ŚĀNTARASA & ABHINAVAGUPTA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

J.L.MASSON

M.V.PATWARDHAN

BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE

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Abhinavagupta is generally considered to be the greatest of the many Indian writers in the field of poetics. The breadth and profundity of his intellect, and the originality and brilliance of his critical insight, entitle him to a distinguished place in the ranks of philosophers of aesthetics of all lands and all periods of history.

This tenth century Kashmiri scholar advanced ideas in every way as interesting and sophisticated as those propounded by Aristotle, yet his work is virtually unknown in the West beyond a very small circle of Sanskritists. It is to remedy this situation by making some of the central insights of Abhinavagupta available to literary critics and the interested layman that the authors offer the present volume. Most of the material they present has never before been translated.

The introduction is meant primarily for students of comparative literature and the general reader. The body of the work is divided into two parts. In the first, the authors examine the various influences which went into the shaping of Abhinavagupta's philosophy of aesthetic experience, a unique synthesis of original insights into traditional Indian poetics with the Śaiva philosophy of Kashmir. They deal with such problems as : the nature of obscenity, the aesthetic enjoyment of tragic literature, the nature of poetic imagination, Tantric rituals as drama, and, above all, the relation between imaginative experiences and transcendent mystical experiences. In the second part of the work, the authors reproduce and translate everything written on the subject of *śāntarasa* (" the aesthetic experience of tranquillity ") prior to Abhinavagupta.

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For Jack and Diana
who made it possible

द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया
समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते।
तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्ति
अनश्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति ॥

"Two birds, deepest of friends,
live on the same tree.
One eats the sweet fruit.
The other, without eating, watches".

CONTENTS

FORWORD

I have great pleasure in writing a Foreword to this book by Prof. M. V. Patwardhan and Mr. J. L. Masson and in introducing the latter whom I have known intimately for some time and who was struck me with his flair for Sanskrit and its cultivation and for the literary study of Sanskrit literature, qualities which, undoubtedly, he has imbibed from his chief teachers L. Renou of the Sorbonne and Prof. D. H. H. Ingalls of Harvard. His association with these two scholars explains his association with me.

This monograph is on Śānta Rasa and Abhinavagupta's aesthetics as it emerges out of the philosophy of Rasa as expounded by him. It stems out of my *Number of Rasas* which at the time of its first appearance in the middle of the forties, was the first detailed exposition of this important subject. In that work, I had also offered a critical edition of the section relating to the Śānta from Abhinavagupta's commentary on the *Nātya Śāstra*. Naturally, while the material given in the present study has already been known, the treatment of the authors has given it a freshness, illustrating the principles of novelty elucidated by Ānandavardhana in Uddyota IV of *Dhvanyāloka*. As Max Müller said, at every stage, a fresh study of a branch of knowledge is required. In the introduction, as also in the main part of their work, the authors have traversed a wide ground in respect of literature and response to it, and on the background of the latest writers, critics and philosophers in the West and the attempts of a few of them to interpret or understand the contributions of the Sanskrit writers, they have highlighted some of the most important ideas of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. The thought of these two masters of Sanskrit literary criticism, particularly of the latter, is examined on the background of their school of philosophy, Kashmir Śaivism. But as they go, the authors take in their stride many other related concepts which involve parenthetical treatment; added to these are the very large number of references to works and authors, but the reader should be able to follow the main theme of the authors namely the conception of Rasāsvāda as elucidated by the two great aesthetes Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta.

It would not be possible to fall in line whith the authors on some of the literary judgements that they have passed on Sanskrit poems and plays, e. g. those on p. ix of the Introduction. Also in some contexts of textual interpretation, the authors have expressed their disagreement with earlier writers and have given their own interpretation. However this is not the place to enter into discussion of details.

Not only does the study in the following pages show the extensive reading of the authors, but it also expressly mentions a chain of further studies, connected with the present one, which the authors have prepared. As a member of the Indian Advisory Committee of the American Institute of Indian Studies, I am pleased that a Grantee of the Institute, one of the joint-authors of the Volume, has done remarkably well on his grant-programme in India. Quite a few of the younger generation of American scholars are engaged in pure Sanskrit and Śāstraic studies, and by assisting them, the Institute is giving a fillip to Sanskrit studies.

Vijayādaśamī
20–10–1969
Madras.

V. RAGHAVAN

PREFACE

The present study grew out of a much larger work that the authors are presently completing. We have both been long interested in Sanskrit literary criticism. Professor Patwardhan has taught the *Dhvanyāloka* and the *Rasagaṅgādhara* over a period of fifteen years to students in Fergusson College. Mr. Masson has translated and annotated the *Dhvanyāloka* and the first chapter of the *Locana* for his Ph. D. thesis at Harvard.

When we met we discovered a deep mutual interest in Abhinavagupta's *Locana*, the greatest Indian work on aesthetics, but a text so difficult that even the Pandits hesitate to teach it in the Pāṭhaśālās. We began meeting twice a week for 3–4 hour sessions to read and discuss textual difficulties in the *Locana*. We soon found that we shared nearly identical views on the major problems in this work. Gradually most of the textual mysteries began to yield up their secrets, and we decided to translate the entire *Locana* as a joint work.

The section on *śāntarasa* was originally to have been an appendix to this three-volume annotated translation. But we found that so many issues in the *Locana* had a direct bearing on the problem of *śāntarasa* that it really required a more extensive and separate treatment. Especially in reading the *śāntarasa* passage in the *Abhinavabhāratī*, a text of notorious difficulty, we found that our readings in the *Locana* were a great help to its elucidation. It is primarily as an aid to understanding this *śāntarasa* passage of the *Abhinavabhāratī* that we are publishing the results of our research. We regard this as an introduction to our translation of the *Dhvanyālokalocana* which will be published along with the *Dhvanyāloka* in the Harvard Oriental Series.

It is a pleasant duty to thank those who have helped us: Mr. Masson first read the *Dhvanyāloka* with the late Professor L. Renou in Paris, who maintained a lively interest in Sanskrit literary

theory and urged on him the necessity of doing serious work in this field. Professor V. Raghavan was kind enough to read with him daily the fourth *Uddyota* with the *Locana*. His pioneering work, "*The Number of Rasas*", and his *magnum opus*, "Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa*", provided much of the stimulus for writing the present volume. Professor D. H. H. Ingalls read Mr. Masson's translation of the first and fourth *Uddyota* of the *Dhvanyāloka* and made many valuable suggestions on method which we have followed here. Mr. Masson also wishes to thank his old friends, Professor B. K. Matilal of the University of Pennsylvania, and Professor K. Bhattacharya of the Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris, for stimulating discussions over the past years on many of these very topics. Several Pandits of the Deccan College have always been very happy to discuss many of the issues with us. We wish to thank especially Dr. V. W. Paranjpe and Pandit Srinivasashastri for their help. Mr. R. P. Goldman from the Sanskrit department of the University of Pennsylvania helped us to clarify many of our ideas on Sanskrit and general literature while reading the entire work in manuscript. We wish also to thank Mr. J. Losty of the Sanskrit Department at Oxford University for reading through the work and making numerous corrections in the English text, and for his pointed questions. Mr. Masson wishes to thank the A. I. I. S. for a fellowship from 1968–69 which made this study possible by supporting his research, during which time the present work was published. It is a great pleasure to thank our good friend Dr. S. D. Joshi for his constant encouragement. Dr. R. N. Dandekar kindly accepted the work for publication in the B. O. R. I. Oriental Series for which we are grateful. We wish to thank Dr. V. Raghavan, whose work in Sanskrit poetics is well-known to all scholars in the field, for writing the foreword to this volume.

Finally, Mr. I. R. Walavekar and his staff very efficiently and pleasantly saw this work through the press in the short time of two months, for which we remain indebted to them.

ABBREVIATIONS

(For details, see Bibliography)

A. Bh.	Abhinavabhāratī, Abhinavagupta's commentary on the Nāṭyaśāstra.
Ānanda	Ānandavardhana, author of the Dhvanyāloka.
Avaloka	Dhanika's commentary on the Daśarūpaka of Dhanañjaya.
BN	Bhaṭṭanāyaka, author of the lost Hṛdayadarpaṇa, often quoted by Abhinava.
B. O. R. I.	Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.
BP	Bālapriyā commentary on the Dhvanyāloka.
Bharata	Author of the Nāṭyaśāstra.
D. Āl.	Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana.
DR	Daśarūpaka of Dhanañjaya.
Daṇḍin	Author of Kāvyādarśa.
Gnoli	R. Gnoli, author of " The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta ".
G. O. S.	Gaekwad Oriental Series.
HC	Hemacandra's Kāvyānuśāsana (with his own commentaries).
ĪPVV	Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī of Abhinavagupta.
J. A. O. S.	Journal of the American Oriental Society.
J. O. R.	Journal of Oriental Research, Madras.
KM	Kāvyamālā.
K. Mīm.	Kāvyamīmāṃsā of Rājaśekhara.
KP	Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammaṭa.
KSTS	Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies.
Kane	P. V. Kane, author of " History of Sanskrit Poetics ".
Kaumudī	The Kaumudī commentary by Uttuṅgodaya on the Dhvanyālokalocana of Abhinavagupta.
Locana	Abhinavagupta's commentary on the Dhvanyāloka.
M. Bh.	Mahābhārata.
NŚ	Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata.
NSP	Nirṇayasāgara Press.

Pandey	K. C. Pandey, "Abhinavagupta, an Historical and Philosophical Study".
RG	Rasagaṅgādhara of Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja.
Raghavan	V. Raghavan, author of "The Number of Rasas".
ŚR	Śāntarasa.
Śrīdhara	Śrīdhara's comm. on the Kāvyaprakāśa, ed. by Sivaprasad Bhattacharya.
T. Āl.	Tantrāloka of Abhinavagupta, in 12 vols.
VB	Vijñānabhairava, with comm. partly by Kṣemarāja, and partly by Śivopādhyāya.
VJ	Vakroktijīvita of Kuntaka.
VV	Mahimabhaṭṭa's Vyaktiviveka.
Vāmana	Vāmana's Kāvyālaṅkārasūtra.
YS	Patañjali's Yogasūtra.
YV	Yogavāsiṣṭhamahārāmāyaṇa.

INTRODUCTION[1]

A word on methodology:[2] Philip Rawson in a recent article on Indian aesthetics writes: "In fact I believe that in the field of aesthetics (as in the field of logic) a great series of thinkers who lived in India and wrote in Sanskrit between the fourth century A. D. and the thirteenth have put many ideas which *must* be brought into our present-day debates on art – ideas which

1. It might be asked why we use the term "æsthetics" in the title when surely "poetics" would have been more correct, since aesthetics is a wider concept, including reflections on the experience of the beautiful in all art forms, and not only in literature. This would be true were we to confine our attention only to the *Dhvanyālokalocanā*. But the *Abhinavabhāratī* includes considerations of music and of dance as well as of literature, and it is clear, even if nowhere explicitly stated, that Abhinava intends his remarks on the nature of imaginative experiences in drama and poetry to apply to other art forms as well. If we were to sum up Abhinava's theory in one phrase as "great art demands the transcendence of self" then we could surely apply this to music as well.

2. We presuppose on the part of our readers a certain familiarity with the technical terms of Sanskrit poetics. For those who are reading about the field for the first time, we would recommend the following works:

For a general introduction to Sanskrit poetry the reader cannot do better than read D. H. H. Ingalls' humane study: *An anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry* Harvard Oriental Series, Cambridge, 1965. The two standard works on Sanskrit literary criticism are: S. K. De, *History of Sanskrit Poetics*, Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyaya, Calcutta, 1960, and P. V. Kane, *History of Sanskvit Poetics*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1961. Kane is better than De on textual problems, but less full on the actual theories. A concise but intelligent overview of the theory of suggestion can be found in an article by J. Brough, "Some Indian Theories of Meaning", *Transactions of the Philological Society*, 1953, Oxford. An excellent book, which contains a very fine chapter on the theory of *dhvani* is K. Kunjunni Raja, *Indian Theories of Meaning*, Adyar Library and Research Center, Madras, 1963. A clear account by a good modern Indian philosopher of many of the issues will be found in M. Hiriyana's *Art Experience*, a collection of his essays on such questions as "Art contemplation", "Art and Morality", "The Philosohhy of Æsthetic Pleasure" and so on, Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore, 1954. For those who read French, we would rccommend the pioneer study of the Indian theatre by Sylvain Lévi, *Le Théatre Indien*, reprinted with Renou's article, "La Recherche sur le théatre Indien depuis 1890", Paris, 1963. The Introduction to R. Gnoli's *The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta*, Rome, 1965 and now reprinted by Chowkhamba, Banaras, 1968, is excellent, though readers might find the actual text difficult. K. C. Pandey's two works, *Abhinavagupta, an Historical and Philosophical Study* Chowkhamba, Banaras, 1966, and *Comparative Aesthetics*, vol. I, *Indian Aesthetics* (both second editions), Chowkhamba, Banaras, 1959, are also likely to prove difficult, though both works contain much valuable information. The reader would also be well advised to read one or two of the texts in translation. The most important work on theatre and on dramatic theory is the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (ca. 3rd century A. D.?) of which there is a new edition and translation by M. Ghosh, Manisha Granthalaya, Calcutta, 1957. Available translations are

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we can use on works of art as one uses a can–opener on a can, to get at the meat. Their writings could extend our conceptual armoury ".[1] While we agree with the sentiment, we disagree strongly with the method. In an article subtitled: " A Study in Indian Aeshetics ", there is no mention of a single Indian critic ! One could contribute an entire negative bibliography on Sanskrit poetics which would illustrate the same fault : an insufficient acquaintance with the basic texts of Sanskrit literary criticism. Instead of vague generalisations (or reinterpretations such as are found in the special issue of the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* on Oriental Aesthetics, Fall, 1965), we need detailed studies[2] and especially translations into modern English of the major works of Sanskrit æsthestics. It is disturbing to think that there are no English translations at all of many of the most important works : the *Vakrotkijīvita*, the *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, the *Abhinavabhāratī*, the *Dhvanyālokalocana*, the *Vyaktiviveka* or the *Rasagaṅgādhara*.[3] There is no readily available translation of Daṇḍin, or Bhāmaha, or Vāmana, and Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* is sorely in need of a new and better translation. We know that the Indians have creative ideas on such important issues as " the nature

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rare : The *Dhvanyāloka* the most important text on poetics will soon be published with a complete translation of Abhinavagupta's commentary, the *Locana*, by the authors. Meanwhile there is Jacobi's excellent German translation, *Z. D. M. G.* no. 56, Leipzig, 1902 and the translation into English by K. Krishnamoorthy, Poona Oriental Series, Poona, 1955. There is a French translation of Rājaśekhara's *Kāvyamīmāṁsā* (9th century), a fascinating and eccentric work, by N. Stchoupak and L. Renou published by Société Asiatique in 1946 that is still in print. The second most important work on drama, though much later (10th century) than the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, has been translated by G. O. Haas, *The Daśarūpaka of Dhanaṃjaya : A Treatise of Hindu Dramaturgy*, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1962. A good translation of Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa* (11th century) has come out by G. Jha, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Banaras, 1967. Mammaṭa follows Abhinava very closely, though he is more conventional in his opinions. It is by far the best of the "text books" that became so popular in the Sanskrit tradition. Similar to it, and even fuller in treatment, though less interesting, is the *Sāhityadarpaṇa* of Viśvanātha, translated by J. R. Ballantyne and P. Misra, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1965. An excellent and readable French translation of one of the later texts is *Le Pratāparudrīya de Vidyānātha* by Pierre Filliozat, Institut Français d'Indologie, Pondichery, 1963.

1. " An Exalted Theory of Ornament ", published in *Aesthetics in the Modern World*, edited by H. Osborne, London, Thames and Hudson, 1968.

2. Such detailed studies are to be found pre–eminently in the works of two modern Indian scholars, V. Raghavan, and the late Sivaprasad Bhattacharya. For details, see Bibliography.

3. A four–volume work is soon to appear on readings from literary criticism throughout the world. One volume will be devoted to Indian Aesthetics. It is being edited by B. K. Matilal of the University of Pennsylvania and will contain translations of all the major texts (excerpts only of course) by B. K. Matilal, V. Raghavan, M. Ghosh, M. V. Patwardhan and J. Masson.

of poetic imagination", "the dichotomy between learning and inspiration", "linguistics and poetics", "the tension between pleasure and didacticism", "poetry and philosophy", "effort and spontaneity", and so on. But what exactly did the Indian writers have to say on each of these issues? We have taken up one of these issues, *śāntarasa*, for detailed discussion in this volume.

Śāntarasa might be translated as "the imaginative experience of tranquility". It is an issue on which there exists some confusion. Edgerton was able to write, astonishingly, of *śāntarasa*: "....that it is forbidden to use it in the drama; it is inherently opposed to the very nature of the drama".[1] This is a simple misunderstanding of the texts. Such misunderstandings arise because many modern writers are not taking the trouble to see just what the Sanskrit writers on poetics have said. They are relying on secondary literature instead of going directly to the original sources. In this way errors only compound themselves. How will one be able to appreciate Sanskrit literature properly if one is unware of just what it is that a cultivated audience expected from its literature? And how can one know this, unless one reads Sanskrit literary criticism? Here we must take sides in what seems to us a major issue concerning the proper method of understanding Sanskrit poetry: Professor D. H. H. Ingalls has written of A. B. Keith, whose two works, "*A History of Sanskrit Literature*" and "*The Sanskrit Drama*" are standard reading in the field, "that for the most part he disliked Sanskrit literature." After illustrating this, Professor Ingalls remarks: "What is unjust in these judgments is that not once does Keith apply the remarks of a Sanskrit critic to any of the Sanskrit works he is judging."[2] Professor J. Brough, a former student of Keith, responds to this criticism by quoting a paragraph from Keith's "*History of Sanskrit Literature*", after which he remarks: "I have re-read this paragraph with close attention, but I have not been able to discover any hidden meaning in it; and I do not understand how such words could be written by one who 'for the most part disliked Sanskrit literature.'"[3] Professor Brough may well be correct, for it is perfectly possible that Keith did in fact like much of Sanskrit literature. But surely this is irrelevant. The point is not whether Keith did or did not like Sanskrit poetry (since one can certainly understand something for which one does not have great admiration), but whether he understood it or not. Brough does not answer Ingalls' second charge, by far the more important of the two. Did Keith judge Sanskrit literature according to the highly developed canons of its own texts on literary criticism?

1. F. Edgerton, "Indirect Suggestion in Poetry", *Proc. of the American Philosophical Society*, vol. 76, 1936, p. 704.

2. *An Anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry*, p. 50.

3. J. Brough, *Poems from the Sanskrit*, Penguin, 1968, p. 21.

Judging from his chapter on the theories of poetry in ancient India, one would guess not. He seems for the most part innocent of their more detailed doctrines.[1] This is an important point of methodology. Before we can judge or even appreciate Sanskrit literature, we must understand it. As I. A. Richards often remarked to his students at Harvard : "We do not admire what we do not understand." No amount of theory on methodology will help one to understand Sanskrit literature. There is only one method that counts : exposure to, and familiarility with, the texts. There is a perfectly straight-forward use of the word "understanding" which is too often ignored in the elaborate treatises now fashionable on "methodology" (often, it seems to us, merely excuses for not dealing with the texts themselves). The difficulties of interpreting a Sanskrit poem are considerably less in India than in the West. The meaning of a Sanskrit poem is rarely subjective. Either you have understood a verse or you haven't. In a traditional Sanskrit class, the Pandit will ask a student after he has read a verse : *artho jñāto vā na vā*, "Have you understood the meaning or not?" This makes it far more easy to reach a concensus about a poem's worth in Sanskrit than would be true in English literature.[2] When we read a passage in one of these Sanskrit texts we know

1. For instance, on p. 386–397 of *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, (Oxford, 1928) Keith is supposed to be explaining the theories of Jagannātha's *Rasagaṅgādhara*, but everything he quotes is actually taken by Jagannātha from Abhinavagupta's *Locana*, a fact of which Keith seems totally unaware. Thus, he writes : "The cause of this form of pleasure is a form of meditation (*bhāvanā*), consisting of continued application to the object characterized by the pleasure. It is quite different from the joy produced by the thought of the meaning of what is said to one, e. g. "A son is born to you". But this example actually occurs several times in the *Dhvanyāloka-locana*, (e. g. p. 80, Bālapriyā Edn.) 600 years earlier !

2. Not that the Indians ever made the fallacy of thinking that a poem was exhausted by what it meant. Far from it, they were likely to sin in the opposite direction, and suppose that a poem derived all its worth from how it was said (*vyañjanā*) rather than what it said. As I. A. Richards puts it : "It is never what a poem says which matters, but what it is". John Wain speaks of the difficulty of pinpointing the elements in a poem that make for its success : "But to illustrate these things in the concrete is to approach the vanishing center of literary criticism, which, not being an exact science, is bound sooner or later to reach a point at which demonstration breaks down and is replaced by a shared sensibility ; though, of course, this point is very much more distant than the anti-critical writers on literature would have us think", *Interpretations*, edited by J. Wain, Routledge, London, 1955. For the Indians it was not only distant, but actually beyond the horizon. This is an important point to stress : the Indians simply cannot conceive of arguing over the final worth or even interpretation of a poem in quite the same way as can be done today in Western literary criticism. It is of course true that finally the *sahṛdaya*, the intelligent and responsive reader, is the final criterion. But generally, *sahṛdayas* tend to agree amongst themselves to an astonishing degree. One has only to look at the interpretations of poems advanced in Sanskrit commentaries. They are usually very

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immediately whether we understand it or not. If we do not, no amount of "methodology" will give us instant and magic insight into the meaning. It is only by reading further in the literature that understanding will be gained.

We feel that we have to speak of this because in a sense we are dealing with religious material, and the familiar criticism comes to mind that in order to understand Buddhism one must either be a Buddhist or at least belong to some religious tradition. Similarly, the argument goes, one must be "personally" concerned with the problems raised by *śāntarasa* and by religious ecstasy in general in order to understand the issues properly. To this belief we cannot subscribe. We can sympathise intellectually with the problems raised by *śāntarasa* without being personally moved by the issues in our everyday life. Certainly to have a profound understanding of Dante it is not necessary to be a believing Christian. We can respond to the power and grace of a mind without necessarily agreeing with what is said. Were it necessary to hold firmly to a set of immovable beliefs, then the whole of surrealism, in which our common expectations are constantly arrested, should possess no aesthetic significance. Literature does not depend for its power on a set of beliefs. Is the ghost of Hamlet real? How can this matter for a proper appreciation of the play? The important point is that it is real for the play. Are the punishments that Dante describes "real"? They are real in the poem. Whether we believe in their objective reality or not has nothing whatever to do with our appreciation of the poem itself. Similarly, *śāntarasa* exists within the context in which we discuss it. We must judge these beliefs in the context of the works of literature in which they appear, and not in the light of our personal convictions, or we seriously restrict the possibilities of our own literary appreciation. We have elucidated certain difficult texts which describe ecstatic experiences. It should not be relevant what our own belief is as to the objective nature of these experiences.

A more important dichotomy than that between belief and scepticism has to do more directly with our method of work. This is the dichotomy between modern Western methods and the more traditional method of under-

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similar to one another. (This is surely why plagiarism in such matters was never considered to be a serious matter. Witness Hemacandra, who uses Abhinava's explanations of innumerable stanzas. He is not "cheating", he is "agreeing".) When a modern commentary like the *Bālapriyā* follows Uttuṅgodaya's *Kaumudī* on the *Locana*, Rāmaśāraka is not being lazy or dishonest. This simply points to shared values in Sanskrit literary criticism. We know, for example, that Mahimabhaṭṭa and Kuntaka both disagree sharply with the views of the *dhvani* school, and with Ānandavardhana in particular. But their disagreements concern principles, and do not really extend to the interpretation of individual poems. When they explain the *rasa* of a poem there is remarkable agreement.

standing texts used by the *Pandits*. There need exist no opposition between the two methods. In our cases, we have both profited greatly from our study among the *Śāstrins*, and we both possess an unqualified admiration for the depth of their knowledge into a given *śāstra*. On the other hand the major part of our education has been along Western lines, and we see no reason to abandon the critical principles it has instilled in us.

ABHINAVA'S ACHIEVEMENT

Abhinavagupta was without a doubt the greatest example in Indian history of a literary critic who was also a philosopher of repute. Pandits will often say of him that : *alaṃkāraśāstraṃ tenaiva śāstratvaṃ prāpitam*—"He alone turned poetics into a science." There are virtually no important ideas in later Sanskrit poetics that do not derive from him (or from his influences)[1]. In his two famous commentaries, the *Locana* on the *Dhvanyāloka*, and the *Abhinavabhāratī* on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, he has dealt with almost every important issue of Indian aesthetics. Neither work is meant to be primarily philosophic—he deals rather with specific verses, and especially in the *Locana* he performs brilliant feats of understanding and interpretation in discovering the hidden "suggested" meaning in verses. (There are numerous examples of this; one thinks in particular of the enormous range of suggestion he is able to derive from a single case of *vastudhvani* in the *Dhvanyāloka*)[2]. His linguistic acumen is no less astonishing, and he often points to the suggestive use of a case-ending, or even a particle. But we are concerned in this volume with those passages, by no means rare, where he deals more with theory than with its practical application. In extracting Abhinava's philosophy of aesthetics, we have discovered that he is deeply concerned with religious values in literature. In this he marks a decided break with his predecessors. There is nothing particular religious about the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. As for the *Dhvanyāloka*, which we believe to be the work of two different authors,[3] the

1. Many of the ideas of later writers (especially Mammaṭa) which modern writers mistakenly think to be original, derive ultimately and often literally from Abhinavagupta. Thus S. K. De, "The theory of Rasa", in *Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics*, Calcutta, 1959, p. 206, attributes to Viśvanātha the doctrine that "those very things which are called cause of pain in the world.....when consgined to poetry and dramatic representation possess the right to be called, in consequence of their assuming such a function, *alaukika vibhāvas* etc., and from them only pleasure ensues, as it does from bites and the like in amorous dalliance". But this doctrine is found first in the *Abhinavabhāratī*, Vol. I, p. 292.

2. One thinks of his long explanations of the two last Prakrit verses quoted under I. 4, on pp. 74–78 of the *Locana* (B. edition).

3. This is of course a very complex issue. Mr. Masson has written a long article on the problem, arguing from internal evidence, that Ānandavardhana wrote only the *Vṛtti*, and that the *Kārikās* belong to an earlier author. The article will appear soon.

kārikās present absolutely no religious aspect at all. There are no religious terms used, and no analogies drawn from religious literature. Even the term *śāntarasa* is never used.[1] Ānandavardhana is a different matter. In his *vṛtti* religious preoccupations are evident. Unfortunately, his *Tattvāloka*,[2] a work that dealt with the relation between poetry and philosophy, is lost, so that we cannot know how great its influence upon Abhinava was. At least his concerns within the *Dhvanyāloka* never culminate in a philosophic theory. It is only with Abhinava himself (preceded, in all likelihood, by Bhaṭṭanāyaka in his lost *Hṛdayadarpaṇa*) that specific religious doctrines are applied to aesthetics (we do not of course distinguish sharply between religion and philosophy, for in Abhinava's case, as in much Indian writing, the two are nearly coterminous).

Abhinava is concerned with providing a stable philosophical foundation for his theories. We have tried to show in this volume how often Abhinava draws on *śāntarasa* for his major contribution to Sanskrit aesthetics, the theory of *rasa*. Reduced to its bare essentials the theory is as follows : watching a play or reading a poem for the sensitive reader (*sahṛdaya*) entails a loss of the sense of present time and space. All worldly considerations for the time being cease. Since we are not indifferent (*taṭastha*) to what is taking place, our involvement must be of a purer variety than we normally experience. We are not directly and personally involved, so the usual medley of desires and anxieties dissolve. Our hearts respond sympathetically (*hṛdayasaṃvāda*) but not selfishly. Finally the response becomes total, all-engrossing, and we identify with the situation depicted (*tanmayībhavana*). The ego is transcended, and for the duration of the aesthetic experience, the normal waking " I " is suspended. Once this actually happens, we suddenly find that our responses are not like anything we have hitherto experienced, for now that all normal emotions are gone, now that the hard knot of "selfness" has been untied, we find ourselves in an unprecedented state of mental and emotional calm. The purity of our emotion and the intensity of it take us to a higher level of pleasure than we could know before – we experience sheer undifferentiated bliss (*ānandaikaghana*) for we have come into direct contact with the deepest recesses of our own unconscious where the memory

1. Those *rasas* with which the *Kārikās* of the *Dhvanyāloka* are concerned are actually mentioned at some point or another. Thus *Karuṇarasa* is mentioned at II, 8 ; *Bībhatsa* at III. 4 ; *Raudra* at II. 9 ; *Śṛṅgāra* time and again, e.g. II. 7, II. 15, etc. But nowhere is *Śāntarasa* mentioned by name in the *Kārikās*. Ānanda, however, does interpret III. 30 (p. 397) to be a reference to *Śāntarasa*, but it is possible that he has misinterpreted the verse.

2. Abhinava refers to it on p. 67 of the *Locana* in the first *Uddyota*, and again in the fourth *Uddyota*, p. 533.

of a primeval unity between man and the universe is still strong. Inadvertently, says Abhinavagupta, we have arrived at the same inner terrain as that occupied by the mystic, though our aim was very different from his. Such an experience cannot but make us impatient with the ordinary turmoil of emotions that is our inner life, and though Abhinava never explicitly says so, one cannot help feeling that he expects the reader to search out now these experiences on a more permanent basis.

We would be justified in asking why Abhinava felt it necessary to provide such a unified theory of *rasa* (when Ānandavardhana for instance never felt the need to philosophise about *rasa*), and especially a theory that depended so heavily on notions involving *śāntarasa*. We think there is a good reason : as a religious man, Abhinava must have been under a certain amount of at least internal pressure to justify his deep interest in purely secular literature. There has always been among Indian philosophers (and Western ones too; one thinks of Plato)[1] a certain distrust of poetry. There is the attack of Jayantabhaṭṭa, the great logician, on Ānandavardhana's theory of suggestion : "There is no point in arguing with poets,"[2] or the famous remark with which Mīmāṃsakas[3] were known to rebuke those interested in poetry : "One should avoid the useless prattle that is poetry."[4] Abhinava undermined such opposition by attempting to show that the states of mind during religious experiences and during literary experiences bore a basic affinity to one another. Literature, he wished to prove, at least the best literature, is just one more expression of an ineffable transcendent experience. This was a daring move and one which might legitimately have been expected earlier.[5] It is rather odd when one considers it, that nobody before

1. As Blake puts it so well : "This was the fault of Plato. He knew of nothing but virtues and vices and good and evil".

2. यमन्यः पण्डितंमन्यः प्रपेदे कंचन ध्वनिम् ।
.....
अथवा नेदृशी चर्चा कविभिः सह शोभते । *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 45.

3. Abhinava can use his wit very trenchantly when he desires. He has no liking for Mīmāṃsakas and loses no opportunity to amuse himself at the expense of what he calls their dried-up minds. See for ex. *Locana*, p. 65, *paśyata śrotriyasyoktikauśalam*. One thinks of the very funny verse manufactured by the Mīmāṃsā pandits in the *Bhojaprabandha*, भोजनं देहि राजेन्द्र घृतसूपसमन्वितम् । "Give us, great king, food with butter and soup."

4. काव्यालापांश्च वर्जयेत् । See Mallinātha on *RV*. I. 1.

5. All large generalisations are dangerous, but we cannot refrain from mentioning what we consider to be a fundamental dichotomy that runs through Sanskrit literature. That which is trivial and which does not look beyond itself is contrasted with that which is significant and transcendental. Witness the hatred most philosophers have envinced for the *cārvākas* who stress the absence of any numinous experience in life.

the Kashmir Śaivas thought of associating aesthetic experience with states of religious ecstasy, since the two have always been closely allied in India. Perhaps it was because the philosophical atmosphere of Kashmir Śaivism was so saturated with literature : we have only to glance at any single page of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* to see how true this is. The most philosophic texts from this school bristle with terms taken from literature and literary criticism, just as conversely a work like the *Dhvanyāloka* is rich in philosophical implications and learning. For the Kashmir Śaivas generally, with their interest in Tantric ritual, sexual pleasure, indeed, aesthetic pleasure in general, was much less repugnant to them than it was to the Advaita tradition (though we must not exaggerate this either, for did not the orthodox tradition itself ascribe to Śaṅkara the *Amaruśataka*?).

