SĀNTARĀSA & ABHINAVAGUPTA’S
PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

J. L. MASSON AND M. V. PATWARDHAN

Abhinavagupta is generally considered to be the greatest of the many Indian writers in the field of poetics. The breadth and profundity of his intellect, and the originality and brilliance of his critical insight, entitle him to a distinguished place in the ranks of philosophers of aesthetics of all lands and all periods of history.

This tenth century Kashmiri scholar advanced ideas in every way as interesting and sophisticated as those propounded by Aristotle, yet his work is virtually unknown in the West beyond a very small circle of Sanskritists. It is to remedy this situation by making some of the central insights of Abhinavagupta available to literary critics and the interested layman that the authors offer the present volume. Most of the material they present has never before been translated.

The introduction is meant primarily for students of comparative literature and the general reader. The body of the work is divided into two parts. In the first, the authors examine the various influences which went into the shaping of Abhinavagupta’s philosophy of aesthetic experience, a unique synthesis of original insights into traditional Indian poetics with the śaiva philosophy of Kashmir. They deal with such problems as: the nature of obscenity, the aesthetic enjoyment of tragic literature, the nature of poetic imagination, Tantric rituals as drama, and, above all, the relation between imaginative experiences and transcendent mystical experiences. In the second part of the work, the authors reproduce and translate everything written on the subject of ṣāntarasa (“the aesthetic experience of tranquillity”) prior to Abhinavagupta.

§ 6.—

Rs. 25/-
ŚĀNTARASA

By

J. L. Masson

M. V. Patwardhan

BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, POONA

1969
Śāntarasa

and

Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics
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J. L. MASSON
M. V. PATWARDHAN

BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, POONA

1969
SYNTHESES AND PREPARATION OF ALCOHOLS OF MUSCALIS

Price Rs. 25

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DR. B. N. DANDEKAR,
HON. SECRETARY
BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
POONA-4.
For Jack and Diana
who made it possible
"Two birds, deepest of friends,
live on the same tree.
One eats the sweet fruit.
The other, without eating, watches."
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FORWORD

I have great pleasure in writing a Foreword to this book by Prof. M. V. Patwardhan and Mr. J. L. Masson and in introducing the latter whom I have known intimately for some time and who was struck me with his flair for Sanskrit and its cultivation and for the literary study of Sanskrit literature, qualities which, undoubtedly, he has imbied from his chief teachers L. Renou of the Sorbonne and Prof. D. H. H. Ingalls of Harvard. His association with these two scholars explains his association with me.

This monograph is on Śanta Rasa and Abhinavagupta’s aesthetics as it emerges out of the philosophy of Rasa as expounded by him. It stems out of my *Number of Rasas* which at the time of its first appearance in the middle of the forties, was the first detailed exposition of this important subject. In that work, I had also offered a critical edition of the section relating to the Śanta from Abhinavagupta’s commentary on the *Nāṭya Śāstra*. Naturally, while the material given in the present study has already been known, the treatment of the authors has given it a freshness, illustrating the principles of novelty elucidated by Anandavardhana in Uddyota IV of *Dvanyāloka*. As Max Müller said, at every stage, a fresh study of a branch of knowledge is required. In the introduction, as also in the main part of their work, the authors have traversed a wide ground in respect of literature and response to it, and on the background of the latest writers, critics and philosophers in the West and the attempts of a few of them to interpret or understand the contributions of the Sanskrit writers, they have highlighted some of the most important ideas of Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. The thought of these two masters of Sanskrit literary criticism, particularly of the latter, is examined on the background of their school of philosophy, Kashmir Śaivism. But as they go, the authors take in their stride many other related concepts which involve parenthetical treatment; added to these are the very large number of references to works and authors, but the reader should be able to follow the main theme of the authors namely the conception of Rasāsvāda as elucidated by the two great aesthetes Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta.

It would not be possible to fall in line with the authors on some of the literary judgements that they have passed on Sanskrit poems and plays, e.g. those on p. ix of the Introduction. Also in some contexts of textual interpretation, the authors have expressed their disagreement with earlier writers and have given their own interpretation. However this is not the place to enter into discussion of details.
Not only does the study in the following pages show the extensive reading of the authors, but it also expressly mentions a chain of further studies, connected with the present one, which the authors have prepared. As a member of the Indian Advisory Committee of the American Institute of Indian Studies, I am pleased that a Grantee of the Institute, one of the joint-authors of the Volume, has done remarkably well on his grant-programme in India. Quite a few of the younger generation of American scholars are engaged in pure Sanskrit and Śastraic studies, and by assisting them, the Institute is giving a fillip to Sanskrit studies.

Vijayādaśami
20–10–1969
Madras.

V. RAGHAVAN
PREFACE

The present study grew out of a much larger work that the authors are presently completing. We have both been long interested in Sanskrit literary criticism. Professor Patwardhan has taught the Dvanyāloka and the Rasagaṇḍādhara over a period of fifteen years to students in Fergusson College. Mr. Masson has translated and annotated the Dvanyāloka and the first chapter of the Locana for his Ph. D. thesis at Harvard.

When we met we discovered a deep mutual interest in Abhinavagupta's Locana, the greatest Indian work on aesthetics, but a text so difficult that even the Pandits hesitate to teach it in the Pāṭhasālās. We began meeting twice a week for 3–4 hour sessions to read and discuss textual difficulties in the Locana. We soon found that we shared nearly identical views on the major problems in this work. Gradually most of the textual mysteries began to yield up their secrets, and we decided to translate the entire Locana as a joint work.

The section on sāntarasa was originally to have been an appendix to this three-volume annotated translation. But we found that so many issues in the Locana had a direct bearing on the problem of sāntarasa that it really required a more extensive and separate treatment. Especially in reading the sāntarasa passage in the Abhinavabhārati, a text of notorious difficulty, we found that our readings in the Locana were a great help to its elucidation. It is primarily as an aid to understanding this sāntarasa passage of the Abhinavabhārati that we are publishing the results of our research. We regard this as an introduction to our translation of the Dvanyālokalocana which will be published along with the Dvanyāloka in the Harvard Oriental Series.

It is a pleasant duty to thank those who have helped us: Mr. Masson first read the Dvanyāloka with the late Professor L. Renou in Paris, who maintained a lively interest in Sanskrit literary
theory and urged on him the necessity of doing serious work in this field. Professor V. Raghavan was kind enough to read with him daily the fourth Uddyota with the Lokaṇa. His pioneering work, "The Number of Rasas", and his magnum opus, "Bhoja’s Śrīgāra-prakāśa", provided much of the stimulus for writing the present volume. Professor D. H. H. Ingalls read Mr. Masson's translation of the first and fourth Uddyota of the Dhvanyālōka and made many valuable suggestions on method which we have followed here. Mr. Masson also wishes to thank his old friends, Professor B. K. Matilal of the University of Pennsylvania, and Professor K. Bhattacharya of the Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris, for stimulating discussions over the past years on many of these very topics. Several Pandits of the Deccan College have always been very happy to discuss many of the issues with us. We wish to thank especially Dr. V. W. Paranjpe and Pandit Srimivasashastri for their help. Mr. R. P. Goldman from the Sanskrit department of the University of Pennsylvania helped us to clarify many of our ideas on Sanskrit and general literature while reading the entire work in manuscript. We wish also to thank Mr. J. Losty of the Sanskrit Department at Oxford University for reading through the work and making numerous corrections in the English text, and for his pointed questions. Mr. Masson wishes to thank the A. I. I. S. for a fellowship from 1968–69 which made this study possible by supporting his research, during which time the present work was published. It is a great pleasure to thank our good friend Dr. S. D. Joshi for his constant encouragement. Dr. R. N. Dandekar kindly accepted the work for publication in the B. O. R. I. Oriental Series for which we are grateful. We wish to thank Dr. V. Raghavan, whose work in Sanskrit poetics is well-known to all scholars in the field, for writing the foreword to this volume.

Finally, Mr. I. R. Walavekar and his staff very efficiently and pleasantly saw this work through the press in the short time of two months, for which we remain indebted to them.
ABBREVIATIONS

(For details, see Bibliography)

A. Bh. Abhinavabhārati, Abhinavagupta’s commentary on the Nāṭyaśāstra.
Ānanda Ānandavardhana, author of the Dhvanyāloka.
Avaloka Dhanika’s commentary on the Daśarūpaka of Dhananājaya.
BN Bhaṭṭaṇāyaka, author of the lost Hṛdayadarpana, often quoted by Abhinava.
BP Bālapriyā commentary on the Dhvanyāloka.
Bharata Author of the Nāṭyaśāstra.
D. Āl. Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana.
DR Daśarūpaka of Dhananājaya.
Daṇḍin Author of Kāvyādarśa.
Gnoli R. Gnoli, author of “The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta”.
G. O. S. Gaekwad Oriental Series.
HC Hemacandra’s Kāvyānusāsana (with his own commentaries).
ĪPVV Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśini of Abhinavagupta.
KM Kāvyamāla.
KP Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammaṭa.
KSTS Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies.
Kane P. V. Kane, author of “History of Sanskrit Poetics”.
Kaumudi The Kaumudi commentary by Uttuṅgodaya on the Dhvanyāloka locanaka of Abhinavagupta.
Locana Abhinavagupta’s commentary on the Dhvanyāloka.
M. Bh. Mahābhārata.
NŚ Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata.
NSP Nirṇayasāgara Press,
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<td>K. C. Pandey, &quot;Abhinavagupta, an Historical and Philosophical Study&quot;.</td>
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<td>RG</td>
<td>Rasagaṅgādhara of Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja.</td>
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<td>Raghavan</td>
<td>V. Raghavan, author of &quot;The Number of Rasas&quot;.</td>
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<td>ŚR</td>
<td>Śāntarasa.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Śrīdhara</td>
<td>Śrīdhara's comm. on the Kāvyaprakāśa, ed. by Sivaprasād Bhattacharya.</td>
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<td>VB</td>
<td>Vījñānabhairava, with comm. partly by Kṣemarāja, and partly by Śivopādhyāya.</td>
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<td>VJ</td>
<td>Vakroktijīvita of Kuntaka.</td>
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<td>VV</td>
<td>Mahimabhatta's Vyaktiviveka.</td>
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<td>Vāmana</td>
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<td>YS</td>
<td>Pataňjali's Yogasūtra.</td>
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<td>YV</td>
<td>Yogavāsiṣṭhamahārāmāyaṇa.</td>
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INTRODUCTION

A word on methodology: Philip Rawson in a recent article on Indian aesthetics writes: "In fact I believe that in the field of aesthetics (as in the field of logic) a great series of thinkers who lived in India and wrote in Sanskrit between the fourth century A.D. and the thirteenth have put many ideas which must be brought into our present-day debates on art—ideas which

1. It might be asked why we use the term "aesthetics" in the title when surely "poetics" would have been more correct, since aesthetics is a wider concept, including reflections on the experience of the beautiful in all art forms, not only in literature. This would be true were we to confine our attention only to the Dhvanyālakosanā. But the Abhinavagītā includes considerations of music and of dance as well as of literature, and it is clear, even if nowhere explicitly stated, that Abhinava intends his remarks on the nature of imaginative experiences in drama and poetry to apply to other art forms as well. If we were to sum up Abhinava's theory in one phrase as "great art demands the transcendence of self" then we could surely apply this to music as well.

2. We presuppose on the part of our readers a certain familiarity with the technical terms of Sanskrit poetics. For those who are reading about the field for the first time, we would recommend the following works:

For a general introduction to Sanskrit poetry the reader cannot do better than read D. H. H. Ingalls' humane study: An anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry Harvard Oriental Series, Cambridge, 1965. The two standard works on Sanskrit literary criticism are: S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyaya, Calcutta, 1960, and P. V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, 1961. Kane is better than De on textual problems, but less full on the actual theories. A concise but intelligent overview of the theory of suggestion can be found in an article by J. Brough, "Some Indian Theories of Meaning", Transactions of the Philological Society, 1953, Oxford. An excellent book, which contains a very fine chapter on the theory of dhvani is K. Kunjannal Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning, Adyar Library and Research Center, Madras, 1963. A clear account by a good modern Indian philosopher of many of the issues will be found in M. Hiriyana's Art Experience, a collection of his essays on such questions as "Art contemplation", "Art and Morality", "The Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure" and so on, Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore, 1954. For those who read French, we would recommend the pioneer study of the Indian theatre by Sylvain Lévi, Le Théâtre Indien, reprinted with Renou's article, "La Recherche sur le théâtre Indien depuis 1890", Paris, 1963. The Introduction to R. Gnoli's The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta, Rome, 1965 and now reprinted by Chowkhamba, Banaras, 1968, is excellent, though readers might find the actual text difficult. K. C. Pandey's two works, Abhinavagupta, an Historical and Philosophical Study Chowkhamba, Banaras, 1966, and Comparative Aesthetics, vol. I, Indian Aesthetics (both second editions), Chowkhamba, Banaras, 1959, are also likely to prove difficult, though both works contain much valuable information. The reader would also be well advised to read one or two of the texts in translation. The most important work on theatre and on dramatic theory is the Nāṭyaśāstra (ca. 3rd century A. D.) of which there is a new edition and translation by M. Ghosh, Manisha Granthalaya, Calcutta, 1957. Available translations are

(Continued on next page)
we can use on works of art as one uses a can-opener on a can, to get at the meat. Their writings could extend our conceptual armoury”. While we agree with the sentiment, we disagree strongly with the method. In an article subtitled: “A Study in Indian Aesthetics”, there is no mention of a single Indian critic! One could contribute an entire negative bibliography on Sanskrit poetics which would illustrate the same fault: an insufficient acquaintance with the basic texts of Sanskrit literary criticism. Instead of vague generalisations (or reinterpretations such as are found in the special issue of the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism on Oriental Aesthetics, Fall, 1965), we need detailed studies and especially translations into modern English of the major works of Sanskrit aestheticians. It is disturbing to think that there are no English translations at all of many of the most important works: the *Vakroktijīva*ita, the *Kāvyamimāṃsā*, the *Abhinavabhārati*, the *Dhvanyālakokocana*, the *Vyaktiveka* or the *Rasagaṅgādhara*. There is no readily available translation of Dāndin, or Bhāmaha, or Vāmana, and Anandavaradhana’s *Dhvanyālakokocana* is sorely in need of a new and better translation. We know that the Indians have creative ideas on such important issues as “the nature

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rare: The *Dhvanyālakokocana* the most important text on poetics will soon be published with a complete translation of Abhinavagupta’s commentary, the *Locana*, by the authors. Meanwhile there is Jacobii’s excellent German translation, Z. D. M. G. no. 56, Leipzig, 1902 and the translation into English by K. Krishnamoorthy, Poona Oriental Series, Poona, 1955. There is a French translation of Rājaśekhara’s *Kāvyamimāṃsā* (9th century), a fascinating and eccentric work, by N. Stehoupak and L. Renou published by Société Asiatique in 1946 that is still in print. The second most important work on drama, though much later (10th century) than the *Nāyikabhaṭṭara*, has been translated by G. O. Haas, *The Daśarūpakas of Dhavanmījaya: A Treatise of Hindu Dramaturgy*, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1962. A good translation of Mammapā’s *Kāvyaprakāśa* (11th century) has come out by G. Jha, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Banaras, 1967. Mammapā follows Abhinava very closely, though he is more conventional in his opinions. It is by far the best of the “text books” that became so popular in the Sanskrit tradition. Similar to it, and even fuller in treatment, though less interesting, is the *Sāhityadarpana* of Viśvanātha, translated by J. R. Ballantyne and P. Misra, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1965. An excellent and readable French translation of one of the later texts is *Le Pratāparudraṇya de Vidyānātha* by Pierre Filliozat, Institut Français d’Indologie, Pondichery, 1963.


2. Such detailed studies are to be found pre-eminently in the works of two modern Indian scholars, V. Raghavan, and the late Sivaprasad Bhattacharya. For details, see Bibliography.

3. A four-volume work is soon to appear on readings from literary criticism throughout the world. One volume will be devoted to Indian Aesthetics. It is being edited by B. K. Matilal of the University of Pennsylvania and will contain translations of all the major texts (excerpts only of course) by B. K. Matilal, V. Raghavan, M. Ghosh, M. V. Patwardhan and J. Masson,
of poetic imagination", "the dichotomy between learning and inspiration", "linguistics and poetics", "the tension between pleasure and didacticism", "poetry and philosophy", "effort and spontaneity", and so on. But what exactly did the Indian writers have to say on each of these issues? We have taken up one of these issues, šāntarasa, for detailed discussion in this volume.

Šāntarasa might be translated as "the imaginative experience of tranquility". It is an issue on which there exists some confusion. Edgerton was able to write, astonishingly, of šāntarasa: "...that it is forbidden to use it in the drama; it is inherently opposed to the very nature of the drama". ¹ This is a simple misunderstanding of the texts. Such misunderstandings arise because many modern writers are not taking the trouble to see just what the Sanskrit writers on poetics have said. They are relying on secondary literature instead of going directly to the original sources. In this way errors only compound themselves. How will one be able to appreciate Sanskrit literature properly if one is unaware of just what it is that a cultivated audience expected from its literature? And how can one know this, unless one reads Sanskrit literary criticism? Here we must take sides in what seems to us a major issue concerning the proper method of understanding Sanskrit poetry. Professor D. H. H. Ingalls has written of A. B. Keith, whose two works, "A History of Sanskrit Literature" and "The Sanskrit Drama" are standard reading in the field, "that for the most part he disliked Sanskrit literature." After illustrating this, Professor Ingalls remarks: "What is unjust in these judgments is that not once does Keith apply the remarks of a Sanskrit critic to any of the Sanskrit works he is judging." ² Professor J. Brough, a former student of Keith, responds to this criticism by quoting a paragraph from Keith’s "History of Sanskrit Literature", after which he remarks: "I have re-read this paragraph with close attention, but I have not been able to discover any hidden meaning in it; and I do not understand how such words could be written by one who 'for the most part disliked Sanskrit literature.'" ³ Professor Brough may well be correct, for it is perfectly possible that Keith did in fact like much of Sanskrit literature. But surely this is irrelevant. The point is not whether Keith did or did not like Sanskrit poetry (since one can certainly understand something for which one does not have great admiration), but whether he understood it or not. Brough does not answer Ingalls' second charge, by far the more important of the two. Did Keith judge Sanskrit literature according to the highly developed canons of its own texts on literary criticism?

2. An Anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry, p. 50.
Judging from his chapter on the theories of poetry in ancient India, one would guess not. He seems for the most part innocent of their more detailed doctrines. This is an important point of methodology. Before we can judge or even appreciate Sanskrit literature, we must understand it. As I. A. Richards often remarked to his students at Harvard: “We do not admire what we do not understand.” No amount of theory on methodology will help one to understand Sanskrit literature. There is only one method that counts: exposure to, and familiarity with, the texts. There is a perfectly straight-forward use of the word “understanding” which is too often ignored in the elaborate treatises now fashionable on “methodology” (often, it seems to us, merely excuses for not dealing with the texts themselves). The difficulties of interpreting a Sanskrit poem are considerably less in India than in the West. The meaning of a Sanskrit poem is rarely subjective. Either you have understood a verse or you haven’t. In a traditional Sanskrit class, the Pandit will ask a student after he has read a verse: artha jñāto vā na vā, “Have you understood the meaning or not?” This makes it far more easy to reach a concensus about a poem’s worth in Sanskrit than would be true in English literature. When we read a passage in one of these Sanskrit texts we know

1. For instance, on p. 386-397 of *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, (Oxford, 1928) Keith is supposed to be explaining the theories of Jagannātha’s Rasagangādārā, but everything he quotes is actually taken by Jagannātha from Abhinavagupta’s Locana, a fact of which Keith seems totally unaware. Thus, he writes: “The cause of this form of pleasure is a form of meditation (bhāvanā), consisting of continued application to the object characterized by the pleasure. It is quite different from the joy produced by the thought of the meaning of what is said to one, e.g. “A son is born to you.” But this example actually occurs several times in the Dhvanyāloka-locana, (e.g. p. 80, Balapriya Edn.) 600 years earlier!

2. Not that the Indians ever made the fallacy of thinking that a poem was exhausted by what it meant. Far from it, they were likely to sin in the opposite direction, and suppose that a poem derived all its worth from how it was said (vyāyanā) rather than what it said. As I. A. Richards puts it: “It is never what a poem says which matters, but what it is”. John Wain speaks of the difficulty of pinpointing the elements in a poem that make for its success: “But to illustrate these things in the concrete is to approach the vanishing center of literary criticism, which, not being an exact science, is bound sooner or later to reach a point at which demonstration breaks down and is replaced by a shared sensibility; though, of course, this point is very much more distant than the anti-critical writers on literature would have us think”, *Interpretations*, edited by J. Wain, Routledge, London, 1955.

For the Indians it was not only distant, but actually beyond the horizon. This is an important point to stress: the Indians simply cannot conceive of arguing over the final worth or even interpretation of a poem in quite the same way as can be done today in Western literary criticism. It is of course true that finally the sahārdhayas, the intelligent and responsive reader, is the final criterion. But generally, sahārdhayas tend to agree amongst themselves to an astonishing degree. One has only to look at the interpretations of poems advanced in Sanskrit commentaries. They are usually very

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immediately whether we understand it or not. If we do not, no amount of "methodology" will give us instant and magic insight into the meaning. It is only by reading further in the literature that understanding will be gained.

We feel that we have to speak of this because in a sense we are dealing with religious material, and the familiar criticism comes to mind that in order to understand Buddhism one must either be a Buddhist or at least belong to some religious tradition. Similarly, the argument goes, one must be "personally" concerned with the problems raised by śāntarasa and by religious ecstasy in general in order to understand the issues properly. To this belief we cannot subscribe. We can sympathise intellectually with the problems raised by śāntarasa without being personally moved by the issues in our everyday life. Certainly to have a profound understanding of Dante it is not necessary to be a believing Christian. We can respond to the power and grace of a mind without necessarily agreeing with what is said. Were it necessary to hold firmly to a set of immovable beliefs, then the whole of surrealism, in which our common expectations are constantly arrested, should possess no aesthetic significance. Literature does not depend for its power on a set of beliefs. Is the ghost of Hamlet real? How can this matter for a proper appreciation of the play? The important point is that it is real for the play. Are the punishments that Dante describes "real"? They are real in the poem. Whether we believe in their objective reality or not has nothing whatever to do with our appreciation of the poem itself. Similarly, śāntarasa exists within the context in which we discuss it. We must judge these beliefs in the context of the works of literature in which they appear, and not in the light of our personal convictions, or we seriously restrict the possibilities of our own literary appreciation. We have elucidated certain difficult texts which describe ecstatic experiences. It should not be relevant what our own belief is as to the objective nature of these experiences.

A more important dichotomy than that between belief and scepticism has to do more directly with our method of work. This is the dichotomy between modern Western methods and the more traditional method of under-

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similar to one another. (This is surely why plagiarism in such matters was never considered to be a serious matter. Witness Homacandra, who uses Abhinava's explanations of innumerable stanzas. He is not "cheating", he is "agreeing".) When a modern commentary like the Bālapriyā follows Uttanāgodaya's Kauṭumāti on the Locana, Rāmānāraka is not being lazy or dishonest. This simply points to shared values in Sanskrit literary criticism. We know, for example, that Mahimabhaṭṭa and Kuntaka both disagree sharply with the views of the dhvani school, and with Ānandadvardhana in particular. But their disagreements concern principles, and do not really extend to the interpretation of individual poems. When they explain the vasa of a poem there is remarkable agreement.
standing texts used by the Pandits. There need exist no opposition between the two methods. In our cases, we have both profited greatly from our study among the Sāstrins, and we both possess an unqualified admiration for the depth of their knowledge into a given śāstra. On the other hand the major part of our education has been along Western lines, and we see no reason to abandon the critical principles it has instilled in us.

**ABHINAVA’S ACHIEVEMENT**

Abhinavagupta was without a doubt the greatest example in Indian history of a literary critic who was also a philosopher of repute. Pandits will often say of him that: *ālamkāarakāstraṁ tenaiva śāstratvaṁ prāpitam*—“He alone turned poetics into a science.” There are virtually no important ideas in later Sanskrit poetics that do not derive from him (or from his influences). In his two famous commentaries, the Locana on the Dhvanyālaka, and the Abhinavabhāratī on the Nāṭyaśāstra, he has dealt with almost every important issue of Indian aesthetics. Neither work is meant to be primarily philosophic—he deals rather with specific verses, and especially in the Locana he performs brilliant feats of understanding and interpretation in discovering the hidden “suggested” meaning in verses. (There are numerous examples of this; one thinks in particular of the enormous range of suggestion he is able to derive from a single case of *tastudhevaṇi* in the Dhvanyālaka.) His linguistic acumen is no less astonishing, and he often points to the suggestive use of a case-ending, or even a particle. But we are concerned in this volume with those passages, by no means rare, where he deals more with theory than with its practical application. In extracting Abhinava’s philosophy of aesthetics, we have discovered that he is deeply concerned with religious values in literature. In this he marks a decided break with his predecessors. There is nothing particular religious about the Nāṭyaśāstra. As for the Dhvanyālaka, which we believe to be the work of two different authors, the

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1. Many of the ideas of later writers (especially Māmata) which modern writers mistakenly think to be original, derive ultimately and often literally from Abhinavagupta. Thus S. K. De, “The theory of Rasa”, in Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics, Calcutta, 1959, p. 206, attributes to Viśvanātha the doctrine that “those very things which are called cause of pain in the world......when consigned to poetry and dramatic representation possess the right to be called, in consequence of their assuming such a function, *ālamkāra vibhāvas* etc., and from them only pleasure ensues, as it does from verses and the like in amorous dalliance ”. But this doctrine is found first in the Abhinavabhāratī, Vol. 1, p. 292.

2. One thinks of his long explanations of the two last Prakrit verses quoted under I. 4, on pp. 74–78 of the Locana (B. edition).

3. This is of course a very complex issue. Mr. Masson has written a long article on the problem, arguing from internal evidence, that Ānandavardhana wrote only the *Pratti*, and that the Kārikās belong to an earlier author. The article will appear soon.
kārikās present absolutely no religious aspect at all. There are no religious
terms used, and no analogies drawn from religious literature. Even the term
śāntarasa is never used.1 Ānandavardhana is a different matter. In his
vṛtti religious preoccupations are evident. Unfortunately, his Tatvāloka,2
a work that dealt with the relation between poetry and philosophy, is lost, so
that we cannot know how great its influence upon Abhinava was. At least
his concerns within the Dhvanyāloka never culminate in a philosophic theory.
It is only with Abhinava himself (preceded, in all likelihood, by Bhāṭṭanāyaka
in his lost Hṛdayadarpana) that specific religious doctrines are applied to
aesthetics (we do not of course distinguish sharply between religion and
philosophy, for in Abhinava’s case, as in much Indian writing, the two are
nearly coterminous).

Abhinava is concerned with providing a stable philosophical foundation
for his theories. We have tried to show in this volume how often
Abhinava draws on śāntarasa for his major contribution to Sanskrit aesthetics,
the theory of rasa. Reduced to its bare essentials the theory is as follows: watching a play or reading a poem for the sensitive reader (sahṛdaya)
entails a loss of the sense of present time and space. All worldly considerations
for the time being cease. Since we are not indifferent (tatātatha) to
what is taking place, our involvement must be of a purer variety than we
normally experience. We are not directly and personally involved, so the
usual medley of desires and anxieties dissolve. Our hearts respond sympathetically (hṛdayasamānvāda) but not selfishly. Finally the response becomes total,
all-engrossing, and we identify with the situation depicted (tattavāhavāna).
The ego is transcended, and for the duration of the aesthetic experience, the
normal waking “I” is suspended. Once this actually happens, we suddenly
find that our responses are not like anything we have hitherto experienced, for
now that all normal emotions are gone, now that the hard knot of “selfness”
has been untied, we find ourselves in an unprecedented state of mental and
emotional calm. The purity of our emotion and the intensity of it take us to
a higher level of pleasure than we could know before – we experience sheer
undifferentiated bliss (ānandaikāghana) for we have come into direct
contact with the deepest recesses of our own unconscious where the memory

1. Those rasas with which the Kārikās of the Dhvanyāloka are concerned are
actually mentioned at some point or another. Thus Karuṇārasa is mentioned at II, 8;
Bhūkṣaṣṭa at III, 4; Raudra at II, 9; Śṛṅgāra time and again, e.g. II, 7, II, 15, etc. But
nowhere is Ānatarasa mentioned by name in the Kārikās. Ānanda, however, does
interpret III, 30 (p. 397) to be a reference to Ānatarasa, but it is possible that he has
misinterpreted the verse.

2. Abhinava refers to it on p. 67 of the Locana, in the first Uddyota, and
again in the fourth Uddyota, p. 533.
of a primeval unity between man and the universe is still strong. Inadvertently, says Abhinavagupta, we have arrived at the same inner terrain as that occupied by the mystic, though our aim was very different from his. Such an experience cannot but make us impatient with the ordinary turmoil of emotions that is our inner life, and though Abhinava never explicitly says so, one cannot help feeling that he expects the reader to search out now these experiences on a more permanent basis.

We would be justified in asking why Abhinava felt it necessary to provide such a unified theory of rasa (when Ānandavardhana for instance never felt the need to philosophise about rasa), and especially a theory that depended so heavily on notions involving śāntarasa. We think there is a good reason: as a religious man, Abhinava must have been under a certain amount of at least internal pressure to justify his deep interest in purely secular literature. There has always been among Indian philosophers (and Western ones too; one thinks of Plato)\(^1\) a certain distrust of poetry. There is the attack of Jayantabhaṭṭa, the great logician, on Ānandavardhana’s theory of suggestion: “There is no point in arguing with poets,” \(^2\) or the famous remark with which Mīmāṃsakas\(^3\) were known to rebuke those interested in poetry: “One should avoid the useless prattle that is poetry.”\(^4\)

Abhinava undermined such opposition by attempting to show that the states of mind during religious experiences and during literary experiences bore a basic affinity to one another. Literature, he wished to prove, at least the best literature, is just one more expression of an ineffable transcendent experience. This was a daring move and one which might legitimately have been expected earlier.\(^5\) It is rather odd when one considers it, that nobody before

1. As Blake puts it so well: “This was the fault of Plato. He knew of nothing but virtues and vices and good and evil.”

2. यमन्य: प्रविष्टाम्बत्त: प्रवेदे क्षेत्रेऽध्विनिः।

3. Abhinava can use his wit very trenchantly when he desires. He has no liking for Mīmāṃsakas and loses no opportunity to amuse himself at the expense of what he calls their dried-up minds. See for ex. Ṭvāma, p. 65, paṇḍita śrotrīgyasyokti-kausalam. One thinks of the very funny verse manufactured by the Mīmāṃsā pandits in the Bhujaprabandha, भूजनं देहि राजेन्द्र वर्तुयसमनविन्दुः। “Give us, great king, food with butter and soup.”

4. केतायापाश्च ब्रजंवैत। See Mallinātha on RV. I. 1.

5. All large generalisations are dangerous, but we cannot refrain from mentioning what we consider to be a fundamental dichotomy that runs through Sanskrit literature. That which is trivial and which does not look beyond itself is contrasted with that which is significant and transcendental. Witness the hatred most philosophers have evinced for the cāreṇkaś who stress the absence of any numinous experience in life,
the Kashmir Śaivas thought of associating aesthetic experience with states of religious ecstasy, since the two have always been closely allied in India. Perhaps it was because the philosophical atmosphere of Kashmir Śaivism was so saturated with literature; we have only to glance at any single page of the Yogavāsīṣṭha to see how true this is. The most philosophic texts from this school bristle with terms taken from literature and literary criticism, just as conversely a work like the Dhvanyāloka is rich in philosophical implications and learning. For the Kashmir Śaivas generally, with their interest in Tantric ritual, sexual pleasure, indeed, aesthetic pleasure in general, was much less repugnant to them than it was to the Advaita tradition (though we must not exaggerate this either, for did not the orthodox tradition itself ascribe to Śaṅkara the Amaruśataka?).

What are the advantages that such a theory provides for Sanskrit literature? They are many. (1) Such a philosophical justification must have helped to explain to Abhinava himself the nature of his interest in Sanskrit kāvya. If, as Kafka said, poetry should be a pick-axe to free the sea frozen within us, then most of Sanskrit poetry fails utterly. Most kāvya cannot reach us in our most primitive minds the way that Proust, or Lawrence, or Joyce can. In reading through the Dhvanyāloka, one is struck by the disparity between the theory and the literature to which it is applied. The poems themselves do not represent values more universal than their time. But the refined and subtle theories which Ānandavardhana employs, clearly do. For a modern scholar, it is easier to view these principles sub specie aeternitatis than to do so with the literature which illustrates them. The doctrine, oddly enough, is not significant merely as cultural anthropology, whereas many of the poems can only interest us for reasons other than their literary appeal. Abhinava surprises us by ascribing the fault to us and not to the poetry. He could hardly have been unaware of this more or less unspoken complaint of sensitive critics, that a certain amount of Sanskrit poetry was mere trivia. The criticism would apply equally to Sanskrit plays. If we demand of our best literature transcendence, then these works seem to fail us. But Abhinava, in order to prove the lack of sensitivity in such a view, uses a very new argument: he brings in the example of śāntarasā. The one thing that śāntarasā does that no other rasa can, is that it disturbs us. If we really believe the message that any successful play dealing with śāntarasā tells us, we hear what Rilke said was the final lesson of all great literature: “You must change your life.” By powerful arguments, Abhinava attempts to show that this quality of transcendence, which we must admit in śāntarasā (though his critics of course did not), applies equally well to good literature. The greatest example, which Ānanda was apparently the first critic in Sanskrit literature to notice, is the Mahābhārata. Before Ānanda nobody ever consider-
ed the possibility of looking at a piece of literature as a unified whole, with a single dominant suggestive atmosphere, and certainly not something of such gigantic proportions as the Mahābhārata. But both Ananda and following him, Abhinava, insist on the overwhelming experience that reading the Mahābhārata provides. As unhappiness and doom succeed one another in a seemingly endless display of the vanity of this world; as we slowly become aware of the folly of trusting to the external world to bring happiness; as one after another the heroes of the epic whom we have come to know over volumes and volumes fade from existence and everything seems to dessiccate and near its end, the reader is invaded by a sense of doom, a sense of the uselessness of strife, and he is eventually instilled with a craving for tranquillity, for an end to human suffering and misery. If our reading is extensive enough, concentrated enough, with no distractions from the outside world, then we can induce in ourselves a profound imaginative experience of tranquility, kāntarasa. The Mahābhārata remains for Sanskrit literary critics the supreme example of this mood, this imaginative creation. It is not surprising that Ananda is at his most eloquent when he describes this experience in great detail in the fourth Uddyota of his Dhvanyāloka. The passage was clearly a powerful influence in Abhinava’s theories.

(2) If Abhinava was struck by the poverty of much Indian kāvya (which, through a reinterpretation of its purpose, he felt need no longer be considered trivial), he must have been equally disturbed by the lifeless quality of much Indian philosophy. By eschewing the real world, it often found itself in the arid territory of the purely theoretic, with no tap-root leading into the rich soil of real life as it is lived by men and women in a real world. An English literary critic has recently berated this arid quality in surrealism: “... reading surrealistic books, as in talking to hermits, one is often struck by the impoverishment of fantasy when not continually cross-pollinated by the external world. Paradoxically, fantasy is not enriched, but etiolated by resolute subjectivism.”¹ Abhinava, by importing literary issues into philosophy, was able to provide philosophical thinking with a literary quality it previously lacked. Aesthetics now becomes a legitimate concern for the philosopher.

(3) Abhinava discovered that great poems such as the Mahābhārata, reach us beyond the conscious mind. One is reminded of Freud’s great study of Leonardo, when he speaks of the effeminate forms of Leonardo’s “John the Baptist” and “Bacchus”: “They are beautiful youths of feminine delicacy and with effeminate forms; they do not cast their eyes down, but

gaze in mysterious triumph, as if they knew of a great achievement of happiness, about which silence must be kept. The familiar smile of fascination leads one to guess that it is a secret of love."

(4) Abhinava was not only a philosopher, he was also an authority on Tantric ritual. The rites he practised, probably even before he became interested in literary theory, must have provided him with his first contact with the kind of play-activity that he later found once again in the theatre. It seems to us no accident that Abhinava was more fond of the theatre than of any other form of literature. By establishing the intimate connection between theatre and ritual (and thus by implication mythology as well), Abhinava foreshadowed certain modern theories, even though he was not followed in this brilliant insight by any of his successors. The ramifications are many, and Abhinava often draws them in scattered places throughout his works. He is fond of the comparison of life with a drama and the resultant sense of unreality this gives. Dreams come up again and again in his works. In his Tantrāloka he speaks of man, the creator, as destroying the produce of his life, a dream. The external buildings, he says, are razed in the fire of his sudden awareness that he is Śiva, the great destroyer. Then follows the purely joy-filled dance of Śiva, the Tanḍava, that has no purpose other than to give expression to a sense of freedom and joy. On the other hand, one feels that Abhinava was not unaware of the enrichment that results from imaginative experiences. Even one's own childhood becomes an aesthetic object, something viewed with the dual detachment and involvement (hṛdayānupraveśa, or hṛdayāsaṃvāda) of the perfect spectator, the sahṛdaya who is both moved and yet distanced from the object he contemplates. Has Abhinava in fact had an insight into the unconscious, and the value of imaginative understanding which Freud stressed as being essential to any true freedom from our own childhood traumas?

(5) Abhinava is able to restore to poets an important place in the intellectual hierarchy by showing their underlying philosophical seriousness. One thinks he would have approved of Andre Malraux's comment: "Les grands artistes ne sont pas les transcripteurs du monde; ils en sont les rivaux."

An advantage which might well pass unnoticed that Abhinava's system provides is the following: in Indian society, curiously enough, it was always the religious mystic who has been considered the maverick, who has been allowed the eccentric freedom that in the West we tend to associate with

2. See the very lovely verse from Vol. II of the Tantrāloka, p. 257, verse 286:

अन्तःचित्रस्वप्नः मेवत्सरस्मिन्द्रसः।
इश्वरव एवं नवंद्रश्वतिः प्रवर्षः॥

For the dance image, see A. Bh. Vol. I, p. 21.
poets. Edmund Wilson, in "The Wound and the Bow", documents the neurotic elements in many of the great poets of the nineteenth and twentieth century. The striking phrase of the title refers to the myth of Philoctetes, the Greek warrior who possessed a magic bow, but was forced to live in isolation on an island because of the insufferable odour that emanated from a suppurating wound on his ankle. Eventually his countrymen had to call him back, in spite of their disgust, because of his unerring weapon. Art extracts its own price. Of course in India the mystic was never both loathed and venerated, he was simply venerated. Nonetheless already in the Upaniṣads we hear of the mystic as being similar to a child in his unrestrained behaviour.¹ The adjective sometimes applied to him is unmatā, mad. One thinks of the extraordinary passage in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad dealing with Raikva of the cart, who dares to call King Janaka but a śūdra, and who finally agrees to teach him for the pretty face of his daughter. He received his name from where he lived, underneath a cart. This has not generally been true of the artist. The poet has always been far more integrated into Indian society. India has not developed the sense of the loneliness of the writer, shunned by, and shunning, society. But Abhinava, by restoring to him his more important functions, also enables him to preserve his independence. It is now not only the mystic who opens himself to numinous experience. Is it significant that the only description of the poet as a man out of his ordinary senses that immediately comes to mind is from Uttungodaya, Abhinava's commentator, in his fourteenth century commentary on the Locana, the Kaumudi? There he says of the poet: "... the poet wants to write poetry in order to instruct those of delicate minds, people who are for the most part similar to princes, in the means of attaining the four goals of life through aesthetic enjoyment. First, by the stream that is rasa, to be aesthetically enjoyed by the presentation of the vibhāvas etc. that are at the root of the poem he wishes to make, his own heart which is like a great and immeasurably deep lake (of rasa) becomes filled, then he becomes as if possessed by a planet, as if mad, and finally he pours out his poetry, and turns the listener, the sensitive reader (sahṛdaya), into the same (sort of madman as he has become)."² But of course the artist is never in Sanskrit

¹ Cf. Abhinava's Paramārthasāra, verse 71:

जह वच चिन्तरावदामिति।

² Kappuswami Sastri's edition of the Dvīnāloka, p. 179:

इदमव सचितुथम—कवियिः सुपुरुषायोगसमालः आस्थायुपरस्तर्वम चुवुंगोपायः

वहिष-सतिनिपाविनयः कायें विनचित्रिः, चिन्ति-चिन्तनायायायाय-विवधत्वम्-मोनकविमानयादियोजनास्ताद्विषेकस्त्रियत-प्रथ-प्रभसम सम्बंधत मरितमवसितन-विद्वानसहहहरी मुनया महाविजय सत्ता चतुजयत् काव्यं तत्त्वम् विगं

प्रसारं श्रीदुर्गामपि सहद्वासमात्मसान्योगश्चर्चां संपादयति।
society an alien figure. When we read of Abhinava (see below) sitting in a grape garden, a single golden earring hanging from his ear, surrounded by magicians and women Yogins, playing on a lute with dūris by his side with cups of wine and lemons in their hands, this in no way makes him eccentric, at least to the Indian public. Even in the legend of his death, how he entered a cave with twelve hundred disciples and never returned, there is nothing "asocial" to shock the Indian.

(6) One corollary of his theories, though again it does not seem to have been realised either by Abhinava or by his successors, is that rasa becomes available not only to poetry and the theatre but to all literature. Generally rasa is only possible in kāvya or nātya. But the Mahābhārata is after all already an exception since it cannot be considered kāvya in the strict definition of the term. Yet both Ānanda and Abhinava give it the careful literary attention it deserves. The claim was made by Kalhaṇa at the beginning of his Rāja	arāṅgini that his work on history contains kāntarasa:

"Considering how the life of creatures cracks after a few moments, one should understand (why) kāntarasa has been given the most important position in this work (attra)." ¹

It is all the more surprising then that Abhinava never thought of extending his theory to purely religious texts. After all the most obvious and in a sense the best examples of kāntarasa are to be found in religious and philosophical literature, and not in belles lettres. The Upaniṣads, for example, would surely have provided Abhinava with his finest examples. Today we can consider the Upaniṣads to be among the finest examples of world "literature", though no text on literary criticism in ancient India ever thought of quoting them or deriving support from any of their beautiful lines. As the rhetoricians define literature, the Upaniṣads do not qualify. Abhinava's brilliant insight that what makes for literature is the quality of the sentiment and not adherence to formal rules, provided the opportunity for a re-definition that was curiously never taken advantage of. Even Jagannātha Panḍitarāja, who gives a more liberal definition of literature,² does not depart from standard examples in his illustrations (indeed he even regresses in including only his own works, thus furthering the greatest single misfortune of Sanskrit literary criticism, the divorce between what actually was written and what was supposed to be written). No better example of kāntarasa could be found.


क्षणभोगिन स्फूर्ति परिचितिलिते ।
मुच्छोमिपकः शान्तस्य रसस्थात्र विद्वाच्यामि ॥

2. Rasaganagādhara, KM edition of 1939, p. 4:

रसणीयाःसन्तस्मितपदकः शब्दः काथम् ।
than the Pali Mahāparinibbānasutta, the sober, moving account of the death of the Buddha. Or even such prosaic but haunting lines as that of King Janaka when his kingdom went up in flames: mithilāyāṁ prādīptāyāṁ na me kimeṇa dahyate—"Nothing of mine is burned when Mithilā is in flames." 1

(7) Abhinava insists on the epiphany that poetry provides, on the sense of camatkāra, of having our breath taken away. He compares it at one place to a wondrous flower that suddenly bursts into bloom. He is particularly fond of a fine image in the Nātyaśāstra:

"The externalisation (bhāva) of that emotion (artha) which makes an appeal to the heart is the source (udbhava) of rasa. The body it suffused by it, as dry wood is suffused by fire." 2

(8) An advantage that Abhinava's philosophy provides for Sanskrit literary criticism is that there need be no disagreements over significant literary experiences. Since the emotional experience in great literature is for Abhinava and later critics who follow him (Mammata, Viśvanātha, Jagannātha, etc.) always the same, namely ātmānanda, "the bliss of the self", an insoluble problem for Western literature has been solved. The problem is that there is no guarantee that two spectators feel the same thing when viewing a work of art. To say "it depresses me" or "it thrills me", or "it excites me", is often a comment on the viewer's own state of mind and not on the work of art itself. Usually it is discovered in later conversation that the work of art has acted as a catalyst, releasing some emotion long consciously forgotten, dislodging it from its undercover. One might object that Abhinava too is no longer speaking about the work of art on its own, but about certain universal states of mind. This is true, but at least, if all literary critics accept that this is the true function of literature, namely to induce such a state of euphoria, then they have a common ground on which to argue whether a particular piece of literature has been successful or not. And in fact it is astonishing to note how great a concensus of opinion there is in Sanskrit literature over what is good. The concensus lasts over the centuries. There are few poets who have been considered great in the tradition long ago, but now forgotten. If one looks through the names of poets that Abhinava constantly quotes, one is struck by how many of these are poets we still read and admire today, 1000 years later. We are all aware how

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in the West even thirty years ago "great poets" are now not much more than footnotes in college textbooks. Goethe is reported to have said that he found "the Inferno abominable, the Purgatorio dubious and the Paradiso tiresome." One thinks too of Donne, eclipsed for three centuries and only restored to honour through the critical efforts of T. S. Eliot. Such ups and downs in Sanskrit literature are more or less impossible. (There are of course other reasons for this as well.)

These are just some of the more general results of Abhinava's theories. The details will be found in the body of this work. We think it is clear that the way for later writers on poetics to expand on religious and philosophical themes was provided by Abhinava. (Surely, for example, the Bengal Vaiṣṇavas, especially the two Gosvāmins, were inspired to their elaborate theories by the climate Abhinava created.) Abhinava's final theory bears a remarkable similarity to what Aldous Huxley developed in his work "The Doors of Perception". H. Osborne writes of this work as follows: "Finally it is sometimes asserted that works of art symbolize a metaphysical reality of which by our appreciative commerce with the work of art we become directly and immediately aware. This is a view which many modern artists have themselves alleged. In his essay "The Doors of Perception" Aldous Huxley describes how under the influence of mescaline his ordinary perceptions were accompanied by an intense and inescapable feeling of revelation. He develops the theory that artistic vision in general has this revelatory character and that the works of art which artists create communicate to us imperfectly the revelation of ultimate reality which they have enjoyed. 'What the rest of us see only under the influence of mescaline', he says, 'the artist is congenitally equipped to see all the time....It is a knowledge of the intrinsic significance of every existent. For the artist as for the mescaline taker, draperies are living hieroglyphs that stand in some peculiarly expressive way for the unfathomable mystery of pure being'. The statement that in the act of appreciating a beautiful work of art we have immediate intuitive awareness of ultimate or pure being, takes us outside the confines of aesthetics proper. As 'emotive' descriptions of the artistic experience such affirmations are significant and must be treated with respect'.

We have seen some of the advantages that Abhinava's philosophy provided for literary criticism, all of which derive from his brilliant insights into what lay behind imaginative experiences in literature. Let us now look far more briefly (for they are less important) at some of the disadvantages. The chief danger, it seems to us, is the reductionism in his theories; how all

literature becomes reduced to a single experience. A similar criticism has been made of Coleridge: "Coleridge's demand for unification and harmony entailed the conversion of the poetic into something other than the poetic, its subordination to philosophy and ultimately to religion." 1 Perhaps the reason, in Abhinava's case, was that he was not himself a very good poet. He did of course write a good deal of poetry, but there are at the most three or four memorable verses in all of his work, 2 and his poetry goes virtually unquoted in later critical literature. Perhaps he was prevented by his own intelligence from being direct and concrete. 3 Had he been more of a poet, and more interested in the particular, would he have preached quite so reductionist a theory? There are of course advantages to this (a unified theory for one) but it means forgetting what I. A. Richards has taught a generation of literary critics, namely that "a poem does not stand for something else." 4 Abhinava's strength lay in ideas, in conceptual thinking. He was not himself an artist, and one cannot help being reminded of Eliot's famous remark a propos Henry James, that he had a mind so fine that no idea could violate it!

There is a sense in which Abhinava confuses art and life when he insists on the primacy of kāntarasa. It is of course true that dramatists can be concerned with anything they like, including the experience underlying kāntarasa; but the point is not one of theoretic possibilities, but of what actually succeeds in the theatre. Abhinava's weakest point was that he did not really have any example of a great play in which kāntarasa was dominant, to lend credence to his theories. The Nāgasimha is the sole exception, and this could hardly be considered great literature. By seeing beyond literature to the universal experience that lies behind it, Abhinava is undermining the autonomy, the uniqueness of literary experience. He is in danger of turning literature into an icon, a representational object, an aid to devotion rather than an experience unique and precious for its own sake. "Art", in C. S. Lewis' fine phrase, "must be received, not used". Religion is not, after all, the same thing as literature, unless we dilute the definition of these two terms

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2. The one really fine verse in the Locana is quoted under III, 30, p. 397:

तां च चन्द्रचूँ सहसा स्त्राण्वती
प्राणेवरां गाहितविविषता ।
सा चन्द्रकान्तालङ्कितपुष्किकाय
संविरעש्णा पारि विकास्यते मे ॥

in which he pangs very effectively in comparing sexual love and kānta.

3. Cf. the verse he wrote on p. 127 of the Locana and the absurdly long and tortuous commentary he writes on it.

INTRODUCTION

into harmless. The descriptions that Huxley gives of what he felt under mescal in are interesting psychologically, but to claim that they are essentially literary is to forget the fact that great literature can never be unconscious and ephemeral. The efforts and pains of creation are conceptual, concrete and external. Dreaming is not, after all, making. That literature could point nowhere except to itself, must have somehow proved disquieting to Abhinava. He was too religious to allow that literature might be somehow "useless", a goal in itself. (Though rasa does involve surrender to the work of art, and Abhinava insists that one's own self must be got out of the way before the work of art can truly be appreciated for its own sake.) It is significant in this respect that Abhinava shies away from the terms priti "pleasure" and vinoda "entertainment", to express the purpose of poetry. He prefers the religious word ānanda "bliss"). By insisting on putting such significance into poetry Abhinava is in danger of making much of Sanskrit literature too heavy; one is wary that it simply cannot bear the philosophical burden he places on it. One's mind is irreverently invaded by an image of Kālidāsa sitting politely bored, listening to Abhinavagupta explain to him the deeper significance of his plays, his ears really attuned to the joyous shouts of the spring festival taking place outside.
Sāntarasa

Part I

Abhinava's Philosophy of Aesthetics

Influences

Abhinava seems to us deeply concerned with four or five basic ideas: the relation of poetry to philosophy; the nature of suggestion; religious ecstasy (and its bearing on literature); drama and poetry, and ritual and drama. The question that must have helped him to bring all these elements together is one still asked today: how is it that we "enjoy" literary situations that are sad or tragic? He sought the answer to this basic question in extraordinary states of mind, in ecstatic experiences. Nobody denied these in poetry or in religious literature generally, but in drama their existence was still debated. Sāntarasa was not universally acknowledged as a legitimate element in drama. For Abhinava the question was not merely academic, for if he were not able to provide convincing arguments in its favour, he could hardly justify his interest in drama. Moreover he had no examples of a play in which sāntarasa played an important part, with the single exception of the Nāgānanda, largely a Buddhist drama, and of questionable literary excellence. By synthesising all of his preoccupations into one system, a theoretical justification for sāntarasa could be made, with the ultimate result that the type of otherworldly or transcendental experience which the spectator undergoes during ŚR (sāntarasa) would be basic to all aesthetic experience. Such a system was not to be found ready-made. But Abhinava was able to take what he needed from different sources: from the Dhvanyāloka he took his theory of suggestion; from Bharata he took the starting point of his ideas on rasa and drama; from speculation on ŚR and from Kashmir Śaivism and Tantric works he took ideas on the relation of religious ecstasy to literature. The final end product was his theory of rasa in which he combines philosophy and poetics. There are, therefore, four major influences in his theories: poetics, philosophy, speculation on ŚR and ritual.

Before examining these influences more closely, we must note that while open to all of them, Abhinava had an extremely independent mind.

1. Since a great and undisputed literature already existed along these lines, one has only to think of Bhartṛhari's Vaiśṇavaśāstra.
Not only is he not afraid to disagree with his own teachers, he is even able to disregard the great texts of the tradition: “We don’t care in the least if it is described in this way in the Ramayana itself. In fact, it might be described in the Veda itself, and we won’t be stifled by this fact.” There are very few ideas which did not “suffer a sea-change” when immersed into the depths of Abhinava’s mind. On the other hand, he belonged to a tradition in which a careful grounding in the past was de rigeur, and it is not surprising to find that he has been greatly influenced by a large number of writers. To consider this plagiarism is as absurd as demanding that Coleridge (like Lowell in “The Road to Xanadu”) footnote all his allusions and quotations! Abhinava has a very fine verse in the Abhinavabhāratī, right after giving elaborate expositions of his predecessors’ views on rasa, in which he justifies his urge to proceed further:

“When intellectual curiosity (dhīḥ) climbs higher and higher and sees the truth (arthatattva) without getting tired, this is because of the ladders of thought built by earlier writers.”

Poetic Influences

Abhinava was of course familiar with all the works on poetics extant at the time of his writing (many of which are no longer available). He is particularly fond of Bhāmaha, whom he often quotes in the Locana.

1. On p. 314, A. Bh., Vol. I, Abhinava seems to disagree with Bharata concerning the definition of hāsya. Note Kane, H. S. P., p. 55. “On p. 436 (of the B. O. R. I. copy) Abhinava appears to differ from him (Utpaladeva, the author of the Pratyabhijnā, Abhinava’s teacher’s teacher) उपट्रे सिवास्वरभूमिस्वरुपं च्याच्यते.......

2. A. Bh., Vol. III, p. 74:

3. Ānanda has some very perceptive remarks on plagiarism in the fourth Uddyota of the D. A., stanzas 11–17. It seems to us possible that he was influenced by Gaṅgāvaho. We think in particular of verse 66 of Vākpatirāja’s, which is identical in sentiment with the Prakrit verse that Ānanda quotes on p. 627. Verses 85 and 86 of the Gaṅgāvaho also prefigure several of the ideas in the fourth Uddyota. There seems no reason for questioning the date of 700 A.D. (Pandit, p. C. of his ed. of the Gaṅgāvaho) and it is therefore perfectly possible that Ānanda knew the work. Rājaśekhara, who knew Ānanda by name (see p. 16 of the Kaṭayamimāṃsā) systematised Ānanda’s views on plagiarism. See KM, p. 62.

4. A. Bh., I, p. 278. Also Gnoli, op. cit., p. 12:

The verse is quoted by Uttuṅgodaya in his Kaumudi, p. 102 with some variation.
Udbhāta,1 Yamana and Daṇḍin all of whom Abhinava quotes, do not seem to have provided him with any of his major doctrines. Bharata’s Nātyaśāstra was of course a major influence or rather stimulus, to his ideas on rasa.2 Much of his technical terminology derives directly from the NŚ, as well as several more advanced ideas. All this is well-known so there is no need for us to provide illustrations. There is one “influence”, however, which seems to us to have been overlooked. This is Aśvaghoṣa’s Saundarananda. There is of course no way, of knowing whether Abhinava knew this work or not.3 However, in the light of his pre-occupation with ŚR, and of his good knowledge of Buddhism generally, there seems no real reason why he should not. Moreover, there seems some evidence, in the form of certain striking similarities, which suggests that he did know this remarkable poet. The dominant rasa in both the Buddhacarita and the Saundarananda (and most probably the dramas4 as well, to judge from the meagre fragments pieced together by Lüders) is

1. E. g. Udbhāta’s lost Bhāmabhacaritavāra (see p. 65, K. Sastri’s ed.). Recently Professor Gnoi has published “Udbhāta’s commentary on the Kāvyālaṅkāra of Bhāmaha”, ISMEO, Rome, 1962, editing the fragments found at Kāśīrājā which he identifies with the commentary on the Kāvyālaṅkāra. If Gnoi is correct, fragment number 10 (p. 7–8), which deals with the Locana passage, should have been (without the pratikā) between abhidhānārthaḥ and ābhidānaḥ abhidhānam. But there is no room in the MS for such a reading. Therefore, if we are to retain Gnoi’s theory, this will have to have occurred in the second half of line 2 of fragment 10. The only problem is that there does not seem, if we have correctly understood the accompanying photographs of the manuscripts, any room for this passage in the fragment in question. There seems to us no good reason why the pratikā, abhidhānārthaḥ should be repeated, nor can we see any justification for the second member of a compound being explained before the first member. It is true that the author of these fragments accepted abhidhānārthaḥ and gahasamārtiḥ as sbhāvyapāras, but why must we assume—the person holding such a view is Udbhāta?


न हि रसकोटे कालिधर्मः: भवति; the definition of rasa; p. 288, रस शक्ति कः पदम्?: उच्चते – आविष्कारण: VI. 38 (p. 294); p. 299: रस्याविष्कार्यशः रसलब्ध्यान्यामः.

3. There is no quotation from Aśvaghoṣa in any of Abhinava’s works. The quotations from Aśvaghoṣa in the anthologies (see Kaviyadraacaramcasamuccaya, p. 29) are not found in any of his extant works. Rājaśekhara (K.M, p. 18) quotes a verse from the Buddhacarita (VIII. 25), but this is not ascribed by him to anybody. Similarly the Bhajaprabhandha takes over BC IV. 50. Neither of these passages is sufficient evidence to say that the author actually knew Aśvaghoṣa’s work, since the quotations could have come down though the work be lost. Note that BC VIII. 25 is similar to Bhagavatam III. 15, but the whole problem of Kālidāsa’s borrowing from A. is not settled. On the whole, we are inclined to think that Kālidāsa did know Aśvaghoṣa, and was influenced by him. Johnston (op. cit, Int. to the English Tr. of the BC, p. LXXII) thinks that Daṇḍin, KD, II. 44 has BC IV 33 in mind, and that Bhāmaha, in criticizing ajñahast (used in S. II. 36) may be referring to Aśvaghoṣa.

4. The fragments from the three dramas were edited by H. Lüders, “Bruchstücke Buddhismischen Dramen”, Berlin, 1911, and Philologica Indica Göttingen, 1940.
śānta. The words śāma and śānti occur constantly in both works.¹ Further, at the end of Saundarananda² there are two remarkable verses which might well have influenced Abhinava:

“And so this work, whose essence is liberation, (was written) so that people might obtain peace of mind, and not for amusement (rataye). I have written it in the form of a poem in order to engage the minds of readers interested (primarily) in other things (and not in liberation). The fact that I have dealt with things other than liberation is because of (the book’s) poetic nature, and in order that it might appeal to the hearts of readers, just as a bitter medicine is mixed with honey in order to induce the patient to drink it.”³

Abhinava has used this very simile of medicine and honey in the Locana. Moreover, he insists, time and again, that poetry is more gentle than śāstra (which can be loosely translated as “philosophy”), but that it leads to similar results. The last verse of the work is no less important:

“Since men are, for the most part, engrossed in sensual pleasures, and totally disinterested in mokṣa, I have said in this work, under the (sweet) disguise of poetry, that mokṣa is the highest (truth). Knowing this, (the reader) should with attentive mind (avahitam) accept from the poem that which leads to peace, and not (only) that which is pleasant. For gold is surely separated from mineral dust-particles”⁴

If we suppose that Abhinava did know this poem, how do we explain the fact that he did not use Aśvaghoṣa’s works, seeing that he could certainly

1. E.g. Saundarananda VII. 22; VIII. 56; XI. 5; XI. 33–34; XV. 49, a lovely verse that could be engraved on the tombstone of the twentieth century.
2. Note that in Saundarananda, XIV. 50, Aśvaghoṣa uses the expression śamasukharasa! But there is no evidence, aside from the dubious expression rasāntara at BC VII. 51, that he knew either the NŚ or the rasa theory.
3. Saundarananda, XVIII. 63:

लघुप्रेमायुक्ते नर रत्ने मोक्षार्थयिनः कृतः
श्रीश्रीमणवधानिनयेन मोक्षार्थमन्यस्तः कृतम्
थमोक्षार्थमन्यस्तः दिः सया तत्त्वार्थमन्यस्तः
पाठुं तिर्त्तमूच्छीतः मधुरता हृद्यं कर्म स्वामितिः

4. S. XVIII. 64:

प्राचीनलिपियो नौकं विश्वरतिपरं मोक्षार्थतिः
काव्यायोजनं तत्वं कवितामिदं सया मोक्ष: परमितिः
तमोक्षणां शासितं योजनायमितो धारणां न भविष्यते
पालनां भाषुर्जनेन निविष्टमुखार्थं नामोक्षकर्मिति

According to Johnston (p. 164, notes) the word upakaram is hapax since it occurs nowhere else in the literature. Perhaps like upakāra it means something like “useful”, “valuable”,,
have argued with perfect justification that they are all good examples of SR? We think there is a plausible reason: although there are passages of real kānta poetry, nonetheless on the whole Āśvaghoṣa’s position is directly opposed to the enjoyment of poetry for its own sake (a position Abhinava defends, see below). The whole of his work (even the Saundarananda) can be seen as a tract against just such frivolous activities as reading poetry and watching plays! Śama is seen therein to be opposed to literary enjoyment, which after all implies a certain delight in the senses. Both Abhinava and Ānanda (see below), extol the great variety of this world. Two other, less probable reasons, suggest themselves: (1) Āśvaghoṣa was after all a Buddhist, and to quote him with approbation might have seemed odd. (2) In the verses quoted below there is real poetry. But there is a great difference between being told something, and actually experiencing it (a problem which Abhinava and Ānanda are greatly concerned with, under the name of svāsabdanivedītatva). Preachers inform us; only poets invite us to experience. Āsvaghoṣa is more often than not a preacher. Thus, the same ideas from the fine verses quoted in the notes are repeated time and again, especially in chapter XIV. But they make no impression, for they are merely bald statements—ideas rather than poems. As George Boas puts it, bluntly, in a lecture on philosophy and poetry: “... the ideas in poetry are usually stale and often false, and no one older than sixteen would find it worth his

1. Saundarananda, XV, 32:

अतिलक्ष्यनि संहृतं स्वजनो दि जननस्य
अन्ते सद्विनि जन: स्वजनस्य सभवितः

“Further back on this long path those closest to you were strangers, and as you walk further into the future those who are now strangers will become close to you.”

S. XV, 33:

विहारानां यथा सार्थवा तव तव समागमः
जातै: जातिः तथा श्रेष्ठो जनस्य स्वजनस्य च

“Just as in the evening birds gather together in small groups, so also in various lives do people come together with their relatives.”

S. XV, 34:

प्रतिश्रयं बहुविंचं संशोभितं श्रवाचारमः
प्रतियावति पुनस्वकर्त्तः तद्वं ज्ञातितस्मागमः

“Just as travellers meet for a few moments at various resting places along the road and then separate, so also does one come together with those one loves (only for a moment).”

In the next verse such meetings are compared to a fistful of sand, held together only by the hand: वाशुकंमुस्तवाजजगति. Cf. MBh. XII, 28, 36:

यथा कार्यं च कार्यं च समेतां गहोदयी
समेतं च न्यायेऽयां तद्ज्ञातितस्मागमः
while to read poetry merely for what it says”. ¹ On the other hand, the real poetry of the Saundaranandana becomes “part of the furniture of the mind”, and nobody who has read the fine verses from XV, 32–30 is likely to forget them. But such verses are rare, and Abhinava may well have classified the whole poem as “didactic”, thus dismissing it from serious literary consideration, for the philosophical passages are of interest to the believer and to the scholar, but not to the sahrdaya. But this is mere speculation.

