanah is indicated as a subjective genitive depending on jñānam kriyā ca (kartari eṣā ṣaṣṭhī / tatkartṛkam hi jñānam karaņam ca, na tu sambandhaṣaṣṭhī). 11 sarvārthasiddhi° cit. ibid. p. 49; °samāśrayasya results from the paraphrase ibid. p. 52 sarve tasmāt pramātur anye ye 'rthāḥ teṣāṃ yā siddhih prakāśamānatā, tasyā yatah sa pramātā nibandhanam viśrāntisthānam vimarśarūpatayā samāśrayah. 12 °sarvārtha° omitted in E. 13 krodīkṛtasiddheḥ cit. and commented on ibid. p. 67 krodīkṛtasiddhikatvam yad uktam vṛttau ādisiddhatvasphuṭīkaraņābhiprāyena ... tena pramātrā svātmano nijasya rūpasya siddhiḥ prakāsaḥ prameyasiddhyaiya krodikrtā krodopalaksitahrdayarūpatām gatā krtā hrdayangamīkrtety arthah. ¹⁴ pūrvasiddhasya cit. ibid. p. 67. ¹⁵ purāņasya commented on (and differentiated from the close pūrvasiddhasya) ibid. p. 51 idantādešakālasvarūpaniyamārūdham prathanam yasya nīlasukhādikasya, tasya bhāvas tannişedhopalaksitah san pramātā prakāsate ca prākāsistha ca prakāsisyate ceti yāvat / ata eva purāņah pūrvasiddhas ceti na parvāyau, purāņo 'pi hi na pūrvasiddhaḥ piśāca iva, pūrvasiddho 'pi na purāņo dhūma iveti ubhayoktih. 16 T omits eva. 17 tena cit, ibid. p. 50. 18 jadanam evodyamah cit, ibid. p. 49 and commented on p. 78.

किंतु मोहवशावस्मिन् रष्टे ध्यनुपलिक्षते । शक्तयाविष्करणेनेयं प्रत्यभिज्ञोपदर्श्यते ॥ ३॥

केवलमस्य ^{१९}स्वसंवेदनसिद्धस्या^{२०}पीश्वरस्य ^{२१}मायाव्यामोहाद् ^{२२}अहृदयङ्गमत्वाद् ^{२३}असाधारणप्रभावाभिज्ञानख्यापनेन ^{२४}दृढनिश्चय-रूपं ^{२५}पृत्यभिज्ञानमात्रम् ^{२६}उपदर्श्यते ॥३॥

तथा हि जहभूतानां प्रतिष्ठा जीवदाश्रया । ज्ञानं किया च भूतानां जीवतां जीवनं मतम् ॥ ४ ॥

२७ वस्तूनां २८ जडाजडभेदेन २९ द्वैविध्यम्। ३० तत्र जडस्वरूपस्य ३१ जीवन्निष्ठा सिद्धिः, जीवतां पुनर्जीवत्त्वं ३२ जीवनं ज्ञानिकये एव ३३ ॥ ४॥

19 svasamvedanasiddhasya cit. and commented on ibid. pp. 79-80 svasamvedanasiddhasya ity api vṛttau gauṇam drasṭavyam sukhādivat anapahnavanīyatām nirūpayitum. ²⁰ E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T omit api. ²¹ Cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 80 māyākṛto vyāmoho māyāvyāmohaḥ. 22 ahrdayangamatvāt cit. ibid. p. 80, where it is remarked that this causal ablative glosses the locative anupalaksite, which is therefore a nimittasaptamī. 23 The compound is paraphrased and commented on ibid. p. 86 asādhāraņam anīśvare yad asambhāvyam jñatvakartṛtvādi, tad eva abhijñānam ekadharmātmakasvarūpamukhena anuntadharmacitravastusvarūpapraveśābhyupāyaḥ, abhitaḥ svarūpasarvasvasvīkāreṇa vastu jñāyate yeneti, tasya khyāpanena prathanāya. This confirms °abhijñāna° T Gh N J Jh Ţ, instead of °abhijāapana° E C Ñ and °abhijāanākhyānakhyāpanena Ch. 24 Cf. ibid. p. 86 "iyam" iti dṛḍhaśabdena, "pratyabhijñā" iti bhāvasādhanam niścayaśabdena. 25 Quoted as pratyabhijñāmātram ibid. p. 87. 26 upadarsyate cit. and commented on ibid. p. 87 atas tadvyavahāramātram api neha sādhyate, api tu upāmsu cchannam sthitam sat, upa samīpe iti hṛdayasamgamanena pradhānatayā darsyate ... tena vṛttau sūtrānusāreṇaiva "upadarśyate" ity uktam. 27 vastūnām cit. ibid. p. 88. 28 Cit. ibid. p. 95 vrttau ca jaḍājaḍabhedapadam. 29 dvaividhyam: dvaividhye C Jh Ţ. 30 tatra cit. ibid. p. 96. 31 jīvanº: jīvaº T; cf. ibid. p. 97 "anena" iti jaḍānām antarāle jīvanniṣṭhatānirūpaṇena. ³² Cf. ibid. p. 97 "jīvanasambandhaḥ" ity anena kriyāsambandho 'tra pravṛttinimittam iti hṛdi nidhāya samāsakṛttaddhiteşu sambandhābhidhānam iti manyamānaḥ śatrantam jīvacchabdam sādhyamānāvyuparatajīvanakriyāvadabhidhāyakam sūcayati / jīvatām ity upakramya jīvanam jñānakriye ity ekavacanena samvidaikyam pāramārthikam āha. jīvanam jāanakriye eva cit. ibid. p. 104. E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T invert: jīvanam jīvattvam. 33 Gh N add yo janāti karoti ca jīvatīty ucyate, being a gloss drawn from ĪPV I p. 67.

11.5 अतत्र ज्ञानं स्वतः सिद्धं क्रिया कायाश्रिता सती । परैरप्युपलक्ष्येत तयान्यज्ञानमृद्यते ॥ ५॥

³⁴जीवतां क्रिया कायपरिस्पन्दपर्यन्तीभूतान्यत्रापि प्रत्यक्षा , ज्ञानमात्मवेद्यं परत्रा³⁶पि क्रिययैव ³⁶प्रसिध्यतीति ³²सिद्ध एव स्वसंवेदन³⁶संवेद्यतया ^{४0}स्वपरयोरीश्वरोऽहं^{४1}प्रत्येय ^{४२}आत्मा, तस्य मायाशक्त्या निसर्गतिरोधानाद् ^{४3}एवं विमतिः ॥ ५॥

^{४४}इत्युपोद्धातः ॥

इति ज्ञानाधिकारे प्रथममाह्मिकम् ॥

³⁴ tatra: tathā T. ³⁵ Instead of jīvatām ... ātmavedyam T, E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T have a text that is evidently corrupt: tatrāpi pratyakṣāj (pratyakṣa° C Ch) jñānam ātmasamvedyam. The text of T is supported by IPVV: jīvatām cit. p. 103; kriyā is mentioned p. 104; kāyaparispandaparyantībhūtā appears through the paraphrase p. 104 kāyaspandarūpatvam prāptā satī and p. 105 vṛttau ca ayam arthaḥ pūrvāvasthāsambhavasūcakacvipratyayaprayogena (referring to oparyantībhūtā) svīkrtā; anyatrāpi can be understood from p. 104 ... yat pramātrvyatiriktasya pramātrantarasya darśanasparśanasphutapratyāvaseyeti. ³⁶ api omitted in Gh. ³⁷ Cit., in a slightly different form, ibid. p. 108 sidhyatīty api vṛttau svaprakāśatāṃśaprādhānyāya. ³⁸ Cf. ibid. p. 108 etac ca vṛttau "siddha eva na tu sādhyah" ity anena darśitam (na tu sādhyah being most probably a gloss). 39 °samvedyatayā: °siddhatayā E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ T, equally good. 40 Cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 111 tasya iti karmani ca kartari ca ślesena sasthī / yaḥ svaparayor ahammātrapratyeyatayā nirbhāsanayogyo 'ta eva sa māyāśaktitirohitair mūrkhair vimanyate uktarūpaviruddhena rūpeņa abhimanyate, sa eva ca īśvaro vipratipadyate tasyaiva sarvatra kartrtvāt / ubhayatra māyāśaktikṛtam āvaraṇāvabhāsanam hetuḥ. 41 °pratyeya: °pratyaya E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 42 ātmā: svātmā J. 43 evam vimatih: eva vimatih E, also possible; eva vi... T; evemiti (then corrected to eva vimatih) Gh; evam iti N C J Jh N; eva mitih Ch; evam probably cit. ibid. p. 111 and glossed with vaksyamāņapūrvapakṣarūpatayā. 44 Omitted in E C N; upodghātaḥ is glossed ibid. p. 112.

द्वितीयमाह्निकम्

84

ननु स्वलक्षणाभासं ज्ञानमेकं परं पुनः । साभिलापं विकल्पाख्यं बहुधा

नापि तद्द्वयम् ॥१॥

४६ नित्यस्य कस्यचिद् द्रष्टुस्तस्यात्रानवभासतः । अहंप्रतीतिरप्येषा शरीराद्यवसायिनी ॥ २ ॥

ज्ञानमेकं स्पुटा^{४७} वभासस्वलक्षणानुभवरूपं ^{४८} निर्विकल्पकं ते कथयन्ति । अपरं तु शब्दारुषणया स्मृतिसंशयोत्प्रेक्षादिबहुभेदं विकल्प^{४९} संज्ञम् । ^{५०} उभयमप्येतन्न युज्यते ^{५१} बोधरूपज्ञानातिरिकत-स्यान्यस्य संबन्धितया ^{५२} तस्यानुपलब्धेः । कोऽसौ ^{५३} स्थिररूप आत्मा । ^{५४} साभिलापाहंप्रत्ययेनापि शरीरादिकवेद्यवस्तूतीणीं ^{५५} वेदियता न ^{५६} किरिचल्लोकैरवधार्यते ॥ १-२ ॥

⁴⁵ T adds atha pūrvapakṣaḥ (Ch om pūrvapakṣatayeti). ⁴⁶ nityasya: anyasya T. 47 °avabhāsa°: °avabhāsam T J, but cf. ibid. p. 118 tata eva sphuţo deśakālākāraniyato 'tra artho bhāti. 48 nirvikalpakam is probably to be preferred to nirvikalpam T (cf. ibid. p. 116, where it is said that in the tīkā the form vikalpakam is used in order to indicate, by the agent suffix, the autonomy of this function and the fact that it does not require a permanent entity as a subject; however, in the case of nirvikalpaka, the suffix might also be understood as a mere samāsanta). 49 °samjñam: °samjñakam Jh. 50 The quotation (from the tīkā) ibid. p. 118 āha "ubhayam api evam" ity anena prakāreņa bodharūpam iti creates some doubt about the reading etan, on which, however, all the MSS agree. ⁵¹ IPVV I p. 119 quotes as vṛtti only bodhātiriktasya, which, however, might be a deliberate abbreviation by Abhinavagupta. 52 tasya: asya T; tasya cit. and commented on ibid. p. 119 tasya iti ātmano 'nupalabdheḥ, tasyeti vā ubhayasya anyasambandhitayā anupalabdhir iti vṛttiyojanā (the meaning does not change; a twofold interpretation of the kārikā had already put forward ibid. p. 115). 53 sthirarūpa: sthira E Gh N C Ch Jh N, equally good. 54 Cf. ibid. p. 121 vrttāv api sahaśabdena ahampratīter abhilāpāvyabhicāro darśitah and p. 120 nanu ahampratyayaśabde sābhilāpagrahanam viśeşanam vṛttau kimartham iti. 55 vedayitā na: na vedayitā T Gh Ch J Jh N. 56 kaścit cit. ibid. p. 119; lokair cit. ibid. p. 120.

12.3 अथानुभवविध्वंसे स्मृतिस्तदनुरोधिनी । कथं भवेन्न नित्यः स्यादात्मा यद्यनुभावकः ॥ ३॥

^{५७}स्मृतिकाले ^{५८}पूर्वानुभवनाशात् कथं ^{५९}पूर्वार्थानुभवाव-ष्टम्भधर्मा ^{६०}स्मृतिर्जायेत यदि ^{६१}तदापि तदनुभवबोधो ^{६२}नानु-वर्तेत , यश्च ^{६३}अनेककालस्थायी बोधः स एवात्मानुभविता ॥ ३ ॥

सत्यप्यात्मनि रङ्नाशात्तद्द्वारा रष्टवस्तुषु । स्मृतिः ^{६४}केनाथ यत्रैवानुभवस्तत्पदैव सा ॥४॥

अर्था^{६ ५}भासनाशात् तन्मुखा^{६ ६}वलम्बनीयो विषयोऽप्यत्र नास्ति स्मृतेरित्येकबोधात्मनि ^{६ ७}सत्यप्यात्मनि सा निर्विषयैवेतिन्य-वहारोच्छेदः । असतो^{६ ८}ऽप्यर्थानुभवस्य विषयेण सा विषयवती ^{६ ९}यदि ॥ ४ ॥

⁵⁷ smṛtikāle cit. ibid. p. 122. ⁵⁸ pūrva°: pūrvārtha° T, but cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 122 anubhave pūrvabhāvini; purvānubhavābhāvāt N. ⁵⁹ E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T omit °artha°, but cf. the analysis of the compound ibid. p. 122 pūrvo yo 'rthaviṣayo 'nubhavas tasya yo 'vaṣṭambhas tadrūpaparityāgah sa dharmo yasyāh. ⁶⁰ smṛtir jāyate yadi: smṛtismṛtau di N. ⁶¹ tadāpi cit. ibid. p. 122 "tadāpi" iti smṛtikāle smṛtirūpatāyām ity arthah. ⁶² nānuvarteta: nānuvartate N J, nāvarteta E C N. ⁶³ aneka°: pūrva° N. ⁶⁴ kenātha: kenāpi T. ⁶⁵ °ābhāsa°: °avabhāsa° Gh Ch. ⁶⁶ °avalambanīyo viṣayo 'py atra: °ālambanīyo 'py artho E N, °ālambanīyo viṣayo 'py artho Gh N C Ch J Jh T (viṣayo is added in the margin in C and deleted in J). ⁶⁷ saty apy ātmani omitted in Ch. ⁶⁸ 'pi only found in T; asato 'pi cit. ibid. p. 126. Cf. the paraphrase of the whole passage in the tīkā, cit. ibid. p. 126 "katham sā naṣṭasya viṣayeṇa viṣayavatī" iti. ⁶⁹ yadi cit. ibid. p. 126 yadišabdena athasabdasya sambhāvanām dyotyatvena āha.

12.5

यतो हि पूर्वानुभवसंस्कारात् स्मृतिसंभवः । यद्येवमन्तर्गहुना कोऽर्थः स्यात् स्थायिनात्मना॥ ५॥

अनुभवात् संस्कारः संस्काराच् ^{७०}च स्मृतिर्जायमाना तं पूर्वानुभवम् ^{७१}अनुकुर्वत्येवावगाहितविषयं ^{७२}तमनुभवमाभासयति । ^{७३}एवमात्मस्थैर्येण किमनुपयोगिना संस्कारस्यात्मवादेऽप्यङ्गीकरणात् ^{७४}तेनैव च सिद्धेः ॥ ५॥

ततो भिन्नेषु धर्मेषु तत्स्वरूपाविशेषतः । संस्कारात् स्मृतिसिद्धौ स्यात् स्मर्ता द्रष्टेव कल्पितः॥६॥

^{७५}सुखदुःखज्ञानादिभिन्नधर्मा^{७६}श्रयत्वेनापि आत्मनो^{७७}ऽनुपयोगो भिन्नैर् ^{७८}धर्मैरसंभिन्नस्य ^{७९}अनुपजातिवशेषस्य स्मृताव् ^{८०}अञ्या-पृतेः । ^{८१}तद् द्रष्ट्वत् कल्पनामात्रमेतदात्मा स्मर्तेति ॥६॥

ta C. ⁷² tam anubhavam ābhāsayati: tam anubhavam avabhāsayati E C Ñ, tam anubhavam ābhāsayaty eva Ch, tam anubhāvayati T. The reading accepted (Gh N J Jh) agrees with the quotation ibid. p. 126. ⁷³ evam: yady evam Ch, evam corrected to eva Gh. ⁷⁴ Cit. ibid. p. 126 "tenaiva ca" iti samskāreņa; ca omitted in Ñ. ⁷⁵ sukhaduḥkha° cit. ibid. p. 131. ⁷⁶ °dharmāśrayatvena: °dharmatvena T T. ⁷⁷ 'nupayogo: nopayogo E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ T; cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 132. ⁷⁸ dharmair, omitted in E Ñ and added in the margin in C, cit. ibid. p. 131 "bhinnair dharmair asambhinnasya" iti alabdhatadāveśasyeti yāvat. ⁷⁹ anupajāta°: anujāta° Ñ. ⁸⁰ Cit. and commented on ibid. p. 132 (avyāprteḥ is interpreted as a bahuvrīhi depending on ātmano), where a portion of the whole passage is also paraphrased "smṛtāv avyāpṛteḥ" iti vṛṭtigrantham saṣṭhyantam ātmano viśeṣaṇatvena hetutāsamuccayagarbham vyācaṣṭe / asaṃbhinnatvena anupajātaviśeṣatvāt pratisamdhāv ātmano 'nupayogaḥ smṛtav avyāpṛtatvāc ca. ⁸¹ tad draṣṭṛvat cit. ibid. p. 132.

I 2.7

ज्ञानं च चित्स्वरूपं चेत्तदिनत्यं किमात्मवत् । अथापि जहमेतस्य कथमर्थप्रकाशता ॥ ७॥

^{८२}चित्स्वाभान्ये ज्ञानस्य ^{८३}चेत्यधर्मदेशकालावेशयोगाद् ^{८४}आत्मन इव नित्यतादिप्रसङ्गः । जडत्वे कथम् अर्थस्यासौ प्रकाशः ॥ ७ ॥

अथार्थस्य यथा रूपं धत्ते बुद्धिस्तथात्मनः । चैतन्यमजहा सैवं जाह्ये नार्थप्रकाशता ॥ ८॥

८ इंडानं बुद्धिः । सा जडापि यथा विषयरूप^{८६} च्छायां धत्ते तथात्मनोऽपि चैतन्यच्छायाम् , ८ अतोऽसावर्थप्रकाशः ८ तथा च ८ तस्याश्चितस्वरूपता स्यात् । १० एवं ज्ञानं १ सदिप १ नान्यस्य संबन्धि, अनुपपत्तेः । क्रिया तु १ न स्वरूपेणास्ति १ नान्य-संबन्धितया ॥ ८॥

⁸² cit°: jñānacit° T. ⁸³ cetyadharma° cit. ibid. p. 136. ⁸⁴ ātmana iva nityatādiprasangah cit. ibid. p. 135. 85 jñānam buddhih cit. and commented on ibid. p. 154. ⁸⁶ °cchāyām cit. ibid. p. 154. ⁸⁷ ato 'sāv arthaprakāsah cit. and commented on ibid. p. 154 "ataḥ" iti ubhayacchāyādhāraṇāt / asau buddhiḥ / arthasya prakāsas tatphalaparyanto 'dhigama ity arthaḥ. ° tathā ca: tathāpi Ch; tathā ca cit. ibid. p. 174 vṛttau tathāpīty arthena tathā ca ity anena abhyupagamavādābhidhāyinā (cf. also p. 158). 89 tasyāś citsvarūpatā syāt cit. ibid. p. 174. 90 evam cit. and commented on ibid. p. 176 evam iti sūtradvayoktābhir yuktibhih yah prasanga uktah, tadviparyāyeņa anityarūpasya ananyāśritasya jñānasya siddhir ity arthah. 91 sad api cit. and commented on ibid. p. 176 sad api iti vṛttāv apisabda uttarakārikāvakāsadānārthah / apisabdo hi kāmakārarūpam sattve tāvad anvavasargam dyotayann anyasya tu sattvam api na adhigantum śakyam iti prakatayati. 92 Even though it is not found in any MS (nānyasambandhitayā E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ Ţ, nānyasya sambandhinah T), nānyasya sambandhi is the reading that the context seems to require. This is confirmed by the quotation ibid. p. 182 tad āha "na anyasya" iti "sambandhi" iti tādātmyasamavāyādinety arthah. Then the IPVV cites the words that the tīkā uses to gloss anyasya: "anyasya" iti vṛttim vivṛnoti pāṭhapūrvakam "ātmākhyasya" iti "vastunaḥ" iti. 93 na omitted in E. 94 na: nāpy T. The last sentence

कियाप्यर्थस्य कायादेस्तत्तद्देशादिजातता । नान्यादृष्टेर्न साप्येका कृमिकैकस्य चोचिता ॥ ९ ॥

क्रिया^{६५}पि ^{६६}पूर्वापरीभूतावयवैका कारकन्यापाररूपा ^{६७}न युक्ता ^{६८}क्रमिकस्यानेककालस्पृशः स्वात्मैक्यायोगात् , ^{६९}नापि कालक्रमन्यापी चैकस्वभावश्च तस्या आश्रयो युक्तः , ^{१००}केवलं गमनपरिणामादि^{१०१}रूपा सा क्रिया । ^{१०२}कायादीनां ^{१०३}त् तत्तद्भिन्नदेशकालगतापूर्वसत्तामात्रम् एतदितिरिक्तस्य ^{१०४}अन्यस्यानु- पलम्भात् ॥ ९॥

तत्र तत्र स्थिते तत्तद्भवतीत्येव दृश्यते । नान्यन्नान्योऽस्ति संबन्धः कार्यकारणभावतः ॥ १० ॥

पूर्विस्मन्सित परस्य सत्तेत्येतावन्मात्रेऽनुभवः । ^{१०५}क्रियावच्च न क्रियाकारकसंबन्धः कश्चिद्धिन्नस्यास्यानुपलम्भात् । कार्यकारण-

of the vṛtti is recalled at the beginning of the ĪPVV on the following kārikā (ibid. p. 183): svarūpeņa anyasambandhitayā ceti ... / yuktyā pramāņavyāpāreņa bādhitatvam svarūpata uktam "na sāpy ekā kramikā" iti, anyasambandhitayā tu uktam "ekasya kramikā katham bhavet". 95 T omits api, which is confirmed by the quotation ibid. p. 183 kriyāpi na yuktā iti vṛttir vyākhyātā. 96 pūrvāparībhūtāvayavaikā (cf. ŚDVṛ p. 91) kārakavyāpārarūpā paraphrased ibid. p. 184 kārakasya phalasiddhihetubhūtakriyānimittasya svakriyāpekṣayā vā kartuh sambandhī tatsamavāyī tadātmā vā vyāpāro rūpam svam lakṣaṇam yasyāḥ, sā kriyā vasyāh sambandhino bhāgāh pūryāparībhūtāh kramavṛttayah iti yāyat. °aikākāravyāpāra° T Ch. 97 na omitted in E. 98 Cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 191 ekā katham kramikā iti sūtram sphuţayitum vṛttau kramikatvam vyācaṣṭe / anekakālaspṛktvam hi kramikatā / ekas ca tatkālo tatkālas ceti katham bhavet, tadatadau vā kālāv ekam katham bhavet iti svarūpatas tāvad aikyam kriyāyām bādhitam. 99 Cf. ibid. p. 193 āśravabādhakanirūpaņam sūtrāmsam vyācaste vrttikrt "nāpi kālakramavyāpī ca" iti / cakārāv anyonyavirodhadyotakau. 100 Cit. ibid. p. 194 kevalam gamana ity ādinā vṛttigranthena, p. 196 parināma iti (cit. by the tikā, which comments on it). 101 °rūpā: °rūpaṃ T. 102 kāyādinam ... matram paraphrased ibid. p. 195. 103 tu omitted in T J Ñ. 104 Ch omits 105 kriyāvac ca na kriyākārakasambandhaḥ kaścit cit. ibid. p. 198; anyasya. kriyākārakādi° E Gh N C Ch Jh Ñ T.

I 2.10 भावाहते ^{१०६} नान्यद् ^{१०७} वस्तूनां ज्ञातेयम् ॥ १०॥

द्विष्ठस्यानेकरूपत्वात्सिद्धस्यान्यानपेक्षणात् । पारतन्त्रयाद्ययोगाच्च तेन कर्तापि कल्पितः ॥ ११ ॥

संबन्धो द्विष्ठो न ¹⁰²चैकेनात्मनोभयत्रावस्थितिर्युक्ता ¹⁰⁸न च द्वयोः सिद्धयोर् ¹¹⁰अन्योन्यापेक्षात्मा नापि स्वात्ममात्रनिष्ठयोः ¹¹¹पारतन्त्र्यरूपः संबन्धः । ततो ¹¹²यथा ज्ञातृत्वं किष्पतं तथा कर्तृत्वमिप ¹¹³इति कथमात्मा सर्वेश्वर इति ॥ ११॥

^{११४} इति ज्ञानाधिकारे द्वितीयमाह्मिकम्॥

¹⁰⁶ Cf. ibid. p. 198 nānyad iti atra pūrvasya hetutvam vṛttāv uktam bhinnasya vyatiriktasya asya sambandhasya kriyāyā iva anupalambhād ity anena; T omits asya. 107 Instead of vastūnām T has an almost illegible word (perhaps iha, which would be equally good). 108 Cf. ibid. p. 203 ekatvam hi abhinnarūpatvam, tadviruddhena ca bhinnarūpatvena vyāptam dvayor yugapatsvarūpasarvasvena avasthānam; °sthitir E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 109 na ca dvayoh cit. ibid. p. 204. 110 anyonyāpekṣā° cit. ibid. p. 204; E Gh N Ch J omit °ātmā, °apekṣaṇāpi C N, °apekṣe T. 111 pāratantryarūpah cit. and commented on ibid. p. 204 tena "pāratantryarūpah sambandha" ity atra ittham yojanā - pāratantryam bhavad api sambandho na siddhyatīti. °svarūpah T. 112 yathā ... kalpitam ... kartrtvam api cit. ibid. p. 206, where the whole passage is commented on. 113 iti katham ātmā sarveśvarah cit. ibid. p. 206; maheśvarah T. 114 T adds iti purvapakṣo, Ch iti pūrvapakṣavivṛtih, J iti pūrvapakṣanirūpanam.

तृतीयमाह्नि कम्

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सत्यं किंतु स्मृतिज्ञानं पूर्वानुभवसंस्कृतेः । जातमप्यात्मनिष्ठं तन्नाद्यानुभववेदकम् ॥१॥

¹¹⁶पूर्वानुभवसंस्कारप्रबोधजनमापि स्मृतिर् ¹¹⁰आत्ममात्रनिष्ठत्वात् ¹¹⁷स्वरूपसंवेदिकेव ¹¹⁸न तु पूर्वानुभवा^{1२०}वेशाभावातपूर्वानुभूता-र्थान्यवस्थापिका घटते ॥ १॥

हक्स्वाभासैव नान्येन वेद्या रूपहशेव हक् । रसे संस्कारजत्वं तु तत्तुल्यत्वं न तद्गतिः ॥ १ ॥

^{१२१}सर्वा हि इप्तिः ^{१२२}स्वसंवेदनैक^{१२३}रूपानन्यसंवि^{१२४}द्वेद्या , रूप-रसज्ञानयोर् ^{१२५}अन्योन्यवेदनेऽन्योन्यविषयवेदनमपि स्यात् ^{१२६}ततश्च ^{१२७}इन्द्रियनियमाभावः । पूर्वानुभव^{१२८}संस्कारजत्वेन ^{१२९}तत्सादृश्यमात्रं

¹¹⁵ T adds atha paraduršanānupapattinirūpaņam. 116 pūrvānubhavasamskāraprabodhajanmāpi cit. ibid. p. 210; °prabodha° omitted in T (in Gh it is added under the line); °jāpi E. 117 ātmamātranisthatvāt cit. ibid. p. 210. 118 Cf. ibid. p. 211 tat katham uktam "ātmanisthasvarūpasamvedikaiva" iti (from the tīkā). On the same page the compound is cit. in a slightly different form: vṛṭṭau ca "svaviṣayasaṃvedikaiva" iti; saṃvedakaiva Ch. 119 na tu vyavasthāpikā ghaṭate cit. ibid. p. 213; °vyavasthāpikāpi T; °vyavasthāpitā N. 120 °āvešābhāvāt: °āvešāt J. 121 sarvā hi jñaptiķ cit. ibid. pp. 216 and 222; sarvāpi T. 122 Cf. the quotation from the tīkā ibid. p. 215 svasamvedanaikarūpatvāt, glossed with svasamvedanam ekam rūpam yasya iti; *svarūpā. Cf. ibid. p. 229 svasamvedanaikarūpā ... yā kācit hi jñaptiḥ, sā anyasamvidvedyā na bhavatīti and the quotation from the țīkā ibid. p. 222 "jñānam jñānāntaravedyam na bhavati" iti. 123 °rūpānanya°: °rūpā nānya° E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ T. 124 °vedyā: °samvedyā E. 125 anyonyavedane anyonyavişayavedanam api syāt cit. ibid. p. 229; anyonyavedane omitted in N Ch Jh: anyonyasamvedane E Gh (added in the margin) C J N T. 126 tatas ca cit. ibid. p. 230. 127 Cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 230 iti indriyaniyamo hīyeta. 128 Cit. ibid. p. 214 upacāra iha vṛṭṭau sphuṭīkṛṭaḥ "saṃskārajatvena" iti; "saṃskāratvena C. 129 Cf. ibid. p. 253 āha "sādrsyamātram" iti, perhaps cit. through the tīkā; Ch omits tato.

13.2 न तु पूर्वानुभवावगतिः , तदभावात् तत्सादृश्यमपि नावसेयम् ॥२॥

अथातद्विषयत्वे धि स्मृतेस्तदवसायतः । दृष्टालम्बनता भान्त्या तदेतदसमञ्जसम् ॥ ३॥

^{१३०}न चापि भ्रान्त्या पुर्वानुभवं तद्विषयं ^{१३१}च ^{१३२}शुक्तौ रजतम् ^{१३३}इवासंवेद्यमानमध्यवस्यतीति स्मृतिस्तद्विषया ॥३॥

समृतितैव कथं तावद् भानतेश्चार्थस्थितिः कथम् । पूर्वानुभवसंस्कारापेक्षा च किमितीष्यते ॥ ४ ॥

¹³⁸पूर्वानुभवापकाशात् तिद्वषय¹³⁴संप्रमोषेऽध्यवसायमात्रात्समृतित्वं न युक्तम् । न च भान्त्या ¹³⁶पूर्वानुभूतार्थव्यवस्थापनम् , ¹³⁶पूर्वानुभवास्पर्शे च तिद्धन्नयोगक्षेमाया ¹³⁷भान्तेः संस्कारजत्वे को ¹³⁸ग्रहः ॥ ४ ॥

¹³⁰ na ca cit. ibid. p. 236 asamañjasam iti vṛṭṭau vyākhyāṭam neti samastavākyārthaniședhena / cakāreņa āśankādyotakena atha iti vyākhyātam. 131 E omits ca. 132 śuktau cit. ibid. p. 236. 133 T reads iti $v\bar{a}^{\circ}$, which, if corrected to itī $v\bar{a}^{\circ}$, would be equally acceptable. 134 The whole sentence up to the danda cit. ibid. p. 238. 135 osampramose: °asampramoșe C. 136 pūrvānubhūtārtha° cit. ibid. p. 239, where this point is dwelt on at length; ef. in particular na asyām [smṛṭau] kimcit prakāśate yena vaiparityam āśankate / etadartham eva vṛttau pūrvānubhūtāgrahaṇam anumānavikalpanādāv iva apūrvaprakāśatānirākaraņatātparyeņa prayuktam. 137 pūrvānubhavāsparše ca tadbhinnayogakṣemāyā paraphrased and commented on ibid. p. 240 purvānubhavenāsparšo 'sādṛṣṣam anāveṣaṣ́ ca saptamyā hetutvena nirdisto vrttau bhinnayogaksematve sādhya iti vivrņoti "tataḥ" iti / yogo 'labdhalābhaḥ, iha tu tadupalakṣitaṃ prakāśalakṣaṇaṃ svarūpam, kṣemaṃ labdhaparirakṣaṇam, tadupalakṣitas tu iha viṣayāṃśaḥ / tadubhayam anubhavāt bhinnam smṛteḥ prakašasya apūrvatvat visayasya ca avastutvāt iti. T omits ca. 138 bhrānteh saṃskārajatve ko grahah cit. ibid. p. 240; p. 241 Abh. records a different reading (ity anye patanti): °jatvam. 139 grahah: bhramah G Ch (in T bhramah, deleted, precedes grahah); hetuh K CÑ.

I 3.5

भानितत्वे चावसायस्य न जहाद्विषयस्थितिः । ततोऽजाह्ये निजोल्लेखनिष्ठान्

नार्धिस्थितिस्ततः ॥ ५ ॥

¹⁸⁰अध्यवसाय एव भ्रान्त्या विषयञ्यवस्थापको न तु स्वसंवित्, ¹⁸¹स च जडः कथमर्थञ्यवस्थाया हेतुः । चिद्रूपोऽप्यती-तार्थ¹⁸²मात्रमाभासयेदबाह्यस्वात्मोल्लेखमात्रप्रकाशो वा न तद्धेतुः ॥ ५ ॥

एवमन्योन्यभिन्नानामपरस्परवेदिनाम् । ज्ञानानामनुसंधानजन्मा नश्येज्जनस्थितिः ॥ ६ ॥

¹⁸³ज्ञानानि स्वात्ममात्रपरिनिष्ठितानि ¹⁸⁸स्वसंविद्रूपतया ¹⁸⁴अपर -संवेद्यानि । ¹⁸⁶तेषाम् ¹⁸⁸अन्योन्यविषयसंघट्टनामयः ¹⁸²परमार्थी -

140 adhyavasāya eva cit. ibid. p. 242. The whole passage is paraphrased and commented on pp. 242-43 bhrāntyā bhramarūpeņa upalaksito yo visayavyavasthāpaka uktaḥ, so 'dhyavasāya eva, na tu svasamvit / nāpi svasya prakāsamanasya rūpasya samvit nirvikalparūpā. E (but not G) Gh omit sva°. 141 sa ca cit. ibid. p. 243, where the rest of the vṛtti is also paraphrased, sa tarhi adhyavasāyo jado vyavatiṣṭhāpayiṣite bāhye 'rthe tasya aprakāśarūpatvāt / yadi tu tatra prakāśarūpah syāt, yogina iva tatra pūrvasminn arthe vikalpanīyābhimate sphuṭatayā pūrvaprakāśaḥ syād iti na smṛtitā, nāpi adhyavasāyatā bhaved anubhavaikarūpatvāt / atha na bāhye 'sau prakāśo yena anubhavarūpatvam, nāpi sarvathaiva aprakāśo yena jadaļi, kimtu svātmani svollekhe ca svākāre prakāśarūpa eva asau, tarhi punar api arthe bāhye jaḍa eveti bāhyārthavyavasthāyā hetuḥ syāt / sā hi saṃvinniṣṭhā bhavati, na tu kadācit jaḍaniṣṭheti / bhramarūpeņa ca yad abāhyabāhyayor ekīkaraņam, na tena bāhyasya kimcit sprstam tatsparše bhrānta-tvāyogāt l na hi rajatajñānena satyarajatasya śukter vā vyavasthā kācid iti tātparyeņa vṛttyarthaḥ / evam sūtre vṛttau ca adhyavasāyamātrasya rūpam dūṣitam, taddvāreṇa tu smṛtyadhyavasāyasyeti / atītagrahaņam ca vṛttau vikalpopalakṣaṇam utprekṣāvikalpasyāpi pūrvānuhhavopajīvanapravesena vastuto 'tītatvād eveti. 142 omātram only found in T. 143 jñānāni svātmamātrao cit, in the tīkā (Torella 1988: 144); cf. also ĪPVV I p. 253. 144 svasamvidrūpatayā cit. in the ţīkā (Torella 1988: 144). 145 aparasamvedyāni: nāparasamvedyāni E Gh N Ch J Jh Ț, na parasamvedyāni C Ñ, na parasparasamvedyāni T. I have accepted the reading as quoted and glossed ibid. p. 255; see also the tīkā (Torella 1988: 144). 146 tesām cit. ĪPVV I p. 268. ¹⁴⁷ anyonya° cit. in the tīkā (Torella 1988: 150); cf. ĨPVV I p. 268 vṛttau vişayasamghattanāyāh prādhānyāt ... and the ţīkā (Torella 1988: 150) vṛttau ca viṣayasamghaṭanāpekṣayā ṣaṣṭhī; samghaṭṭanā°: samghaṭanā° E Gh C N T (also possible). 148 paramārtha° cit. ibid. p. 269 and in the tīkā (Torella 1988: 151).

I 3.6 पदेशपर्यन्तो लोकन्यवहारः ^{१४९}कथम् ॥६॥

न चेदन्तःकृतानन्तविश्वरूपो महेश्वरः । स्यादेकश्चिद्धपुर्ज्ञानस्मृत्यपोहनशक्तिमान् ॥ ७॥

¹⁴⁰चित्तत्वमेव विश्वरूपमतोऽतिरिक्तस्यानुपपत्तेः , ¹⁴¹अशेषपदा-र्थज्ञानानामन्योन्यानुसंधानम् । ¹⁴²अस्यैव ज्ञाना¹⁴³दिकाः शक्तयः । मत्तः स्मृतिर्ज्ञानमपोहनमं चेति ह्युक्तम् ॥ ७॥

¹⁴⁸ इति ज्ञानाधिकारे तृतीयमाहिकम्॥

चतुर्थमाह्निकम्

स हि पूर्वानुभूतार्थोपलब्धा परतोऽपि सन् । विमृशन्स इति स्वैरी स्मरतीत्यपदिश्यते ॥१॥ 大学 大学 ないこととのできるということとの

^{१५५}पश्चादिप पूर्वानुभूतार्था^{१५६}नुभिवतृत्वात् ^{१५७}पूर्वानुभूतार्थ-

149 katham cit. ĨPVV I p. 272. 150 cittattvam eva and ato 'tiriktasya cit. in the tīka (Torella 1988: 152); riktasya Ch. 151 Cf. the quotation in ĨPVV I p. 276 vṛttikṛd āha aśeṣapadārthajñānānam anyonyānusaṃdhānam cittatvam iti. 152 asyaiva cit. ibid. p. 285. 153 °ādikāḥ: °ādi° T. 154 C Ch J T add paradarśanānupapattiḥ. 155 paścād api cit. in ĨPVV II p. 4. 156 °anubhavitṛtvāt: °anubhavitṛtayā E C Ñ (°tvāt is also the reading of Kh). 157 The whole passage (from pūrva°) is paraphrased and partly cit. (through the tīkā) ibid. p. 4 "tasya ekasya pūrvānubhūtatvena yaḥ pratyavamarśaḥ" iti ubhayakālasaṃsparśī "atra" iti prāṇapuryaṣṭakadehādau saṃkucitasya "pūrvānubhūtārthāsaṃpramoṣarūpā smṛtir nāma vyāpāraḥ" iti sambandhaḥ / ekatvāt hi sa ubhayakālaspṛk / kartṛtaiva ca vibhutā svairitvam iti vṛttiyojanā; p. 11 atra iti vṛttipadam; p. 13 vṛttau ca uktaṃ vibhoḥ iti. vibhoḥ kartuḥ Ch.

प्रकाशासंप्रमोषणम् , तस्यैकस्य विभोः कर्तुः स इत्यत्र पूर्वानु- ^{I 4.1} भूतत्वेन प्रत्यवमर्शः स्मृतिर्नाम न्यापारः ॥ १ ॥

भासयेच्च स्वकालेऽर्थात् पूर्वाभासितमामृशन् । स्वलक्षणं घटाभासमात्रेणाथाखिलात्मना ॥ २ ॥

147 समृतिशकत्या स इति पूर्वानुभूतं स्वलक्षणं परामृ-शन्नाभासयत्येव 148 अन्यथा 160 प्रकाशितस्य 161 परामर्शो न कृतः स्यात् 168 स्वसत्ताकाल एव च , 163 तेन समरणकाले 168 नष्टस्याप्याभासो न दुष्यति । कदाचित् त्वर्थितावशाद् घटकाञ्चनद्रन्य 164 सत्ताद्य 166 न्यतमैकाभासरूपेणैवास्य 160 स्फुटावभासः, 167 अन्यदा तु 168 सर्वातमनार्थित्वेन तथैव 100 । अतिशय 101 निरन्त -रावहितचेतसस्तु 100 हष्टार्थ 103 प्रत्यक्षीकार एव ॥ २ ॥

¹⁵⁸ smrtišaktyā cit. ibid. p. 19. 159 anyathā cit. in ĪPVV II p. 22. 160 prakāšitasya cit. and commented on ibid. p. 22 pūrvaprakāśitatvena tatprakāśanānulagnah katham parāmarśo bhavet / yadi ca na bhavet pūrvaprakāśitatvena parāmarśanam, tat sa iti bhūtaprakāśaparāmaršo na syāt / tena "prakāšitasya" iti vṛttau prakṛtyarthe ca pratyayārthe ca bharaḥ kartavyah; cf. also p. 31. 161 parāmarśo: parāmarśo 'pi Ch. 162 svasattākāla eva ca cit. ibid. p. 31; ca omitted in J. 163 tena cit. ibid. p. 23. 164 Cf. ibid. p. 23 tathā hi nāśe arthena smṛter na doṣaḥ, sadbhāve vā na poṣaḥ; na duṣyati cit. ibid. p. 25, where the whole argumentation of the vrtti, as developed in the $t\bar{t}k\bar{a}$, is summarized. °sattā°: °sattva° Gh N J Jh T T. 166 °anyatama° cit. ibid. p. 29 ghaṭābhāsaśabdaḥ sūtre kevalābhāsopalakṣaṇārthaḥ iti vṛttau vyākhyātam anyatamapadena. 167 My conjectural emendation for asvāsphutāvabhāsaḥ Gh N C J Jh N T T, asyāḥ sphutāvabhāsaḥ E Ch. The emendation is suggested by the argumentations in IPV, IPVV and in the tikā (Torella 1988: 154-55, 168-69) and by the (probable) gloss sphuta eva added to the following tathaiva in Ch J T (see also the țikă: tadă sphuța evābhāsaḥ; Torella 1988: 155). The reading asvāh sphutāvabhāsah, to which asvāsphutāvabhāsah might be reduced by assuming the omission of the visarga before samyoga, could only be acceptable if we took asyāh as referring to smṛti (which does not seem likely). 168 anyadā tu cit. ibid. p. 29 and in the țīkā (Torella 1988: 155). 169 sarvātmanārthitvena: sarvārthitvena J. 170 T J (and Ch, in the margin) add sphuta eva (being probably only a scribal gloss of tathā eva). 171 Cf. ibid. pp. 29-30 antarayati sāntaram karotīti antaram vijātīyāmso malam, tadabhāvo nairantaryam; atisayanirantara° cit. in the tīkā (Torella 1988: 155). 172 Cf. ibid. p. 30 anena drstārthasabdo vyākhyātah. 173 °pratyaksīkāra cit. ibid. p. 29.

I 4.3

न च युक्तं स्मृतेभेदि स्मर्यमाणस्य भासनम् । तेनैक्यं भिन्नकालानां संविदां वेदितैष सः ॥ ३॥

पुर्वानुभूतश्चार्थो ¹⁰⁸ इनुभवेन सह ¹⁰⁹ तात्कालिक ¹⁰⁶ समृतिप्रकाशे इवभासमानः स्मृत्यिभन्न एव ¹⁰⁰ प्रकाशाद्भिन्नस्य प्रकाशमानतानु-पपत्तेः। एवं ¹⁰² चानुभवस्मृत्यादि ¹⁰⁸ संविदामैक्यं स एव चात्मा वेदकः। ¹²⁰ तथा हि ॥ ३॥

नैव ह्यनुभवो भाति स्मृतौ पूर्वोऽर्थवत् पृथक् । प्रागन्वभूवमहमित्यात्मारोहणभासनात् ॥ ४ ॥

स्मृतौ स्मर्थमाणो^{१८१}ऽनुभूतार्थी यथा पृथग्भूतो ^{१८२}भाति न तथानुभवः स्वात्मन एवाहन्ताप्रत्येयस्यानुभवमयत्वेन प्रथनात् , ^{१८३}यश्चानेककालोऽहंवेद्योऽर्थः स एवात्मा ॥४॥

योगिनामिप भासन्ते न हशो दर्शनान्तरे । स्वसंविदेकमानास्ता भान्ति मेयपदेऽपि वा ॥ ५ ॥

^{१८४}सर्वज्ञानामपि ^{१८५}प्रमात्रन्तरगतोपलम्भाः स्वसंविन्मात्रवेद्यस्व-

¹⁷⁴ Cf. ibid. p. 34 anubhavena saha arthah smaranād abhinnah iti vṛttyā tātparyadvayam sautram vyākhyātam. 175 tātkālika°: tātkālike Ch. 176 °smṛtiprakāśe cit. ibid. p. 33; T omits °smṛti° and reads °prakāśo. 177 prakāśād bhinnasya cit. ibid. p. 34; cf. p. 33 prakāśād bhinnasya mā bhūt prakāśamānatā; prakāśyamānatā° T. 178 ca only found in T T. 179 °saṃvidām: °saṃvid° N. 180 tathā hi cit. ibid. p. 37. 181 'nubhūta°: 'nubhūto T G. 182 bhāti: 'vabhāti T. 183 yaś ca cit. ibid. p. 40; anekakālo, cit. ibid. p. 41, is quoted on the same page in a slightly different form (probably meant to clarify its meaning) nanu ca saṃvidah kālasparśa eva nāstīti katham vṛttih anekakālagata iti / anekakālagateṣu vedyeṣu yad unmukhatvam, tāvanmātrād eva sa bodho 'nekakāla iti upacāreṇa ācaryate ... tadunmukhaś ca ekah svasaṃvedanapramātā. 184 Cf. ibid. pp. 43-4 nanu yogī kriyāśaktiprakarṣavān api iha darśane, tat katham jñānaśaktiprakarṣamātram asya vṛttau nirūpitam; cf. also ibid. p. 47 sarvajñagrahaṇam ... 185 pramātrantaragatopalambhāh cit. ibid. p. 42.

भावाः ^{१८६}स्वात्मारूढा एव भासेरन् , ^{१८७}अतश्च तेषां ^{१८८}योगिनां ^{I 4.5} परात्मतापत्तिरेव ^{१८९}तत्त्वम् । प्रमेयकक्ष्यायाम् अपि^{१९०} घटादिवत् ^{१९१}प्रातिस्विकेन शुद्ध^{१९२}बोधात्मना रूपेण ^{१९३}अवभासेरन् यदि ^{१९४}तथा संभवेत् ॥५॥

स्मर्यते यद् हगासीन्मे सैविमत्यपि भेदतः । तद्वचाकरणमेवास्या मया हष्टमिति स्मृतेः ॥ ६ ॥

^{१९५}मया हष्टिमिति प्रमात्रन्तर्गत^{१९६}दर्शनपरामर्शातिमकाया एव स्मृतेर्विभज्य ^{१९७}कथनम् ^{१९८}एतदेवमन्भवोऽसौ ममाभूदिति भेदेनापि ^{१९९}निर्देशः ^{२००}॥६॥

या च पश्याम्यहमिमं घटोऽयमिति वावसा । मन्यते समवेतं साप्यवसातिर दर्शनम् ॥ ७॥

पुरःस्थितार्थविकल्पनेऽपि घटमिमं पश्यामि घटोऽयमिति वा प्रमातृमयमेव ^{२०१}दर्शनं प्रत्यवमृश्यते ॥ ७ ॥

¹⁸⁶ svātmārūdhā eva cit. ibid p. 47 and in the tīkā (Torella 1988: 158). bhāseran cit. ĪPVV II p. 52; ābhāseran E, avabhāseran K G Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ T. 187 atas ca: ata eva T. 188 yoginām paratmatāpattir eva cit. in the tīkā (Torella 1988: 158) (as parama°, which is also the reading of Kh Gh J). 189 tattvam cit. and commented on in ĪPVV II p. 47 "tattvam" iti vivṛṇoti "paramātmavedakam" ity anena tattvam paramātmavedakatvam ity arthah (cf. Torella 1988: 158, n. 54) [...] sarvajāagrahanam prāgupakrāntaparasamvedanopakramāt parātmavedakaparyāyatām etīti bhāvah. 190 api: eva vā T, also possible. 191 prātisvikena cit. ibid. p. 52. 192 obodhātmanā rūpena: bodhena E, but cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 52 ayam ca atra bhāvah svasmin svasmin daršane yādršam bodhasya suddharūpam 193 Cit. (as bhāseran) ibid. p. 52. 194 T omits tathā, but cf. ibid. p. 53 yadi tathā iti na tu etat sambhavatīti; tadā Ch. 195 mayā drṣtam cit. ibid. p. 54. 196 In T odaršana° is added under the line; "parāmaršana" T; "ātmikā Gh Ñ. 197 Cf. ibid. p. 54 kathanašabdena (from the tīkā). 198 etad omitted in T. 199 T adds dršo, being probably a gloss. 200 Ch adds smṛter vyākaranam eva. 201 The text cit. ibid. p. 55 is a little different: ity evam vṛttau vyākhyāto "daršanam eva tat pratyavamṛšyate" iti vacanena.

14.8 तन्मया दृश्यते दृष्टोऽयं स इत्यामृशत्यि । गुह्मगुह्नकताभिन्नावर्थी भातः प्रमातरि ॥८॥

तस्माद् ^{२०२}हकपरामर्शपुरःसारायां स्मृतौ विकल्पमात्रे वा ^{२०3}हक्शब्दानुवेधं विनापि स इत्ययमिति वार्थमात्र^{२०४}निर्देशेन ^{२०५}सर्वत्रैकप्रमातृलीनावेवानुभाव्यानुभावकौ ^{२०६}मायाकृतविच्छिन्ना-वभासाव् ^{२०७}अपि ^{२०८}प्रकाशेते ॥ ८॥

इति ज्ञानाधिकारे चतुर्थमाह्निकम् ॥

पञ्चममाह्निकम्

वर्तमानावभासानां २०० भावानामवभासनम् । अन्तःस्थितवतामेव घटते बहिरात्मना ॥१॥

प्रत्यक्षे^{२१०}sपि यावदर्थानां भेदेनावभासः प्रमात्र^{२११}न्तर्लीनानामेव सतां युक्तः ॥१॥

²⁰² Cf. ibid. pp. 57-8 vivṛtāv api ... dṛk prādhānyena parāmṛṣ́yate / smaraṇe pratyakṣādhyavasāye ca ādaraṇam eva puraḥsārapūrvādiśabdair darśitam. 203 In Ch °parāmarśa° is added after drk° under the line. 204 onirdesena: onirdese T N C Jh N T; in Gh ona is added in the margin. 205 sarvatraikao: sarvatrātraikao T. 206 Cf. ibid. p. 62 nanu māyākṛtavicchedāv iti yad uktam 207 Cf. ibid. p. 57 apiśabdo bhinnakramah. bhinnāv api ekatra ābhasate iti vṛttyanusāreṇa vā yojanā. 208 prakāṣete: prakāṣeta J. 209 It is out of question that bhāvanām is the original reading of the kārikā (cf. vṛtti: arthānām). Bhāskara holds, instead, that the text which Abh. had in front of him had bhinnānām, glossed by him with vicchinnānām. Also the editors of Bh accept this thesis. I would say that the text commented on by Abh. also had bhāvānām and that bhinnānām - as well as the further explanation vicchinnānām - are meant to elucidate the sense of bahirātmanā; bhāvānām is simply understood in vesām ... tesām ... bhinnānām etc. (IPV I p. 196). Furthermore, bhāva is mentioned in the paraphrase in IPVV II p. 68 atyaktasamvidabhedasyaiva bhāvasya kalpitapramātrapekṣayā vicchedena yat prakāśanam ... (it is worth noting that bahirātmanā is here paraphrased as vicchedena prakāśanam; as bhedenāvabhāsah in the vṛtti). 210 Cf. ibid. p. 68 vṛttāv apiśabdo yāvacchabdaś ca sūtraśeṣatvena pathitāḥ. 211 °antar°: °antara° N C N.

I 5.2

प्रकाशता ॥ २ ॥

प्रमातृ^{२१२}संज्ञप्रकाशस्वरूपतां विना ^{२१३}यथादौ घटोऽस्य नावभा-तस्तथा ^{२१४}ज्ञानकालेऽपि स्यात् , ^{२१५}प्रकाशमानता चार्थस्य प्रकाशः स्वरूपभूतो न तु भिन्नः ॥ २ ॥

भिन्ने प्रकाशे चाभिन्ने संकरो विषयस्य तत् । प्रकाशात्मा प्रकाश्योऽथीं नाप्रकाशश्च

सिध्यति ॥ ३॥

प्रकाश^{२१६}मात्रं चार्थाद्भिन्नं सर्वार्थसाधारणं ^{२१७}तस्य घटस्य प्रकाशोऽयमयं पटस्यैवेति विषयनियमो निर्निबन्धनः । तस्माद् ^{२१८}अर्थस्य सिद्धिः प्रकाशात्मतायत्ता ॥३॥

²¹² °samjña°: °samjñaka° T, samjñā E. ²¹³ yathā: yadā N C Ñ T. ²¹⁴ jñānakāle: jñānajñāne J. 215 Cf. ibid. pp. 68-9 tathā ca vṛttiḥ - svarūpabhūto yaḥ prakāśaḥ so 'rthasya prakāśamānatā, na tu tasmād arthād bhinnaḥ san prakāśaḥ, so 'rthasya prakāśamānatā yukteti; p. 69, where a slightly different interpretation is given, atra pakse vrttir evam netavyā - arthasya yā prakāśamānatā, sa prakāśo 'nubhavaḥ, na tu asau prakāśamānatātmā prakāśo 'rthasya svarūpabhūto 'rthaśarīramagnah. The passage ibid. p. 75 nanu prakāśamānatā svarūpabhūtā ghatasya iti vṛttau kim etat, although presenting itself as a literal quotation is only a further variation on the same theme. ²¹⁶ Cf. ibid. p. 77 vrttau mātraśabdena abhinnatvamātram vyākhyātam, sarvārthasādhāranatvena samkaraśankāyāh pīthābandhah kṛtaḥ. 217 Cf. ibid. pp. 77-8 "tasya" iti prakāśamātrasya "vişayaniyamo nirnibandhanah" na kenacit hetunā upapadyate iti sambandhah / visayaniyamasya ākāram darśayati "ghaṭasya" ity ādinā. In J tasya is followed by prakāśamātrasya, which is precisely the gloss of IPVV; ghataprakāśo J; T does not repeat ayam. 218 Cf. ibid. p. 78 tṛtīyapādasya artham prakāśātmatāśabdena vṛttau vyācaṣṭe "arthasya siddhiḥ" iti / "tat" iti vyākhyātam "tasmāt" ity anena; artha E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ Ţ; prakāśāyattā T.

15.4 तत्तदाकस्मिकाभासो बाह्यं चेदनुमापयेत् । न ह्यभिन्नस्य बोधस्य विचित्राभासहेतुता ॥ ४ ॥

जडानाम् ^{२१९}आभासमानतैव ^{२२०}सत्तासिद्धिः सा च ^{२२१}आभा-सात्मतैव । ततश्च बोधमात्रम् ^{२२२}एकमेवात्र तत्त्वम् । ^{२२३}तस्या-विशेषेऽपि ^{२२४}क्रमेण विशिष्यमाणोऽर्थावभासस्ततोऽन्यमप्रकाशमानं हेतृतया बाह्यमर्थमूहयेदिन्द्रियवत् ॥४॥

न वासनाप्रबोधोऽत्र विचित्रो हेतुतामियात् । तस्यापि तत्प्रबोधस्य वैचित्र्ये किं निबन्धनम् ॥ ५ ॥

२२^५विचित्रवासनाप्रबोधो २२६न २२^७बोधाद्भिन्नः , तस्यापि वैचित्रये को हेतुः । ततो बाह्य एवार्थी भिन्नाभासहेतुः ॥ ५॥

स्यादेतदवभासेषु तेष्वेवावसिते सित । व्यवहारे किमन्येन बाह्येनानुपपत्तिना ॥ ६ ॥

आभासमानैरेव ^{२२८}अर्थैर्ग्यवहारः , ते चाभासात्मकाः सन्तु का ^{२२९}क्षतिः । तिकं बाह्येन कार्यं ^{२३०}तावता ^{२३१}लोकयात्रा-

avabhāsamānataiva: avabhāsamānataiva T, Jh has ābhāsamātrahetutaiva then corrected to ābhāsamānataiva. 220 sattā° omitted in C N. 221 ābhāsātmataiva: ābhāsamānataiva E C, ābhāsataiva Kh G Gh N T, bhāsataiva Ch, ābhāsatātmaiva J, ābhāsataiva corrected to ābhāsātmataiva Jh, bhāsamānataiva N. 222 ekam omitted in E Ch. 223 tasyāvišeṣe 'pi cit. ibid. p. 82; tasya višeṣaṇa° T. 224 krameṇa višiṣyamāno 'rtho cit. and commented on ibid. p. 89 "krameṇa" iti vṛttau kramo 'pi na niyataḥ, api tu bahubhir bhedair ābhāsān višiṣtān karoti iti višiṣyamāṇaśabdam vṛttigatam tātparyeṇa vyācaṣṭe ... yo 'rthaśabdo vṛttau 225 vicitra°: citra° C N. 226 na omitted in T. 227 Cf. ibid. p. 89 "bodhavilakṣaṇa" iti aprakāśamānatvād eveti āśayaḥ. 228 arthair cit. ibid. p. 130. 229 kṣatiḥ: kṣitiḥ J. 230 tāvatā: tāvaty eva T. 231 Cf. ibid. p. 130 teṣu [ābhāseṣu] samāpte vyavahāre

15.6

समाप्तेः । ^{२३२}बाह्यश्चार्थः प्रमाणबाधितः सावयवो विरुद्ध- ¹ः धर्माध्यासादेर्निरवयवश्च दिक्षट्कयोगादेर्बहुशः ^{२३३} ॥ ६ ॥

चिदात्मैव हि देवो इन्तः स्थितमिच्छावशाद् बहिः । योगीव निरुपादानमर्थजातं प्रकाशयेत् ॥ ७॥

चित्तस्वमेव ^{२३५}ईश्वरत्वात् ^{२३५}स्वात्मरूपतया ^{२३६}उपपन्नाभासनम् अनन्तशिक्तत्वाद् ^{२३७}इच्छावशान् ^{२३८}मृदादिकारणं विनैव बाह्यत्वेन ^{२३९}घटपटादिकम् ^{२४०}अर्थराशिं प्रकाशयेत् ॥ ७॥

अनुमानमनाभातपूर्वे नैवेष्टमिन्द्रियम् । आभातमेव बीजादेराभासाद्धेतुवस्तुनः ॥ ८॥

पूर्वा^{२४१}वभातान्तःस्थित एव ^{२४२}अर्थे ^{२४३}नान्तरीयकार्थदर्शन-

²³² Cf. ibid. p. 130 bāhyaś cārthaḥ sāvayavaniravayavobhayavilakṣaṇo viruddhadharmādhyāsādikam dūṣaṇam avalambya pramāṇahādhitaḥ ... "niravayavaś ca paramāņurūpo 'rthaḥ pramāṇabādhito bahubhir bahubhiḥ prakāraiḥ şaṭkayogādikaṃ vikalpya" iti vṛttigranthasya yojanā. T reads yugapadarthadikṣaṭkayogād eva (yugapad whether it was in the original text or not - is anyhow understood; cf. Viņišatikā 12ab satkena yugapad yogāt paramāņoh sadamsatā). 233 Ch adds iti syāt. 234 īśvaratvāt: īśvarāt T; cf. ĪPVV II p. 146 "hi" iti yata evam devatvāt cidātmā 235 svātmarūpatayā cit. ibid. p. 146. 236 upapannābhāsanam: upapannāvabhāsanam T, upapannābhāsarūpam E Gh C Ch J Jh Ñ T, upapannāhhāsam rūpam N. I have accepted the reading quoted and glossed ibid. p. 146 tasya yad ābhāsanam, tat tāvad upapannam na prayatnasādhyam; tadabhedinas ca bhavarāseh prakāsātmatvād upapannābhāsanam iti. 237 icchā°: icchādi° E Gh N C Ch Jh N T. 238 mṛdādi°: apara° T. 239 ghaṭapaṭādikam: ghaṭādim T. artharāsim cit. ibid. p. 155. 241 °avabhāta°: °avabhāsa° E Gh N Ch Jh Ñ T T, but cf. ibid. p. 156 prathamam sūtrabhāgam gamyamānārthanirūpaņena sphuṭayati vṛttikṛt "pūrvāvabhāta" ity ādinā "anumānam" ity antena / "pūrvāvabhātāntaḥsthitaḥ" iti. 242 arthe: artho E Gh N C Ch N T, artha T. The reading arthe, required by meaning, is only found in Jh, as a correction of a previous artho; J has arthe, then corrected to artho. ²⁴³ nāntarīyaka° cit. ibid. p. 156, where the rest of the sentence is paraphrased: pūrvaśabdopādāne 'pi hi antaḥsthitatvasya avarakālatāvṛttir vyangyā / na ca vimarśanamātram anumanam, api tu praptipravrttiyogyavastuniścayarūpam, ity āha "nāntarīyaka" ity ādi. On the meaning and the necessity of tattaddeśakālādiyojanayā see also ibid. p. 162.

15.8 वशात् तत्तद्देशकालादियोजनया विमर्शनमनुमानम् । इन्द्रियम् २४४अप्यनुमीयते किंचिन्मात्रं निमित्तं तच्च बीजाद्याभासाद् २४५आभासितमेव ॥ ८॥

आभासः पुनराभासाद्वाह्यस्यासीत् कथंचन । अर्थस्य नैव तेनास्य सिद्धिर्नाप्यनुमानतः ॥९॥

२४६ घटाद्याभासाद् बाह्यस्यानुपपत्तेर्नासीदाभासः , २४७ ततस्तत्र नानुमानादिप सिद्धिः ॥९॥

> स्वामिनश्चात्मसंस्थस्य भावजातस्य भासनम् । अस्त्येव न विना तस्मादिच्छामर्शः प्रवर्तते ॥ १० ॥

चिदातमनञ्चेश्वरस्य ^{२४८}आत्मनीवाभेदेनार्थेष्विप प्रकाशोऽस्तय-न्यथा प्रतिभासमानार्थै^{२४९}कविषयो निर्मातृतामयो विमर्श इच्छारूपो न स्यात् ॥ १० ॥

स्वभावमवभासस्य विमर्शं विदुरन्यथा । प्रकाशोऽथीपरकतोऽपि स्फटिकादिजहोपमः ॥ ११ ॥

प्रकाशस्य ^{२५०}मुख्य आत्मा प्रत्यवमर्शः , ^{२५१}तं विना ^{२५२}अर्थ-भेदिताकारस्य ^{२५३}अप्यस्य स्वच्छतामात्रं न त्वजाड्यं ^{२५४}चमत्कृ-तेरभावात् ॥ ११॥

²⁴⁴ apy omitted in C. ²⁴⁵ ābhāsitam; ābhātam T. ²⁴⁶ ghaṭādi° cit. ibid. p. 165 vṛttau "ghaṭādi" iti ābhāsasya viśeṣaṇam. ²⁴⁷ tatas cit. ibid. p. 165. ²⁴⁸ ātmanīva cit. ibid. p. 167. ²⁴⁹ °eka° cit. ibid. p. 167 ekaśabdena avaśyam eṣaṇīyaniyantritavā icchayā bhavitavyam ity āha. °arthakalāpaika° G Ch, also possible. ²⁵⁰ mukhya ātmā cit. ibid. p. 175. ²⁵¹ tam vinā cit. ibid. p. 175. ²⁵² arthabhedita° cit. ibid. p. 175 "artha" iti / bheditagrahanena pratikarma vyavasthāmātram sidhyatu ataḥ, na tu ajāḍyam. ²⁵³ apy, only found in T T, is cit. ibid. p. 177 sūtre vṛttau ca ayam apiśabdaḥ svabhavāntarasamuccayārtha iti yāvat. ²⁵⁴ camatkṛter abhāvat cit. ibid. pp. 177-9.

आत्मात एव चैतन्यं चित्कियाचितिकर्तृता- । तात्पर्येणोदितस्तेन जहात् स हि विलक्षणः ॥ १२ ॥

२५५ आत्मद्रव्यस्य २५६ भावात्मकमप्येतज्जडाद् २५७ भेदकतया विम -र्शाख्यं २५८ मुख्यं रूपमुक्तं चैतन्यं २५९ हिशशिकतश्चितिरिति । सा चेतनक्रिया चितिकर्तृतैव ॥ १२ ॥

चितिः प्रत्यवमशितमा परावाक् स्वरसोदिता । स्वातन्त्र्यमेतनमुख्यं तदैश्वर्यं परमात्मनः ॥ १३ ॥

^{२६०}अभिन्नवाच्याद्या वाग् ^{२६१}एषा ^{२६२}नित्यचित्स्वरूपत्वेनाना -द्यन्ता^{२६३}परतन्त्रा , भावान्तरानपेक्षं शुद्धमेतत् स्वातन्त्र्यमैश्वर्यसंज्ञम् ॥ १३ ॥

सा स्फुरत्ता महासत्ता देशकालाविशेषिणी । सैषा सारतया प्रोक्ता हृदयं परमेष्ठिन: ॥ १४॥

^{२६४}स्फुरद्रूपता स्फुरणकर्तृता ^{२६५}अभावाप्रतियोगिनी ^{२६६}अ-भावन्यापिनी सत्ता भवता भवनकर्तृता ^{२६७}नित्या देशकाला-^{२६८}स्पर्शात् सैव ^{२६९}पृत्यवमर्शात्मा चितिक्रियाशिकतः । ^{२७०}सा

²⁵⁵ Cf. ibid. p. 184 vṛṭṭau dravyapadam āṭmasāmānādhikaraṇyena uktam; °dravyasva° T. 256 bhāvātmakam cit. ibid. p. 186. 257 bhedakatayā: bhedatayā T. 258 mukhyam: muktam T. 259 dṛṣiṣaktiṣ citir: citiṣaktir dṛṣir E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T (also possible). 260 abhinnavācyā cit. ibid. p. 190. 261 eṣā: ameyā E. 262 nitya°: nityā N, omitted in T; cf. ibid. p. 195 aham iti yat nityam citsvarūpam taddeṣakālākārakṛtābhyām ādyantābhyām ṣūnyam nityoditam. 263 aparatantrā: aparatantra° E Gh N C Ch Jh N T, paratra G. 264 sphuradrūpatā: sphurattā E Gh N C Jh T (in Ch sphurattā is corrected to sphuradrūpatā); cf. ibid. p. 206 vṛṭtāv api sphuradrūpatā. 265 abhāvāpratiyoginī: abhāvapratiyoginī T, bhāvapratiyoginī Kh. Ch has abhāvā° corrected to abhāva°; abhāvāpratiyoginī is cit. and commented on ibid. p. 201. 266 abhāva°: bhāva° T. 267 nityā cit. ibid. p. 201. 268 °asparṣāt: °asparṣā T. 269 pratyavamarṣātmā: pratyavamarṣā C N. 270 sā viṣvātmanah: sāro viṣvātmano pi T.

 15.14
 विश्वात्मनः परमेश्वरस्य स्वात्म^{२७१}प्रतिष्ठारूपा ^{२७२}हृदयमिति तत्र

 तत्रागमे निगद्यते ॥ १४ ॥

आत्मानमत एवायं ज्ञेयीकुर्यात् पृथिकस्थिति । ज्ञेयं न तु तदौनमुख्यात् खण्डयेतास्य

स्वतन्त्रता ॥ १५ ॥

२७^३एतादृशशुद्धस्वातन्त्रयवशान्नैष^{२७४} पृथगेव लब्धप्रतिष्ठं वस्त्व् २७५अवैति , अपि त्वज्ञेयमात्मानमनियन्त्रितप्रभावतया ज्ञेयीकरोति । भिन्नज्ञेयसापेक्षत्वे ज्ञानकर्तृता म्लायेत् ॥१५॥

स्वातन्त्रयामुक्तमात्मानं स्वातन्त्रयादद्वयात्मनः । प्रभुरीशादिसंकल्पैनिमिय न्यवहारयेत् ॥ १६॥

२७६ अत एव वेद्यैकीभावलक्षणपूर्णतामयात् स्वातन्त्रयात् २७७ तदानीन्तनमेव वेदकमात्मानम् ईश्वरः शिवो वेदितेत्येवमादि -विकल्पैर् ^{२७८}आभासयति भावनादिन्यवहारार्थम् ॥ १६ ॥

नाहन्तादिपरामर्शभेदादस्यान्यतात्मनः । अहंमृश्यतयैवास्य सृष्टेस्तिङ्वाच्यकर्मवत् ॥ १७ ॥

वर्तमानप्रमातृ^{२७९}भावे नाहंप्रत्यवमृश्यस्य प्रमेयत्वेनेदन्ता । विम-र्शभेदे चाभासभेदे च प्रमातैवेश्वरशब्देन सृष्टोऽहं^{२८०}परामर्श-

²⁷¹ °pratiṣṭhārūpā cit. ibid. p. 206; °rūpam T. ²⁷² hṛdayam iti cit. ibid. p. 206. ²⁷³ etadṛśa°: etadṛga° E Gh N C J Jh N T. ²⁷⁴ E Gh N C J Jh N T add tadā, which seems unnecessary. ²⁷⁵ avaiti: vetti T. ²⁷⁶ ata eva cit. ibid. p. 209. ²⁷⁷ tadānīntanam cit. ibid. p. 209. ²⁷⁸ ābhāsayati cit. ibid. p. 211. ²⁷⁹ °bhāve nāhaṃpratyavamṛśyasya: °bhāvenāhitapratyavamṛśyasya E Gh N C J Jh N T. ²⁸⁰ °parāmarśa°, conjectural emeradation for °parāmarśo E Gh N C J Jh N T, °pratyavamṛśyaparāmarśa° T.