What are the advantages that such a theory provides for Sanskrit literature ? They are many. (1) Such a philosophical justification must have helped to explain to Abhinava himself the nature of his interest in Sanskrit *kāvya*. If, as Kafka said, poetry should be a pick-axe to free the sea frozen within us, then most of Sanskrit poetry fails utterly. Most *kāvya* cannot reach us in our most primitive minds the way that Proust, or Lawrence, or Joyce can. In reading through the *Dhvanyāloka*, one is struck by the disparity between the theory and the literature to which it is applied. The poems themselves do not represent values more universal than their time. But the refined and subtle theories which Ānandavardhana employs, clearly do. For a modern scholar, it is easier to view these principles *sub specie aeternitatis* than to do so with the literature which illustrates them. The doctrine, oddly enough, is not significant merely as cultural anthropology, whereas many of the poems can only interest us for reasons other than their literary appeal. Abhinava surprises us by ascribing the fault to us and not to the poetry. He could hardly have been unaware of this more or less unspoken complaint of sensitive critics, that a certain amount of Sanskrit poetry was mere trivia. The criticism would apply equally to Sanskrit plays. If we demand of our best literature transcendence, then these works seem to fail us. But Abhinava, in order to prove the lack of sensitivity in such a view, uses a very new argument : he brings in the example of *śāntarasa*. The one thing that *śāntarasa* does that no other *rasa* can, is that it disturbs us. If we really believe the message that any successful play dealing with *śāntarasa* tells us, we hear what Rilke said was the final lesson of all great literature : " You must change your life." By powerful arguments, Abhinava attempts to show that this quality of transcendence, which we must admit in *śāntarasa* (though his critics of course did not), applies equally well to good literature. The greatest example, which Ānanda was apparently the first critic in Sanskrit literature to notice, is the *Mahābhārata*. Before Ānanda nobody ever consider-

ed the possibility of looking at a piece of literature as a unified whole, with a single dominant suggestive atmosphere, and certainly not something of such gigantic proportions as the *Mahābhārata*. But both Ananda and following him, Abhinava, insist on the overwhelming experience that reading the *Mahābhārata* provides. As unhappiness and doom succeed one another in a seemingly endless display of the vanity of this world; as we slowly become aware of the folly of trusting to the external world to bring happiness; as one after another the heroes of the epic whom we have come to know over volumes and volumes fade from existence and everything seems to dessicate and near its end, the reader is invaded by a sense of doom, a sense of the uselessness of strife, and he is eventually instilled with a craving for tranquillity, for an end to human suffering and misery. If our reading is extensive enough, concentrated enough, with no distractions from the outside world, then we can induce in ourselves a profound imaginative experience of tranquillity, *śāntarasa*. The *Mahābhārata* remains for Sanskrit literary critics the supreme example of this mood, this imaginative creation. It is not surprising that Ānanda is at his most eloquent when he describes this experience in great detail in the fourth *Uddyota* of his *Dhvanyāloka*. The passage was clearly a powerful influence in Abhinava's theories.

(2) If Abhinava was struck by the poverty of much Indian *kāvya* (which, through a reinterpretation of its purpose, he felt need no longer be considered trivial), he must have been equally disturbed by the lifeless quality of much Indian philosophy. By eschewing the real world, it often found itself in the arid territory of the purely theoretic, with no tap-root leading into the rich soil of real life as it is lived by men and women in a real world. An English literary critic has recently berated this arid quality in surrealism: "..reading surrealistic books, as in talking to hermits, one is often struck by the impoverishment of fantasy when not continually cross-pollinated by the external world. Paradoxically, fantasy is not enriched, but etiolated by resolute subjectivism."[1] Abhinava, by importing literary issues into philosophy, was able to provide philosophical thinking with a literary quality it previously lacked. Aesthetics now becomes a legitimate concern for the philosopher.

(3) Abhinava discovered that great poems such as the *Mahābhārata*, reach us beyond the conscious mind. One is reminded of Freud's great study of Leonardo, when he speaks of the effeminate forms of Leonardo's "John the Baptist" and "Bacchus": "They are beautiful youths of feminine delicacy and with effeminate forms; they do not cast their eyes down, but

1. Miles Burrows, reviewing *Surrealism and the Novel*, by J. H. Mathews in the *New Statesman*, December, 22, 1967.

gaze in mysterious triumph, as if they knew of a great achievement of happiness, about which silence must be kept. The familiar smile of fascination leads one to guess that it is a secret of love."[1]

(4) Abhinava was not only a philosopher, he was also an authority on Tantric ritual. The rites he practised, probably even before he became interested in literary theory, must have provided him with his first contact with the kind of play-activity that he later found once again in the theatre. It seems to us no accident that Abhinava was more fond of the theatre than of any other form of literature. By establishing the intimate connection between theatre and ritual (and thus by implication mythology as well), Abhinava foreshadowed certain modern theories, even though he was not followed in this brilliant insight by any of his successors. The ramifications are many, and Abhinava often draws them in scattered places throughout his works. He is fond of the comparison of life with a drama and the resultant sense of unreality this gives. Dreams come up again and again in his works. In his *Tantrāloka* he speaks of man, the creator, as destroying the produce of his life, a dream. The external buildings, he says, are razed in the fire of his sudden awareness that he is Śiva, the great destroyer. Then follows the purely joy-filled dance of Śiva, the Tāṇḍava, that has no purpose other than to give expression to a sense of freedom and joy.[2] On the other hand, one feels that Abhinava was not unaware of the enrichment that results from imaginative experiences. Even one's own childhood becomes an aesthetic object, something viewed with the dual detachment and involvement (*hṛdayānupraveśa, or hṛdayasaṃvāda*) of the perfect spectator, the *sahṛdaya* who is both moved and yet distanced from the object he contemplates. Has Abhinava in fact had an insight into the unconscious, and the value of imaginative understanding which Freud stressed as being essential to any true freedom from our own childhood traumas?

(5) Abhinava is able to restore to poets an important place in the intellectual hierachy by showing their underlying philosophical seriousness. One thinks he would have approved of Andre Malraux's comment: "Les grands artistes ne sont pas les transcripteurs du monde; ils en sont les rivaux." An advantage which might well pass unnoticed that Abhinava's system provides is the following: in Indian society, curiously enough, it was always the religious mystic who has been considered the maverick, who has been allowed the eccentric freedom that in the West we tend to associate with

1. S. Freud, *Leonardo*, pp. 162–163, Pelican Books, 1963.
2. See the very lovely verse from Vol. II of the *Tantrāloka*, p. 257, verse 286:

अनन्तचित्रसद्भर्मसंसारस्वप्नसद्मनः ।
प्लोपकः शिव एवाहं इत्युल्लासी हुताशनः ॥

For the dance image, see *A. Bh.* Vol. I, p. 21.

poets. Edmund Wilson, in "*The Wound and the Bow*", documents the neurotic elements in many of the great poets of the nineteenth and twentieth century. The striking phrase of the title refers to the myth of Philoctetes, the Greek warrior who possessed a magic bow, but was forced to live in isolation on an island because of the insufferable odour that emanated from a suppurating wound on his ankle. Eventually his countrymen had to call him back, in spite of their disgust, because of his unerring weapon. Art extracts its own price. Of course in India the mystic was never both loathed and venerated, he was simply venerated. Nonetheless already in the *Upaniṣads* we hear of the mystic as being similar to a child in his unrestrained behaviour.[1] The adjective sometimes applied to him is *unmatta*, mad. One thinks of the extraordinary passage in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* dealing with Raikva of the cart, who dares to call King Janaka but a *śūdra*, and who finally agrees to teach him for the pretty face of his daughter. He received his name from where he lived, underneath a cart. This has not generally been true of the artist. The poet has always been far more integrated into Indian society. India has not developed the sense of the loneliness of the writer, shunned by, and shunning, society. But Abhinava, by restoring to him his more important functions, also enables him to preserve his independence. It is now not only the mystic who opens himself to numinous experience. Is it significant that the only description of the poet as a man out of his ordinary senses that immediately comes to mind is from Uttuṅgodaya, Abhinava's commentator, in his fourteenth century commentary on the *Locana*, the *Kaumudī* ? There he says of the poet : " ... the poet wants to write poetry in order to instruct those of delicate minds, people who are for the most part similar to princes, in the means of attaining the four goals of life through aesthetic enjoyment. First, by the stream that is *rasa*, to be aesthetically enjoyed by the presentation of the *vibhāvas* etc. that are at the root of the poem he wishes to make, his own heart which is like a great and immeasurably deep lake (of *rasa*) becomes filled, then he becomes as if possessed by a planet, *as if mad*, and finally he pours out his poetry, and turns the listener, the sensitive reader (*sahṛdaya*), into the same (sort of madman as he has become). "[2] But of course the artist is never in Sanskrit

1. Cf. Abhinava's *Paramārthasāra*, verse 71 :

जड इव विचरेदवादमतिः.

(Silburn, *le Parmārthasāra*, P. I. C. I., Paris, 1957, p. 60).

2. Kuppuswami Sastri's edition of the *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 170 :

इदमत्र वस्तुतत्त्वम्—कविहिं सुकुमारमनसां राजकुमारप्रायाणाम् आस्वादपुरस्कारेण चतुर्वर्गोपायव्युत्पत्तिसंपिपादयिषया काव्यं चिकीर्षुः, चिक्रीर्ष्यमाणकाव्यनिबन्धनीभूतविभावादियोजनास्वादनीयरसामृतप्रवाहेण प्रथमं स्वयमेव परिपूरितगम्भीरतरनिजहृदयमहाह्रदो भूत्वा ग्रहाविष्ट इवोन्मत्त इव काव्यं बहिः प्रसार्य श्रोतृणामपि सहृदयानामात्मसमानयोगक्षेमतां संपादयति ।

society an alien figure. When we read of Abhinava (see below) sitting in a grape garden, a single golden earring hanging from his ear, surrounded by magicians and women Yogins, playing on a lute with *dūtīs* by his side with cups of wine and lemons in their hands, this in no way makes him eccentric, at least to the Indian public. Even in the legend of his death, how he entered a cave with twelve hundred disciples and never returned, there is nothing " asocial " to shock the Indian.

(6) One corollary of his theories, though again it does not seem to have been realised either by Abhinava or by his successors, is that *rasa* becomes available not only to poetry and the theatre but to all literature. Generally *rasa* is only possible in *kāvya* or *nāṭya*. But the *Mahābhārata* is after all already an exception since it cannot be considered *kāvya* in the strict definition of the term. Yet both Ānanda and Abhinava give it the careful literary attention it deserves. The claim was made by Kalhaṇa at the beginning of his *Rājataraṅgiṇī* that his work on history contains *śāntarasa* :

> " Considering how the life of creatures cracks after a few moments, one should understand (why) *śāntarasa* has been given the most important position in this work (*atra*). " [1]

It is all the more surprising then that Abhinava never thought of extending his theory to purely religious texts. After all the most obvious and in a sense the best examples of *śāntarasa* are to be found in religious and philosophical literature, and not in *belles lettres*. The *Upaniṣads*, for example, would surely have provided Abhinava with his finest examples. Today we can consider the *Upaniṣads* to be among the finest examples of world " literature ", though no text on literary criticism in ancient India ever thought of quoting them or deriving support from any of their beautiful lines. As the rhetoricians define literature, the *Upaniṣads* do not qualify. Abhinava's brilliant insight that what makes for literature is the quality of the sentiment and not adherence to formal rules, provided the opportunity for a re-definition that was curiously never taken advantage of. Even Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja, who gives a more liberal definition of literature,[2] does not depart from standard examples in his illustrations (indeed he even regresses in including only his own works, thus furthering the greatest single misfortune of Sanskrit literary criticism, the divorce between what actually was written and what was supposed to be written). No better example of *śāntarasa* could be found

1. *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, I. 23, 4 (Viśva Bandhu's edition, Hoshiarpur, 1953):
   क्षणभङ्गिनि जन्तूनां स्फुरिते परिचिन्तिते ।
   मूर्धाभिषेकः शान्तस्य रसस्यात्र विचार्यताम् ॥
2. *Rasagaṅgādhara*, KM edition of 1939, p. 4 :
   रमणीयार्थप्रतिपादकः शब्दः काव्यम् ।

than the Pāli *Mahāparinibbānasutta,* the sober, moving account of the death of the Buddha. Or even such prosaic but haunting lines as that of King Janaka when his kingdom went up in flames : *mithilāyāṃ pradīptāyāṃ na me kiṃcana dahyate*—"Nothing of mine is burned when Mithilā is in flames."[1]

(7) Abhinava insists on the epiphany that poetry provides, on the sense of *camatkāra,* of having our breath taken away. He compares it at one place[2] to a wondrous flower that suddenly bursts into bloom. He is particularly fond of a fine image in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* :

> "The externalisation (*bhāva*) of that emotion (*artha*) which makes an appeal to the heart is the source (*udbhava*) of *rasa.* The body it suffused by it, as dry wood is suffused by fire."[3]

(8) An advantage that Abhinava's philosophy provides for Sanskrit literary criticism is that there need be no disagreements over significant literary experiences. Since the emotional experience in great literature is for Abhinava and later critics who follow him (Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha, Jagannātha, etc.) always the same, namely *ātmānanda,* "the bliss of the self", an insoluble problem for Western literature has been solved. The problem is that there is no guarantee that two spectators feel the same thing when viewing a work of art. To say "it depresses me" or "it thrills me", or "it excites me", is often a comment on the viewer's own state of mind and not on the work of art itself. Usually it is discovered in later conversation that the work of art has acted as a catalyst, releasing some emotion long consciously forgotten, dislodging it from its undercover. One might object that Abhinava too is no longer speaking about the work of art on its own, but about certain universal states of mind. This is true, but at least, if all literary critics accept that this is the true function of literature, namely to induce such a state of euphoria, then they have a common ground on which to argue whether a particular piece of literature has been successful or not. And in fact it is astonishing to note how great a concensus of opinion there is in Sanskrit literature over what is good. The concensus lasts over the centuries. There are few poets who have been considered great in the tradition long ago, but now forgotten. If one looks through the names of poets that Abhinava constantly quotes, one is struck by how many of these are poets we still read and admire today, 1000 years later. We are all aware how

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1. Mahābhārata, XII. 178. Quoted by Śaṅkara in his bhāṣya on Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. I. 4. 15.

2. *Locana,* p, 160, (B. P. edition).

3. *NS.* VII, 7, Vol. I, p. 348. Quoted also in the *Locana,* p. 39, It is erroneously ascribed by the editors of the ed. with *Bālapriyā* to Bhaṭṭanāyaka.

> योऽर्थो हृदयसंवादी तस्य भावो रसोद्भवः।
> शरीरं व्याप्यते तेन शुष्कं काष्ठमिवाग्निना॥

in the West even thirty years ago " great poets " are now not much more than footnotes in college textbooks. Goethe is reported to have said that he found " the Inferno abominable, the Purgatorio dubious and the Paradiso tiresome. " One thinks too of Donne, eclipsed for three centuries and only restored to honour through the critical efforts of T. S. Eliot. Such ups and downs in Sanskrit literature are more or less impossible. (There are of course other reasons for this as well.)

These are just some of the more general results of Abhinava's theories. The details will be found in the body of this work. We think it is clear that the way for later writers on poetics to expand on religious and philosophical themes was provided by Abhinava. (Surely, for example, the Bengal Vaiṣṇavas, especially the two Gosvāmins, were inspired to their elaborate theories by the climate Abhinava created). Abhinava's final theory bears a remarkable similarity to what Aldous Huxley developed in his work " The Doors of Perception ". H. Osborne writes of this work as follows : " Finally it is sometimes asserted that works of art symbolize a metaphysical reality of which by our appreciative commerce with the work of art we become directly and immediately aware. This is a view which many modern artists have themselves alleged. In his essay " The Doors of Perception " Aldoux Huxley describes how under the influence of mescalin his ordinary perceptions were accompanied by an intense and inescapable feeling of revelation. He develops the theory that artistic vision in general has this revelatory character and that the works of art which artists create communicate to us imperfectly the revelation of ultimate reality which they have enjoyed. ' What the rest of us see only under the influence of mescalin ', he says, ' the artist is congenitally equipped to see all the time.... It is a knowledge of the intrinsic significance of every existent. For the artist as for the mescalin taker, draperies are living hieroglyphs that stand in some peculiarly expressive way for the unfathomable mystery of pure being '. The statement that in the act of appreciating a beautiful work of art we have immediate intuitive awareness of ultimate or pure being, takes us outside the confines of aesthetics proper. As ' emotive ' descriptions of the artistic experience such affirmations are significant and must be treated with respect ".[1]

We have seen some of the advantages that Abhinava's philosophy provided for literary criticism, all of which derive from his brilliant insights into what lay behind imaginative experiences in literature. Let us now look far more briefly (for they are less important) at some of the disadvantages. The chief danger, it seems to us, is the reductionism in his theories; how all

1. " Aesthetics as a Branch of Philosophy " by Ruth Saw and Harold Osborne, p. 31, in " *Aesthetics in the Modern World* ", London, 1968.

literature becomes reduced to a single experience. A similar criticism has been made of Coleridge: " Coleridge's demand for unification and harmony entailed the conversion of the poetic into something other than the poetic, its subordination to philosophy and ultimately to religion ".[1] Perhaps the reason, in Abhinava's case, was that he was not himself a very good poet. He did of course write a good deal of poetry, but there are at the most three or four memorable verses in all of his work,[2] and his poetry goes virtually unquoted in later critical literature. Perhaps he was prevented by his own intelligence from being direct and concrete.[3] Had he been more of a poet, and more interested in the particular, would he have preached quite so reductionist a theory? There are of course advantages to this (a unified theory for one) but it means forgetting what I. A. Richards has taught a generation of literary critics, namely that " a poem does not stand for something else ".[4] Abhinava's strength lay in ideas, in conceptual thinking. He was not himself an artist, and one cannot help being reminded of Eliot's famous remark à propos Henry James, that he had a mind so fine that no idea could violate it!

There is a sense in which Abhinava confuses art and life when he insists on the primacy of *śāntarasa*. It is of course true that dramatists can be concerned with anything they like, including the experience underlying *śāntarasa*; but the point is not one of theoretic possibilities, but of what actually succeeds in the theatre. Abhinava's weakest point was that he did not really have any example of a great play in which *śāntarasa* was dominant, to lend credence to his theories. The *Nāgānanda* is the sole exception, and this could hardly be considered great literature. By seeing beyond literature to the universal experience that lies behind it, Abhinava is undermining the autonomy, the uniqueness of literary experience. He is in danger of turning literature into an icon, a representational object, an aid to devotion rather than an experience unique and precious for its own sake. " Art ", in C. S. Lewis' fine phrase, " must be received, not used ". Religion is not, after all, the same thing as literature, unless we dilute the definition of these two terms

1. Roy Park, " Poetic Imagination in Coleridge and Kant ", *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 8, no. 4, Oct. 1968, p. 343.

2. The one really fine verse in the Locana is quoted under III, 30, p. 397 :

त्वां चन्द्रचूडं सहसा स्पृशन्ती
प्राणेश्वरं गाढवियोगतप्ता ।
सा चन्द्रकान्ताकृतिपुत्रिकेव
संविद्विलीयापि विलीयते मे ॥

in which he puns very effectively in comparing sexual love and *śānta*.

3. Cf. the verse he wrote on p. 127 of the *Locana* and the absurdly long and tortuous commentary he writes on it.

4. Quoted by A. Alvarez, " *The Phoenix and the Turtle* " p. 5, in the work ed. by J. Wain already cited.

into harmlessness. The descriptions that Huxley gives of what he felt under mescalin are interesting pyschologically, but to claim that they are essentially literary is to forget the fact that great literature can never he unconscious and ephemeral. The efforts and pains of creation are conceptual, concrete and external. Dreaming is not, after all, making. That literature could point nowhere except to itself, must have somehow proved disquieting to Abhinava. He was too religious to allow that literature might be somehow "useless", a goal in itself. (Though *rasa* does involve surrender to the work of art, and Abhinava insists that one's own self must be got out of the way before the work of art can truly be appreciated for its own sake.) It is significant in this respect that Abhinava shies away from the terms *prīti* "pleasure" and *vinoda* "entertainment", to express the purpose of poetry. He prefers the religious word *ānanda* "bliss". By insisting on putting such significance into poetry Abhinava is in danger of making much of Sanskrit literature top-heavy; one is wary that it simply cannot bear the philosophical burden he places on it. One's mind is irreverently invaded by an image of Kālidāsa sitting politely bored, listening to Abhinavagupta explain to him the deeper significance of his plays, his ears really attuned to the joyous shouts of the spring festival taking place outside.

ŚĀNTARASA

PART I

Abhinava's Philosophy of Aesthetics

INFLUENCES

Abhinava seems to us deeply concerned with four or five basic ideas: the relation of poetry to philosophy; the nature of suggestion; religious ecstasy (and its bearing on literature); drama and poetry, and ritual and drama. The question that must have helped him to bring all these elements together is one still asked today: how is it that we "enjoy" literary situations that are sad or tragic? He sought the answer to this basic question in extraordinary states of mind, in ecstatic experiences. Nobody denied these in poetry or in religious literature generally,[1] but in drama their existence was still debated. *Śāntarasa* was not universally acknowledged as a legitimate element in drama. For Abhinava the question was not merely academic, for if he were not able to provide convincing arguments in its favour, he could hardly justify his interest in drama. Moreover he had no examples of a play in which *śāntarasa* played an important part, with the single exception of the *Nāgānanda*, largely a Buddhist drama, and of questionable literary excellence. By synthesising all of his pre-occupations into one system, a theoretical justification for *śāntarasa* could be made, with the ultimate result that the type of otherworldly or transcendental experience which the spectator undergoes during *ŚR* (*śāntarasa*) would be basic to all aesthetic experience. Such a system was not to be found ready-made. But Abhinava was able to take what he needed from different sources: from the *Dhvanyāloka* he took his theory of suggestion; from Bharata he took the starting point of his ideas on *rasa* and drama; from speculation on *ŚR* and from Kashmir Śaivism and Tantric works he took ideas on the relation of religious ecstasy to literature. The final end product was his theory of *rasa* in which he combines philosophy and poetics. There are, therefore, four major influences in his theories: poetics, philosophy, speculation on *ŚR* and ritual.

Before examining these influences more closely, we must note that while open to all of them, Abhinava had an extremely independent mind.

1. Since a great and undisputed literature already existed along these lines. One has only to think of Bhartṛhari's *Vairāgyaśataka*.

Not only is he not afraid to disagree with his own teachers,[1] he is even able to disregard the great texts of the tradition : " We don't care in the least if it is described in this way in the *Rāmāyaṇa* itself. In fact, it might be described in the Veda itself, and we won't be stifled by this fact ".[2] There are very few ideas which did not " suffer a sea-change " when immersed into the depths of Abhinava's mind. On the other hand, he belonged to a tradition in which a careful grounding in the past was *de rigeur*, and it is not surprising to find that he has been greatly influenced by a large number of writers. To consider this plagiarism[3] is as absurd as demanding that Coleridge (like Lowell in " *The Road to Xanadu* ") footnote all his allusions and quotations ! Abhinava has a very fine verse in the *Abhinavabhāratī*, right after giving elaborate expositions of his predecessors' views on *rasa*, in which he justifies his urge to proceed further :

" When intellectual curiosity (*dhīḥ*) climbs higher and higher and sees the truth (*arthatattva*) without getting tired, this is because of the ladders of thought built by earlier writers ".[4]

Poetic Influences

Abhinava was of course familiar with all the works on poetics extant at the time of his writing (many of which are no longer available). He is particularly fond of Bhāmaha, whom he often quotes in the *Locana*.

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1. On p. 314, *A. Bh.* Vol. I, Abhinava seems to disagree with Bharata concerning the definition of *hāsya*. Note Kane, *H. S. P.*, p. 55. " On p. 436 (of the B. O. R. I. copy) Abhinava appears to differ from him (Utpaladeva, the author of the *Pratyabhijñā*, Abhinava's teacher's teacher) उत्पलदेवपादास्त्वस्मत्परमगुरवो व्याचक्षते..... वयं तु मन्महे ।

2. *A. Bh.* Vol. III, p. 74 :
रामायणेऽपि तथा वर्णितमिति चेत्किमतः । वेदेऽपि तथा वर्ण्यतां न वयमतो बिभीमः ।

3. Ānanda has some very perceptive remarks on plagiarism in the fourth *Uddyota* of the *D. Al.*, stanzas 11–17. It seems to us possible that he was influenced by *Gaüḍavaho*. We think in particular of verse 66 of Vākpatirāja's, which is identical in sentiment with the Prākrit verse that Ānanda quotes on p. 527. Verses 85 and 86 of the *Gaüḍavaho* also prefigure several of the ideas in the fourth Uddyota. There seems no reason for questioning the date of 700 A. D. (Pandit, p. C of his ed. of the Gaüḍavaho) and it is therefore perfectly possible that Ānanda knew the work. Rājaśekhara, who knew Ānanda by name (see p. 16 of the *Kāryamīmāṁsā*) systematised Ānanda's views on plagiary. See *KM*, p. 62.

4. *A. Bh.*, I, p. 278. Also Gnoli, *op. cit.* p. 12 :

ऊर्ध्वोर्ध्वमारुह्य यदर्थतत्त्वं
धीः पश्यति श्रान्तिमवेदयन्ती ।
फलं तदाद्यैः परिकल्पितानां
विवेकसोपानपरम्पराणाम् ॥

The verse is quoted by Uttuṅgodaya in his *Kaumudī*, p. 102 with some variation.

Udbhaṭa,[1] Vāmana and Daṇḍin all of whom Abhinava quotes, do not seem to have provided him with any of his major doctrines. Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* was of course a major influence or rather stimulus, to his ideas on *rasa*.[2] Much of his technical terminology derives directly from the *NŚ*, as well as several more advanced ideas. All this is well-known so there is no need for us to provide illustrations. There is one "influence", however, which seems to us to have been overlooked. This is Aśvaghoṣa's *Saundarananda*. There is of course no way of knowing whether Abhinava knew this work or not.[3] However, in the light of his pre-occupation with *ŚR*, and of his good knowledge of Buddhism generally, there seems no real reason why he should not. Moreover, there seems some evidence, in the form of certain striking similarities, which suggests that he did know this remarkable poet. The dominant *rasa* in both the *Buddhacarita* and the *Saundarananda* (and most probably the dramas[4] as well, to judge from the meagre fragments pieced together by Lüders) is

1. E. g. Udbhaṭa's lost *Bhāmahavivaraṇa* (see p. 68, K. Sastri's ed.). Recently Professor Gnoli has published "Udbhaṭa's commentary on the *Kāvyālaṅkāra* of Bhāmaha", *ISMEO*, Rome, 1962, editing the fragments found at Kifirkoṭh which he identifies with the commentary on the *Kāvyālaṅkāra*. If Gnoli is correct, fragment number 10 (p. 7–8), which deals with the *Locana* passage, should have been (without the *pratīka*) between *abhidhānārthāḥ* and *śabdānām abhidhānam*. But there is no room in the MS for such a reading. Therefore, if we are to retain Gnoli's theory, this will have to have occurred in the second half of line 2 of fragment 10. The only problem is that there does not seem, if we have correctly understood the accompanying photographs of the manuscripts, any room for this passage in the fragment in question. There seems to us no good reason why the *pratīka*, *abhidhānārthāḥ* should be repeated, nor can we seen any justification for the second member of a compound being explained before the first member. It is true that the author of these fragments accepted *abhidhāvṛtti* and *guṇavṛtti* as *śabdavyāpāras*, but why must we assume that the person holding such a view is Udbhaṭa?

2. E. g. *NŚ*, vol. I, p. 272, G. O. S. ed.:

न हि रसादृते कश्चिदर्थः प्रवर्तते; the definition of *rasa*: p. 288, रस इति कः पदार्थः? उच्यते – आस्वाद्यत्वात्; VI. 38 (p. 294); p. 299: स्थायिभावांश्च रसत्वमुपनेष्यामः.

3. There is no quotation from Aśvaghoṣa in any of Abhinava's works. The quotations from Aśvaghoṣa in the anthologies (see *Karīndravacanasamuccaya*, p. 29) are not found in any of his extant works. Rājaśekhara (*KM*, p. 18) quotes a verse from the *Buddhacarita* (VIII. 25), but this is not ascribed by him to anybody. Similarly the *Bhojaprabandha* takes over *BC* IV. 59. Neither of these passages is sufficient evidence to say that the author actually knew Aśvaghoṣa's work, since the quotations could have come down though the work be lost. Note that *BC* VIII. 25 is similar to *Raghuvaṃśa* III. 15, but the whole problem of Kālidāsa's borrowing from A. is not settled. On the whole, we are inclined to think that Kālidāsa did know Aśvaghoṣa, and was influenced by him. Johnston (*op. cit*, Int. to the English Tr. of the *BC*, p. LXXII) thinks that Daṇḍin, *KD*, II. 44 has *BC* IV 33 in mind, and that Bhāmaha, in criticising *ajihladat* (used in *S*. II. 30) may be referring to Aśvaghoṣa.

4. The fragments from the three dramas were edited by H. Lüders, "*Bruchstücke Buddhistischer Dramen*", Berlin, 1911, and *Philologica Indica* Göttingen, 1940.

śānta. The words *śama* and *śānti* occur constantly in both works.[1] Further, at the end of *Saundarananda*[2] there are two remarkable verses which might well have influenced Abhinava :

" And so this work, whose essence is liberation, (was written) so that people might obtain peace of mind, and not for amusement (*rataye*). I have written it in the form of a poem in order to engage the minds of readers interested (primarily) in other things (and not in liberation). The fact that I have dealt with things other than liberation is because of (the book's) poetic nature, and in order that it might appeal to the hearts of readers, just as a bitter medicine is mixed with honey in order to induce the patient to drink it ".[3]

Abhinava has used this very simile of medicine and honey in the *Locana*. Moreover, he insists, time and again, that poetry is more gentle than *śāstra* (which can be loosely translated as " philosophy "), but that it leads to similar results. The last verse of the work is no less important :

" Since men are, for the most part, engrossed in sensual pleasures, and totally disinterested in *mokṣa*, I have said in this work, under the (sweet) disguise of poetry, that *mokṣa* is the highest (truth). Knowing this, (the reader) should with attentive mind (*avahitam*) accept from the poem that which leads to peace, and not (only) that which is pleasant. For gold is surely separated from mineral dust-particles ".[4]

If we suppose that Abhinava did know this poem, how do we explain the fact that he did not use Aśvaghoṣa's works, seeing that he could certainly

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1. E. g. *Saundarananda* VII. 22; VIII. 56; XI, 5; XI, 33–34; XV, 49, a lovely verse that could be engraved on the tombstone of the twentieth century.

2. Note that in *Saundarananda*, XIV. 50, Aśvaghoṣa uses the expression *śamasukharasa* ! But there is no evidence, aside from the dubious expression *rasāntara* at *BC* VII. 51, that he knew either the *NŚ* or the *rasa* theory.

3. *Saundarananda*, XVIII, 63:

इत्येषा व्युपशान्तये न रतये मोक्षार्थगर्भा कृतिः
श्रोतॄणां ग्रहणार्थमन्यमनसां काव्योपचारात् कृता ।
यन्मोक्षात्कुतमन्यदत्र हि मया तत्काव्यधर्मात्कृतं
पातुं तिक्तमिवौषधं मधुयुतं हृद्यं कथं स्यादिति ॥

4. *S.* XVIII. 64 :

प्रायेणालोक्य लोकं विषयरतिपरं मोक्षात्प्रतिहतं
काव्यव्याजेन तत्त्वं कथितमिह मया मोक्षः परमिति ।
तद्बुद्ध्वा शामिकं यत्तदवहितमितो ग्राह्यं न ललितं
पांसुभ्यो धातुजेभ्यो नियतमुपकरं चामीकरमिति ॥

According to Johnston (p. 164, notes) the word *upakaram* is hapax since it occurs nowhere else in the literature. Perhaps like *upakāra* it means something like " useful ", " valuable ".

have argued with perfect justification that they are all good examples of *SR?* We think there is a plausible reason : although there are passages of real *śānta* poetry,[1] nonetheless on the whole Aśvaghoṣa's position is directly opposed to the enjoyment of poetry for its own sake (a position Abhinava defends, see below). The whole of his work (even the *Saundarananda*) can be seen as a tract against just such frivolous activities as reading poetry and watching plays ! *Śama* is seen therein to be opposed to literary enjoyment, which after all implies a certain delight in the senses. Both Abhinava and Ānanda (see below), extol the great variety of this world. Two other, less probable reasons, suggest themselves : (1) Aśvaghoṣa was after all a Buddhist, and to quote him with approbation might have seemed odd. (2) In the verses quoted below there is real poetry. But there is a great difference between being told something, and actually experiencing it (a problem which Abhinava and Ānanda are greatly concerned with, under the name of *svaśabdaniveditatva*). Preachers inform us; only poets invite us to experience. Aśvaghoṣa is more often than not a preacher. Thus, the same ideas from the fine verses quoted in the notes are repeated time and again, especially in chapter XIV. But they make no impression, for they are merely bald statements — ideas rather than poems. As George Boas puts it, bluntly, in a lecture on philosophy and poetry : " .... the ideas in poetry are usually stale and often false, and no one older than sixteen would find it worth his

1. *Saundarananda*, XV, 32 :

अतीतेऽध्वनि संवृत्तः स्वजनो हि जनस्तव ।
अप्राप्ते चाध्वनि जनः स्वजनस्ते भविष्यति ॥

" Further back on this long path those closest to you were strangers, and as you walk further into the future those who are now strangers will become close to you."

S. XV, 33 :

विहगानां यथा सायं तत्र तत्र समागमः ।
जातौ जातौ तथा श्लेषो जनस्य स्वजनस्य च ॥

" Just as in the evening birds gather together in small groups, so also in various lives do people come together with their relatives. "

S. XV, 34 :

प्रतिश्रयं बहुविधं संश्रयन्ति यथाध्वगाः ।
प्रतियान्ति पुनस्त्यक्त्वा तद्वज्ज्ञातिसमागमः ॥

" Just as travellers meet for a few moments at various resting places along the road and then separate, so also does one come together with those one loves (only for a moment.) "

In the next verse such meetings are compared to a fistful of sand, held together only by the hand : *vālukāmuṣṭivaj jagat.* Cf. MBh. XII. 28. 36 :

यथा काष्ठं च काष्ठं च समेयातां महोदधौ ।
समेत्य च व्यपेयातां तद्वद्भूतसमागमः ॥

while to read poetry merely for what it says ".[1] On the other hand, the real poetry of the *Saundarananda* becomes " part of the furniture of the mind ", and nobody who has read the fine verses from XV, 32–30 is likely to forget them. But such verses are rare, and Abhinava may well have classified the whole poem as " didactic ", thus dismissing it from serious literary consideration, for the philosophical passages are of interest to the believer and to the scholar, but not to the *sahṛdaya*. But this is mere speculation.