With Ananavardhana, however, we pass into the realm of certainty. The influence of the Dhvanyaloka on Abhinava cannot be exaggerated. We can safely say that the two greatest works in Indian literary criticism are the Dhvanyaloka and Abhinava’s commentary on it, the Locana. There are few ideas in the D. Al. which Abhinava has not assimilated, often by dealing with them in a more subtle manner. Those ideas however for which he owes less to Ananda, will be dealt with in the section on Abhinava himself. Here we should like to call attention to certain key terms, which stand for important concepts, from the D. Al. which might escape the notice of a hurried reader. These are the terms which seem to us most important to Abhinava’s theories. Before doing so, we should remember what dhvani is not. There is nothing imprecise, or vague about dhvani, as many Western writers have erroneously supposed, misled by the connotations of the word “suggestive” in English. The concept is not a subjective one. There is nothing ineffable about dhvani. It is important to realise this. Ananda in fact spends a good deal of energy in refuting the anākhayeyavādins, those who claim that, if suggestion exists at all, it is beyond the realm of speech. ² Both vastudhvani and alankāradhvani can be paraphrased, without losing their status as poetry (though of course they are no longer cases of dhvani by definition), but rasadhvani cannot. In fact, if we were to state what is the single most important characteristic feature of rasadhvani, we would say that it is the inability to lend itself to paraphrase. The reason this is so has to do with


2. The position of the anākhayeyavādins is given at the beginning of the D. Al. p. 33 (B. ed.): कोंक्यवत्साकंक्षकरणशास्त्रीयाः क्रियात्मकोऽवत्मक होत सह्याध्यायस्वेष्मभेद समासयात्मकम् । "Some whose minds shied away from attempting a definition declared that the truth of dhvani lay outside the realm of speech, and could only be internally realised by a sensitive reader." Ananda replies to this at the very end of the first Uddyota (after K. 22). Again at the end of the third Uddyota, Ananda comes back to their views, informing us that the Buddhists claim that all things are beyond definition (p. 519, B. ed.). Note that the kārikas themselves never reply to the anākhayeyajāvada. In the third Uddyota (p. 403 and also p. 517–518) Ananda, perhaps borrowing from Vākyapadīya I, 35, says that only a jeweller can recognise the true value of gems and whether they are genuine or synthetic.)
Ánanda’s theory of the different functions that words fulfill in literature. We will deal with this only briefly, for while it is essential to Abhinava, it is an area about which the reader can find reliable information with no great difficulty.¹ In essence it is this: Ánanda inherited from older works, two functions of words, abhidhā and lakṣaṇa. Abhidhā is denotation, the literal meaning of any utterance. Lakṣaṇa is more complex (it has often been misunderstood), but can be translated as secondary usage, including metaphorical usage. The time-honored example, unfortunately not so simple to understand as has been thought, is: gangāyam ghoṣah, literally: “In the Ganges is a village of cow-herders.” If this sounds absurd in English so does it in Sanskrit, for the locative is not normally used in the sense of proximity. By “in the Ganges” is therefore meant “near the Ganges”, i.e. “on the banks of the Ganges”. This meaning (known as the lakṣyārtha, as opposed to the abhidheyaartha) is reached through lakṣaṇa. Until the time of Ánanda, these were the only two functions (apart from tātparya with which we are not concerned here) which writers, either on literature or philosophy, recognised. Ánandavardhana revolutionised the field of poetics by adding a third function, hitherto completely unsuspected: vyañjana or “suggestiveness”. This sābdavyāpāra or “linguistic function” is active in all the three types of suggestion mentioned above. Both Ánanda and Abhinava spend a great deal of time justifying this function and defending it against detractors.² They did this so successfully that, after one or two major critics (Kuntaka and Mahimabhaṭṭa), this function was universally acknowledged, and one finds no major work written after the eleventh century in which the author does not use it as an important element in his own theories on literature. To our mind, Abhinava’s major contribution to this doctrine was to show that rasa is not niyata, i.e. “necessary”, thus differing from arthāpatti (presumption, as used by Mukulabhaṭṭa in the Abhidhīvatimārktkā) and from anumāna, which are logical processes. Direct statements “produce” results. Thus the phrase putras te jātaḥ,³ “A son has been born to you”, “produces” delight. This is not the case with aesthetic delight, which, according to Ánanda and Abhinava, can only be “suggested”. But there are a great many other ideas in the D. Al. not nearly so well-known, which must have exercised a certain fascination for Abhinava, as they still do for us, one thousand years later. The most important of these (and certainly the least recognised by modern writers) goes by the name of svakabdanivedatva. It is closely relat-

¹ See the excellent chapter on metaphor in K. Kujumni Ḍāja, Indian Theories of Meaning, Madras, 1963.

² Abhinava has a long defence in the Locana, p. 55-70 (B. ed.). The very long commentary (p. 401-457) in the D. Al., third Uḍḍyota, also is concerned with this.

³ Locana, p. 79, 80, 83.
ed to the idea of vyañjanā. Can an emotion be conjured up by simply naming it?\(^1\) When an author attempts to charge a situation with sensuality, for example, is it sufficient for a man to say to a woman: “I want to sleep with you”? If a character says to someone: “I love you”,\(^2\) this may or may not be the case, but as readers of literature we demand proof, and the only proof relevant to literature is the actual suggestion of the emotion in the work. Simple profession is not enough. Surely the great fault of Thomas Mann’s “Magic Mountain” is that while the first half of the book successfully creates the atmosphere of a sanatorium removed from the preoccupations of ordinary existence, the second half, in which Mann deals with philosophical and political ideas, fails to come to life. It is too intellectualised, too explicit—Mann seems to be writing essays, not literature. Settembrini’s long discourses only arouse impatience to get on to the real fictional elements of the work. Ānanda saw this clearly (is he perhaps the first recorded literary critic to do so?): “In a poem in which there is no description of the vibhāvas, etc., but a simple use of the word “love”, etc., how can there possibly be the slightest imaginative experience (on the part of the reader)?”\(^3\) Abhinava was deeply impressed by this doctrine, as he tells us in the A. Bh.: “It has been shown by the author of the dhvani (āloka) and others, that rasas, etc., are never conveyed by the mere naming of the emotion (to be suggested). This can be ascertained from my exposition called the Locana on the Sahādayāloka.”\(^4\) It is this doctrine that has led Ānanda to emphasise the extreme importance of the suggested element (vyañgyārtha) in literature, over and above the explicit element (vācyārtha). The whole first Uddyota of the D. Al. is devoted to establishing the existence of this suggested element, and to underlining its supreme place in poetry. At times, in fact, this seems excessive, for it often leads Ānanda to give critical acclaim to a poem that we should judge less satisfactory\(^5\) and to deride a poem that we should

1. Note what Abhinava says in the Locana, p. 51, that rasa is “never even in a dream svāsatabāvacya,” स्वसत्तबावावतः

2. There is a whole class of literature devoted to saying this same thing, on the part of women, by suggestion. They are always, as in D. Al. p. 71, cases of vastudhvani.

3. D. Al. p. 83: न हि केनृश्चुशतारिमिश्रत्त्वावथाव विभावादिमित्तत्वावत्रहति काव्ये मनापि रसत्तपत्तापितारतः

4. A. Bh., Vol. I, p. 343: लाृशदाधनविनभव न हि रसार्धीत व्यक्तिकारितविनिदीक्षितम्।

5. The only names that Abhinava uses for the D. Al. are kāryāloka (“light on poetry”) and sahādayāloka (“light for the sensitive reader”). The name dhvanyāloka is thus actually a mienomer.

5. We think of the verse: सुवर्णमपणम् द्विविवी विक्षिप्ति पुस्तावभव | etc. given on p. 137 of the D. Al. as an example of avakṣitavācyadhvani, and which is surely

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prefer aesthetically, on the simple grounds that one contains suggestion and the other lacks it. But as Ananda was the very first critic in literary history to have perceived the existence of the suggested sense, we must not complain if he is carried away by enthusiasm at his discovery.¹ There is however one place in the D. Al where Ananda makes a very significant concession which has been for the most part overlooked by the later tradition: in the first Uddyota of the D. Al he says that an emotional evocation can be “directly and explicitly stated” if this statement is merely a recapitulation (anuvāda) of what has already been suggested.²

A doctrine which Ananda never developed into a specific theory, but which is nonetheless discernible from various passages and their underlying assumptions in the D. Al, is the autonomy of literary experience. A poem creates its own world, and must be consistent only with itself. It owes only token allegiance to the outside world. The values of life are not necessarily the values of literature. Ananda says, very explicitly, in an important passage in the third Uddyota, that questions of truth and falsity simply do not apply to imaginative literature:

“In the field of poetry where we perceive suggested elements, truth (satya) and falsity (asatya) are pointless. To examine (literature) through (the usual) valid means of cognition would simply lead to ridicule.”³

The criteria by which we judge literature, he explains, are not those which we apply in our everyday life. This theory culminates in the famous doctrine of aucitya, literally “propriety”. He develops this concept at very great length in the third Uddyota, and culminates by saying:

“Except for impropriety, there is no other source of harming rasa. The highest secret (upanisad) of rasa is following well-known (canons) of propriety.”⁴

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inferior, as literature, to the verse quoted on p. 114:

अनुरागवती संवेद्या विचलतनुष्ठतः।
अद्वैत दैवतति: कालुकू तथापि न समागमः॥

which is only an example of gunabhātavagniya.

1. A criticism levelled by his detractors in an amusing line in the D. Al, p. 25: अविभाविरिति विदेहसाधकसहस्रास्त्राकानामयुक्ति लिङ्गमुंगनते तत्र हृदु न बिश्वः।

2. D. Al, p. 81: सन्तर्णेन गा (nāmade śraptātī) केवलमूग्नते, न तु तकृता।

3. D. Al, p. 455: काव्यस्त्रीयं च व्यक्तिस्त्रीयायं स्तवस्यगृहसिद्धास्याक्सात्मकप्रमाणाय सम्पूर्णते।

4. D. Al, p. 330: अन्तःचित्तलवथानु नाय्यदस्मिन कारणम्।

प्रसिद्धीचित्रलवथानु रसिकप्रियताः॥
What Ānanda means by *aecitya* is not however what we associate with the word "proper". Space does not permit us to go into the issue here, but at least one application of the theory, of great relevance to modern literature, should be briefly touched upon. This is the question of obscenity. The problem centres around the very beautiful eighth chapter of the *Kumārasambhava* in which Kālidāsa describes the love-making of Śiva and Pārvatī. Now Ānanda points out that this is tantamount to describing the love-making of one's own parents, since Śiva and Pārvatī are considered in mythology to be the father and mother of the world. Ānanda, from the same passage, leaves us in no doubt that the passage is "obscene" (*asabhya*). But this does not mean either that it should be censored (a question Ānanda never even considered, for it would be considered *hubris* to do more than make literary judgments; an actual "judge", deciding what people should or should not read, would be distasteful and indeed unthinkable in ancient India, as hopefully it is coming to seem to us today) or that it is not great literature. The description may be obscene (*asabhya*) but it is not vulgar (*grāmya*), i.e. it may offend some people's notion of propriety, but it is not on that account unrefined or without value. The reason, Ānanda tells us, is the literary skill with which the description is made. Kālidāsa was a consummate artist, and this is all that need concern the literary critic. Questions of morality are simply absurd. (Though one might sympathise, partially, with Kenneth Tynan when he pleads that he should be allowed to criticise a play of Ionesco on moral grounds: "If a man tells me something which I believe to be an untruth, am I forbidden to do more than congratulate him on the brilliance of his lying?" 4) Here is Ānanda's remarkable passage: "How is it that in such cases sensitive critics do not find the subject-matter utterly lacking in literary beauty (*cūrtva*)? It is because (what would ordinarily be considered a blemish) is cancelled out (lit. concealed-*tirohita*) by artistic genius (*kaviśakti*). For there are two kinds of blemishes (*doṣa*): (1) that due to the lack of intellectual refinement (*avutapatti*) on the part of the poet, and (2) that due to the absence of genius (*ṣakti*). Now the fault that is due to a lack of intellectual refinement can sometimes be passed over by grace of (the poet's inborn) genius. But a fault due to lack of genius will very quickly obtrude itself (on the attention of the reader) ... And so for example, great poets can describe the well-known sexual love, etc., among the very highest gods, and although they are improper, nonetheless, due to

2. *D. Al*. p. 332: तत्त्व पिन्चोः संभोगप्रवृत्तिः।
4. See the London Observer for the week of June 5, 1968.
the saving power of their genius, such descriptions do not strike us as (at all) vulgar. An example is the description of the love-making of Parvati (and Śiva) in the Kumārasambhava."

Another seminal idea of importance for Abhinava’s later theories was the critical equipment necessary to appreciate this “suggested sense”. Kārikā 7 of the first Uddyota, has this remarkable verse:

“(The suggested sense) cannot be known merely through lexicography or through grammar. Only those concerned with the very essence of poetry have access to it.”

Here the author of the Kārikās is criticising what was until his time the very staple of the literary critic: technical knowledge. Reading through the works written before the D. Al., one is struck by the extraordinary perception of this remark. Dāṇḍin, Vamanā, Udbhaṭa and Bhāmaha are unbending in their concern with the technicalities of the language, with metre, with grammar,3 and, especially, with figures of speech. One is reminded of the situation today, where the battle still continues between the “academics” who insist on the importance, for understanding a work, of peripheral knowledge, and the “new” critics (a term Ānanda uses of his school) who insist on the autonomy and self-sufficiency of the poem. The difference, of course, is that it could be taken for granted that anybody in ancient India who was interested in Sanskrit poetry automatically came armed with elaborate training in purely formal disciplines: grammar, prosody, logic. But Ānanda was the first to demand that another element be introduced: literary sensivity. He was concerned with essentials, with the aesthetic impact of the work of art. This was revolutionary, but in a sense it never had the impact on later critical writers that one would expect it to have. The one great critic to assimilate this principle into his own literary criticism is Abhinava himself. For only Ānanda and Abhinava concerned themselves with wider issues of literary criticism. Thus in the fourth Uddyota4 of the D. Al.

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1. D. Al. p. 316–317:

2. D. Al. p. 93:


Ananda judges both the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata as whole works of literature.

Later authors were content to simply enumerate once again the various technical factors in a given poem. Abhinava of course carried on the tradition of Ananda by focusing on fundamental questions of the philosophy of aesthetics. Though he was followed in this by all later writers, he was the last to make any contribution to the field. What he had to say was new and intellectually daring. Later writers simply repeat his ideas, usually in a simplified form. But it seems to us very likely that Abhinava was encouraged to take this wider view because of the example that Ananda set for him.

Another idea which Abhinava must have first assimilated from Ananda is the extraordinary importance ascribed to the poet. Not importance in the worldly sense of the term, but his autonomy, his ability to create new worlds. This too was an idea barely foreshadowed in earlier criticism. Ananda states his position in two very exceptional verses, which have impressed themselves on the imagination of all later writers:

"In the shoreless world of poetry, the poet is the unique creator. Everything becomes transformed into the way he envisions it.

If the poet is emotionally moved (lit. "in love") in his poems, then the whole world is infused with rasa. But if he be without an interest in the senses (vitārāga), then everything will become dry (nirasa)."

1. D. Al. p. 498:

अपारी काम्यतासाय विशुचिकाम प्रजापतिः;
सवासी मोलने विश तनामे परिकल्पिता।
श्रीकारिः चेतकविः काम्ये जाते रसमाय जगत्;
स एव्वीतत्तत्त्वविद्वारसंधयेव ततोऽ

These verses are quoted in the Agnipurāṇa 339, 10-11, Ānandārama ed. Abhinava explicitly states that these verses are by Ananda in the A. Bk. Vol. I, p. 296:

तत ग्राहनम्— 'श्रीकारां चेतकविः' इवाधिनद्वशेषनाचार्ये।

So there can be no doubt that the Agnipurāṇa has borrowed the verses from Ānanda and not vice versa.

Note also the fine verse quoted immediately after these two:

भावानेतानान्तिः विशेषतः वेदांतमच्छेत्ततः;
व्यवहारस्यात बहुद ज्ञातः काले व्यवस्तत्तवा।

"A great poet, at his own will, causes even inanimate objects to behave as if they were animate objects and animate objects to behave as if they were inanimate".

Note that Abhinava (p. 499) takes विताराग्या in the second stanza to be an upalakṣaṇa for all the other rásas.

We should not interpret vitārāga to mean vaivṛgyavat and take it to be a covert reference to kāntarasa. For if this were so, nirasaśam would make no sense even in its punned meaning. Vitārāga here simply means a poet not interested in rásas, emotionally uninvolved. The second half of the verse, therefore, means that if the poet is not very good (not alive to the external world) he will not be able to invest his poetry with any real interest.
Abhinava echoes this in his famous remark on poetic imagination (pratibhā) in the Abhinavabhārati:

"The poet is like Prajāpati, from whose will this world arises. For the poet is endowed with a power to create wondrous and unheard of things. This power arises from the grace of Parā Vāk ("Highest Speech"), which is just another name for poetic imagination (pratibhā), which has its seat in the poet's own heart, and which is eternally in creative motion (udita)."\(^1\)

It follows from this that for both Ānanda and Abhinava, there could be no end to this creative imagination and to the actual poetic situations it could envisage. This is the theme of a whole section at the beginning of the fourth Uddyota of the D. Al., where we are told that there is no end to the themes of poetry, as long as one is endowed with poetic imagination.\(^2\) He gives a beautiful simile:

"Even though subjects may have been already used, thanks to the fact that they are associated with imaginative experience (rasa) in literature, they all appear new, just as trees appear new during the honey-months (spring)."\(^3\)

There is no end to the novelty of poetic themes,\(^4\) no way of exhausting the subject—matter of poetry:

"Thousands upon thousands of poets as eminent as Vācaspati himself might use (various) subjects (in their poetry), and yet, like primordial world-matter, they cannot be exhausted."\(^5\)

This is a healthy emphasis on the primacy of the external world, and how it must always form the poet's major source of material.\(^6\)

One is reminded of the passage from the Avimāraka: "How lovely is the great variety of this world!"\(^7\) This agrees with the emphasis the kārikās

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1. A. Bh., Vol. I, p. 4:
2. D. Al., p. 537:
3. D. Al., p. 528:
4. D. Al., IV, 6,
5. D. Al., IV, 10:

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place upon love, of all the rasas (note that ŠR is never mentioned specifically in any kārikā of the D. Al.). In the second Uddyota when the guṇas (linguistic qualities) are being discussed, mādhurya “delicacy” is emphasised: “love alone is very delicate, for it is the most pleasing among all the rasas.”

This is so, we are told, because “the mind, in love, becomes exceedingly sensitive (is moved).” It is surely this emphasis that has led Abhinava, in the A. Bh., to make a profound philosophical definition of love. This occurs under NŚ. VI. 45, where Abhinava has a very long comment on Bharata’s definition of śṛṅgārarasā. The section is, for the most part, very corrupt. However one passage can be translated:

“Someone objected as follows: how can there be only one rasa (śṛṅgāra) when there are so many different kinds of love (rati) according to the literary character in whom (love) exists? The person objecting thus is not (really) acquainted with love. For all love is only one. It (exists) where there is not the separation of the one (?-ekavīyoga) (from the other), because there is a mutual (comingling) of consciousness. This is why (Bharata) said: uttamayuvaprakṛtih (this refers to p. 301, Vol. I of the NŚ: sā ca stripuruṣahetukā uttamayuvaprakṛtiḥ): “he is noble” and “she is noble” and so we get the dual compound uttamau. The same is true of yuvānau (i.e. “he is young and she is young” and so the dual compound). Now the word uttamauyuva in this context refers to their consciousness (i.e. their minds), and not to their bodies. For this concept (viz. nobility), from the highest point of view, applies only to consciousness...”

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jagataḥ. Cf. Auden, in the New Republic, Dec. 9, 1967: “If today, it seems to me, the word “real” can be used at all, the only world which is real for us, as the world in which all of us, including scientists, are born, work, love, hate, and die, is the primary phenomenal world as it is and always has been presented to us through our senses, a world in which the sun moves across the sky from east to west, the stars are hung in the vault of heaven, the measure of magnitude is the human body, and objects are either in motion or at rest”. It is clear that this love for the human, for the particular and the imperfect (cf. Balzac: “Blessed are the imperfect for theirs is the kingdom of love”) is much closer to the hearts of Indian poets than of Indian philosophers.

1. ख्वज़्र एव मदुरः परः प्रह्ददर्नो रसः | D. Al., II. 7.
2. आर्द्रताः वाणि यतस्ताभाषीं मनः | D. Al., II. 8.
3. See also III. 28:
विशेषतः ख्वज़्रे सुकुमारदृष्मि ख्वसैि।

“Especially in Śṛṅgāra, for it is the most delicate of all the rasas”. See also D. Al., II. 11 and II. 15.

4. A. Bh. Vol. I, p. 302: अत एव यक्ष्मत्रदृशीचोवः—तत्रा भाषामेधेन भरताः। कथमेको रस हि तदन्निमित्तवः। एको ख्वसैि तृतीया रसः। यक्ष्मयोग्यसङ्कारा एकविषयेण न महतः। अत एवः

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The above is meant only to give an idea of Ánandn's influence. The actual influence of the D. Al, has been far more extensive than we are able to indicate here. We have not, for instance, dealt with such important themes as prādhānya, "predominance", and its importance for judging the status of a given poem, or of Ánanda's new ideas on figures of speech, or on saṅghātana (linguistic structure). But what we have said should suffice to give the reader an idea both of the remarkable profundity of some of the views of the Dvhanyūloka, and of their importance for Abhinava's philosophy of aesthetics.

BHAṬṬATAUTA

Bhaṭṭatauta, Abhinava's teacher of dramatic theory, wrote a work entitled the Kavyakautuka, now lost. On this work Abhinava wrote a commentary, also lost. It is thus not possible to determine just how many of Abhinava's ideas come from Bhaṭṭatauta. He quotes him often in the A. Bh., but many of the passages are too corrupt to understand. However, it is clear that Bhaṭṭatauta emphasised the drama (over and above lyric poetry). Thus Abhinava says:

"(Our) teacher says that rasa arises in a poem when there arises an experience (on the part of the reader) that is similar to direct perception (pratyakṣa) (of a drama). Thus he says in the Kavyakautuka:

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Cf. Abhinavagupta's remarks about love in the Locana, p. 205:

"For there is an unbroken propensity for love in all creatures, gods, animals, men etc. And so there is no creature who is not (capable of) responding sympathetically to love. Even an ascetic can find aesthetic delight in (descriptions of) love. And so it is called "delightful" (madhura). For a sweet dish such as sugar candy etc., when it falls on the tongue of a discriminating person or a non-discriminating person, a healthy man or a sick man, will immediately be pleasurable."

1. Generally whenever the term upādhyāya is used in the A. Bh, it refers to Bhaṭṭatauta.

"In a poem that is not enacted, it is not possible to have a (true) aesthetic experience (āśvāda). When things (bhāava) such as gardens, one’s beloved, the moon, etc., are well and elegantly described by a polished imagination, then they appear as if they are actually taking place before our very eyes (i.e. as if we saw them acted out)."¹

Abhinava improves on this:

"... the actions of the actor have been devised in order that the spectator might obtain an aesthetic experience that is appropriate to direct perception (as in the drama). This is why Bharata has sanctioned the use of music, etc., in order to break the knots of the heart that is filled with the anger and sorrow indigenous to it. For the text (the Nāṭyaśāstra?) includes everything (or: is meant for all people). Therefore, rasas are only found in dramas, and not in the everyday world. This is what (Bharata) means (to say). And poetry is nothing other than drama".²

But what is most significant for us, is the term pratībhā. It is clear from the quotations by later writers that Bhaṭṭācara was greatly preoccupied with this term and the concepts that lay behind it. Hemacandra quotes three verses from Bhaṭṭācara:

"It has been said that there can be no poet who is not (also) a seer. And a man (becomes) a seer because of his "vision" (darśana). Vision is the knowledge of the truth of the nature and properties of various things. A man is said in the kāstra to be a poet only because of vision. A man is said to be a poet in the world when he has both vision and (the power of) description. This is why, although the first poet (Valmiki) was always gifted with a clear vision, as long as he did not actually describe (things) he was not known as a poet (but only as a sage)".³

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1. A. Bh., Vol. p. 290:

2. A. Bh., Vol. I, p. 291:

The Kauṇḍinya on the Locana quotes a very important verse that might well come from the Kavyakautuṭaka:

“There are two paths of the goddess of speech: one is the śāstra, and the other is poetry (kavikārma). The first of these arises from intellectual ability (prajñā), and the second from genius (pratībhā).”¹

This propels us to the heart of a great controversy, the tension between “inspiration” and “learning.”² For pratībhā not only means creative, or poetic imagination, it also means “genius”, or “inspiration”. The term to which it is generally opposed is vyuptyati, “learning”, “intellectual refinement”. The dichotomy is very old in Sanskrit poetics. It held a particular fascination for Abhinava, for it involved him in one of his life-long preoccupations: the relation between philosophy and poetry. In a sense one can look at this dichotomy as finally touching the most famous dichotomy of all, that between the followers of the old school of poetics who believed in the paramount importance of alāṅkāras and gumas, and the new dhvani school. For the older school emphasises the hard work that must go into creation, the need for being properly schooled. The new school on the other hand, emphasises imagination,³ inspiration, rasa and dhvani. This is expressed in the famous kārikā of the Dhvanyāloka where it is said that figures of

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1. Kauṇḍinya, K. Sastrī’s edition of the D. Al. p. 170:


3. Also, IV, 6: वदि स्वात्मतिमार्गः
speech will come without any effort to the poet concerned with rasadhvani. Of course Ānanda himself was not unaware of the importance of gujas and alaṅkāras; it is only that for him and for Abhinava, they constitute the body, the externals of poetry. The argument is not confined to India. It is a matter of controversy whether a “creative writing course” is of any use to the young writer or not. There are those who argue that nobody ever learns anything from such artificial attempts to instil talent into students. Howard Nemrov once said in conversation that the only thing he really felt he should tell his class on creative writing was: “Why don’t you write well? Why aren’t you good?” On the other hand, there is general agreement that such classes do often manage to teach the already gifted student certain technical skills.

The most famous line on pratibhā, first quoted by Abhinava and later by a great many writers, belongs to Bhaṭṭatāraka. It is: “Poetic imagination is that (form of) intelligence which shines with ever new scintillation.” The whole verse is quoted as far as we know, only by Vidyācakravartin, in his Sampradāyaprakāśini:

“Remembrance is that which refers to an object of the past. Mati refers to something that is still in the future, buddhi deals with that which is present and prajñā belongs to all three times (past, present and future). But pratibhā is that intelligence which shines with ever new scintillation. The poet is he who is skilful in descriptions animated by that (pratibhā). Poetry is that which the poet does.”

There is of course a long tradition behind this word. The most famous quotation is perhaps the verse from Bhāmaha that Abhinava quotes more than once:

1. II, 16 and vṛtti thereon.
2. Several stanzas on pratibhā have been ascribed by Gnoli to Bhaṭṭatāraka: “Three stanzas, quoted by Hemacandra and probably taken from Bhaṭṭa Tota”, Gnoli, op. cit. p. XXX, Int. But this is incorrect, since the verses are from Mahimabhaṭṭa’s Vyaktiveka, II, 117–119.
3. See also Locana, p. 92:
4. Hemacandra, p. 3 quotes the whole passage:
5. Vidyācakravartin’s comm. on the KP; the Sampradāyaprakāśini, TSS. noe. 88 and 100, part I, p. 13:

The rest is as given in the preceding note.
"Even a stupid man can learn the šāstra from the teachings of his professor. But poetry is only given to the person who has imaginative genius (pratibhā) and that only once in a while".1

Abhinava and Bhaṭṭatāuta must have known the fourth chapter of the Kāvyamimāṃsā, most of which is given over to various views on pratibhā.2 Rājaśekhara defines it as: "That which causes to appear in the mind the collections of words, the technique of alaṅkāras, the caravans of meanings, the path of (poetic) expression, and other similar things as well".3 He divides pratibhā into two sorts: (1) that which applies to poets (kārayitri, or "creative"), and that (2) which applies to critics or readers (bhāvyātirī). "Creative imagination is of three sorts: sahaṇa, "inborn", aharṣya, "acquired", and upadeśikā, "learned". Poets too are divided into three classes, in accord with this scheme (sārāsvata, abhyāsika and upadeśikā). He has many interesting and unusual observations on critics and poets in the rest of the chapter as well. One thinks in particular of the two poets, blind from birth,4 who are nonetheless endowed with "vision" (pratibhā).

But it is really only Abhinavagupta who enables the various insights into the nature of imagination to be coordinated into a philosophical whole, as we shall see when dealing with his philosophy of aesthetics in the next section. The fine image of Mahimabhaṭṭa was surely inspired by Abhinava's philosophic views on imagination:

"Pratibhā is that intellectual function of the poet whose mind is concentrated (stimita) on thinking about words and meanings that are appropriate to rasas. It arises for a moment from the contact of the poet's mind with the essential nature (of the Ātman)."

1. Bhāṣṭara, Kāvyālakāra, I, 5:

2. On pratibhā see also : Vāmana, I, 3, 16; Yogasūtra, II, 36; also Kashmir Śaiva literature, e. g. Somānanda's Śivadṛṣṭi, II, 64 (p. 78, KST, LIV, 1984); Vasugupta, Spandakārikā, IV, 7. See also L. Silburn, "Vāṭulānātha Śūtra" (Paris, 1957) p. 14 and p. 38. See also Int. to De's ed. of the Vakrakātiśāstra, pp. XXIV ff. For the term in philosophy, see G. Kaviraj, "The Doctrine of Pratibhā in Indian Philosophy", Annals of the B. O. R. I, V (1923–24), p. 1 ff. and 113 ff.

3. K.M. ed. by C. D. Dalal and B. A. Sastry, revised ed. by Ramaswami Sastry Siromani, 3rd ed, Baroda, 1934, p. 11:

4. op. cit. p. 12 वत्सो मेघाविरुद्धकुमारदासानाथाच: जालन्धर: कवय: श्रेयः ।
"It is that which makes the things that exist in all the three worlds seem as if they were right before our very eyes, and (hence) it is known as the third eye of Śiva."\(^1\)

It is clear that the striking image in this verse is borrowed from passages in the D. Āl.\(^2\) Abhinava is also greatly concerned with pratibhā as a philosophic concept. Thus we find it defined\(^3\) and very often referred to in his Tantrāloka.\(^4\)

BHATṬANĀYAKA

As we have noted under the passages quoted from Bhatṭanāyaka in the Locana passage from the second Uddyota,\(^5\) Abhinava has very obviously taken many of his key notions on poetry from BN. The most important of these is sādhārāṇikarana, the power which enables a situation in literature to abstract itself from its unique application to one individual, and to be universally applicable. This is not a concept found in Ānandavaradhana, nor in the Nātyaśāstra. The word that BN uses for it is bhāvanā. Abhinava\(^6\) quotes the first line of a verse that Hemacandra\(^7\) and Jayaratha\(^8\) give in full:

"(There are three functions in poetry:) abhidiḥa (denotation, which, for BN, includes lakṣaṇā as well), bhāvanā (generalisation), and the enjoyment that ensues. Both word and sense-figures belong to denotation. The whole collection of (primary emotions such as) love, etc., arises from bhāvanā.


2. D. Āl. p. 508 where the *nava drṣṭi* is referred to, and also D. Āl. p. 498, third verse.


4. Gnoli, quoting four very difficult stanzas from the T. Āl. (XI, pp. 60–62), remarks: "Abhinava .... stress (es) the fact that pratibhā does not exhaust itself in the poetical intuition, but is, in a broader sense, the same consciousness, the same Self. In the majority of men it does not succeed in liberating itself from the chain of relationships and practical interests which condition and construct it, but, in the poet, it burns with a purified light – to shine out finally in all its fullness in the intuition of the saints." Gnoli, op. cit., p. 154. Further references in the Tantrāloka are XII. 90; 97; 101; 166; 112; 130 etc.

5. Below, we translate Abhinava’s brief summary of Bhatṭanāyaka’s views on rasa.


7. See Hemacandra, op. cit. p. 96. See also Chintamani, "Fragments of Bhatṭanāyaka." J. O. R. vol. I. p. 271. It is quoted in the Rasagargasdhara p. 25 (with the variant reading *tadbhogikītīr eva ca.*

The accomplished man (siddhīnāmarah) is permeated by the form of the enjoyment of that.  

Of course Bhaṭṭanāyaka was himself influenced by the D. Al. (though he is supposed to have written his Hṛdayadarpana to demolish the idea of dīvanī) in granting that there is an element in poetry beyond denotation and secondary usage. In one passage in the Locana, Abhinava even says that BN is simply giving suggestion another name. But far more important for Abhinava was BN’s views on religious ecstasy and poetry.

It may well be that Bhaṭṭanāyaka was the first person to make the famous comparison of yogic ecstasy and aesthetic experience. Unfortunately his Hṛdayadarpana has been lost, and only quotations survive in the later Alanka works. The Hṛdayadarpana appears to have been either a commentary on the Nāṭyāsāstra or an independent work criticising the theory of dīvanī in the course of which he had occasion often to quote from the NS. Abhinava quotes Bhaṭṭanāyaka frequently in the Locana, not always to disagree with him. It is clear from many of his remarks that he had a high respect for him.

The first passage we quote and translate is one of exceptional interest, that must certainly have been of great importance for Abhinava’s own theories. It is found on p. 5 of the Abhinavabhārati (G. O. S. vol. I, 2nd ed.) and is a commentary on the opening verse of the Nāṭyāsāstra:

"Bhaṭṭanāyaka however (explains the verse as follows):

1. 
   अभिभा भावना चान्या तद्भौगolidे च ।
   अभिभध्रुपिणी वस्ति श्रवणाथाल्कति ततः ॥
   भावनाभावपुर्वविशिष्टविशिष्टविशिष्टस्वरूपः ॥
   तद्भौगलितः स्वायत्तेऽसिद्धमात्रः ॥

We are not certain about bhāvanabhāryaḥ. Perhaps it should be translated as "to be reflected on in the mind by means of bhāvanā” i.e. bhāryaḥ would mean "to be reflected on”, bhāvanayāt bhāryaḥ.

2. On Bhaṭṭanāyaka see Gnoli, op. cit., p. XX. Also Kane, H. S. P. p. 221–225. The date Gnoli gives is around 900 A.D. In any case he certainly lived after Ānandaśvara in response to whose theory of dīvanī his own work seems to have been written.

3. See Locana p. 188.

4. For all references in the Locana to BN, see Kane, op. cit. p. 223.

5. 
   मन्त्रयो चिंतसा देवौ हितातिशमेः शरीरः ।
   शास्त्रायाऽश्च विषयाः मन्त्रायाऽश्च ॥

6. Udahārasya, which simply means “spoken” is taken to be a pregnant use of the word by BN who interprets it as udahārasya. The drama is like life. It is essentially unreal, and yet it affects us profoundly. Most important of all, it is

(Continued on next page)
“I shall (now) expound that drama which was promulgated\(^1\) by Brahman – the highest Self – as an illustration such that people might understand that worldly objects are insubstantial (nissārabheda), fabricated (as they are) by ignorance (of the identity between the Self and Brahman). Just as the unreal actions of Rāma, Rāvana and others, which are essentially a figment of one’s imagination and hence do not possess a single fixed form, but in a moment assume hundreds and thousands of forms; which though different (in their unreality) from dreams, etc., are still the outcome of mental imagination (hrdayagrahanidāna); which are enacted by actors who are almost like the creator of the world (Brahmā) and who have not relinquished their separate identity (as persons in real life) – those actions (of Rāma and Rāvana, etc.) appear (to us) in a most unusually wondrous way; and though appearing like that, they become the means of attaining the (four) goals of life – in exactly the same way this universe consists of a display of unreal forms and names and yet through listening to and meditating on spiritual instruction, it leads to the realisation of the highest goal of human life (namely mokṣa).

Thus this stanza, by suggesting (the attainment of) the other-worldly highest goal of human life introduces kāntarasa.

‘Depending on their respective causes the different rasas originate from kānta (a state of mental calm).’\(^2\)

Thus the present stanza (\(\text{NS}, \text{I}, \text{I}\) ) conveys the higher purpose (of drama).” This is the explanation that Bhaṭṭanāyaka has given in his Sahṛdayadarpana. As he said:

Continued from previous page)

the means whereby we may attain bliss, which is after all the same as the Self and therefore the same as mokṣa. A. Bh. Vol. 1, p. 5:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{महानामाः} & \text{ महासा परस्मायना बुद्धामलमण्डिताविविधातिसारभरतसे बुद्धारणीकृते तवामने ताइधामि.} \\
\text{सब} & \text{ हे कल्पनामात्सर्त तत् ध्वानविनिवेशकुष्णे कल्पनान्दिशास्त्रसमस्यासद समातिविविध्यन्} \\
\text{मापि सुन्दरतरु ह्यतममातिरंतत्रमक्तव्यमनहनमक्तव्यपरिपरितं रामरसाबलि वेषितमततं क्षौद्यूरत्वुप्रुत्य भावति} \\
\text{तथा भासमामायं च पुनःध्वनितत्त्वात्} \text{ माति} \\
\text{तथा कांपित विशेषिन्द्रस्यसमार्थकमथम} \\
\text{च अवण्माननारिवश्रेणे परमपुर्वप्राप्तमिति षोडतापरस्मुक्ष्युक्तनेन शान्तारसोपक्षिपथं भविष्यति} \\
\text{सत सं निमितास्मादव शान्तायुधस्त रसः} \text{ १ १ हति} \\
\text{तदनेन परमस्थितिः प्रयोजनमुक्तः} \text{।} \\
\text{हति व्यक्ताने सहदेवरप्रेये पर्यस्तहाति} \text{।}
\end{align*}\]

\[\text{वदाह—} \]

\[\text{नमकृतौप्रियिमाण्णवेदे शास्त्रः यत्स:} \\
\text{प्रतिविंशि जग्नरा} \text{अपौपरिक्रमेण अजन:} \text{।} \text{।} \text{हति} \]

\(^1\) It is not clear whether Abhinava accepts this justification of ŚR or not. Most likely he does, at least in great part, for he also quotes this stanza (\(\text{NS}, \text{VI}, \text{p.} \text{335}, \text{in the interpolated kāntarasa section} \) and also uses it in the third Udygoda of the Locana, p. 391, as a proof of the existence of kāntarasa.
“I pay my homage to Śiva the poet (also the omniscient one—kavi) who has created all the three worlds and thanks to whom (yataḥ) (sensitive) people are able to attain aesthetic bliss by watching the spectacle (prayoga) of the play that is our life in this world.”

We can see prefigured in this fascinating fragment (from a commentary on the Nātyaśāstra itself?) many of the themes that were to occupy Abhinava so closely: the world as a drama, the individual as the actor, the illusion of drama and the illusion of existence, the acceptance of jāntarasa, the importance of mokṣa, Śiva as the cosmic poet, etc. How many more ideas would we find that Abhinava is indebted to BN for, if the Hṛdayadarpaṇa were extant?

The second passage from Bhaṭṭānāyaka is quoted in the Locana, under I. 6 (p. 91, Bālapriyā ed.):

“The cow in the form of speech gives a unique drink (rasa) out of love for her young. That (rasa i.e. bliss) which is (laboriously) milked by the Yogins cannot be compared to it.”

Abhinava comments: “Without being possessed by rasa, the Yogins laboriously milk out (bliss).”

1. Note that in the Locana, Abhinava speaks of Bhaṭṭānāyaka’s Hṛdayadarpaṇa, whereas here he refers to the Sahṛdayadarpaṇa. Are these just variant names for the same work? K. C. Pandey (Abhinavagupta, p. 200) suggests that the Hṛdayadarpaṇa refers to a book that refuted Ānanda’s theories, whereas the Sahṛdayadarpaṇa would have been a commentary on the NS. It is true of course that hṛdaya and sahṛdaya mean very different things, but Abhinava seems in the habit of calling a single work by different names. Thus he speaks of the Rāgayūla (i.e. the Dheanyūla) of Ānandavardhana (Locana, p. 2 and again Locana, p. 554) and later in the Abhinavabhāratī, Vol. I, p. 343, he calls the same work the Sahṛdayāloka. This is the same name he uses in the second vol. of the A. Bh, as well.

2. It is clear that Abhinava has used the ideas contained in this important passage. But how did he feel consciously about it? Did he accept the views or not? It would seem that he does, and yet on p. 3, Vol. I of the A. Bh, he quotes the interpretation of his teacher (Bhaṭṭatauté) on this verse from the NS!

3. Surely Uttvagodaya is wrong in saying that ignorance is suggested by the word bāla:

 बाले कालबदन्तिः उपासके वसे च ।

The point is that the bāla (child) is like the sahṛdaya. There can be no question of the sahṛdaya being ignorant.

4. सदृशं महत्ततानवः

वार्षपुरुषं पति हि रत्न यव्यावहुत्स्यम ।

तैन नास्ति सम्म स्वयंविधिते बौमिकिषिः ब: ||

5. Locana, p. 91:

नामिते ब्रह्मायक्षकलाः हि श्री बौमिकिषिः ।
The point of the verse\(^1\) must be that rasa is superior to the bliss that Yogins achieve. The reason is that the Yogins must go through an elaborate process.\(^2\) But note that the verse could mean just the opposite, namely that the rasa the Sahṛdaya enjoys is not equal to what the Yugin enjoys. Tena nāsya samaṇah does not specify whether it is superior or inferior. The verse is quoted in the context of poetry, and so the first interpretation ought to be the correct one. Furthermore, if it were not, Abhinava’s quoting it here would be out of place.\(^3\)

**Philosophical Influences**

**Vedānta:**

Not only was Abhinava, along with Ānandavardhana, assuredly the greatest thinker on aesthetic theory in India, he was also one of the greatest philosophical minds of mediaeval India. In Kashmir Śaivism, to which school he belonged, his word is considered authoritative in all philosophical issues. It has been suggested\(^4\) that he wrote his works on poetics after his major works on philosophy. One would, therefore, expect his aesthetic theories to have been influenced by his readings in Kashmir Śaivism. But probably even prior to his writings on Kashmir Śaivism, Abhinava was exposed to earlier Advaita literature. There is of course his own commentary on the Gītā,\(^5\) and though

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1. According to the K, the word udg here means poetry:

2. As the Kaumudi on the Locana says:

3. However, there is no doubt that in the third Uddyota, Locana, p. 510, Abhinava speaks of rasadviḍa as being only the reflection of a drop of the bliss that is parameshvaraviśrānt yananda. See our translation of this important passage below.

Note also the line that Abhinava quotes in the Locana (p. 39) from Bhāṭṭanāyaka:


5. The Gītārthaśasāgraha, published in the NSP edition of the BG edited by Wasudeva Laxman Shastri Pansikar, with 8 commentaries, Bombay, 1912. It seems clear though that Abhinava was reluctant to comment on the Gītā. Not only is his

(Continued on next page)
he himself does not often quote the Upaniṣads, there is little likelihood that he did not know them. He could not fail to have been deeply impressed with certain remarkable passages that have a direct bearing on his own aesthetic doctrines. We think of the beautiful simile in the Bhadāranyaka:

"Just as a man, when closely embraced by a woman he loves, knows nothing of the outside world, nor even of the inner one, so also does the ego (puruṣa) know nothing of the outside or of the inside when it is closely embraced by pure consciousness, the Self."

Then there are the passages from the Taittirīya Upaniṣad which are also quoted by Śaṅkara in the Brahmaśūtrabhāṣya.

The phrase anandaghana, used constantly in Vedānta works, obviously made an impression on Abhinava, for he uses it several times. One also thinks of such works as the Gaudapādakārikās (Agamaśāstra), which Abhinava must have known (in fact, the doctrines in Kashmir Śaivism take over most of the major views of Advaita), for example III. 42-45, where the four impediments in controlling the mind are mentioned. The four impediments are: vikṣepa (distraction); laya (which Madhusūdanarasavatī takes to mean susupti, in which he is supported by Gaudapāda himself under III. 35); kaśāya

Continued from previous page.

commentary unusually devoid of interest, but he himself hints that he did not really feel any inward compulsion to write it:

तत्तथारत्नमालमयां भगवद्गौर्तिकर्त्संवादधार
आचार्यवर्ग: सत्क्रियंजयकलोकश्चनकांनासाय
अन्त्यहस्तवाच विद्यामय तत्तथो भवत
तत्तथारत्नमालमयां भगवद्गौर्तिकर्त्संवादधार
In other words, he felt pressured to write it, and did it only for the sake of his relatives. (op. cit., pp. 775-776).

1. Bhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, IV, 3. 21:
लत्वा भिन्ना शिष्या संपरिष्कर्ष्टो न बाह्य कीर्तन वेद नान्तरेवेदवाचय गुरुः: प्राकृतसमना संपरिष्कर्ष्टो न बाह्य कीर्तन वेद नान्तरेव.

A somewhat amusing verse on this very passage is quoted in the commentary to the Viṣṇuṇābhaṁrāsa, under verse 69, p. 59:

जावित्वं तत्तथारत्नसान्यान्ति मुखरे मर्यादय निद्वली निविद्वली निविद्वली निविद्वली

2. रत्नो वै स: and रत्नों होंवथ हवव्यानवन्दी भवित अव विद्वान वश.

Taittirīya, II, 7.

3. II, 1. 12: (अनन्तमविद्वस्वासात्)

4. Note though how Śaṅkara understands rasa:

रत्नों नाग द्वियन्तरान्तरहरू महार्शार्त: प्रशिक्षीय रसी

5. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his Gādhārathadīpika, N. S. P. Gūḍā with 8 comments, Bombay, 1912 quotes the verses and clearly explains them.
(stiffening of the mind); and sukha, which Śadānanda in the Vedāntaśāstra
(33) explains as rasāsvāda! Here is the first half of kārikā 45 on sukham:

"In Yogic practices, one must not indulge in aesthetic pleasure
(sukham). One should, through wisdom, remain unattached ".

It would not be difficult, especially in a reductionist system (where all,
from the highest level, is pure Brahman), to see how Brahman and rasa, or
raša and the sākśin, the "witness" in the sense of pure consciousness, were all
one, and identical with añanda itself (since Brahman is characterised as
saccidānanda). This may of course have something of hindsight in it, but it
is doubtful whether Ānanda and thus Abhinava were not inspired to their
doctrine of vyājanā, at least in certain aspects, by the Vedānta notion of
mukti, which is not produced, or created, but is made manifest (abhivyakta)
through the removal of the āvaranās.

Already Bhavabhūti had used an important Vedānta simile in regard to
rasa. In the Uttararāmacarita III. 47 he speaks of karuṇa as the one rasa
of which all the others are simply vikāras, just as the bubbles and waves of
the ocean are all forms of water. Abhinava applies a very similar notion
to ŚR.

1. Jacob's ed. p. 51, under number 33.
2. नासवद्वृत्तं तस्मात न नियम: प्रह्या महें, on which Madhusūdana comments
   (under Gitā VI, 313, NSP ed.):

   तत समायेः परमसुखेकोऽकारिपु न नासवद्वृत्त:।
   एतानं कालमहं सुकृतिः शुपास्वादरूपेः
   शृङ्गे न दुर्गान्तुः।

   There is a very interesting variant, quoted in the Vedāntaśāstra (Jacob's ed.,
   p. 51, under 33): नासवद्वृत्तं तस्मात।
   Śadānanda says: अवृत्तवर्यानवस्त्रविभेदानि
   नित्यविकारः शुपास्वादरूपेः: एतानं कालमहं सुकृतिः.
   We can't help feeling that Śadānanda must have been
   aware of the famous comparison, brahmānanda (or even brahmāsvāda), and rasāsvāda
   and this is his way of answering it. His point then, as Nṛsiṃhasarasvati notes, is that
   the distinction is between nīrvikalpasamādhi and savikalpasamādhi, two terms which
   must have influenced Abhinava's own thinking on rasāsvāda. For in savikalpasamādhi,
   the tripūta (subject, object, knowledge) is present, as it must be in rasāsvāda, but
   it is absent in brahmāsvāda, where there is only one sākśin, with no object to cognise,
   pure consciousness.

3. This similarity was already noted by Jacobi in his introduction to the
   Dhvanyāloka translation, p. 398.
4. Raghavan, " The Number of Rasas," p. 165 quotes this verse and
   explains it.

5. एको रसे करुण एवं नियमित्वं: —
   नित्यं पुनः पुनः विचित्रविभेद: नित्यविकारः
   आन्तरिकतत्त्वाभ्यासान्वितारः: —
   नमस्ते यथा सत्त्वत्मेच द्वैतस्वरूपः।

6. Cf. A. Bh., Vol. I, p. 335, basing himself on the famous verse in the NS:
   Vol. I, G. O. S., p. 335:

   (Continued on next page)
When we come to the influence of Kashmir Śaiva texts, we are on firmer ground. A work which seems to us to have had a decisive influence on Abhinava is the \textit{Vijñānabhairava}, a work he often quotes.\textsuperscript{1} What is unusual about this work\textsuperscript{2} is its preoccupation with ecstatic experiences, and with exercises for inducing them. Here are some of the verses that undoubtedly captivated Abhinava:

"One should cast one's glance out into space, where there are no trees, no mountains, no walls (to obstruct one's vision), for when the nature of the mind (which is to think about various objects presented to it) is suspended, all activities come to an end".\textsuperscript{3}

"Meditating on the knowledge (that exists on its own) between two thoughts, one should fix (the mind) on that (empty) middle (space). Suddenly abandoning both of them, truth will appear in the middle".\textsuperscript{4}

In these verses, one finds a certain preoccupation with aesthetic themes—a feature that is lacking in \textit{Advaita} works. It is carried even further, when sexual comparisons, for which Kashmir Śaivism has a definite sympathy, begin to appear:

"Wherever the mind finds pleasure, one should firmly fix it on that object. For there the true nature of absolute bliss will manifest itself".\textsuperscript{5}

\textit{Continued from previous page}"

\begin{align*}
\text{श्रे} \text{षे} \text{ निमित्तमासाय शारणारः मववते } \| \\
\text{विकारः प्रक्षेपतं: पवनतिविवेय स्विवेय } \| \\
\text{बाहवा विकारर र्लारः: शारणालः प्रक्षेपमत्तं: } \|
\end{align*}

1. Only, as far as we are aware, in the \textit{Īśvarapratyabhijñānāvitivimānani} (edited in three volumes by Madhusūdana Kaul Sāstri, NSP, Bombay, 1938, 1941 and 1943 respectively). The work is quoted in Vol. I, 77, 80 and 287 and in Vol. II on p. 50, 179, 214, 262, 311, 427, and Vol. III, on p. 30, 52, 169, 346 and 386.

2. There is an interesting French translation of this remarkable text by L. Silburn, \textit{Le Vijñānabhairava}, Publications de l' Institut de Civilisation Indienne.

3. \textit{VB}, 60 (p. 50):
\begin{align*}
\text{विनिमित्तमासाय शारणारः मववते } \|
\text{विकारः प्रक्षेपतं: पवनतिविवेय स्विवेय } \|
\end{align*}

In fact Abhinava quotes this very verse in the \textit{ĪPVV} twice, once on p. 311 of Vol. II, and again in the same volume, p. 427.

4. \textit{VB}, 61 (p. 50):
\begin{align*}
\text{विनिमित्तमासाय शारणारः मववते } \|
\text{विकारः प्रक्षेपतं: पवनतिविवेय स्विवेय } \|
\end{align*}

This verse too is quoted by Abhinava in the \textit{ĪPVV}, Vol. III, p. 346.

5. \textit{VB}, 74, (p. 62):
\begin{align*}
\text{वात्र वात्र मनसदुर्लभस्त्रावः धारवते } \|
\text{तत्र तत्र रामदुर्लभस्त्रः स्वामवते } \|
\end{align*}
The commentator explains this to mean that one can fix one’s attention on any attractive object, such as the lotus-like face of a beautiful woman, and find bliss of a transcendental nature therein.¹

“After the manifestation of the happiness resulting from the nourishing moisture produced in the body by eating a good meal and drinking, one should meditate on the state of fullness of the body (at that time). From this, absolute bliss will arise.”²

The commentary explains rasa to mean the sense of “I-consciousness” and quotes the famous line from the Taittiriya already mentioned above.³

“The pleasure which terminates in the infusion of the power of bliss in a person on the achievement of sexual intercourse — that pleasure is one’s own pleasure on the realisation of the essence of Brahman.”⁴

Here the comparison that Abhinava will make between sexual experiences and ecstatic experiences, is explicitly stated. Note that the commentary speaks of the pleasure of knowing Brahman as being of the form of the resonance of a bell (ghantyanuraṇa), a term that Ānanda applies to dhvani. He also speaks of sexual intercourse as the abhivyaktikāraṇa (i.e. that which manifests or suggests) bliss,⁵ again a term that Abhinava uses of rasa. Verse seventy⁶ is another sexual verse where we are told that there is ānandasaṃplava, immersion in bliss, simply by remembering the various acts such as sucking (lehana), fondling etc., indulged in during love-play. The interesting thing is that the commentary gives a

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1. वंशर वसिन्नकुरि मण्डल व कामिनीवदनां वमाणीए मत: सती, ततः धारणसिरियां 'कर्तव्यम्।
2. VB, 72, (p. 60) : जर्गितश्रान्तसक्षणान्तविक्रमणात। भाववेदनिरताशी महान्नतस्मातो भैव॥
   This verse too is quoted by Abhinava, in the IPFV, Vol. II, p. 179.
3. VB, p. 61 : अहंरिप्रविहरिषीयां फसुपौ बाहानदृषः।
4. VB, 69, (p. 58) : स्वतिरसमन्द्रयक्षाविस्तारानी बाह्यमानवासावानिकषः।
   बसुकुले भावदल्पकति ततसुके स्वात्मकमुच्चतेः॥
5. VB, p. 59: the first passage is:
   कृतिक्रान्तविवेतीतान्तशक्तिमावशाश्रवः बलुं धण्डसुरुग्रहस्य महात्तपस्य दृशुं प्रभावः॥
   The second is: खोंसुः अभिविक्षिप्तिर्गमित।
6. The verse is:
   लेखापानमचकारोऽय्यसुभाष भरातु स्वतेः।
   शास्त्रावादिः देवविषि भवेदान्नदेवः॥
complex Tranitic explanation, which, it says, is Abhinava's! Could this mean that Abhinava had himself written a commentary on the *Vījñāna- 

bhārava*, now lost? Reading through the commentary on these verses by Śivopādhyāya, one is struck by the fact that he too uses the terms of Abhinava from aesthetics. Clearly he also felt their relevance here. Surely it is the kind of speculation found in these remarkable mystic verses of the *VB* that is responsible, at least in part, for Abhinava's own philosophy, where worldly pleasures are not to be rejected.

Another work, of perhaps even greater importance, is the *Yogavāsiṣṭha- 

mahārāmāyaṇa*. This is one of the most extraordinary texts of mediaeval India. To claim it for Kashmir Śaivism would be unjust, since the work itself stresses the fact that it belongs to no one school. The terminology is clearly heavily influenced by Kashmir Śaivism, but it is just as deeply marked by Buddhism and by Advaita Vedānta. What we cannot know for certain is whether Abhinava knew this text or not. There is a tradition current in Kashmir that he commented on the *YV*. Dr. K. C. Pandey informs us that he has seen parts of this commentary in manuscript form in Kashmir.

There is some likelihood that the author of the *YV* knew the *Dhvanyā- 

loka*, and we already have quotations from the work by the thirteenth century, so that it appears reasonable to say that it was written in Kashmir, sometime between the ninth century A. D. and the twelfth. The work is

1. *VB*, p. 60:

2. *Yogavāsiṣṭhamahārāmāyaṇa*, edition with the commentary *Vāsiṣṭhamahā- 

rāmāyaṇadīrghaprabhāsa* (a singularly uninteresting commentary of very little help in real difficulties), by W. S. Laxmaca Sāstri Pāṇiḍkar, NSP, Bombay, 1918, in two volumes.

3. See K. C. Pandey, *Abhinavaagupta*, p. 28–29: "There is enough evidence to show that he wrote many other works besides the above...His commentary on the *Yoga- 

vāsiṣṭha*. We have no other source of information about it than a tradition current among Kashmirian Pandits."

4. This was first pointed out by V. Raghavan, "The Date of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*", *J. O. R. Vol. XIII*, Part II, 1939, p. 121–123. The important verse of Ananda that we quote and translate later is copied almost identically in *Vol. II*, p. 1521 (VIB, 190, verse 89). *YV*, VI B, 197, verses 16–17 are very similar to the *D. Āl. I*, 4. There can be little doubt that the *YV* is the borrower here.

5. See Raghavan, "The *Yogavāsiṣṭha* and the Bhagavad Gītā and the place of origin of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*", p. 73, *J. O. R. Vol. XIII*, Part I, January–March 1939. "Hence the suggestion that Kashmir was the place where the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* was produced deserves acceptance," *op. cit.*, p. 82.

6. See Raghavan, *op. cit.*, p. 128: "What is the lower limit to the date of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* is a question which I can answer here. Scholars have up till now pointed out Vidyārāpya as the earliest to cite the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*. We can take up the (Continued on next page)
unique in many ways; one in particular interests us here: it is the only work in Sanskrit (apart from the Mahābhārata) that illustrates one of Ananda’s and Abhinava’s pet doctrines: the relation between śāstra and kāvya. The work itself\(^1\) says that it is meant as both, and all of its thirty-three thousand verses bear out this boast. Not only does it contain remarkable philosophical doctrines, but many of the passages are as complex and literary as any of the Mahākāvyas. The philosophical stories are replete with lyric descriptions of great beauty,\(^2\) and the very language itself gives evidence of a highly literary mind.\(^3\) The author was clearly aware of all the terminology from literary criticism,\(^4\) and makes use of it, thus illustrating Abhinava’s very philosophy. If he preceded Abhinava, then we can be certain that

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lower limit to the date of the Yogasūcīgīha by a century. The Sūkṣmukārāṇī (G. O., S. edn.) was compiled by Vaidya Bānu for Jalhaṇa in A.D. 1258. On pp. 412, 417, 439, 445 and 451 of this anthology, the Yogasūcīgīha is extracted.” Raghavan opts for between the 11th and the middle of the 13th century as the date for the YV. This is much closer to the truth than the unconvincing arguments of Aṭṭaya (Philosophy of the Yogasūcīgīha) and Dasgupta’s claim that it should be dated before Śaṅkara. Had Abhinava known the work, it seems odd that he would not have quoted it anywhere. It is interesting to note that in the preserved portion of the commentary on the YB by Kṣemarāja, the direct disciple of Abhinavagupta, there are no quotations from the YV, whereas in the later commentary (18th cent.) by Śivapāḍhyāya, there are numerous quotations. This seems to us to point to the fact that Kṣemarāja did not know the work.

1. YV, II, 18, 33:


3. We think of such passages as III, 16, 1–17, with its descriptions of artistic delights. Also VIA, 104, 15–21 for a fine discourse on the ill luck of a woman in spring who is not able to make love with a man. The remarkable story of Gaḍhī (V, 45–50), who dreams, in one second an entire life that turns out to have actually taken place in another dimension, is replete with the most extraordinary literary passages. There is no finer example in world literature of a profound philosophical mind with a genius for artistic description, even though many of the verses betray a certain lack of traditional literary education (odd syntax, unorthodox similes etc.). There is a fullness and an overflowing of the creative spirit in this work such as we have never come across in any other Sankrit text.

4. The word kama and its derivatives are to be found on virtually every page of the YV (e.g. VI, 68, 29; V. 25. 4); vihārati also occurs constantly (e.g. IV, 39, 20; VI, 42. 3); camathāra is also very common (e.g. III. 14, 45); tanmayi is not a rare expression (e.g. IV. 42. 11). Clearly the author is aware of the terms of literary criticism, for we find at VIA, 83. 6: वाच्यवाच्यकवाच्यव बिना बोध न जायते | VIA, 85. 1–5 contains a number of puns on rasa and rasikājana.
Abhinava derived a great deal of his inspiration from the *YV*, and if the author of the *YV* succeeded Abhinava, then it is just as clear that the *YV* derived its inspiration from Abhinava. In any case, both authors are closely related. One doctrine which is remarkably similar to passages from the *VB* and to passages in the *Tantrāloka* that we shall shortly examine, is the emphasis on being unfettered in one's enjoyment of life. Thus there is a passage where Vasiṣṭha tells Rāma that he, Rāma, is now a *jivanmukta*, who knows that his consciousness is ever pure, and so he should: “Drink, live, make love, for you have obtained the far-shore of worldly existence.”

Such verses are not rare in the *YV*, e.g.:

“It is all the same (if the realised man) be, with unbridled passion (*uddāmanamamnatham*), given to heavy drink, or dance, or if, on the other hand, he abandon all society and go off alone to the mountains.”

The number of verses in which *ānanda* is described in terms to which we are now used from Abhinava, are legion. Here are just a few examples:

“That is genuine happiness wherein the mind ceases to function. Such happiness is not possible in heaven, just as it is not possible for a house of ice to exist in the desert.”

And on a theme that Abhinava will develop himself:

“Higher than a kingdom, than heaven, than the moon, than the status of Maghavan and even than the delight that arises in making love with one's beloved is the happiness proceeding from the extinction of desires.”

The *YV* tells us that “all beings strive for bliss”. Speaking of *ātmānanda*, a term of which the book is very fond, it says:

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1. विश्व विहर रमल आलससार्यारः | *YV*. V. 50, 75.
2. *YV*. V. 56, 63:
   उद्दामाश्रयं पानातपरी बापि *गुलशुः* ।
   सांसारिकाणि समावायते वा बिरीः ॥
3. *YV*. VIA 44, 26:
   न सुन्दरी संसारं मरी हिमसूर्यं यथा ॥
4. *YV*. V. 74, 44:
   अपि राज्यादिपि *समाधियान्तनारदः* मामवातः ।
   अपि कालासासारशेरादं परमें सुखमें ॥

*We suppose that* *indu* *here means something like* *sandraloka*.

5. आनन्दायैव भूलाणि गताती बापि फामितितः | *YV*. VIA 108, 20.
"That is the highest place, the peaceful way (i.e. state), the eternal
good, happiness (śīva). Delusion no longer disturbs the man who has found
rest (vibrānti) there."  

Such verses, many of them very lovely, could be multiplied indefinitely.  

1. **Y V, V 54, 70:**

2. **We have here essentially only the importance of this fascinating work.**

There are many more passages relevant to the issues we are considering here. We think of the extraordinary explanation in VI B 83, 18 of Śiva at the end of time dancing and:

3. **When the world and the “I” disappear, only tranquillity is left.** A verse that occurs frequently (with minor variations) is:

4. **When the commentary quotes the verse yac ca kāmaścchā loke etc. (p. 1139), which Ānanda quotes in the Dvīnapaloka, p. 390. The tree that gives vibhrānti is said (VI B 44, 20) to be vairāyagrasupūtyā. A passage very interesting in the context of rasa is VI B 41, 5-6:**

5. **Note the commentary on this (p. 1150):**

6. **A similar verse, betraying the same knowledge of aesthetic theory is VI B 1, 18-19:**

7. **On which the commentary (p. 1070) reads:**
There are many passages from Kashmir Śaiva literature that helped to stamp Abhinava’s philosophy. Here, for example, is a fine passage from the Parātrīṃśikā:

"He sees, without any doubt, through the saktis of Siva (as if things were) right in front of him. This is the attainment of immortality, the experience of the Self. This is the initiation into Nirvāṇa, and that which establishes the existence of the world."

And here is an important verse from Somānanda’s Śivadrṣṭī:

"When one attains great bliss, or when one sees a friend after a long absence, meditating on the joy that arises, one merges into it, and one’s mind becomes one with it."

It is impossible to say how influential for Abhinava was the Tatvaveda of Ānandavardhana. The work has been lost, and unfortunately no quotations at all have been preserved. All we know of this work is what Abhinava tells us in the fourth Uddyota of his Locana: that it dealt, in great detail, with the relation between śāstra and kāvyā, poetry and philosophy. Most

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2. śaṅkara(pravartanās) sāntāvagāhī śraddhāśāmilī!

... ... ... ... ...

(Or सुविभिरति श्रवतः)

We are not sure how to take abṛśṭih. Is it the subject of sākṣat pakṣoti or its object?


4. Ānandaḥ māhāt śraddhā śraddhā śraddhayā vratam tadbhad gamī māhāt

5. Locana, p. 533: पत्रच प्रत्यक्षित (i.e. Ānandavardhana) तत्त्वावलोकिते विनिवेशितस्मात्तिष्ठति . It is clear from the Vṛtti passage on p. 533 of the D. Al, that the work dealt with what Ānanda calls the śāstranaya and the kāvyanaya. The Tatvaveda is also referred to by Abhinava in his Locana on Udd. I (p. 67).
likely Ānanda was inspired to this from his speculations on the nature of the Mahābhārata as both a work of philosophy and a work of poetry. We can justly presume that many of Abhinava’s ideas come from this text.

Another question that must go unanswered, though it is rich in possibilities, is Abhinava’s debt to Buddhism. We simply do not know anything definite on this problem at all, though it is very tempting to speculate.¹

INFLUENCES FROM SPECULATION ON Śantarasa

It is clear that Abhinava did have access to certain old manuscripts of the Nātyaśāstra in which nine rasas were enumerated, including śantarasa, and not the usual eight. Apart from the famous Kālidāsa passage² which mentions only eight, there is reason to believe that Abhinava himself realised, with an extraordinary display of intellectual integrity, that eight was the older and more genuine reading. We say this because when he quotes the verse from the NS³ enumerating the rasas, in the Locana, he quotes the

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¹ Abhinava of course knew Dharmakīrti whom he refers to with great respect in the IPVF, e.g. Vol. II, p. 111: प्रामाणिकतायायेति वेदाधिकारिण्यं वाद्यकिर्ति राजनार्थकोम्प्रामणिकतायायति, न पुनर्नाम सर्वत्रात्नीति. He again refers to him by name at IPVF, I, 279; II, 46 and 174. He mentions the Pramāṇavārttika by name at several places in the IPVF. E.g., Vol. II, 220; 223; 228; 234; 400; Vol. III, p. 11; 72; 103; 127; 138; 140; 200; 389 and 397. In defending śvāhā against those who claimed that it was inessential, Ānanda has the following line: वस्तिरकष्ठ्यायायेन व्याख्यातिसंवस्य वैष्णवानां महा-म्वलपरिधार्यां न्यायप्रकृतिः। इदु न्यायान्तरसर्वस्यस्मादि शास्त्रवेमस्मास्थायै न प्रकृतिः। Abhinava, commenting on this passage (Locana, p. 619) remarks: प्रथमात्मर इति। विन्दुर्यात्मकां यमोद्वत्वो वा विव्याहायिकां अयस्तु खता चित्रं लक्ष्यायत्मन्। It is really most unusual that Ānanda should write a commentary on a Buddhist text. This certainly shows that Buddhist doctrines must have exercised at least a fascination for Ānanda and thus for Abhinava as well. Under NS VI, 45 (G.O.S. p. 299), there is Abhinava’s odd remark that some who believe in Śantarasa add the Buddha as the devata: हुक्का: शालाकुंजलोकलोपति इति शालाकुंजलोप: कैथिप्रभुदित्व। He then goes to remark: हुक्को जीन: परकोकर्मनः प्रभुदिको वा। Is it not significant that the only drama that Abhinava quotes in support of śantarasa is the Buddhist drama, the Nāgānanda? Oddly enough, however, there exists at present no Buddhist text on alanakarāsāstra. It seems rather unlikely that Dharmakīrti wrote a work entitled simply “Alanakāra”, as Kane has noted (H.S. P. p. 65): “So the Buddhist logician and philosopher Dharmakīrti may have been a poet, but there is nothing to substantiate the claim to regard him as a writer on Alanakāra.” See Śīvaprakāsa Bhattacharyya, “Studies in Indian Poetics”, Calcutta 1964, which contains the reprint of an article entitled “The Neo-Buddhist Nucleus in Alanakarāsāstra”, though as Kane points out, the quotation from the Vāsaradāśa is at the most ambiguous in spite of what Śīvārama says. There seems to us no likelihood that the kārikās of the Alanakārāsāchāra could be by Dharmakīrti though we have no space to give our arguments. Note finally that Abhinava often quotes one Rāhula, a commentator on the Nātyaśāstra, and that this is a Buddhist name.