I 5.17

व्यवधानेन केवलम्, यथा क्रियादिशब्देन ^{२८१}पचत्यादिवाच्योऽर्थः । यथाहुः क्रियागुणजातिसंबन्धादिशब्दैर्न क्रियादय उच्यन्ते पच-त्यादिमुखेनाभिधानात् । ईश्वरशब्दाद् आत्मशब्दाच्चाहिमिति परामृशन्न् ^{२८२}एवात्मानमवैति न साक्षात्, ^{२८३}प्रतीतिस्त्वस्त्येव स्मृत्येवानुभवमुखेनानुभूतस्य ॥ १७ ॥

मायाशकत्या विभोः सैव भिन्नसंवेद्यगोचरा । कथिता ज्ञानसंकल्पाध्यवसायादिनामभिः ॥ १८ ॥

प्रकाशात्मनः ^{२८४}परमेश्वरस्य मायाशक्त्या स्वात्मरूपं ^{२८५}विश्वं भेदेनाभास्यते । ^{२८६}ततः सैव ^{२८७}चितिर्ज्ञानम्^{२८८ २८९}अध्यक्षम् । ^{२९०}तस्यैव भिन्नस्याभातस्य स्मृतिः ^{२९१}संकल्पोऽध्यवसायो मनोबुद्धिवृत्तिरूपत्वेऽपि ^{२९२}चितिरेव ॥ १८ ॥

साक्षात्कारक्षणेऽप्यस्ति विमर्शः कथमन्यथा । धावनाद्युपपद्येत प्रतिसंधानवर्जितम् ॥ १९॥

^{२९३}साक्षात्कारलक्षणे ज्ञानेsपि चितोsर्थप्रत्यवमर्शोsस्ति सूक्ष्मः,

ucyante pacatyādivācyo'rthaḥ / yathāhuḥ kriyāguṇajātisambandhādiśabdair na kriyādaya ucyante pacatyādimukhenābhidhānāt : pacatyādivācyo 'rtha / yathāhuḥ kriyāguṇajātisambandhādiśabdena kriyādaya ucyante pacatyādivat / pacatyādimukhenābhidhānāt J, kriyādaya ucyante pacatyādivat pacatyādimukhenēty abhidhānāt E Gh N C Ch Jh Ñ Ţ. ²⁸² eva only found in T. ²⁸³ pratītis tv asty eva: pratīti<h>svasyaiva T. ²⁸⁴ Cf. ibid. p. 218 yataḥ pratyagātmā vṛttau parameśvara iti kathitaḥ. ²⁸⁵ viśvam bhedenābhāsyate cit. ibid. p. 218; avabhāsyate T. ²⁸⁶ tataḥ: tadā Ţ, also possible. ²⁸⁷ citir: citikriyā Ţ. ²⁸⁸ J adds apy. ²⁸⁹ adhyakṣam cit. ibid. p. 217. ²⁹⁰ tasyaiva bhinnasya cit. ibid. p. 218. ²⁹¹ The rest of the vṛtti is paraphrased ibid. p. 218 nanu pratyagātmano manovṛttiḥ saṃkal-paḥ, buddhivṛttir vā jñānam, manobuddhyakṣāṇām ca jadatvam iti jñānādayah katham citisvabhāvāḥ, - iti codyam garbhīkrtya vṛttāv apiśabdo yaḥ prayuktaḥ ...; °rūpatvenāpi E Gh N C Ch Jh Ñ Ţ (J has °tve corrected to °tvena). ²⁹² The quotation ibid. p. 218 is a little different: iti vṛttau darśayati "citišaktiḥ" iti. ²⁹³ sākṣātkāralakṣaṇe jñāne: sākṣātkārakṣanajñāne E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ Ţ.

15.19 २९४ वाचनधावनादौ शीघकिया तत्तद्दश्यमानदेशाद्युपादित्साजिहासा-नुसंधानेन हि भवेत्॥१९॥

घटोऽयमित्यध्यवसा नामरूपातिरेकिणी । परेशशक्तिरात्मेव भासते न त्विदन्तया ॥ १०॥

२९५अयमिति घट इति २९६वाध्यवसायो भिन्नप्रकाशमाननाम-रूपा^{२९७}तिरिक्तिश्चितिशक्ति^{२९८}मय एवा^{२९९}तमेवाभेदेन ^{३००}अवभासते ॥ १०॥

केवलं भिन्नसंवेद्यदेशकालानुरोधतः । ज्ञानस्मृत्यवसायादि सक्रमं प्रतिभासते ॥ २१ ॥

चित्तत्त्वस्य मायाशकत्या भिन्नं घटादि संवेद्यं तत्तद्देशकाल-भिन्नं प्रकाश्यते ^{३०१}यस्याभेदेनावष्टम्भाद् ^{३०२}विभिन्नदेशकाला-^{३०३}दिना ज्ञानस्मृत्याद्याभासते ॥ ११॥

इति ज्ञानाधिकारे पञ्चममाहिकम् ॥

²⁹⁴ The rest of the vṛṭṭi is cit. and commented on ibid. pp. 232-3 atha dhāvanasya ādipadasya cu prakārārthasya vyākhyānāya yat śīghrapadam, tasya vyāvartyam āha "kriyāpi" iti sayanāsanādikā niranusandhānatrņatroṭanādikā vā / [...] / anyat desarūpaņ yat dravyam, ādipadena suklapītādilakṣaṇo guṇaḥ, yadi vā anyadesam anyasvabhāvam ca yat dravyādi, tadviṣayā / "tad āha" iti etad vastu dṛśyamānaśahdena āhety arthaḥ / anusandhānaśahdam vivrņoti "tādrgicchāyojanena" iti lakṣaņe tṛtīyā / idam iṣṭam idam iṣyate idam ca eşaniyam iti hānopādānecchānām anusandhānena upalakşitam yad eşaniyatvam, tena vinā "tat" iti hānam upādānam ca pratikṣaṇam yad, tat na upapadyate iti sambandhaḥ. 295 ayam iti ghaṭa iti cit. ibid. p. 241. 296 vā: ca T. 297 °atiriktaś: °atirikta° E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 298 omaya cit. ibid. p. 244. 299 ātmeva: ātmaiva Gh N Ch Jh Ñ T. 300 avabhāsate: ābhāsate Gh N C Ch Ñ, bhāsate J. 301 Cf. the quotations from the tīkā, glossed ibid. p. 271 "bodhyasyāvaṣṭambhaḥ" iti karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī bodhyam avaṣṭabhnāti, bodhah svam rūpam tadekalīnam karotīti yāvat / "athavā" iti atra vyākhyāyām kartari sasthī, bodhasyeti tu karmaṇi. 302 Cf. ibid. p. 272 evam ca atra yojanā - jñānadirupatayā ekajātīyatve 'pi vibhinnadeśakälādinā uparaktam jāānam api jāānāntarāt smaraņam ca smaraņād anyad ābhasate iti samastasūtravrttitātparyam samksipya [tīkākrt] 303 Cf. ibid. p. 269 eşa ca artho vṛttikṛtā spṛṣṭa ādipadena; p. 270 deśakālapadasya ca atra pakṣa upalakşanatvanı vyākhyātam.

षष्ठमाह्निकम्

अहंपत्यवमशे यः प्रकाशात्मापि वाग्वपुः । नासौ विकल्पः स ह्युक्तो द्वयाक्षेपी

विनिश्चयः ॥१॥

³⁰⁸प्रकाशस्यात्मन्यहमिति ³⁰⁹परावागूपत्वात् ³⁰⁸साभिलापोऽपि ³⁰⁸स्वभावभूतः प्रत्यवमर्शो ³⁰⁷न विकल्प इत्युच्यते, ³⁰⁸स हि ³¹⁰प्रतियोगिनिषेधपूर्वो निश्चयो न च ³¹⁹अत्र प्रतियोगि-संभवः ॥ १॥

^{३१२}तथा हि

भिन्नयोरवभासो हि स्याद्धटाघटयोर्द्धयोः । प्रकाशस्येव नान्यस्य भेदिनस्त्ववभासनम् ॥ १ ॥

प्रकाशाद् ^{३१३}द्वितीयस्य भिन्नस्य प्रतियोगिनोऽप्रकाश^{३१४}संज्ञस्य ^{३१५}अनवभासने प्रकाशे^{३१६}तरत्वं ^{३१७}न स्यात् । तस्य ^{३१८}अनाभासे न्यपोहनायोगाद्विकल्पताहानिः^{३१९} ॥ १ ॥

prakāśyasyātmani: prakāśātmani C J Ñ. Cf. the quotation ibid. p. 274 aham ity ātmani. 305 parāvāgrūpatvāt cit. and commented on ibid. pp. 274-5; para° T. 306 sābhilāpo: sābhilāşo (then corrected to sābhilāpo) Ch J. 307 svabhāvabhūtaḥ cit. and commented on ibid. pp. 278-9. 308 na vikalpaḥ cit. ibid. p. 274. 309 Cit. ibid. p. 274 "sa hi" iti vikalpaḥ. 310 Cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 274 pratiyoginiṣedhapūrvatvād eva niścayaśabdavācyatā iti yojanīyam; "niṣedha" cit. ibid. niṣedhaśabdena nirasanam vyācaṣṭe. 311 Cit. ibid. p. 274 "atra" iti viśuddhe prakāśe and (through the tīkā) p. 279 "atra" iti vṛttigatam vyācaṣṭe "viśuddhe" iti viśeṣaṇam māyāpramātur vyavacchedāya. 312 tathā hi, only found in T, cit. ibid. p. 280. 313 dvitīyasya bhinnasya cit. ibid. pp. 282-3. 314 Cf. ibid. p. 284 vyapadeśa iti tucchena hi atuccham eva vyapadiśyate ity anena samjñapadam vyākhyātam; "samjñakasya E. 315 anavabhāsane: ābhāsane T, anavabhāsena Ch. 316 Cf. ibid. p. 287 itaraśabdena iti vṛttau. 317 na syāt cit. ibid. p. 288. 318 anābhāse: anavabhāse E Gh; cf. ibid. p. 288 pratiyogyanābhāse vā iti (from the tīkā). 319 Ch adds iti.

16.3 ^{३२०}तथा च

तदतत्प्रतिभाभाजा मात्रैवातद्वयपोहनात् । तन्निश्चयनमुक्तो हि विकल्पो घट इत्ययम् ॥ ३॥

प्रमातुर् ^{३२१}एव स्वतन्त्रस्यान्तर्लीन^{३२२}तदतदर्थाभासस्य ^{३२३}अ-तदपोहनेन घट इति निश्चयो विकल्पो नाम न्यापारः ॥३॥

चित्तत्त्वं मायया हित्वा भिन्न एवावभाति यः । देहे बुद्धावथ पाणे कल्पिते नभसीव वा ॥ ४ ॥ प्रमातृत्वेनाहमिति विमर्शोऽन्यव्यपोहनात् । विकल्प एव स परप्रतियोग्यवभासजः ॥ ५ ॥

चित्तत्त्वस्यैवेश्वरस्य मायाशकत्या भेदा^{3२४}वभासिनि शरीरे बुद्धाव् ^{3२५}आन्तरे वा स्पर्शे तदुत्तीर्णे वाकाश इव शून्य एव ^{3२६}विकल्पितेश्हमिति प्रमातृभावेन विमर्शः, ^{3२७}तत्तदाभासमानशरी-रादि^{3२८}प्रतियोग्यपोहनकरणाद् ^{3२९}घटोश्यमितिवद् विकल्प एव³³⁰ ॥ ४-५॥

³²⁰ tathā ca, only found in T, cit. ibid. pp. 290 and 280. 321 eva cit. ibid. p. 291. 322 °tadatad°: °tad° E Gh N C Ch Jh Ñ T (in J °tadatad° is corrected to °tad°). 323 atadapohanena cit. ibid. p. 293; °vyapohanena E Gh. 324 °avabhāsini: °avabhāsinī N. 325 āntare vā sparše cit. and commented on ibid. pp. 295-6; vā omitted in E Gh N Ch J Jh T, āntarasparša C, āntarasparše Ñ. 326 vikalpite: kalpite E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ T; kalpite (kār.) is glossed p. 297 with vikalpanamātraparamārthah. 327 Cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 299 tasmin tasmin nijaniyatarūpe šarīrādau yāvad ābhāsamānatvam, tāvad eva tasya šarīrāder avašyam pratiyoginah sakašād apohah kriyate iti yo vṛttyarthah ...; tad° T. 328 pratiyogyapohanakaranāt cit. ibid. p. 299; °pratiyogyo 'pohana° Ñ. 329 ghato 'yam itivat cit. ibid. p. 299. 330 Ch adds iti.

कादाचित्कावभासे या पूर्विभासादियोजना । संस्कारात्कल्पना प्रोक्ता सापि भिन्नावभासिनि ॥ ६ ॥

³³ विच्छिन्नविच्छिन्नेषु ³³ शून्यदेहाद्याभासभेदेषु पूर्वाभासा-³³ हंकाराख्यानाम् ³³⁸ एैक्ययोजनान्तःपूर्वा³³⁴ भासस्थिति³³⁶ लक्षण-संस्काराश्रिता प्रमातृन्यापाररूपा कल्पनैव ³³⁰ प्रत्यभिज्ञाख्या ॥ ६ ॥

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तदेवं व्यवहारेऽपि प्रभुर्देहादिमाविशन् । भान्तमेवान्तरथौँ घमिच्छया भासयेद्वहिः ॥ ७॥

³³²आदिसर्गे ³³⁸वा व्यवहारेऽपि वा ³⁸⁰महेश्वरो ³⁸¹माया-शक्तया देहादिमात्मत्वेन ³⁸⁸अभिनिविश्य प्रमातारं कुर्वन्नन्तःस्थितं विभान्तमेव ³⁸³तं तमर्थ ³⁸⁸क्रमेण बहीरूपं ³⁸⁹कर्तृशक्त्या ³⁸⁶भासयति । ³⁸⁰तथाभासनमेवोत्पादनम् । अस्य देहाद्यनाविष्टस्य ³⁸⁷तु स्वतो युगपदहमिदमिति सर्वार्थप्रकाशः ॥ ७॥

sārvatriko viccheda uktaḥ. 332 sūnya° cit. ibid. p. 315. 333 E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T invert the last two members of the compound, but the paraphrase ibid. p. 310 follows the order of T: pūrvābhāsena yā aikyayojanā ādigrahanād ahamkārena tatsamānādhikaranena ca caitra ityādināmnā ca, sā kalpanaiva iti vrītau sambandhaḥ. 334 aikyayojanā cit. ibid. p. 312; aikyam C Ch. 335 °ābhāsa°: avabhāsa° E N Ch J Jh T. 336 °lakṣaṇa°: °lakṣaṇam C N. 337 pratyabhijñā cit. and commented on ibid. p. 314; pratyabhijñāna° T. 338 ādisarge vā vyavahārakāle 'pi vā cit. ibid. p. 324. 339 vā: omitted in Jh T, 'pi vā C N. 340 maheśvaro cit. ibid. p. 317. 341 māyāśaktyā cit. ibid. p. 316. 342 abhiniviśya: abhiniveśya Ch. 343 taṃ tam: tattad° E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 344 krameṇa cit. ibid. p. 316. 345 kartṛśaktyā cit. ibid. pp. 316 and 323. 346 bhāsayati cit. ibid. pp. 317 and 324. 347 tathābhāsanam evotpādanam: yathāvabhāsanam evāpūrvam evotpādanam N C, yathāvabhāsanam evāpūrvam evotpādanam Ch; I have accepted the reading T,

I 6.8

एवं स्मृतौ विकल्पे वाप्यपोहनपरायणे । ज्ञाने वाप्यन्तराभासः स्थित एवेति निश्चितम् ॥ ८॥

सर्वसंवित्सु ^{३४९}सर्वार्थावभासः प्रमातृसंलीनश्चित्तत्त्ववद् ^{३५०}आनु -रूप्येण प्रकाशमानः ^{३५१}सदा स्थित एव ॥८॥

किंतु नैसर्गिको ज्ञाने बहिराभासनात्मनि । पूर्वानुभवरूपस्तु स्थितः स स्मरणादिषु ॥ ९॥

^{३५२}ज्ञाने बहिराभासनरूपे ^{३५३}सहज एव ^{३५४}चित्तत्त्वस्यान्त-रथी^{३५५}वभासः , स्मृत्यादौ तु ^{३५६}पूर्वानुभवात्मा । अत एव स्मृतिः संस्कारजोच्यते ॥९॥

स नैसर्गिक एवास्ति विकल्पे स्वैरचारिणि । यथाभिमतसंस्थानाभासनाद् बुद्धिगोचरे ॥ १०॥

^{३५७}स्वतन्त्रस्तु विकल्पश्चक्षुराद्यगोचरमपि बुद्धिविषयता^{३५८}पाद-नेन यथारुचि पूर्वानुभूतत्वाविमर्शनेन नवमेव तं तमर्थमाभासयित संनिवेश^{३५९}विशेषं च । ^{३६०}तत्रासावर्थः सहज एवास्ति ॥ १० ॥

³⁴⁹ sarvārthāvabhāsaḥ: sarvārthābhāsaḥ Gh N Jh T, sarvābhāsaḥ J. 350 ānurūpyeṇa: ānupūrvyeṇa E Ñ, ānurūpeṇa T; cſ. ibid. p. 328 iyatā ānurūpyapadam vivṛtam. 351 sadā sthita eva: sthita eva Ñ, sthita eva sadā C. 352 jñāne bahirābhāsanarūpe cit. ibid. p. 329; °ābhāsanātmarūpe C Ñ, °ābhāsanātmani rūpe Ch Jh T. 353 sahaja cit. ibid. p. 329 (through the ṭīkā) "sahaja" iti bhagavata eva svātantryād ullāsitaḥ iti yāvat. 354 cittattvasyāntar cit. ibid. p. 330. 355 °avabhāsaḥ: °ābhāsaḥ Gh N J Jh Ţ. 356 pūrva°: pūrvārtha° T. 357 Cſ. ibid. p. 332 nanu saugatavat kim iha vikalpa eva svatantro yena vṛttau tathā uktam. 358 °āpādanena yathāruci pūrvānubhūtatvāvimaršanena navam eva tam tam artham: °āpādanena navam etam artham Ñ. 359 °višeṣaṃ: °višiṣṭaṃ T. 360 tatra cit. ibid. p. 335 tatra iti vṛttau svatantravikalpo nirdiṣṭaḥ.

I 6.11

अत एव यथाभीष्टसमुल्लेखावभासनात् । ज्ञानिकये स्फूटे एव सिद्धे सर्वस्य जीवतः ॥ ११ ॥

अपूर्वार्थनिर्माणज्ञान^{३६१}सामर्थ्याच् ^{३६२}च विकल्प एव सर्वस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वकर्तृत्वं ^{३६३}च स्फुटम् ॥११॥

इति ज्ञानाधिकारे षष्ठमाहिकम् ॥

सप्तममाद्धिकम्

या चैषा प्रतिभा तत्तत्पदार्थक्रमरूषिता । अक्रमानन्तिचद्रूपः प्रमाता स महेश्वरः ॥१॥

तत्तत्पदार्थक्रमाच्छुरितश् ^{३६४}चैषोऽन्तःस्थित एव ^{३६५}आभासः ^{३६६}सर्वसंवित्कालन्याप्यक्रमानन्तचिन्मय आत्मसंज्ञः प्रमाता स्वाङ्गभूते प्रमेये निर्मातृतया महेश्वरश्च ॥१॥

> तत्तद्विभिन्नसंवित्तिमुखैरेकप्रमातिर । प्रतितिष्ठत्सु भावेषु ज्ञातेयमुपपद्यते ॥ २ ॥

^{३६७}अनेकसंवित्स्रोतोमुखैरेकप्रमातृसिन्धुमुपलीय भावभेदाः का-र्यकारणतादि^{३६८}न्यवहारसमन्वयं भजन्ते ॥ २ ॥

³⁶¹ C adds °kriyā°. 362 ca cit. ibid. p. 336. 363 ca sphuṭam: sphuṭam J, cāsphuṭam Ñ. 364 ca omitted in T. 365 ābhāsaḥ: avabhāsaḥ TJ, but cf. ibid. p. 341 ābhāsa eva ātmā iti vṛttigrantham 366 sarvasaṃvitkālavyāpī cit. ibid. p. 341. 367 Cf. ibid. p. 342, where the exposition of the kār. merges with that of the vṛtti: ... api tu tās tā nīlasukhādiviṣayeṣu vibhinnā yā saṃvido niścayāntāḥ, tāny eva mukhāni upāyās tair nadīsrotaḥsthānīyair nenīyamānā haṭavāhenaiva aham ity ekamahāsaṃvitsamudre yadā ābhimukhyena viśrāntiṃ yānti, tadā eṣāṃ jñāteyaṃ parasparaṃ svasvāmitākāryakāraṇabhāvādiḥ samanvayo vyavahārātmā upapattyā ghaṭate. 368 °vyavahāra°: °vyavahāram Ñ.

^{17.3} देशकालक्रमजुषामर्थानां स्वसमापिनाम् । सकृदाभाससाध्योऽसावन्यथा कः समन्वयः ॥ ३॥

^{३६९}स्वरूपमवभासनं च भावानां स्वात्मपरिनिष्ठितमेव । युगप-देकाभासनिबन्धनश्चैषां समन्वयः । सो^{३७०}ऽभिन्नः प्रमातृलीनतया कल्पते ॥ ३॥

पत्यक्षानुपलम्भानां तत्तक्किन्नांशपातिनाम् । कार्यकारणतासिद्धिहेतुतैकप्रमातृजा ॥ ४ ॥

कार्यकारणभाव इव तिसद्धिरिप प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भैरेकप्रमातृ-मुखेन समन्वयमागत्य ^{३७१}क्रियते , असमन्विताः प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भाः क्रिमक^{३७२}स्विषयमात्र^{३७३}ज्ञापनक्षीणा नान्योन्यापेक्षोपलक्षणक्षमाः ॥ ४ ॥

स्मृतौ यैव स्वसंवित्तिः प्रमाणं स्वात्मसंभवे । पूर्वानुभवसद्भावे साधनं सैव नापरम् ॥ ५ ॥

पूर्वानुभव^{३७४}स्वसंवेदनस्य ^{३७५}अभावात् ^{३७६}स्मृतिस्वसंवेदनमेव

bhedena nirdeśah kṛtaḥ / āha "svarūpa" iti svarūpe äbhasane prakāśananiścayanarūpe yat bhedapratipādanam 370 'bhinnah: 'bhinnao' T J N. The latter would convey a meaning slightly different but equally acceptable (however, as I have already pointed out, the omission of the visarga before a samyoga is frequent in T). The quotation ibid. p. 344 so 'bhinna ityādivṛttiḥ is not useful, since 'bhinna might be quoted as being the first part of the compound; but cf., in a similar context, ibid. p. 351 pramātṛlagnatvena yad abhinnarūpam 371 kriyate only found in T. E C N have samanvitā and the same reading is cit. ibid. p. 362, but meaning requires asamanvitāḥ T (cf. also āgatyāsamanvitā Gh N Ch Ih, °tāḥ T; in J agatyā is corrected to āgatya). 372 °sva° omitted in T. 373 °jāāpanakṣīṇā: °jāānaparikṣīṇā Ch Jh, °jāāpanakṣīṇā corrected to jāānaparikṣīṇā T. 374 °svasamvedanasya abhāvāt smṛtisvasamvedanam evātraika°: °svasamvedanam evātraika° N. 375 abhāvāt cit. ibid. p. 367. 376 smṛtih T.

^{३७७}अत्रैकार्थाभासमयप्रमातृरूपं ^{३७८}स्मृतिस्वरूप इव प्रमाणम् । ^{३७९}स्मृतेः पूर्वानुभवाभासाभावे कार्यकारणभावासिद्धेर्न कार्य-लिङ्गता ॥ ५॥

बाध्यबाधकभावोऽपि स्वात्मनिष्ठाविरोधिनाम् । ज्ञानानामुदियादेकप्रमातृपरिनिष्ठितेः ॥ ६ ॥

भिन्न^{३८०}स्वाभासमात्रनिष्ठानां ज्ञानानां को विरोधः , तत्कथं बाध्यबाधकत्वम् । एकप्रमातृविश्रान्तौ तु युक्तम् ॥६॥

विविकतभूतलज्ञानं घटाभाव ३८१मितिर्यथा । तथा चेच्छुकितकाज्ञानं रूप्यज्ञानाप्रमात्ववित् ॥ ७ ॥

इह भूतले घटो नास्तीति घटाभावज्ञानं केवलभूतलज्ञानमेव शून्यभूतलस्य घटाभावरूपत्वात् । तथैव यदि शुक्तिका-रजतयोरपरस्परात्मत्वाच् ^{३८२}छुक्तिकाज्ञानं ^{३८३}रजताभावज्ञानमिति ^{३८४}प्रत्यक्षं बाधकम् ॥ ७॥

³⁷⁷ atra cit. ibid. p. 368 "atra" ity asya vyākhyānam "pūrvānubhave" iti. 378 smṛti-svarupa iva pramāṇam / smṛteḥ omitted in C N. 379 The whole sentence is paraphrased and commented on (with some literal quotations) ibid. pp. 368-9 pūrvānubhavakāla eva samanantarakṣaṇe smṛter udbhavo nāsti; smṛtisamaye tu pūrvakṣaṇe yadi anubhavaḥ prakāṣeta vahnidhūmayor iva, gṛhyetāpi karyakāraṇabhāvaḥ, smṛtipūrvakṣaṇe tu na kathamcid anubhavaṣya prakāṣaḥ, na tu atra smṛtikāla eveti mantavyaṃ sahabhāvena prakāṣe kāryakāraṇa-tvāṣiddheḥ / etadartham api ca vṛttau pūrvagrahaṇam / smṛter na kāryaliṅgatā yataḥ pūrvaṣya anubhavaṣya ābhāso nāsti yena tasya smṛtiṃ prati kāraṇabhāvaḥ siddhyet iti vṛttisaṅgatiḥ. pūrva°: pūrvārtha° T. 380 Cf. ibid. p. 372 vṛttau ca vivṛtau ca "svaṣ ca abhāṣaṣ ca" iti "svaṣ ca viṣayaṣ ca" iti yojyam. 381 °mitir: °matir Ch Jh (this is also the reading found in ĪPV and ĪPVV). 382 chuktikā°: chukti° Gh N Ch J Jh T. 383 rajatāhhāvajāānam: rajatajāānāpramātvavedanam J, omitted in E Gh N C Ch Jh N T. 384 pratyakṣaṃ: pratyakṣaゥ E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T; cf. ibid. p. 381 atra āha "tac ca" iti pratyakṣam eva bādhakam.

नैवं शुद्धस्थलज्ञानात् सिध्येत् तस्याघटात्मता । न तूपलिधयोग्यस्याप्यत्राभावो घटात्मनः ॥ ८॥

केवलभूतलज्ञानाद्भूतलस्याघटात्मता सिध्यति , न तु तत्राधारे भिन्नो दर्शनयोग्योऽपि घटो नास्तीति ॥८॥

विविक्तं भूतलं शश्वद्भावानां स्वात्मनिष्ठितेः । तत्कथं जातु तज्ज्ञानं भिन्नस्याभावसाधनम् ॥ ९॥

भूतलम् ^{३८५}अभूतलिविवन्तं सदैव तत्कथं तज्ज्ञानं कदा-चिदेव^{3८६} तत्र भिन्नघटाभावं साधयेत् । भिन्नघटिविविक्तता ^{३८७}च भूतलस्य कादाचित्कं रूपं स्याद्यदि घटसिहततापि कदाचित् स्वरूपं भवेत् , न त्वेवम् । पदार्थौ द्वावेव स्वात्मपरिनिष्ठितौ , ^{३८८}साहित्यं न तदितिरिक्तम्भयात्मकम् ^{३८९}एकरूपम् । ज्ञानमेकं ^{३९०}तूभयाभाससंसर्गात्मकमप्य् ^{३९१}एकाभासज्ञानान्तरा^{३९२}भावरूपम् । वस्तु पुनः स्वात्मनिष्ठमेव परिच्छिनत्तीति न वस्तुबलेन ^{३९३}पदेशदर्शनात् प्रदेशसिद्धिबद्धटाभावसिद्धिः । उभया^{३९४}भासै-कज्ञानात्मककार्या^{३९५}भावात्तु स्यात् । न चैवं व्यवधानेन ^{३९६}प-तीतिः प्रदेशदर्शनादेव ^{३९७}तितसद्धेः ॥ ९॥

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³⁸⁵ abhūtala°: abhūtalaṃ Ch. 386 T adds hi. 387 ca: api T. 388 sāhityaṃ na: sāhityena (sāhitye na) E Gh C Ch J Jh Ñ Ṭ, sāhityeva N. 389 ekarüpam: ekaṃ rūpam T.
390 tūbhayābhāsasaṃsarga°: tūbhayāsaṃsarga° T, tūbhayātmakasaṃsarga° (corrected to
tūbhayābhāsasaṃsarga°) Jh, tūbhayātmakam ekarūpaṃ jūānam ekaṃ tūbhayāsaṃsarga°
Ch. 391 ekābhāsa°: ekābhāsaṃ E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ Ṭ. 392 °abhāva°: °bhāva° Ñ.
393 pradešadaršanāt: °pradaršanāt C. 394 °ābhāsaika°: °ābhāsātmakaika° (also possible)
K C Ñ, °ābhāsakaika° E Gh N Ch Jh, °ābhāsakaika° corrected to °ābhāsātmakaika° J
and to °ābhāsātmaka° Ţ. 395 °abhāvāt: °abhāvavat E Gh Ch Jh Ñ, °abhāvāt corrected to
°abhāvavat J (vice versa in C Ṭ). 396 pratītiḥ: pratīti° Ch. 397 tat°: tathā° (also possible) E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ Ţ.

किंत्वालोकचयोऽन्धस्य स्पर्शो वोष्णादिको मृदुः । तत्रास्ति साधयेत्तस्य स्वज्ञानमघटात्मताम् ॥ १०॥

प्रदेशेष्वालोक^{३९८}पूरं सन्तमसे मृदुमुष्णादिकं स्पर्शं वा घटरूपस्पर्शाभावात्मकमनुभूयालोकादि घटाभावोऽत्रास्ति , घटो ना-स्तीति ^{३९९}व्यवहर्तुं युक्तम् ॥ १० ॥

> पिशाचः स्यादनालोकोऽप्यालोकाभ्यन्तरे यथा । अदृश्यो भूतलस्यान्तरनिषेध्यः स सर्वथा ॥ ११ ॥

न चैवमालोकस्य पिशाचान्यत्वात् ^{४००}तत्र पिशाचनिषेधप्रसङ्गः , स ह्यदृश्यो ^{४०१}ऽन्यत्वेऽपि यथा ^{४०२}मृद्गोलकस्याप्यन्तरनिवा-र्यस्तथालोकस्यान्तरे । ततस्तस्य ^{४०३}अन्यमत इवास्मन्मतेऽपि ^{४०४}नादृश्यत्वादभावसिद्धिः ॥ ११ ॥

> एवं रूप्यविदाभावरूपा शुक्तिमतिर्भवेत् । न त्वाद्यरजतज्ञप्तेः स्यादप्रामाण्यवेदिका ॥ १२॥

शुक्तितज्ञानमेव रजतज्ञानाभावरूपं सिध्यति , तदानीन्तनशुक्ति -४०५ ज्ञानानुभवेन न भिन्नस्यातीतस्य रूप्यज्ञानस्याप्रामाण्यम् ॥ १२ ॥

³⁹⁸ °pūram: °prasaram E (Kh °pūram) Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. ³⁹⁹ vyavahartum: vyavaharanam Gh. ⁴⁰⁰ tatra cit. ibid. p. 389 ... iti tridhā tatraśabdo vyākhyātaḥ; tatrāpi E. ⁴⁰¹ 'nyatve: 'nyathātve Kh; cf. ibid. p. 389 anyatvam saptamyantam yat vrttāv uktam. ⁴⁰² mrdgolakasyāpy: bhūgolakasya N Ch Jh T, °bhūgolasya E Gh C J N. ⁴⁰³ anyamata: anyatra C. ⁴⁰⁴ nādrśyatvād abhāva°: nādrśyatvābhāva° E Gh N Ch Jh T, na drśyatvād abhāva° C N. ⁴⁰⁵ jñānānubhāvena na bhinnasyātītasya rūpyajñānasyāprāmānyam: °jñānasyāprāmānye sā E Gh N T (this is also the original reading of C Jh, then corrected to °jñānānubhavena bhinnasya rūpyajñānasyāprāmānye sā; the latter is the reading of J), °jñānānubhave jñānasyāprāmānye sā N, °jñānasyād aprāmānye sā Ch.

धर्म्यसिद्धेरिप भवेद् बाधा नैवानुमानतः । स्वसंवेदनसिद्धा तु युक्ता सैकप्रमातृजा ॥ १३॥

शुक्तिकाज्ञानकाले च न पूर्वं रजतज्ञानमस्ति । ततः स धर्मी न सिद्ध इति नानुमानेन बाधा , एकप्रमातृ^{४०६}मय^{४०७}स्व-संवेदने त्वेकदेशावष्टम्भ्युभय^{४०८}ज्ञानमयसंबन्धभासनात् सिध्यति । पश्चात्^{४०९}संवादः प्रत्यक्षस्वसंवेदने पूर्वस्यापि तस्य ^{४१०}भासनादेकं प्रमाणमितरदन्यथेति भवति । संवादोऽप्येक^{४११}प्रमातृकृतः ॥ १३ ॥

इत्थमत्यर्थभिन्नार्थावभासखिते विभौ । समलो विमलो वापि न्यवहारोऽनुभूयते ॥ १४ ॥

मायाशकत्या भेदविषयोऽयं सर्वी व्यवहारस् ^{४१२}तथाज्ञानिनां शुद्धोऽज्ञानान्धानां ^{४१३}तुं मलिनस्तत्तद्^{४१४}भिन्नार्थावभासभाजि भगवति ^{४१५}संभाव्यते ^{४१६}ऽनुभवेन ॥ १४॥

इति ज्ञानाधिकारे सप्तममाह्निकम्॥

^{406 °}maya° omitted in C. 407 °svasamvedane: °samvedane E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ T. 408 °jñānamayasamhandhabhāsanāt: °jñānam asambaddham E Gh J Ñ, °jñānasambaddha° N, °jñānasambaddham Ch T, °jñānam asambaddham corrected to °jñānasambandhasambaddham Ch T, °jñānam asambaddham corrected to jñānam asambaddham Jh. 409 °samvādah pratyakṣasvasamvedane: sasamvādapratyakṣe svasamvedane E Gh C Ch J Jh Ñ T, samvādapratyakṣe svasamvedane N. 410 bhāsanād: ābhāsanād E Ch Ñ T. 411 °pramātṛ°: °mātṛ° J. 412 tathājñāninam: tathā jñāninām E, but cf. ibid. p. 405 tathājñāninām iti vṛttau samastam padam. 413 tu omitted in C Ñ. 414 °bhinna°: °vibhinna° E C Ñ. 415 sambhāvyate cit. and commented on ibid. p. 405 sambhāvyate iti vṛttāv uktam mūḍhānām jaghīti tathābhimānābhāve 'pi uktopadeśapariśīlanadiśā prakāśate eva ayam arthah iti darśayitum. 416 'nubhavena: 'nubhavane Ñ.

अष्टममाह्निकम्

तात्कालिकाक्षसामक्ष्यसापेक्षाः केवलं क्विचत् । आभासा अन्यथान्यत्र त्वन्धान्धतमसादिषु ॥ १॥

आभासाः कदाचित् सन्निहितप्रत्यक्षाक्षिप्ता घटोऽयमिति ४^{१७}व्यवहारहेतवः , अन्धतमसादौ तु पूर्वानुभवोत्थिताः ॥ १ ॥

विशेषोऽथविभासस्य सत्ताः ल पुतः कवित्त । विकल्पेषु भवेद्वाविभवद्भृतार्थगामिषु ॥ १॥

स्मृत्युत्पेक्षारूपेषु प्रत्यक्षपृष्ठपातिषु ^{४१८}स्वतन्त्रेषु वान्येषु ^{४१९}विकल्पेषु कालत्रय^{४२०}विषयेष्वर्थावभासो ^{४२१}ऽन्तस्तुल्य एवाव-स्थितः ॥ १ ॥

सुखादिषु च सौख्यादिहेतुष्विप च वस्तुषु । अवभासस्य सद्भावेऽप्यतीतत्वात् तथास्थितिः ॥ ३॥

सुखदुःखाद्याभासास्तत्साधनाभासाश्च सदैवान्तः सन्तोऽपि न तथाह्नादादिमयीं स्थितिं कुर्वन्त्यतीतत्वाद् बहिस् ^{४२२}तदानीमभावात् ^{४२३}तदात्वविशिष्टानां च तथाकारित्वात् ॥३॥

vyavahārahetavaḥ: vyavahārahetor E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ Ṭ; vyavahāra° cit. ibid. p. 408. 418 svatantreṣu vānyeṣu: asvatantreṣu vānyeṣu C Gh Ñ Ṭ, asvatantreṣu nyeṣu N, va svatantreṣu vānyeṣu J, vā svatantreṣv anyeṣu T. 419 vikalpeṣu omitted in Gh. 420 °viṣayeṣv: °viśeṣeṣv J. 421 'ntas: 'nta eva T. 422 Cf. ibid. p. 410 (perhaps from the tīkā) tadānīm ity anena hi vartamānatā bāhyaniṣṭhaiva iti darśitam. 423 tadātvaviśiṣṭānām: tathātvam aviśiṣṭānām T; cf. ibid. p. 410 tadatvam vartamānatā.

I 8.4

गाढमुन्लिख्यमाने तु विकल्पेन सुखादिके । तथास्थितिस्तथैव स्यात् स्फुटमस्योपलक्षणात् ॥ ४ ॥

४२४कुतिश्चित् प्रयत्निविशेषात् ^{४२५}स्वतन्त्रविकल्पोल्लिखतं स्फुटमेव सुखादि ^{४२६}जातं विकासादिहेतुः ॥४॥

भावाभावावभासानां बाह्यतोपाधिरिष्यते । नात्मा सत्ता ततस्तेषामान्तराणां सतां सदा ॥ ५॥

^{४२७} सर्वेषामाभासानां ^{४२८}भावाभावविषयाणामबहीरूपत्वेऽपि सत्ता-स्त्येव स्मृत्यादौ , बाह्यत्वं हि तेषामुपाधिर्न स्वरूपम् । अभावा-^{४२९}भासस्यान्तःसत्तायामपि ^{४३०}बहिरभावात्तथात्वम् ॥ ५॥

आन्तरत्वात् प्रमात्रैकये नैषां भेदनिबन्धना । अर्थकियापि बाह्यत्वे सा भिन्नाभासभेदतः ॥ ६ ॥

अन्तरच सर्वेषामेव नीलसुखाद्या^{४३१}भासानां ^{४३२}सदा सत्त्वेऽपि प्रमातृमात्ररूपत्वात् कार्यकारणादिभेदा^{४३३}श्रया नार्थक्रिया , प्रमा-तुर्भेदे ^{४३४}ऽपि ^{४३५}बौद्धचाक्षुषत्वादिभेदेनाभासभेदादाभासाश्रितार्थका-रितापि ^{४३६}भिद्यते रूपादीनाम् ॥६॥

^{**}ananirākaraṇāya.** 426 jātam could also be considered as being compounded with sukhādi with the meaning of 'multitude, collection', without this involving a notable variation of the general meaning. 427 sarveṣām ābhāsānām: bhāvābhāvāvabhāsānām (which is the same as the first pāda of the kār.) E Gh N C Ch N T, bhāvābhāvāvabhāsānām corrected to sarveṣām ābhāsānām Jh. 428 bhāvābhāvaviṣayānām is paraphrased and commented on ibid. p. 412 nanu evam vṛttāv ābhasānām bhāvābhāvā viṣayatvena katham uktaḥ ... and pp. 414-15 nanu ca ābhāsā viṣayaḥ, yato grāhyāḥ, tat katham teṣām vṛttau bahuvrīhinā viṣayitvam darsitam. 429 °ābhāsasya: °abhāvasya N. 430 bahirabhāvāt: bahirābhāsāt T; cf., in a similar context, ŚDVṛ p. 130 bāhye prakāṣanābhāvād 431 °ābhāsānām: °abhāsabhedānām T (also possible). 432 sadā sattve: sadasattve E Gh N C Ch Jh N T 433 °āṣrayā nārtha°: °āṣrayaṇārtha° Ch. 434 'pi: hi E Gh C N, pi corrected to hi Gh. 435 bauddha°: boddhya° T. 436 bhidyate: vidyate T.

I 8.7

चिन्मयत्वेऽवभासानामन्तरेव स्थितिः सदा । माययाभासमानानां बाह्यत्वाद् बहिरप्यसौ ॥ ७॥

चित्स्वरूपत्वेनाभासानां सदान्तस्तत्त्व एव स्थितिः । मायाशक्त्या बहिः ^{४३७}प्रत्यक्षत्वेन ^{४३८}प्रकाश्यमानेषु भावेषु प्रकाशा^{४३९}व्यतिरि - क्तेषु ^{४४०}बहिराभास इत्युच्यते , ^{४४९}तदापि तेषामान्तरत्वमेव सिसृ - क्षादौ तु भावानामपि ^{४४२} ॥ ७ ॥

विकल्पे योऽयमुल्लेखः सोऽपि बाह्यः पृथकप्रथः । प्रमात्रैकात्म्यमान्तर्यं ततो भेदो हि बाह्यता ॥ ८॥

विकल्पे घटाद्युल्लेखश्चक्षुराद्यगोचरोऽपि पृथगाभासाद् बाह्य एव । ^{४४३}अहंविमर्शो ह्यान्तरत्वम्, इदिमिति तु बाह्यता । एवं ^{४४४}च घटादीनामुभयी ^{४४५}बाह्यता बाह्यान्तःकरणद्वयीवेद्यता, ^{४४६}सुखादेस्त्व् ^{४४७}एकान्तःकरणवेद्यतैव ॥८॥

kāśamāneşu E Gh. This is also the reading cit. ibid. p. 421, but all the argumentation that accompanies it presupposes prakāśyamāneşu: "ata eva" iti yato 'bhimānamātrasāram māyīyam ābhāsate svātantryam eṣām nīlādīnām, tato vṛttau pāratantryam eṣām nīrūpitam, svātantryam tu na spṛṣṭam iti darśayati "antarnīta" iti svatantrasyaiva hi pradhānakriyāyām tanniṣṭhavighnasambhāvanānirāsopayogipraiṣādikriyāntaraviṣayam pāratantryam viṣaye 'pi prasaratīva mukhyakriyārūpe, na tu paramarthatah pradhānakriyāyām asambhavatsvātantryah praiṣādibhir abhisambadhyate / nanu sūtrānusāreṇa vṛttau "ābhāsyamāneṣu" iti vaktavye "prakāśa[śya?]māneṣu " iti kā vācoyuktiḥ ' 439 °avyatirikteṣu: °vyatirikteṣu T. 440 bahirābhāsa cit. ibid. p. 422. 441 tadāpi cit. ibid. p. 423 and glossed with pratyakṣatve 'pi. 442 T adds iti. 443 ahamvimarśo cit. ibid. p. 426. 444 ca omitted in E Gh N C Ch Jh N T. 445 bahyatā omitted in E Gh N C Ch Jh N T. T. 446 sukhādes tu cit. ibid. p. 429, where also ghatādīnām is mentioned. 447 ekāntaḥ°: ekānta° Ch.

I 8.9

उल्लेखस्य सुखादेश्च प्रकाशो बहिरात्मना । इच्छातो भर्तुरध्यक्षरूपो ^{४४८} sक्ष्यादिभुवां यथा ॥ ९ ॥

४४९ उल्लेखसुखदु:खलज्जादीनां चाक्षुषाणां रूपादीनामिवेश्वरस्य शक्त्या साक्षात्करणरूपो बौद्ध: प्रकाश: ॥ ९ ॥

> तद् ^{४५०} ऐक्येन विना ^{४५१}न स्यात् संविदां लोकपद्धतिः । प्रकाशैक्यात्तदेकत्वं मातैकः स इति स्थितम् ॥ १० ॥

तत्तिद्विभिन्नसंविदनुसंधानेन ^{४५२}हि न्यवहारः । ^{४५३}एकश्च प्रका-शात्मा तदनुसंधानरूपः स एव ^{४५४}चैकः प्रमाता ^{४५५}परमात्मसंज्ञः ॥ १०॥

स एव विमृशत्त्वेन नियतेन महेश्वरः । विमर्श एव देवस्य शुद्धे ज्ञानिक्रये यतः ॥ ११॥

स परमात्मा चिद्रूपो विमर्शा^{४५६} रूथेनैव मुख्यस्वभावेनाव्यभि -चारिणा महेश्वरः । चित्तत्त्वस्य विश्वात्मनः शिव^{४५७} संज्ञस्याहं -

^{448 &#}x27;kṣya°: 'kṣa° E, which is also the reading of ĪPV (KSTS Ed.), khyā° N; the reading 'kṣya° occurs also in Bh and ĪPVV and is confirmed by the paraphrase ibid. p. 430 akṣyādibhūmikādirūpānām 449 The text of the vṛṭṭṭi in E Gh N C Ch Jh Ñ T appear at first sight corrupted and full of gaps: ullekhasya sukhaduḥkhādīnām ceśvarasya sākṣātkārarūpo bauddhaḥ prakāṣaḥ. I have accepted integrally the text of T, even though one would expect an explicit reference to bahirātmanā; the addition of 'lajjā' is indirectly confirmed ibid. p. 430 "atadrupāc ca" iti lajjā hi na sukham, na duḥkham, cittavṛṭṭiviṣeṣaṣ ca. The text of J is very close to T (only, it omits 'lajjā' and reads sākṣātkara'). 450 aikyena: ekena Ch Ţ. 451 na syāt: nāsti Gh N Ch J Jh Ţ. 452 hi vyavaharah, my conjectural emendation: hi na vyavaharaḥ Ţ, vyavahāra E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ Ţ. 453 ekaṣ ca: eka eva E (ekaṣ ca also in K Kh). 454 ca omitted in E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ Ţ. 455 paramatma' cit. ibid. p. 433. 456 °ākhyena: 'ākhya' Ţ. 457 °samjñasyāhamvimarṣanam: 'samjñakasyāhamvimarṣa J.

विमर्शनमेव ^{४५८}शुद्धे ज्ञानिकये, भिन्नाभिन्नज्ञेयकार्य^{४५९}गते ^{18.11} त्वीश्वरस्य ^{४६०}शुद्धाशुद्धे, भिन्नार्थ^{४६१}विषये तु पुंसः सत्त्वरजो-ब्वृत्तिरूपे प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिसंज्ञे तमसा ^{४६२}संकुचिते अशुद्धे एव ॥ ११॥

इति ज्ञानाधिकारेऽष्टममाहिकम् ॥

) इति ज्ञानाधिकारः ॥

⁴⁵⁸ śuddhe: viśuddhe T. ⁴⁵⁹ °gate tv īśvarasya: °gatve tv īśvarasya C Ch Jh Ñ, °gatve ve (corrected to °gate) tv īśvarasya Gh, gatam tveśvarasya N, °gatatveśvarasya corrected to °gate tv īśvarasya J. ⁴⁶⁰ Cf. ibid. p. 437 evam ahantāyāḥ śuddhāśuddhatvaṃ vyākhyāya, aśuddhatvaṃ vyācaṣṭe. ⁴⁶¹ viṣaye tu: °viṣayatve E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ Ṭ. ⁴⁶² saṃkucite: saṃkocite T.

क्रियाधिकारः

प्रथममाहिकम्

अत एव यदप्युक्तं किया नैकस्य सक्रमा । एकेत्यादि प्रतिक्षिप्तं तदेकस्य समर्थनात् ॥ १॥

एकचित्तत्त्वसमर्थनादेकसंबन्धी व्यापार एक एवेति क्रिया-प्यपकृतदूषणा ॥१॥

> सक्रमत्वं च लौकिक्याः क्रियायाः कालशक्तितः । घटते न तु शाश्वत्याः प्राभन्याः स्यात् प्रभोरिव ॥ २ ॥

मायाशक्तेर्भिन्नभावावभासानां क्रिया कालशक्तिवशात् सक्रमा न त्वात्मविमर्शरूपानादिनिधना प्रभोः 'स्वभावभूता ॥ २ ॥

> कालः सूर्यादिसंचारस्तत्तत्पुष्पादिजन्म वा ॥ १शीतोष्णे वाथ तल्लक्ष्यः क्रम एव

> > स तत्त्वतः ॥३॥

³सा सा प्रसिद्धा क्रिया कालः ^४शीतादि वा तद्⁹पलक्षितः

¹ svabhāva°: svaprābhava° T. 2 śītoṣṇe: śītoṣṇaṃ T; śītoṣṇe is also quoted in MMP p. 131. 3 There is a direct allusion to sā sā in IPVV III p. 6: ādiśabdopāttaṃ ca yat sūtre tat sankṣepavṛttau vīpsayā, vyākhyātam. 4 śītādi: śītādir T Ñ. 5 °upalakṣitaḥ: °upalakṣita° T.

सर्वभिन्ना वभासमानभावोपाधि भूतः क्रम (एव वासौ तस्यै- II 1.3 वोपयोगात् ॥ ३॥

> कमो भेदाश्रयो भेदो sप्याभाससदसत्त्वतः । आभाससदसत्त्वे तु चित्राभासकृतः प्रभोः ॥ ४ ॥

अन्योन्याभासशून्य भिन्नभावावभासवैचित्र्यकियैव प्रभोर् ¹⁰भावेषु क्रमहेतुः ॥ ४ ॥

> मूर्तिवैचित्र्यतो देशक्रममाभासयत्यसौ । कियावैचित्र्यनिभिसात् कालक्रममपीश्वरः ॥ ५ ॥

¹¹अनेकस्यान्योन्यभेदाभासाद्देशक्रमः ¹²क्रियामुखेन कालक -मोsपि । ^{१३}एकस्य तु भावस्य तत्तज्जन्मसत्ता^{१४}विपरिणामादि -क्रियाभेदात् कालक्रम एव ॥५॥

> सर्वत्राभासभेदो (प्रवेत् कालक्रमाकरः । विच्छिन्नभासः शून्यादेमत्भितस्य नो सकृत्॥६॥

सर्वत्र ^{१५}अर्थे विचित्रोऽवभासः शून्यदेहादेरेव प्रमातुः काल-

^{6 °}avabhāsamāna° : °bhāsamāna° Ch. 7 °bhūtaḥ : °bhūta° T. 8 eva vāsau : evāsau E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ Ţ. 9 Cf. ibid. p. 11 vṛṭṭau bhinnāvabhāsavaicitryaśabdābhyāṃ nauṃsakaikaśeṣo 'tra dvayasya upayogitāṃ darśayati. 10 bhāveṣu cit. ibid. p. 11. 11 Cf. 🏲 🏙e paraphrase ibid. p. 12 anekasmin vastuni dešakramo grhānganavat, kālakramo ` 📭 uhakāramallikādivat / ekasmims tu na dešakramo dūratāder abhāvāt / vaitatyam api rimsänäm / tad ekatra kālakrama eva pacyamānāmraphalavat iti vrttitātparyam. 12 kriyāmukhena cit. ibid. p. 15. 13 ekasya cit. ibid. p. 16. 14 °viparināma° : °parināma° E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ Ţ (cf. Nirukta I.2.8-9 şad bhāvavikārā bhavantīti ha smaha bhagavān varşayanih jāyate 'sti viparinamate vardhate 'pakṣīyate vinasyati'). 15 arthe is referred to ibid. p. 20 sūtrānupāttam arthapadam vrttau praksipya ...,

II 1.6 क्रमाभास¹६ हेतुः, स हि ¹७ प्राक्कालो न तथा तदानीं भासते ¹८ समृतिं विहाय ¹९ स्ववर्तमानापेक्षया चासौ भूतभविष्यत्ते व्यवहरित । सकृ २० द्विभातस्य तु २¹ भासनिक्रयाविच्छेदाद् २२ आवृत्तिगणनाभावात् नात्मनीवार्थेष्विप कालभेदः ॥ ६ ॥

देशक्रमोऽपि भावेषु भाति मातुर्मितात्मनः । स्वात्मेव स्वात्मना पूर्णा भावा

भान्त्यमितस्य तु॥७॥

परिमितं प्रमातारमपेक्ष्य भावास्ततो रें इन्योन्यं च भिन्ना दूरादिव्यपदेशभाजश्च, प्रकाशैकरूपत्वेन त्वीश्वरस्य न रें क्वाप्य-प्रकाशसंभवात् परमाणाविष । प्रकाशर्भघनस्य रें नात्मनो भिन्नं दूरं वान्योन्यतो रें वा किंचिदाभाति ॥ ७॥

किंतु निर्माणशिकतः साप्येवंविदुष ईशितुः । तथा विज्ञातृविज्ञेयभेदो यदवभास्यते ॥ ८॥

एवं पूर्णतया प्रकाशमानस्य २८अपि परमेश्वरस्य सैषा सृष्टि-

^{16 °}hetuḥ : °krt T. 17 prākkālo : prāk<k>āle T; cf. ibid. p. 21 "sūnyadehādyābhāsa-prākkāla" iti bahuvrīhiḥ. 18 Cf. ibid. p. 21 "smṛtim" [from the ṭīkā] iti smṛtau kevalam bhāsate ity arthaḥ. 19 sva° omitted in T. 20 °vibhātasya° : vibhāvasya T. 21 bhāsana° : bhāsamāna° E Gh N C Ch Jh T, bhāsamānasya Ñ. 22 āvṛtti° : abhyāvṛtti° E Gh N C, avyāvartti° Ch T, abhyavartti° Jh, avyāvṛtti° Ñ; āvṛtti° occurs many times ibid. pp. 21-22. 23 'nyonyam ca bhinnā: 'nyam ca bhinnā T, 'nyonyam bhinnā E Gh C, 'nyonyam ca C, 'nyonyam Ñ. 24 °sambhavāt : °sambhavaḥ C Ñ, °sambhavāt corrected to °sambhavaḥ Gh J (in the preceding prakāśaikarūpatvena tv īśvarasya na kvāpy a is added in the margin), °svabhāvābhāvāt T. Also the reading °sambhavaḥ would be acceptable, but Abh. refers explicity to the ablative case: ibid. p. 23 "na kvāpi aprakāśa" iti vṛttivākyasya iyam yojanā "sakrdvibhāto 'yam ātmā pūrṇasyāsya na kvāpy aprakāśanasambhavaḥ" iti sārasvatasamgrahasūtraikadešārtho [...] pañcamīm vidhāya hetutayā vṛttāv uktaḥ. 25 °ghanasya : ghaṭanasya T. 26 ātmano na : nātmano E Gh N C Ch J Jh T, nātmanā Ñ. 27 vā omitted in T. 28 api cit. ibid. p. 27.

शक्तियंज्ज्ञातृज्ञेयस्वभावा भावाः स्वतोऽन्योन्यं च ^{२९}विभागे- ^{II 1.8} नावसीयन्ते, ^{३०}न च तथावसायेन ^{३१}तस्य स्वरूपस्थितिस्तिरोधीयते ॥ ८॥

इति क्रियाधिकारे प्रथममाह्निकम् ॥

द्वितीयमाह्निकम्

कियासंबन्धसामान्यद्रव्यदिककालबुद्धयः । सत्याः स्थैयीपयोगाभ्यामेकानेकाश्रया मताः ॥ १॥

^{3२}क्रियावदन्येऽपि संबन्धादय एकानेकविषया अपि ³³सत्या-भासाः, ^{3४}सर्वदोपयोगिनामेषामर्थवत्त्वेनापरिहरणीयत्वात् ॥१॥

> तत्रैकमान्तरं तत्त्वं तदेवेन्द्रियवेद्यताम् । संप्राप्यानेकतां याति देशकालस्वभावतः ॥ २ ॥

^{³५}अभिन्नमेव ^{³६}तत्त्वमन्त^{३७}र्बहिराभासभेदादेकानेकम् , बहिर्देश -कालस्वभावभेदाभास^{३८}संभेदमयै^{३९}कैकस्वलक्षणाभासानामनेकत्वात् ॥ १ ॥

²⁹ Cf. ibid. p. 26 anena vibhāgāvasāyena ³⁰ na ca cit. ibid. p. 26. ³¹ tasya omitted in E Gh N C Ch Jh N T. ³² Cf. ibid. p. 29 kriyātra dṛṣṭāntatvena upāttā.
\$\int_{\text{satyābhāsāh}}^{\text{cit.}}\$ ibid. p. 36. ³⁴ sarvadopayoginām : sadopayoginām T, but cf. ibid. p. 29 "sarvadopayoginām" iti sthairyam uktam "arthavattvena" iti arthākriyopayogaḥ. ³⁵ T adds tatraikam (that is, the first two words of the kār.). ³⁶ Cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 45 antarabhinnam tattvam samvinmātratayā, māyāpramātuḥ punaḥ antaḥkaraṇābhāsāt bāhyakaraṇābhāsāc ca bahirbhedāt vastu phalata ekānekam / anekatve hetuḥ "bahiḥ" ity ādīti vṛttisamgatiḥ; J has etat instead of eva. ³⁷ bahir° cit. ibid. p. 45. ³⁸ °saṃbhedamayaikakasvalakṣaṇābhāsānām : °saṃbhedabhāsānām Jh Ţ. ³⁹ °ekaika° : °eka° E Gh N C Jh.

11 2.3 तद्द्वयालम्बना एता मनोऽनुन्यवसायि सत् । करोति मातृन्यापारमयीः कर्माविकल्पनाः ॥ ३ ॥

४० मध्यस्थतयान्तर्बहिस्तत्त्वविषया मानस्यः क्रियादिकल्पूनाः ४१ प्रमातृन्यापाररूपाः ॥ ३॥

> स्वात्मनिष्ठा ^{४२}विविक्ताभा भावा एकप्रमातिर । अन्योन्यान्वयरूपैक्ययुजः संबन्धधीपदम् ॥ ४ ॥ ४

राज्ञः पुरुष इत्यादिसंबन्धधियोऽन्तःसमन्वयादैकयं बेहिः
^{४३}संबन्धिभेदं चालम्बन्ते ॥ ४ ॥

जातिद्रव्यावभासानां बहिरप्येकरूपताम् । व्यक्त्येकदेशभेदं चाप्यालम्बन्ते विकल्पनाः ॥ ५ ॥

गावश्चैत्र इति च मतयो बहिरिप गोमात्रैकघनपुरुष-विशेषाकाराभासैक्यं स्वलक्षणावयवाभासबहुत्वं च परामृशन्ति ॥ ५॥

> क्रियाविमर्शिवषयः ^{४४}कारकाणां समन्वयः । . अवध्यवधिमद्भावान्वयालम्बा दिगादिधीः ॥ ६ ॥

काष्ठस्थालीदेवदत्तौदनानां पचतीत्यन्तःसमन्वयाद् बहिर्भेदाच्चै-कानेकविषया क्रिया^{४५}मतिः । देशकालक्रमोऽपि^{४६} भावानामवध्य-

⁴⁰ Cf. ibid. p. 47 kayor madhyastham mano vrttau uktam iti śankitvā grāhya-grāhakayor iti darśayati. 41 pramātro: mātro E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 42 viviktābhā: viviktā vā E, viviktātā (but in Malayalam script t and bh are rather similar) T. 43 sambandhio: sambandhao E Gh N C Ch Jh N T. 44 kārakānām: kāraṇānām Gh N C Ch J Jh T. 45 Cf. ibid. p. 62 evam kriyām ekānekarūpam upapādya vrttigranthaṣya "matih" ity antasya 46 E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T add bhāti, which is very probably to be expunged.

II 2.6

वधिमद्रुपाणामन्योन्यापेक्षः ^{४७}संबन्धभेद ^{४८}एव तथा ^{४९}एवैका-नेकमयः । जातिद्रव्यक्रियासंख्यादिमतयः सर्वा एव संबन्धविशेष-समवायविषया एव ॥६॥

> एवमेवार्थसिद्धः स्यान्मातुरर्थिकयार्थिनः । भेदाभेदवतार्थेन तेन न भान्तिरीहशी ॥ ७ ॥

^{५०}एकानेकरूपैरेव कियादिभिरेवमाभासानुगुण्यरूपः प्रमातुः तदर्थिनोऽर्थक्रियासंवादः । ततो न तद्बुद्धयो भ्रान्ताः ॥ ७ ॥

, इति क्रियाधिकारे द्वितीयमाह्मिकम्॥

तृतीयमाह्नि कम्

इदमेतारगित्येवं यद्वशाद् न्यवतिष्ठते । वस्तु प्रमाणं तत् सोsपि स्वाभासोsभिनवोदयः॥१॥ सोऽन्तस्तथाविमर्शात्मा देशकालाद्यभेदिनि एकाभिधानविषये मितिर्वस्तुन्यबाधिता ॥ २ ॥

हि "वस्तुनः स्वरूपेण नित्यताविशेषणैर्

⁴⁷ sambandha°: samanvaya° E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T, but cf. ibid. p. 61 yā dikkālabuddhiḥ, sāpi ... saṃbandharūpatvapradhānaiva. 48 eva : evaṃ T. 49 eva omitted in T. In the KSTS Ed. of IPV (vol. II pp. 57-8) fn. 110 is constituted by a long passage drawn most probably from the $t\bar{t}k\bar{a}$, where the beginning of the vrtti is quoted: $tad\ \bar{a}ha\ vrttau$ ekānekarūpaih kriyādibhir iti. 51 vastunah and visesaņair cit. ibid. p. 77. 52 vā : yā E.

II 3.1-2 भे व्यवस्थाप्यमानता स प्रमातुः स्वत्वेनापूर्ववस्त्व भे वभास एव स्थितः प्रमाणम् । भे भे एव चाभासो अयिमिति नित्य इति वा तथैव पृथक्तयाभिनवत्वेन च प्रमातर्युपारूढो विमर्शरूपतामः पन्नो भे विमर्शभेदानुसार्येकैक शब्दवाच्ये पृथकपृथगेव तिरः कृतदेशादिभेदे तिसन्नाभात एव सामान्यरूपे वस्तुनि स्वकार्थिक या भे प्रपापते प्रमाणान्तरेण भे अबाधित भे स्थैर्या प्रमितिः प्रमातृ व्यापारः ॥ १-१ ॥

यथारुचि यथार्थित्वं यथान्युत्पत्ति भिद्यते । आभासोऽप्यर्थ एकस्मिन्ननुसंधानसाधिते ॥ ३ ॥

16

एकस्मिन्न् ^{६०}एव चैकप्रत्यवमर्शसामध्योपपादिते ^{६१}वस्तुनि स्वेच्छावशादर्थित्वानुरोधाद्वा नैपुणवशाद्वावभासभेदः ॥ ३ ॥

⁵³ A reference to vyavasthāpyamānatā can be found ibid. p. 74 pramātrādhīnatām tasya prakaţīkartum vrttau nicprayogah. 54 avabhāsa eva sthitah cit. and commented on ibid. p. 76 "avabhāsa eva sthitah" iti vrttipadair ābhāsavyatiriktam na anyat sthitam rūdham satyam kimapi asti - iti vadadbhir abheda ukta iti yāvat. 55 sa eva cābhāso 'yam iti nitya vā cit, and commented on ibid. p. 77 nanu "vastuno višesaņaiķ" iti upakrāntā vṛttiḥ, tata evam vṛttyantareṇa bhāvitavyam "idam iti" "nityam iti vā", tat puṃnirdeśe ka āśayaḥ / ayam iti āha "ābhāsa eva" iti / "sa eva cābhāsaḥ" iti hi vṛttigranthe ya ābhāsaḥ pramānatvena uktah, tam eva atinikatām apeksya nirdesah prakrtam pramānaprameyayor, abhedam tāttvikam ācaste ity arthah. In the KSTS Ed. of the IPV (vol. II pp. 69-70) fn; 46 is constituted by a passage from the tīkā, where the same phrase from the vrtti is quoted: tad eva daršitam vrttau sa eva cābhāso 'yam iti nitya iti veti. 56 vimaršabhedānusāryekaikasabdavācye paraphrased ibid. p. 78 iyatā vimarsavisesam anusarati avasyam ya ekaikah sabdas tadvācya iti yā vṛttih. 57 prāpte : prāpteh E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T.\ ⁵⁸ abādhita°: abādhitā Ch Ṭ. ⁵⁹ °sthairyā: °sthairyam T, °sthairyah Gh N. ⁶⁰ eva cit. and commented on ibid. p. 107 vṛttāv evena apyartha eva ākhyāta ekatvam tatra na na yuktam ity ācakṣaṇena. 61 vastuni cit. ibid. p. 108.

II 3.4-5

६२तथा हि

वीर्घवृत्तोध्वपुरुषधूमचान्दनता ^{६३} दिभिः ।

^{६४} यथाभासा विभिद्यन्ते देशकाला ^{६५} विभेदिनः ॥ ४ ॥

तथैव सद्धटद्रव्यकाञ्चनोज्ज्वलतादयः ।

आभासभेदा भिन्नार्थकारिणस्ते पदं ध्वनेः ॥ ५ ॥

एकिस्मन्नेव घटादावर्थे इविधित्सावशाद्दीर्घता इविश्वापारि माण्डल्यादि दिवाभाति, चिह्नव्यवधानच्छायामात्रार्थितायां पुरुष एव इविज्ञास्त्रं ७० प्रतिभाति, तत्कार्यार्थितायां ७१ तु न्यक्षेणेक्षमाणस्य पुरुषः । धूममात्रमेव कस्यचिदाभासते, ७२ तद्विदस्तु ७३ तार्णतादि मणिरूप्यादिविशेष ७४ इव । ७५ स च तथा भिद्यमानोऽपि देश - कालभेदं न स्पृशति । ७६ तथैव घट एव ७७ सिन्नत्याभासोऽन्या-

⁶² E puts tathā hi at the beginning of the vrtti. 63 °ādibhih : °ādayah T, °ādibhih corrected to ādayaḥ J. 64 yathā: yadā T; ābhāsā vibhidyante T (and ĪPV, Bh, ĪPVV): avabhāsā bhidyante E Gh N C Ch J Ñ Ţ. 65 °avibhedinaḥ : °vibhedinaḥ Gh N Ch Ţ. Also the text commented on by Bhaskara has ovibhedinah and on these grounds the editors of Bh claim that this was the original reading. The correct reading, on the contrary, is certainly avibhedinah, as one can gather from the IPVV and from the IPV itself, if rightly understood, and as is evident from the thread of the argumentation. Lastly, the vṛtti (tathā bhidhyamāno 'pi dešakālabhedam na spṛśati) removes any doubt on this point. b 'vadhitsā': tathārthitā' T, tathāvidhitsā J; cf. the quotation (from the tīkā) ibid. p. 110 avadhitsādi iti rucyādibhedatrayāśrayeņety arthaḥ. 67 Cf. ibid. p. 109 "tryaśra" [from the țikā] iti dvigur matvarthiyājantaḥ. 68 vā : ca E Gh N C Ch J Ñ Ț. 69 ūrdhvatā° : ūrdhva° E Gh N C Ch J Ñ T. 70 pratibhāti : bhavati E Gh N C Ch Ñ T, bhāti J. 71 tu omitted in E Gh N C Ch Ñ T. 72 tadvidas tu : taddhitavastu T. 73 tārņatādi : tārṇatādi° E, tārṇatāpi Gh N C Ch J Ţ. 74 iva: °bhāvaḥ E Gh N C Ch J Ñ Ţ. 75 In the KSTS Ed. of the IPV (vol. II p. 90) fn. 112 is constituted by a passage of the Astasāhasrī (that is, Utp.'s tīkā), where this phrase from the vrtti is quoted: ata eva vrttau sa ca deśakālabhedam tathā bhidyamāno 'pi na sprśati; deśao na sprśati cit. in IPVV III p. 110. 76 The whole sentence (from tathaiva) is quoted in a passage from the tika which constitutes fn. 114 of the KSTS Ed. of the IPV (vol. II p. 91). The text is the same as the one I have established, except for omātra (see below fn. 81, reading J) which should probably be expunged. 77 sann ity: santīty T.



11 3.4-5 हमेव ७८पटाद्यनन्ताशेषा ७९थिसाधारणः ८०सत्तामात्रसाध्य ११सत्परामशाद्यर्थिक याकारी, ८९तत्रैव घट इति ८३ चाभासो ६ न्तर्बिह ६ करण ४५ होयः पृथु बुध्नोदराकारार्थ ४५ सामान्यो ८६ ६ न्य एव ८७ यः ८
पटादिषु ४८ नास्ति, काञ्चन इति ८९ चापरो यो मृण्मयादिषु नास्ति १० स च तथार्थिता १९दिवशादै न्द्रियक एव जायते । एकै कश्चा सावाभास १९ एकै केन शब्देन व्यवहारार्थं तत्ति नियतार्थिक यार्थिभिर्
१३ अभिधीयते, घट इति १४ न सत्ताभिधीयते न १५ च काञ्चन
इति घटाभासः । चैत्र इति बाल्यादिसाधारणो १६देशादिरहि तस्तथैव च । ततो ६थिक या भिन्ना ॥ ४ - ५॥

आभासभेदाद्वस्तूनां नियतार्थिकिया पुनः । सामानाधिकरण्येन प्रतिभासादभेदिनाम् ॥ ६ ॥

^{९७}एकस्मिन्नेव स्वलक्षणे ^{९८}प्रत्याभासं नियतिशकत्या ^{९९}कार्यं नियमितं तथाभूतानेककार्यकृदा^{१००}भासभेदाधिकरणमेकं च ।

⁷⁸ pața°: ghața° E Gh N C Ch Ñ T, pața° corrected to ghața° J. ⁷⁹ °arthasādhāraṇa°: °arthasārthasādhāraņa° T, °arthamātrasādhāraņah J, °padārthasādhāraņa° Kh. 80 sattā°: sattva° T. 81 °sat°: °tat° T. Cf. ibid. p. 111 nanu sad ity ābhāsāntarvartī satparāmarśaḥ, sa ca katham arthakriyeti uktaḥ / arthakriyā hi kāryam na tu svabhāvaḥ. 82 Cf. the (abridged) quotation ibid. p. 111 nanu ca vṛttau ... tatraiva ghate ghata ity ābhāso yaḥ paṭādiṣu nāsti, kāñcana ity ābhāso yo mṛṇmayādiṣu nāstīti. 83 cābhāso 'ntar : cābhāsāntar T. 84 °jñeyah : °jñeya° T. 85 sāmānyo cit. ibid. p. 111. 86 'nya eva : anyatā T. 87 yah patādisu : yo ghata° E Gh C Ñ, yah ghata° N Ch T, yah pata° corrected to yaḥ ghaṭa° J. 88 E repeats the passage budhnodara° ... ghaṭādiṣu. 89 cāparo yo omitted in E Gh N C Ch J Ñ T. 90 sa ca omitted in E Gh N C Ch J Ñ T. 91 °ādi° omitted in J. 92 ekaikena: ekaika° E Gh N C Ch J Ñ T. 93 abhidhīyate ghata: aghata E Gh N C Ch J Ñ Ţ. 94 na sattābhidhīyate : san nābhidhīyate E Gh N C Ch J Ñ Ţ. 95 na ca kāñcana: na kāñcana E Gh N Ch J Ñ T, na kāñcanaghaṭa C. 96 deśādirahitas: deśādivirahitas G, desādibhir abhihitas E, desādir abhihitas C Ñ (in C then corrected to desādirahitas), deśādibhihitas then corrected to deśādirahitas T. 97 ekasmin cit. ibid. p. 114. 98 pratyābhāsam : pratyābhāsān T; cf. ibid. p. 114 vṛttitātparyam vyācaṣṭe "pratyābhāsam" iti. 99 kāryam : kāryān T. 100 °ābhāsa° : avabhāsa° J.