With Ānanavardhana, however, we pass into the realm of certainty. The influence of the *Dhvanyāloka* on Abhinava cannot be exaggerated. We can safely say that the two greatest works in Indian literary criticism are the *Dhvanyāloka* and Abhinava's commentary on it, the *Locana*. There are few ideas in the *D. Al.* which Abhinava has not assimilated, often by dealing with them in a more subtle manner. Those ideas however for which he owes less to Ānanda, will be dealt with in the section on Abhinava himself. Here we should like to call attention to certain key terms, which stand for important concepts, from the *D. Al.* which might escape the notice of a hurried reader. These are the terms which seem to us most important to Abhinava's theories. Before doing so, we should remember what *dhvani* is not. There is nothing imprecise, or vague about *dhvani*, as many Western writers have erroneously supposed, misled by the connotations of the word " suggestive " in English. The concept is not a subjective one. There is nothing ineffable about *dhvani*. It is important to realise this. Ānanda in fact spends a good deal of energy in refuting the *anākhyeyavādins*, those who claim that, if suggestion exists at all, it is beyond the realm of speech.[2] Both *vastudhvani* and *alaṅkāradhvani* can be paraphrased, without losing their status as poetry (though of course they are no longer cases of *dhvani* by definition), but *rasadhvani* cannot. In fact, if we were to state what is the single most important characteristic feature of *rasadhvani*, we would say that it is the *inability to lend itself to paraphrase*. The reason this is so has to do with

1. G. Boas, " *Philosophy and Poetry* ", Wheaton College, Mass. 1932, p. 9.

2. The position of the *anākhyeyavādins* is given at the beginning of the *D. Al.* p. 33 (B. ed.) : केचित्पुनर्लक्षणकरणशालीनबुद्धयो ध्वनेस्तत्त्वं गिरामगोचरं सहृदयहृदयसंवेद्यमेव समाख्यातवन्तः । " Some whose minds shied away from attempting a definition declared that the truth of *dhvani* lay outside the realm of speech, and could only be internally realised by a sensitive reader. " Ānanda replies to this at the very end of the first *Uddyota* (after *K.* 22). Again at the end of the third *Uddyota*, Ānanda comes back to their views, informing us that the Buddhists claim that all things are beyond definition (p. 519, B. ed.). Note that the *kārikās* themselves never reply to the *anākhyeyavāda*. In the third *Uddyota* (p. 403, and also p. 517–518) Ānanda, perhaps borrowing from *Vākyapadiya* I. 35, says that only a jeweller can recognise the true value of gems (and whether they are genuine or synthetic).

Ānanda's theory of the different functions that words fulfill in literature. We will deal with this only briefly, for while it is essential to Abhinava, it is an area about which the reader can find reliable information with no great difficulty.[1] In essence it is this : Ānanda inherited from older works, two functions of words, *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*. *Abhidhā* is denotation, the literal meaning of any utterance. *Lakṣaṇā* is more complex (it has often been misunderstood), but can be translated as secondary usage, including metaphorical usage. The time-honoured example, unfortunately not so simple to understand as has been thought, is : *gaṃgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*, literally : " In the Ganges is a village of cow-herders. " If this sounds absurd in English so does it in Sanskrit, for the locative is not normally used in the sense of proximity. By " in the Ganges " is therefore meant " near the Ganges ", i. e. " on the banks of the Ganges ". This meaning (known as the *lakṣyārtha*, as opposed to the *abhidheyārtha*) is reached through *lakṣaṇā*. Until the time of Ānanda, these were the only two functions (apart from *tātparya* with which we are not concerned here) which writers, either on literature or philosophy, recognised. Ānandavardhana revolutionised the field of poetics by adding a third function, hitherto completely unsuspected : *vyañjanā* or " suggestiveness ". This *śabdavyāpāra* or " linguistic function " is active in all the three types of suggestion mentioned above. Both Ānanda and Abhinava spend a great deal of time justifying this function and defending it against detractors.[2] They did this so successfull that, after one or two major critics (Kuntaka and Mahimabhaṭṭa), this function was universally acknowledged, and one finds no major work written after the eleventh century in which the author does not use it as an important element in his own theories on literature. To our mind, Abhinava's major contribution to this doctrine was to show that *rasa* is not *niyata*, i. e. " necessary ", thus differing from *arthāpatti* (presumption, as used by Mukulabhaṭṭa in the *Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā*) and from *anumāna*, which are logical processes. Direct statements " produce " results. Thus the phrase *putras te jātaḥ*,[3] " A son has been born to you ", " produces " delight. This is not the case with aesthetic delight, which, according to Ānanda and Abhinava, can only be " suggested ". But there are a great many other ideas in the *D. Al.* not nearly so well-known, which must have exercised a certain fascination for Abhinava, as they still do for us, one thousand years later. The most important of these (and certainly the least recognised by modern writers) goes by the name of *svaśabdaniveditatva*. It is closely relat-

1. See the excellent chapter on metaphor in K. Kujunni Raja, *Indian Theories of Meaning*, Madras, 1963.

2. Abhinava has a long defence in the *Locana*, p. 55–70 (B. ed.). The very long commentary (p. 401–457) in the *D. Al.*, third *Uddyota*, also is concerned with this.

3. *Locana*, p. 79, 80, 83.

ed to the idea of *vyañjanā*. Can an emotion be conjured up by simply naming it ?[1] When an author attempts to charge a situation with sensuality, for example, is it sufficient for a man to say to a woman : " I want to sleep with you " ? If a character says to someone : " I love you ",[2] this may or may not be the case, but as readers of literature we demand proof, and the only proof relevant to literature is the actual suggestion of the emotion in the work. Simple profession is not enough. Surely the great fault of Thomas Mann's " *Magic Mountain* " is that while the first half of the book successfully creates the atmosphere of a sanatorium removed from the preoccupations of ordinary existence, the second half, in which Mann deals with philosophical and political ideas, fails to come to life. It is too intellectualised, too explicit– Mann seems to be writing essays, not literature. Settembrini's long discourses only arouse impatience to get on to the real fictional elements of the work. Ānanda saw this clearly (is he perhaps the first recorded literary critic to do so ?) : " In a poem in which there is no description of the *vibhāvas*, etc., but a simple use of the word " love ", etc., how can there possibly be the slightest imaginative experience (on the part of the reader)? "[3] Abhinava was deeply impressed by this doctrine, as he tells us in the *A. Bh.* : " It has been shown by the author of the *dhvani* (*-āloka*) and others, that *rasas*, etc., are *never* conveyed by the mere naming of the emotion (to be suggested). This can be ascertained from my exposition called the *Locana* on the *Sahṛdayāloka*."[4] It is this doctrine that has led Ānanda to emphasise the extreme importance of the suggested element (*vyaṅgyārtha*) in literature, over and above the explicit element (*vācyārtha*). The whole first *Uddyota* of the *D. Al.* is devoted to establishing the existence of this suggested element, and to underlining its supreme place in poetry. At times, in fact, this seems excessive, for it often leads Ānanda to give critical acclaim to a poem that we should judge less satisfactory[5] and to deride a poem that we should

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1. Note what Abhinava says in the *Locana*, p. 51, that *rasa* is " never even in a dream *svaśabdavācya*, " स्वप्नेऽपि न स्वशब्दवाच्यः ।

2. There is a whole class of literature devoted to saying this same thing, on the part of women, by suggestion. They are always, as in *D. Al.* p. 71, cases of *vastudhvani*.

3. *D. Al.* p. 83 : न हि केवलशृङ्गारादिशब्दमात्रभाजि विभावादिप्रतिपादनरहिते काव्ये मनागपि रसवत्त्वप्रतीतिरस्ति ।

4. *A. Bh.*, Vol. I, p. 343 : स्वशब्दानभिधेयत्वं हि रसादीनां ध्वनिकारादिभिर्दर्शितम् । तच्च मदीयादेव तद्विवरणात् सहृदयालोकलोचनादवधारणीयम् । The only names that Abhinava uses for the *D. Al.* are *kāvyāloka* (" light on poetry ") and *sahṛdayāloka* (" light *for* the sensitive reader "). The name *dhvanyāloka* is thus actually a misnomer.

5. We think of the verse : सुवर्णपुष्पां पृथिवीं चिन्वन्ति पुरुषास्त्रयः । etc. given on p. 137 of the *D. Al.* as an example of *avivakṣitavācyadhvani*, and which is surely

(*Continued on next page*

prefer aesthetically, on the simple grounds that one contains suggestion and the other lacks it. But as Ānanda was the very first critic in literary history to have perceived the existence of the suggested sense, we must not complain if he is carried away by enthusiasm at his discovery.[1] There is however one place in the *D. Al.* where Ānanda makes a very significant concession which has been for the most part overlooked by the later tradition : in the first *Uddyota* of the *D. Al.* he says that an emotional evocation can be " directly and explicitly stated " if this statement is merely a recapitulation (*anuvāda*) of what has already been suggested.[2]

A doctrine which Ānanda never developed into a specific theory, but which is nonetheless discernible from various passages and their underlying assumptions in the *D. Al.* is the autonomy of literary experience. A poem creates its own world, and must be consistent only with itself. It owes only token allegiance to the outside world. The values of life are not necessarily the values of literature. Ānanda says, very explicitly, in an important passage in the third *Uddyota*, that questions of truth and falsity simply do not apply to imaginative literature :

" In the field of poetry where we perceive suggested elements, truth (*satya*) and falsity (*asatya*) are pointless. To examine (literature) through (the usual) valid means of cognition would simply lead to ridicule. "[3]

The criteria by which we judge literature, he explains, are not those which we apply in our everyday life. This theory culminates in the famous doctrine of *aucitya*, literally " propriety ". He develops this concept at very great length in the third *Uddyota*, and culminates by saying :

" Except for impropriety, there is no other source of harming *rasa*. The highest secret (*upaniṣad*) of *rasa* is following well-known (canons) of propriety. "[4]

Continued from previous page)
inferior, as literature, to the verse quoted on p. 114 :

अनुरागवती सँध्या दिवसस्तत्पुरःसरः ।
अहो दैवगतिः कीदृक् तथापि न समागमः ॥

which is only an example of *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*.

1. A criticism levelled by his detractors in an amusing line in the *D. Al.*, p. 25 : ध्वनिर्ध्वनिरिति यदेतदलीकसहृदयत्वभावनामुकुलितलोचनैर्नृत्यते तत्र हेतुं न विद्मः ।

2. *D. Al.* p. 81 : स्वशब्देन सा (namely रसप्रतीतिः) केवलमनूद्यते, न तु तत्कृता ।

3. *D. Al.* p. 455 : काव्यविषये च व्यङ्ग्यप्रतीतानां सत्यासत्यानिरूपणस्याप्रयोजकत्वमेवेति तत्र प्रमाणान्तरव्यापारपरीक्षोपहासायैव सम्पद्यते ।

4. *D. Al.* p. 330 :

अनौचित्यादृते नान्यद्रसभङ्गस्य कारणम् ।
प्रसिद्धौचित्यबन्धस्तु रसस्योपनिषत्परा ॥

What Ānanda means by *aucitya* is not however what we associate with the word "proper". Space does not permit us to go into the issue here,[1] but at least one application of the theory, of great relevance to modern literature, should be briefly touched upon. This is the question of obscenity. The problem centres around the very beautiful eighth chapter of the *Kumārasambhava* in which Kālidāsa describes the love-making of Śiva and Pārvatī. Now Ānanda points out that this is tantamount to describing the love-making of one's own parents,[2] since Śiva and Pārvatī are considered in mythology to be the father and mother of the world. Ānanda, from the same passage,[3] leaves us in no doubt that the passage is "obscene" (*asabhya*). But this does not mean either that it should be censored (a qucstion Ānanda never even considered, for it would be considered *hubris* to do more than make literary judgments; an actual "judge", deciding what people should or should not read, would be distasteful and indeed unthinkable in ancient India, as hopefully it is coming to seem to us today) or that it is not great literature. The description may be obscene (*asabhya*) but it is not vulgar (*grāmya*), i. e. it may offend some people's notion of propriety, but it is not on that account unrefined or without value. The reason, Ānanda tells us, is the literary skill with which the description is made. Kālidāsa was a consummate artist, and this is all that need concern the literary critic. Questions of morality are simply absurd. (Though one might sympathise, partially, with Kenneth Tynan when he pleads that he should be allowed to criticise a play of Ionesco on moral grounds: "If a man tells me something which I believe to be an untruth, am I forbidden to do more than congratulate him on the brilliance of his lying?"[4]) Here is Ānanda's remarkable passage: "How is it that in such cases sensitive critics do not find the subject-matter utterly lacking in literary beauty (*cārutva*)? It is because (what would ordinarily be considered a blemish) is cancelled out (lit. concealed-*tirohita*) by artistic genius (*kaviśakti*). For there are two kinds of blemishes (*doṣa*): (1) that due to the lack of intellectual refinement (*avyutpatti*) on the part of the poet, and (2) that due to the absence of genius (*śakti*). Now the fault that is due to a lack of intellectual refinement can sometimes be passed over by grace of (the poet's inborn) genius. But a fault due to lack of genius will very quickly obtrude itself (on the attention of the reader) ... And so for example, great poets can describe the well-known sexual love, etc., among the very highest gods, and although they are improper, nonetheless, due to

1. See Raghavan, "Some Concepts of the Alaṅkāra Śāstra", "*Aucitya*", p. 194-257, Madras, 1942.
2. *D. Al.* p. 332: तत् पित्रोः संभोगवर्णनमिव।
3. *D. Al.* p. 332: सुतरामसभ्यम्।
4. See the London Observer for the week of June 5, 1968.

the saving power of their genius, such descriptions do not strike us as (at all) vulgar. An example is the description of the love-makiug of Pārvatī (and Śiva) in the *Kumārasambhava.*"[1]

Another seminal idea of importance for Abhinava's later theories was the critical equipment necessary to appreciate this "suggested sense". *Kārikā* 7 of the first *Uddyota*, has this remarkable verse :

"(The suggested sense) cannot be known merely through lexicography or through grammar. Only those concerned with the very essence of poetry have access to it."[2]

Here the author of the *Kārikās* is criticising what was until his time the very staple of the literary critic : technical knowledge. Reading through the works written before the *D. Al.*, one is struck by the extraordinary perception of this remark. Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Udbhaṭa and Bhāmaha are unbending in their concern with the technicalities of the language, with metre, with grammar,[3] and, especially, with figures of speech. One is reminded of the situation today, where the battle still continues between the "academics" who insist on the importance, for understanding a work, of peripheral knowledge, and the "new" critics (a term Ānanda uses of his school) who insist on the autonomy and self-sufficiency of the poem. The difference, of course, is that it could be taken for granted that anybody in ancient India who was interested in Sanskrit poetry automatically came armed with elaborate training in purely formal disciplines : grammar, prosody, logic. But Ānanda was the first to demand that another element be introduced : literary sensitivity. He was concerned with essentials, with the aesthetic impact of the work of art. This was revolutionary, but in a sense it never had the impact on later critical writers that one would expect it to have. The one great critic to assimilate this principle into his own literary criticism is Abhinava himself. For only Ānanda and Abhinava concerned themselves with wider issues of literary criticism. Thus in the fourth *Uddyota*[4] of the *D. Al.*

1. *D. Al.* p. 316–317 :

कथमचारुत्वं तादृशे विषये सहृदयानां नावभातीति चेत्, कविशक्तितिरोहितत्वात्। द्विविधो हि दोषः – कवेरव्युत्पत्तिकृतोऽशक्तिकृतश्च। तत्राव्युत्पत्तिकृतो दोषः शक्तितिरस्कृतत्वात्कदाचिन्न लक्ष्यते। यस्त्वशक्तिकृतो दोषः स झटिति प्रतीयते ..... तथा हि महाकवीनामप्युत्तमदेवताविषयप्रसिद्धसंभोग-शृङ्गारनिबन्धनाद्यनौचित्यं शक्तितिरस्कृतत्वात् ग्राम्यत्वेन न प्रतिभासते। यथा कुमारसंभवे देवीसंभोग-वर्णनम्।

2. *D. Al.* p. 93 :

शब्दार्थशासनज्ञानमात्रेणैव न वेद्यते।
वेद्यते स तु काव्यार्थतत्त्वज्ञैरेव केवलम्॥

3. See "Grammaire et Poétique en Sanskrit" by L. Renou, *Études Vediques et Pāṇiniennes*, Tome VIII, Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne Paris, 1961.

4. *D. Al.* p. 529.

Ānanda judges both the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* as whole works of literature.

Later authors were content to simply enumerate once again the various technical factors in a given poem. Abhinava of course carried on the tradition of Ānanda by focusing on fundamental questions of the philosophy of aesthetics. Though he was *followed* in this by all later writers, he was the last to make any contribution to the field. What he had to say was new and intellectually daring. Later writers simply repeat his ideas, usually in a simplified form. But it seems to us very likely that Abhinava was encouraged to take this wider view because of the example that Ānanda set for him.

Another idea which Abhinava must have first assimilated from Ānanda is the extraordinary importance ascribed to the poet. Not importance in the worldly sense of the term, but his autonomy, his ability to create new worlds. This too was an idea barely foreshadowed in earlier criticism. Ānanda states his position in two very exceptional verses, which have impressed themselves on the imagination of all later writers :

" In the shoreless world of poetry, the poet is the unique creator. Everything becomes transformed into the way he envisions it.

If the poet is emotionally moved (lit. " in love ") in his poems, then the whole world is infused with *rasa*. But if he be without an interest in the senses (*vītarāga*), then everything will become dry (*nīrasa*)." [1]

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1. *D. Al.* p. 498 :

अपारे काव्यसंसारे कविरेकः प्रजापतिः ।
यथास्मै रोचते विश्वं तथेदं परिवर्तते ॥
शृङ्गारी चेत्कविः काव्ये जातं रसमयं जगत् ।
स एव वीतरागश्चेन्नीरसं सर्वमेव तत् ॥

These verses are quoted in the *Agnipurāṇa* 339, 10–11, Ānandāśrama ed. Abhinava explicity states that these verses are by Ānanda in the *A. Bh.* Vol. I, p. 295 :

तत एवोक्तम् – ' शृङ्गारी चेत्कविः ' इत्यानन्दवर्धनाचार्येण ।

So there can be no doubt that the Agnipurāṇa has borrowed the verses from Ānanda and not vice versa.

Note also the fine verse quoted immediately after these two :

भावानचेतनानपि चेतनवच्चेतनानचेतनवत् ।
व्यवहारयति यथेष्टं सुकविः काव्ये स्वतन्त्रतया ॥

" A great poet, at his own will, causes even inanimate objects to behave as if they were animate objects and animate objects to behave as if they were inanimate ".

Note that Abhinava (p. 499) takes *Śṛṅgāra* in the second stanza to be an *upalakṣaṇa* for all the other *rasas*.

We should not interpret *vītarāga* to mean *vairāgyavat* and take it to be a covert reference to *śāntarasa*. For if this were so, *nīrasam* would make no sense even in its punned meaning. *Vītarāga* here simply means a poet not interested in *rasa*, emotionally uninvolved. The second half of the verse, therefore, means that if the poet is not very good (not alive to the external world) he will not be able to invest his poetry with any real interest.

Abhinava echoes this in his famous remark on poetic imagination (*pratibhā*) in the *Abhinavabhāratī* :

" The poet is like Prajāpati, from whose will this world arises. For the poet is endowed with a power to create wondrous and unheard of things. This power arises from the grace of Parā Vāk (" Highest Speech "), which is just another name for poetic imagination (*pratibhā*), which has its seat in the poet's own heart, and which is eternally in creative motion (*udita*). "[1] It follows from this that for both Ānanda and Abhinava, there could be no end to this creative imagination and to the actual poetic situations it could envisage. This is the theme of a whole section at the beginning of the fourth *Uddyota* of the *D. Al.*, where we are told that there is no end to the themes of poetry, as long as one is endowed with poetic imagination.[2] He gives a beautiful simile :

" Even though subjects may have been already used, thanks to the fact that they are associated with imaginative experience (*rasa*) in literature, they all appear new, just as trees appear new during the honey-months (spring). "[3]

There is no end to the novelty of poetic themes,[4] no way of exhausting the subject-matter of poetry :

" Thousands upon thousands of poets as eminent as Vācaspati himself might use (various) subjects (in their poetry), and yet, like primordial world-matter, they cannot be exhausted. "[5]

This is a healthy emphasis on the primacy of the external world, and how it must always form the poet's major source of material.[6]

One is reminded of the passage from the *Avimāraka* : " How lovely is the great variety of this world ! "[7] This agrees with the emphasis the *kārikās*

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1. *A. Bh.*, Vol. I, p. 4 :
कवेरपि स्वहृदयायतनसततोदितप्रतिभाभिधानपरवाग्देवतानुग्रहोत्थितविचित्रापूर्वार्थनिर्माण-शक्तिशालिनः प्रजापतेरिव कामजनितजगतः ।
See also the Prākrit verse quoted by Ānanda in the fourth *Uddyota*, *D. Al.* p. 527.
2. *D. Al.* p. 537 :
न काव्यार्थविरामोऽस्ति यदि स्यात्प्रतिभागुणः । IV. 6.
3. *D. Al.* p. 528 :
दृष्टपूर्वा अपि ह्यर्थाः काव्ये रसपरिग्रहात् ।
सर्वे नवा इवाभान्ति मधुमास इव द्रुमाः ॥ IV. 4.
4. *D. Al.* IV, 6.
5. *D. Al.* IV. 10 :
वाचस्पतिसहस्राणां सहस्रैरपि यत्नतः ।
निबद्धा सा क्षयं नैति प्रकृतिर्जगतामिव ॥
6. See also *NŚ*, I. 119 (G. O. S. edition, p. 42).
7. Devadhar's edition of the Bhāsa plays, p. 132 : *aho vicitrasvabhāvatā*

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place upon love, of all the *rasas* (note that *ŚR* is never mentioned specifically in any *kārikā* of the *D. Al.*). In the second *Uddyota* when the *guṇas* (linguistic qualities) are being discussed, *mādhurya* "delicacy" is emphasised : "love alone is very delicate, for it is the most pleasing among all the *rasas*."[1] This is so, we are told, because "the mind, in love, becomes exceedingly sensitive (is moved)."[2] It is surely this emphasis[3] that has led Abhinava, in the *A. Bh.*, to make a profound philosophical definition of love. This occurs under *NŚ*. VI. 45, where Abhinava has a very long comment on Bharata's definition of *śṛṅgārarasa*. The section is, for the most part, very corrupt. However one passage can be translated :

"Someone objected as follows : how can there be only one *rasa* (*śṛṅgāra*) when there are so many different kinds of love (*rati*) according to the literary character in whom (love) exists ? The person objecting thus is not (really) acquainted with love. For all love is only one. It (exists) where there is not the separation of the one (?–*ekaviyoga*) (from the other), because there is a mutual (commingling) of consciousness. This is why (Bharata) said : *uttamayuvaprakṛtiḥ* (this refers to p. 301, Vol. I of the *NŚ* : *sā ca strīpuruṣahetukā uttamayuvaprakṛtiḥ*) : "he is noble" and "she is noble" and so we get the dual compound *uttamau*. The same is true of *yuvānau* (i. e. "he is young and she is young" and so the dual compound). Now the word *uttamayuva* in this context refers to their consciousness (i. e. their minds), and not to their bodies. For this concept (viz. nobility), from the highest point of view, applies only to consciousness..."[4]

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jagataḥ. Cf. Auden, in the *New Republic*, Dec. 9, 1967 : "If today, it seems to me, the word "real" can be used at all, the only world which is real for us, as the world in which all of us, including scientists, are born, work, love, hate, and die, is the primary phenomenal world as it is and always has been presented to us through our senses, a world in which the sun moves across the sky from east to west, the stars are hung in the vault of heaven, the measure of magnitude is the human body, and objects are either in motion or at rest". It is clear that this love for the human, for the particular and the imperfect (cf. Balzac : "Blessed are the imperfect for theirs is the kingdom of love") is much closer to the hearts of Indian poets than of Indian philosophers.

1. शृङ्गार एव मधुरः परः प्रह्लादनो रसः। *D. Al.*, II. 7.
2. आर्द्रतां याति यतस्तत्राधिकं मनः। *D. Al.*, II. 8.
3. See also III. 28 :

   विशेषतस्तु शृङ्गारे सुकुमारतमो ह्यसौ।

   "Especially in *Śṛṅgāra*, for it is the most delicate of all the *rasas*". See also *D. Al.* II. 11 and II. 15.

4. *A. Bh.* Vol. 1, p. 302 : अत एव यत्कैश्चिदचोद्यत—रतेराधारभेदेन भेदात् कथमेको रस इति। तदनभिज्ञतया। एकैव ह्यसौ तावती रतिः। यत्रान्योन्यसंविदा एकवियोगो न भवति। अत एवो-

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The above is meant only to give an idea of Ānanda's influence. The actual influence of the *D. Al,* has been far more extensive than we are able to indicate here. We have not, for instance, dealt with such important themes as *prādhānya*, " predominance ", and its importance for judging the status of a given poem, or of Ānanda's new ideas on figures of speech, or on *saṅghaṭanā* (linguistic structure). But what we have said should suffice to give the reader an idea both of the remarkable profundity of some of the views of the *Dhvanyāloka*, and of their importance for Abhinava's philosophy of aesthetics.

BHAṬṬATAUTA

Bhaṭṭatauta, Abhinava's teacher[1] of dramatic theory, wrote a work entitled the *Kāvyakautuka*,[2] now lost. On this work Abhinava wrote a commentary, also lost. It is thus not possible to determine just how many of Abhinava's ideas come from Bhaṭṭatauta. He quotes him often in the *A. Bh.*, but many of the passages are too corrupt to understand. However, it is clear that Bhaṭṭatauta emphasised the drama (over and above lyric poetry). Thus Abhinava says:

" (Our) teacher says that *rasa* arises in a poem when there arises an experience (on the part of the reader) that is similar to direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) (of a drama). Thus he says in the *Kāvyakautuka* :

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त्तमयुवप्रकृतिः । उत्तमश्चोत्तमा चोत्तमौ । एवं युवानौ । तत्रोत्तमयुवशब्देन तत्संविदुच्यते । न तु कायः । चैतन्यस्यैव हि परमार्थत उत्तमयुवत्वं विशेषः ।

Cf. Abhinavagupta's remarks about love in the *Locana*, p. 205:

रतौ हि समस्तदेवतिर्यङ्नरादिजातिष्वनवच्छिन्नैव वासनास्त इति न कश्चित्तत्र तादृग्यो न हृदयसंवादमयः, यतेरपि हि तच्चमत्कारोऽस्त्येव । अतो मधुर इत्युक्तम् । मधुरो हि शर्करादिरसो विवेकिनोऽविवेकिनो वा स्वस्थस्यातुरस्य वा झटिति रसनापतितस्तावदभिलषणीय एव भवति ।

" For there is an unbroken propensity for love in all creatures, gods, animals, men etc. And so there is no creature who is not (capable of) responding sympathetically to love. Even an ascetic can find aesthetic delight in (descriptions of) love. And so it is called " delightful " (madhura). For a sweet dish such as sugar candy etc., when it falls on the tongue of a discriminating person or a non-discriminating perosn, a healthy man or a sick man, will immediately be pleasurable ".

1. Generally whenever the term *upādhyāya* is used in the *A. Bh.* it refers to Bhaṭṭatauta.

2. अस्मदुपाध्यायकृते काव्यकौतुकेऽप्ययमेवाभिप्रायो मन्तव्यः । A. *Bh.* Vol. 1, p. 37; this is in the context of what constitutes " imitation " in the drama. Abhinava also wrote a commentary on this work : स चायमस्मदुपाध्यायभट्टतौतेन काव्यकौतुके, अस्माभिश्च तद्विवरणे बहुतरकृतनिर्णय(i. e. विचार)पूर्वपक्षसिद्धान्त इत्यलं बहुना, *Locana*, p. 394.

See V. Raghavan, " Authors Quoted in the *Abhinavabhāratī* ", *J. O. R.* Vol. 6, Madras, 1932.

" In a poem that is not enacted, it is not possible to have a (true) aesthetic experience (*āsvāda*). When things (*bhāva*) such as gardens, one's beloved, the moon, etc., are well and elegantly described by a polished imagination, then they appear as if they are actually taking place before our very eyes (i. e. as if we saw them acted out) ".[1]

Abhinava improves on this :

" .... the actions of the actor have been devised in order that the spectator might obtain an aesthetic experience that is appropriate to direct perception (as in the drama). This is why Bharata has sanctioned the use of music, etc., in order to break the knots of the heart that is filled with the anger and sorrow indigenous to it. For the text (the *Nāṭyaśāstra* ?) includes everything (or : is meant for all people). *Therefore, rasas are only found in dramas, and not in the everyday world.* This is what (Bharata) means (to say). And poetry is nothing other than drama ".[2]

But what is most significant for us, is the term *pratibhā*. It is clear from the quotations by later writers that Bhaṭṭatauta was greatly preoccupied with this term and the concepts that lay behind it. Hemacandra quotes three verses from Bhaṭṭatauta :

" It has been said that there can be no poet who is not (also) a seer. And a man (becomes) a seer because of his " vision " (*darśana*). Vision is the knowledge of the truth of the nature and properties of various things. A man is said in the *śāstra* to be a poet only because of vision. A man is said to be a poet in the world when he has both vision and (the power of) description. This is why, although the first poet (Vālmiki) was always gifted with a clear vision, as long as he did not actually describe (things) he was not known as a poet (but only as a sage) ".[3]

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1. *A. Bh.* Vol. p. 290 :
काव्यार्थविषये हि प्रत्यक्षकल्पसंवेदनोदये रसोदय इत्युपाध्यायाः। यदाहुः काव्यकौतुके—
'प्रयोगत्वमनापन्ने काव्ये नास्वादसंभवः' इति ।
'वर्णनोत्कलिता भोगप्रौढोक्त्या सम्यगर्पिताः ।
उद्यानकान्ताचन्द्राद्या भावाः प्रत्यक्षवत् स्फुटाः ॥' इति ।

2. *A. Bh.* Vol. I, p. 291 :
[तत्र ये स्वभावतो निर्मलमुकुरहृदयास्त एव संसारोचितक्रोधमोहाभिलाषपरवशमनसो न भवन्ति । तेषां तथाविधदशरूपकाकर्णनसमये साधारणरसनात्मकचर्वणग्राह्यो रससंचयो नाट्यलक्षणः स्फुट एव । ये त्वतथाभूतास्तेषां] प्रत्यक्षोचिततथाविधचर्वणालाभाय नटादिप्रक्रिया । स्वगतक्रोधशोकादिसङ्कटहृदयग्रन्थिभङ्गनाय गीतादिप्रक्रिया च मुनिना विरचिता । सर्वानुग्राहकं हि शास्त्रमिति न्यायात् । तेन नाट्य एव रसा न लोक इत्यर्थः । काव्यं च नाट्यमेव । See Addenda.

3. Hemacandra, *Kāvyānuśāsana*, p. 432, Parikh and Kulkarni's second edition, (Bombay, 1964) :

(*Continued on next page*

The *Kaumudī* on the *Locana* quotes a very important verse that might well come from the *Kāvyakautuka* :

"There are two paths of the goddess of speech : one is the *śāstra*, and the other is poetry (*kavikarma*). The first of these arises from intellectual ability (*prajñā*), and the second from genius (*pratibhā*)".[1]

This propels us to the heart of a great controversy, the tension between "inspiration" and "learning".[2] For *pratibhā* not only means creative, or poetic imagination, it also means "genius", or "inspiration". The term to which it is generally opposed is *vyutpatti*, "learning", "intellectual refinement". The dichotomy is very old in Sanskrit poetics. It held a particular fascination for Abhinava, for it involved him in one of his life-long preoccupations : the relation between philosophy and poetry. In a sense one can look at this dichotomy as finally touching the most famous dichotomy of all, that between the followers of the old school of poetics who believed in the paramount importance of *alaṅkāras* and *guṇas*, and the new *dhvani* school. For the older school emphasises the hard work that must go into creation, the need for being properly schooled. The new school on the other hand, emphasises imagination,[3] inspiration, *rasa* and *dhvani*. This is expressed in the famous *kārikā* of the *Dhvanyāloka* where it is said that figures of

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तथा चाह भट्टतात: (sic) :

नानृषि: कविरित्युक्तमृषिश्च किल दर्शनात् ।
विचित्रभावधर्मांशतत्त्वप्रख्या च दर्शनम् ॥
स तत्त्वदर्शनादेव शास्त्रेषु पठित: कवि: ।
दर्शनाद्वर्णनाच्चाथ रूढा लोके कविश्रुति: ॥
तथा हि दर्शने स्वच्छे निर्ल्लेऽप्यादिकवेर्मुने: ।
नोदिता कविता लोके यावज्जाता न वर्णना ॥

1. *Kaumudi*, K. Sastri's edition of the *D. Al.* p. 170 :

द्वे वर्त्मनी गिरां देव्या: शास्त्रं च कविकर्म च ।
प्रज्ञोपज्ञं तयोराद्यं प्रतिभोद्भवमन्तिमम् ॥

This verse is quoted as the motto to a very fine article by T. N. Sreekantiya, "Imagination in Indian Poetics", *I. H. Q.* Vol. XIII, No. 1, p. 1937. There he says : "Quoted by Vidyādharacakravartin in his commentary on the *Kāvyaprakāśa* (Trivandrum Edition Part I, p. 14). I am indebted to Dr. V. Raghavan of Madras for this reference."