² Vikramottara, II, 18.

³ NS VI, 15, quoted in the Locana on p. 83.
verse with only eight rasas. Moreover, throughout the A. Bh., he speaks, whenever he mentions sānta, of those who "read" sānta. We cannot therefore know how old the doctrine of ŠR is. The first author of known date to mention ŠR is Udbhaṭa, who simply includes it in his enumeration of all the rasas without further comment or explanation. The interpolated sāntarasa passage in the Nātyaśāstra, whatever it was (for it is clear that the present passage is not likely to be precisely the one that Abhinava commented on), is nonetheless likely to have been the earliest reference to ŠR that Abhinava knew. If we, purely tentatively, place the core of the NS around the fourth century A.D., then all we can say is that ŠR must have been added to the text sometime before the time of Udbhaṭa, i.e. the eighth century A.D. (unless we are to argue that it was Udbhaṭa who first spoke of ŠR, which seems most unlikely in view of the fact that he has nothing whatever to say about it, beyond naming it). However, it is clear that for Ānanda, ŠR was a matter of controversy. Had the passage from the NS already existed, and had Ānanda felt that it was genuine, there would be no reason for him not to have mentioned this fact in his D. Al., while discussing ŠR. The fact that he did not, makes us suspicious of its existence in his time. But if it was not existing, this means that it was added between the time of Ānanda and Abhinava, i.e. only a space of about one hundred years. Is this sufficient for Abhinava to speak of "old" manuscripts which contained the ŠR additions?

The influence on Abhinava of Ānanda's speculation on ŠR will become clear from the passage we translate below. The importance of the NS passage (and related verses, which though they do not specifically mention ŠR, yet seem to Abhinava to imply it) will also be clarified in part II of this volume. But here we should say something of several passages which claim to be old, but which can at best be described as suspect.

1. E.g. A. Bh. Vol. 1, p. 299 and 332.


3. For one thing he does not comment on all of the passage, and for another, the terms used contradict his own. Thus the sūgībhāva is sāma (which Abhinava attempts to interpret), and tatattvebhāva is given (p. 332, NS. Vol. 1, G. O. S.) as a viśhāṣa of sānta!

4. One should note too the passage from the VJ of Kuntaka. In his résumé of the fourth name, S. K. De quotes a line on this subject (p. 239, second edition):

"Ancient sages have described sānta as the main rasa of both the Rāmāyaṇa and the

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In the twentieth chapter of the *Vigñudharmottara purāṇa*, we find the following stanzas:

“Śāntarasa is to be considered as independent and as standing separate.” ¹

The point here is that four of the other rasas give rise to four others according to Bharata. Since Bharata does not mention śānta, and since there are only an even number of eight rasas, there is nothing it could come from.

“O King, they say that śānta arises from vairāgya. It can be enacted by means of taking on religious paraphernalia and through such means as compassion for all beings, meditation, encouraging others towards the path of mokṣa etc.” ²

“Śāntarasa is that wherein one feels the same toward all creatures, where there is no pleasure, no sorrow, no hatred and no envy.” ³

It is clear that these lines are simply a pastiche of the various passages which the reader can see in Part II. It seems to us unlikely that this passage antedates Abhinava. The editor, Miss Priyabala Shah, thinks differently:

“Thus in the present stage of our knowledge, it would be safe to put *Vigñudharmottara* somewhere between the first or rather the second half of the fifth century A. D., and the first half of the seventh century A. D., i.e. between circa 450 and 650 A. D.” ⁴ But in dating any *Purāṇa* text, to date more than single sections (and indeed, perhaps more than single stanzas!), even very roughly, is a hazardous undertaking. It is perfectly possible that certain sections of the *VDP* are as old as Miss Shah claims the whole is, but

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*Mahābhārata*. This can only be a reference to Ānanda’s fourth Uddyota (*Kūrikā* 5, the vṛtti on this). The puzzling thing is that Ānanda describes karuṇa as the aśūrāsa of the Rāmāyana, and not śānta! (Moreover, is it not a bit odd to refer to Ānanda as pūrvavatibhiḥ?) Note that the MS of the *Vakroktijīvita* breaks off in the middle of a sentence discussing the Nagānanda (*De, op. cit.*, p. 244) (although Dr. Nagendra in his “Hindi Vakroktijīvita” claims that the work cannot be said to be incomplete since it deals with all the six topics it mentions at I. 18, although of course there is no colophon) and we cannot know, therefore, what *rasa* Kuntaka held to be the major one in the Nagānanda.


2. शान्ती रसः लतन्तुद्रश्येक श्वेतम् ब्यवस्थित: ।

3. ब्रह्मविद्या मेधासमुदायेत् सारासः ।

there is no likelihood that the same is true of the Alaṅkāra sections. It would be preposterous to hold that such a composite and clearly derivative work as the VDP (indeed any Purāṇa) actually originated an idea such as ŚR.

This same reasoning can apply to the Jain text, the Anuyogadvāra-sūtra.¹ We cannot of course say for certain that the following passage is interpolated, and thus it could, in theory, be as old as the fifth century A.D. But the possibility of interpolation, especially in the case of a text that provides examples of numbered objects, is not unlikely. In any case, this could not possibly lie at the origin of ŚR, especially since it is the only reference to sāntarasa in Jain literature before the tenth century A.D.

वीरो सिमारो अन्ययो अ रोदो अ होइ बोझ्वयो ।
बेहणयो बीमुच्छो हासो कलुणो पसंतो अ ॥

निद्रोसमाणसमागणस्मृयो जो पसंतमाघण ।
अविकारकङ्कणो सौ रसो पसंतो लि गायणयो ॥

पसंतो रसो जहाँ—
सम्मानिनिवगार उवजसतपसंतसोमदिक्षीयं ।
हि जह मुणिणो सोहद युक्तमलं पीवरसिरीयं ॥

"There are nine rāsas in poetry. They are:

' The heroic, the sexual, the wondrous,
the wrathful, as well as shyness,
the disgusting, the comic,
the pathetic and the calm'.

Sāntarasa is to be known as characterised by an absence of (mental) per-

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1. We have used the Āgamodaya Samiti edition, Pothi form, Bombay 1924, with Maladhāri Hemacondrastirī’s (not Hemaendra, the author of Kāvyānukūrasa) Sanskrit commentary. We have just received a very fine edition of the Nandisutam and the Anuyogaddgīrī, ed. by Muni Puṇyavijaya, Pt. Dalsukha Mālvanā and Pt. Amritlāl Mohanlāl Bhujak, Jain-Āgama Series No. 1, Shri Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, Bombay, 1968. See p. 121, St. 262. For the date of this text see the excellent introduction to this volume.

2. Note that bhayānaka is not included in this list. In its place is veloman (vīṭanaka), the sthāyibhava of which is vṛīḍā, or lājā (p. 137–138). According to the commentator, bhayānaka is included under raudraraṇa.
turbation; as arising from composure of the mind divested of all passions and as marked by tranquillity.¹

Here is an example:²

‘Oh, (look) how the lotus-like face of the sage shines! It is full of the beauty (of mental calm) and genuinely devoid of any contortions (due to the upsurge of passions), with its calm (devoid of all urge to look at beautiful objects) and gentle eyes unperturbed (by anger, lust, etc.).’”

Even if both of these passages were older than Abhinava, there is little likelihood that he would have seen either.

TANTRIC INFLUENCE

The only contemporary description we have of Abhinavagupta is one of exceptional interest. Allowing of course for stylisation, the picture is nonetheless extremely vivid. Abhinava is presented as a mystic of a most unusual sort: he is surrounded by women, playing a musical instrument (it is not unlikely that this was at the time of Abhinava’s life when he was expounding the text of the NS on music), drinking wine and yet engaged in the most intellectual of pursuits, commenting on a text. The work is called the Dhanyāloka, and consists of only four verses. According to Prof. Pandey,³ the man who wrote them was a direct disciple of Abhinava, and actually saw him as he describes him in the verses. Here is our translation of this important passage:

“May the glorious god Dakṣiṇāmūrti (Abhinavagupta), who is an incarnation of Śiva, protect us! Out of his deep compassion he has taken a new bodily form and come to Kashmir. He sits in the middle of a garden of grapes, inside a pavilion made of crystal and filled with beautiful paintings. The room smells wonderful because of flower garlands, incense-sticks and (oil-) lamps. Its walls are smeared with sandal-paste and other such things. The room is constantly resounding with musical instruments, with songs and

¹ 1. Hemacandra explains nirdosa as himsādidoparphita. Samādhāna is composure of the mind: विसर्जनात्माः विद्यादिनिविरिजयं स्वास्त्यं। He takes praśāntahāvāna in the sense of krodhādiparāgyaś ca jāyamānaḥ, “arising from the renunciation of anger, etc.” But this involves repeating the idea conveyed by nirdosa. We, therefore, understand it as standing for praśāntahāvāna upalakṣitaḥ (the instrumental of characterisation—upalaksana trisya), and take praśāntahāvāna to mean praśāntatva, i.e. the same thing as śānta.

² 2. Our translation of this stanza follows the commentary, p. 139. There is one puzzling word there; on p. 140 the commentary writes: पद्यमो! वयं मुनेत्रस्वास्त्यं कर्ममेत् | कर्ममूलात्मा! | सक्षास्तो न मात्राशास्त्रभीतः. Now what does this mātryasthana stand for? Perhaps mātrasthana is a wrong sanskritisation of maityasthana for māryasthana, i.e. “not with deceit, sincerely.”

with dancing. There are crowds of women Yogins and realised beings (śiddha) with magic powers. It is equipped with a golden seat from which pearls are hanging. It has a soft awning (talima) stretched over it (as a canopy). Abhinava is attended by all his numerous students, with Kṣemarāja at their head, who are writing down everything he says. To his side stand two women, partners in Tantric rites (dāti), who hold in one hand a jug of wine (śivarasa) and a box full of betel rolls, and in the other hand a lotus and a citron. Abhinava has his eyes trembling in ecstasy. In the middle of his forehead is a conspicuous tilaka made of ashes. He has a rudrākṣa bead hanging from his ear. His long loose hair is held by a garland of flowers. He has a long beard and golden (reddish-brown) skin; his neck is dark with shining yakṣapaṅka powder. His upaviṣṭa string is hanging down loose from his neck. He wears a silken cloth (as a dhoti) as white as moon-beams, and he sits in the Yogic position called virāsana. One hand is held on his knee holding a rosary with his fingers clearly making the sign (mudrā) that signifies his knowledge of the highest Siva. He plays on his resonating lute with the tips of the quivering fingers of his lotus-like left hand.1

Clearly this is a picture of a Tantric rasika. It would be a grave error to suppose that Abhinavagupta accepted only a token form of Tantrism.2 The Kaula system on which he comments so elaborately in

1. The text has been edited by Pandey, op. cit. p. 738 from a single manuscript preserved in Banaras:

his Tantrāloka repelled all Westerners and most Indians who knew anything about it. This is a great pity, for it is surely one of the most interesting forms of practical mysticism ever invented. What concerns us here is the ādiyōga, the rahasyavidhi (secret ritual) belonging to the Kaula school. Abhinava devotes the whole of the 29th aṅhika of the Tantrāloka¹ to very elaborate explanations of this ritual. The text is extremely obscure on those passages that interest us the most, partly on purpose² and partly because this subject has been rarely seriously studied, so that one is ignorant of most of the technical terms. In fact, apart from K. C. Pandey’s use of the Tantrāloka in his work on Abhinavagupta, nobody else seems to have used, for any extensive purpose, this massive text.³ What is of interest to us is the similarity this process bears to a dramatic performance and the influence that this must have exercised on Abhinava’s incipient theory of aesthetics.⁴ The ritual is in fact an elaborate play that takes the greater part of the day. The goal is the same as the goal in any ordinary drama, to reach a state of perfect equanimity, blissful repose, where the Dāti identifies herself with Śakti, and the male identifies himself with Śiva. As Abhinava puts it in an extraordinary verse in this section:

“I do not exist, nor does anyone else. Only as sāktis do I exist.”⁵ “If one meditates, for even a moment, on one’s real natural (Self) that is pure rest, then, one becomes (like) a great bird, and finds a woman to make spiritual


³

See also p. 19, Jayarathe:

3. Professor R. Gnoli writes to me (June 11, 1969): “I have just completed the translation of the Tantrāloka by Abhinavagupta, which has kept me very busy for several years. The book will be shortly published by a Firm of Turin, in Italian.”

4. Although Kane (H. S. P., p. 242) and K. C. Pandey (Abhinavagupta, p. 33) place the Tantrāloka earlier than the Locana, this is due to what must have been a wrong reading in the early editions of the Dvānayāloka in the Kāśyapamāla edition. There the reading was given as—


³

These readings do not fit the context as well as the reading given by Kuppuswami Sastri in his edition, p. 125:

This is also the reading given in the edition with Bālaprīya.

5. Verse 64, p. 44:

Note that the first part of this verse (nāham asmi na cānya ’sti) is identical with a stanza in the Yogarāṣṭrīka, VI A, 26, 36, p. 828. It is found with variations, throughout the YV.
Abhinava uses the same terms for both experiences. The whole ritual, according to Jayaratha, in his remarkable commentary on the Tantrāloka, is to “reveal” or “suggest” (abhivyakti) ātmānanda. The strangest and the most disturbing element in the ritual involves the Dūtī (note the similarity to love-poetry, where every Nāyikā must have a Dūtī). The culmination of the ritual is concerned with this Dūtī, who identifies herself with Śiva’s Šakti. Jayaratha quotes a text to the effect that this Dūtī should be:

“One’s own wife, one’s sister, one’s mother, one’s daughter or one’s beautiful friend.”

But Jayaratha points out that Abhinava (?) did not accept one’s own wife as a Dūtī, for one might conceive purely carnal lust in her case, which goes against the whole ritual where the goal is to enter a state of pure consciousness. The Dūtī is very elaborately described in fourteen verses from the Śīraṭantrarajabhaṭṭāraka, with all the paraphernalia of a mahākāvyā. Now follow the ordinarily forbidden acts, the three makāras:

1. The rest of the stanza is taken from Jayaratha, p. 45:

2. Thus on p. 118, verse 176, the words caṇakṛṣṭa, ācāra and ācāra are all found.

3. The same idea is found in the Kūḻapravatātra, under V. 80 (Jīvananda Vidyasagara’s ed.).

Cf. what Jayaratha says on p. 102:

4. Jayaratha, p. 72:

5. Jayaratha, p. 73:

6. Cf. p. 67, Jayaratha:

7. Jayaratha, p. 72: Anāvartitajñaprattisthastavākiśa:


9. Jayaratha often quotes verses in support of the seriousness of the aspirant, e.g. on p. 67 (under verse 99):

10. Verse 10, p. 7:

(not out of greed).

अत्र यथो च वददृष्टम् निषिद्ध शास्त्रसंतोऽः
लदेव योज्येदीमाम् वामायुक्तपरिषद्धम्।
wine (madya also called Śivarasa at V. 17), meat (māṃsā) and love-making (maithuna). These three, when combined together, give the highest bliss (ānanda) and the highest bliss is none other than Parabrahman. Abhinava points out that this ritual expands (vikāsa) the heart, by inducing a state of complete freedom from desire (nairākānīkṣya), since one’s body (through the use of perfume, incense and flowers, verse 108, p. 77) and mind, are mutually satisfied. The actual sexual union, described in verse 50 is said to give rise to ānandavīrānti, “rest in bliss”, on which Jayaratha has the significant gloss (p. 36) of śvāmeccamatākāra. In his exposition, Abhinava uses the term kānta several times (e.g. verse 133, p. 95) and many other words and concepts which were to form his theory of aesthetics. Finally one of the major verses makes this comparison that we have been drawing inevitable:

“Because of the flow (rasa) of desire, through the force of the relish (carvāṇā) of outward things, which are filled with one’s own flow (?), one attains the state of complete repose (viśrāntidhāma) and all phenomenal objects (comm. bhāvajāta) are merged into one’s own Self.”

1. Verses 49–50. The verses actually dealing with intercourse (e.g. 111–117) are deliberately couched in obscure and symbolic terms, so that it is very difficult to understand precisely what is meant. There is no doubt that the sexual act is preceded by elaborate foreplay directly acted out, but symbolically interpreted. Thus Jayaratha on verse 114, p. 83 writes: “अथ चान परस्परसाधनाचिन्तनार्थमपर वादार्थप्रसिद्धार्थम: स्वाम:।

The passages concerning the actual ejaculation of semen are the most obscure of all. It is clear from p. 89 and elsewhere that the face of the saktī is the most important sakra of all, and it would seem, though we are not certain if we have understood the passages correctly (e.g. p. 88), that the man ejaculates in the mouth of the woman. From the many quotations that Jayaratha cites, it is obvious that there existed a very elaborate and serious literature on this subject, unfortunately lost today. In explaining the difficult verse on p. 91, (verse 128) Jayaratha explains that the semen should be passed back and forth from the mouth of the woman to the mouth of the man, and finally poured into a consecrated vessel. Several verses from “the āgamas” are quoted in support, e.g. p. 93:

चक्राकारसंविभगं समाभेम महारससै।
तेन सतवस्मेवं देवताकर्त्तरस्तुतम॥

Abhinava himself discusses various forms of ejaculation, all supported by ancient authorities. The subject, of enormous interest to students of religion and of psycho-logy, deserves a close and impartial investigation.

2. T. Āt. verse 97, p. 64:

आणवदं भयं परमेन तव देहे भिषवा श्मेतम॥
उपकारी दृढः तस्म फलवनविद्वतमकम॥

Dvayam in this verse is explained by Jayaratha as wine and meat. Anyad is sexual intercourse. Note that Abhinava himself, verse 99, and Jayaratha as well, are careful to point out that the reason for engaging in such rituals must be transcendental, and not lust or greed, p. 66–67.

3. T. Āt. 137, p. 97:

रणमकसातिशिरास्तमार्थितविशेषियतन्यथार्थम॥
विश्रामनिधाम विशिष्टस्तवयमन्याचार्थ॥
Abhinava uses very similar terminology⁠¹ when speaking of śṛṅgārarasa in the Abhinavabhāratī:

"The joys of sex really apply to those who are in love with one another. Because it is only when one is in love that there is continual (dhārā) repose in sheer happiness." ²

Leaving aside the extremely curious sexual contacts with one's own family (which require a very careful psychological, or psychoanalytic analysis if the significance is to be found), there is nothing in the rest of the ritual that does not bear a close resemblance to the theatre. Surely such Tantric rituals affected Abhinava's views on the eventual goal of art, and led him to his transcendental theories on the aim of the aesthetic experience. The combination was unique in all of Indian history, and has produced one of the great monuments to the complexity and profundity of the human mind. If we sneer at the sexual elements, we reveal more about our own inadequacies and parochialism than about the ritual itself. It is only a lack of respect for the texts that will allow us to dispense with such passages under the excuse that they are "indecent", for this they are surely not.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

It is of course impossible to give more than a brief sketch of Abhinava's amazingly rich range of thinking on aesthetic topics. What we wish to do here is to quote two long passages from the Locana with a translation. In the first, Abhinava gives a brief survey of his own philosophy of aesthetics, the earlier draft of his famous statement in the A. Bh. on the rasasūtra of Bharata. The second passage we chose because it serves to illustrate how these principles will apply to a concrete literary situation. Before giving the

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1. Note how similar this is to XXVIII. 20, p. 10 vol. XI of the Tantrāloka where the actual comparison with the theatre is stated:

सत्ताः प्रेत्याको तत्तद्वृद्धिवर्गमेविदिताम्

कमोदविदा सवा एव वप्सते तत्बेव मातात्

गोगाभयक्षङ्गमापतः तथा पूण्यत्वस्विदाम्

Note also the preceding verse, no. 18, where the participants in the mystic obhā are must be pārṇasaṃvid and capable of tanmāyibhavana, again the very terms used by Abhinava in the Locana and the Abhinavabhāratī:

तच्चन्तरं विषयतां ते कौशल्यसंविदात्

तान्ते माययाबिभक्तार्ति ततुज्ञापोऽसऽस देव

The next verse (p. 10) speaks of tanmāya.

2. A. Bh., Vol. I, p. 302:

रत्नक्षेत्रसारं (रत्ना: कौशल्य | सा: त) परमार्थव: कामिनोरेश

तत्तैव सुचक्य धर्मविवाहेत: ।

The next line, beginning aparasya tu and ending paramo bhogah is, we feel, important, but unfortunately we are unable to make good sense of it,
passages however, we thought it would be helpful if we indicated certain important ideas of Abhinava from his philosophical and literary works that will serve as an introduction to the two difficult passages to follow. (As the reader has probably already recognised by now, all of Abhinava is more or less difficult. It is impossible, unfortunately, to read his works the way one reads the Dhvanıyāloka, with immediate comprehension. Almost every sentence of Abhinava’s is a puzzle which must be carefully pondered before it yields up its meaning, and even then we are not always certain to have understood correctly.)

In his philosophical works, we find Abhinava moving towards a synthesis of aesthetic pleasure and philosophy. The most important passage in this respect is from Abhinava’s commentary on Utpala’s viveti on the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārīka. Parts of it are corrupt, or at least we have not been able to make perfect sense of every sentence. Here is a tentative translation:

"And so it has been said by Śrī Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa: "Whatever bliss is to be found in all of the three worlds is only a drop from the ocean of bliss that is the god (Śiva) to whom I bow down." And so when a gourmet tastes drinks (rasa) such as a delicious beverage, he behaves very differently from a glutton, and distinguishes carefully: "Ah, this is like this." As he does so, since he takes rest in his Self as the knower, and takes into account predominantly only that element, namely the knowing subject, he is called bhuiṇīna ("one who enjoys"). Whenever one completely passes beyond an ordinary state (anyathābhāva) and enjoys happiness, because such possible obstacles as (the desire for) material gain, etc., have been excluded, as for

2. 
4. This phrase occurs often in the Locana, e.g. p. 97.
instance in the context of a play or a poem where śṛigāra, in which the
pleasure experienced is different from the kind of pleasure we derive from
objects in the world, (is the subject matter), because of the very disappearance
of obstacles (such as desire for material gain, etc.,) this is called rasanā,
carvāṇa, nirvṛti, pratiti and pramāṭṝti-viśrānti (“rest in the Self”). And then
because of not caring for the established element of illumination which rests
on the object to be known, there is said to be sensitivity — the aesthetic
experience whose nature is undisturbed relish, and which is designated (ās
sahṛdayatā) principally because of the hrdaya (heart) consisting in conscious-
ness (parāmarśa). And so aesthetic experience (rasanā) consists in tasting
(āsvāda) without any obstacles. The idea that the states of mind which
are the objects of this aesthetic experience are the nine rāsas has been
examined at great length in my commentary on the Nāṭyaveda, the Abhi-
navabhāratī. Anyone interested in this question should, therefore, consult
that book. Since it is not really germane to the present issue, I have not
examined it at length (here). Therefore, parāmarśa, (consciousness), para-
mānanda (highest bliss), nirvṛti (happiness), are all called camatkāra, because
of the completeness (or compactness — ēkaghatā)1 of the aesthetic
experience (rasanā). Therefore, he correctly said: “Because of the absence
of camatkṛti”. In the tasting of a delicious beverage and other liquids,
however, there intervenes a contact with an object of the senses, whereas
in poetry and drama there is a far greater absence of such intervention,
although even there, the latent impressions (saṃskāra) of such sensory
contacts permeate the (spectator). Still, those whose hearts are careful
to dispel the part of the customary intervention of sensory contacts will
attain the highest bliss”,2

This passage3 is quoted in the context of camatkṛti,4 one of the

1. On ēkaghatā see Gnoli, op. cit. p. 58.
2. There are several difficulties in this text, and we are not certain of having
understood the exact implication of some of the phrases. E. g. vyapadeśyāryavasthitā-
syāpi prakāśabhāgasya vedyaviśrāntasya is not clear. In the expression tato’pi bāyav-
nāyādau tadevyavahānasānyatā, we take tato’pi to mean tato’pi adhibā and have
translated accordingly. The words tasmād anupācāritasya ... svatantarasya vras-
nautkaghañatasyā are baffling.
3. After translating the above passage, we have found that Gnoli, in the
second ed. of his “The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta” translates
the very same text in his Introduction, p. XLIII–XLV, but, oddly enough, he does not
give the reference. We are afraid that we cannot follow his translation. See how-
ever his Essenza dei Tantra (Torino, 1900) an Italian translation of Abhinava’s Tantrasāra. Attention was first called to this important passage by K. C. Pandey in his Comparative Aesthetics, Vol. I, first ed. 1950, on p. 94. The reference he gives is
Bṛhat Vimarsini (Ms.) 407 (1. 5. 11), to which he provides the text on p. 421–422.
4. See in V. Raghavan, “Some Concepts of the Alankāra Śāstra”, the short
essay on Camatkāra, p. 268–271.
key terms for Abhinava. He gives, in the A. Bh., a very lovely example of its use:

“Viṣṇu is still in a state of wonder (camatkāra), for, how strange, the thighs of Lākṣmi as white as a sliver of the moon, were not broken by (the churning of the ocean with) Mt. Mandara.”

He then provides the definition of camatkāra: “It is defined as a seizure by joy (bhogāveśa), unbroken (aviccīna) and continuous satisfaction (ateptivyatireka”).

Another important concept found in this passage is the idea of vīghnas, which Abhinava develops at some length in the A. Bh. In brief the theory is this: all the synonyms for aesthetic pleasure (e.g. camatkāra, rasānā, āsvāda, etc.) are just another name for consciousness that is devoid of any obstacle (sakalavighnāvinirnāktaśeṣaṁ ātakta eva). It is only by removing these obstructions, seven in number, that we become totally receptive to a drama. These seven are: (1) lack of credibility (ayogyatā). One must be

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1. Cf. Śāhīla-darpaṇa III, 2–3 (Viṇṭi), रस-सारसमकारः, ascribed to Nārāyaṇa, Cf. Bhāskara’s versified commentary on the Śivasūtra, I, 12:
(विस्मयी शोभनूमित):
लत्वकवितमेवं जगसमस्वलोकयून ।
विस्मयविभिं द्व विकालयित्र प्रभिमानयां ।
There is no doubt that this notion of being filled with wonder, of surprise, had a great appeal for Abhinava. He himself never tires of using the expression camatkāra, though it occurs only once in the Dvārakāloka itself. There is no doubt that the Śivasūtras exercised an important influence on Abhinava. One thinks of the definition of Śakti, I, 13:

इच्छा शक्तिः कुमारी, on which Kṣemarāja comments:

ीष्ठिन इच्छा एव पारसवश्च त्वात्सत्तवकुमारीशक्तिः - कुमारी विशक्षसंहरसतासापरा । (p. 4).

Kṣemarāja’s commentary will be found at the back of the volume which contains Bhāṭṭa Bhāskara’s commentary, KSTS, Vols. IV, and V, edited by J. C. Chatterji, Srinagar, 1916.

2. A. Bh., Vol. I, p. 279. The Prākrit text reads:
अज वि हरो क्षमकेत कह दि वि श मंदरेण दिलितार्य ।
रुद्रकालखसच्चायां धन्यभों अंगार ॥

For which the Sanskrit translation is:

अक्षासिप विशिष्टकरोति कह कथमपि न मन्दरेण देखितानि।
नृद्रकालखसच्छायां वरम्य स्वास्य ॥


स चारविततिन्त्विनिबिन्द्विषीभूभवितः इत्युच्छोले। युक्ताः सत्वोऽरोगसत्वदाहिन्य च मनवरण
चमकारतिमिथित।

4. See also the Alakaṇakauṣṭubha, Sivaprasad Bhattacharya’s ed. p. 137:
रस-सारसमकारों वि विना न रसी रसः।

which is quoted from another, untraced, source.

able to sympathise (হৃদয়াসংবিধা) with the events being portrayed. They cannot be completely beyond our scope of knowledge, whether that knowledge be acquired through our own past experiences or through our acquaintance with literature.¹ (2) Too personal an identification. One must not feel that the drama is an actual event in the world. A certain aesthetic distance is necessary. This is the purpose of the nātyadharmīs, those conventions found only in the theatre, e. g. unusual speech habits, dress etc. (3) An absorption with one’s own feelings (নিজস্বহাতিরিভাব). One must overcome personal feelings in order to enter another person’s feelings (ব্যভিচারে সম্মিলন যশ্চন্ত্রযোগ) in the theatre, etc., all help to soften the spectator’s hard sense of ego. The setting works on him and enables the spectator who is willing to respond to become a sahṛdaya, a man sensitive to literature. (4) Lack of proper means of perception (প্রতিভায়াবাকায়ম). (5) Lack of clarity (স্পৃহাতব্যোঃ). Just as Abhinava insists on certain conventions in the theatre (nātyadharmī), so also he insists on their opposite as well, a certain realism (lokadharmī). Thus he says the acting (ঋভনায়ি) is in many senses very close to direct perception (প্রত্যক্ষপ্রায়াবাকায়ম). (6) Lack of pre-dominance (অপ্রদক্ষণী). Abhinava feels that there are four major mental states, more important (প্রাধীর্ণ) than any other.² He associates these four with the four goals of life. Rati, love (the sthāyihāva of শ্রুতি) corresponds to kāma. Krodha, anger (the sthāyibhāva of raudra) corresponds to artha. Utsāha, energy (the sthāyihāva of vīra) corresponds to three (kāma, dharma and artha).

1. Cf. Abhinava, in the Loka, p. 331:

2. Note that Bharata (NS, VI. 39-40) too has this doctrine of four prominent rasas which give rise to the other four in turn (শ্রুতি, রাউড্রা, বীর and বিহাতসা). But he does not include বীতনা, a fact of which Abhinava could hardly have been unaware, since in his commentary on the NS verses (p. 295) he does not even give a variant reading that would include বীতনা.
Finally *nirvana*, world-weariness (given here, then, as the *sthāyibhāva* of *kānta*, as opposed to the *Abhijnavabhadra*, *kāntarasaprakaraṇa* passage!) corresponds to *mokṣa*. One of these must predominate in every drama. Abhinava explains that all of them contain a predominance of bliss (*suvṛmī sukha-pradhāna*), since in experiencing them, one is tasting one's own consciousness, which is a single compact mass of bliss (*svasamvicaravaṇārūpa-syakagahanasya......ānandasāratvāt*). (7) The presence of doubt (*samśaya-yoga*). This refers to the fact that we cannot be certain what the *anubhāvas* are meant to represent. Tears, Abhinava tells us¹ might be due to joy or to sorrow, and anxiety (*cintā*) might refer to *virarasa* as well as to *bhayānaka*. But when properly combined (*samyoga*) such doubts will not arise.

We can see from this that Abhinava places emphasis (and not only here, but throughout both his major works on poetics) upon the transcendental (*alaukika*) nature of our feelings during a drama. He has stressed over and over that there is not a direct correspondence between *kārana* and *vibhāva*, or between *kārya* and *anubhāva*, for one refers to the world, and the other to art. Ordinary means of knowledge play no role in *rasa*:

"The enjoyment of an aesthetic experience consists of a transcendental wonder (*alaukikacamatkāra*) and is decidedly ( *eva*) different from ordinary ( *laukika*) knowledge such as ( *is produced*) by memory and inference".²

The *sthāyibhāva* that Abhinava speaks of is the same as *vāsanā*, an important word in his philosophy. It means the same as *samāskāra*, latent impressions that we carry with us from birth to birth. In a sense it corresponds to the Freudian unconscious. The *sthāyibhāva* would correspond to the conscious, for the *vāsanā* is aroused, awakened, and we then call it a *sthāyibhāva*. Now this doctrine enables Abhinavagupta to answer one of the great puzzles of literary criticism in the West. How do we explain the fact that we can appreciate a drama which deals with emotions beyond the range of our experience? E. g. how is it that inacess dramas grip those of us who have no experience (at least consciously) of such emotions? The answer that Abhinava gives is ingenious. He claims that in our beginningless (for it is an axiom of Sanskrit philosophy that *samśāra* is *anādi*, though of course it has an end) wanderings through the universe, we have had every conceivable experience, been open to every possible emotion. "Nothing human

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². *A. Bh.*, Vol. I, p. 284:

*तथा हि लौकिकचित्रित्वतः समस्या यो रसात। तेनालौकिकचित्रित्वतः समस्याः सुविदायग- 
लौकिकस्वेतुदनविवक्षण एव।*
is foreign to us". In a brilliant passage,\(^1\) Abhinava examines each of the nine sthāyībhāvas, and shows how we all possess each and every one of them. For example, we all seek pleasure, and avoid pain, and are thus open to rati (sarpa rirāṃsayā vyāptaḥ). He concludes: "There exists no living being who is devoid of the latent impressions of these mental states".\(^2\) What happens after this sthāyībhāva is activated is hṛdayasamvāda, a word of which Abhinava is very fond. It means "sympathetic response" and he uses it to represent the state just before identification. It is made possible through the existence of sādhāraṇikaraṇa, the factor in literature that makes all events impersonal and universal, an idea that Abhinava borrowed from Bhāṭṭa-nāyaka as we have already seen. This identification which then takes place is what Abhinava calls tanmayībhavana, another key term. The word is already used in a difficult verse from the Tantrāloka:

"Those who do not identify (with the object of contemplation), who do now know the merging of the body, etc., (in that object) and whose intellect as a means of cognition is not merged (in that object)—they are known as insensitive".\(^3\)

It is defined elsewhere in the Tantrāloka, where we are told that "identification is the attainment of one's highest Self. It is the highest stage of fulfilment, and there can be no further fruit after that".\(^4\) By "further

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3. T. Āl. (Vol. II) III, 240, p. 228:

Note the commentary (Jayaratha):

In order to overcome the difficulties in this obscure verse we construe: dekādīnimaśṭjam with avidanto as its object, and we dissolve the sandhi as avidanto amagunayamānāḥ. We understand samvit to mean intellect and māna to mean "a means or instrument of cognition". But in spite of these interpretations, we are not really certain that we have correctly understood the meaning of the stanza.


Abhinava gives this definition in order to explain an exercise for inducing ecstasy that he gives in the preceding verse, where we are told that just as one examines one's own face again and again in a mirror and knows it to belong to oneself, so also examining oneself in the mirror of consciousness that consists in meditation, worship etc., one sees Śiva and then one merges with him:

(Continued on next page)
fruit” (phalāntaram), Jayaratha explains that Abhinava means the following:
generally when we obtain something, we are left with further expectations. When we get what we want, we have further wants. Not so with this, for we have attained ourselves, and there is nothing further to desire. Immediately after tanmayibhavana, the last stage in the process of aesthetic experience, we come to the actual experience itself: rasa. Abhinava has played down both alankāradhvani and vastudhvani in his Locana commentary, to give unique preference to rasa. Time and again he will say things like the following:

“By the word ucita (proper), Ānandavardhana shows that the only propriety (relevant to poetry) is the one with regard to rasa, and thereby he suggests that rasadhvani is the essence (of all poetry)”.

His definition of rasa occurs in such a context:

“When the suggested sense does not take the form of an alankāra, then we say that it is plain vastu. The word plain (mātra) rules out its being anything else (i.e. alankāradhvani or rasadhvani). Now rasadhvani is something else altogether. It belongs (goceara) only to the (suggestive) function in poetry. It is never included under worldly dealings (vyavahāra) and is never even to be dreamed of as being revealed directly through words. No, quite the contrary, it is rasa, that is, it has a form which is capable of being relished (rasanīya) through the function (vyāpara) of personal aesthetic relish (carvanā), which is bliss (ānanda) that arises in the sahṛdaya’s delicate mind that has been coloured (anurāga) by the appropriate (samucita) latent impressions (vāsanā) that are deeply embedded from long before (prāk); appropriate that is, to the beautiful vibhāvas and anubhāvas, and beautiful, again, because of their appeal to the heart (samvāda), and which

Continued from previous page)

1. In the commentary, p. 237, there seems to be some sort of misprint: anuttātmanā prāthāpi kīṁ bhavet? This must stand for something like anuttarātmanā prāptyāpi kīṁ bhavet? The commentary on this verse is particularly fine (though we cannot make sense of the sakānkṣate’pi tasya tathākalpanāt). It ends thus:

ात्मक तत्त्वात्रूप फले फलानारं संमानायमु साक्षात्सर्वगा भावात्, वरुण: पारमारिकं पूर्णवः, तत्र न फलानारं संमान - सिद्धि एव साक्षात्सर्वसंक्षाय।

2. Locana, p. 45:

उष्णतकोन्दे रसविषयमेलोचितं भजातीद दयावनं रसवेजजिवितलं सुन्त्वत! रा
are conveyed by means of words. That alone is rasadhvani, and that alone, in the strict sense of the word, is the soul (of poetry)".1

His definition of drama is equally difficult and philosophic:

“A drama is a thing (vastu) whose essence, so far as the spectator is concerned (tadgrāhaka) consists of rasa that can only be known by direct experience (samvedana) in the form of aesthetic enjoyment which is altogether different from correct knowledge (samyagjñāna), erroneous cognition (bhrānti), doubt, uncertainty, non-determination (anadhyavasāya) and ordinary knowledge (vijñāna). It is distinct from worldly objects, and also different from such things as their (i.e. worldly objects’) imitation, reflection and pictorial presentation (ālekhya), determination (adhyavasāya), fancy, magic shows, etc.”.2

Abhinava likes to insist on the autonomy of a work of art, on the fact that it is sui generis and need have no object corresponding to it in the real world. Thus he remarks of the dance that it imitates nothing in real life, but is pure creation, with no practical aim (to be free of practical aims is for Abhinava one of the defining characteristics of drama, as indeed it is of all art). Thus he remarks, d’propos of Śiva’s famous cosmic dance, that it is the spontaneous expression of his overflowing bliss, in which no thought other than sheer creative beauty exists.” The poet is very much like Śiva; in fact, Abhinava often associates the poet, Śiva and rasa all together. For

1. Locana, p. 51:

2. A. Bh. Vol. I, p. 3:

3. A. Bh. I, p. 21:

4. For an elaboration of this passage (and an explanation of how drama differs, qua anukāra from other imitative objects) see A. Bh. I, p. 35-38, edited and translated by Gnoli, op. cit., p. 88-101, appendix I.

5. M. K. Vanugopalan suggests to us that perhaps the reading should be nirekha.

Abhinava is very fond of the notion of overflowing (see Locana, p. 86) with one’s own bliss. He uses it often in the Tantrāloka and in the very first verse of the Locana he speaks of nijārasabhāvān, the same expression.

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instance in the Maṅgalaśloka to the fifth chapter of the A. Bh., he has a very fine verse with a remarkable simile:

“We bow down to that sky-form of Śiva which acts as a preliminary to the production of the play that is the creation of this world by providing the proper moment (avakāśa) (for the play) (also: by providing the space in which creation is to be projected).”

Here samsāra is compared to a drama. The creation of samsāra is by Śiva, the poet (note the implication: both are unreal). Reductive statements dealing with identification are not uncommon with Abhinava. His commentary on the NŚ. VI. 38, provides a good example and is itself intrinsically interesting. The verse from the NŚ reads:

“Just as a tree grows from a seed, and from the tree come flowers, and from flowers fruit, so also rasas are the root, and from them are all bhāvas derived.”

After a very involved commentary which we translate in full below Abhinava ends by saying: “The tree stands for poetry. Flowers, etc.,

1. A. Bh. I, p. 207:

 संसारकल्पनामौ वादककाराविवाहानं।
 पूर्वरज्ञाते स्विभूमिते तत्ता शायती नमः॥

2. There are said to be eight forms of Śiva, among which the last five are the paṇca mahābhūtas. Vyoma is the fifth. It is the pūrvaraṇga, the preliminary to creation. The pūrvaraṇga forms a natural introduction to drama. Similarly Śiva’s form, namely abhāja (sky) forms a preliminary to creation, because it provides the space in which creation is projected.

3. E. g. A. Bh. I, p. 342:

 खादी प्रदूषितेऽयुत्तोष्ठेऽकामलकुल्लुकं।
 जननमाल महानमाल मम निनेहः॥

4. वधा बृंजाद वदेक्ष भुवेण श्रावण, पुष्पं फलं यथा।
 लता मूर्ति रसं: सबं ततो माया भविषः॥

5. A. Bh. I, p. 294 (NS, VI. 38). The text has been edited by Raghavan in “Bhōja’s Śṛngāra Prakāśa”, Madras 1963, p. 332. The passage is extremely important, and warrants a full translation. The text, as given by Raghavan reads:

 नन्द यदिः मायेनं सरस्वतिः कथुमलं ‘न हि रसायों कविधर्मि: प्रवत्तत्’ तति। तेन पूर्वं ते एवौ इत्यदि इश्वराश्रवण—प्रधानतया। विभेष्य यथा वृक्षमुलेण यथे कथितं तथा रसं: तत्त्वं यहि प्रतिमहिका

6. खुदुवत्तिः कामावधारायतं, कामिनतसायारीभुवत्तिः विभवतिः।
 सवं स्थितिर्मान्यायथो रसः। सामाजिकं च सक्तितथा विशेषत् कामादिविविभतिः।

(Continued on next page)
Here is our translation:

"Objection: if the rasas arise from the bhāvas, how was it said, 'without rasa no (dramatic) matter can arise?' Hence they alone (i.e. the rasas) deserve to be mentioned first (and not the bhāvas)." Anticipating such an objection he says: just as the seed stands as the root-cause of a tree, so the rasa (stand as the root cause of the bhāvas), for moral instruction and intellectual training, which are preceded by entertainment, arise from them (i.e. from the rasas).

(The following words—tata eva ca nyākyanūrhāt are obscure, and we are not able to follow what Abhinava means.) The functioning of the actor which is preceded by (i.e. which is based on) the (dramatic) poem, is (ultimately) based on the thought arising in the poet's mind — which thought is attained in sympathy (to that of the original characters). It is that very thought (arising in the poet's mind) that is really speaking the rasa. The spectator who is carried away by the perception of that (rasa) later on perceives the vibhāvas etc. (only) on analysis (of the aesthetic experience - apoddhārakuddhāyā). (The following words: iti prayojane, nāye, kāye, sāmakākhiṇi ca, are obscure and we are not able to follow what Abhinava means by them.) Thus the rasa existing in the poet (kavyage rasaḥ) is like the seed which is the root (i.e. cause) (of a tree) (we propose reading mālabījashāhniyāt for the G. O. S. reading of mālabijashāhniyāt which makes no sense). For the poet is just like the spectator. For this very reason it has been said by Añandavardhanācārya "If the poet is full of śrīgāravara" etc. (Dhvanīloka III, p. 498). Therefore a (dramatic) poem is like a tree. The activity (functioning) of the actor such as gesticulation, is like the flowers etc. The aesthetic experience on the part of the spectator is like the fruit. Consequently everything is full of rasa." What follows is no less interesting. Here is the text as corrected by Raghavan (op. cit. p. 531):

अत्र च विज्ञानवादी, विपर्याप्रयोग, स्वातत्त्ववाद, सत्कारवाद,परदर्शनवादमिलान्तः ज्ञातावैभाविति
तत्र च प्रजातिप्रवृत्तिसंयतंसंयतंसम्बन्धायांस्माहिष्टिकृत्ताध्यायां सत्कारस्य आभावस्य एव
अर्था ती वैभाविति प्रजातिप्रवृत्तिसंयतंसंयतंसम्बन्धायाः

tattva which is the root. The activity (functioning) of the actor such as gesticulation, is like the flowers etc. The aesthetic experience on the part of the spectator is like the fruit. Consequently everything is full of rasa." What follows is no less interesting. Here is the text as corrected by Raghavan (op. cit. p. 531):

(The first sentence is obscure.) "But we have not been taught to take the fruitless trouble of parading bits of wisdom which are not useful to the matter in hand. And so let it rest at that. (This seems to be a reference to an earlier commentator on the Nyāsa who must have made a display of his acquaintance with the Vijnānavāda, the Satkārvāda, etc. while explaining this stanza.) Others however explain: the tree in the form of rasa arises from the bhāva, which is like a seed; and from that (tree of rasa) which is lovely with its blossom in the form of abhinaya, the bhāva like a fruit, is enjoyed by its perception (pratityā). Now these people (in explaining the passage in this way) have explained the whole thing in a manner repugnant to the matter in hand. For in explaining the passage in this manner, they are saying that bhāva exists both in the beginning (upakrama) and in the end (paryayavāsa) (in as much as they claim that bhāva is both the seed and the fruit). And so enough of that."

Thus the idea is that all three views (namely): (सत्कारवादी भावात्, ज्ञातावैभाविति, प्रजातिप्रवृत्तिसंयतंसंयतंसम्बन्धायाः) are acceptable (upagatah) according to the diversity of the intention (abhīpraya vaiditya): गृहं वहनि पश्चात् कर्मचिन्हुपतता अभिभाविति, ज्ञातावैभाविति.
stand for such activities of the actor as abhinaya, etc. Fruit stands for the aesthetic enjoyment of the spectator. Thus everything (or: the whole world) is made of rasa!"  

For Abhinava, poetry and drama are essentially the same thing. Thus rases are only to be found in drama, and not in the real world. And what does Abhinava consider the purpose of drama and poetry to be? What is his stance on the largely unspoken but constant controversy between vyutpatti (in the sense of moral or intellectual instruction) and priti (pleasure) as the goal of literature? Basically Abhinava holds that the major purpose of art is pleasure. Thus in the Locana he says:

"Although knowledge and pleasure for the reader are both present, as Bhâmaha has said:

'Study of good poetry confers fame and pleasure, as well as skill in dharma, artha, kâma and moksa, and skill, too, in the fine arts,' nevertheless pleasure is the main thing. Otherwise, how would poetry, a source of knowledge, comparable to a (loving) wife, differ from the Vedas, etc., which are also sources of instruction, comparable (in their manner of instruction) to a master, or from sources of instruction such as the itihasas, etc., which are comparable (in their manner of instruction) to a friend?"


4. Locana, p. 40:


6. Vyutpatti most often means bhâyârasulâtâ, learning. See Rudraṭa 1, 18; Mammâta, KP. I. 2 (vyasvârañi, explained in the Vyâtti as râjâdayata-uccâcârapariprâjñânam) and I. 3 (where the Vârtti explains the word nisparâjit of the Kâriki by vyutpatti, which is said to arise from mahâkârtvârddhasmâ kâvyaâmârthaâhârâhārimâhâhârâhāhâhâhāhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâhâh
And so delight has been mentioned (here) primarily (as the purpose of poetry). Even of instruction in the four goals of life delight is the final and major result.

Abhinava has an interesting passage in the third Uddyota of the Locana in which he repeats this fundamental distinction in method between history, philosophy and poetry. Since, he says, people, and especially people in important positions, must be made sensitive (lit. "instructed", vyūtpādyā), the best way to provide them with this ethical and intellectual education (vyūtpatti) is through poetry. The way to instruct people in the four goals of life is by entering their hearts (hrdayānupraveśa), which is just another name for imaginative experience in general (hrdayānupraveśaḥ ca rasāsvādamaaya eva). Abhinava ends by saying that prīti, pleasure, is the cause of vyūtpatti (prīti eva vyūtpattek pravojikā). His concluding phrase leaves us wondering whether this whole doctrine was not inherited from his teacher:

"Rasa consists of pleasure, and rasa alone is drama, and drama alone is the Veda. This is what our teacher says." Abhinava goes on to make this important remark: "Nor are pleasure and instruction really different things, for they both have the same object."

Continued from previous page)

śvetākāryasāmyam śatām śatāmāpāvyavādāṁ

prasāhīndham prājīṁ karuṇaṁ ī
ds

"(Readers) use (i.e., read) even the śāstras if they are mixed with sweet poetic rasas (just as children will) swallow bitter medicine if they first lick honey."

Curiously enough, according to Professor Bhattacharya, this is a quotation from the Hṛdayadarśapura (see p. 8, fn. 1: sādānāyaśaśadāsaraśaśatāvṛtāṁ yad iti bhūvākāśāmsahā). But this cannot be correct, since the stanza is found in Bhāmasa, V. 3. What are the works in Skt. that can be considered śāstras as well as kāvyas? Really only two: the Yogasūčiśtha and the Mahābhārata. It is a great pity that Ānandavaradhaṇa's Tattvālokā is lost, for it very probably dealt with this fascinating topic in detail (see Locana, p. 67 and p. 333).

1. Locana, p. 336.
2. Locana, p. 336:

prīviṇaṁ ca rastādēva nāthaṁ nārāyameva vadha śaśāsukāśvāya:

3. Locana p. 336:

n caite prītiśyutvā ca bhūvākāśā eva, tattvālokābhunāca

What Abhinava means by ekāśrayatvāt is brought out in the next sentence: bhāvābhāvataścāntaḥ hṛitāvat: prītiśirāntaścāntaścaṁś ca. The acūtīya of the vībhāras etc. is the cause of the pleasure that we derive from poetry. Similarly the acūtīya of the vībhāras etc. is the cause of the edification that we derive from poetry. This is stated by Abhinava in the next sentence (p. 337): bhāvābhāvaraṁ tattvāchāntaṁ (for which we should perhaps read tattvāchāntaṁ) bhūvākāśābhunācaṁ śaśāsūkāśvāyatvā
dharmābhunācaṁ. Thus both prīti and vyūtpatti depend on vībhāraseucūtīya. Both are the result of vībhāraseucūtīya. Abhinava’s phrase devagor api ekāśrayatvāt therefore means devagor api ekāśrayatvāt. Since both are the outcome of a single cause, they are not different from one another.
In this connection and in slightly more concrete terms (the reader should not feel that the passages we translate in any sense exhaust the range of Abhinava's interest. For most of the Locana consists of very close textual remarks on specific verses. We have simply extrapolated the more abstract passages, since it is here that Abhinava deals with his philosophical views), Abhinava has a very interesting passage in the A. Bh. on the NŚ. I. 108–110, on what drama does for the different kinds of spectators: 2

"Drama thus described 'creates mental repose' (viśrāntijanana, NŚ. I. 114), that is, it destroys the flow of pain for all spectators who are overcome either with pain such as comes from illness, who are afflicted with tiredness

1. One should compare the very interesting passage in the Dabarūpaka, and especially the commentary of Dhanika (I. 6):

Avaloka: tva kṛitiḥ—

Dharmaḥ samastamokṣedu vaivāyante kāmaḥ ca.

Kāro'ti kārīti prātiṣṭi ca sarvāvayamānīvam.

Evam iti viśkrtaḥ kāmaḥ pravṛttanāṃ samśayāṇaḥ
drāgadvatāḥ sarvāvayamānaḥ
tanuḥ nānādyorahitaṁ sahāyakam.

2. A. Bh., Vol. I, p. 39:

Note that the word sādhu can be construed with both namah and with tasmai; tasmai sādhu namah, "I bow low (sādhu) to him, and tasmai sādhu, tasmai namah". "May he fare well (i.e. may god bless him), I bow to him". We think the correct reading is sādhu as an adverb and not sādhuḥ as an adjective going with alpabuddhi.

"In that connection some (claim): "Reading (and study—nijarasa) of good poetry bestows pleasure and fame and skill in the fine arts". (Bhāmaha, I. 2).

By this and other verses they wish to show that the purpose of poetry is to give knowledge of the three goals of life etc. By refuting this, the author shows that the purpose of the ten drama-types is aesthetic enjoyment, which is of the form of the highest bliss that is inwardly experienced (svāsānvedya) and not merely knowledge of the three goals of life etc. as is the case in itīkāsas etc. 'I bow low' is of course meant sarcastically".
which comes from the inconveniences caused by a long journey etc., or are suffering from sorrow as when one's relations, etc., die, or for ascetics whose minds are distressed by excessive weakness resulting from constant ascetic practices and from the ānātāya and other vows. When their sufferings are overcome, drama becomes the cause of dhṛti, etc., according to suitability (yathāyogam); thus dhṛti etc., (verse 113), having delight for their essence, apply in their proper order to the spectators afflicted with sorrows etc. For instance, (drama) gives courage to the person overcome with sorrow. For the man afflicted with illness it distracts his mind. For the weary man it creates happiness. The word "etc." (in verse 113) stands for such things as awakening of the mind, etc., in the case of the man who practises tapas. Not only (does the drama achieve) this, but it also gives rise at a later date (kālāntare) to the result (paripāka) in the form of happiness that stems from instruction. In this manner the purpose (of the drama) for those who are unhappy (is threefold): it calms the pain of those who are grieved, it gives immediate pleasure, and it gives happiness later (through instruction, which if followed leads to happiness). As for those who are not in sorrow, but are almost always happy, such as princes, etc., even for them the drama provides instruction in the ways of the world and in the means leading to the (four) goals of life, such as dharma, etc. The word "world" means "ways of the world." Question: does the drama instruct the way a teacher (or an elderly person) does? (Answer:) No. Rather it causes one's wisdom to grow."

In his commentary on the rasasūtra of Bharata, just before commencing a detailed statement of his own position, Abhinava quotes the first line of a very famous verse from the Sākuntala. Abhinava considered this verse to be the ideal introduction to his exposition of rasa. Since its exact significance has proved somewhat mysterious, we feel we are justified in introducing the two passages from the Locana with a short discussion on this passage. The verse reads:

"Seeing moving sights, and hearing soft sounds, even a man who is happy is filled with strange longing. Surely it is because he vaguely remembers, though he is not fully conscious, affections formed in an earlier life that are fixed inside him through the latent impressions they leave behind."

1. A good summation of this whole theory is Abhinava's account at the beginning of the A. Bh., of what takes place when we actually witness a drama, G. O. S., p. 36. The passage has been edited and translated by Gomoli, op. cit. (p. 96).
2. The verse is quoted in the A. Bh., p. 279-280, (Vol. 1).
3. Sākuntala, V. 2:

रमण्ये बीक्ष्म मृतरङ्ग निर्माणमय शाब्दान्।
परंतुत्तमो मैतलितीष्टिपि जन्मुः।
तबाचलस्य समरतरुपयुक्तते पञ्चमीर्पूः।
भावशिररण्ये जननानन्तरसीहद्रानि॥
Why then does Abhinava quote this? The reason we feel is this: Dusyanta has an experience of rasa. But it is not like any other experience in the world. He is not directly experiencing any kind of sexual pleasure, but the vibhānas (music and perhaps paintings as well) call up to him some vague memories. This in its turn produces longing (autsukya) in him. It is an aesthetic experience. The memory involved is not of course any other kind of memory, for it has no object. The bāvasthirāṇi in the verse are the actual vāsanās. These vāsanās (latent impressions) are brought to life by his hearing the music, and they then bring to his aesthetic attention (i.e. his deeper unconscious) intimations of a pleasure he formerly had. But this pleasure is now no longer direct, it is purified, not directly stateable. It is thus a higher kind of delight than the original. So Abhinava regards this verse as proof of rasa.

1. Hemacandra, कृष्णानुसार, II, 1, p. 99:
   अन्तर हि समस्तति सा स्तूतिरपदिष्ठिता सा न ताकिकालिणः। पूर्वोत्तमसायस्यस्यानु भृत्यवाचः।
   अथि तु प्रतिभानापरप्रवासात् स्वल्पमाथविभाषितां
   What Hemachandra means by saying that Dusyanta has not experienced this love is that he is not now remembering something he has experienced. In other words, ordinary memory of happy experience does not constitute aesthetic experience. Thus a play does not bring up in our memories similar experiences. What is conjured up in us is the more general emotion, purified of any actual memory. This interpretation is confirmed by the passage from the Īṭāvān, quoted in Note 3.

2. For Rāghavabhaṭṭa, the verse is a case of kṛgāra.

3. On p. 252 of the third volume of the ĪṭPāV, Abhinava quotes the last lines of the same verse: bhāvasthirāṇi javanatārasau√jīrṇā (this reading of bhāvasthirāṇi instead of bhāvasthirāṇi is confirmed by Rāghavabhaṭṭa, who says that it is a well-established reading). The context is extremely difficult to make out, since the text on which Abhinava is commenting is not extant, and none of the pratiśās make sense. But it is clear that he is quoting this as an example of an emotion (he seems to be discussing the distinction between various kinds of love; kāma, teṣā, abhāsa, autsukya, etc.) that has no direct object, but is atheralised as it were, that is, in his terms, “generalised” : आदिरिणादिरिणामयम् यथा साधारणसांसरसांकारसिद्धास्वाभिविद्यासि तथा च.
   आदिरिणादिरिणामयम् यथा साधारणसांसरसांकारसिद्धास्वाभिविद्यासि तथा

Clearly then these vāsanās bring us to a state of generalised love, which is why it is called autsukya, for it would seem that autsukya is a longing with no particular object. This is in fact what takes place during a dramatic performance of the Śakuntala, for we do not wish to actually possess Śakuntala herself.

4. Note that according to Rāghavabhaṭṭa, the verse is a case of aprastuta-prakāśa, and this figure of speech further suggests the sthāyibhās of uninterrupted love (aprasīta-prakāśa, tene sāpyaṁ rātur evaṣeḥo dveṇāṇaṁ). He also sees this as kāryālaya, and hence as saṃkṣerṣi. There are also three types of anuprāśa (cheṣa, vrīti and śrutī). He notes that the verse must be a case of vrīti (i.e. kṛgāra-rāsa-dheṇi) for otherwise there will be the dasa of having the major rasa cut midway.

अन्वया सदे विष्णुदारभाग्य रसदेव: स्तूतः।
All of this culminates in what is lacking even in Ānandavardhana, a philosophical scaffolding on which to raise the structure of rasa. We are now ready to read the two important passages from the Locana.¹

1. We have barely touched the surface of Abhinava’s aesthetic philosophy. There are of course a great deal of interesting passages from his philosophical works which shed light on the issues discussed here. Lack of space prevents us from examining all of these passages here, but we cannot refrain from noting briefly at least some of them. The first verse of the last chapter of Utpalacārya’s Īśvara-pratyabhijñā (Bhāskari, vol. II, p. 280) reads:

विभूतिः प्रियदम्पितलक्षणाम्यायितः ||

“The one highest God is the very Self of all beings. He assumes the form of everything. He is filled with the unbroken notion: ‘I am this (universe)’. ”

In his commentary to this Abhinava speaks of the consciousness that is not restricted by time and space, just as he speaks of the consciousness in a play that is not restricted by time and space (e.g., Abhinavagupta, p. 280): यतः सत्त्वसमायोद्दौ संविद्व न देशोऽन न कालं न संस्कृतेन कौऽभि नेद्यः। अन्तर्गतिः पराणुलाग्रवऽधिके अविनायसपरिप्रवर्त्ताः। “Filled with the notion of ‘I’ness which takes the form of rest in the self which is not directed towards anything else.”

These are precisely the terms in which Abhinava speaks of the aesthetic experience.

See also Abhinava’s Tantrasāra, p. 19, where two interesting verses sum up the third ākhīka. The verses, oddly, are in Prākrit. Note that saiv bhāk in the Prākrit should be translated into Skt. as savyaṃ bhāti and not as satyaṃ bhāti as in the chāya given in the footnote on p. 19. Also, sarahsas in the Prākrit should be translated as sarahṣaṇa and not as sarahṣaṇya. Perhaps too one should emend vimsatā-rūpaṃ into vimśatārūpe to agree with darpaṇa in the first line. The verse reads:

संबिज्ञानीमठ्ठपयण्यामुष्टिः समेतं पूर्ततिभिरसारं | आमिरवित्तसतसहितविवर्णस्वह सर्व मार ||

(With slight changes in the text.)

“The whole of one’s very own essence, vibrating in the pure mirror of consciousness becomes manifest by itself; its (the mirror’s) form having been rubbed quickly with the fluid in the form of amarkana.”

One of the finest verses is found in the Tantrāloka, Vol. II, p. 200:

तथा हि सुरू गौति रघुन वा चन्द्रानादिके ||

माध्यस्त्वयमवे याति हुदये सप्तसनाता ||

आयानन्दसिफः सैनिकश्च यतः सहद्वियेऽजनाः ||

“That vibration which arises in the heart when one touches sandalwood etc. or hears soft singing — when one is no longer indifferent, that is known as the Śakti (force) of bliss through which one becomes “sensitive” (lit. “endowed with a heart”).”

Note that Jayaratha quotes Viśṇuṁabhairava, 73 (gītādīnīyāyāsāda etc.).

When Abhinava speaks of the sense of the “I” changing, deepening, we are irresistibly reminded of a very moving and powerful poem:

“I have to tell
you .... your son is a mongol”
the doctor said.
How easily the word went in —

(Continued on next page)
The first passage is extracted from the Locana on the second Uddyota of the Dhvanyāloka. As far as we know this is Abhinava's first systematic exposition of his own and earlier views on the nature of aesthetic experience:


Continued from previous page)

... clean as a bullet
leaving no mark on the skin
stopping the heart within it.
This was my first death,
the "I" ascending on a slow
last thermal breath
studied the man below
as a pilot treading air might
the buckled shell of his plane,

The poem ends with the grave insight this new "I" bestows:

You have a sickness they cannot heal,
the doctors say: locked in
your body you will remain.
Well, I have been locked in mine.
We will tell each other out,
You seal the covenant with a grin.

(Jon Stallworthy, "Root and Branch", Hogarth, London, 1968.),
which is the same kind of pure and beautiful reconciliation that Abhinavagupta achieves in his finest moments of philosophy, a wisdom we appreciate in literature, but hope for in vain in life.

खंडकारणां की भेदः! श्रुतिमेद्रविधिहं स्निविकितः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः। श्रुतिलयारस्तिकचर्चा त्रिकथारामसः।
Here is our translation of this complex passage:

Objection:¹ It has been said by Bhaṭṭanāyaka:² "Were rasa³ to

1. In the second edition of Gooli's work, "The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta", Chowkhamba, 1968, which has just appeared, he has added an appendix in which he translates the passage. However, our interpretations differ so often and so radically from his, that we felt we were not duplicating any labour by translating this important passage. It did not seem to us necessary to point out all the places where we differ.

2. This is an earlier version of what Abhinava later expands into the famous commentary on the rasasūtra in the Abhinavabhāṣātī, Vol. I, p. 277 ff. This passage forms the core of Gooli's book. See also, for details on the views of Abhinava's predecessors, Sankaran, "Some Theories of Rasa and Dhvani", and P. Shastri, "The Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure".

3. We have found the following texts useful, either because they reproduce, or because they expand these very arguments:

(Continued on next page)
be apprehended as belonging to someone else (and not to the spectator), then (the spectator) would remain indifferent (tātasthya). Nor can rasa, which stems from a poem dealing with a subject like the life and deeds of Rāma, etc., be apprehended as belonging to oneself. For if it were apprehended as belonging to oneself, we would have to say that real emotions (such as sexual desire, etc.) arise in one’s own self (while witnessing a dramatic performance). And that would be most improper in the case of (somebody like) Sītā. For (she) cannot be the (ālambana) vibhāva with respect to a spectator. Should it be argued that what causes (prayojaka) her to become a vibhāva (cause) of arousing (vikāsa) latent emotions (vāsanā) (of love, etc.) (in the spectator) is the fact that (she stands as a symbol for) non-personalised (sādhāraṇa) womanhood (kāntātva), we reply: how would such a process be possible in the case of the description of gods, etc. Nor can it be said that during a dramatic performance (madhye) there is (on the part of the spectator) a recollection of his own wife. How can

Continued from previous page

(For full bibliographical information on each item consult the bibliography at the end of the volume): (1) Śrīdhara’s commentary on the Kāvyaprakāśa; (2) Manikyananda’s commentary on the KP.; (3) Candāda’s commentary on the KP.; (4) Hemacandra’s Kāvyānubhava; (5) Prabhakara’s Rasaprakāśa; (6) Vidyādharacaryu’s Ekavali; (7) Vidyanātha’s Pratāparudrayakabhāṣa, and finally (8) Jagannātha’s Rasagāgadāhara.

1. Abhinava, following Bhātīyata, uses this same argument against Saṅkhu, A. Bh., p. 277 (Gnoli, p. 17):

चित्रश्रवण साधिता विविधतैर्यिति क्षात्मकायेन प्रविधिप्रियतंतष्यः

“The actor does not think to himself: ‘Sītā belongs to me’."

2. BN means that Sītā is only a vibhāva with regard to Rāma, not to the spectator. But what can this mean? Vibhāvas are all in regard to rasa. After all, it is not Rāma who experiences rasa in regard to Sītā, so how can she be his vibhāva? We must take the word vibhāva to be a loose usage for kāraṇa of true rati in Rāma, but this has to do with the real world and not with rasa.