सामानाधिकरण्याभासवशाद् वस्तु । ¹⁰¹अनेकस्यैकता हि सामा- II 3.6 नाधिकरण्यम् ॥ ६ ॥

पृथकदीपप्रकाशानां स्रोतसां सागरे यथा । अविरुद्धावभासानामेककार्या तथैकयधीः ॥ ७ ॥

भिन्नाः प्रदीपप्रभा ¹⁰³अविभागेनावभासन्ते नदीप्रवाहाश् ¹⁰³च सिन्धुबुद्धौ पानके च ते ते रसाः, तथा शौकल्यमहत्त्व- ¹⁰⁸पटत्वाद्य¹⁰⁴वभासाः परस्परानुप्रवेशक्षमाः, न तु नील- पीताद्यवभासास्तत्तदेककार्यैकद्रव्याभासभावेन कल्पन्ते प्रत्यक्ष ¹⁰⁶एव । ¹⁰⁸तदेतत् सामानाधिकरण्यम् ॥ ७॥

तत्राविशिष्टे वह्नचादौ कार्यकारणतोष्णता- । तत्तच्छब्दार्थताद्यात्मा प्रमाणादेकतो मतः ॥ ८॥

¹⁰⁶कदाचिद् ¹⁰⁸देशादिसहभावाविच्छन्नस्वलक्षण¹¹⁰रूपविशेष-त्यागेन ¹¹¹एकसामान्यरूपाग्न्याभास¹¹⁸मात्र एव ¹¹³त्रैलोक्यत्रैका-ल्यगामित्वेन निजप्रमाणादेकस्मादेव विशिष्टकार्य¹¹⁸कारणतो-ष्णोर्ध्व¹¹⁹भागग्निशब्दवाच्यता¹¹⁸दिस्वभावसिद्धिः ॥८॥

¹⁰¹ anekasyaikatā cit. ibid. p. 114. 102 avibhāgenāvabhāsante : avibhāgā ābhāsante T; avibhāgena cit. ibid. p. 117. 103 ca only found in T, but cf. ibid. p. 117, where the two ca in the sentence are referred to. 104 °paṭatvādi°: °paṭādi° J. 105 °avabhāsāh : °ābhasāh J T. 106 eva omitted in T N J. 107 tad etat : tat E Gh C Ch Jh N T, etat N J. 108 kadācit cit. (perhaps from the ṭīkā) ibid. p. 121. 109 Cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 121 vṛttau deśakālābhāsāv eva tyajyatvena kasmād uktau. 110 °rūpa°: °svarūpa° T. 111 Cf. ibid. p. 124 avasthātṛrūpam hi tatra ekam sāmānyam ity upapāditam / ekam ekaikasāmānyasvarūpam upapādya 112 °mātra omitted in E (but found in Kh). 113 Cf. ibid. p. 124 yenaiva prathamaprathamapravṛttena pramāṇena bhāsvarasanniveśaviseṣarūpam auṣṇyādi avyabhicāritayā gṛhītam, tenaiva trailokye traikālye ca bhāsvararūpasanniveśaviseṣasya tadauṣṇyāvyabhicāritvam niścitam iti na tatra pramāṇāntaropayogaḥ. 114 °kāraṇatoṣṇa°: °kāraṇordhva° T. 115 °ūrdhvabhāgagni°: °ūrdhvabhāgagāmi° T, °ūrdhvabhāgāgni° N J. Cf. also vṛtti ad II. 2. 20 °ūrdhvabhāktvād agni°. 116 °ādi° cit. ibid. p. 125; °svabhāva°, omitted in E Gh N C Ch Jh N T, cit. ibid. p. 125 svabhāvašabdena iti vṛttigatena.

II 3.9

सा तु देशा^{11७} दिकाध्यक्षान्तरिभन्ने स्वलक्षणे । तात्कालिकी प्रवृत्तिः स्यादिथिनोऽप्यनुमानतः ॥ ९॥

¹¹²कायप्रवृत्तिः पुनर्देशकालादिप्रत्यक्ष¹¹⁸भेदसाहित्येन ¹²⁰स्वल -क्षण एव तद¹²¹र्थितया प्रमाणसमूहादेव । अनुमानादिप¹²² धर्मिप्रत्यक्षविशिष्टादेव प्रवृत्तिः ॥ ९ ॥

दूरान्तिकतयार्थानां परोक्षाध्यक्षतात्मना । बाद्यान्तरतया दोषैर्ग्यञ्जकस्यान्यथापि वा ॥ १० ॥ भिन्नावभासच्छायानामपि मुख्यावभासतः । एकपत्यवमश्राख्यादेकत्वमनिवारितम् ॥ ११ ॥

^{1२3}दूरान्तिकादिस्फुटास्फुटत्वादिना बहिरन्तश्^{1२४}चरत्वेन वाभा-सस्य च्छायामात्रभेदेऽपि ^{1२५}तन्मुख्यस्वभावरूपप्रत्यवमर्शे^{1२६}क्याद् अर्थानाम् ^{1२७}ऐक्यम् ^{1२८}अबाधितम् ॥ १०-११ ॥

> अर्थिकयापि सहजा नार्थानामीश्वरेच्छया । नियता सा हि तेनास्य नाकियातोऽन्यता भवेत्॥ १२॥

^{१२९} उल्लेखघटादीनां बाह्यार्थिक्रयाविरहेऽपि घटादितैव, ^{१३०}अस्वा-भाविकत्वात् ^{१३१}तस्या ईश्वरेण प्रत्याभासं नियमितायाः ॥ १२ ॥

^{1. 119 °}bhedasāhityena: °bheda eva sāhityena T. 120 svalakṣaṇa eva tad°: svalakṣaṇe etad° E Gh N C Ch Jh N T. 121 °arthitayā: °arthatayā N. 122 T adds hi. 123 dūrāntikādisphuṭāsphuṭātvādinā: dūrāntikādiṣu sphuṭatvāsphuṭatvādinā Gh N Ch T, dūrāntikatvādiṣu sphuṭatvāsphuṭatvādinā Jh. 124 bahirantaścaratvena vābhāsasya: bahirantaścaratvenāvabhāsasya T, bahirantaścaratve vābhāsasasya N, ca gatvarābhāsasya J. ābhāsasya cit. ibid. p. 150 (perhaps through the ṭīkā). 125 tanmukhya° cit. ibid. p. 150. 126 °aikyād: °ākhyād N. 127 aikyam omitted in N. 128 abādhitam: apabādhitam E C Jh N T, upabādhitam Ch, api bādhitam corrected to apabādhitam J. 129 Cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 151 ullekhā eva ghaṭādayas teṣām, bāhyasya svalakṣanasya yā arthakriyā tayā virahe 'pīti vṛttyarthaḥ. 130 asvābhāvikatvād: svābhāvikatvād E Gh N C Ch Jh N T. 131 tasyā: asyā E (tasyā K).

II 3.13

रजतै^{13२}कविमर्शेऽपि शुक्तौ न रजतस्थितिः । उपाधिदेशासंवादाद् द्विचन्द्रेऽपि नभोऽन्यथा ॥ १३ ॥

¹³³रजते शुक्तौ च रजता¹³⁸वमशैंकयेन रजतत्वेऽपि पुनः शुक्तिदेशसंगति¹³⁴बाधेनोपाधिसंवादाभावात् तद्बुद्धिरस्थैर्याद् भ्रान्ता । द्विचन्द्रेऽपि ¹³⁶नभोदेशासंवादान्मिथ्या ॥ १३ ॥

> गुणैः शब्दादिभिर्भेदो जात्यादिभिरभिन्नता । भावानामित्थमेकत्र प्रमातर्युपपद्यते ॥ १४ ॥

भावानां शब्दरूप^{१३७}संस्थानादिना भेदाक्षेपो जात्यादिना च ^{१३८}एकताक्षेपोऽनुभूयमानः प्रमात्रैक्ये घटते । अन्योन्य^{१३९}भेदव्य-वस्थाप्यनुसंधानायत्ता ॥ १४ ॥

> विश्ववैचित्र्यचित्रस्य समिभित्तितलोपमे । विरुद्धाभावसंस्पर्शे परमार्थसतीश्वरे ॥ १५ ॥ प्रमातिर पुराणे तु सर्वदाभातिवग्रहे । कि प्रमाणं नवाभासः सर्वप्रमितिभागिनि ॥ १६ ॥

^{१४०}अपूर्वाभासस्यासिद्धवस्तुसाधनान् ^{१४१}नित्यावभासिनः प्रमातुर्न

132 °eka°: °aikya° E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ T. A fluctuation between these two readings is also found in the editions of Abh.'s commentaries (°eka° in the two editions of the ĪPV, confirmed by the Bh; °aikya° in the ĪPVV). The vṛṭṭṭi seems to presuppose °eka° and so also does the ĪPVV, though it begins precisely with rajatayā yadyapi śuktirajatasya aikyam vimṛśyate. But these are simply two ways of formulating a concept that is basically the same. 133 Cf. ibid. p. 152 "rajate" iti satyarajate, "śuktau ca" iti rajatvena adhyavasitavyam, "dvicandre 'pi buddhir mithyā" iti vṛṭṭṭiyojanā. 134 °avamarśa°: °vimarśa° E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ T. 135 °bādhenopādhi°: °bādhanenopādhi° E Gh N C Ch Jh Ñ T, bādhena nopādhi° corrected to bādhanenopādhi° J. 136 nabhodeśa° cit. ibid. p. 153. 137 °samsthāna°: °samsthā° T C Ch Jh Ñ T; cf. ibid. p. 158 samsthānasya gunatvam eva vidhīyate. 138 ekatākṣepo: ekatādikṣepo J. Cf. ibid. p. 159 nanu ākṣepo 'nubhūyate. 139 Cf. ibid. p. 160 vṛṭṭau bhedavyavasthaiva upasamhṛṭā; api cit. ibid. p. 160. 140 apūrvābhāsasya: apūrvārthābhāvasya T. 141 nityāvabhāsinah: nityābhāsinah J; nityāvabhāsinah cit. ibid. p. 163.

II 3.15-16

प्रमाणोपयोगः । तत्तन्नवा^{१४२}वभासानां ^{१४३}तत्तत्प्रमाणत्वात् कामं स प्रमाणमन्यस्य स्यान्न तु स्वात्मनः सदा सिद्धस्य, केवलं ^{१४४}विभुः प्रमितौ स्वातन्त्र्यात् प्रमातैव । ते ते ^{१४५}विचित्रा विश्वाभासास् तिस्मन्स्थायिनि वैचित्र्येणोपपद्यन्ते । ^{१४६}तदिच्छातो ^{१४७}ऽपरावभास-मानार्थानां तत्सार^{१४८}स्वरूपाभृशे ^{१४९}मायाशिक्तवशादुन्मज्जन-निमज्जने, तत्त्वतस् ^{१५०}तस्यैवापराधीना सत्ता सदातनी^{१५१} विरुद्धपाकप्रध्वंसाभावादियोगात्, सोऽपि यावद् ^{१५२}उपदिश्यते भावाभावाभ्यां तावत् स एव प्रमातृतां ^{१५३}भजत ^{१५४}उपदि-दिक्षोरभावाद् ^{१५५}उपदेशानुपपत्तेः ॥ १५-१६॥

अप्रवर्तितपूर्वो इत्र केवलं मूढतावशात् । शक्तिप्रकाशेनेशादिन्यवहारः प्रवर्ति ॥ १७ ॥

मायान्यामोहवशात् केवलमस्मिन्नात्मिन प्रमातृरूपे शिवेश्वरादि-न्यवहारो यो न प्रवर्तितः स शुद्धस्वातन्त्र्यादिहेतुपदर्शनेन ^{१५६}भावनाद्युपदेशाय साध्यते ॥ १७ ॥

इति क्रियाधिकारे तृतीयमाहिकम् ॥

^{142 °}avabhāsānām : °ābhāsānām T, °ābhāsānām corrected to °avabhāsānām N J.
143 tattatpramāṇatvāt : tatpramāṇatvāt E Gh N Ch Jh T, tanmayatvāt T, tanmayatvāt
corrected to tattatpramāṇatvāt J.
144 vibhuh : prabhuh N.
145 vicitrā viśvābhāsās tasmin
: vicitrābhāsā viśvā (then two illegible akṣaras) smin T.
146 tadicchāto cit. ibid. p. 163.
147 °avabhāsamāna° : °ābhāsamāna° T.
148 °svarūpābhramśe : °svarūpabhramśe ca E
Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ Ţ.
149 māyāśaktivaśāt cit. ibid. p. 163.
150 tasyaiva : tasyā vā E Gh
N, tasyā yā Ch Ñ Ţ, tasyā vā corrected to tasyā yā J Jh.
151 E Gh Ch N J Jh N Ţ add
purātanī, which is probably a gloss; sadā purātanī C.
152 upadiśyate : upadiśyeta E, uddiśyate G Kh.
153 bhajata omitted in T.
154 upadidikṣor : upadidṛkṣor J.
155 upadeśānupapatteh, conjectural emendation for upadeśānupapattih E Gh N C Ch J Jh N Ţ and
deśānupapatteh Ţ.
156 The phrase bhāvanādyupadeśāya, found in all MSS, is apparently
corrupt (unless one takes it as a, rather unlikely, samāhāradvandva formed by bhāvanādi
and upadeśa); sādhyate : bhāvyate Ţ.

चतुर्थमाह्निकम्

एष चानन्तराक्तितत्वादेवमाभासयत्यमून् । भावानिच्छावशादेषा क्रिया निर्मातृतास्य सा ॥ १॥

प्रमाता चिद्रूपोऽनन्तराक्तितरीरवरः स्वेच्छावशात् ^{१५७}तथा तान्भावान् ^{१५८}आभासयेत् । सैव ^{१५९}चेच्छाशिक्तिर्निर्मातृताख्या क्रिया तस्य ॥१॥

> जहस्य तु न सा शक्तिः सत्ता यदसतः सतः । कर्तृकर्मत्वतत्त्वैव कार्यकारणता १६० ततः ॥ २ ॥

^{1६1}जडं प्रधानपरमाणुबीजादि तु न शक्तमसतो निर्माणे, कर्तृत्वमेव हि कारणत्वं कर्मतैव ^{१६२}च कार्यत्वं न त्वन्यत् ॥ १॥

यदसत्तदसद्युक्ता नासतः सत्स्वरूपता ।
सतोऽपि न पुनः सत्तालाभेनाथेऽथ चोच्यते ॥ ३ ॥
कार्यकारणता लोके सान्तर्विपरिवर्तिनः ।
उभयेन्द्रियवेद्यत्वं तस्य कस्यापि शक्तितः ॥ ४ ॥

असतः सत्स्वभावता विरुद्धा सतश्च ^{१६३}सिद्धा । सिद्धस्यैवान्तर्बाह्यान्तः करणद्वयीवेद्यतापादनम् ^{१६४}ईश्वरेणोत्पादनम् ॥ ३-४॥

tathā tān bhāvān: tathā tadbhāvān T, tān ābhāsān E Gh N C Ch Jh Ñ T. \bar{a} \bar{b} \bar

11 4.5 एवमेका किया सैषा सक्रमान्तर्बिहः स्थितिः । एकस्यैवोभयाकारसहिष्णोरुपपादिता ॥ ५ ॥

सैषा क्रियान्तर्बिहिःस्थितिरूपतया सक्रमाप्येकस्य स्वसंवित्सि-द्धस्य कर्तुराभासच्छाया^{१६५}भेदेऽप्यैक्येन प्रत्यवमृश्यस्य कर्मणश् ^{१६६}चैकस्य संबन्धिनी तदभिन्नाश्रयत्वादेकत्वेन साधिता ॥ ५ ॥

बहिस्तस्यैव तत्कार्यं यदन्तर्यदपेक्षया । प्रमात्रपेक्षया चोक्ता द्वयी बाह्यान्तरस्थितिः ॥ ६ ॥

अर्थस्य बाह्यतापादनं ^{१६७}कार्यत्वम् , ततो बाह्यता कार्यता चैका^{१६८}पेक्षया प्रमातारम् ^{१६९}अपेक्ष्य चान्तर्बहिन्यवहारः । ^{१७०}ततस्तस्यैव कार्यम् ॥६॥

मातैव कारणं तेन स चाभासद्वयस्थितौ । कार्यस्य स्थित एवैकस्तदेकस्य क्रियो^{१७१}चिता॥७॥

एवं प्रमातैव कारणं ^{१७२}स च बाह्या^{१७३}न्तरकार्याभास^{१७४}क्रमे इप्येक एवेत्येवमप्येकस्य कर्तुः सिद्धा क्रिया ॥ ७॥

^{165 °}bhede 'py aikyena: °bhedenaikatvena E Gh N C Ch Jh N T, °bhede 'py ekatvena J; cf. ibid. pp. 189-90 ābhāsabhedayoge 'pi ity arthaḥ. 166 caikasya: caikyasya T. 167 kāryatvam omitted in E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 168 °apekṣayā: °apekṣā E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 169 apekṣya: apekṣā Ch. 170 T adds tatas tasyaiva kārya<m>, which is very probably a gloss. 171 ĪPV (confirmed by Bh) and ĨPVV read kriyoditā (c and d are rather similar in śāradā script). 172 sa ca: sarva° T. 173 °āntara°: °abhyantara° E C J N. 174 °krame: °kramo E Gh N C Ch J N T.

II 4.8

अत एवाङ्कुरे॰पीष्टो निमित्तं परमेश्वरः । तदन्यस्यापि बीजादेहेंतुता नोपपद्यते ॥ ८॥

¹⁰⁴बाह्याभासतापादनमुत्पादनमिति चिद्रूपस्यैव कारणता ततो ऽङ्कुरादौ निमित्तकारणत्वेनेश्वरः कैश्चिदिष्टः, न चापि बीजा-देर्जंडस्य कारणता निरनुसंधानस्य युक्ता ॥८॥

तथा हि कुम्भकारोऽसावैश्वर्येव व्यवस्थया । तत्तनमृदादिसंस्कारक्रमेण जनयेद्धटम् ॥ ९॥

कुम्भकाररूपे प्रमातिर कारणे स्थितेऽपि मृदादिसंस्का-रा^{१७६}पेक्षा घटस्येश्वरकृतनियतिसंज्ञमर्यादया न स्वभावेन ॥९॥

योगिनामपि मृद्बीजे विनैवेच्छावशेन तत् । घटादि जायते तत्तत् ^{१७७}स्थिरस्वार्थिकयाकरम् ॥ १० ॥

मृदाद्यनपेक्ष्य योगिनामिच्छामात्रेण घटादेः स्थिरस्य घटाद्यर्ध-क्रियाकारिणश् ^{१७८}च निर्वृत्तिः ॥ १० ॥

योगिनिर्माणताभावे प्रमाणान्तरनिश्चिते । कार्यं हेतुः स्वभावो वात एवोत्पत्तिमूलजः ॥ ११ ॥

अत एव कार्यं स्वभावो वा तदुत्पत्तिगर्भो योगिनिर्मित-त्वाभावनिश्चयाभावे हेत्वाभासः । ^{१७९}तन्निश्चये पुनरीश्वर-नियत्य^{१८०}पेक्षया हेतुता स्यात् ॥११॥

¹⁷⁵ bāhyābhāsatā°: bāhyatā° E (bāhyābhāsatā° Kh G). 176 °apekṣā : apekṣayā J T.

177 sthirasva°: sthirasya T. 178 ca nirvṛttiḥ: cittavṛttiḥ corrected to ca nirvṛttiḥ J.

179 tanniścaye: tanniścayena J. 180 °apekṣayā: °apekṣā yā T.

II 4.12-13

भूयस्तत्तत्प्रमात्रेकवद्वयाभासादितो भवेत् । परोक्षादप्यधिपतेर्धूमाभासादि नृतनम् ॥ १२ ॥ कार्यमन्यभिचार्यस्य लिङ्गमन्यप्रमातृगात् । तदाभासस्तदाभासादेव त्वधिपतेः परः ॥ १३ ॥

¹८¹अबह्नचाभासस्फुरणपूर्वकोऽपि जायमानो धूमाभासो दूरादौ

¹८²नियतिशक्त्या कृतसामर्थ्यादग्न्याभासादेव ¹८³तद्देशगततत्तत्¹८४प
मात्रन्तरसाधारणात् तस्यैव सोऽव्यभिचारेण गमकः, जातरूढस्तु

धूमाभासस्तद्वह्नचा¹८५भासस्य ¹८६अत्यन्तपरिक्षयात् ¹८७तत्तत्प्रमात्र
न्तरगाद् धूमाभासादेव परोक्षादपि ¹८८पूर्ववत् कृताधिपत्यात्
॥ १२-१३॥

अस्मिन्सतीदमस्तीति कार्यकारणतापि या । साप्यपेक्षाविहीनानां जहानां नोपपद्यते ॥ १४ ॥

अस्मिन्सतीदं ^{१८९}भवतीति नियतं पौर्वापर्यं कृत्तिकारोहि-न्युदययोरकार्यकारणयोरप्यस्तीति पूर्वस्य ^{१९०}साम्थ्ये परस्य सत्तेति स्यात् कार्यकारणभावः, ^{१९१}तच्चापेक्षा^{१९२}रहितानां जडानां न

eva jāyamānas tasyaiva gamakah, jātarūdhas tu dhūmābhāsād eva jāyamānas tasyaiva gamakah iti pūrveņa sambandha iti vṛttiyojanā. 182 niyati°: niyata° C. 183 tad°: tattad° J. 184 °pramāṭr°: °pramāṇa° N. 185 °avabhāsasya : °ābhāsasya corrected to °avabhāsasya T. 186 atyanta°: antara° E Gh N C Ch J N T. 187 tattatpramāṭr°: tatah pramāṭr° T, tatpramāṇa° N. 188 pūrvavat : ca tatpūrvakṛta° E Gh N C Ch J N T. 189 bhavati cit. ibid. p. 219 bhavatisabdena ... vṛttigatena. 190 sāmarthye : sāmarthyam E Gh C N, sāmarthye corrected to sāmarthyam T, sāmarthya N. Cf. ibid. p. 218, where the two meanings implicit in the Buddhist formula asmin sati idam asti are clearly distinguished: atraiva ca sūtre pūrvasāmarthye parasya satteti pūrvasāmarthyam parasya satteti pakṣāv api sūcitāv eva. 191 tat cit. ibid. p. 227 nanu vṛttau sa iti vaktavye katham "tat" iti nirdeśaḥ / ... na atra kāryakāranabhāvah parāmṛṣyate, api tu tallakṣaṇatvena sammato visiṣṭaḥ sattvabhūto vākyārtha iti bhāvaḥ. 192 °rahitānām : °hīnānām N.

युक्तम् । एतावदेतत्स्यात् पूर्वस्य ^{१९३}सामर्थ्यं परस्य सत्ता न चैवं ^{II 4.14} किंचिदुक्तं स्याद् न च ^{१९४}पूर्वस्य सामर्थ्यलक्षणः स्वभावः परसत्तारूपः ॥ १४ ॥

न हि स्वात्मैकनिष्ठानामनुसंधानवर्जिनाम् । सदसत्तापदेऽप्येष सप्तम्यर्थः प्रकल्प्यते ॥ १५ ॥

सदसद्वा कार्यं कारणमप्यात्मपर्यवसितं जडमनुसंधानशून्यं नान्यापेक्षस्वभावं ततश्च नात्र ^{१९५}प्रधानापेक्षामयो गुणविभकत्यर्थो घटते ॥ १५॥

अत एव विभक्त्यर्थः प्रमात्रेकसमाश्रयः । क्रियाकारकभावाख्यो युक्तो भावसमन्वयः ॥ १६ ॥

एकप्रमातृसंलग्नस्तु क्रियाकारकभावाख्यो विभक्तयर्थी भूमिबी-जोदकादीनां समन्वयो युक्तो न तु शुष्कोऽन्यः कार्यका-रण^{१९६}भावः ॥ १६॥

परस्परस्वभावत्वे कार्यकारणयोरिप । एकत्वमेव भेदे हि नैवान्योन्य^{१९७}स्वभावता ॥ १७॥ कार्यकारणयोरन्योन्यरूपत्वेऽप्येकतैव स्यान्न तद्भावः ॥ १७॥

sāmarthyam: sāmarthye T; cf. ibid. p. 226 etad vastu vṛttau vivariṣyate / katham pūrvasya sāmarthyam parasya sattā. 194 Cf. ibid. p. 223 tatra hi pūrvasya sāmarthyam nāma svabhāvah sa parasya sattārūpo neti vakṣyate. 195 pradhāna° and guṇavibhakti° cit. ibid. p. 231. 196 °bhāvah: °bhāvākhyah E. 197 °svabhāvatā: °svarūpatā Kh G (this is also the reading of the ĪPVV and the two editions of the ĨPV).

II 4.18

एकात्मनो ^{१९८}विभेदश्च किया काल^{१९१}क्रमानुगा । ^{२००}तथा स्यात् कर्तृतैवैवं तथापरिणमत्तया ॥ १८॥

२०^१एकस्वभावस्य भेदेन स्थितिः परिणामः कालकलितः क्रियैव, ततः परिणामे स्वतन्त्रस्य शिक्तमतः कर्तृतैव हेतुता ॥ १८ ॥

न च युक्तं जहस्यैवं भेदाभेदिवरोधतः। आभासभेदादेकत्र चिदात्मिन तु युज्यते॥१९॥

२०२ जडस्याभिन्नात्मनो भेदेन २०३ अवस्थितेर्विरोधादयुक्तम्, स्वच्छे चिदात्मन्येकस्मिन्नेवमनेकप्रतिबिम्ब^{२०४}धारणेनाविरोधाद्युज्यते ॥ १९॥

वास्तवेsपि चिदेकत्वे न स्यादाभासिभन्नयोः । चिकीषिलक्षणैकत्वपरामर्शं विना किया ॥ २०॥ एकस्मिंश्चित्तत्त्वेsप्य् ^{२०५}अकस्माद् ^{२०६}आभासभेदो न घटते,

198 vibhedas ca: vibhedena N Ch J T, vibhede 'pi corrected to vibhedena Gh. 199 °kramānugā : vibhāginī Gh N Ch T. 200 The readings of the third pāda fluctuate: hetoh syāt kartṛtaivaivam E Ch T, hetoh syāt kartṛtaivaitam Gh, hetuh syāt kartṛtaivevam N, hetoh (corrected to tathā) syāt kartrtaivaivam C, hetoh syāt kartrtevaivam J Ñ, tato 'nyat kartṛtaiveyam T, tathā syāt kartṛtaivaivam ĪPV, tathā syāt kartṛtā vaivam ĪPVV. Except for hetoh, otā vaivam and 'nyat, all the other readings might be admissible. As it is impossible to ascertain the original reading, I have decided to accept the reading of IPV, which was definitely the one Abh. had in his text (this is also confirmed by Bhāskara). ekasvabhāvasya: ekasvabhāve sya J. 202 Cf. ibid. pp. 238-9 nanu evam pratibimbagrahaņe jadasya virodhāt cidātmana eva ekasya bhedena sthitir ity etat yujyate, jadasya tv evam ayuktam; abhinnasya bhedasthitir hi viruddheti vṛttau kim iti pratibimbadhāraṇam darśitam. 203 avasthiter: avasthite N. 204 odhāranena: odhārana T. 205 akasmād, my correction: ekasmād E T, ekah sadā G Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ T. Cf. ibid. p. 248 vṛṭṭau "akasmāt" iti nimittasya alābhād iti bhāvaḥ; cf. also ibid. p. 249 nirnimittatvāt in the paraphrase of the $t\bar{t}k\bar{a}$. ²⁰⁶ $\bar{a}bh\bar{a}sabhedo$ cit. *ibid*. p. 248, where the whole sentence is commented on: ābhāsabheda ity ādinā vedyagatam rūpam uktam / tad vişayatvena yat kriyātvam nāma kartṛtādhāyakam, tat na ghaṭate iti brahmagatam rūpam uktam.

II 4.20

न च तत्र क्रियात्वम् । यदा तु स चिदात्मा ^{२०७}तथाचिकीर्षया परामृशन् बहिराभासयित तदा ^{२०८}तदुपपद्यते । ^{२०९}जडस्याप्यस्ति भवतीत्यस्यामिप सत्ताक्रियायां ^{२१०}बुभूषायोगेन स्वातन्त्र्याभावाद् ^{२११}अकर्तृत्वम्, तेन ^{२१२}प्रमातैव ^{२१३}तं भावयित ^{२१४}तेन तेन वा हिमाचला^{२१५}दिना रूपेण ^{२१६}स भवतीत्यत्र परमार्थः ॥ २०॥

इत्थं ^{२७}तथा घटपटाद्याभासजगदात्मना । तिष्ठासोरेवमिच्छैव हेतुता कर्तृता किया ॥ २१ ॥

चिद्वपुषः स्वतन्त्रस्य विश्वात्मना ^{२1}८स्थातुमिच्छैव जगत्प्रति कारणता कर्तृतारूपा सैव कियाशिकतः । एवं चिद्रूपस्यैकस्य कर्तुरेव चिकीर्षारूपा ^{२1}९क्रिया मुख्या, ^{२२०}नाकर्तृकं कर्मास्ति कर्मादीनां कर्तृमुखेनो^{२२1}पचारतः ॥ २१ ॥

इति क्रियाधिकारे चतुर्थमाह्निकम् ॥

इति क्रियाधिकारः ॥

²⁰⁷ cikīrṣayā parāmṛṣan cit. ibid. p. 250, where the rest of the sentence is also commented on: vṛttyartham vyākaroti "atra" hi" vṛttigranthe / ābhāsanā ca kriyā tasya ādya eva parāmaršo lakṣaṇam / sa eva bahiḥkaraṇātmakābhāsanāparyantā / tena trayam etad upakrame bhāsamānam api dvayam eva, vastutas tu ekam apīti tātparyam. 208 tad cit. ibid. p. 248 "tat" ity ābhāsabhedasya ghaṭanam kriyātvam. 209 judasyāpi : jadasyāsyāpi T (also possible); jadasya cit. ibid. pp. 248 and 250. 210 Cf. ibid. p. 252 tadābhāsas ca iti svātantryābhāvasya nimittam ukta icchābhāva iti saṅgatiḥ / iyatā vṛttir ubhayathā gamitā bubhūṣāyogena yat svātantryam tasya abhāvat, ayogena ca yaḥ svātantryābhāvas tata iti. 211 akartṛtvam : akartṛkatvam E; akartṛtvam cit. ibid. p. 248. 212 The reading of T is not clear (pramave?). 213 tam cit. ibid. p. 248 tam iti jadam. 214 tena tena: tena T Gh N J. 215 °ādinā: °ādi° E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 216 sa cit. ibid. p. 248 sa iti pramātā. 217 tathā: tadā Ch. 218 sthātum: kartum E Gh N C Ch Jh Ñ T; sthātum is also confirmed by the quotation of this passage (cidvapuṣaḥ ... °rūpā) in MMP p. 39. 219 kriyā mukhyā: mukhyā kriyā N. 220 nākartrkam: nākartrtvam N Ch Jh, nākartrtvam corrected to nākartrkam J. 221 oupacāratah : oupacārāt E C Ñ, oupacāratah corrected to oupacārāt J.

आगमाधिकारः

प्रथममाह्निकम्

एवमन्तर्बहिर्वृत्तिः क्रिया कालक्रमानुगा । मातुरेव तदन्योन्यावियुक्ते ज्ञानकर्मणी ॥१॥

'प्रमातुरन्तःस्थितस्य 'आत्मनो बहिष्कार एव क्रमा³नुगता क्रियेति ^४परस्पराविरहिते 'तस्य ज्ञानक्रिये ॥१॥

> किंतु आन्तरदशोद्रेकात् सादाख्यं तत्त्वमादितः । बहिभविपरत्वे तु परतः पारमेश्वरम् ॥ २ ॥

"ईशितुरन्तर्बिहःस्थितावन्तर्भावप्राधान्ये पुनः सादाख्यं तत्त्वम्, अपरं बहिर्भावोद्रेकादैश्वरम् ॥ १ ॥

> ईश्वरो बहिरुनमेषो निमेषोऽन्तः सदाशिवः । सामानाधिकरण्यं च सद्विद्याहमिदंधियोः ॥ ३॥

उन्मेषनिमेषौ बहिरन्तःस्थिती ^७एवेश्वरसदाशिवौ, बाह्या^८न्तरयोर् ^९वेद्यवेदकयोरेकचिन्मात्रविश्रान्तेरभेदात् सामानाधिकरण्येनेदं विश्व-महमिति विश्वात्मनो ^{१०}मितिः ^{११}शुद्धविद्या ॥ ३ ॥

¹ pramātuḥ and kriyā cit. in ĪPVV III p. 260 vṛttau pramātuḥ kriyā iti sambandhaṣaṣṭhī, na tu bahiṣkaraṇāpekṣayā kartari. ² ātmano, omitted in T, cit. ibid. p. 258. ³ °anugatā; °anugataḥ T. ⁴ Cf. the quotation from the ṭīkā ibid. p. 259 tad etad darśayati "parasparāviraha" ity ādinā. ⁵ tasya omitted in C N. ⁶ īśitur cit. ibid. p. 265. ⁷ eva omitted in E Gh. ⁸ °āntarayor: °abhyantarayor E Gh J. ⁹ vedyavedakayor omitted in T. ¹⁰ matiḥ cit. ibid. p. 273. ¹¹ śuddha° cit. ibid. p. 273.

इदम्भावोपपन्नानां वेद्यभूमिमुपेयुषाम् । भावानां बोधसारत्वाद्यथावस्त्ववलोकनात् ॥ ४ ॥

भिन्नवेद्यभूमाविदन्तया हश्यतामापादितानाम् ^{१२}अपि भावानां चिन्मात्रसारत्वादहमिदमिति तत्त्व^{१३}प्रतिपत्तिः शुद्धताज्ञप्तिः ॥४॥

> अत्रापरत्वं भावानामनात्मत्वेन भासनात् । परताहन्तयाच्छादात् परापरदशा हि सा ॥ ५ ॥

अत्रेदन्तामतेर् ^{१४}अपरत्वमहन्तया सर्वस्य वेद्यस्याच्छादनात् ^{१५}परतेति परापरावस्थैषा ॥ ५ ॥

> भेदधीरेव भावेषु कर्तुर्बोधात्मनोऽपि या । मायाशक्तयेव सा विद्येत्यन्ये विद्येश्वरा यथा ॥ ६ ॥

बोधकर्तृतामयस्यापि भेदेन विश्वेक्षणं विद्येति केचित् । मायाशक्तिरप्येषा विद्या ^{१६}एव । संसारोत्तीर्णत्वात् तत्रस्था मन्त्रेश्वरविद्येश्वराः ॥६॥

> तस्यैश्वर्यस्वभावस्य पशुभावे प्रकाशिका। विद्याशिकतस्तिरोधानकरी मायाभिधा पुनः॥७॥

संसारिणाम् ^{१७}ऐश्वर्यस्य ^{१८}स्वात्मनः ^{१९}प्रत्यभिज्ञानं ^{२०}विद्यया, पश्^{२१}भावो ^{२२}मायया ॥ ७ ॥

strictly necessary). 13 °pratipattih: °pratipatti° T (but the omission of visarga before a sibilant is frequent in Malayalam script). 14 aparatvam cit. ibid. p. 275. 15 paratā cit. ibid. p. 275. 16 eva omitted in Ch Jh. Gh N C Ch J Ñ T put a daņda before tatrasthā. 17 aiśvaryasya: aiśvaryeṇa T. 18 svātmanaḥ: ātmanaḥ E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ T. 19 pratyabhijñānam: pratyabhijñāne E Gh N C Ch Jh Ñ T. 20 vidyayā: vidyā E C Ñ, vidyayā corrected to vidyā Gh T. 21 °bhāvo: °bhāve E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ T. 22 māyayā: māyā E C Ñ, māyayā corrected to māyā Gh Jh T.

III 1.8

भेदे त्वेकरसे भाते इहन्तयानात्मनीक्षिते । शून्ये बुद्धौ शरीरे वा मायाशिक्तिर्विजृम्भते ॥ ८॥

यदा भावा भेदेनेदन्तया ^{२३}एव भासन्तेऽहमिति प्रमातृत्वेन ^{२४}च देहादिः, तदा ^{२५}विपर्ययद्वयहेतुर्मायाशिक्तिविमोहिनी नाम ^{२६}वि-भोर्विजृम्भते ॥८॥

यश्च प्रमाता शून्यादिः प्रमेये न्यतिरेकिणि । माता स मेयः सन् कालादिपञ्चकवेष्टितः ॥ ९॥

यश्य ^{२७} व्यतिरिक्तप्रमेयजाते प्रमाता शून्यादिः स इदिमिति वेद्य एव वस्तुतः काला^{२८}द्यैः पञ्चिभिश् ^{२९}च परतन्त्रीकृतः । तत्र कालाद्वर्तमाना^{३०}भासेन तस्य भूतभविष्यत्^{३१}संभवः, नियतेः ^{३२}कार्यकर्मफलनियमः, रागाद्धोगाभिष्वङ्गः, विद्याकलाभ्यामचिदा - तमनोऽस्वतन्त्रस्यापीषज्ज्ञानिक्रये चित्स्वातन्त्र्यरूपे^{३३} ॥ ९ ॥

²³ eva: omitted in T, evam Ch Jh T, evam corrected to eva J. ²⁴ ca omitted in T; ca dehādih cit. and commented on ibid. p. 285 ekavacanāntam iti vrttau dehādir ity etadapekṣayā cakāreṇa sphutatvena vākyabhedo 'tra ānīta ity āśayena evam uktam. ²⁵ viparyayadvayahetur: vibhur yaddvayahetur Ch Ñ, vibhur yadadvayahetur (corrected to viparyaya°) Jh, vibhur yadvaya (corrected to yaddvaya)hetur T; viparyayadvayahetur cit. (from the tīkā) ibid. p. 280. ²⁶ vibhor vijrmbhate: vijrmbhā E N C Ch Jh Ñ T, vibhor vijrmbhā Gh J; vijrmbhate cit. ibid. p. 280. ²⁷ vyatirikta°: vyatirikte T. ²⁸ °ādyaih: °ādibhih J. ²⁹ ca omitted in T. ³⁰ Cf. ibid. p. 288 ... tat kim vṛttāv ābhāsapadena. ³¹ °sambhavah: °bhāvah T (equally good). ³² After kārya° T adds °kāraṇa°, as, indeed, meaning would require. However, according to what Abh. seems to say (ibid. p. 290), kāraṇa is to be considered as understood in kārya and is not directly mentioned: niyatim vyākartur yā vṛttiḥ, tām vivṛṇoti "kāryakāraṇabhāvas ca" iti / kāryalakṣaṇaśabdena tadbhāva ucyate. Cf. ibid. p. 290 karmatatphalaniyamavyākhyāne siddhe ... and pp. 290-91 vṛttau karmaśabdena cet kriyā, tadā phalam tatkṛta ātmavartī saṃskāraḥ, atha sa eva karmaśabdena tadā phalam svargādīni. ³³ J adds iti.

III 1.10-11

त्रयोविंशतिधा मेयं यत् कार्य^{३४}करणात्मकम् । तस्याविभागरूप्येकं प्रधानं मूलकारणम् ॥ १०॥ त्रयोवशविधा ^{३५}चात्र बाह्यान्तःकरणावली । कार्यवर्गश्च दशधा स्थूलसूक्ष्मत्वभेदतः ॥ ११॥

कार्याणि ^{३६} द्विधा । शब्दस्पर्शरूपरस^{३७} गन्धानि सूक्ष्मत्वेन तन्मात्रसंज्ञानि ^{३८} पञ्च, ^{३९} अन्योन्यव्यूहेन स्थूलानि पृथिव्यादि- ^{४०} संज्ञानि तान्येव पञ्च । श्रोत्रत्वगक्षिजिह्वा^{४१} नासिका^{४२} इति पञ्च बुद्धीन्द्रयाणि , वाक्पाणिपादपायू^{४३} पस्थाख्यानि पञ्च कर्मेन्द्रियाणि , ^{४४} मनोबुद्धचहंकारा इति त्रिधान्तःकरणमिति त्रयोविंशतिभेदस्य कार्य^{४५} करणात्मनः प्रमेयस्य मूलभूतैकाविभागदशा प्रधानाख्या ॥ ११॥

इत्यागमाधिकारे प्रथममाह्निकम् ॥

द्वितीयमाह्निकम्

तत्रैतन्मातृतामात्रस्थितौ रुद्रोऽधिदैवतम् । भिननप्रमेयपसरे ब्रह्मविष्णु व्यवस्थितौ ॥१॥

शून्ये पुर्यष्टका^{४६}त्मके sत्यन्तसूक्ष्मदेह एव वा प्रमातृमात्रे

^{34 °}karaṇa° : °kāraṇa° N J Ñ. 35 cātra : cātha E Gh N C T. 36 dvidhā : dvidhāni daśadhā T. 37 °gandhāni : °gandhākhyāni E, °gandhātmakāni T. 38 T adds ca. 39 anyonyavyūhena, my conjectural emendation : anyonyasampatvyūho na T, anyonyavyūhasambandhena E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ Ţ. 40 °samjñāni tāny eva : °samjñatāny eva T; tāny eva cit. ibid. p. 299. 41 E adds °ghrāṇa°. 42 °nāsikā° : °nāsikā° ca Ţ, °nāsiketi Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ Ţ. 43 °upasthākhyāni : °upasthāni N C Ch J Jh Ñ Ţ. 44 manobuddhyahamkārā : mano buddhir ahamkāra Ţ, manobuddhyahamkāra Gh C Ch Ţ. 45 °karaṇa°: °kāraṇa° N Ch Ţ. 46 °ātmake 'tyantasūkṣma°, my correction (cf. ibid. p. 306 upādānārhatābhidhānāya atyantasūkṣmagrahaṇam ...) : °ādyarthe sūkṣma° E Gh C J, °ādyarthasūkṣma° N Ch Jh Ñ Ţ, °ātmake sūkṣma° Ţ.

III 2.1 रिथतावन्यप्रमेयोपसंहारे रुद्रोऽधिष्ठाता, भिननप्रमेया^{४७}भासे सर्ग - रिथतिहेतू ब्रह्मविष्णू ॥ १॥

एष प्रमाता मायान्धः संसारी कर्मबन्धनः । विद्याभिज्ञापितैश्वर्यश्चिद्धनो मुक्त उच्यते ॥ २ ॥

मायीयशून्यादिप्रमाता ^{४८}नियत्या कर्माधीनः संसारी, विद्यावशाद् ^{४९}आत्मतत्त्वाभिज्ञया मुक्तः ॥२॥

> स्वाङ्गरूपेषु भावेषु प्रमाता कथ्यते पतिः । मायातो भेदिषु क्लेशकर्मादिकलुषः पशुः ॥ ३॥

ऐश्वर्यदशायां प्रमाता विश्वं शरीरतया पश्यन् पतिः, ^{५०}पुंस्त्वावस्थायां तु रागादि^{५१}क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैः परीतः पशुः ॥ ३॥

स्वातन्त्र्यहानिर्बोधस्य स्वातन्त्र्यस्याप्यबोधता । द्विधाणवं मलमिदं स्वस्वरूपापहानितः ॥ ४ ॥

"रेस्वतन्त्रो बोधः "³परमार्थः, तथारूपत्वादेव पूर्णः । तस्य स्वातन्त्र्यादेव तथेच्छया स्वातन्त्र्यं विना बोध⁴⁸मात्रनिर्माणे बोधतां विना स्वातन्त्र्यमात्रनिर्माणे वा पूर्णत्वाभावेन परिमितत्वाद् द्विधाणुत्वं तात्त्विकस्वरूपविपर्यासान्मलत्वम् ॥ ४ ॥

⁴⁷ °ābhāse : °ādhāre T; cf. ibid. p. 308 sūtre ya evamarthaḥ prasaraśabdaḥ, sa ābhāsapadena vṛttau vivṛtaḥ. ⁴⁸ niyatyā karmādhīnaḥ : niyatiniyamitaḥ E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ Ṭ (also possible). ⁴⁹ ātmatattvābhijāayā : ātmatvābhijāatayā T, ātmatattvābhijāatayā N ; cf. ibid. p. 311 nanu ātmatattvam pratyuta heyam ... iti śankitvā āha "ātmana" iti ṣaṣṭhīsamāso 'yam vṛttāv ity arthaḥ. ⁵⁰ puṃstvāvasthāyāṃ cit. ibid. p. 312. ⁵¹ Cf. ibid. p. 312 klešakarmavipākāśayair yukto 'stu pumān. ⁵² svatantro : svatantra° E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ Ṭ; cf. ibid. p. 313 "svatantro bodha" ity etat tattvam. ⁵³ paramārthaḥ : paramārthataḥ T. ⁵⁴ °mātra° cit. and commented on ibid. p. 314.

भिन्नवेद्यप्रथात्रैव मायाख्यं जन्मभोगदम् । कर्तर्यबोधे कार्मं तु मायाशक्त्यैव तत्त्रयम् ॥ ५॥

"अत्रैव द्विधाणवे वेद्यमिभन्नमिप भेदेन यदा भाति "दत्तदातोऽपि "विपर्यासाद् नाम्ना "मायीयं मलम् । अहेतूनामिप कर्मणां जन्मादि"हेतुभावविषयविपर्यासादबोधात्मककर्तृगतं कार्मम् । तन्मलत्रयनिर्माणे प्रभोर् ६० इच्छा मायाशिकतरुच्यते ॥ ५॥

शुद्धबोधात्मकत्वेsपि ^{६१}येषां नोत्तमकर्तृता । निर्मिताः ^{६२}स्वात्मनो भिन्ना भत्र ते कर्तृतात्ययात् ॥ ६ ॥

^{६ ३}वेद्यानुपरक्तबोधानामपि पूर्णकर्तृत्व^{६ ४}शून्यत्वात् ^{६ ५}स्वरूपा-न्यत्वेन प्रभुणा निर्माणम् ॥६॥

> बोधादिलक्षणैक्येsपि "तेषामन्योन्यभिन्नता । ^{६७}तथेश्वरेच्छाभेदेन ते च विज्ञानकेवलाः ॥ ७॥

शुद्धबोधानां ६८ बोधत्वनित्यत्वाद्यभेदेऽप्यन्योन्यभेदस् ६९ तथैवेश्वरेण

⁵⁵ atraiva: atraivam Gh N C Ch J Jh N T, tatraiva G. 56 tadāto 'pi: tadāto T, tadāpi C J N, tad ato 'pi ChT; cf. ibid. p. 318 "ato 'pi" [from the tīkā] iti na kevalam pūrvo viparyāyo ya āṇavamalātmā uktaḥ, yāvad ayam apīty arthaḥ. 57 viparyāsād nāmnā: viparyāsanamnā E Gh N Ch Jh N T, viṣayavāsanānāmnā C J. 58 māyīyam: māyīya° E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 59 °hetubhāvaviṣaya°: °hetubhāve C Ch J Jh T (also possible), hetubhāvena E Gh N; cf. the paraphrase and explanation ibid. p. 317 tatra abodharūpasya kartur dehāder bhinnavedyaprathāyām satyām ahetusu api jadesu karmasu nimittāvagrahātmā viparyayaḥ / janmanas tu niyatāvadhyāksiptasya āyuşo bhogasya ca sukhaduḥkhādeḥ kāraṇabhūtam kārmam malam. 60 icchā omitted in T. 61 yeṣām: teṣām C Ch J Jh N T. 62 svātmano: svātmanā T. 63 vedyānuparakta° cit. ibid. p. 319 "anena" iti vedyānuparaktaśabdena. 64 °sūnyatvāt: °sūnyāt E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 65 svarūpa°: svarūpād E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 66 teṣām: yeṣām Gh N. 67 tathā: tatra E N C Ch J Jh T (tathā is also the reading of ĪPV and ĪPVV). 68 bodhatva°: bodha° T. 69 tathaiva: tathā T.

III 2.7 निर्माणान्नान्यथा । ते च ^{७०}सांख्यपुरुषप्राया ^{७१}विज्ञानकेवला ^{७२}इत्युच्यन्ते ॥ ७ ॥

शून्याद्यबोधरूपास्तु कर्तारः प्रलयाकलाः । तेषां कार्ममलोऽप्यस्ति मायीयस्तु विकल्पितः ॥ ८॥

^{७३}शून्यप्राणादौ ^{७४}बोधरूपतातिक्रमेणाहन्तया स्थिताः प्रलय-केवलिनः । तेषामणूनां कर्मसंस्कारो^{७५}ऽप्यस्ति, मायामलस्तु वेद्य-योगायोगाभ्यां विकल्पितः ॥८॥

बोधानामपि कर्तृत्व^{७६}जुषां कार्ममलक्षतौ । भिन्नवेद्यजुषां मायामलं विद्येश्वराश्च ते ॥ ९॥

^{७७}कर्तृतायोगेऽपि बोधानां ^{७८}कर्मोत्तीर्णानां ^{७९}विद्येश्वरत्वेऽपि भिन्नवेद्य^{८०}योगान्मायामलम्^{८१} अस्त्येव । पूर्णकर्तृत्वाभावाद् ^{८२}ईश्वराद् भिन्ना अन्योन्यं च ^{८३}पूर्ववदत एवैषामणुत्वम् ^{८४}अपि स्यात् ॥९॥

⁷⁰ sāmkhyapuruṣaprāyā, though not directly quoted, is diffusely commented on ibid. p. 320. ⁷¹ E Gh C J Jh Ñ have vijñānākalā (vijñānakalā Ń Ch Ṭ), but Abh. gloss (ibid. p. 322) refers explicitly to the reading vijñānakevalā. 72 iti only found in T. 73 śūnya° : śūnye E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 74 bodha° : deha° E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T; bodha° is confirmed by the quotation from the tīkā, ibid. p. 323 "bodhatātiraṣkāreṇa", which presupposes bodharūpatātikramena. 75 api, omitted in Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ T, is put after teṣām in T. 76 °juṣām : °yujām Gh T. 77 kartṛtā° : kartṛ Gh N C Ch J Jh N T, kartrtva° E. 78 karma° : kārma° E; cf. ibid. p. 324 karmasamskāravikalās ca samsārottīrņatvāt. 79 vidyeśvaratve 'pi: vidyeśvarākhyānām E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ Ţ, but cf. ibid. p. 325 bodhayogena vidyāsparśaḥ, kartṛtayā ca īśvarateti "vidyeśvaratve 'pi" ity atra vṛttivākye daršitam. 80 °yogān : °bhāktvena E Gh N C Ch J Jh Ñ Ţ (also possible). 81 The edited text of the vrtti stops at this point, where all the available śāradā MSS break off. From here onwards the only source (besides IPVV) is T. 82 iśvarād bhinnā, my correction: iśvarābhinnā T. 83 pūrvavad ata cit ibid. p. 325. 84 Cf. ibid. p. 325 apišabdasya bhinnakramatām daršayann asambhāvyam eṣām tāvad aņutvam, tat tu nyāyabalāyātam bhaved api ity etat dyotayati.

III 2.10

देवादीनां च सर्वेषां भविनां त्रिविधं मलम् । तत्रापि कार्ममेवैकं मुख्यं संसारकारणम् ॥ १०॥

देवादीनां स्थावरान्तानां संसारिणां त्रयोऽपि ^{८५}मलाः, कार्म एव संसारप्रयोजकः ॥ १० ॥

कलोद्वलितमेतच्च चित्तत्त्वं कर्तृतामयम् । अचिद्रूपस्य शून्यादेर्मितं गुणतया स्थितम् ॥ ११ ॥

संसारिणामेतच्च चित्तत्त्वं कर्तृतारूपं शून्यप्राणादौ जडे देवस्य कलाशक्त्योपोद्वल्यमानमुपसर्जनत्वेनावस्थानात् परिमितम् । अतश्चा-त्रैव मुख्यमणुत्वम् ॥ ११ ॥

मुख्यत्वं कर्तृतायाश्च बोधस्य च चिदात्मनः । शून्यादौ तद्गुणे ज्ञानं तत्समावेशलक्षणम् ॥ १२ ॥

एतदेव पुनः ^{८६} शून्यादि ^{८७} कर्तृतात्मनो बोधस्य यदो-पसर्जनत्वेनास्ते तदास्य प्रमातुरेतद्^{८८} बोधमयतामापन्नस्य ज्ञानं तच्छक्तिसमावेशलक्षणमुच्यते ॥ १२ ॥

शून्ये बुद्धयाद्यभावात्मन्यहन्ताकर्तृतापदे । अस्फुटारूपसंस्कारमात्रिणि होयशून्यता ॥ १३ ॥

बुद्धिपाणादिनिषेधमात्रे यदाहन्ताभिमानेन प्रमातृता तदा सौषुप्ते

kārmamalo (kārmo Gh ĪPV ĪPVV, karma° N C Ñ Ţ) and II.2.9 māyāmalam (°malo Gh ĪPV ĪPVV). ⁸⁶ Cf. ibid. p. 328 tat vṛṭṭau prathamānirdeśena nirdiṣṭasya api śūnyādeḥ paścād guṇatāpradarśanena vivṛṭam. ⁸⁷ My conjectural emendation for kartṛṭātmano bodho yad upasarjanatvāste T, evidently corrupt. The expected meaning of the sentence is sufficiently clear. ⁸⁸ bodhamayatām āpannasya cit. ibid. p. 331.

III 2.13 तावन्मात्रावस्थितौ वेद्याभावः संस्कारस्य संभवेऽप्य् ^{८९}अरूपत्वेन अनुपलक्ष्यत्वात् । ^{९०}तावतैव सांख्यपुरुषाद्विशेषः ॥ १३ ॥

साक्षाणामान्तरी वृत्तिः प्राणादिपेरिका मता । जीवनाख्याथवा प्राणेऽहन्ता पुर्यष्टकारिमका ॥ १४ ॥

एष एव शून्यप्रमाता ^{११}सर्वेन्द्रियशिकतसाधारणजीवनाख्य-प्राणादिप्रेरणान्तर्वृत्तिर्जीवाख्यः , तासामिन्द्रियशकतीनामहन्तया सह पुर्यष्टकत्वमथवा प्राणाहन्तया प्रमातृत्वेन पुर्यष्टकता ॥ १४ ॥

तावनमात्रस्थितौ पोक्तं सौषुप्तं प्रलयोपमम् । सवेद्यमपवेद्यं च मायामलयुतायुतम् ॥ १५ ॥

शून्यतायां ^{१२}स्थितौ वेद्याभावान्मायामलाभावः , ^{१३}प्राणादौ सुख-स्पर्शादिवेद्ययोगान्मायामलवत् प्रलय इव सौषुप्तं पदम् ॥ १५॥

मनोमात्रपथेऽप्यक्षविषयत्वेन विभ्रमात् । स्पष्टावभासा भावानां सृष्टिः स्वप्नपदं मतम् ॥ १६ ॥ चक्षुरादीन्द्रियशकत्यप्रवृत्ताविष मनःशकत्यैव दष्टरूपाद्याभासेश्व-

⁸⁹ My conjectural emendation for arūpatve vā° T. ⁹⁰ tāvataiva cit. ibid. p. 333, where the rest of the sentence also seems to be confirmed by the quotation from the tīkā: "tāvataiva" iti vṛttigatam evakāram vyākhyātum darśayati "sāmkhyapuruṣāṇām ca" iti / viśeṣam tu āha "kevalam" iti. ⁹¹ The compound is paraphrased and interpreted, following the tīkā, in two different ways (ibid. p. 335): pūrvavyākhyāne vṛttau evam vigrahah - sarvendriyaśaktisādharaṇam jīvanākhyam yat praṇanādikriyāpañcakam prāṇādivibhāga-kāraṇabhūtam tasya vyāpārapañcakasya preraṇātmikā aham iti samrambhalakṣaṇā vṛttir yasya śūnyasya, sa tathā uktah / idānīm tu evam vigrahah - sarvendriyaśaktīnām sādhāraṇam jīvanaśabdavācyam prāṇādivāyūnām preraṇalakṣaṇam antarvṛttiśabda-vācyam tat yasyeti; tad dhi tasya sambandhi tasya eva kartṛtvāt, na tu tāsām kāraṇatvād iti. ⁹² sthitau cit. ibid. p. 338. ⁹³ prāṇādau cit. ibid. p. 338 "prāṇādau" iti vṛttau "sthitau" iti pūrvakam yad vaiyadhikaraṇyena tad apekṣaṇīyam.

> सर्विक्षगोचरत्वेन या तु नाद्यतया स्थिरा । सृष्टिः साधारणी सर्वप्रमातृणां स जागरः ॥ १७ ॥

सर्वान्तर्बहिष्करणशक्त्या सृष्टिर्जागरा, तत्रापि ^{१५}पूर्ववद् द्वि-चन्द्रादिभान्तिः ॥ १७ ॥

> हेया त्रयीयं प्राणादेः प्राधान्यात् कर्तृतागुणे । तद्धानोपचयपायसुखदुःखादियोगतः ॥ १८॥

एतानि जागरस्वप्नसृषुप्तानि प्राणादेरात्मत्वेनाभिमन्यमानस्यो - द्रेकात् स्वातन्त्र्यस्यापहासाद्धेयानि, स्वातन्त्र्यस्य मात्रया ^{९६}उपचयः सुखहर्षादयस्तथैव न्यूनता दुःखद्वेषादयः । सर्वभोगात्मा संसारो बन्धः ॥ १८ ॥

पाणापानमयः प्राणः प्रत्येकं सुप्तजागतोः । तच्छेदात्मा समानाख्यः सौषुप्ते विषुवित्स्वव ॥ १९ ॥

^{९७}स च ^{९८}प्राणात्मा ^{९९}[स्वप्ने] प्राणापानरूपश्वासप्रश्वासरूपो जागरेडथ सुप्ते ^{१००}[त्र] तयोरिप विषुवतीव रात्रिदिनयोः साम्ये ^{१०१}तन्न्यूनताधिक्यरोधात् समानसंज्ञः ॥ १९ ॥

⁹⁴ kālāntara° cit. ibid. p. 339. ⁹⁵ pūrvavad cit. ibid. p. 340. ⁹⁶ My correction, required by meaning, for °upacaya° T. ⁹⁷ sa ca cit. ibid. p. 345. ⁹⁸ prāṇātmā cit. and commented on ibid. p. 343 prāṇātmā iti vṛttau karmadhārayo 'yam iti yāvat. ⁹⁹ T adds svapne, apparently to be expunged. ¹⁰⁰ T adds tra ('tra), apparently to be expunged. ¹⁰¹ tara T, meaningless, is probably to be corrected to tan° (or expunged).

III 2.20

मध्योध्वंगाम्युदानाख्यस्तुर्यगो हुतभुङ्मयः । विज्ञानाकलमन्त्रेशो न्यानो विश्वात्मकः परः ॥ २०॥

^{10२}पाणापानयोः पार्श्वद्वयतिर्यकप्रवाहिविच्छेदेनैकतामापाद्योध्वं - रूपमध्यमार्गप्रवाहेणोद्गमनाद् उदानः । ¹⁰³मध्यनेत्रमिव ¹⁰⁸ऊर्ध्वं - भाक्त्वादिग्नधर्मा तुर्यदशायाम् । ¹⁰⁴तुर्यातीते दिक्काला ¹⁰⁸नवच्छेदे पूर्णे प्रवाहतां हित्वोतिनिर्भरावस्थो ग्यानसंज्ञः । एतच्च दशा-द्वयमुपादेयं ¹⁰⁸प्राणशक्तेः परमेश्वर ¹⁰⁷कल्पत्वेनावस्थानात् ॥ २०॥

इत्यागमाधिकारे द्वितीयमाह्निकम्॥

इत्यागमाधिकारः ॥

¹⁰² Cf. ibid. p. 350 katham prānāpānau madhye ūrdhvena ekatāpannau pravahata iti vrttau bhanitam ... prānāpānayoś ca katham vyatirekena tiryakpravāha uktah; pārśvadvaya° cit. (from the tīkā) ibid. 103 The comparison with the third eye is developed ibid. p. 350-51. 104 Cf. ibid. p. 350 turyādilakṣaṇam ūrdhvabhāktvādīti vibhāgah. 105 Cf. the paraphrase of the parallel passage of the tīkā ibid. p. 352-53 "turyātītapade tu" iti pravahaṇavyāpārasamsparṣaṇahetuh, deṣakālabhedāpekṣaṃ gamanaṃ pravahaṇam, deṣakālāv api ca atra ahantaikamātrasārajātau, na tu kathamcid bhinnāv iti. 106 °anavacchede (or °anavacchedena), my correction for °anavaccheda° T. 107 Cf. ibid. p. 353 "prāṇaṣaktiḥ" ity ādi parameṣvaronmeṣamātrarūpā cety arthaḥ. 108 °kalpa° cit. (through the tīkā) ibid. p. 353 "kalpaṣabdena" iti vṛttigatena / kalpaṣabdaḥ svabhāvavācī.

तत्त्वसंग्रहाधिकारः

स्वात्मैव सर्वजन्तूनामेक एव महेश्वरः । विश्वरूपोऽहमिदमित्यखण्डामर्शनृंहितः ॥ १॥

एकः 'प्रथमोपादेयतुर्यदशायाम् अखण्डितग्राहकाखण्डित गाह्य-तन्मेलनाचमत्कारोपबृंहितः साधारण एव सर्वप्राणिनामात्मा विश्व-रूपो महेश्वरः ॥१॥

> तत्र स्वसृष्टेदम्भागे ³नुद्धयादि ग्राहकात्मना । अहंकारपरामर्शपदं नीतमनेन तत् ॥ २ ॥

महेश्वरस्य जृम्भामयेऽस्मिन्निर्गते तस्मिन्निदन्तापरामर्शे ग्राह्यं

¹ Cf. ibid. p. 357 yad āha "ādibhūmikāyām" iti prathamopādeyatā tataḥ prabhṛti malavigalanārambhāt. 2 My conjectural emendation for °grāhyohamkāra° T. Abh. ibid. p. 357 refers to the 'long compound' (mahāpadam) in the vṛtti, quoting very concisely passages from the commentary devoted to it by the tīkā, integrated with his own glosses. It appears that the last word is upahrmhitah and that therefore the reading T is corrupt; in T the compound ends with grāhyo, which might be theoretically admissible if the following word 'hamkāra did not give rise to considerable perplexity. The words that Abh. expressly quotes are: akhanditagrāhaka, akhanditagrāhya, melanā, upahrmhita. It is worth quoting the whole passage: akhanditagrāhaka ity ādikam vṛttigatam mahāpadam vyācaṣṭe "yat tat" iti / anena grāhakapadam vyākhyātam, akhaņditapadam vyācaṣṭe "yatra" ity ādinā "akhandita" ity antena / "tathā" ity ādinā grāhyapadam vyācaṣṭe, "tatra" ity ādinā tadviśeşanam "akhandita" iti , "tayoh" ity ādinā melanāpadam / tayor iti grāhakagrāhyayoh / "paraspara" iti akhanditapadena grāhakasya grāhakāntarāt, grāhyasya grāhyāntarāt na viccheda iti darśitam, amunā tu parasparato 'pīti / upabṛṃhitapadaṃ vivṛṇoti "nirākānkṣā" ity antena. This permits us to establish the general sense with sufficient precision; there remains the doubt as to what exactly the word preceding melanā must be. My hypothesis is tan (on the basis of tayoh, which seems referred to it in the tīkā), but it might also be something like ubhaya, or ahamidam (which would be closer to the corrupt 'hamkāra T). 3 ÎPV (KSTS) ÎPVV and E read buddhyādio.

IV 2 यन्निर्मितं बुद्धिः प्राणोऽथ शून्यं तद्वे^४द्यैकदेशरूपमहंकारा-वमृश्यतापादनेन परिच्छिन्नग्राहकीकृतम् ॥ २ ॥

स्वस्वरूपापरिज्ञानमयोऽनेकः पुमान्मतः । तत्र सृष्टौ कियानन्दौ भोगो दुःखसुखात्मकः॥३॥

एतदेव विश्वात्मनः परिमितत्वकरणमप्रत्यभिज्ञानमुच्यते । एवं चानेकबुद्धिप्राणादि 'खण्डगतापराहंकारपरामर्शः परापरिज्ञानसंज्ञः । प्रत्यगात्मानो बहवः, तेषु प्रमातृरूपेषु महेश्वरेण स्वानन्दः स्विकयैककर्तृतानुसारिणी निर्मिता । स एव भोग आनन्दलेशाख्यः सुखसंज्ञितः क्रियालवात्मा दुःखरूपः क्रिया दुःखं च वक्ष्यते ॥ ३ ॥

स्वाङ्गरूपेषु भावेषु पत्युङ्गानं किया च या । मायातृतीये ते एव पशोः सत्त्वं रजस्तमः ॥ ४॥

^६ ईश्वरस्य ज्ञानिकये ते मायया सिंहते पशोः सत्त्व-रजस्तमांसि ॥ ४ ॥

⁴ The same expression cit. (from the tīkā) ibid. p. 359 in the introduction to the following verse: vedyaikadeśe 'pi ity ādi. ⁵ T has 'khandanatāpara'; 'khanda' and 'apara' (aparāparaśabdena is most likely a mistake for aparaśabdena) are quoted ibid. p. 360, 'gata' is my tentative emendation for 'nata', evidently corrupt. In the same passage 'aneka' and 'parijñāna' are also quoted: "anena" iti vṛttigranthena / khandaśabdena atidīrghagonāsaśarīragatābhinnajīvatve khandīkarane khandakhandānām pṛthagjīvatvam punar ekībhāvāpattāv ekajīvateti dhvanatā anutvam aparāpara(read apara')śabdena ca parimitatvam darśitam / anekatvāparijñāne tu svaśabdenaiva ukte. ⁶ The lack of commentary on the particularly important first pāda may induce one to question the integrity of the vṛtti. However, the content of the first pāda might be considered as already explained above (cf. III.2.3).

IV 5

भेदस्थितेः शक्तिमतः शक्तित्वं नापदिश्यते । एषां गुणानां करणकार्यत्वपरिणामिनाम् ॥ ५॥

सत्त्वरजस्तमसां च भेदेनावभासनान्न शक्तिन्यपदेशः शक्ति-शक्तिमतोरभेदात् । वस्तुतः ^७शक्तिविकासो विश्वम्॥५॥

सत्तानन्दः किया पत्युस्तदभावोऽपि सा पशोः । द्वयात्मा तद्रजो दुःखं ^८श्लेषिसत्त्वतमोमयम् ॥ ६ ॥

ईश्वरस्यानन्तकर्तृता चंमत्काररूपा क्रियोक्ता परमप्रकाशा-नन्दमयी, प्रत्यगात्मनस्तु तौ प्रकाशानन्दौ ^रग्राह्मभूतौ सत्त्वमुच्यते । तदभावश्च तमः , सत्त्वतमसी प्रकाशानन्दतदभावरूपे द्वे अपि श्लेषात्मनी ¹⁰<रजः> । पशो रजःसंज्ञया क्रिया च दुःखं चोच्यते ॥ ६ ॥

> येऽप्यसामियकेदन्तापरामर्शभुवः प्रभोः । ते विमिश्रा विभिन्नाश्च तथा चित्रावभासिनः॥ ७॥

ये चैते महेश्वरस्येदंशब्दसंकेतानुसंधानं विनापि प्रकाशस्य परामर्शसारत्वाद् "बालदशायामिवेदमर्थनिर्देश्या भावाः , ते" श्रेनका-

⁷ Cf. ibid. p. 363 "āgame" iti śrīmangalāśāstre; the tīkā is probably referring to the well-known ardhaśloka of the Mangalāśāstra (or Sarvamangalā) śaktayo 'sya jagat kṛṭṣṇam, echoed by the vṛṭṭi. ⁸ śleṣi°, which in E and in the two editions of ĪPV stands alone, is to be taken as compounded with the following sattvatamo°, as we can gather from the vṛṭṭi and the other commentaries (only Bh., II p. 291, refers it to rajaḥ); tat-tyamano° corrected to sattvatamo° T. ⁹ Cf. ibid. p. 364 atra hetuḥ pārimityam, tatrāpi grāhyatāpādanam. ¹⁰ The context seems to require the addition of rajaḥ. ¹¹ Cf. ibid. p. 367 na kevalam sadyojātabālāder gocarīkāryaḥ ...; cf. also ibid. p. 368. ¹² Cf. the quotation (from the tīkā) ibid. p. 368 "aneka" ity ādipadena svalakṣaṇātmānaḥ, "pṛṭhak" ity ādinā tu sāmānyalakṣaṇarūpā nirdiṣṭāḥ.