2. E. I. Daṇḍin *KD*, I. 103. *Mahābhārata*, XII. 260. 1. We even find the dichotomy in the Pali texts, e. g. *Aṅguttara Nikāya* II. 230 where four types of poets are described (*cintakavi, sutakavi, atthakavi* and *paṭibhānakavi*) of which the last type, naturally superior, writes from "seizure" as it were.

3. The term *pratibhā* is often used in the *D. Āl.* e. g. I. 6 :

अलोकसामान्यमभिव्यनक्ति परिस्फुरन्तं प्रतिभाविशेषम् ।

also, IV. 6 : यदि स्यात्प्रतिभागुण: ।

speech will come without any effort to the poet concerned with *rasadhvani.*[1] Of course Ānanda himself was not unaware of the importance of *guṇas* and *alaṅkāras ;* it is only that for him and for Abhinava, they constitute the body, the externals of poetry. The argument is not confined to India. It is a matter of controversy whether a " creative writing course " is of any use to the young writer or not. There are those who argue that nobody ever learns anything from such artificial attempts to instil talent into students. Howard Nemrov once said in conversation that the only thing he really felt he should tell his class on creative writing was : " Why don't you write well ? Why aren't you good ? " On the other hand, there is general agreement that such classes do often manage to teach the already gifted student certain technical skills.

The most famous line on *pratibhā*, first quoted by Abhinava and later by a great many writers, belongs to Bhaṭṭatauta.[2] It is :[3] " Poetic imagination is that (form of) intelligence which shines with ever new scintillation ".[4] The whole verse is quoted as far as we know, only by Vidyācakravartin, in his *Saṃpradāyaprakāśinī :*

" Remembrance is that which refers to an object of the past. *Mati* refers to something that is still in the future, *buddhi* deals with that which is present and *prajñā* belongs to all three times (past, present and future). But *pratibhā* is that intelligence which shines with ever new scintillation. The poet is he who is skilful in descriptions animated by that (*pratibhā*). Poetry is that which the poet does ".[5]

There is of course a long tradition behind this word. The most famous quotation is perhaps the verse from Bhāmaha that Abhinava quotes more than once :

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1. II. 16 and *vṛtti* thereon.

2. Several stanzas on *pratibhā* have been ascribed by Gnoli to Bhaṭṭatauta : " Three stanzas, quoted by Hemacandra and probably taken from Bhaṭṭa Tota ", Gnoli, *op. cit.* p. XXX, Int. But this is incorrect, since the verses are from Mahimabhaṭṭa's *Vyaktiviveka*, II. 117–119.

3. See also *Locana*, p. 92 :

प्रतिभा अपूर्ववस्तुनिर्माणक्षमा प्रज्ञा ।

4. Hemacandra, p. 3 quotes the whole passage :

प्रज्ञा नवनवोल्लेखशालिनी प्रतिभा मता ।
तदनुप्राणनाज्जीवद्वर्णनानिपुणः कविः ॥
तस्य कर्म स्मृतं काव्यं

5. Vidyācakravartin's comm. on the *KP*, the *Sampradāyaprakāśinī*, TSS. nos. 88 and 100, part I, p. 13 :

स्मृतिर्व्यतीतविषया मतिरागामिगोचरा ।
बुद्धिस्तात्कालिकी प्रोक्ता प्रज्ञा त्रैकालिकी मता ॥

The rest is as given in the preceding note.

"Even a stupid man can learn the *śāstra* from the teachings of his professor. But poetry is only given to the person who has imaginative genius (*pratibhā*) and that only once in a while".[1]

Abhinava and Bhaṭṭatauta must have known the fourth chapter of the *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, most of which is given over to various views on *pratibhā*.[2] Rājaśekhara defines it as: "That which causes to appear in the mind the collections of words, the technique of *alaṅkāras*, the caravans of meanings, the path of (poetic) expression, and other similar things as well".[3] He divides *pratibhā* into two sorts: (1) that which applies to poets (*kārayitrī*, or "creative"), and that (2) which applies to critics or readers (*bhāvayitrī*). "Creative imagination is of three sorts: *sahajā*, "inborn", *āhāryā*, "acquired", and *aupadeśikī*, "learned". Poets too are divided into three classes, in accord with this scheme (*sārasvata, ābhyāsika* and *aupadeśika*). He has many interesting and unusual observations on critics and poets in the rest of the chapter as well. One thinks in particular of the two poets, blind from birth,[4] who are nonetheless endowed with "vision" (*pratibhā*).

But it is really only Abhinavagupta who enables the various insights into the nature of imagination to be coordinated into a philosophical whole, as we shall see when dealing with his philosophy of aesthetics in the next section. The fine image of Mahimabhaṭṭa was surely inspired by Abhinava's philosophic views on imagination:

"*Pratibhā* is that intellectual function of the poet whose mind is concentrated (*stimita*) on thinking about words and meanings that are appropriate to *rasas*. It arises for a moment from the contact of the poet's mind with the essential nature (of the Ātman)."

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1. Bhāmaha, *Kāvyālaṅkāra*, I, 5:

गुरूपदेशादध्येतुं शास्त्रं जडधियोऽप्यलम् ।
काव्यं तु जायते जातु कस्यचित्प्रतिभावतः ॥

2. On pratibhā see also: *Vāmana*, I, 3. 16; *Yogasūtra*, II, 36; also Kashmir Śaiva literature, e. g. Somānanda's *Śivadṛṣṭi*, II, 64 (p. 78, KSTS, LIV, 1934); Vasugupta, *Spandakārikā*, IV, 7. See also L. Silburn, "*Vātulanātha Sūtra*" (Paris, 1957) p. 14 and p. 38. See also Int. to De's ed. of the *Vakroktijīvita*, pp. XXIV ff. For the term in philosophy, see G. Kaviraj, "The Doctrine of *Pratibhā* in Indian Philosophy", *Annals of the B. O. R. I.* V (1923–24), p. 1 ff. and 113 ff.

3. *KM.* ed. by C. D. Dalal and R. A. Sastry, revised ed. by Ramaswami Sastri Siromani, 3rd ed. Baroda, 1934, p. 11:

या शब्दग्राममर्थसार्थमलंकारतन्त्रमुक्तिमार्गमन्यदपि तथाविधमधिहृदयं प्रतिभासयति सा प्रतिभा ।

Uktimārga might also mean *racanā, rīti*, i. e. style.

4. *op. cit.* p. 12 यतो मेधाविरुद्रकुमारदासादयो जात्यन्धाः कवयः श्रूयन्ते ।

"It is that which makes the things that exist in all the three worlds seem as if they were right before our very eyes, and (hence) it is known as the third eye of Śiva".[1]

It is clear that the striking image in this verse is borrowed from passages in the *D. Āl.*[2] Abhinava is also greatly concerned with *pratibhā* as a philosophic concept. Thus we find it defined[3] and very often referred to in his *Tantrāloka.*[4]

BHAṬṬANĀYAKA

As we have noted under the passages quoted from Bhaṭṭanāyaka in the *Locana* passage from the second *Uddyota*,[5] Abhinava has very obviously taken many of his key notions on poetry from BN. The most important of these is *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*, the power which enables a situation in literature to abstract itself from its unique application to one individual, and to be universally applicable. This is not a concept found in Ānandavardhana, nor in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. The word that BN uses for it is *bhāvanā*. Abhinava[6] quotes the first line of a verse that Hemacandra[7] and Jayaratha[8] give in full :

"(There are three functions in poetry :) *abhidhā* (denotation, which, for BN, includes *lakṣaṇā* as well), *bhāvanā* (generalisation), and the enjoyment that ensues. Both word and sense-figures belong to denotation. The whole collection of (primary emotions such as) love, etc., arises from *bhāvanā*.

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1. *Vyaktiviveka*, II. 117–118, p. 452-453 (Kashi Sanskrit Series 121) :

रसानुगुणशब्दार्थचिन्तास्तिमितचेतसः ।
क्षणं स्वरूपस्पर्शोत्था प्रज्ञैव प्रतिभा कवेः ॥
सा हि चक्षुर्भगवतस्तृतीयमिति गीयते ।
येन साक्षात्करोत्येष भावांस्त्रैलोक्यवर्तिनः ॥

2. *D. Āl.* p. 508 where the *navā dṛṣṭi* is referred to, and also *D. Āl.* p. 498, third verse.

3. *T. Āl.* XIII, 87.

4. Gnoli, quoting four very difficult stanzas from the *T. Āl.* (XI, pp. 60–62), remarks : "Abhinava ..... stress (es) the fact that *pratibhā* does not exhaust itself in the poetical intuition, but is, in a broader sense, the same consciousness, the same Self. In the majority of men it does not succeed in liberating itself from the chain of relationships and practical interests which condition and constrict it, but, in the poet, it burns with a purified light – to shine out finally in all its fullness in the intuition of the saints." Gnoli, *op. cit.* p. LI. Further references in the *Tantrāloka* are XIII. 90; 97; 101; 106; 112; 120 etc.

5. Below, we translate Abhinava's brief summary of Bhaṭṭanāyaka's views on *rasa*.

6. *A. Bh.* Vol. 1, p. 277.

7. See Hemacandra, *op. cit.* p. 96. See also Chintamani, "Fragments of Bhaṭṭanāyaka" *J. O. R.* vol. I. p. 271. It is quoted in the *Rasagaṅgādhara* p. 25 (with the variant reading *tadbhogīkṛtir eva ca.*)

8. *Alaṅkārasarvasva*, p. 9.

The accomplished man (*siddhimānnaraḥ*) is permeated by the form of the enjoyment of that."[1]

Of course Bhaṭṭanāyaka[2] was himself influenced by the *D. Al.* (though he is supposed to have written his *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* to demolish the idea of *dhvani*) in granting that there is an element in poetry beyond denotation and secondary usage. In one passage in the *Locana*,[3] Abhinava even says that BN is simply giving suggestion another name. But far more important for Abhinava was BN's views on religious ecstasy and poetry.

It may well be that Bhaṭṭanāyaka was the first person to make the famous comparison of yogic ecstasy and aesthetic experience. Unfortunately his *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* has been lost, and only quotations survive in the later *Alaṅkāra* works. The *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* appears to have been either a commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra* or an independent work criticising the theory of *dhvani* in the course of which he had occasion often to quote from the *NŚ*. Abhinava quotes Bhaṭṭanāyaka frequently in the *Locana*,[4] not always to disagree with him. It is clear from many of his remarks that he had a high respect for him.

The first passage we quote and translate is one of exceptional interest, that must certainly have been of great importance for Abhinava's own theories. It is found on p. 5 of the *Abhinavabhāratī* (G. O. S. vol. I, 2nd ed.) and is a commentary on the opening verse of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*:[5]

"Bhaṭṭanāyaka[6] however (explains the verse as follows):

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1. अभिधा भावना चान्या तद्भोगीकृतमेव च ।
अभिधाधामतां याते शब्दार्थालंकृती ततः ॥
भावनाभाव्य एषोऽपि शृङ्गारादिगणो हि यत् ।
तद्भोगीकृतरूपेण व्याप्यते सिद्धिमान्नरः ॥

We are not certain about *bhāvanābhāvyaḥ*. Perhaps it should be translated as "to be reflected on in the mind by means of *bhāvanā*", i. e. *bhāvyaḥ* would mean "to be reflected on", *bhāvanayā bhāvyaḥ*.

2. On Bhaṭṭanāyaka see Gnoli, *op. cit.*, p. XX. Also Kane, *H. S. P.* p. 221–225. The date Gnoli gives is around 900 A. D. In any case he certainly lived after Ānandavardhana in response to whose theory of *dhvani* his own work seems to have been written.

3. See *Locana* p. 188.

4. For all references in the *Locana* to BN, see Kane, *op. cit.* p. 223.

5. प्रणम्य शिरसा देवौ पितामहमहेश्वरौ ।
नाट्यशास्त्रं प्रवक्ष्यामि ब्रह्मणा यदुदाहृतम् ॥

6. *Udhāhṛtam*, which simply means "spoken" is taken to be a pregnant use of the word by BN who interprets it as *udāharaṇīkṛtam*. The drama is like life. It is essentially unreal, and yet it affects us profoundly. Most important of all, it is

(*Continued on next page*

"I shall (now) expound that drama which was promulgated[1] by Brahman – the highest Self – as an illustration such that people might understand that worldly objects are insubstantial (*nissārabheda*), fabricated (as they are) by ignorance (of the identity between the Self and Brahman). Just as the unreal actions of Rāma, Rāvaṇa and others, which are essentially a figment of one's imagination and hence do not possess a single fixed form, but in a moment assume hundreds and thousands of forms; which though different (in their unreality) from dreams, etc., are still the outcome of mental imagination (*hṛdayagrahanidāna*); which are enacted by actors who are almost like the creator of the world (Brahmā) and who have not relinquished their separate identity (as persons in real life) – those actions (of Rāma and Rāvaṇa, etc.) appear (to us) in a most unusually wondrous way; and though appearing like that, they become the means of attaining the (four) goals of life – in exactly the same way this universe consists of a display of unreal forms and names and yet through listening to and meditating on spiritual instruction, it leads to the realisation of the highest goal of human life (namely *mokṣa*).

Thus this stanza, by suggesting (the attainment of) the other-worldly highest goal of human life introduces *śāntarasa*.

'Depending on their respective causes the different *rasas* originate from *śānta* (a state of mental calm).'

Thus the present stanza (*NŚ*, I. 1) conveys the higher purpose (of drama)." This is the explanation that Bhaṭṭanāyaka has given in his *Sahṛdayadarpaṇa*. As he said :

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the means whereby we may attain bliss, which is after all the same as the Self and therefore the same as *mokṣa*. *A. Bh.*Vol. 1, p. 5 :

भट्टनायकस्तु "ब्रह्मणा परमात्मना यदुदाहृतमविद्याविरचितनिस्सारभेदग्रहे यदुदाहरणीकृतं तन्नाट्यं तद्वक्ष्यामि। यथा हि कल्पनामात्रसारं तत एवानवस्थितैकरूपं क्षणेन कल्पनाशतसहस्रसहस्रं स्वप्नादिविलक्षणमपि सुष्ठुतरां हृदयग्रहनिदानमत्यक्तस्वालम्बनब्रह्मकल्पनटोपरचितं रामरावणादिचेष्टितमसत्यं कुतोऽप्यद्भुतवृत्त्या भाति। तथा भासमानमपि च पुमर्थोपायतामेति। तथा तादृगेव विश्वमिदमसत्यनामरूपप्रपञ्चात्मकमथ च श्रवणमननादिवशेन परमपुमर्थप्रापकमिति लोकोत्तरपरमपुरुषार्थसूचनेन शान्तरसोपक्षेपोऽयं भविष्यति।

'स्वं स्वं निमित्तमादाय शान्तादुत्पद्यते रसः।' इति॥

तदनेन पारमार्थिकं प्रयोजनमुक्तं।" इति व्याख्यानं सहृदयदर्पणे पर्यग्रहीत्।

यदाह—

'नमस्त्रैलोक्यनिर्माणकवये शम्भवे यतः।
प्रतिक्षणं जगन्नाट्यप्रयोगरसिको जनः॥' इति

1. It is not clear whether Abhinava accepts this justification of *ŚR* or not. Most likely he does, at least in great part, for he also quotes this stanza (*NŚ*. VI, p. 335, in the interpolated *śāntarasa* section) and also uses it in the third *Uddyota* of the *Locana*, p. 391, as a proof of the existence of *Śāntarasa*.

" I pay my homage to Śiva the poet (also the omniscient one – *kavi*) who has created all the three worlds and thanks to whom (*yataḥ*) (sensitive) people are able to attain aesthetic bliss by watching the spectacle (*prayoga*) of the play that is our life in this world. "

We can see prefigured in this fascinating fragment (from a commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*[1] itself ?) many of the themes that were to occupy Abhinava so closely[2] : the world as a drama, the individual as the actor, the illusion of drama and the illusion of existence, the acceptance of *śāntarasa*, the importance of *mokṣa*, Śiva as the cosmic poet, etc. How many more ideas would we find that Abhinava is indebted to BN for, if the *Hṛdaya-darpaṇa* were extant ?

The second passage from Bhaṭṭanāyaka is quoted in the *Locana*, under I. 6 (p. 91, *Bālapriyā* ed.) :

" The cow in the form of speech gives a unique drink (*rasa*) out of love for her young.[3] That (*rasa* i. e. bliss) which is (laboriously) milked by the Yogins cannot be compared to it. "[4]

Abhinava comments : " Without being possessed by *rasa*, the Yogins laboriously milk out (bliss)."[5]

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1. Note that in the *Locana*, Abhinava speaks of Bhaṭṭanāyaka's *Hṛdaya-darpaṇa*, whereas here he refers to the *Sahṛdayadarpaṇa*. Are these just variant names for the same work ? K. C. Pandey (*Abhinavagupta*, p. 200) suggests that the *Hṛdaya-darpaṇa* refers to a book that refuted Ānanda's theories, whereas the *Sahṛdaya-darpaṇa* would have been a commentary on the *NŚ*. It is true of course that *hṛdaya* and *sahṛdaya* mean very different things, but Abhinava seems in the habit of calling a single work by different names. Thus he speaks of the *Kāvyāloka* (i. e. the *Dhvanyāloka*) of Ānandavardhana (*Locana*, p. 2 and again *Locana*, p. 554) and later in the *Abhinavabhāratī*, Vol. I, p. 343, he calls the same work the *Sahṛdayāloka*. This is the name he uses in the second vol. of the *A. Bh.* as well.

2. It is clear that Abhinava has used the ideas contained in this important passage. But how did he feel consciously about it ? Did he accept the views or not ? It would seem that he does, and yet on p. 3, Vol. I of the *A. Bh.* he quotes the interpretation of his teacher (Bhaṭṭatauta) on this verse from the *NŚ* !

3. Surely *Uttuṅgodaya* is wrong in saying that ignorance is suggested by the word *bāla* :

बाले बालवदनभिज्ञे उपासके वत्से च।

The point is that the *bāla* (child) is like the *sahṛdaya*. There can be no question of the *sahṛdaya* being ignorant.

4. यदाह भट्टनायकः

वाग्धेनुर्दुग्ध एतं हि रसं यद्बालतृष्णया।
तेन नास्य समः स स्याद्दुह्यते योगिभिर्हि यः॥

5. *Locana*, p. 91 :

तदावेशेन विनाप्याक्रान्त्या हि यो योगिभिर्दुह्यते।

The point of the verse[1] must be that rasa is superior to the bliss that Yogins achieve. The reason is that the Yogins must go through an elaborate process.[2] But note that the verse could mean just the opposite, namely that the *rasa* the *Sahṛdaya* enjoys is not equal to what the Yogin enjoys. *Tena nāsya samaḥ* does not specify whether it is superior or inferior. The verse is quoted in the context of poetry, and so the first interpretation ought to be the correct one. Furthermore, if it were not, Abhinava's quoting it here would be out of place.[3]

Philosophical Influences

Vedānta:

Not only was Abhinava, along with Ānandavardhana, assuredly the greatest thinker on aesthetic theory in India, he was also one of the greatest philosophical minds of mediaeval India. In Kashmir Śaivism, to which school he belonged, his word is considered authoritative in all philosophical issues. It has been suggested[4] that he wrote his works on poetics after his major works on philosophy. One would, therefore, expect his aesthetic theories to have been influenced by his readings in Kashmir Śaivism. But probably even prior to his writings on Kashmir Śaivism, Abhinava was exposed to earlier *Advaita* literature. There is of course his own commentary on the *Gītā*,[5] and though

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1. According to the *K.* the word *vāg* here means poetry :

वाक् काव्यात्मतया परिणममाना धेनुः ।

K. Sastri's ed. p. 168–169.

2. As the *Kaumudī* on the *Locana* says :

आक्रान्त्या प्रत्याहारादिप्रयत्नपरम्परात्मकप्रपीडनोपायाश्रयेणेत्यर्थः ।

3. However, there is no doubt that in the third *Uddyota*, *Locana*, p. 510, Abhinava speaks of *rasāsvāda* as being only the reflection of a drop of the bliss that is *parameśvaraviśrāntyānanda*. See our translation of this important passage below.

Note also the line that Abhinava quotes in the *Locana* (p. 39) from Bhaṭṭanāyaka :

काव्ये रसयिता सर्वो न बोद्धा न नियोगभाक् ।

" In (the realm of) poetry anyone who feels aesthetic pleasure (*rasayitṛ*) (is eligible for reading), but not the cold rationalist (*boddhā*) nor the man willing to take orders (from religious works—*niyogabhāk*). "

Abhinava makes this very charge against BN himself in the *Locana* (p. 173), accusing him of being more a philosopher than a poet : न च.....कल्पना युक्ता । जैमिनीयसूत्रे ह्येवं योज्यते न काव्येऽपि ।

4. See K. C. Pandey, *Abhinavagupta*, p. 30 for the chronological order of Abhinava's works.

5. The *Gītārthasaṅgraha*, published in the NSP edition of the *BG* edited by Wasudeva Laxman Shastri Pansikar, with 8 commentaries, Bombay, 1912. It seems clear though that Abhinava was reluctant to comment on the *Gītā*. Not only is his

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he himself does not often quote the *Upaniṣads*, there is little likelihood that he did not know them. He could not fail to have been deeply impressed with certain remarkable passages that have a direct bearing on his own aesthetic doctrines. We think of the beautiful simile in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka :*

"Just as a man, when closely embraced by a woman he loves, knows nothing of the outside world, nor even of the inner one, so also does the ego (*puruṣa*) know nothing of the outside or of the inner when it is closely embraced by pure consciousness, the Self".[1]

Then there are the passages from the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*[2] which are also quoted by Śaṅkara[3] in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*.[4]

The phrase *ānandaghana*, used constantly in *Vedānta* works, obviously made an impression on Abhinava, for he uses it several times. One also thinks of such works as the *Gauḍapādakārikās* (*Āgamaśāstra*), which Abhinava must have known (in fact, the doctrines in Kashmir Śaivism take over most of the major views of *Advaita*), for example III. 42–45,[5] where the four impediments in controlling the mind are mentioned. The four impediments are : *vikṣepa* (distraction); *laya* (which Madhusūdanasarasvatī takes to mean *suṣupti*, in which he is supported by Gauḍapāda himself under III. 35); *kaṣāya*

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commentary unusually devoid of interest, but he himself hints that he did not really feel any inward compulsion to write it :

तच्चरणकमलमधुपो भगवद्गीतार्थसंग्रहं व्यदधात् ।
अभिनवगुप्तः सद्द्विजलोककृतचोदनावशतः ॥
अत इदमवधार्यं यथार्थमपि सर्वथा नैव ।
विदुषामभ्यूहनीयं कृत्स्नमिदं बान्धवार्थं हि ॥

In other words, he felt pressured to write it, and did it only for the sake of his relatives. (*op. cit.*, pp. 775–776).

1. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, IV, 3. 21 :

तद्यथा प्रियया स्त्रिया संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किंचन वेद नान्तरमेवमेवायं पुरुषः प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किंचन वेद नान्तरम् ।

A somewhat amusing verse on this very passage is quoted in the commentary to the *Vijñānabhairava*, under verse 69, p. 59 :

जायया संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं वेद नान्तरम् ।
निदर्शनं श्रुतिः प्राह मूर्खस्तं मन्यते विधिम् ॥

2. रसो वै सः and रसं ह्येवायं लब्ध्वानन्दी भवति and विज्ञानं ब्रह्म.
Taittirīya, II, 7.

3. II, 1. 12 : (आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात्)

4. Note though how Śaṅkara understands *rasa* :
रसो नाम तृप्तिहेतुरानन्दकरो मधुराम्लादिः प्रसिद्धो लोके ।

5. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Gūḍhārthadīpikā*, N. S. P. *Gītā* with 8 comms., Bombay, 1912 quotes the verses and clearly explains them.

(stiffening of the mind); and *sukha*, which Sadānanda in the *Vedāntasāra*[1] (33) explains as *rasāsvāda*! Here is the first half of *kārikā* 45 on *sukham*:

"In Yogic practices, one must not indulge in aesthetic pleasure (*sukham*). One should, through wisdom, remain unattached".[2]

It would not be difficult, especially in a reductionist system (where all, from the highest level, is pure Brahman), to see how Brahman and *rasa*, or *rasa* and the *sākṣin*, the "witness" in the sense of pure consciousness, were all one, and identical with *ānanda* itself (since Brahman is characterised as *saccidānanda*). This may of course have something of hindsight in it, but it is doubtful whether Ānanda and thus Abhinava were not inspired to their doctrine of *vyañjanā*, at least in certain aspects, by the *Vedānta* notion of *mukti*,[3] which is not produced, or created, but is made manifest (*abhivyakta*) through the removal of the *āvaraṇas*.

Already Bhavabhūti had used an important *Vedānta* simile in regard to *rasa*. In the *Uttararāmacarita* III. 47[4] he speaks of *karuṇa* as the one *rasa* of which all the others are simply *vikāras*, just as the bubbles and waves of the ocean are all forms of water.[5] Abhinava applies a very similar notion to *ŚR*.[6]

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1. Jacob's ed. p. 51, under number 33.

2. नास्वादयेत्सुखं तत्र निस्सङ्गः प्रज्ञया भवेत्।, on which Madhusūdana comments (under *Gītā* VI, 313, NSP ed.):

तत्र समाधौ परमसुखव्यञ्जकोऽपि सुखं नास्वादयेत्। एतावन्तं कालमहं सुखीति सुखास्वादरूपां वृत्तिं न कुर्यात्।

There is a very interesting variant, quoted in the *Vedāntasāra* (Jacob's ed., p. 51, under 33): नास्वादयेद्रसं तत्र। Sadānanda says: अखण्डवस्त्वानन्दावलम्बेनापि चित्तवृत्तेः सविकल्पानन्दास्वादनं रसास्वादः। We can't help feeling that Sadānanda must have been aware of the famous comparison, *brahmānanda* (or even *brahmāsvāda*), and *rasasvāda* and this is his way of answering it. His point then, as Nṛsiṃhasarasvatī notes, is that the distinction is between *nirvikalpasamādhi* and *savikalpasamādhi*, two terms which must have influenced Abhinava's own thinking on *rasāsvāda*. For in *savikalpasamādhi*, the *tripuṭī* (subject, object, knowledge) is present, as it must be in *rasāsvāda*, but it is absent in *brahmāsvāda*, where there is only one *sākṣin*, with no object to cognise, pure consciousness.

3. This similarity was already noted by Jacobi in his introduction to the *Dhvanyāloka* translation, p. 398.

4. Raghavan, "*The Number of Rasas*," p. 165 quotes this verse and explains it.

5. एको रसः करुण एव निमित्तभेदा-
द्भिन्नः पृथक् पृथगिवाश्रयते विवर्तान्।
आवर्तबुद्बुदतरङ्गमयान् विकारा-
नम्भो यथा सलिलमेव हि तत्समस्तम्॥

6. Cf. *A. Bh.* Vol. I, p. 335, basing himself on the famous verse in the *NŚ*, Vol. I, G. O. S. p. 335:

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When we come to the influence of Kashmir Śaiva texts, we are on firmer ground. A work which seems to us to have had a decisive influence on Abhinava is the *Vijñānabhairava*, a work he often quotes.[1] What is unusual about this work[2] is its preoccupation with ecstatic experiences, and with exercises for inducing them. Here are some of the verses that undoubtedly captivated Abhinava :

" One should cast one's glance out into space, where there are no trees, no mountains, no walls (to obstruct one's vision), for when the nature of the mind (which is to think about various objects presented to it) is suspended, all activities come to an end ".[3]

" Meditating on the knowledge (that exists on its own) between two thoughts, one should fix (the mind) on that (empty) middle (space). Suddenly abandoning both of them, truth will appear in the middle ".[4]

In these verses, one finds a certain preoccupation with aesthetic themes — a feature that is lacking in *Advaita* works. It is carried even further, when sexual comparisons, for which Kashmir Śaivism has a definite sympathy, begin to appear :

" Wherever the mind finds pleasure, one should firmly fix it on that object. For there the true nature of absolute bliss will manifest itself ".[5]

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स्वं स्वं निमित्तमासाद्य शान्ताद्भावः प्रवर्तते ।,

a verse he quotes also in the *Locana*, p. 391. Note the preceding verse (p. 334, *A. Bh.* Vol. I) :

भावा विकारा रत्याद्याः शान्तस्तु प्रकृतिर्मतः ।
विकारः प्रकृतेर्जातः पुनस्तत्रैव लीयते ॥

1. Only, as fas as we are aware, in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī* (edited in three volumes by Madhusūdan Kaul Śāstrī, NSP, Bombay, 1938, 1941 and 1943 respectively). The work is quoted in Vol. I, 77, 80 and 287 and in Vol. II on p. 50, 179, 214, 262, 311, 427, and Vol. III, on p. 30, 52, 169, 346 and 386.

2. There is an interesting French translation of this remarkable text by L. Silburn, *Le Vijñānabhairava*, Publications de l' Institut de Civilisation Indienne.

3. *VB*, 60 (p. 50) :

निर्वृक्षगिरिभित्त्यादिदेशे दृष्टिं विनिक्षिपेत् ।
विलीने मानसे भावे वृत्तिक्षीणः प्रजायते ॥

In fact Abhinava quotes this very verse in the *ĪPVV* twice, once on p. 311 of Vol. II, and again in the same volume, p. 427.

4. *VB*, 61 (p. 50) :

उभयोर्भावयोर्ज्ञाने ध्यात्वा मध्यं समाश्रयेत् ।
युगपच्च द्वयं त्यक्त्वा मध्ये तत्त्वं प्रकाशते ॥

This verse too is quoted by Abhinava in the *ĪPVV*, Vol. III, p. 346.

5. *VB*, 74, (p. 62) :

यत्र यत्र मनस्तुष्टिर्मनस्तत्रैव धारयेत् ।
तत्र तत्र परानन्दस्वरूपं संप्रवर्तते ॥

The commentator explains this to mean that one can fix one's attention on any attractive object, such as the lotus-like face of a beautiful woman, and find bliss of a transcendental nature therein.[1]

" After the manifestation of the happiness resulting from the nourishing moisture produced in the body by eating a good meal and drinking, one should meditate on the state of fullness of the body (at that time). From this, absolute bliss will arise ".[2]

The commentary explains *rasa* to mean the sense of " I- consciousness " and quotes the famous line from the *Taittirīya* already mentioned above.[3]

" The pleasure which terminates in the infusion of the power of bliss in a person on the achievement of sexual intercourse — that pleasure is one's own pleasure on the realisation of the essence of Brahman ".[4]

Here the comparison that Abhinava will make between sexual experiences and ecstatic experiences, is explicitly stated. Note that the commentary speaks of the pleasure of knowing Brahman as being of the form of the resonance of a bell (*ghaṇṭyanuraṇana*), a term that Ānanda applies to *dhvani*. He also speaks of sexual intercourse as the *abhivyaktikāraṇa* (i. e. that which manifests or suggests) bliss,[5] again a term that Abhinava uses of *rasa*. Verse seventy[6] is another sexual verse where we are told that there is *ānandasaṃplava*, immersion in bliss, simply by remembering the various acts such as sucking (*lehana*), fondling etc., indulged in during love-play. The interesting thing is that the commentary gives a

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1. यस्मिन् यस्मिन्वस्तुनि मनोहरे कामिनीवदनकमलादौ मनः सज्जते, तत्रैव धारयेत्स्थिरं कुर्यान्मनः ।

2. *VB*, 72, (p. 60) :
जग्धिपानकृतोल्लासरसानन्दविजृम्भणात् ।
भावयेद्भरितावस्थां महानन्दस्ततो भवेत् ॥
This verse too is quoted by Abhinava, in the *ĪPVV*, Vol, II, p. 179.

3. *VB*, p. 61 :
अहंविमर्शसंचेतनं रसरूपो वा आनन्दः ।

4. *VB*, 69, (p. 58) :
शक्तिसंगमसंक्षुब्धशक्त्यावेशावसानिकम् ।
यत्सुखं ब्रह्मतत्त्वस्य तत्सुखं स्वाक्यमुच्यते ॥

5. *VB*, p. 59 : the first passage is :
स्त्रीसङ्गानन्दाविर्भूतानन्दशक्तिसमावेशान्ते यत् घण्ट्यनुरणनरूपं ब्रह्मतत्त्वस्य सुखं परब्रह्मानन्दः ।
The second is : स्त्रीसङ्गस्तु अभिव्यक्तिकारणमेव ।

6. The verse is :
लेहनामन्थनाकोटैः स्त्रीसुखस्य भरात् स्मृतेः ।
शक्त्यभावेऽपि देवेशि भवेदानन्दसंप्लवः ॥

complex Trantric explanation, which, it says, is Abhinava's![1] Could this mean that Abhinava had himself written a commentary on the *Vijñāna-bhairava*, now lost? Reading through the commentary on these verses by Śivopādhyāya, one is struck by the fact that he too uses the terms of Abhinava from aesthetics. Clearly he also felt their relevance here. Surely it is the kind of speculation found in these remarkable mystic verses of the *VB* that is responsible, at least in part, for Abhinava's own philosophy, where worldly pleasures are not to be rejected.