3. Bhātīyata (BN) uses sophistry to prove that rasa is perceived neither as located in the sāmājika (ātmagata) nor as located in someone else (e.g. the character portrayed or the actor who presents that character). By ruling out both the possibilities, ātmagata and paragata of rasaprātiṣṭhita, he comes to the conclusion that rasah na pratīgyate, “rasa is not perceived at all”. According to BN we do not have any perception (pratīti) of rasa, but only its enjoyment (bhoga or bhogikarana). BN is not against admitting rasa in the sāmājika—he is against admitting its pratītya (perception) in the sāmājika. Instead of pratītya, BN uses his own terminology bhoga and bhogikarana. The difference between the two ideas seems to us only one of terminology.

For the same arguments, see the A. Bh., p. 278, (Gnoli, p. 10).

4. We have translated this sentence as if it were a serious observation, namely that when the spectator sympathises he does not remember his own personal life. However, it is possible that it is meant humorously as well: “for God’s sake, you do not want to have to remember your own wife when watching love scenes!”

XI
(uddipana) vibhāvas in the form of such deeds as building a bridge over the ocean, etc., by extraordinary heroes like Rāma ever become generalised, (since nobody else could ever do them)? Nor can it be said that Rāma, etc., as full of energy, etc., is remembered, because he has never actually formed a part of our (past) experience (such that now we could remember him). To perceive (Rāma’s) energy (utsāha, the sthānyābhāva of virarasa) from a verbal source of knowledge (śabda) is not to experience rasa, just as when we directly watch a couple making love there is no aesthetic pleasure. As for the theory that rasas arise (upatti), (the difficulty is that) because of the (spectator’s) (real) sorrow (karuṇa, i.e. ṣoka) he would be genuinely unhappy and would no longer return to watch such dramatic performances in which (there was) karuṇa (rasa) ever again. Therefore rasa does not “arise” (upatti), nor is it induced by suggestion

1. The important word is Rāma, to which utsāhādīmān is simply an adjective. The ādi stands for ratimāṇa, etc., depending on the rasa. But none of these states form part of our own experience of Rāma, since we never knew him. Even though the spectator might apprehend the sthānyābhāvas like utsāha, etc., in Rāma, etc., from the words actually used in the poem, still it will be only śabda-janyajñāna of the utsāha in Rāma. This śabda-janyajñāna cannot lead to rasotpati in the sahā-daya. The reason for this is given in the form of an analogy in the next sentence: “Just as when a couple is actually observed (pratyakṣa) making love to each other, there is no rasotpati in the observer (rasopajñāna means ratibhāvavividhāna - an aesthetic experience of love).” But we cannot quite see the point in the argument, in spite of the analogy. However, to have seen this “generalised” nature of drama was one of the great moments of literary criticism, and it appears that this view belongs to Bhaṭṭanāyaka, for Abhinava simply takes it over. Bhāvānta is the same as sādhāraṇikarana. Ananda does not use this term.

2. The reason we cannot remember Rāma is that the definition of memory in Sanskrit logic involves anubhava, direct experience.

3. The expanded version of this, A. Bh., p. 278 (Gnoli, p. 10) reads:

च छ शादास्युक्तानिष्ठस्थिता (where तत् refers to अत्याब्धिर्मिथिभाषा) — प्रताली लोकस सरसता तु कहा प्रदायित।

What is BN’s point? Does he mean simply that we cannot have rasapratipatti through anumāna and śabda?

4. Abhinava (A. Bh. Vol. I. p. 278, Gnoli, p. 10) expands the analogy of watching a couple making love by adding:

प्रताली लोकस सरसता तु कहा प्रदायित।

On the contrary, because one becomes preoccupied (vyāpratayā) with one's own mental moods that arise, such as embarrassment, disgust, or even sexual desire, we cannot say that this is an aesthetic experience.” Cf. also Daśārayaka IV, 39 and the Avatoksa thereon. Abhinava makes the same point on p. 35 of the A. Bh. (Vol. I.): 

We take tapratiipatitau in the last sentence of p. 181 to refer to utsāha of the preceding sentence: त च उत्साहाधिविभा रामः सप्तेति, as opposed to Gnoli who takes it to refer to Rāma.
(abhivyakti), for if (such emotions as) love, existing in a dormant form (saktirupa) (in the spectator), were to (arise or be) induced by suggestion, then there would occur the difficulty that to a greater or lesser extent (tāratamya) the spectators would make actual physical attempts to possess the object (presented before them on the stage).\footnote{1} And if we held that rasa was aroused (i.e. induced)\footnote{2} by suggestion, (we could ask the same question as before:) is rasa existent in the spectator himself, or in someone else? The same difficulties would arise now as arose before. Therefore rasa is not (directly) perceived (pratiyate),\footnote{3} nor conjured up (utpadyate), nor suggested (abhivyayate) by poetry. But poetic words are of an altogether different nature from ordinary words, thanks to the three functions (tryambatā) possessed by them. Denotation (abhidhāyakatva) is concerned with the literal meaning; universalisation (bhāvakatva) is concerned with rasa, etc.; and aesthetic enjoyment (bhoktrītva) is concerned with the sensitive reader (sahṛdaya). These are three (separate) functions which are the constituents of words used in poetry (or literature). If one were to claim that in

1. All later writers reproduce this phrase, vīṣayārjanatārratamya but without explaining it or paraphrasing it. It is thus clear that nobody really knew what Abhinava meant. Gnilö takes it very differently from the way we have (see op. cit. p. 45, 108). We take it to mean that the spectator would actually feel the need to acquire (arjana) the object (vīṣaya) on the stage, i.e. he would want to get up and take Sīta away. But the expression tāratamya is, we admit, inconvenient. We suppose the idea is that some people will make a greater effort (i.e. will be more excited) to attain the object, and others less. See Dāsurūpaśa IV. 39 and Avalokast on the same; हतर्यान्तरसूरसराशिच्छादद: प्रस्तुतये: \footnote{4} Cf. the old story of the backwoodsman in the gallery who shot the "villain" on the stage.

2. It is not clear to us just what Bhaṭṭānayaka intends by the term abhivyakti. He must of course have known the doctrine of vyāfbijā as put forth by Anandavardhana. Abhinava uses the term abhivyakti as synonymous with "suggestion". Bhaṭṭānayaka however understands "abhivyakti" to be a sort of production which he places on the same level as utpatti, since his argument kṛṣgārya abhivyaktay et al., really applies to utpattiyapakas. Abhinava points out that in a verse which he quotes from BN, the expression vyanāgya occurs. The verse is:

The verse is:

3. BN's stand that rasa is not perceived at all (rasaḥ na pratiyate) is not reasonable. It is the same sophistic argument used in svagatāva and paragatāva, meant only to silence the opponent. Unless he could mean by pratiyate "direct experience", which is of course not what takes place in the theatre, since, as BN already pointed out, we do not know the people on the stage and are thus not personally involved.

4. Rasādevīśayam is problematic. We must understand ratgādevīśayam, which is confirmed by the Rasāpradīpa, p. 26.
literature (tatra) denotation alone held sway, then what would differentiate śleṣa and other figures of speech from such devices as the use of words in two senses (tatra), etc., in scientific works? Moreover (if this were true) then the different varieties of alliteration (ṛttī) would be virtually useless. And what purpose would the avoidance of such faults as cacophony (śrutiduṣṭa), etc., serve? Therefore there is a second function known as generalisation (bhāvanā) (responsible for bringing about the experience) of rasa (i.e. of the sthāyibhāvas), thanks to which, denotation (abhidhā) assumes a new dimension (vilakṣāṇa). This function of universalisation (bhāvakārava) with respect to the rasas (i.e. sthāyibhāvas) is in fact (nāma) what is, in poetry, responsible for making the vibhāvas, etc., universal. Once a rasa (i.e. sthāyibhāva) has been thus universalised, its realisation (bhoga, i.e. sākṣātkāra) (is possible), a realisation which is different from the perceptions derived from memory or direct experience, which takes the

1. The Bālapriyā (p. 182) explains tantra as follows:

शक्तिः "हवत्व"मिति 

where the sītra of Paṇini (I.3:3; kalantyāṇa), "hal" stands for two completely different things: it means (1) the ārasūtra (no. 14) hal, and (2) any one of the consonants. There is of course no samātkāra in this. Cf. Udd, III, Locana, p. 472. Cf. Vāmana’s Kavyālankārāsūtra, IV.3.7.

2. At this point in the exposition of BN’s views, the Śrīdhara commentary adds: तत्रश्रवण्ये (तत्रभिम) निर्देशार्थालर्थिनिश्चलन सुकायमुक्तयज्ञानीयाणि व्याकरण: शास्त्रयापार: | स शास्त्रेष्यांतिर्दारणिः यथातथे शास्त्रमाध्यमयन्त्यमपुरुसायिकविभ: साधारणः। अवस्थानं तु कार्यन्यथा

3. Śrutiduṣṭa is mentioned by Bhāmaha, L.47, and by the Dhanayāloka II.14 and the Vṛttī thereon. Abhinava (p. 214–215 of the Locana) speaks of it as anütya because there are cases in which harsh sounds are appropriate, e. g. in raudravarṇa. See also Uddyota III, parikāravāloka no.1, p. 302. Abhinava also refers to niyyāni-tyādoja on p. 16 of the Locana.

4. Note that BN is arguing for a further power in poetry, beyond the literal sense. Most probably he derives this doctrine from Anandavardhana.

5. Bhāve ca rasa is really speaking an improper usage. Bhāvanayā samarpita rasa is what BN means.
form of druti, vistara and vikāsa, and which approximates the bliss that comes from realising (one's identity) with the highest Brahman (para-brahmāsvādasaviddhiḥ), for it consists of repose in the bliss (nirvṛtti vrāntī) which is the true nature of one's own Self, and which is permeated with sattva (guṇa) intermingled with the diversity of rajas and tamas. It is this aesthetic pleasure (bhoga) alone that is the major element (i.e., purpose of poetry), and it is an accomplished fact (siddharūpa) (since it consists in blissful repose in the pure consciousness of the Self which is an accomplished fact) (even though in relation to abhidhā and bhāvanā it is sādhyanūpā, i.e., to be accomplished). (All forms of) intellectual and moral instruction (vyutpatti) (in literature) are in fact only subsidiary, (pleasure being the major goal of literature).” 

We reply (to these views of Bhaṭṭanāyaka) as fol-

1. Note the Rasagūḍāhara, p. 66 (KM ed. of 1939): गुणानां वैतिकं तत्तत्विभिन्नतिः विकासात्यसाधिततत्साधितात् यत्र तत्तत्विभिन्नतिः।

These terms are explained in the DR, IV, 43. Ānanda speaks of dipti on p. 209. See also Kārikā II, 9 (p. 208). Abhinava speaks of dipti as being vikāsa-vistāraprajaṇavala-mahābhavaḥ (p. 208-209, Locana). He also uses the verb dravati in connection with karuṣa. Ānanda says that the mind, in karuṣa, is exceedingly moved (āvṛ tooth-yāti, which Abhinava (p. 207-208) explains as kāthi nāy-ttāyāti). This certainly prefigures the theory. Is BN the first to use these terms? We think it unlikely. See also Gnoi, p. 46, and Raghavan, Śr. Pr, p. 436.

2. Note the importance of the term sacidhā, which means literally “near”. We don't think it can be taken to mean simply “similar” here, since surely the implication is that it is inferior. If this is the correct interpretation, then perhaps the passage about the Yogins milking the cow of mysticism (Locana, p. 91) should be reinterpreted, in spite of what Abhinava says. (Note that this agrees with the extraordinary passage in the third Uddyota, p. 510, where Abhinava unambiguously states that rasaśvāda is inferior to brahmāsvāda."

3. This is very important, for Bhaṭṭanāyaka may have been the first to clearly say that vyutpatti is secondary to pṛti. In this he is followed by Abhinava (p. 41 - Ānanda eva pārgantikā phalam; and third Uddyota, p. 336 where vyutpatti is said to be an incidental result of pṛti, though the passage is somewhat ambiguous).

4. Govinda, in his Kīrti-pradīpa, (p. 66) actually says that this view of BN is in accord with the Sāṅkhya doctrine: उच्छवं द्वेषार्थमनुसारास्वास्त्यं दत्त साधनविधितद्वारानुसारं विद्युत् | Sattva, rajas and tamas are of course the three constituents of human nature. As Jagannātha says (p. 29, RG), during rasaprastī, rajas and tamas are suppressed by the preponderance of sattva, because of the power of the function called bhokṣakṛtā. (Continued on next page)
lows: the true nature of rasa is the subject of many different and controversial views. For instance, some (Lollata for example) believe that that which is known as a permanent emotion (sthāyibhāva) in its prior (undeveloped) form (pihāvāstha) becomes nourished (i.e. developed, prāptaparipoṣa) through the introduction (sāmpāta) of the vyābhirāms, etc., and (then becomes) rasa located in the character being portrayed (anukārya). Rasas are called nātyarasas because they are used in drama. (Objection to this view by Saṅkuka:)

1. what can it mean to say that one state of mind (cittavṛtti) is "nourished" by another state of mind, seeing that mental moods are in a constant state of flux (pravāhādarmin)? Wonder, grief and anger, etc., are not gradually augmented (paripoṣa) (on the contrary, they diminish with time). Therefore there is no rasa in the character being portrayed. If one were to say that it is in the actor (anukartre), (the difficulty is that) the actor would then be unable to follow the tempo (laya), etc., (since he would be

Continued from previous page)

An excellent account of BN's view and its similarity to the Saṅkhya is to be found in Hiriyana, "Indian Aesthetics", Proceedings and Transactions of the first Oriental Conference, Poona, 1922, p. 246–247. "The purpose of evolution in the Saṅkhya is bhoga and apavarga, and the use of this word bhoga in this passage constitutes a link, connecting the present theory with the Saṅkhya." (op. cit. p. 247–248).

1. Here is a one-sentence summary of Saṅkuka's position by Prabhakara, Rasapradipika, p. 22: विभाबलिपिन्यं ज्ञानीवादादोऽसुवक्षेत्यविधिमायो रसः

2. It is not clear what Saṅkuka intends by pravāhādarmin: What does he mean when he says that one mental state cannot nourish another, since any mental state is in constant flux? The analogy of a river does not hold good, for while it is in a constant state of flux, it is nonetheless augmented by minor streams. Why should not a major (or abiding, sthāyin) mental state be intensified by subsidiary and fleeting mental states? Does Saṅkuka mean that there is no question of any mental state being strengthened by any other mental state, since all of them are after all in a state of flux—always changing—diminishing in their intensity with the passage of time? But this does not seem true. Does he mean that it is only in the theatre that one has a concentrated mental mood, not in real life? If so, would he argue that Rāma's love was constantly changing? Unlike. What then could he mean?

3. This passage has been expanded in the A. Bh. p. 274: शोकः प्रथम तीसरे कालातु माण्डलमन्दिनम्। तिस्ति बलवत् हवहवा। This is very true, and well observed, but what does it prove? Perhaps the point is that a mental state becomes intensified or weakened because of the external objective stimuli, and not because of other mental states (like the vyābhichārībhāva).

4. The sentence iti nānukārya rasaḥ is elliptical. It should be explained as follows: अनुकार्य (रामायण) विशाल: प्रायः सामाजिकान्तरात्मात इति नूतनम्। According to Lolla, the spectator relishes the rasa (i.e. ratiyādīsthāyibhāva) which is located in the character portrayed. Now Saṅkuka's view is that the spectator cannot be said to enjoy the ratiyādībhāva which is after all located in the character portrayed, who is removed both in space and time from the spectator.

5. Note how the BP takes laya (p. 184): छन्दो नाम चुदासौविवधानमेकतानाहरू सृजायस। But we feel that Gnoli's interpretation, which we follow, is better (see his Int. p. XVIII).
absorbed in an aesthetic experience and unable to concentrate on his duties as an actor). If one were to say (that rasa, i.e. ratyādibhāva exists) in the spectator, how could there be delight (camatkāra)? On the contrary, in karuṇa (rasa) (i.e. in tragic situations), etc., the spectator would experience (only) pain. Therefore this thesis is incorrect. What then is the correct view? It is not possible (precisely) to imitate any one particular mood because of the endless and ever-changing (aniyata) degrees of intensity (of the mental moods). Moreover it would be useless to do so, for if they were reproduced exactly (viśiṣṭatā), because (the spectator) would not be moved (tātasthya), there could result no edification (vyutpatti).

Therefore, (here is Śaṅkuka’s view:) when this sthāyi(bhāva), whose nature is not definite (as regards its particular intensity) is combined with the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas, there results an experience (pratipatti) of the the sthāyi(bhāva) (love, etc.) which is inferred as existing in the actor (because he is for the time being the locus of the rati, etc.) and is (therefore) confined only to the drama. The nature of this experience is the enjoyment of the sthāyibhāva (love, etc.) (thus inferred as existing in the actor) and it is different from memory, because it is the object of the apprehension that “this Rama (standing before me, as represented by the actor) is happy” (because he is with Sītā)”. This rasa does not depend on any other thing beyond the actor who is apprehended (by the spectator) as non-different from the character being portrayed, and the spectator who is the relisher (of the ratibhāva, etc., inferred by him as existing in the actor). Only that much (and nothing more is required for the aesthetic experience of the rasa). Therefore, rasa exists only in the drama, and not in the characters to be portrayed, etc. This is the view of some (i.e. of Śaṅkuka).

Others say: the appearance (semblance, avabhāsa) of a sthāyi (bhāva) in the actor, which has been brought about by the dramatic accessories (sāmagri) such as abhinaya, etc., is like the appearance (semblance) of a

1. This is a difficult passage. We take viśiṣṭa to mean niyata (definite, particular, precise).: nete anutapairāmāvatvātvaśiṣṭa (i.e. niyata) vibhāvaḥ niyataḥ śavetē | te na te na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na n

2. Ayam rāmaḥ sukhi is explained by the BP (p. 185) as rūmo’ yam sitāvīsa-

jakaratīmān.

3. Adah means “idam”. See Locana p. 160, where Abhinava uses the same expression. It occurs again on p. 239 and 238 of the Locana.

4. It is difficult to identify the person who held this opinion, number 4, given on p. 186. According to Mammajā (KP, IV, p. 88 of Jhalkikar’s ed.) the painted horse analogy (citavatragānīya) belongs to Śaṅkuka, whereas here it is given after his views have already been expounded.
horse (drawn) on a canvas by means of yellow pigment, etc. Because it is enjoyed by an act of cognition, which is otherwise called relish (āsvāda), and since it is transcendental, it is called rasa. And so the expression nātyarasāḥ is to be explained as nātyād rasāḥ, i.e. rasas arising from drama.

Others, however, say: the vibhāvas and anubhāvas alone, being presented (to the spectator) with the help of special stage-equipment (acting, music, dialogue, etc.) (viṣṭasāmāgrī) and being linked (anuṣākta) with the instincts (vāsanā) appropriate to the mental state in the form of the sthāyi-bhāva which is sought to be produced (vibhāvanīya)¹ by these vibhāvas and which is intended to be brought within the purview of the experience of the spectators by means of these anubhāvas, these (vibhāvas and anubhāvas) becoming the object of the relish in the form of the bliss of the Self (svanireti-carvanāvāśṭa)²—and well, these vibhāvas and anubhāvas themselves are rasa. Therefore, rasas, are nothing but drama. Others say that rasa is the vibhāva alone, others that it is the anubhāva alone, and some that it is the sthāyibhāva alone. Others say that rasa is the vyabhicāribhāva; still others that the combination of these (four) is rasa. Some say that rasa is the character being portrayed. Others say that rasa is the conglomeration of all these (five) things. Anyway, this is enough now.

(Here then is my own, Abhinava’s, position): rasa applies to (non-dramatic) poetry as well, where in place of realism³ (lokadharmī) and

1. This is a difficult passage. Tadevibhāvanīya means vibhāvasvibhāvanīya, “The sthāyibhāva which is sought to be produced by these vibhāvas.” Tadanubhāvanīya means anubhāva-anubhāvanīya, “The sthāyibhāva which is intended to be brought within the purview of the experience of the spectators by means of those anubhāvas.”

2. Note how similar this is to Abhinava’s view.

3. On nātyadharmī and lokadharmī, see the long article by Raghavan, J. O. R., Vol. VII, 1933, p. 399-398, part I, and part II, Vol. VIII, 1934, p. 57-75. Lokadharmī refers to everything in the drama that is realistic (and applies thus primarily to the prakārāṇa), whereas nātyadharmī refers to all the conventions used only in the theatre: asides that nobody else can hear, monologues, talking animals, gods on the stage, etc. Note that in the thirteenth chapter of the Nātyāśatra (Vol. II, G. O. S., p. 214) when Bharata begins a long list of the lakṣānas of each, he speaks of lokadharmī as svabhāvabhāvopagata (XIII, 71). It is a very embracing topic with Bharata, and includes such diverse elements as the pravītis, the prakītis, the dance, etc. Note the very interesting verse that Abhinava quotes from his teacher (Bhāṭītaka?—he only says: सवैनिसम्):

यद्रासिथि न तत्रायस्क कर्मविनिर्माणः
सत्तालंकारल तत्र यथाप्रयत्नं दुः परम:।

The second half of the verse, unless one has saṃbhāri, makes no sense. But the first is all right: “Not everything that is in the world deserves to be described by the poet in his plays,” Abhinava more than once points out that not everything in

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convention (nātyadharmi) (that apply to the theatre) there are the two modes of svabhāvakti and vakrokti which convey rasa by means of transcendental (alaukika) vibhāvas, etc., which are presented by words possessing such qualities as clarity (prassana), softness (madhura) and vigour (ojasvin).  

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the drama need correspond to real life. As proof of this, he points out that many dances do not have anything to correspond to them in real life. (What in the outside world bears any resemblance whatsoever to Beethoven's last quartets?) Note too, what Abhinava says in the A. Bh, vol, I, p. 269: लोके सु कटिचिर भवमयस्य गृहतत्तावाय नाथो तु तए ज्ञेतितम्. It may be that Abhinavagupta was the first writer ever to have articulated this refutation of strict realism, which has now come to seem so commonplace in modern literature that it needs no defence. This was not so, less than fifty years ago.

1. These are parallel terms, svabhāvakti corresponding to lokadharmi and vakrokti to nātyadharmi as applied to kāvya. Thus Abhinava is using the terms in their widest sense. Bhāmaha too (V. 66 II, 85, I. 30) uses vakrokti to apply to all forms of alankāra. But he defines svabhāvakti (II. 93) as a separate figure of speech. (Thus De's remark, Vakroktīṣṭhita, p. 23: "Kuntaka follows Bhāmaha in rejecting svabhāvakti as an alankāra" is not true. It stems from the qualifying phrase in Bhāmaha: its kṣet pravacate, which does indicate doubt on Bhāmaha's part, but not complete rejection.) Daṇḍin (II. 363) divides vibhāvas into two realms: svabhāvakti and vakrokti. See also Udbhata, III. 8-9. The most elaborate discussion on svabhāvakti is found in the first chapter of Kuntaka's Vakroktīṣṭhita. Vakrokti of course for Kuntaka is just what dharm is for Ānanda, only it is even wider in its embrace. Svabhāvakti is the alankāra, the kāvyaśāstra to which vakrokti is applied. See the valuable article by V. Raghavan, "History of Svabhāvakti" in "Some Concepts, etc.," It is tempting to see the division in Skt. poetry as that of realism and romanticism, Certainly verses that illustrate svabhāvakti tend to be more simple and direct, and to deal with less exalted subjects. Moreover, the passage from the Lokaṇa supports this conjecture. There are not a great many Skt. poets who excelled in realism. Professor Ingalls has written about one who did, Yogesvara, in two remarkable articles: "A Sanskrit Poetry of Village and Field; Yogesvara and His Fellow Poets" J. A. O. S. vol. 74 (1954) pp. 119-131; and "Yogesvara and His Favourite Poets," Dr. V. Raghavan Felicitation Volume, Adyar Library Bulletin, Vols. 21-22, 1967-68, Madras, pp. 185 ff. A poem that deserves to be much better known in this respect is Abhinanda's Kādambarikathāśāstra, quoted by Abhinava several times, which contains some remarkable examples of well-observed minor moments in life.

2. Against Balaprīya (p. 186), we take alaukika to construe with the vibhāvas, etc. In other words, the vibhāvas are alaukika in so far as they are called vibhāvas. It would not make much sense to associate the word with the guṇas themselves.

3. These are the śabdagūnas mentioned by Bharata, Daṇḍin and Vāmana, Ānandavardhana completely altered the older teaching of Daṇḍin (I. 41-42) and Vāmana (I. 2.11) on guṇas by bringing them under his system of rasa. For him, the guṇas are the properties of rasa (as opposed to the alankāras). See under II. 7 of the Dharmayogika. Instead of the usual ten guṇas accepted by Bharata, Daṇḍin and Vāmana, Ānanda accepts only the three mentioned here. The concept is very complex, and we shall deal with it at some length in our notes to the Lokaṇa

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Or we could even grant that aesthetic experience (rasapratitty) in poetry is distinct in nature from that experienced in drama, since there is a difference in the means whereby it is brought about (in both cases). Nonetheless (tīvat), the particular mode by which aesthetic experience is brought about is the only one that will be explained presently (iyam eva). This being the case, the criticism (of Bhaṭṭaṇāyaka) concerning the impossibility of rasa being found either in oneself or in someone else, applies only to the first view (i.e. Bhaṭṭalollata’s). But in all the views (so far expounded) the unavoidable fact remains that rasa is perceived (pratitty). For if it were unperceived (as Bhaṭṭaṇāyaka claims), then we could have no dealings with it, just as we can have no dealings with goblins (since such creatures do not really

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translation to be published shortly. Note that Abhinava, in his discussions on the gunas, has occasion to develop a theory much like the one hinted at by the words druti, vistara and vikāsa as used by Bhaṭṭaṇāyaka. Ārdraṭā stands for druti. Dīpti would be the equivalent of vistara, and vyō+pakaṭavo (or samarpakaṭavo) of vikāsa. They are of course associated with certain rasas. See the Locana on II, 7–10. The best treatment of the problem is to be found in P. C. Lahiri, “Concepts of Riti and Guṇa in Sanskrit Poetics”, University of Dacca, 1937, and V. Raghavan, Śrāgūra-prakāśa, pp. 249–251.

1. There should be a dash after upāyanaśilākṣanayād. Iyam eva begins a new sentence.

2. I.e. Lollata’s views, which BN refutes so convincingly that Abhinava need not do the work again.

3. This is directed against BN, who had said earlier (p. 182), tena na pratiyāt…rasaḥ. Abhinava expands this on p. 277 (A. Bh, Vol. I, Gnl, p. 11): pratiyātābhāṣyaśāstrikā sūkṣma kī cōgā ṣāncitam vā bīhā: rāgrāmiṇi vāc śāṣeśa pratiyātābhāṣya। But this is perhaps to interpret BN too rigidly. By saying na pratiyāt rasaḥ, obviously he could not be claiming that rasa does not exist, only that pratiyāt is not an adequate word to express how it is experienced. Perhaps (if he is not merely to be sophistic) BN means that it is not “perceived” the way other things are in the world, i.e. it is not the result of the ordinary pramāṇas such as pratyakṣa, etc. Moreover, Abhinava accepts what BN says about rasa being neither personal (avagata) in which case we would become physically involved, nor paragata, in which case we would be indifferent. Abhinava also accepts the reason for this statement: rasa is made universal, sādhāraṇikaranā, which is one of the most important concepts of Skt. poetics, first met with (under the name of bhūscāla) in BN and universally accepted by later writers.

4. It would seem that Abhinava is saying that pīṣācas (goblins) are merely figments of the imagination. On p. 277, vol. I of the A.Bh. (Gnl, p. 11) Abhinava says the same thing: na bhaṭṭaṇāyakā śatyaśāstrikā avadvahireṇa gītāṃ. If Abhinava is indeed saying that such things as goblins and ghosts are merely products of our fancy, he would be one of the few early Indians to hold such an unorthodox opinion. We think it very likely that this is what he means (how else could we interpret the line?) for he has made similar statements earlier: in the first Uddvyota, commenting on a verse by his teacher Bhaṭṭendurāja, he says: na śatyaśāstrikā ṣatyaśāstrikā avadvahireṇa gītāṃ (p. 127).
exist outside of the imagination). Moreover, though as cognition they are the same, nonetheless such forms of perception as direct perception (prātyakṣikā), inferential perception (ānumānikī), that which arises from verbal testimony (āgamoṭhā), that which is caused by intuition (pratibhāna-kṛta), and that which stems from yogic sight (yogyāpratikṣaṇa i.e. telepathy, etc.) are distinguished from one another by the means through which they are brought about. So also the perception (pratiti) of rasa, for which other names are carvaṇa (relish), āsvādana (gustation), bhoga (enjoyment), (is a form of perception different from these other types of perception), because the set of factors, namely the vibhāvas, etc., helped by sympathetic response (hrdayasamvāda), etc., which lie at the base (nīdāna) of the aesthetic experience are of a transcendental nature. When we say that "rasas are perceived" (we are using language loosely) like when we say that "he is cooking the boiled rice"¹ (odanaṃ paccati) (where to be more precise we should really say tandulāṃ paccati, since odana is the finished product), for rasa is the process of perception (pratīyamāna eva hi rasaḥ)² itself; and rasanā (aesthetic experience) is a particular kind of perception (i.e. it is brought about by the sāmakṛī such as vibhāvas, etc., in literature) (pratitir eva viśiṣṭā rasanā). This perception (of rasa) in drama is distinct from every-day cases of inference, though it depends on inference in the initial stages (since one first infers from the vibhāvas, etc., the sthāyībhāva in the person being portrayed). In poetry too this perception (of rasa) is different from other kinds of verbal cognition (i.e. abhidhā, tātparya and laksanā), but in the initial stages it depends on abhidhā as a means (of reaching the suggested sense). Therefore the pūrvapakṣa (Lollaṭa's view)³ has been destroyed (by Bhāṭanāyaka) such that it can

1. This refers to the distinction between tandula, the raw rice, and odana, the finished product. Strictly speaking, we should say: tandulāṃ paccati, "he cooks the rice" and not "odanaṃ paccati." But the words are used loosely. In the same way, rasaḥ pratīyate is not strictly correct, for rasa is the finished product. What we should say is vibhāvādi pratīyate. Most probably this is what Bhāṭanāyaka meant as well.

2. Pratīyamāna eva hi rasaḥ means pratīyamānatā eva hi rasaḥ. Abhinava means that rasa is the actual process of aesthetic experience, and not the object (viṣaya) of that process. Just as rasa is described as rasyamānatā, in the same way it is here called pratīyamānā (i.e. pratīyamānātā, pratītī, rasanā, āsvādaḥ). It is identical with experience—it is the aesthetic experience itself. In a similar fashion (and this may well have been the inspiration for Abhinava's view), the sākṣya, in Vedānta, does not really see another object, or even experience happiness, for it is sarvapratikṣaṇa, and actual saccidānanda itself. To say ātmānubhāyaḥ is simply loose terminology, since this implies the tripūṣṭi, which is absent in true anubhava. Cf. A. Bh. p. 280: त्रिपुष्ट च गौरव्यास्यमण्डली रसायनान्तरः

3. We take this as a reference to Bhāṭalollaj'a's views on the strength of the equivalent passage in the A. Bh., p. 277 (Gnoli, p. 11): त्रिपुष्ट च गौरव्यास्यमण्डली रसायनान्तरः नम्बरुपयमादेव नम्बरुपयमािति तदमयमनुस्मानीपतिभयं
never rise again. (When Bhāṭṭāntakyaka) on his part says that (extraordinary) deeds of Rāma (such as building a bridge over the ocean, etc.) do not win sympathetic response from everybody, he is being very rash (sāhasa) indeed. For minds are characterised as possessing a great variety of latent impressions (vāsanā). As has been said: “Vāsanās are endless, because desire is eternal”. “Though separated by species (jāti), place (deka) and time (kāla), nonetheless there is a correspondence between memory and saṃskāras (i.e. though several lives intervene, vāsanās still give rise to instinctive reactions to external situations).” Therefore it is now established

1. There is a very interesting passage in the A. Bh. Vol. II, p. 412, germane to this issue. Here is the text:

"If however the doings of Gods are described (in a drama) as the main thing, then in case they are presented as appropriate to vipralambha (śrāgāra), karuna, adbhuta, and bhayānaka, they will turn out to be only the doings of (ordinary) human beings. If on the contrary, the (genuine) doings of Gods are presented unwittingly (ādhiyā udhānam), that would offend what is generally well-known (in the world as possible in the case of human beings). The blemish entailed therein has been (already) stated. And if there is no presentation of rāgas such as vipralambha (śrāgāra), etc., what charm can result therefrom, since entertainment (of the audience) essentially depends on these (i.e. on vipralambha, karuna, etc.)? Hence it is, that sympathetic response (from the spectators) is difficult to achieve in the case of the presentation of the doings of Gods. For they (i.e. the Gods) are not subject to any suffering, so that from the description of (that suffering and of) the means used by them to overcome it, the spectators may derive instruction. There is however nothing contradictory in introducing even a divine heroine (as opposed to a hero), as for example Urvāśī (in Kālidāsa’s Viṣṇumāruviśyam), for her actions are presumed to be plausible because of the actions of the (human) hero (in that drama)."

"We are not certain of the phrase: pratyuta devānām adhiyādhanam prasid-dhīvīgātakaṁ. Also, we are not able to understand the exact sense of the last sentence: Nāinyākā tū vīyāvādyāno vīyāvādyāno vīyāvādyāno vīyāvādyāno."

2. This must be a reference to p. 181 of the Locana, where BN said: समुद-स्तूतविधायो विभावाय वष साधारण मजेशु:। But what could he mean by this? The only logical inference would be that evraasa in such cases is not genuine, since it involves improbabilities. But this would be an odd position for anyone to take of the Rāmāyana though Abhinava himself acknowledges the truth of this for all but the most famous of exploits, when he says in the case of the prakaraṇa, outlandish events should not take place, since this will prove to be a vighna for the spectator – see p. 331 of the Locana). Surely the whole point of the sūdhārṣikaraṇa doctrine is that it allows such events to become impersonalised, and so imaginatively possible. Could BN have actually said: रामादिविधायो न सकवासर्ववादिदियसः?

3. Yogasūtra IV. 10, and IV. 9. On p. 282 of the A. Bh. Abhinava has a very (Continued on next page)
that there is the perception of *rasa*. Moreover (*Bhaṭṭanāyaka is wrong, because*) this perception in the form of aesthetic enjoyment (*rasanā*) does arise (*utpadyate*). And in bringing about this perception (*tatra*) the function is the suggestiveness (*dhvanana*), i.e. the *vyāṇjanā* of the literal sense and denotative words,¹ which is a function different from *abhidhā*. (*What Bhaṭṭanāyaka calls*) the function of aesthetic relish (*bhogikaranā*) with regard to *rasa* in poetry is nothing other than suggestiveness (*dhvanana*). As for *bhāvakatva*, which (for us) consists in the use (*parigraha*) of proper *gūnas* and *alakāras*,² we will speak of this in some detail (later in the second *Uddyota*). What is new about it? When you (*Bhaṭṭanāyaka*) say that poetry is the producer (*bhāvaka*) of *rasas*, through *bhāvanā*, you have yourself revived the theory of *utpatti* (which you supposedly destroyed).³ One cannot say that in poetry words alone are productive (of *rasa*)⁴ for

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¹ Continuation from previous page:

Interesting passage where he justifies the nine *sthāyibhāvas* in all human beings (though some predominate in certain people and others in others) and ends by saying: न सङ्क्षिप्तलिखिता इत्यादि: प्राणी भवति। In the course of our beginningless journey through this universe, we have experienced all emotions. Thus nobody fully aware of his own humanity can fail to be moved by another person's experiences. On p. 283 (of the A. Bh.), Abhinava quotes a fascinating line from *Patañjali* II. 4: न हि वै एकसां स्थितं रक्ष इव- स्पन्दितः। "The fact that Caitra is in love with one woman does not mean that he is out of love with others." This is not meant humorously, but only that when Caitra is in love with one woman, this means that his love for that particular woman is dominant in his mind. It does not mean that his mind is altogether devoid of love for any other woman. Hence of course has love in his mind for other women also, but this love is more feeble than the other, and hence overpowered by the love he feels for a particular woman at any given moment.

1. Suggestion applies to the *vāgya* (e.g. in *vasudhvani*, where the literal meaning suggests the *vyāṇgyārika*) and to the *vācaka* (since *vācakas* are *vyāṇjakas*).  

2. This is somewhat curious. Where has BN said that *bhāvakatva* is *samucārayogānāśakaraparigraha*? For BN *bhāvanā* is *sadhāraṇikarana*. How can this be associated with *gūnas* and *alakāras*? However, Abhinava himself, in the A. Bh. p. 277, uses these very words to characterize BN's views. The wording in the A. Bh. is slightly different: दोषाभावस्याशकारमवन्धनवेतनोऽयः भावन्त्वपारेभाः. The phrase *nibidantjamahassakašākārikā* on p. 277 of the A. Bh. vol. I, is puzzling. Perhaps we must read *sambhājanīyakārikā*.

3. This is well observed. It is true that BN must use some expression like *utpadyate*, regardless of what word he chooses. Thus when he says *bhāvite ca rase* (*Locana* p. 183), one must paraphrase by *bhāvanaya samarpite ca rase*.

4. Abhinava's point seems to be that BN said (*Locana*, p. 182) that there are three functions of *words*: क्षालयातः शरद्य अङ्गलापारातः। But this is unfair of Abhinava, since he too says over and over that *vyāṇjanā* is a *bhāvapupāra*. Surely Bhaṭṭanāyaka must have meant the same thing? It is most unlikely that he would have restricted the function to words. On the other hand, Abhinava himself has argued for the importance of गट्टा. Cf. the interesting passage at the end of the first *Uddyota*, p. 158-159.
if their meaning is not known, no rasa can arise. Nor can one say that it is
meaning alone (that gives rise to rasa in poetry) for if the same meaning is
expressed by other words (śabdānte rgyarpyānāgamate) rasa does not arise.1
We (the Dhvanyālīkins) have explained that both word and meaning (are
helpful in the presentation of rasa) when we said: “Wherever a meaning or
a word manifests a suggested meaning,”2 etc. Therefore by means of the
function known as suggestiveness (as a means), and through (the use of)
guṇas, alankaṇaras and propriety (aucitya), etc., as a procedure (iti kṛtvyāya),
poetry which is possessed of the power of conveying (bhāvaka) (rasas)
conveys (bhāvayati) rasas, and in this three-fold scheme of bhāvanā
(as accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas)3 suggestiveness fits in as the means

1. Cf. what Ānanda says on p. 356 of the Dhvanyālōka, Uddyota III in the
context of vyākhyāna.

2. Dhvanyālōka I. 13. The whole verse reads:

"When the (directly expressive) word and the literal meaning both first
subordinate themselves (to the suggested sense), the word subordinating its meaning
and the literal meaning subordinating itself, and then reveal that (suggested) sense,
that kind of poetry has been called dhvani by the wise.” This is in fact the major
definition of dhvani in the D. Āl.

3. In brief, the Mīmāṃsā position is as follows: bhāvanā, creative force, or
creative energy, is of two kinds: (1) śābdi, and (2) ārthi. It is a particular kind
of activity in an efficient or operative agent (bhāvayīt), which is conducive to the
production of the effect (or conducive to the coming into being of that which is going
to come into being). śābdi bhāvanā means verbal creativity, or word-efficient force.
Ārthi bhāvanā is purposive creativity, or end-efficient force. śābdi bhāvanā is
concerned with how the words in a scriptural or secular command operate in bringing
about the fulfilment of that command. Ārthi bhāvanā is concerned with how a
particular action ordered by the scriptures or by a human master is carried out by the
person ordered to do it, with a view to achieving the expected result. In this passage
we are concerned with ārthikbhāvanā and not with śābdi bhāvanā. Bhāvanā consists of
three elements: (1) sādhya (objective aimed at by the action), (2) sādhana or
karaṇa (the means leading to that objective) and (3) itikartavya (procedure to be
followed in reaching the objective) (kiṃ bhāvayet, kena bhāvayet, kathāṃ bhāvayet).
According to Abhinava, Bhāṣṭānāyaka has borrowed the word bhāvanā from the
Mīmāṃsakas. In karmakāṇḍa, in the case of a sacrifice like jyotiṣoma (jyotiṣomena
svargakāmo yajeṣa), svarga is the sādhya. The jyotiṣoma sacrifice is the sādhaṇa or
karaṇa, and the performance of the minor sacrifices prayāya, amṣya, etc., is the
itikartavya. In poetry and drama, rasa (or rasadāda) is the sādhyā, dhvana or
vyākhyāyāsa is the sādhaṇa or karaṇa, and guṇalakāravyacitvādi (i.e., samudra-
tapatyānābhāparāparāga) is the itikartavya. Thus according to Abhinava, dhvana
is the karaṇa or sādhaṇa by which rasadāda is brought about. This is what he
means by the sentence इति श्रवःशाब्दसब्दि भावनायां कल्पूलेष्वर्मण्यं निपतलि | He means that
kāyā is the bhāvana of the rasadāda, just as the performer of a sacrifice is the
bhāvayīt (i.e., bhāvana) of the svargarūpaphala.
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(karna).\(^1\) Nor does bhoga (aesthetic enjoyment) come about through the words used in poetry (alone), but rather (it comes about) through the removal of the obscuration (saṅkata) (of the blissful nature of the Self) caused by the blinding darkness which is itself the result of deep ignorance (moha). In the transcendental (lokottara) aesthetic enjoyment (bhoga) that is to be brought about (in this manner), for which another name is āsvāda (enjoyment), and which consists of druti, vistara and vikāsa,\(^2\) suggestiveness alone (according to us, should be) given the highest place of honour (mūrdhābhīṣikta). When suggestiveness (of poetry in relation to rasa) is admitted, this so-called bhogakṛitra (of poetry) inevitably follows. For bhoga is nothing other than the inexplicable thrill of delight (camatkāra) that arises from aesthetic enjoyment (rasyamānatā). But it is not correct to say that aesthetic pleasure (āsvāda) is divided (only) into three, druti, etc., (because there are innumerable variations possible) on account of the endless variety created by the principal–subordinate relation among the (gūnas) sattva, etc. We admit (with Bhātānāyaka) that aesthetic enjoyment is similar to the joy (that comes from realising one’s identity with) Brahmā.\(^3\) (We also admit with Bhātānāyaka\(^4\) that) the intellectual

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1. This is BN’s own position. See A. Bh. p. 277: चतुर्विधाधिकत्वप्रेषण निविदिष्ट- सोहस्त्रकारणं विभाविदिरसाधारणकान्तामादिविषयं हितिवेदिति भाष्कव्यापारण साहिदानो- रसं etc.

2. This could not be Abhinava’s position, since on the next page (190) he will reject this three-fold classification (even though in the Locana comm. on II. 7–10 he develops a similar scheme). But if this is BN’s position, and not Abhinava’s, there should have been some indication to this effect. By ending it with dhananāyāpāra eva mūrdhābhīṣiktaḥ, he has inextricably woven in his own views.

Further on druti, vistara and vikāsa, see Mammat, K.P. p. 474, Jhalikar’s ed. Dīpiṭa is vistara, māḍāṭhya is druti, but for some reason vikāsa is not connected with prassada, as one would expect. The scheme is accepted by Dhanānāyaṇa.

3. Note how Mammat (p. 59, Jhalikar’s edition) puts this: परिपुन्तु हर्वविद्वत मनिषिद्वातिक्षिणं अन्यन्त संभवित स्वरोपेक्ष सुमातिकर्मायति मात्रवृत्तिपुमुखं अभिज्ञातस्माक्षरसूक्ता ज्ञातार्थसह सत्यत: \ This is so well expressed that it has been copied by the Kāṇḍapradīpa, p. 69. Such language became, surely on account of both BN and Abhinava, very common in describing rasa (whereas Ānanda does not use the word camatkāra in its technical sense), so much so that we find Kuntaka, in describing an exquisite verse (quoted in the Locana, p. 163 as well), using similar terms (De’s ed. of the Vakrokti- jāti, p. 35): तत्र स्मृतिपूर्वत: (as an explanation of the line in the verse that reads हर्वदे किदष्टि ज्ञातनि) तद्काल्यामयित्वातिक्षिणं यथाकृति चरवाद्यक्षत्राद्ये प्रतिपादित: \ 4.

4. It would seem, as already noted, that for Abhinava, as for BN, pṛiti is the major goal of poetry. Cf. Locana p. 40 (under I. 1), तवालत प्रति विदित भावनाम् | Thus for Abhinava, syutpatti becomes easier to accept (see p. 336 of the Locana) and is the result of pṛiti, but still the major point of poetry is delight. Of course syutpatti means instruction in all the four gūnas, including mokṣa (p. 41: चतुर्विधाधिक्-प्रेषणां चलनम् 

Pārśvanātha कुमार्यः तत्) with the result that syutpatti and pṛiti (i.e., ānanda) amount finally to the same thing; Cf. p. 336: न वैत प्रतिविदित्वातिक्षिणं प्रतिप्रेत एव, इदं इतिविषयवाद एव...
refinement (vyutpādana) (that results from poetry) is different from that which comes from the śāstra through mandates (śāsana) and from the itihāsa through recommendation (pratipādana). In addition (attrikta) to the message that poetry provides for the readers in the form of the analogy that they must behave like Rāma,1 can we help it (or: “who is to be blamed”–kam upālabhāmahe)2 if finally (poetry) creates an intellectual refinement in the form of the development (vijñāmbhā) of their critical receptivity? Therefore the following is established: rasaś are suggested (abhivyajyante). They are aesthetically enjoyed3 by their very perception (pratityā eva ca rasyante) (i.e. rasaś is aesthetic enjoyment itself).”4

And here, finally, is the application of this theory to what has been traditionally regarded as the first actual literary experience. We include here the Kārikā and Anandavardhana’s Vṛtti on it as well:5

(Chandakāleśa, pp. 84–90)

कृत्यस्यात्मा: स एवायस्तथा चादिके: पुरा।
कृत्यबद्धिविपि�योगोत्य: शोकः शोकत्वभावानः।

विविधायांवचनरत्नम्प्रभावाः: काल्यस स एवायथ: ससारभुतः। तथा
चादिकेवविलंबि: निहतसंधविनिश्चारसाधा: क्षाक्षाणितः: शोकं स्व: शोकत्वम् धर्मितः।

शोकोऽि: कहरणस्थापिनाय: प्रतियममन्त्र चायकेभद्द्रामाधिपि रसायांयत्वेन्द्रोप-

क्षणं ग्रामवर्यात्।

1. This must be the source of the later dictum, so frequently met with (e.g. KP. under I. 2): रामाविद्रवतावथ न रामेणादिवत।

2. The idea is: this is the way things are, and nothing can be done about it, with the further implication that this is the way things ought to be as well. (Ananda uses this idea on p. 408 and Abhinava uses the expression kīm kurvāḥ often). Thus Gniel’s interpretation is incorrect.

3. Throughout the Locana, Abhinava has insisted on the importance of the sahṛdaya, the reader. Cf. his opening stanza: kavisahṛdayākhyam. See also the Kāvyamānasā, IV, where Rājasākhara divides pratībhā into two kinds: kārayitri and bhrāayitri, where bhrāayitri corresponds to this type of “imagination” that belongs to the reader, and which is a faculty he brings to his appreciation of poetry.

4. Note what Abhinava says in the A. Bh. p. 279: अविकारी च च मित्यवत्तामनस-स्थापित:। See the important definition of the sahṛdaya, the “sensitive reader”, in the Locana, p. 38: वेणु कायामुनीमाप्यस्वात्मादिरूपायते। Mānusmitra’s translation of this line as “externalisation, the act of that emotion (avṛti) which makes an appeal to the heart is the source of udbhava” of rasa. The body is infused by it, as dry wood is infused by fire.” Cf. Locana, p. 212.

5. D. Al. I. 5. (pp. 84–90, B. ed.),
KARIKA V:

It is the (suggested) meaning alone that is the soul of poetry. Thus long ago, the sorrow of the first poet that sprang from the permanent disruption of the sandpipers’ love-making was transformed into verse.¹

VRTTI:

That (suggested) sense alone is the essence of poetry—poetry which is beautiful because of a richness (propaṇca) of structure (racanā) and of varied words and ideas. And thus the sorrow that was aroused (janita, i.e. uddipta) by the cries of the Kraunika bird who was frightened (kātara) by the separation (viraha) from his murdered wife, in (Valmiki) the first poet, was turned into a verse. For it has been stated (in the present Kārikā) that sorrow is the sthāyibhāva of karuṇārasa, (and that it is only suggested and not directly expressed). Although there are other varieties of the suggested sense, they are implicitly indicated through rasa and bhāva, because these are the most important.

Now here is the Locana passage, pp. 84–90:

एवं ‘प्रत्येकमां पुनरर्प्येव’ इत्यत् च निकसर्पं व्यास्यात्। अभुमा काव्यालब्धि

काव्यस्यादमृतम् । स प्रवेदति प्रत्येकमां मृत्युप्रैपि प्रकाश्यते तत्त्वया एव रसचनिर्भरति

सत्त्वयम्। इतिहासकालूप्त प्रकाशत् ध्रुवविथार्थविचारः। तेन रस एव वर्तत आमि, वस्तुलक्षाकारभं तु सम्यक रसं प्रति पर्यन्तायि इति वाचयं कद्यादि तात्त्विकविम्ब्रणाः । इन्तः

काव्यस्यादमृतम् सामाजिकतेनोऽपि। शोक इति। शोकायुक्तविवेगसहस्वर्णनां न्यूनतः साहित्यसंस्कृतो नो: यो: शोकः: साहित्यमो निरर्पेयश्वारयती। रामचरितमाश्यमाय-भावान्त्य एव, स एव तथा भूतविमाताधीनदायकतुभावविचारणया हदरसाविद्यतनंदनक-कमादासाधारणानि प्रतिपल: कहंगसस्त्रपता शौकिकश्रोक्तितिरिति शैचित्यसमास-स्वाभाविको प्रतिपलो सत्तरसिरुक्तमोचाचर्यवित्वचित्तचित्त: यन्त्रसाधणविचारान्यस्ममतिश्वात्स्मतोऽनुसूचितः

इत्यतःनिमित्तश्रौक्तपता प्रति—

¹ Cf. Rāhuvaṇī, XIV. 70:

ामक्षमस्तुधितातुरुचिः कवि: क्रेडाग्रहणरङ्ग वालतः। नित्यादिविधाणकमर्गेष्य: केशामापचत वश्यो शोकः।

It is clear from the context that Kālidāsa means this verse to convey the compassion of Vālmiki, and thus the fact that he will accept the suffering Sītā, and take her into his abrama. Thus Mallinītha remarks: तिर्ष्यामिषपुरवसं न स्वेत, कस्मिन्तथापिति वालतः। Bhavadhūti (Uttararāmacarita II. 5) quotes the ma nisāda verse from the Rāmāyaṇa, but he quotes it in the context of the first verse written in Skt., and not with regard to the compassion of Vālmiki,

XIII
या निषाद प्रतिष्ठा लम्बान: शाष्कती: समाया:।
बज़लोभनिन्दृढकमतथा: काममाहितम्। इति।

न तु सुनेन: श्रोक इति मन्तव्यम्। एवं हि स्तति तुदुःखोन सोर्दिपि दुःखित हिति
कृत्वा रस्मियामेति निरवकाशां भ्रेत:। न च तु:खसंतसर्या देशतिः। एवं चर्चणोऽचिते
शोकस्थियामत्वकङ्कङ्कर्तकङ्करसमुचलनसङ्कङ्कराचार्याः एवत्काय्याम्या सारभूतसम्माहोऽपरे
शारद्योऽवृहित्यकार्कः।

एतद्वरोकु हद्रदर्पणम्——‘ यावपूणों न चैतन तावचैत चामुण्डम्’ इति। अगम
इति च्यादसेनाणागमेन। व एतवेदवकारणेणादर्मानान्य आमेति। तत्त्व यदाह भ्रेत:॥

शारद्याचारणामानिष्य तत्र शालौ प्रथविदु:।
अर्थतत्वेन यतं तु वदल्याचारमेतमेत:।
हर्षोऽपि न्यायप्राध्यानोकाय्याम्या काव्यालीमेवेत:॥

इति तद्यथातः। व्यापरे हि यद्य चतुरामा रसनास्मातवनसत्यापूर्वमुक्तम्।
अधारिकी व्यायामसाहाय्यस्या: प्राध्यायेन नेत्यावेदित त्राकू:॥

श्रोकं व्यापि——‘विविधेति। विविधं तत्तदभविव्याविज्ञातसानुपुने विविधं कृत्वा
वाचो वाचके रचनायां च प्रस्फुण यथार्थ शारदपालकारणापुकथितयं:। तेन स्वरूपायेन
अननस्तङ्कनेवोपि न तथा व्यवहारः। आभावादोऽवृहि कविचिचि जीवनवर्ण हयुतं प्रागेचि
तस्मैताविकाशम्। यदूते हद्रदर्पणे——‘तर्क नहः काल्यावहारः स्पष्ट’ इति। निहत्
सहिष्ठीति विभाव उत्कार्यान्ति स्मात्तात:। आकृतितत्त्वादेनान्ति:। जनित इति। चर्चणागोऽवृहितेति
शेषः॥

नन्तु शोकचरणावतो यदि श्रोक उद्वृत्तत्त्रातीतयानां वक्तु काल्यावालेति कुल
इत्यादियाहयाय——शोको इति। कहणय त्र्यावावतानाग्रामान: स्मात्तात:। श्रोके हि स्थापि
भोजे ने विभवानामामातसमुचिता चिन्तातिथिव्यमानामारस द्विपृथच्चित्रायः सति
तातीतिभवर्त्यथाते। प्राक्षसर्वितितां प्रत्यन्ति च चिन्तुत्तितां संस्कार्यमेन हद्रअण्वार
मातियाणां चर्चणायांमुखोऽचिते यतः। नन्तु प्रतियामानुपालमा तत्र प्रभेदेन प्रतिष्ठादित न
तु सत्तारूपः। अनेन चर्चणापन सत्यवाचमृतामुखः भवतियाहार्याः य्यागमेनान्तराचार्याः
प्रतियामानस्य चेति। अन्योः भेदोऽवत्त्वंकारावत:। भावान्ध्रोण व्यविभारिणोपि चर्चयः
माग्निष्टां तावनात्रातिक्षाताअपि स्मात्तिचर्चणायांसतस्नापितरस्मातिथिमाणियापि
प्राणलिब्धः भवतीतुल्यतः। यथा:—

नयं नयाप्रोण चिंद्रयनर्ती विचरणानां वनर्ष विनोक्षम:।
आभावादोऽबिष्कितानुपुर्णं पादेन मन्द्र मुचमाल्यान्ति॥
Thus by the Kārikā: pratīyamānam purṇaḥ anyad eva, etc., he has explained the nature of dhvani. Now he shows, under the cover (vyūja) of an incident from the epic (itiḥāsa), how it is the soul of poetry. KĀVYASYĀTMA SA EVA. Although the suggested sense in general is the point at issue, only the third (type of the suggested sense known as) rasadhvani, should be considered as (the soul of poetry), because of the force of the epic quotation, and because of the force of the meaning of the Vṛttī passages that immediately precede (and follow). Therefore really speaking, rasa alone is the soul (of poetry). Vastudhvani and alankāradhvani (really) finally end up in rasa. And since they too are far more important

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1. Abhinava means that Ānanda has so far explained the nature of dhvani (i.e., the suggested sense) by means of the Kārikā prātiṣṭhāna pūrṇasvāda vratasvatā vāpīḥ madhuchchauṇaṁ etc. Now he will begin to expound how the suggested sense is the actual soul of poetry.

2. Vyūja, literally “under the pretext of”, “under the guise of”, which amounts to “on the authority of”, or “taking the help of”.

3. After rasadhvani one must understand kāvyasyātmā.

4. We are not certain that we have understood prakrāntavṛttigranthārtha-balāc ca, on p. 158 (84–85 B. P.). (References in this section are to the edition by Kuppuswami Sastrī). We take it to mean: “because of the force of the Vṛttī both preceding and following”. This must be a reference to iti sthitam (p. 84 B. P.) which speaks of this kind of pratīyamānārtha (i.e., rasādi) as different from the vācyā. The immediately following passage, viniścaya, etc., and in particular the words on p. 168, (p. 90 B. P.) rasānvṛtthāvaiśvādāyā prātiṣṭhānaḥ again speak of the third kind of pratīyamānārtha (namely rasadhvani).

5. It is an important point that Abhinava comes back to again and again. He claims that Ānanda uses vastudhvani and alankāradhvani only to show the difference between the abhidhāvyāpāra and the evaṃjānyāpyāpāra. He does not intend these as examples of true poetry, for that title is reserved for rasa alone. Earlier (pp. 50–51 B. P.) he had noted that one can often find vastu and alakāra as svāsaṅkāryā (i.e., as no longer cases of dhvani). What we think he means is that both of these are capable of paraphrase without any resulting decrease in the aesthetic experience (which is already slight in any case). But rasadhvani can never be paraphrased without destroying the poetry in it. In this Abhinava is in agreement with the “New Criticism”. Thus in a famous essay on Yeats’ great poem “Sailing to Byzantium”; Elder Olson said: “Although the argument as we have stated it clearly underlies the poem (note: he has just finished explaining the “argument”, i.e., the vācyārtha of Yeats’ poem), it would be erroneous to suppose that this in itself constitutes the poem, for in that case there would be no difference between our paraphrase and the poem itself”. He then (Continued on next page)
(utkarṣa) (or charming) than the literal meaning, it was said (in Kārikā 1) in a general way that dhvani is the soul of poetry.

ŚOKA. That sorrow, the permanent emotion (belonging to karuṇarasa) which arose because of the destruction of the coupling (dvandva), i.e. because of the destruction of the intimate physical contact (sāhacarya) of the Krauṇḍa birds, owing to the killing of the female—this sorrow is different from the sthāyībhāva rāti (love) that is appropriate to vipralambhaśrīgāra, because in it there is no hope of reunion (nirapekṣabhāva). The sorrow has become capable of being aesthetically enjoyed (āsvādyamānāta) through the following stages: first come the vibhāvas (both ālambana and uddipana), and the anubhāvas (i.e. the wailing of the male bird etc.) that arise from them (i.e. the vibhāvas). By feecing these deeply (carvāna), the heart (of the sage Valmiki) sympathises (with the plight of the male bird), and (finally, he identifies (with the situation). (Once it is aesthetically enjoyable, it becomes karuṇarasa, where the sorrow (felt) is different from the ordinary sorrow we feel in everyday life. Its essence became capable of being enjoyed once the mind (of the sensitive sage) had melted (to the point of total

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goes on to say, later in the same essay: "If the basic terms of a lyric poem do not receive their meanings from the chance associations of the reader, neither do they have their dictionary meanings; like terms in most discourse, they take their significance from their context, through juxta-position to other terms with which they are equated, contrasted, correlated or combined." (From "Five Approaches to Literary Criticism" edited by W. Scott, N. Y. 1962).

1. Abhinava takes dvandva not to mean "pair" but to mean actual "sexual intercourse" (sāhacarya), a meaning the dictionaries do not seem to sanction.

2. For the significance of the change that both Abhinava and Ānanda make in the legend by having the female bird killed rather than the male, see J. Masson: "Who Killed Cook Kraunḍa; Abhinavagupta's Reflections on the Origin of Aesthetic Experience", Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, 1969.

3. This is a fundamental distinction that goes back to the NŚ VI, under verse 50 (p. 309, G. O. S. Vol. I):

करुणामाय विप्रलंब्धा | पलस्म: करुणाध्याय विप्रलंब्धा: हिति |
The point is that in vipralambha there is some hope of being reunited. But in karuṇa there is none. This makes it much closer to "tragedy" than has generally been acknowledged. Thus in speaking of the Rāmāyaṇa, Abhinava will point out in his Locana to the fourth Uddyota (p. 580) that Rāma and Sitā are "permanently" separated, thus showing that the final verses of the epic which speak of their reunion in heaven, have no impact on the reader in any aesthetic sense.

4. We take tadutthākramaṇa to refer to both the cryings of the male and the female. It will also include her (or his, as described in the Rāmāyaṇa) whirling on the ground in pain, one of the anubhāvas.

5. Druti refers to the "melting" of the mind, i.e. to a state when the mind is exceedingly receptive. There is a very fine verse in MadhusūdanāŚravastī'ś (Continued on next page
receptivity). (And this aesthetic experience) became transformed into a verse (śloka) regulated by (niyantriti) proper (words) and metre, etc., because of the unartificiality (akrtakatā) (of the experience) and the complete possession (of Valmiki). The emotional upheaval in the mind of the sage was like the overflowing of a jug filled to the brim with water, or like the cry of sorrow which is of the nature of the effusion of the mental mood (of grief). The words that the sage uttered (on that occasion) are suggestive of the state of his mind according to the maxim that exclamations (of joy, sorrow, etc.) are suggestive of (the relevant) natural moods, even in the absence of a fixed convention (between them and mental moods, unlike what is the case for words and their literal meanings).2

"Oh hunter, may you never, for eternal years, attain to stability (pratīghā) (in this world) since you killed, from a pair of Krauṇca birds, the male (when) he was engrossed in love (— making).” 3

But it should not be supposed that Valmiki was (actually experiencing) sorrow (in the ordinary sense). For if he were, (that is,) if he were pained on account of the bird’s pain, then the point of the Kārikā, that rasā is the soul of poetry, would be without any basis in the present stanza.4 Nor is

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Śrībhāgavatādhyātirīyasya, p. 14 (verse 4), explaining the state of receptivity that the mind adopts during an aesthetic experience:

विचिद्रवः दि जतुप्रसन्नविवादित्तिनिमित्तम् ।
तपस्येनिषीदेयो धसमव ध्रुवेश्वरभवे ॥

"The substance of which the the mind is made is like red sealing wax. By nature it is hard. But when it comes in contact with the emotional states (during an aesthetic experience) which act as heating agents, it becomes soft to the point of flowing". He takes this fine analogy a step further, and says that the mind is impressed with the emotions it contemplates. First the mind becomes soft and pliable, and then comes the hard substance like the drama or the play when the mind receives its impression, the wax sealing wax is impressed with a seal-ring.

1. In K. Sastrī’s edition we must understand śabda after sanucita.

2. The point is that there is no fixed convention with regard to the meanings of exclamations that we utter spontaneously. Thus, a shriek can be due to either grief or joy, in the same way that tears can. Nonetheless these signs of joy or grief are “suggestive”. This is of course not true in the case of words and their literal meanings, where there is a fixed convention.

3. Rāmāyana, I. 2. 15.

4. As the Kaumudi says on p. 160: sōkanātraśya rasatvāsambhavād, “If this verse simply illustrated sorrow there would be no possibility of rasā”. Abhinava’s point is that karaṇa rasā arose in the sage, and not the primary emotion of sorrow. He, therefore, interpreted the whole point of this example to be that the situation described in the Rāmāyana is one of rasapratiiti on the part of Valmiki. For this to be the case, we must say that he was the audience, as it were, of his own verse! So, Abhinava envisages the situation something like this: Valmiki sees

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it possible for somebody burdened with grief to utter a verse (at the very moment of his sorrow).

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the killing of the bird. He is deeply moved to the point of uttering a poem about it. But of course as long as he is simply in sorrow, that is, feeling one of the primary emotions that belong to real-life situations, he does not have the necessary “artistic distance” which would enable him to engage in poetic creation. So, at some magic point he stops feeling sorrow (if in fact Abhinava ever felt that he did), and it is as if he were witnessing a drama in a play-house. It is at this stage of some distance that he speaks his poem. Each time he contemplates what he uttered, he is the sakhrdaya, the rasika, the spectator (which would explain why he says kim idam vyahriam maya at Rām. I. 2. 16). i.e., he is again in an alankīka state of aesthetic enjoyment. The soka that he formerly felt has been transformed into art. While this is a profound interpretation of the famous incident, it should be carefully noted that this could hardly have been what the author of the episode in the Rāmāyana had in mind. For the word soka occurs again and again in the account: I. 2. 16: sokaśtana......maya; I. 2. 18: sokaśtasya......me; I. 2. 20: deve eva punah kroṣṇaṁ; I. 2. 30: punah......

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I. 2. 13 we read: kūrṇyāṃ samapadyata; and in I. 2. 14: kāraṇa-
vedāvata. Perhaps for the first time in any critical tradition, Abhinava has articulated the distinction between the “primary world” of actual events, and the “secondary world” of literature. These terms have been used by J.R.R. Tolkien in his essay “On Fairy-Stories”, published in “Tree & Leaf”, Unwin Books, London, 1964. See also “Secondary Worlds” by W.H. Auden, Faber & Faber, London, 1988. The world of the Rāmāyana belongs to what Tolkien calls Faerie, “the perilous realm, and the air that blows in that country”. Mortal men only exist there when they are enchanted. In modern times, perhaps only Tolkien himself, in “The Lord of the Rings” has managed to create an entire “secondary” world. It is the greatness of Sanskrit literature that such autonomous worlds have been built — Kṛṣṇa’s world in the Bhāgavatapurāṇa, and the dream world of the Yogavasiṣṭha. The sustained effort of imaginative creation evidenced in the latter work is to our mind unparalleled in any other literature.