IV 7 भाससामानाधिकरण्येन 13स्वलक्षणात्मानः पृथकसामान्यरूपतया
18नानाकाराश्च तथा तन्निर्माणात् प्रथन्ते ॥ ७ ॥

ते तु भिन्नावभासार्थाः प्रकल्प्याः प्रत्यगात्मनः । तत्तिद्विभिन्नसंज्ञाभिः स्मृत्युत्पेक्षादिगोचरे ॥ ८॥

^{१५}ते विभिन्नावभासाः ^{१६}सामान्यात्मानोऽर्थास् ^{१७}तदनुभवसंस्कृतैः कृशोऽहं दुःखी सुखी वाहमिति विचित्रव्यपदेशविषयीकिय-माणात्मिभः ^{१८}क्षेत्रहौर् ^{१९}विकल्पनशक्तया तत्तद्धटरजतशुक्लपटश-कटादिनाम्नान्तःप्रत्यवमर्शनीयत्वेन ^{२०}प्रदर्श्यन्ते स्मृतौ पूर्वानुभवा-प्रमोषे, विचित्रोत्प्रेक्षादिषु तु स्वातन्त्र्येण । अयमेव ग्राह्मग्राहक - भेदावभासः ^{२१}शब्दमयः पशुभावे ^{२२}संसारबन्धः ॥८॥

¹³ My conjectural emendation for svalakṣaṇātmānam T, meaningless in this context (see also fn. 12). ¹⁴ After some perplexity (nānākārāś might seem connected with citra° and in this case the text should be modified at several points to yield a satisfactory meaning) I have fully accepted T, taking nānākārās as a gloss of vibhinnās and referring to the sāmānyas. 15 My conjectural emendation for ye T. 16 Following Abh.'s commentaries one would expect here something like viśesasāmānyātmano, but Utp.'s intention is certainly different and samanyatmano continues the line of interpretation begun in the preceding verse, where vibhinna refers to the universals. The sense of sāmānyātmano, which occurs also in the tīkā, is clearly explained ibid. p. 370 "sāmānyātmanaḥ" iti svalakṣaṇarūpā api śabdagocarīkāryatvena sāmānyātmakā eveti prāg eva uktam asakrt. Abh. points out (ibid. p. 370) that according to the vṛtti the expression tattadvibhinnasamjñābhih in the kārikā refers both to the objects and the subjects: "tattadvibhinna" ity ādinā sautram vṛttāv api ubhayathā yojitam. 18 kṣetra° cit. and commented on ibid. p. 379 vṛttim vyācaṣṭe "atra" iti kṣetraśabdena śarīram vadatā tacchūnyānām nāsti vikalpanaśaktir ity uktam. 19 vikalpana° (or vikalpa°), my correction (vikalpanaśakti occurs many times in the parallel passage ibid. p. 379): vikalpya T. 20 In T the last akṣara is not clearly legible, fluctuating between te (as in the devanagarī transcript) and nte. But meaning requires pradarsyante. 21 sabdamayah cit. and commented on ibid. p. 380. 22 Cf. ibid. p. 380 etac ca vakşyate "saṃsāro viśrāntaḥ" saṃsaraṇasya heyatām āha "bandharūpa" iti.

IV 9-10

तस्यासाधारणी सृष्टिरीशसृष्ट्यु विजानिन। । सैषाप्य् विश्वज्ञातया सत्यैवेशशक्त्या तदात्मनः ॥ ९ ॥ विश्वविश्वान्त्युपरोधाय चलया प्राणरूपया । विकल्पिक्यया तत्तद्वर्णवैचित्रय विश्वया ॥ १० ॥

क्षेत्रज्ञश्चेश्वररूप एव तत्तत्^{२७}सामान्यरूपानर्थानीशशक्तयैव ^{२८}अ - परिज्ञातया सर्वसाधारणार्थदर्शन^{२९}संस्कृतानन्यवेद्यान् निर्मिमीते । ^{३०}सा चेश्वरशिक्तः स्वात्ममात्रविश्रान्तिवरोधाय मायान्यपदेश्या तत्तत्ककारादि^{३१}वर्णभेदशतानन्तगणना प्राणरूपेण ^{३२}चञ्चलता-मापन्ना ^{३३}विकल्पाख्यव्यापारा तथान्तः सृजत्यर्थान् ॥ ९-१०॥

साधारणोडन्यथा ^{१४}चैशः सर्गः स्पष्टा^{१५}वभासनात् । विकल्पहानेनैकाग्र्यात् क्रमेणेश्वरतापदम् ॥ ११ ॥ ^{३६}ईस्वरस्य तु ^{३७}सृष्टिः सर्वप्रमातृणां साधारणी तेषां तन्मध्य

²³ °upajīvinī: °upajīvanī T. ²⁴ ajñātayā: ajnātayā Ñ (also found in E, ĨPV and ĪPVV). 25 sva°: sa T. 26 All the editions of the kārikās have °rūpayā (also found in C Ch N T) instead of ocitraya T Jh N, but all the commentaries presuppose the latter (IPV kakārādivarņavaicitryair vicitrā, Bh tattadvarņavaicitryacitrayā, ĪPVV aṣṭāṣṭakabhedasahasravaicitryavicitrā). 27 ° sāmānyarūpān cit. and commented on ibid. p. 382 nanu niyatadeśakālā eva svatantravikalpe 'pi ābhāsante arthāḥ, tat kathaṃ vṛttau "sāmānyarūpān" ity uktam / etat pariharati "sāmānyarūpatvena" iti smṛtiviṣayo vikalpyamāno 'pi na svotthāpitadešakālayogī, kintu nirūdhadešakālayogī eveti svalakṣaṇātmā, tena svasṛṣṭadeśakālābhāsamelanā eva arthāḥ svātantrya[svatantra?]vikalpaśaktau, na tu nirūdhāv eṣām kaucana deśakālābhāsāv ity etat tātparyam. 28 °aparijñātayā, my correction: °aparijñātatayā T. 29 Cf. the quotation (from the tīkā) ibid. p. 382 "tattat" ity ādinā "saṃskṛta" ity antena samāsapadena "īśasṛṣṭyupajīvinī" iti vyākhyātam. 30 sā, my correction : sa T. Cit. ibid. p. 384 "varnabhedaśatānantagaņanā iti vrttigatena bahuvrīhiņety arthaķ. ³² cañcalatām, my conjectural emendation: cañcalataram T (ā and ra are very similar in Malayalam script). 33 Cit. ibid. p. 386 "vikalpākhyavyāpāra" iti vṛttyā sūtre "vikalpakriyayā" iti bahuvrīhir ayam śaktim viśinasti, ity āha. 34 caiśah sargah : ceśah sargao T. 35 °avabhāsanāt: °ābhāsavān T (which would be acceptable and even give a better meaning, but all the MSS and the editions of the commentaries agree on oavabhāsanāto). Cf. ibid. p. 387 sargasya pramātrsādhāraņyādicintā kva upayujyate iti cet pramātrsāhityena prameyasya sṛṣṭir na anyathā bhedāvabhāsabhājanam vinā tad anupapatter iti. 37 srstih, my correction: srsteh T.

IV 11

एवोत्पादात् , एकप्रमातृनियता चैकप्रमात्रावेशेन स्वप्नभान्त्यादौ सृष्टिः । ^{३८}सा चाहमिदमित्येतावत्परामर्शमयी ^{३९}भेदानुदयाद्वि-कल्पोज्झिता स्पष्टावभासा च । ^{४०}तत्रान्तरान्तरोद्यत्क्षेत्रज्ञन्यापार-विकल्पनिहासपरिशीलनेन संसारिणां क्रमेणैकरसैश्वर्योद्गमात् क्षेत्रज्ञताविमुक्तिः ॥ ११॥

^{४१}सर्वो ममायं विभव इत्येवं परिजानतः । विश्वात्मनो विकल्पानां प्रसरेऽपि महेशता ॥ १२ ॥

क्षेत्रज्ञस्यापीश्वरशक्तयैव विकल्पारम्भ इति तद्दशायामपि

³⁸ sā cāham idam ity etāvat° cit. ibid. p. 387. ³⁹ bhedānudayāt cit. (from the tikā) ibid. p. 388. 40 The text is doubtful and my restoration is only tentative. Here the second part of the kārikā is glossed (cf. ibid. p. 388 evam ślokārdham vyākhyātam, which concludes the gloss of the first half). T reads tantrāntarāntarodyatkṣetrajñavyāpāravikalpanirhrāsaparasilpanena. I correct tantrā° to tatrā° on the basis of the quotation ibid. p. 388 tadvṛttim "tatrāntara" ity ādikam; antarāntarā is confirmed by its mention in the ṭīkā "yady api" iti / "sahabhāve ca antarāntarā" iti yuktam iti bhāvaḥ / "tathāpi" iti na atra vikalpasṛṣṭer antarāntarā sambhava uktaḥ, kintu tannirhrāsasya. In the same compound, after *kṣetrajña*, T has some akṣaras deleted and corrected, which are read in the transcript as °vāpārakalpa°. Actually, T has vikalpāpāra, where the part ikalpā is deleted and va is corrected to vya, thus forming the word vyāpāra followed not by kalpa but by vikalpa; °vikalpanirhrāsa occurs many times ibid. p. 389. Then I read °pariśīlanena instead of °parisilpanena T (my conjecture is supported ibid. p. 389 tam eva ca vikalpanirhrāsam yadi parisīlayati 41 sarvo : so 'ham E. According to Bh (II p. 305), sarvo, found in the text of IPV commented on by him, would be the corruption of the original reading sargo, graphically rather similar in śāradā script. In his opinion sargo would fit the context better (ayam sargo, that is, the creation of the vikalpas of which it is question), but the decision is left to the reader's sensitivity (sahrdayā atra pramānam). However, a close examination of the vrtti induces me to think that the original reading was precisely sarvo (which is not directly glossed, but which lends itself to not being glossed). I would even add that Abh.'s commentaries may allow one to suppose that his text had precisely the corrupt reading sargo (he would gloss it, in fact, with vikalpasṛṣṭiḥ), then returned, by a further corruption or correction, to the original one which was in front of Bhāskara. Accordingly, Abh.'s interpretation of vibhava is also different from the vrtti's. But another hypothesis may also be put forward. Bhāskara records and immediately discards a further reading so 'ham (kutrāpy ādarśe "so 'ham" ity api pāṭho 'sti, sa tu na yuktaḥ). This reading, found in E, is accepted by Sivopādhyāya in the Vijñānabhairavivṛti (p. 95) and fiercely defended against the upholders of the other two (ibid. p. 96) ye tu "sarvo mamāyam, sargo mamāyam" ity ādipāthāntaram kalpayanti te pāņditammanyāh ... mūdhāh). The परिज्ञातेश्वरभावस्य ममायं संसारमयो विभव इत्यभेदेन IV 12 विश्वमाविशतः परामर्शमात्रानशेषान्विकल्पान्संपादयतो महेश्वरतैव ॥ १२ ॥

मेयं साधारणं मुक्तः स्वात्माभेदेन मन्यते । महेश्वरो यथा बद्धः पुनरत्यन्तभेदवत् ॥ १३ ॥

बद्धमुक्तयोर्वेद्यमेकम्, किंतु बद्धोऽत्यन्तविभेदेन तद्वेत्ति विमुक्तः स्वात्मदेहत्वेन ॥ १३ ॥

> सर्वथा त्वन्तरालीनानन्ततत्त्वौघनिर्भरः । शिवश्चिदानन्दघनः परमाक्षरविगृहः ॥ १४ ॥

सर्वथा त्वन्तर्लीने प्रमेये^{४२} इहंमतौ पूर्णायां शिवतैव ॥ १४ ॥

एवमात्मानमेतस्य सम्यक् ज्ञानक्रिये तथा । ^{४३}पश्यन् यथेप्सितानथीन् जानाति च

करोति च॥ १५॥

इत्थमाविष्कृतशकत्यभिज्ञानम् आत्मानमनन्तज्ञानक्रियाशिकत^{४४}नि-भृतमीश्वरं प्रत्यभिज्ञाय यथेच्छं सर्वं पश्यति निर्मिमीते ॥ १५ ॥

first pāda of the kārikā, in this form, would refer to the two aspects of 'recognition' (pratyabhijāādvaidham), connected by him with the vv. 109-10 of the Vijāānabhairava. According to Śivopādhyāya, this would be the reading commented on by Abh. (pratyabhijāāvimarśinīkāreṇa); and indeed IPV II p. 305 (and almost in the same terms IPVV III p.393) says: na hi sah pratyagātmā nāma paśuh kaścid anyo 'ham, api tu pari-grhītagrāhyagrāhakaprakāśaikaghanah paro yah sa evāham sa cāham eva But this may also be a mere digression of Abh., not directly dependent on the text of the kārikā. Lastly, sahrdayā atra pramānam. ⁴² Cf. ibid. p. 395 "cidānandaghana" iti sautram ahampratītau pūrnāyām" itīyatā vyākhyātam. ⁴³ paśyan yathepsītān arthān: jānan yathepsītān paśyan C Ñ (this is also the reading of IPV, IPVV and Bh), paśyan yathepsītān ātmā Ch Jh T (ātmā then corrected to arthān in T). The text of E T N is the one presupposed by all the commentaries. ⁴⁴ This word in T is difficult to read. Among the various options "nibhrtam" (or "nirbhrtam") seems to me the only one that may furnish an acceptable meaning (the transcript has "nivrtam").

इति प्रकटितो मया सुघट एष मार्गो नवो महागुरुभिरुच्यते स्म शिवदृष्टिशास्त्रे यथा । तदत्र निद्धत्पदं भुवनकर्तृतामात्मनो विभाग्य शिवतामयीमनिशमाविशन्सिध्यति ॥ १६ ॥

यत्र यथावस्थित एव व्यवहारे प्रत्यभिज्ञामात्रात् शिवतालाभः । सोऽयमवक एवाभिनवो मार्गः ^{४५}साक्षात्कृतपरमेश्वरभट्टारकाका-रैर्भट्टश्रीसोमानन्दपादैः शिवदृष्टिनाम्नि प्रकरणे निर्दिष्टो मया युक्तिनिबन्धनेन हृदयंगमीकृतः। एतत्परिशीलनेन शिवतावेशाज् जीवन्न् ^{४६}एव मुक्तो भवति ॥ १६॥

तैस्तैरप्युपयाचितैरुपनतस्तन्व्याः स्थितोऽप्यन्तिके कान्तो लोकसमान एवमपरिज्ञातो न रन्तुं यथा। लोकस्यैष तथानवेश्वितगुणः स्वात्मापि विश्वेश्वरो नैवालं निजवैभवाय तदियं

तत्प्रत्यभिज्ञोदिता ॥ १७ ॥

कान्तरष्टान्तेन ईश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञोपपादनीया चापूर्वफला च ॥ १७॥

⁴⁵ Cf. ĪPVV I p. 38 tīkākāro 'pi "sākṣātkṛtaparameśvarākāraiḥ" iti vakṣyati. ⁴⁶ eva cit. in ĪPVV III p. 403 "jīvanmukto na saṃśayaḥ" ity ādiṣu āgamasthāneṣu niyamārthavyākhyānāya vṛttau ya evakāraḥ ... / adbhūtatvam api ca evakāreṇa sūcita asya upadeśasya.

जनस्यायत्नसिद्धवर्थमुदयाकरसूनुना । ईश्वरपत्यभिज्ञेयमुत्पलेनोपपादिता ॥ १८ ॥

सुलभोऽयं सिद्धिमार्गः प्रदर्शितः ॥ १८ ॥

इति तत्त्वसंग्रहाधिकारः ॥

॥ समाप्तेयमीश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञावृत्तिः ॥

TRANSLATION



SECTION I. KNOWLEDGE

CHAPTER I

- 1. Having in some way¹ attained the state of servant of Maheśvara and wishing to offer assistance also to the whole of mankind, I shall by giving it logical justification make possible the awakening² of the recognition of the Lord, which brings about the achievement of all success³.
- I who have obtained, thanks to the benevolence of the Supreme Lord⁴, the benefits that derive from being His servant⁵- a state it is very difficult to achieve being ashamed of my solitary success, shall, by the method that will here be described, enable the whole of mankind to recognize their Lord, in order to gain my complete fulfilment through the attainment also by them of the Supreme Reality. -1 -
- 2. What intelligent being could ever deny or establish the cognizer and agent, the Self, Maheśvara, established from the beginning (ādisiddhe)?

¹ I.e. in a way that eludes all description.

² I have thus tried to render the various meanings that Utp. gives to the one verb *upapādayāmi* (cf. ĪPVV I pp. 31-32; cf. also the closing verse of the ĪPK). The main meaning of the causative here is *samarthācaraṇa*, i.e., to act in such a way as to bring about the production of a certain action (in this case the awakening of recognition).

³ Thus, following the order that appears most obvious, I refer the compound sama-stasampatsamavāptihetum to pratyabhijnām, but, as Abh. points out on the basis of the tīkā and the vrtti, it not only qualifies tatpratyabhijnām but also dāsyam. The compound, which is implicitly understood as tatpuruṣa in the vrtti, is the object of intricate interpretations, sometimes as tatpuruṣa and sometimes as bahuvrīhi, in the IPV.

⁴ Or also, as Abh. suggests (see text note 1), «thanks to the benevolence of the master».

⁵ Cf. the vigraha of the compound (see text note 3).

- 11.2 The Self of all beings, the substratum of the establishment of all objects⁶, who embraces the establishment of himself⁷ since otherwise it would be impossible to establish all the various objects self-luminous, whose nature is uniquely that of cognizer, formerly⁸ established, 'ancient', possesses knowledge and action. Sovereignty (aiśvaryaṃ) is established through inner awareness. Therefore only the foolish strive to establish or deny the Lord. 2
 - 3. However, since He, though being directly perceived (dṛṣṭe 'pi), is not discerned for what He is because of delusion, precisely for this reason, by bringing His powers to light, the recognition (pratyabhijñā) of Him is shown.
 - However, since the Lord, though established through inner awareness⁹ (svasamvedanasiddham), does not enter the sphere of full and defi-
 - ⁶ According to Abh. (see text note 11), this is to be understood as meaning that the cognizer constitutes the final stage (viśrāntisthāna) of the cognitive act, at which the revelation of the object (prakāśa) becomes reflective awareness (vimarśa).
 - ⁷ The cognizer becomes implicitly conscious of himself, of his being 'light', precisely through perception (the 'illumination' of the object); indeed, the illumination of the object its perception presupposes a light into which it enters, a light that by definition is not its own but pertains to the subject.
 - The being established of the subject always 'precedes', as an a priori condition of knowledge, and for this reason eludes any objectification that attempts to capture it, so to speak, from behind. That would be like trying to step ahead of one's own shadow, as a well-known verse of the Trikahrdaya (quoted in SSV p. 4) puts it. Abh. (IPVV I p. 51) gives the example of inferring fire from smoke, which, indeed, implies that it is always the smoke that is already established first: the difference being that the priority of the self is ad infinitum (yadā yadā upakramaḥ tadā tadā pūrva-siddhatvam ity eṣo 'tra paramārthah). This is precisely what the nearness of pūrva-siddha to purāna signifies, which taken singly may apply to various things (see text note 15); the same theme will be taken up again later.
 - The expression svasamvedanasiddha interprets and orientates, by limiting its meaning, drste in the kārikā, which, insofar as it is passive, seems to degrade to the status of object He who is the subject par excellence, the Lord. But, Abh. notes (see text note 19), this expression, too, is, in the strict sense of the word, inadequate, as the fikā itself has pointed out (nāpi svasamvedanasiddhatvam ātmanah); it can be accepted only if understood in a metaphorical sense, as expressing the undeniability of the experience of the I. The theme of the absolute impossibility of objectifying the I, Siva, recurs with particular insistence in the work of Utp. Cf. IPVV III p. 162 yat prameyīkrto 'smīti sarvo 'py ātmani lajjate / katham prameyīkaraṇam sahatām tan maheśvarah // 'Everyone feels ashamed in himself at seeing that he is transformed into an objet of cognition; then, how might the Great Lord stand this '?'

nite knowledge $(ahrdayangamatv\bar{a}t)^{10}$ because of the delusion caused by I 1.3 māyā, His mere 'recognition'¹¹ is here shown – in the form of the acquisition of unswerving certainty - through the illustration of that sign of recognition that is represented by the faculties peculiar to Him^{12} . – 3 –

- 4. Indeed, the foundation of insentient realities rests on the living being; knowledge and action are considered the life of the living being.
- There are two kinds of reality: insentient and sentient. The establishment of an insentient nature rests on the living being; the being such of the living, i.e. life, is represented precisely by knowledge and action. -4
- 5. Knowledge is self-established (svatah siddham); action, when it manifests itself through a body, becomes cognizable also by others. Thanks to it, knowledge in others can be guessed.
- In living beings action, when it reaches the final stage of bodily movement, also becomes directly perceptible in other subjects¹³; knowledge, which is in itself capable of self-perception, becomes evident (*prasidhyati*) also in others precisely through action¹⁴. Therefore, the Lord,

¹⁰ Lit.: 'does not reach the heart', i.e. the plane of *vimarśa* which alone makes a cognition fully accomplished and effective (cf. ĪPVV I p. 80).

- The reality of the Self is not therefore 'known' as happens with any object in phenomenal reality, which, not shining itself, needs to be illuminated by consciousness but is simply 'recognized'. Moreover, this act of recognition is not something that was not there formerly and must be brought into existence, but eternally present and merely concealed, it is only 'shown' (darśyate) as predominant, by placing it near (upa), in contact with the heart (ĪPVV I p. 87 see text note 26). Thus Abh. intends to remove the act of recognition from the sphere of the vyavahārasādhana as well (cf. p. 173 n. 3). In fact, there may not be anything asiddha in the Lord, not even as regards any aspect of vyavahāra (prakhyā-upākhyā, jñāna-abhidhāna) concerning him, for in this case even the establishment of the smallest portion of the knowable would become impossible (ĪPVV I p. 87 tadasiddhau prameyaleśasyāpi hi na kācit siddhir ity uktam).
 - 12 That is, above all, the powers of knowledge and action.
- 13 This means that action, as an inner reality (vimarśa), inseparable from knowledge, is also self-established. The possibility of objectification only regards its extreme phenomenal form of bodily movement.
- If action is examined first in the vrtti, thus reversing the order of the $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$ where knowledge is mentioned first, this is because action is the means by which knowledge (from which it is inseparable) can be inferred in others ($\bar{I}PVVI$ pp. 104-105). That bodily action, and the use of the word, presuppose knowledge is a gene-

11.5 the Self perceived as 'I' in oneself and others, is established insofar as it is directly experienced through inner awareness. Because of the obscuring of his true nature caused by the power of māyā, the Self is thus 15 erroneously conceived. - 5 -

rally recognized fact; cf. for instance Dharmakīrti's Santānāntarasiddhi 1-2 (Kitagawa 1955: 58; Stcherbatsky 1969: 64). But to infer knowledge means to objectify it and it is for this reason that Utp. in the $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$ and in the $t\bar{i}k\bar{a}$ prefers to resort to other expressions, such as to conjecture, suppose, guess etc. (cf. ūhanam tarkanam sambhavanam ibid. p. 101). The problem, however, arises again and is given an elaborate solution in IPVV I pp. 105-108. Abh. begins by stating that since it is a question of an inference founded on the svabhāvahetu (see below p. 179 n. 17) - that does not aim to make known an object not formerly known, but only to rid it of erroneous conceptions - the real basic self-luminosity of knowledge and of the subject is not contradicted. After a series of objections and replies, following the line of argument in the $t\bar{t}k\bar{a}$, the conclusion is reached: a certain level of objectification in inferring knowledge in another body is undeniable, but this applies only to the initial and medial stages, whereas in the end (paryante) knowledge appears in all its luminosity, at unity with the subject making the inference, as happens at the conclusion of every cognitive act. In saying prasidhyati the vrtti intends to express the emergence of the natural self-luminosity of knowledge and to exclude the possibility of its being a luminosity induced by the subject, as is the case for the common object of knowledge (siddham bhavati, na tu sādhyam).

lie. in the way that will be described in the following chapter. In understanding tasya both as objective and subjective genitive (it is Abh. himself who underlines this, see text note 43), the Self becomes both the object and the subject of the error: the Self in its freedom is mistaken about itself. Indeed, every reality, even error, has the Lord, the Self, as its ultimate source.

CHAPTER II

1-2. [Objection]¹ There is one type of cognition² in which the particular reality (svalakṣaṇa°)³ appears and another type of cognition,

¹ In the whole of āhnika II a Buddhist pūrvapakṣin is speaking; his arguments are broadly speaking those of the Buddhist logicians, that gradually become more specifically vijñānavādin, sautrāntika etc. The target of Buddhist criticism here are some ātmavādins whose (various) positions are only partially shared by the Śaiva ātmavādin. One might almost say that Utp. sometimes uses the Buddhists' own weapons to demolish doctrines which, though apparently closer to the Śaiva positions, remain, however, extraneous to what is their core and essential tenor. In the text the word 'Objection' refers to the Buddhists and the word 'Reply' refers to the ātmavādins.

² I have understood ekam ... param here in the plainest sense, which is also the one explained in the vrtti. Abh. (IPVV I p. 114) lists three possible interpretations, and the one accepted here is the third. The second, which Utp. adopts in the fikā, takes ekam as 'single, undifferentiated', in this sense referring to direct experience (anubhava) as opposed to the vikalpa, which assumes different forms (memory, imagination, doubt etc.). The only differentiation in direct experience is the one deriving from the variety of its objects. Thus param, apart from 'another' correlated to 'one', is also to be understood as 'subsequent', in the sense that the vikalpa always depends on a previous direct experience.

³ The svalakṣaṇa - which Dharmottara understands as a karmadhāraya 'unique character, unique reality' (NBT p. 70 svam asādhāraņam lakṣaṇam tattvam svalaksanam) - is, for the Buddhist logicians, the object of direct perception. Dharmakīrti (no definition of svalakṣaṇa is found in the extant works of Dignāga) describes it as follows: capable of causal efficiency, dissimilar from everything else, not being the object of words and not being known in the presence of signs that are different from it (PV III.1-2); and that which, owing to its being far or near, determines a difference in the form that appears in cognition (NB I.13). The svalaksaņa - says Mokṣākaragupta (TBh p. 11) - is something real, unique, determined by a space, a time and a form which are peculiar to it; he gives the example of a particular jar, capable of containing water, with a definite place, time and form, directly present to knowledge, devoid of differentiation into many properties, different from what belongs to the same or a different class. The svalaksana strictu sensu is an absolutely undivided reality; it is an instant (NBT p. 71 pratyaksasya hi kṣaṇa eko grāhyaḥ). The term svalakṣaṇa is borrowed by the śaiva authors to denote "an entity having a character which is only its own, consisting in a determined place, time and form which 'contract' its own nature" (ĪPV I p. 86 svam anyānanuyāyi svarūpasamkocabhāji laksaņam deśakālākārarūpam yasya ...). The basic difference

- 12.1-2 called mental elaboration (vikalpa°), inseparably connected with discourse (sābhilāpam), which appears in manifold forms. For neither of the two is there any necessity to posit any stable perceiving subject, since he does not appear⁴ in them. Also the notion of T (ahampratītiḥ) has in reality as referent the body etc...
 - One type of cognition, consisting in the direct perception of the clearly manifested (sphuṭāvabhāsa°) particular reality, is called 'exempt from mental elaborations' (nirvikalpakam); the other type of cognition, on the other hand, which, permeated by the word, appears in the various forms of memory, doubt, fantasy etc., is called 'representation, mental elaboration' (vikalpa°). Neither the one nor the other are admissible as depending on another entity distinct from knowledge itself in the form of consciousness, since this other entity is not perceived (tasyānupalabdheḥ). Who, then, is this permanent Self? Even on the basis of the notion of 'I', which is indissolubly connected with discourse, the existence of a cognizer, who transcends what are simply cognizable realities, namely the body and so on, cannot be ascertained⁵. 1-2 -

with the Buddhists lies precisely in conceiving of place-time-form not as the intrinsic nature of the thing but as the contingent contraction of an entity whose real nature is, on the contrary, expanded (vikāsitasvabhāva eva, vitatātmā; cf. ŚD V.6c), 'open' (cf. ĪPVV II p. 27). Though appearing as a unitary entity, the svalakṣaṇa, in Utp.'s view, is in fact formed by a number of ābhāsas, i.e. universals, which have become a particular owing to their mutual delimitation and their connection with space and time (Torella 1987: 168-69). In the process of particularization space and time are considered the most essential elements (antaranga). If, already in perception itself, the svalakṣaṇa appears as a unitary reality (the world of practical experience is, indeed, made of svalakṣaṇas), this is due to the unifying power of the mind (anusamdhāna) which links together a group of ābhāsas by making them subordinated to a predominant one (sāmānādhikaranya; see below pp. 166-167) Thus the śaiva position may be defined ābhāsanikurumhātmakavāda as opposed to the niramśasvalakṣaṇavāda of the Buddhists (on svalakṣaṇa in the Buddhist pramāna tradition see Stcherbatsky 1930²: 181-198, Katsura 1991: 135-137).

⁴ The Buddhist logicians acknowledge the validity of non-perception as the criterion for establishing the non-existence of something that could (if present) be perceived (drśyānupalabdhi); this subject will be extensively taken up again later.

⁵ The Buddhist knows he is laying himself open to an obvious objection: how is it possible to say that no 'I' is manifested in knowledge when, on the contrary, we all usually say « I know, I am happy or unhappy, I am thin or fat». But he has his answer ready: this notion of 'I' does not reveal a permanent subject but refers to the series of distinct moments of cognition (jñānasantāna) and of body (śarīrasantāna) on which apparent personal identity is based. And in any case this experience

- 3. [Reply] How could we explain memory, which conforms to direct 12.3 perception when the latter is no longer present, if there were not a permanent self, who is the subject of the perception?
- Since the former direct perception has disappeared at the moment of the memory, the memory, whose essential quality is precisely its dependence on that former perception of the object, could not arise, unless one admits the persistence⁶ of the awareness of this perception also at the moment of the memory. And this lasting awareness at different times is precisely the self, the perceiving subject. -3
- 4. [Objection] Even if we do acknowledge the existence of a self, memory is still not explained, given that the perception no longer exists and that only through it [the perception] does memory have access to the objects formerly perceived. [Reply]. But memory acts on those very things that were the object of the perception...
- Once the direct perception (manifestation) of the object has ceased, the object no longer exists even for memory, since it is assumed precisely through direct perception. Therefore, even if one acknowledges a self consisting in a unitary consciousness, memory finds itself without an object and thus all worldly activity collapses. If, on the other hand, you claim that memory has as its object that of a perception that no longer exists... -4
- 5. ...insofar as the occurrence of memory is due to the latent impressions left by direct⁷ perception. [Objection] If that is how things stand, what need is there for this useless burden of a permanent self?

would come into the category of the vikalpa, since it takes place through verbal mediation (the word T); and therefore, even if an T existed, it would become transformed into object.

⁶ Or, if we accept the reading *āvartate* or *āvarteta*, 'the arising again'.

This is the reason for the ātmavādin's reply; the ātmavādin and the Buddhist pūrvapakṣin completely agree on this point. However, while this admission allows the ātmavādin to elude the criticism levelled at him in the previous verse, he lays himself open to further, even more radical criticism: once the fundamental role that the samskāra plays in memory is acknowledged, resorting to a permanent self becomes superfluous. The grounds of the Buddhist argumentation are clearly outlined by Abh. (ĪPVV I pp. 126-7). Every cognitive act has two levels: an outer and an inner one. The first (bahirmukha) consists in the illumination or perception of the

- 12.5 From direct perception there derives a latent impression (saṃskāraḥ); the memory arising from this conforms to that former perception and makes that perception in which the object is immersed manifest. If things are explained in these terms, why is it necessary to assume a useless permanent subject, since even the supporter of the existence of the self acknowledges the existence of the latent impression and this alone is enough to account for memory? 5
 - 6. If the qualities are separate [extrinsic to the self], then, since the nature of the self remains unaltered, the latent impressions are sufficient to explain the phenomenon of memory. The subject of memory is therefore only a mental construct (kalpitah), as was the subject of the perception.
 - The self, even if it is invoked as a substratum of qualities that are distinct from it, such as pleasure, pain, knowledge etc. serves no useful purpose. Indeed, it does not perform any function in the phenomenon of memory⁸, since it does not undergo any modification, seeing that it does not combine with the above-mentioned qualities, which are conceived as separate. Therefore, as in the case of the subject of perception, to say that the self is the subject of memory is purely a mental construct. -6

object, the second (antarmukha) is constituted by the self-consciousness (sva-samvedana) of this perception. According to the Buddhist, the ātmavādin stakes everything on this continuity of self-consciousness (to which he gives the name of ātman) to explain the phenomenon of memory, and in so doing leaves memory without an object which can only derive from the bahirmukha level of the former cognition. Now, if this has completely ceased there cannot be a memory (which corresponds to saying 'that') and, if it is fully present there, there is only a new direct perception. What is required is 'the non-cessation of something that has however ceased (nastasyāpy anāśah)' and this is precisely what the samskāra is. Even the ātmavādin cannot refute this either and thus he gives renewed vigour to the Buddhist's attack, which is expressed in the second part of the kārikā.

The kārikā is parrying an objection that the ātmavādin might raise, this time on behalf of a Vaiśesika: the saṃskāra is a quality (dharma) of the self, on a par with knowledge, pleasure and pain, and as such presupposes a substratum (dharmin) where it inheres (i.e. the self); the dharmin, on the other hand, cannot be represented by a santāna, because it must be a unitary reality (eka) (cf. IPVV I p. 130); but if one wishes to preserve the permanence of the ātman one must consider these qualities as separate from him and not able to modify him (this is explained in IPV I pp. 92-3 and IPVV I p. 130). In this case, however, neither a saṃskāra which does not modify the self, nor a self which is not modified by the saṃskāra, can explain the phenomenon of memory.

- 7. If 9 cognition were conscious (citsvarūpam) then it ought to be per- 12.7 manent like the self 10; if, on the contrary, it were not sentient, how could it illuminate objects?
- If cognition were by nature conscious, then, unable to be associated with time and place which are qualities pertaining to objects –, it would become permanent etc., like the self¹¹. If, on the other hand, it were not sentient, how could it illuminate the object? 7 –
- 8. [Reply]. Just as the intellect assumes the form of the object, so it assumes the sentience (caitanyam) of the self¹². [Objection]. In that case it is not insentient, for if it were so, it could not illuminate the object.
- ⁹ After confuting those who maintain that the existence of the self is directly perceptible or inferable, the $p\bar{u}rvapaksin$ turns to attacking the 'sovereignty' (aiśvarya) of the self, i.e. its being endowed with the powers of cognition and action. Cognition as a reality or function distinct from the self is primarily criticized; this is a conception that may be ascribed to the $\bar{a}tmav\bar{a}dins$ in general but as we shall see rejected by the Saivas.
- This is, of course, the opinion held by the majority of ātmavādins. The reasoning is as follows: the self is nitya, because it is citsvarūpa svaprakāśa, and time can qualify only objects. Abh. (IPVV I pp. 135-6) mentions the positions of the followers of the Sāmkhya (kāpilānām tāvat nitya eva asau), of the Mīmāmsakas (jaiminīyāh purusam saṃvidrūpam eva sukhādyavasthābhinnam manyante ... cidrūpāmśena nityah, avasthāmśena tu anityo 'sti, this is a doctrine which stems from the Bhāṭṭas, cf. ŚV, Ātmavāda, vv. 26 ff.) etc. The positions of the ātmavādins differ greatly as regards whether the self is conscious or not.
- 11 If cognition, as distinct from the self, is conceived as being conscious by nature and such, for instance, is the position of the Vaisesikas and the Prābhākaras it follows that it, too, is permanent. The contradiction that arises (in the eyes of the Buddhist) and is not made clear in the vrtti nor, it seems, in the tīkā, is pointed out by Abh. (IPVV I p. 103): if both jñāna and ātman are nitya, there can be no relation between them, because, according to the Buddhists, the only relation is that of cause and effect, which, indeed, cannot exist between two permanent realities. Abh. (IPVV I p. 134) points out a further consequence: cognition thus having the same properties as the self, would only be another self, and thus the hetu that it represents in the inference of the self would become asiddha.
- This is the Sāmkhya theory, according to which the buddhi, though itself insentient, cognizes by means of the light that is reflected in it from the puruṣa. Thus the buddhi would be both insentient and sentient (cid-acit), which is a position the pūrvapakṣin recognizes as untenable (in order for it to be able to fulfil its function in the final analysis it must be sentient and therefore the criticism levelled earlier is valid). The view of the Sāmkhya is inadmissible it is said, among other, in the IPV and IPVV because only a clearer thing can receive the reflection of another and the buddhi is certainly no 'clearer' than the self.



The intellect (buddhih) is cognition¹³. Though it is itself insentient, just as it assumes the reflection of the form of the object, so, in the same way, it also assumes the reflection of the sentience pertaining to the self. Thus [in assuming them both¹⁴], it can illuminate the object. However, [it is replied] it follows that it must be sentient by nature.

Therefore 15 cognition, though it exists, is not related to anything else [i.e. to a subject], because this has been recognized as untenable. Action, on the other hand, neither exists in itself, nor as related to anything else. -8

- 9. Also action [as a separate reality is logically inadmissible as it] consists in the coming into being of hodies etc. in different places etc. (tattaddeśādijātatā)¹⁶ and nothing more, since nothing more is perceived; nor is it tenable that it being one and also characterized by succession may be related to a unitary reality.
- Action, too, conceived as one and constitued by various preceding and succeeding parts, consisting in the activity of factors $(k\bar{a}raka^{\circ})^{17}$, is not tenable, as it is not possible to attribute unity to something characterized by succession, i.e. that exists in a multiplicity of moments¹⁸. Nor is it admissible that it has a substratum that is both characterized by tem-

¹³ The various reasons for this apparently inappropriate identification (of the organ with the function etc.), are extensively analyzed in ĪPVV I pp. 149-50.

¹⁴ Cf. text note 87.

That is, on the grounds of the arguments put forward in this and the previous $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$ from which the conclusion is reached that cognition is neither permanent nor related to a subject.

¹⁶ Cf. e.g. TS 706 deśāntaropalabdhes tu nairantaryeṇa janmanaḥ / samānaparavastūnāṃ gatibhrāntiḥ pradīpavat //.

¹⁷ This is an allusion to Patañjali's famous definition, kārakāṇām pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ kriyā (Mahābhāṣya, vol. I p. 258), understood in various ways by generations of commentators (e.g. What is the meaning of kārakāṇām? The subject, the subject and object, all the kārakas without distinction? etc.). This is the background to the whole of the Kriyāsamuddeśa of the VP, which is, in turn, the reference point for the Śaiva conception of action (cf. the extensive and repeated quotations from this fundamental text in the IPVV's comment on this verse).

¹⁸ This is a reply to an implicit objection, formulated in IPVV I pp. 186-7: there are, indeed, collective units such as the army etc., but here the various antecedent and consequent parts, linked by a reciprocal relation, exist simultaneously; this is not so in the case of action.

poral succession and is unitary in nature 19 . Action is only 'to go' 'to $^{12.9}$ change' and so on, which is but the assumption on the part of bodies etc. of new states of existence at various and diverse times and places, since nothing else distinct from this is perceived. -9

- 10. The various things come into being in concomitance with the presence of certain other things: this is what is experienced and nothing more. There is no relation (sambandhah) other than that of cause and effect ²⁰.
- What is directly perceived is simply that, when a certain preceding thing is present, a subsequent thing comes into being. As was argued in the case of action, no relation of action and factors ($kriy\bar{a}k\bar{a}rakasam-bandhah$) exists, since such a 'relation' is not perceived as a distinct entity. There is no connection between things other than that of cause and effect. 10
 - 11. [A relation (sambandha)21, however conceived, is inadmiss-
- The difference in nature inherent in the various antecedent and consequent parts determines a difference in nature in the substratum they share (cf. ĪPVV I p. 193).
- 20 $\overline{\text{IPV}}$ I p. 117 summarizes the series of criticisms the $p\bar{u}rvapaksin$ levelled against the Saiva statement «the I is sovereign ($\overline{i}svara$) because it is in union with knowledge and action ($j\bar{n}\bar{a}nakriy\bar{a}yog\bar{a}t$)». $J\bar{n}\bar{a}na$ is produced ($k\bar{a}rya$) by its own group of causes, such as the faculty of sight etc.; $kriy\bar{a}$ does not exist: therefore they cannot be $k\bar{a}ryas$ of the self (nor can the self, by definition, be a $k\bar{a}rya$ of them). And therefore, given that the only relation acknowledged by the Buddhists is that of $k\bar{a}rya$ - $k\bar{a}rana$, it follows that there cannot be any relation between $j\bar{n}\bar{a}na$ and $kriy\bar{a}$ on the one hand and the self on the other.
- Utp. refers to Dharmakīrti's Sambandhaparīkṣā. The complete text of this short work, and the vṛtti with which Dharmakīrti accompanied it, has only survived in Tibetan translation (the commentaries Sambandhaparīkṣāṭīkā and anusāra, respectively by Vinītadeva and Sankaranandana, are also extant only in Tibetan translation). The Sanskrit text of twenty-two of the twenty-five kārikās that compose it can be obtained from Devasūri's Syādvādaratnākara (see Frauwallner 1934: 261-300) and Prabhācandra's Prameyakamalamārtānda (see Jha 1990). Like Dharmakīrti, after dealing with the concept of relation in various parts of his magnum opus, the PV, felt the need to return to it both organically and concisely in the SP, similarly and this does not seem merely coincidental after the ĪPK, Utp. also composed the Sambandhasiddhi (with a vṛtti), a short work in which he outlines the Saiva conception of relation. Indeed, the critical reference point for the latter is the SP, an ardhaśloka

12.11 ible]²² since, as it rests on the two related terms²³, it cannot be unitary in nature; since a thing that is [already] accomplished (siddhasya) cannot 'require' ('apekṣanāt) another and dependence (pāratantrya') etc. are not logically tenable²⁴. Thus the agent, too, is merely a mental construct.

of which is even included in the text (4cd ity amisrāh svayam bhāvās tān yojayati kalpanā, corresponding to v. 5cd of the SP). Some verses quoted by Abh. in IPVV I, without any reference to their source, also come from the SP. It is worth quoting them in full, also because they differ in some places from the form in which the same verses are quoted by Devasūri and Prabhācandra (the latter are in square brackets): bhāvabhedapratītyartham samyojyante 'bhidhāyakāḥ (v. 6b, cit. p. 195), paśyann ekam adrstasya darsane tadadarsane / apasyan [Prabh. apasyat] kāryam anveti vināpy ākhyātrbhir [Prabh. vinā vyākhyātrbhir] janah // darśanādarśane muktvā kāryabuddher na saṃbhavāt [asaṃbhavāt] / kāryādiśrutir apy atra lāghavārthaṃ niveśitā // (vv. 13-14, citt. p. 199), ity amiśrāh svayam bhāvās tān yojayati [miśrayati] kalpanā // tām eva cānurundhāṇaiḥ kriyākārakavācinaḥ / bhāvabhedapratītyartham samyojyante 'bhidhāyakāḥ // (vv. 5cd-6 citt. p. 200), samś ca sarvanirāsamso bhāvah katham apekṣate / apekṣā yadi [parāpekṣā hi; Prabh. inverts] the two hemistichs] sambandhah so 'san katham apeksate (v. 3, cit. p. 203), ... tān miśrayati kalpanā (v. 5cd, cit. p. 204), dvitve sati [Dev. dvișthe sa ca, Prabh. dvitve sa caj katham bhavet (v. 2a, cit. p. 205), siddhe kā paratantratā (v. 1a, cit. p. 204). It should be noted that the readings given by Devasūri and Prabhācandra are generally more in line with the Tibetan translations.

In Dharmakīrti's opinion the connection between cause and effect is not a relation (as conceived by the realists), since the essential requisite of a relation is the simultaneous presence of the two related terms on which it rests equally – whereas cause and effect must necessarily belong to two different moments in time (cf. PV III.246 asatah prāg asāmarthyāt paścāc cānupayogataḥ / prāgbhāvaḥ sarvahetūnām ...//) – (SP v. 7 kāryakāraṇabhāvo 'pi tayor asahabhāvataḥ / prasidhyati katham dviṣṭho 'dviṣṭhe saṃbandhatā katham //). Thus, the cause-effect relation is, in the final analysis, unreal precisely qua relation, being reduced to a concatenation of presences and absences (anvaya-vyatireka, bhāva-abhāva); cf. SP v. 17 etāvanmātra[i.e. bhāvābhāvau]tattvārthāḥ kāryakāraṇagocarāḥ / vikalpā darśayanty arthān mithyārthā ghaṭitān iva //.

²³ The fact that it rests on the two related elements is, as we have seen, the essential feature of a relation, as it is commonly understood by the realists: in the opinion of the Buddhist opponent this is a contradiction in terms, but precisely because this is the essential requisite it cannot be abandoned without rejecting the very concept of relation (see SP v.11ab dvistho hi kaścit sambandho nāto 'nyat tasya lakṣanam).

Here, too, a direct reference is made to the SP the first ślokas of which are devoted to confuting one by one the various forms in which a relation may be represented. Utp. expressly mentions and criticizes only apekṣā and pāratantrya; the $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$, however, adds $^{\circ}\bar{a}di^{\circ}$ and the $fik\bar{a}$ shows that this is intended to refer to $r\bar{u}paśleṣa$, which in the SP is actually examined in v. 2, after $p\bar{a}ratantrya$ and before $apekṣ\bar{a}$.

- A relation is based on two terms (dviṣṭhaḥ) and it is not logically 12.11 tenable for it to rest on both and preserve its unitary nature. Neither is a relation conceivable in the form of a reciprocal requirement (anyonyāpekṣā°) between two things which are already accomplished nor in the form of a dependence (pāratantrya°) of two self-contained things²⁶. On the grounds of what has been said, just as the state of cognizer is a mental construct, the same holds good for the agent²⁷.

²⁵ I.e. they already have their own independent existence. Primarily one must distinguish, as Utp. does here, between apekṣā and pāratantrya, often generically translated as 'dependence'. In apekṣā the sense of 'need, requirement, expectation' predominates: the shoot 'requires' the seed (SSVr p. 2 ankura eva bījam apekṣate); the genititve rājnah 'requires' ('depends' on) puruşah (apekṣā, ākānkṣā; see ĪPVV I pp. 203-204), without which it would remain incomplete. Dharmakīrti's criticism (SP v.3 parāpekṣā hi saṃbandhaḥ so 'san katham apekṣate / saṃś ca sarvanirāśaṃse bhāvaḥ katham apekṣate //) is taken up again in the ṭīkā and then in IPVV (I pp. 203-204). If a cause is existent (sat) it cannot 'require' anything else; if it is nonexistent (asat) it cannot 'require' at all; nor can it be said that a thing 'requires' its effect in order to be qualified as a cause, because this is not anything other than its very nature, but is identified with it. If one objects that its nature, though being fully present, may not be realized as such in practical reality (vyavahāra), one may reply that, if the vyavahāra is cognition and verbalization (jñāna-abhidhāna), then it is the subject (i.e. the mind), not the thing, that is directly involved, and therefore he is given the responsibility for establishing such unreal relations (cf. SP v. 5cd ity amiśrāh svayam bhāvās tān miśrayati kalpanā). In the case, then, of rājñah (which is sat) with respect to purusah (also sat) there is no reciprocal apeksā, but only of the former towards the latter, (IPVV I p. 204 rājnah satah sati eva pumsi apekseti, na tu anyonyāpekṣā atra vivakṣitā); therefore it cannot be represented as sambandha, which - we know - must be dvistha.

The criticism of pāratantrya (more precisely 'dependence' as subordination, heteronomy) is outlined in the first verse of the SP (pāratantryam hi sambandhaḥ siddhe kā paratantratā). Abh. notes, following in the steps of the tīkā (IPVV I p. 204), that a reciprocal 'requiring' (anyonyāpekṣā) may well come within the sphere of pāratantrya; but this is still not enough to fulfil the prime requisite of sambandha, which is that it must be equally present in the two related terms (dviṣṭha). In effect, in the relation of pāratantrya anyonyāpekṣarūpa (glossed in the tīkā with parasparonmukhatā and anyonyam aunmukhya), like that of wife and sacrificer in the sacrifice or of two lovers making love, one cannot say that the 'expectation' (unmukhatā) of the one coincides with that of the other. Thus unmukhatā does exist, but it is not a proof of sambandha.

²⁷ It is the use of language (Dharmakīrti notes) – serving as a means of differentiating things – that suggest the existence of relations like that of factors and action. This relation has no correspondence in reality, but is merely the result of the synthesis of discursive thought (kalpanā), which, in fact, comes about through lan-

I 2.11 Thus²⁸ how is it possible to claim that the Self is the Lord of all? -11 -

guage (tām [kalpanām] eva cānurundhāṇaiḥ kriyākārakavācinaḥ / bhāvabhedaprafityarthaṃ saṃyojyante 'bhidhāyakāḥ). The valuation of kalpanā according to Dharmakīrti can obviously not be shared by Utp. (cf. SSVr p. 5).

In IPVV I p. 206 it is debated whether the two terms of the simile are on the same plane. In fact, from the previous arguments, in the case of $j\bar{n}atrtva$, $j\bar{n}ana$ is acknowledged and only the existence of a subject is denied (and should the latter exist, the possibility of a relation between the two is denied), whereas in the case of kartrtva even $kriy\bar{a}$ itself is denied. It is replied that the example tends to show their equality as regards being kalpita; and it is added that also $j\bar{n}ana$ is essentially $kriy\bar{a}$ – because of the verbal root it contains – and that therefore the confutation of $kriy\bar{a}$ also implies the confutation of that particular $kriy\bar{a}$ that is $j\bar{n}ana$, which places them on the same plane.

CHAPTER III

- 1. Agreed. However, that form of cognition which is memory, though arising from the latent impression deposited by the former direct perception, is restricted to itself (ātmaniṣṭham) and does not know the original perception².
- Memory, though arising from the reawakening of the latent impression deposited by the former perception, because it is restricted to itself exclusively knows only its own form. It cannot be claimed that memory determines the object formerly perceived, since it [memory] does not penetrate the former direct perception. -1
- 2. A cognition is self-revealing (svābhāsaiva)³ and cannot be the object of another cognition, just as the cognition of taste is not known by that of shape. The fact that [memory] arises from latent impressions implies its similarity to the former perception, but not its cognition of that (tadgatih)⁴.
- ¹ The author shows that he partly shares the view that the *pūrvapakṣin* puts forward regarding memory in the previous *āhnika*, especially with respect to the importance of the function of the *saṃskāras*. He departs from this view, however, when he examines their role, taking into account the impossibility (also recognized by the Buddhists) of one cognition becoming the object of another.
- ² Every cognition and memory is a form of cognition is svasamvedana and it is in this sense that the expression ātmaniṣṭham, which generally refers to insentient realities (jaḍa), must be understood. It is 'confined, restricted to itself' in the sense that it is only aware of itself and not of other cognitions (cf. ĪPVV I pp. 210-11).
- The expression svābhāsa (cf. below p. 161 n. 2, p. 162 n. 4) may be interpreted in various ways and my translation of it has been left deliberately vague. The vṛtti understands it as svasaṃvedanaikarūpa. Abh. glosses it in the ĪPV in two different ways (ābhāsaḥ prakāśamānatā sā svaṃ rūpam avyabhicāri yasyāḥ; svasya ca ābhāsanaṃ rūpaṃ yasyāḥ, which coincides with the vṛtti); in the ĪPVV he even gives four different interpretations.
- ⁴ The samskāra of the former perception is reawakened by a present perception similar to the other which gives rise to the memory. The samskāra, therefore, ensures this 'similarity' in the memory, but the memory itself has no direct access

- Fvery cognitive act is by nature only aware of itself (sva-samvedanaikar $\bar{u}p\bar{a}$) and does not become the object of another cognition: if the cognition of shape could grasp the cognition of taste and vice versa, then the one would perceive the object of the other and in this way every restriction on the activity of the individual senses would cease to exist. Since memory arises from the latent impression left by the former perception it only bears a similarity to that perception but does not have direct cognition of the latter; and, moreover, as there is no cognition of this former perception (tadabh $\bar{a}v\bar{a}t$) not even the similarity to it can be maintained. -2
 - 3. [Some might object that]⁵ memory appears erroneously (bhrāntyā) as having as its object something directly perceived (dṛṣṭālambanatā), being reduced, instead, to the only determinative activity directed at them⁶ (tadavasāyataḥ), despite the fact that they have never directly entered its cognitive sphere (atadviṣayatve 'pi). But this objection, too, is inconsistent.
 - And it cannot even be claimed⁷ that memory has these as its object only erroneously, in the sense that it makes the object of its own determinative activity (adhyavasyati) the former direct perception and its object, which in reality are not experienced, as happens when one states that one sees silver when faced with mother-of-pearl. -3 -
 - 4. How⁸ is it possible to reduce the true nature of memory to this? (smṛtitaiva kathaṃ tāvad). And how is it possible that the establishment

to (cannot 'know') the former perception and therefore nor can it, strictly speaking, establish the similarity between the latter and the present perception which has reawakened the saṃskāra. This, as will be shown later, is an operation that presupposes the I. As one can gather from the vṛṭṭi, and as Abh. (IPVV I p. 214) explains, tad in tadgatiḥ has two different meanings, the first of which refers to anubhava and the second to sādṛṣya; the first is to be considered the cause of the second: 'na tadgatiḥ' ity atra dvāv arthau tacchabdena anubhavasya sādṛṣyasya ca parāmarṣāt / tatra prathamārtho dvitīyasmin hetutvena mantavyaḥ. IPV I pp. 129-30 defines the question with great clarity (and in this the Sanskrit language is an unrivalled instrument): saṃskārāt paraṃ saviṣayatāmātraṃ smṛteḥ siddham, natu anubhavaviṣayatvam, nāpy asya viṣayasya pūrvānubhavaviṣayīkṛtatvam iti niścaya eṣaḥ.

⁶ The former perception and its object.

⁷ As IPVV I p. 236 (cf. text note 130) explains na negates the whole sentence.

⁵ This is once again a Buddhist speaking.

⁸ The author states the reasons that induced him to consider (in the last $p\bar{a}da$ of the previous $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$) the opposing thesis untenable.

of objects (arthasthitih) should come about thanks to error ⁹? And, if such 13.4 is the case, what sense is there in claiming dependence on the latent impressions left by the former direct perception?

- Memory cannot be identified with something that derives only from determinative knowledge ($adhyavas\bar{a}yam\bar{a}tr\bar{a}t$), the object of the former perception being absent (tadvisayasampramose) because it [the former perception] is not made manifest [in the memory, according to your conception]. Neither can the definite establishment of an object formerly perceived be taken to be due to error. And moreover, [if it is a question of 'error'] why insist so much on the fact that memory conceived of as error arises from the latent impressions, when, on the contrary, it is different from the former direct perception from every point of view ($tadbhinnayogaksem\bar{a}y\bar{a}h$)¹⁰, not coming into contact with it in any way? 4 -
- 5. If 11 the determinative knowledge (avasāyasya) is error, how can it then, being insentient, establish objects? If, on the contrary, it is
- ⁹ The essential core of memory is the former perception recalled to mind. There is therefore no new cognition and it is only a new cognition that can be imputed for error (cf. IPVV I p. 239 and text note 136). The vrtti and, as can be gathered from the IPVV, also the fikā, leave no doubt as to the meaning that Utp. attributes to the second pāda of the kārikā (bhrānteś cārthasthitih katham). It must be pointed out, however, that the interpretation of the IPV (I p. 132) is completely different. It essentially says that obviously no establishment of the nature of the object can derive from error, since the former is not manifest in error (if one understands error, as the opponent does, as asat° or ātmākhyāti), and that on the contrary everyone can see that the organization and functioning of the world of experience depend on memory. Therefore memory cannot be an illusion. This interpretation of the kārikā (misunderstood in Bh.'s commentary) is, in fact, what everyone would give on a first reading, and it anticipates the argumentation that Utp. actually presents further on.

In the expression yogaksema (according to IPVV I p. 240) yoga (which has the general meaning of the attainment of something not formerly possessed) stands for the object's own nature characterized by light-knowledge (prakāśa), and kṣema (the preservation of what has been attained) refers to the part-object. Thus these features differentiate smṛti-bhrānti from anubhava, since in the former there is no new cognition (I read anapūrvatvāt instead of apūrvatvāt) and the object is not really present.

The argumentation of this verse presupposes the opponent's objection, clarified in IPV I p. 133: the determination (adhyavasāya) of the former direct perception and its object, which is brought about by memory, establishes a partial similarity of the latter to the perception; and for this one needs to resort to the saṃskāras. The discourse, therefore, turns to the nature of this adhyavasāya (and

- 13.5 conceived of as being sentient, how can it, restricted as it is to it-self and to its own ideation (nijollekhaniṣṭhāt), establish objective reality?
 - It is the determinative knowledge ($adhyavas\bar{a}yah$) alone that erroneously establishes objects, and not its self-awareness¹² (svasamvit). If such is the case, it is sentient and being insentient how can it cause the establishment of objects? Thus, even if one were to acknowledge it was insentient, [this should be understood in a limited way, that is, in the sense that] it would only be able to make manifest objects pertaining to the past, or illuminate only non-external objects itself and its own ideation ($ab\bar{a}hyasv\bar{a}tmollekham\bar{a}traprak\bar{a}sah$) and, therefore, it could not equally be accepted as the cause of that establishment of objects we are dealing with 13. 5 -
 - 6. Thus, the functioning of the human world which stems precisely from the unification (anusamdhāna°) of cognitions, in themselves separate from one another and incapable of knowing one another would be destroyed...

this is what the present $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$ is about) and as IPVV I p. 243 underlines (a-dhyavasāyamātrasya rūpam dūṣitam, taddvārena tu smṛṭyadhyavasāyasyeti) through the confutation of this conception of the adhyavasāya in general, the form in which it operates in the ambit of memory is also confuted. If the object is illuminated by it, then one cannot define it error; if it is not illuminated, then this means that memory does not have access to the object and therefore it does not make sense to speak of 'similarity'.

¹² The adhyavasāya is on the one hand insentient (as regards its actual not coming into contact with the object, its being bhrānti), and on the other sentient as regards its self-awareness. But only the first aspect is significant in this case.

13 This point is made clear in a passage from the IPVV (I p. 243), which due to its importance and clarity I have quoted in full (see text note 141). The adhyavasāya is insentient insofar as it does not illuminate the object it aims at determining. If it does not illuminate the external object (otherwise it would be no different from direct experience) and neither can it be said that it does not illuminate at all (otherwise it would simply be jada), nonetheless, it is acknowledged that at least it illuminates itself and its own ideation. But even this is not sufficient for it to cause the determination of external objects, because precisely as regards the latter (and it is this that counts here) it is insentient. All this criticism of the adhyavasāya aims at reducing its significance in the phenomenon of memory, with the ultimate purpose of making way for the admission of another principle that may consistently explain the point, i.e. the self, as we shall see later.

- Cognitions are restricted to themselves only (svātmamātraparini- I 3.6 sṭhitāni) and cannot be the object of other cognitions (aparasanīvedyāni) being by nature [exclusively] conscious of themselves. But then how would the dimension of human activity and behaviour (lokavyavahāraḥ) culminating in the teaching of the absolute reality be possible, since this consists precisely in the interconnection between the objects of knowledge? (anyonyaviṣayasamghaṭṭanāmayaḥ)¹⁴. 6 -
- 7. ...¹⁵ if there were no Maheśvara who contains within himself all the infinite forms, who is one, whose essence is consciousness, possessing the powers of knowledge, memory and exclusion¹⁶.
- The mutual unification of all cognitions of things is [constituted by] the consciousness principle (*cittattvam*) whose form is all, since nothing distinct from it is admissible. The powers of knowledge etc. only pertain to this consciousness principle. It has been said 17 : «From me derive memory, knowledge, exclusion». 7 -

The second secon

¹⁷ Bhagavadgītā XV, 15.

¹⁴ See Torella 1988: 160-66.

¹⁵ It continues from the preceding kārikā.

¹⁶ Cf. IPVV I p. 276. The implication of the opponents' theses is recognized as untenable (naśyej janasthitih) and it is this untenability that leads to the confirmation of what they sought to deny (prasangaviparyaya), i.e. the Self as the subject of knowledge and action, unifier and coordinator of the discontinuity of reality. Consciousness is the unification of cognitions both in the sense of 'becoming one' (ekībhavana) and of 'making one' (ekīkaraṇa), 'merging together' (miśrīkaraṇa). In the vṛtti anusaṃdhāna and cittattvam are in a relation of sāmānādhikaraṇya since action and the subject of the action are in reality the same (yuktam eva abhedena upacaraṇaṃ kriyākartroḥ paramārthata aikyāt). See Torella 1988: 166-67.

CHAPTER IV

- 1. The Free One (svairī), the perceiver of the object formerly perceived, continuing also to exist later, has the reflective awareness: 'that'. This is what is called 'remembering'.
- The light-perception of the object formerly perceived is not extinguished [at the moment of memory], since he [the knowing subject, the Lord] also continues to exist later as the perceiver of the object formerly perceived. Having here $(atra)^2$ a reflective awareness of an object in terms of 'that' as formerly perceived on the part of he who is one, the Lord (vibhuh), agent, is the function called 'memory'. 1 –
- 2. [He who remembers] must necessarily, having a reflective awareness of (āmṛśan) the particular entity (svalakṣaṇaṃ)³ formerly made manifest, make it manifest⁴ at the actual moment of the memory
- ¹ Cf. the classical definition of memory in Yogasūtra I. 11 anubhūtaviṣayāsam-pramoṣaḥ smṛtiḥ.
- ² I.e. in the present limited condition, at least according to Abh.'s interpretation which is, in turn, based on the fikā. The subject of memory is thus Śiva himself as had already been suggested in the previous kārikā. This is underlined in IPVV II p. 11 sūtravṛttyor bhagavatah smartṛtvam uktam, tadanusārena fikāyām api and p. 13, where it is excluded that vibhu may be simply taken to mean 'pervader', vividham kṛtvā bhavafīti vibhutvam, na tu iha vyāpakatvam... The phenomenon of memory, though having as its ultimate subject Śiva, the Supreme Consciousness, must necessarily occur on the individual plane, otherwise it would not make sense to speak of a before and after of a perceived object, etc... And this is what the vṛtti refers to with atra, which is glossed in IPVV (see text note 157) «... function of the Lord contracted in the breath of life, the eightfold body, the physical body etc.» and at greater length ibid, p. 11, where the expression samāropitasvātantrya, which glosses atra in the tīkā, is cited and explained.
- The object of memory is the svalakṣana, or the individual entity in space and time. In memory, in fact, there is necessarily an association with a former time and place, otherwise there would be no memory but a general vikalpa (cf. ĪPVV II p. 19 smrtau hi prāgdeśakālayogo 'vaśyam sphurati / anyathā vikalpamātram tat bhavet).
- ⁴ Without prakāśa, in fact, there would be no parāmarśa, but as ĪPVV II p. 18 remarks the latter should also immediately follow prakāśa, being inseparable

(svakāle), either as a single manifestation 'jar' or as the totality of its I 4.2 components (akhilātmanā).

- Thanks to the power of memory $(smrtiśakty\bar{a})$ the subject, when having a reflective awareness $(par\bar{a}mrśan)$ as 'that' of the particular entity formerly perceived, must make it manifest [in the present] $(\bar{a}bh\bar{a}sayaty\ eva)^5$, for there could be no reflective awareness of an object made manifest [only in the past] $(prak\bar{a}śitasya)^6$; and this manifestation occurs at the very moment of the act of remembering $(svasatt\bar{a}k\bar{a}la\ eva)$. Therefore it is not erroneous to state that there is the manifestation, at the moment of the memory, of an object, which, however, is no longer present at that moment. At certain times the object appears in the form of a single manifestation⁷, i.e. limited to one of the many manifestations that constitute it, such as – in the case of a jar – 'jar', 'golden', 'individual substance', 'existence' etc., depending on the subject's intentions⁸. In these cases its manifestation in memory is distinct and vivid $(sphuta^\circ)^9$. At

from it (parāmarśanam ca prakāśanāntarīyakam). The question this kārikā is meant to answer is precisely how to bridge the gap between the prakāśa of the object - which occurred in the past, at the time of the former perception - and its parāmarśa, being effected now by memory.

In the sense that making the object manifest in the present is the necessary condition for the memory to be such. ābhāsayaty eva glosses ābhāsayet; therefore this optative is to be understood in the sense of niyoga (cf. IPV I p. 161).

⁶ This interpretation is supported by Abh.'s argument (see text note 160). Cfr. n. 4.

⁷ The single ābhāsa in the memory is only single relatively speaking, i.e. it is not combined with other ābhāsas such as 'golden' etc. In actual fact, due to the very nature of memory, the connection with the ābhāsa 'time' is inevitable, and this is sufficient in itself to make it svalakṣaṇa and in this sense sphuṭa (cf. ĪPV 1 p. 159 ābhāsāntaravyāmiśraṇābhāve 'pi tu kālābhāsasambhedenaiva svālakṣaṇyaṃ tasya ābhāsasya karoti kālaśakter eva bhedakatvāt iti vakṣyate / evaṃ tāvat svalakṣaṇībhāvaḥ prāktanadehābhāsasācivyādyuditakālābhāsayojanayā ghatābhāsasya iti).

 8 This theme is extensively developed later (II 2. 5-7).

The readings of the MSS oscillate between sphuta and asphuta and, at first sight, there seem to be arguments in defence of both. In fact, in the tīkā the manifestation of an object in the form of sāmānya is said to be asphuta. But this is so as regards the so-called independent vikalpas, whereas we have seen that for memory the case is different. The tīkā goes on to say that in general many sāmānyas, in combining with one another, mutually delimit each other and thus may be said to become sphuta, and, once they have been further delimited by the ābhāsas of space etc., they finally give rise to the svalaksanas. It is true that the case in question concerns a single ābhāsa, but its status in memory is a particular one, as has

- 14.2 other times, on the contrary (anyadā tu), the object appears in its totality, since this is the subject's intention: its manifestation is equally distinct and vivid (tathaiva), as in the previous case¹⁰. And finally, the subject whose mind is intensely concentrated without interruption even directly visualizes the object formerly perceived $(drstartha^{\circ})^{11}$. -2
 - 3. It would not be possible to speak of the manifestation of the object being remembered if it appeared as separate from the memory 12;

just been said. Moreover, the *fikā* adds, the *sāmānya* even when taken singly may be *sphuṭa* (compared to others), when it implicitly contains other broader and more generic *sāmānyas* (e.g. the *sāmānya* of the *dhava* tree, compared to the *sāmānya* of tree in general). See Torella 1988: 168-70. The concept of a hierarchy of *sāmānyas* as regards their extension probably stems from Vaiśeṣika and grammatical speculation.

¹⁰ In IPV I p. 160 the degree of *sphutatva* in this case (where there is a combination of different *ābhāsas*) is considered greater than the former: i.e. it is *atisphuta*.

It is the case that *ibid*. p. 160 is defined atyantasphuta. IPVV II p. 29, following the fikā, considers it implicit in the expression akhilātmanā in the kārikā, that would therefore be understood as referring in the broad sense to a multiplicity of ābhāsas (bahvābhāsopalakṣaṇam) and with a further differentiation within it (samagratva and asamagratva). Thus the object would appear in the memory as a combination of many ābhāsas: when the latter do not cover the whole (asamagratva) of the object this is the intermediate level (introduced in the vṛtti by anyadā tu); when, on the other hand, the object is recalled in the totality of its aspects, the memory is so vivid that it closely borders on the direct perception from which it differs only in the fact that its object is a thing 'already' seen. The expression dṛṣṭārtha distinguishes this from other forms in which the object visualized had not been previously seen but experienced in various ways through the revelation of the scriptures, as in the case of the visualization of deities etc.

In other words, if the object appeared as external to and distinct from the memory (ĪPV I p. 163 bhinnatvena bahīrūpatayā), then the requirements for direct perception and not for memory would exist. The object is present in the memory only through the manifestation of the former perception, but it is only in it, i.e. in the past (tadā), that the object bahir avabhāsate. What is manifested in the present is only the reflective awareness (vimaršana). See Abh.'s lucid formulation of the question in ĪPVV, which may serve as a general definition of memory according to the Pratyabhijāā: pūrvadṛṣṭataiva savimaršā satī idānīntanavimaršabhūmipatitā sa iti vimarša ucyate (II p. 30). This stanza actually shows how the apparent inconsistency between a (present) vimaršana and a (past) anubhava is only resolved by the l which ensures the possibility of unifying the various cognitions occurring at different times. A further clarification is provided by ĪPVV II p. 32. The prakāśa concerning the part-object (arthāmśe) in the former perception belongs to the past; but the prakāśa as grasped by the vimarśa, concerning the part-self (svātmāmśe), is not

therefore the unity of cognitions that occur at different times is neces- I 4.3 sary, and this unity is precisely the knowing subject.

- And the object formerly perceived, manifesting itself together with the perception in the present 'light' of the memory ($t\bar{a}tk\bar{a}likasmrtiprak\bar{a}se$) (directed at that past time), is necessarily not separate from the memory, since that which is separate from the light cannot shine. There is therefore a unity of the distinct cognitions such as direct perception, memory etc. and this unity is constituted by the self, the knowing subject. To elaborate: -3
- 4. In fact, in memory the former perception is not manifested separately like the object since it appears as resting on the self, as the expression 'I perceived in the past' indicates.
- In memory the former perception unlike what happens to the perceived object that is remembered is not manifested as separate (differentiated), since it is the self itself that is manifested the object of the notion 'I' whose essence is informed by this perception. And it is precisely that reality present at many different times, known as 'I', that is the self.

limited by time (kālānavacchinna eva). Thus the vimarša in the memory can connect itself with the vimarša in the perception and, through it, with the former light of the object — in this way meeting both requirements, that is, taking place in the present and not being divorced from prakāša (tannāntarīyakavimaršasahitaḥ punar vimaršas tu idānīntanaḥ).

13 In the perception the object appeared - due to the power of maya - as if it were separate, external to consciousness. This may not happen in the memory for otherwise it would not be memory (IPVV II p. 34 smaranataiva na bhavet); in fact, the light of memory embraces, so-to-speak, the object much more strongly (ibid. artham atitamām krodīkaroti). However, this is true only to a certain extent: the assumption of externality - in the form of residual traces, as a shadow (ibid. chāyāmātreņa) - continues to exist (p. 32 pṛthagbhāvaprakāśābhimāno 'nuvartate), remaining in the object remembered in the background. In underlining this, Utp. also implicitly draws a sharp distinction between the 'external' thing, on the one hand, and perception, on the other: unlike the thing, the latter can never be objectified (see next kārikā). Thus those who think they can do without the I as the unifier of different cognitions, by claiming that memory has access to its object simply by embodying (i.e. objectifying) the former perception of it, are mistaken. In IPV I p. 167 Abh. gives an interpretation of the example concerning the status of the object (arthavat in the kārikā) both as sādharmya° and vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta; neither of them reflects the interpretation found in the vrtti.