Another work, of perhaps even greater importance, is the *Yogavāsiṣṭha-mahārāmāyaṇa*.[2] This is one of the most extraordinary texts of mediaeval India. To claim it for Kashmir Śaivism would be unjust, since the work itself stresses the fact that it belongs to no one school. The terminology is clearly heavily influenced by Kashmir Śaivism, but it is just as deeply marked by Buddhism and by *Advaita Vedānta*. What we cannot know for certain is whether Abhinava knew this text or not. There is a tradition current in Kashmir that he commented on the *YV*.[3] Dr. K. C. Pandey informs us that he has seen parts of this commentary in manuscript form in Kashmir.

There is some likelihood that the author of the *YV* knew the *Dhvanyā-loka*,[4] and we already have quotations from the work by the thirteenth century,so that it appears reasonable to say that it was written in Kashmir,[5] sometime between the nineth century A. D. and the twelfth.[6] The work is

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1. *VB*, p. 60 :

इति अभिनवगुप्तपादाः ।

2. *Yogavāsiṣṭhamahārāmāyaṇa*, edition with the commentary *Vāsiṣṭhamahā-rāmāyaṇatātparyaprakāśa* (a singularly uninteresting commentary of very little help in real difficulties), by Wāsudeva Laxmaṇa Śāstrī Paṇśīkar, NSP, Bombay, 1918, in two volumes.

3. See K. C. Pandey, *Abhinavagupta*, p. 28–29 : " There is enough evidence to show that he wrote many other works besides the above...His commentary on the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*. We have no other source of information about it than a tradition current among Kashmirian Pandits ".

4. This was first pointed out by V. Raghavan, "The Date of the Yogavāsiṣṭha", *J. O. R.* Vol. XIII, Part II, 1939, p. 121–123. The important verse of Ānanda that we quote and translate later is copied almost identically in Vol II, p. 1521 (VIB, 190, verse 89). *YV*, VI B, 197, verses 15–17 are very similar to the *D. Āl.* I, 4. There can be little doubt that the *YV* is the borrower here.

5. See Raghavan, " The Yogavāsiṣṭha and the Bhagavad Gītā and the place of origin of the Yogavāsiṣṭha ", p. 73, *J. O. R.* Vol. XIII, Part I, January–March 1939. " Hence the suggestion that Kashmir was the place where the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* was produced deserves acceptance, " *op. cit.*, p. 82.

6. See Raghavan, *op. cit.*, p. 128 : " What is the lower limit to the date of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* is a question which I can answer here. Scholars have up till now pointed out Vidyāraṇya as the earliest to cite the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*. We can take up the

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unique in many ways; one in particular interests us here : it is the only work in Sanskrit (apart from the *Mahābhārata*) that illustrates one of Ānanda's and Abhinava's pet doctrines : the relation between *śāstra* and *kāvya*. The work itself[1] says that it is meant as both, and all of its thirty-three thousand verses bear out this boast. Not only does it contain remarkable philosophical doctrines, but many of the passages are as complex and literary as any of the *Mahākāvyas*. The philosophical stories are replete with lyric descriptions of great beauty,[2] and the very language itself gives evidence of a highly literary mind.[3] The author was clearly aware of all the terminology from literary criticism,[4] and makes use of it, thus illustrating Abhinava's very philosophy. If he preceded Abhinava, then we can be certain that

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lower limit to the date of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* by a century. The *Sūktimuktāvālī* (G. O. S. edn.) was compiled by Vaidya Bhānu for Jalhaṇa in A. D. 1258. On pp. 412, 417, 439, 448 and 451 of this anthology, the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* is extracted." Raghavan opts for between the 11th and the middle of the 13th century as the date for the *YV*. This is much closer to the truth than the unconvincing arguments of Atreya (*Philosophy of the Yogavāsiṣṭha*) and Dasgupta's claim that it should be dated before Śaṅkara. Had Abhinava known the work, it seems odd that he would not have quoted it anywhere. It is interesting to note that in the preserved portion of the commentary on the *VB* by Kṣemarāja, the direct disciple of Abhinavagupta, there are no quotations from the *YV*, whereas in the later commentary (18th cen.) by Śivopādhyāya, there are numerous quotations. This seems to us to point to the fact that Kṣemarāja did not know the work.

1. *YV*, II, 18, 33 :

शास्त्रं सुबोधमेवेदं सालंकारविभूषितम् ।
काव्यं रसमयं चारुदृष्टान्तैः प्रतिपादितम् ॥

2. On this aspect of the work, see J. Masson and B. K. Matilal, "A love-story from eighth-century India" In the *Jadavpur Journal of Comparative Literature*, 1966.

3. We think of such passages as III. 16. 1–17, with its descriptions of artistic delights. Also VIA. 104, 15–21 for a fine discourse on the ill luck of a woman in spring who is not able to make love with a man. The remarkable story of Gādhi (V. 45–50), who dreams, in one second an entire life that turns out to have actually taken place in another dimension, is replete with the most extraordinary literary passages. There is no finer example in world literature of a profound philosophical mind with a genius for artistic description, even though many of the verses betray a certain lack of traditional literary education (odd syntax, unorthodox similes etc.). There is a fullness and an overflowing of the creative spirit in this work such as we have never come across in any other Sankrit text.

4. The word *śama* and its derivatives are to be found on virtually every page of the *YV* (e. g. VI. 68. 29 ; V. 25. 4) ; *viśrānti* also occurs constantly (e. g. IV. 39. 20 ; VI. 42. 3) ; *camatkāra* is also very common (e. g. III. 14. 45) ; *tanmayī* is not a rare expression (e. g. IV. 42. 11). Clearly the author is aware of the terms of literary criticism, for we find at VIB. 83. 6 : वाच्यवाचकसंम्बन्धं विना बोधो न जायते । VIB. 65. 1–5 contains a number of puns on *rasa* and *rasikajana*.

Abhinava derived a great deal of his inspiration from the *YV*, and if the author of the *YV* succeeded Abhinava, then it is just as clear that the *YV* derived its inspiration from Abhinava. In any case, both authors are closely related. One doctrine which is remarkably similar to passages from the *VB* and to passages in the *Tantrāloka* that we shall shortly examine, is the emphasis on being unfettered in one's enjoyment of life. Thus there is a passage where Vasiṣṭha tells Rāma that he, Rāma, is now a *jīvanmukta*, who knows that his consciousness is ever pure, and so he should : " Drink, live, make love, for you have obtained the far-shore of worldly existence. " [1]

Such verses are not rare in the *YV*, e. g. :

" It is all the same (if the realised man) be, with unbridled passion (*uddāmamanmatham*), given to heavy drink, or dance, or if, on the other hand, he abandon all society and go off alone to the mountains. " [2]

The number of verses in which *ānanda* is described in terms to which we are now used from Abhinava, are legion. Here are just a few examples :

" That is genuine happiness wherein the mind ceases to function. Such happiness is not possible in heaven, just as it is not possible for a house of ice to exist in the desert. " [3]

And on a theme that Abhinava will develop himself :

" Higher than a kingdom, than heaven, than the moon, than the status of Maghavan and even than the delight that arises in making love with one's beloved is the happiness proceeding from the extinction of desires. " [4]

The *YV* tells us that " all beings strive for bliss ". [5] Speaking of *ātmānanda*, a term of which the book is very fond, it says :

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1. पिब विहर रमस्व प्राप्तसंसारपारः । *YV.* V. 50, 75.
2. *YV.* V. 56, 53 :
   उद्दाममन्मथं पानतत्परो वापि नृत्यतु ।
   सर्वसङ्गपरित्यागी सममायातु वा गिरौ ॥
3. *YV.* VIA 44, 26 :
   यत्र नाभ्युदितं चित्तं तत्तत्सुखमकृत्रिमम् ।
   न स्वर्गादौ संभवति मरौ हिमगृहं यथा ॥
4. *YV.* V. 74, 44 :
   अपि राज्यादपि स्वर्गादपीन्दोरपि माधवात् ।
   अपि कान्तासमासङ्गान्नैराश्यं परमं सुखम् ॥

We suppose that *indu* here means something like *candraloka*.

5. आनन्दायैव भूतानि यतन्ते यानि कानिचित् । *YV.* VIA 108. 20.

"That is the highest place, the peaceful way (i. e. state), the eternal good, happiness (*śiva*). Delusion no longer disturbs the man who has found rest (*viśrānti*) there."[1]

Such verses, many of them very lovely, could be multiplied indefinitely.[2]

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1. *YV*, V 54, 70 :

तत्पदं सा गतिः शान्ता तच्छ्रेयः शाश्वतं शिवम् ।
तत्र विश्रान्तिमाप्तस्य भूयो नो बाधते भ्रमः ॥

2. We have hardly done justice to the importance of this fascinating work. There are many more passages relevant to the issues we are considering here. We think of the extraordinary explanation at VI B 83, 18 of Śiva at the *end of time* dancing and : यन्नृत्यति हि तद्विद्धि चिद्घनस्पन्दनं निजम् । It is almost identical with the explanation that Abhinava gives in the *A. Bh.* Vol. I, p. 21. The dance of Devī (at VI B, 85) is similarly explained and again linked up with the concept of *spanda* (one of the key terms in Kashmir Śaivism), so often used in the *YV* (e. g. at III. 67. 6 it is equated with *cinmātra*). Many other passages bring to mind Abhinavagupta and his ideas on *Śāntarasa*. Thus at VI B 39, 36 we are told : यथा नाहं न संसारः शान्तमेवावशिष्यते । "when the world and the "I" disappear, only tranquillity is left." A verse that occurs frequently (with minor variations) is : न दुःखमस्ति न सुखं शान्तं शिवमजं जगत् । (VI B 37, 39) which we can compare with the *NŚ*, Vol. I, (G. O. S.), p. 334 and with the verse quoted below from the *Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa*. *Śānta* is said to be the end of desire for which there is nothing comparable in the universe :

इच्छोदयो यथा दुःखमिच्छाशान्तिर्यथा सुखम् ।
तथा न नरके नापि ब्रह्मलोकेऽनुभूयते ॥

(VI B 36, 24) on which the commentary quotes the verse *yac ca kāmasukham loke* etc. (p. 1139), which Ānanda quotes in the *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 390. The tree that gives *viśrānti* is said (VI B 44, 20) to be *vairāgyarasapuṣṭātmā*. A passage very interesting in the context of *rasa* is VI B 41, 5–6 :

चिच्चमत्कारमात्रात्मकल्पनारङ्गरञ्जनाः ।
संख्यातुं केन शक्यन्ते खे जगच्चित्रपुत्रिकाः ॥
रसभावविकाराढ्यं नृत्यन्त्यभिनयैर्नवैः ।
परमाणुप्रति प्रायः खे स्फुरन्त्यम्बरात्मिकाः ॥

Note the commentary on this (p. 1150) : चिच्चमत्कारमात्रात्मनो ये जीवास्तेषां कल्पनामात्रात्मके रङ्गे नृत्यमण्डपे शृङ्गारादिना नानारसरञ्जना यासाम् । जगच्चित्रपुत्रिकाः खे नृत्यन्तीति परेणान्वयः । रसैः शृङ्गारादिभिर्भावैः स्थायिभावैर्विकारैः कम्पस्वेदादिसंचारिभावैराढ्यं यथा स्यात्तथा ।
A similar verse, betraying the same knowledge of aesthetic theory is VI B 1, 18–19 :

रसभावनमन्तस्ते मालं भवतु कर्मसु ।
दारुयन्त्रमयस्येव परार्थमिव कुर्वतः ॥
नीरसा एव ते सन्तु समस्तेन्द्रियसंविदः ।
आकारमात्रसंलक्ष्या हेमन्तर्तौ लता इव ॥

on which the commentary (p. 1070) reads : यथा परेषां कौतुकार्थं नृत्यादि कुर्वत इव स्थितस्य दारुपुत्रिकायन्त्रस्य नटवच्छृङ्गारादिरसभावनं नास्ति तद्वत्त्वापि कुर्वतो विषयसुखे मूर्खस्येव रसभावनं कौतुकबुद्धिर्मा भूदित्यर्थः ।

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There are many passages from Kashmir Śaiva literature that helped to stamp Abhinava's philosophy. Here, for example, is a fine passage from the *Parātriṃśikā*[1] :

" He sees, without any doubt, through the *śaktis* of Siva (as if things were) right in front of him. This is the attainment of immortality, the experience of the Self. This is the initiation into *Nirvāṇa*, and that which establishes the existence of the world. "[2]

And here is an important verse from Somānanda's *Śivadṛṣṭi*[3] :

" When one attains great bliss, or when one sees a friend after a long absence, meditating on the joy that arises, one merges into it, and one's mind becomes one with it. "[4]

It is impossible to say how influential for Abhinava was the *Tattvāloka* of Ānandavardhana. The work has been lost, and unfortunately no quotations at all have been preserved. All we know of this work is what Abhinava tells us in the fourth *Uddyota* of his *Locana*[5] : that it dealt, in great detail, with the relation between *śāstra* and *kāvya*, poetry and philosophy. Most

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On *tṛṣṇāsantyāga* (cf. Ānanda's *sthāyibhāva* for *śāntarasa*, namely *tṛṣṇākṣaya*), see V 24, 52. Note how dolls sing and talk with goddesses : VI B 6, 41. On the mirror image, cf. II 15, 6; II 13, 75. Note VI A 26–36 : नाहमस्मि न चान्योऽस्ति न मनो न च मानसम् which is a verse quoted in the *Tantrāloka*, Vol. 11, p. 44. Cf. Tantrāloka, II p. 173. The *YV.* stresses the relativity of time (and how profound experiences escape from ordinary notions of duration) : III 60, 22 : क्षणः स्वप्ने भवेत्कल्पः कल्पश्च भवति क्षणः. Finally one thinks of the awesome : *maunam evāvaśiṣyate* (VI B 83, 29). " Only silence remains. "

1. *Parātriṃśikāvivṛti of Abhinavagupta*, ed. by M. R. Shastri, KSTS. No. XVIII, Bombay, 1918, p. 258–259.

2. साक्षात्पश्यत्यसंदिग्धमाकृष्टी रुद्रशक्तिभिः ।
... ...
इयमेवामृतप्राप्तिरयमेवात्मनो ग्रहः ।
इयं निर्वाणदीक्षा च विश्वसद्भावसाधिनी ॥
(इयं संविदिति यावत्)

We are not sure how to take *ākṛṣṭīḥ*. Is it the subject of *sākṣāt paśyati* or its object ?

3. *Utpaladeva's Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti*, ed. by M. K. Shastri, KSTS, LIV. Srinagar, 1934, p. 12. The verse is also number 71 of the *Vijñānabhairava*. p. 60. Abhinavagupta quotes the verse in the *ĪPVV.* Vol. II, p. 50.

4. आनन्दे महति प्राप्ते दृष्टे वा बान्धवे चिरात् ।
आनन्दमुद्गतं ध्यात्वा तल्लयस्तन्मयो भवेत् ॥

5. *Locana*, p. 533 : एतच्च ग्रन्थकारेण (i. e. Ānandavardhana) तत्त्वालोके वितत्योक्तमिह त्वस्य न मुख्योऽवसर इति नासाभिस्तद्दर्शितम् . It is clear from the *Vṛtti* passage on p. 533 of the *D. Āl.* that the work dealt with what Ānanda calls the *śāstranaya* and the *kāvyanaya*. The *Tattvāloka* is also referred to by Abhinava in his *Locana* on Udd. I (p. 67).

likely Ānanda was inspired to this from his speculations on the nature of the *Mahābhārata* as both a work of philosophy and a work of poetry. We can justly presume that many of Abhinava's ideas come from this text.

Another question that must go unanswered, though it is rich in possibilities, is Abhinava's debt to Buddhism. We simply do not know anything definite on this problem at all, though it is very tempting to speculate.[1]

INFLUENCES FROM SPECULATION ON *Śāntarasa*

It is clear that Abhinava did have access to certain old manuscripts of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* in which nine rasas were enumerated, including *śāntarasa*, and not the usual eight. Apart from the famous Kālidāsa passage[2] which mentions only eight, there is reason to believe that Abhinava himself realised, with an extraordinary display of intellectual integrity, that eight was the older and more genuine reading. We say this because when he quotes the verse from the *NŚ*[3] enumerating the *rasas*, in the *Locana*, he quotes the

1. Abhinava of course knew Dharmakīrti whom he refers to with great respect in the *ĪPVV*, e. g. Vol. II, p. 111 : प्रामाणिकोऽप्यार्यधर्मकीर्तिराचार्यदिङ्नागग्रन्थानुरोधात्तत्पक्षपातादेवमभिधत्ते, न पुनरस्य स्वरुचिरेषेति. He again refers to him by name at *ĪPVV*, I, 279; II, 46 and 174. He mentions the *Pramāṇavārttika* by name at several places in the *ĪPVV*. E. g. Vol. II, 220; 223; 228; 234; 400; Vol. III. p. 11; 72; 103; 127; 138; 140; 200; 389 and 397. In defending *dhvani* against those who claimed that it was ineffable, Ānanda has the following line : यत्त्वनिर्देश्यत्वं सर्वलक्षणविषयं बौद्धानां प्रसिद्धं तत्तन्मतपरीक्षायां ग्रन्थान्तरे निरूपयिष्यामः । इह तु ग्रन्थान्तरश्रवणलवप्रकाशनं सहृदयवैमनस्यप्रदायीति न प्रक्रियते । Abhinava, commenting on this passage (*Locana*, p. 519) remarks : ग्रन्थान्तर इति । विनिश्चयटीकायां धर्मोत्तर्यां या विवृतिरमुना ग्रथकृता कृता तत्रैव तद्व्याख्यातम् । It is really most unusual that Ānanda should write a commentary on a Buddhist text. This certainly shows that Buddhist doctrines must have exercised at least a fascination for Ānanda and thus for Abhinava as well. Under *NŚ*. VI. 45 (G. O. S. p. 299), there is Abhinava's odd remark that some who believe in *Śāntarasa* add the Buddha as the *devatā* : बुद्धः शान्तेऽब्जजोऽद्भुते इति शान्तवादिनः केचित्पठन्ति । He then goes to remark : बुद्धो जिनः परोपकारैकपरः प्रबुद्धो वा । Is it not significant that the only drama that Abhinava quotes from in support of *śāntarasa* is the Buddhist drama, the *Nāgānanda* ? Oddly enough, however, there exists at present no Buddhist text on *alaṅkāraśāstra*. It seems rather unlikely that Dharmakīrti wrote a work entitled simply "*Alaṅkāra*", as Kane has noted (*H. S. P*. p. 65) : " So the Buddhist logician and philosopher Dharmakīrti may have been a poet, but there is nothing to substantiate the claim to regard him as a writer on *Alaṅkāra*. " See Śivaprasada Bhattacharya, " *Studies in Indian Poetics* ", Calcutta 1964, which contains the reprint of an article entitled " The Neo-Buddhist Nucleus in *Alaṅkāraśāstra* ", though as Kane points out, the quotation from the *Vāsavadattā* is at the most ambiguous inspite of what Śivarāma says. There seems to us no likelihood that the *kārikās* of the *Alaṅkāraśekhara* could be by Dharmakīrti though we have no space to give our arguments. Note finally that Abhinava often quotes one Rāhula, a commentator on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, and that this is a Buddhist name.

2. *Vikramorvaśīya*, II. 18.

3. *NŚ* VI, 15, quoted in the *Locana* on p. 83.

verse with only eight *rasas*. Moreover, throughout the *A. Bh.*[1] he speaks, whenever he mentions *śānta*, of those who "read" *śānta*. We cannot therefore know how old the doctrine of *ŚR* is. The first author of known date to mention *ŚR* is Udbhaṭa,[2] who simply includes it in his enumeration of all the rasas without further comment or explanation. The interpolated *śāntarasa* passage in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, whatever it was (for it is clear that the present passage is not likely to be precisely the one that Abhinava commented on[3]), is nonetheless likely to have been the earliest reference to *ŚR* that Abhinava knew. If we, purely tentatively, place the core of the *NŚ* around the fourth century A. D., then all we can say is that *ŚR* must have been added to the text sometime before the time of Udbhaṭa, i. e. the eighth century A. D. (unless we are to argue that it was Udbhaṭa who first spoke of *ŚR.*, which seems most unlikely in view of the fact that he has nothing whatever to say about it, beyond naming it). However, it is clear that for Ānanda, *ŚR* was a matter of controversy. Had the passage from the *NŚ* already existed, and had Ānanda felt that it was genuine, there would be no reason for him not to have mentioned this fact in his *D. Āl.*, while discussing *ŚR*. The fact that he did not, makes us suspicious of its existence in his time. But if it was not existent, this means that it was added between the time of Ānanda and Abhinava, i. e. only a space of about one hundred years. Is this sufficient for Abhinava to speak of "old" manuscripts which contained the *ŚR* additions?

The influence on Abhinava of Ānanda's speculation on *ŚR* will become clear from the passage we translate below. The importance of the *NŚ* passage (and related verses, which though they do not specifically mention *ŚR*, yet seem to Abhinava to imply it) will also be clarified in part II of this volume. But here we should say something of several passages[4] which claim to be old, but which can at best be described as suspect.

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1. E. g. *A. Bh.* Vol. 1, p. 299 and 332.

2. Udbhaṭa, *Kāvyālaṅkārasārasaṅgraha*, IV. 4.

Note that Vararuci's *Ubhayābhisārikā* mentions a drama contest in which the phrase *aṣṭau rasāḥ* occurs (*Caturbhāṇī*, Madras, 1922, p. 13). See A. K. Warder and T. Venkatacharya's recent translation, Madras, 1967.

3. For one thing he does not comment on all of the passage, and for another, the terms used contradict his own. Thus the *sthāyibhāva* is *śama* (which Abhinava attempts to interpret), and *tattvajñāna* is given (p. 332, *NS.* Vol. 1, G. O. S.) as a *vibhāva* of *śānta!*

4. One should note too the passage from the *VJ* of Kuntaka. In his résumé of the fourth *unmeṣa*, S. K. De quotes a line on this subject (p. 239, second edition):

रामायणमहाभारतयोश्च शान्ताङ्गित्वं पूर्वसूरिभिरेव निरूपितम्।

"Ancient sages have described *śānta* as the main *rasa* of both the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the

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In the twentieth chapter of the *Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa*, we find the following stanzas :

" *Śāntarasa* is to be considered as independent and as standing separate." [1]

The point here is that four of the other rasas give rise to four others according to Bharata. Since Bharata does not mention *śānta*, and since there are only an even number of eight *rasas*, there is nothing it could come from.

" O King, they say that *śānta* arises from *vairāgya*. It can be enacted by means of taking on religious paraphernalia and through such means as compassion for all beings, meditation, encouraging others towards the path of *mokṣa* etc." [2]

" *Śāntarasa* is that wherein one feels the same toward all creatures, where there is no pleasure, no sorrow, no hatred and no envy." [3]

It is clear that these lines are simply a pastiche of the various passages which the reader can see in Part II. It seems to us unlikely that this passage antedates Abhinava. The editor, Miss Priyabala Shah, thinks differently : " Thus in the present stage of our knowledge, it would be safe to put *Viṣṇudharmottara* somewhere between the first or rather the second half of the fifth century A. D., and the first half of the seventh century A. D., i. e. between circa 450 and 650 A. D." [4] But in dating any *Purāṇa* text, to date more than single sections (and indeed, perhaps more than single stanzas !), even very roughly, is a hazardous undertaking. It is perfectly possible that certain sections of the *VDP* are as old as Miss Shah claims the whole is, but

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Mahābhārata ". This can only be a reference to Ānanda's fourth *Uddyota* (*Kārikā* 5, the *vṛtti* on this). The puzzling thing is that Ānanda describes *karuṇa* as the *aṅgirasa* of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, and not *śānta* ! (Moreover, is it not a bit odd to refer to Ānanda as *pūrvasūribhiḥ ?*) Note that the MS of the *Vakroktijīvitam* breaks off in the middle of a sentence discussing the *Nāgānanda* (De, *op. cit.*, p. 246) (although Dr. Nagendra in his "*Hindi Vakroktijivita*" claims that the work cannot be said to be incomplete since it deals with all the six topics it mentions at I. 18, although of course there is no colophon) and we cannot know, therefore, what *rasa* Kuntaka held to be the major one in the *Nāgānanda*.

1. *Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa* (*VDP*) p. 100, Vol. I, 9–11.
   शान्तो रसः स्वतन्त्रोऽत्र पृथगेव व्यवस्थितः ।
2. शान्तस्य तु समुत्पत्तिर्नृप वैराग्यतः स्मृता ।
   स चाभिनेयो भवति लिङ्गग्रहणतस्तथा ॥
   सर्वभूतदयाध्यानमोक्षमार्गप्रवर्तनैः ।
3. नास्ति यत्र सुखं दुःखं न द्वेषो नापि मत्सरः ।
   समः सर्वेषु भूतेषु स शान्तः प्रथितो रसः ।
4. *VDP*, third *Kāṇḍa*, Vol. I, O. I. Baroda, 1958, p. XXVI.

there is no likelihood that the same is true of the *Alaṅkāra* sections. It would be preposterous to hold that such a composite and clearly derivative work as the *VDP* (indeed any *Purāṇa*) actually originated an idea such as *ŚR*.

This same reasoning can apply to the Jain text, the *Anuyogadvārasūtra*.[1] We cannot of course say for certain that the followiug passage is interpolated, and thus it could, in theory, be as old as the fifth century A. D. But the possibility of interpolation, especially in the case of a text that provides examples of numbered objects, is not unlikely. In any case, this could not possibly lie at the origin of *ŚR*, especially since it is the only reference to *śāntarasa* in Jain literature before the tenth century A. D.

णव कव्वरसा पण्णत्ता, तं जहा—

वीरो सिंगारो अब्भुओ अ रोद्दो अ होइ बोद्धव्वो।
वेलणओ बीभच्छो हासो कलुणो पसंतो अ॥

निद्दोसमणसमाहाणसंभवो जो पसंतभावेणं।
अविकारलक्खणो सो रसो पसंतो त्ति णायव्वो॥

पसंतो रसो जहा—

सब्भावनिव्विगारं उवसंतपसंतसोमदिट्ठीअं।
ही जह मुणिणो सोहइ मुहकमलं पीवरसिरीअं॥

"There are nine[2] *rasas* in poetry. They are:

'The heroic, the sexual, the wondrous,
the wrathful, as well as shyness,
the disgusting, the comic,
the pathetic and the calm'.

Śāntarasa is to be known as characterised by an absence of (mental) per-

1. We have used the Āgamodaya Samiti edition, Pothi form, Bombay 1924, with Maladhāri Hemacandrasūri's (not Hemacandra, the author of *Kāvyānuśāsana*) Sanskrit commentary. We have just received a very fine edition of the *Nandisuttam* and the *Aṇuogaddārāṁ*, ed. by Muni Puṇyavijaya, Pt. Dalsukha Mālvaṇia and Pt. Amritlāl Mohanlāl Bhojak, Jain-Āgama Series No. 1, Shri Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, Bombay, 1968. See p. 121, St. 262. For the date of this text see the excellent introduction to this volume.

2. Note that *bhayānaka* is not included in this list. In its place is *velaṇao* (*vrīḍanaka*), the *sthāyibhāva* of which is *vrīḍā*, or *lajjā* (p. 137–138). According to the commentator, *bhayānaka* is included under *raudrarasa*.

turbation; as arising from composure of the mind divested of all passions and as marked by tranquillity.[1]

Here is an example:[2]

'Oh, (look) how the lotus-like face of the sage shines! It is full of the beauty (of mental calm) and genuinely devoid of any contortions (due to the upsurge of passions), with its calm (devoid of all urge to look at beautiful objects) and gentle eyes unperturbed (by anger, lust, etc.)'."

Even if both of these passages were older than Abhinava, there is little likelihood that he would have seen either.

TANTRIC INFLUENCE

The only contemporary description we have of Abhinavagupta is one of exceptional interest. Allowing of course for stylisation, the picture is nonetheless extremely vivid. Abhinava is presented as a mystic of a most unusual sort: he is surrounded by women, playing a musical instrument (it is not unlikely that this was at the time of Abhinava's life when he was expounding the text of the *NŚ* on music), drinking wine and yet engaged in the most intellectual of pursuits, commenting on a text. The work is called the *Dhanyaśloka*, and consists of only four verses. According to Prof. Pandey,[3] the man who wrote them was a direct disciple of Abhinava, and actually saw him as he describes him in the verses. Here is our translation of this important passage:

"May the glorious god Dakṣiṇāmūrti (Abhinavagupta), who is an incarnation of Śiva, protect us! Out of his deep compassion he has taken a new bodily form and come to Kashmir. He sits in the middle of a garden of grapes, inside a pavilion made of crystal and filled with beautiful paintings. The room smells wonderful because of flower garlands, incense-sticks and (oil-) lamps. Its walls are smeared with sandal-paste and other such things. The room is constantly resounding with musical instruments, with songs and

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1. Hemacandra explains *nirdoṣa* as *hiṃsādidoṣarahita*. *Samādhāna* is composure of the mind: विषयाद्यौत्सुक्यनिवृत्तिलक्षणं स्वास्थ्यं। He takes *praśāntabhāvena* in the sense of *krodhādiparityāgena jāyamānaḥ*, "arising from the renunciation of anger, etc.". But this involves repeating the idea conveyed by *nirdoṣa*. We, therefore, understand it as standing for *praśāntabhāvena upalakṣitaḥ* (the instrumental of characterisation – *upalakṣaṇe tṛtīyā*), and take *praśāntabhāva* to mean *praśāntatva*, i. e. the same thing as *śama*.

2. Our translation of this stanza follows the commentary, p. 139. There is one puzzling word there; on p. 140 the commentary writes: पश्य भो! यथा मुनेर्मुखकमलं शोभते। कथंभूतम्? । सद्भावतो न मातृस्थानतः. Now what does this *mātṛsthānataḥ* stand for? Perhaps *mātṛsthāna* is a wrong sanskritisation of *māiṭṭhāna* for *māyāsthāna*, i. e. "not with deceit, sincerely."

3. K. C. Pandey, *Abhinavagupta*, p. 20.

with dancing. There are crowds of women Yogins and realised beings (*siddha*) with magic powers. It is equipped with a golden seat from which pearls are hanging. It has a soft awning (*talima*) stretched over it (as a canopy). Abhinava is attended by all his numerous students, with Kṣemarāja at their head, who are writing down everything he says. To his side stand two women, partners in Tantric rites (*dūti*), who hold in one hand a jug of wine (*śivarasa*) and a box full of betel rolls, and in the other hand a lotus and a citron. Abhinava has his eyes trembling in ecstasy. In the middle of his forehead is a conspicuous *tilaka* made of ashes. He has a *rudrākṣa* bead hanging from his ear. His long loose hair is held by a garland of flowers. He has a long beard and golden (reddish-brown) skin; his neck is dark with shining *yakṣapaṅka* powder. His *upavīta* string is hanging down loose from his neck. He wears a silken cloth (as a dhoti) as white as moon-beams, and he sits in the Yogic position called *vīrāsana*. One hand is held on his knee holding a rosary with his fingers clearly making the sign (*mudrā*) that signifies his knowledge of the highest Śiva. He plays on his resonating lute with the tips of the quivering fingers of his lotus-like left hand ".[1]

Clearly this is a picture of a Tantric *rasika*. It would be a grave error to suppose that Abhinavagupta accepted only a token form of Tantrism.[2] The Kaula system on which he comments so elaborately in

1. The text has been edited by Pandey, *op. cit.* p. 738 from a single manuscript preserved in Banaras :

द्राक्षारामस्य मध्ये स्फटिकमणिमये मण्डपे चित्ररम्ये
पुष्पस्रग्धूपदीपैर्बहलपरिमले चर्चिते चन्दनाद्यैः ।
वाद्यैर्गीतैः सनृत्यैः सततमुखरिते योगिनीसिद्धसंघै-
राकीर्णे स्वर्णपीठे मृदुतलिमतले बद्धमुक्ताविताने ॥

आसीनः क्षेमराजप्रभृतिभिरखिलैः सेवितः शिष्यवर्गैः
पादोपान्ते निषण्णैरवहितहृदयैरुक्तमुक्तं लिखद्भिः ।
द्वाभ्यां पार्श्वस्थिताभ्यां शिवरसकरकं पूर्णताम्बूलपेटीं
दूतीभ्यां बिभ्रतीभ्यामपरकरलसन्मातुलिङ्गोत्पलाभ्याम् ॥

आनन्दान्दोलिताक्षः स्फुटकृततिलको भसना भालमध्ये
रुद्राक्षोल्लासिकर्णः कलितकचभरो मालया लम्बकूर्चः ।
रक्ताङ्गो यक्षपङ्कोल्लसदसितगलो लम्बमुक्तोपवीतः
क्षौमं वासो वसानः शशिकरधवलं वीरयोगासनस्थः ॥

जान्वासक्तैकहस्तः स्फुटपरमशिवज्ञानमुद्राक्षसूत्रो
वामश्रीपाणिपद्मस्फुरितनखमुखैर्वादयन्नादवीणाम् ।
श्रीकण्ठेशावतारः परमकरुणया प्राप्तकाश्मीरदेशः
श्रीमान्नः पातु साक्षादभिनववपुषा दक्षिणामूर्तिदेवः ॥

2. For good bibliographies on Tantrism, see M. Eliade, " *Yoga, Immortality and Freedom* ", Bollingen Series, Pantheon Inc. N. Y. 1958, and A. Bharati, " *The Tantric Tradition* ", Rider & Co., London, 1965.

his *Tantrāloka* repelled all Westerners and most Indians who knew anything about it. This is a great pity, for it is surely one of the most interesting forms of practical mysticism ever invented. What concerns us here is the *ādiyāga*, the *rahasyavidhi* (secret ritual) belonging to the Kaula school. Abhinava devotes the whole of the 29th *āhnika* of the *Tantrāloka*[1] to very elaborate explanations of this ritual. The text is extremely obscure on those passages that interest us the most, partly on purpose[2] and partly because this subject has been rarely seriously studied, so that one is ignorant of most of the technical terms. In fact, apart from K. C. Pandey's use of the *Tantrāloka* in his work on Abhinavagupta, nobody else seems to have used, for any extensive purpose, this massive text.[3] What is of interest to us is the similarity this process bears to a dramatic performance and the influence that this must have exercised on Abhinava's incipient theory of aesthetics.[4] The ritual is in fact an elaborate play that takes the greater part of the day. The goal is the same as the goal in any ordinary drama, to reach a state of perfect equanimity, blissful repose, where the Dūtī identifies herself with Śakti, and the male identifies himself with Śiva. As Abhinava puts it in an extraordinary verse in this section :

"I do not exist, nor does anyone else. Only as *śaktis* do I exist."[5] "If one meditates, for even a moment, on one's real natural (Self) that is pure rest, then, one bocomes (like) a great bird, and finds a woman to make spiritual

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1. *Tantrāloka*, Vol. XI, part II, p. 1–172.
2. *Op. cit.*, p. 115, verse 169 :

न पठ्यते रहस्यत्वात् स्पष्टैः शब्दैर्मया पुनः ।

See also p. 19, Jayaratha :

स रहस्यत्वात् समयभङ्गभयाच्च नेहास्माभिः प्रदर्शितः ।

3. Professor R. Gnoli writes to me (June 11, 1969) : "I have just completed the translation of the *Tantrāloka* by Abhinavagupta, which has kept me very busy for several years. The book will be shortly published by a Firm of Turin, in Italian ".
4. Although Kane (*H. S. P.*, p. 242) and K. C. Pandey (*Abhinavagupta*, p. 33) place the *Tantrāloka* earlier than the *Locana*, this is due to what must have been a wrong reading in the early editions of the *Dhvanyāloka* in the *Kāvyamālā* edition. There the reading was given as—

तदुत्तीर्णत्वे तु सर्वं परमेश्वराद्वयं ब्रह्मोल्लसच्छास्त्रानुसारेण विदितं तत्रालोकग्रन्थं विचार्य ।

These readings do not fit the context as well as the reading given by Kuppuswami Sastri in his edition, p. 125 :

तदुत्तीर्णत्वे तु सर्वं परमेश्वराद्वयं ब्रह्मोल्लसच्छास्त्रकारेण न न विदितं तत्त्वालोकग्रन्थं विरचयतेत्यास्ताम् ।

This is also the reading given in the edition with *Bālapriyā*.