1. Another point is that there can be no duḥkha in rasa, which is a synonym for ānanda, “bliss”, as Abhinava points out again and again. See De, H. S. P., Vol. II, p. 132, and note the passage he quotes from the Abhinavabhāratī:

सामाजिकानि हृदयलोकोऽन्त्येऽन्त्याकारितकल्याम।

For the spectators, the whole point of the drama is to produce pleasure, not sorrow, etc.” It is almost certain that Viśvanātha’s remarks in the third pariśodha of the Śāhāyikadarpaṇa were inspired by Abhinavagupta. There he says: (p. 53, Vidyāśāgara’s ed.) नवो विषयं कथातीत्वं सत्तानं दुःखमयाद्रवधेनास्ति (precisely the objection that Abhinava records.)

कथातीत्वं सत्तानं दुःखमयाद्रवधेनास्ति।

नवो विषयं कथातीत्वं सत्तानं दुःखमयाद्रवधेनास्ति।

He then goes on to show that what in the world is a source of unhappiness is transformed in the drama into happiness, for the vihāras are alankīka (an idea taken from Abhinava):

अन्यश्चविनाशनः मास्माः कार्यसंवादात।

(Continued on next page)
Thus then, because the nature of the present stanza is the complete overflow ( _samucchālana_ ) of _kumārāśa_ the essence of which is the _sthāyibhāva_ sorrow, which is appropriate for aesthetic enjoyment, _rasa_ alone is the soul of poetry, its very essence, which produces a charm far beyond the reach of other word-functions (i.e. _abhidhā_ and _lakṣaṇā_). This is confirmed by ( Bhaṭṭatānyaka ) in his _Hṛdayadarpana_:

"The poet does not regurgitate _rasa_ until he is completely filled with it."  

(In the stanza quoted from the _Rāmāyana_ ) _āgamo_ ( is used in the sense of an augmentless Aorist ) retaining the augment as a Vedic peculiarity

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In the _Vṛttī_ to this _sloka_ he gives his famous comparison of love-bites, which only produce, in their pain, pleasure:

तमथा सुरते दलन्तायतादिष्य हि मुखेव मायेत।

But it must be pointed out that once again the source of this idea is Abhinavagupta. Thus in the _Abhinavagīrīṣṭi_; p. 285 ( Vol. I. G. O. S. ) we read: तथा हीकनस्तसक्तकिलस्मिव ब्याहितस्मात वर्णस्यांस्वतस्मार्तोज्जितात् which refers to precisely this. Cf. the _Pratīpyāndra_ ( Madras, 2nd Ed., 1931 ), comm. p. 209: समीपसभें श्रीमति-सुम्बा-चालकीवार्तावदनंदनचरितम्: See further the _Rāmāyana_ , p. 20-31 ( KM, 1939 ed. ) and Raghavan, " _Number of Rasas_ " p. 155, 1st ed. ( p. 183, 2nd ed. ).

_Esā daśā_ refers to the act of creation, _Kāumudi_ p. 160: _slokaqītānārāpe_ 'īyaṛēhaḥ. The point is that in pain we cannot create. Creation takes place later, when the experience has been assimilated and is then contemplated. This is another of Abhinava's seminal ideas taken over by the later tradition.

1. Reading _samucchālana_. On p. (160) ( 86 B. P. ), top of the page, the term has been used of water overflowing from a jug. Actually though this is an error, for it is not the _kumārāśa_ that overflows, but the original emotion. The word _rasa_ is used loosely here to stand for both the final aesthetic result, _rasa_ proper, and to mean "emotion" in general.

2. On p. 28 ( p. 10, B. P. ), Abhinava has used this same expression. B. ed. reads " _śāda_ " which is a better reading. This is also the earlier reading that we have accepted in our translation of the _Lokānā_. _Vāilakaṇṭya_ here means "charm", from the notion of its being something completely different. _Śāda_ stands for _śabdayāpāra_.

3. Is this famous line from Bhaṭṭatānyaka meant to show that the poet must be full of emotion, using _rasa_ in the wider sense, before he can write? In other words, is Bhaṭṭatānyaka saying that first one must be overwhelmed by an experience? Or is he using _rasa_ in the technical sense to mean that first the poet himself actually has an aesthetic experience, and then records it, so that others may share it? Sanskrit poetic theory is not really clear on precisely what the experience of the poet is in relation to that of the reader. Abhinava seems, in his more rigorous moments ( " _nātye eva rasāḥ sa tu loka_" ), to restrict the aesthetic experience to the reader, in which case the poet would be excluded. Bhaṭṭatāuts, (see _Lokānā_, p. 92 B. P.) however, says that this experience ( _asubha_ ) is the same as that undergone by the reader, the poet and the _nāṭa_! Note the _Rasapradīpa_ (quoting DR. IV. 42, p. 23) : _काव्यांमें भावनास्वादी मतिकं जाति_.

4. On this form, see Renou's " _Grammaire Sanskrite_", p. 414 and 439.
(chândasena). SA EVA. The use of the word "alone" (eva) shows (that it alone is) the Ātman, not anything else. Therefore, what Bhaṭṭanāyaka has said, namely:

"Because of the overriding importance of the words used, people class the śāstra\(^1\) apart (from poetry and stories). They give the name ākhyaṇa (historical tale) to compositions in which the sense conveyed by words is possessed of paramount importance. When both (word and meaning) are subordinated, and (all) importance is given to the manner (vyāpāra), then it is called "poetry",\(^2\) is refuted. For if by "manner" he means that (function) whose essence consists in suggestiveness (dhvanana) and which is of the nature of aesthetic enjoyment (rasanā), he will have said nothing new. If, on the other hand, he means by "manner" abhidhā, we have already shown earlier\(^6\) how it cannot be of major importance in poetry.

He now explains the verse: VIVIDHA. That which is (made) beautiful because of the high degree of excellence\(^4\) in respect to the ideas (vācyā), the words, and the structure (racanā), having been diversified (vicirām krtvā) so as to be favourable to the various rasas to be suggested, i. e. that which is endowed with gunas and alankāras, both of words and meanings. There-

1. Śāstram here means the Veda. Bhaṭṭanāyaka's point is that in the Veda the "letter" is all-important. In stories, the meaning is important, and finally, in poetry, it is the manner in which something is told that counts the most. Cf. I. A. Richard's famous dictum: "It is never what a poem says which matters, but what it is".

2. It is impossible to know just how indebted to Bhaṭṭanāyaka Abhinava really is. We think, however, that the famous comparison of poetry to a loving wife, certainly was either taken directly from Bhaṭṭanāyaka, or was at least inspired by this very passage. Both ideas are in fact synthesised by Śridhara in his commentary on the Kāvyaprakāśa and by Vidyādhara's Ekāvali (K. P. Trivedi's edition. Bombay, 1903), p. 13:


4. Prapañca here must be understood in the sense of utkaraṇa.
fore, although "suggestiveness" exists everywhere (even in such examples as "the boy is a lion"), we don't use the term "poetry" (in all such cases), just as, in spite of the fact that the ātman exists (in all things) we only call certain things "living". We have already explained this.¹ This thus shows that what (Bhaṭṭaṇāyaṇa) has said in the Hṛdayadārpaṇa: "In that case the word poetry would apply promiscuously everywhere"² is out of place. The expression nihatasahacari³ ("the killed female") expresses the vibhāva. The word ākrandita ("cries") expresses the anubhāva. JANITA.⁴ One must supply: "through attaining to the state of aesthetic enjoyment." Objection: if the verse arose from the aesthetic enjoyment of "sorrow", how can one say that the soul of poetry is that suggested thing (viz. rasa)?⁵ (i.e. only śoka has been mentioned in the stanza, and not rasa). With this doubt in mind he says: ŚOKO HI. Sorrow (śoka) is the sthāyibhāva of karuṇa which consists in the aesthetic enjoyment of sorrow.⁶ Since the state of mind appropriate to the vibhāvas and anubhāvas in relation to the sthāyibhāva śoka, when aesthetically enjoyed, becomes rasa, it is but proper⁷ to say that

2. The objection must have been that if one accepts the suggestive function (dhyānanyāyāna), which Bhaṭṭaṇāyaṇa does not, we will have to admit as examples of poetry, cases which merely include suggestion, but no charm. Thus sarvatva means, as the K. says on p. 162: sīṃha māṇḍiḥ ity ādāv atri tathāti. See p. 57 (B.P. ed.) of the text of the Lokaṇa.
3. Note that K. Sastri, on p. 164 of his Upalokaṇa says that this is a pratikīta that only gives the first words, but that it is meant to read: nihatasahacariṁśaṁvaghaṁkāra, i.e. that it stands for the male kramāya! But this is mere sophistry. Had Abhinava meant this, he would have said so.
4. Note that Abhinava has said (p. 79, 80, and 83) of the Lokaṇa that rasa is not jānita, i.e. the function is not jānana, "production". Thus he is of course bothered by the phrase kramāyaṁkārandajanitaṁ śoka eva. He therefore says here (p. 89) that one must add the phrase: sarvacācāryacarasteṇa.
5. The objection is that in the kārikā only śoka is mentioned, not rasa. This is perfectly true, for the point of the Kārikā is to show the existence of a pratīya- mānārthe i.e. that śoka is here suggested, and not directly stated. However Abhinava and Āṇanda are probably correct to go further in their interpretations, for if this is all the author of the Kārikā meant, it would be a very weak argument; for in the Ramāyaṇa itself, we are directly told both before and after this verse that Vālmiki was in sorrow! And of course there can be no doubt that the author of the Kārikā knew very well that śoka is the sthāyibhāva of karaṇa.
6. The sthāyibhāva, as soon as they are brought to the state of enjoyment (sarvacāra), become rasa. A rasa is after all only a latent sthāyibhāva that has become manifest. Thus the K. says that śoka here stands for all the other sthāyibhāvas: śoka ity upalokyaṁ sam ratyādeḥ, p. 167.
7. We have translated anūtīyāt to mean "it is but proper". But it might mean upacāra. Thus the K. says: upayogimevniśastād upacārād iti vārat. This may well be the correct interpretation, for in the Abhinavabhāratī, p. 285, we read: kavadam anūtīyad evam uṣyaite sthāyī rasiḥ ūdhūteḥ.
the sthāyin itself attains the status of rasa. For ( yataḥ ) ( the sthāyibhāva ) leads to aesthetic enjoyment in the following manner: the collection ( jāta ) of states of mind ( cītavṛtti ) is first experienced earlier in one's own life; then it is inferred ( from outer symptoms ) to be existing in others; then by the arousal of the latent impressions ( sanskāra ) it creates a sympathetic response ( in the spectator's ) heart ( and then it leads to the identification of the spectator with the situation ).

Objection: the soul ( of poetry ) has the form of the suggested sense ( in general ) and it has already been shown to have three varieties. It does not consist exclusively of rasa. But this episode from the epic seems to suggest that only rasa is the soul ( of poetry ). ( Ānandavardhana ) replies to this objection by accepting it! PRATĪTAMĀNAŚYA CA. “ Other varieties ” refers to vastu and alaṅkāra. The word bhāva ( in rasabhāvamukhena ) shows that one can ( in a loose manner of speaking ) refer to the vyabhicā- ribhāvas as the essence ( of poetry ), even though when they are aesthetically enjoyed they do not come to rest only in themselves ( tāvanmātra i.e. svasmin—esthetic enjoyment does not terminate in bhāvadhvani ), and even though they do not attain the pre-eminent position ( pratiṣṭhā ) of a rasa which take place on culmination in the aesthetic enjoyment of the sthāyī ( bhāva ).

“Rubbing one toe-nail with the tip of her other toe-nail, turning the loose bracelet on her wrist, and slowly scratching the ground with her foot whose anklet makes a deep sound ”.

In this stanza shyness ( has been suggested as the essence of the verse ). The word rasabhāva includes rasabhāsa, bhāvabhāsa and bhāvaprāśa, for in spite of minor difference between, them in essence they are one and the same. Prādhānyat means because ( vastudhvani and alaṅkāradhvani ) terminate in

1. Note again that rasa is the cītavṛtti that is induced in the reader. It is latent there all along, as a sthāyibhāva.
2. We must insert tanmayibhayana here to complete the series, as the K. does.
3. Here is the K. on this sequence ( p. 166 ) :

That which was known in one's own self in day-to-day life is now, from the cries etc. ( of the bird ) and other effects, inferred to be existent elsewhere. After that, one's own latent impressions are awakened; then there is a sympathy of one's heart because it is pure ( i.e. free from inhibitions ). After that, one identifies. Thus in this manner, because the stable mental mood is the means to aesthetic enjoyment, the sthāyibhāva itself is called rasa, metaphorically speaking ”.

Perhaps we should omit yataḥ, with three MSS ( K. Sastrī’s edition, p. 166, fn. 1).

4. Tāvanmātra is paraphrased by the K. as svarūpamātra.
rasa. Even though there is no full aesthetic repose in vastudhvani and alankāra-
dhvani, nevertheless, because they give rise to an extraordinary charm that
is beyond the reach of other word–functions (i.e. abhidhā and lākṣaṇā), by
extension (aucitya = upacāra) we can say that vastudhvani and alankāradhvani
are the essence (of poetry).

We can thus see that all of Abhinava’s efforts focus on one important
need: to crack the hard shell of the “I” and allow to flow out the higher
Self which automatically identifies with everyone and everything around. We
can see this preoccupation in all of his work, and in many of the verses he
quotes. He takes especial pleasure in a displacement of the “I”, as in
the Vijñānabhairava passages he is so fond of, where the “I” is dissolved
by staring long into empty space. Even the verse from the D. Āl. for which he
evines a particular liking, speaks of lovers reaching “other shores” of
ecstasy.  

With this background we are now in a position to understand the
importance for Abhinava of śāntarasa – how much support he derived from a
theory which demanded the transcendence of personality, and which ends in
a feeling of cosmic peace.

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PART II

ŚĀNTARASA

Our primary concern in this part of the book is to translate and annotate the notoriously difficult section of Abhinavagupta's *Abhinavabhāratī* that deals with śāntarasā. This is the most extensive and the most important passage in Sanskrit literature on śāntarasā. In order to permit the reader to see the background in some perspective, we have also translated all passages relating to śāntarasā prior to Abhinavagupta. We have decided to let the passages speak for themselves in our translation, and to utilize the limited space available to us for textual notes.

The first passage is found in the *Nātyaśāstra*, but is most probably a later interpolation.

*Nātyaśāstra* G. O. S. ed. vol. I, pp. 332–335:

अथ शालसो नाम शास्वार्थिमानवालम्बको मोक्षप्रपक्षः । स तु तत्थत्त्रानुविमोक्ष day-

छुट्टीशान्तरसान्तरसातः समुपथलेः । तत्सत्त्र यथात्मावत्मायांनानायणापासोपपन्मसन्तुद्वयान्तरसान्तरसातः

भूषणः दिनमिषुतमानात्मकेवलिनयः । प्रयोजनः । व्यथितिः ास विवेकशृंखलातः दिस्मिनमृतितिस्वाममधै-

सम्मरामाज्ञादयः । अत्रायं: क्षोकाश्च मद्विनिः—

मोक्षाध्यायमसमुथुतत्रत्वत्त्रानात्त्रातःततुद्वधः ।

ैःमेघस्वपिरिर: शालतसो नाम सम्‌भवितः

बुद्धिन्द्रियकमेंदिन्द्रियस्वरोधायायामस्थितिसः

सन्तोतीर्थितिरितितिस्वाममधै-सम्मरामाज्ञादयः । अत्रायं: क्षोकाश्च मद्विनिः—

नामेंस्योपिरिर: शालतसो नाम सम्‌भवितः

बुद्धिन्द्रियकमेंदिन्द्रियस्वरोधायायामस्थितिसः

न वर दुःखिनन्दमविकारिनितिः शालतसो नाम विकारिनितिः

न वत्र दुःखिनन्दमविकारिनितिः शालतसो नाम विकारिनितिः

न सब दुःखिनन्दमविकारिनितिः शालतसो नाम विकारिनितिः

भावाप्रयोगात् राजयाय: शालतसो नाम विकारिनितिः

बिकार: प्रहरितान्त: पुनस्त्रावे दीपयते

बिकार: प्रहरितान्त: पुनस्त्रावे दीपयते

पुन:ष निमित्तांस्वतं शालतावः प्रतितसते

एवं नक्रसा द्वार नायाज्ञानाज्ञानतः

"Now śānta, which has sama for its sthāyibhāva, and which leads to mokṣa, arises from the vibhāvas such as knowledge of the truth, detachment (vairāgya), purity of mind etc. It should be acted out by means of the anubhāvas, such as yama and niyama, meditation on the Self, concentration of the mind on the Self (dhāraṇā) due to world (nirveda), remembrance, firmness of mind, purity in all the four stages of life (āṣrama), rigidity of the body (stambha), horripilation, etc. The following Æryas and Slokas exist on this subject:

1. It is clear that this passage does not belong to the original NŚ. For one thing, it is found in only one of the many MSS of the NŚ. For another, Abhinava does not comment on it directly. It is however obvious from what Abhinava says on p. 399, G. O. S., Vol. I (p. 115, Raghavan’s text, 2nd edition) namely: ‘तथा च चित् त्रट्टून्नि नमुना’ (which is actually found on p. 299 of the G. O. S., Vol. I) भक्षणात्मक शास्त्रीय नाम श्रवणाश्रुतिवाचार इत्यदि शास्त्रवाचार स्मरयो, that he read some definition, of which the first few words correspond to what we have printed. He read this not at the end of the definition of the various rasas, but at the beginning. He might well have been aware of the fact that this was an interpolation, for he says: “in (some) old manuscripts”. On the other hand, he was eager to attempt to show that Bharata in fact sanctioned śāntarasa, even though he may not have said this in so many words. This comes out even in the adjective he applies to pustaka, cīvantana, thereby attempting to give them some prestige and worth in the eyes of his readers.

2. In the further proof is needed that Abhinava did not have this very same text before him, note that tattvajñāna is given here as one of the vibhāvas of śānta, whereas for Abhinava it is exclusively the sthāyibhāva of SR.

3. Yama means the five “abstentions” given in the YS. II, 30 as ahiṃsā, satya, asteya, brahmaçarya and aparigraha.

4. Niyama refers to the “observances” given in YS. II, 32 as: śauca, santopa, tapas, svādhyāya and śvarūpa-prāṇidhāna.

5. Dhāraṇā refers to keeping the mind collected, cīttasya cāyāgrata (See YS. II, 63).

6. Liṅgagrahāna refers to taking on the outer garments of an ascetic, as well as all the other paraphernalia of a religious mendicant.

Surely these refer to the eight elements of Yoga. Cf. Yogasūtra, II. 29:

7. Note that all these vyabhicāribhāvas are given by Bharata and apply to various other rasas. In fact, even tattvajñāna itself is given as one of the vibhāvas of nirveda (VII, 23). For Bharata, the vyabhicāribhāvas can become sthāyibhāvas and vice-versa, Nirveda is mentioned as an anubhāva of śrīgāra and of karuṇa. At VII, 56, dhṛti is said to arise from viṣṇa! At VII, 108, thinking about the śīstras is given as a vibhāva of māti. Desavprāśa is a vibhāva of harṣa. Dhṛti, māti, svaṣṭi and vrāmda are vyabhicāribhāvas of vīra. Stambha is given as a vyabhicāribhāva of adbhuta (p. 386) and of bhīyānaka. The present passage is thus merely a pastiche from these various sources.

8. There is something wrong with this introduction; there are only two Ærya here, and thus the dual (ārye) should have been given.
"Śāntarasa has been taught as a means to the highest happiness (naiḥśreyasā). It arises from a desire to secure the liberation of the Self and leads to knowledge of the Truth." ¹

"Śāntarasa should be known as that which brings happiness and welfare to all beings and which is accompanied by the stabilization (saṃsthita) in the Self that results from the curbing of the organs of perception and the organs of physical activity." ²

"Śāntarasa is that state wherein one feels the same towards all creatures, wherein there is no pain, no happiness, no hatred and no envy." ³

"Śānta is one's natural state of mind (prakṛti). Other emotions such as love, etc., are deformations (of that original state). The deformations arise out of this natural state of the mind and in the end again merge back into it." ⁴

"The emotions arise out of śānta depending on their particular respective causes. And when the specific causes cease to function, they all merge back into śānta." ⁵

"Those who know dramaturgy see nine rasas along with their characteristics in this manner."

**Rudrata’s Kavyālaṅkāra XV, 15–16**

सम्यक्ष्यांग्रद्धित: शान्तो विग्रहेष्ठिनांको भवति ।
सम्यक्षां विषयेष्ठ तमसो रागाय चाप्यमात् ॥

जन्मजारामसणादिव्रीं वैश्यवास्त्रानां विषयेष्ठ ।
मुखदु:खपरिच्छेद्यपञ्चिति तत्र जायते ॥

1. Tattvañjōśārthabherasamyuktah is very clumsy, since artha and hetu mean exactly the same thing.

Mokṣādhyātamasamathāḥ is equally clumsy. We think mokṣādhyātma should be understood as standing for adhyātmanamokṣa, i.e. "liberation of the Self". Adhyātma would mean: ātmanam adhiḥkṛtya, "with reference to the Self". This stanza is quoted, anonymously, by Abhinava in the Abhinavabhūvatī, p. 340 (p. 115, Raghavan's text 2nd ed.). He introduces it as a Saṅgrahakārikā, thus making it clear that it is not by Bharata.

2. We take adhyātma here to be used in the sense of the locative ātmanā.

3. Buddhendriya means the same as jñānendriya, the eyes, the ears, the nose, the skin and the tongue. Karmendriya means the organs of physical activity, such as hands, feet, speech, etc.


5. Abhinava quotes this verse (svaṁ svam, etc.) in the A. Bh., p. 340. He also quotes it in the Lokaṁ, p. 391, with the remark: अच्छे तु......इति भरतेश्वर्येश्वरवन्द्ये: thereby ascribing it to Bharata.

"Śānta (rasa) has for its cause (i.e. as its sthāvyabhāva) right knowledge, and its hero is one whose passions are completely gone. Right knowledge arises from the disappearance of ignorance and of attachment to pleasure. Fear of birth, old age, death, etc., an attitude of disgust towards objects of enjoyment, and indifference to pleasure and pain arise (as its anubhāvas)."1

Dhvanyāloka pp. 388–394:

एवमेकाकधिकरण्यविरोधिन: प्रत्रत्वसैन्य स्वाभिना सतेनाभागकामेन नितिकृतिभिः यथा तथा तद्धर्षतम्। द्वितीयस्य तु तयात्तिपदितितयुष्ट्यते—

एकाधर्मवे निदामो नैन्तर्याय विरोधावान।
रसान्तरव्यवधिना रसो व्यञ्जुः सुमंगला। ॥ २६ ॥

य: पुनरेकाकधिकरण्ये निन्दीपरो नैन्तर्याये तु विरोधे सं रसान्तरव्यवधिने प्रवचने निनेकृतिविन:। यथा शान्तकुञ्जरो नागानं निन्देश्यति।

शान्तकुं तुण्डाक्ष्यसूक्ष्येः य: परिप्रेयस्थल्यन रसः प्रतीयत एव। तथा चोक्तम्—

यथा वामसुखुं लोके यथा दिव्यं महत्सुखम्।
तुण्डाक्ष्यसूक्ष्येः नाहित: भोडीशी कलमः। ॥

यदि नाम सवीजनाभागोचरता तत्स्य नासित नैतिकतावाभूतागितकासमायमहामहाभावः

चित्रकृतिविशेष: प्रतिकृतें शक्यं। न च शीरे तस्यात्तिमृ: कठौः दुःखः।

तस्याभिमान-मयेषाः व्यवस्थापनाः। अस्य चाहत्कार्यधापकार: पत्य: स्वते।

ततो श्रेयों विधायसस्त्रूतेषुपि

यथैं परिक्षयतेत तद्धीरोद्दोपरिपि तथा प्रसंसः।

दयां विदादिनां च चित्रकृतिविशेषाणाः

सर्वकार्तिकार्तकर्मिनिन्देः शान्तस्मृतेऽद्वेशः।

द्वेशेन्निन्देः शान्तो रसः।

Translation of Dhvanyāloka III. 26:

So now it has been shown how one can avoid the opposition of a rasa that is opposed to the pervading rasa of the work because of their being in a single character, by assigning to it a subsidiary position. Now the following is said to show that one can avoid opposition in the case of the second variety as well:

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1. Here is Namisādhuc's commentary: sugamam na varam (which should be read navaram, from Sanskrit na varam — so this phrase will mean: "The stanza is (generally) easy to understand, but (the following explanations are necessary):"
Even when there is no opposition between two \textit{rasas}, though they are found in one character,\textsuperscript{1} there might still be opposition because of (the opposing \textit{rasa}) occurring immediately after (the major \textit{rasa}). (In such a case) the intelligent (poet) will introduce\textsuperscript{3} a (third) \textit{rasa} that will intervene (between the two opposed \textit{rasas}). (26).\textsuperscript{8}

The \textit{rasa} that is not opposed (to the principal \textit{rasa}), though occurring in the same character, but is opposed because of its immediate occurrence (after it), should be introduced into the work only after the intervention of a third \textit{rasa}. As, for instance, \textit{sūnta} and \textit{kṛghāra} have been introduced into the \textit{Nāgānanda}\textsuperscript{4} (with the intervention of \textit{adbhuta}). \textit{Sūnta}, which is characterised by the full development of the happiness that comes from the destruction of desires,\textsuperscript{5} is indeed apprehended (as one of the \textit{rasas} by sensitive readers).\textsuperscript{6} And so it has been said:

1. Insert \textit{rasasya} after \textit{aiśkūṭikararyayavirodhihā}
2. The \textit{KM} edition records \textit{rasyayā} as an alternative to \textit{vyāṅgya}
3. By \textit{ekāśrayate nirodha}, we think that the author of the \textit{Kārikās} meant to convey the fact that two opposing \textit{rasas} may reside in one person if a long time elapses. I.e., a man can be a \textit{kāmin} in one part of a poem and eventually become a \textit{vīrāgarī} in another. Bhartrhari's \textit{satakārayam}?
4. The idea in citing the \textit{Nāgānanda} is that two opposing \textit{rasas}, namely \textit{kṛghāra} and \textit{sūnta}, are interrupted by a third \textit{rasa}, \textit{adbhuta}, that is not opposed to either of them. Abhinava has a long passage where he gives quotations from the drama exemplifying all the three \textit{rasas}. The only noteworthy expression there is \textit{kramaprasarasambhāvanabhiprāya}, which means the orderly progression of the \textit{rasas}. First comes \textit{sūntarasa}, right at the very beginning of the drama (in fact in the \textit{Prasta-vana}), when Jimūtavāhana goes off to the forest. Then the \textit{śhāyibhāva} of \textit{adbhuta}, namely \textit{vismaya} (over the beautiful singing), is introduced, and this forms the transitional phase to \textit{kṛghāra}. But note that this is a weak argument, for \textit{adbhuta} hardly forms an important element in this drama. It is there, formally, only because of the one phrase: \textit{ahā gitām, aha vāditām}, which Jimūtavāhana says when he first hears \textit{Malayamani} singing and playing on the lute. Moreover, all of these three \textit{rasas} occur in the first act. The rest of the drama is exclusively concerned with the hero's efforts to give up his life for the sake of another.
5. This definition of \textit{sūnta} is needlessly complicated. A single long compound would have been more clear: \textit{nandāśvarasatārāparṇapāpyā}: \textit{śānta}:
6. Ānanda is seriously concerned with showing that \textit{sūntarasa} does exist (\textit{pratiyagata eva} and \textit{asti śūnto rasah}). It is, therefore, likely that this was a controversial point in the ninth century (indeed it has remained controversial until the present day). Since the \textit{Kārikās} mention all of the eight \textit{rasas} by name, at some point or another, there is absolutely no reason why they should not have mentioned \textit{śūnta}, had \textit{śūnta} been known to their author. The fact that \textit{śūnta} is never mentioned in a single \textit{Kārikā} leads us to believe that their author was unaware of its existence (at least of its formal existence as a \textit{rasa}, though there is no reason why he should not have known about \textit{śūnta} as an attitude), and most probably, therefore, lived before the time of Udbhāṣa, the first author to mention \textit{śūnta} as a \textit{rasa}.

XV
"The pleasures of love, as well as the great pleasures of heaven, do not equal even the sixteenth part of the happiness that succeeds the destruction of desire." 1

Even should it be claimed that this is not within the range of experience of all men, still it is not possible simply on this account 9 to reject what is the special state of mind of great men who are not like ordinary people. Nor is it correct to include sānta within virarasa, because vira depends on egoism, whereas sānta consists exclusively in the destruction of any feeling of self. If, in spite of this distinction, one should still claim that sānta and vira are one and the same, then the same absurd reasoning would apply to vira and raudra. In the case of the states of mind in vira which depend on compassion, etc., when there is a total absence of egoism, they can be considered as varieties of sāntarasa. If, however, egoism remains, then they should be considered varieties of vira. If we understand things in this way, there will be no contradiction. And therefore there is sāntarasa. There is nothing wrong with including, in a work dealing with sāntarasa, a rasa (intrinsically) opposed to sānta, as long as a third and neutral (aviruddha) rasa intervenes.

Locana pp. 390–394:

नन्तु नास्पेयं शान्तो रसं; तस्य तु स्मृत्वं नोपदिष्टो मुलिनेवाशाशः क्रां—शान्त—
श्रेति। तुषणानं विषयाभिभावणां यः क्षयः सब्दः निर्मितिरिपो विचिन्ते; तदेव सुखं तस्य
शान्तिस्थिपत्यम् यः परिपोर्यो रस्यमानस्तुलयस्तुलस्य शत्रुं स शान्तो रसः। प्रतीयत
एकौः तः। स्तावनवापि निर्द्वृत्तिस्वयंश्रेयः विपक्षेण रसस्तुलकाते सम्माध्यते एव।

अथवे तु सर्वचिन्तामिकायां एवाल्य स्थापिति मन्यते। तुषणास्तुलस्य प्रस्थव—
प्रतीयतबहुकर्माणि चैव चतुर्दशमाहेन भाववायोगान्त। परंदोरसं तस्मात्वम् एवायम्।

अथवे तु—
खं खं निमित्तमासाक्ष्य शान्तधारां प्रतीयते।
पुनिमित्तापाये तु शान्त एव प्रतीयते।

इति भरतवाक्यं इद्यन्तं; सर्वसामायन्यस्वभावं शान्तमाचक्षणा अनुपज्ञातविशेषात्कर—
चिन्तामिकायं शान्तस्य स्थायिभावं मन्यते। एतत्त नातीवायवायद्वयुस्म। प्रागम्याव—
प्रस्थवाभ्यस्ततुलस्य विशेषः। उत्त्यक्ष्य प्रतीयत्वम् एव तुषणानाम। यथोक्तं—विद्वा
गच्छन्ति। प्रतीयत एकौः। मुलिनेयाशाश्त्रेण एव ‘कलिच्ह्यम्’ इत्यादि वदता।

1. Mahābhārata, XIII, 174, 46. The verse has become (because of Ānanda's quotation?) a subhāṣita, quoted even in elementary primers of Sanskrit in India.
2. etevatā—"simply because of that".
3. Tasya and asya refer to virarasa and sāntarasa respectively.
TRANSLATION OF THE Locana ON Dhvanyaloka III, 26:

Objection¹: “There is no śāntarasa at all, for Bharata has not taught its sthāyībhāva.” In order to answer this objection, (Ananda-

1. Note what Kane has to say on the date of the Avatok: “The dāharūpa and its commentary Avatok were probably composed before Abhinavagupta wrote the Abhinavavābārati. The earliest datable work of Abhinavagupta is the Kramastotra composed in 990 a.d. It has been shown above that the Dāharūpa was composed between

(Continued on next page)
vardhana) has said: "And śaṁta, etc." The complete extinction of desires, that is, love for sense-objects, in the form of the withdrawal (of the mind) (from every object of the sense) (also called) detachment,¹ that alone is happiness. The development of this, which arises from the aesthetic enjoyment of this detachment, when it turns into an abiding mental state, constitutes the definition of śaṁtarasa. "It is indeed apprehended." It is possible (for ordinary people) to imagine what it is like from their own experience at the time when the course of their desires for all objects of the senses, such as food etc., has completely ceased (because of having eaten to satiation etc.).² Others, however, believe that the sthāyībhāva of śaṁtarasa is the calming down of all mental activity. If the absence of desires (which is the meaning of tṛṣṇākṣaya) is understood in the sense of a complete negation of their existence, then it would amount to the absence of all mental activity and could not be regarded as a bhāva (i.e. a positive mental state). But if it is understood in the sense

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974-996 A.D. and the commentary of Dhanika was composed not before 1000 A.D. Therefore, Dhananājaya and Dhanika were contemporaries of Abhinavagupta. At all events the two works do not refer to each other, though (sic) they differ in several important respects." P. V. Kane, op. cit. p. 248. We think, though, that the Locana passage we are dealing with has in mind the criticisms of Dhanika, for in at least 5 places Abhinava refers to views that Dhanika has either mentioned or espoused. We think, for instance, that the passage on p. 390, न तस्मात शान्ति रसः तत्स्य तु स्थायीभव तपतिविद्वेद्मुनिनेनाध्याया is a reference to Dhanika, under IV, 33. इह शान्तार्थस्य प्रकरणेवान्तर्भवति च भिन्नार्थस्य (p. 147). The passage in the Locana on page 391, न च तथा यथा परमार्थस्य वैण्डे सत्य सत्तेदीपभरसाद ज्ञानेनान्तर्भवत हास्यायुज्ञात: महेनानंतर्भवत हास्यायुज्ञात: सर्वस्मात्तेदायाम विद्याः स्वाधिकारभवति तथा सत्तेदीपभरसादाय विद्याः स्वाधिकारभवति तथा सत्तेदीपभरसादाय विद्याः (See also the more elaborate argument on this subject given in the Abhinavabhārati). The passage on p. 393, न च तथा यथा परमार्थस्य वैण्डे सत्य सत्तेदीपभरसाद ज्ञानेनान्तर्भवत हास्यायुज्ञात: महेनानंतर्भवत हास्यायुज्ञात: सर्वस्मात्तेदायाम विद्याः स्वाधिकारभवति तथा सत्तेदीपभरसादाय विद्याः स्वाधिकारभवति तथा सत्तेदीपभरसादाय विद्याः (See also the more elaborate argument on this subject given in the Abhinavabhārati).

The passage on p. 394 of the Locana, विषयं विज्ञानावधारतां भीमसेनस्तत्तभवं शाक्तेति, might be a reference to the reported view on p. 147 of the Avalok.: अन्यं तु बीरविमानसारास्त्रादाय तपतिविद्वेद्मुनिनेनाध्याया वैण्डे चिन्तन. Finally, the remark in the Locana, on p. 392, न च तथा यथा भारायाम विद्याः स्वाधिकारभवति तथा सत्तेदीपभरसादाय ज्ञानेनान्तर्भवत हास्यायुज्ञात: महेनानंतर्भवत हास्यायुज्ञात: सर्वस्मात्तेदायाम विद्याः स्वाधिकारभवति तथा सत्तेदीपभरसादाय ज्ञानेनान्तर्भवत हास्यायुज्ञात: महेनानंतर्भवत हास्यायुज्ञात: सर्वस्मात्तेदायाम विद्याः स्वाधिकारभवति. Of course, there is no guarantee that these were not merely general views, held in common by a number of authors.

1. Note then that Abhinava is not saying that Ānanda's sthāyībhāva, tṛṣṇā-kṣaya-sukha, is different from niredu.

2. Niśitta goes with iṣcā-prasāra. We think the idea is that after one has taken a large meal, food is no longer attractive. From this we can infer that for the sake, worldly pleasures are no longer attractive, and thus we have a basis for understanding śaṁtarasa from our own experience.
of exclusion (of all desires), then this view will fall within our position. Others, however, have taken their stand on the following verse of Bharata:"

"Various feelings, because of their particular respective causes, arise from śānta (a state of mental calm). But when these causes disappear, they melt back into śānta;" and they then claim that śānta is common to all rāsas and consider the sthāyi bhāva of śānta to be that state of mind which has not been particularised into any other mood. This opinion is not very far removed from our position. The difference is one of prāgahāva ("non-existence of something before its origination") and pradhvamsābhāva (non-existence of something when it is destroyed). And it is correct for desires to be destroyed. As has been said: "We can never find a man who is without desires from his birth." (I.e. a person achieves this state at some later point in his life, and therefore desires can be destroyed.) Even Bharata has shown his agreement by saying: "Sometimes peace", etc. The culmina-

1. The point is this: what kind of negative is ippākravya? Is it prasājyapratisādha, or paryudūsapratisādha? If it is the former, then there could be no question of a bhāva at all, and therefore this is unacceptable. Paryudāsa, which means "exclusion of something with the possibility of including its opposite", is however acceptable. The two kinds of negation are paralleled by the two forms of absence, prāgahāva and pradhvamsābhāva which will be mentioned later.

2. This is from the NŚ VI. 106-8 and forms part of the interpolated śānta passage in that text.

3. Note that this verse does not necessarily mean that their author accepted śāntarasa. Śānta is simply the absence of emotion, the tabula rasa of the emotional board. It has nothing to do, necessarily, with mokṣa or religious views in general.

The stanza is given under the heading of Āryā verses and was, therefore, most probably part of a floating tradition, and not part of a continuously argued passage. On p. 326 of the NŚ (Vol. I), several verses are introduced with these words: atrāryaḥ (with a variant reading of atrānānāmāṃ śānta bhavati) on which Abhinava has a most important remark: ता पत्ता वामी एकपञ्चकर्त्ता (Abhinava is fond of this rather rarely used word) पुंशकारामानवस्त्रया वनार्जनानां निनिष्टा: It is, therefore, clear that these verses are not by Bharata himself. Some of them, however, might well be his own, and in this the situation resembles that of the Dhvanyāloka, where some of the Saṅgrahāloka must be by Ānanda, and some must be by earlier or contemporary writers. Kane quotes Vanaprava 129, 8: अनानामाय अवस्त्रया kāryā on which Nilakanṭha says: परसप्रागतमावलियानामोऽत्र। (For more references, see Kane, op. cit., p. 17). Note that Abhinava explains this term (ānānāmāya) as: अनुवर्ती भनी स्त्रियाद्रि परसप्रागति वनार्जनानां कारकाकर्षितानां भवति। Vol. I, p. 290 (second paragraph).

4. This is a reference to the NŚ, I. 106:

काव्यमें: काव्यकी० काव्यवर्ष: काव्यस्मूः।
कु:शारणिन्ती शारणां शोककात्याः तपस्विनाम्।
विश्वासितानाः काले नामसंगतव्रविवर्ति।
शारणां विनोगः नाथव इतरांतरस्मूः।

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ting stage of nirveda is not to be described (in śānta), so that one could say it cannot be perceived, because of the absence of any (visible) symptoms due to the cessation of all activity. This applies equally to sthūla, etc., where the culminating stage (for example, actual sexual intercourse) cannot be described. But in earlier stages, according to the two Sūtras (of Patañjali):

“Thus (mind-stuff) flows peacefully by reason of the subliminal-impression,”

and “In the intervals of this (mind-stuff) there are other presented-ideas (coming) from subliminal-impressions,” such diverse actions as yama, niyama, etc., or activities such as ruling the kingdom of the earth, etc., are perceived even in the case of Janaka and others who are nonetheless śānta (i.e., full of mental calm). And so it must be admitted that śānta is apprehended because of the existence of such outwardly visible symptoms and because of the existence of many vyabhicārabhāvas which are imaginable in the intervals of (the accessories of yoga such as) yama, niyama, etc. Should one object that it is not perceived, as there are no vibhāvas belonging to it, we reply, no, it is perceived, and its vibhāvas such as acquaintance with people who are devoid of desire, fruition of one’s former good deeds, grace of the highest God, and acquaintance with the secret teaching relating to

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It is one of the key passages for those who believe that Bharata really did accept śānta as a rasa. But there is no reason to believe that these correspond exactly to any of the rasas. They refer rather to the purusārthas. One wonders, though, precisely what Bharata had in mind by including mokṣa (corresponding to śāma) as suitable for the drama.

1. Delete the quotation mark before śṛgārāder api, in the B. P. ed.

2. This is an important distinction, but it is difficult to know exactly what Abhinava has in mind. He admits that it is impossible to show the anubhāvas of the last phases of śāntarasa, because at that point there is a complete absence of activity. (This is an old Advaita problem, whether the Jivanmukta engages in activity or not. The conundrum had passed into Zen, where it has formed the basis of elaborate discussions concerning the identity of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa.) But Abhinava says that the same is true of śṛgāra, etc. What does he mean? We suppose he is referring to actual sexual intercourse. Now, why, precisely, does he say that this cannot be portrayed? On the analogy of the earlier example of śānta, it would seem to be because there is no physical activity. But this, of course, is not true. Or does he mean, not only sexual intercourse in general, i.e., not only the act of penetration, but also the actual moment of ejaculation? In this case, he might well mean that there is little or no activity. (Which does not, however, imply that one cannot describe it, or even present it on the stage). Perhaps Abhinava simply means that it would be a breach of good taste to portray actual sexual intercourse on the stage. But if this is what he means, it is hard to see how this is relevant to śāntarasa and the absence of activity. Moreover, in the Abhinavagītrī, Abhinava makes the same remark concerning karunārasa.


4. After vyabhicārabhāvā ca add śāntarasaḥ.
the Self, must be presumed. And so by all this we have shown that vibhāvas, anubhāvas, vyabhicāribhāvas, and a sthāyibhāva for sānta all exist. Objection: "In kāntarasa no act of relishing can arise because of the lack of sympathetic response." Who said that there is no sympathetic response? For it has already been said that it is perceived. Objection: "(Though it may be) perceived, it is not esteemed by everybody." Yes, but according to this reasoning, men devoid of desire will not find love very praiseworthy either, and so it will have to be removed from the annals of rasa history! And so Anandavardhana says: "Even if ". Objection: "It is possible to consider this (sānta) as identical with that variety of vīra which consists primarily of dharma". He answers this by saying: "And not." tasya refers to vīra. "Is full of egoism," because the essence of utsāha (energy, the sthāyibhāva of vīra) is to feel and say that "I am such and such", etc. Asya ca refers to sānta. "Between the two": ca here means although they are extremely opposed to each other because the one (vīra) is full of desire and the other (sānta) is devoid of desire. But vīra and raudra are not even very much opposed, because their similarity consists in this, that in attaining dharma, artha or kāma, both are (equally) helpful (upayogī). Objection: "If this is so, then compassionate heroism (dayāvīra) is either religious heroism (dharmanvīra) or generous heroism (dānaveṇa) (but not sānta)."

1. The point of the objection is that sānta is never experienced by ordinary people in everyday life, and therefore they will have no sūmanā that will enable the acting to heighten the sthāyibhāva in them to the status of a rasa. Abhinava replies that sānta is, in fact, experienced by ordinary men. He refers, we believe, to the analogy of feeling sated after a full meal.

2. The opponent’s argument, that kāntarasa appeals only to a select few, is very strong and deserves a serious reply. Abhinava’s reply that for a vitarāga, a man with no passions, kṛgāra will also hold no appeal, is very weak. The point, surely, is that kṛgāra is, or has been, within the experience of all men, whereas sānta is not. (There are after all philosophical schools in India which denied the very existence of moḥa, but none that ever denied the existence of kṛgāra!) This is presumably what the pārvaspatin means by śāhāsavādam. Moreover Abhinava has himself made fun of those very vitarāgus who are unable to appreciate love. Dry Mimamsaka scholars he calls them. Of course, from a modern point of view, both objections can be simply met: it is not necessary to believe in something in order to enjoy it, for otherwise no atheist would find any pleasure in reading religious poetry, or even the Upanisads for that matter. Brigid Brophy has said that most of us “have replaced belief in fairies by a Midsummer Night’s Dream”.

3. Abhinava must have in mind the passage in the N.J. 27, 59:

4. The punctuation of the Balaprīyā text is wrong. Place a daṇḍ after dānaveṇa va. nāsan kaścit is a separate sentence, a reply to this objection.
(compassionate heroism) is simply another name for śānta. For the sage has said:

"Brahma has said that virarasa is of three kinds: generous heroism, religious heroism, and battle heroism."

And so, using the tradition (āgama) as authority, he (i.e. the sage), declared (vīra) to have only three varieties. And so Ānanda has said: "compassionate heroism, etc.," where the word "etc." (refers to dānavirā and dharmavirā). It might be (wrongly) suspected that (śānta) could be included under bhākṣa, because in both cases there is disgust with worldly objects. But while disgust can be a vyabhicārabhāva of śānta (in the sense that it is transitory), it cannot be its sthāyibhāva; because in the last phases of śānta, it is completely rooted out. The author of the Candrikā claims that śāntarasa should not be employed as the major rasa (in a work). We have not examined this opinion here since that would lead to digression (prasaṅgāntarāt). Because śānta is grounded on the highest goal of man,

1. Read rasam vīra and not rasavirām. It means virarasa.
2. The point of the verse is that Bharata does not even mention dayāvīra, and therefore it is not vīra at all, but śānta. (NŚ VI, 79, p. 331). The real question to ask Abhinava would have been how he intends to understand dharmavirā. How does this really differ from dayāvīra?
3. Something has been dropped from the Locana passage dayāvirādīnāṁ cetyādigravahānas. The Bālapriyā says that one must supply dharmaviradānavirāgrahamam. But this seems a contradiction, for Abhinava has just finished saying that dharmavirā and dānavirā are virarasa, not śāntarasa, whereas dayāvīra is śānta. However, this seems to be what Ānanda has in mind, for otherwise it is difficult to know what ādi will stand for. The view of Ānanda is that all the three, dayāvīra, dharmavirā and dānavirā, are to be regarded as varieties of śānta (as far as one can judge from his Vyāsa), if they are free from all traces of egoism. If not, they should be regarded as varieties of virarasa. Thus, Ānanda does not appear to have shared Abhinava’s view that any form of dayāvīra is necessarily śānta itself. Abhinava holds the view that dayāvīra is not to be identified either with dānavirā or with dharmavirā.

He believes that dānavirā and dharmavirā are also to be regarded as varieties of śānta if they are divested of all traces of egoism. The difference between the positions of Ānanda and Abhinava seems to be this: that, whereas Ānanda regards dayāvīra as identical with śānta only in certain circumstances (viz. when there is no egoism), Abhinava regards dayāvīra as identical with śānta in all circumstances. This implies that there can be no egoism in dayāvīra for Abhinava. Cf. Locana, p. 314: dayāvīra-kabdaṇāvaś śāntaṃ vyayapadiṣṭi.

4. The idea is that jagupāśa is not really a part of śānta, or rather, it is not an abiding element (though it can be regarded as a vyabhicārabhāva of śānta), since at the moment of realisation, nāśīnaḥ tasya prabhūtva pratikṣihitā?

5. Note Raghavan, "Number of Rasas", p. 22, "Evidently, the Candrikākāra also held the view that Vīra and Śīvāṇa are the Rasas in the Nāgarām in accordance with the ending in the attainment of vidyādharā-sabramartīna, the overlordship of the kingdom of Vidyādharā-s, and the sustained love-theme, and that the śānta came in there as a subsidiary idea to give a new variety of Vīra called Dayā-vīra.

(Continued on next page)
i.e. because it gives rise to moksā, it is the most important of all the rasas.  
And this has been demonstrated at great length, stating both pro- and contra-
positions, in the Kavyakautukā of our teacher Bhattacharja and in our com-
mentary on that. So enough of further discussion here.

Dhvanyālōka pp. 529-533:

तथा च रामायणमहाभारतशाङ्कमादयः पुनः पुनरस्तितिष्ठति अपि नवनव: प्रकाश्यते ।
प्रक्षेपः चार्मीर रस एक एत्यायत्वायाभान्धकिभवितः हयायतिविश्व च पुनरमहति ।
कालिणि-कार्तिकशस्त्रिष्ठ: यथा रामस्माधि यथा व महाभाष्यते ।
रामायणोहि कथः रसः खमशिविन-अविनाशित: तोऽसः खमशिविन-अविनाशित: ।

पद्मानि. । निर्वृत्तः स एव सौतायत्विवेचनम् पर्यत्ततेन सुप्रकटस्वप्रवृत्तता ।
महाभाष्यते शास्त्रे शास्त्रं शास्त्रे शास्त्रं सुसहास्यतामयिनि शृणिपावर्गेयम्
 महाभाष्यते शास्त्रे शास्त्रं सुसहास्यतामयिनि शृणिपावर्गेयम्
 महाभाष्यते शास्त्रे शास्त्रं सुसहास्यतामयिनि शृणिपावर्गेयम्
 महाभाष्यते शास्त्रे शास्त्रं सुसहास्यतामयिनि शृणिपावर्गेयम्
 महाभाष्यते शास्त्रे शास्त्रं सुसहास्यतामयिनि शृणिपावर्गेयम्
 महाभाष्यते शास्त्रे शास्त्रं सुसहास्यतामयिनि शृणिपावर्गेयम्


तथा तथा विरागोहं नाथे नात्र संग्रामः ।

इयादि बहुः: कथयता ।

पारमाण्विकतत्सर्ववान्ते कशीह स्वभावस्ततयस्त सरस्य पुरुषाक्षरे च स्वभावस्ततयां च

परमाण्विकतत्सर्ववाशिष्ठी शरीरस्वतं स्यत ।

Abhinavagupta, however, rejects this view of the Candrikā in his Locana. Ādhikāri- 
katvena tu śānto rasa (rasa na) nibadākhyata iti candrikākāraḥ, taic ekaśāmābhir na 
paryālocitam. This does not seem justified by the passage Dr. Raghavan quotes. 
Abhinava has not said that he rejects the views of the Candrikā, but only that a 
discussion of these views would involve digressing from his main theme. We have 

1. Note that what Abhinava says here: sauvrāsabhikāya pradhānatamāḥ is 
directly contrary to what Ananda will say on p. 397 of the D, Āl.: 

Through however he himself will admit in the Abhinavravātī that śānta is 
apradhāna; at (in) शास्त्रेषु सत्यनिर्वापणम्। (Vol. I, p. 339). And again in the 
A. Bh. IV, p. 78: utkant hi - na śāntarakṣapraddhānapaṇe pravagasya bhavati, sato'pi 
(sanu api?) hi rasāntaroparabha eva pravagayogyo nāsvyatheti.

XVI
च सूर्यहवार्यम्: प्राधान्यप्रियेतन्त स्वराष्ट्राधिपतिभेदयननुक्रमणां दशिनतम्, दशिनं तु 
व्यज्ञलेवन—

‘भगवान्नुदेशक कीर्तिष्ठक समान्तन:\’

इस्मिन् वाचे। अनेन दाहमयों व्यज्ञलेवन विवक्षितो यद्रत्र महाभारते पाण्डवादिवर्तिते 
यलीक्षयों तत्सत्त्वमसातिविसमोविचिब्ब्रह्मचं च, परमार्थस्यस्यस्यस्य भगवान् वासुदेवोऽह 
कीर्तिते। तत्सत्सातिवेद परमेश्वरे भगवते भवते भावितनेतरसो, मा भूत विभूतिषु निःसाध 
रासु रागिणो गुणेण वा नवतिनयपाराक्षनामिष्य मेयू बेतिभुजिष्य सयोऽनन्तमा व्रतिविविधिष्ठयः।

तथा चादे—पश्चात् निःसार्वं संसारस्यगुणस्यमाथं धोतिन् स्वपुदेवार्थसातिवेद व्यज्ञानक्षत्रु 
गृहीतश्च चतर्कः। एवविनेत्राय गम्भीरं संस्तिष्टं तोडनलरलोकोऽका ध्ययनेत्—‘स हि सर्वम’ 
इत्यादयः।

अथ च निगुणार्थगीरोरों महाभारतासाने हरिभविष्णुन्न समास्ति विष्णुदता तेनेक 
काव्यवेशस्य कृष्णदिक्षापनेन सम्पवदकुस्तीकः। अनेन चादे संसारासाति तत्ततात्ते माधवति 
शयं प्रकाशिता सकलं एव सासातिको व्यवहारं तुष्टिको व्यज्ञलेवन प्रकाशित। देवतातीष्ठ 
तपः श्रुतीतरं च प्रभावसत्त्वस्य तसैव परम्यत: प्राधान्यमवेद तदनुभिविष्ने देवतात 
विष्णुसातिवेद च। पाण्डवादिवर्तित्वाचनमाणिष्ठे वैराग्यनाननतयादार्थप्रेयम्य 
च मोक्षभूम onCreate मूलस्वरूपश्च सम्बोधनाभिनेत्रवेद वर्ग वपु वर्भमं प्रशास्त भविष्यत: 
प्रतिज्ञासहस्तो भवन्तवात्मकासहस्तो च सम्बोधनाभिनेत्रवेद वर्ग वपु वर्भमं 
प्रशास्त भविष्यत:। तत्तत्त्वाधिकृति महाभारतसाति धातृकरानुसार सप्तः स्वपुदेवार्थसातिवेद 
सामान्यताय विष्णुदता अत्यन्ति श्रीमान्यादशर्यावच्छिन्न। श्रीमान्यादशर्यावच्छिन्न 
ि र्शतात विष्णुदता अत्यन्ति श्रीमान्यादशर्यावच्छिन्न।

Dhvanyāloka, Uddyota IV.1:

Thus in the Rāmāyaṇa, in the Mahābhārata, and other works, though 
battles and the like are described again and again, they seem new each

time. When one single rasa is presented as dominant in a large work, this creates originality in the subject matter and gives rise to great beauty as well. "Such as where?" Well, for instance in the Rāmāyana and the Mahābhārata. For in the Rāmāyana, karuṇarasa has been hinted at by Vālmiki when he says: "Sorrow was transformed into poetry." It is that very (rasa) that has been sustained till the very end, since Vālmiki ends his work with (Rama's) final separation from Sītā. (The same applies to) the Mahābhārata also, (that work) which has the form of a philosophical (or didactic) text and possesses the beauty of poetry. When the great sage (Vyāsa) ends his work in such a way that it makes us feel melancholy (vaimanasayadāyini) by having the Vṛṣṇis and the Pāṇḍavas all finish in a pathetic way, and shows how his book puts emphasis on the creation of world-weariness (vairāgya), he suggests by this emphasis that (among the rasas) kāntarasa is meant to be predominant, and (among the goals of life), mokṣa is primarily intended. Moreover this has been partially explained by other commentators as well. The father of the world (lokanātha), who wishes to lift people out of the morass of rampant (udīna) ignorance in which they have fallen, and provide them with the pure light of knowledge, has himself asserted this very thing when he said the following and many other things like it over and over:

1. What makes the battles seem original each time, is not, we think, the use of dhvani in each particular description (though vīra, bhayānaka, bhākṣa, and raudra can all exist therein), but their subordination to a more general aesthetic goal. So in the case of the Rāmāyana, the constant expressions involving pain, sorrow, separation, etc., all conduce to the over—all end of the work, a feeling of karuṇa. In the Mahābhārata, the more battles are described, the more distasteful war becomes and the more firmly grounded our feeling of detachment, of world-weariness (vairāgya). This theory, advanced as it is, would be appropriate to a work where the subject is a unified one, but it can hardly be applied to a work as varied (in authorship as well) as the Mahābhārata, which contains several rasas, and cannot be viewed as a unity. Ānanda of course could not have agreed.

2. Arthaśāstra here means arthaśāstravatvā.

3. See the passage translated from the Locana on the first Uddyota of the Dvārakāloka, p. 79. The passage here is Rāmāyana 1, 2, 40.

4. This refers to Sītā's being swallowed up by the earth. At the very end of the Rāmāyana, Rāma is promised a heavenly reunion. One wonders whether this obvious interpolation existed at the time of the Dvārakāloka. If it did, then Ānanda in an unprecedented critical attitude seems to suggest that this cannot concern the literary critic, which is a remarkably advanced view.

5. Read kṣetrarūpe on p. 530.

6. Note what the Dīdhīti commentary (p. 611) says on this: तेषां च विद्वानोऽवलोकन: "If even they ended up like this, what hope is there for the rest of us?" The mahāprasthāna episode, especially the svargaśrōtana, does indeed convey an atmosphere of dejection. After all, the brothers undertook this suicidal voyage because things looked so bleak. Yudhīśthira especially strikes one as a tired man, battle-weary and without illusions about man's perfectability.
"The more the course of the world (lokatantra) unfolds itself before us as vain and insubstantial, the more, surely, does (our) detachment grow."

From this the ultimate meaning of the Mahābhārata appears most clearly: the two subjects intended as predominant are śāntarasa, with other rasas in a subordinated position, and mokṣa, with other aims of life likewise subordinated. The topic of the predominance and subordination of the different rasas has already been dealt with. It is no contradiction to say that if we do not take into consideration the ultimate (pāramārthika) inner truth (of the Mahābhārata), other subsidiary goals of life (besides mokṣa) and other subsidiary rasas (besides śāntarasa) are beautiful in their own way (svaprādhānena, i.e. svavāśaye), just as the body, when we do not take the soul into consideration, is thought of as beautiful, though it is really only subsidiary (to the soul). "But", (someone might argue), "in the Mahābhārata all the subjects to be presented have been given in the table of contents, and this one (that you mention) is not found there.

On the contrary, we can understand, through the very words used (svaśabdani-vedītāv) in that section (uddeśā), that the Mahābhārata teaches all the goals of man, and contains all the rasas." We reply: What you say is true. In the table of contents it has not been said in so many words that in the Mahābhārata, śāntarasa is the main (rasa) nor that mokṣa is more important than all other human preoccupations. But it has been shown through suggestion, as in the following phrase: "And the blessed eternal Vasudeva is praised herein." The intended meaning, arrived at through suggestion, is that the deeds of the Pāṇḍavas, etc., which are recited in the Mahābhārata, all end pathetically and are only a manifestation of cosmic ignorance; and that the blessed Vāsudeva, whose form is the highest truth, is glorified there. "Therefore turn your minds devoutly to that revered, highest God alone. Do not set your hearts on the empty outward shapes of things, and do not exclusively fix your thoughts on mere worldly virtues like political sagacity, enforcement

1. We have not succeeded in tracing this stanza in the Mahābhārata.

The verse might appear to an impartial reader (that is, outside of the context of the D. Áś. I.) as a rather cynical comment: "only when things go badly do they appear unreal."

Without the context, we cannot say whether Ānanda's interpretation is the correct one.

2. D. Áś. III. 20 and following.

3. The passage the Pūrvapakṣin seems to have in mind is Mahābhārata I. 1. 48:

of discipline, valour, etc." And further on, the word "and" (ca) helped by its suggestive power, is here clearly seen to suggest the following idea: "Take into account the hollowness of worldly existence." The verses immediately following, such as "He indeed is the Truth," etc., are (also) seen to contain implied in them similar ideas.

By completing his work at the end of the Mahābhārata with the description of Kṛṣṇa’s genealogy (harivamśa), the poet-creator Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana has made this hidden beautiful sense wonderfully patent. And because this (hidden) meaning compels us to great devotion for another truth, beyond the phenomenal world, all worldly activities assume a preliminary¹ and vincible position (pīrvapakṣa)² as being fit to be ignored (nyākṣa).³ The description of the exceptional power of gods, holy places, penance, etc., is (only) a means to attaining the highest Brahman, because the various particular gods and other things (i.e. holy places, penance, etc.) are its manifestations (vibhūti).⁴ The description of the life of the Pāṇḍavas etc., gives rise to

1. Cf. Raghavan, "The Number of Rasas", p. 36: "The author of the Bhāgavata in his criticism of the Bhārata, says that in the Great Epic, Vyāsa has described "Praṇava" (as Pārvapakṣa) so much and so well, that man who is by nature attached to it has mistaken the Pārvapakṣa itself for the Siddhānta.

Here is the verse, as quoted by Raghavan:

इष्टकोष्ठम न्यायिनप्रथम
tumjākṣेत तथा निवारण नि: वन्नम्र (Bhāgavata, I, 5, 15)

Note the important verse of Abhinavagupta in his Gitārthasastrasagraha (edited by V. L. Shastri Pansikar in his edition of the Gitā, N. S. P., Bombay 1912 with 8 commentaries), p. 2:

प्रख्यातेन शून्यिना विद्विद्या विषादिच
शास्त्रं सहववन्ततामितमत्र मोक्षः।
प्राथमितमत्र विवधविषादिच
तथा च नरामान्यस्य अपनातस्यां निवारणस्य स्त्राव्यितमत्रमेव सामिति नुवाच।

2. Professor Daniel H. H. Ingalls has kindly directed our attention to an interesting remark of Nilakṣṇa on M. Bh., I, I, 275 (Poona Ed. p. 24), where an adversary is made to remark: अनुभवकोणे युद्धिनिर्माणायां भूमार्ग दृढःस्ते to which the reply is: एवं भारतीयं भर्ममध्यमविप्रस्ह्य एव भर्ममध्यमविप्रस्ह्य एव भर्ममध्यमविप्रस्ह्य एव भर्ममध्यमविप्रस्ह्य एव भर्ममध्यमविप्रस्ह्य.......

Note how similar this is to the last two verses of the Saunakaramanda of Aśvaghoṣa quoted above, p. 4.

3. Jacobi (p. 334, ZDMG. vol. 57, 1903) remarks that for adhyakṣena, adhyakṣena or adhyakṣena should be read. He translates: "... erscheint das ganze weltliche Treiben ganz deutlich als überwundener Standpunkt." The Bālakryāya takes nyākṣa to mean "entirely" (kārtṣyena), but we do not believe it has that meaning. Surely it means "despised" (Cf. nyakkṛta), literally "looked down upon" from ni and akṣa.

4. See Gitā X, 16 and 41, for this meaning of vibhūti.
vairāgya; vairāgya is at the base of mokṣa; and mokṣa is a means to attaining the blessed one, as has been principally shown in the Gītā, etc.; and thus the description of the life of the Paṇḍavas is indirectly a means of attaining the highest Brahman. By designations such as Vāsudeva, etc., is meant the highest Brahman, the abode of unlimited power, which is well-known in the Gītā and other parts (of the Mahābhārata) under the name of Vāsudeva (lit. "as denoted by such words as Vāsudeva—tadabhidhānavatvena"), the whole of whose essential nature was reflected in the incarnation at Mathura. This is proved by the fact that the name Vāsudeva is qualified (in the quotation from the Mahābhārata given above) by the adjective "eternal" (which could not qualify an individual); and (further) because this appellation is used of other manifestations of Viṣṇu in the Rāmāyana etc. This matter has been decided (niṇīta) by the grammarians themselves. And so, through the sentence found in the table of contents, it is revealed that everything different from the blessed one is ephemeral, and thereby it is well-established that looking at the Mahābhārata as a kāstra, the highest goal of man, namely mokṣa, is alone intended as the most important (of the goals of life), and looking at it as poetry, śāntarasa, which is characterised by the nourishing of the happiness that succeeds the destruction of desire, is intended as the most important (of all the rasas). Because it is the very essence of the whole work, this meaning has been conveyed through suggestion, and not directly. For an essential idea, if it is revealed without directly stating it in so many words, carries a far greater beauty. It is

1. Paramparayā obviously goes with the preceding series, and thus the danda should be removed and placed after paramparayā.

2. Gītādīpradeśa can mean: "in passages in the Gītā, etc."

3. Read tadabhidhānavatvena instead of tadabhidhānavatvena.

4. Understand aagīrapam after saubhāyaanāvadhikarasyakalkapam.

Māthurasprādurbhāva refers to Kṛṣṇa as an incarnation, being only a part (aṃśa) of the highest Brahman. Vāsudeva does not refer to this limited individual (since qua avatāra he is not eternal), but to the principle lying behind it. To limit him to a specific place (Mathurā) obviously shows that this is only a part, not the aṃśa or aṅgīn, the whole.

5. Both Tripiṭkha (p. 1349) and the Dīdhīti (p. 621) quote the following verse from the Rāmāyana to support Ānanda’s statement:

6. See Kāśā in Pāṇini IV. 1. 114.

7. Tṛṇākṣyasyaṇaka is, according to Ānanda (see p. 390, D. Āl. third Uddyota), the sthāyībhāva of śāntarasa.

8. Saubhāyadīrveda is a key concept in Ānanda’s system. See above, p. 7-8, and also Locana, on p. 528: Saubhāyasyaṇaka ithe kā kṛdyatā. See also the discussion in (Continued on next page)
well-known among the assemblies of the cultured and the learned that something which is highly prized should be revealed by suggestion and not in so many words”.

Locana pp. 530–533:

अख्ततच्चरणिन्निर्मित्यान्वित विचारमभीश्वरं परिवर्तित | क्रन्तानां परस्यान्च | पाण्डवानाममपि महाक्षेडोनेनुमिता विचित्रः | क्रन्तव्रीणिर्स्वाभाविकः इति सर्वेश्वापि विवेदनात्मानिति | सुनुक्तयत्वेऽति | यथार्थे "धर्मं चार्यं च कामों च मौद्रक्ते च समादिक्षे "युक्ते, तथापि बलवर्धनार्तां मन्वादः—यथार्थे भ्रमोपकामानां सर्वे संतां सादस्यां यद्यन्यत्र न सन्यतं, तथापि एवेनादिरस्वसंहतिावल्लकताम् | मौद्रक्ते तु यहूद् पञ्चयथि सत्य सर्वाद्वित्व विचार्यमतिः।

यथायत्वेऽति | योगकृत्यान्यं वचनेन संपादितानां धन्महायक्तात्साधारणेऽण सख्त-भूतात्मित्वामां | येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन येन

Continued from previous page.