- 14.5 5. The cognitions [of others] are not manifested [as an object] even in that particular cognition belonging to the yogins. The only means of knowing them is self-awareness. What has just been stated also applies if they are acknowledged as an object of cognition (meyapade 'pi vā).
 - For the omniscients, too, the cognitions belonging to other subjects which can be known only through self-awareness 14 must always be manifested as resting on their own self ($sv\bar{a}tm\bar{a}r\bar{u}dh\bar{a}$ eva); and, therefore, what in reality occurs (tattvam) is the identification on the part of the yogins with the self of others 15 ($par\bar{a}tmat\bar{a}pattir$ eva). Should one attribute [to the cognitions of others] the nature of cognizable object ($prameyakaksy\bar{a}y\bar{a}m$ api) such as the jar etc., they would have to be manifested each in its own form of pure awareness ($suddhabodh\bar{a}tman\bar{a}$ $r\bar{u}pena$), whereas that is impossible 16 . 5 -

14 I.e. that introspective awareness that one has of every cognition or that every cognition has of itself. This position had also been accepted by Bhartrhari; see the last four verses of the Jātisamuddeśa, in particular v. 106 yathā jyotih prakāśena nānyenābhiprakāśyate / jñānākāras tathānyena na jñānenopagrhyate (Abh. quotes this verse in another section of the ĪPVV giving a slightly different reading of the second hemistich: jñānarūpam tathā jñāne nānyatrābhiprakāśyate) 'Just as light is not illuminated by another light, in the same way, the form of cognition is not determined by another cognition' (transl. Iyer 1971: 62) and v. 110 yato viṣayarūpena jñānarūpam na grhyate / artharūpaviviktam ca svarūpam nāvadhāryate // 'As the form of the knowledge is not cognized as an object, its form as distinct from that of the object is not grasped' (transl. Iyer 1971: 63). See also Helarāja's lucid commentary. For a penetrating analysis of the various theories about 'knowledge of knowledge' I refer to Matilal 1986:141-179.

15 This is the most obvious meaning of the text of the vrtti. According to Abh.'s interpretation (ĪPVV II p. 47, see text note 189), who in turn takes this from the tīkā, tattvam is 'the being such of the omniscient' (mentioned at the beginning of the vrtti), meaning the condition of subject identified with the Supreme I (parātmavedakatvam); thus the meaning of the sentence would be the following: 'the condition of subject identified with the Supreme I, pertaining to these yogins, means in point of fact the attainment of identification with the self of others.' On the yogin's cognition of other minds see Dharmakīrti's Santānāntarasiddhi vv. 89-93 (Stcherbatsky 1969: 89-92, Kitagawa 1955: 108-10).

The nature of every cognition is in the final analysis śuddhabodha and it should appear in this form to the yogin's cognition: but precisely this is impossible, because descending to the condition of vedya necessarily entails the flawing of śuddhatva (see IPVV II p. 52 svasmin svasmin darśane yādṛśaṃ bodhasya śuddhaṃ rūpam, ... na tādṛśaṃ niruparāgaṃ vedyatāṃ paracittajñāne 'bhyeti; cf. also IPV 1 p. 183). A similar remark is made by Helarāja, commenting on VP III.1.109: cf.

- 6. The memory¹⁷ expressed as 'thus that cognition occurred in me' is I 4.6 none other than an analysis (vyākaraṇam) in terms of differentiation of the memory expressed as '[that thing] was seen by me'¹⁸.
- The memory presented as 'thus that perception occurred in me', in which the cognition is mentioned separately, is nothing more than the analytic exposition of the memory understood as '[that thing] was seen by me', which is characterized precisely by having a reflective awareness of the visual perception as residing in the knowing subject. -6
- 7. Determinate cognition (avasā) too, in the form of 'I see this' or 'this is a jar' regards (manyate) the visual perception as being indissolubly inherent in the subject of the determinate cognition (avasātari)¹⁹.
- Also in the determinate cognition of the object in front of one whether it appears in the form 'I see this jar' or 'this is a jar' the visual

Prakīrņakaprakāśa I pp. 103-4 ghatajñānam iti tu jñānam na jñānarūpānupāti, yato ghatajñānagatam, viṣayam nirūpya jñānarūpam kimapi tad ity etāvad yadi param nirūpayitum śaknoti, na tu sā tadīyā bodharūpatā tasya pratibhāsate parasamvedana iva «But the cognition '[This is] the cognition of a jar' does not come after the form of the cognition ['This is a jar'], for, having brought to the intellect the object in the cognition of the jar, it can at the most bring to the intellect 'that is some form of cognition'; the awareness character [bodharūpatā] of that [cognition, namely 'This is a jar'] is not reflected in it as in the case of somebody else's cognition.» (transl. Aklujkar 1970: 179).

This $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$ aims at confuting anyone who might still wish to claim, in presenting the memory as 'I remember having had this perception', that the perception appears as the object in the memory (cf. $\bar{I}PV I p. 177$).

Abh. (ĪPV. I p. 182) also points out a different interpretation of the kārikā, supported by 'others' (anye tu), but he keeps to that of the vrtti.

This kārikā is in reply to the hypothetical objector who might seek to invalidate the principle of the non-objectifiability of cognition (applied here to memory in order to show the need for the I as the fundamental reality), by claiming that the determinate cognition (adhyavasāya, vikalpa) that follows the undifferentiated perception (nirvikalpa) knows the latter as object (cf. ĪPV I p. 186, ĪPVV II p. 54). It must be remembered that the adhyavasāya plays an essential role in memory, because memory is not linked directly to the anubhava itself, but to the anubhava as filtered and determined by the adhyavasāya; indeed there is no memory of an anubhava not followed by adhyavasāya (ĪPVV II p. 54 avikalpite smaranāsambhavāt). The criticism levelled at the adhyavasāya therefore constitutes both an analogical and a direct criticism of memory.

- 14.7 perception one becomes aware of (pratyavamrsyate) has the knowing subject as its constitutive reality 20.-7
 - 8. Therefore, when there is the reflective awareness 'that is seen by me, that was seen by me', 'this', 'that', the two elements though divided into perceiving subject and perceived object are manifested within the [true] cognizer (pramātari).
 - Therefore in memory or in generic mental elaboration (vikal-pamātre)²¹ which both presuppose the reflective awareness of a former perception only the 'object' part in the form of 'this' or 'that' may be expressly mentioned, even without being intermixed with the word 'perception' (drksabdanuvedham vinapi). Nonetheless, in all cases, the perceiving subject and the perceived object, though²² they appear to be separate due to the influence of māyā, are manifested as absorbed within the one cognizer. 8 -

²¹ I.e. in the determinate cognition (adhyavasāya) that follows the direct perception. In the construction I have followed Abh.'s indications (see text note 202).

The 'I' that is the subject of the determinate cognition is that same 'I' that constitutes the centre of the *anubhava*, even if the latter may be such that the I does not appear in it ('this is a jar' as opposed to 'I see this jar'). But the absence of the I is only apparent and does not concern the *anubhava* in itself but a particular aspect of the following *adhyavasāya*, which, depending on the circumstances, may stress the objective (i.e. when one is intent on bringing about some practical activity connected with it) or the subjective element (cf. IPV I pp. 187-8).

Utp., unlike Abh. (see text note 207), assigns api a different place from the one it occupies in the kārikā. The separateness of the perceiver and the perceived - Abh. says (ĪPVV II p. 58) developing Utp.'s remark in the tīkā - is only apparent as the very use of the dual form shows. On the basis of the sahavivakṣā principle, in grāhyagrāhakatābhinnāv arthau each term refers both to itself and the other; they are interdependent (anyonyāpekṣau). For the analysis of a similar use of this grammatical argument see Torella 1987:154-157.

CHAPTER V

- 1. The objects that are manifested in the present can be manifested as external only if they reside within.
- Even in direct perception¹, however², the manifestation of objects as separate³ is admissible only if they are absorbed in the cognizer $(pram\bar{a}trantarl\bar{n}n\bar{a}m\bar{a}m)^4$. 1-
- 2. If it were not essentially light, the object would remain non-light as before⁵; and the light is not differentiated [from the object]: being light constitutes the very essence of the object.
- In this the manifestation of the object is present, unlike in memory etc., in which the direct presence of the object has vanished.
- ² The reference is to an implicit objection to which this *kārikā* is intended as a reply (cf. ĪPV I p. 195, ĪPVV II pp. 67-8). If it has been said that in direct perception the object appears as external, differentiated from the knowing subject, and that in memory (and also in *vikalpa* etc.) it appears in union with it, how is it possible to claim the dependence of the latter on the former? Indeed, this *kārikā* establishes the sense in which the 'externality' of the object in direct perception is to be understood.
 - ³ Separate from the mayic cognizer, identified with the mind, the body etc.
- ⁴ The only true cognizer in the absolute sense (paramārthapramātr, ĪPV I p. 197), i.e. the Supreme Consciousness.
- 5 An object that is external to consciousness does not exist at all, since it would be jada and what is jada cannot shine in knowledge; cf. SD IV.29-31, V.12 etc. This principle, which often recurs in Vijñānavāda texts, has a lucid and synthetical formulation in a verse of Prajñākaragupta's Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (quoted in TBh p. 35) yadi saṃvedyate nīlaṃ kathaṃ bāhyaṃ tad ucyate / na cet saṃvedyate nīlaṃ kathaṃ bāhyaṃ tad ucyate «If blue is perceived, then how can it be called 'external'? And, if it is not perceived, how can it be called 'external'?»; see also TS 1998 ff., etc. Furthermore, the Vijñānavādin says, blue and cognition of blue are never perceived separately (sahopalambha); therefore, they are non-different. Cf. the well-known passage from the PVin (I.55ab; Steinkellner 1972: 206) sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ, also quoted by Abh. (ĪPVV II p. 78). For a comprehensive treatment of the inference based on sahopalambhaniyama, see Iwata 1991. Among the many examples in monistic śaiva texts cf. the verse from the lost Ucchuṣmabhairava (cit. ŚSV p. 4) yāvan na vedakā ete tāvad vedyāḥ katḥaṃ priye

- I 5.2 If it did not have light, i.e. the cognizer, as its own nature, the jar, just as it was not manifest [to the cognizer] at first, would continue not to be so even at the moment of cognition. What constitutes the object's being manifest ($prak\bar{a}\acute{s}am\bar{a}nat\bar{a}$) is light insofar as it is its own form ($sva-r\bar{u}pabh\bar{u}tah$) and not a separate reality 6 . 2
 - 3. If light were undifferentiated [in itself] and differentiated [from objects], then objective reality would be confused. The object that is illuminated must itself be light; that which is not light cannot be established.
 - Light, conceived as absolutely undifferentiated [as regards itself] $(prak\bar{a}\acute{s}am\bar{a}tram)^7$ and as differentiated from the object would be common to all objects⁸. In this case the delimitation of objects ('this is the light-cognition of a jar; this other, of a piece of material') would have no plausible grounds. Therefore, the establishment (siddhih) of the object depends on its essence being light (prakāśātmatāyattā). 3 -
 - 4. [Objection]⁹ Since consciousness-light (bodhasya) being undifferentiated cannot be the cause of a multiform manifestation, all this

/ vedakam vedyam ekam tu tattvam nāsty aśucis tataḥ //. See also SPT I.12 tvadātmakatvam bhāvānām vivadanti na kecana / yat prakāśyadaśāyāto nāprakāśaḥ prakāśate //; etc.

⁷ Cf. text note 216.

⁸ I.e. it would illuminate all objects indiscriminately.

⁶ In formulating the Saiva position, Utp. is implicitly critical particularly of the Buddhist and Kumārila theses. According to the Buddhists (kṣaṇikavādin) the manifestation (perception) of the object is understood as a 'luminous' moment produced in a chain of moments, e.g. of a jar – a luminous moment determined by a concurrence of causes, such as the operation of the sense of sight, light etc. For Kumārila, on the contrary, an added quality, 'being manifest' (prakaṭatā) occurs in the object, from whose presence a former cognitive act is inferred. In both cases the light is not separate – as Utp. also maintains – but it is found, so to speak, completely resolved within the object (ĪPVV II p. 69 arthaśarīramagnaḥ) and one is unable to understand how a thing can be cognized only by some and not by others. According to Utp. there is an illumination of the thing (whose essence is light) by the light of the subject.

The preceding argumentations may lead to a Vijnanavadin-like conception. In order to undermine this, Utp. temporarily opposes it with the Sautrantika criticism (which he agrees with up to a point, at least with the motives for it) and in this context presents their doctrine known, at least in later sources, as anumeyabāhyārtha-

various manifestation lacking in an apparent cause (ākasmika°) leads to 15.4 the inference of an external object [as its only possible cause].

- The establishment of the being of insentient realities is merely their becoming manifest ($\bar{a}bh\bar{a}sam\bar{a}nataiva$), and this is precisely having manifestation as their essence ($\bar{a}bh\bar{a}s\bar{a}tmataiva$). Their true reality, therefore, lies in the one pure consciousness. The gradually changing manifestation of objects which occurs though there is no diversity in the latter induces one to hypothesize an external object, different from consciousness (tato 'nyam), not shining (aprakāśamānam), as the cause. This reasoning is analogous to that which establishes the existence of the senses 10 . 4 -
- 5. Not even a varied reawakening of the karmic residual traces can be taken to be the cause [of the multiform manifestations], for in that

vāda (Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha V.2ab sautrāntikamate nityo [°am?] bāhyārthas tv anumīyate, 7ab vişayatvam hi hetutvam jñānākārārpaņakṣami; TBh p. 36 arthasya svarūpeņa nāsti vedanam 'bhāktam syād arthavedanam' iti vacanāt; SDS p. 94 anumeyam satyam ity āsthitān vijneyam anumeyam iti). The bāhyārthānumeyavāda as upheld by Badhanta Subhagupta is mentioned and criticised in TS vv. 2050-55. If consciousness is abhinna, as the Vijñānavādins claim, and no other cause can convincingly explain the emergence from it of the various differentiated images that constitute phenomenal reality, all that remains is to hypothesize the existence of external objects as the source (bimba) of the reflection (pratibimba) present in consciousness. The existence of the external object is strictly speaking only inferable (nityānumeyaḥ; on the proof by the method of vyatireka see TBh p. 35), not directly perceivable, as it is in Vaibhāṣika conception: in cognition only ākāras figure. Mokṣākaragupta summarizes the various positions as regards the reality of external object as follows (TBh p. 36): ye 'pi tadārambhakāh paramāņavo vaišesikānām, sākṣādadhyakṣagocarā vaibhāṣikānām darśane, svākārasamarpaṇapravaṇāḥ sautrāntikānām mate, te 'pi yogācārānām darśane na sambhavanti; see also SDS p. 35 te ca mādhyamika-yogācāra-sautrāntika-vaibhāṣikasamjñābhiḥ prasiddhā bauddhāḥ yathākramam sarvašūnyatva-bāhyārthašūnyatva-bāhyārthanumeyatva-bāhyārthapratyakṣatvavādān ātisthante. (In Sautrāntika epistemology this is to be understood in the sense that the thing, the absolute particular that is the object and cause of the direct perception, is (imperfectly) cognizable only through the filtered image of discursive thought - anumāna in the broadest sense -: if, on the one hand, there is absolute otherness between the thing and its mental image - which is sāmānya in nature - there is, nonetheless, an undeniable coordination, too: the one is the cause of the other). Sautrāntika criticism does not succeed in undermining the Vijnānavādin position, but serves to show the need for a more coherent and comprehensive conception, which is represented precisely by the definitive conclusion (siddhānta) of the Saiva doctrine.

¹⁰ Indeed we do not perceive the senses directly but we infer their existence from the existence of cognition, which only occurs through them (cf. below I. 5. 8.).

- 15.5 case a new question would arise: what is the cause of the variety of such a reawakening?
 - The varied reawakening of the karmic residual traces does not occur outside consciousness; also what might be the cause of this reawakening is not seen. Consequently the cause of differentiated manifestations cannot be anything but the external object 11 . 5 -
 - 6. That may be (syād etad)¹². [But] seeing that ordinary worldly activity can be accomplished on the basis of such 'manifestations' alone, what sense is there in wanting to resort to an external reality other [than consciousness], which is not supported by reason?
 - Ordinary human activity takes place through objects precisely insofar as they are manifested (ābhāsamānair evārthaiḥ). So what harm could there be in considering them essentially 'manifestations' (ābhāsa°) and nothing more 13? In which case there is no longer any need to resort to an external object, since they alone are sufficient to ensure the complete functioning of practical reality (tāvatā lokayātrāsamāpteḥ). Furthermore 14, the external object is contradicted by the criteria of right
 - The argumentation of those who claim the existence of external objects continues with the reply to the expected Vijñānavādin objection. A detailed account of the arguments set forth by the two opponents (Vijñānavādin's vāsanāvaicitrya and Sautrāntika's pratyayavaicitrya) is to be found in SDS pp. 80-84; Vācaspatimiśra also refers to them in the Bhāmatī and Tātparyadīpikā (La Vallée Poussin 1901: 190, n. 114).
 - At this point the author takes up the discussion in the first person (but the same thesis with the same arguments might also be put forward by a Vijñānavādin), after having voiced the opposing theses of the bāhyārthavādins. Abh. sees two possible interpretations of the expression syād etad: the partial acknowledgement of the opposing theses and then the exposition of his own, introduced by a kimtu that is to be understood; or the simple addition to the adversary's thesis of another even more convincing one, his own (the vṛtti gives the latter interpretation). But, as can be seen, the general meaning remains the same.
 - ¹³ It is understood by this that the external objects themselves 'inferred' precisely as such i.e. illuminated, brought to consciousness through inference are inseparable from the light of consciousness which is their essence; for if they were outside it, there would be no knowledge of them (cf. I. 5. 9.). This implication is taken up and developed by Abh. (IPV I, p. 222).
 - 14 After the fundamental negative reason given in the previous lines, additional reasons (abhyuccayabādhaka) are put forward. Utp.'s remarks are the same as those a Vijñānavādin might make; cf. Vimšatikā 11-15 and vṛtti, Sthiramati's bhāṣya on

cognition ($pram\bar{a}nab\bar{a}dhitah$): this is so if it is considered as having parts, I 5.6 since this would result in attributing to it contrasting qualities etc.; if it is considered as devoid of parts it is still contradicted in various ways (bahuśah), because it is simultaneously in contact with the six directions of space, etc. $^{15} - 6 -$

Trimśikā 1, Alambanaparīkṣā 1-5 etc. Particularly exemplary is the argumentation in Vimsatikā, often taken up again by later authors (cf. Mokṣākaragupta's TBh, SDS etc.; see also Lévi 1932: p. 52 note 2) and, implicitly, also referred to by Utp. Vimsatikā 11 reads: na tad ekam na cānekam visayah paramāņusah / na ca te samhatā yasmāt paramāņur na sidhyati // «The object is not one; it is not multiple as composed of many atoms; and it does not even consist in these atoms agglomerated, since the atom is not established.» The first thesis belongs to the Vaiseșikas who consider the object an individual substance (dravya), a totality (avayavin) formed by a complex of parts. The Buddhist tradition is unanimous in rejecting the avayavin as a mere mental costruct (see Milindapañha pp.26-28 (PTS Ed.), Samyuttanikāya I p.135 (PTS Ed.), TS 555-620 and Panjikā, Pandita Aśoka's Avayavinirākaraņa etc.). The second thesis may also be ascribed to the Vaisesikas who consider the atoms, imperceptible if taken singly, as being the parts that constitute the avayavin (cf. TBh p. 36 ye 'pi tadārambhakāḥ paramāṇavo vaiśeṣikānām ...). The third thesis is upheld by the Vaibhāṣikas (see, for example, AK I.35d sancitā daśa rūpiņaḥ - Bhāṣya: pancendriyadhātavaḥ, pancaviṣayāḥ sancitāḥ paramāņusanghātatvāt) and, in a modified form, by the Sautrāntikas; the Sautrāntika criticism of the Vaibhāṣika conception is expressed in various places in the AKBh. The Vijnanavada rejects the theory of the agglomeration of atoms, however formulated (sañcaya, sanghāta, samudāya etc.); see bhāṣya on Triṃśikā 1, Viṃśatikā 12-15 and vrtti, Madhyāntavibhāgafīkā p.21 (Stcherbatsky 1936²: 93-95). One of the Abhidharma passages which lends support to this thesis is sañcitālambanāh pañca vijñānakāyāḥ. This is also quoted by Dignāga (Vṛtti on PS I.4ab; see Hattori 1968: 88-89) who endeavours to show how it is possible for direct perception to have a group of entities as object while remaining avikalpaka. The same passage is quoted by Manorathanandin in his commentary on PV III.194, where Dharmakīrti's defence of Dignāga's controversial statement begins. According to Dharmakīrti, arthāntarābhisambandhāj jāyante ye 'navo 'pare / uktās te sañcitās te hi nimittam jñānajanmanah // «Those other atoms which come into being in close relation [Manorathanandin glosses: 'in close proximity'] to other things [i.e. atoms] are called 'agglomerated'. They are the cause of the arising of knowledge». In this way Dharmakīrti tries to show that the agglomeration is not a different thing from the atoms themselves. This position, too, expressed from a Sautrantika standpoint, is, however, altogether unacceptable to a Vijñānavādin like Sthiramati, who concludes his criticism (Bhāṣya on Triṃśikā 1) by pointing out the internal contradiction: na hi asañcitāvasthātaḥ sañcitāvasthāyām paramāņūnām kaścid ātmātiśayaḥ / tasmād asañcitavat sañcitā api paramāņavo naivālambanam.

15 A critical allusion to the Vaibhasikas' anusamcayavāda. If the ultimate reality, the atom (paramāņu), has no parts, it is not understood how this can aggregate to

- 15.7 7. Indeed, the Conscious Being, God, like the yogin, independently of material causes, in virtue of His volition alone, renders externally manifest the multitude of objects that reside within Him¹⁶.
 - It is therefore the consciousness-principle alone that, in his sovereignty, renders manifest as external the multitude of things such as the jar, cloth etc., which are spontaneously manifested as being informed by his very self¹⁷. Since his power is infinite, this external manifestation of objective reality takes place through his volition alone without resorting to causes such as clay etc. -7
 - 8. Neither can one speak of inference if the thing that is the object of this has not been formerly directly perceived (anābhātapūrve). This is also the case as regards the senses, whose direct perception may be said to have occurred through the perception of a reality that has the characteristics of a cause (hetuvastunaḥ), such as the seed etc.¹⁸
 - Inference is an act of reflected thought (vimarśanam) which has as its object a thing that was formerly manifest to consciousness and [as such] is internal to it ($p\bar{u}rv\bar{a}vabh\bar{a}t\bar{a}ntahsthita\ eva$); it occurs on the basis of the direct perception of an object invariably concomitant with this entity and involves the linking [of this entity] with this or that determinate

others, aggregation only being possible through a contact between parts which by definition it does not possess (see e.g. Viṃśatikā 11 ff. and vṛtti). See also Dignāga's Ālambanaparīkṣā vv. 1-5. In the text bahuśaḥ might equally well refer to the previous pramāṇabādhitaḥ.

¹⁶ Cf. ŚD I. 44-45ab yoginām icchayā yadvan nānārūpopapattitā / na cāsti sādhanam kimcin mṛdādīcchām vinā prabhoḥ // tathā bhagavadicchaiva tathātvena prajāyate; cf. also III.35-37.

p. 146), is intended to underline that this manifestation as Self is not something that has to be proved, but is itself taken for granted and self-evident. This expression in the text may equally well refer to cittativam: «which is spontaneously manifest as Self» (see text note 236).

This kārikā and the following one examine inference, since this is used by the bāhyārthavādin to establish the existence of the external object. In stating the inevitable necessity that it should operate on an object which has already been directly present to consciousness (ābhāta) and that therefore, as was shown earlier, is internal and coessential to it, Utp.'s aim is to exclude the possibility that inference might establish the existence of something that is absolutely other than consciousness, i.e. the bāhyārtha. To achieve this he is compelled, as will be seen, to include the concept of sāmānyatodṛṣṭa within the pratyakṣatodṛṣṭa.

time and place ¹⁹. The senses, too, are inferred only partially and generi- I 5.8 cally ($kimcinm\bar{a}tram$), as cause, and this was, in fact, formerly directly present to consciousness, through the perception of the seed etc. ²⁰ – 8 –

- 9. But the object that is outside the light [completely extraneous to it] has not been manifested to consciousness at all; thus its existence cannot be established even through inference.
- There has been no manifestation at all of the object that is outside the manifestation as jar etc., since this would be logically untenable; therefore its existence cannot even be established by inference. -9

This definition of inference does not only refer to the mode of the cognitive act, but — as is clarified in this last sentence — it is careful to add that it aims at proving the existence of an object that is able to propose itself as the possible object of a purposeful activity (i.e. specified by a definite time and place; cf. text note 243). It is true that the sphere of inference is constituted by the general (cf. NB I. 16), but its ultimate application is to the particular: its 'usefulness' consists in permitting one, via an argumentation in which there are only conceptual abstractions, to establish the existence, for instance, of a 'determinate' fire, which at this moment cannot be directly perceived, and to act consequently (cf. NBT p. 21 anumānam ca lingasambaddham niyatam artham darśayati). As Hetubinduṭīkā p. 34 puts it, yat mahānasādāv anagnivyāvṛttam vastumātram prāg anubhūtam na tat taddeśādisambandhitayaivānumānavikalpena smaryate kintu yatra pradeśe prāg ananubhūtam tatsambandhitayā (cf. Shah 1967; 278, 280; Katsura 1984: 227).

²⁰ According to the bāhyārthavādin the existence of the external object is inferable from that of the ābhāsa, just as from the occurrence of perception the existence of the sensory faculty is proved, even though the latter is never directly perceived. We have, therefore, an inference based on the general correlation (sāmānyatodṛṣṭa) as understood, for instance, by Jayanta (NM I p. 120 sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṃ tu yatra sambandhakāle 'pi linga[read lingi]svarūpam apratyakṣaṃ nityaparokṣam eva sāmānyato vyāptigrahaṇād anumīyate yathā sabdādyupalabdhyā srotrādi karanam, which Bh. I p. 231 follows very closely), where the object was and continues to be inaccessible to direct cognition. Utp. replies that in this case it is not the sensory faculty as such, in its particular individuality, that is inferred, but its generic nature of cause (therefore only one of the many ābhāsas of which it is composed), which it shares with an infinite number of other objects, such as the seed, and in which it had been perceived several times before. Thus, here too, we are faced with a case of pratyaksatodrsta, in which there is perception limited to a general aspect (sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, but in the Saiva sense of the term), with the aforementioned consequences. It must be kept in mind that the terms pratyaksato° and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa have been, since Vātsyayana, understood in various ways (see, e.g., Śābarabhāṣya on Mīmāṃsāsūtra I. 1.5, NM I pp. 120-21, TS 1441-1454; cf. also Matilal 1985: 29ff; cp. Foreword).

- 15.10 10. The multitude of things cannot but shine resting on the self of the Lord, otherwise that act of reflective awareness which is volition (icchāmarśaḥ) could not be produced.
 - As in the self of the Lord, whose essence is consciousness, so also in the objective realities themselves there is a shining without differentiation 21 , for otherwise reflective awareness, in the form of volition, which necessarily concerns objects that are already shining [to the subject], consisting in the state of creator, could not exist 22 . -10 -
 - 11. The essential nature of light is reflective awareness (vimarsam); otherwise light, though 'coloured' by objects, would be similar to an insentient reality, such as crystal and so on.
 - Reflective awareness (pratyavamarśah) constitutes the primary essence (mukhya ātmā) of light. In the absence of this reflective awareness, light, though objects make it assume different forms, would merely be 'limpid', but not sentient, since there is no 'savouring' (camatkṛteḥ) 23 . 11 -

The autonomous shining beyond every duality and scission, which is peculiar to the self, is a state that also extends to things when they are immersed in the self (cf. IPVV p. 167 ātmani hi nirbhāsamāne tadabhedasthitam katham na nirbhāseta) in such a way that the condition of idantā does not develop.

The will to produce something – at every level – presupposes an object that is in some way already present, 'shining', in consciousness (see below p. 126 n. 43). Volition, in order to be such, must be connected with a desired object that 'limits' it from within, that gives it a content. The will of the Lord, therefore, presupposes the shining of the whole of objective reality, which, not being separate from the subject, shines as the I shines (cf. IPVV II pp. 166-167). Furthermore, volition, being a particular form of reflective awareness (cf. SD II.84-5), is already in itself the proof of the existence of the 'light' with which we know it is inseparably connected (see *ibid*. p. 167 tena avasyambhavino vimarsāt tatprakāso 'numīyate; p. 169 icchādi parāmarsavisesa eva parāmarsas ca prakāsasya svabhāvaḥ).

²³ Camatkṛti, camatkāra, is one of the key-words of this school. Abh. (ĪPVV II p. 177) says: «Camatkṛti means the act of a person savouring (bhun̄jānasya), that is, the bliss constituted by the full achievement of fruition». Bhun̄jāna, Abh. explains later, is he who, engaged in savouring a taste such as sweetness etc., unlike a voracious glutton, lets the experience rest on the cognizing subject, that is, makes the 'subject' part predominate over the 'object' part. Camatkāra, in its highest form, is therefore both the act of savouring and fullness, absolute independence, consciousness devoid of obstacles (avighnā samvit) a savouring which is in the final analysis a savouring of one's own self and of one's own bliss, which eludes every

- 12. Precisely for this reason the self has been defined as 'sentience' I 5.12 (caitanyam) meaning by this the activity of consciousness in the sense of being the subject of this activity. It is thanks to sentiency, in fact, that the self differs from insentient reality.
- Sentience that is, the power of consciousness, perceiving though an abstract $(bh\bar{a}va^\circ)^{24}$, has been said to be the primary nature the reflective awareness $(vimarśa^\circ)$ of the substance self, being that which distinguishes it from insentient reality. This activity of being conscious means precisely being the subject of such activity 25 . 12 –

screen or intermediation of the world of objects, and even goes beyond that relative and momentary transcendence that one has in the aesthetic experience of poetry and the theatre. The terms with which it is glossed or with which it is closely related may be grouped according to its principal components: cognition, bliss, wonder. The first group includes, for example, vimarsa (pratyavamarsa etc.), carvaṇā, āsvāda, rasanā, prafīti; the second includes ānanda, nirvṛti, viśrānti, laya; the third vismaya, vikāsa. This last sense (prevalent in the sphere of rhetoric and aesthetics, and in nontechnical usage) refers to the wonder and astonishment that accompanies the return of reality to its original 'virgin' state, the transfiguration that this type of experience operates on reality in freeing it from the veils of the I and of the mine. Utp. seems to have been the first to use this word pregnantly. However, already vismaya in SS (I. 12 vismayo yogabhūmikāḥ), glossed by Kṣemarāja with āścaryamāṇatā (see also the verse from the Kulayukti, cit. SSV p. 13, ātmā caivātmanā jñāto yadā bhavati sādhakaiḥ / tadā vismayam ātmā vai ātmany eva prapasyati //) and āmoda in SD (e.g. I. 7b yadā tu tasya ciddharmavibhavāmodajrmbhayā) glossed by Utp. precisely with camatkāra, seem to hint at very similar concepts. On camatkāra see Gnoli, 1968: XLV-XLVII, 59-62; Gnoli, 1985: 32 and n. 90; see also Hulin 1978: 343-58, Masson-Patwardhan 1969: 46; id. 1970: 17-8 and notes; Larson 1976.

²⁴ Bhāva can also be understood here in the sense of 'quality (of the substance self)'; the general meaning is basically the same (cf. n. 25). According to Kātyāyana's vārttika on P. V.1.119 tasya bhāvas tvatalau (see n. 25), the abstract nominal suffixes (bhāvapratyaya), such as syañ in caitanyam, denote an essential quality (bhāva being thus interpreted as guṇa); cf. the remark of Helārāja (Prakīrṇa-kaprakāśa I p. 194) ittham atra viśeṣaṇaṃ svarūpeṇa param uparañjayat sūtre bhāvaśabdena pratipāditam, bhavaty asmāt tena prakāreṇa dravyam iti bhāvah.

²⁵ Being 'conscious' is the attribute (dharma) of the substance (dravya, dharmin) 'self', that is in fact the dravya par excellence, because everything without distinction rests on him (cf. IPV I p. 248). Saying 'the self is sentience' (SS. I. 1), instead of 'the self is sentient' or 'in the self there is sentience', means underlining the absolute pre-eminence of this quality over all others (cf. IPVV II p. 33 bhāva-pratyaye<na> taddharmaprādhānyam daršitam; see also PV I.61-2). In fact, permanence, incorporeity etc. may also pertain to other entities, whereas consciousness only pertains to the self and it alone suffices to characterize it (cf. IPV I p. 248,

- 15.13 13. Consciousness has as its essential nature reflective awareness (pratyavamarśa°); it is the supreme Word (parāvāk) that arises freely. It is freedom in the absolute sense, the sovereignty (aiśvaryam) of the supreme Self.
 - This is the First Word $(\bar{a}dy\bar{a}\ v\bar{a}c)^{26}$, in which the expressible is

ŚSV p. 2). «The suffixes of the abstract -tā and -tvam - says Kātyāyana (vārttika V on Pān. V I 119) - indicate that quality whose presence in the dravya determines the application of the name (yasya guṇasya hi dravye bhāvāt śabdaniveśas tadabhidhāne tātvau bhavataḥ; one can guess the quotation in a corrupted passage of IPVV II p. 186, yad āha madhyamo muniķ - yasya guņasya hi ...). In the particular case of caitanya the abstract is particularly significant: cetana, as Abh. says (IPV I p. 247), is a kṛdanta and as such its abstract denotes a 'relation' (samhandha) and, through the relation, the two related elements, i.e. the subject and the action of perceiving, of being conscious (eit-). Abh.'s argumentation is implicitly based on the grammatical maxim (see Torella 1987: 158-59) samāsakrttaddhitesu sambandhābhidhānam anyatra rūdhyabhinnarūpāvyabhicaritasambandhebhyaḥ (Kielhorn 1874: 537; cf. Šīradeva's Brhatparibhāṣāvṛtti 130 and Haribhāskarāgnihotri's Paribhāṣābhāskaraḥ 132 in Paribhāṣāsamgraha pp. 272 and 373-74) «(the abstract nominal suffixes) when suffixed to compounds, to words formed with primary derivational suffixes and to words formed with secondary derivational suffixes, name relations, except (when words of the aforementioned types) are idiomatic or have the same phonic form (as a word expressing a general property or universal), or name an invariable relation» (transl. Hayes 1983: 710). This paribhāṣā is also quoted in Helārāja's Prakīrnakaprakāśa on VP III.5.1 (I p. 194) and, in an abridged form (samāsakrttaddhiteşu sambandhābhidhānam) ibid. p. 55 on VP III.1.47). Kaunda Bhatta (who also quotes the same maxim in a slightly modified form) in Vyākaraņabhūṣaṇasāra p. 344 refers to the treatment of the matter by Bhartrhari himself in the MBh fikā (not found in the fragmentary text that has come down to us). Tattvabodhinī on Siddhāntakaumudī 1781 (cf. Hattori 1968:85) even seems to ascribe the authorship of the maxim to Bhartrhari himself. Cf. also, from a different point of view, VP III.1.34.

The vrtti does not dwell on the levels of the Word; it mentions only the supreme level (ādyā vāc). On the contrary, this subject is developed in the fīkā – as is seen from ĪPVV – where the polemic with the Vaiyākaraṇas, which Somānanda had started in Chapter II of the ŚD (Gnoli 1959; Gaurinath Shastri 1959: 69; Ruegg 1959: 11), is also reproposed. Grammarians (particularly Bhartrhari), as is known, are criticized for having conceived a division of the Word into three levels, instead of four, and for having consequently identified the supreme level with Paśyanti. For a description of the levels of vāc see PTV pp. 102-159 (Gnoli 1985: 60-97); Ruegg 1959: 79-81, Gnoli 1959: 55-63, Iyer 1969: 142-145, Aklujkar 1970: 67-75, Padoux 1990: 166-222, Torella forthcoming. Though Bhartrhari is unanimously thought (e.g. in the Śaiva tradition; but cfr. Intr. p. XXVI) to be the upholder of the threefold division, the VP seems to hint at a further level, which may be seen as the supreme form of Paśyantī (VP I vrtti

undifferentiated²⁷, without beginning or end in that it is constituted by I 5.13 perpetual consciousness, autonomous. This is pure freedom, independent of any other reality, which has the name of 'sovereignty'. - 13 -

14. It is the luminous vibrating (sphurattā)²⁸, the absolute being (mahāsattā)²⁹, unmodified by space and time; it is that which is said to be the heart (hṛdayam) of the supreme Lord, insofar as it is his essence.

p. 216, but this interpretation seems more open to doubt) or as parā prakṛti (VP III. 2. 15 etc.); cf. Iyer 1968: 143-5, Aklujkar 1970: 69-70 and n. 6, Aklujkar 1990. Among the Vaiyākaraṇas only Nāgeśa (MBhUddyota pp. 40-41; Paramalaghumañjuṣā p. 68 caturvidhā hi vāg asti ...; see also his commentary on the Yogasūtra) explicitly maintains the division into four levels. It is to be noted that, four centuries before Nāgeśa, Sāyana in the Rgvedabhāṣya proposed, among others, the same interpretation of the verse catvāri vākparimitā padāni ..., quoted in the Paśpaśā. It would have been very interesting to see how Bhartrhari, whose tīkā on that portion of the MBh is extant (Bronkhorst 1987), interpreted it, but unfortunately he is completely silent on that point. The verse, however, is quoted in the Vrtti on VP I.159 and interpreted there in terms of tripartition (p. 220).

²⁷ Abh. refers to three different interpretations of abhinnavācya given in the fīkā (ĪPVV p. 191): ṣaṣṭhī° or pañcamīsamāsa and karmadhāraya, that is, 'in (or from) which the expressible is undifferentiated', 'designated as undifferentiated'.

28 Sphurattā and the closely related term spanda are specially fit to designate the highest śakti of Parameśvara due to their paradoxical nature of immovable movement – 'oscillation sur place' (Hulin 1978: 290) –; kimciccalanam, Abh. says, where kimcit stands for the appearance of movement, agitation in something which is, however, motionless, firm. In ordinary usage, too, the adjective spandavat is referred to one who is firmly established though being full of the freedom of many deliberations. In comparison with spanda, sphurattā (Abh. records the use of this term and concept by Śańkaranandana) also contains a 'luminous, shining' connotation. One may say mama sphurati ghaṭaḥ only in the sense that this shining-vibrating which belongs to the I is transferred to the object. Truly speaking, it is the I (whose essence is light) who – partially departing or, in a sense, not departing at all, from his nature of consciousness – shines-vibrates as an object (ibid. p. 200).

²⁹ Cf. the concept of mahāsattā in Bhartrhari. «It is being [sattā] which, being differentiated according to the object in which it is present, is called the universal. All words are based on that. That is the meaning of the stem and of the root; it is eternal it is the great Soul; it is the meaning of the suffixes -tva and -tal.» (VP III.1.33-34; transl. Iyer 1971: 25-26). Words, whether one accepts the thesis that they denote the universal (jāti, sāmānya) or the individual substance (dravya), all express, in the end, the pure being in the most general form, the mahāsattā, i.e. the sattā not qualified by any particular content. This is valid not only for nouns - which refer to accomplished realities – but also for verbal roots – which express processes to be accomplished. This, so-to-speak, universals' universal (mahāsāmānya), present in all things and embracing even non-being (cf. Prakīrnakaprakāśa p. 41 sarvabhāveṣu sadrūpam sāmānyam anugatam / abhāvasyāpi buddhyākāreṇa nirūpanāt), is Brahman itself.

- It is, by nature, luminous vibrating, it is the subject of this luminous vibrating; it is not to be understood as the counterpart of non-being $(abh\bar{a}v\bar{a}pratiyogin\bar{\imath})$ [but] it also pervades non-being; it is existing, being, the subject of the action of being; permanent, because untouched by space and time. It is the power of the activity of consciousness, whose essence is reflective awareness. It constitutes the foundation of the self of the supreme Lord, who is all things; the various $\bar{a}gamas$ call it the 'heart' 30 . -14
 - 15. Precisely by virtue of this he transforms himself into the reality which is the object of cognition (jñeyīkuryāt); but this object does not subsist independently [of the subject]. If he were to tend towards it ³¹ his freedom would cease.
 - By virtue of such pure freedom, he knows no object that has any foundation outside himself, but, on the contrary, his power being unrestrained, he transforms his very self, which is not the object of cognition, into cognizable reality. If he had to depend on a cognizable object separate from himself, his state as the subject of cognition would lapse³². -15
 - 16. The Lord, thanks to his freedom which is absence of duality, by creating a self not devoid of freedom variously representing him in the forms of Isa etc. renders the carrying out of practical activity possible.
 - Therefore the Lord, by virtue of his freedom which is perfect fullness characterized by unity with the cognizable object, manifests himself as that particular cognizing subject of that particular moment, representing him in the forms of $\bar{1}$ svara, $\hat{5}$ iva, the perceiving subject and so on, acting thus for the purpose of the various practical activities such as creative meditation etc. 33 . 16 -

31 I.e. towards an object conceived of as independent of him.

32 The subject is by definiton free (svatantra).

³⁰ On the 'heart' in the Saiva texts and, in general, in Indian tradition see Muller-Ortega 1989.

³³ It is only the Lord's power of freedom that renders possible this paradoxical blend of objectivity and true subjectivity. The terms of the question are lucidly expounded by Abh., in an earlier passage of ĪPVV (I p. 108): «Although freedom and dependence are two diametrically opposed realities and mutually exclude one another, Parameśvara in his supreme freedom combines them (yojayati) when he

- 17. The variety of notions such as 'l' etc., does not entail diversity in 15.17 the nature of the self, because a self is created precisely as he who lends himself to being the object of the reflective awareness 'l' (ahammṛśyataiva), like action which is expressed by personal endings (tinvācyakarmavat).
- He who is the object of the reflective awareness 'I' on the plane of the present cognizing subject does not have the nature of 'this' (*idantā*), which he should have being the object of cognition³⁴. In the diversity of ways in which the self is definitely apprehended and in which he appears to perception, what is expresseded [e.g.] by the word 'īśvara' is the cognizing subject and no other; only, this happens indirectly, through the reflective awareness 'I' 35. Similarly, that reality, for example, that is

creates differentiated representations such as Īśvara, the self etc. Their *idantā* component makes them able to become the object of meditation, worship, teaching and so on, and, on the other hand, their unveiled *ahantā* component ensures the attainment of their true nature».

The power of freedom of Parameśvara, in the sphere of the general process of the objectification of the self – from which all stems – causes a certain layer to remain as though suspended between the 'I' and the 'this'. 'This' insofar as constructed, 'created' (nirmita) just like any reality posited as external, but unlike these, closer to pure subjectivity and capable of reimmersing itself in it by virtue of the contact with the 'I'. This is the case with notions (and words) such as Śiva, Īśvara, self, cognizer, which are on the one hand an objectified reality, separate from consciousness, and on the other not completely so (ĪPVV II p. 210 na ca atyantam prthak svātmany eva); na ca anīśvaram, Abh. adds elsewhere (ĬPV I p. 272), otherwise meditating on īśvara or anīśvara would be the same thing, which is contradicted by the different fruits that derive from it.

The real self, consciousness, is characterized by aham-parāmarśa; on the contrary, reality and denominations such as Śiva, Īśvara, Bhagavān, I etc. are characterized by idam-parāmarśa whose sphere includes the individual parāmarśas (śivaparāmarśa etc.). The issue raised is how a single reality can be the basis on which both creator and created (nirmita) rest. According to Utp.'s reply, as developed by Abh., unification is provided by the aham-parāmarśa which also underlies the notions of Śiva, Īśvara etc. It is the I (aham) in fact – as Abh. says (ĪPV I p. 278-9) – which constitutes the ultimate outcome, the definitive resting place (viśrāntisthāna) of this kind of cognition (but also, he adds later, of all the others, without distinction); even for the cognition 'blue' the final resting place is the I, though this is more difficult for the average intellect to grasp. This distinction between the two planes is outlined by Abh., following the fīkā, in a passage of ĪPVV (II p. 213). In the case of the, so to speak, primary aham-parāmarśa, from the very beginning (upakrama eva) there is awareness of freedom. In the parāmarśas concerning ātman, īśvara etc. this is true only as regards the final outcome; at the beginning, on the

- 15.17 denoted by the verbal form 'he cooks', is expressed by the word 'action'; for, as has been said: «The words 'action', 'quality', 'universal', 'relation' etc. do not express [directly] the various actions etc. because they are denoted instead through the verbal form 'he cooks' and so on»³⁶. From the words 'īśvara' and 'self' one reaches the understanding of one's own self, but only insofar as one contextually has the reflective awareness 'I', that is, not directly. The apprehension of the self, however, effectively takes place, just as the object previously perceived is known by memory, through the direct perception³⁷. 17
 - 18. Owing to the power of māyā, for the Lord it has as its object a cognizable reality differentiated [from self] and is called by the names of cognition, imagination, determination etc.
 - By the power of māyā, to Parameśvara³⁸ whose essence is light, the world which consists of his own self is manifested as differentiated. This very Consciousness, therefore, appears as sensory cognition; precisely this reality which is manifested as differentiated³⁹ forms the object of memory, imagination (samkalpah) and determination (adhyavasayah). Though⁴⁰ appearing in the form of the functions of the internal sense ($manas^{\circ}$) and the intellect ($buddhi^{\circ}$), what is acting is in fact none other than Consciousness itself. 18 –

contrary, there is the condition of dependence peculiar to the 'this', insofar as those notions arise marked by objectivity, despite the fact that the aham-parāmarśa is present in them and pervades them from within.

Untraced quotation. In tenor it may be compared to VP III 6. 1, which Abh. quotes in ĪPVV II p. 215.

³⁷ The parallelism is clearly explained by Abh. (*ibid.* p. 213).

In departing from what appears to be the plainest interpretation ('the power of māyā of the Lord'), Abh. ($\overline{I}PVV$ II p. 217) follows the indications in the $\overline{\mu}k\bar{a}$. In the eyes of the Lord (or rather, of the limited subject in whom he is freely contracted) the world is made to appear as differentiated from the self.

³⁹ According to Abh. (IPVV II p. 218) tasyaiva bhinnasya is not to be understood as anubhūtasya, which – it is objected – would be all right for smṛti and adhyavasāya, but not for saṃkalpa (saṃkalpe tu nava ekaviṣaya utthāpyate). It means the external object in the broad sense of the word, i.e. that which is subject to the power of māyā.

The concessive meaning of *api* refers here, according to IPVV II p. 218, to the implicit objection: how can cognition, determination etc. have Consciousness as their essential nature, since they are functions of the intellect, the *manas* and the senses, which are in themselves insentient (see text note 291)? Cf. SK I. 6-7.

- 19. Even at the moment of the direct perception (sākṣātkārakṣaṇe 'pi) I 5.19 there is a reflective awareness (vimarśaḥ). How otherwise could one account for such actions as running and so on, if they were thought of as being devoid of determinate awareness (pratisaṃdhāna°)?⁴¹.
- Even at the time of that cognizing which is characterized by direct perception there is in consciousness a reflective awareness of the object (arthapratyavamarśah), in a subtle form⁴². In fact, a rapid action such
- ⁴¹ In other words there can be no prakāśa without vimarśa. The two examples given in the $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$ of moments that might be considered as not having discursive articulation - the first moment of direct perception and rapid action - only appear to be so. The discursive articulation is already contained in embryo in the sensorial experience, and so too - still in a 'contracted' (samvartita) form - is the linguistic articulation, inseparably connected with it, for otherwise it would not be able to occur after the perception; similarly, even the most rapid and thoughtless action cannot but contain, however sketchily, an articulated awareness of the ends to be achieved etc. (cf. Hulin 1978: 294-96). In formulating this conception, which may be considered one of the pivots of Pratyabhijñā philosophy, Utp. follows in the footsteps of Bhartrhari (cf. VP I. 131-32 na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte / anuviddham iva jñānam sarvam sabdena bhāsate // vāgrūpatā ced utkramed avabodhasya śāsvafī / na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī //) «There is no cognition in the world in which the word does not figure. All knowledge is, as it were, intertwined with the word. If this eternal identity of knowledge and the word were to disappear, knowledge would cease to be knowledge; it is this identity which makes identification [or, in a broader sense, 'reflective awareness'] possible» (transl. Iyer 1965: 110-11; see Matilal 1990: 133-141) and is constantly aware of Dharmakirti's diametrically opposed position (cf. in particular PV III. 174-191ab; and, obviously, the well-known definiton of pratyakşa as kalpanāpoḍham in PS; see Funayama 1992).
- ⁴² A potential linguistic articulation (śabdabhāvanā), says Bhartrhari (vṛtti on VP 1.131, p. 188), is present in various degrees in every cognition; it is therefore also present in the cognition devoid of mental elaboration (avikalpajñāna), though only in a contracted and hidden form ($samhrtar\bar{u}pa$). (But at this point one – and first of all a Buddhist – might wonder on which basis it is then possible to draw a distinction between savikalpa and nirvikalpa, and, moreover, what nirvikalpa is. An elaborate answer to these crucial questions is given by Abh. in IPVV II p. 239-40; cf. Torella forthcoming). This condition makes the cognition that occurs remain, in one sense, as though it had not occurred, because it is not able to manifest its effects (kārya), namely, to attain the plane of verbal communication and practical use (Vṛṣabhadeva's Paddhati p. 188). That this cognition, however, has occurred is proved by the fact that a suitable occasion (nimitta), such as the subsequent occurrence of a similar cognition (Paddhati p. 189 sadršagrahanāder nimittāt) may reawaken it and render it manifest. Bhartrhari gives the example of a person walking quickly, wholly intent on reaching his destination, who seems not to notice anything that he meets along his path leaves, clods of earth -, until, some time later, he finds himself faced with a similar

- I 5.19 as reciting, running and so on necessarily occurs through a determinate awareness (°anusaṃdhānena)⁴³ of the intention of reaching or leaving this or that place etc. which is seen at that moment⁴⁴. 19
 - 20. The determinate cognition (adhyavasā) 'this is a jar', beyond the linguistic sign and the thing signified (nāmarūpa°), is the very power of the supreme Lord. It is manifested in the same way as the self and not in terms of 'this' 45.

object and this brings to mind the cognition that he did not previously realize he had had. This is possible, says Bhartrhari, only if we admit the existence within the first perception of a sabdabhāvanā which, after being 'contracted' (cf. IPVV II p. 226) as it was, has now become fully manifest (vyakta). Then let us consider the case of a sensation taken in its very first moment (Vrtti p. 170 prathamopanipātī) and not destined to further development. Even the indistinct cognition that derives from it, based on an inner formulation such as 'this, that' is made possible only by the presence of a śabdabhāvanā, though in a subtle form. Finally I will quote one last, particularly significant, example from those Bhartrhari gives. This is the analysis of the process that leads from the perception of a group of words to the comprehension of the meaning of the sentence they form. The text of the Vṛṭṭi (pp. 191-92) is ambiguous in some places and I understand it in the light of Vṛṣabhadeva's interpretation (which is, however, questionable; cf. Aklujkar 1970: 147-48). What appears at first is the indeterminate reality of a series of separate words-meanings, isolated from one another. Subsequently (uttarakālam; Paddhati p. 191 abhinnapadārthaparicchedād uttarakālam) there is a reflective awareness (pratyavamarśa), namely a determination of the meanings understood from the words (Paddhati ibid. padebhyo 'nubhūtānām arthānām ākāranirūpaņā) and a coordination (anusamdhāna), namely the ascertainment, with mutual connection, of the meanings obtained from the words (Paddhati ibid. padebhyo 'vagatanam arthanam parasparāvacchedenāvadhāraṇam); finally, the constitution of a single overall meaning (ekārthakāritvam). All this depends on having the word as essence (vāgrūpatāyām baddham). It is to be noted that pratyavamarśa and anusamdhāna are precisely the two terms on which Utp.'s Vrtti on this kārikā is centred.

⁴³ Anusamdhāna, to be understood also in the sense of 'coordination' of the distinct wills to leave one thing and seek another, present in the act of volition (see text note 294). As stated before (I.5.10), volition is a particular form of reflective awareness; it must include a vimarśa 'this is that', though in a generic form, touching the desired object in same way. In this state the powers of volition, knowledge and action are united with the light full of consciousness and bliss (IPVV II p. 233 and SDVr pp. 91-92). See also SD I.9.11ab.

⁴⁴ According to Abh. (IPVV II p. 233, see text note 294) the expression *deśādi*° may be understood in two ways: 'other substances or qualities' or 'substances etc. existing elsewhere or of another nature'.

The $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$ is to be understood as a reply to an objection which we find made explicit by Abh. in $\bar{I}PV$ and $\bar{I}PVV$. The objector admits that the determinate cogni-

- The determinate cognition 'this' and 'jar', beyond the linguistic ex- I 5.20 pression and the thing signified, which in themselves appear as differentiated [from the subject], consists essentially in the power of Consciousness: it is manifested, like the self 46 , in terms of non-differentiation. 20 -
- 21. However, insofar as they conform to the time and place of the differentiated cognizable reality, [perceptive] cognition, memory and determinate cognition etc. appear to be successive⁴⁷.
- Differentiated cognizable reality, such as the jar and so on, is made manifest to the Consciousness⁴⁸ as differentiated by this or that time and place due to the power of māyā. [Perceptive] cognition, memory etc., closely resting on this differentiated reality, are manifested at different times and places etc. 21 -

tion in the subtle form the previous $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$ spoke of may be considered not separate from the subject or from the 'light', as we have seen, but he wonders how one can continue to claim this once the determinate cognition (adhyavasāya) 'this is a jar' becomes evident (sphuta) and, on being articulated in words, fully assumes the form of vikalpa. The word 'jar' - like the thing it signifies - is manifested as an objective reality, separate from the light of consciousness, and this cannot but have repercussions on the determinate cognition the very essence of which is the linguistic expression. The meaning of Utp.'s reply is the following. No one has ever said that it is the ordinary manifested word (which is only the lowest level of language) that constitutes the vimarsa; it is, on the contrary, on the same level as any reality that appears as external. This word and the thing it signifies are only the object of unification by a determinative cognition, which is rooted in the Lord's pure power of consciousness (of which it is one of the manifestations). In unifying nāma and rūpa (śabda and artha) determinate cognition remains distinct from them, on another level, retrieving them through the outcome of its very process within the sphere of the T.

⁴⁶ The various notions of self, cognizing subject, Lord etc. shine directly to the consciousness as 'I' (cf. above $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}s$ 16-17 above).

One can explain this $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$, too, as the reply to an unformulated objection, which it is possible to intuit from the thread of the argumentation and with the aid of Abh.'s commentaries. If every form of cognizing – the objector wonders – in the ultimate analysis is resolved in the 'I', what results is an absolute unity of cognition in which there is no room for spatio-temporal differentiations (which may characterize only the object). And yet this differentiation is evident at every moment of ordinary experience ...

⁴⁸ See above n. 38.

CHAPTER VI

- 1. The reflective awareness T, which is the very essence of light, is not a mental construct (vikalpaḥ), although it is informed by the word (vāgvapuḥ). For a vikalpa is an act of ascertainment (viniścayaḥ) presenting a duality (dvayākṣepī)¹.
- The reflective awareness concerning the self, the reflective awareness 'I', which constitutes the very nature of light, cannot be called vikalpa even if it is essentially associated with a 'discourse' ($s\bar{a}bhil\bar{a}po$ 'pi)² since the word that informs it is the supreme word. Indeed, the vikalpa³ is an ascertainment (niscayah) acquired through the negation of the opposite⁴, and, as regards pure light, there is no possibility of the existence of something that is its opposite⁵. 1 -
- ¹ Without a duality of this non-this, Abh. remarks (IPVV II p. 280), how can the functions peculiar to *vikalpa* be carried out, that is, how and what to unify, divide, imagine?
- ² Utp. refers here critically to the well-known definition of kalpanā given by Dharmakīrti (NB I. 5) abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā, which in turn derives, with modifications, from Dignāga (PS I. 3d nāmajātyādiyojanā; cf. Funayama 1992). During the discussion of this subject in IPVV, Abh. repeatedly quotes passages from Dharmottara, which turn out to be either paraphrases or summaries of passages from the NBT (ad I. 5).
- ³ On vikalpa in general see Matilal 1986: 313-15. The term vikalpa is analysed in IPVV II p. 274 in a few different, but compatible (or even complementary) ways, each of them singling out an aspect of this complex notion. a) vividhakalpanā, to be understood either as putting together what is differentiated in reality (bhinnasyāpi ... yojanā) or as conceiving as manifold what is one in reality (ekasyāpi vaividhyena kalpanā). b) Cutting (klp- in the sense of vicchedana) another form which has been imagined (vividhasya ca śankitasya rūpāntarasya kalpanam vicchedanam). c) After dividing (vibhajya), removing from the other and protecting by making it enter into the cognizer's mind (vi-kal-pa). And later on (p. 281), d) vividham kalpanam, i.e. manifold conceiving, in the sense that at same time it has something being affirmed and something being negated as its object (vidhīyamānaniṣidhyamānatayā).
- ⁴ The main characteristic of *vikalpa* is that of projecting the object outside the I, of knowing it in terms of separation: 'this'. In analyzing the working of *vikalpa*, Āhnika VI dwells particularly on its aspect of 'exclusion'. In the avikalpaka state the thing is 'full', just like consciousness, but it cannot become the object of practical

To elaborate:

2. In fact, the manifestation of two opposite realities is possible in the case of 'jar' and 'non-jar'. On the contrary, the manifestation of a

usage as regards cognition, communication and so on (IPV I pp. 309-310 tadavikalpadaśāyām citsvabhāvo 'sau ghaṭaḥ cidvad eva viśvaśarīraḥ pūrṇaḥ, na ca tena kecid vyavahārāḥ). For this purpose the subject in the māyic world has to break into pieces what is full in itself, distinguish and negate: knowing becomes contrasting. Also in this case Utp. appears drawn into the orbit of Buddhist thought. The first formulation of the apoha theory is found, as is well-known, in the PS and in the Nyāyamukha, though apparently still limited in its application to the ambit of the inferential process and the denotation of words (for the development of the apoha theory in Dignāga's works see Frauwallner 1959: 99-106). The word expresses things as qualified by the negation of the other meanings (śabdo 'rthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha, cit. in PVSV pp. 62-63; the passage comes from the vṛtti on PS V.36d, Hattori 1980: 71). Or again: '[The word] expresses its meaning through the exclusion of others' (PS V.1cd ... svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate). It was, then, Dharmakīrti who extended the application of the apoha to all the fields where universals operate, that is, in the broad sense, to the contents of discursive thought (PV I.134 tenānyāpohaviṣayāḥ proktāḥ sāmānyagocarāḥ / śabdāś ca buddhayaś caiva vastuny eṣām asambhavāt //; PVSV pp. 92-93 tasmāt siddham etat sarve śabdā vivekavişayā vikalpāś ca). Therefore, words (or vikalpas), do not express universals, undividedly present in single particular things, - as the Realists maintain - but only a 'difference' (bheda) through the exclusion of what is other, namely, of all those things which are joined by the fact of having different effects with respect to the thing intended. The intrinsic nature of the thing constitutes its difference, the exclusion of what is other its (potentially) common dimension (PV 1.180ab cintyete svātmanā bhedo vyāvṛttyā ca samānatā); the anyāpoha, after all, is seen to share all the essential characters of the sāmānya, that is, ekatva nityatva pratyekaparisamāpti (cf. PS V.36cd; Katsura 1991: 132). Therefore, the word is applied to that difference in which the exclusion of the other has made a common structure appear (PVSV p. . bhede samānarūpapratibhāsiny ākṣiptatadanyavyāvṛttir niveśyata iti), However, it is not a question of two distinct operations (with a relationship of viśesyaviśeṣaṇa), Dharmakīrti says - and Jinendrabuddhi will repeat, a few centuries later, in his commentary on the PS (Stcherbatsky 1930²: 464) – since the denotation of its own meaning entails by itself the exclusion of others, precisely inasmuch as the nature of its own meaning is the 'difference' (PVSV p. 63). But, Dharmakīrti adds a little later (PV I.128), the difference is not a real thing (vastu) - nor is exclusion $\vec{-}$; it is only a relative term. Something real would be the form $(r\bar{u}pa)$, but the object of the word is not rūpa but bheda (abhāva, viveka; PV I.185 and PVSV thereon). Almost all the debates of the later Buddhist thinkers, who will attempt to recast the apoha theory taking into account the Nyāya and Mīmāmsā criticism, are centred on these points. The current division (Mookerjee 1935:132-33) between 'negativists' (Dignāga and Dharmakīrti; for a distinction of their respective positions see Katsura 1991: 142-143), 'positivists' (Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla: the word expresses firstly

16.2 reality that is other and differentiable from light, on the same plane (iva)⁷, is not possible.

a positive entity and only secondly, by implication, the exclusion of the other, TS 1018 tasya ca pratibimbasya gatāv evāvagamyate i sāmarthyād anyaviśleşo nāsyānyātmakatā yataḥ //) and 'synthetists' (Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti: the word expresses a positive entity qualified by the exclusion of the other; Ratnakīrti's Apohasiddhi p. 59 nāsmabhir apohaśabdena vidhir eva kevalo 'bhipretaḥ / nāpy anyavyāvṛttimatram / kintu anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ, then taken up again by Mokṣākaragupta) seems too simplistic and fails to grasp what appears as a substantial unity with different formulations (Katsura 1986, Siderits 1986). The Pratyabhijñā position is very close to Ratnakīrti's: the words (and vikalpas) rest on a reality which is mainly affirmative, qualified by the implicit negation of the opposite (ĪPVV II p. 289 antarlīnīkṛtapratiyogyabhāvaviśiṣṭavidhipradhānavastuniṣṭhāḥ; p. 280 vidhau viśrāntatvāt niścayasya). In this process three moments may be singled out: imagining what is other than the object intended, then superimposing it onto the object and lastly negating it. (ibid. p. 289 vikalpayet, āropayet niședhec ca). Or, according to another formulation: every apprehension includes the superimposition of the manifestations to be excluded and their negation (ibid. p. 290 sarvā prameyeşu pratipattir apohyābhāsāropaniṣedhavyāpārāntaḥkāriņī).

⁵ The countercorrelate of light, its contrary, cannot in fact be either aprakāśamāna – because in this case it would simply not exist – or prakāśamāna – because it would be of the same essence as light (ĪPVV II p. 279).

⁶ Cf. IPV I p. 307 bhedinah ... apohanātmakabhedanavyāpārasahiṣṇoḥ [both Bh and KSTS Ed. read incorrectly °vyāpārāsahiṣṇoḥ]. On the plane of knowable reality it is possible to imagine, with respect to a 'blue', a 'non-blue' (and what is other than blue indeed exists); why then, on the plane of the knowing subject, imagining a reality other than consciousness should be inadmissible? This objection is put forward by Utp. and Abh. (IPVV II p. 288) and answered as follows. On the plane of prameya, created by māyā and made of a multitude of ābhāsas, anekatva and vaicitrya are not surprising, whereas in pure light a reality different (cf. bhinnasya in the vṛtti) from the nature of pramatr cannot possibly exist. But even admitting that lights may be differentiated in their nature owing to a differentiation of space and time, nonetheless, just as, when a certain 'blue' is ascertained, only yellow etc. are negated - not the other 'blues' -, likewise, when a light is ascertained the other lights are not negated. The two parts of this argument unfold what is implicit in dvifiyasya bhinnasya in the vrtti. Therefore, even if there were a 'second' (etc.) light, this would not be subject to exclusion. However, a 'second' light is not admissible as a reality (IPV I p. 308 na ca prakāśasya svarūpadeśakālabhedo yena dvitīyah prakāśa ekasmād apohyate). A 'second' light as the product of mental construction cannot constitute a pratiyogin in the same way as 'being cause, effect, instantaneous' cannot be considered a pratiyogin with respect to 'blue' (IPVV II p. 282 svakalpanākalpitena dvifīyena na pratiyogiparipūraņam kriyate / na hi nīlasya kāraņatvakāryatvakṣaṇikatvādi pratiyogipakṣe vartate, na hi tat prthak kiñcit). See also above n. 5.

⁷ What is needed for two entities to be termed *pratiyogin* is precisely their opposing each other while remaining on the same plane. My translation makes the

- Otherness with respect to light ($prak\bar{a}\acute{s}etaratvam$) is not possible, I 6.2 since an opposite reality, second to and distinct from light, called non-light, is not manifested. There being no possibility of exclusion ($vyapohan\bar{a}yog\bar{a}t$), since such an opposite reality does not exist, one cannot, therefore, speak of mental construct ($vikalpat\bar{a}^{\circ}$) [with reference to $ahampratyavamar\acute{s}a$]. - 2 -

Likewise:

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- 3. For we call vikalpa the ascertainment of a certain thing (tan-niścayanam) [e.g.] 'jar' arrived at through the exclusion of its opposite (atadvyapohanāt) by the knowing subject only (mātraiva), in whom that and the opposite of that are manifested (tadatatpratibhābhājā)⁸.
- The ascertainment 'jar', brought about by the free knowing subject only within whom lie the manifestations of that [the jar] and its opposite, and that takes place through the exclusion of the opposite: this is the activity called vikalpa. 3 -
- 4-5. Having left the plane of Consciousness because of the influence of māyā, that reflective awareness 'I' which addresses differentiated realities e.g. the body, the intellect, the vital breath or that imagined entity, similar to ether understood as the knowing subject, that reflective awareness, excluding what is other than its object, is a vikalpa,

value of iva explicit and in so doing follows Abh.'s commentary. Bh., too, insists on this point (II p. 307) tulyakakṣya eva hi pratispardhitayā bhedena puraḥ sthātuṃ śaknoti iti tulyakakṣyasyety uktam; Abh. (ĪPVV II p. 282) adds pratiyogitvaṃ hi tat-sthānāpannatvam.

8 The Buddhist description of vikalpa's modus operandi thus seems liable to be shared also by the Saivas. Moreover, on a close scrutiny, it is only within the śaiva context that it may logically stand and elude criticism. Indeed, if one accepts the Buddhist presupposition of things being self-confined, it results that what appears from the cognition of a thing is only that same thing and the awareness of its cognition, and one does not understand where the 'other' things and their negation spring from. But this difficulty concerns only the Buddhist (IPV I p. 308 evam śākyah paryanuyojyo na tu vayam), not the śaiva conception centred in a cognizer who is not bound to the present object and its cognition (IPVV II p. 291 viṣayataddarśanādipāratantryam ujjhatā) but is free to dynamically aggregate, separate and merge all the various cognitions. The centrality of the I, which characterizes the śaiva conception, is pointed out by the particle eva in the kārikā (mātraiva) and in the vṛtti (pramātur eva).

- I 6.4-5 which arises precisely from the manifestation of an opposite reality to be excluded⁹.
 - The reflective awareness 'I' as the knowing subject, which because of the power of māyā $(m\bar{a}y\bar{a}\acute{s}akty\bar{a})$ of the Consciousness-principle itself, of the Lord, addresses realities that are manifested as separate such as the body, the intellect, the interior tactile sensation¹⁰ or that imagined¹¹ entity which is the void $(\acute{s}\bar{u}nya)$, beyond them, similar to ether¹² this form of reflective awareness 'I' is nothing other than a vikalpa, like 'this is a jar', since it excludes the various opposite entities that are manifested, such as the body and so on. 4-5 –
 - 6. The connection, in the case of an entity that is manifested at a certain time (kādācitkāvabhāse), with something that was formerly manifested etc., this connection, too, which occurs thanks to the latent impression, is a mental construct (kalpanā) since it is applied to realities that are manifested as differentiated¹³.
 - Within the sphere of the various totally differentiated and discontinuous manifestations such as the body, the void etc., the connection in
 - ⁹ In his commentaries Abh. introduces these two stanzas with an objection to which they furnish the reply. The reflective awareness 'I' (ahampratyavamarśa) occurs through the exclusion of non-I; is it not therefore a vikalpa itself? The answer is that there are two kinds of ahampratyavamarśa, one is pure and the other is impure; the objector's remark is pertinent only to the latter, which is the object of the two stanzas.
 - ¹⁰ Sparśa (but āntara) is the sensory faculty that reveals the existence of the prāṇa, just as antaḥkaraṇa reveals that of the mind and the sense of the I, or sight reveals that of the body. But Abh., in commenting on the fikā, grasps other meanings of this āntaratvam of the prāṇa (not to be confused with physical breath), namely its not being directed outwards, its being the essential element and its permeating all the senses (cf. ĪPVV II pp. 295-7).
 - Imagined insofar as, unlike the other realities with which subjectivity is wrongly identified, it cannot be directly known by the internal and external senses (*ibid.* p. 297).
 - ¹² For example, it shares with ether 'vacuity' and the fact that it is not a pure non-entity (*ibid.* p. 297). On the void see below pp. 203 ff.
 - 13 Once again it is useful to resort to Abh.'s commentaries to understand the link between the present stanza and the previous one. The notion of the I (ahampratyaya) is not only to be divided into pure and impure (śuddha aśuddha), but each of these two forms has in turn two aspects: an immediate awareness through a direct internal experience and a mediated one which is the result of a connection

unity (aikyayojanā) with former manifestations, with an individuality, I 6.6 with a name, (a connection) made possible by the latent impressions which ensure the internal permanence of the former manifestations, – this connection in unity, which is essentially an activity of the knowing subject (pramātṛvyāpārarūpā), is merely a mental construct and precisely that called 'recognition'. – 6 –

- 7. Thus also in the course of ordinary reality¹⁴ the Lord, entering the body etc., renders externally manifest by his volition the multitude of objects that shine within him.
- At the moment of the original creation, as in the course of everyday reality, Maheśvara, by virtue of the power of māyā¹⁵, by entering the body etc. conceived of as self, creates the [limited] knower and thanks to the power of doer (kartṛśaktyā) gradually¹⁶ renders the various objects

(anusamdhāna) between several elements. Now in the case of the aśuddhaahampratyaya (which concerns us here), the direct form (anubhavarūpa) – e.g. 'I am the body', namely 'I am thin', 'I am old' etc. - has already been spoken of and acknowledged as vikalpa (see above kārikās 4-5). But it might be objected that the second form, since it works through unification - 'that which was previously a child, then an adult, with a determinate name, character etc. is the I - and not exclusion (as was seen in the case of the first), does not have the characteristics of the vikalpa. The present stanza answers this objection by essentially saying that an anusamdhāna that has as its object realities conceived as bāhya and bhinna cannot bring about a real unification as it is polluted by their appearing in the sign of vikalpa. On the contrary, it is on the plane of Sadāsiva where the 'this' is not yet bhinna that anusamdhāna brings about a śuddha-ahampratyaya. However, Abh. concludes (ÎPV I p. 327), in every anusamdhāna, namely in every act of unification we perform in ordinary reality, the light of vidyāśakti (see below pp. 193-194) shines for an instant: each of these may be taken by the limited subject as the first step in the process leading to the overcoming of differentiation and duality.