5. Verse 64, p. 44 :

नाहमस्मि न चान्योऽस्ति केवलाः शक्तयस्त्वहम् ।
(इत्येवं वासनां कुर्यात् सर्वदा स्मृतिमात्रतः ॥)

Note that the first part of this verse (*nāham asmi na cānyo 'sti*) is identical with a stanza in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, VI A, 26, 36, p. 828. It is found with variations, throughout the *YV*.

love to ".[1] Abhinava uses the same terms for both experiences.[2] The whole ritual, according to Jayaratha, in his remarkable commentary on the *Tantrāloka,* is to "reveal" or "suggest" (*abhivyakti*)[3] *ātmānanda.* The strangest and the most disturbing element in the ritual involves the Dūti (note the similarity to love-poetry, where every *Nāyikā* must have a Dūtī). The culmination of the ritual is concerned with this Dūtī, who identifies herself with Śiva's Śakti. Jayaratha quotes a text to the effect that this Dūtī should be :

" One's own wife, one's sister, one's mother, one's daughter or one's beautiful friend ".[4]

But Jayaratha points out that Abhinava (?) did not accept one's own wife as a Dūtī, for one might conceive purely carnal lust in her case,[5] which goes against the whole ritual[6] where the goal is to enter a state of pure consciousness.[7] The Dūtī is very elaborately described in fourteen verses from the *Śrītantrarājabhaṭṭāraka,* with all the paraphernalia of a *mahā-kāvya.*[8] Now follow the ordinarily[9] forbidden acts,[10] the three *makāras* :

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1. The rest of the stanza is taken from Jayaratha, p. 45 :

   क्षणमप्यत्र विश्रामं सहजं यदि भावयेत् ।
   तदा स खेचरो भूत्वा योगिनीमेलनं लभेत् ॥

2. Thus on p. 118, verse 176, the words *camatkṛti, rasa* and *ānanda* are all found.

3. The same idea is found in the *Kulārṇavatantra,* under V. 80 (Jivananda Vidyasagara's ed.) :

   आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो रूपं तच्च देहे व्यवस्थितम् ।
   तस्याभिव्यञ्जकं मद्यं योगिभिस्तेन पीयते ॥

Cf. what Jayaratha says on p. 102 :

   स्वानुभवमात्रैकरूपस्यार्थस्य प्रकाशकमभिव्यञ्जकमित्यर्थः ।

4. Jayaratha, p. 72 :

   स्वपत्नी भगिनी माता दुहिता वा शुभा सखी ।

5. Jayaratha, p. 73 :

   स्वपत्न्यां हि रिरंसासंभावनाया अपि अवकाशः स्यात् । यदुक्तम् —
   दूतीं कुर्यात्तु कार्यार्थी न पुनः काममोहितः ।

6. Cf. p. 67, Jayaratha :

   एवमेतत्कुलमार्गानुप्रविष्टेन सर्वथा स्वात्मानन्दव्यञ्जकतामात्रपरतया सेव्यं, न तु तद्गर्धेन । (not out of greed).

7. Jayaratha, p. 72 : अनवच्छिन्नपरसंवित्स्वरूपावेशः ।

8. Jayaratha, p. 68–69.

9. Jayaratha often quotes verses in support of the seriousness of the aspirant, e. g. on p. 67 (under verse 99) :

   विना गुरुं विना देवं मूढवत्परमेश्वरि ।
   मद्यमांसाशिनो नित्यं पशवस्ते न संशयः ॥

10. Verse 10, p. 7 :

   अत्र यागे च यद्द्रव्यं निषिद्धं शास्त्रसंततौ ।
   तदेव योजयेद्धीमान् वामामृतपरिप्लुतम् ॥

wine (*madya* also called *Śivarasa* at V. 17), meat (*māṃsam*) and love-making (*maithuna*). These three, when combined together, give the highest bliss (*ānanda*) and the highest bliss is none other than Parabrahman.[1] Abhinava points out that this ritual expands (*vikāsa*) the heart, by inducing a state of complete freedom from desire (*nairākāṅkṣya*), since one's body (through the use of perfume, incense and flowers, verse 108, p. 77) and mind, are mutually satisfied. The actual sexual union,[2] described in verse 50 is said to give rise to *ānandaviśrānti*, "rest in bliss", on which Jayaratha has the significant gloss (p. 36) of *svātmacamatkāra*. In his exposition, Abhinava uses the term *śānta* several times (e.g. verse 133, p. 95) and many other words and concepts which were to form his theory of aesthetics. Finally one of the major verses makes this comparison that we have been drawing inevitable :

"Because of the flow (*rasa*) of desire, through the force of the relish (*carvaṇā*) of outward things, which are filled with one's own flow (?), one attains the state of complete repose (*viśrāntidhāma*) and all phenomenal objects (comm. *bhāvajāta*) are merged into one's own Self."[3]

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1. Verses 49–50. The verses actually dealing with intercourse (e. g. 111–117) are deliberately couched in obscure and symbolic terms, so that it is very difficult to understand precisely what is meant. There is no doubt that the sexual act is preceded by elaborate fore-play directly acted out, but symbolically interpreted. Thus Jayaratha on verse 114, p. 83 writes : अथ चात्र परस्पराहननालिङ्गनपरिचुम्बनादिलक्षणः क्षोभः। The passages concerning the actual ejaculation of semen are the most obscure of all. It is clear from p. 89 and elsewhere that the face of the *śakti* is the most important *cakra* of all, and it would seem, though we are not certain if we have understood the passages correctly (e. g. p. 88), that the man ejaculates in the mouth of the woman. From the many quotations that Jayaratha cites, it is obvious that there existed a very elaborate and serious literature on this subject, unfortunately lost today. In explaining the difficult verse on p. 91, (verse 128) Jayaratha explains that the semen should be passed back and forth from the mouth of the woman to the mouth of the man, and finally poured into a consecrated vessel. Several verses from "the *āgamas*" are quoted in support, e. g. p. 93 :

वक्त्राद्वक्त्रप्रयोगेण समाहृत्य महारसम् ।
तेन संतर्पयेच्चक्रं देवतावीरसंयुतम् ॥

Abhinava himself discusses various forms of ejaculation, all supported by ancient authorities. The subject, of enormous interest to students of religion and of pyschology, deserves a close and impartial investigation.

2. *T. Āl.* verse 97, p. 64 :

आनन्दो ब्रह्म परमं तच्च देहे त्रिधा स्थितम् ।
उपकारि द्वयं तत्र फलमन्यत्तदात्मकम् ॥

Dvayam in this verse is explained by Jayaratha as wine and meat. *Anyad* is sexual intercourse. Note that Abhinava himself, verse 99, and Jayaratha as well, are careful to point out that the reason for engaging in such rituals must be transcendental, and not lust or greed, p. 66–67.

3. *T. Āl.* 137, p. 97 :

रणरणकरसान्निजरसभरितबहिर्भावचर्वणवशेन ।
विश्रान्तिधाम किंचिल्लब्ध्वा स्वात्मन्यथार्पयेत् ॥

Abhinava uses very similar terminology[1] when speaking of *śṛṅgārarasa* in the *Abhinavabhāratī* :

" The joys of sex really apply to those who are in love with one another. Because it is only when one is in love that there is continual (*dhārā*) repose in sheer happiness. " [2]

Leaving aside the extremely curious sexual contacts with one's own family (which require a very careful pyschological, or pyschoanalytic analysis if the significance is to be found), there is nothing in the rest of the ritual that does not bear a close resemblance to the theatre. Surely such Tantric rituals affected Abhinava's views on the eventual goal of art, and led him to his transcendental theories on the aim of the aesthetic experience. The combination was unique in all of Indian history, and has produced one of the great monuments to the complexity and profundity of the human mind. If we sneer at the sexual elements, we reveal more about our own inadequacies and parochialism than about the ritual itself. It is only a lack of respect for the texts that will allow us to dispense with such passages under the excuse that they are " indecent ", for this they are surely not.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

It is of course impossible to give more than a brief sketch of Abhinava's amazingly rich range of thinking on aesthetic topics. What we wish to do here is to quote two long passages from the *Locana* with a translation. In the first, Abhinava gives a brief survey of his own philosophy of aesthetics, the earlier draft of his famous statement in the *A. Bh.* on the *rasasūtra* of Bharata. The second passage we chose because it serves to illustrate how these principles will apply to a concrete literary situation. Before giving the

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1. Note how similar this is to XXVIII. 20, p. 10 vol. XI of the *Tantrāloka* where the actual comparison with the theatre is stated :

यथा प्रेक्षणके तत्तद्द्रष्टृसंविदभेदिताम् ।
क्रमोदितां सच एव लभते तत्प्रवेशनात् ।
योगाभ्यासक्रमोपात्तां, तथा पूर्णां स्वसंविदम् ॥

Note also the preceding verse, no. 18, where the participants in the mystic *cakra* must be *pūrṇasaṃvid* and capable of *tanmayībhavana*, again the very terms used by Abhinava in the *Locana* and the *Abhinavabhāratī* :

तच्चक्रचारनिष्णाता ये केचित्पूर्णसंविदः ।
तन्मेलकसमायुक्तास्ते तत्पूजापराः सदा ॥

The next verse (p. 10) speaks of *tanmaya*.

2. *A. Bh.*, Vol. I, p. 302 :

रतिक्रीडासार्धं च (रतिः क्रीडा । सा च) परमार्थतः कामिनोरेव ।
तत्रैव सुखस्य धाराविश्रान्तेः ।

The next line, beginning *aparasya tu* and ending *paramo bhogaḥ* is, we feel, important, but unfortunately we are unable to make good sense of it.

passages however, we thought it would be helpful if we indicated certain important ideas of Abhinava from his philosophical and literary works that will serve as an introduction to the two difficult passages to follow. (As the reader has probably already recognised by now, all of Abhinava is more or less difficult. It is impossible, unfortunately, to read his works the way one reads the *Dhvanyāloka*, with immediate comprehension. Almost every sentence of Abhinava's is a puzzle which must be carefully pondered before it yields up its meaning, and even then we are not always certain to have understood correctly.)

In his philosophical works, we find Abhinava moving towards a synthesis of aesthetic pleasure and philosophy. The most important passage in this respect is from Abhinava's commentary on Utpala's *vivṛti* on the *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā*.[1] Parts of it are corrupt, or at least we have not been able to make perfect sense of every sentence. Here is a tentative translation[2]:

"And so it has been said by Śrī Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa:[3] "Whatever bliss is to be found in all of the three worlds is only a drop from the ocean of bliss that is the god (Śiva) to whom I bow down." And so when a gourmet tastes drinks (*rasa*) such as a delicious beverage, he behaves very differently from a glutton, and distinguishes carefully: "Ah, this is like this."[4] As he does so, since he takes rest in his Self as the knower, and takes into account predominantly only that element, namely the knowing subject, he is called *bhuñjāna* ("one who enjoys"). Whenever one completely passes beyond an ordinary state (*anyathābhāva*) and enjoys happiness, because such possible obstacles as (the desire for) material gain, etc., have been excluded, as for

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1. *ĪPVV.* Vol. II, p. 178.

2. त्रैलोक्येऽप्यत्र यो यावानानन्दः कश्चिदीक्ष्यते ।
स बिन्दुर्यस्य तं वन्दे देवमानन्दसागरम् ॥

इति श्रीभट्टनारायणेन । तथा च मधुरादौ रसे औदरिकाभ्यवहारवैलक्षण्येन प्रवृत्त इदमित्थमिति प्रमातरि विश्रमयन्प्रमातृभागमेव प्रधानतया विमृशन् मुञ्जान इत्युच्यते । यत्राप्यत्यन्तमन्यथाभावमतिक्रम्य सुखमास्वाद्यते अर्जनादिसंभाव्यमानविघ्नान्तरनिरासाद्वैषयिकानन्दविलक्षणशृङ्गारादौ नाट्यकाव्यादिविषये, तत्र वीतविघ्नत्वादेवासौ रसना चर्वणा निर्वृतिः प्रतीतिः प्रमातृताविश्रान्तिरेव, तत एव हृदयेन परामर्शलक्षणेन प्राधान्याद्व्यपदेश्याव्यवस्थितस्यापि प्रकाशभागस्य वेद्यविश्रान्तस्यानादरणात्सहृदयतोच्यते इति निर्विघ्नास्वादरूपाश्च रसनातद्गोचरीकार्याश्चित्तवृत्तयो रसा नवेत्ययमर्थोऽभिनवभारत्यां नाट्यवेदविवृतौ वितत्य व्युत्पादितोऽस्माभिरिति । तत्कुतूहली तामेवावलोकयेत् । इह तु प्रकृतविघ्नकारित्वान्न विततः । तस्मादनुपचरितस्य संवेदनरूपतानन्तरीयत्वेनावस्थितस्य स्वतन्त्रस्यैव रसनैकघनतया परामर्शः परमानन्दो निर्वृतिश्चमत्कार उच्यते । तस्माद्युक्तमाह '**चमत्कृतेरभावात्**' । मधुरादिरसास्वादे तु विषयस्पर्शव्यवधानम् । ततोऽपि काव्यनाट्यादौ तद्व्यवधानशून्यता तद्व्यवधानसंस्कारानुवेधस्तु । तत्रापि तु तथोदितव्यवधानांशतिरस्क्रियासावधानहृदया लभन्त एव परमानन्दम् ।

3. Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa's *Stavacintāmaṇi*, 61.

4. This phrase occurs often in the *Locana*, e. g. p. 97.

instance in the context of a play or a poem where *śṛṅgāra*, in which the pleasure experienced is different from the kind of pleasure we derive from objects in the world, (is the subject matter), because of the very disappearance of obstacles (such as desire for material gain, etc.,) this is called *rasanā, carvaṇā, nirvṛti, pratīti* and *pramātṛtāviśrānti* ("rest in the Self"). And then because of not caring for the established element of illumination which rests on the object to be known, there is said to be sensitivity — the aesthetic experience whose nature is undisturbed relish, and which is designated (as *sahṛdayatā*) principally because of the *hṛdaya* (heart) consisting in consciousness (*parāmarśa*). And so aesthetic experience (*rasanā*) consists in tasting (*āsvāda*) without any obstacles. The idea that the states of mind which are the objects of this aesthetic experience are the nine *rasas* has been examined at great length in my commentary on the *Nāṭyaveda*, the *Abhinavabhāratī*. Anyone interested in this question should, therefore, consult that book. Since it is not really germane to the present issue, I have not examined it at length (here). Therefore, *parāmarśa*, (consciousness), *paramānanda* (highest bliss), *nirvṛti* (happiness), are all called *camatkāra*, because of the completeness (or compactness — *ekaghanatā*)[1] of the aesthetic experience (*rasanā*). Therefore, he correctly said: "Because of the absence of *camatkṛti*". In the tasting of a delicious beverage and other liquids, however, there intervenes a contact with an object of the senses, whereas in poetry and drama there is a far greater absence of such intervention, although even there, the latent impressions (*saṃskāra*) of such sensory contacts permeate the (spectator). Still, those whose hearts are careful to dispel the part of the customary intervention of sensory contacts will attain the highest bliss".[2]

This passage[3] is quoted in the context of *camatkṛti*,[4] one of the

1. On *ekaghanatā* see Gnoli, *op. cit.* p. 58.

2. There are several difficulties in this text, and we are not certain of having understood the exact implication of some of the phrases. E. g. *vyapadeśyāvyavasthitasyāpi prakāśabhāgasya vedyaviśrāntasya* is not clear. In the expression *tato'pi kāvyanāṭyādau tadvyavadhānaśūnyatā*, we take *tato'pi* to mean *tato'pi adhikā* and have translated accordingly. The words *tasmād anupacaritasya ... svatantrasyaiva rasanaikaghanatayā* are baffling.

3. After translating the above passage, we have found that Gnoli, in the second ed. of his "*The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta*" translates the very same text in his Introduction, p. XLIII–XLV, but, oddly enough, he does not give the reference. We are afraid that we cannot follow his translation. See however his *Essenza dei Tantra* (Torino, 1960) an Italian translation of Abhinava's *Tantrasāra*. Attention was first called to this important passage by K. C. Pandey in his *Comparative Aesthetics*, Vol. I, first ed. 1950, on p. 94. The reference he gives is *Bṛhat Vimarśinī* (Ms.) 407 (I. 5. 11), to which he provides the text on p. 421–422.

4. See in V. Raghavan, "*Some Concepts of the Alaṅkāra Śāstra*", the short essay on *Camatkāra*, p. 268–271.

key terms for Abhinava.[1] He gives, in the *A. Bh.* a very lovely example of its use :

" Viṣṇu is still in a state of wonder (*camatkaroti*), for, how strange, the thighs of Lakṣmī as white as a sliver of the moon, were not broken by (the churning of the ocean with) Mt. Mandara." [2]

He then provides the definition of *camatkāra* :[3] " It is defined as a seizure by joy (*bhogāveśa*), unbroken (*aviccinna*) and continuous satisfaction (*atṛptivyatireka*)." [4]

Another important concept found in this passage is the idea of *vighnas*, which Abhinava develops at some length in the *A. Bh.*[5] In brief the theory is this : all the synonyms for aesthetic pleasure (e. g. *camatkāra, rasanā, āsvāda,* etc.) are just another name for consciousness that is devoid of any obstacle (*sakalavighnavinirmuktasaṃvittir eva*). It is only by removing these obstables, seven in number, that we become totally receptive to a drama. These seven are: (1) lack of credibility (*ayogyatā*). One must be

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1. Cf. *Sāhitya-darpaṇa* III, 2-3 (Vṛtti), रसे सारश्चमत्कारः, ascribed to Nārāyaṇa. *Cf.* Bhāskara's versified commentary on the *Śivasūtra*, I. 12 :

(विस्मयो योगभूमिकाः) :

तदधिष्ठितमेवेदं जगत्समवलोकयन् ।
विस्मयाविष्ट इव यस्तिष्ठति प्रतिभानवान् ॥

There is no doubt that this notion of being filled with wonder, of surprise, had a great appeal for Abhinava. He himself never tires of using the expression *camatkāra*, though it occurs only once in the *Dhvanyāloka* itself. There is no doubt that the *Śivasūtras* exercised an important influence on Abhinava. One thinks of the definition of *śakti*, I. 13 :

इच्छा शक्तिरुमा कुमारी, on which Kṣemarāja comments :

योगिन इच्छा परैव पारमेश्वरी स्वातन्त्र्यरूपा शक्तिः, कुमारी विश्वसर्गसंहारक्रीडापरा । (p. 4). Kṣemarāja's commentary will be found at the back of the volume which contains Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara's commentary, KSTS, Vols. IV, and V, edited by J. C. Chatterji, Srinagar, 1916.

2. *A. Bh.*, Vol. I, p. 279. The Prākrit text reads :

अज्ज वि हरी चमक्कइ कह कह वि ण मंदरेण दलिआइं ।
चंदकलादलसच्छाआइं लच्छीइ अंगाइं ॥

For which the Sanskrit translation is :

अद्यापि हरिश्चमत्करोति कथं कथमपि न मन्दरेण दलितानि।
चन्द्रकलादलसच्छायानि लक्ष्म्या अङ्गानि ॥

3. *Op. cit.*, p. 279 :

स चातृप्तिव्यतिरेकेणाविच्छिन्नो भोगावेश इत्युच्यते । भुञ्जानस्याद्भुतभोगस्पन्दाविष्टस्य च मनःकरणं चमत्कारमिति ।

4. See also the *Alaṅkārakaustubha*, Sivaprasad Bhattacharya's ed. p. 137 :

रसे सारश्चमत्कारो यं विना न रसो रसः ।

which is quoted from another, untraced, source.

5. *A. Bh.*, Vol. I, pp. 280-284.

able to sympathise (*hṛdayasaṃvāda*) with the events being portrayed. They cannot be completely beyond our scope of knowledge, whether that knowledge be acquired through our own past experiences or through our acquaintance with literature.[1] (2) Too personal an identification. One must not feel that the drama is an actual event in the world. A certain aesthetic distance is necessary. This is the purpose of the *nāṭyadharmis*, those conventions found only in the theatre, e. g. unusual speech habits, dress etc. (3) An absorption with one's own feelings (*nijasukhādivivaśībhāva*). One must overcome personal feelings in order to enter another person's feelings (*vastvantare saṃvidaṃ viśrāmayet*). Music, decoration in the theatre, etc., all help to soften the spectator's hard sense of ego. The setting works on him and enables the spectator who is willing to respond to become a *sahṛdaya*, a man sensitive to literature. (4) Lack of proper means of perception (*pratītyupāyavaikalyam*). (5) Lack of clarity (*sphuṭatvābhāva*). Just as Abhinava insists on certain conventions in the theatre (*nāṭyadharmī*), so also he insists on their opposite as well, a certain realism (*lokadharmī*). Thus he says the acting (*abhinayana*) is in many senses very close to direct perception (*pratyakṣavyāpārakalpa*). (6) Lack of pre-dominance (*apradhānatā*). Abhinava feels that there are four major mental states, more important (*pradhāna*) than any others.[2] He associates these four with the four goals of life. *Rati*, love (the *sthāyibbāva* of *śṛṅgāra*) corresponds to *kāma*. *Krodha*, anger (the *sthāyibhāva* of *raudra*) corresponds to *artha*. *Utsāha*, energy (the *sthāyibhāva* of *vīra*) corresponds to three (*kāma*, *dharma* and *artha*).

1. Cf. Abhinava, in the *Locana*, p. 331 :

एतदुक्तं भवति–यत्र विनेयानां प्रतीतिखण्डना न जायते तादृग्वर्णनीयम् । तत्र केवलमानुषस्य एकपदे सप्तार्णवलङ्घनमसम्भाव्यमानतयानृतमिति हृदये स्फुरदुपदेश्यस्य चतुर्वर्गोपायस्याप्यलीकतां बुद्धौ निवेशयति । रामादेस्तु तथाविधमपि चरितं पूर्वप्रसिद्धिपरम्परोपचितसम्प्रत्ययोपारूढमसत्यतया न चकास्ति । अत एव तस्यापि यदा प्रभावान्तरमुत्प्रेक्ष्यते तदा तादृशमेव । न त्वसम्भावनापदं वर्णनीयमिति ।

"This comes to the following : one should only describe such incidents as do not destroy the enjoyment of the audience. So that if (one should say that) a simple man crosses the seven oceans in one step, because it is impossible, it will strike the mind as untrue and so will cause even the teaching consisting in the means of attaining the four aims of life to seem false as well. But in the case of Rāma etc., even such (inherently unreal) feats as the one just described (namely crossing the seven oceans) do not seem false because such deeds are based on (our) trust that is generated by a series of earlier well-known narrative events. And so even other extraordinary feats of Rāma, when imaginatively described, will not seem false. But in any case one should avoid describing unlikely events (unless they are vouchsafed by a narrative tradition)."

2. Note that Bharata (*NŚ.*, VI. 39–40) too has this doctrine of four prominent *rasas* which give rise to the other four in turn (*śṛṅgāra*, *raudra*, *vīra* and *bībhatsa*). But he does not include *śānta*, a fact of which Abhinava could hardly have been unaware, since in his commentary on the *NŚ* verses (p. 295) he does not even give a variant reading that would include *śānta*.

Finally *nirveda*, world-weariness (given here, then, as the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta*, as opposed to the *Abhinavabhāratī*, *śāntarasaprakaraṇa* passage!) corresponds to *mokṣa*. One of these must predominate in every drama. Abhinava explains that all of them contain a predominance of bliss (*sarve'mī sukhapradhānāḥ*), since in experiencing them, one is tasting one's own consciousness, which is a single compact mass of bliss (*svasaṃviccarvaṇārūpasyaikaghanasya.....ānandasāratvāt*). (7) The presence of doubt (*saṃśayayoga*). This refers to the fact that we cannot be certain what the *anubhāvas* are meant to represent. Tears, Abhinava tells us[1] might be due to joy or to sorrow, and anxiety (*cintā*) might refer to *vīrarasa* as well as to *bhayānaka*. But when properly combined (*saṃyoga*) such doubts will not arise.

We can see from this that Abhinava places emphasis (and not only here, but throughout both his major works on poetics) upon the transcendental (*alaukika*) nature of our feelings during a drama. He has stressed over and over that there is not a direct correspondence between *kāraṇa* and *vibhāva*, or between *kārya* and *anubhāva*, for one refers to the world, and the other to art. Ordinary means of knowledge play no role in *rasa*:

"The enjoyment of an aesthetic experience consists of a transcendental wonder (*alaukikacamatkāra*) and is decidedly (*eva*) different from ordinary (*laukika*) knowledge such as (is produced) by memory and inference".[2]

The *sthāyibhāva* that Abhinava speaks of is the same as *vāsanā*, an important word in his philosophy. It means the same as *saṃskāra*, latent impressions that we carry with us from birth to birth. In a sense it corresponds to the Freudian unconscious. The *sthāyibhāva* would correspond to the conscious, for the *vāsanā* is aroused, awakened, and we then call it a *sthāyibhāva*. Now this doctrine enables Abhinavagupta to answer one of the great puzzles of literary criticism in the West. How do we explain the fact that we can appreciate a drama which deals with emotions beyond the range of our experience? E. g. how is it that incest dramas grip those of us who have no experience (at least consciously) of such emotions? The answer that Abhinava gives is ingenious. He claims that in our beginningless (for it is an axiom of Sanskrit philosophy that *saṃsāra* is *anādi*, though of course it has an end) wanderings through the universe, we have had every conceivable experience, been open to every possible emotion. "Nothing human

1. *A. Bh.*, Vol. I, p. 284.

2. *A. Bh.*, Vol. I, p. 284 :

तथा हि लौकिकचित्तवृत्त्यनुमाने का रसता। तेनालौकिकचमत्कारात्मा रसास्वादः स्मृत्यनुमानलौकिकसंवेदनविलक्षण एव।

is foreign to us ". In a brilliant passage,[1] Abhinava examines each of the nine *sthāyibhāvas*, and shows how we all possess each and every one of them. For example, we all seek pleasure, and avoid pain, and are thus open to *rati* (*sarvo riraṃsayā vyāptaḥ*). He concludes : " There exists no living being who is devoid of the latent impressions of these mental states ".[2] What happens after this *sthāyibhāva* is activated is *hṛdayasaṃvāda*, a word of which Abhinava is very fond. It means " sympathetic response " and he uses it to represent the state just before identification. It is made possible through the existence of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*, the factor in literature that makes all events impersonal and universal, an idea that Abhinava borrowed from Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka as we have already seen. This identification which then takes place is what Abhinava calls *tanmayībhavana*, another key term. The word is already used in a difficult verse from the *Tantrāloka* :

" Those who do not identify (with the object of contemplation), who do now know the merging of the body, etc., (in that object) and whose intellect as a means of cognition is not merged (in that object) — they are known as insensitive ".[3]

It is defined elsewhere in the *Tantrāloka*, where we are told that " identification is the attainment of one's highest Self. It is the highest stage of fulfilment, and there can be no further fruit after that ".[4] By " further

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1. *A. Bh.*, Vol. I, p. 282.
2. *Op. cit.*, p. 282 :

   न ह्येतच्चित्तवृत्तिवासनाशून्यः प्राणी भवति ।
3. *T. Āl.* (Vol. II) III, 240, p. 228 :

   येषां न तन्मयीभूतिस्ते देहादिनिमज्जनम् ।
   अविदन्तो मग्नसंविन्मानास्त्वहृदया इति ॥

   Note the commentary (Jayaratha) :

   लोके हि सातिशये गीतादौ विषये तन्मयीभावेन सचमत्काराणां सहृदया इति अन्यथा परहृदयगा (अहृदयाः) इति प्रसिद्धिः ।

   In order to overcome the difficulties in this obscure verse we construe : *dehādi-nimajjanam* with *avidanto* as its object, and we dissolve the *sandhi* as *avidanto amagnasaṃvinmānāḥ*. We understand *saṃvit* to mean intellect and *māna* to mean " a means or instrument of cognition ". But in spite of these interpretations, we are not really certain that we have correctly understood the meaning of the stanza.
4. *T. Āl.*, IV, 209, p. 237 (Vol. III) :

   तन्मयीभवनं नाम प्राप्तिः सानुत्तरात्मनि ।
   पूर्णत्वस्य परा काष्ठा सेत्यत्र न फलान्तरम् ॥

   Abhinava gives this definition in order to explain an exercise for inducing ecstasy that he gives in the preceding verse, where we are told that just as one examines one's own face again and again in a mirror and knows it to belong to oneself, so also examining oneself in the mirror of consciousness that consists in meditation, worship etc. one sees Śiva and then one merges with him :

(Continued on next page

fruit" (*phalāntaram*), Jayaratha explains that Abhinava means the following: generally when we obtain something, we are left with further expectations. When we get what we want, we have further wants. Not so with this, for we have attained ourselves, and there is nothing further to desire.[1] Immediately after *tanmayībhavana*, the last stage in the process of aesthetic experience, we come to the actual experience itself: *rasa*. Abhinava has played down both *alaṅkāradhvani* and *vastudhvani* in his *Locana* commentary, to give unique perference to *rasa*. Time and again he will say things like the following:

"By the word *ucita* (proper), Ānandavardhana shows that the only propriety (relevant to poetry) is the one with regard to *rasa*, and thereby he suggests that *rasadhvani* is the essence (of all poetry)".[2]

His definition of *rasa* occurs in such a context:

"When the suggested sense does not take the form of an *alaṅkāra*, then we say that it is plain *vastu*. The word plain (*mātra*) rules out its being anything else (i. e. *alaṅkāradhvani* or *rasadhvani*). Now *rasadhvani* is something else altogether. It belongs (*gocara*) only to the (suggestive) function in poetry. It is never included under worldly dealings (*vyavahāra*) and is never even to be dreamed of as being revealed directly through words. No, quite the contrary, it is *rasa*, that is, it has a form which is capable of being relished (*rasanīya*) through the function (*vyāpāra*) of personal aesthetic relish (*carvaṇā*), which is bliss (*ānanda*) that arises in the *sahṛdaya's* delicate mind that has been coloured (*anurāga*) by the appropriate (*samucita*) latent impressions (*vāsanā*) that are deeply embedded from long before (*prāk*); appropriate that is, to the beautiful *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*, and beautiful, again, because of their appeal to the heart (*saṃvāda*), and which

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Continued from previous page)

यथा पुरःस्थे मुकुरे निजं वक्त्रं विभावयन्।
भूयो भूयस्तदेकात्मवक्त्रं वेत्ति निजात्मनः॥
तथा विकल्पमुकुरे ध्यानपूजार्चनात्मनि।
आत्मानं भैरवं पश्यन्नचिरात् तन्मयीभवेत्॥

1. In the commentary, p. 237, there seems to be some sort of misprint: *anuttarātmani prāttāpi kiṃ bhavet?* This must stand for something like *anuttarātmani prāptyāpi kiṃ bhavet?* The commentary on this verse is particularly fine (though we cannot make sense of the *sākāṅkṣatve'pi tasya tathākalpanāt*). It ends thus:

अतश्च तत्रोत्पन्नेऽपि फले फलान्तरं संभाव्यम् — आकाङ्क्षान्तरस्यापि भावात्, यत्पुनः पारमार्थिकं पूर्णत्वं, तत्र न फलान्तरं संभवेत् — सर्वत एव साकाङ्क्षत्वस्य संक्षयात्।

2. *Locana*, p. 45:

उचितशब्देन रसविषयमेवौचित्यं भवतीति दर्शयन् रसध्वनेर्जीवितत्वं सूचयति।

are conveyed by means of words. That alone is *rasadhvani*, and that alone, in the strict sense of the word, is the soul (of poetry) ".[1]

His definition of drama is equally difficult and philosophic :

" A drama is a thing (*vastu*) whose essence, so far as the spectator is concerned (*tadgrāhaka*) consists of *rasa* that can only be known by direct experience (*saṃvedana*) in the form of aesthetic enjoyment which is altogether different from correct knowledge (*samyagjñāna*), erroneous cognition (*bhrānti*), doubt, uncertainty, non-determination (*anadhyavasāya*) and ordinary knowledge (*vijñāna*). It is distinct from worldly objects, and also different from such things as their (i. e. worldly objects') imitation, reflection and pictorial presentation (*ālekhya*), determination (*adhyavasāya*), fancy, magic shows, etc. ".[2]

Abhinava likes to insist on the autonomy of a work of art, on the fact that it is *sui generis* and need have no object corresponding to it in the real world. Thus he remarks of the dance that it imitates nothing in real life, but is pure creation, with no practical aim (to be free of practical aims is for Abhinava one of the defining characteristics of drama, as indeed it is of all art). Thus he remarks, *à propos* of Śiva's famous cosmic dance, that it is the spontaneous expression of his overflowing bliss, in which no thought other than sheer creative beauty exists.[3] The poet is very much like Śiva; in fact, Abhinava often associates the poet, Śiva and *rasa* all together. For

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1. *Locana*, p. 51 :

तद्रूपताभावेन तूपलक्षितं वस्तुमात्रमुच्यते । मात्रग्रहणेन हि रूपान्तरं निराकृतम् । यस्तु स्वप्नेऽपि न स्वशब्दवाच्यो न लौकिकव्यवहारपतितः, किंतु शब्दसमर्प्यमाणहृदयसंवादसुन्दरविभावानुभावसमुचितप्राग्विनिविष्टरत्यादिवासनानुरागसुकुमारस्वसंविदानन्दचर्वणाव्यापाररसनीयरूपो रसः, स काव्यव्यापारैकगोचरो रसध्वनिरिति, स च ध्वनिरेवेति, स एव मुख्यतयात्मेति ।

2. *A. Bh.* Vol. I, p. 3 :

तत्र नाट्यं नाम लौकिकपदार्थव्यतिरिक्तं तदनुकारप्रतिबिम्बालेख्यसादृश्यारोपाध्यवसायोत्प्रेक्षास्वप्नमायेन्द्रजालादिविलक्षणं तद्ग्राहकस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानभ्रान्तिसंशयानवधारणाध्यवसायविज्ञानाभिन्नवृत्तान्तास्वादनरूपसंवेदनसंवेद्यं वस्तु रसस्वभावमिति वक्ष्यामः ।

For an elaboration of this passage (and an explanation of how drama differs, *qua anukāra* from other imitative objects) see *A. Bh.* I. p. 35-38, edited and translated by Gnoli, *op. cit.* p. 88–101, appendix I.