The word *atyastra* (in the expression *sītāyataniyoga*), since it shows that they have no hope of meeting, indicates that this is (*karuṇa* and) not *vipralambha* (*śrīgāra*). The mutual destruction of the Viṣṇis, the end of the Pándavas by experiencing undeserved troubles on their great journey (north, to death), and Kṛṣṇa’s destruction by a hunter show that everybody’s end was pathetic. *MUKHYATAYĀ*. Although it has been said: “And in *dharma*, and in *artha*, and in *kāma*, and in *mokṣa*,” whatsoever the four “ands” amount to this, that although the essence of *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* (as described in the *Māhabhārata*) can be found elsewhere (i.e. in works other than *Māhabhārata*), nonetheless, the fact that they ultimately come to a pathetic end is to be found here only. But the paramount importance (*sārāta*) of the nature of *mokṣa* (*mokṣe yaḥ rūpam tasya*) can be seen only here (in the *Mahābhārata*). *YATHĀ YATHĀ*. (*Tantryaṁāṇa* means) that which people tend towards, i.e. what is sought by them (*sampādayamāna*) with effort. This refers to *dharma*, *artha*, and *kāma*, and the means leading to them, though people consider them to be real (and essential). *YATHĀ YATHĀ* means (the goals and their means) characterised by the working for their acquisition and for their protection (once they are obtained) and (finally) by (their) destruction. *Asāravat* means like an insubstantial magic show. *Viparyeti* means:2 on the contrary they turn out the opposite (of what we had hoped for), so there is no question of their being regarded as real and abiding. *Tathā tathā* means (the goals and their means) characterised by (acquisition, protection and eventual destruction). *VIRAGO JAYATE*. This

1. This is a fundamental distinction that goes back to the NŚ. VI, under verse 50, p. 310 G. O. S. (1st ed.). The point is that in *vipralambha* there is some hope of being reunited (*sāpekṣabhaṁ*), but in *karuṇa* there is none (*niropekaṁbhāva*). For the actual passage, see above, p. 82.

2. This verse has been omitted from the critical ed. of the *M. Bh*. One wonders whether Sūkhānanda had seen it. Will his critical principles permit him to omit from the text a verse vouchsafed by as old an authority as Abhinavagupta?

3. Remove the *dasya* after *sampaẏaṁata* on p. 530.
suggests the sthāyi (bhāva) of sāntarasa, i.e. nirveda (“world-weariness”), which arises from knowledge of the truth (tattvajñāna). And its supreme importance is suggested (ukta) by demonstrating that all the other goals of human life are insubstantial. Objection: “In the Mahābhārata, śṛigāra, vīra, etc., are charming as well.” Anticipating this doubt he says: PĀRAMĀRTHIKA. Although these other rōpas are subsidiary (āṅgabhūta), yet people who are exclusively interested in pleasures and who are overcome by worldly desires think of them as predominant, just as (foolish people) think of this body as the cognising Self, although it is merely an instrument (āyatana) for the enjoyment (of pleasures) by the conscious Self. KEVALEŚU. There is no harm (in fixing one’s thoughts on virtues) helpful to one’s devotion to the highest God. The construction is this: don’t have your minds attached to worldly goods, and exclusively interested (even) in worldly virtues. AGRE. In the text of the Mahābhārata, right after the Anukramaṇi, Objection: “Surely Vāsudeva is used in the sense of the son of Vāsudeva, and not in the sense of the highest Lord, the Ātman, the supereme God.” Anticipating this doubt he says: VĀSUDEVĀDISAMJĀBHIDHEYATVENA.

“At the end of many births, the wise man reaches me, (thinking that) Vāsudeva is everything.”

(In) this and other (passages like it) the final meaning (tāṭparyā) (of the word Vāsudeva) has been established to be the whole (truth, the highest Brahman), which is the content (abhidheya) of that designation (i.e. Vāsudeva).

NIRNĪTAS CA. In discussing (the Sūtra of Pāṇini): “rṣyandhaka-vṛgānikurubhyās ca”, it has been said that words (i.e. names of individuals) are really eternal, but are assigned conventional meanings (in the form of particular individuals) only by accident. ŚĀSTRANAYE. The designation of puruṣārtha (in general) is appropriate (for the subjectmatter of the

1. According to what Abhinava says, tattvasaṃśāna would have to be regarded as a vibhāva (i.e. an uddipanavibhāva) of sānta. This is precisely the opposite of what he says in the Abhinavaḥārati (p. 106, Raghavan’s text): कि च निश्चित नाम सवंत्तानुपादितवालभाव्यो वेदायत्ते, स च तत्त्वज्ञानद्वय प्रमुच्यते, where it is nirveda that must be regarded as an uddipanavibhāva of sānta, with tattvasaṃśāna as the sthāyi nibhāva. It is a strange contradiction for which there seems to be no plausible explanation.

2. Tasya would seem to mean sāntarasaśya (which is how the Bālopriya takes it).

3. Gītā, VII. 19. The rest of the verse is:

रति स महालम सुदुर्लभः

4. See Kāśikārtti on Pāṇini, IV, I. 114.

XVII
Mahābhārata), in the sense of that which is sought after by men, there being no question of aesthetic pleasure. But the designation of rasa (in general) is appropriate (for the subject matter of the Mahābhārata) from the point of view of aesthetic delight. This is what is meant. This has been dealt with in detail by Ānandavardhana in his book the Tatvāloka. Since it is not the main subject here, we have not gone into the problem.

He now explains the reason for saying “far greater beauty.” **PRASIDDHIŚ CA.** The word ca is used in the sense of “since”. As this matter is well-known in the world since beginningless time, therefore, in not saying directly (that mokṣa and rasa are the subjects of supreme importance in the Mahābhārata) the intention of the revered Vyāsa and others must have been just that (i.e. they did not use direct words because this is not the practice in assemblies of the wise). For otherwise in regard to the relations of actions and the senses conveyed by the various case-endings, etc., while explaining the meanings of the words in a stanza like “Paying my homage to Nārāyaṇa etc.” (the first verse of the Mahābhārata), what evidence is there to show that Vyāsa had the same intention (as the one which is in conformity with lokaprasiddhi)? This is what he means. The words “cultured and learned” correspond to the method of poetry (kāvyanaya) and the method of philosophy (śāstranaya) respectively.

1. Understand sati after ānavādayogābhāve.

2. There are two references to the Tatvāloka of Ānandavardhana in the Locana: this one, and another on p. 67 in the first Uddyota. Unfortunately this work is lost to us. It would have been unique, for nowhere has the relationship between śāstra and kāvyā been discussed in Indian philosophy. Obviously Ānanda (like Abhinava) with his interest in both fields would have been an ideal person to write about this question. One wonders whether his idea of the Mahābhārata as both a śāstra and a kāvyā did not inspire the book and if this was not one of the most important works discussed. Note that here, as elsewhere, Ānanda is interested in things that seem to have passed unnoticed before among his fellow Indians. If Abhinava really did comment on the Yogavāsiṣṭha, and if Ānanda is really quoted therein (see above, p. 29), then it is possible that the Yogavāsiṣṭha was inspired by Ānanda’s lost Tatvāloka.

3. This line anyathā hi kriyākārakasambandhadau, etc., involves a rather complex point. Here is the what Abhinava means:

Vyāsa has made use of countless sentences in the M. Bh. in describing the main events in the story, the various episodes and incidents introduced from time to time, and in discourses on various worldly and philosophical topics. He has also commenced the M. Bh. with the verse nārāyaṇanamākṣṛtya, etc., which is a sentence. Now a sentence is nothing but a combination of an action (kriyā) with various efficient causal factors or relations (kārakas) (such as kartṛ, karma, karana, etc.). A sentence is the relation between an action and its various contributory factors (kriyākārakasambandhādau vākye); and this action and its various causal factors are displayed in a sentence according to well-known and generally accepted
rules and conventions of syntax, which are as old as time (i.e., practically beginningless). And Vyāsa and other sages (like Vālmki) have strictly adhered to these well-known and generally accepted rules of sentence-structure (or syntax). In explaining the various syntactical relations in the sentences in the M. Bh. and other works and in explaining the meaning of the stanza nārāyaṇam namaskṛtya, etc., we take it for granted that in constructing these sentences, Vyāsa has strictly followed the generally accepted principles, and we proceed on this assumption at the time of reading the sentences in the M. Bh. and understanding their sense; and we have the satisfaction of having understood exactly what Vyāsa intended to convey. Thus, if we take it for granted that Vyāsa and others have followed the well-known and generally accepted (lokaprasiddha) laws of sentence-structure (as laid down by grammarians), we must also take it for granted that Vyāsa has also followed the well-known principle, generally accepted in circles of refined critics and scholars (vidagdhavidevatpariṣātsu), namely that a matter close to the heart (i.e., a matter of primary importance) should be conveyed by suggestion and not by direct expression (and that comparatively unimportant matters should be expressed directly). If Vyāsa and others have followed laukikaprasiddhi in the matter of sentence-structure, then we can safely assume that they must have followed vidagdhavidevatpariṣātsu-prasiddhi in the matter of conveying abhimatiṣṭravastu (i.e., a pradhānavastu) by suggestion (and an apradhānavastu by direct expression).
शान्तरस

स्वतितांतिविद्वत् कथो रघुशिष्णुद्वाचः। कविनिद्वायापारेण आखाद्योग्यवताप्राप्तारणेन
tथा कवित्वहदर्षसमस्मादः सामाजिकान वल्लरसस्वागिताय नीतिते तथा मौलाबिधानः
परमपुरुषार्थस्वच्छरीतिः किंतू रसस्वागिताय नानायितु स्तव्वत्वम्। या चासौ
tथामसा विचारतुः सैयात्र स्वाधिकारः। एततु चिन्त्यम् किनामासीः तत्तवानोऽस्थितो निर्वेदः
इति केलित। तथा हि—दास्विष्णुविद्वत्वानोऽया निर्वेदः तत्तत्त्वाय एवः
हेतुस्तत्तवानस्य वैरध्यायात। स्वाधिकारिकायेः चैतर्यमभागायं पञ्चितः। अन्यसा मानसिनिको
मूषितः तथा न परते। नुवयसं च व्यभिचारिनः शुभादश्री निर्धेषनु मुनिभवानाः सौमयायः
स्वाधिकारिकायेः। अत्येहं प्रयत्नं गुणात्मकायांत्वातः पञ्चितान्त्व शुभाविधाक्षणः अनु
जानान्ति। तत्तत्त्वानुजयश निर्वेदः स्वायत्तसन्योपदर्शः। महाभैरवविषयसिद्धिययः रघुशिष्णु
यः परमं स्वाधिकितः सु एवं कि श्याम्यसतानंगुर्द्वे।

इदं धमं पर्ययुघस्तः—तत्तत्त्वानोऽन्तर्देशाः स्वाधिकीत कथता तत्तत्त्वानमेवं
उक्तं स्यात्। बैरा बवलवीजादिद् कथं विमाक्तम्। तत्तत्त्वानाविति चैत राहिनात्करणं
तिवात्वालयवहरः। स चातिष्ठस्वलः। किथ्च निर्वेदः नाम संवागातिरपयतायाः बैराग
लक्षणः। स च तत्तत्त्वानस्य प्रतिच्छोदनोभेऽ। बिर्चो हि तथा प्रवततेः यथाय तत्तत्त्वान
मुच्नातः। तत्तत्त्वानाविति भोः। न तु तत्तत्त्वान निर्नितेः निर्नितादि मोक्षं इति। ‘बैरागृवत
प्रतिक्षित्थः।’ इति हि तत्तत्त्वम्। न नु तत्तत्त्वानिति। सत्त्व छठतर्व वैराग्यं द्वारः।
तत्तत्त्वनिविष्णुक्तम्। ‘तत्पन्तु पुरुण्याविशेषतुणन्यम्’ इति। मध्येवम्। ‘तावदु जू वैराग्यं ब्राह्मणे
परा काष्ठः।’ इति तुम्हारणामृह स्वामश्चायाः। तत्तत्त्व तत्तत्त्वांत्वे तत्तत्त्वानमेवं
परिप्रेयमाणिमिति न निर्नितः। स्वादीं। किंतु तत्तत्त्वान्त्वे श्राव्याः भैरवः। यतो व्यभिचारिते
व्यायामानसे तस्यातो तत्त्वानविभिक्तवयमत्रस्योपदेशाः। सौम्यमुद्राः। यथा—
हृदा दुम्योक्ष्य्यानं स्वनमहत्तता गौरिती परेः
परिगम्यं। प्रभु दुश्मितीति स्यात्मरहितः।
कुशा बैराग्याशा विनिविष्णुविकारेऽ काचाकरेः
मया मुदृश्यं त्वं क्षणमध्यमा प्रणमताः।
इति तत्तत्त्वानुर्ध्वरूपस्य मूलवेदेन; एतत्र तत्त्व वश्याम्।

ननु महामायानुस्तुतो विनिविष्णु: तत्तत्त्वानात् प्रतिच्छोदन: हुं:हजनमसूचिता अश्रे
पादपदिः। महामहिषं: महामायानप्रतिच्छोद्यानात् परमस्य हृदमायश्चायां कारण
मुक्तम्। ननु तत: किरू:? ननु वैराग्यं निर्नितः? क प्रज्ञाम्? निर्निते हि शोकप्रभोः
प्रसररूपविचित्तितिविविष्णु:। वैराग्यं तु रागादिनां प्राच्छः। भवनु वा वैराग्येऽविनितः।
तथापि तस्य स्वकारणवादात् मध्यभाविनीसि न मोक्षे साथे सुत्रस्थानीयता प्रत्यादि
आचार्यन्। किंतु तत्तथानेनपि निषेधः इति शास्त्रवैदेश निबिद्धमात्र उत्तरे।
शामसािण्याः पर्यायं तु हास्यस्याः यथायताम्; सिद्धसाधनयः, श्रीकिण्काशीकिकलेन,
सामायणासाधरणतया च वैचोट्यां शामसािणेऽपि सुझािते। तस्मात् निषेधः शायाहितः।
अन्ये मन्यते र्यादया एवाहेत विष्णुविनिवेयोऽ उक्ता:। त एव कथितिवेदाविष्णु-
श्वातःश्रीकिण्काशीकिकिनाविनिवेयोऽसंशया: विष्णु यथा र्यादय। ततथ्य तमस्मादेऽत्र अन्तनेऽ
र्यादयः। तत्र अनायात्मनःदययलसामसिश्नया रतिरेव मोक्षाधिन्नमिति, सैव शाले शायानिीति।

यथोऽक्षः—

व्यक्तिसारिन्ते ऋषिः, आत्मसृज्ञान मानवः।
आयाम्येच स संतुः: तस्य कारः न विचयोऽ॥

इति। एवं संसारिण्यं बैढः प्रवर्तता:। बिष्णु च शरोदयं बिषायकयत:। सांसारिकं च
बौद्धात् अत्तदिर्शेन प्रवर्तता:। सांतियसमग्रेयकिनाव श्रीयम् आश्विनिततः। सर्वसार
बिषयस्यारंधू विष्णु:। सर्वज्ञास्माध्यम सर्वदेव:। जुगुस्मानस्य, अर्जुनसामालिङ्गवाद्माना
सामायणासाधरण निषेधितं रतियहासार्दीनां विस्मयान्तानां अन्तवतमय मध्यिसे
निषेधिनणीयम्। न च बौद्धानां संस्मतम्। यावदेव हि विष्णुदान्त भागानु परिश्रामणयति र्यादि-
शान्त्वेतिहे चतुर्वेदेः च तत्प्राचारणेऽत्र अन्यायरं संगीतीत, तात्मदेव तत्वनिर्विन्नकिचित्त्वेतुपत्तानां
र्यादीनामविहारायोऽेत्र। अत्याविचरयम्। एवविदिनां तु परस्येऽवर्तिहे विशारदानां, प्रत्येक
सामायिकं विशारधम्। तदुपरमेतादि तस्य तस्य शायाधिनं दिव्यतमाणं प्रत्युक्तमेव।
शायाधिनेत्र प्रतिशेषः र्यादिप्रवत्त्यान्यापेतेः। मोक्षस्तेवतायुः एवो वर इति चेतुः। श्रीमकं
भौवल भौर्येऽिेशे वस्तात॥

अन्ये तु पाणकसंभासानां प्राप्ता: सर्वेऽत्र श्रायदोऽः शायिन हस्याद।।
बिषायस्यारंधू आयाम्येत्र अन्येऽत्र च विरोधादि एतदिप न मनोरमम्।

कस्तत्र्येत्र शायिन्? उच्छोैः। इह तत्त्वातोऽयदुक्त तत्त्वातोऽयदुक्त मोक्षे
शायिता युता।। तत्त्वाः च नामान्त्रास्त्रेत्र अन्योस्मृतविविधानेत्र ज्ञानम्।।
परो बौद्धमान अनामम्य स्वाद।। विष्णुस्तैं चतुर्वेदम्युः।। अर्जुनमध्यस्य ज्ञानेऽत्र
इति इह नातिविनायः कृत:।। तेन आमेन ज्ञाननदिमिविशिल्लहमीयायं पुष्करिंचितःचिरो-
पमोगानहिलोऽः शायिन्।। न चायाय शायिनवा शायियते कचन्वम्।। र्यादयो हि तत्त्वात-
णात्तेऽः त्र्यादेऽः प्रश्नायमिन्नसुब्धान्नेयम्।। कान्तनेत्र, कान्तनेत्र आपेतितया शायिनेप्राप्तम्।
भिदिसंभ्या: सन्त: स्थायिन इति उच्यते। तत्त्वान तु सकलभावातत्त्वभिदित्वातियं सन्त: स्थायिन सन्त: रत्नालिका: बिदित्वात: व्यभिचारियानवर् नियंगत एव सिद्धांश्यामिनितितित तथ वचनीयम्। अत: एव प्रथमाय गणना न युक्त। न हि खोर-मुण्डयोमयेषु तुर्तीमिति ग्रन्थद्यते। तेन एकाण्यादानालिका इत्याहंतः। असापि किम्यं न प्रथमानेति चेत्त प्रथम आयस्तायोगाविद्विति ब्रूम्ख॥ न हि रवायत: इत्तरतसंस्कृतेन बुधया तत्त्वालम्भरूपः जौत्तिकानुप्रतितिगोचरः। खण्डस्था मि अविद्यायूपं युग्मानन्तस्तु-संस्थितमा: चित्तवत्त्वातलक्षणेश्वराभावालित।

भास्तं वा वोके तथा। तात्त्वि न संभवभास्पानिनां गणयुः, रसेत्तुकेषु अनुप्येतः। अपि तु व्यभिचारिनेन व्यष्टियवर्षे निज्ययते, नेतरम्। तथा बेकारपहारा-
श्रद्धावैनितिते एव्यभिचारकोपरतित:। न चानाश्चवास्मावस्म व्यभिचारितम्। असंबन्धातु, अतिनिर्मलतद:। न नाम आलमस्वात:। न रामदेशेन मुनिना व्यपदिद्ध:। यदि तु स एव रामदेशेन व्यपदिस्यते, निषेधश्चेदेन वा, तव कोधिना:। केवले शमशिरज्ञकृत्वं निकितोपितै: दादित्वाद्विदित्वावानावर्ष्याबितिनिर्भर: निर्भरतताय:। स भवित। तत्रजाली: एव हेतुमेदेनस्य तदविदेशयो रतिभावाविदिन:। तदिदमाल्कसर्वेयुः तत्त्वान शाय:। तथा च यज्ञाल्प्योपराबिग्रहो एवाल्मो रत्नाद:। तदनुभेदापि शुद्धस्य रूपम्
अवपक्षान्तसमाधिकलादू अदिगम्य, व्युग्मेदापि प्रशान्तता भवित। यथोत्तमः ‘प्रशान्तवा-
hितातिंकाराद्’ इति। तत्त्वान्तमोशास्त्र्य च भास्निन: समस्तोभृथूः जौत्तिकारूपिक-निर्णाितिकनायो व्यभिचारितमेवति।
तदनुभेदा एव च यज्ञानांयुद्धकालू पुन्ननेत्रतु अनुमानवः
उपाध्यामन्त्वायख्यायत्रेषु च ये समानभिन्नता वहनते। अत पते पुत्रिष्यया एव। अयमेव
हि ख्यात:। विभावश्च अपि परमेषुनेतृप्रवृंभमवः, प्रभ्रोक्षुमुल्लखः रत्न मेदेनादभावाय:।
चैव यथा च रूपमा:। निर्मिते: निर्मिते:। ओप्तमाल्कस्तुमयोनि: प्रशान्तात: अर्थात:। तत्र शान्तेतु जुःसादावः। तथा च कालण्वीकरमानकाद्वूतेषु निबंधुत्तितिसंस्कृतेषु। व्यभिचारिताहंपि प्राप्तेन अवस्ताते, तथा साते जुःसादावः: सन्निहित: रागप्रतिलोकावः। तथा हि महात्ते यज्ञाऐवर्ष्यारभावम्, अनुभावादित्यमुदार्थ्यादितिस्तांत्स्तस्ते प्रानुप्रति: धर्म:। जुःसादानेत्रेन निजामस्तु च देवसरास पुत्रस्य: उपर्ययः। चार्मित्वं च कालण्वी
रत्नाकोपगम्यावात्मेश्च इति उपकाराविकाराज्यप्रशान्तस्थो
द्यापरपरायोद्विनिर्मित:लक्ष्म:। अत: एव एतटवभिचारीप्रविष्टै: केवलो: दयालविशेष
व्यपदिद्धति, अन्ये धृतिविशेषः।
नमुसाऽसहक्रामणः शान्तसचतुश्चरोधितिः प्रायः। श्रविष्णवते हि विरुद्ध-स्थाप्न नोऽभिविचितः, तलिचित विनेितः। ‘श्रय जादुक्रमः’ इथारः हि परोपकार-करणेः दुस्सत्यसृष्टिः प्रक्रिया कःसेः। न तु उसाहशुम्या कारचिद्विवश्या; इत्याध्यायन्वय-लिङ्केिण पापांिण्यतापेः। यत् एव च परिपरावरत्वेः स्वामोदेशेन कर्त्त्वानंतः नाव-शिष्यः। अत एव शान्तहरुः परोपकारावर शरीरस्विर्धिः बिद्यादिर्मानं शान्तविरिः।

‘आलमाने गोपायेन्’ इथारः व्यक्तस्य विरुद्धविषयं शारीरस्यमुपादिस्येत्, सन्यासिनां तद्विनितािप्यथािभावात्। तथा हि—

धमरथिकाममभाग्याणां प्राणः: संस्यितिहेतुतः।

तातिपन्तवा किं न हत रक्तता किं न रश्कितम्।

इति ध्वस्तसिद्धचुर्णिसारसपण्वेऽदेहरक्षया निद्राः दशितम्। वृक्षक्षया जोडः श्रेये वा प्रवेदितिः संयासिः श्रवणात्। तथारक्षणीतिः स्थायं शरीरम्। यदि परायं लघेिते तद्व विचित्रो न संग्राहितं महतः? जीयुमुदगानादीहः न विचित्रितिः चेत्, किं तेन नः?

तावदासमालं तावदासमालस्य। अन्यथा देहायमानिनां देश एव सर्वस्मृित्ते धर्माशः दिशेन परायं लघेेः असर्वायुमाराित। युद्धधर्म किं न बीरस्य देहायमानिनमेऽः; खराज्जोऽदेशेः वर्णेः। मुगुत्तथाविद्यायणां श्रमतरेवात्सरत्सरविद्याविशेष्यां विजुम्भेः। तव, स्वामोदेशेन परायं लघेेः यथावेषेिति देहायमानिनमुपादिस्यादानादि तददवह्वात्मवचनानामस्तुमायरेिनेिति। तेषां तदाधिकािनिः। शामानिः सर्वाः श्रेयेितु मुक्तिपविति स्त्रन्तिच्छु श्रितेिच्छु च। यथोक्तम्—

‘देवाच्यनरसदशतर्वचालनिधिः’ तिमिरियः।

आदेि गुल्मच्छु हि मुचते।

इति। केवलं परायंसिद्धविजातः धमरथिति परोपकारामकरकवेशेऽव अभियविनात् पुनरपि देहस्य तदुपुितस्य प्रातन्त्वंतो बोधिसत्वचादीनां तत्तत्त्वानित्तानामपि।

दद्। अख्वत्रिव विश्रान्तिहाः। खमाखमूऽचित्ताः, यथा रास्य वीर्ये शुचिमां शुचिमा शुचिमां।

इति। एवं श्रुताश्रयक्रिाः मन्त्वम्। अत एव शान्तस्य स्मायवेक्ति अप्रात्तां अयायस्यम्। जीयुमुदगानेिति विवःितं चेति परोपकार्यन्ताः। फलवातु। अनेनवागायेन नात्तकल्याणेः बक्षिते—‘कृत्तिविनासादिरिणः’। इति। अनेन हि कृत्तिविनासप्राप्तामथ्यकामायणं सर्वेऽ चैव चारितं मुख्यः सख्तहरुः सख्तहरुः सख्तहरुः च। तत्र बिनेवागायेन नात्तकल्याणेः नात्तकल्याणेः नात्तकल्याणेः।

इति। अनेन हि कृत्तिविनासप्राप्तामथ्यकामायणं सर्वेऽ चैव बिनेवागायेन नात्तकल्याणेः नात्तकल्याणेः।
अनेक तु जीमूतवाहन: ‘कस्ते पुत्र नाता भविष्यति’ इति शरणार्धिनां इवत्रमेव जालवान्। शर्मिख्याय न काचित्। परिहर्षा च न काचिदिर्देश्यमाहः। तदामृत्यमेव; न हि वेधितस्तवा मुन:। अमुकानामकामनीक्षितामभिसंख्यानातुप्राचिन्ह शर्मिख्याय इति। न च कारताहीपञ्चम्य शाक्तमुदश्चाति। तत् सिद्धेद्वाल्ल्यान: हुस्यसाधोऽन्न प्रत्याचार्यः।

अनेक तु व्यभिचारिणो यथायोंग: भवतावति। यथोत्तमः ‘तत्त्वदेव प्रत्याचारिणो संस्कारण्य: ’ इति। अत: एव निधेषस्तवादस्माभावमात्र इति प्रत्युत्तमः। यदा तु पर्यःतम्भिकालाभेदः नुमाभावमात्रः; तदार्थ अयोध्यः, रतिश्चोकार्यपि नानादशायाम: अप्रकृतस्य युजवातः॥

हदासमावदेऽद्विते तथा अविन्ततव्यानकीसंस्कारसालिनां भवेऽयै। यद्यक्तः ‘ मोक्षा चापिन विरागिणः’ इति। सरस्य न सर्वत् दन्यायान्तः; मधानके खिश्रुकर्मरावातः। ननु गतविषिद्ध प्रयोऽग वीरस्य क आस्थः। उत्पातः — यताय निवच्यते, तत्रावर्य पुरुषार्थयोगः गिंगित् वृजानरीवान्यमात्मायेव। तत्रिक्ष्यस्तवामागः। यथाप्रक्रियारूपः। प्रत्यास्तत्तुनिक्षिप्तसंतरसङ्ग्रामः प्रायाः। भिन्निक्षिप्तसाध्वान्त: एव रुपसः। मेम्म्यतनों निम्मित्वमिति केवलः।

तस्मादैतः शान्तो रसः। तथा च चित्रतानुसारकेषु ‘ स्थायिबालान सरस्यमुच्ये भायः;’ तथ्यन्तरे शान्तो नाम शास्त्रार्थिभवायमाक इवादि शान्तःक्षणं पावः। तन सरस्यान्त: शान्ताप्राय प्रायाः। विप्रभयाद् विप्रितः। तस्मात्तातायेव: केवल वासान्तः नरसिंहितिति इति। अत: सर्पास्तिकुतवायमाय पूर्वमामनम्। भोके च पृथक पृथक् सामान्यस्य गणनमिति स्मायस्य पृथकः नोतः। भानंदेनापि च विवेचनेन पुरखेऽग गणनीयमिति विवेचकासमाजसारिकास्तबत्र्याणामन्त्रीसङ्ग्राहितिश्रुतिनिविषयत्या स गृहमूल: एव। इत्यादिः।

पुराणामिनित्वकोशादि च नव रसः। श्रृयुन्ते, श्रीमिव्यायानसाहास्यचपिनै। तथा चोकम्—

‘अयोध्य'धातुतां दासान्ता श्रुत्यार्दिनी प्रदर्शेत।

मयेष्ये च देवदेवस्य शाल्ल्यो रूपेन प्रदर्शेत।

तस्य च बृहायसंसारबीलादिको विभावः। स हि तेघविनिवध्वाहिण:। नेक्षाब्रह्मचित्ताद्योऽस:। निविन्दितसंन्यातायाम: व्यभिचारिण:। अत: एव इवविदिधानविभय:। भक्तिःक्षेत्रः शृङ्गितमिति पुरुसाहातुप्रथिवितेऽप्रेमवाङ्मिति न तत्य:। पृथक्कः प्रकृतः गणनम्। अत: समस्तकारिकः—
यद्यपि हास्यशास्त्रीयरूपः प्रदातवेच कर्तव्यें मनोरथं। तत्रात्र भवते। 'दीर्घकायोति:' इति भावना क्षणपरं सौंदर्यानं तारंगिं, तद्रुढःत्वम् शाश्वस्त्य संभावनेन न, किं निषेध्येन। शाश्वस्त्यसंभवे दीर्घकायोतिं निर्लभस्य किं व्यक्तिदृष्टिः। शाश्वस्त्यज्ञानें नरस्युर्धुरुपम् इति द्वादश तत्र प्रसंगः।

नन्दनु कर्णनिमित्तमाणाक्ष्यानान्यान्यानेन पादेन्यं व्यक्तिदृष्टे।

नैतकः, सातोरातिहिनिग्रंथितसंधि इत्यनैवः तत्कारणः। शाल्ये तु सातोरातिहिनिग्रंथिति न तद्धक्षेत्रेऽपेक्षामैव। तेन विद्युक्तं प्रश्नतु हास्यस्त्य सद्वत्रावेच विच्छमः।

शाश्वस्त्य प्रसंगेश्वरम्: संभाव्य एव। तद्धेति च हास्य इति तयोरेऽपि प्रतिपेधः। कृत्ति: प्रातिलकायः।

सर्वसामायाच विद्यविद्या केनद्रविलापानमुनिरत्मपथं तत्कथित्वत्मिति श्रेष्ठः।

उपाधिस्तु हास्यस्त्य शाश्वस्त्यः। सत्वनारायणहस्तम्: (?)।

बिभक्तिकाले वास्तव वैविवेकाति (?)। अति एसा शास्त्रसूचनाम गच्छितम्। वामनोपाध्यायलिपि महाकर्षं सूर्याधार्यमितिधुत्वातपरं चोपपुन्मिति अथभावित्वमात्रं।

तत्रात्त्विकम् कीर्ति:। उच्चते — उपरागदायिमिः। उत्ताराहस्तादिपुरकरं बदामस्वरूपः पदेश विद्यदिविभिरविनिर्मालरात्रिनिग्रंथिरात्रितिः। सत्यातिहिनिग्रंथितानं सुरूढःकालादोषायमेतति।

न्यायम् भास्मान्यं प्रकाशरक्षकं कालस्यप्रयोगप्रविधिः। स्वस्मानं सर्वसमानस्यात्रेऽक्षणेन कालस्यమूलसम्बन्धः।

तत्तायतोऽपि विच्छेदः।

प्राति नवेच रसाः। प्रमोनोपोगिक्षेत्रं रक्षानिपिक्षेत्रं वा इत्यतः उपरागदायिमिः।

तेन रसात्तरस्वरूपः पारंपरिसन्धिः। संध्यामितर्मृतः। इति यद्कर्षमं तत्रप्रकृमः। बाह्यः।

वैचार्य्ये च चेतास्त्यत्। आंद्रविशालिकः। स्वेदः। इति लक्ष्यते।

स्वेदः। हयरिष्पः। स च संयं। यथेइव इतिहोक्ते। इति इति यथेइव।

तथा हि शास्त्रम् माताप्रदेशः। श्रीममी। एते।

एते इतिहस्तु ध्यानालिपि।

प्रयोगमेत्याज्ञातिः। चोपपुन्मितिः।

उपरागदायिमिः।

एते इतिहस्तु ध्यानालिपि।

XVIII
The nature of śānta will now be explained according to those who follow the reading nava rasāḥ (nine rasas), (instead of the reading aṣṭau rasāḥ). In this connection some say that śānta is the śhayaibhāva of śānta and that it arises from vibhāvas such as ascetic practices, association with Yogins, etc. It can be represented on the stage by anubhāvas such as the absence of lust, anger, etc. Its vyabhicāribhāvas will be firmness, wisdom, etc. Others however do not accept this, because, they say, śāma and śānta are synonyms. Nor do they wish to relinquish the figure of 49 bhāvas (that was given by Bharata). Moreover, they say that it is proper for the vibhāvas such as the seasons, flowers, etc., to be connected with love, etc., which arise immediately after these (vibhāvas are apprehended). But ascetic practices, Vedic recitation, etc., do not immediately give rise to śānta. Should

1. The text used here is that given by Dr. V. Raghavan in the revised edition of "The Number of Rasas", published in 1967, p. 104 ff. All textual corrections will be found in the notes.

2. The three largest discussions in the Abhinavabhārati are all in the sixth chapter of the NS. (All of the seventh chapter of the Abhinavabhārati but the very beginning has been lost, which is a great misfortune, since Abhinava refers to it frequently. It must have been a large and important section of the A. Bh.). One deals with krāyāra, the other (ed. and tr. by Gnoi) is on the araisal of rasa, and this is the third. But Abhinava was to some extent aware that there was something artificial about the śāntaraśa section, for he says: ye punar nava rasāḥ iti paśhaiti, thereby clearly suggesting that this was a pāññāntaraśa, and not an established part of the text. (Note that at page 83 of the Lecana, Abhinava quotes the text of the NS that reads: ily aṣṭau nīya rasāḥ smrtāḥ, which shows that he must have regarded this as a more authoritative text.) He uses this same type of expression when discussing the god of śānta (buddha) and the colour (svachca). (See also A. Bh. p. 267: तेन प्रथम रसा। ते च चन। शान्तारासिनिनिर्दाहकिति तत्र प्रदल्लि। This on NS. VI 15, which gives the list as follows:

3. The forty-nine bhāvas are: eight śthāyibhāvas, eight nātivakabhāvas and thirty-three vyabhicāribhāvas. This means that the exact number of vibhāvas (which are really innumerable), and of anubhāvas, is not given. Of course Bharata does mention, for each rasa, its anubhāvas as well as its vibhāvas, though he does not separately enumerate them in a Kārikā.
one argue\(^1\) that ascetic practices, Vedic recitation, etc., are the immediate causes of the knowledge of the truth, then, since the knowledge of the truth which precedes (\(\text{k\={a}nta}\)) is their (immediate) effect, they cease to be the \(\text{vibh\={a}vas}\) of \(\text{k\={a}nta}\). Even the absence of lust, etc., cannot be the \(\text{anubh\={a}va}\), because it is not conclusive evidence (of \(\text{k\={a}nta}\)), inasmuch as it is found to be present in \(\text{rasas}\) other than \(\text{k\={a}nta}\) as well\(^2\), and because it cannot be combined with a stage-representation (\(\text{prayoga}\)). After all, it is not possible to display a cessation of activity. For example, even the \(\text{anubh\={a}vas}\) sleep, swoon, etc., can be shown by actions like breathing in and out, falling down, lying on the ground, etc. (As for \(\text{vyabhic\={a}rabh\={a}vas}\)), how can firmness of mind, etc., which is accompanied by a desire for the attainment of objects,\(^3\) be appropriate to \(\text{k\={a}nta}\)? Those to be instructed cannot be taught how to attain the knowledge of the truth by means of a state of complete inactivity.\(^4\) Those people whose minds are pained by the sufferings of other people have not (yet) reached a state of tranquillity characterised by correct perception (of the highest truth), but rather they are (still) caught in the turmoil of worldly life.\(^5\) Therefore \(\text{s\={a}ntarasa}\) does not exist. The reply is

\(^1\) \text{Vibh\={a}va}\ can be equated with \(\text{k\={a}ra\={n}a}\), the immediate cause that arouse the \(\text{sth\={a}yibh\={a}va}\) of a \(\text{rasa}\). The argument here then is that Vedic recitation, etc., do not immediately precede the \(\text{sth\={a}yibh\={a}va}\) (\(\text{\text{k\={a}ma}\)) of \(\text{k\={a}nta}\). The \text{P\={u}rvapak\={s}\={i}n}\'s point is that if Vedic recitation, etc., are the immediate causes of \(\text{tattvaj\={a}na}\), then they cannot also be the \(\text{vibh\={a}vas}\) of \(\text{k\={a}nta}\), for they would be at one remove.

\(^2\) This line, \(\text{\text{s\={i}n\={i}t\={u}\text{d vib\={a}pak\={s}\={i}d a\={s}\text{\text{\textv\={a}s\={y}t\={e}t\={e}\text{\text{\textv}}}}}}\), is difficult. If we take \text{vipak\={s}\={a}} to mean “opposite” which is its usual meaning, the passage will make no sense, for then it will be saying that even in the emotion which is the opposite of \(\text{k\={a}nta}\) (i.e. “love”) there will be \(\text{k\={a}n\={a}dya\={b}h\={a}va}\), i.e., there will be no “love” in “love”! We will have to interpret \text{vipak\={s}\={a}} to mean “anything different from \(\text{k\={a}nta}\),” i.e., any other \(\text{rasa}\) besides \(\text{k\={a}nta}\). In other words, there is no \(\text{k\={a}ma}\), etc., in such \(\text{rasas}\) as \(\text{raud\={r}a}\) and \(\text{bhog\={y}\={a}s\={a}}\).

\(^3\) \text{P\={u}\={r}p\={a}t\={i}v\={i}\={s}\={a}g\={o}p\={o}r\={a}g\={a}}\, \text{Pandit Srinivasa Shastri of the Deccan College, who was kind enough to read over some of the more difficult passages with us, says that \text{upar\={a}g\={a}}\) here means \text{sambh\={a}nd\={h}a\={h}}\), so that the phrase will mean : यत्र विश्वास सांवतः: प्राणोऽभवत्। According to him, since \(\text{k\={a}nta}\) is a state of no mental activity at all, how can there be any contact with \text{vish\={a}yas} therein? But another interpretation is possible: \text{d\={h}\={r}\={i}\={s}i} is defined in the 7th ch. of the \text{N\={S}}. (Vol. I, p. 363, VII, 56) as arising from, among other things, \text{manorathal\={a}b\={h}}\={a}\). These are its \text{vibh\={a}vas} (note that for Bharata the \text{vyabhic\={a}ra-vibh\={a}vas} can become \text{sth\={a}yibh\={a}vas} and have their own \text{vibh\={a}vas}, etc., as \text{Abhinava} will point out later in this passage). Its \text{anubh\={a}vas} are : तांमामितत् दृश्यानि विधिवाणुः श्रीगते श्रीगते etc. Therefore we think it is possible to take \text{upar\={a}g\={a}} simply in the sense of \text{upabh\={o}g\={a}},” “pleasure,” and interpret as : “accompanied by a desire for the attainment of sense-objects”.

\(^4\) We interpret \text{ab\={i}n\={e}ch\={i}tr\={a}var\={a}m\={a}t\={r}a} here as the complete absence of any action, which is supposed to result from the state of \(\text{tattvaj\={a}na}\).

\(^5\) The point is that we can only sympathise with another person’s pain if we still identify with the body. For the \text{J\={i}\={e}\={i}\={a}n\={m}u\={k}ta}\ (i.e. the सन्तानष्टिःसमस्तसङ्गमाशांत्योऽवर्जनः)

(C)\^{Continued on next page}
as follows: 1. Just as in this world there is the triology dharma, etc., so also, it is quite well-known that mokṣa too is one of the goals of life, and it is found to be taught predominantly in the śāstras and in the smṛtis and itiḥāsas, etc., by specifying the means leading to its attainment. Just as the states of mind that are proper to love, etc. and expressed by such words as sexual love (rati) etc., by being made capable of being relished through the activity of the poet and the actor, are brought to the status of rasas such as kṛṣṇa, etc., in relation to the spectators who are possessed of the proper sympathetic response; in the same way, we ask you to tell us why the state of mind which is appropriate to the highest goal of man known as mokṣa cannot be

Continued from previous page.

—note how this phrase sanyādarsaṇa is often used in Buddhism in many variations sanyāgebhūti, etc.), such identifications are not possible. The main character of śānta dramas is supposed to be paramakṛṣṇabhinavakuta. The Purāṇapakṣa objects that this kind of sympathy is found in worldly life and not in transcendental mystic states.

1. We take atrocyate as Abhinava's own position. He is of course quite right in pointing out that mokṣa was already a well-known puruṣottama long before the NŚ. But that mokṣa should be prevalent in the smṛtis and itiḥāsas does not, ipso facto, establish any connection of it with literature. We must remember that for people like Abhinavagupta, the smṛtis and itiḥāsas were not literature in the strict sense of the word. Nobody, of course, would have argued that śānta in the sense of mokṣapuruṣottama does not occur in such works. The point was whether it could occur in the far more refined Nāyakas and Kāvyas. It simply never occurred to these older writers that one can apply the term literature to many of these works, as well as to a large number of purely religious works, e.g. the Mahāparinibbānasutta in Pāli, and several of the Sanskrit Mahāyāna Sūtras, e.g., the Vajracchedikā, or the Vimalakīrtivinirdeśa (not available in Sanskrit, but recently so beautifully translated into French by Professor Éc. Lamotte). Even the Gītā, in spite of the fact that Ānandavardhana (p. 293) quotes the verse yā nīkā sarvabhūtaānām, etc., as an example of dhvani, was not really considered "literature" in the strict, and restricted, sense of the term that the Indians used it. This restriction was a great loss to the theory, for dhvani would have been more faithfully served, in illustrations, by passages from many of these religious or secular texts (e.g. the Brhadāraṇyakasūtra) than by the Nāyakas and the Kāvyas, many of which were artificially composed to conform to a given rasa and its definition by Bharata. One has only to think of some of the literary passages in the Upaniṣads (e.g. Satyakāma Jābala, or Raikva with the Cart) to realise how much the Indians lost by such a restriction. If later writers like Jagannātha Pāṇḍitarāja widened the definition of kāvyam (ramaṇīyārthapratiṣṭāṇāh kādāh kāvyam) it still does not mean that they went for their examples to this non-literary literature. Viśvanātha comes closest when he says: vākyam rasātmakaṁ kāvyam, but even he never uses the vast literature that true obedience to such a phrase would make available. It was only the Bengal school of Vaiṣṇavism that opened itself to the influence of religious literature, but its purpose was more religious than it was aesthetic, and was confined, for the most part, to such works as the Bhāgavatapurāṇa.

(One thinks of some of the fine examples that Madhusūdana Sarasvati, a strict Advaitin, chose from the Bhāgavatapurāṇa in his Bhāgavadbhaktīrasayanam.)
raised to the status of a *rasa*? That state of mind just described is indeed the *sthāyībhāva* of *śānta*. But one must consider what its name is. Some say that it is complete detachment (*nīrveda*—world-weariness) that is born from a knowledge of truth. For this detachment is quite different from the detachment that arises from poverty, etc., because its cause, viz. knowledge of the truth, is different. It was for this very reason (i.e. because *nīrveda* is the *sthāyībhāva* of *śānta*) that it has been mentioned (by Bharata) midway between the *sthāyībhāvas* and the *saṃcārībhāvas* (i.e. *vyabhicārībhāvas*).  

1. There seems to us no doubt in reading through the objections made against *śāntarasa* that the objectors had a real point. There is something about *ŚR* that forces it apart from all the other *rasas*. It is true, as the Pārvapākin argues, that we find that all people are open to love, to fear, to terror etc. (some more than others, and some only to certain emotions of course—as Abhinava points out in his commentary on the famous *rasaśūtra* of the *NS*, we have, in the course of our many lives, experienced all of the primary emotions, the *sthāyībhāvas*). But *śānta* is peculiar. Truly to be able to enjoy it, one must be religious (at least this was the Indian view—today we are more sophisticated: it is perfectly possible to be moved by a religious spectacle without feeling primary "religious sentiments"), and if the *śāntarasa* experience truly takes place during a drama, it must change our lives. It is not like the other *rasas*, which simply enrich us, provide great scope for our imagination, refine our sensibilities, in short do all the things that great literary experiences are supposed to do. It is not that it demands a suspension of judgment as do the other *rasas*, a momentary identification with different emotions. It means a complete reversal of our personality, what the Buddhists call *parādepti* (see the controversial article on this word by A. Coomaraswamy, "Transformation, Regeneration, Anagogy", in *Festschrift Ernst Windelband*, 1933). We believe that it was this difference, this sense of the "completely other" in *ŚR* that bothered so many literary critics in ancient India. While one sympathises with their hesitation, one can also understand the point of view of people like Abhinava, for whom these religious experiences were an integral part of their everyday life and especially of their literary life. Witness the great number of hymns attributed to people like Saṅkara, and the surviving ones of Abhinava and Ānanda. The conflict, the real conflict, which we see as one between the secular-minded literary critic and the religious-minded literary critic, never really came out into the open, except in this one argument over *ŚR*, for it was assumed, by all, that nearly everybody was religious. From our perspective, however, it is clear that some critics were more religious than others.  

2. *Nīrveda* can mean two things: it can have an ordinary, everyday sense of "disgust"; and it can have the more subtle and religious sense of "total detachment" from the world. Abhinava is here implicitly referring to this distinction.  

3. This is a very curious, and we believe, a very weak argument: Bharata has begun his list of the *vyabhicārībhāvas* (VII. 28, p. 356) with *nīrveda* at the top (*tatra *nīrvedo nāma dāridryasyādhi, etc.*). Now, it is said by "some people" as reported by Abhinava, that Bharata had great respect for the idea of the *maṅgala*, that is, beginning a new topic with an auspicious word. *Nīrveda* is not an auspicious word, therefore, Bharata (since he cannot be presumed to be in error), must have had some special intention in mind. According to these "some people" it is to show that *nīrveda* is actually a *sthāyībhāva* and also a *vyabhicārībhāva*. The view regarding the dual character of *nīrveda* as both *sthāyībhāva* and *vyabhicārībhāva* is expressed by Mamnaja in the *KP*, IV (p. 116, Jhalkikar's ed. BORI—see his comments, p. 116, last paragraph).
Otherwise (i.e. if nirvāda had not been intended by Bharata as the sthāyi-bhāva of sānta), the sage who had great regard for uttering an auspicious word at the commencement of a section of his work (mūṅgalika) would not have mentioned nirvāda at that place (i.e. he would not have put the inauspicious word nirvāda at the head of the list of vyabhicāribhāvas). When Bharata forbade the use of disgust (jugupsā) as a vyabhicāribhāva of śṛṅgāra, he sanctioned (by implication)\(^1\) the interchangability of the characters of the sthāyi-bhāvas, the saṃcāribhāvas, the sāttvikabhāvas, and the anubhāvas, in the case of all the 49 bhāvas as demanded by the requirements of a particular situation and as presented by the power of words and their senses. Nirvāda arises from knowledge of the truth and overwhems the other sthāyins. For only that (emotion) which is more highly stable than any of the other sthāyins such as love etc. which can tolerate co-existence with a variety of emotions,\(^2\) that alone (namely nirvāda), they say, can overwhelm other sthāyins.

They also raise the following objection: if nirvāda which arises from knowledge of the truth, is said to be the sthāyi-bhāva of sānta, [this amounts to saying that knowledge of the truth is the vibhāva (i.e. cause) of nirvāda], in which case how could vairāgya (detachment) and similar other things\(^3\) (e.g. samādhi, which have been mentioned as vibhāvas of nirvāda) be the vibhāva of nirvāda? If one were to claim that detachment, etc., become the vibhāva of nirvāda because they are the means of attaining to the knowledge of the truth, then it would mean that you are giving the name vibhāva to that which is the cause of another cause,\(^4\) and that would involve you in a great absurdity (since vibhāva means the direct cause of a sthāyi-bhāva and not the distant or remote cause). Moreover nirvāda is an attitude of rejecting everything (i.e. an attitude of not being attached to anything), and it

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1. The point is that normally jugupsā is the sthāyi-bhāva of bibhāva. It is not given in the list of the thirty-three vyabhicāribhāvas, but the very fact that Bharata says that it should not be used in love shows that he felt that it could be a vyabhicāri-bhāva as well as a sthāyi-bhāva. He therefore, felt that under certain circumstances, ordinary vyabhicāribhāvas could become sthāyi-bhāvas, and sthāyi-bhāvas could become vyabhicāribhāvas. This is an important point. Abhinava has expressed a similar view in the Lōcana on the third Uddyota of the Dveṇyaśāstra, while commenting on bahūnaṁ samavetānām, on p. 380 of the B. P. ed.

2. Bhāvavākhyasaḥpātaḥ, "which can tolerate co-existence with a variety of emotions". Does this mean that whereas rati, etc., can tolerate the presence of other sthāyi-bhāvas, nirvāda the sthāyi-bhāva of sānta cannot?

3. We take sādhāraṇa to mean sādṛśa, just as sājātiya is taken to mean sādṛśa. Literally it means "coming from the same seed", i.e. the same source. The word ādi in the compound vairāgyasādṛśa (i.e. vairāgyasādṛśa) is redundant. We have, therefore, ignored it in the translation.

4. Again, vibhāva cannot mean both "a cause" and "cause of the cause". See page 121, note 1.
would on the contrary be helpful to the emergence of the knowledge of the truth (i.e. far from being the effect of the knowledge of the truth, it would be a cause leading to it), because a detached person will strive in such a fashion that the knowledge of the truth arises in him. And mokṣa comes from a knowledge of the truth. It is not that one knows the truth, and then feels detached, and from that detachment mokṣa would arise. For Īśvarakṛṣṇa says:

"From detachment comes (only) prakṛtilaya, (i.e. dissolution into the eight causes, pradhāna, buddhi, abhākāra, and the pañcatanmātras, and not mokṣa"). Objection: "Everywhere one sees a very great detachment on the part of those who know the truth. Even Patañjali has said:

"Thereafter from that knowledge of the truth (puruṣaṅkhyāti) arises an extreme aversion to the guṇas (i.e. detachment)". That is true (bhavaty evam). But Patañjali himself has said: "Such detachment is really the highest state (kāśṭhā) of knowledge." Thus, then, knowledge of the truth (leading to aversion according to Yogasūtra I. 16) means nothing but knowledge of the truth reinforcing itself from state to stage. And so nirvāda is not the sthāyibhāva of kāśta. On the other hand, knowledge of the truth alone would be the sthāyibhāva. As for right perception, which will be mentioned (by Bharata) while describing nirvāda as a vyabhiçārabhāva, as a bhāva of

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1. Sākhya-kārikā 45. This means that if a person has vaśrūga only, but no knowledge of the truth, he becomes, on his death, dissolved into the eight causes (namely, pradhāna, buddhi, abhākāra and the pañca-țanmātras) but he does not obtain mokṣa. Thus, it would seem that Īśvarakṛṣṇa holds the view that vaśrūga does not directly lead to mokṣa.

2. Yogasūtra, I. 16.

3. Vyāsa's Bhāṣya on the Yogasūtra, (Ānanda-gama ed. p. 20). Patañjali, the author of the Mahābhāṣya, is considered to be an incarnation of Śiva (bhūja-bhūṣita). Therefore it would seem that Abhinava thought Patañjali the author of the Yogasūtras to be identical with the Patañjali of the Mahābhāṣya (which of course he is not). Raghavan has pointed out (p. 106) that the quotation is not from Patañjali, but from Vyāsa. Did Abhinava simply make an error in the ascription, or did he believe that Vyāsa and Patañjali were one and the same? See V. Raghavan, "Abhinavagupta and the Bhāṣya on the Yogasūtra", A. O. R. Madras, Vol. XII, Part II, 1938-39.

4. This passage: किं तत्त्वज्ञानाः स्वभूतिः नवेदः is Abhinava's own position, Bhaveti here must be used (according to Pāṇini III. 3, 161) in the sense of bhavitum arhati.

5. Tattva-jñānamāṁśā means a series or succession of tattva-jñānas. The idea seems to be that the tattva-jñāna referred to by the word puruṣaṅkhyāti in Yogasūtra I.16 is a lower tattva-jñāna which grows or develops into a higher stage of tattva-jñāna (referred to by the word guṇa-sūrtyan in the Yogasūtra). Idam tattva-jñānam therefore would mean: युग्मभृत्त्व-प्रत्यक्षक्षण-तत्त्वस्मादिनि तत्त्वज्ञानार्थिः परिरोध-प्रत्ययमयम्, उपर्युपरी विभवक्रश्च नीवमानम्.
nirveda, and which leads to the dissipation of the attitude of acceptance (or attachment to unworthy objects) on the part of a person who has been deceived by a delusion of long standing, as exemplified in the following stanza:

"In vain did I milk a bull mistaking it for a cow bending under the burden of her full udder; in vain¹ did I embrace an ugly eunuch thinking him to be a young girl; in vain did I cherish a longing for a piece of glittering glass thinking it to be beryl. All this I did when bemused as I was, I bowed to you, a miser unable to appreciate merit"—well, that perception of truth has been mentioned as a vibhāva (cause) of only the ordinary kind of nirveda² whose nature is sadness (arising from a realisation of one's stupidity in wasting energy in a worthless cause).³
We will speak of this (perception of truth) there⁴ (i.e. in the seventh chapter while commenting on the section on nirveda). Objection: "Attachment to the sense-objects is rooted in false knowledge. It will cease when knowledge of the truth arises."⁵ This is what the revered Akṣapāda has

1. The second comparison in this poor verse (it is interesting that it is the only verse quoted by Abhinavā in the whole Śiśutarasa section. It is strange that he should have chosen to give no effective examples of Śiśutarasa, considering that there was such a large variety to choose from, and it would have been very much to the point) is somewhat odd, for if the "boy" was lāvanyarāhitak, we can only assume that he was embraced due to inadequate lighting!

2. Samyagjñāna, therefore, means here only a worldly kind of "right knowledge" and is not used in the higher sense of the term.

3. This is a reference to NŚ VII, 28, pp. 356–357. Abhinava's point seems to be that nirveda as a vyahāracīrvibhāva is the ordinary kind of worldly nirveda (kchedāpani) while nirveda as a sthāvibhāva is a higher, philosophical nirveda. It is, however, interesting to note that among the vibhāvas of nirveda, Bharata mentions tattva-jñāna. At NŚ VII, 30 (O. O. S. Vol. I, p. 357) Bharata says:

बत्तवज्ञानात् तु निष्टादेवो तदात्मात्मानमुक्ते॥
बोधीय ध्यानपरो भवित हि निष्टादेवो पुरुषः॥

The idea here seems to be that nirveda is to be acted out by means of, among other things, absorption in thought (dhyānaparāte) similar to that of a Yogin. However, it does not follow that Bharata had any religious notion about nirveda while writing this stanza, although it is true that the term tattva-jñāna will then be puzzling.

4. The promised discussion is not available. Unfortunately this section of the seventh chapter of the Abhinavabhāratī has never been found. The editor (Kavi) writes (p. 347):

एवतसत्मती नवमय्यायपपयते यस्यो नोपपद्यम्।
बद्वद्वयभवस्स्यां न्युत्पादतुष्णान्त:।
मनवाय प्रयत्नानात्मसां बुद्धितत्वा अवस्थायामां नोपपद्यते लोकं
उस्मेदर्द्विचिन्ताचार्यां नित्यं ध्यातामुस्मेदर्द्विचिन्ताम्
सुमृतारससांस्यामसां सामसायत्त्वमार्द्विचिन्ताम्
सवसामसां यात्राधाराय रविवत्त्वे यथायां तत्रविवत्त्वमार्द्विचिन्ताम्।

However, Kavi did not live to fulfill his promise.

5. This is a reference to Nyāyasūtra, I. I. 2: दुःस्वम्भूविन्दूविन्दायमेकाध्यायनवः
जुनयेतापायः तदनन्तरापिवानन्तरभिधवायाः। The upshot of the preceding argument based on the

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said in his Sūtra beginning with the words duṣkha-jānman etc., when he says that knowledge of the truth is caused by the removal of false knowledge and that it is further the cause of vairāgya which is of the nature of the removal of all faults (doṣa) (such as attachment to worldly pleasures) "So what?" "Well, vairāgya and nirveda are the same thing (and therefore, nirveda is the sthāyin and tattva-jñāna is a vibhāva)". Who says so? For nirveda is a certain state of mind which is characterised by a flow of sadness, whereas vairāgya is the complete destruction of rāga, etc. (including soka, i.e. vairāgya is a higher form of detachment than is nirveda, for the latter is often used non-technically to mean simply "weariness" or "disgust"). Even granting that vairāgya and nirveda are identical, still Gautama placed it in the midst of several (other causes of mokṣa) and did not mention it as the immediate cause of mokṣa (for it is only the remote cause), and so it does not follow that according to Akṣapāda nirveda, that is, vairāgya, is the sthāyibhāva of īśānta). Moreover² to say that nirveda arising from tattva-

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sūtra of Akṣapāda is that mithyā-jñāna-paśca-ga leads to tattvajñāna and tattva-jñāna leads to vairāgya. The opponent thinks that vairāgya is the same thing as nirveda. Hence according to Akṣapāda the causal chain is: mithyā-jñāna-paścaga gives rise to tattva- jñāna which gives rise to nirveda. So, this means that according to Akṣapāda, nirveda leads to mokṣa and hence, nirveda (and not tattva-jñāna) must be regarded as the sthāyibhāva of īśānta. Now, the opponent challenges the position that vairāgya and nirveda are identical, and then proceeds to point out the difference between nirveda and vairāgya. He says that nirveda is a particular attitude of mind which is of the nature of unbroken sadness (soka-prakāraṇaprasarasa), while vairāgya is the destruction of rāga, deesa, moha, etc. The opponent of kṣetinmata (this refers to the view mentioned on p. 105 of Raghavan's text, that nirveda born of tattvajñāna is the sthāyibhāva of īśānta, see footnote 2, p. 123, above) first challenges the position that vairāgya and nirveda are identical. But then he concedes it for the sake of argument in the sentence bhavatu va vairāgyam eva nirvedah. Even granting that nirveda and vairāgya are identical, it does not follow that according to Akṣapāda nirveda (i.e. vairāgya) is the sthāyibhāva of īśānta. For although nirveda has a place in the causal sequence given above (the whole chain is: mithyā-jñānapaścaga) (i.e. tattva-jñāna leads to duṣkha-paścaga (i.e. nirveda or vairāgya), which leads to pravṛtti-paścaga, which leads to jñānapaścaga, which leads to duṣkha-paścaga, which leads to mokṣa), still it is not actually stated in the Sūtra to be the direct cause leading to mokṣa, but rather it is given as a remote cause (mokṣa sādhyo sūtra-adhikāra eva pravṛtti-paścaga ācārya). Thus according to the opponent of kṣetinmata, the authority of Akṣapāda cannot be cited in support of the view that nirveda is the sthāyibhāva of īśānta. For if at all anything is to be the sthāyibhāva of īśānta, it must be the direct and immediate cause of mokṣa.

1. The question mark in Raghavan's text after nantu vairāgyam nirvedah should be removed.

2. This is a complex passage. Kimc tattva-jñānapaścaga etc. is the position of the Siddhāntin, that is, of Abhinava. It is an objection against the kṣetinmata (namely that tattva-jñānapaścaga is the sthāyibhāva of īśānta). The essence of the objection seems to be that the words denoting the sthāyibhāva and the rasa become

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Others believe that only eight mental states have been mentioned (by Bharata), such as love, etc. Those same mental states when depending on extraworldly vihāvas such as śruta (study of the scriptures and especially of the Upaniṣads), which are different from the ordinary (kathita) vihāvas, become indeed unusually lovely (vicīra). And from out of their midst one can become the sthāyin here (i.e. in the case of kāntaraṣa). Out of them (tātra), rati alone, having for its object one’s own Self consisting of undisturbed bliss, is the means of attaining mokṣa. And so, that rati itself is the sthāyin in kānta. For it has been said:

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synonymous, which is improper. The next sentence continues the view of the Siddhāntin: शम्भविन्धव: पवित्र्येव तु हास्यास्यां स्थायिनम्. I and contains within it the objection that the Purvapakṣin might make, namely that hāsa and hāsyā are synonymous as well. Abhinavā replies that this has already been explained. But now what follows does not make sense as it is explained as the view of the Siddhāntin. For Abhinava says: शम्भविन्धव: पवित्र्येव तु हास्यास्यां स्थायिनम्। Now why does Abhinava say this; for it only lends support to the Purvapakṣin? Moreover tasāna na nīvedaḥ sthāyiti does not follow from it. On the other hand, if we take the words śamahāntayok, etc., as stating the view of the Purvapakṣin, the next sentence tasāna na nīvedaḥ sthāyiti presents a real difficulty. For if the Purvapakṣin is speaking, and has just made a valid point, it makes no sense for the Siddhāntin to reply by saying: “therefore our position is proved”. Thus both solutions are unsatisfactory.

1. Note that on p. 268, Vol. III, NS, nīveda is given as the sthāyin of kānta!

2. We cannot ascertain any difference between laukika and alaukika on the one hand, and sādharaṇa and asādharaṇa on the other, such that Abhinava would be justified in using both terms. Surely sādharaṇa and laukika mean precisely the same thing.

3. Raghavan reads tāta eva. But the Baroda ed. has ta eva (i.e. te eva) which seems to us a better reading.
"That man whose love is centered in the Self, who is gratified in his Self, and who takes all delight in the Self — for such a man there is nothing any longer to be accomplished."  

In the same way, any of the sthāyibhāvas beginning with rati and hāsa and ending with vismaya can be explained as the sthāyibhāva of śānta, because we find that a person attains to liberation if he realises the oddity of everything in the world (hāsa); if he sees that the whole world is lamentable (kōka); if he perceives the happenings in the world as harmful to his spiritual well-being (and, angry with them, desires to conquer them) (krodha); if he resorts to extraordinary energy dominated by the absence of delusion (in order to overcome worldly temptations) (utsāha); if he feels afraid of all the objects of the senses (bhaya); if he feels disgust for young women, etc., though they are desirable for all other people (jugupsā); if he feels astonished at his unprecedented realisation of his own self (vismaya). And Bharata agrees with this position. For while (Bharata) enumerates particular bhāvas by using words like rati, etc., and includes thereunder other varieties of the same by using the word ca, he does admit their ability to lead to liberation, provided that they are the result of extraordinary causes (i.e. vibhāvas) different from ordinary causes. But in the case of those people who hold this view (namely that any one of the sthāyibhāvas such as rati, etc., can be the sthāyibhāva of śānta), the different sthāyibhāvas would cancel each other out and so not even one of them could be regarded as the sthāyibhāva of śānta. If it is said that the different sthāyibhāvas can be the sthāyibhāvas of śānta because of the different approaches leading to it, that is (as good as) already refuted. (Further), because of the different sthāyibhāvas of śānta depending on the approaches of the persons concerned, there would be an infinity of śāntarāsas. If it is said

2. All eight of the sthāyibhāvas can be accepted as the sthāyibhāvas of śāntarāsa. For instance, hāsa can become the sthāyibhāva of śānta, if we look at everything around us as vaiśrava, "odd" or "deformed" (note that the Vidūṣaka, the main representative of hāsa, is described in the texts as being deformed and thereby amusing), etc. Rati is considered in the sentence immediately preceding the quotation from the Gitā.
4. Ca refer to NS, VI, 17, which enumerates the eight sthāyibhāvas and uses a ca after hāsa and kōka. According to Abhinava, the use of the particle ca is intended to convey the inclusion of other varieties of the eight sthāyibhāvas. It is not however clear what these varieties are.
5. Does caid (in na ca itan muren na sammatam) refer to the interchangeability of evahitiṣṭhībhāvas and sthāyibhāvas; or to the fact that the sthāyibhāvas of other rasas can induce an attitude leading to mokṣa?
that there would be only one \( \text{kāntarasa} \) (and not countless \( \text{kāntarasas} \)) because of its being the cause of one single result, namely \( \text{mokṣa} \), then even \( \text{vīra} \) and \( \text{raudra} \) would have to be regarded as one \( \text{rasa} \) because both lead to one single result, namely destruction (of one’s enemy). Others say that all the \( \text{sthāyibhāvas} \), \( \text{rati} \), etc., become merged together, just as (different flavours merge together) in a beverage, and when so merged they become the \( \text{sthāyibhāvas} \) (of \( \text{śānta} \)). But because different states of mind cannot co-exist at one time, and because (some) are mutually antagonistic, even this is not a very attractive thesis.