The five activities of the Lord take place not only on a cosmic level but also in everyday reality, which is, in various ways, continually penetrated and supported by them (cf. SSV pp. 10-12, PH pp. 22-26).

Utp. glosses *icchayā* with $m\bar{a}y\bar{a}śakty\bar{a}$ and kartṛśaktyā; as Abh. explains (IPVV II p. 323) $m\bar{a}y\bar{a}śakti$ is responsible for the identification of the 1 with the various seats of limited subjectivity (body etc.), kartṛśakti – in the form of $kal\bar{a}$ and $vidy\bar{a}$ – for the manifestation of reality as external.

¹⁶ I.e. linking the various manifestations with particular subjects and then removing them from those to link them with others and so on (cf. IPVV II pp. 316-7); this pertains to the microcosmic level of the five divine operations (creation, reabsorption etc.). Or, according to another interpretation (*ibid.* p. 323), gradually connecting on the pure, mixed and impure levels of creation.

- 16.7 that shine within him externally manifest. Creating is precisely rendering manifest in this way ($tath\bar{a}bh\bar{a}sanam\ eva$). On the contrary, if he does not enter the body etc., then the whole manifestation of objective reality will take place spontaneously and simultaneously in the form of 'I am all this' 17. -7
 - 8. Therefore it is definitely ascertained that whether in memory, or in vikalpa that depends on exclusion –, or in direct perception, the manifestation of the object is internal.
 - In every kind of cognition (sarvasamvitsu), all objective manifestation is always shining as absorbed in the cognizer (pramātṛsaṃlīnaḥ) like the consciousness-principle, in an appropriate way (ānurūpyeṇa)¹⁸. 8 -
 - 9. However, in direct perception, which consists in rendering the object externally manifest, [this manifestation] occurs spontaneously (naisargikaḥ), while in memory etc. this is informed by a former perception.
 - In direct perception, consisting in rendering the object externally manifest¹⁹, the manifestation of the object within the consciousness (*cittattvasyāntar*) is spontaneous (sahaja)²⁰; on the contrary, in memory etc. it has as its essence a former perception, and it is for this very reason that memory is said to arise from latent impressions²¹. 9 -

¹⁷ It is the plane of Sadāśiva-Īśvara.

When, for example, the cognition appears as 'this is a jar' and there does not seem to be any reason to claim a connection with the subject, even then, on the contrary, the fact that the cognition and its object rest ultimately on the cognizing subject reveals that their nature is essentially consciousness. The expression anurupyena seems to refer to the possibility of relative differentiations of degree within a basic identity; see also above I. 5. 10 and vrtti.

¹⁹ In the sense of perceiving it as other than self, as 'this'.

²⁰ I.e. it does not depend on external factors (former perceptions), but, as Abh. says (ĪPVV II p. 329), it stems from the freedom of the Lord himself (cf. text note 353). Also see PTV p. 221 (svasāmarthyodbhūta°), ĪPVV I p. 114 (svasāmarthyotthanirvikalpakajñāna°).

The criterion on the basis of which it is possible to make a general distinction between the various kinds of cognition lies in the spontaneous or mediated manifestation of the object. The object is manifested spontaneously in direct perception, and mediately in *vikalpa* (or rather in a certain kind of *vikalpa*; see the following $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$), where the manifestation of the object must necessarily pass through the reawakening of a former perception. Therefore we have as homologous terms

- 10. It is also spontaneous in the case of the vikalpa that acts 16.10 autonomously (svairacāriņi) rendering particular configurations manifest in the mental sphere at will.
- However, the independent (svatantrah) vikalpa²² renders this or that thing manifest, whether new or characterized by a different organization of its parts, making it the object of the mind even if it has never entered the field of the senses such as sight etc.; and it renders it manifest at will without considering its having been previously perceived²³. Within the sphere of this form of vikalpa the manifestation of the object is spontaneous, too. -10
- 11. Therefore, owing to the fact of rendering manifest at will, what is mentally conceived, knowledge and action have been proved to be fully evident (sphute) in every being.
- By virtue of the capacity for creating and knowing objects not formerly experienced, found in the *vikalpa*, the presence of the power to know and create everything is evident in everyone. 11 -

naisargika-avyavadhāna-sphuṭatā on the one hand and saṃskāraja-vyavadhāna-asphuṭatā on the other (cf Bh I p. 337). The fact of making the object manifest as external, which is mentioned as characteristic of direct perception, does not constitute an equally valid criterion; in fact, as Abh. notes, in the other kinds of knowledge, too, the object is projected outside the I, into the antaḥkaraṇa.

There are two kinds of vikalpa, according to whether it depends or does not depend on a former direct perception. The first kind includes, of course, memory (smṛti), determination (adhyavasāya), conjecture (utprekṣaṇa); the second, to which the stanza refers, — the autonomous (svatantra) vikalpa — includes fantasy (manorājya) and imagination (saṃkalpa).

23 Both kinds of vikalpa work on material furnished by former perceptions. The 'novelty' (navatā, apūrvatvam) which characterizes the object of the vikalpa called 'independent' is not therefore to be found in an impossible 'novelty' of the individual ābhāsa, but in not considering the former manifestation of the object at a particular time and place (which is, on the contrary, essential in the two main kinds of 'dependent' vikalpa – memory and determination) and in the different connection (yojanā) of the individual ābhāsas – different compared to the former experience – with the consequent creation of new arrangements (sanniveśa). The example Abh. gives of this is imagining a white elephant, with two trunks, a hundred tusks etc. Another element that characterizes the autonomous vikalpa is that it comes into being and ceases independently of the subject's will, as the mind's free wandering (see ĪPVV II p. 332; in the compound sansthānayojanāmśena, l. 14, the final na is to be read separately).

CHAPTER VII

- 1. And this intuitive light (pratibhā)¹ influenced (°rūṣitā) by the succession of all the various objects is the knowing subject, which is consciousness devoid of succession and limit², Maheśvara.
- And this light ($\bar{a}bh\bar{a}sah$) variegated ($^{\circ}\bar{a}cchuritah$) by the succession of all the various objects is, insofar as it rests internally, the knowing subject, called the 'self', which pervades the times of all the cognitive acts ($sarvasamvitk\bar{a}lavy\bar{a}p\bar{\imath}$) and consists of consciousness devoid of succession and limit; and it is Maheśvara in that it is the creator as regards the cognizable reality that constitutes its 'body' ($sv\bar{a}ngabh\bar{u}te$). 1 -
- 2. Relation (jñāteyam) is possible if things, through the paths of the various and distinct cognitive acts, come to rest on a single knowing subject.
- Once they have merged and been absorbed (*upalīya*) into the sea of the single knowing subject through the currents of the many cognitive acts [flowing into him]³, the different objects are set in the network of

² In his two commentaries Abh. divides the third pāda into akramā (referring to pratibhā) and anantacidrūpaḥ (referring to pramātā). The vṛtti, on the contrary, takes it as a single compound, referring to pramātā.

³ Or also, following Abh.'s commentary (see text note 367): 'by the means represented by the currents of the many cognitive acts', currents that force the objects from the external to the internal plane, into consciousness.

¹ Pratibhā, which I have translated vaguely as 'intuitive light', is the revelation, the presentation of the object to consciousness, its illumination by the light of the subject (prati-bhā), in which in the final analysis it rests. The succession which seems to be projected on the light when the objects shine within it (or rather when it shines as objects) disappears at the moment when the perception of the object as external reality 'this', becoming introverted, dissolves and finds its root in the I: 'I perceive this'; cf. the formulation in APS v. 22, often quoted in Saiva texts, prakāśasyātmaviśrāntir ahambhāvo hi kīrtitaḥ. Pratibhā is here to be understood as synonymous with prakāśa, ābhāsa (cf. I.6.3) and not in the pregnant sense of 'intuition', that is, a special, superhuman kind of direct vision (cf. Gopinath Kaviraj 1966: 1-44, Gonda 1963: 318-48, Iyer 1969: 86-92; Tola-Dragonetti 1990).

connections pertaining to practical reality ($^{\circ}vyavah\bar{a}rasamanvayam$), such I 7.2 as, for instance, the cause-effect relation and so on. -2 –

- 3. A connection between objects having a spatio-temporal succession and being self-contained is established by their manifestation in terms of unification (sakṛdābhāsa°)⁴. Otherwise, no connection at all is possible.
- Things, both in their own nature and manifestation⁵, are self-contained. A connection between them depends on their simultaneous and unitary manifestation ($yugapadek\bar{a}bh\bar{a}sa^{\circ}$). This undivided [manifestation, i.e. connection] is possible only if absorbed into the knowing subject. 3 -
- 4. The perceptions and non-perceptions (pratyakṣānupalambhānām), which in themselves concern this or that separate part, may cause the establishment of the cause-effect relation only if they rest on a single knowing subject.
- Perceptions and non-perceptions determine the cause-effect relation and also its establishment $(tatsiddhih)^6$, [only] once they have entered into a connection with one another $(samanvayam \ \bar{a}gatya)$ through a single knowing subject. If they do not enter into a reciprocal connection $(asamanvit\bar{a}h)$ perceptions and non-perceptions fade away at the moment
- ⁴ Cf. ĪPVV II p. 343 sakṛcchabdo bhedaniṣedhatātparye prayuktaḥ; ibid. sakṛdābhāsena deśakālasvarūpābhāsayojanaikyābhāsena. On sakṛdābhāsa see also below p. 155.

⁵ Namely, both in themselves and as regards the cognitions that have them as object, or, as Abh. says, both in perception and ascertainment (see text note 369).

tributes it to tarkikādi) to ascertain the existence of a cause-effect relation. This criterion is based on the combination and interrelation of a certain number of perceptions and non-perceptions (cf. PVin II pp. 33-4, HB p. 4, SP 13, PVSV p. 22). Fire, for example, may be considered the cause of smoke since, fire having been perceived, smoke, not initially perceived, is perceived later. Dharmakīrti does not explicitly state the number of these perceptions and non-perceptions: though their division into five seems the most likely (this is what Dharmottara in the PVin-fikā, Mādhava in the SDS, and Abh. in the IPVV understand), some commentators — Śākyamati, Karnakagomin, Arcata — only recognize three as being essential (see Steinkellner 1967: II, 97 n. 49). The dispute between these two views has been studied in Kajiyama 1963, where the Kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhi of Jñānaśrīmitra (a trikavādin) has been translated.

- I 7.4 in which they make known one after the other their respective objects, and are not able to display any mutual dependence 7 . -4
 - 5. The self-consciousness (svasamvittih) which in memory is the proof of memory's very being, that same self-consciousness and nothing else establishes the subsistence of the former direct perception.
 - Since [at the time of the memory] the self-consciousness of the former direct perception no longer exists, it is the self-consciousness of the memory and nothing else which establishes the existence of this former perception, as it does for the memory itself. This self-consciousness consists in the knowing subject characterized by the manifestation of a single identical object⁸. The status of effect acting as logical reason ($k\bar{a}ryalingata$) may not be attributed to memory since, as the manifestation of the former perception is no longer present, it cannot be said that a cause-effect relation has been established⁹. 5 –

⁷ Here the allusion is to the difficulties inherent in the Buddhist conception of causality; the whole of the fourth *āhnika* of the *Kriyādhikāra* will be devoted to the discussion of this.

⁸ The argument that memory is the manifestation and proof of the existence and continuity of the knowing subject, already extensively dealt with earlier, is here incidentally taken up once again. It is in effect through memory that the subject may establish that link between perceptions and non-perceptions capable of proving the existence of the cause-effect relation. This connection, as has been seen in the previous $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$, does not really pertain to the cognitions themselves, but is projected onto them by the subject. The continuity of self-consciousness thus reveals itself in memory. In fact, it is the very same svasamvedana which illuminates the memory that illuminates, makes manifest, the former perception – now no longer existent – on which the memory is based. Abh, lucidly distinguishes this type of argumentation supporting the existence of the self, based on memory (insofar as it reveals the oneness of self-consciousness), from that also based on memory, put forward earlier (cf. IPV I pp. 363-4).

Utp.'s aim here is to reject a possible objection – namely that there is no need to resort to the work of a continuous svasamvedana, but that memory is enough in itself to connect up with the former perception, since by general consensus the effect can lead to the knowledge of the cause. What Utp. does not acknowledge is precisely the admissibility of such an inference, whose logical reason (linga) is represented by the nature of effect (karya) attributed to the memory: between the perception that occurred in the past and the present memory there is no cause-effect relation, which presupposes a continuity (see text note 379 for the development of this argumentation). Therefore those who invoke memory as the unifier of cognitions which are in themselves separate implicitly finish up by involving precisely

- 6. Also the invalidating-invalidated relation (bādhyabādhakabhāvaḥ) I 7.6 between cognitions which are restricted to themselves and do not contradict one another (svātmaniṣṭhāvirodhināṃ) may exist only by virtue of their resting on a single knowing subject.
- What contradiction can there be between cognitions which are only directed to the single manifestations that are their own (*bhinnasvābhāsa-mātraniṣṭhānām*)¹⁰ and, consequently, how can one speak of an invalidating-invalidated relation with reference to them?¹¹ On the contrary, this relation is admissible if they rest on a single knowing subject. -6
- 7. [Someone might however object that] just as the cognition of an empty surface entails at the same time the cognition of the absence of the jar, so the cognition of mother-of-pearl entails the non-validity of the cognition of silver (rūpyajñānāpramātvavit)¹².

that knowing subject they wanted to avoid, who, as we have seen, is identified with the continuity of self-consciousness on which memory is based.

Or also: «that insist only on themselves (sva°) – i.e. on their own self-awareness - and on the manifestation (°ābhāsa°) that is their object», following IPVV II p. 371 svasmin vişaye ātmani ca svasamvedane (also ÎPV I p. 365, which substitutes svarūpe for svasamvedane). This is an interpretation that does not basically differ from the text of the vitti but constitutes the development of what is there implicit, apparently following the indications in the fikā (cf. IPVV II p. 372 vṛttau vivṛtau ca svaś ca ābhāsas ca iti svaś ca viṣayas ca iti yojyam). Or, Abh. continues, only the ābhāsa (the content of the cognition) may be considered mentioned in this expression, since the invalidation can concern only that and not the 'self-awareness' component (pp. 372-73 atha vā svasamvedanabhāge bādhāsambhavād ābhāsamātram eva sambhavadbādham iha nirdistam); in this case the svātma° of the kārikā is to be understood in the sense of ābhāsa (p. 373 tadā ca sūtre 'pi svātmagrahaņam ābhāsatātparyena yojyam). Abh. (IPV I pp. 265-6) indicates yet another possible interpretation of the kārikā as a whole, which is really rather contrived, but is, in the end, not far removed from the general meaning considered so far. As regards the sense in which the expression svābhāsa is used in the logical schools of Buddhism (grāhakābhāsa and svasamvedana) cf. Hattori 1968: 101 ff.

Also the invalidating-invalidated relation is therefore possible only thanks to the subject's freedom to act on cognitions that are themselves unrelated and therefore incapable, except in a uselessly general way, of being in opposition to one another. According to the Saiva view, an invalidating condition is one which interrupts the continuation of the result of another (IPVV II p. 372 yat yasya phalānuvṛttibhangan karoti, tat tasya bādhakam; cf. Rastogi 1986) which presupposes precisely the continuity and oneness of the knowing subject. See also SD IV.15 ff.

This kārikā voices an objection expressed from the point of view of the Buddhist logicians (IPVV 11 p. 376 dharmottaropādhyāyādidarśitam), according to

I 7.7 — The cognition of the absence of the jar — 'on this surface there is no jar' — is precisely the cognition of the empty surface (kevala-bhūtalajñānam eva), since the empty surface appears as the absence of the jar. Analogously, one may say that the cognition of mother-of-pearl

whom the invalidating-invalidated cognition relation does not need any single subject on which to base itself, but it is the correct cognition that entails by itself alone, implicitly, the non-validity of every other different cognition of its object. The principle is the same - as pointed out in the $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$ – as the one underlying the explanation of the concept of non-being (abhāva) and non-perception (anupalabdhi) given by Dharmottara in the NBT. The cognition of the absence of the jar, though being in itself distinct from that of the empty surface, is essentially connected with it, just as determined cognition is linked to perception and represents its subsequent stage: the same cognitive act embraces both of them (cf. NBT pp. 122-123). Dharmottara here depends directly on Dharmakīrti, who had extensively debated the question in several of his works (PV, PVSV, HB, NB). The essential points of Dharmakīrti's conception – which he sharply distinguishes from his teacher Isvarasena's adarsanamātra (Steinkellner 1966: 75 ff; 1992: 315) – may be summarized as follows (I refer to HB pp. 21-28*). Non-perception is not a distinct pramāņa connected with a particular prameya of its own (abhāva), as for instance Kumārila maintains. It consists in a positive perception of something that exists, a perception and object that however are different from the cognizer's expectation (anyopalabdhi, anyābhāva, vivaksitopalabdher anyatvāt) and in this way reveal an absence. From the positive perception of an 'other' thing one may pass to the cognition of the absence of the thing intended only on determinate conditions: first of all, that the two things possess an equal capacity to suscitate a certain cognition (avisistayogyatā) and that therefore they are necessarily associated in a single cognitive act, and, furthermore, that for the thing that is the object of negation there subsist all the conditions necessary for its perception (listed in NB II. 13-14). The cognition of the absence is immediate: the perception of the one thing alone entails the determination of the absence of the other (bhāvasiddhir evāparasyābhāvasiddhih). Seeing that a surface is empty - in the classical example - is knowing that the vase is not there (tasya kaivalyam aparasya vaikalyam). If this is possible, it is because it is the very nature of every cognition to define its object contextually by excluding the other (tat paricchinatti tadanyad vyavacchinatti). As Dharmakīrti states several times using different arguments, we are not dealing with an inferential process here, by which from the being there of the other we arrive (via mediation) at the not being there of the thing aimed at, because between the two there is no real sambandha on which the relation of linga-lingin may rest (na vai kutaścit sambandhād anyabhāvas tadabhāvagamaka iştah, kim tv anyabhāva eva tadabhāvah). The non-perception therefore directly reveals the absence of a thing (abhāva) and promotes the use (verbalization etc.) of this notion in practice (abhāvavyavahāra). Anupalabdhi may be used as a hetu to establish abhāvavyavahāra, but only when it is a question of illuminating and guiding a torpid intellect (mūdhapratipattau) that needs to arrive by degrees at a notion that is, on the contrary, immediate in a normal person.

- is, at the same time, the cognition of the absence of silver, since there I 7.7 is no mutual identification between mother-of-pearl and silver. And therefore it is the very perception that constitutes by itself the invalidating cognition (pratyakṣaṃ bādhakam). -7
- 8. That is inadmissible. From the cognition of the empty surface all that is proved is merely that this surface is not a jar (tasyāghaṭātmatā), and not the absence on it of a jar that is accessible to perception (upalabdhiyogyasya)¹³.
- From the cognition of an empty surface it is proved that this surface is not a jar, but not that on this substratum there is not a distinct jar, capable for its part [if it were there] of being the object of sight.

 8 -
- 13 Utp.'s reply is based on the distinction between two types of abhāva: tādātmya° 'the surface is not the jar' and vyatireka° 'on that surface there is no jar' (the two terms recur in IPV and IPVV; the Navyanyāya would say samānādhikaraņaovyadhikaraṇābhāva or anyonya°-saṃsargābhāva, cf. Matilal 1968: 50, 116, 148; or tādātmya^o - samsargābhāva, cf. Jha 1981: 184-187); in the first the possibility of perception has no part, in the second it is essential. The example proposed by the Buddhists would be valid only in the first case, but not in the case that interests them here, in which the negation is not generalized but concerns, according to their own formulation, an object characterized by hypothetical visibility (dṛśyatva). Its application to vyatirekābhāva is erroneous for atiprasanga (ĨPV I p. 374). The same point had already been made by Kumārila in the ŚV (Abhāvapariccheda, in particular vv. 38-39 and Pārthasārathimiśra's lucid explanation in the Nyāyaratnākara). Dharmakīrti had also foreseen this possible objection to his own theory: if the reference to the cognition that simultaneously defines its object and excludes that which is other may serve to account for the immediacy of the cognition of absence, what results, however, is a generalized negation concerning all that is other than the object effectively perceived, thus rendering impossible the application of those distinctions (ekajñānasamsargi, upalabdhilakṣanaprāpta) mentioned above (HB p. 26* evānyavyavacchedah yady ekaparicchedād sidhyati, sarvasyānyasyāviśesena tatrābhāvasiddhir bhavet, na tulyayogyāvasthasyaiva; upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdhir abhāvasādhanīti viśeṣaṇaṃ ca na vaktavyam, anupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānām api tatra vyavacchedāt). Dharmakīrti replies by referring to the narrow sense in which the term 'other' is to be understood in the context of the anupalabdhi, as explicitly stated at the beginning (ibid. p. 22* aviśistayogyatārūpayor ekajñānasamsarginoh parasparāpekṣam evānyatvam ihābhipretam). In conclusion, from the non-perception, as it has been defined, there follows the determination of the absence of something definite in a definite time and place (p. 27 tasmād yathoktād evānupalambhāt kvacit kadācit kasyacid abhāvasiddhih).

- 17.9 9. The surface is always a separate and distinct reality (viviktam), since things are self-contained (svātmaniṣṭhiteḥ); and therefore how can the cognition of it sometimes (jātu) lead to establishing the not being there of a thing distinct from it?
 - The surface is always separate from what is other than itself and so how can the cognition of it establish only in some cases (kadācid eva) the absence on it of a distinct entity, such as the jar¹⁴? The separation from a distinct jar (bhinnaghaṭaviviktatā) might be an occasional aspect (kādācitkaṃ rūpaṃ) of the surface only provided that also the association with that jar (ghaṭasahitatāpi) sometimes constitutes its own form. But this is not the case: there are always two things, each self-contained, and the association (sāhityam) between them is not another individual entity which, though distinct from them, comprises both of them (tadatiriktam ubhayātmakam)¹⁵. However [the objector replies], a single cognitive act in which the two manifestations appear associated (ubhayābhāsasamsargātmakam) constitutes in itself the absence of another cognition in which only one of the two is manifested (ekābhāsajñānāntarābhāvarū-

What guides Utp.'s criticism, here as elsewhere, is his intent to underline the immobility of phenomenal reality (objects, cognitions taken in themselves etc.), in order to make the affirmation of an T necessary, as the only source of that dynamism which is present at all levels of practical reality, and which renders it possible. In doing this he cannot but find himself continually disputing with the Buddhists, who in certain respects take the opposite path. Here he denies that sāhitya, ghaṭasahitatā, is something that may be perceived when space is perceived, as its nature; it is not an objective given, it is merely a mental construct (ĪPVV II p. 384 vikalpanamātram etat). This subject is dealt with extensively by Abh. following on from the fikā (cf. ibid. p. 383).

¹⁴ Utp.'s objection serves to induce his opponent to play the last card he was saving, in a sense his most important one, that on which the Buddhist conception of the anupalabdhi rests, and which gives it its originality. In order that the non-perception of a thing A may define its absence, all the conditions of perceptibility must exist (both as regards the thing and the subject), and there must be the positive perception of a thing B (and this is the essential point) which enters into such a relation with A that a single cognitive act must necessarily grasp both of them (NBT p. 101 ekendrivajñānagrāhyam locanādipranidhānābhimukham vastudvayam anyonyāpekṣam ekajñānasamṣargi kathyate). If this cognitive act takes place and only B is perceived this means that A is absent. It is in this sense that the Buddhist equation – perception of B equals absence of A – must be understood (NBT p. 118 arthajñāne eva pratyakṣasya ghatasyābhāva ucyate). This is – as we have seen (kārikā 7) – perfectly homologous to the Buddhist explanation of bādhā: cognition of mother-of-pearl equals invalidation of cognition of silver.

pam)¹⁶. [A cognitive act] nevertheless [it is replied] delimits the object I 7.9 as being self-contained: the determination of the absence of the jar does not occur as a direct consequence of the datum (na vastubalena), as is the case, on the contrary, in the determination of the existence of the place, which depends on the perception of the place. However [the objector says] it can be arrived at through the absence of the effect, that is, through the absence of a single cognition in which the two things are manifested¹⁷. Not even this is admissible: it would be a cognition arrived at through mediation (vyavadhānena prafītiḥ), whereas the establishment of the [empty] place derives immediately from the sight of it (pradešadaršanād eva)¹⁸. -9

10. However, on the surface in question there is a beam of light, or – for the blindman – a soft, warm, etc. tactile sensation: it is these perceptions that establish on this surface the non-identification of their object with the jar¹⁹.

Buddhist?) that sāhitya does not belong to the sphere of things, but to the sphere of cognitions (cf. e.g. PV I. 87 samsrjyante na bhidyante svato 'rthāh pāramārthikāh / rūpam ekam anekam ca teṣu buddher upaplavaḥ) and reformulates his position in less equivocal terms. Utp.'s reply is developed by Abh. in ĪPVV II pp. 384 (prativiṣayam paryavasyat ...) – 385. Dharmakīrti for his part might say that if such an 'association' (sahitatā, samsarga) is not a given fact (vastu), it is however present in cognition and it is reverberated by cognition on the things that gave rise to it (in the background lies the principle expounded in PV I. 109 ekapratyavamarśasya hetutvād dhīr abhedinī / ekadhīhetubhāvena vyaktīnām apy abhinnatā //).

17 The Buddhist opponent, put on the spot, thus ends up by presenting the negative judgement «on the surface there is no jar» as an inference, coinciding substantially with the first of the eleven types described in NB II. 30 ff. (reduced to three in IIB), svabhāvānupalabdhi; as Kamalašīla points out in TSP p. 587 and as results precisely from its formulation in the vrtti, it is resolved in a kāryānupalabdhi. The Buddhist has therefore illicitly changed plane and Utp. promptly points this out. Buddhist logic is perfectly aware of the dual level of the negative judgement (NBT p. 123 ato drśyānupalambho 'bhāvajñānam krtam pravartayati na tu akṛtam karofīty abhāvaniscayo 'nupalambhāt pravrtto 'pi pratyakṣeṇa kṛto 'nupalambhena pravartita ukta iti) and, as has been seen (cf. above n. 12), admits the presentation of the negation in terms of inference only to demonstrate the abhāvavyavahāra in certain cases. This final shift in perspective is thus equivalent to a surrender.

This is also the Buddhist position restated so often (cf. e.g. HB p. 27* darśanānantaram vyavadhānena vinedam astīdam tu nāstīti), that the Buddhist interlocutor ended up, however, by contradicting.

19 After criticizing the opposing thesis, Utp. now puts forward his own; it is 'unknown to the ancients' (IPV I p. 376 cirantanair aparidṛṣṭam; Bh. ibid., ciran-

- 17.10 The verbal formulation and relative behaviour (vyavahartum) 'there is the absence of the jar on this surface, there is no jar' can be legimately brought about by sight or another sense $(\bar{a}lok\bar{a}di)^{20}$ only once they have directly perceived in the place in question a beam of light or, in the shadows, a warm, soft etc. tactile sensation constituting in the first case the absence of the shape of the jar, and in the second of its tangible form. -10
 - 11. A piśāca is a different thing from light (anālokaḥ); [nevertheless] being invisible, he may reside within the light, just as he may be within the surface in question: from every point of view (sarvathā) his presence may not be denied.
 - On the basis of what has been said, the fact that light is a different thing from the $pi\dot{s}\bar{a}ca$ does not entail the negation of its presence within the light. The $pi\dot{s}\bar{a}ca$ is, in fact, invisible and, though it is different from the light, it can reside within the light, in the same way in which it can without any difficulty also reside within a ball of clay. Therefore the absence of the $pi\dot{s}\bar{a}ca$, as he is not visible, is not proved both from the point of view of the opposing doctrines and of our own²¹. 11 -

tanair hi śuddhabhūtaladṛṣter evābhāvasādhakatvam) referring to the masters of Buddhist logic, whose conception was here the object of his criticism. It is not the cognition of the empty surface in itself that may lead to the establishment of the absence of the jar, but the perception, through any of the senses, of something else that must necessarily be in its place (this principle is categorically expounded by Abh., IPV I p. 376 iha bhāva eva bhāvāntarasya abhāva). In this way the presence of all the factors essential for perception to take place (upalabdhilakṣaṇa) is ascertained in the subject – which the Buddhists also demand (dṛṣya = upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta) –, since a visual or auditory etc. perception actually takes place and may, by perceiving a particular object, legitimately imply the non-perception of another (the object whose absence one wishes to establish). All without unduly confusing ādhāra and ādheya (IPVV II p. 382 ekasyaiva hi katham ādhārādheyatā): the perception required to establish an absence is not that of the surface (ādhāra), but the space above it, which may or may not be occupied by a jar etc. (ādheya; cf. ibid. p. 388).

lt is to be noted that here the word āloka is used in the same sentence first in the sense of 'light', then in that of 'sight'. [I was mistaken; see above Foreword]

²¹ In the opponent's eyes, the Śaiva conception runs the risk of making the vyatirekābhāva, which is essential in practical reality, become an undifferentiated tādātmyābhāva, consequently including even the negations of what is imperceptible by nature. Indeed, this verse confirms that the Śaiva and Buddhist theories fully agree on this point.

- 12. Thus the cognition of mother-of-pearl may appear as the non- 17.12 being of the cognition of silver; however, it cannot reveal the non-validity of the former cognition of silver ²².
- The cognition of mother-of-pearl in itself appears as the non-being of the cognition of silver; but through the direct cognition of mother of pearl which takes place at that particular moment ($tad\bar{a}n\bar{i}ntana^{\circ}$) one does not obtain the non-validity ($apr\bar{a}m\bar{a}nyam$) of a distinct cognition of silver that occurred in the past. 12 -
- 13. Not even inference can account for the invalidation of a cognition, due to the property-possessor not being established (dharmyasid-dheḥ)²³; on the contrary the invalidation, established on the basis of everyone's inner experience (svasaṃvedanasiddhā)²⁴, is coherently explained (yuktā) as deriving from a unitary knowing subject.
- At the moment of the cognition of mother-of-pearl the former cognition of silver no longer subsists. Therefore, since the property-possessor is not established, the invalidation may not be explained in terms of inference²⁵. On the contrary, it is explained (*sidhyati*) by maintaining that it is in the self-awareness (*svasaṃvedane*) consisting in the unitary

The discussion now returns to the invalidating-invalidated cognition relation, after this long digression on the concept of negation has furnished the elements needed to clarify the crux of this relation and its implications.

²³ The preceding *kārikās* have shown that, remaining in the sphere of the Buddhist conception, perception alone is not able to account for the invalidation (*hādhā*) of a cognition. Nor, this *kārikā* adds, would a possible Buddhist recourse to inference achieve this purpose. 'Also' (*api*), as Abh. suggests, may also refer to *dharmyasid-dher*; in this case there would be an allusion to the *asiddhi* of the reason adduced, as well as of the property-possessor. The *dharmyasiddhi* is a form of logical fallacy (*hetvābhāsa*), included by Dharmakīrti in the *asiddha* type (NB III.65 *dharmyasid-dhāv apy asiddhaḥ-yathā sarvagata ātmeti sādhye sarvatropalabhyamānaguṇatvam*). On the meaning and translation of the term *dharmin* see Kitagawa 1960: 387.

 24 I translate it in this way on the basis of the immediate meaning, which – I believe – remains valid, even if the *vrtti* chooses to make a so-to-speak concentric meaning emerge in its place, which contains the analytic explanation of $b\bar{a}dh\bar{a}$.

²⁵ In fact, the inference would be as follows: the cognition of silver (dharmin) is faulty (dharma) because of the cognition of mother-of-pearl, or of the cognition it is not silver, or also because the thing in question becomes the object of two contradictory cognitions (three possible hetus). The fault, as the vrtti makes clear, lies in the fact that at the moment of the inference the cognition of silver, produced in the past and momentary according to the Buddhists, no longer exists. The fault of asiddhi may also be attributed to the possible hetus (cf. IPVV II p. 397).

- 17.13 knowing subject that the relation constituted by the two cognitions referring to a single object is manifested (ekadeśāvaṣṭambhyubhayajñā-namayasambandhabhāsanāt). The congruence with reality which is subsequently ascertained (paścātsaṃvādaḥ), and which causes one to say that the one cognition is valid and the other is not, can take place insofar as the former cognition is also manifested in the self-awareness of the present direct perception. The determination of the congruence also depends on the unitary knowing subject²⁶. 13
 - 14. Thus ordinary worldly activity, whether pure or impure²⁷, is experienced as resting on the Lord associated (khacite)²⁸ with the manifestation of greatly differentiated objective realities.
 - All practical activity, based on differentiation due to the power of $m\bar{a}y\bar{a}$, is pure for those who possess such knowledge, impure for those who are blind because of nescience²⁹. It is possible to grasp, through direct experience (sambhāvyate 'nubhavena), that all this daily practical activity is founded on the Blessed One³⁰, engaged in the manifestation of the various differentiated realities. 14 -
 - Two stages may be distinguished in the invalidating process: firstly a conflict (virodha) between two cognitions, and then the ascertainment of their congruence with reality (samvāda) on the basis of their ability to produce the expected results etc. Virodha is possible, Abh. continues on the basis of the fikā (ĪPVV II pp. 403-4), only if there is a single and unitary subject of the two cognitions (virodhasya kāraṇaṃ yad ekāśrayatvaṃ tat sati ekasmin pramātari jñeyam); similarly, saṇṇvāda, taking place only after (parataḥ) the cognitions, requires the unifying action of the subject. Therefore, since the invalidation depends on virodha and saṃvāda and these in turn depend on a single cognizer, it follows that the invalidation also depends on this.
 - In the activity of everyday life (vyavahāra) there is an impure aspect, consisting of sales, purchases, quarrels etc., in which the vulgar man is immersed, and a pure aspect, consisting of teaching, meditation, initiation, ritual ceremonies, pertaining to the man who has entered on the path of freedom. The value of this division is, however, far from being absolute and diminishes with the gradual elevation of consciousness.
 - ²⁸ Glossed (ÎPV I p. 390, ÎPVV II p. 404) with svarūpānanyathābhāvena uparakte.
 - 29 I.e. sakala, pralayākala and vijñānākala (ibid. p. 406).
 - ³⁰ Practical reality is possible as such in that it is rooted in the Supreme Consciousness and this may be known through direct experience itself (i.e. not through inference). This experience is accessible also to obtuse souls incapable of arriving at it immediately, through meditation and the repeated practice of this teaching. (cf. *ibid.* p. 405).

CHAPTER VIII

- 1. However (kevalam)¹, the manifestations sometimes depend on the direct sensory experience which takes place at that very moment (tātkālikākṣasāmakṣya°) at other times they do not, as in the case of the blindman, darkness etc.²
- Sometimes the manifestations are conveyed by the present direct experience, thus determining the cognition that may be formulated as 'this is a jar'; on the contrary, in the case of darkness etc. they derive from a former perception. -1
- 2. On the contrary, there is no difference (viśeṣaḥ) in the intrinsic existence (sattāyām) of the manifestation of the object within the sphere of the mental constructs regarding future, present or past objects.
- In the mental constructs that follow direct perception (pratyakṣapṛṣṭhapātiṣu), such as memory and conjecture, or in the others that are not dependent on it (svatantreṣu), concerning the three times, the manifestation of the object remains internally the same³. -2
- 3. Even if pleasure etc. and the causes of the states of pleasure etc. are real (vastușu) and their manifestation exists (sadbhāve), nevertheless,
- Here kevalam introduces a qualification of the general statement that concluded the previous āhnika: the whole fabric of phenomenal existence has its reality within the Lord.
- ² This explains how the ābhāsas differ in clearness or vividness (sphuṭatva; ĪPV I p. 402-3). The vividness of an ābhāsa depends on its association with the ābhāsa 'direct experience'. This is missing, therefore, when the subject is in the dark or blind (but not born blind) and is replaced by its reconstruction on the basis of former direct experiences. On the contrary, this is altogether absent in the case of a person who is born blind, unless one acknowledges (ĨPVV II p. 408) that it occurs through the latent traces left by former existences.
- The ābhāsa 'blue' is essentially the same whether it appears associated with the ābhāsa 'I see' or 'I remember' or 'I imagine'. Similarly the ābhāsa 'seeing' remains essentially the same even if it is associated in turn with the ābhāsa 'blue', 'jar' etc. In the end everything, without distinction, takes on the form 'I' (I perceive, I remember, I imagine the colour blue; cf. ĪPVV II p. 409).

- I 8.3 because they belong to the past, an effective similar⁴ condition of pleasure is not⁵ produced (tathāsthitiḥ).
 - The manifestations of pleasure, pain etc. and those of the factors that cause them, though they always exist internally⁶, do not bring about a state of joy etc. because, due to their belonging to the past [in the case in question], they have no external existence at the present moment and only the manifestations that exist at the present moment ($tad\bar{a}tvavisistan\bar{a}m$) are able to produce the above mentioned state. 3 -
 - 4. If, however, pleasure etc. is intensely reproduced (gāḍham ulli-khyamāne) through mental representation, then that same state (tathāsthitiḥ) comes about in the subject, in the same way⁷, since he vividly experiences that pleasure.
 - Reproduced through an autonomous mental representation⁸ with particularly intense effort, pleasure etc. becomes completely vivid and causes, in the same way, joy $(vik\bar{a}sa^\circ)^9$ etc. 4 -
 - 5. External existence (bāhyatā) is to be considered an accessory condition (upādhiḥ) and not the very essence (ātmā) of the manifestations of being and non-being. These, therefore, insofar as they are inner manifestations, always exist.

⁴ Similar to that experienced in the past, when that particular pleasure and its causes were present.

⁵ The negative, required by meaning and supported by all three commentaries, is based on reading the compound *tathāsthitiḥ* as *tathā-a-sthitiḥ*, thus attributing to the negative particle the sense of *prasajyapratiṣedha* (the only one to say so explicitly is Bh I p. 406). *Tathā* may also not be considered part of the compound that follows, but *tathāsthitiḥ* must, in any case, appear joined (as it stands for *tathā asthitiḥ*); however it is only so in Bh's *yojanā* and never in the *kārikās* or quotations in ĪPV and ĪPVV.

⁶ United with the I.

⁷ I.e. like that deriving from an 'external' pleasure.

Which – like determinate knowledge or judgement – is strictly dependent on direct perception (cf. text note 425). The role of memory is limited to supplying the object for the mental evocation, which having freed it from its ties with a particular past time, place and subject, brings it so vividly back to consciousness that it appears as if it were altogether new (see *ibid.* p. 411; cf. also *kārikā* I. 4. 2).

⁹ On vikāsa ('expansion', joy) see Gnoli 1968: 46-47.

- All the various manifestations, concerning both being and non-being, even if they do not appear as external, nonetheless have an existence (sattāsty eva), for instance in memory and so on. The fact that they exist externally is only an accessory condition and not their own form. The same is true of the manifestation of 'non-being', even though this [only] has an internal existence (antaḥsattāyām api), since it does not exist externally $\frac{10}{10}$. 5 –
- 6. These manifestations being internal (antaratvat), insofar as they are one with the knowing subject, cannot have causal efficiency which presupposes differentiation. Even when the condition of externality [of the manifestations as regards the knowing subject] exists, the causal efficiency is differentiated on the basis of the differentiation of the manifestations (bhinnabhasabhedatah).
- Even if all the various manifestations, such as blue, pleasure etc. permanently exist within, nevertheless, precisely because they consist only in the knowing subject, they do not possess causal efficiency, which is based on the differentiation typical of the relation of cause and effect etc. Even if there is the condition of differentiation from the knowing subject, causal efficiency, being linked to the manifestations, is seen to be differentiated according to whether it pertains to the form and so on, conforming with the diversity of the manifestations (e.g. their being mental, sensory etc.)¹¹. -6
- 7. Insofar as they are essentially constituted by consciousness (cin-mayatve) the manifestations permanently reside internally; insofar as they are manifested as external owing to the power of māyā, they also exist externally.
- As their own form is consciousness the manifestations permanently reside internally. One speaks of external manifestation when the things, remaining unseparated from light (prakāśāvyatirikteṣu) are made

¹⁰ Cf. ŚDVr p. 130 tad avastv api prakāśamānam cidrūpam eva, kevalam bāhye prakāśanābhāvād avastu ucyate. See ŚD III.78ab.

In other words, this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition: in order for a manifestation to produce a determinate effect a series of specifications and relations with other ābhāsas are also required. On causal efficiency (arthakriyā) see below p. 166.

- 18.7 by the power of māyā to appear $(prakāsyamānesu)^{12}$ externally as the object of direct perception¹³. But even when they are directly perceptible (tadāpi) they do not cease, for this reason, in the final analysis to be internal. On the contrary, in the case of intending to create and so on (sisrksādau) even things come to be internal. -7
 - 8. Even the mental representation (ullekhah) which occurs in the sphere of discursive thought (vikalpe) is external, because it appears in terms of separation (pṛthakprathah). Indeed, internality is unity with the
 - 12 By using the causative form the vrtti seeks to underline the heteronomy (pāratantrya) of the manifestations of objective reality which ordinary experience dominated by the power of maya tends to consider extraneous to and independent of consciousness. On the other hand, grammatical speculation is able to place the correct limits on a statement such as this, which, if taken literally, runs the risk of leading one just as far from the truth as that against which it was advanced. If the responsibility for the action of becoming manifest, of shining (prakāś-) rested solely with the primary subject of the causative (hetu) or, in other words, with consciousness, this would mean that the subject were completely extraneous to the reality of light – and in that case truly $b\bar{a}hya$, or from the Saiva point of view, a mere nothing. But as Bhartrhari says (cf. VP III. 7. 122-128), the subject of the action induced, in the causative form, can only be someone who possesses the requirements to act as a free agent of it (cf. the passage in Abh.'s lost Sivadṛṣṭyālocana quoted in PTV p. 225, preryo 'pi sa bhaved yasya saktatā nāma vidyate) (Torella 1987: 157-58). The meaning of the causative does not go beyond the, more or less, cogent stimulation of the hetu so that the karty performs the action in question: only what is in itself able to shine or, in other words, that which is essentially light, may be made to appear or shine (cf. also $T\bar{A}$ X. 38-45a). The status of the ābhāsa is thus to be found in this delicate balance between svatantrya and paratantrya.
 - 13 Abh. (ĪPVV II pp. 21-2), following the thread of the fikā, deals at length with the various implications contained in the expression 'as directly perceptible' (pratyaksatvena), and he begins by imagining the surprise of those who expected to see also the vikalpas (particularly those termed 'independent') mentioned in this context. Utp. is here primarily concerned with underlining what contrasts with what is commonly accepted in this case claiming the ultimate internality of what is considered external par excellence (the object of pratyakṣa) –, whereas the internality of the vikalpas is generally taken for granted and thus it is not worth expressly stating it. On the contrary, what has to be demonstrated and this once again conflicts with the general opinion is precisely the real externality of the vikalpas and this is done in the following stanza. Later this externality ultimately comes to rest on a fundamental internality, which is common to every reality. But pratyakṣatvena in the vṛtti may also have another function: this expression may re er to all types of ābhāsa whether sensory or mental being directly present to the consciousness, and thus to their indiscriminate satyatā.

knowing subject (pramātraikātmyam), externality is separation from I 8.8 him^{14} .

- The mental representation of the jar etc. in the sphere of discursive thought, though not the object of the senses such as sight, is non-etheless external insofar as it is manifested as separate [from the subject]. Indeed, internality is the reflective awareness 'I' (ahanvimarśah), externality is the reflective awareness 'this' 15. Thus for things such as the jar and so on there are two kinds of externality, that is, they are the object of cognition through both the external and internal senses; for pleasure and so on there is one, in that they are cognised only by the internal senses. -8
- 9. Owing to the will of the Lord mental representations and pleasure etc. are manifested to consciousness as external, in the same way as [also owing to the will of the Lord] the manifestation in the form of direct perception of what pertains to the planes of realities perceptible by the eye etc. (akṣyādibhuyām) is external.
- The manifestation $(prak\bar{a}\hat{s}ah)^{16}$ of mental representations and pleasure, pain, shame etc. that takes place through the mind $(bauddhah)^{17}$ is no different from that which, having the form of direct perception due to the power of the Lord¹⁸, concerns those realities that can be perceived by the eye, such as shapes etc. -9
- One must keep in mind the background against which this discussion of the externality of the ābhāsa in direct perception and in vikalpa takes place. Indeed externality has been declared the sine qua non condition on which the existence of causal efficiency depends (and it cannot be denied that the vikalpas, too, are able to produce effects); and this dependence is invoked in order to refute the satyatā-arthakriyākāritvam identification, upheld by the Buddhists. The vrtti distinguishes between two forms of this general externality, according to whether the ābhāsa is the object of both the external and internal senses, or internal only.

Or to put it more clearly, becoming conscious of the object in terms of T (unity, internality) or of 'this' (separation, externality).

Once again the problem arises of how to translate the term *prakāśa*, whilst preserving its density of meaning (light, manifestation, presence to consciousness and therefore also coming to light, perception, knowledge etc.).

17 If this knowing is called *bauddha* – in spite of the fact, a hypothetical objector notes, the actual *grāhaka* is in this case the *manas* – it is because it is concluded by the act of the *niscava*, which is pertinent to the *buddhi* (ĪPVV II pp. 430-31).

¹⁸ Isvara is the ultimate source of all manifestations. This is so not only in the case of those that are the object of perception as external objects, which appear more

- 18.10 10. On the basis of what has been said (tad) without a unity of cognitions ordinary worldly activity would not be possible. It is on the unity of light that the unity of the various cognitions is based and this unitary light is precisely the one knowing subject. This has been definitively established.
 - Indeed, practical activity is based on the unification (°anusaṃdhā-nena) of the various cognitions, which are in themselves separate from one another, and the unification of the cognitions is constituted by the light-principle, which is unitary in itself. This unitary light is precisely the knowing subject, one, called the Supreme Self. -10 -
 - 11. And precisely this knowing subject is Maheśvara, insofar as he is characterized by indefectible reflective awareness (vimṛśattvena niyatena). In fact, in God this awareness is pure knowledge and action.
 - Maheśvara is the supreme self, whose nature is consciousness, with his own primary indefectible nature constituted by reflective awareness. In this consciousness-principle, called Śiva, whose essence is everything, there is absolutely pure knowledge and action, being none other than the reflective awareness 'I' (ahaṃvimarśanam eva). In Īśvara, on the contrary, knowledge and action, connected as they are with an object assumed to be partly differentiated (bhinnābhinna°), are to be considered partially pure (śuddhāśuddhe). Referring then to an objective reality assumed to be differentiated, as happens on the plane of the individual subject, knowledge and action, informed respectively by sattva and rajas, or in other words by light and activity, contracted by tamas, are called impure. 11 -

as independent from the limited subject, but also in the case of those that might seem solely determined by the individual's will, such as mental representations, fantasies etc. Similarly, as Somānanda says (see ŚD I. 44 and vṛtti), the jar is produced by the potter but only insofar as his creativity is contained within the all-pervading creativity of the Lord.

SECTION II. ACTION

CHAPTER I

- 1. Therefore, also the objection raised earlier + 'an action that is both unitary and successive, belonging to a unitary subject is not admissible' was rejected through the demonstration of the existence of the unitary [consciousness].
- Through the demonstration of the unitary consciousness-principle the activity related to the unitary subject is proved unitary. Thus even the objections against action are found to be confuted. -1
- 2. Succession pertains to ordinary action, which is dependent on the power of Time; it is not, however, admissible for divine eternal action, as it is not for the Lord.
- The action of entities that, due to the power of māyā, appear differentiated, is successive, being dependent on the power of Time²; but that action, informed by the awareness of the self, without beginning or end, which is the very essence of the Lord, is not. -2
- 3. Time is the transit of the sun etc., or the birth of this or that flower and so on, or also heat and cold. Or time, in reality, is nothing but the succession (krama eva) characterized by these elements.

¹ This is the Buddhist objection expressed in kārikā I. 2.9.

² On the power of Time as the cause of the passing from the One to the many the 'locus classicus' is VP I. 3 and vrtti; cf. also III. 9. 46. The distinction between the working of māyāśakti (the differentiation between things, and between things and the subject) and kālaśakti (the introduction of succession into activity) is found in almost the same terms in Helarāja's commentary on VP III. 3. 83 (akrame 'pi brahmani bhedāvabhāsanam avidyākrtam / tatraiva kramāvabhāsanam kālākhyasvātantryaśaktikrtam); cf. Aklujkar 1970: 122 n. 39; Iyer 1969: 125-26. Abh. (ĪPVV III p. 10) synthetically defines the power of Time in the following words: bhagavata eva ābhāsānābhāsaprathanasamarthatā.

- II 1.3 Time consists of various actions that are common knowledge in everyday experience³, or of cold and so on. Or rather, time is the succession itself characterized by these which is an accessory qualification (°upādhi°) of all the various realities in their being manifested as differentiated; time is nothing but this succession, because it is through it that temporal differentiations are established. 3
 - 4. Succession is based on differentiation and this in turn derives from the existence or non-existence of a certain manifestation (ābhāsasadasattvataḥ). The existence or non-existence of manifestations depends on the Lord, who is he who determines their multiform appearance.
 - The cause of succession in things is the very action of the Lord, directed to the multiform appearance of the manifestations differentiated in their nature and mutually exclusive 4 . 4 -
 - 5. Through the variety of physical forms he causes spatial succession to appear; through the manifestation of the variety of actions the Lord also causes temporal succession to appear⁵.
 - In the case of many entities, there is spatial succession through the manifestation of mutual diversity and temporal succession through actions. However, with reference to a single entity there is only temporal succession due to different actions such as birth, existence, change etc. $^6 5$

³ The same idea (that the name 'time' is given to those realities able to act as a reference point, or 'measure' for the others) is found expressed in VP III. 9.77 kriyāntaraparicchedapravrttā yā kriyām prati / nirjñātaparimāṇā sā kāla ity abhidhīyate //. 'That (activity), the measure (of time) of which is well-known and which is employed in measuring (the duration of) any oyher activity, with regard to (any other) activity, is called time' (transl. Sharma 1972: 101).

⁴ This is my translation of the expression °anyonyābhāsaśūnya°, guided also by a passage in IPV (II p. 16), which recurs in almost the same terms in IPVV. Different manifestations may implicate each other, referring to a single substratum, such as 'red', 'jar' etc. or may be completely distinct from each other such as 'jar', 'cloth': obviously not in the first case, but not even in the second – where the two things, though unrelated, may coexist in a single cognitive act (yugapad evaikajñānena sphuraṇāt Bh II p. 16) – is there succession. On the contrary, succession is only possible if the manifestations are such that the presence of the one necessarily excludes that of the other, as in the case of autumn and winter.

⁵ On kāla / kriyā and deśa / mūrti see VP I.1 Vṛtti pp. 2, 9 (and Paddhati pp. 5, 9); see also VP III.7.153 and Helārāja's commentary; Prakīrņakaprakāśa I p. 117.

⁶ Together with growth, decline and disappearence they constitute the six modifications of existence (bhāvavikāra; cf. Nirukta 1.2.8-9).

- 6. In all things (sarvatra) the diversity of the manifestations is the II 1.6 source of temporal succession for those knowing subjects such as the void etc., whose light is discontinuous (vicchinnabhāsaḥ), but not for the knowing subject who shines once and for ever (sakṛt).
- In every object diversified manifestation determines the appearance of temporal succession [exclusively] for the knowing subject who identifies himself with the void, the body and so on. Indeed, apart from memory, what was manifested in the past $(pr\bar{a}kk\bar{a}lah)$ does not shine in the same manner at the present moment⁷, and it is with reference to his own present $(svavartam\bar{a}n\bar{a}peksay\bar{a})$ that the subject may use the notions of past and future in everyday experience. On the contrary, for the [true] knowing subject who shines uninterruptedly once and for ever $(sakrdvi-bh\bar{a}tasya)^8$, there is no temporal differentiation, neither in himself nor as regards objects, since, as the shining is never interrupted, it is not possible to speak of repetition. -6
- 7. Also spatial succession in things is manifested [only] to the limited knowing subject; on the contrary, to the unlimited subject things appear full of his own self, like his own self.
- With reference to the limited subject [only] things appear differentiated from the subject and from each other, and they are said to be far away etc., for the Lord, on the contrary his essence being solely light cannot be non-light ($aprak\bar{a}\dot{s}asambhav\bar{a}t$) with respect to anything, not even to an atom. The separation or distance from himself, or between things, does not appear to him who is light and only light⁹. 7 -

⁹ Lit. 'a compact mass of light' (prakāśaghanasya).

⁷ That is, connected with preceding manifestations of the limited subject (cf. text note 17). Only through memory can the former shining of the object be revived, in some way; but this is a totally different question, already dealt with at length above (Jñānādhikāra, āhnikas III-IV).

This is a reference – through a saiva text (Sārasvatasamgraha according to IPVV III p. 23, Sivasūtra according to Spandasamdoha p. 25) - to sakṛdvibhāta in Chāndogva Up. VIII. 4.2, later taken up again by Gaudapāda in Māndūkyakārikā III.36, IV.81; see also PTV p. 199. Consciousness shines 'once only' (this is the primary meaning of sakṛt), but as this shining is never interrupted the expression may also be taken in its secondary meaning of 'constantly, always, once and for ever (cf. Abh.'s explanation in IPVV III pp. 21-22; see also IPVV II p. 262 sakṛcchabdena tu ekavāravācinā sadārthaparyāyeṇa vā vicchedasankā nivāritā). Sankara similarly glosses sakṛt in the passages quoted above with satatam.

- II 1.8 8. Nevertheless, the manifestation of such a differentiation between subject and object of knowledge is the very creative power (nirmāṇaśaktiḥ) of the Lord (īśituḥ), who knows thus.
 - The fact that the various entities existing as subject and object of knowledge are determined as differentiated from each other and from Parameśvara (or from the self), is [due to] the creative power of Parameśvara, who, yet, thus shines in absolute fullness, neither does his own permanent form ever in any way cease to exist as a consequence of this determination. 8 -

CHAPTER II

- 1. The ideas of action, relation, universal, substance, space and time¹, which are based on unity and multiplicity, are to be considered real (satyāḥ), because of their permanence and efficacy (sthairyopayogābhyām).
- The ideas of relation etc. are also real manifestations, just like action², even if they regard both unity and multiplicity [at the same time]³. They can, in fact, be employed permanently with determinate practical results, and as such they are undeniable⁴. -1
- This second āhnika aims at establishing that the categories acknowledged by the bāhyavādins (the reference is particularly to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) are acceptable only if seen from the Śaiva viewpoint. Otherwise they do not stand up to criticism (and the criticism par excellence is that of the Buddhist logicians). Cf. Torella 1992: 328-29.
- ² The demonstration of the reality of action was implicit in that of the power of action discussed earlier. In the $t\bar{t}k\bar{a}$ (cf. $\bar{t}PVV$ III pp. 36-37) Utp. refers to three different interpretations of the compound satyābhāsa as karmadhāraya, sasthītatpurusa and bahuvrīhi.
- ³ The principal objection the Buddhists make to these categories, which they place in the sphere of relative truth, is precisely that of viruddhadharmādhyāsa.
- ⁴ The truth of a cognition is established here precisely by its not being contradicted by a subsequent cognition (sthairya) and by its leading to expected practical results (upayoga); see Abh.'s lucid formulation (ÎPVV III p. 29), satya eva yatah sthiro bādhakenānunmūlyamānavimarśah samvādavāms ca abhisamhitāyām grāmaprāptilakṣaṇāyām kriyāyām upayogī. The key-term saṃvāda may be applied both to sthairya and to upayoga (cf. ibid. p. 69, asyām vyākhyāyām bhāvasya arthakriyām kurvata ekānekarūpatā ... iti kartavyatā, – ity evambhūta upayoga uktaḥ, sthairyaṃ tu samvādah; uttaravyākhyāne tu sthairyam bādhakābhāvah, upayogas tu samvādah iti bheda iti). This may be compared with one of the classical explanations of the term, that given by Dharmottara (NBT p. 17, avisamvādakam jñānam samyagjñānam loke ca pūrvam upadaršitam artham prāpayan samvādaka ucyate, tadvat jñānam api svayam pradarsitam artham prāpayat samvādakam ucyate (behind which lies Dharmakīrti, PV II. 1 ... arthakriyāsthitiķ / avisamvādanam...). On samvāda and related terms, such as avisamvādin etc. (and their different acceptions in the Buddhist exegetical tradition) see Katsura 1984: 222-24, Dreyfus 1991, Franco 1991: 49-50, van Bijlert 1989: 122-28.

- II 2.2 2. In action etc. (tatra)⁵ there is one internal reality (āntaram tattvam); this, once it has become the object of sensory knowledge, becomes manifold depending on place, time and the specific shapes it assumes.
 - The essential reality (tattvam) which is by nature absolutely undivided ($abhinnam\ eva$) becomes one and manifold because of the division into internal and external manifestation⁶. [It becomes manifold] because of the multiplicity of the manifestations of the individual realities ("svalak sana"), constituted as they are by the different combination of external manifestations such as place, time, shape. 2 -
 - 3. The mind (manas), performing the function of determination following [the direct perception] (anuvyavasāyi)⁷, brings about conceptual
 - The vrtti does not indicate the interpretation to be given of the word tatra. Abh. in his two commentaries suggests three interpretations that he considers equally possible: 'in action etc.', 'given the reality of action etc.', 'as regards the unity and multiplicity of action etc.'. The tikā, from which Abh. quotes the expression evam sati (probably referring to tatra) glossed with vidyamāne kriyādau tadgate ca satyatve (ĪPVV III p. 45), seems to indicate the second interpretation.
 - ⁶ A reality, when it is completely identified with consciousness, in other words, when it is only consciousness (cinmātratayā), may not even strictly be referred to as one since the unity-multiplicity opposition only arises at a later stage. This is seen from the vrtti, from its paraphrase in IPVV (see text note 36) and from what Abh. states a few lines earlier in IPVV III p. 45 nīlādīnām bhāvānām pāramārthikam yad āntaram samvinmātralakṣaṇam tattvam, tatra na kalanā kācid abhedaghanatvād ekatāyā api tatra abhāvāt. The kārikā and the vṛtti become clearer once various levels of meaning have been recognized in the word antaram. The primary meaning of antaram is the absolute reality identified with the I; it coincides with the first of the two types of antaram spoken of in IPVV II p. 416 (antaratvam dvidha ahantayā samskāratayā ca), later articulated (pp. 416-417) and dislocated along the scale of the principles (the highest antaratvam corresponds to the plane of Parameśvara); it is called abhinnam in the vrtti. This absolute antaratvam constitutes the ultimate foundation from which unity and multiplicity come into being on the phenomenal level. Unity is understood as a relative antaratvam, which may be taken in more than one way (see IPVV III p. 45 yat tu āntaram ābhāsāntarānāmiśram antarangam. āntaram ca antaḥkaraṇamātravedyam tattvam ekam, tad ekam), and multiplicity is knowability on the part of the external senses, temporality, spatiality etc. Thus it becomes one-many (ekānekam).

This is apparently the meaning indicated by IPV II pp. 43-44, aindriyake nirvikalpake ... I paścādbhāvinam vyavasāyam niścayātmakam vikalpakam anuvyavasāya śabdavācyam. According to IPVV III p. 46 anuvyavasāya is the mental operation that occurs after the determinate awareness of the direct experience (anuvyavasāyam sākṣātkāravimarśasya paścādbhāvinam vimaršam ...). In any case, the term is not used here in the particular sense attributed to it in the Nyāya.

elaborations such as action and so on, which are based on these two⁸ II 2.3 and substantiated by the activity of the knowing subject⁹.

- The conceptual elaborations such as action etc., carried out by the mind $(m\bar{a}nasyah)$ and regarding both the external and internal plane the mind being half way between them are essentially the activity of the knowing subject $(pram\bar{a}trvy\bar{a}p\bar{a}rar\bar{u}p\bar{a}h)$. 3 -
- 4. Things that are self-contained (svātmaniṣṭhāḥ)¹⁰ and are manifested separately (viviktābhāḥ), possess a unity in the sense of mutual connection within the unitary knowing subject. This is the basis of the ideas of relation.
- The various ideas of relation ($sambandha^{\circ}$) such as that expressed in the phrase 'the king's servant', rest on the unity which derives from the connection on the internal plane (antah samanvayat) and the differentiation of the two related terms externally 11 . 4 -
- 5. The conceptual elaborations of the manifestations of 'universal' and 'individual substance' also rest externally on unity, as well as on the differentiation of the individual realities and parts.
- The notions of 'cows' and 'Caitra' have as object, externally too, both the unity of manifestation represented respectively by the general

- ⁸ I.e. 'on the external and internal plane' (according to the vrti), 'on unity and multiplicity' (according to Abh.). The two interpretations are equivalent in the light of the preceding $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$.
- As Abh. clarifies very well in the introduction to this stanza in his commentaries, Utp.'s intention here is to reply to the objection that might be raised by a Buddhist: these conceptual elaborations which is what they are do not take place at the time of the direct perception but later, when any contact with reality is precluded; therefore they are, in the absolute sense, unreal. In Utp.'s reply it is the continuity and dynamism of the I that guarantees the contact between these two moments of time, thus legitimating the working of the mind.
- The absolute difference and self-containment of things, which is one of the pivots of Buddhist doctrine and the school of Dignāga in particular, finds its most well-known and rigorous expression in PV I 40ab (later taken up again in PVin; see Steinkellner 1973: I, 40-41) sarve bhāvāḥ svabhāvena svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ ...
- The two terms of the servant-king relation have an autonomous reality on the external level, but they cease to be separate once they are linked in the consciousness of the knowing subject. This does not mean that they become one, because in that case it would no longer be a relation: there is unification in separation (bhedābheda).

- II 2.5 configuration of cow and by the configuration of a particular man seen as a whole, and the multiplicity of manifestations typical of the individual realities (svalakṣaṇa°) and the various parts¹². 5 -
 - 6. The connection existing between the factors of the action (kārakāṇām) is based on the awareness of the action (kriyā°); the notions of space etc. rest on the connection between limit and limited.
 - The notion of action is based on unity-multiplicity, insofar as the various factors that contribute to carrying out the action wood, saucepan, Devadatta, rice are internally linked to each other by the verb 'he cooks' and externally differentiated. Also spatial and temporal succession given the mutual involvement of the objects which act as the limiting and limited element is merely a particular case of relation characterized in the same way by unity and multiplicity. The notions of universal, individual substance, action, number etc. all rest on inherence ($^{\circ}$ samav \bar{a} y a°), which is a particular type of relation. 6 -
 - 7. Thus the knowing subject who aspires to the production of determinate results may obtain them with an entity that is at the same time both differentiated and undifferentiated. Thus one may not speak of error (bhrāntiḥ) as regards them.
 - With the notions that have been discussed so far, that is, action and so on, which are both one and many, the knowing subject has the capacity to obtain the determinate effects he desired (which demonstrates their congruence with reality), accompanied by the continuity and homogeneity ($^{\circ}anugunya^{\circ}$) of their manifestations. Therefore such notions are not erroneous 13 . 7 —

The unity-multiplicity tension, which characterizes the series of concepts examined in this $\bar{a}hnika$, is not reduced, as it might have seemed so far, to that of internal-external. In actual fact, for the concepts of $j\bar{a}ti$ (universal) and of dravya (understood as individual entity constituted by a complex of parts) the double pole of unity-multiplicity is also to be found at the level of external reality, as the $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$ and vrtti indicate.

¹³ The notions of action etc., do not, that is, become subsequently contradicted by other cognitions: thus one has the requisite of *sthairya* which, together with *arthakriyāsaṃvāda* (already mentioned), determines the empirical validity of a cognition.

CHAPTER III

- 1-2. The means of knowledge (pramāṇam) is that thanks to which the object is situated within its own confines (vyavatiṣṭhate)¹ 'this thing, with these characteristics'. This means of knowledge is an ever freshly arising light related to a subject (svābhāso 'bhinavodayaḥ)². This light, whose essence is the inner reflective awareness of that which is thus manifested, becomes as regards the object without spatio-temporal differentiations etc. and expressed by a single name knowledge (mitiḥ), [provided it is] not invalidated.
- The means of knowledge is that on which the setting of the object within its confines depends (vyavasthāpyamānatā), both as regards its mere being and the various possible qualifications such as permanence and so on. It consists precisely in the manifestation to a knowing subject of a new object (apūrvavastu°) as related to him (svatvena). And this very manifestation 'this' or 'permanent'³, which thus appears to the subject as separate and new, becomes the object of reflective awareness and finally valid knowledge (pramitih), whose stability is not undermined by
- ¹ In the interpretation of the notion of vyavasthā- vyavasthāp- (which refers to the definitive establishment of something, both as regards its intrinsic nature and the other realities in whose context it is situated; 'establish separately') so pregnant with meaning and untranslatable in a single word I have kept in mind Abh.'s gloss (ĪPV II p. 68 niyatām prakāśamaryādām na ativartate).
- ² Svābhāsa (together with viṣayābhāsa) characterizes the pramāṇa also in the opinion of Dignāga and his school (cf. PSV 1.9a, PS 1.11ab and vṛtti, PS 1.10 in particular). However in Dignāga, and in the Yogācāra view in general, sva° refers to knowledge itself seen as the subject, whereas in the ĪPK it refers to the knowing subject and its centrality (cf. ĪPV II p. 73 svatvena ābhāsamāno ya ābhāso ...; Bh ibid. svatvena grāhakāśrayamamatāviṣayatvena; Utp.'s vṛtti pramātuḥ svatvenāpūrva-vastvavabhāsaḥ). On pramāṇa as revealing a previously unknown object, cf. the second (and probably complementary) definition of pramāṇa in PV II.5c ajñātārthaprakāśo vā (Katsura 1984: 220, Dreyfus 1991: 25 ff., Franco 1991, van Bijlert 1989: 150-53).
- According to Abh. (see text note 55), Utp. chooses to make these two terms masculine (in the *kārikā* they were neuter), thus making them agree with *ābhāsa*, to state implicitly the single nature of the means of knowledge and of its objects (both being *ābhāsas*).

II 3.1-2 another means of knowledge⁴. The object of such knowledge – which is an activity of the subject (pramātrvyāpāraḥ) – is that entity which is

⁴ According to the Pratyabhijñā, therefore, there is no differentiation between the means of knowledge and its result (pramāṇa-pramā), as also the Buddhists – but not only them (cf. Bandyopadhyay 1979) - maintain (see for example PS 1.8b-11 and vrtti, PV III. 301-319, NBT pp. 79-86, 90-1, TS 1343-60). The Buddhist position on this point is substantially unitary, with a distinction between Sautrantika and Yogācāra resulting from the admission or non-admission of the reality of the external object. Thus, according to the Sautrantikas, prameya is the external object, pramāņa the assumption by knowledge of the form of the object (viṣayākāratā, sārūpya), pramā the obtained knowledge of the object (viṣayādhigati). According to the Yogācāra, prameya is the appearance of the object to consciousness understood as the appearance of consciousness itself in the form of object (viṣayābhāsa, vişayākāratā), pramāņa knowledge in the form of subject (svābhāsa) or, in other words, the capacity (yogyatā) of knowledge to know itself; pramā, finally, the selfawareness of knowledge (svasamvitti; on svasamvitti as the final outcome the two doctrines would agree); see e.g. PV III. 366-7, TP 1346 with the relative pañcikā and especially PS 1.8cd-10 and vrtti, with the notes of Hattori; see also Iwata 1991: 1-20. The distinction between pramāņa and pramā – the Buddhists say – is only the outcome of the analytic consideration of a reality, cognition, which is in itself one. The two terms which are thus foregrounded cannot in any case represent a relationship of cause and effect - because this would require the actual otherness of the two terms - but at most a relation of vyavasthāpya-vyavasthāpaka, with a division of roles within the same reality (NBT p. 82 na cātra janyajanakabhāvanibandhanaḥ, yenaikasmin vastuni virodhah syät api tu vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpanabhāvena tata ekasya vastunah kimcid rūpam pramāņam kimcit pramāņaphalam na virudhyate). And up to this point Saivas and Buddhists are mainly in agreement (except that the Saivas admit a relation of the type hetu-phala). A proof of this is the fact that Abh. in concluding his argumentation (IPV II pp. 73-5, IPVV III pp. 71-2) - which develops Utp.'s above-mentioned position - quotes part of a verse from Dharmakirti (PV III.308c tadvaśāt tadvyavasthānāt). On the contrary, the two positions differ on the concept of 'function, activity' (vyāpāra), performed by the elements occurring in cognition. Vyāpāra is completely denied by the Buddhists, who consider every distinction on this basis completely imaginary (utpreksita), so much so that, for example, an act such as piercing with an arrow may be analyzed in various ways, all equally legitimate, attributing to the bow the function (vyāpāra) either of kartṛ, or karaņa, or apadāna (TS 1346 ata utpreksito bhedo vidyate dhanurādivat / utpādyotpādakatvena vyavastheyam tu neşyate // and relative Panjikā). But, above all, the impossibility of vyāpāra is the direct consequence of the acceptance of the doctrine of momentariness (TSP I p. 488 kṣaṇikatvena nirvyāpāratvāt sarvadharmāṇām). Knowledge, therefore, only 'appears' to be endowed with a function (PV III.308a) savyāpāram ivābhāti). The reply of Abh. - who, as we have seen, had just quoted with approval the third $p\bar{a}da$ of the same verse - implicitly refers to this statement by Dharmakīrti (who in turn depends on PS I.8cd savyāpāraprafitatvāt pramāņaņi phalam eva sat): vyāpārātmakam eva hi karaņasya prathamasādhyatvāt phalam / manifested to the consciousness, taken separately⁵, as a universal⁶, II 3.1-2 devoid of spatial differentiations etc., denoted by a single word in conformity with the specific reflective awareness (vimarśabhedānusāri^o) and endowed with its own causal efficiency (svakārthakriyāprāpte). - 1-2 -

- 3. In an object, though its unity is established by the unifying power of the mind (anusamdhāna°), various manifestations may be distinguished according to the inclinations, practical requirements and specific experience [of the subject].
- For the object, though it is unitary, having been assumed as such thanks to a single [unifying] reflective awareness (ekapratyavamarśa°)⁷,

vyāpāraś ca vyāpriyamāṇāt kartur vyāpāryamāṇāt vā karaṇād ananyātmaka eva yukta iti mukhyatvena pramāṇaphalayor abheda eva nyāyyaḥ (ĪPVV III p. 72; see also ĪPV II p. 75). Vyāpāra not only exists but constitutes the very essence of pramā, and according to the Saivas the non-differentiation of pramāṇa and pramā hinges on this: vyāpāra is not a different reality from the subject that acts and from the instrument that is set in action. All this had already been essentially contained in the laconic pramātrvyāpāraḥ that follows pramitiḥ in the vṛtti. But Abh. (ĪPV II p. 75) goes on to say that this does not mean that pramāṇa and pramā are simply two ways of saying the same thing (paryāyatvam); the cognitive light (bodhātmā ābhāsaḥ) which is the essential nature of both is turned towards the external object in the pramāṇa, whereas in the pramā it is turned inwards as pure determinate awareness, contracted due to the influence of the object assumed in it, having as its essence the word.