3. *A. Bh.* I, p. 21 :

शंकरस्यैव भगवतः परिपूर्णानन्दनिर्भरीभूतदेहोच्चलदान्तरनिर्वार (ह) सुन्दराकारस्य अत एव नृत्यतः इतिकर्तव्यान्तरवैकल्यादानन्दनृत्तमात्रस्थितस्य ।

M. K. Venugopalan suggests to us that perhaps the reading should be *nirvāha*.

Abhinava is very fond of the notion of overflowing (see *Locana*, p. 86) with one's own bliss. He uses it often in the *Tantrāloka* and in the very first verse of the *Locana* he speaks of *nijarasabharāt*, the same expression.

instance in the *Maṅgalaślloka* to the fifth chaper of the *A. Bh.*, he has a very fine verse with a remarkable simile :

" We bow down to that sky–form of Śiva which acts as a preliminary to the production of the play that is the creation of this world by providing the proper moment (*avakāśa*) (for the play) (also : by providing the space in which creation is to be projected) ".[1]

Here *saṃsāra* is compared to a drama. The creation of *saṃsāra* is by Śiva,[2] the poet (note the implication : both are unreal). Reductive statements dealing with identification are not uncommon with Abhinava.[3] His commentary on the *NŚ*. VI. 38, provides a good example and is itself intrinsically interesting. The verse from the *NŚ* reads :

" Just as a tree grows from a seed, and from the tree come flowers, and from flowers fruit, so also *rasas* are the root, and from them are all *bhāvas* derived ".[4]

After a very involved commentary which we translate in full below[5] Abhinava ends by saying : " The tree stands for poetry. Flowers, etc.,

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1. *A. Bh.* I, p. 207 :

संसारनाट्यनिर्माणे याऽवकाशविधानतः ।
पूर्वरङ्गायते व्योममूर्ति तां शाङ्करीं नुमः ॥

2. There are said to be eight forms of S'iva, among which the last five are the *pañca mahābhūtas*. V*yoma* is the fifth. It is the *pūrvaraṅga*, the preliminary to creation. The *pūrvaraṅga* forms a natural introduction to drama. Similarly S'iva's form, namely *ākāśa* (sky) forms a preliminary to creation, because it provides the space in which creation is projected.

3. E. g. *A. Bh.* I, p. 342 :

स्थायी प्रबुद्धहृदये व्यभिचारिभूतः
कामाकुलासु जनतासु महानुभावः ।
अन्तर्विभावविषयो रसमात्रमूर्तिः
श्रीमान् प्रसन्नहृदयोऽस्तु मम त्रिनेत्रः ॥

4. यथा बीजाद् भवेद् वृक्षो वृक्षात् पुष्पं फलं यथा ।
तथा मूलं रसाः सर्वे ततो भावा व्यवस्थिताः ॥

5. *A. Bh.* I, p, 294 (*NS*, VI. 38). The text has been edited by Raghavan in " *Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa* ", Madras 1963, p. 532. The passage is extremely important, and warrants a full translation. The text, as given by Raghavan reads :

ननु यदि भावेभ्यो रसास्तर्हि कथमुक्तं ' न हि रसादृते कश्चिदप्यर्थः प्रवर्तत ' इति । तेन पूर्वं त एवोद्देश्या इत्याशङ्क्याह—यथेत्यादिना । बीजं यथा वृक्षमूलत्वेन स्थितं तथा रसाः, तन्मूला हि प्रीतिपूर्विका व्युत्पत्तिरिति । तत एव च व्याख्यानार्हात् कविगतसाधारणीभूतसंविन्मूलश्च काव्यपुरस्सरो नटव्यापारः । सैव संवित्परमार्थतो रसः । सामाजिकस्य च तत्प्रतीत्या वशीकृतस्य पश्चादपोद्धारबुद्धया विभावादिप्रतीतिरिति प्रयोजने नाट्ये काव्ये सामाजिकधियि च । त (तद् ?) एवं मूलबीजस्थानीयाः (यः ?) कविगतो रसः । कविहिं सामाजिकतुल्य एव । तत एवोक्तं ' शृङ्गारी चेत्कविः ' इत्यानन्दवर्धनाचार्येण । ततो वृक्षस्थानीयं

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काव्यम् । तत्र पुष्पस्थानीयोऽभिनयादिनटव्यापारः । तत्र फलस्थानीयः सामाजिकरसास्वादः । तेन रसमयमेव विश्वम् ।

Here is our translation :

" Objection : if the *rasas* arise from the *bhāvas*, how was it said, ' without *rasa* no (dramatic) matter can arise ' ? Hence they alone (i. e. the *rasas*) deserve to be mentioned first (and not the *bhāvas*)." Anticipating such an objection he says : just as the tree etc. Just as the seed stands as the root-cause of a tree, so the *rasas* (stand as the root cause of the *bhāvas*), for moral instruction and intellectual training, which are preceded by entertainment, arise from them (i. e. from the *rasas*). (The following words—*tata eva ca vyākhyānārhāt* are obscure, and we are not able to follow what Abhinava means.) The functioning of the actor which is preceded by (i. e. which is based on) the (dramatic) poem, is (ultimately) based on the thought arising in the poet's mind – which thought is attuned in sympathy (to that of the original characters). It is that very thought (arising in the poet's mind) that is really speaking the *rasa*. The spectator who is carried away by the perception of that (*rasa*) later on perceives the *vibhāvas* etc. (only) on analysis (of the aesthetic experience – *apoddhārabuddhyā*). (The following words : *iti prayojane, nātye, kāvye, sāmājikadhiyi ca*, are obscure and we are not able to follow what Abhinava means by them.) Thus the *rasa* existing in the poet (*kavigato rasaḥ*) is like the seed which is the root (i. e. cause) (of a tree) (we propose reading *mūlabījasthānīyāḥ* for the G. O. S. reading of *mūlabījasthāniyāt* which makes no sense). For the poet is just like the spectator. For this very reason it has been said by Ānandavardhanācārya " If the poet is full of *śṛṅgārarasa* " etc. (*Dhvanyāloka* III, p. 498). Therefore a (dramatic) poem is like a tree. The activity (functioning) of the actor such as gesticulation, is like the flowers etc. The aesthetic experience on the part of the spectator is like the fruit. Consequently everything is full of *rasa*," What follows is no less interesting. Here is the text as corrected by Raghavan (*op. cit.* p. 532) :

अत्र च विज्ञानवादो, द्विधाभिधानं, स्फोटतत्त्वं, सत्कार्यवादः, एकत्वदर्शनमित्यादि च द्रष्टव्यमिति कैचित् । वयं तु प्रकृतानुपयोगिश्रुतलवसंदर्शनमिथ्याप्रायसंश्रयमशिक्षितपूर्विण इत्यास्ताम् । अन्ये तु बीजादिव भावाद्रसवृक्षस्ततोऽप्यभिनयकुसुमसुन्दरात्फलमिव भावः प्रतीत्या भुज्यत इति व्याचक्षते । तैः प्रकृतविरुद्धं सर्वं व्याख्यातम् । एवं हि भावस्यैवोपक्रमपर्यवसानवर्तित्वमुक्तं स्यादित्यास्तां चैतत् ॥

(The first sentence is obscure.) " But we have not been taught to take the fruitless trouble of parading bits of wisdom which are not useful to the matter in hand. And so let it rest at that. (This seems to be a reference to an earlier commentator on the *NŚ* who must have made a display of his acquaintance with the *Vijñānavāda*, the *Satkāryavāda* doctrine etc. while explaining this stanza). Others however explain : the tree in the form of *rasa* arises from the *bhāva*, which is like a seed; and from that (tree of *rasa*) which is lovely with its blossom in the form of *abhinaya*, the *bhāva* like a fruit, is enjoyed by its perception (*pratītyā*). Now these people (in explaining the passage in this way) have explained the whole thing in a manner repugnant to the matter in hand. For in explaining the passage in this manner, they are saying that bhāva exists both in the beginning (*upakrama*) and in the end (*paryavasāna*) (in as much as they claim that *bhāva* is both the seed and the fruit). And so enough of that."

Thus the idea is that all three views (namely) : (रसेभ्यो भावाः, भावेभ्यो रसाः, and परस्परसंबन्धादेतेषामभिनिष्पत्तिः) are acceptable (*upagatāḥ*) according to the diversity of the intention (*abhiprāyavaicitryena*) : एवं त्रयेऽपि पक्षाः कथंचिदुपगता अभिप्रायवैचित्र्येणेति तात्पर्यम् ।

stand for such activities of the actor as abhinaya, etc. Fruit stands for the aesthetic enjoyment of the spectator. Thus everything (or : the whole world) is made of *rasa* ! "[1]

For Abhinava, poetry and drama are essentially the same thing.[2] Thus *rasas* are only to be found in drama, and not in the real world.[3] And what does Abhinava consider the purpose of drama and poetry to be ? What is his stance on the largely unspoken but constant controversy between *vyutpatti* (in the sense of moral or intellectual instruction) and *prīti* (pleasure) as the goal of literature ? Basically Abhinava holds that the major purpose of art is pleasure. Thus in the *Locana*[4] he says :

" Although knowledge and pleasure for the reader are both present, as Bhāmaha[5] has said :

' Study of good poetry confers fame and pleasure, as well as skill in *dharma, artha, kāma* and *mokṣa*, and skill, too, in the fine arts, '

nevertheless pleasure is the main thing. Otherwise, how would poetry, a source of knowledge, comparable to a (loving) wife, differ from the *Vedas*, etc., which are also sources of instruction,[6] comparable (in their manner of instruction) to a master, or from sources of instruction such as the *itihāsas*, etc., which are comparable (in their manner of instruction) to a friend ?[7]

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1. Further on the tree analogy, cf. v. 24, p. 13 of the *Parātriṃśikā* of Abhinava, edited by Pandit J. Z. Shastri, Srinagar, 1947, KSTS LXVIII :

यथा न्यग्रोधबीजस्थः शक्तिरूपो महाद्रुमः ।
तथा हृदयबीजस्थं जगदेतच्चराचरम् ॥

2. काव्यं तावन्मुख्यतो दशरूपकात्मकमेव । *A. Bh.*, I. p. 291.

3. तेन नाट्य एव रसा न लोक इत्यर्थः । काव्यं च नाट्यमेव ॥ *A. Bh.*, I. p. 291.

4. *Locana*, p. 40 :

श्रोतॄणां च व्युत्पत्तिप्रीती यद्यपि स्तः, यथोक्तम्—

' धर्मार्थकाममोक्षेषु वैचक्षण्यं कलासु च ।
करोति कीर्तिं प्रीतिं च साधुकाव्यनिषेवणम् ॥' इति

तथापि तत्र प्रीतिरेव प्रधानम् । अन्यथा प्रभुसंमितेभ्यो वेदादिभ्यो मित्रसंमितेभ्यश्चेतिहासादिभ्यो व्युत्पत्तिहेतुभ्यः कोऽस्य काव्यरूपस्य व्युत्पत्तिहेतोर्जायासंमितत्वलक्षणो विशेष इति प्राधान्येनानन्द एवोक्तः । चतुर्वर्गव्युत्पत्तेरपि चानन्द एव पार्यन्तिकं मुख्यं फलम् ।

5. Bhāmaha, *Kāvyālaṅkāra*, I. 2.

6. *Vyutpatti* most often means *bahuśrutatā*, learning. See Rudraṭa I, 18; Mammaṭa, *KP.* I. 2 (*vyavahāravid*, explained in the Vṛtti as *rājādigata-ucitācāraparijñānam*) and I. 3 (where the *Vṛtti* explains the word *nipuṇatā* of the *Kārikā* by *vyutpatti*, which is said to arise from महाकविसंबन्धिनां काव्यानामितिहासादीनां च विमर्शनम्), and *Rasagaṅgādhara* pp. 9–11 (1939, KM ed.).

7. Cf. p. 8 of the *Dīpikā* comm. on the *Kāvyaprakāśa* (ed. by Sivaprasad Bhattacharya) :

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And so delight has been mentioned (here) primarily (as the purpose of poetry). Even of instruction in the four goals of life delight is the final and major result."

Abhinava has an interesting passage in the third *Uddyota* of the *Locana*[1] in which he repeats this fundamental distinction in method between history, philosophy and poetry. Since, he says, people, and especially people in important positions, must be made sensitive (lit. "instructed", *vyutpādya*), the best way to provide them with this ethical and intellectual education (*vyutpatti*) is through poetry. The way to instruct people in the four goals of life is by entering their hearts (*hṛdayānūpraveśa*), which is just another name for imaginative experience in general (*hṛdayānupraveśaś ca rasāsvādamaya eva*). Abhinava ends by saying that *prīti*, pleasure, is the cause of *vyutpatti* (*prītir eva vyutpatteḥ prayojikā*). His concluding phrase leaves us wondering whether this whole doctrine was not inherited from his teacher:

"*Rasa* consists of pleasure, and *rasa* alone is drama, and drama alone is the Veda. This is what our teacher says".[2] Ahhinava goes on to make this important remark: "Nor are pleasure and instruction really different things, for they both have the same object".[3]

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स्वादुकाव्यरसोन्मिश्रं शास्त्रमप्युपयुञ्जते।
प्रथमालीढमधवः पिबन्ति कटु भेषजम् ॥

"(Readers) use (i. e. read) even the śāstras if they are mixed with sweet poetic rasas (jnst as children will) swallow bitter medicine if they first lick honey."

Curiously enough, according to Professor Bhattacharya, this is a quotation from the *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* (see p. 8, fn. 1 : भट्टनायककृतहृदयदर्पणे इति बहुत्राकरनिर्देशः). But this cannot be correct, since the stanza is found in Bhāmaha, V. 3. What are the works in Skt. that can be considered *śāstras* as well as *kāvyas*? Really only two : the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* and the *Mahābhārata*. It is a great pity that Ānandavardhana's *Tāttvāloka* is lost, for it very probably dealt with this fascinating topic in detail (see *Locana*, p. 67 and p. 533).

1. *Locana*, p. 336.
2. *Locana*, p. 336 :

   प्रीत्यात्मा च रसस्तदेव नाट्यं नाट्यमेव वेद इत्यसदुपाध्यायाः।
3. *Locana* p. 336 :

   न चैते प्रीतिव्युत्पत्ती भिन्नरूपे एव, द्वयोरेकविषयत्वात्।

What Abhinava means by *ekaviṣayatvāt* is brought out in the next sentence : विभावाद्यौचित्यमेव हि सत्यतः प्रीतेर्निदानमित्यसकृदवोचाम। The *aucitya* of the *vibhāvas* etc. is the cause of the pleasure that we derive from poetry. Similarly the *aucitya* of the *vibhāva* etc. is the cause of the edification that we derive from poetry. This is stated by Abhinava in the next sentence (p. 337) : विभावादीनां तद्रसोचितानां (for which we should perhaps read तत्तद्रसोचितानां) यथास्वरूपवेदनं फलपर्यन्तीभूततया व्युत्पत्तिरित्युच्यते। Thus both *prīti* and *vyutpatti* depend on *vibhāvadyaucitya*. Both are the result of *vibhāvādyaucitya*. Abhinava's phrase *dvayor api ekaviṣayatvāt* therefore means *dvayor api ekaheṭukatvāt*. Since both are the outcome of a single cause, they are not different from one another.

In this connection[1] and in slightly more concrete terms (the reader should not feel that the passages we translate in any sense exhaust the range of Abhinava's interest. For most of the *Locana* consists of very close textual remarks on specific verses. We have simply extrapolated the more abstract passages, since it is here that Abhinava deals with his philosophical views), Abhinava has a very interesting passage in the *A. Bh.* on the *NŚ.* I. 108–110, on what drama does for the different kinds of spectators :[2]

"Drama thus described 'creates mental repose' (*viśrāntijanana*, *NŚ.* I. 114), that is, it destroys the flow of pain for all spectators who are overcome either with pain such as comes from illness, who are afflicted with tiredness

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1. One should compare the very interesting passage in the *Daśarūpaka*, and especially the commentary of Dhanika (I. 6) :

आनन्दनिष्यन्दिषु रूपकेषु व्युत्पत्तिमात्रं फलमल्पबुद्धिः ।
योऽपीतिहासादिवदाह साधु तस्मै नमः स्वादुपराङ्मुखाय ॥

Avaloka : तत्र केचित्—

धर्मार्थकाममोक्षेषु वैचक्षण्यं कलासु च ।
करोति कीर्तिं प्रीतिं च साधुकाव्यनिषेवणम् ॥

इत्यादिना त्रिवर्गादिव्युत्पत्तिं काव्यफलत्वेनेच्छन्ति तन्निरासेन स्वसंवेद्यः परमानन्दरूपो रसास्वादो दशरूपाणां फलं न पुनरितिहासादिवत् त्रिवर्गादिव्युत्पत्तिमात्रमिति दर्शितम् । नम इति सोल्लुण्ठम् ।

"The silly man who says that as in the case of *itihāsa*, etc., so in the case of the different types of drama, which overflow with bliss, the only purpose is to impart moral and secular instruction — I bow low to him, who is averse to the pleasure arising from literature".

(Note that the word *sādhu* can be construed with both *namaḥ* and with *tasmai*; *tasmai sādhu namaḥ*, "I bow low (*sādhu*) to him, and *tasmai sādhu, tasmai namaḥ*". "May he fare well (i. e. may god bless him), I bow to him". We think the correct reading is *sādhu* as an adverb and not *sādhuḥ* as an adjective going with *alpabuddhiḥ*.)

"In that connection some (claim) : "Reading (and study – *niṣevaṇa*) of good poetry bestows pleasure and fame and skill in the fine arts". (Bhāmaha, I. 2).

By this and other verses they wish to show that the purpose of poetry is to give knowledge of the three goals of life etc. By refuting this, the author shows that the purpose of the ten drama-types is aesthetic enjoyment, which is of the form of the highest bliss that is inwardly experienced (*svasaṃvedya*) and not merely knowledge of the three goals of life etc. as is the case in *itihāsas* etc. 'I bow low' is of course meant sarcastically".

2. *A. Bh.*, Vol. I, p. 39 :

एवंभूतं यन्नाट्यं तत्प्रेक्षकाणां दुःखेन व्याध्यादिकृतेन, श्रमेणाध्वक्लेशादिजेन, शोकेन बन्धुमरणादिकृतेनार्तानां पीडितानां तथा तपस्विनामनवरतकृच्छ्रचान्द्रायणाद्याचरणकलितदौर्बल्यातिशयपरिखिन्नहृदयानां विश्रान्तिजननं दुःखप्रसरणविघातकम् । प्रतिहतदुःखानां चाह्लादात्मकधृत्यादिकारणं यथायोगम् । तद्यथा शोकार्तस्य धृतिर्व्याध्यार्तस्य क्रीडा । श्रमार्तस्य सुखम् । आदिग्रहणेन तपस्विनो मतिविबोधादय इति मन्तव्यम् । न चैतावदेव यावत्कालान्तरेऽपि(रवि)परिपाकं सुखमुपदेशजं जनयतीत्येवं दुःखितानां तत्प्रशमसुखवितरणकालान्तरसुखलाभाः प्रयोजनम् । ये पुनरदुःखिताः सुखभूयिष्ठवृत्तय एव राजपुत्राद्यास्तेषां लोकवृत्ते धर्माद्युपायवर्गे उपदेशकार्यतन्नाट्यम् । लोकशब्देन लोकवृत्तम् । ननु किं गुरुवदुपदेशं करोति । नेत्याह । किं तु बुद्धिं विवर्धयति ।

which comes from the inconveniences caused by a long journey etc., or are suffering from sorrow as when one's relations, etc., die, or for ascetics whose minds are distressed by excessive weakness resulting from constant ascetic practices and from the *cāndrāyaṇa* and other vows. When their sufferings are overcome, drama becomes the cause of *dhṛti*, etc., according to suitability (*yathāyogam*); thus *dhṛti* etc., (verse 113), having delight for their essence, apply in their proper order to the spectators afflicted with sorrows etc. For instance, (drama) gives courage to the person overcome with sorrow. For the man afflicted with illness it distracts his mind. For the weary man it creates happiness. The word "etc." (in verse 113) stands for such things as awakening of the mind, etc., in the case of the man who practises *tapas*. Not only (does the drama achieve) this, but it also gives rise at a later date (*kālāntare*) to the result (*paripāka*) in the form of happiness that stems from instruction. In this manner the purpose (of the drama) for those who are unhappy (is threefold): it calms the pain of those who are grieved, it gives immediate pleasure, and it gives happiness later (through instruction, which if followed leads to happiness). As for those who are not in sorrow, but are almost always happy, such as princes, etc., even for them the drama provides instruction in the ways of the world and in the means leading to the (four) goals of life, such as *dharma*, etc. The word "world" means "ways of the world". Question: does the drama instruct the way a teacher (or an elderly person) does? (Answer:) No. Rather it causes one's wisdom to grow.".[1]

In his commentary on the *rasasūtra* of Bharata, just before commencing a detailed statement of his own position, Abhinava quotes the first line of a very famous verse from the *Śākuntala*.[2] Abhinava considered this verse to be the ideal introduction to his exposition of *rasa*. Since its exact significance has proved somewhat mysterious, we feel we are justified in introducing the two passages from the *Locana* with a short discussion on this passage. The verse reads:

"Seeing moving sights, and hearing soft sounds, even a man who is happy is filled with strange longing. Surely it is because he vaguely remembers, though he is not fully conscious, affections formed in an earlier life that are fixed inside him through the latent impressions they leave behind."[3]

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1. A good summation of this whole theory is Abhinava's account at the beginning of the *A. Bh.*, of what takes place when we actually witness a drama, G. O. S., p. 36. The passage has been edited and translated by Gnoli, *op. cit.* (p. 96).

2. The verse is quoted in the *A. Bh.*, p. 279–280, (Vol. 1).

3. *Śākuntala*, V. 2:

रम्याणि वीक्ष्य मधुरांश्च निशम्य शब्दान्
पर्युत्सुको भवति यत्सुखितोऽपि जन्तुः।
तच्चेतसा स्मरति नूनमबोधपूर्वं
भावस्थिराणि जननान्तरसौहृदानि॥

Why then does Abhinava quote this?[1] The reason we feel is this: Duṣyanta has an experience of *rasa*.[2] But it is not like any other experience in the world. He is not directly experiencing any kind of sexual pleasure, but the *vibhāvas* (music and perhaps paintings as well) call up to him some vague memories. This in its turn produces longing (*autsukya*) in him. It is an aesthetic experience. The memory involved is not of course like any other kind of memory, for it has no object. The *bhāvasthirāṇi* in the verse are the actual *vāsanās*. These *vāsanās* (latent impressions) are brought to life by his hearing the music, and they then bring to his aesthetic attention (i. e. his deeper unconscious) intimations of a pleasure he formerly had. But this pleasure is now no longer direct, it is purified, not directly stateable. It is thus a higher kind of delight than the original.[3] So Abhinava regards this verse as proof of *rasa*.[4]

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1. Hemacandra, *Kāvyānuśāsana*, II. 1. p. 99:

अत्र हि स्मरतीति या स्मृतिरुपदार्शिता सा न तार्किकप्रसिद्धा। पूर्वमेतस्यार्थस्याननुभूतत्वात्। अपि तु प्रतिभानापरपर्यायसाक्षात्कारस्वभावेयमिति।

What Hemachandra means by saying that Duṣyanta has not experienced this love is that he is not now remembering something he has experienced. In other words, ordinary memory of happy experience does not constitute aesthetic experience. Thus a play does not bring up in our memories similar experiences. What is conjured up in us is the more general emotion, purified of any actual memory. This interpretation is confirmed by the passage from in the *ĪPVV*. quoted in Note 3.

2. For Rāghavabhaṭṭa, the verse is a case of *śṛṅgāra*.

3. On p. 252 of the third volume of the *ĪPVV*, Abhinava quotes the last lines of the same verse: *bhāvasthitāni jananāntarasauhṛdāni* (this reading of *bhāvasthitāni* instead of *bhāvasthirāṇi* is confirmed by Rāghavabhaṭṭa, who says that it is a well-established reading). The context is extremely difficult to make out, since the text on which Abhinava is commenting is not extant, and none of the *pratīkas* make sense. But it is clear that he is quoting this as an example of an emotion (he seems to be discussing the distinction between various kinds of love; *kāma*, *icchā*, *abhilāṣa*, *autsukya*, etc. — क्वचित्तु स्वात्मविश्रान्तिर्भावान्तरमनागूरितविशेषमपेक्ष्योत्थाप्यते यत्र सा इच्छा राग इत्युच्यते। आगूरितविशेषतायां तु काम इति।) that has no direct object, but is aetherealised as it were, that is, in his terms, "generalised": आदिग्रहणादभिलाषमलो यत्र भावान्तरं सामान्याकारमपि वासनाशेषमात्रेणास्ते यथाह.....भावस्थितानि जननान्तरसौहृदानि।

Clearly then these *vāsanās* bring us to a state of generalised love, which is why it is called *autsukya*, for it would seem that *autsukya* is a longing with no particular object. This is in fact what takes place during a dramatic performance of the *Śākuntala*, for we do not wish to actually possess *Śakuntalā* herself.

4. Note that according to Rāghavabhaṭṭa, the verse is a case of *aprastutaprašaṃsā*, and this figure of speech further suggests the *sthāyibhāva* of uninterrupted love (*aprastutapraśaṃsā, tena sthāyinaḥ rater avicchedo dhvanitaḥ*). He also sees this as *kāvyaliṅga*, and hence as *saṃsṛṣṭi*. There are also three types of *anuprāsa* (*cheka*, *vṛtti* and *śruti*). He notes that the verse must be a case of *rati* (i. e. *śṛṅgārarasadhvani*) for otherwise there will be the *doṣa* of having the major *rasa* cut midway:

अन्यथा मध्ये विच्छेदान्महान् रसदोषः स्यात्।

All of this culminates in what is lacking even in Ānandavardhana, a philosophical scaffolding on which to raise the structure of *rasa*. We are now ready to read the two important passages from the *Locana*.[1]

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1. We have barely touched the surface of Abhinava's aesthetic philosophy. There are of course a great deal of interesting passages from his philosophical works which shed light on the issues discussed here. Lack of space prevents us from examining all of these passages here, but we cannot refrain from noting briefly at least some of them. The first verse of the last chapter of Utpalācārya's *Īśvara-pratyabhijñā* (*Bhāskarī*, vol. II, p. 280) reads :

स्वात्मैव सर्वजन्तूनामेक एव महेश्वरः ।
विश्वरूपोऽहमिदमित्यखण्डामर्शबृंहितः ॥

" The one highest God is the very Self of all beings. He assumes the form of everything. He is filled with the unbroken notion : 'I am this (universe)'. "

In his commentary to this Abhinava speaks of the consciousness that is not restricted by time and space, just as he speaks of the consciousness in a play that is not restricted by time and space (e. g. *Abhinavabhāratī*, p. 280) : यतः संवित्स्वभावोऽसौ संविदश्च न देशेन न कालेन न स्वरूपेण कोऽपि भेदः । And later in his Vṛtti : *parānunmukhasvātmaviśrāntirūpāhaṃvimarśaparipūrṇaḥ*. " Filled with the notion of 'I' ness which takes the form of rest in the self which is not directed towards anything else. " These are precisely the terms in which Abhinava speaks of the aesthetic experience.

See also Abhinava's *Tantrasāra*, p. 19, where two interesting verses sum up the third *āhnika*. The verses, oddly, are in Prākrit. Note that *saiṃ bhāi* in the Prākrit should be translated into Skt. as *svayaṃ bhāti* and not as *satyaṃ bhāti* as in the *chāyā* given in the footnote on p. 19. Also, *sarahasa* in the Prākrit should be translated as *sarabhasa* and not as *sarahasya*. Perhaps too one should emend *vimṛṣṭarūpam* into *vimṛṣṭarūpe* to agree with *darpaṇe* in the first line. The verse reads :

संवेअणनिम्मलदप्पणम्मि सअलं फुरंतनिअसारं । आमरिसणरससरहसविमट्ठरूवं सइं भाइ ॥

(With slight changes in the text.)

" The whole of one's very own essence, vibrating in the pure mirror of consciousness becomes manifest by itself; its (the mirror's) form having been rubbed quickly with the fluid in the form of *āmarśana*. "

One of the finest verses is found in the *Tantrāloka*, Vol. II, p. 200 :

तथा हि मधुरे गीते स्पर्शे वा चन्दनादिके ।
माध्यस्थ्यविगमे यासौ हृदये स्पन्दमानता ।
आनन्दशक्तिः सैवोक्ता यतः सहृदयो जनः ।

" That vibration which arises in the heart when one touches sandalwood etc. or hears soft singing — when one is no longer indifferent, that is known as the *Śakti* (force) of bliss through which one becomes " sensitive " (lit. " endowed with a heart "). "

Note that Jayaratha quotes *Vijñānabhairava*, 73 (*gītādiviṣayāsvāda* etc.).

When Abhinava speaks of the sense of the " I " changing, deepening, we are irresistibly reminded of a very moving and powerful poem :

" I have to tell
you ..... your son is a mongol "
the doctor said.
How easily the word went in —

(*Continued on next page*

The first passage is extracted from the *Locana* on the second *Uddyota* of the *Dhvanyāloka*.[1] As far as we know this is Abhinava's first systematic exposition of his own and earlier views on the nature of aesthetic experience:

Locana pp. 180–190.