What then is the \( \text{sthāyibhāva} \) of \( \text{śānta} \)? The reply is as follows: knowledge of the truth alone is the means of attaining \( \text{mokṣa} \) and so it would be proper to regard that alone as the \( \text{sthāyibhāva} \) of \( \text{mokṣa} \). Knowledge of the truth is just another name for knowledge of the Self. The knowledge of any object other than the Self is the knowledge of worldly objects. For anything that is different from the Self is nothing but non-self. Our teacher has dealt with this at great length. And we have gone into it in some detail elsewhere, and so at this moment there is no point in dilating. Therefore,

1. \( \text{Eko rasaḥ means kāntarasa since the whole of the preceding discussion} \)
   is concerned with \( \text{kāntarasa} \) and is intended to show how all the \( \text{sthāyibhāvas} \) can be
   connected with \( \text{kāntarasa} \). To this it was replied, on p. 108, that (1) the different
   \( \text{sthāyibhāvas} \) would cancel one another out, with the result that there would be not a
   single \( \text{sthāyibhāva} \) for \( \text{śānta} \), and (2) such a view would lead to not one \( \text{rasa} \) (called
   \( \text{kāntarasa} \)) but to an infinite number of \( \text{kāntarasas} \) depending on the divergent atti-
   tudes and approaches of different persons. The opponent replies to this by saying that
   since all these \( \text{sthāyibhāvas} \) (helping the emergence of \( \text{kāntarasa} \)) would lead finally
to \( \text{mokṣa} \), there would not be an infinity of \( \text{kāntarasas} \), but only one. To this the reply
   is given on p. 109: “In that case since both \( \text{vīra} \) and \( \text{raudra} \) lead to a single result,
   namely destruction of one’s enemy, they too would have to be regarded as constituting
   a single \( \text{rasa} \)”.

2. The comparison with \( \text{pānakarasa} \) is used again and again, both in the
   \( \text{Lokana} \) and in the \( \text{Abhinavabhārati} \). Cf. A.Bh. p. 286: \( \text{पानकरसालोकसिद्ध} \).
   \( \text{दृश्य} \) शास्त्राते व्याख्याते. 1 See also the \( \text{NŚ} \), Vol. I, p. 287 ff.

3. After \( \text{অক্ষ} \) begins the \( \text{siddhānta} \) view.

4. The word \( \text{mokṣa} \) in the phrase: \( \text{शत्ति} \) \( \text{সমামেত} \) \( \text{স্বাস্থ} \) is odd. One
   expects \( \text{śānta} \).

5. \( \text{अक्ष} \) \( \text{अन्त्य} \) \( \text{लिखित} \) \( \text{सीम} \) \( \text{शास्त्र} \) is very clumsily worded. We think the
   distinction is between knowledge of the Self and ordinary knowledge (cf. the \( \text{Gītā} \)
   distinction between \( \text{vijñāna} \) and \( \text{jñāna} \)). Whatever knowledge is different from
   the Self is simply worldly knowledge, \( \text{jñāna} \). The next sentence, \( \text{paro hi evam} \) \( \text{ātman} \)
   \( \text{सत} \) \( \text{सत} \) is also very clumsy. How are we to understand \( \text{paro} \)? We would
   expect the noun governed by this adverb to be in the ablative: “different from the
   Self”. Raghavan records the reading \( \text{ātmanā} \), instrumental singular, which would
   also be irregular, but somewhat better than the nominative. Note that we read \( \text{vinyaya}-
   \text{syāt} \) instead of \( \text{vinyasya} \).

6. It is important to realise that at this point Abhinava abandons practical
   considerations of drama, and gives the philosophic base underlying his views on \( \text{śānta} \).
   It is not different from the philosophic justification of an Advaitin — the additions
   from his school of Kashmir Saivism are very slight.
the Atman alone possessed of such pure qualities as knowledge, bliss, etc., and devoid of the enjoyment of imagined sense-objects, is the sthāyībhāva of šānta. Its status as a sthāyībhāva should not be explained in the same terms as the status, as a sthāyībhāva, in the case of other sthāyībhāvas (i.e. there is a great difference between the Atman’s status as a sthāyībhāva and the other sthāyībhāvas’ status as sthāyībhāvas). For rati, etc., which arise and disappear due to the emergence and disappearance of their respective causes, are called sthāyībhāvas in so far as they attach themselves for some time to the canvas1 (wall) in the form of the ātman which is of an unchanging nature relative to them. But knowledge of the truth is the canvas behind all emotions, and so it is the most stable of all the sthāyībhāvas. It transforms all the states of mind such as love, etc., into transitory feelings, and its status as a sthāyībhāva, having been established by its very nature, need not be specifically mentioned. And therefore it is not proper to count (knowledge of the truth) separately (in addition to the eight sthāyībhāvas). Between a lame bull and a dehorned bull,2 bullness (which is the generic property present in both of the bulls) is not considered as a third thing. And so the number, viz. forty-nine, of the bhāvas is not disturbed. Should one demand to know why then knowledge of the truth is separately considered (as a sthāyībhāva) (by me, Abhinavagupta), we reply that it is so because it can be separately enjoyed.3 For whereas rati, etc., can be the subject of ordinary perception (in their pure form), without being mingled with anything else, the nature of the Self is (of course) not the subject of ordinary perception in its pure form without being mingled with anything else, the way rati etc., are. (But) even though in its pure nature it is of an indeterminate form, still when it is investigated at the time of the return from abstract meditation,5 it invariably appears as mingled with various mental states.

Or6 let it appear like that (i.e. let the nature of the Self appear as you say, soiled by the various mental states). Still you cannot consider as

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1. Is this comparison of the Ātman to the canvas of the painter found elsewhere? We know that it occurs several times in the Yogavaisñavacharāmāvatāra.

2. Muṇḍa cannot of course mean shaven here. The practice is to cut the horns of bulls so that they cannot harm anyone.

3. The reading as printed by Raghavan is: अस्थायी कर्म न प्रथमगमनिति वेत् प्रथमास्तादयोगदिति प्रमहे। But he notes readings in M. & G. which have: अस्थायी कर्म प्रथमगमनिति वेत् प्रथमास्तादयोगदिति प्रमहे, which seems to us to give a more rational sense. As for the next sentence, we think it means that the Ātman is not tāniśka-pratitiyogāvā as is rati, etc., because it is not mixed with any other form.

4. Svagatam means, according to Srinivasa Shastri, svasmin ātmani.

5. On svyutthāna, see Yogasūtras, III. 9, and III. 37.

6. It would appear from this concession, bhārataeva lōke tathā, that this is Abhinava speaking. This means that the last sentence in the preceding paragraph must belong to the Pārvapakṣa. But what precisely his point would be, we fail to see.
sthâyibhâvas all possible stable moods of the mind, for they are of no use so far as the (eight) rasas actually mentioned (by Bharata) are concerned. They rather deserve to be regarded as transitory feelings and not otherwise (i.e. not as sthâyibhâvas). And thus only can the statement (praghaṭṭaka) that there are in all forty-nine bhâvas be justified. This nature of the Self cannot be said to be transitory because it would be impossible, unimaginative (avacitrtyâvaha) and improper. Śama is the nature of the Self. Bharata has designated it (i.e. the nature of the Self) by the word śama. If that same (nature of the Self) is called śama or nirveda, there is no objection. Only (note that) śama is a different (kind of) state of mind (altogether). And this (special) nirveda is (only apparently) similar to the nirveda that arises from other causes such as poverty, etc. Although their causes are different, (nonetheless, because) they are similar, they are both called nirveda. This is similar (to what takes place in) love, fear, etc. (?)

Therefore the nature of the Self is itself the knowledge of the Truth, and it is also tranquillity. Further (tathā ca) rati, etc., are (only) particular dark colorations (kālusyoparāgaviṣeṣāh) of the Self (or of śānta?). Having by means of continued concentration realised its form as being pure, though connected with them (i.e. rati, etc.), there is even at the time of withdrawing from meditation (vyuttāna), complete tranquility (of the spiritual aspirant, the sādhaka). As has been said: prāśāntavāhitā sanskārāt. This entire collection of ordinary and extraordinary states of mind can become the helper of the major (emotion) known as knowledge of the Truth. Its anubhâvas are anubhâvas helped by yama, niyama, etc., and also the svabhāvabhānas which will be described in the three chapters beginning with upāngābhāna. And so they (i.e. these anubhâvas) are concerned with śāntarasa itself. This itself is its nature (i.e. the nature of śāntarasa). The vibhāvas are the grace of God, etc. And love etc., which are soon to be completely destroyed, can be aesthetically enjoyed in śānta (as subsidiary, momentary elements). Just as the vyabhicāra "eagerness" appears as important in love–durance–separation or even in love–durance–union, as said in the phrase: "love whose festivity never comes to an end"; and just as augrya, a vyabhicārin, appears as prominent in raudra; and just as nirveda,

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1. We simply cannot understand the simile ratibhāyādiriva.
2. Yogasūtra, III, 10. But we cannot understand what bearing this has on the word prāśāntatā used by Abhinava in the preceding sentence.
3. We cannot make out what svabhāvabhānas means. The phrase upāngābhāna means to chaps. VIII, IX, and X of the NŚ.
4. We are not sure we have understood ayam eva hi svabhāvena.
5. Drop the comma after paramesvarāṇugrahaprabhātayaḥ and add a full stop.
dhṛti (firmness of mind), trāṣa (fear) and harṣa (joy), though really vyabhicārībhāvas, appear as prominent in kārūṇa, vīra, bhayānaka and adbhuta; so in sāntarasa, jugupsā (disgust), etc., appear predominantly, since they are completely opposed to love. For in the mahāvrata (ceremony) one carries about a human skull . . . . . . . (obscure). At the time of begetting a son (by a widow) from her brother-in-law, anointment of one's own body (with oil) has been recommended with a view to creating a sense of disgust. For the man who has done all that must be done with regard to his Self, (i.e. who has realised the true nature of his Self), his efforts are all for promoting the good of other people, and so his energy takes the form of an effort that is prompted by the wish to help others. This is a synonym for compassion, and it is very intimately connected with sānta. And so some people call sāntarasa, dayāvīra (compassionate heroism) and some call it dharmavīra (religious heroism) because of the intensity of this energy (utsāha) which becomes its vyabhicārībhāva.

Objection: “Energy is based on egoism as its essence, whereas sānta consists primarily in a loosening of egoism.” (Reply:) It is not improper for an opposing mood to be a vyabhicārībhāva (in sānta), for we find, for instance, nirveda (as a vyabhicārībhāva) in love. In the verse “With the forest-ground overgrown with grass as my bed” and other similar stanzas, we find a high degree of utsāha in helping others. There is no state that is devoid of utsāha. For in the absence of desire and effort, one would be like a stone. And so because one has understood the higher (Self) and the lower (Self), there is nothing left to do with regard to one's own Self, and therefore, for those whose hearts are tranquil, to give their all-in-all, i.e. to give their bodies, for the sake of helping another is not contrary to sānta. “One should preserve one’s self,” such and similar advice is meant in the sense of guarding one’s body and is meant for those who have not realised their Self, because ascetics are not concerned with guarding their bodies at all. For it has been said:

1. The main point of this argument escapes us.

2. As Raghavan has noted, this passage is extremely corrupt. We are unable to make any sense of the lines तथा हि महामन्दन्ताकाचार्यामणसाहितेदिसकादिकार्यांति मवमें।

3. This is a reference to the fact that when levirate takes place, it should be without any sexual desire, but only for the sake of procreation. Therefore, in order to create a sense of disgust for the body, both partners smear themselves with foul-smelling oil. Jayarathna quotes a verse on this subject in his commentary to the Tāntraloka, Vol. XI, p. 73. (Part II).


5. Gautamadharmasūtra, I. 9, 35.
"The life-breaths (prāṇāḥ) are the cause of attaining dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa. When they are destroyed what is not destroyed? When they are guarded, what is not guarded? (i.e. all is guarded)."

1. Not traced.

2. We should keep in mind the legend, still current in Kashmir, (see Pandey, "Abhinavagupta", p. 23) that "one day Abhinavagupta ............Along with twelve hundred disciples walked into the Bhairava cave and was never seen again."

3. Jimūtvāhana was a Vidyādharā. Abhinava replies: so what?

4. Not traced.
result in the benefit of others, a reappearance of a body appropriate to that
(i.e. to those actions that they have performed).¹

Even in the case of rásas which occupy a subsidiary position (in a
poetic work), the attainment of “repose”² (i.e. aesthetic enjoyment) is
met with, because that is only appropriate to their nature (as rásas).
For instance, (in the Rámáyána), in the case of Ráma when he obeys
his father’s orders (and goes into exile), repose is met with in this,
though this aesthetic repose is only subsidiary. The same should be un-
derstood in the case of śvägará and other rásas (when they occupy a subsidi-
ary position in a poetic work). Hence although śántarasá³ has come to
stay ⁴ (in the Nágáṇanda), it is not the major rasa, because (in that play)
the achievement of the three goals of human life (dharma, artha and káma),
with special emphasis on helping others, is the final result in the case of

1. We cannot decide whether this means that Bodhisattvas and others
who give up their bodies for the sake of others are reborn on earth, i.e., whether this
contains a veiled reference to the famous apratishhitaniśeṣa theory (on which see
S. Lévi’s tr. of the Sátrálaśára, III, 3, note 4 — in brief a Bodhisattva never enters
Nirvána but is reborn again and again svátaṇātryéna in order to benefit mankind) ; or
whether Abhinava means that Bodhisattvas, etc., receive an appropriate body in
heaven. Or could he even mean (since heaven is a rather crude notion for Bodhi-
sattvas and Jivanmuktas) that the Bodhisattvas receive the dharmakáya ?

2. Víśrántilábha really means níyaprávrittha.

3. A passage from the A. Bh., Vol. II, p. 451 (abhgyá 18) has an important
bearing on this issue. Here is the Sanskrit text :

एवं तात्त्विकरीद्यज्ञारथविवेचना सदा यथा (कि) पुरुषचन्द्राक्षरमभुक्तवेदं वर्तमाना, ध्वस्य प्रयोगं शान्तः-
बीमसाबं तु च मुरुधकामादिकारे, अवि कत्यविदधधिशिमान-मोनोलिखिकारं।
नात्र गणि तत्कल्पनात्तथा भोज्यावधिकमभंद्रविवेचना, तथापि नासी प्रत्येकात्त् श्रवणं तद् तथा : पुरुषोष-
वर्गचन्द्राक्षरविवेचना स्वरूपसंविवेचना स्वरूपकारणम्। एवं तात्त्विकरीद्यज्ञारथविवेचना स्वप्नकारणविवेचना
परमार्थस्त, तथापि वित्तिज्याद्यसाधनार्थमध्योषियोषिनि तद्रज्जया तत् महति ।

The passage has been translated by Professor Wright, BSOAS, Vol. 26, 1963,
p. 115 : “Thus vîra, raudra, śr̥g̥g̥ra (are used there) respectively, occurring in
these works by being engendered by (the aims of the character portrayed) dharma,
artha and káma, while bāṇa and bīhatsa occur in connexion with moksa. But not
every character can carry the main role in this (latter) case, only the occasional
saint. Although in the nátyaka, bāṇa or bīhatsa may be the principal rasa when
moksa is the principal goal, this is not a common practice, so they, although en-
generald by the best of human aims (the character’s pursuit of moksa) are consider-
ed subordinate to the other rásas – vîra, raundra, and śr̥g̥g̥ra. Thus the main rasa
of a drama is really governed by the purvasthārtha it portrays, but other rásas occur
in support of it as a result of the variety of subject matter included.

4. What does Abhinava mean by अतः एवं शान्तस्तः स्थायित्वतः अपाणान्तम् ?
How are we to take sthāyitva? We can translate as “firmly entrenched”, i.e.,
Abhinavagupta is simply insisting that śántarasá is actually present in the Nágá-
ṇanda.
Jñātavāhana.\(^1\) With this thought in mind, Bharata will say (NŚ, XVIII.11) while defining a Nāṭaka, that “it is possessed of qualities such as wealth, flirtatious ways, etc.”.\(^2\) This means that a dramatist should introduce into the Nāṭaka all kinds of actions in which opulence and flirtation are predominant and in which emphasis is placed on the two goals of life, artha and kāma, because such actions have the charming purpose of winning a sympathetic response from all people (i.e. because such actions have a universal appeal). We will describe this in that very section (dealing with the definition of a Nāṭaka). With this in mind, Bharata will not prescribe any jātyamśaka in kǔnta.\(^3\) Hence the view (of some) that kūntarasa does not exist in as much as Bharata has not prescribed any jātyamśaka in its case, is refuted.

Others however say: “Jñātavāhana saved an old woman who needed protection, and who said: ‘Oh son, who will save you?’\(^4\) He had no

1. By saying that kūnta is apradhāna, Abhinava is not necessarily saying that šantarasa can never be pradhāna, but only that it is not the pradhānārasa in this particular play. But it is an odd statement, since if any emotion is prominent in the Nāghananda it is kūnta. Śṛṇgāra is brief in its appearance, and vīra almost non-existent. Perhaps Abhinava was conceding a point belaboured by his critics. But if he does not allow šantarasa as pradhāna in this play, where was it pradhāna? For this is the only play Abhinava quotes in the context of šantarasa, and indeed the only play that all the early writers quote. Therefore, by implication, it would seem that Abhinava concedes that kūnta is never the pradhānārasa in drams. But then what does he mean by saying that it is the most important (and he uses the very word pradhāna), of all the rasas? See Locana on the third Udyotya, p. 394: māyakṛṣita vādaya parapekṣāṃbhikaraṇātān


That which is called nāṭaka is accompanied by diverse kinds of spendour (i.e. according to Abhinava, by the magnificence of dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa) (in general), and (in particular) it is possessed of such qualities as wealth, flirtatious ways, etc. It is rich in aśkas (acts) and pravakas (minor scenes)\(^5\).

3. The topic of the jātyamśakas is discussed in stanzas 1–13 of the NŚ XXIX (Vol. IV of the G. O. S. ed.). This same objection is raised in the A. Bh., Vol. IV, p. 78: nānu kūntarasa na kena idaṃ kākana gānam uktam. The reply that Abhinava gives is curious: visvarasaśiloʼsi, smarṣa'śte uktam hi na kūntarasapradhānār prayoṣaṣa hāvaita, sato'pi (surely we must read sann apti) hi vasāntaropavakta eva prayogayogyo nāyaṇatheti. But where has this been said? Not in the NŚ itself. Nor do we find this actually quoted in the A. Bh. Perhaps Abhinava is in fact referring to this idea (and not the actual words) as explained in the A. Bh., in the kūntarasapradhānā. The passage is puzzling.

4. Nāghananda IV, 10. Sāṅkhaoḍa’s mother is speaking, asking who will save her son: ḫa puchk, yata nāgolakṣaṇākṣa apūṣa pritaḥ prītaḥ kāta prajñāṣa parivakṣaṇāsaśe sāma rastapara; prarthaṇā kāraṇa? Just at that moment Jñātavāhana appears (nāne abha) and offers to help (amba, mā bhaiṣṭiḥ). The mother had said she would end her own life as well (IV, under v, 20 — tad śkaiva teṣāvca saha marisyañā). So Jñātavāhana saves her life by his action too.
power. He wanted to harm nobody.” We agree with this. Should it be further argued that there is no power, . . . . of Bodhisattvas (?). But the Śāstra does not teach by means of kākatāliya(nyāya) (?). Therefore it is proved: utsāha is principally intended (in this play and therefore vira is the major rasa), and it is characterised by compassion. (In the Nāgānanda) other moods (like love for Malayavatī, detachment, etc.) become subsidiaries according to the circumstances (yathāyogam). As has been said:

तत्त्विक्रियाय प्रत्ययांतरणि संस्कारंः ||

And so we have refuted the contention that anubhāvas cannot exist because of a complete absence of action (in the case of the man who is śānta). When, however, one has reached the culminating state (of śānta) and all anubhāvas are absent, this (śānta) cannot be represented. In love and sorrow, etc., also, in the culminating stages, it is correct that there is no possibility of representation.

Sympathetic identification however is possible for those who have (planted) in them the sanskāras that are the seeds of such knowledge of the Truth. As Bharata will say:

"People devoid of passion (take delight) in mokṣa".  

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1. Śāktiḥ cāya na kācid to śastrām upadikāti: we cannot, in spite of repeated attempts and devious explanations, make any sense of this passage.
2. This is very curious, for in the Lokana (p. 392) Abhinava has said that dayāeira, is only another name for śāntarasa and that it is not to be regarded as a variety of vīrārasa, since Bharata has recognised only three varieties, dānāeira, dharmāeira and yuddhaeira. Now he has just said that śāntarasa is not the pradhānarasa of the Nāgānanda, But dayāeira is. How are we to solve this contradiction?
3. Does this passage, anye tu vyabhicārīno, etc., mean that in the Nāgānanda other emotions like love for Malayavatī, detachment, etc., become subsidiary to dayāeira according to circumstances?
4. Yogasūtra, IV. 27. We don't know what Abhisava means.
5. What is the culminating stage of kāraṇarasa — death?
6. This is N.S., XXVII, 58. It is one of Abhinava's most important reasons for thinking that Bharata really did feel that there was such a thing as mokṣa that could be dramatically treated and displayed on the stage. Here is the verse:

तुम्हारते नरम्: काम्स विद्याह्यां सामयानान्ति। अर्थेन यथार्थनिश्चन गोपेः नाथ निरासिनः ।।

"Young people are delighted with (watching spectacles of) love, the learned with (watching spectacles concerned with) doctrinal matters (philosophy), those interested in wealth are delighted with (watching spectacles concerning) material gain, and those without passion are interested in (spectacles dealing with) mokṣa".

This is certainly curious, for one wonders just where Bharata would include such spectacles, i.e., under what rasa? It is odd that he should be silent on such an important point. Perhaps the verse is not by Bharata himself. Note verse 61:

भविषयेवनपुराणां द्वितीयवत्तै लिखसि।

What would the rasa be of such dharmākhyānas and purūpas?
(After all,) not everybody is always sympathetic to everything. For instance, a man whose nature is heroic (will not sympathetically identify with a character) in bhayānaka. Objection: "How can a heroic type of person take any delight in such a presentation?" The reply is: in a work where this (śānta) is presented, surely there is one or other of the (other rasas) such as śrīgāra, vīra, etc. since the work is intended to be useful to the goals of life (other than liberation). Its aesthetic relish is grounded in śānta (however). In Prahasanas, etc. too, where hāsya, etc., are principal, the aesthetic relish is grounded in other rasas which arise in their wake (anumīśpadā). According to some, the justification for the exposition of the different drama-types is the intention to cater to aesthetic enjoyment in the case of different kinds of spectators (adhisthānaḥ). Therefore śāntarasa does exist. And so in (certain) old manuscripts, after the passage 3‘we will show how the sthayībhāṣādevelop into the rasas’, is read the definition of śānta in the phrase "What is called śānta has for its sthayībhāṣāsāma,” etc. In this connection, the aesthetic enjoyment of all rasas is similar to that of śānta, because it (i.e., this aesthetic enjoyment) is turned away from actual sense-object contact. Because we are particularly concerned with one rasa, except that it is mixed with

1. In the Locana Abhinava has simply replied to this important question with an arrogant response (p. 392-393). Here he considers it more seriously (the Locana was written before the Abhinavabhāratī, for we find that the A.Bh. refers to the Locana, e.g. p. 343, Vol. I: तथा च इत्यतुस्पतकेन्द्र शाल्लविचाराणु इत्यतुस्पतकेन्द्र शाल्लविचाराणु।)

But it is interesting that his reply makes bad sense. For he is saying that there are other rasas in every śānta play which will appeal to other people. This is of course true, but not a reply to the important objection that śānta is not an emotion that belongs to mankind universally, whereas the other rasas are. He fails to catch the point that it is qualitatively different from the example he counters with, namely that a vīra will take no pleasure in bhayānaka. He might not, but he could, since he must be aware of fear in himself though it may not be dominant. Cf. the curious remarks on p. 323 of the A. Bk., Vol. I, last 3 sentences of the first paragraph.

2. From this passage: तथा च इत्यतुस्पतकेन्द्र शाल्लविचाराणु, etc., it is clear that śāntarasa was defined, in certain MSS before all the other rasas, and not after them. For these words, sthayībhāṣā, etc., are the last words before the description of the eight rasas. But note that in the A. Bk. Abhinava does not comment directly on whatever he read there. Why? Is it because he did not believe it was part of the NS? It is in fact quite possible that this section on śāntarasa was a totally separate "book", not intended to fit into the NS at all. In any case, it could not have come at the end of the rasa section, i.e., the end of the sixth adhyaśya as it is printed in the G.O.S. edition.

3. Does he mean: (a) "I do not have śānta in my text"; or (b) "It is given in the beginning only in some books"? The implication is that most MSS did not contain a śāntarasaprakāra. Oddly enough Abhinava does not justify this omission.
other latent mental impressions (vāsamā)? In order to indicate that it (śānta) is at the root of all (rasas), it was named at the beginning. In ordinary worldly dealings, one does not mention separately a thing common to all, and so its sṛhūyin was not separately given. But even a thing which is common to a number of other things deserves to be separately reckoned by the discriminating man, and so it (śāntarasā) has become separate as the object of cognition in the form of the aesthetic enjoyment of the spectator who is admitted to be a discriminating reader. In the līlāsas, the Purāṇas, dictionaries, etc., we hear of nine rāsas as well as in the revered Siddhāntasāstra. Thus it is said:

"He should display the eight rāsas in the places allotted to the eight gods. And in the centre he should display śāntarasā in the place of the supreme God (Śiva)."

Its vibhāvas are vairāgya, fear of samsāra, etc. Śānta is known through the portrayal of these. Its amubhāvas are thinking about mokṣa-texts, etc. Its vyabhicāribhāvas include world-weariness, wisdom, contentment (dṛṣṭi), etc. And as bhakti and śraddhā which are directed towards meditation on God and which are reinforced by smṛti, matti, dṛṣṭi and utsāha, are in any case (anyathaiva) helpful (to śānta), neither of them should be counted as a separate rāsa. Here is a Saṅgrahakārikā on this matter:

"Śānta rasa is to be known as that which arises from a desire to secure the liberation of the Sefl, which leads to a knowledge of the Truth, and is connected with the property of highest happiness."

1. We cannot arrive at a meaning for this sentence.
2. This refers, most likely, to the drawing of a mystic circle (cakra) as practised in Tantric rituals. The eight gods are represented on the outside of the circle. By pradarśayet probably "līkhet" is meant. The point is that one draws the gods, and then writes in underneath the rasa that accompanies them. There is one difficulty however: devadeva must refer to Śiva. Now in the NŚ, VI. 44 (Vol. I, p. 299) Śiva is given as the god of raudraraśa (raudra rudradhīnaiṣvayyaḥ). Moreover, in the A. Bh. commentary on that stanza, Abhinava has associated śāntarasā with the Buddha: "बुद्ध: शान्तिस्वजोऽदृश्यन् हि शान्तवादिनः कदाचित् पतिताः।" But as this is a quotation from a different (and untraced) source, it need not agree with the NŚ. One can also take rūpa to refer to the actual pictorial representation. Pradarśayet would, therefore, mean "draw". One should draw each of the gods according to the rāsa, i. e. each and such a god looking angry (raudra), another looking amorous (sṛṣṇāra), etc., and Śiva should be shown in samādhi. In the original, the genitive in aṣṭānum devānām might also be taken as used in the sense of samādha (aṣṭadeva- samādhaññān rasān). The idea is that the eight rāsas are to be pictorially represented as symbolised by the eight presiding gods, i. e., by means of the characteristic forms of the eight gods.
3. This is a verse actually found in the so-called śāntarasāprakāraṇa of the NŚ (p. 332, Vol. I, A. Bh.), introduced with the words: aṭrāryāḥ slokā ca bhāvani

(Continued on next page)
By the three adjectives qualifying śānta in this verse, the vibhāvas, sthāyi-bhāva and anubhāvas are shown respectively.

"Various feelings, because of their particular respective causes arise from śānta (a state of mental calm). But when these causes disappear, they melt back into śānta". ¹

In this verse and others it has been summarily shown that śānta is the source of (all) other rasas.

As for the statement that will be made by Bharata² to the effect that in the Dīma (type of drama) there are six rasas, excluding both hāsya and śṛṅgāra,³ here is what is meant: by giving the definition: "It is based on a composition with an exciting rasa", there can be no question at all of śānta, as it is opposed to raudra which is predominant (in the Dīma). So what is the point of (separately) excluding it? Since śānta

Continued from previous page

( which is really incorrect, since there are only two āryās and three glokas. The dual ārya, therefore, should have been used ). The reading is slightly different. The last line reads: नैःअवमयापि दिनः शन्तरसोऽनाम समनवतैः। It is clear from this quotation that Abhinava is not commenting on the actual passage of the NŚ.

The following remark of Abhinava does not seem to agree with the stanza. For how can nīkṣyeśa be said to represent an anubhāva? The first two correspond, but not the third.

1. NŚ, VI, 87, p. 335.
3. This is NŚ, 18, 85, under the definition of Dīma. Here is the passage from the NŚ, XVIII, 83 ff. (Vol. II, p. 443 G. O. S. ed.) ¹¹

And verse 88:

And verse 88:

Now Abhinava’s argument is this: Dīma deals mainly with raudrārasa. There can be no question of śānta at all, and so śānta was not specifically excluded by Bharata. We can also translate the sentence शान्तासांवेदे तदः दीतरसकारावनार्थवर्तिति, etc., as follows: “Since śānta is impossible, what else can be excluded but śṛṅgāra and hāsya, by the phrase ‘viz. the Dīma has as its source (i. e. is based on) an exciting theme’? Had he said (merely) that it can be associated with six rasas (and had he not said diptarasakāreyayoniḥ), then there would be the undesirable contingency of that (i. e. śānta) being included.” As for the sentence शान्तो तदः साक्षात बृत्तिः न ततः ब्रह्मार्थेर्मोनि (p. 116), we think the as should be dropped (Raghuvar notes that MSS, M and G omit it). If we do so, the translation of the sentence will be as follows: “But śānta uses only the sāttvaci style, and therefore this (qualification, namely sāttvayārabhātiñītisampannih) is quite sufficient to exclude it.”

(Continued on next page)
is impossible and since the Dima has as its source (i.e., since it is based on) an exciting rasa, what else can be excluded (but śānta)?¹ Had he (only) said that it can be associated with six rasas, excluding śringāra and hāśya, (without adding the qualifying phrase diptarasakāvayoneyih), śānta would not have been excluded. Objection: “This quarter stanza (dīptarasakāvayoneyih) excludes karuṇa, bībhatsa and bhayānaka as predominant rasas.” This is not true, because when (he says) that the (Dima) is associated with the styles called Sāttvati and Arabharti,² they are automatically excluded (since they belong to the style Kāśikī). But śānta uses only the Sāttvati style, and therefore this (qualification) alone would not be enough to exclude it. And therefore the definition of the Dima, far from arguing against the existence of śānta, is evidence for its existence. Śringāra however would be possible (in a Dima) because (demons) make love in a violent manner.³ Hāśya is helpful to śringāra and therefore only their exclusion was specifically mentioned, because both are possible (and only a possible thing can be excluded, but not an impossible thing such as śānta).

Because (śānta) is common to all (rasas), it would be improper to name especially a colour⁴ or god⁵ (that is appropriate to it, as one has

Continued from previous page

Abhinava’s point is this: all the six rasas are dīptarasas, except for śānta. This word, therefore, excludes śānta, or otherwise there would be no point in saying dīptarasas, since that is just what the other six are (though this is in fact wrong, since there is no reason to believe that Bharata uses each adjective to exclude something). Surely this is tautological in the sense that it is an explanation of padrasa. Bharata is not so subtle as Abhinava wants him to be.

1. In an important article (Vṛtti in Daksīṇaprakramaśāttvita of Abhinava-bhāratī, B. S. O. A. S. 1963, p. 113), Professor Wright translates Abhinava’s comments on the Dima passage. Unfortunately, he has been misled by the use of the word syāt into misunderstanding the passage. The passage in the A. Bh. reads (Vol. II, p. 443, 1-3): नातकदृष्टव्य संयथाकरणसिद्धान्तानी सन्तानो च श्राद्धहस्त्यवेद महत्सरस्य वयनवेश शालस्य प्रयोगः। सयावदिभाषातीवर्तित। This Professor Wright translates as follows: “All is as in the nāṭaka, the only difference is the incompleteness of sandhis and rasas, dīptarasas—enjoins the use of śānta since (in its normal sense) it would be (tautological, being) synonymous with the injunction that it should have six rasas to the exclusion of śringāra and hāśya.” But śāntasya prayogah syāt does not mean “enjoins the use of śānta” but precisely the opposite, namely that unless this adjective were there, śāntarasas would be included, which is precisely what is not wanted. Śāntarasas is excluded from the Dima, not included, as is clear from the śāntarasaparbavana. Paryāyena in the above quotation is obscure, and we can make no sense of it.

2. Note that bhayānaka is associated with arabharti! (NŚ, III, p. 106.)

3. Abhinava has taken this notion of demons making love in a violent manner from the NŚ definition of Raudhra, Vol. I, p. 322: श्राद्धहस्तः सर्वथा: प्रायवा: प्रामः संगमेतः।


5. The god of śānta is svaccha (Vol. I, p. 299: “बुद्ध: शान्तेन्द्रमोहद्वृत्तेः” हति शान्तवालिनः क्रिया पठलिः। बुद्धी जिनः परीपकारकपर: प्रशुद्रो वा।
done for the other rasas), but they have been invented (by some). And so the reasonableness of šānta has been shown. Its true nature is hāsyā. (?) \(^2\) Vira and bibhatsa tend to lead towards it.\(^3\) Therefore there is in the case of šānta the advice about the practice of yama, niyama, meditation on God, etc. It stands to reason that it leads to a great result (i.e. mokṣa), as it eschews enjoyment (of worldly objects) (anupabhogitayā),\(^4\) that it is more important than any other (rasa), and that it pervades the entire plot (?). And so enough of further elaboration.

What is the nature of its true relish? It is the following: The nature of the soul is tinged by uṭsāha, rati, etc., which are capable of imparting their (peculiar) tinges to it. It is like a very white thread that shines through the interstices of sparsely threaded jewels. It assumes the forms of all the various feelings like love, etc., (which are superimposed on it), because all these feelings are capable of imparting their tinges to it. Even then (tathābhāvenāpi) it shines out (through them), according to the maxim that once this Atman shines, (it shines for ever).\(^5\) It is devoid of the entire collection of miseries which consist in (i.e. which result from) turning away (from the Atman). It is identical with the consciousness of the realisation of the highest bliss. It takes its effect through the process of generalisation in poetry and drama. It makes such a heart (i.e. the heart of the sensitive spectator or reader) the receptacle of an other-worldly bliss by inducing a peculiar kind of introspection (antarmukhāvasthābheda).

There are only these nine rasas, because only they deserve to be taught, as they are useful to the (four) goals of life or are exceptionally pleasant.

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1. Following the reading upapattī ca in M. and G. (Raghavan, p. 116).
2. Does sāttvikabhāvah ‘mean sāttvikabhāvah?’ ‘Its sāttvikabhāva is hāsyā?’ But now can hāsyā be regarded as a sāttvikabhāva? Raghavan implies that this is corrupt. Perhaps we could emend as follows: sānto hi hāso ‘syā. Hāsa would stand for the smile of joy. Or one thinks of Śiva’s atihaśa. Note the idea of the white colour associated with sānta.
3. Raghavan implies that this is corrupt. But perhaps the meaning is this: vīra and bibhatsa tend to lead towards sānta. Bibhatsa, because it creates juggupsā, vīra, because after all it is the major rasa of the Nāgānanda.
4. We follow the reading anupabhogitayā (as in Raghavan’s 1940 ed., p. 105). In the 1967 ed. (p. 116), Raghavan has adopted the reading abhinayopayogitayā. Thus the phrase abhinayopayogitayā mahāphalatvatam would mean: ‘It stands to reason that it leads to a great result (namely mokṣa) by reason of its being useful for acting.’ But we cannot see in what sense sānta can be said to be ‘useful for acting’, nor how its being useful for acting would lead to mokṣa.
5. This is only a partial analogy, and we cannot know exactly what Abhinava meant.
6. Is sādhāraṇaśastra a reference to sādhāraṇikāraṇa? I.e. do the vībhāvas etc., undergo the process of depersonalisation necessary in the theatre?
7. Lokottarāṇādānayanam is a bahuvrīhi compound: लोकोत्तराणादानयानयम्
Therefore, what others say, 1 namely that this restriction on numbers is because only these nine are well-known to enlightened literary critics, though other rāsas are possible, has been refuted. This will be explained in the chapter on the bhāvas. It is wrong to say that affection, with a sthāyibhāva of being moved (ārdratā) can be a rasa, because affection is (nothing other than) attachment, and all attachment culminates in rāti, utsāha (or some other such accepted sthāyibhāva). For instance, the love of a child for its mother and father terminates in (i.e. can be included under) “fear”. 2 The affection of a young man for his friends terminates in rāti. The affection, as of Lakṣmaṇa, etc., for his brother terminates in (i.e. can be included under) dharmāvīra. The same is true (of the affection) of an old man for his son, etc. 3 The so-called rasa “cupidity” with the sthāyibhāva of “greed” can be refuted in the same manner, because it will terminate in some other (sthāyibhāva) such as hāsa or rāti. The same holds true of bhakti.

Dakṣarūpa, II, 4 and commentary thereon:

अथ धीरोदातः—

महासचोदितिगम्भीरः क्षमावानविकल्पनः।
सिंधो निन्दूढाल्प्रो धीरोदातो दृढ़वत्॥

Avaloka:

महासचवः शोक कौशल्यायनानमिभूतात् सतः। अविकल्पः अनास्मातः निन्दूढाल्प्रोः
विनयस्यविकल्पः दृढ़वतः अक्षितस्तनिविष्कृतः धीरोदातः।
यथा नागान्धे जीववाहिनः—

शिरस्मुः स्थंद्रत एव रत्नमधापि धे तम मांसमिति।

नृति न पश्यामि तवेत तावधिक मन्त्रायं निविदीर गृहमान्॥

यथा च रामं प्रति—

आत्मस्याभिमेक्यात्विस्तृतयं कनाय च।

न मध्या लक्षितस्य खल्पोद्योगारङ्कविभम्॥

1. Cf. the A. Dk. I, p. 298:

एततान्त्व एव रसा हलुचे पूर्वम्। वेणान्नावेदिपि पार्षदप्रसिद्धवेन्तंत्वं प्रभोक्तामिति यद्वइलः-
हृद्दन्त निरुपितं तदन्तःपेणपरास्त्वस्वपनम्।

“We already said earlier that there are only these many rūpas. So that when Bhāṭalollaṭa says that really there are an endless number of rūpas, but that these (eight alone), since they are familiar to the audience (pārṣada), are fit to be portrayed, he says this without thinking, out of haughtiness.”

2. The point seems to be that a child is afraid of its mother and father, and its “love” can therefore be included under bhayaṅaka!

3. This is not a very good argument since surely these feelings are different in kind from śṛgāra.

XXI
यथा केशवचित्रयादिवी न सामान्यगुणानादिनी (नायक—) विशेषक्षणे काविसंशीतों
तत्कालं तत्ततुतत्त्वाविकारानेन।

नन्दु च कथं जीमूतवाहनाधिनं माननन्दादुरात्त इत्युत्तरः। औद्दाच्छ ति नाम
समायोगं दृष्टं, तत्तथ विकल्पिताम्बुद्ध एवोपपत्ते, निमित्तीनावेर सविता
प्रतिपादितः। यथा—

tिष्ण्मभावं पिदः: पुरो मुक्त: यथा सिद्धास्तः कि तथा
यस्माहपन्त: शुचि हि चरणो तत्त्वस्य, कि राज्यतः।
कि मुंके मुननचे धृतिरंशिती भुक्ते प्रज्ञायते या गुरोऽ
रायास: खलु राज्यमुख्तिपुरोसत्त्वांति काल्पितं:॥

इत्यनेन।

पिषोविषादु श्रूष्णाप लक्षणाय भक्तिएवम्।
वनं याम्यहम्म्पयं यथा जीमूतवाहन:॥

इत्यनेन च। अतोद्धारप्रस्थापतावर्षमरकारणिकमाच्छ खीतान्तःग्नानात्मा। अति-
व्यक्तायुक्तः, वत्ताहास्मु राज्यकुलाय निर्मित्यां नायकमुपाद्यात्त्त्त तथाभूतमलयक्युनु-
रगोपावणम्। यथोक्तम—‘ सामान्यगुणयोग्यी त्वज्ञातिलकफळतात्!’ उत्तम तदपि पारसिक-
मानकावदवासत्वमिश्रयेकम्। अतो वस्तुकृष्ण: बुद्धयितिरसुद्धान्तानेदिव्यबहारा: शाल्तानामविभवविलित।

अत्र्यथे—यतः वर्तुकत: समायोगं दृष्टिकोलाप्यमिति न तत्त्वोमूत्वाहानार्दौ
परिहिते। न हेमकावपथि विजितुपुः। यः: जनसिद्धि भीममयादिनयानान्तिनि: को
विजितुपुः। न यः: पराकाल्पन्यःधिशोधिप्रवृत्तः। तथासि: च मांगदुपकार्ष्यसिद्धं
प्रसिद्ध। रामदेशस्य ग्राहोपमिति हंसनिग्रहे प्रवृत्तव नानास्त्रेष्यकानेन भुवानिधिधार्मः।
जीमूतवाहनादिनु श्रीसर्वपर्यत्त्त्त्तति: प्रागैतिहासिक्योर्मुख्यमपतिविलित: इत्युत्तम:। यथोक्तम—
“लिष्णभावित” इत्यादिति विप्रस्थुक्परार्धमुखतेति, तत्सवम्—कार्यक्षेत्रे प्रवृत्तकीयात्त्तु: खलुके
वद्वार्षु निर्मित्योपय: एव विकृत:। तद्ववम्—

खलुभिन्नविभविलित: विशिष्टसे शेषाद्हते:
प्रतिपित्रनभवसे ब्रूतितेर्ग्निधेशः।
अनुभवसि हि मुक्त: पद्मपीतामुणा
शास्त्रयति परितां चाययोपास्तिस्तानाम्।॥ इत्यादिन।
दक्षिणेश्वर कृष्ण सरस्वती महाविद्यालय जैन विद्या संस्थान
Translation of the Daśarūpāka, II, 4:

Now the definition of the dhīrodatta (nāyaka) is given.

"The dhīrodatta (nāyaka) is a great being, very profound, tolerant, not boastful, steady; his sense of ego is kept in check and he is firm in his commitments."

Translation of the Daśarūpākāvaloka on II, 4:

"Great being" means that his inner nature is such that he does not experience sorrow, anger, etc. "Not boastful" means that he does not praise himself. "His sense of ego is kept in check" means that his pride is hidden by modesty. "Firm in his commitments" means that he carries out till completion whatever he agrees to do. An example of this dhīrodatta (nāyaka) is Jimūtavāhana in the Nāgananda:

"Blood is oozing from the openings in my veins, and on my body there is still flesh. O Garuḍa, I see that you are not yet satisfied, so why have you stopped devouring me?"

Or as with regard to Rāma (it was said):

"I did not perceive the slightest change in his appearance, neither when he was called to be consecrated (as king), nor when he was banished to the forest."

When in the definition of a particular type (of hero) there is a (special) mention of some of the general qualities like firmness, etc. (mentioned in II. 1–2), that (special mention) is intended to show that those qualities are present in this particular (hero) in a very great degree.

Object: How can you say that Jimūtavāhana and other similar heroes, in the Nāgananda and other such plays, are exalted (udātta)? Because exaltedness means superiority to all others and is possible only in the case of

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1. We have used the edition by Pandit Sudarshanāchārya Shāstri, printed at the Gujarati Printing Press, Bombay, 1914. This contains a brief commentary, mainly on the Avaloka, by the editor.

2. It is somewhat odd that Dhananaśa should give, as one of the four types of heroes, the dhīrāhā (p. 36), if he does not allow saṇṭaras in dramas. Apparently he has in mind Cārudatta in the Mṛchakātika. At the very least, it is a bad choice of words. Note the definition of the saṇṭarānāyaka: सामात्यवृद्धिकृतः धीर-शान्ती दिजादिर्क, which would rule over Jimūtavāhana, who is a Vidyādhara.


5. The point seems to be that sthīraḥ had already been mentioned in II. 1 among the general characteristics of all nāyakas. Keśāneśvī construes with sthīrayādyṣ-ṇāṃ. It does not refer to people of a different persuasion (i.e. keśāneśvī maṭām-vāreṇaḥ). Before viśvalakṣaṇe we should understand the word nāyaka which makes the sense clearer.

6. Vṛtti here does not mean "behaviour". It means only "existence".
a man who has worldly ambition (vijigisuta), whereas Jīmūtavāhana has been described by the poet (Harṣa) as devoid of worldly ambition, as for example in the following stanza:

"Does a man shine as (brilliantly) when he is seated on a throne as he does when he stands on the bare ground before his father? Can the happiness he receives from his kingdom be compared to the happiness he derives from massaging the feet of his father? Is the contentment he experiences from enjoying the whole universe comparable to what he feels when he eats the left-overs from his father's meal? Kingship is indeed only a misery for the man who has abandoned his parents. Is there any virtue in such kingship?"

And also (in the following verse):

"In order to dedicate myself to serving my parents, I am going to renounce my inherited fortune and go to the forest, just as did Jīmūtavāhana."

Therefore, because Jīmūtavāhana is predominantly peaceful and because he is very compassionate, he is a śānta hero, like a sage who has subdued his passions. Moreover (?) this is improper, that having introduced (upādāya) a hero who is without any desire for the pleasure of kingship, etc., the poet has indulged, in the course of the play (antarā), in a description of his intense (nathābhūta) love for Malayavati. As for the statement: "The dhīraśānta is a twice-born, etc., who is endowed with general virtues" (II, 4.), (this definition) is not realistic, because it is meant to be technical (or formal)

1. Vijigisuta literally means "a desire to conquer" and is often used of kings and heroes. But here we think it has the larger sense of worldly ambition.
3. Nāgānanda, I, 4, in the prastāvanā, spoken by the Sūtradhāra to introduce Jīmūtavāhana.
4. We take śāntatā to construe with aya. In this case the argument is for Jīmūtavāhana's being a dhīraśāntanāyaka. But surely the whole point of the Pāreapakṣa is not only that he is such a type of hero, but that this should further imply that the rasa of the Nāgānanda is śānta.
5. anyac ca means "and further, moreover". It cannot construe with nyuktaṃ (to give "there is something else that is improper"), because there was no first thing given to which this would be the second. The construction is nonetheless peculiar. Understand idam between anyac ca and atra anyac ca idam atra nyuktaṃ. But it is odd that the Pāreapakṣa should use an argument against himself. For he claims that Jīmūtavāhana as a dhīraśānta hero should not be open to sexual passion. As Dhanika will point out, this must be used against him. Why then should the Pāreapakṣa have provided such ammunition? However, since Dhanika accepts Ārañja in the Mṛcchakatika as an example of dhīraśānta, though he is greatly interested in sexual love, it is consistent on his part to use this as an argument against the possibility of dhīraśānta in the case of Jīmūtavāhana.
and thus it is not exclusive. Therefore, in reality, the behaviour of the Buddha, of Jimūṭavāhana and of Yudhiṣṭhira shows that they are śānta heroes. Here is our reply (to all the above points): First of all (tāved), the statement “Exaltedness means superiority to all others” is not inappropriate to the case of Jimūṭavāhana and others (as you claim), because worldly ambition takes many forms. If anyone exceeds others in heroism, or in liberality, or in compassion, he is said to be “possessed of worldly ambition”. This description is not used in the case of one who wishes to seize wealth by harming another person, otherwise we would find ourselves defending the ridiculous position that highwaymen are dhīrodatta(nāyakas)! In the case of Rāma etc., they felt that they must protect the world and so they set out to punish the wicked (and) it was only incidentally (nāntarīyakatva) that they obtained (lordship over) the earth. But Jimūṭavāhana and others like him were superior to all, because they were willing to give up even their own life to help others. And so they are to be regarded as the most exalted (udāttatama) (and not merely exalted). As for the verse that begins: “Does a man shine”, etc., it is true that it shows (Jimūṭavāhana’s) revulsion from sensual pleasures; but those who are ambitious are not concerned with their own personal pleasures that are the cause of misery. Thus it has been said:

“Indifferent to your own pleasure, you work hard for the sake of others. Or perhaps this is your natural disposition. For a tree carries on its head the most intense heat, and cools, through its shade, the heat of those who come to it for protection (from the the sun).”

On the contrary, the description of (Jimūṭavāhana’s) love for Malayavati which is not in keeping with śāntarasa, (aśāntarasākraya) rules out his being

1. The Pārśvapāksin is objecting to Dhaṇāṇjaya’s definition of the dhīraśāntanāyaka (II, 4). He says that this definition is not realistic, but only technical. For it says that the dhīraśāntanāyaka is endowed with the general qualities of a nāyaka. These include such qualities as vivitata, madhurata, daksitata, etc. Now these qualities are not all possible in the case of a dhīraśānta hero, because they are inconsistent with the state of being without desires which follows from his being a dhīraśānta hero. It is only technical or formal since it is a consequence of his being a hero (in general). Since the possession of the general qualities is thus unreal in the case of a dhīraśānta hero, it cannot be said to distinguish him from the other types of heroes (abhedakams). This means that according to the Pārśvapāksin, the definition of the dhīraśānta hero as given by Dhaṇāṇjaya is unsound. One cannot help agreeing, for surely the differentiation that Dhaṇāṇjaya makes (namely that he is a dvaṇḍa and has the general characteristics of a hero) is hardly consistent with śānta in any form. It is, therefore, most surprising that Dhanika, although he takes up and answers all the other objections, does not deal with this one! It is almost as if he were admitting its justice. Could this possibly mean that he is himself criticizing his brother under the guise of a Pārśvapāksin?

2. Śakuntalā, V, 7.
a śānta (i.e. a dhīraśānta) hero. The state of being tranquil involves the absence of egoism, and this is naturally met with in the case of learned Brahmins etc., and therefore learned Brahmins, etc., are really śānta heroes in the real sense of the term and not simply in a technical or formal way. In the case of the Buddha and Jīmūtavāhana, though it is true that there is no distinction in terms of their compassion (i.e. though they are both equally compassionate), still there is this difference: that the Buddha is compassionately without any desire (niśkāma) and Jīmūtavāhana is compassionate with desire (sakāma). Thus it is established that Jīmūtavāhana and others like him are dhīrodatta (nāyakas).

TRANSLATION OF THE Daksāryā, IV, 35:

“(The sthāyībhāvas are) love, energy, disgust, anger, mirth, amazement, fear and sorrow. Some add peace (śama), but it cannot be developed in plays.”

TRANSLATION OF THE AVALOKA ON IV, 35:

There are a great number of differing opinions among disputants in the case of śāntarasa. Some say there is no śāntarasa because Bharata did not mention its vibhāvas, etc., and because he did not define it. Others, however, argue that (regardless of whether Bharata mentioned it or not) in actual reality it cannot exist, because (they claim), it is impossible to root out love and hate which have been continuously cultivated (inside man) from time immemorial. Others claim that it can be included within vīra, bhīhatsa, etc. Those who speak this way do not accept even śama (as a sthāyībhāva). Accept whichever opinion you like (yathā tathāstū),) in all events, however, we cannot allow śama to be a sthāyībhāva in a Nāṭaka, etc., where acting is essential, because, after all, śama consists in the complete cessation of all activity and therefore cannot be acted out. As for what some have claimed, namely that in the Nāgānanda, etc., śama is a sthāyībhāva, this is contrary to the portrayal of Jīmūtavāhana’s love for Malayavatī, which persists right through the entire play and is also opposed to his (finally) obtaining the universal sovereignty of the Vidyādharas. For we never come across both love for

1. We are not sure which of the two senses of sakāma and niśkāma is meant here. We have translated them in the Gītā sense of the terms. But Sylvain Levi has translated this line in a discussion concerning types of nāyakas as follows: “En outre, Buddha et Jīmūtavāhana ne peuvent être classés ensemble; l’un et l’autre sont des modèles de compassion, mais l’un est étranger à l’amour, l’autre y est sensible.” ("Théatre Indien", p. 66, 2nd ed.) We take it that Levi refers to his love for Malayavatī.

2. This first criticism, that Jīmūtavāhana loves Malayavatī, is of course true. It is a fault of the drama, for in actual fact the description of Jīmūtavāhana would
sense–objects and detachment from sense–objects subsisting in one single character. And so utsāha (energy) connected with dayāvīra (as the major rasa) is the sthayībhāva (of the Nāgānanda). For (in that play) love being a subsidiary of that (dayāvīrotsāha), there is no objection to the attainment of universal sovereignty as the final result (of the dramatic action). We have already said that even though an ambitious (dhirodatta) hero may set out with the primary object of doing good to others with a view to achieving that which is sought by them, worldly advancement may very well follow incidentally in his case. Therefore there are only eight sthayins”.

**TRANSLATION OF Dāsārūpaka, IV, 45 ALONG WITH DHANIKĀ’S COMMENTARY THEREON:**

Commentary: “Although sāntarasa cannot be introduced into a play, as it cannot be presented by means of acting, still because all things, though they be very subtle or long past, can be conveyed through words, its presentation is not forbidden in poetry.” And so this is said:

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*Continued from previous page*

seem to preclude his falling in love. We are given absolutely no psychological preparation for this. Quite the contrary, we would rather expect him to remain detached, if not actually repelled by sensual contact. It is only the Pārvapakṣin who seems aware of this when he calls it ayuktaṃ. As for his attaining lordship over the Viḍyādharas, this is perhaps the weakest moment in an altogether weak play. He does absolutely nothing to achieve this. It is bestowed upon him by Gaurī (what is she doing in this supposedly Buddhist play in any case?) in a single verse at the end of the play, and this must strike any non-devotee of Gaurī as highly inappropriate.

1. Ekanukāryavibhāgamalānau means “as subsisting in one single character as their locus” : ekānuṭāryavibhāgamalānau vibhāgamalānau.

2. This refers to page 144, line 21:

रामादरिणि जमाभवीसिद्धिः हुष्टदिरहीः प्रशास्य नात्तरीवकलेव भूस्वादिविलाम्:

3. Note Raghavan ("The Number of Rasas", 2nd revised edition, p. 61): “The critics who do not accept śānta are mainly writers on Dramaturgy proper. They think they are loyal to Bharata by denying it. This attitude begins, as far as extant works go, in the Dāsārūpaka, the model and source for many a later work on Rūpaka, Dhanamjaya and Dhanika, both refute it and argue for its impossibility in drama.

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From this it would appear that Dhanamjaya denies śānta only in drama but accepts it in Kāvyā. But, as a matter of fact, Dhanamjaya, as interpreted by Dhanika, does not recognize it even in Kāvyā (see p. 124)”. S.K. De says more or less the same thing in his article “The Sāntarasa in the Nāṭya Sāstra and the Dāśā–Kūpaka”:

“Dhanamjaya himself would object to śānta only in the Nāṭya, which requires the delineation of the Rasas through its anubhūtan, etc.; but he would permit it in the Kāvyā, because what cannot be acted can at least be described. But his commentator Dhanika would not allow śānta even in poetry. There can be, in his opinion, no such sthayibhāva as śānta or nisṛṣṭa”. Both De and Raghavan follow the reading in the NSP, ed.; see addendum for discussion.
(Kārikā): “Sāntarasa (ṣamapraKarṣa) need not be mentioned (separately and specifically), because the mental attitudes such as muditā, etc., out of which it is developed, are of the same nature (as vikāsa, vistara, kṣobha and vikṣepa, which are at the root of the other eight sthāyibhāvas)

If sāntarasa is of the following nature, namely:

“Where there is no sorrow and no happiness, no anxiety, no hate or love and no desire at all, this is called sāntarasa by great sages, and it has sāma as its sthāyibhāva”

then (it must be noted that) it appears only in the state of mokṣa, which is defined as the realisation of the true nature of the Self. Even the scriptures speak of this state as indescribable by saying “it is not thus, it is not thus”, thereby denying all positive attributes (in its case). Moreover, there are no sensitive readers who can be said to aesthetically enjoy sāntarasa as described above. Still muditā, maitri, karunā, and upekṣā, which are means leading to it, are of the nature of vikāsa, vistara, kṣobha and vikṣepa, and since these latter (four mental states) have been mentioned earlier (in connection with the eight sthāyibhāvas) the aesthetic enjoyment of sāntarasa is as good as already described.

1. This is a difficult passage. Haas reads nivṛcyaḥ, whereas Shastri reads aivṛcyaḥ (which he interprets, wrongly we feel, as saktum abāhyah); we accept the latter and translate it as: “need not be (separately) mentioned”. ṢamapraKarṣa means the same as sāntarasa (see bhayotkarṣa in the sense of bhayānaka used in the preceding verse). For such a controversial subject this line is hardly sufficient. What are its implications? Apparently that sānta exists, but can be subsumed under the other rasas. However, Haas translates as follows: “The Quietistic Sentiment, (which arises) from happiness and the like, is to be defined as a state having that (i.e., happiness) as its essential nature”. This is in case not how Dhanika understands the line. See addendum.

2. Aśṭāpī would mean “nonetheless”. So, it would seem that we should understand the phrase: n c teṣāsūrūtra sāntarasaḥ sādaṇaḥ: sādāyātma: sānta, to mean that sādāyātas do not enjoy it.

3. Muditā etc., are of course of great fame in Buddhism, forming a separate chapter of the Visuddhimagga. They are equally known to the Hindu tradition (Yoga-sūtra, I, 33). Here Dhanika equates them with the four states of mind mentioned in IV, 52, where vikāsa (expansion or dilution) applies to śṛṅgāra and hāsya; vistara (exaltation or elevation) to vīra and adhikūta; kṣobha (excitation) to bhūhatā and bhāyānaka; and vikṣepa (perturbation) to raudra and karunā. It would seem that śānta arises from upekkhā (which is correct), which would then be assimilated to vikṣepa (?). The construction of Dhanika’s passage is somewhat complicated. Our translation best explains how we have understood it. (Note that we have emended prādurbhāvāt to prādurbhāvah).

XXII
CONCLUSION

Abhinava’s final view on the relation between brahmāsvāda and rasāsvāda seems to us best summarised by his commentary on a very unusual verse by Ānandavardhana. The verse is found in the third Uddyota of the Dhvanyāloka, in a long passage where Ānanda illustrates various combinations of dhvani with other types of poetry. The verse in question is meant to illustrate the conningling (sankīrnavat) of arthāntarasankramitavācyadhvani with virodhālaṅkāra, but the verse is interesting for completely different reasons.

Here is the verse along with Abhinava’s remarkable commentary on it:

प्रभेदान्तराणायमिव कदाचित् सहृदयं भवेयेत् | यथा समवः

या व्यापरस्तिः रसान् रसिद्ध्विं कालिकवीचा नवा

दृष्टिनिहितार्थविषयोऽस्मे च वैपदिकि

तेन देव अयत्सम्भव विचारात्मतो निर्विभास्तो वन्यम्

आकारत नैव च वद्भक्तव्रियायन वद्विक्षित्वम् सूक्ष्मम् ॥

इत्यत्र विरोधालंकारेष्टर्वयुक्तसंक्रमितवाच्चित् चनिप्रभेदस्य संकीर्णिलम् ।

Locana p. 508:

व्यापरस्तिति निष्ठाद्राग्राणो हि सस्य ह्युक्तम् । तत्र विभावादिद्ग्धजनानामिका

वर्णं, तत्: प्रमुखे घटनापरिता क्रिया व्यापरः, तेन सतस्तुकु च रसानिति । रसानिति । रसानिति । रसानिति ।

अन्ययं तस्य कथा: वर्णनायोगात् तेषाम्।

नवेन इति । कण्येषे षङ्गे द्वैतमूर्तिः वस्मिन्यात्मतसुपतः । दृष्टिनिहितिः । प्रतिभासुः, तत्र

दृष्टिवाचकं त्रां षङ्गेषु रसानिति विरोधालंकारेष्टर्व नवाः । तदनुग्रहीत्व चणिनः,

तथा हि चाल्मुष्ट्वलो नाविकसंक्रमितमयं न साधनाभावात् । न चायत्मभार्या। अपि तव:कौतेर

प्रतिभासुः, तत्र विचारस्य वस्मी नाविकसंक्रमितमयं संक्रमितम् । संक्रमिते च विरोधोद्भुवाहक

एव । तद्रक्षिति–‘तिरोधाल्कारेण’ ह्यादिनः । या चैवचित्विषये दृष्टिः परिनिहितोऽववः: अयतः

विषये निक्रियत्वम् विचारे उनमेऽथ बस्य।। तथा परिनिहिते कौयामितं कौयामित्वं च नु कविवर्द्वृत्त

स्मितेऽवन्मेऽवन्मेऽ वस्मी: सा । विधिविद्यामिति वैपदिकि । तेन अयत्मभुवेति । कालिकितिः

विचारति वचनेन नाहं कविन्म पण्डित ह्यामानोद्भुवायं च सर्वते । अनावीयमिति दसिद्रोह

इत्योपकारणतयाय आहातमेन्तमयां दृष्टिनिहितिः । तेन देव अपीति । न ह्येकाया ह्यथः
“There is also a mixture of a figure of speech in varieties of dhvani (other than rasadhvani) as well. For instance in the verse:

“The new and wondrous (kācit) vision (deṣṭi) of poets which concerns itself (vyāpāravati) with turning permanent emotional states (rasas; i.e. sthāyibhāvas) into aesthetic experiences, and that philosophic (or analytic, vaipāściti) vision that reveals the realm of already existing (i.e. not depending on the poet’s creative imagination) objects — we have employed both of these constantly to examine and describe the world (we live in). We have become weary in so doing, but have not found happiness therein, in any sense comparable to the joy we feel in our devotion to you, who sleep on the ocean”.

In this verse, there is a mixture of arthāntarasāṅkramitavaiśeṣa and the figure of speech (known as) (apparent) contradiction (virodha).”

Translation of Locana III:

“VYĀPĀRAVATI: For we have (already) said that rasa is identical with the process of conveyance itself (nispādanaprāṇo hi rasah).” (Poetic

2. This refers to Abhinava’s doctrine, explained in the second Uddyota on p. 187, (B. P. ed.) that rasa is the process of perception itself (pratyākṣaṇā caa hi rasah), i.e., it is not an object of cognition in much the same way that the sākṣa (the subject) in Advaita can never be the object of cognition. In this sense, rasa is purely subjective, and is not amenable to ordinary means of cognition.
vision is) constantly engaged in that activity (vyāpāra), i.e., that action which begins with a description consisting in the combination (i.e., presentation) of the vibhāvas, etc., and ending with sentence-structure (ghatāṇā). Rasāṇa refers to the sthāyibhāvas, the essence of which consists in the state of being enjoyed aesthetically (rasayamānatā). Rasayitum means to make the sthāyibhāvas fit for attaining to this status of being aesthetically enjoyed. Kācid ("wondrous") means revealing itself (umilanti) by abandoning (and becoming superior to) the state of the cognition of ordinary worldly things. And so (i.e., because they are endowed with such a vision), they are poets by virtue of their power to describe (things in an extraordinary way). Navā means, it reveals (āsūtrayanti) worlds at every instant in ever new and variegated forms. Dṛṣṭī (The vision) is of the form of poetic imagination (pratibhā). Since "vision" refers (primarily) to knowledge we derive from our eyes and since it is here said to enable (one) to enjoy (such beverages and edibles as) șādava, etc., there is the figure of speech known as (apparent) contradiction (virodha). And so this vision is called "new" (i.e., marvellous). And the (arthāntarasūkramitavācy) dhvani (in the word dṛṣṭi) is helped by this figure of speech. For actually eyesight (the literal sense of the word dṛṣṭi) is not here altogether unintended, since it is not totally impossible (to think of physical eyesight being of use to the poet in observing the world before describing it). Nor is actual eyesight (wholly intended) (and) subservient to some other suggested sense (anyapara = vivekṣitānyaparaṇavācyā). Rather the literal meaning (of sight) passes over

1. This refers to those passages in the first Uddyota (p. 88 and 104) that speak of guṇas and alaśkāras as contributing to the beauty of poetry. In the second Uddyota (p. 188) there is a passage in the Locana where the phrase samucitagunā-laśkāra is actually used. See also Locana, p. 88.


4. Place a danda after virodhahalakāra on p. 508.

5. This expression, dṛṣṭiḥ (i.e., vāyuna jānam) rasāṇa rasayitum vyāparavatī involves a contradiction, something illogical and queer, and that is the reason for calling the vision navā (novel, out of the ordinary). Of course it is true that the contradiction is removed later on by taking dṛṣṭiḥ to mean "poetic vision" and rasāṇa rasayitum to mean "to bring about aesthetic experience in the minds of the readers or spectators", but as soon as we understand the words metaphorically in this manner, the "novelty" or "marvellousness" also disappears. The words ati eva navā refer to the contradiction between the prima facie senses of dṛṣṭi and rasāṇa rasayitum.

6. Atyantam can be taken both with aviveksitam and with āśambhavrābhāvita. The idea is that this is not atyantairaviveksitacitā (a subvariety of aviveksitacitā), because the literal meaning of "sight" is slightly retained in the sense that careful observation of the world around us is useful for the aspiring poet.
into the meaning of “poetic vision” that is the result of the repetition of the “sensual” (ocular) perception (of the world) (aindriyakavijnāna). This passing over (into another meaning) is helped by the figure of speech known as “contradiction.” So, Ānanda will say: “(there is the combination of arthāntaraśaśkramitāvācyā) with virodha-laṅkāra.” (The compound pariniśhitārtha viṣayonmesā can be explained as follows:) (First) yā ca means sight as just described, i.e., the functioning (unmesa) of which with respect to objects to be cognised is fixed (or stable) that is, immovable (definite). Or else (we can analyse the compound as follows:) That sight the functioning (unmesa) of which is firm (pariniśhitā), that is, well-known in worldly experience, and not with respect to completely unprecedented (new) objects as is the case with poets (i.e., poets create new worlds whereas philosophers analyse the one we live in). The word (valpaściti) is explained as vipaścitām iyam (“pertaining to philosophers”). When Ānanda says4: “drawing on both sorts of vision”, “that of poets”, and “that of philosophers”, his own modesty is suggested, for he means: “I am neither a poet nor a scholar.” “I have borrowed this double vision (poetic and philosophic) which does not really belong to me, the way a poor man in an ill-equipped house will borrow provisions (and articles of furniture, etc.) from somebody else’s house in order to entertain (a guest).”