⁵ Pṛthak pṛthak, in the sense that the pramāṇa works only on the single ābhāsa (in the form of sāmānya). The knowledge of the particular is the result of the subsequent unification of the group of single ābhāsas, among which those of time and space have a particular individualizing power. As Abh. notes, the same vimarśa, which is prakāśapramāṇa, sometimes rests on the single ābhāsa - and we have a sāmānya -, sometimes combines several ābhāsas - and we have a svalakṣaṇa; in the latter case it takes the name of anusamdhāna.

⁶ On the basis of the interconnection – and in the final analysis of the identity – between *vimarśa* and *śabdana*, Utp. is led to state the *sāmānya* character of the object of the *pramāna*, in that it is precisely the *sāmānya* that is expressed by the word (obviously in the Śaiva view).

⁷ The particular realities, in themselves completely different from one another, form an apparent unity on the strength of the same judgment that they are able to determine because of their very nature. This concept, even in its formulation, refers back to Dharmakīrti (see e.g. PV I. 109, already quoted, and the vrtti tad api pratidravyam bhidyamānam api prakrtyaikapratyavamarśasyābhedāvaskandino hetur bhavad abhinnam khyāti). This may be applied, mutatis mutandis, both to account for the formation of the idea of class or universal which embraces a plurality of dis-

II 3.3 there are different manifestations depending on the will, practical requirement, and experience of the subject 8 . -3 –

To elaborate:

- 4-5. Just as the various manifestations are differentiated as 'long', 'round', 'tall', 'man', 'smoke', 'made of sandalwood' and so on, without this entailing a spatial-temporal differentiation, so one also has various distinct manifestations such as 'being', 'jar', 'individual substance', 'made of gold', 'shining' and so on; each has its own separate efficiency. They are the object of the word.
- Given an object unitary in itself⁹, for example a jar, depending on how a subject regards it (avadhitsāvaśāt) what appears to him may be the length, or the triangular, circular etc. shape. What appears of a man may only be his 'being erected' if the subject is only looking for a reference point, or a shelter, or shade. 'Man' as such, however, appears to those who regard him entirely (nyakṣeṇa)^{9a}, seeking the services that

crete realities that may not be strictly reduced to anything other than temselves (as in the context of Dharmakirti's argumentation), and to account for the synthesization of a group of distinct ābhāsas in the apparent unity of the object which confronts us in practical reality (as in the context of Utp.'s argumentation). The expression ekapratyavamarśa may be understood either as 'single, same reflective awareness' concerning different things, which, owing to this, are assumed as being one (cf. PVSV p. 41 ekam ekākāram pratyabhijānam commenting on ekapratyavamarśa' v. 73a); and as 'reflective awareness of things as being one' (ekatvena pratyavamarśah). The meaning is basically the same. Utp. and Abh. use this expression in both senses.

Here, too, there is an evident reference to a remark made by Dharmakīrti (PV I.58 and vṛtti), according to whom a thing that appears to perception as an undifferentiated entity is in fact grasped at the moment of determinate knowledge, depending on which of its components the subject is inclined to foreground (a female body may be seen as an object of desire, a corpse, something to eat; a person may at times be seen as a father and at times as a teacher). A similar remark had already been made by Bhartrhari (VP III.8.64 ācāryo mātulaś ceti yathaiko vyapadiśyate / sambandhibhedād arthātmā sa vidhiḥ paktibhāvayoḥ //). See also PVSV p. 41 evaṃ śiṃśapādayo'pi bhedāḥ [...] janayanti anyāṃ vā yathāpratyayaṃ dahanagṛhādikāṃ kāṣṭhasādhyām arthakriyām.

⁹ I.e. a svalakṣaṇa (see the previous $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$). The multiplicity of manifestations does not entail the loss of the object's individuality, the object being a collection of $\bar{a}bh\bar{a}sas$, distinguished by a particular collocation in space and time and by a specific form $(\bar{a}k\bar{a}ra)$.

^{9a} On the meaning of this uncommon word cf. Vṛṣabhadeva's *Paddhati* on VP I.3 (p. 20) nyakṣeṇa iti ābhimukhyena kārtsnyena vā (Abhyankar-Limaye 1965: VII n. 4).

are peculiar to him. To some [smoke] appears as merely smoke, in its II 3.4-5 general form (dhūmamātram eva); on the contrary, those who are familiar with it (tadvidas tu) grasp its specific aspect, for example, that it is the smoke from burning leaves, just as an expert is able to grasp the particular features of stones, silver etc. (maņirūpyādiviśeṣa) and so on¹⁰. However, the object that is manifested with these distinctions is not differentiated as regards space and time. Thus for the object 'jar' there is the manifestation 'being' - which is in itself different [from the specific manifestation 'jar' etc.] - common to all the countless other objects such as cloth etc. and the cause of specific effects such as the determinate awareness 'is, exists' which is produced by the mere fact of existing; still, as regards the jar, there may be the manifestation 'jar' known by the inner and outer senses and common to every object with a broad base and bulbous shape, and different from the other manifestations, i.e. absent in cloth etc.; or yet another, 'made of gold', absent in clay jars etc. This manifestation becomes the object of sensory experience depending on the subject's practical requirement and so on¹¹. Each of these manifestations is referred to for the practical purposes of communication, by those who aim at obtaining this or that determinate result, with a single word: the word 'jar' refers to the manifestation 'jar' and not to 'being' or 'made of gold'12. The manifestation 'Caitra' common to the different stages of

¹⁰ This is an explicit reference to the ābhyāsikapratyakṣa in Bhartṛhari's formulation (VP I. 35 pareṣām asamākhyeyam abhyāsād eva jāyate / maṇirūpyādivijñānaṃ tadvidāṃ nānumānikam //).

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For instance, Abh. explains (IPV II p. 98), he who on seeing a jar thinks of its price will be aware of the manifestation 'made of gold'. This does not occur at a later stage, as a result of mental elaboration, but at the moment of the direct perception itself (aindriyaka eva); see also below vṛtti on II.3.7.

12 Cf. the position of Bhartrhari, according to whom a thing, in its intrinsic unity, cannot be expressed by a word (except the pronoun); it may be the object of many words, each referring to one aspect or power (sakti) among the many it is composed of (Vrtti p. 131 apara āha – yady api vastu na bhinnam sabdārthas tu bhinnah / sabdo hy ekavastuvisayānām api saktīnām avacchedenopagrahe vartate; on the meaning of apara in Bhartrhari's work see Prakīrnakaprakāśa II p. 267, quoted in Aklujkar 1970: 116 n. 5.). This theme is taken up again and developed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The thing, because of its many aspects, cannot be fully expressed by one word (PS V 12 bahudhāpy abhidheyasya na śabdāt sarvathā gatih / svasambandhānurūpyena vyavacchedārthakāry asau //; cf. Hattori 1980: 70 n. 3, where a relevant passage from Jinendrabuddhi's PStīkā is also referred to; see also the parallel passage, not extant in Sanskrit, concerning cognition through logical mark, in Frauwallner 1959: 102). The function of the word is only to denote a certain part of the thing through the exclusion of what is other than that (arthāntaravyāvrttyā

- II 3.4-5 childhood etc. is devoid of place and so on; and what has been said above applies to this, too. Thus causal efficiency is differentiated [for every ābhāsa]. 4-5 -
 - 6. Things possess a determinate causal efficiency (niyatārthakriyā) depending on the variety of the manifestations they are composed of; and, on the contrary (punaḥ), [a different] one based on their appearing as unitary realities owing to a common substratum (sāmānādhikaraṇyena)¹³.
 - In the unitary particular entity there is a specific effect for every single manifestation determined by the power of Necessity (niyatiśaktyā) and [equally determined by Necessity] a single substratum of the different manifestations, which produce as we have said manifold effects. The concrete entity (vastu) is such because of the manifestation of this sameness of substratum (sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāsavaśāt). In fact, this sameness of substratum constitutes the unity of what is manifold (anekasyaikatā)¹⁴. 6 –

tasya vastunah kaścid bhāgo gamyate, quoted in PVSV p. 62). As Dharmakīrti points out in a subsequent passage, this does not mean that a thing has 'parts' (PV I.135ab ekatvād vasturūpasya bhinnarūpā matih kutaḥ), but only that it appears as associated with various causes of error concerning its nature; a word serves to remove one of these causes (PVSV p. 64 tatraiva ca te śabdās tais tair bhrāntikāraṇaih saṃsṛṣṭarūpa ivābhāti yathāsaṃketaṃ vicchedāya vyāpriyante; cf. PV I.50-51). Dignāga's statement quoted above is closely related, also in its formulation, to the one found at the beginning of the PS (I.5ab): dharmino 'nekarūpasya nendriyāt sarvathā gatiḥ. They are like the two faces of a coin. And similarly Dharmakīrti explains the right way in which this assumed multiplicity of aspects and properties is to be understood (PV III.231; cf. Hattori 1977: 52). See also Torella 1992: 333-35.

13 The kārikā hinges on the ambiguity of the expression niyatārthakriyā, which belongs simultaneously to both parts of the sentence, with a different orientation of meaning. At least this is the interpretation that Abh. gives in IPV and IPVV: things have a multiplicity of arthakriyās, each one of which is inherent in every ābhāsa that composes them; things, however (punaḥ), also have a unity (and also a unitary arthakriyā), due to the predominance of one ābhāsa over the others and therefore to their appearing according to a sameness of substratum.

The ultimate intention of this stanza is therefore, as I understand it, to restate the reality of the unity of the thing which the analysis carried out in the previous stanzas had, in a sense, denied. The meaning of the sentence seems to coincide with that of Abh.'s avataraṇikā to the stanza (ÎPV II p. 101 nanu evam pratyābhāsam eva vastutve eko ghaṭātmā na vastu syāt; ÎPVV III p. 113 nanu evam eko 'rtho ghaṭatvalohitatvādyātmā na vastu bhavet, bhavati).

- 7. As in the case of the distinct rays of light in a torch and of the II 3.7 currents in the sea, so in manifestations that are not in contrast with each other the notion of unity (aikyadhīḥ) is produced by their appearing as unitary entities (ekakāryā).
- The individual rays of light in a torch appear as an undifferentiated whole and the same holds for the currents of rivers in the notion of the sea and for the various flavours in the $p\bar{a}naka$. Similarly, manifestations such as 'white', 'big', 'cloth', capable as they are of interpenetrating, lend themselves to the manifestation, in the direct experience itself, of the various unitary things having a single, unitary, effect (tattadeka-kāryaikadravya°)¹⁵. The same does not happen in the case of other

¹⁵ The very elliptical expression used in the kārikā (ekakāryā, literally 'produced by one') is analyzed by Abh. (IPV II pp. 106-7, IPVV III pp. 116-7) in its various possible implications, which are substantially analogous to those succinctly indicated in the vrtti. When one sees a unitary effect that cannot be traced back to the individual components of a given aggregate, this proves that they form a new complex unity (ekam vastu, svalakṣaṇa). The vṛtti says that certain manifestations, characterized by mutual compatibility, may give rise to ekakārya (= ekakriyā) namely to a unitary effect - and to ekadravya (= ekavastu, svalakṣaṇa) - namely to their appearing as a unitary and individual reality; the notion of their unity is produced by this. One must, however, remember that the individual ābhāsas continue to keep their own specific identity and causal efficiency intact, ready to come to the fore again depending on the attitude of the knowing subject, Ekakāryao may also be understood as internal bahuvrīhi referring to °ekadravya°: 'of a unitary substance with a unitary effect'. In this way the expression would be used in the same sense in which it is understood, in an analogous context, by the Buddhist logicians (to attribute unity to different entities on the grounds that they produce the same single effect). Dharmakīrti, too, - as we have seen - makes the (illusory) non-difference of determinate entities derive from their producing a single effect - hence the concept of sāmānya (PVSV p. 57 ekakāryataiva bhāvānām abhedaḥ). (A somewhat parallel question is to be found in the capacity of a causal complex (hetusāmagrī) to produce a single effect though being composed of many different causes to which Dharmakīrti does not acknowledge a common svabhāva; see Steinkellner 1971: 184-88). Cf. also TS 201ab ekakāryopayogitvād ekasahdasya gocaraķ. The reference to TSP p. 59 seems even more pertinent. Here Kamalasīla (probably bearing in mind PVSV p. 68) states that ordinary experience groups together data that are completely heterogeneous and separate, such as a certain shape, colour etc., on the basis of their concurring to carry out a single function (e.g. that of containing water), constructing in this way the unity of a 'thing' (e.g. the jar): ta eva rūpādayah salilādidhāraņārthakriyākāriņah samudāyo ghaţa iti vyapadiśyante. Returning to our text, it may be added that ekakārya° in the vrtti definitely has a different meaning from ekakāryā in the kārikā: the expression is to be understood as a partial comment on eka° alone.

- II 3.7 manifestations such as 'blue', 'yellow' etc. This is what we call 'having the same substratum'. -7
 - 8. Faced with a non-specific manifestation of 'fire' etc., a single means of knowledge knows what the outcome or cause of it is, its being hot, its being able to be denoted by this or that word and so on 16.
 - On a particular occasion $(kad\bar{a}cit)^{17}$, when faced with the bare manifestation 'fire' in which only the universal 'fire' is present, without its particular features consisting in the single individuality ("svalakṣaṇa") delimited by the association with a particular space etc. 18, there is through the means of knowledge operating at that moment and through that means only and in a way that embraces the three worlds and the three times, the establishment of the various specific features of its own nature, such as its effect, its cause, its heat, the fact that it goes upwards and is denoted by the word 'fire' etc. 19. 8
 - 9. On the contrary²⁰, it happens differently in the case of the activity

¹⁷ I.e., following IPVV III p. 121 (kadācit iti jijnāsāvasare), 'at the moment in which the desire to know appears'.

¹⁸ The pramāṇa, in fact, works on the individual ābhāsa, which, as we have seen, is a sāmānya.

The statement that a means of knowledge (pramāṇa, which may be generically understood here as a 'cognitive act') acts on the individual manifestation may give rise to some difficulties: e.g. (cf. IPV II p. 107) it becomes on these grounds impossible to determine the relation of cause and effect, whose elements being the object of distinct pramāṇas would remain isolated from one another in knowledge. This stanza and the vrtti reply to this objection as follows: this same pramāṇa (in this case a visual perception) that knows the individual ābhāsa — for example the bright form of fire — at the same time implicitly knows all those other ābhāsas which are set by the power of Necessity (niyatišakti) in invariable concomitance with it; there is therefore no need for another pramāṇa to ascertain the concomitance, valid for every space and time, of that particular bright form with heat etc. This implicit knowledge regards not only intrinsic properties, such as heat, the fact of having as its cause wood and as its effect smoke and so on but also those derived from convention, such as the connection with a certain word and so on.

The difference from what was said earlier lies in the fact that the activity set in motion in the subject by the perception of a determinate, particular object requires the combined operation of several means of knowledge (pramāṇasamūha), whereas

¹⁶ Cf. Dharmakīrti's analogous statement, in a different context: (PV I. 43, 45ab) ekasyārthasvabhāvasya pratyakṣasya sataḥ svayam / ko 'nyo na dṛṣṭo bhāgaḥ syād yaḥ pramāṇaiḥ parīkṣyate // ... // tasmād dṛṣṭasya bhāvasya dṛṣṭa evākhilo guṇaḥ ...

that starts at that moment²¹ in the subject who aims at producing cer- II 3.9 tain effects, as regards a particular, individual object, differentiated by various, specific sensations of place etc. (deśādikādhyakṣāntarabhinne)²², and also [in the case of that activity promoted] by inference.

- On the contrary, the bodily activity of a person $(k\bar{a}yapravrttih)^{23}$, that may concern only the particular object in association with a whole variety of perceptions (of place, time etc.), in that he aims at producing certain effects, necessarily depends on the concourse of several cognitive acts (pramāṇasamūhād eva). This activity may also be promoted by inference, qualified, of course, by the direct perception of the property-possessor (dharmi). -9-
- 10-11. Though the particular forms of the manifestation of the objects may be differentiated (bhinnāvabhāsacchāyānām) in that they are far or near, directly or indirectly perceived by the senses, external or internal, faulty in what is needed to make them known or for other reasons —, their unity is not affected by this thanks to the main manifestation

for the knowledge of the same svalaksana a single means (with svasamvedana) is sufficient. This distinction corresponds to that between mere knowing and vyavahāra. (Pramāṇa, as I have already pointed out, may be translated here as 'cognitive act'; it would be misleading to say 'various means of knowing', as they may also be various operations of the same means – even if every pramāṇa is essentially new –). The apparent contradiction is pointed out in ĪPV II p. 114, where three different ways of explaining it are proposed. As regards inference in particular, Abh. (ĪPVV III p. 148) notes that the difference of the object, introducing a temporal differentiation, necessarily also brings about a difference in the nature of the pramāṇas; indeed, it is not possible to say that the direct perception through which the dharmin is known is one with the inference itself, which knows the fire, in the classical example, only indirectly through the linga.

At the moment when the cognition of the svalakṣaṇa occurs.

- Abh. puts forward three distinct interpretations of the compound. In the first (following the order in IPVV) taking *bhinne* as a neuter substantivized adjective (= *bhede*), one gets 'there being a variety of perceptions', where the locative is taken to mean cause (*nimittasaptamī*); the need for a plurality of *pramāṇas* stated in the commentaries depends on this. As Abh. notes, the second 'the *svalakṣaṇa* being differentiated by perceptions of time etc.' coincides basically with the first; this is also the meaning attributed to it by the *vṛtti*. As regards the third interpretation 'the *svalakṣaṇa* constituting though combined with perceptions of space etc. an undifferentiated reality within the knowing subject' (*adhyakṣa-antar-abhinne*) this seems traceable only to Abh..
- 23 And, one understands, also the other two types of activity, that of the mind and of the word. The translation of *arthitayā* had been omitted in the first edition (I thank J. Bronkhorst for pointing it out).

- II 3.10-11 (mukhyāvabhāsatah) consisting in a single reflective awareness (ekapratyavamarśākhyāt)²⁴.
 - Even if there may be a differentiation in the particular forms of the manifestation (i.e. as regards whether the objects are near or far etc., evident or not evident etc., external or internal), the unity of the objects is not contradicted, because there is a single reflective awareness forming the primary nature of the various particular manifestations²⁵. - 10-11 -
 - 12. Causal efficiency itself is not intrinsic to things, since it is determined by the will of the Lord. Thus a thing may not be said to be different because it does not possess a certain efficiency.
 - Objects, such as the jar etc., when imagined do not lose their nature as a jar etc., even if they lack the ability to produce external effects, because this capacity is not intrinsic to their being (asvābhāvikatvāt), since it is determined by the Lord for every single manifestation 26 . -12 –

²⁴ Cf. again PV I. 109 ekapratyavamarśasya hetutvād dhīr abhedinī / ekadhīhetubhāvena vyaktīnām apy abhinnatā // (on this peculiar statement by Dharmakīrti see the critical remarks in Prabhācandra's Prameyakamalamārtānda pp. 469-70; Shah 1967: 143). Abh. interprets °ākhya° in the compound ekapratyavamarśākhyād as prathana, but the general meaning does not change much.

²⁵ Thus the avabhāsacchāyās, or the various direct perceptions, the pratibhāsas of the Buddhists - which cannot but differ from one another even if they concern the same object, depending on whether it is near or far, frontal or lateral etc. are contrasted with the mukhyāvabhāsa - or the manifestation not divided up and discontinuous, seen, as it were, from a more elevated vantage point, and of a more general character (sāmānyarūpa) having as its essence the ekapratyavamarśa, that is a single reflective awareness, which recognizes and sanctions the basic unity of the thing through its manifestations; ekapratyavamarśa, for its part, is contrasted with the individual vimarsas corresponding to the individual pratibhāsas (or avabhāsacchāyās). This point is dealt with by Abh. in his two commentaries.

²⁶ Utp. is aware that the previous $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$ is bound to arouse the Buddhists' opposition; what is particularly unacceptable is that the nature of an external and internal manifestation of an object is basically identical. The Buddhists would say that the reality of an object consists in its efficiency and only the external manifestation is efficient; therefore the two cannot be put on the same plane. In his reply Utp. denies, as he has done earlier, that efficiency constitutes the essential nature of a reality: it pertains to it only under certain conditions - primarily externality (see above I. 8.5ff.) - depending solely on the Lord's power of Necessity. In an earlier passage of the IPVV (III pp. 30-31) Abh., following in the steps of the fikā, had denied that arthakriyā might be either svarūpa, lakṣaṇa, or upalakṣaṇa of the real thing. On the concept of arthakriyā (already found in the Nyāyabhāṣya) and its place

- 13. Even if the reflective awareness of silver is one, this awareness II 3.13 'silver' referring to mother-of-pearl is not valid, since there is incongruence²⁷ as regards the place, which has a qualifying function [in the cognition] (upādhideśāsaṃvādāt); also in the case of the double moon the ether appears differently.
- Even if the cognitions as 'silver' of real silver and of mother-of-pearl are in themselves equally real, insofar as in them the reflective awareness 'silver' [on which its validity is based] is the same, however the cognition 'this is (here there is) silver' referring to mother-of-pearl is to be considered erroneous because of its impermanence (asthairy $\bar{a}t$), since it is not congruent as regards the accessory quality place –, as its connection with the place occupied by mother-of-pearl is later found to be contradicted. Also in the case of seeing a double moon there is no congruence as regards the place, occupied in this instance by the ether ²⁸. 13 –

and acception in Dharmakīrti's work (it is apparently absent in Dignāga) see Nagatomi 1967-1968, Mikogami 1979, Kano 1991.

Abh., as he did for ākhya in the previous kārikā, makes saṃvāda derive from a root vad- 'to shine'. Thus saṃvāda is taken to mean 'to be correctly and completely (saṃyak) manifest' or 'to be manifest combined with a lasting determinate awareness' (vimarśānuvṛtti) (cf. ĪPV II p. 126). In translating saṃvāda in the vṛtti I have, however, kept to the current meaning.

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The extremely laconic style of the vrtti, which I have tried as far as possible to preserve in translation, makes a few additional comments necessary. Firstly, the relationship this return to the subject of error, already dealt with above, has with the preceding stanzas. Abh. says it is a reply to those who contest the role of the vimarśa in the establishment of reality, objecting that thus the notion of erroneous knowledge ends up by being denied. If a thing is such in that it is recognized as such by an act of determinate reflective awareness (vimarśa) - remember the maxim so frequently cited by Abh. bhāvarāśir yathā vimṛśyate tathā asti - which follows its appearing to consciousness (avabhāsa, prakāśa), then the mother-of-pearl that is mistaken for silver is no less silver than real silver. The stanza in question, containing Utp.'s reply, is inserted at this point. It is true that a vimarsa is in itself valid, but it is not meant to be something momentary, it tends to last, unless that tendency to last is blocked by a further vimarsa. And this is precisely what happens in the cognition examined here 'this is silver, there is silver here'. A later vimarsa ascertains that the place that qualified the object of the earlier vimarśa (the 'here') is different from the one that had been understood: the place that ought to contain the silver is occupied by the mother-of-pearl, the place - in the case of seeing two moons - of the second moon is occupied by the ether. This reasoning rests on the assumption that every concrete object of knowledge (svalaksana) is mixed with space and time and that therefore the *vimarsa* must embrace them, too.

- II 3.14

 14. Thus, both the differentiation of things due to qualities such as sound and so on and their non-differentiation due to universals etc. (jātyādibhiḥ)²⁹ are possible on the basis of the unity of the knowing subject.
 - It is a fact of direct experience that qualities such as sound, form, configuration and so on, suggest³⁰ the differentiation of things and universals etc. their unity: this is admissible only if the unity of the subject is assumed. The determination of mutual differentiation also depends on the unifying function [of the knowing subject]. 14 -
 - 15-16. What function can the means of knowledge perform being a new light (navābhāsaḥ) as regards the knowing subject, he who exists in the absolute sense, the Lord like a smooth wall that is the substratum for the painting of the multiform universe –, whose association with non-being would be a contradiction in terms, the Ancient One³¹, whose nature is perennially manifest (sarvadābhāta°), inherent in every cognition?
 - The means of knowledge since it is an ever-new light which establishes the still not established reality of the object can do nothing as regards the knowing subject, who is uninterruptedly luminous. Since it is the various ever-new manifestations that constitute the various means of knowledge, this light (manifestation) will be, of course, the means of knowledge for what is other, but not the self, which is always established; the Lord is, on the contrary, the knowing subject because he acts freely as regards knowledge. All the various multiform manifestations are pos-

³⁰ IPVV III p. 160, following in the steps of the fikā, considers at lenght why the word ākṣepa 'allusion, suggestion' is used; and concludes yataḥ sphuṭaṃ avabhāsanaṃ nāsty alakṣaṇam, bhavati ca bhāsanam, tata ity arthaḥ.

 31 Purāna (literally 'the Ancient One') to be understood here as meaning 'he who existed before (purā)', before every other thing, beyond time, the eternal etc. This is also how Abh. explains the term ($\bar{I}PVV$ III p. 162), relating it to the impossibility of attributing any form of non-existence to the subject, which (non-existence) is in effect the soul of time.

The doctrine of differentiation and non-differentiation is restated yet again. Objects share both conditions: they are differentiated if one looks at the distinctive qualities of each of them, non-differentiated if one looks at the universal, similarity etc. (°ādibhiḥ refers to sādṛśya and bhedāgrahaṇa according to ĪPV II p. 132). These two aspects may co-exist without excluding one another only on the basis of the unity of consciousness.

sible in their multiformity insofar as the subject is stable. His volition II 3.15-16 makes the various objects that are manifest in reality, without lapsing from their own nature of which he is the ultimate essence (tatsāra-svarūpābhraṃśe), appear and disappear by virtue of the power of māyā. In reality he alone possesses perpetual existence (sattā) independently of every other thing, since it would be contradictory to associate any form of non-existence (previous non-existence, non-existence due to destruction etc.) with him. Even if he is taught in terms of being and non-being, nonetheless his nature as subject remains unaltered, since the teaching would be impossible there not being he who wishes to teach³². – 15-16 –

17. [What in reality happens] is only that the use in practical reality of notions and expressions ("vyavahāraḥ) like 'Lord' etc., which due to the condition of obfuscation was not brought about earlier (apravartitapūrvaḥ), is promoted through the bringing to light of the powers³³.

³² I.e. there not being the subject.

³³ Utp. says yet again here that what is the true reality, the sovereignty of consciousness, is not something that has to be proved (sādhya), brought to light; it is constantly luminous, it is, in fact, light itself, it is unfading. If anything, it is rather a question of removing that state of obfuscation which prevents the limited subject from recognizing that he and the Lord are basically one and the same. Or, in other words, to call consciousness by its real name, thus making it enter the sphere of everyday existence; discourse and everyday reality are both included in the semantic field of the term vyavahāra. (It has even been supposed that this extension of meaning derives from the coalescence of two different words vyāhāra 'noun, verbal designation' and vyavahāra 'practical transactions', both being represented in Pali by the same word vohāra; cf. Bapat 1975. It is also to be noted that vyāhāra and vyavahāra are usually both translated into Tibetan with the same word tha sñad). It is therefore a question not of demonstrating something new, but of pointing out (pradarśana; cf. IPVV I p. 87) a reality that has always existed, of calling man's attention to this and thus inducing him to fill the void that followed awareness and to use this latent notion in practical life (vyavahāraḥ pravartyate). And this is intended to exclude, in the case of such vyavahārasādhana referring to the sovereignty of the I, any nuance of apūrva, which is, on the contrary, admitted as being still subtly present in the vyavahārasādhana referring to an insentient object (cf. ibid). Recognition, which is in fact vyavahārasādhanarūpam (ibid. p. 39), concerns an entity which, invested from the outset with a valid means of knowledge, is already manifest (maulikadrdhapramānaprabhāvaprakāśamānatāyogini vastuni); the process that leads to the identification of the I with Siva - which is the specific function of the śāstra - is therefore essentially an inference based on the svabhāvahetu, which (as Abh. says, ibid. p. 106) vyavahārasādhaka eva abhidhīyate na tv aprasiddhapra-

- Only, the use in practical reality of notions and expressions like 'Siva', 'Lord' etc. referring to our self which is the knowing subject — which was not brought about due to the total obfuscation caused by māyā — is established (sādhyate) for the purpose of teaching, meditation etc. through bringing to light the reasons that justify it, i.e. the presence in the I of the pure power of freedom etc. — 17 —

sādhanarūpaḥ, thus leaving the basic self-illuminating quality of his object intact. This is what the sacred texts on the knowledge of the Self – the Vedānta, the Siddhānta and the secret tantras – aim at (ĪPVV III p. 179 yāvanti hi ātmajñānaśāstrāṇi śrutyantasiddhāntarahasyatantrarūpāṇi, tāni ātmani naiva siddhim apūrvarūpāṃ racayanti / tasmāt vyavahāramātrasādhanaphalāni eva tānīti bhāvaḥ).

CHAPTER IV

- 1. And thus, his power being infinite, he makes those things manifest thanks to his volition; and this constitutes his activity, his being creator (nirmātṛtā).
- The knowing subject, that is essentially consciousness, having infinite power, the Lord, by means of his volition makes those entities manifest in this way. And it is precisely in this power of volition (icchāśaktih) that his activity, that is, his being creator, consists. 1 -
- 2. But² an insentient reality does not have this power namely, to confer existence on something that is not³. Therefore, the relation of cause and effect (kāryakāraṇatā) is essentially reduced to that of agent and object of the action (kartṛkarmatva°).
- But an insentient reality whether it is primordial matter ($pra-dh\bar{a}na^{\circ}$) or atoms or seed is incapable of producing something that does not exist. Being cause and effect, therefore, is merely being agent and object of the action and nothing more. 2 -
- 3-4. What is non-existent is non-existent and that is that. One cannot predicate the existence of what is non-existent, nor, on the other hand,

² The examination of the relation of cause and effect begins with the statement of the Saiva position and the whole chapter is devoted to justifying this.

¹ By 'those things' Utp., according to Abh. (ĪPV II p. 152), means that the Lord makes manifest what he had already previously manifested. His work of manifestation is therefore continuous: it does not take place only once and it is uninterrupted (avicchinnena prabandhena).

In the IPV (and similarly in the IPVV) Abh. proposes three distinct interpretations of asatah satah. According to the one at the beginning of the Vimarśini (IPV II p. 153) we have ankurasya sato 'sato vā, with reference therefore to the tārkika (Vaiśeṣika) and Sāmkhya positions regarding the existence of the effect in the cause, which is denied by the former and accepted by the latter (in the IPVV III p. 186 hījasyaiva seems to have to be corrected to ankurasyaiva). The second is asadrūpasya satah (ankurasya), which may therefore be traced to the interpretation in the vṛtti. The third is asato ankurasya sato vā bījasya.

- II 4.3-4 would the existent gain any advantage from obtaining existence [which it already possesses]. If one then points out that in practical reality there is general consensus on the existence of the relation of cause and effect, [then one replies that] it consists in the fact that a thing, that is internally present (antarviparivartinah), becomes, by virtue of the power of that indefinable Being (tasya kasyāpi), the object of knowledge for both senses.
 - Attributing the nature of existent to what does not exist is contradictory, and it is already established in what exists. [The relation of cause and effect consists in this:] a thing, already present within [the I], is 'created' by the Lord, or in other words, is caused by him to become the object of knowledge for the internal and external senses. 3-4 -
 - 5. Thus, action which has so far been the subject of discussion (saiṣā) –, characterized by succession and manifesting itself both internally and externally (antarbahiḥsthitiḥ), being related to an entity that is unitary (ekasya)⁵ and capable of showing both aspects, is proved to be one.
 - This action, though taking place in succession, being both internal and external⁶, is connected with a unitary reality, the agent, established as such through inner awareness, and with an object⁷ that is also unitary,

⁴ To be more precise: 'that moves about internally'. Viparivrt- often recurs in Bhartrhari's work.

⁵ In saying this, Utp. is referring both to the subject and the object of the action (this is the interpretation in the *vṛtti* which all the other commentaries also accept, cf. IPVV III p. 189 ekasya iti kartuḥ karmaṇaś ca). Each is unitary in itself and unitary in that it is inserted in a superior unity, that of the cognizer that assumes these two forms (cf. IPVV III p. 258 ātmānam eva pramātṛṣaṃjñaṃ karmabhāvena kartṛbhāvena ca avalambamānā kriyā karmasthatvena kartṛsthatvena vā vivicyamānā ekāśrayaiva bhavantī vastuta ekaiva).

⁶ I.e. the two internal and external levels of the action. Both the subject and the object, Abh. explains (*ibid.* p. 189), can be involved in these two dimensions without losing their unity (*ekaś ca asāv āśrayaḥ saṃvidrūpo bhagavān svacchandatvasvac-chatvābhyāṃ sahate eva ubhayam antarbahīrūpam ... karmaṇo 'pi antarbahiru-bhayākārasahatvaṃ parāmarśābhedāt).*

All actions primarily rest upon the agent and are therefore called *kartṛstha*; however, some actions may be particularly connected with the object and they are therefore called *karmastha* (cf. *ibid.* p. 190). This division goes back (but from a different angle) to the fourfold one – *kartṛsthakriya*, *kartṛsthabhāvaka*, *karmastha-kriya* and *karmasthabhāvaka* – mentioned in the MBh (on Pāṇini III. 1. 87, *vārtt.* 3).

since it is recognized as being one by reflective awareness (aikyena II 4.5 pratyavamṛśyasya), despite the manifold changeable forms of the manifestation. And it is precisely on the basis of this fact - i.e. that its substratum is unitary - that its unity is proved. - 5 -

- 6. The entity which is [first] internal with respect to another, once it has become external is to be understood as the effect of that other. The two planes of externality and internality are such in relation to the knowing subject.
- For an object the condition of effect is merely its having been made external ($b\bar{a}hyat\bar{a}p\bar{a}danam$); thus both being external and being an effect are such only in relation to a single reality, and, indeed, it is depending on the knowing subject that one may speak in practical reality of internal and external ($antarbahirvyavah\bar{a}rah$). [Therefore effect is produced by the knowing subject and none other]^{7a}. 6 -
- 7. Cause, therefore, is only the knowing subject, and he in the two modes of manifestation of the effect remains unchanged in his unity⁸. It is therefore appropriate to say that action belongs to a unitary entity.
- Thus cause is solely the knowing subject, who remains one even if there is succession in the external and internal manifestation of the effect. On the basis of what has been said action is therefore proved to belong to a unitary (and single) 9 subject. 7 -
- 8. Precisely for this reason Parameśvara is taken as efficient cause as regards the shoot; [however] it is not possible to also consider entities different from him such as the seed etc. as causes.
- Considering the fact that producing something (utpādanam) means making it manifest externally (bāhyābhāsatāpādanam), the status of

The action of creating $(nirm\bar{a}nakriy\bar{a})$ – Abh. explains ($\bar{I}PVV$ III p. 190) – concerning an object which has the cognizer as its ultimate essence, is at the same time kartrstha and karmastha.

⁹ Here and elsewhere eka means both 'unitary' and 'one, single'.

^{7a} See text note 170.

⁸ Abh. gives a different interpretation (ĪPV II p. 162): «... since the knowing subject is the cause of the twofold, external and internal, manifestation of the effect ...».

- II 4.8 cause may be exclusively attribued to the conscious being. For this reason some consider the Lord efficient cause¹⁰, but in so doing they become inconsistent in considering inert and insentient realities such as the seed etc. which have no intentionality (niranusaṃdhānasya)¹¹ also causes. 8
 - 9. In fact, the potter produces the jar through a whole series of operations to which he subjects the clay etc., following the rule determined by the Lord (aiśvaryaiva vyavasthayā)¹².
 - Even when it has been ascertained that the cause is a knowing subject, i.e. in this case the potter, nevertheless, for the jar to be produced it is necessary to carry out determined operations on the materials, such as clay, following a criterion that does not automatically derive from the nature of the thing (na svabhāvena) but which is dictated by the restrictive order (maryādayā) created by the Lord, called 'necessity' 13 . 9 -
 - The allusion is to the followers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, as Abh. and Bhāskara confirm (ĪPV II p. 163). They consider the Lord solely as efficient cause, which would be in itself admissible if it did not necessarily also entail the admission of a series of other causes from whose cooperation only effect finally derives. Material cause, auxiliary causes etc. i.e. in the case of the shoot, seed, water, earth are all insentient realities from which, in the Śaiva view, the causal function is precluded.
 - The term anusamdhāna is used in this school with various meanings. Sometimes it means 'unification, connection', often referring to the unifying function of thought which establishes relations between things (it is then glossed with ekīkaraṇa), pervading them with its own dynamism. In other cases as in the whole of this chapter it has the meaning of 'intentionality, straining towards a particular objective'. These two levels of meaning may also coexist simultaneously.
 - ¹² In the ĪPV Abh. devotes quite a long commentary to this stanza, putting forward different possible interpretations; these reflect the doubts that the establishment of causality as outlined may give rise to. In the case of the potter, who is here used as an example: there is a knowing subject who as such may legitimately assume the role of cause, but how can one then say that cause is always and everywhere the supreme Lord, and, on the other hand, if one accepts this thesis at the outset, what room is there in it for the potter? The stanza may be interpreted in both of these ways, depending on the meaning one chooses to give to the expression aiśvaryaiva vyavasthayā; and also in a third (or even fourth) way, if one takes the optative janayet as being 'interrogative' (sampraśna) and not in the sense of 'obligation' (niyoga).

This means that the potter's kartṛtā is not absolute, but made possible by the higher kartṛtā of the Lord, on whom the order of things – the operations the potter

- 10. The various things (tattat), jar etc., lasting and able to fulfil II 4.10 the functions that are natural to them (sthirasvārthakriyākaram)¹⁴ may also be produced by virtue of the volition of the yogins alone¹⁵, without the need for clay or seed.
- By virtue of the volition of the yogins alone, without recourse to clay etc., things such as the jar may be produced, that endure and are capable of fulfilling the functions of the jar and so on. -10 -

こうかんない こうしょうしゅんかい かんかん かんかん

- 11. It is precisely because of this that an effect (kāryam) or an essential property (svabhāvaḥ) which comes into being from that root which is the arising [from a cause] (utpattimūlajaḥ)¹⁶ may legitimately constitute the logical reason of an inference only provided that another valid means of knowledge has established that it is not the creation of a yogin.
- Precisely because of this, an effect or an essential property that implicitly contains a relationship of causality are only illusory

has to carry out etc. - depends. The potter's creativity must necessarily be seen within the creativity of the Lord, otherwise one would not understand how clay etc., insentient as they are, can obey the craftsman's will. See also SD I. 44-45ab and vrtti.

14 My translation conforms to the vṛtti. Abh., though aware of the precise indications in the vṛtti (ĪPVV III pp. 194-5 sthiraṃ ca arthakriyākaraṃ ceti yojanā vṛttikṛtā kṛtā) takes tattat sthirasvārthakriyākaram as a single compound (which thus comes to mean 'able to carry out lastingly the various forms of efficiency that are natural to them'), claiming that his interpretation must also be considered admissible (... iti samāse 'pi na kaścid doṣaḥ); we do not know if the ṭīkā authorized this type of construction. On the contrary, according to the vṛtti, tattat is separate and refers to ghaṭādi and sthirārthakriyākaram is to be understood as a karmadhāraya expressing two qualifications of ghaṭādi.

15 The example of the yogin [which occurs frequently in Indian philosophical literature] was already to be found in the SD (see III. 34b-36a and Utp.'s vrti, etc.). See also above I. 5. 7.

¹⁶ The translation goes back to Abh.'s gloss (ĪPVV III p. 197 svabhāvo 'pi svabhāvāntaraniyato yo jātas tatra utpattir eva kāryakāraṇabhāvātmikā mūlam. Cf. the well-known passage from Dharmakīrti (PVSV p. 17) siddhas tu kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ svabhāvaṇ niyamayati.

17 Dharmakīrti, as we know, admits only two types of 'essential connection' (svabhāvapratibandha; see Steinkellner 1984) between things – or rather between concepts –: identity (tādātmya) and causality (tadutpatti). Therefore the only inference he considers valid is the one based on svabhāva (Steinkellner 1974, 1992) – anupalabdhi also enters into its ambit (cf. Iwata 1991: 86-88) -, e.g. 'this is a tree, because it is a śimśapā' where the concepts are co-extensive, in that the one im-

II 4.11 reasons, if the certainty that this is not the creation of a yogin is lacking. However, even when this certainty exists, the status of logical reason $(hetut\bar{a})$ still depends on the necessity instituted by the Lord. -11

plicitly embraces the other and refers to the same thing; or on kārya, 'there is fire there, because there is smoke'. Utp. points out that the svabhāvahetu, too, in the final analysis emerges as being based on causality (tadutpattigarbha), given that the nature of a thing is that which is due to the causes that produced it (cf. above note). Dharmakīrti had already expressed himself in similar terms (PVSV p. 99 Śālibījādīnām api sa svabhāvaḥ svahetor iti yo na taddhetuḥ so 'tatsvabhāvaḥ syāt; PV I. 38 anvayavyatirekād yo yasya dṛṣṭo 'nuvartakaḥ / svabhāvas tasya taddhetur ato bhinnan na sambhavaḥ //; cf. Steinkellner 1971: 188 notes 35 and 36). The causal implication, as Abh. observes following the fikā (ĪPVV III pp. 197 ff.), may be evident to a greater or lesser degree. It is obvious when by virtue of the svabhāvahetu 'to be endowed with smoke' one goes back to 'to be endowed with fire'. It is less evident, but equally present, in the case of 'this is a tree, because it is a $\dot{sim}\dot{sap}\bar{a}$; here it is, in fact, the cause of the $\dot{sim}\dot{sap}\bar{a}$ – i.e. its seed – which infuses it with the nature of tree (ibid. p. 202 śimśapābījasya viśistasya yā śimśapām prati bījatā śiṃśapākāraṇatā, saiva vṛkṣatvaṃ tatra niveśayatīti; see also IPV II p. 175 svahetuta eva hi śimśapā vṛkṣasvabhāvāvyabhicārinī jātā; and this cause that produces the simsapā as always united with vrksatva depends in turn on Parameśvara's power of Necessity, IPVV III p. 200). It is therefore essential in each case to establish at the outset that the smoke or the simsapā in question are not yogin creations. The inference based on svabhāvahetu as conceived by Buddhists and Saivas differs in that for the former it does not give rise, strictly speaking, to a new and real knowledge. According to the Buddhist pramāņa tradition, the very relationship of gamya-gamaka between two essential properties is ultimately unreal, just as is the distinction of a plurality of properties within one thing. 'All this question of inference and object to be inferred' - Dignaga says in a famous passage often quoted, in slightly different forms, by later authors (Randle 1926²: 51-54; see also PVSV pp. 2-3, IPVV III p. 200) - 'depends on a differentiation between property and property-possessor imposed by the mind, and does not concern the actual external existence'. The difference between the two kinds of inference besides the operating of two concepts belonging to the same thing in the one case, and to two distinct things in the other - would seem to lie in the fact that the svabhāvahetu can establish only vyavahāra and not vastu (NBŢ p. 106 tad ayam arthaḥ - vṛkṣavyavahāro 'yam, śiṃśapāvyavahārayogyatvāt). Abh., commenting on the fīkā (ĪPVV III p. 213), distinguishes between vastu°, vastuvvavahāra° and śabdavyavahārasādhana. In the śaiva view vṛkṣatva and śiṃśapātva are two different and in themselves completely autonomous $\bar{a}bh\bar{a}sas$, set by the Lord in a relationship of sāmānādhikaraņya but not necessarily present to consciousness at the same time. Thus the status of the svabhāvahetu, moving from a real entity towards an equally real entity, comes to be, as it were, enhanced; as Abh. says (IPV II p. 180) referring to the Buddhists, tasmāt sarveşu svabhāvahetuşv ābhāsabhedam vinā vyavahāramātrasādhanam (vyavahāramātra, tnat is, śabdavyavahāra; ĪPVV III p. 213).

12-13. ¹⁸A new (nūtanam) manifestation of smoke etc. derives from a II 4.12-13 manifestation of fire etc. common to various other knowing subjects, which, though not directly perceived at that moment, is its determining condition (adhipateh)¹⁹. The effect, which is invariably concomitant with

18 These two stanzas respond to a twofold need. The first is the need to succeed in explaining causality whilst remaining faithful to the equation ābhāsa=vastu (how can one through inference determine the reality of a fire that is anabhata being the cause of smoke present here and now?). The second need is to obtain this result by distancing oneself from the Vijñānavādins, who, in maintaining that the ābhāsas of the cause and effect must belong to the same individual santāna, risk removing every general value and therefore all practical importance from causality. The solution proposed by Utp., according to how Abh. develops it, is the following. Some subjects present in a certain place (e.g. the kitchen) grasp the relation of invariable concomitance (vyāptigrahaṇa) between fire and smoke, in general, but through the observation of particular cases. Namely, they become one as regards these two ābhāsas, or, in other words, there is a single ābhāsa 'fire' and a single ābhāsa 'smoke' for all the subjects present. This identification is provided by the action of the Lord himself through the power of Necessity (niyatiśakti), and here lies the fundamental difference from the Vijnanavadins. Later, one or more of these subjects finds himself faced with a particular ābhāsa 'smoke' - thus present on his own mental continuum (svasantānavartin) - and, remembering the previously established vyāpti, goes back to a generic ābhāsa 'fire', which is immediately present to other subjects (parasantānavartin): therefore at the moment of the inference the subjects involved are found to be, by the very will of the Lord, unified as regards a particular smoke and a generic fire. In the kārikā bhūyaḥ, understood in the vṛtti as an adjective referring to "pramātr" (cf. vrtti "pramātrantara"), may also be taken separately as an adverb. In this case it would mean 'also later on', i.e. also at a time subsequent to the grasping of the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire, that is, at the time when the inference is made (Bh II p. 185 bhūyo 'pi na kevalam vyāptigrahanakāla eva api tu anumānakāle 'pi). This double interpretation of bhūyah goes back to the fikā itself (cf. IPVV III p. 216).

19 Of the four pratyayas 'causal conditions' in the Sautrāntika conception (as outlined in SDS p. 85 te catvārah pratyayāh prasiddhā ālambanasamanatarasaha-kāryadhipatirūpāh ...) the adhipatipratyaya is the one most directly responsible for the production and the specific nature of the effect (cf. Madhyamakavṛtti p. 33 yasmin sati yad bhavati tat tasyādhipateyam ity adhipatipratyayalakṣaṇam); for instance, it is the organ of sight that is the adhipatipratyaya of the visual sensation, in the presence of a determinate object also able to arouse the sensations of taste, smell etc. (SDS p. 86 caksuṣo 'dhipatipratyayād viṣayagrahaṇapratiniyamah | uditasya jāānasya rasādisādhāraṇye prāpte niyamakaṇ cakṣur adhipatir bhavitum arhasi loke niyamakasyādhipatitvopalambhāt). In the AK the adhipatipratyaya is included in a system (see II. 49-55a, 61b-73) formed by six hetus and four pratyayas – the other pratyayas are there hetu°, samanantara° and ālambana° – (cf. de La Vallée Poussin 1923-31: 1 pp. 299-308; for different classifications inside the

- II 4.12-13 the cause, is indicative (lingam) of the latter being there. On the contrary, a manifestation of smoke different from the one we have spoken of derives solely from the manifestation 'smoke' perceived by other subjects, which takes on in this case the role of determining condition.
 - The manifestation 'smoke' (in the distance etc.), which, though not preceded by the direct presence of the manifestation 'fire', arises from the manifestation 'fire' common to the various other knowing subjects in that place and endowed with such causal power by the power of Necessity; this manifestation 'smoke' is that which invariably makes known the existence of this manifestation 'fire'. On the contrary, that smoke which derives from other smoke that already exists²⁰ the manifestation 'fire' now being completely extinct –, arises precisely from the manifestation 'smoke' present to the consciousness of various other subjects, which, though not being directly perceived at that moment²¹ [by the subject who makes the inference], is invested [by the Lord] with the role of determining condition²², as we saw in the previous case. 12-13 –

Buddhist tradition, id.: I p. 299 n. 1; see also id. 1928-49: 448 ff. for the hetu-pratyaya theory in the Vijñaptimātratā). The first hetu in the series (kāraṇa°) is identified with the adhipatipratyaya. All dharmas can be kāraṇahetus (but not with regard to themselves) in the general sense, in that they do not make obstacle to the causal process; but there is a principal (pradhāna) kāraṇahetu which is that responsible for the effective production of the effect - for example, sight or form for the visual sensation or food for the body (AKBh p. 83; see also de La Vallée Poussin 1923-31: I pp. 247-248). The adhipatipratyaya in the kārikā therefore would correspond to the pradhānakāraṇahetu. Actually, neither Utp. nor Abh. explain what they exactly mean by adhipatipratyaya. In particular Abh. limits himself to pointing out the character of 'being remote, out of sight' (ĪPV II p. 185 tasmāt kāryāt so 'numīyate yataḥ parokṣo 'sāv adhipatitvād eva, ĪPVV III p. 215 tac ca vahnyābhāsādi yato 'numātuḥ parokṣam, tato 'dhipatipratyaya ity ucyate, etc.). See also n. 21.

The reference is to the smoke the shepherd puts into a leather bottle and lets out later. The example, known as the *gopālaghaṭikā*, already occurred in ŚD V.67; see also Karṇakagomin's commentary on the PVSV p. 99.

The adhipatipratyaya must necessarily belong to a different (earlier) time from that of the effect (cf. AKBh p. 84, where there is an exposition of the Sautrāntika criticism of the Sarvāstivadins, supporters of the relation of causality between co-existent dharmas; see also PV III.246). And, on the other hand, if it were not parokṣa, it would be the object of direct perception and there would be no need to resort to inference.

²² Each of the elements that enter into the relation of causality plays a role, that does not directly derive from or coincide with its own nature (as in the Buddhist

- 14. Also the relation of cause and effect conceived as 'there being II 4.14 this, this other is produced (asmin satidam asti)²³ is not admissible for realities that are insentient and as such incapable of 'requiring' $(apeks\bar{a}^{\circ})^{24}$.
- A fixed temporal succession of antecedent-consequent, which is expressed in the formulation 'there being this, this other is produced', also occurs between things that have no causal connections, such as for instance the rising in the firmament of the constellations of the Kṛttikās and Rohiṇ $\bar{1}^{25}$. The relation of cause and effect should therefore be formulated thus: 'there being the causal power of the thing that precedes, there is the existence of the one that follows'. But this is not possible for insentient realities incapable of requiring 26 . And even if we understand the meaning of the formula as 'the causal power of the precedent constitutes the existence of the consequent', in this way, too, virtually nothing is said; neither can the own nature, characterized by the causal power, of the preceding element appear as the existence of the following one. 14 –

conception), but is, so to speak, superimposed upon it by the power of Necessity of the Lord, who remains the only true causal agent, the agent par excellence. This is also generally valid for the whole sphere of practical reality.

²³ The Buddhists in general are referred to here. The relation of causality is resolved, in the final analysis, in a fixed temporal concomitance as being the only ascertainable thing (cf. Torella 1979: 397-98, n. 32).

To the same objection put forward in TS 521 and relative $Pa\bar{n}jik\bar{a}$ – «If causality is explained in this way, namely without the intervention of an operation, how can one explain expressions such as 'the effect depends on (requires) a cause'?» – the Buddhist replies that it is only a question of turns of phrase: what is called 'dependence, need' ($apeks\bar{a}$) is merely an invariable immediate succession (ya $\bar{a}nantaryaniyamah saiv\bar{a}peks\bar{a}bhidh\bar{i}yate$).

²⁵ The Pleiades and Taurus. This argument is commonly used by the various critics of the Buddhist conception of causality. The invariable concomitance between the rising of these two constellations, a Buddhist would reply (cf. TS 1423-4), rests anyway upon a causal connection, which links the two terms not directly but through their common dependence on a single complex of causes (cf. PV I. 8); in this case, in fact, it would be the same wind (*prabhañjanavišeṣa*) that pushes both constellations consecutively (*santatyā*).

²⁶ I.c. in the sense that the existence of one thing 'requires' (apekṣā) the existence of another. The concept of apekṣā – which is the meaning of the locative case here—contains on the one hand this intentional dynamism (anusaṃdhāna in the following kārikā; cf. SSVṛ p. 2 jaḍasya nirabhisaṃdheḥ ...), on the other the resting of one thing upon another: IPVV III p. 228 paraniṣṭhārūpā anusaṃdhānarūpā vā saptamy utthāpitā (directly commenting upon abhiprāya and anyānuṣaṅgitā in the fikā), and yet again ibid. p. 229 anyonyalagnatātmikā apekṣā and abhiprāyakṛtā.

- II 4.15 15. In fact the meaning of the locative case may not be applied to self-contained entities, incapable of intentionality (anusaṃdhāna°), whether [cause and effect] are considered existent or non-existent.
 - Effect and also cause may be understood as existent or as non-existent; but, whatever the case, they still remain insentient realities, self-contained and lacking intentionality, whose being is independent of other entities. And it is for this reason that the meaning expressed by the endings of the subordinate cases²⁷, whose essence is precisely its dependence on a predominant element, is not applicable to them. -15
 - 16. On the basis of what has been said the only logically admissible relation between things is to be found in the meaning of the case endings, which consists in a relation between the action and the factors of the action (kriyākāraka°) and has as its only foundation the knowing subject²⁸.
 - ²⁷ All the cases are subordinate excluding, of course, the nominative which is by definition svatantra - (ĪPVV III p. 231 dvitīyādayo); the kartṛ presides over and promotes the carrying out of the individual functions of the various kārakas and they all bring about the main action expressed by the verb. But subordination itself presupposes a conscious dynamism, an intentionality which everything that is conceived as jada, as confined in itself, cannot possess, as well as a capacity for unification, for establishing relations, which is all expressed in the single word, anusanidhāna, in all its concentration of meanings. However one wishes to conceive this dependence (we have seen that, following the fikā, Abh, has distinguished two types, anyonyalagnatārūpā and abhiprāyarūpā), it is precluded from inert and insentient realities. Utp. returns to this subject and develops it further in the SSVr (p. 2): na hi jadayoh sambandhinor apekṣārtho ghaṭate pāratantryārtho vā / athāpy ankura eva bījam apekṣate bīje vā paratantro bhavati, tadāyattvādes tadātmalābhasyety etad api na samyak; upacāro hy ayam apekṣata iva paratantra iveti syāt, na tu jaḍasya mukhyaivākankṣā prārthanā cecchaiva viśiṣṭā apekṣā pāratantryam vā parapravaņatā parakīyaviniyogākankṣā svecchācaraṇanirodhalakṣaṇaḥ saṃkalpaviśeṣa eva samgacchate, alabdhātmanas cātmalābhārtham apeksādi kathyate. If the Buddhist premises are accepted - Abh. concludes (ĪPVV III p. 231) - the relation of cause and effect therefore remains inexplicable, seeing that however one puts it $-b\overline{i}je$ sati ankuro, bijād ankuro 'nkurasya bījam etc. - no formulation stands up to a logical examination, as there is no room for assuming the role itself of kāraka.
 - ²⁸ This concept is already formulated in substantially the same terms in SD IV. 32ab vinaikatvam ca na bhavet kārakatvam kadācana; Utp. gives a very succinct commentary on this, referring the reader to the IPK (and commentaries) for a more extensive treatment of the subject: ghaṭādeś ca yad etat svakāryakaraṇam bhavadbhir iṣyate tac cidekarūpatvam vinā na syāt / jaḍasya nirabhisamdheḥ karaṇāyogād ity etad api īśvarapratyabhijñāyām evoktam.

- The connection between earth, seed, water and so on is correctly II 4.16 understood as the meaning of the case endings consisting in a relation between verbal action and the factors of the action, depending on a single subject, and is not to be identified with some other type of 'dry' (śuṣka)²⁹ connection such as that of cause and effect. 16 -
- 17. Even if it is maintained that cause and effect have one another's very nature, merely the unity of the two is obtained, for if there were any distinction it could not be said that they have the same nature³⁰.
- Even if it is maintained that cause and effect have one another's form, the only result would be that they are a single thing and not that they constitute a relation. -17
- 18. The differentiation of a unitary entity is action, occurring in temporal succession. In this way we necessarily return to our thesis of an agent subject, as being that which becomes modified in the various forms³¹.
- The presentation of a single reality in differentiated ways, change, impelled (or 'measured') by time, is precisely action. Therefore for an entity free to modify itself, endowed with energy, being a cause means being the agent of the action. 18 -
- 19. But this is not possible for an insentient reality, because differentiation would conflict with unity, given the manifold forms of manifesta-

The meaning of śuṣka is explained in ĪPVV III p. 234 śuṣkaḥ kartṛtātma-svātantryalakṣaṇobhayamelanātmakarasaśūnyaḥ; i.e. without the 'juice' that is represented by conscious dynamism.

- The previous $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$ concluded the argumentations put forward by Utp. against the Buddhist conception of causality, based on the absolute otherness and isolation of single entities. A different argument must be addressed to the followers of Sāṃkhya who, in admitting the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, maintain the continuity and substantial unity of things. But the thesis of the Sāṃkhya (also criticized in the $\bar{I}S$), as the following $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$ points out, cannot figure as a real alternative to the Saiva thesis.
- The Sāṃkhya conception of causality as the continual modification of a primordial nature (prakrti, pradhāna) to forms that are constantly new and already implicitly contained in it, in the end, enters into the Saiva scheme of the $kartrt\bar{a}$: the modification of the prakrti is precisely its being the agent of the action of modification. The Saivas would have no objection were it not for the fact that the prakrti as conceived by the Sāṃkhya i.e. jada has no right to assume this role, which is the exclusive prerogative of the conscious being (cf. the following $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$).

- II 4.19 tion. On the contrary, it is possible in the case of a conscious unitary reality.
 - This is not possible for an insentient reality, because its nature which is single would conflict with its appearing in differentiated forms. On the contrary, it is possible for an absolutely limpid (svacche), unitary, conscious reality, because there is no conflict here between its unity and its capacity to receive manifold reflections³². 19 -
 - 20. Even if the unity of consciousness is maintained³³ to be the only ultimate reality, there cannot be action, for two entities divided as regards the nature of their manifestation (ābhāsabhinnayoḥ), without a preliminary act of thought which grasps and establishes the unity (ekatvaparāmarśaṃ), characterized by the desire to act.
 - Even if one posits the conscious principle as the only reality, a differentiation of the manifestations conceived of as random (i.e. without a cause) is not admissible³⁴, and on the other hand there is no action in
 - The I, according to a simile which is very dear to these schools, is like a clear mirror serving as substratum for the manifestation of objective reality. Owing to its absolute transparency it remains unmodified by the apparition of these forms, which are in a sense different from it. It is this very purity that causes what is actually not separate from it to appear, instead, as separate (IPVV III p. 243 etad eva hi tannirmalatvam yat svātmānatiriktasya api atiriktasya iva avabhāsanam). See also SPr I.54-55 atyantācchasvabhāvatvāt sphaṭikasya yathā svakam / rūpam paroparaktasya nityam naivopalabhyate // tathā bhāvasamāyuktam bhagavams tāvakam vapuḥ / atyantanirmalatayā pṛthak tair nopalabhyate // «Just as due to its absolute transparency, the intrinsic nature of crystal, that is continually coloured by other things, is not perceived, so indeed, O Blessed One, your body, that is united with the various beings, due to its absolute limpidity is not perceived without them».

33 Utp. now turns his criticism to the śāntabrahmavāda, which might avail itself of what is stated in the preceding kārikā to propose itself as the definitive truth, able to overcome all the contradictions pointed out in the theories of causality examined so far.

The multiplicity and diversity of manifestations cannot be conceived of as being purely random, because the order and regularity of reality would remain inexplicable. The multiplicity must therefore have a cause and this cause cannot be anything but action. However, in the conscious principle as understood by the Vedāntins (śāntabrahman) action is by definition absent, and – as the vrtti explains – every insentient reality is incapable of action. Action, as the bridge between the one and the many, must necessarily contain as a precondition an awareness of the not absolute otherness of the two terms, in order that these may play the roles - which are distinct yet intimately coordinated –, for example, of kartr and karma. As Abh.

this conscious principle. If, however, it renders externally manifest II 4.20 through an act of determinate thought combined with a desire to act in this way, then action is possible³⁵. On the other hand, an insentient reality cannot even be the agent of the action of being - 'it exists, is' - since it does not possess the freedom that is manifested through 'wanting to be' (bubhūṣāyogena)³⁶. Thus the ultimate truth in this regard is that the knowing subject, and he alone, 'causes' the insentient reality 'to be' (bhāvayati), or, in other words, appears in various forms such as mount Himācala and so on. - 20 -

- 21. Therefore causality, agency, action are nothing but the will of Him who wishes to appear in the form of the universe, in the various manifestations of jar, cloth and so on.
- The very will of Him who is free and has consciousness as His nature to appear as universe constitutes His being cause as regards the universe, in the form of agency; and this is the power of Action. In this way action in the primary sense $(mukhy\bar{a})$ - i.e. the desire to act belongs uniquely to the agent, one, whose essence is consciousness.

says (ĪPV II p. 205), action, which is single, could not be the svabhāva of two things, if these were utterly different form one another. This moment of unity occurs in the first attempt towards action (cikīrṣā), when the object is still completely immersed in the I. It must be pointed out that Abh.'s commentaries give three or four different interpretations of the kārikā, according to whether ābhāsabhinnayoh is made to depend on cikīrṣā, parāmarśa or kriyā respectively; however, these interpretations are not incompatible and, on the contrary, broaden the implications of the meaning as a whole.

Action, Abh. explains, following the $fik\bar{a}$ (see text note 207), is the 'rendering manifest' (ābhāsanā), whose essential feature is constituted by the very first impulse of thought and will to act (parāmarśa - cikīrṣā or icchā) which already contains in embryo the future manifestation and externalization (cf. SD I. 19-20a and vṛtti).

³⁶ A certain action may be attributed to an insentient reality (SDV_r p. 159 ghato 'rthakriyām udakāharaņādikām karoti), only in a figurative sense; strictly speaking it would not be permissible even to say that it 'is', unless one takes into account that this sattā that practical experience ascribes to it is in reality śivatākhyā; see above, Introduction pp. XV-XVI. This point is developed by Utp. in the vṛtti on ŚD IV. 32b-33a, where Somānanda solves in the same terms the problem of the attribution in discourse of the qualification of kāraka (and thus of case endings) to entities that are by definition non-existent, such as the antelope's horn etc. Bhartrhari would have faced the problem by referring to the distinction between mukhyasattā and vastvartha, on the one hand, and upacārasattā and śabdārtha, on the other. On the related question whether (kārakas') agency presupposes animation see Cardona 1974.

II 4.21 There is no object of action without an agent; action, in fact, is attributed to the object etc. only in a figurative sense, through the agent 37 . -21 -

³⁷ All the other kārakas may even be absent from the sentence, but the presence of the subject is enough to ensure the carrying out of the verbal action, and, vice versa, even if all the other kārakas are present the absence of the subject alone makes the action impossible (ĪPVV III p. 253; cf. VP III. 7. 101-2 and Helarāja's commentary). Cf. SPr II. 54 prakāśate saṃvid ekā tadanyat tu prakāśyate / prakāśyaṃ ca bhavet karma tac ca kartrā vinā katham // «Consciousness alone shines; that which is other from it is illuminated. What is illuminated is the object, and how can the object subsist without a subject?».

SECTION III. REVELATION

CHAPTER I

1. On the basis of the preceding argumentations (evam)¹, action, which consists of an internal and external level, subject to temporal succession, pertains to the knowing subject alone²: therefore cognition and action are inseparable from one another.

¹ This is the sense that is expressly indicated by Abh. (ĪPVV III p. 257).

² This knowing subject is, first and foremost, the supreme knowing subject, Parameśvara, but also every limited subject, insofar as Śiva is his model and ultimate essence. What the kārikā expounds is therefore the sivatatīva (ÎPVV III p. 258 śivatattvalakṣaṇasya parapramātur); all the tattvas, from Sadāśiva and Īśvara (see the following $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$) are his modes of being, or so-to-speak internal modifications, he is the sole reality (ibid. p. 257 śivatattvam hi sarvapadārthānām vapuņ, p. 263 śivatattvam eva ekam vastusat). Utp. does not place this supreme reality (called *īśitṛ* in the following $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$) beyond the scale of the *tattvas*, but at the top of it, as the union between śiva and śakti. His powers are absolutely pure (cf. above I.8.11) in that they are without object. If at the pati level the subject sees the world as his own body (III.2.3, IV.1.4), at the paramapati level we cannot even speak of the knowable (IPVV III p. 367 paramapatau tu bhagavati prameyakathaiva na asti, ibid. p. 266 na ca śiva pade viśvam kiñcit). All the universe is completely dissolved into the I; śivatā is precisely the plane where only the 'I' exists. At various points in the SDVr a (not constant) distinction is made between Siva on the one hand and Paramasiva (or Paramesvara) on the other seen as the all-inclusive form (p. 3); elsewhere (p. 27) the God is expressly said to assume the form of the thirty-six principles, all indistinctly understood as kārya (... tattvarūpam sattrimšattattvasamkhyam kāryam rūpeņa bibharti). It must be borne in mind, however, that what Utp. primarily intends to do in this work is to render explicit the teaching of his master Somänanda. Bhāskara (Bh II p. 211 ff.) distinguishes between prakriyāśāstra (ĪPK is one of these), whose aim is to describe the nature of the tattvas (tattvasvarūpakathana), and sāraśāstra (e.g. the Mālinīvijaya), devoted to the teaching of the supreme non-duality. According to the latter, within Sadāśiva - since it has the nature of śāntabrahman – there is not a full contact with Śakti; thus Śakti is posited as a separate principle (the thirty-fifth) above Sadāśiva and is to be united with Śiva (the thirty-sixth) distinct from Sadāśiva. Though in reality Siva and Paramaśiva are one single thing, Anāśritaśiva refers to his specific nature (svarūpanirdeśa) and Parasiva refers to his pervading the whole scale of principles. However it is not

- III 1.1 Action, subject to temporal succession, is nothing but externalization; it pertains to the knowing subject, the self, which resides within. Thus cognition and action are mutually inseparable in him. 1 -
 - 2. But by virtue of the pre-eminence of the internal state there is, at the beginning, the Sādākhya principle³; then, with the predominance of externality, the Pārameśvara principle.
 - But when in the Lord ($\bar{\imath}situh$), between the planes of internality and externality, internality has pre-eminence, there is the Sādākhya⁴ principle; then, with the increase in externality, there is the principle of $\bar{\imath}svara^5$. 2 -
 - 3. Iśvara is opening outwards (unmeṣaḥ), Sadāśiva is closing inwards (nimeṣaḥ)⁶; True Science (sadvidyā) is the state of the notions of 'I' and 'this' having an identical substratum.

legitimate – Bhāskara continues – to make it into a thirty-seventh principle, because $vy\bar{a}pya$ and $vy\bar{a}paka$ cannot be placed on the same plane, namely, $vy\bar{a}paka$ cannot be collocated in the same series as the $vy\bar{a}pya$, though higher up (the same applies to those who posit a further thirty-eight principle). The fact that the description given by the $prakriy\bar{a}\dot{s}\bar{a}stra$ stops at the $\dot{s}ivatattva$ may be explained, again according to Bhāskara, in two ways: either they were only aiming at giving a differentiated description of the tattvas, without intending to proclaim the supreme non-duality (to which in any case they constitute a way of access); or they do not mention a reality beyond the tattvas in order not to expose it to objectivization.

³ 'Principle' (tattva), according to Abh.'s definition (ĪPVV III p. 264, ĪPV II P. 219), is a reality that extends, as a unifying element, to a set of distinct entities, such as earth for hills, mountains, countries etc., or water for lakes, rivers, seas. See as regards this MPĀ, vidyāpāda, V. 3-4 and Rāmakantha's commentary. Cf. also the (implicit) etymological interpretation that Utp. gives of it (SDVr p. 27) viśvaprapañcatananakṣama 'capable of extending the deployment of everything'; there is yet another definition in TP 73. The tattva refers to the objective dimension of a certain plane of reality, that is, to the content and quality of the experience of the subjects who pertain to those levels (ĪPVV III p. 274 vedyabhāvaniṣṭhā daśā tattvasvarūpā tadavabhāsayitṛśuddhamātṛyedyavastusādhanā).

⁴ Abh. (ĪPV II pp. 217-8) gives more than one explanation of the word Sādākhya: the derivative with *vrddhi* has here the meaning of 'that is in *sadākhya*' (cf. Pānini IV. 3. 53), where *sadākhya* means the plane on which the notion of 'being' (*sat*) first appears; or of 'what is the meaning of *Sadākhya* (understood as a synonym of Sadāśiva)'. The word Sadāśiva, again according to Abh. (ĪPVV III p. 264), means that the nature of Siva does not cease to be present, even if the object begins to arise.

⁵ Parameśvara, as the *vrtti* makes clear, stands for Īśvara here.

⁶ Nimeşa refers to the moment in which the 'this', which in Śuddhavidyā becomes fully evident and faces the I (still, of course, in the sphere of consciousness

- Īśvara and Sadāśiva are respectively opening outwards and closing III 1.3 inwards, the condition of externality and internality. Pure Science (śud-dhavidyā) is the plane of him who, having all things as his essence, thinks 'I am this universe', where the two terms have the same substratum (sāmānādhikaranyena)⁷, without any differentiation between external and internal, cognizable object and cognizing subject, both resting on the sole reality which is pure consciousness. 3 –
- 4. [The latter principle is called sadvidyā] for in this things, having reached the plane of object of cognition and the level of 'this', are known by what is their true reality, as their essence is consciousness.
- Things, though they have become cognizable object in the form of 'this' on the plane of cognizable reality differentiated [from the subject], are known by their true reality in the terms of 'this is I', insofar as their essence is none other than consciousness; this is the sense conveyed by the adjective 'pure' [in Pure Science] 8 . 4 -

and non-differentiation), is still evanescent and veiled by the I which completely overcomes it, as at the dawn of creation or the twilight of cosmic dissolution. The I-this relation is reversed in the Īśvara principle; the 'this' in Sadāśiva and in Īśvara are related to one another in the same way as a sketch is related to a finished painting. There is no real differentiation between the Sadāśiva, Īśvara and Śuddhavidyā principles; the 'identical substratum' which, according to Utp., characterizes Śuddhavidyā is also an essential element for the first two, which show the disequilibrium between subject and object though they have unity as their common basis (in the one case – cf. ĪPVV III p. 266 – it is idam that is projected in aham and vice versa). The texts seem to be quite in agreement on this, though there are certain discrepancies in the description (ĪPVV III p. 266 asau vyāpāro vidyākhyah / ubhāv api ca tadvyāpāramayau paramaśivanāthasya ekaghanam aiśvaryam; ĪPV II p. 222 tadadhiṣthātrdvayagatam karaṇam vidyātattvam āha; PTV p. 224 bhagavatsadāśiveśadaśā śuddhavidyāmayī; etc.).

⁷ Sāmānādhikaranya is, in grammatical terms, 'co-referentiality', having the same case, such as the subject and nominal predicate of a proposition. The plane of māyā is characterized by the opposite condition, pṛṭhagadhikaranya: subject and object appear as two realities unrelated to one another: 'they have a different substratum'.

⁸ Abh. (ĪPVV III p. 273) refers to the MPĀ to define the nature of Śuddhavidyā. Indeed, the tenth paṭala of MPĀ's vidyāpāda (with Rāmakanṭha's vṛṭti) is devoted to the vidyātattva. Vidyā is the basic component of human knowledge, which takes place through the various forms assumed by the buddhi (determination, memory, intuition and so on) (vṛṭti p. 311 adhyavasāyasmṛṭipratibhādipratyayabhedabhinnā buddhir api yayā vedyate sā vidyā tat paraṃ karaṇam); Vidyā embraces it entirely,

- III 1.5 5. Here⁹ there is imperfection (aparatvam) on the one hand because things are manifested as other than the self –, perfection (paratā) on the other because they are veiled by the I. This is in fact the perfect-imperfect state (parāparadaśā).
 - Here there is imperfection because there is the notion of 'this', perfection because all the cognizable is veiled by the I^{10} : this is therefore the perfect-imperfect condition. 5 -
 - 6. Others¹¹ maintain that Vidyā is the idea of differentiation with respect to things, present in the one who is, however, for his part, [fully]

in the sense that it 'knows', is aware of, all forms of cognition (X.5 sāsannātīva satatam sarvāngālingane kṣamā | na tathā prākṛtī buddhir bahirangā yatas tu sā |||). However, Vidyā is bound to the limited human condition (X.20a pauruṣam bhāvam āśritya), and, as such, it illuminates the ordinary cognizable reality (X.15b vedyār-thapratipādikā) but it cannot reveal the highest principles (X.20d na śivārthapradāyikā). This task pertains to Śuddhavidyā, which transcends the plane of māyā but acts on the plane of the limited subject, since it is only in him – not in the akala subject and still less in the mukta –, in his consciousness, that the whole universal deployment, from the lowest plane, is the object of knowledge (X.23 śivādyavaniparyanto yo 'yam adhvātivistṛtaḥ | sa sarvaś ca citau jñeyo nāśivatvād vimucyate |||).

⁹ Or in other words, as Abh. comments (ĪPV II p. 227), 'in the two principles (Bh: Sadāsiva and Īśvara)'.

¹⁰ Cf. ĪPVV III p. 274 aparatvam apūrņatā anyākānkṣitvam idam iti, paratvam pūrņatvam aham iti.

According to a conception that Utp. does not present as his own (Abh., ĪPV II p. 228, attributes it to the Rauravāgama), Śuddhavidyā is the principle in which differentiation appears, restricted, however, only to the sphere of the object: the subject, in other words, without declining from its own total absorption in pure consciousness (therefore no identification with a mind, body etc.) regards the object as other than himself. It is the condition of the Vidyesvaras - which we will return to later - who, omniscient and omnipotent, face a reality considered other than themselves. It may be added, again on the basis of Abh., that what differentiates this conception from that of the preceding kārikā is that there Vidyā represents in the sphere of the consciousness 'I-this' the predominance of the I which veils the 'this'; whereas here it is the predominance of 'this' veiled by the I. The introduction of differentiation determines a certain assimilation with māyā (the Raurava and other texts in fact call Suddhavidyā also by the name of Mahāmāyā); cf. Rauravāgama, vidyāpāda, IV. 28b māyopari mahāmāyā sarvakāraņakāraņam, a māyā, however, which is not fully developed (aprarūḍha) because the 'this' in it is incapable of developing in the sense of full duality, veiled as it is by the I (the 'purity' of Suddhavidya consists precisely in this). Mahamaya

an agent having consciousness as his essence, as in the case of the III 1.6 Vidyeśvaras: this idea of differentiation is similar to that caused by the power of māyā.

- Some consider Vidyā as the view of everything as differentiated [from the I], pertaining however to a subject [fully] endowed with consciousness and agency. This Vidyā is also the power of māyā. Being beyond the flow of existence, the Mantreśvaras and the Vidyeśvaras reside there 12 . -6
- 7. The power of Vidyā reveals in the state of 'beast' (pasubhāve) the true nature as Sovereignty; the power of māyā, on the contrary, conceals it^{13} .

is sometimes (cf. e.g. PTV p. 225) considered a distinct tattva – between Māyā and Śuddhavidyā – in the need to assign an abode to the vijnānakevalas, which on the hierarchical scale of subjects occupy an intermediate position between the pralayākalas and the vidyeśvaras etc., located respectively in Māyā and Śuddhavidyā; in other texts it is, on the contrary, included in Śuddhavidyā or in Māyā, depending on which of its aspects – mentioned above – one wishes to refer to (see Śataratnasamgraha II. 24-27 and comm., ŚDVr p. 25; see also Dvivedi 1983: Upodghāta, 139-141).

12 IPVV III p. 277 explains, following the tīkā, the co-presence in this principle of the Mantreśvaras and Vidyeśvaras on the basis of the essential unity of Mantras and Vidyās (śuddhānādiparāmarśasāraśabdarāśikalāśarīratvena); the difference is that in the former mukti, samvedana and śaktimat predominate, while in the latter

siddhi, vācya and śakti predominate.

13 The conception expressed in this kārikā (attributed by Abh., ĪPV II p. 231, to the Şadardhasāra, a text of the Trika school) seems to be that favoured by Utp., since it is not introduced as pertaining to 'others' (ibid. anye ity anukteh). Abh. formulates it in the avataranikā to the IPV as follows: in Sadāśiva the differentiation is not evident, icchāśakti is in action; in Īśvara the differentiation is evident, the śakti is jñāna; in Śuddhavidyā (literally 'in the Vidyeśvaras') the differentiation is not only evident, but also fully developed (prarūdha) - but only as regards the plane of the knowable, subjectivity is untouched $-kriy\bar{a}\dot{s}akti$ is in action. After that, with the differentiation which also embraces the sphere of the I, one enters the samsaric world, the realm of māyāśakti. Vidyāśakti is also in action on this plane, having the opposite function from that of māyā, that is, it discloses true reality to the yogins and the jñānins in whom the error of differentiation has been overcome and survives only in the state of karmic impulse. The parallel avataranikā in IPVV contains some variants and seems more in line with Utp.: jñānaśakti in Sadāśiva and kriyāśakti in Isvara (as in SD II. 1); a residual trace of kriyāsakti constitutes, on the contrary, the power of Šuddhavidyā, also called Mahāmāyā.

- III 1.7 In beings in the flow of existence there is the recognition of the self as Sovereignty thanks to $Vidy\bar{a}^{14}$ and the state of 'beast' through the action of $m\bar{a}y\bar{a}$. 7
 - 8. On the contrary, when absolute differentiation appears, and the void, the intellect or the body which are other than the self are considered as Γ , it is then that the power of māyā displays itself.
 - When things appear exclusively as 'this', as differentiated [from the subject], and entities such as the body and so on appear as the cognizing subject the 'I' -, then the power of māyā called 'obfuscating' 15 , which is the cause of these two errors, displays itself in the Lord. 8 -
 - 9. That cognizing subject identified with the void etc. who faces a cognizable reality assumed to be separate [from himself], such a subject who is in fact himself an object 16 is enveloped by the pentad constituted by Time etc.
 - On vidyāśakti and its degrees cf. ŚDVr pp. 31-32, 25; see also below III.
 2. 3.

15 Abh. (ÎPVV III p. 285) quotes a passage from the Rudrayāmalasāra (māyā vimohinī nāma kalāyāh kalanam sthitam), to which the vṛtti probably alludes.

- with which a person believes he can identify his own subjectivity and which he opposes to an objective reality considered 'other', are on the contrary, in the final analysis, part of it, as they too are objects compared to the authentic subjectivity constituted by consciousness (cit). But if in one way they are not identical to consciousness they are however an expression of it, there not being anything substantially other than consciousness and that does not ultimately merge with it. The error is therefore a double error, paradoxical like the nature of māyā which lies at its basis: identifying consciousness, the I, with what is not consciousness is māyā, but it is māyā too which causes what in reality is not different from consciousness to appear as other than it. In order that the reality of the object may be conceived as being differentiated from the I a degradation of the I is necessary. Without this identity crisis the I, in its fullness, could only embrace the whole as his own self and the word 'this' could not be uttered.
- 17 The manifestation of the present, characterized by vividness and clarity, is the point of reference for conceiving a past and a future. The seat of the experience of time, Abh. adds (ĨPVV III p. 287), is primarily the empirical subject and only secondarily things, which receive their temporal colour from the time of the subject with whom they are associated.

¹⁸ Utp. himself, according to what Abh. reports (*ibid.* pp. 290-1, see text note 31), acknowledges two interpretations of the expression *karmaphala*: 'the action and

- That cognizing subject identified with the void etc. who faces the III 1.9 whole of cognizable reality conceived as separate [from the self], is, in fact, himself the object of cognition as 'this' and is conditioned by the five priciples, Time and so on. From Time he derives, through the manifestation of the present, the existence of the past and of the future 17; from Necessity the strict concatenation of [cause with] effect and of action with its fruit (karmaphalaniyamah) 18; from Attachment the yearning for fruition; from Science and Force this subject who, however, is not identified with consciousness nor is he free derives a partial knowledge and activity, essentially constituted by consciousness and freedom. 9 -
- 10-11. Cognizable reality, distinct in products and instruments, appears in twenty-three forms; it has a single, undivided, radical cause, the pradhāna. The series of internal and external instruments has thirteen aspects; the class of products, divided into gross and subtle, has ten.
- The products are divided into two groups. Five are constituted by sound, tangible shape, colour, taste and smell and are called *tanmātra* because of their subtle nature¹⁹; by combining them one has the gross ele-

its result (i.e. the karmic impulse that derives from it)' or 'the karma and its fruit (i.e. the heaven etc.)'. The principle of Necessity is therefore that which ensures in the subject the apparent validity and fixity of the cause-effect relation in everyday experience, so that what is essentially the Lord's creativity may appear as the capacity of one thing invariably to produce another.

19 The relation between the series of subtle elements (tanmātra) and that of the gross elements (hhūta, mahāhhūta) is referred to in both the Sāmkhya and Āgama texts as the relation between universal and particular. The tanmatra represents the archetypal, quintessential form of the relative mahāhhūta of which it constitutes the primary quality (sound-ether, tactile sensation-air, etc.), though not the only one, as all the schools are forced to admit. In fact experience shows that - with the exception of ether - all the gross elements also have some of the qualities that are not considered co-essential to them; sound, for example - says the MṛĀ, vidyāpāda, XII. 17 and relative vrtti - is present not only in ether, but also in air, fire, water and earth. Thus two distinct conceptions emerge. According to the first every gross element possesses only one single quality and, if we perceive others, this is due to its combining or connecting (samparka, sanniveśa) with other elements. Abh. (ĪPVV III p. 299) quotes, with reference to this, a line from the MPA, kşubhitāt sparšatanmātrād dviguņo vyūhato marut (not found in the published text; but cf. vidyāpāda, XX. lcd-2ab yat tat prāk sparšatanmātram tāmasam samudāhrtam / tatkṣobhād abhavad vāyur dviguņo vyūhalakṣaṇaḥ), which he glosses with pūrvabhūtāntaravyūhayogāt. This is the thesis of the ancient Sāmkhya, which will be later supplanted

III 1.10-11 ments called earth etc., of which there are also five, and they are essentially no different from the former $(t\bar{a}ny\ eva)^{20}$. The ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue and the nose are the five instruments of cognition; the voice, the hands, the feet, the excretory and genital organs are the five instruments of action. The internal organ is threefold: the mind, the intellect and the sense of the I. This cognizable reality, composed of products and instruments and divided into twenty-three forms, has a single and undivided plane called $pradh\bar{a}na$, which constitutes its radical foundation. -10-11-

in the classical Sāṃkhya by the thesis of the accumulation of qualities (ether has sound, air has sound and tactile sensation, and so on, until one reaches earth which possesses all five), which is that generally accepted in the theoretical section of the Āgamas (e.g. Kālottara, Pauṣkara etc.) and presupposed by ritual. Furthermore this accumulation is generally explained as deriving from the fact that the individual tanmātra generates the relative mahābhūta not in isolation, but by associating itself with the other tanmātras in various ways (see Pauṣkarāgama, puṃstattvapaṭala, II. 243-4, cit. in Śaivaparibhāṣā p. 125; MPĀ, vidyāpāda, XVIII. 102-104ab, etc.).

This seems to mean that the gross elements do not have a different reality from the essential qualities that compose them, combined and separate (cf. the fragmentary quotations from the fikā on this point in the vrtti, cited by Abh., IPVV III pp. 299-300, 'tāny eva' iti vrttim vyācaste 'tāny eva ca' ityādinā 'natu vastvantaram'). This principle is clearly fomulated in TĀ IX. 289: «In this regard the earth etc., as is attested by direct perception, are nothing but an aggregate of qualities, neither, separate or different from them, does any subject appear that may be called earth and so on».

CHAPTER II

- 1. Such being the structure of reality¹, Rudra is the deity that presides over the state in which this² subjectivity exclusively subsists; Brahma and Viṣṇu³ reside in the flowing of the differentiated cognizable reality.
- Rudra is he who presides over the condition of pure [limited] subjectivity represented by the void or by an extremely subtle body formed by the $purya staka^4$ in other words, over the condition in which there is a reabsorption of every other cognizable reality. Brahma and Visnu preside over the manifestation of differentiated cognizable reality, the former causing creation and the latter continuity. 1 -
- 2. This cognizer blinded by māyā, bound by the karma, is immersed in the saṃsāra; but once Science (vidyā) has made him recognize his own nature as Lord, then, his essence being solely consciousness, he is called 'liberated'.
- The mayic cognizer who is identified with the void and so on, depending on the karma because of the law of necessity⁵, is in the power

² 'This', i.e. the limited subjectivity described in III. I. 9.

On the puryastaka see below pp. 204-205.

¹ This is how I understand tatra – not glossed by Utp. – in conformity with Abh.'s interpretation.

³ Brahma, Viṣṇu and Rudra along with Īśvara, Sadāśiva and Anāśrita are the so-called Kāraṇas or Kāraṇeśvaras, the hypostases of Śiva situated on the various planes of reality in an order of increasing ontological dignity. Each of these deities presides over (adhiṣṭhā-) a plane of reality, brings his devotees to this plane and, vice versa, becomes directly present to those who are absorbed into the contemplation of that level of reality (ĪPVV III p. 305). Abh., commenting on the tīkā, connects them with forms of knowledge, levels of the word and locations in the human body. Brahma is associated with the first moment of cognition and manifestation (prāthamakālpikī sṛṣṭiḥ), with the first effusion of paśyantī in the form of pratibhā and his locus is the heart; Viṣṇu is associated with the continuing of cognition, as in memory and dream, with madhyamā and vaikharī, his locus is the throat; Rudra with the reabsorption of all discourses, the first step into the supreme word and his locus is the palate.

⁵ That the principle of 'necessity' is at the root of the karma is stated in the $fik\bar{a}$

- III 2.2 of the samsāra. With the recognition of the true reality of the self attained thanks to Science he is free. 2 -
 - 3. The cognizer is called 'lord' (patih) when things appear to him as constituting his own body. When they appear to him differentiated due to māyā, the subject, polluted by the various contaminations, by the karma etc., is called 'beast' (paśuh).
 - On the plane of sovereignty (aiśvarya°) the cognizer who sees the universe as his body is 'lord' (patih). On the plane of limited individuality (pumstva°) the subject, enveloped by contaminations attachment and so on 6 –, by actions, by the ripening of the fruits that derive from them and the latent impulses determined by them, is a 'beast' (paśuh). 3 –
 - 4. Consciousness that is devoid of freedom and, vice versa, freedom devoid of consciousness: these are the two forms of maculation so called because it obliterates one's own true nature called anava⁷.
 - The absolute reality is free consciousness; only insofar as this is its essence is it in perfect fullness. Since it thus wills, in virtue of its very freedom [there is the $\bar{a}nava$ maculation which is twofold]: 'maculation' insofar as it involves error as regards the self's real nature and 'twofold atomicity' insofar as consciousness becomes limited with the loss of its fullnes, creating a subjectivity in which only the light of consciousness subsists without freedom, or only freedom without consciousness. -4
 - 5. There being the āṇava⁸ maculation (atraiva), the apparition of a cognizable reality differentiated [from the subject] constitutes the maculation called māyā; that, then, which in a subject endowed with agency, but lacking the full light of consciousness, determines births and ex-

on the following kārikā, as may be gathered from IPVV III p. 312 āha 'niyatyā' iti niyatir yataḥ karmaṇo mūlabhūmiḥ; see also vṛtti on III. 1. 9.

⁶ All these elements, i.e. the contaminations (kleśa) – avidyā, rāga, asmitā, dveṣa and abhiniveśa – and so on, are listed in Yogasūtra II. 3 ff.

⁷ The fundamental maculation, 'concerning the anu' ($\bar{a}nava$), or the reduction of consciousness to a minimal, 'atomic', state (anu).

⁸ The maculation $\bar{a}nava$, which is often simply called 'maculation', is necessarily the basis of the other two and is, in the course of recovering consciousness in its fullness, the last to disappear.

periences is the karmic maculation. All three are solely the work of the III 2.5 power of māyā.

- When, there being this twofold $\bar{a}nava$ maculation, cognizable reality, though in reality not separated from the subject, appears differentiated from him, there is, on the basis of this other error, the maculation known as māyic. The karmic maculation, which pertains to the agent devoid of the light of consciousness, is due to the error of considering the cause of births and so on the actions, which on the contrary as has been established are not causes⁹. The Lord's will to create these three maculations is called the power of māyā. 5 –
- 6. Those who do possess pure consciousness but not the agency to the highest degree (uttamakartṛtā) are created by the Lord as separate, distinct from the self, due to their being devoid of agency¹⁰.
- Some subjects, though having a consciousness not stained by the cognizable, are created by the Lord as different from what is their true nature, because they are devoid of the full agency. -6
- 7. Though having the same characteristics consciousness etc. these subjects are differentiated from one another because of a particular will of the Lord: they are the Vijñānakevalas¹¹.

⁹ The error on which the karmic maculation is based is therefore that of attributing to the actions and karmic impulses determined by them the status of cause as regards birth, length of life, quality of fruitions etc. Actions, being insentient realities (jada), cannot, according to the conception expounded in the Kriyādhikāra, be the cause of any thing whatsoever; the sole real cause is the agent, the Lord.

This is, in particular, a reference to the Sāmkhya conception of the purusa in the state of kaivalya (cf. IPVV III p. 319). The use of the expression 'are created (nirmita) by the Lord' points out how all these various maculations and levels of subjectivity are merely a 'construct' created by the free dynamism of Consciousness.

Here begins the description of the various categories of subjects. Utp. expressly mentions the Vijñānakevalins, the Pralayakevalins, the Vidyeśvaras and the Sakalas, implicitly referring to the more classical division (see MV I. 15 ff.) which lists seven levels of subjectivity — Śiva, Mantramaheśvara, Mantreśvara, Mantra, Vijñānākala, Pralayākala and Sakala — (see e.g. TP, MrĀ, TĀ, PH etc.). There are variations in the texts as regards the attribution and location in the scale of the principles; in the latter case this ambiguity is often due to the confusion between ontological plane and field of action. Besides this there are other divisions, based on different criteria (e.g. the well-known one of the Svāyambhuvāgama in kevala, sakala and amala; see Śataratnasamgraha 1. 34); cf. Dvivedi 1983: Upodghāta. 134-35. As

- These subjects characterized by the pure light of consciousness are differentiated from one another, though there is no differentiation as regards their attributes of consciousness, permanence etc. This occurs because they are created thus by the Lord and for no other reason. This class of subjects, corresponding more or less to the *puruṣas* of the Sāṃkhya, has the name of Vijnānakevala¹². 7 -
 - 8. The agents that are identified with realities other than consciousness, such as the void etc., are the Pralayākalas¹³. Karmic maculation also pertains to them; on the contrary, māyic maculation may or may not be present (vikalpitaḥ).
 - The Pralayakevalins assume as I the void, the *prāṇa* etc., not grasping their having consciousness as true nature. In these limited souls the karmic impulses are also present; on the contrary, the *māyic* maculation

regards the ŚD, first (I. 31) vidyā, vidyeśa, mantra and mantreśvara are mentioned, then (I. 41c-43) paśu, śānta, kevaleśa kevalaśambhu, pralayakevalin and vijñānakevalin. The division of the subjects — mostly, as has been said, into seven classes — may be considered the common heritage of Shaivism in the broad sense, whilst keeping in mind the remark of Jayaratha (TĀV vol. VII pp. 7-8), according to which this differentiation between subjects is particularly appropriate to the dualist schools such as the Siddhānta (siddhāntadarśanādisamucitam).

12 The state of Vijñānakevala (or Vijñānākalas), Abh. explains (ĪPVV III p. 322), may be attained through a special initiation aimed only at going beyond the path of māyā without there being any conjunction with the supreme reality, or through the creative meditation (bhāvanā) of the puruṣa in the state of isolation, without the karmic bond, according to what is expounded in the Gītā; or through concentration (dhāraṇā), contemplation (dhyāna) and absorption (samādhi) that have as their object the path of māyā as far as this point of deployment. The attainment of this state is therefore a special kind of experience (bhogavišeṣa). It is for this reason that one may speak of its being similar to the state of the Sāmkhya puruṣas but not absolutely identical to it.

13 'Devoid of kalā because of dissolution' where 'dissolution' is generally the state of total absorption pertaining to deep sleep, and 'kalā' stands for the various principles that constitute the faculties and products (IPV II p. 152), listed above, III. 1.0-11. The māyic maculation is present in the state of savedyasausupta, in the state of deep sleep in which the traces of objective reality still remain; this is the level of identification with the mind (buddhi). In the state of apavedyasausupta, to which the identification with the void and the prāna corresponds, every cognizable reality is completely swallowed up and with it the māyic maculation, which just consists in the apparition of a cognizable object differentiated from the subject. These states are analyzed in the following kārikās.

may or may not be present, depending on whether there is connection III 2.8 with cognizable reality or not. -8

- 9. A class of subjects identified with consciousness and endowed with agency experiences cognizable reality as differentiated; the karmic maculation having disappeared, the māyic maculation is present in them. They are the Vidyeśvaras¹⁴.
- There are subjects who have transcended the karma and are identified with consciousness, being also endowed with agency¹⁵. These, though having the nature of Vidyeśvara¹⁶, continue to be affected by the maculation of māyā, being in relation with a differentiated cognizable

¹⁵ Unlike the Vijnānākalas.

¹⁴ The Vidyeśvaras are a group of eight deities headed by Ananta, whom Śiva invests with determinate functions; in particular, they are called to cooperate in the liberation of the limited souls, acting as intermediaries in the revelation of the teaching of Siva, etc. They employ another class of subjects as their instruments, the seventy million Mantras; they are identified, as some texts indicate explicitly (see MrV, vidyāpāda, p. 46, TĀV vol. VI p. 55; cf. also ĨPVV II p. 405), with the class of the Mantramaheśvaras. It may be useful to mention the clear description given by the Moksakārikā of Sadyojyotih and the relative vṛtti of Rāmakantha (particularly II 73-94), obviously without wanting to impose it in every detail as the norm for the whole saiva tradition. In this the terms vidyā and mantra - and consequently Vidyeśvara and Mantreśvara – are interchangeable; the Vidyeśvara-Mantreśvaras are however divided into a higher group of eight headed by Ananta (which we can therefore call Mantramaheśvaras) and a lower group (apradhāna) of a hundred and eighteen, composed of the hundred Rudras etc. The higher Mantreśvaras are situated ontologically below kriyāśakti. After them, but still above māyā, come the seventy million Mantras, they too are divided into two parts, one half impelled directly by Siva and the other by the Mantreśvaras. Then follow the hundred and eighteen Mantreśvaras which are mantraprayojakas but have an inferior status, as they are situated within maya - and are consequently sakalas, just as the first two groups are niskalas. Regarding their functions, the higher Mantresvaras are distinguished from the lower ones since only they perform the five activities of creation etc. in the māyic world. All the Mantreśvaras and the Mantras together attain supreme liberation once Ananta ceases to exist, which happens after he has completed the five activities, at the beginning of the mahāpralaya. As regards the discrepancies between the texts it may be remembered, for example, that the PH places the Mantramaheśvaras in the sadāśivatattva, SvT X. 1060 and TP 1. 10 vṛtti place the Vidyeśvaras in the *īśvaratattva*, etc.

¹⁶ The term Vidyeśvara expresses, according to Abh. (ĪPVV III p. 325), the contact with knowledge and sovereignty (vidyā-bodha and īśvaratva-kartṛtva). These subjects however – unlike the nature of Sadāśiva and Īśvara, on which level dif-

- III 2.9 reality. They do not possess the full faculty of action and are therefore distinct from the Lord and one another¹⁷, as has been previously seen; therefore, they too must be considered limited souls (anutvam). 9 -
 - 10. All the beings that are immersed in the flowing of existence, starting from the gods, are affected by the three maculations: but of these it is precisely the karmic maculation that constitutes the sole direct cause of the saṃsāra.
 - The beings in the power of the samsāra, from the gods to immobile things, have all three maculations: but it is only the karmic maculation that is responsible for setting in motion the samsāra. -10 -
 - 11. And this consciousness-principle constituted by agency (kartṛtā°), reinforced by kalā, being limited, comes to be in the individual who is identified not with consciousness but with the void etc. in a subordinate position¹⁸.
 - In the beings immersed in the flowing of samsāra this consciousness-principle, constituted by agency, in the sphere of insentient realities [assumed as subject] such as the void, the *prāṇa* and so on, corroborated

ferentiation is not yet manifested – conceive the objects of their knowledge and action as different from themselves due to the mayic maculation; they are, rather, similar to the Lord of the dualist doctrines.

¹⁷ See MṛĀ, vidyāpada, IV. 5.

18 The consciousness-principle (cittattvam), supreme consciousness, in its fullness is constituted by the interpenetration of bodha (luminous, cognitive principle) and of kartṛtā or vimarśa (dynamic principle which is expressed in the activity of the I). The maculation called anava is responsible for the fragmentation of this unity by suppressing either one or the other of these two components (cf. above kārikā 4). In the samsaric world cittattvam is found devoid of the bodha aspect and reduced to only kartṛtā, but no longer a full kartṛtā (and not even an 'almost' full one, as it was for example in the Vidyeśvaras). It has now become a shadow of its former self and is only partially revitalized by the contribution of the kalā principle, 'the partial agency'. The consciousness-principle, thus limited, in the individual is therefore found in a decidedly secondary position, superseded by the whole concretion of inert realities with which the I is erroneously identified. In the verse (kalodbalitam ... cittattvam) there is an obvious echo of passages form the scriptures; cf. v. I. 10 of the Svāyambhuvāgama (Government Oriental MSS Library, Madras, MS. 16797) kalodbalitacaitanyo vidyādarśitagocarah / rāgeņa rañjitaś cāpi buddhyādikaraņair tatah // and the substantially identical one of the Tantrasadbhāva cit. in SSV p. 37 (ad III. 3); cf. also Kiraņāgama 1. 16. On the kancukas (kalā etc.) see Torella 1998.

by the power of $kal\bar{a}$ pertaining to the Lord, is limited, being placed in III 2.11 a subordinate state. And therefore the status of limited soul occupies here a pre-eminent position. -11

- 12. The pre-eminence, in the conscious self, of agency and consciousness, with the consequent subordination of insentient realities such as the void, constitutes knowledge whose distinctive feature is the absorption in it (tatsamāveśa°)¹⁹.
- On the contrary, when this same void etc. comes to be in a state of subordination as regards the consciousness whose essence is agency, then in the subject thus substantiated by this consciousness there is a knowledge characterized by the absorption in the power of that. 12 -
- 13. When the seat of agency T is the void, understood as the absence of the mind etc., where only the karmic impulses exist (°saṃskāramātriṇi) without any evidence or form, there is the state of the absence of the knowable 20 .
- When there is a subjectivity characterized by the identification of the I solely with the negation of the mind, the *prāṇa* and so on²¹, then in the state of deep sleep, which means residing exclusively in the above-

¹⁹ On samāveśa sec Introduction pp. XXXII-XXXIV.

This verse describes the state of apavedyasausupta 'deep sleep devoid of the knowable' which represents the plane of the identification of the I with the void. The void is here the negation of every reality that is the object of knowledge including the mind and the prāṇa, which is experienced, apart from in deep sleep in the strict sense of the word, also in the state of cosmic dissolution, stupefaction, or in the deepest states of samādhi. However, one can only speak metaphorically of there not being the knowable: in fact it does not entirely disappear (the śaiva texts often remind us that there can never be the complete annihilation of what exists) but it is rather reduced to the shadowy and vacillating state of saṃskāra.

Abh. explains (ĪPVV III p. 333) that the negation (niṣedha) already appears on the plane of aham-idam which extends as far as Īśvara (śivatattve īśvarānte); it is caused by the introduction of the idam, which precisely entails negation as differentiation (bhedanarūpam) from the consciousness and between objects. While consciousness remains predominant and negation performs only a subordinate role, we have as subjects the Mantramaheśas and the Vijñānākalas, which are differentiated on the grounds of possessing or not possessing vimarśa. On the contrary, when negation predominates there is the śūnyapramātṛ, which the present śloka is referring to; finally, when the objects predominate, there is the subject Sakala.

- III 2.13 mentioned state, there is the absence of the knowable, in the sense that the karmic impulses, though they exist, are imperceptible since they are devoid of form. The difference from the Sāṃkhya puruṣa lies precisely in this. 13 -
 - 14. It is the inner activity (āntarī vṛttiḥ)²² of the sensory faculties, it is that which sets in motion the various breaths, the prāṇa and so on; it is called 'life', whose essence is the eightfold body. Or the subjectivity identified with the breath of life (prāṇe) has as its essence the eightfold body (puryaṣṭakātmikā).
 - Precisely this knowing subject identified with the void in which there exists an inner dynamism, the driving force of all the various breaths, $pr\bar{a}na$ and so on, which is called 'life' and is common to all the sensory powers is called 'living' $(\bar{j}va^{\circ})^{23}$. These sensory powers combined with the I constitute the eightfold body. Or it is formed by the subject inasmuch as it is identified with the $pr\bar{a}na^{24}$. 14 –
 - The kārikā identifies āntarī vrtti with śūnyapramātr (ĪPVV explains that the identification is only metaphorical, in actual fact the real relationship is one of cause and effect); the vrtti places āntarī vrtti (antarvrtti) in a bahuvrīhi referring to śūnyapramātā. The tīkā and ĪPVV explain that this bahuvrīhi may be understood in two ways. In the first, antarvrtti is the very dynamism of subjectivity present in the śūnyapramātr that sets in motion the vital dynamism (jīvana) common to the sensory powers, a dynamism which is that of the five functions of the breaths of life of whose differentiation it is the cause. In the second, with a subtle distinction, it directly denotes the vital energy that is common to all the sensory powers and sets in motion the various breaths. The mention of antarvrtti in bahuvrīhi (depending on śūnyapramātā) is particularly pregnant; Abh. remarks that it aims at removing the role of cause from the sensory powers and leading them back to their total dependence on the agent who is the sole true source of their dynamism. The classical passage on this in SK I. 6, which the ĪPVV does not fail to quote.
 - ²³ Cf. ĪPVV III p. 334 tām vṛttim jīvanalakṣaṇām ... utthāpayan jīva ity ucyate.

 ²⁴ The limited individuality, the 'living' (jīva), the transmigrating nucleus, therefore corresponds to the plane of the identification of the I with the void (śūnyāhantā) or the prāṇa (prāṇāhantā). It consists in a body called 'eightfold' (puryaṣṭaka), or, according to another traditonal etymology, the 'ogdoade that is in the body', a kind of subtle body that forms the deep structure of the person and determines his continuity as the vehicle of the I in transmigration and the depository of the karma etc. There are various opinions on its composition; from eight elements five tanmātras, manas, buddhi and ahamkāra (see Kālottarāgama XVII 4cd-5ab. SK III.17; see also Sāṃkhyakārikā 40 and Gaudapādahhāṣya) -, which is probably the most widely

- 15. When the subject rests exclusively on these planes, this is the state III 2.15 of deep sleep similar to cosmic dissolution which may or may not be affected by the maculation of māyā, depending on whether the knowable is present or absent (savedyam apavedyam ca).
- On the plane of the identification with the void, since there is no knowable reality, the maculation of māyā is absent. On the plane of the identification with the $pr\bar{a}na$ etc. the state of deep sleep, which is similar to cosmic dissolution²⁵, is affected by the maculation of māyā, since in

credited conception, to thirty (Rāmakantha's Kālottaravrtti p. 126; see Torella 1979: 376, notes 35, 36); some texts are collected in Dvivedi 1983: Upodghāta, 132-133, note 3. In Utp.'s opinion, as gathered from IPVV III pp. 334-336, the puryastaka referring to the subjectivity identified with the void (śūnyāhantā) is constituted by the 'pentad' - the inner group of powers common to all the senses, which gives rise to the five particular breaths and makes the body's machine function; it therefore includes the class of breaths (as what is impelled), the class of the sensory faculties (as what impels) and the śūnyāhantā (as that presiding over the whole) (sa preryam prāņādivargam prerakam ca indriyavargam adhisthātrīm ca śūnyāhantām āksipya vartamānah puryaṣṭakah ity uktah). But, as is noted, the current conception is that of the puryaștaka as connected with the prāṇāhantā (prāṇāhantāpakṣe sarvasya abhimatam puryaṣṭakāvasthānam). In this case one has: the pentad of breaths, combined with the three classes of faculties (those of knowledge, of action and the antahkarana) impelled by the ahamkāra which, however, is not included in the number since it presides over it (prāņādipañcakam ahamkāraparam ahamkāreņa preryamāņam, na tena samam gaņanārham api tu tenādhisthitam ... karaņātmanā vargatrayena sahitam pancakam samvedanopadhanatvena adhistheyam pranadirupam aham ity evam pramātṛbhāvena adhiṣṭhitam puryaṣṭakam). However, the picture that emerges from Abh.'s remarks is not completely clear. In conclusion Abh., still guided by the fikā, says that there is a 'most subtle' body (sūksmatama; is it the one connected with śūnyāhantā?), which is merely the rough sketch of the subtle body (pelavaśarīrasya hi tad āsūtraņamātram); and a body sthūlatama (the physical body). The transmigrating body is only the intermediary one between the two (madhyama), in which there are also the tanmātras. Nevertheless, there is no real difference between the above-mentioned conception and the conception of the puryastaka composed of five tanmātras plus the three components of the antahkarana, since the sparśatanmātra also embraces the five breaths (sparśatanmātreņa prāņādisvīkārāt).

The similarity consists in the fact that both in the state of cosmic dissolution and in deep sleep the constituent elements of the person (the body and so on), like those of external reality, no longer exist. But this non-existence is real in the case of cosmic dissolution, whereas in deep sleep there is merely the loss of the consciousness of them, which may come about through an effort of will in the case of the samādhi, through ingesting a certain substance as in drunkennes, through exhaustion as in sleep. The state of deep sleep is also distinguished from dissolution by its brevity (cf. IPV II p. 265).

- III 2.15 this state there is relation with the knowable, such as the contact with pleasure and so on 26 . -15 -
 - 16. The clearly manifested (spaṣṭāvabhāsā) creation of things in the mental sphere alone which are mistaken for objects of the senses, is called the dream state.
 - The dream state for the limited soul is the creation of objects which appear in the sphere of consciousness as if they were really being seen, etc. –, a creation that occurs through the power of the mind alone without the action of the powers of the senses such as sight etc.; this creation is the work of the Lord²⁷. And this is an illusion inasmuch as this perception, e.g. of a form, common to other subjects, after having lasted as such [for the length of the dream], does not continue later²⁸. 16 –
 - 17. The creation which is stable, in that it is the object of all the senses and external, common to all knowing subjects, is the waking state.
 - The creation which occurs thanks to the powers of all the internal and external senses is the waking state. Here too, as in the dream state, illusion may occur, in the form of seeing two moons etc. $^{29} 17$
 - 18. This triad is to be abandoned, since, as the prana etc. predominate and, consequently, [authentic, free] agency becomes subordinated in it, there is union with pleasure and pain, essentially consisting in the attenuation or intensification of this.
 - These waking, sleeping and dream states are to be abandoned since in them the $pr\bar{a}na$ etc. presumed to be the self are pre-eminent and

²⁶ As the memory, for example, of having slept 'well' shows.

In line with the conception of illusion as apūrnakhyāti the illusion of the dream does not lie in the perception itself but in its lack of permanence.

anyonyānupraveśo bahuśākha uktaḥ), this is a hint at the conception according to which there exist within every single state various planes and aspects corresponding to its merging with other states. In the waking state as perception the dream state as illusion is present etc. (cf. ŚSV pp. 11-12, MV II; in particular see TĀ X.227bc ff. and TS IX where both ĪPK III. 2. 16-17 and MV II are commented on).

²⁷ It is not the limited subject who is responsible for these images, since some are unwelcome and others, that would be welcome, are linked with other times and places (see IPV II p. 226).

freedom is reduced. A slight $(m\bar{a}tray\bar{a})$ increase in freedom means III 2.18 pleasure, joy etc., and thus a decrease in freedom is pain, aversion and so on. The samsāra constituted by all the fruitions is the bond. -18

19. The vital breath, constituted by rising and falling breath, is present in everyone in the dreaming and waking state. In deep sleep the breath called samāna is present, consisting in the interruption of those, in a way similar to what occurs during the equinoxes.

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- And that self identified with the vital breath, in the form of inhalation and exhalation, or rising and falling breath $(pr\bar{a}n\bar{a}p\bar{a}na^{\circ})$, is present in the waking and sleeping states³⁰. When these two breaths become equal $(s\bar{a}mye)^{31}$, like day and night at the equinox $(visuvat\bar{i}-$

In the kārikā cheda therefore has the double meaning of 'interruption' (viccheda) – of the breaths as opposites – and 'equality'. At this point – which corresponds
to the plane of the Pralayākalas – the breath is precisely referred to as 'equal'
(samāna). It does not, however, represent the definitive eclipse of prāṇa and apāna
– which would entail going beyond phenomenal existence – but only a momentary

³⁰ The prāṇa in the broad sense of the word (breath, vital energy, life) is a function, a mode of consciousness itself (cidvṛtti; prāk saṃvit prāņe pariṇatā, said the Tattvārthacintāmaņi, cit in ŠSV p. 68 etc.), capable of transmitting life to realities such as the body, which are in themselves inert and insentient (jada). This undifferentiated vibration (sāmānyaparispanda) is manifested in five fundamental forms which include the whole range of states of consciousness. Rising and falling breath (prāṇa in the narrow sense of the word and apāna) characterize the state of ordinary consciousness (waking and sleeping). They incessantly travel from the heart to the dvādašānta in opposite directions: the prāņa, flowing towards the exterior (is 'day', 'sun'), represents the tension towards the object, the apāna ('night', 'moon') represents the tension towards the subject (cf. IPVV III pp. 342-343). The dualistic opposition between prāņa and apāna is the same as that which pervades ordinary consciousness. Now one now the other predominates, just as in the days of the year night prevails over day and vice versa. This perpetual play of opposition is suspended in the state of deep sleep: in the savedyasauşupta when in the interval between prāṇa and apāna there is a momentary rest in the place of the heart, in the apavedyasausupta throughout the duration of deep states of obnubilation, torpor etc. If this suspension of the prāṇa-apāna flow is immediately plausible for the apavedyasausupta where by definition the pole of objective reality disappears, it is legitimate, however, to ask oneself - as does Abh. (ĪPVV III p. 346), following the $f\bar{i}k\bar{a}$ - how this happens for the savedyasausupta, too. The flowing of the $pr\bar{a}na$ is the reply – does not depend on the mere presence of the cognizable (vedyamātra) but on its appearing as separate from the subject, and the cognizable that is present in this state (sensations of pleasure etc.) is such that it appears, so to speak, to be one with the subject (grāhakād avicchinnam iva).

- III 2.19 $va)^{32}$, due to their increasing and decreasing being blocked, the breath is called samāna ('equal'). -19
 - 20. Flowing upwards through the middle path, the breath is called udāna; it is in the fourth state and is made of fire, it corresponds to the Vijnānākalas, the Mantras and the Lord 33. The supreme breath is the vyāna, whose essence is all.

stasis in which they remain in the state of saṃskāra, ready to manifest themselves once more. They still have to be truly surpassed.

³² In his commentaries Abh. expounds two distinct traditional etymologies of visuvat: 'capable (vat) of pervading (visu)' and 'that sets in motion (suvat) the distinction (vi=viśeșa) or the imbalance of duration between day and night'. Bh. finds this second interpretation obviously contradictory, seeing that he insists against all likelihood on glossing prerayati (with which Abh. explains suvati) with nivārayati. The difficulty may perhaps be overcome by understanding that visuvat sets in motion the imbalance only insofar as, there being a momentary balance, the imbalance must necessarily follow. The passage from the Kālapāda (another name for the Kālottara) cit. in IPVV III p. 343 may be understood in this sense: sāmyam vaisamyajanakam visuvat santatam smrtam (this ardhaśloka, not included in the Sārdhatriśatikālottara, probably comes from another of its many versions). The image of the visuvat is not merely incidental but is taken from the Saiva scriptures, where the systematic projection of external time, with all its subdivisions (including the visuvat) in the individual dimension, is frequently found, with the consequent identification of cosmic time with 'prānic' time; in particular see Kālottarāgama (sārdhatriśati) XI. 1-10 and X. 22-23 with the relative vṛtti, SvT VII. 168 ff.; for another use of visuvat see for example SvT II. 316-334a; cf. SSP III pp. 358 ff., Śaivāgamaparibhāṣāmañjarī (transl.) p. 276. Similar conceptions are to be found in the Buddhist Kālacakra school: Vimalaprabhā, passim, Nadapāda's Sekoddeśaţīkā pp. 42-44; on visuvat - but understood as taking place lagnodayābhisamdhau - see Vimalaprabhã p. 178.

33 It appears from the fragmentary indications in the ĪPVV that the fikā suggests two interpretations of the compound vijñānākalamantrešo — a karmadhāraya, as is explicitly said, and not a dvandva (which would have required the plural). The most obvious one is 'the Vijñānākalas and the Lords of the Mantras'; the other, adopted by Abh., is 'the Vijñānākalas, the Mantras in the broad sense of the word (i.e. Mantras, Lords of the Mantras and Great Lords of the Mantras) and the Lord (Abh.: the Lord Sadāsiva)'. From the fikā quotations one would obtain, more precisely, 'Vijñānākalas, the Mantras, the Lords of the Mantras and Īśvara', where Mantreśvara (Lord of the Mantras) derives, according to the tantra method, from mantra and īśa, to which, however, an individual meaning is also assigned (cf. ĪPVV III p. 352, nanu atra vyākhyāne mantreśvarāh kena samgrhītāh / mantrapadena tajjāfīyatvād īšapadena samānavācyatākṛtena tantranyāyeneti).

- [The breath is referred to as] udāna because - after accomplishing III 2.20 the unification of the prāṇa and the apāna through the interruption of their flow along the two sides and transversely – it rises ($udgaman\bar{a}t$) flowing upwards through the middle path³⁴. This breath – which flows in the fourth state -35, similar to the middle eye, has the quality of fire because it rises upwards. The breath ceases to flow in the state beyond the fourth - this being the state of fullness and as such devoid of spatio-temporal delimitations -36 and entering a state of absolute fullness takes the name of vyāna. These two states are to be attained since in them the energy of the prāṇa appears as essentially constituted by the supreme $Lord^{37}$. -20 -

³⁴ The middle path is the susumnā; the two side paths are idā and pingalā.

³⁶ In fact the flowing presupposes spatial and temporal change, whereas the transfourth is the state of absolute simultaneous fullness.

³⁵ The breath udāna rises, therefore, along the susumnā burning every duality (IPVV III pp. 350-1 cites some of them: creation and reabsorption, prāṇa and apāna, day and night, birth and death, aversion and attachment). The fourth state - together with the state beyond the fourth - constitutes going beyond ordinary existence. In this state differentiation dissolves like melting butter, the idantā is veiled by the I as on the Sadasiva and Isvara levels. The objective realities with which the I had identified himself are themselves transformed on contact with the I which is finally recognized as endowed with the divine qualities of sovereignty, permanence etc., so that they continue to subsist, but as though they have ceased to be objects; they are compared to copper which on contact with mercury is transformed into gold. In the state beyond the fourth state the difference is only one of intensity; the quality leap has already been achieved. The state beyond the fourth state, in which only the 'pervading' breath (vyāna) subsists, is the stabilization of the fourth, the differentiation is now completely dissolved, the idantā dispelled; remaining within the terms of the simile suggested by Abh., even the gold into which the various levels of subjectivity have been transformed - from the body to the void - as it is increasingly permeated by the mercury wears away and finally dissolves, these realities only surviving in the residual form of samskāra (cf. ĪPVV III pp. 327-8, 331, 350; ĪPV II pp. 257-8, 270-1, 275-6).

³⁷ Literally 'similar to the supreme Lord'. But my translation is in conformity with Abh.'s gloss (see 'ext note 108), which in turn appears to follow Utp.'s indications.

SECTION IV. SUMMARY OF THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES

- 1. The very Self of all creatures is Maheśvara, one, whose form is all, full of the undivided consciousness 'I-this'.
- The one, full of the 'savouring' ($^{\circ}$ camatkāra $^{\circ}$) of the undivided perceiving subject, of the undivided perceptible object and of the fusion of the two 2 , in the fourth state which is to be sought first 3 , the Self common to all living beings, whose form is all, is Maheśvara. 1 -
- 2. There (tatra), realities such as the mind etc., which are included in the sphere of the 'this' freely created [by the Lord] (svasṛṣṭedaṃbhāge), are caused by him to be considered as the fictitious I (ahaṃkāra°) as being the perceiving subject.
- This universe springing forth as constituted by the free expansion $(jrmbh\bar{a}^{\circ})$ of the supreme Lord⁴, realities that are created as the object
- The translation refers to the most immediate and general meaning of the text of the $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$. The far more complex explanation given by the vrtti depends on considering the two terms of the expression aham idam first separately and then together.
- ² The above note has already mentioned how this interpretation has been arrived at. As Abh. explains (see text note 2), we have here the reflective awareness of the perceiving subject as not distinct from the other subjects, i.e. of the fundamental unity of the subject beneath the apparent fragmentation; the same applies to the object; and finally the awareness of the ultimate non-otherness (melanā) of subject and object.
 - ³ Because starting from this the maculation begins to dissolve (see text note 1).
- ⁴ The text, which remains doubtful, seems to contain a double interpretation (tantra) of tatra in the kārikā (which I have translated in a deliberately vague manner): maheśvarasya jṛmbhāmaye 'smin nirgate and tasminn idantāparāmarśe. This would coincide with the brief references in IPVV III p. 358 to the tīkā, which evidently gave this type of interpretation: tatra iti vaiyadhikaranyena vivṛtya sāmānādhikaranyena vivṛnoti (i.e. tatra taken alone or agreeing with 'bhāge). Abh. in his two commentaries also follows the line of the simultaneous double function of tatra, which he refers in both cases to Maheśvara: 'Maheśvara being the self, the part 'this' is created by him upon a substratum constituted by himself' (thus in the first case

of perception – the mind, the breath, the void – in the sphere of the IV 2 reflective awareness 'this', precisely these realities, which represent a part of the knowable, are caused to be considered as the fictitious I and are, on the strength of this, transformed into the limited perceiving subject. – 2 –

- 3. The individual subjects considered as being many are the fruit of the non-recognition of their true nature. In them action and beatitude are created, that is, the fruition characterized by pleasure and pain⁵.
- It is precisely the rendering limited of that whose essence is all which is called 'non-recognition'. And thus the awareness of a limited subjectivity attributed to multiple and fragmented realities, such as the mind, the breath and so on⁶, is called absence of the perfect knowledge of the supreme subjectivity. The individual selves are many; in them who are manifested as knowing subjects Maheśvara creates his own beatitude and activity, which are themselves inherent in the only real agency. This is precisely the fruition which is called pleasure, since it consists in a particle of [divine] beatitude, and pain, since it is an infinitesimal fragment of [divine] activity. The fact that activity is pain will be explained later. 3 —
- 4. In the limited subject sattva, rajas and tamas correspond to knowledge, activity and, thirdly, $m\bar{a}y\bar{a}^7$, in the Lord for whom things represent his own body (svāngarūpeṣu).

tatra is a locative absolute with sati understood, in the second, it is a locative depending on svasṛṣṭa°).

⁵ The capacity for fruition that the Lord instils in the various limited souls is therefore a reflection created by him of the powers of beatitude and activity, which are, on the contrary, innate in him. They are therefore *kalpita*. Beatitude and activity are not a different thing from *jñāna*° and *kriyāśakti*, *prakāśa* and *vimarśa* (ĪPVV III p. 359).

⁶ Abh. explains this point (*ibid.* p. 360) by using the example of a long scrpent (*gonāsa*), whose body is pervaded by a single life (*jīvatva*), capable, however, of being divided into many distinct partial vitalities which animate the individual parts of the same serpent when it is cut into pieces; and also capable of becoming one again.

The power of māyā is that which on the Sadāśiva-Īśvara plane determines the appearance of *idantā* within the consciousness (ĨPVV III p. 361). It is a further expansion of *kriyāśakti*; indeed, in Abh.'s words (*ibid.* p. 366), it is the *kriyāśakti* itself in which, however, instead of *samharaṇa* predominating (*sṛṣṭi* predominates in *jñānaśakti*) śūnyatā or niṣedha predominates, i.e. the mutual delimitation of subject

- IV 4 The knowledge and activity of the Lord, together with māyā, become sattva, rajas and tamas in the limited subject. 4
 - 5. Owing to the state of differentiation, these qualities (guṇānām), which are transformed in the faculties and in the products, cannot be considered as powers inherent in a subject who is the possessor of them⁸.
 - Since sattva, rajas and tamas are manifested as distinct [from the subject], the term powers may not be applied to them, in that there is no differentiation between the power and the possessor of the power. In actual fact everything is an expansion of the power(s) 9 . 5 -
 - 6. In the Lord there is being, heatitude, activity. In the limited subject there is that, the absence of that and the two together¹⁰. The latter constitute rajas, which is pain and is composed of sattva and tamas intermixed.
 - In the Lord, the infinite agency, whose essence is 'savouring' (ca-matkāra°), is called activity and consists of supreme light and beatitude¹¹.

and object. This power does belong to Siva but, as the formulation of the $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$ points out, it is not on the same plane as the powers of knowledge and action, since it is connected with differentiation (cf. *ibid.* p. 361).

- This kārikā is intended to be a reply to those who want to take the parallel between knowledge, activity, and māyā, on the one hand, and sattva, rajas, and tamas on the other, too far, by considering the latter 'powers' of the limited subject just as the former are powers of Siva. Utp. replies that this cannot be so, because the limited subject looks on them and on all the deployment of phenomena that evolves from them and is imbued with them as other than himself, whereas the power is by definition not separate from the subject who possesses it. In the limited subject knowledge (prakāśa) etc. are not spontaneous (naisargikya) and autonomous functions, but require the contribution of other factors e.g. the senses in order to be performed, which are all penetrated by and derived from the gunas. This is why they are called gunas, i.e. 'qualities, components', but also 'subordinate, auxiliary elements' (cf. IPVV III p. 362).
- ⁹ What has been said so far is only valid, however, within the limits of the world of differentiation. Once the subject recognizes his own true nature, the objective world ceases to appear in the guise of otherness and it is then that all the principles become what they effectively are, his 'powers'.

What is referred to here, as the *vṛtti* makes clear, is the *guṇa rajas*, constituted by the presence of *sattā* as *prakāśa-ānanda* (the *guṇa sattva*) and by its (their) absence (the *guṇa tamas*).

These qualities of the Lord are involved with one another and in the final analysis are identified with one another (cf. IPV II p. 289 yā sattā bhavanakartṛtā

On the contrary, in the individual self this light and beatitude, which have IV 6 become knowable realities, constitute sattva. Their absence is tamas. Sattva and tamas — or light-beatitude and their absence — though two distinct entities, are mutually united to form rajas. In the limited subject activity and pain are called rajas. — 6 —

- 7. Those realities which in the Lord are the object of an unconventional reflective awareness in terms of 'this', those, mixed and separated, are thus manifested in various ways¹².
- The things that constitute this universe (ye caite), which are to Maheśvara as in the case of the child indicated by the meaning of the word 'this' (reflective awareness being the very essence of the light), without the connection with [or: the consideration of] the conventional linguistic expression 'this' coming into play¹³, those very things appear since they were created thus by God as particular realities (svalakṣaṇa°) thanks to several manifestations having the same substratum (°sāmānādhi-karaṇyena) and in many forms insofar as they are universals each taken singly¹⁴. 7 –
- 8. On the contrary, in the individual subject 15, those entities that are manifested separately become the object of mental elaboration in the

sphurattārūpā ... saiva ... camatkārarūpā satī kriyāśaktir ucyate ... svātmaviśrāntirūpatvāc ca saiva ānandaḥ). In the paśu the guṇa sattva corresponds to the sattā and
ānanda aspect in the Lord.

12 'On the plane of the limited subject' is understood.

- 13 Some form of parāmarśa is inseparable from the pure light of cognition, as reflective awareness reactive to it, an act of appropriation on the part of the I. On this level, on which the 'this' is conceived purely and simply as a negation of the I (ĪPVV p. 367), things are the object of parāmarśa only in terms of 'this', without any other differentiations. And furthermore it is specified that this parāmarśa is also free from any contact with the conventional linguistic expression 'this', since the word which is, as we know, inseparable from it is still at a level transcending every articulated language, similar rather to a silent nod of the head. An example that clarifies this is the dim and undifferentiated awareness of (and reaction to) what is other than itself and that surrounds it, that the newborn child is presumed to have.
 - ¹⁴ See the following kārikā.
- 15 Kārikā 7 has defined the status of the object in relation to the Lord. But Abh. (ĪPVV III p. 367) makes it clear that it is not the supreme Lord in this case, since at the level of Paramasiva one cannot speak of any objectivity whatsoever, this only beginning to emerge when he assumes the nature of Sadāsiva and Īśvara (indeed the

- IV 8 sphere of memory, imagination and so on, and have a variety of distinct names.
 - The entities that are manifested separately, that is, the universals 16 are shown by the limited subjects thanks to the power of mental elaboration ($vikalpanaśakty\bar{a}$) 17 as the object of inner reflective awareness through various names such as 'jar', 'silvery', 'white', 'cloth', 'cart' and so on. The limited subjects, conditioned by the experience of these objects, then also make themselves the object of various denotations such as 'I am thin', 'I am happy or unhappy'. In memory this function of mental elaboration takes place in the wake of the previous direct experience; in the various forms of imagination etc. it is, on the contrary, autonomous 18 . It is precisely this manifestation of a differentiation between perceiving subject and object perceived, substantiated by the word 19 , which constitutes the bond of the samsāra in the limited soul. -8
 - 9-10. The creation that pertains to him is not also common [to other subjects] and is dependent on the creation of the Lord. It occurs in the limited subject essentially identical to the Lord in virtue of the very

plane of the Lord (pati^o, īśvaradaśā) corresponds to these). Kārikā 8 expounds how the object appears on the plane of limited subjectivity.

- Of the two kinds of object, particular (svalakṣaṇa) and universal (sāmānya), only the latter (cf. text note 16) is taken into consideration here, because the word, which in this $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$ is shown as that which accompanies and renders possible discursive thought, has as its content precisely the $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya$, i.e. the $\bar{a}bh\bar{a}sa$ taken separately (see above II. 3. 2).
- ¹⁷ Vikalpana is, as has been seen, that characteristic function of discursive thought that proceeds to define the object through the evocation and negation of what is other than it. In this the essential role is played by the word, as the Buddhists show by the conception of the apoha.
 - ¹⁸ See above I. 8. 1 ff.
- Many śaiva texts insist on the fundamental ambivalence of the word, which permeates every level of human activity. The powers of the word, often conceived as the powers that preside over the various alphabetical classes, may lead man to freedom or enmesh him even more in the samsāra. To remain within the terms of the discourse of the vrtti, they may increase the dichotomies of the vikalpa but they may also, if correctly polarized, gradually re-absorb the vikalpa in pure reflective awareness pure insofar as it is not dualizing (the two possible ways of overcoming the vikalpa will be dealt with at some length later). ĪPVV III pp. 379-380 refers to some of the classical passages of these speculations with quotations from the SK, the Timirodghāta (the explicit attribution to this text is contained in SSV p. 7) and the MV, to which the SS, at least, can be added.

power of the Lord, ignored, however, as such²⁰, which aims at prevent- IV 9-10 ing the resting on the self, unstable, whose nature is vital energy, diversified in the multiplicity of the various phonemes, coinciding with the activity of mental elaboration (vikalpakriyayā).

- The individual subject whose nature is identical to that of the Lord creates, thanks to the power of the Lord not recognized as such, objects in the form of the various universals²¹, not perceptible on the part of the other subjects and modelled on the direct experience of objects that may be experienced by everyone. And this power of the Lord, aimed at obstructing the resting on authentic subjectivity, takes the name of māyā; it contains the infinite number of all the various phonemes K etc. -, it is continuously in motion in the form of vital energy, it carries out the function called 'mental elaboration'. In this way it creates the objects internally. 9-10 -
- 11. The creation of the Lord may be common or not common to all subjects (sādhāraṇo 'nyathā ca), manifesting itself [in both cases] in all clarity. With the suppression of the mental constructs, resulting from concentration on a single point, the plane of the Lord is gradually reached²².

As we saw earlier, also the limited subject possesses an innate power of creation which is in essence no different from that of the Lord, since the individual himself is essentially identical to the Lord although he ignores or has forgotten this identity. This power of creation, limited by non-awareness, remains restricted to the individual sphere: what is created are images, feelings, ideas etc., which depend more (as in the case of memory) or less (as in fantasy) on the objects in the phenomenal world created by the Lord. These two kinds of objects and of creations are distinguished by being the last 'common to all subjects', the others are 'not common' i.e. not able to be experienced except by the limited subject who creates them. But the power of creation is essentially the same.

The object of the mental elaboration (vikalpa etc.) is not the svalakṣaṇa, but the sāmānya, which is not attached to a definite time and place.

²² Or: '... becomes the object of the reflective awareness ['I am this universe'] peculiar to the condition of Īśvara'. The creation of the Lord is therefore twofold. On the one hand it constitutes the world of objective existence, regarding which all subjects are coordinated; on the other – restricted to a single individual – it constitutes the sphere of dream and error, such as the mistaken sight of two moons, which as far as clarity and immediacy are concerned is on the same plane as the other (cf. III. 2. 16); cf. ĪPVV III p. 386 aiśvarasya sargasya spastavabhasatvam, ata eva avikalpyateti rūpam. This interpretation of the first part of the kārikā and in particular of the expression sādhārano 'nyathā ca is that suggested by the vrtti, but not the only possible one. For instance, one may understand, as appears from the

IV 11 — On the contrary, the creation of the Lord is common to all cognizing subjects — since they are born within it²³ — or also limited to only one subject like that which is manifested in dream, in error and so on, where it concerns a single subject. Permeated only by the reflective awareness of 'I am this universe', this creation of the Lord is free from mental constructs (vikalpojjhitā) — since no differentiation arises within it²⁴ — and it is manifested in all clarity (spaṣṭāvabhāsā ca)²⁵. On this plane, by applying oneself and intensely cultivating those moments when the mental construct becomes attenuated, which occur sporadically (antarāntarā) while the activity²⁶ pertaining to the limited subject is taking place, the beings in the power of the saṃsāra gradually attain, through

 $fik\bar{a}$, 'the creation of the Lord, common or not common, is different (from the creation of the limited subject)', in which $as\bar{a}dh\bar{a}rana$ ('not common') is implied by the conjunction ca. To this Abh, adds an interpretation of his own ($\bar{I}PVV$ III p. 386 and $\bar{I}PV$ II pp. 301-2): if the creation pertaining to the limited subject, or the creation of the vikalpas, assumes full vividness being experienced differently – i.e. recognizing the power of the Lord in it –, then it too becomes common, i.e. able to be experienced by everyone, as in the case of he who, being imbued with the energy of the mantras, becomes able to transform his representations and intentions into reality; in this case the $p\bar{a}savah$ sargah, too, can lead to the condition of the Lord ($\bar{t}svarat\bar{a}m$ asya $dad\bar{a}ti$). As he himself explains, the aisah sargah of the $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$ may be understood as $p\bar{a}savah$ sargah, insofar as also this latter form of creation rests, in its ultimate essence, on the former; if this interpretation is not directly referred to in the vrtti and $fik\bar{a}$ – Abh, adds – it is only because the ultimate identity of the $p\bar{a}sava$ and aisvara creation is too obvious to be stated overtly.

²³ In the sense that the creation of the object is parallel to that of the subject. Reality, in effect, is constituted by the interaction of determinate levels of subjectivity with the corresponding levels of objectivity (see e.g. PH pp. 6-7).

The absence of the split between subject and objective reality constitutes the cardinal difference between Iśvara's creation and the paśu's creation (IPVV III p. 388 'bhedānudayāt' iti / anena aiśvarasya sargasya pāśavāt sargāt vailakṣanyam darśitam; see also II p. 329); and it is precisely for this reason that the creation of the Lord does not represent a bond. However, it must be considered, Abh. continues (ibid.), that in the paśu's creation two levels may be distinguished, and whereas the first only shows the emergence of differentiation, with the māyic and āṇava maculations, it is the second, presided over by Brahmā (cf. III. 2. 1) and consisting in the various psychic and mental activities (pratyaya), that directly causes the karmic maculation and binds to the samsāra.

²⁵ Dharmakīrti defines the type of knowledge that pertains to the yogins in similar terms: PV III. 281 prāguktam yoginām jāānam teṣām tadbhāvanāmayam / vidhūtakalpanājalam spaṣṭam evāvabhāsate; see also PVin I. 28 and the following passage in prose (Steinkellner 1972: 203).

 $^{2\overline{6}}$ I.e. the *vikalpa*.

the emergence of the state of the Lord in all its fullness, the dissolution IV 11 of the state of limited individuality. -11 -

- 12. He who, having all as his essence, thus knows: «All this multiform deployment is mine», he, even in the flow of mental constructs, attains the state of Maheśa²⁷.
- Also the individual subject who though continuing to produce mental constructs deriving precisely from the power of the Lord has become fully aware of his own nature as Lord 'Mine is this multiform deployment of the saṃsāra' this subject, too, who permeates the universe without any differentiation and transforms all the mental constructs into pure reflective awareness, attains the state of Maheśvara. 12 -
- 13. The liberated soul looks at the 'common' cognizable reality as being undifferentiated from himself, like Maheśvara; the bound soul, on the contrary, looks at it as absolutely differentiated.
- Cognizable reality 28 is the same for the bound and the liberated soul; however, the bound soul knows it as absolutely differentiated and the liberated soul as the body of his very self. 13 -
- 14. But when he is completely full of the infinite series of principles dissolved in him, he is Siva, solely consciousness and bliss, having as his body the supreme syllable²⁹.
- But when the cognizable is entirely dissolved within him and there is the full consciousness of the I, the state of Siva is attained. 14 -

This is an alternative path to that expounded in the previous $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$; both are directed to the same aim which is to free from the bond of the *vikalpas*. In the first the *vikalpas* were gradually suppressed by fixing the *nirvikalpa* (cf. PH pp. 39-40; $\bar{I}PVV$ III p. 386 avikalpakaparigrhītaspaṣṭavastuviṣayaikāgratāvalambanena); here, on the contrary, their inclusion – and transfiguration – in the sphere of the totality of consciousness is taught.

²⁸ I.e. the so-called objective reality (cf. IV.11) facing both the liberated soul and the bound soul.

Unlike the situation expounded in the previous $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$, where the cognizable subsisted though in a state of non-differentiation with the I – a state that Abh. compares to that of the plane of Sadāśiva-Īśvara –, here one cannot even speak of cognizable reality, as it has now been dissolved and absorbed in the I without a trace. This is the state of the supreme Śiva.

- IV 15. Thus seeing the true reality of what is his own self and the knowledge and action that pertain to him, he knows and creates objects as he wishes.
 - Having thus recognized as Lord his own self full of the infinite powers of knowledge and action once the signs of recognition represented by the powers have come to light, he sees and creates all things at will. -15


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- 16. Thus this new, easy path has been explained by me as the great master expounded it in the Śivadṛṣṭi. Thus he who, putting his feet on it, brings to light in the self the nature of creator of the universe whose essence is the nature of Śiva, and is uninterruptedly absorbed in it, attains perfection.
- Within the course of ordinary reality, in its various forms, solely in virtue of an act of recognition ($pratyabhij\bar{n}\bar{a}m\bar{a}tr\bar{a}t$) is the state of Śiva attained. This new path, devoid of tortuosity, was indicated in the treatise that bears the name of Śivadṛṣṭi by the venerable Somānanda, who had direct experience of the form of the blessed Parameśvara; I have here furnished a logical justification of this path, thus causing it to enter the hearts of men. He who by applying himself intensely to this enters into the nature of Śiva, becomes in this very life a liberated soul. 16 —
- 17. Just like the beloved, who after much insistence finally stands in the presence of the maid in love, though he is there before her he does not give her any pleasure until she recognizes who he is as he seems just like other men until that moment —, so for mankind the self, who is yet the Lord of the world, cannot manifest his own glory until his qualities have been brought to light. For this reason the doctrine of the recognition of the Lord has here been expounded.
- The example of the beloved shows that the recognition of the Lord must be awakened³⁰ and that its fruit is extraordinary. -17 -

³⁰ Utp. uses the causative form of the root upapad, as he has done before, in his oscillation between the meanings of 'awaken', 'render possible', and 'justify logically' (cf. also the following $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$).

- 18. In order that the ordinary man too can attain perfection (°siddhi°) IV 18 effortlessly, Utpala, son of Udayākara, has explained with argumentations (upapāditā) this recognition of the Lord.
 - This easy path to perfection has thus been shown. 18 -

Here ends the İśvarapratyabhijñāvṛtti.



ABBREVIATIONS

Abh. Abhinavagupta AK Abhidharmakośa

AKBh Abhidharmakośabhāṣya APS Ajadapramātṛsiddhi

Bh Bhāskarī HB Hetubindu

ĪPK Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā ĪPV Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī

ĪPVV Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī

ĪS Īśvarasiddhi

KSTS Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies

MMP Mahārthamañjarīparimala MPĀ Matangapārameśvarāgama

MṛĀ Mṛgendrāgama MṛV Mṛgendravṛtti MV Mālinīvijaya

MVV Mālinīvijayavārttika

NB Nyāyabindu NBT Nyāyabindutīkā NM Nyāyamañjarī

PH Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya
PS Pramāṇasamuccaya
PTLV Parātriṃśikalaghuvṛtti
PTV Parātriṃśikāvivaraṇa

PV Pramāņavārttika (PV I = Svārthānumāna, PV II = Pramāņasiddhi, PV III =

Pratyaksa. PV IV = Parārthānumāna)

PVSV Pramāņavārttikasvavrtti

PVin Pramāņaviniścaya

ŚD ŚivadṛṣṭiŚDVṛ ŚivadṛṣṭivṛttiŚS Śivasūtra

ŚSV Śivasūtravimarśinī

ŚSĀ Śivastotrāvalī ŚV Ślokavārttika SK Spandakārikā SN Spandanirnaya SS Sambandhasiddhi SSVr Sambandhasiddhivrtti SP Sambandhapariksā SPr Samvitprakāśa

SDS Sarvadarśanasamgraha

SSP Somasambhupaddhati SvT Svacchandatantra

TĀ Tantrāloka

TĀV Tantrālokaviveka

TBh TarkabhāṣāTP TattvaprakāśaTS Tattvasamgraha

TSP Tattvasamgrahapañjikā

TSā Tantrasāra Utp. Utpaladeva

VBh Vijñānabhairava

VP Vākyapadīya (the kārikās are quoted according to Rau's edition)

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