TE DVE API: One sort of vision alone is not sufficient for accomplishing a proper scrutiny and interpretation (nirvarṇanam). Viśvam (‘in addition to the sense “world”) means “all”. Aniśam means again and again

1. The compound aindriyakavijnānābhivyāsollasite (where ullasita must mean something like “being the result of”) can also be understood in a totally different way: We can split the compound after aindriya, and readkavijnāna. This would then translate as: “The result of the repetition of the ocular perception (of the world) on the part of the poet”.

2. How is the arthāntaraśaśkramitāvācyadhāraṇi helped by virodha? The point is this: the initial contradiction between drṣṭi (eye-sight) and rasān rasayitum vyopāracati (“engaged in bringing about the experience of physical flavours or tastes”) is responsible for giving rise to the arthāntaraśaśkramitāvācyadhāraṇi. The suggested prayaṇa in the ajahallakṣaṇa is praṭibhamānasya atisphuṣṭavam (extreme clarity of poetic vision). Had the virodha (i.e., failure of the literal sense of sight) not been there, there would have been no ajahallakṣaṇa, and consequently no suggestion of the prayaṇa. Thus the arthāntaraśaśkramitāvācyadhāraṇi is supported by (or based upon) virodha. So virodha is anugraha of the arthāntaraśaśkramitāvācyadhāraṇi (which is the anugraha). Virodha is the anuga and arthāntaraśaśkramitāvācyadhāraṇi is the anugīn. So this is a case of anugāṇīghāvam- paśkara or anugāṇīghāvam-paśkara.

3. P. 510.

4. Remove the daṇḍa after te avaiśambyeti on p. 509, since this is part of the series of three quotations that Abhinava enumerates.
without stopping. We have been describing (the world) through (poetic) descriptions (as explained above), and also describing in a definite (categorical) manner as follows: This is really like this¹ (i.e. making careful analytic descriptions).² A description (of this kind) involves analysis through direct perception (parāmārṣa),³ inference, etc., so as to discover wherein the essence might lie, i.e. dissecting things very minutely (tilakás tilāśaḥ) (and carefully). It is well-known (khalu) that things to be described are well and properly (or completely) described when they are presented at times by means of the poetic vision (employed for bringing about aesthetic experience) and at times by means of the stable philosophic vision which definitely and categorically reveals their particular (i.e., true) nature. Vayam means "we who have been engaged in using both illusory⁴ (i.e., poetic) vision and analytic (i.e., philosophic) vision". Srāntāḥ means: "not only have we not discovered anything substantial, but quite the contrary, we have only found weariness". The word "and" is used in the sense of "but". Abdhīśaya. ("O you who are sleeping on the ocean"), because of your Yogic sleep, (having withdrawn the whole universe into yourself).⁵ And thus you know the true nature of the real essence, i.e., you remain in your true nature. A person who is tired (naturally) feels respect (bordering on envy) for one who manages to be lying down! TVADDBHAKTI. You alone are the true nature of the highest Self, the essence of every thing. "Devotion to you" means infusion with devotion preceded by faith (sraddhā), etc., which (infusion) arises in due order from upāsanā (adoration), etc. We have not obtained any (joy) (even remotely) com-

1. Abhinava uses this same expression on p. 97 of the Loka. in explaining how a poet, even though he be gifted with imagination (pratibhā) must nonetheless put in hard work in the form of revision, etc. : शब्देपि स्वयंतिपरिस्तिकृतिः। तथावित्वमिति विशेषतः निरुपयो शङ्काकृतिः। Of course the two terms are slightly different in meaning.

2. Place a danda after idam itam iti in the B. P. edition.

3. We take parāmārṣa to stand for pratyrūpa in general, rather than for liṅgapatāmarṣa (i.e., as part of anumāna).

4. Mithyā refers to poetic knowledge, because, as Ānanda says in the fourth Uddyota (p. 527), quoting some unknown mahākavi: "The literary utterance of great poets is glorious. For it causes various ideas to enter the heart (of the reader) and appear (there) in a form which is different, as it were, from their real form", The Skt. chāya for this is: अत्याखितात्मिकः तथायथहितात्मिकः हृदये वा निमेयतः। अर्थविदेयानूः सा जय्यितािपिताकक्योऽदर्ज्जनी। See also the fine verses by Ānanda quoted in the third Uddyota, p. 498. See above, p. 12.

5. We propose placing a danda after yogāniḍrayā, which is the word added by Abhinava to bring out the implication of abhidhīśayana. "You are lying on the ocean in your Yogic repose," तवत्यत एव साति-स्थः, सहस्पाचलितः यथयः; should be taken as a separate sentence. Cf., on the notion of Yoganidrā, Rāgukavāya, XIII. 6.
parable to that arising from devotion to you, let alone an identical ( joy ).
This stanza is the utterance of the author ( Ananda ), who began by first being
a devotee of God, and then, simply out of curiosity, adopted both the viewpoints of the poet and the philosopher ( but found them ultimately unsatisfy-
ing ) and once again came to believe that rest in devotion to God was in-
evitable ( yuktä ).

For we have already explained that the happiness which results from ( conceptual understanding ) of both seen and unseen objects which are ascertained ( pariniścita ), by all the means of valid cognition ( i.e. philosophy ) or even that transcendent joy which consists in relishing an aesthetic experience — to both of these the bliss that comes from finding rest in God is far superior ( prakṛṣyate ); and that aesthetic pleasure ( rasāśvāda ) is only the reflection ( evabhāsa ) of a drop ( viṃśuṣ ) of that mystic bliss.

But ordinary worldly happiness is for the most part ( prāya ) inferior to even that aesthetic delight, because it is mixed with abundant ( bahutarā ) suffering as well. This is the essence of what he means."

This then, is Abhinava’s final position. To have provided a coherent philosophy of aesthetic experience is no small achievement. Clearly it was owing to Abhinava’s influence that so many later writers ( primarily among the ālankārikas, and only very rarely among pure philosophers, for reasons that still puzzle us ) were able to draw upon this precious analogy of religious experience and aesthetic experience, and to make their own contributions. It is not our purpose to provide anything more than the briefest glance into some of the more noteworthy passages in which interesting distinctions can

1. Is Abhinava just guessing that this is the case from the single poem here
given, or is he actually privy to some information about the life of Anandavardhana
that has not come down to us? One might be inclined to believe that he is simply
saying what has become a cliché ( of the popular notions about the life of Bhartrhari,
the author of the kātakātrayam ) namely that one is first inclined towards worldly
life, but eventually, in the wisdom of age, one comes to religion. But here Abhinava
says that Ananda was first a devotee, then went through a middle period of interest
in poetry and philosophy, and finally came back to religion. This is too unusual to
be simply invented, and we think that the likeliness of Abhinava reporting an
actual detail of Ananda’s life is strong. Otherwise the expression prathāmanam would
be out of place, since there is nothing in the verse itself to warrant this assumption.
This is important, because it is the only detail that we know of his life, for no other
legends or reports have come down to us.

2. By ity uktaṃ prāgam asmābhik, Abhinava must be referring to the Locana
itself ( and not to an earlier work ). But we have not come across any explanation in
our reading of the text of the Locana. A puzzle.
CONCLUSION

be found. One is found in the Vyākavyākavya of Mahimabhaṭṭa. ¹ Mahima
is objecting to the use of the word viṣṭaṣa by Ānandavardhana in the expression
kavyaśvaṣa in Kārikā 13 of the first Uddyota: “It is also not possible
to speak of excellence (viṣṭaṣa i.e. atiṣṭha) in the case of poetry, for kavya
(i.e. rasa) consists in the relish of the highest happiness”.² Mahima means
that one cannot use the expression kavyaśvaṣa, since all poetry is rasātmaka
and is therefore in and by itself niratāṣayasukhāsvādalakṣaṇa. (He is thus
not referring to the division of poetry into uttama, madhyama, etc.). In support
of his contention he quotes the following very interesting verse:³

“When, from the recitation⁴ and singing of the Dhrūvā songs, rasa
reaches its peak (i.e. the spectator is filled with rasa), he turns his attention
inwards (antarmukha) for the moment, concentrated entirely on enjoying that
profusion (bhara) (of rasa) and becomes delighted. At that moment (tataḥ)
when (he) is immersed in his own true nature (svārūpa) and he is unaware
of any outside object (nirvīṣāya), his own deep flow (nisyanda) of joy
becomes manifest, by which even Yogins are pleased”.⁵

Madhusūdanarasvaṭī in his Śrībhagavatadhaktirasāyanam, I. 12,
differentiates between rasaśvāda and brahmāsvāda. He says that whereas
brahman is sat (existence) and ajñāta (unknown by ordinary people),
worldly objects like a beautiful woman, etc., are knowable (meya) by
means of valid knowledge. But a beautiful woman, etc., as presented in
literary works appears to the sahādaya in the form of pure consciousness
(caitanya) as limited by the beautiful woman, etc., when the covering mantle
disappears (māyāvatiṭṭiṭṭhāne, paraphrased in the commentary as evāvarāṇa-

1. VV, p. 100 (Kashi Skt, Series ed, 1964.)
2. VV, p. 100: न च तस्य विशेषः संस्कृति विनिर्लस्यमुखावात्यावर्गवाचस्य
3. VV, p. 100: बदलुः —
4. VV, p. 100: बदलुः —
5. VV, p. 100: बदलुः —

4. We take pāṭhya to mean: “anything to be recited”; and thus it can
denote the recitation of the nāṭa, the recitation of the speeches assigned to the
different characters, and also the recitation of non-dramatic poems. Dhrūvāgāna
applies not only to the songs sung in the pārvavāgya, but to all songs sung
in the actual course of the play, such as that sung at the time of the entry of a character
(prāvechākā dhrūvā) and that sung at the exit of a character (nāiskramiki dhrūvā).
Ruyyaka (in his comm. on the VV, p. 99) takes pāṭhya to be a reference to Kāṇa,
and dhrūvā to be a reference to the Nāṭya: पार्ववास्यः, मुधवर्मणीतिसमास्त्यामुखावाचस्य
priyākritāḥ तु गीताज्ञानिति तदवच रसांकुमारः. Note that Ruyyaka,
p. 100, takes asya as a reference to the reader or spectator: asya ca saṃyāghanah.

5. Gnoli (op. cit. first edition, Rome, p. 57), says that this verse is
“.............certainly from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka.”

XXIII
tirodhāne), because the mind of the sahādaya, stabilised in sattvasvāna, becomes for a moment identified with pure consciousness. But because it is after all worldly objects (viṣaya) that are perceived under the form of the highest bliss (paramāntarārsavāpaviṣayopadānā) and because there is the non-perception (abhāne) of the true nature of pure consciousness as it is limited by worldly objects (tattadaracchinnacaityasvarūpā), there is neither immediate release, nor any damage to the self-luminosity (of pure consciousness).

What follows from this?

"Therefore, when this (consciousness limited by worldly objects) becomes manifest in the mind, it turns into rasa, although owing to its being mixed with insentient objects it is somewhat less (than the joy of pure consciousness)").

Curiously enough, we have only come across one author who makes the comparison in favour of rasasvāta (with the possible exception, depending on how it is interpreted, of the verse from Bhaṭṭanāyaka, quoted on p. 23), and this is Jayadeva in his Prasannarāghava:

"Neither the knowledge of Brahman (i.e. spiritual bliss) nor the wealth of a king can be compared to poetry. Like a daughter married to an uncommonly worthy man, it creates joy in the heart when it is appreciated by an exceptional person".

1. We propose reading tattadaracchinnacaityasvarūpā, because this latter makes no sense. If we read the former, tattad can refer to kāntādīvīnya. The expression tattadaracchinnacaityasvarūpā actually occurs in the commentary, in the fourth line from the beginning.

2. BR. I. 12:

सद्गामव तद्या मेयान शास्त्रविभावत: ।
माहाविन्दनिरोधव महा सत्तवश्वा द्वीयम् ॥

Note the commentary (by M. himself):

वसुित: परमाणुलप्यवधोपादनवैतन्याबिष्टत्सैतन्यस्वस्तरामानाथ न सवो नुसिः स्व-प्रकाशम्यम् वा ।

3. BR. I. 13:

तत्: कि अतराद—
ायतादिविभाविलयं मनसि प्रतिपवते ।
किचिद्वन्युग्मश्र रसता याति जात्वेचिविकिर्मिश्च ॥

Note the commentary:

केविन्द्रस्ते तु विश्वाषितचितर्वै विद्यान्विद्यास्य स्कुराणात्
अन्नदेहानुपलैव ।

4. Prasannarāghava, (ed. by V. I., S. Panskar, NSP. 1922, p. 6). prastavand, verso 23 (last stanza):

न श्यायिन्या न च राजावासमीशाया च वेयान चनिता करिनामस ।
लोकोपसे पूर्णति तितिक्षविवानाना प्रपाल द्वयं हृदये करोति ॥

Note the pun on the words lokottare punsi nivagamana,
CONCLUSION

Looking back over the many passages\(^1\) quoted from Abhinava, what can we pick out as the main similarities and the main differences\(^2\) between rasāsvāda and brahmāsvāda?

**SIMILARITIES**

(1) There is no pain in drama, for everything is blissful when we attain the state of rasa. This is equally true of any higher ecstatic experience.

(2) During an actual dramatic performance, we forget the self.

(3) We have no hope of material gain from art. The same is true on the religious level, since to become seriously religious in India generally means abandoning one's acquired wealth.

(4) Both experiences are alaukika. We have seen how often Abhinava uses this term.

(5) Both experiences are ānandaikaghana.

(6) In both cases, the distance between the subject and the object is removed. Thus Abhinava stressed that rasa is not objective.

(7) Time and space disappear for the duration of the experience. We are not conscious of our surroundings during a drama, or at least we ought not to be, according to Abhinava.

(8) During both experiences there is total immersion. In the case of samādhi there is svayutthāna, which could correspond (perhaps forcibly, however) to leaving the theatre and re-entering ordinary life. We have all certainly experienced the curious feeling of being let-down, even of depression, upon leaving a theatre.

(9) In both cases, special preparation is necessary: music and dance in the theatre, and perhaps one might include bhajans and other paraphernalia of bhakti in the case of religion.

(10) In both cases, what appears is not something that is “created” anew, but something that is “manifested”, or “suggested”. Rasa is not “produced”, it is “suggested”. So also, the identity of the ātman and

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1. See also the Brahmāsiddhi of Maḍanamīśra, Ch. I, p. 5, Kuppuswami Shastri’s edition: एवं च लीक्षकांत्रेवास (महानन्दर्स) मात्रविनाय नुस्दृते।
2. Note what the Saṅgītaratnākara, III, 1266 says: महासंगीतविद्विवशुश्ची संविदः। The Bhānaprakṣāna, II, (p. 53) also deals with the distinction between rasāsvāda and brahmāsvāda and then ends by saying:

   श्लोकमहम्रेष्ठोऽवमेववुज: पुराणायः।

Sāradātānaya, as is clear from Ch. I, p. 26-27, and Ch. II, p. 47, does not accept śānta. However, at II, p. 48, a certain Vāsuki is quoted who does accept śānta.

On this problem, see Raghavan, “The Number of Rasas,” p. 11.
brahman is only a question of removing ignorance (i.e. nothing "new" is to be acquired). In Vedânta the term abhivyakti is often used for this process, just as both Ânanda and Abhinava use the same expression for rasa.

(11) In Vedânta, avidyā is removed by means of śravana, manana etc. In rasanispati, Abhinava emphasises how the vighnas must be removed before rasa can manifest itself.

(12) In both cases there is a sense of rest (viśrânti), of having reached the goal (cf. the Vedântic expression krtakṛtya) beyond which there is nothing to be accomplished.

(13) In the aesthetic experience, Ânanda (and Abhinava) make light of the "means" that have brought it about, especially of the vâcya sense, which is compared to a lamp (D. Al. I. 9) which is useful for illuminating objects, but which is not the goal of our efforts. Similarly, in Vedânta, Śaṅkara speaks of the upāyas as being similar to a raft which we leave behind after our destination has been reached.

DIFFERENCES

The differences are no less striking, and certainly ought not to be lightly dismissed. Abhinava himself makes the distinction in a difficult passage in the Abhinavabhârati:

"Aesthetic experience (carvanā) is different from the perception of love, etc., that arises because of ordinary valid means of cognition such as direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), textual authority (āgama), simile (upamāna) and others. It is also (an experience) different from the indifferent (tāṭastha) knowledge of another person's thoughts that arises from direct vision in a Yogin, and from the experience that consists of a single mass of the bliss (ānandaikaghana) of one's own Self that belongs to the highest Yogi and which, being pure (suddha), is devoid of contact (uparāga) with any object of the senses. The reason why aesthetic experience differs from all the above, is because of the absence of beauty caused respectively by the appearance of distractions such as the desire to acquire (arjana), the absence of active participation, the absence of clarity (asphuṭatva), and being at the mercy of the object of contemplation."

CONCLUSION

Other differences are:

(1) The final state in Vedanta is almost always described (16) as ineffable, whereas Ananda is clear that such an adjective can never be predicated of dhvani. Whether Abhinava agreed or not is not evident.

(2) The Adhikarin in the case of liberation is much more clearly defined that he is for literature. After all, children are perfectly capable of watching a drama, though they might not take away as much as a qualified adult. Sahodayatva is a much more worldly and concrete qualification than is mumuksa.

(3) The drama is not expected (at least Abhinava never says anything about this) to change one's life radically. To have a profound aesthetic experience is simply satisfying and does not imply that one will be in any sense profoundly altered. One cannot say the same for mystic experiences. Quite apart from the concept of sadyomukti, any deep religious experience is very likely to make a manifest, sometimes drastic, change in a person's outward life.

(4) It is significant that most writers, (Abhinava is an exception), do not use the term ananda to describe the purpose of poetry as often as they use the less ethereal term priti and even more often vimoda, "entertainment". It is perfectly legitimate to give curiosity as the reason for wishing to see any given drama. But to say the same of religious experience would be unthinkable, at least in ancient India.

(5) With the exception of Abhinava, (who has highly "spiritual" ideas about love, see p. 14) most writers regard the highest expression of drama to be sexual love, without any philosophical implications.

In spite of these differences, such sentiments in regard to aesthetic experience as Abhinava provided, became very common. For instance in the Alankaramahodadh of Narendraprabha Suri we read:

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1. E.g. Gaudapada, III, 47: स्वार्थ शान्ति सतिर्वामकर्षण्य मुखयुतमस्। Anandavardhana is quite clear that such an adjective can never be predicated of dhvani: वेदि सहरवहँशस्यष्मास्थवस्येव धनेशायामनास्यास्यास्यास्यास्यामुत्तत्सिंहितोऽपि न परीर्ववाविदिः। (D. Ai, p. 162-63).

Sahodayatvasaunvedyam is not ambiguous and cannot be Ananda's own position, for if it were, this would in no way prove that dhvani was "speakable" but only that it was "knowable" which is not the same thing at all. Moreover, this is confirmed by the passage in the D. Aii, p. 33, where this adjective is given as part of the anukhyeyavada. We feel that it is quite possible that Abhinava himself, however, did not really agree with this position. It is interesting that he does not comment extensively on the anukhyeyavada except to hint that it is a Buddhist position, with which Ananda has dealt elsewhere (Locana, p. 519).
"(Aesthetic experience is that state) wherein the mind sinks for a moment, where it bathes with ambrosia for a moment, where it gets drunk for a moment, where it melts away for a moment". \(^1\)

Even such a staunchly Vedānta work as the Pañcadaśī of Vidyāraṇya seems to have been influenced by aesthetic speculations in four lovely verses:

"The lamp which is in the theatre lights up equally the manager, the audience and the dancer. Even if they are not present, it shines". \(^2\)

"The manager is the ego. The audience are the sense-objects. The dancer is the mind. The keepers of time, etc., are the sense-organs. The illuminating lamp is the Witness (i.e. the Self)". \(^3\)

"Whatever forms can be imagined with the mind, illuminating all of these, he becomes the Witness of all of them. By himself however he is beyond the reach of words and mind". \(^4\)

"How can I experience such a Self? If you feel this way, then do not (try) to experience it. When all experiences cease, then the Witness alone is left". \(^5\)

Here is a verse quoted by Jayaratha in the Tantrāloka which seems to sum everything up in a very fine analogy:

"Just as when various objects such as pieces of wood, leaves, stones, etc., fall into a salt-mine they turn into salt, so also emotions (turn into bliss when they fall into) the pure consciousness that is our very Self". \(^6\)

1. Alakhaṇamahodadhi of Nārendraprabha Sāri, ed. by L. B. G. J. Pandit, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1942 (G. O. S. XCV) :

2. Pañcadaśī, X. 11 :

3. P.D. X. 14 :

4. P.D. X. 23 :

5. P.D. X. 24 :

APPENDIX

LATER WRITERS ON Śántarasā and Rasāsvāda:

It is not our main purpose to examine in any detail how the writers of the later tradition deal with the themes supplied by Abhinavagupta. Nonetheless there are certain passages which we feel deserve to be noticed. The three main texts that should be seen are the Kāvyaprakāśa, the Sāhityadārpana and the Rasagaṅgādhara. There are two areas in which we are interested: śántarasā and rasāsvāda. The Kāvyaprakāśa is quite brief on śántarasā. At IV. 29 Mammata says:

"Śṛṅgāra, hāya, karaṇa, raudra, vīra, bhayānaka, bīhatsa and abhuta—these are stated to be the eight rasas in drama."

Later, at IV. 35 he says:

"Śānta is the ninth rasa, of which nirveda is the sthāyibhāva" and then he gives the stanza āhaun vā āha vā kusumaśayane vā deśadi vā as an example of śántarasā.¹ It would seem therefore that according to Mammata, śántarasā has no place in drama, but only in kāvyā. But his statement is not unambiguous, and it is possible to interpret him to mean that generally only eight rasas are admitted, but that he would admit also śānta as a ninth.

Viśvanātha, in the Sāhityadārpana, III. 45 ff., has the following remarks on ŚR:

Sāhityadārpana III. 245–250:

अथ शाल्तः —

शाल्तः शामशायिमात्र उत्तमप्रकालितः ||
कुलदृश्युद्धरुप्तः स्त्रीनारायणदेवतः ||
अनिष्ठवादिनीष्ठकर्मस्तुनिसत्तरत्व तस्याऽ ||
परमाष्टरुप्तः वा तत्साधनन्मिथः ||
पुष्पाश्रमसविज्ञविश्ववनन्मन्नादयः ||
महापुष्पान्नर्त्षारसार्द्धविद्यनुस्पिष्टः ||
रोमाश्चार्द्धान्नामार्द्धास्य स्तुपाधिविचारिणः ||
निर्वेदद्विद्यश्रमसविमतिभूतदशादयः ||

¹. According to Ksemendra, Ausiśtyanidāraśvacā A 29 (Minor works of Ksemendra, Sanskrit Academy Series No. 7, Hyderabad, 1961, edited by E. V. V. Rāghavacārya and D. G. Padhya), this stanza was written by Utpalarāja. Kosambi ("The Epigrams Attributed to Bhartṛhari", Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1948, p. 85) includes it among the Saṃkhyitaślokas, as no. 213.
यथा—

रथ्यान्त्यश्चररस्त्वा धृतजलकन्यायङ्गरस्त्वा
सत्रां च सकौतकं च सद्रं दशम्य तैरार्गे:।
निश्चयानीकृत्वा चित्रुग्रासुसुधा निद्रायमणसम् ये
निश्चये: कर्त: कदा करपुटीभिन्नं विषुण्डितयति॥

पुरस्तु महाभारताद्वै दशम्या।

निद्राकाररुपप्रवासवारारंशि नो॥

द्रायोजयाद्धि नागानन्दाद्वै जीन्तवाहानोदरसत्या महायथायाधुरुगादर्त्ते
स विधापच्चकर्तनिवादवाहादद्वाड़वादकाकारायस्यो न दशयेऽ। शान्तस्तु सत्रीकरणाहारारंशि
मैकरुपं च त्र्यायां नामान्तमवाच्छिन्नि॥ अतः नागानन्दि: शान्तसः प्रधानवाच्छिन्नमस्त्यम्।

नन्दु

‘ न यत्र दुःस्व न खुबं न चित्ता न देशराग्न। न छ काभिरदिफ्च्छा।
रस: स शान्त: कवितं मुनि:। सन्तोषु माले च सम्प्रभान्॥१०’

इर्विर्वितुप्स्य शान्तस्य मोक्षाग्रथश्यायाविमानस्यपाणपीतिकविष्णुवायो ग्राहुकृत्यात्चत्र संख्यार्धिन्नी
नामावासवक्ष्यसंस्कृतम् विनिर्देशः॥

उत्तरं हि—

‘ वच्च कामसुलोके च्छोके राघु दिव्यं महंसुधम्।
तुण्णाक्षुपुसुकः नाहित्: पोङ्किस्ती कल्याम्॥११’

सत्रीकारमंकारहिर्स्तम् ब्रजनिन्त चेतु॥

अत्रान्तमध्यमान्तत्तिस्य दुर्योधनाद्यत्तम॥

आदिशाश्वासमतीद्रास्बनेद्वनार्कान्तिमिश्चमः॥

तत्र देवताशिष्यं रत्निक्ष्या—

कदा वाराणस्यामिन्द सुरुनिवर्गोपि कसा
न्मस्यान: कौपीन्ति दिंशिसि निद्रायानोदकं चलच्छुष्टम्।

अीय गारीताय त्रिपुर्हर शम्भो विनिधन
प्रस्तैद्विश्रोष्णिमिपिप्फ नेथ्ममिद्विस्तसान्॥
“Śāntarasa has calmness (śama) as its basic mood. It belongs to the very best of men. It has the white complexion of the Kunda (jasmine) and the moon, and the revered Narāyana as its presiding deity. Its ālambana-vibhāva is the emptiness (or vanity) of all things because of their transient nature, or it is the nature of the supreme Self. Its uddīpanavibhāvas are holy hermitages, sacred places (harikṣetra), places of pilgrimage, pleasant groves, etc., and the company of great men etc. Its anubhāvas are horripilation, etc. Its vyāhicārabhāvas are self-disparagement, joy, recollection, resolve, kindness towards all beings, etc. Here is an example:

“When will the crows fearlessly carry away the food placed as alms in my joined hands, as I move along the highway wearing an old, worn-out, tattered and inadequate garment, looked at by the citizens on the road with fear, curiosity and pity, sleeping in the unfeigned bliss of relishing the nectar of spirituality?”

The full development (of śāntarasa) is to be seen in the Mahābhārata, etc.

“Dayāvīra (in which the sthāyibhāva utsāha is based on or is concerned with mercy or benevolence), etc., are not identical with this (śānta), as (śānta) is without even the slightest trace of egoism (while dayāvīra, etc., are marked by egoism).”

In dayāvīra, etc., such as for example in the case of Jimūtavāhana, etc., we do not find an extinction of egoism, in as much as we observe in the middle of the play, Jimūtavāhana’s love for Malayavatī, and in the end his attainment of the status of sovereignty over the Vidyādhāra. Śānta, however, cannot be included under dayāvīra, etc., because its exclusive nature is the extinction of egoism in every way. Hence the view that in the Nāgānanda, śānta is the dominant sentiment, is refuted.

It may be objected as follows:

“Where there is neither pain, nor pleasure, nor worry, nor hatred, nor affection, that is styled as śāntarasa by the chief among the sages, that which consists in equality towards all objects.”

How can śāntarasa which is of the nature described above, and which manifests itself only in the state of emancipation (mokṣa), where there is the complete absence of the auxiliary feelings (and the abiding mental moods such as love, etc.) be regarded as a rasa? We reply as follows:

“Since that tranquillity alone which exists in the state wherein the mind is joined to and also disjoined from the soul (i.e. wherein the soul is not

1. Reading sarveṣu bhāvena samapramāṇah, while in the Dākṣarāpa, under IV, 48, the reading is sarveṣu bhāvena ṣaṃapradhānāh.
completely absorbed into the absolute) attains to the nature of rasa, the presence of the auxiliary feelings etc. (i.e. of the abiding mental moods, the excitants and the ensuants) is not ruled out”.

As for the statement that there is in śānta the absence even of pleasure, that refers only to worldly pleasure (vaiśayikasukha), and hence, there is no contradiction. For it has been stated:

“The earthly pleasure arising from fulfilment of desires as well as the great pleasure which is attained in heaven—these are not equal to even a sixteenth part of the happiness arising from the extinction of all desires”.

Dayāvīra, etc., deserve to be included under śānta, provided that they are completely divested of egoism in every way.

The word “etc.”, stands for dharmavīra, dānavīra, love having a deity for its object, etc. Amongst these, love having a deity for its object is illustrated in the following stanza:

“When shall I pass my days as a moment, dwelling in Vāraṇaśi, on the bank of the divine river (Ganges) wearing a loin-cloth, holding my hands joined on my head and crying out: “O lord of Gaurī, destroyer of Tripura, three-eyed Śambhu, be merciful towards me!”

The commentary of the Sāhityadarpana on rasāsvāda, while interesting, is too long to include here (see SD III. 1 and ff.). This and the commentary of the Kāvyapraṅkāsa on rasāsvāda (III. pp. 91–95, Jhalkikar) are readily available, since there exist translations into English of both these texts (see Bibliography). The Rasagaṅgādhara, however, is a different matter, since it has never been translated before. We therefore thought it worthwhile to translate in full Jagannātha’s remarks on śāntarasa, and to provide an explanatory translation of his remarks on Abhinava’s views on rasāsvāda.

Here is the first text:

Rasagaṅgādhara

स च——

‘शुद्धार: करुणः शास्त्रो रूपो शीतलेक्ष्मयस्तथा ||
हास्यो भयानकक्षेत्र बीमलक्षेत्रि ते नस ||’

इतिकर्मयथा मुनिवचनं चात मानस ||

केचित्——

‘शान्तस्य शामसाध्यावलयं च तदसमवायत् ||
अष्टोत्सर्गस्य नायद् न शान्तस्त्रत्र युग्यते ||’
Rasa is ninefold, because of the statement:

"Śringāra, karuṇa, śānta,raudra,vīra, adbhuta,
hāsyā, bhayanaka, and bibhatsa — thus they are nine".¹

And in this matter² the statement of the Sage (Bharata) is the final authority.

But there are some who say:³

"Because śānta can be developed only from (the sthāyiḥbhāva) śama, and because śama is impossible in an actor, there are only eight rasas in drama; śānta has no place in it". This is not, however, accepted by others. They say that the argument advanced (by the advocates of eight rasas) namely that

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¹ We have used the KM (12) Ed. 1939, p. 35 ff.
² We do not know where this verse could come from. We take it that Jagannātha is saying that it is based on the Nātyaśāstra, not that it comes from the NŚ.
³ Atra means: asmin vinaye, namely rasasaṅkhyāvinaye.
⁴ Apara includes Jagannātha himself. He of course accepts the existence of śāntarasa.
śāma is not possible in an actor, does not stand to reason, because we do not accept that the revelation (i.e. aesthetic enjoyment) of rasa (ever) takes place in an actor.\(^1\) As the spectators (on the other hand) can experience tranquility, there is no difficulty in the arousal of (śānta) rasa in them. It would not be proper to say that as the actor (himself) is devoid of śāma, he cannot be capable of acting in a manner congenial to śāma. For in that case, it will have to be accepted that, since an actor is devoid of (genuine) fear and (genuine) anger, etc., he would not be capable of acting in a manner congenial to fear, anger, etc. also. Now, if there is nothing objectionable in the actor's being able to manifest, through special training, repeated practice, etc., the artificial effects of anger, etc., although there is no possibility in his case of the real effects of anger, etc., i.e. although he cannot actually kill or imprison (the object of his anger), then the same should apply in the case of śāma as well. It may now be asked: "How can there be the emergence (udreka) of śānta in the minds of spectators (of a drama), since there is in a drama vocal and instrumental music, etc., all of which are opposed (to the suggestion of the śthūlyābhāva śāma), and since śānta is by its nature averse to the contemplation of worldly objects (e.g. music, dance, etc.)?" The reply is that those who admit the existence of śānta in drama, do not believe that the presence of vocal and instrumental music in a drama acts as a hindrance to the emergence of śānta, for the very reason that the result (namely the emergence of śānta) is actually experienced (phalabalāt). If now it is maintained (by the opponent) that the contemplation of any worldly object is detrimental to the emergence of śānta, then (even in the case of non-dramatic poetry), the ālambanavibhāva of śāma such as the transitory nature of worldly existence, and its uddipanavibhāvas such as listening to the recitation of the Purāṇas, association with saintly people, visiting sacred penance-groves and holy places (tīrtha), being worldly objects (after all), will have to be regarded as detrimental to the emergence of śānta (in the minds of the readers of non-dramatic poetry). It is for this very reason that in the last chapter of the Sangitaratnākara, it has been said:

"Some have urged that in dramatic compositions (nātyeṣu) there are only eight rasas. But that is not (at all) correct (acāru — unconvincing), because no actor ever actually relishes any rasa whatsoever".\(^2\)

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1. Jagannātha does not accept the fact that the actor has rasa. Bhaṭṭalollāja, however, A. Bh., p. 264 (Vol. I) believed that he does: rasabhāvanām api vāsanā-vāśvāsana naśe saṃbhavat annaṃdhibhāvā ca layādbhāvanānāśāt (for this phrase cf. Locusa, Uddyota, II, p. 184, last line). Note too Dāsrāṣṭā, IV. 42 — kāryārtha-bhāvanāvādo nartakasya na vāryate.

By means of this and similar arguments it has been established (in that work) that śantarasa exists (even in dramatic poetry). Even those who hold the view that śantarasa has no place in dramatic poetry (nātya) will have necessarily to accept its existence in non-dramatic poetry (kāvya), (firstly) because there are no such objections (to its acceptance in non-dramatic poetry) as given earlier, and (secondly) because it has been established on the strength of all people's actual experience that works like the Mahābhārata have śantarasa as their dominant emotional mood. It is for this very reason that (a great scholar like) Māmataḥbhāṭṭa first opened his discussion (on the number of rasas) with the words "eight are the rasas in drama" \(^1\) and concluded his treatment of the subject with the remark: "śanta too has to be admitted as the ninth rasa (in non-dramatic poetry)". \(^2\)

Of these — love, sorrow, disaffection, anger, enthusiasm, wonder, mirth, and disgust are the abiding mental moods respectively". \(^3\)

**ON THE sthūyābhāva OF ŚANTA**

(The sthūyābhāva of śanta, namely) nirveda \(^4\) ("world-weariness") is a peculiar state-of-mind (cit Govardhīśa) which is also called by the name vīgyāvairāga ("aversion to worldly objects of enjoyment") arising from contemplation on the eternal Reality (nityavastu) and the non-eternal phenomenal appearances in the world (anityavastu). If, however, nirveda is (not the result of such contemplation, but is) the result of domestic quarrels, etc., it is regarded as a vyabhicārabhāva (a transient mood) (since it is of a transitory nature). \(^5\)

Now here is a difficult passage from the Rasagāṅgādhara on rasa: \(^6\)

\[
\text{समुचिततदनिवेशिताधिकादशामु} \\
\text{कायमाय सीमानिकि: सहदयरत् धृति} \\
\text{सहदयरत्सहकुलन भाभविदयेशमहिषा।} \\
\text{विग्रहतुवण्टीरुपमतिवामितःकविभकितिवादानु} \\
\text{भावयिभारितवद्यपरद्वः। शाकुलवनिम्बनपरकारणे;} \\
\text{कन्द्रकादिभिलोक्षतकारणे;} \\
\text{अत्र उत्ताधिमि काथे; कन्तादिरिमि सहारिरिमिथ,} \\
\text{सामूह धारुमविनेताधिकितकेन यथाप} \\
\text{रण तकारित्वतान्तरादिकादशामुनानेन एवं} \\
\text{प्रभुपरिमित्वादिताधितिनिपथमेण प्रभात्रा} \\
\text{स्न्यातादत्वा वास्तवेन निजवस्थापनद्वै} \\
\text{सह गोविष्क्रियायमाण: प्राणिनविद्यासाधा} \\
\text{रस्यादिरिव रस्यः!}
\]

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3. राति: शोकश्च सिंहरकोपलाहस्य निस्वर:। हासोऽभ्यं दुःखस्य च स्थाविभाषा: कमादम्य।।
4. निशाचनिर्वाचण्याः मारतम्या (विन्याचविशेषयः) विविहारागास्य निभाः। गहकरहादितस्तु \\ \\ र्मित्वाचरी।
5. On the two kinds of nirveda, see the *A. Dh.*, (Raghavan's ed. p. 105), surely the source of Jagannātha's remarks.
Rasa—aesthetic enjoyment—is the sthāyibhāva rati, etc., which is of the form of a mental impression, already crystallised in the mind and implanted in the mind since the time of birth (or since time immemorial) and cognised (or perceived) by the cogniser (i.e. by the reader or spectator) along with the joy of self-realisation (nījasvarūpānandena saha) which is absolutely real (and not imaginary), as it is self-luminous (svapraṅkaśā)
APPENDIX

(and does not require anything else to illuminate it). This cognition of a sthāyibhāva (such as rati, etc.,) is the result of an extraordinary function (of words and senses) (i.e. it is brought by the function called suggestion).

(This suggestion) is produced (prādurbhāvita) by the appropriate álambanavibhāvas, uddīpavanibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas (described in the poem or represented on the stage) acting jointly and simultaneously (sambhāya). The extraordinary function (namely suggestion) which is thus brought into play as a result of the vibhāvas, etc., immediately removes the ignorance which acts as a screen (or veil) covering up (or obscuring) the blissful consciousness of the Self. And when the screen of ignorance is thus removed, the cogniser rises superior to and becomes divested of his peculiar properties such as being a limited cogniser (etc.).

The vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas are first presented by the poet or dramatist to the reader (or spectator) through the medium of the poem (or drama) which is charming because of the appropriate and beautiful literary style (adopted for conveying the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas). These vibhāvas, etc., enter (i.e., make an impression on) the mind of the appreciative, sympathetic reader (or spectator). Then by the power of the peculiar mental reflection (on the vibhāvas etc.), on the part of the reader and in cooperation with his appreciative attitude, the vibhāvas etc., become divested of their individualistic limitations and become universalised (or generalised), and vibhāvas like Duṣyanta and Śakuntāḷa lose their individualistic natures as Duṣyanta and Śakuntāḷa and stand out before us in the universal character of manhood and womanhood in general. In the realm of poetics, fundamental causal factors like Śakuntalā, exciting causal factors like moonlight, effect-factors like the shedding of tears and collateral, accessory effect-factors, like anxiety etc., are designated by the names álambanavibhāva, uddīpavanibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva respectively. They are extraworldly (alaukika, i.e. they are idealised (and not presented as they exist in ordinary life) so as to serve the purpose of awakening and nourishing a particular mental mood (such as love etc.). In the ordinary world they are called álambankāraṇa, uddīpakāraṇa, kārya and sahākārin, but when idealised so as to suit the atmosphere of poetry and drama, they are known by the names vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas.

"For it has been said that a sthāyibhāva revealed (or suggested) by the vibhāvas etc. is called by the name of rasa".1 Revealed (or suggested) means "made the object of revelation (or suggestion)". Now vyakti (revelation) (in the context of rasa-realisation) means consciousness (pure,

blissful consciousness of the Self), from which the enveloping screen is (temporarily) removed (bhagnavaranā cid). Just as a lamp covered by an earthen bowl (or wicker-basket) begins to shine by itself, and illumines nearby objects as soon as the cover is taken away, in the same way pure consciousness in the form of the ātman (i.e., the ātman who is pure consciousness and supreme bliss), which is covered by ignorance, desire etc. begins to shine on its own (svayam prakāšate) and illumines the sthāyibhāvas like rati, etc., along with (appropriate) vibhāvas, etc. For the sthāyibhāvas like rati are the properties (or attributes) of the mind (in as much as they are of the form of mental impressions or instincts embedded in the mind) and hence they are admitted (by rhetoricians and Vedántins) to be capable of being illumined by the sāksin (i.e., the ātman consisting of pure consciousness) (as soon as the enveloping veil in the form of ignorance, desire etc., is removed). There should be no difficulty in accepting that even the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas are illumined by the ātman (although they possess an objective character and are objective entities like ghata, pata, etc.), on the analogy of the horse etc. seen in a dream, or on the analogy of the silver (erroneously) perceived in a piece of tin (raṅgarajata). According to this view rasa is nothing but the subtle, latent instincts like love etc. As these instincts are permanent moods of the mind, rasa also is permanent in character. Now the question arises, how rasa is said to come into existence and cease to exist if it is permanent in its nature. The answer is that origination (utpatti) and cessation (vināśa) really belong to the aesthetic experience (carvaṇā) of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas which are the suggesters of the rasa. Or origination and cessation may be said to belong to the āvarāṇabhaṅga (removal of the screen in the form of ignorance, desire etc., which covers up the blissful consciousness). But the origination and cessation are metaphorically transferred to rasa by lakṣanā (rase upacaryete). For this an illustration is given from the sphota doctrine of the grammarians. The letters in the form of sphota are really eternal. But they are in ordinary language spoken of as subject to origination and cessation, only in a metaphorical sense. They are said to be subject to origination and cessation because of the origination and cessation of the contacts between the places of articulation (palate etc.) and the articulators (tip of the tongue etc.). The duration of the removal of the screen of ignorance, desire, worldly distractions etc., is conditioned by the enjoyment (carvaṇā) of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas (i.e., the removal of the screen of ignorance etc., lasts only so long as the enjoyment of the vibhāvas etc., last). The moment the enjoyment of the vibhāvas etc., comes to an end, the light of one’s own blissful consciousness becomes veiled once again by the power of ignorance, desire, worldly distractions etc., and the light of consciousness that until now illuminated the sthāyi-
bhāvas being itself enveloped, the sthāyībhāvas though permanent (i.e. though present and existing all along), do not shine any longer, and their enjoyment comes to an end. This is the reason why, and this is the sense in which, rasa is said to be subject to origination and cessation.

Or we may say as follows: because of the enjoyment of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyābhicāribhāvas, which enjoyment is evoked (or is called into play, unmiṣita) by the sympathetic attitude of the appreciative reader or spectator, the mind of the appreciative reader or spectator dwelling on the various sthāyībhāvas, becomes transformed into the blissful consciousness which is the nature of the ātman, just as in the case of a Yogi, his mind becomes transformed into blissful consciousness during deep meditation (samādhi). This transformation of the mind into the blissful consciousness (which is the real nature of the ātman) amounts to the identification of the mind with blissful consciousness (tammyābhavana). Now this bliss is not comparable with any of the ordinary worldly joys; because ordinary worldly joys are a property of the mind (antarhkarana), (while this bliss, kavyānanda, is the essence of the ātman itself). (Really speaking kavyānanda is not identical with brahmānanda or brahmāsvāda, because it is produced by the laukikasamagri, such as the contemplation of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyābhicāribhāvas as described in a poem or exhibited in a drama, and so it is essentially laukika. But still it is alaukika in the sense that it is not comparable to any of the joys of this world. At the time of experiencing worldly joys, the ātman enters into contact with the mind so that laukikānanda is cittavrūtisamayuktacaitanyasvarūpa. But Kavyānanda—or rasacarvanājananand— is sudhacaitanyarūpa, i.e. at the time of experiencing rasāsvāda the cittavrūti itself becomes transformed into the bliss of pure consciousness). Jagannātha sums up the view of Abhinavagupta and his followers on rasa realisation as follows:

"Thus in the light of the real intention (svārasya i.e. abhiprāya) of the works of Abhinavagupta and of Mammatā and others, rasa is a sthāyībhāva such as rati, characterised by blissful consciousness (i.e. becoming the object of pure, blissful consciousness which is the ātman’s real nature) from which the covering lid has been removed (bhagnāvaranācācādviṣṭah, i.e. bhagnāvaranācācādviṣyatātah). But, says Jagannātha, really speaking the view of Abhinavagupta and Mammatā ought to be stated as follows: rasa is the blissful consciousness itself from which the covering lid (of ignorance, desire and worldly distractions) has been removed and of which the sthāyi-bhāvas like rati have become the object (ratyādyavacchinna bhagnāvaranā cīd eva rasāḥ). This emended statement of the view of Abhinavagupta and Mammatā is based on the śruti passage: raso vai saḥ. rasam hy evaṃ labdhvā anandī bhavati. The difference between the two statements of Abhinava-
gupta’s and Mammaṭa’s view consists in the shifting of the viśeṣaṇaviveṣeya-bhāva. According to the first statement bhagnāvaranā cid becomes the viśeṣaṇa and ratyādisthāyibhāva becomes the viśeṣya. According to the second statement, ratyādisthāyibhāva becomes the viśeṣaṇa and bhagnāvaranā cid becomes the viśeṣya. But according to Jagannātha, the second statement is much more in harmony with the śruti passage quoted above, although the first statement is in keeping with what Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa have actually said in their works. “But in any case, (i.e. under both the statements) the element of consciousness (cidadma) is either a viśeṣaṇa (in the first statement) or a viśeṣya (in the second statement), and one thing is certain (or established) that rasa is eternal (nimya) and self-luminous (svaprakāśa), because rasa is vitally connected with the cidadma (either as viśeṣaṇa or as viśeṣya) and the cidadma is eternal and self-luminous. Thus from the point of view of the cidadma, rasa is eternal and self-luminous, though from the point of view of the ratyādisthāyibhāva it is non-eternal (animya) and illumined by something else (paraprakāśa or itarabhāṣya).” (Hence both the remarks, namely rasaḥ nityah svaprakāśaḥ ca and rasaḥ anityah itarabhāṣyaḥ ca, are justifiable from their respective viewpoints.)

Jagannātha then goes on to say that the relishing of rasa is nothing but the breaking off (or withdrawal) of the screen (or mantle) (of ignorance, etc.) covering the pure consciousness (cidgatāvaranābhāṅgaḥ) or the transformation of the mind into the bliss of pure consciousness which is the nature of the ātman (tadākāra, i.e. svasaśīpānandākāra, antahkaraṇa-vṛttiḥ). Now this aesthetic enjoyment (rasacarvaṇa) is different from (and is not identical with) the meditational trance (samādhi or brahmāsvāda). For it has for its object (ālambana) the bliss of pure consciousness blended with the cognition (or consciousness) of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāri-bhāvas—which are worldly or mundane matters (viṣaya, i.e. sāṁsārikapada-rtha). But brahmāsvāda or parabrāhmaśāksātkāra is not mixed or blended with the cognition (or consciousness) of worldly matters. (It is viśuddha-brahmaṇaviṣayaka or ātmānandaviṣayaka.) Further, aesthetic enjoyment (rasā-svāda or rasacarvaṇa) is the outcome of the special function, namely vyanjana peculiar to poetry, while brahmāsvāda is the outcome of the process laid down in the Upaniṣads, viz. śravaṇa, manana, nididhyāsana, etc. [Thus there is a difference between rasāsvāda and brahmāsvāda with regard to the viṣaya (object) and the means (karaṇa or sūdhana)].

We translate the next section (beginning: athāsyaṁ sukhaṁśabhāne, etc.):

“Objection: what evidence or authority (mānam) is there for holding that in rasāsvāda (or rasacarvaṇa) there is the experience of an element of happiness (joy or pleasure) (sukhaṁśa)?
Appendix

Reply: A similar counter-question (parayanuyoga) could be raised in regard to samādhi (or brahmāsvāda). In other words it may be asked: what is the evidence (or authority) for saying that in meditational trance also there is the experience of happiness (or bliss)?

Objection: Why, there is the following evidence (in the form of a quotation from the Bhagavadgītā, to prove that in brahmāsvāda there is the experience of bliss). The Gītā says (VI. 21): sukham ātyantikaṃ yat tad buddhigrāhyam atindriyam—which means that brahmāsvāda is full of happiness which is super-sensuous, which is perceptible directly by the intellect (intuition) and which is ātyantika, i.e. transcending every other kind of mundane joy.

Reply: we (too) have the authority of a scriptural (upaniṣadic) statement to prove that rasāsvāda is full of happiness. The scriptural statement is: raso vai saḥ. rasaṁ hy evāyaṁ labdhvā ānandī bhavati."

[Actually, however, this scriptural statement refers to the ātman and not to aesthetic experience. The proper meaning of the statement is: "That (ātman) is surely (vai) rasa (joy or bliss). Having realised the (ātman which is) rasa (bliss) he becomes happy or blissful." In the first part of the quotation, the ātman is equated with rasa (i.e. ānanda—supreme joy or bliss). In the second part of the quotation it is said that having realised that ātman which is rasarūpa or ānandarūpa, he, i.e. the spiritual aspirant (sādhaka), becomes supremely happy (ānandī bhavati). But Jagannātha seems to have understood both parts of the quotation as referring to rasa in poetry or drama, i.e. as referring to aesthetic experience. He understood the second part to mean: "having realised rasa, i.e. the emotional flavour, he (i.e. the sāhrdaya or sāmōjika) becomes supremely happy". But we doubt very much if the quotation from the Upaniṣad is capable of such an interpretation].

"In addition to this scriptural statement serving as evidence to show that rasāsvāda is ānandarūpa, the ānandarūpātva of rasāsvāda is borne out by a second authority, namely the direct experience of the sāhrdaya." Jaganñātha means that just as the ānandarūpātva of the brahmāsvāda is supported by the quotation from the Bhagavadgītā, and by actual experience of the Yogins, in the same way the ānandarūpātva of rasāsvāda is supported by the scriptural passage given above (namely: raso vai saḥ. rasaṁ hy evāyaṁ labdhvā ānandī bhavati) and by the direct experience of the sāhrdaya.

Here is our translation of the next section: yeṣaṁ dvitiyapakṣe, etc.: "The rasacarvāṇa (or rasāsvāda) which has been described by us above in connection with the second statement of Abhinavagupta's view as consisting in a mental condition transformed into the bliss which is the ātman, well,
that rasacarvanā (or rasāsvāda) is both śabda (verbal) and aparokṣa (i.e. of the nature of direct experience—pratyakṣarūpa).” Jagannātha means that it is śabda because it is induced by sabdavyāpara, namely vyānjanā, and by abhidhā which always precedes vyānjanā. Rasacarvanā (or rasāsvāda) is aparokṣa (i.e. pratyakṣarūpa) because its object is ātmānanda (aparokṣa-sukhālambanatvāt). Thus rasāsvāda is both śabda (i.e. sabdavyāpārābhāvya) and aparokṣa, just as the knowledge of the identity between the jīvātman and the paramātman, arising out of the Upaniṣadic statement—tat tvam asī—, is śabda in so far as it is the outcome of the sentence tat tvam asī, and is also aparokṣa (i.e. pratyakṣarūpa) as it is a matter of direct, actual experience (sākṣṭkāra) for the spiritual aspirant (yogin).
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ADDENDUM


P. IX, line 12: We must point out in all fairness, that this ascription is given only in the commentary of Ravicandra (see the Bhūmikā to the third edition of the Amaruśataka in the NSP, 1954) and not in the Vedānta tradition itself. Mādhava (Vidyārāṇya) does not mention the legend in the Śaṅkaradigvijaya even though he does tell the story of his seeking sexual knowledge in order to respond to the questions of Sāradā, Manḍanamiśra’s wife. After having studied and put into practice Vātsyāyana’s Kāmasūtra, he is also credited with a work on erotics:

svayam vyadhāttabhīnāvārthagarbam nibandham ekām nipaveśadhārī /
(from Narāyaṇa Rāmaçārya’s Bhūmikā, p. 1 to the Amaru).

The most commonly held belief of the Vedāntasampradāya in relation to sexual love is expressed very graphically by Vidyārāṇya in his Śaṅkaradigvijaya, VIII. 25 (p. 303, Anandaśrama ed.):

yāsāṁ stanyantā tvāyā pītām yāsāṁ jato 'si yonitaḥ /
tāsu mūrkhatāma striṣu paśu adāse katham //

But then, with the honorable exception of Kashmir Śaivism, what religious system has been fair to women?

P. XIV, line 11: Abhinava uses this same simile again in the Locana, p. 212 and adds: akalusodakadṛṣṭāntena, on the analogy of a clean piece of cloth that is dipped into clear water and absorbs all the water. In the same way the sensitive reader absorbs poetry.

P. 2, fn. 1: On p. 223, Vol. II of the A. Bh., Abhinava disagrees with Bhaṭṭatauta. It should be noted that Ānanda too is not bound by tradition. Thus on p. 340 of the D. Āl, he says that it is a mistake to slavishly follow the doctrine of Bharata:

............. na tu kevalam śāstrasītisampādanecchayā, and again
............. bharatamataṃsaranamāmātrecchayā ghaṭanam.

P. 2, fn. 3, line 7: There is no doubt that Ānandavardhana knew Vākpāṭiraṇja’s poem, for on p. 173 (B. P. ed.) of the D. Āl, he quotes a Prākṛt verse which is No. 406 of the Gaūḍavaṇo. See J. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan: “The Dhvanyaloka and the Gaūḍavaṇo”, to be published in the

P. 3, fn. 2: In view of Abhinava’s elaborate commentary on the Nāṭya-sāstra, it is needless to stress the importance of this work for his own theories of aesthetics. See the present authors’ forthcoming book: “Nāṭya-sāstra VI, with Translated Excerpts from the Abhinavabhārati”, Deccan College Monograph Series.


P. 5, last line of the footnote: this verse is also found in the Rāmāyaṇa, Ayodhyākāṇḍa, 105, 24.

P. 6, line 8: Ānanda’s main contribution to literary criticism in India was that he asked, for the first time, the really serious and fundamental questions, e. g.: “What distinguishes great poetry from good poetry?” “Where does the essence of poetic experience really lie?” “What is the true purpose of figures of speech?” “How important is style?” See J. Masson: “Philosophy and Literary Criticism in Ancient India”, in the forthcoming “International Journal of Indian Philosophy” Vol. I, No. 1, edited by B. K. Matilal.

P. 14, line 1: In Vol. III. of the NŚ (G. O. S.), p. 185, Bharata says that love lies at the base of all emotions. प्रायेण स्त्रियां तां कामाधिक्षतिरिष्टते | At XXII, 99 Bharata says that women are the source of all pleasure! सुखवहि वि विवेधः सूर्यस्! Perhaps love was chosen as all-important by literary critics because in the drama, as in real life, it is its own reward. Cf. the lovely verse from Bhoja’s Sarasvatikaṇṭhābhārana V. 74:

\[
yad eva rocate mahāyam tad eva kurute priyā / \]
\[
itī vetti, na jānati tat priyam yat karoti sā //\]

“He thinks: “My beloved does whatever pleases me.” He does not know that whatever she does is (automatically) pleasant.”

P. 16, fn. 2: By oversight, we omitted the translation of the first three lines of the Skt. text from the A. Bh. Here they are: “Only those (spectators) whose hearts are like a clean mirror do not, at the time of watching a play (tatra), come under the influence of emotions like anger, infatuation, sexual desire, etc., which are (emotions only) appropriate to everyday life, (and not to the changes we undergo when watching a drama). For those (self-controlled people), when they listen to the ten types of drama, the collection of rāsas (i. e. the various rāsas) presented by means of dramatic representation (i. e. presented in a drama—nātyalaksanāḥ) and
perceived through aesthetic experience consisting in generalised (i.e., depersonallised) imaginative delight (rasanā) is of course quite evident (sphuta eva). But for those who are not able to control their everyday emotions...

P. 18, line 13: Abhinava quotes the following definition of pratībhā in the Locana, p. 91: pratībhā apūravastunirmāṇakṣamā praṇā. "Imagination is that form of intelligence which is able to create new things."

P. 20, line 15: We wonder though, if it is not possible to interpret the words sāmānyagunayogena in the line: yadi kāvyārthasamāniktair vibhāvānu-bhāvavyanjitaṁ ekonapaśicādabhāvāniḥ sāmānyagunayogenaḥbhinspadyaṁc rasās tat kathāṃ sthāyina eva bhāvā rasatvam āpnuvanti, found in the NS, VII. after verse 7 (p. 349, Vol. I of the G. O. S. ed.), as a reference to sūdhrāraṇī-karana. It would be most interesting to see how Abhinava comments on this line. Unfortunately, his commentary on the 7th Adhyāya has not been found yet.

P. 22, line 1: Note Abhinava in Vol. III. p. 124 of the A. Bh. on the paramātman and drama.

P. 24, fn. 3, line 11: Cf. A. Bh. Vol. III. p. 309: yat tu bhāṭṭanā- yokenoktaṁ "siddher api naṭhdier aṅgatvām vrajaṇyāsā tataṅkṣe’ yam iti” tena nātyāṅgatā samarthatpahalaṇ ca puṟusārthatvād iti kevalām jaiminir anuṣṛta ity alam anena.

P. 29, line 16: This is an error on our part for which we apologise. What Professor Pandey actually wrote (in a personal letter to Mr. Masson, May 1, 1969) is: “Bhāskara Kanṭha, the author of the commentary Bhāskari on the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarsinī of Abhinavagupta wrote a long commentary on it, the fragment of which I saw in Srinagar which his descendants possess.”

P. 34, fn. 1: Anandavardhana, on p. 487 of the D. Āl. quotes a stanza which earlier writers claimed to be an example of vyājastuti (which Ānanda rejects, since there can be no guṇībhūtayānīyatā in V. and Ānanda regards this verse as an ex. of aprastutaprasāmsā). On page 489 he says that the stanza is commonly attributed to Dharmakīrti: tathā cāyaṁ dharmakīrteḥ śloka iti prasiddhiḥ. He then goes on to say that that is perfectly possible in the light of another stanza (which he quotes) that is definitely (Locana: nirvivādatadīyaśloka) by Dharmakīrti.

P. 34, fn. 1, line 10: Tat tanmataparikṣāyām granthāntare nirūpayi- śyāmaḥ means: “We will deal with this in another work, in the examination of the Buddhist views”. Now the most usual way of understanding this is to assume that Ānanda wrote a general work of philosophy (like the Sarva- darsanasaṅghraha), in which he examined critically several different philoso-xxvii
phies. Abhinava’s remarks, which are based on first-hand knowledge, are confusing. Dharmottara wrote a commentary on Dharmaśīra’s Prāmāṇaviniścaya called the Vinīscayatīka, that has been preserved in the Tibetan Tanjur, though not in Sanskrit (see Dharmottaraprāraṇa, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. II, Patna, 1955 – We are indebted to Professor J. W. de Jong for this information). Vṛtti can either mean “an explanation” in general, or it can be an actual commentary (e.g. Nātyavedavṛtti, and Pratyabhijñavṛtti). We could translate Abhinava’s remarks as follows: “Another work” refers to the commentary (vṛtti) called Dharmottari on the Vinīścayatika by the author of the commentary (i.e. the D. Āl., that is, Ananda-wardhana). This (issue) has been explained in that work.” Or Dharmottari could be the name of the commentary on the Vinīscaya (i.e. Darmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya). In this case the meaning would be: “That issue has been discussed in the gloss which was written by this author (namely Ānanda) on the Dharmottari, a commentary on the Vinīscaya.” This would mean that Ānanda wrote an actual commentary on a Buddhist text. To our knowledge, there is no commentary by a Hindu writer on a Buddhist text. The work, therefore, would be unique. But we have seen that much of what Ānandavardhana did was unique, and this need not deter us from explaining the lines in the manner we have. Jacobi (ZDMG Vol. 57, p. 328) writes: Nach Abhinavanagupta in Niścayaṭīka, bei der Erklärung der Dharmottara. Es scheint nämlich dharmottamāya statt dharmottamāyām gelesen werden zu müssen.” The reading dharmottamāyā is found in the KM ed. of the D. Āl. (1935 ed.)

P. 46, fn. 1: Note that Viśvanātha speaks of this Nārāyana as being his great–great grandfather (vṛddhaprapitāmaha i.e. prapitahapitā) SD. III. 2–3.

P. 51, line 12: cf. NŚ XIX. 146 (Vol. III, p. 80):

\[\text{yasmāt svabhāvaṃ sanyaiya sānāgopānagatikramaiḥ}\\  \text{pravijyate jñāyate ca tasmād vai nātaṃ sāṃtaṃ}  ]

P. 53, Note that Abhinava in the A. Bh. Vol. III. p. 124, remarks that the spectator does not think he is watching an actor, but feels it is the original character he is watching: prekṣakapakṣe na nāṭakāhāṃ, tatra hi rāmābhīmāna iti darśayati.

P. 99, last line of text: In the A. Bh. sāntarasapraṇaraṇa, Abhinava twice (once in the case of the jātayamsakas and again for the Dīna) justifies the fact that Bharata does not mention sāntaras separately. But we find it curious that Abhinava is silent on the many passages where Bharata speaks of all eight rasas but omits sānta. For instance: in XX. 72, Vol. III. p. 105, Bharata mentions the different Vṛttis as they apply to each rasa. Sānta is
not mentioned, nor does Abhinava defend its omission. In chapter XVII verses 128–129, the various forms of kāku are mentioned for each rasa, excluding śanta, and again Abhinava (Vol. II. p. 396) has no explanation. The same is true of XVII 103–104, where the svaras are mentioned for each rasa, and Vol. II, p. 398, where the pāthas are given for each rasa, excluding śanta.

P. 139, fn, 2 line: This might refer to a pāṭhāntara of the NŚ text itself.

P. 145, line: We drop nanu as in the NSP ed. of the Daśarūpaka.

P. 150, note 3: We cannot agree with Dr. Raghavan and the late S. K. De when they hold that Dhanika did not allow sāntarasā even in poetry. We think he did. Clearly both scholars have followed the NSP edition, which reads, in the avatāranikā to verse 45 (ch. VI) nanu before sāntarasasya (as well as anabhidheyatvat in place of anabhineyatvat), which would turn this passage into the words of the Pūrvapakṣin. Thus the final phrase: kāvyavijayatvam na nivāryate is the position of the Pūrvapakṣin. Now comes the difficulty: who speaks the words atas tad ucyate? If we suppose that this is the Pūrvapakṣin, who is seeking support in the line of Dhanañjaya, then the pūrvapakṣa must continue with santo hi yadi tavat up till svādayitāraḥ santi. But these two positions are contradictory: in the first part, śanta is admitted in poetry, and in the second part it is excluded. So the words atas tad ucyate must be the words of Dhanika. But this also makes bad sense, because if Dhanika is responding to the pūrvapakṣa, he would be interpreting verse 45 to mean that there is no sāntarasā at all. In that case, what would the words at the end of the paragraph: taduktyaiva śantarasaśvādo nirūpitaḥ mean? Obviously they are meant to establish some sort of existence for sāntarasā. In view of these arguments, we feel that the reading nanu is not correct, since it seems to us clear, both from our interpretation of VI. 45, and from the concluding lines of the Avaloka thereon, that Dhanika did accept sāntarasā in poetry. Without nanu, the avatāranikā is by Dhanika himself, and is meant to introduce the notion of sāntarasā in kāvyā. Atas tad ucyate follows most logically: “Therefore, the following is said.” Now the words santo hi yadi tavat represent Dhanika’s objections to the description of sāntarasā given in the verse na yatra duhkham etc. He ends his objection by saying: na ca tathābhūtasya sāntarasasya saḥṛdayāḥ svādayitāraḥ santi, “There are no sensitive readers who could enjoy such a sāntarasā.” In the Gujerati Press ed. the next words are athāpi, namely, “nonetheless”, i.e. in spite of this definition of sāntarasā, we can admit its existence by understanding it to be, not an indescribable state, but one in which there is mūditā etc. In other words, Dhanika accepts
śaṅtarasa, but he refuses to characterise it as negative the way the definition he quotes does. The reading of the NSP ed., simply atha, makes bad sense, for this would have to be part of the pūrvapakṣa, which would, in that case, never be answered by the siddhānta. It is clear from IV. 45, that Dhanañjaya accepted some form of śaṅtarasa. We accept the reading anirvācya, since nirvācya would mean simply: It can be defined, or explained. But if this is what Dhanañjaya felt, why did he not mention it among the 8 sthāyibhāvas? The reason is that it follows automatically, since it consists of muditā etc., which are the same as vistara, vikāsa, etc. which were already mentioned in IV. 43, and so there is no need to mention it separately. This is what is meant by anirvācya. If Raghavan and De are correct, how would they explain the line in the Avaloka: taduktyaiva śaṅtarasāsvādo nirūpitaḥ, which clearly indicates that śaṅtarasa can be aesthetically enjoyed?
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Śiva’s cosmic dance has no purpose. It is the spontaneous expression of overflowing bliss; it is art.

Abhinavagupta (10th cen.)

Descriptions of love-making among the gods may offend some people’s notions of propriety, but if the poet is gifted with imaginative genius, the sensitive reader will not find them obscene.

Ānandavardhana (9th cen.)

This whole universe is no less a figment of one’s imagination than is the world created in drama. Nor is it less beautiful.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka (10th cen.)

There are poets, blind from birth, who see more deeply than the rest of us. Their eye of imagination never closes.

Rājaśekhara (9th cen.)

To respond deeply to literature and to understand one’s own Self are the same thing.

Abhinavagupta.