ननूक्तं भट्टनायकेन—

रसो यदा परगततया प्रतीयते तर्हि ताटस्थ्यमेव स्यात्। न च स्वगतत्वेन रामादिचरितमयात्काव्यादसौ प्रतीयते। स्वात्मगतत्वेन च प्रतीतौ स्वात्मनि रसस्योत्पत्तिरेवाभ्युपगता स्यात्। सा चायुक्ता सीतायाः। सामाजिकं प्रत्यविभावत्वात्। कान्तात्वं साधारणं वासनाविकासहेतुविभावतायां प्रयोजकमिति चेत्—देवतावर्णनादौ तदपि कथम्। न च स्वकान्तास्मरणं मध्ये संवेद्यते। अलोकसामान्यानां च रामादीनां ये समुद्रसेतुबन्धादयो विभावास्ते कथं साधारण्यं भजेयुः। न चोत्साहादिमान् रामः स्मर्यते, अननुभूतत्वात्। शब्दादपि तत्प्रतिपत्तौ न रसोपजनः। प्रत्यक्षादिव नायकमिथुनप्रतिपत्तौ। उत्पत्तिपक्षे च करुणस्योत्पादाद्दुःखित्वे करुणप्रेक्षासु पुनरप्रवृत्तिः स्यात्। तन्न उत्पत्तिरपि, नाप्यभिव्यक्तिः, शक्तिरूपस्य हि शृङ्गारस्याभिव्यक्तौ विषयार्जनतारतम्यप्रवृत्तिः स्यात्। तत्रापि किं स्वगतोऽभिव्यज्यते रसः परगतो वेति पूर्ववदेव दोषः। तेन न प्रतीयते नोत्पद्यते नाभिव्यज्यते काव्येन रसः। किं त्वन्यशब्दवैलक्षण्यं काव्यात्मनः शब्दस्य त्र्यंशताप्रसादात्। तत्राभिधायकत्वं वाच्यविषयं, भावकत्वं रसादिविषयं, भोगकृत्त्वं सहृदयविषयमिति त्रयोंऽशभूता व्यापाराः। तत्राभिधाभागो यदि शुद्धः स्यात्तत्तन्त्रादिभ्यः शास्त्रन्यायेभ्यः श्लेषाद्य-

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Continued from previous page)

clean as a bullet
leaving no mark on the skin
stopping the heart within it.
This was my first death,
the "I" ascending on a slow
last thermal breath
studied the man below
as a pilot treading air might
the buckled shell of his plane.

The poem ends with the grave insight this new "I" bestows:

You have a sickness they cannot heal,
the doctors say: locked in
your body you will remain.
Well, I have been locked in mine.
We will tunnel each other out.
You seal the covenant with a grin.

(Jon Stallworthy, "*Root and Branch*", Hogarth, London, 1968.),

which is the same kind of pure and beautiful reconciliation that Abhinavagupta achieves in his finest moments of philosophy, a wisdom we appreciate in literature, but hope for in vain in life.

1. *Dhvanyālokalocana*, p. 180, Banaras edition with *Bālapriyā*, under II. 4.

लंकाराणां को भेदः ? वृत्तिभेदवैचित्र्यं चाकिंचित्करम्। श्रुतिदुष्टादिवर्जनं च किमर्थम् ? तेन रसभावनाख्यो द्वितीयो व्यापारः, यद्वशादभिधा विलक्षणैव। तच्चैतद्भावकत्वं नाम रसान् प्रति यत्काव्यस्य तद्विभावादीनां साधारणत्वापादनं नाम। भाविते च रसे तस्य भोगः योऽनुभवस्मरणप्रतिपत्तिभ्यो विलक्षण एव द्रुतिविस्तरविकासात्मा रजस्तमोवैचित्र्यानुविद्ध-सत्त्वमयनिजचित्स्वभावनिर्वृतिविश्रान्तिलक्षणः परब्रह्मास्वादसविधः। स एव च प्रधान-भूतोंऽशः सिद्धरूप इति। व्युत्पत्तिर्नामाप्रधानमेवेति। अत्रोच्यते—रसस्वरूप एव तावद्वि-प्रतिपत्तयः प्रतिवादिनाम्। तथा हि—पूर्वावस्थायां यः स्थायी स एव व्यभिचारिसम्पातादिना प्राप्तपरिपोषोऽनुकार्यगत एव रसः। नाट्ये तु प्रयुज्यमानत्वान्नाट्यरस इति केचित्। प्रवाह-धर्मिण्यां चित्तवृत्तौ चित्तवृत्तेः चित्तवृत्त्यन्तरेण कः परिपोषार्थः ? विस्मयशोकक्रोधादेश्च क्रमेण तावन्न परिपोष इति नानुकार्ये रसः। अनुकर्तरि च तद्भावे लयाद्यननुसरणं स्यात्। सामाजिकगते वा कश्चमत्कारः ? प्रत्युत करुणादौ दुःखप्राप्तिः। तस्मान्नायं पक्षः। कस्तर्हि ? इहानन्त्यान्नियतस्यानुकारो न शक्यः, निष्प्रयोजनश्च विशिष्टताप्रतीतौ ताटस्थ्येन व्युत्पत्त्यभावात्।

तस्मादनियतावस्थात्मकं स्थायिनमुद्दिश्य विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिभिः संयुज्यमानैरयं रामः सुखीति स्मृतिविलक्षणा स्थायिनि प्रतीतिगोचरतयास्वादरूपा प्रतिपत्तिरनुकर्त्रालम्बना नाट्यैकगामिनी रसः। स च न व्यतिरिक्तमाधारमपेक्षते। किं त्वनुकार्याभिन्नाभिमते नर्तके आस्वादयिता सामाजिक इत्येतावन्मात्रमदः। तेन नाट्य एव रसः, नानुकार्यादिष्विति केचित्।

अन्ये तु—अनुकर्तरि यः स्थाय्यवभासोऽभिनयादिसामग्र्यादिकृतो भित्ताविव हरितालादिना अश्वावभासः, स एव लोकातीततयास्वादापरसंज्ञया प्रतीत्या रस्यमानो रस इति नाट्याद्रसा नाट्यरसाः। अपरे पुनर्विभावानुभावमात्रमेव विशिष्टसामग्र्या समर्प्यमाणं तद्विभावनीयानुभावनीयस्थायिरूपचित्तवृत्त्युचितवासनानुषक्तं स्वनिर्वृतिचर्वणाविशिष्टमेव रसः। तन्नाट्यमेव रसाः। अन्ये तु शुद्धं विभावम्, अपरे शुद्धमनुभावं, केचित्तु स्थायिमात्रम्, इतरे व्यभिचारिणम्, अन्ये तत्संयोगम्, एकेऽनुकार्यं, केचन सकलमेव समुदायं रसमाहुरित्यलं बहुना।

काव्येऽपि च लोकनाट्यधर्मिस्थानीयेन स्वभावोक्तिवक्रोक्तिप्रकारद्वयेनालौकिकप्रसन्न-मधुरौजस्विशब्दसमर्प्यमाणविभावादियोगादियमेव रसवार्ता। अस्तु वात्र नाट्याद्विचित्ररूपा रसप्रतीतिः; उपायवैलक्षण्यात्। इयमेव तावदत्र सरणिः। एवं स्थिते प्रथमपक्ष एवैतानि दूषणानि, प्रतीतेः स्वपरगतत्वादिविकल्पनेन। सर्वपक्षेषु च प्रतीतिरपरिहार्या रसस्य। अप्रतीतं हि पिशाचवदन्यत्रहार्यं स्यात्। किं तु यथा प्रतीतिमात्रत्वेनाविशिष्टत्वेऽपि प्रात्यक्षिकी आनुमानिकी आगमोत्था प्रतिभानकृता योगिप्रत्यक्षजा च प्रतीतिरुपायवैलक्षण्यादन्यैव, तद्वदियमपि प्रतीतिश्चर्वणास्वादनभोगापरनामा भवतु। तन्निदानभूताया हृदयसंवादाद्युपकृताया विभावादि-सामग्र्या लोकोत्तररूपत्वात्। रसाः प्रतीयन्त इति ओदनं पचतीतिवद्व्यवहारः, प्रतीयमान

एव हि रसः। प्रतीतिरेव विशिष्टा रसना। सा च नाट्ये लौकिकानुमानप्रतीतेर्विलक्षणा, तां च प्रमुखे उपायतया संदधाना। एवं काव्ये अन्यशाब्दप्रतीतेर्विलक्षणा, तां च प्रमुखे उपायतयापेक्षमाणा।

तस्मादनुत्थानोपहतः पूर्वपक्षः। रामादिचरितं तु न सर्वस्य हृदयसंवादीति महत्साहसम्। चित्रवासनाविशिष्टत्वाच्चेतसः। यदाह — "तासामनादित्वं आशिषो नित्यत्वात्। जातिदेशकालव्यवहितानामप्यानन्तर्यं स्मृतिसंस्कारयोरेकरूपत्वात्" इति। तेन प्रतीतिस्तावद्रसस्य सिद्धा। सा च रसनारूपा प्रतीतिरुत्पद्यते। वाच्यवाचकयोस्तत्राभिधादिविविक्तो व्यञ्जनात्मा ध्वननव्यापार एव। भोगीकरणव्यापारश्च काव्यस्य रसविषयो ध्वननात्मैव, नान्यत्किंचित्। भावकत्वमपि समुचितगुणालंकारपरिग्रहात्मकमस्माभिरेव वितत्य वक्ष्यते। किमेतदपूर्वम्? काव्यं च रसान् प्रति भावकमिति यदुच्यते, तत्र भवतैव भावनादुत्पत्तिपक्ष एव प्रत्युज्जीवितः। न च काव्यशब्दानां केवलानां भावकत्वम्, अर्थापरिज्ञाने तदभावात्। न च केवलानामर्थानां, शब्दान्तरेणार्प्यमाणत्वे तदयोगात्। द्वयोस्तु भावकत्वमस्माभिरेवोक्तम्। 'यत्रार्थः शब्दो वा तमर्थं व्यङ्क्तः' इत्यत्र। तस्माद्व्यञ्जकत्वाख्येन व्यापारेण गुणालंकारौचित्यादिकयेतिकर्तव्यतया काव्यं भावकं रसान् भावयति, इति व्यंशायामपि भावनायां करणांशे ध्वननमेव निपतति। भोगोऽपि न काव्यशब्देन क्रियते, अपि तु घनमोहान्ध्यसङ्कटतानिवृत्तिद्वारेणास्वादापरनाम्नि अलौकिके द्रुतिविस्तरविकासात्मनि भोगे कर्तव्ये लोकोत्तरे ध्वननव्यापार एव मूर्धाभिषिक्तः। तच्चेदं भोगकृत्त्वं रसस्य ध्वननीयत्वे सिद्धे दैवसिद्धम्। रस्यमानतोदितचमत्कारानतिरिक्तत्वाद्भोगस्येति। सत्त्वादीनां चाङ्गाङ्गिभाववैचित्र्यस्यानन्त्याद्द्रुत्यादित्वेनास्वादगणना न युक्ता। परब्रह्मास्वादसब्रह्मचारित्वं चास्त्वस्य रसास्वादस्य। व्युत्पादनं च शासनप्रतिपादनाभ्यां शास्त्रेतिहासकृताभ्यां विलक्षणम्। यथा रामस्तथाहमित्युपमानातिरिक्तां रसास्वादोपायस्वप्रतिभाविजृम्भारूपां व्युत्पत्तिमन्ते करोतीति कमुपलभामहे।

Here is our translation of this complex passage :

Objection :[1] It has been said by Bhaṭṭanāyaka:[2] "Were *rasa*[3] to

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1. In the second edition of Gnoli's work, "*The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta*", Chowkhamba, 1968, which has just appeared, he has added an appendix in which he translates the passage. However, our interpretations differ so often and so radically from his, that we felt we were not duplicating any labour by translating this important passage. It did not seem to us necessary to point out all the places where we differ.

2. This is an earlier version of what Abhinava later expands into the famous commentary on the *rasasūtra* in the *Abhinavabhāratī*, Vol. I, p. 277 ff. This passage forms the core of Gnoli's book. See also, for details on the views of Abhinava's predecessors, Sankaran, "*Some Theories af Rasa and Dhvani*", and P. Shastri, "*The Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure*".

3. We have found the following texts useful, either because they reproduce, or because they expand these very arguments :

(*Continued on next page*

be apprehended as belonging to someone else (and not to the spectator), then (the spectator) would remain indifferent (*tāṭasthya*). Nor can *rasa*, which stems from a poem dealing with a subject like the life and deeds of Rāma, etc., be apprehended as belonging to oneself. For if it were apprehended as belonging to oneself, we would have to say that real emotions (such as sexual desire, etc.) arise in one's own self (while witnessing a dramatic performance). And that would be most improper in the case of (somebody like) Sītā.[1] For (she) cannot be the (*ālambana*) *vibhāva*[2] with respect to a spectator.[3] Should it be argued that what causes (*prayojaka*) her to become a *vibhāva* (cause) of arousing (*vikāsa*) latent emotions (*vāsanā*) (of love, etc.) (in the spectator) is the fact that (she stands as a symbol for) non-personalised (*sādhāraṇa*) womanhood (*kāntātva*), we reply: how would such a process be possible in the case of the description of gods, etc.? Nor can it be said that during a dramatic performance (*madhye*) there is (on the part of the spectator) a recollection of his own wife.[4] How can

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Continued from previous page)

(For full bibliographical information on each item consult the bibliography at the end of the volume): (1) Śrīdhara's commentary on the *Kāvyaprakāśa*; (2) Māṇikyacandra's commentary on the *KP.*; (3) Caṇḍīdāsa's commentary on the *KP.*; (4) Hemacandra's *Kāvyānuśāsana*; (5) Prabhākara's *Rasapradīpa*; (6) Vidyādhara's *Ekāvalī*; (7) Vidyanātha's *Pratāparudrayośobhūṣaṇa*, and finally (8) Jagannātha's *Rasagaṅgādhara*.

1. Abhinava, following Bhaṭṭatauta, uses this same argument against Śaṅkuka, *A. Bh.*, p. 277 (Gnoli, p. 7):

न हि ममेयं सीता काचिदिति स्वात्मीयत्वेन प्रतिपत्तिर्नटस्य ।

"The actor does not think to himself: 'Sītā belongs to me'."

2. BN means that Sītā is only a *vibhāva* with regard to Rāma, not to the spectator. But what can this mean? *Vibhāvas* are all in regard to *rasa*. After all, it is not Rāma who experiences *rasa* in regard to Sītā, so how can she be his *vibhāva*? We must take the word *vibhāva* to be a loose usage for *kāraṇa* of true *rati* in Rāma, but this has to do with the real world and not with *rasa*.

3. Bhaṭṭanāyaka (BN) uses sophistry to prove that *rasa* is perceived neither as located in the *sāmājika* (*ātmagata*) nor as located in someone else (e.g. the character portrayed or the actor who presents that character). By ruling out both the possibilities, *ātmagatatva* and *paragatatva* of *rasapratīti*, he comes to the conclusion that *rasaḥ na pratīyate*, "*rasa* is not perceived at all". According to BN we do not have any *perception* (*pratīti*) of *rasa*, but only its enjoyment (*bhoga* or *bhogīkaraṇa*). BN is not against admitting *rasa* in the *sāmājika* — he is against admitting its *pratyaya* (perception) in the *sāmājika*. Instead of *pratyaya*, BN uses his own terminology *bhoga* and *bhogīkaraṇa*. The difference between the two ideas seems to us only one of terminology.

For the same arguments, see the *A. Bh.*, p. 278, (Gnoli, p. 10).

4. We have translated this sentence as if it were a serious observation, namely that when the spectator sympathises he does not remember his own personal life. However, it is possible that it is meant humorously as well: "for God's sake, you do not want to have to remember your own wife when watching love scenes!"

(*uddīpana*) *vibhāvas* in the form of such deeds as building a bridge over the ocean, etc., by extraordinary heroes like Rāma ever become generalised, (since nobody else could ever do them)? Nor can it be said that Rāma, etc., as full of energy,[1] etc., is *remembered*,[2] because he has never actually formed a part of our (past) experience (such that now we could remember him). To perceive (Rāma's) energy (*utsāha*, the *sthāyibhāva* of *vīrarasa*) from a verbal source of knowledge (*śabda*) is not to experience *rasa*,[3] just as when we directly watch a couple making love there is no *aesthetic* pleasure.[4] As for the theory that *rasas arise* (*utpatti*), (the difficulty is that) because of the (spectator's) (real) sorrow (*karuṇa*, i. e. *śoka*) he would be genuinely unhappy and would no longer return to watch such dramatic performances in which (there was) *karuṇa* (*rasa*) ever again. Therefore rasa does not "arise" (*utpatti*), nor is it induced by suggestion

1. The important word is Rāma, to which *utsāhādimān* is simply an adjective. The *ādi* stands for *ratimān*, etc., depending on the *rasa*. But none of these states form part of our own experience of Rāma, since we never knew him. Even though the spectator might apprehend the *sthāyibhāvas* like *utsāha*, etc., in Rāma, etc., from the words actually used in the poem, still it will be only *śabdajanyajñāna* of the *utsāha* in Rāma. This *śabdajanyajñāna* cannot lead to *rasotpatti* in the *sahṛdaya*. The reason for this is given in the form of an analogy in the next sentence: "Just as when a couple is actually observed (*pratyakṣa*) making love to each other, there is no *rasotpatti* in the observer (*rasopajana* means *ratibhāvāsvādana* – an aesthetic experience of love)." But we cannot quite see the point in the argument, in spite of the analogy. However, to have seen this "generalised" nature of drama was one of the great moments of literary criticism, and it appears that this view belongs to Bhaṭṭanāyaka, for Abhinava simply takes it over. *Bhāvanā* is the same as *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*. Ānanda does not use this term.

2. The reason we cannot remember Rāma is that the definition of memory in Sanskrit logic involves *anubhava*, direct experience.

3. The expanded version of this, *A. Bh.*, p. 278 (Gnoli, p. 10) reads:

न च शब्दानुमानादिभ्यस्तत् — (where तत् refers to उत्साहादिस्थायिभाव) — प्रतीतौ लोकस्य सरसता युक्ता प्रत्यक्षादिव।

What is BN's point? Does he mean simply that we cannot have *rasapratīti* through *anumāna* and *śabda*?

4. Abhinava (*A. Bh.* Vol. I. p. 278, Gnoli, p. 10) expands the analogy of watching a couple making love by adding:

प्रत्युत लज्जाजुगुप्सास्पृहादिस्वोचितचित्तवृत्त्यन्तरोदयव्यग्रतया का सरसत्वकथापि स्यात्।

"On the contrary, because one becomes preoccupied (*vyāgratayā*) with one's own mental moods that arise, such as embarassment, disgust, or even sexual desire, we cannot say that this is an aesthetic experience." Cf. also *Daśarūpaka* IV. 39 and the *Avaloka* thereon. Abhinava makes the same point on p. 35 of the *A. Bh.* (Vol. I): लौकिकमिथुनदृशीव सांसारिकहर्षक्रोधान्वयितापत्तेरुभयदर्शनाकुलतया (?) मुख्यद्दष्टौ प्रयोक्तृदृष्टावनुसंधि (?)-संपत्त्यभावात्।

We take *tatpratipattau* in the last sentence of p. 181 to refer to *utsāha* of the preceding sentence: न च उत्साहादिमान् रामः स्मर्यते, as opposed to Gnoli who takes it to refer to Rāma.

(*abhivyakti*), for if (such emotions as) love, existing in a dormant form (*śaktirūpa*) (in the spectator), were to (arise or) be induced by suggestion, then there would occur the difficulty that to a greater or lesser extent (*tāratamya*) the spectators would make actual physical attempts to possess the object (presented before them on the stage).[1] And if we held that *rasa* was aroused (i. e. induced)[2] by suggestion, (we could ask the same question as before:) is rasa existent in the spectator himself, or in someone else? The same difficulties would arise now as arose before. Therefore *rasa* is not (directly) perceived (*pratīyate*),[3] nor conjured up (*utpadyate*), nor suggested (*abhivyajyate*) by poetry. But poetic words are of an altogether different nature from ordinary words, thanks to the three functions (*tryaṃśatā*) possessed by them. Denotation (*abhidhāyakatva*) is concerned with the literal meaning; universalisation (*bhāvakatva*) is concerned with *rasa*, etc.;[4] and aesthetic enjoyment (*bhoktṛtva*) is concerned with the sensitive reader (*sahṛdaya*). These are three (separate) functions which are the constituents of words used in poetry (or literature). If one were to claim that in

1. All later writers reproduce this phrase, *viṣayārjanatāratamya* but without explaining it or paraphrasing it. It is thus clear that nobody really knew what Abhinava meant. Gnoli takes it very differently from the way we have (see *op. cit.* p. 45, 108). We take it to mean that the spectator would actually feel the need to acquire (*arjana*) the object (*viṣaya*) on the stage, i. e. he would want to get up and take Sītā away. But the expression *tāratamya* is, we admit, inconvenient. We suppose the idea is that some people will make a greater effort (i. e. will be more excited) to attain the object, and others less. See *Daśarūpaka* IV. 39 and *Avaloka* on the same: इतरेषां असूयानुरागापकारेच्छादयः प्रसज्येरन् । Cf. the old story of the backwoodsman in the gallery who shot the "villain" on the stage.

2. It is not clear to us just what Bhaṭṭanāyaka intends by the term *abhivyakti*. He must of course have known the doctrine of *vyañjanā* as put forth by Ānandavardhana. Abhinava uses the term *abhivyakti* as synonymous with "suggestion". Bhaṭṭanāyaka however understands "*abhivyakti*" to be a sort of production which he places on the same level as *utpatti*, since his argument *śṛṅgārasya abhivyaktau*, etc., really applies to *utpattipakṣa*. Abhinava points out that in a verse which he quotes from BN, the expression *vyaṅgya* occurs. The verse is:

भावसंयोजनाव्यङ्ग्यपरसंवित्तिगोचरः ।
आस्वादनात्मानुभवो रसः काव्यार्थ उच्यते ॥

(Gnoli, p. 11, *A. Bh.* I, p. 279) on which Abhinava comments: इति तत्र व्यज्यमानतया व्यङ्ग्यो रक्ष्यते (surely, though, the correct reading is *lakṣyate*).

3. BN's stand that *rasa* is not perceived at all (*rasaḥ na pratīyate*) is not reasonable. It is the same sophistic argument used in *svagatatva* and *paragatatva*, meant only to silence the opponent. Unless he could mean by *pratīyate* "direct experience", which is of course not what takes place in the theatre, since, as BN already pointed out, we do not know the people on the stage and are thus not personally involved.

4. *Rasādiviṣayam* is problematic. We must understand *ratyādiviṣayam*, which is confirmed by the *Rasapradīpa*, p. 26.

literature (*tatra*) denotation alone held sway, then what would differentiate *śleṣa* and other figures of speech from such devices as the use of words in two senses (*tantra*),[1] etc., in scientific works?[2] Moreover (if this were true) then the different varieties of alliteration (*vṛtti*) would be virtually useless. And what purpose would the avoidance of such faults as cacophony (*śrutiduṣṭa*),[3] etc., serve? Therefore there is a second function[4] known as generalisation (*bhāvanā*) (responsible for bringing about the experience) of *rasa* (i. e. of the *sthāyibhāvas*), thanks to which, denotation (*abhidhā*) assumes a new dimension (*vilakṣanā*). This function of universalisation (*bhāvakatva*) with respect to the *rasas* (i. e. *sthāyibhāvas*) is in fact (*nāma*) what is, in poetry, responsible for making the *vibhāvas*, etc., universal. Once a *rasa* (i. e. *sthāyibhāva*) has been thus universalised,[5] its realisation (*bhoga*, i. e. *sākṣātkāra*) (is possible), a realisation which is different from the perceptions derived from memory or direct experience, which takes the

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1. The *Bālapriyā* (p. 182) explains *tantra* as follows :

तन्त्रं नामानेकार्थबोधेच्छया पदस्यैकस्य सकृदुच्चारणम् । . . . . . शास्त्रे "हलन्त्य"मिति पाणिनीयसूत्रादाविव "सर्वेदो माधव" इत्यादिश्लेषस्थलेऽपि तन्त्रादिनानेकार्थबोधसंभवादुभयोर्भेदो न स्यादित्यर्थः । The point is this : In the *sūtra* of Pāṇini (I. 3·3 : *halantyaṃ*), "*hal*" stands for two completely different things : it means (1) the *śivasūtra* (no. 14) hal, and (2) any one of the consonants. There is of course no *camatkāra* in this. Cf. Udd. III, *Locana*, p. 472. Cf. Vāmana's *Kāvyālaṅkārasūtra*, IV. 3. 7.

2. At this point in the exposition of BN's views, the Śrīdhara commentary adds : तत्रापि (तत्राभिधा) निरन्तरसान्तरार्थनिष्टत्वेन मुख्यामुख्यभेदेन द्विविधः शब्दव्यापारः । स शास्त्रेतिहासयोरपि यथाक्रमं शब्दार्थप्राधान्येन प्रभुमित्रसंमितयोः साधारणः । अन्यदंशद्वयं तु काव्यनाट्ययोरेव, उभयत्रापि व्यापारप्राधान्याज्जायासंमितत्वेन व्यवस्थितेः । (S. Bhattacharya, *op. cit.* vol. I, p. 68). This makes it likely that this famous distinction of teaching like a master, and like a wife, was first invented by BN and not by Abhinava. Abhinava first mentions this on p. 40, of the *Locana*, and again on p. 336 and 399. The distinction between *śāstra*, *ākhyāna* and *kāvya* has already been made by BN in a verse that Abhinava quotes on p. 87 of the *Locana* :

शब्दप्राधान्यमाश्रित्य तत्र शास्त्रं पृथग्विदुः ।
अर्थे तत्त्वेन युक्ते तु वदन्त्याख्यानमेतयोः ॥
द्वयोर्गुणत्वे व्यापारप्राधान्ये काव्यधीर्भवेत् ॥

[We Should read *arthe tattvena* as done by K. Sastri (p. 161)]. This is surely the inspiration for Abhinava's famous distinction, taken over by all later writers.

3. *Śrutiduṣṭa* is mentioned by Bhāmaha, I. 47, and by the *Dhvanyāloka* II. 14 and the *Vṛtti* thereon. Abhinava (p. 214–215 of the *Locana*) speaks of it as *anitya* because there are cases in which harsh sounds are appropriate, e. g. in *raudrarasa*. See also *Uddyota* III, *parikaraśloka* no. 1, on p. 302. Abhinava also refers to *nityānityadoṣa* on p. 16 of the *Locana*.

4. Note that BN is arguing for a further power in poetry, beyond the literal sense. Most probably he derives this doctrine from Ānandavardhana.

5. *Bhāvite ca rase* is really speaking an improper usage. *Bhāvanayā samarpite rase* is what BN means.

form of *druti, vistara* and *vikāsa,*[1] and which approximates the bliss that comes from realising (one's identity) with the highest Brahman (*parabrahamāsvādasavidhaḥ*),[2] for it consists of repose in the bliss (*nirvṛtiviśrānti*) which is the true nature of one's own Self, and which is permeated with *sattva* (*guṇa*) intermingled with the diversity of *rajas* and *tamas*. It is this aesthetic pleasure (*bhoga*) alone that is the major element (i. e. purpose of poetry),[3] and it is an accomplished fact (*siddharūpa*) (since it consists in blissful repose in the pure consciousness of the Self which is an accomplished fact) (even though in relation to *abhidhā* and *bhāvanā* it is *sādhyarūpa,* i. e. to be accomplished). (All forms of) intellectual and moral instruction (*vyutpatti*) (in literature) are in fact only subsidiary, (pleasure being the major goal of literature)."[4] We reply (to these views of Bhaṭṭanāyaka) as fol-

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1. Note the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, p. 66 (KM ed. of 1939): गुणानां चैतेषां द्रुतिदीप्तिविकासाख्यास्तिस्रश्चित्तवृत्तयः क्रमेण प्रयोज्याः।

These terms are explained in the *DR.* IV. 43. Ānanda speaks of *dīpti* on p. 209. See also *Kārikā* II. 9 (p. 208). Abhinava speaks of *dīpti* as being *vikāsa–vistāraprajjvalanasvabhāvā* (p. 208-209, *Locana*). He also uses the verb *dravati* in connection with *karuṇa*. Ānanda says that the mind, in *karuṇa*, is exceedingly moved (*ārdratāṃ yāti*, which Abhinava (p. 207–208) explains as *kāṭhinyaṃ tyajati*). This certainly prefigures the theory. Is BN the first to use these terms? We think it unlikely. See also Gnoli, p. 46, and Raghavan, *Śṛ. Pr.* p. 436.

2. Note the importance of the term *savidhaḥ*, which means literally "near". We don't think it can be taken to mean simply "similar" here, since surely the implication is that it is inferior. If this is the correct interpretation, then perhaps the passage about the Yogins milking the cow of mysticism (*Locana*, p. 91) should be reinterpreted, in spite of what Abhinava says. (Note that this agrees with the extraordinary passage in the third *Uddyota*, p. 510, where Abhinava unambiguously states that *rasāsvāda* is inferior to *brahmāsvāda* ..... परमेश्वरविश्रान्त्यानन्दः प्रकृष्यते तदानन्दविप्रुण्मात्रावभासो हि रसास्वादः। See also Śrīdhara : भोगश्च परानन्दास्वादतां योगिगतो ब्रह्मस्वादसंनिकृष्टः। But not everybody thought that BN meant "inferior". Mammaṭa, p. 60 (S. Bhattacharya's ed. from which the above quotation by Śrīdhara is taken), paraphrases as : *brahmāsvādam iva*. Note Hemacandra, p. 88: *parabrahmāsvādasodaro nimīlitanayanaiḥ*, which reminds one of the humorous passage in the *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 26 : ध्वनिर्ध्वनिरिति यदेतदलीकसहृदयत्वभावनामुकुलितलोचनैर्नृत्यते, which Abhinavagupta will later defend as being one of the signs of ecstasy.

3. This is very important, for Bhaṭṭanāyaka may have been the first to clearly say that *vyutpatti* is secondary to *prīti*. In this he is followed by Abhinava (p. 41 – *ānanda eva pāryantikaṃ phalam;* and third *Uddyota*, p. 336 where *vyutpatti* is said to be an incidental result of *prīti*, though the passage is somewhat ambiguous).

4. Govinda, in his *Kāvyapradīpa*, (p. 66) actually says that this view of BN is in accord with the Sāṅkhya doctrine : उद्रेकश्च स्वेतरावभिभूयावस्थानं इति सांख्यसिद्धान्तानुसारेण विवृणुते। *Sattva, rajas* and *tamas* are of course the three constituents of human nature. As Jagannātha says (p. 29, RG), during *rasapratīti, rajas* and *tamas* are suppressed by the preponderance of *sattva*, because of the power of the function called *bhogakṛttva*.

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lows: the true nature of rasa is the subject of many different and controversial views. For instance, some (Lollaṭa for example) believe that that which is known as a permanent emotion (*sthāyibhāva*) in its prior (undeveloped) form (*pūrvāvasthā*) becomes nourished (i. e. developed, *prāptaparipoṣa*) through the introduction (*saṃpāta*) of the *vyabhicārins*, etc., and (then becomes) rasa located in the character being portrayed (*anukārya*). Rasas are called *nāṭyarasas* because they are used in drama. (Objection to this view by Śaṅkuka:)[1] what can it mean to say that one state of mind (*cittavṛtti*) is "nourished" by another state of mind, seeing that mental moods are in a constant state of flux (*pravāhadharmin*)?[2] Wonder, grief and anger, etc., are not gradually augmented (*paripoṣa*) (on the contrary, they diminish with time).[3] Therefore there is no rasa in the character being portrayed.[4] If one were to say that it is in the actor (*anukartṛ*), (the difficulty is that) the actor would then be unable to follow the tempo (*laya*),[5] etc., (since he would be

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An excellent account of BN's view and its similarity to the Sāṅkhya is to be found in Hiriyana, "Indian Aesthetics", *Proceedings and Transactions of the first Oriental Conference*, Poona, 1922, p. 246–247. "The purpose of evolution in the Sāṅkhya is *bhoga* and *apavarga*, and the use of this word *bhoga* in this passage constitutes a link connecting the present theory with the Sāṅkhya." (*op. cit.* p. 247–248).

1. Here is a one-sentence summary of Śaṅkuka's position by Prabhākara, *Rasapradīpa*. p. 22: विभावादिभिर्नटे ऽनुमीयमानोऽनुकार्यगो रत्यादिः स्थायिभावो रसः

2. It is not clear what Śaṅkuka intends by *pravāhadharmin*. What does he mean when he says that one mental state cannot nourish another, since any mental state is in constant flux? The analogy of a river does not hold good, for while it is in a constant state of flux, it is nonetheless augmented by minor streams. Why should not a major (or abiding, *sthāyin*) mental state be intensified by subsidiary and fleeting mental states? Does Śaṅkuka mean that there is no question of any mental state being strengthened by any other mental state, since all of them are after all in a state of flux – always changing – diminishing in their intensity with the passage of time? But this does not seem true. Does he mean that it is only in the theatre that one has a concentrated mental mood, not in real life? If so, would he argue that Rāma's love was constantly changing? Unlikely. What then could he mean?

3. This passage has been expanded in the *A. Bh.* p. 274: शोकस्य प्रथमं तीव्रत्वं कालात्तु मान्द्यदर्शनम्। This is very true, and well observed, but what does it prove? Perhaps the point is that a mental state becomes intensified or weakened because of the external objective stimulants, and not because of other mental states (like the *vyabhichāribhāvas*).

4. The sentence *iti nānukārye rasaḥ* is elliptical. It should be explained as follows: अनुकार्ये (रामादौ) विद्यमानः रसः सामाजिकेनास्वाद्यत इति न युक्तम्। According to Lollaṭa, the spectator relishes the *rasa* (i. e. *ratyādisthāyibhāva*) which is located in the character portrayed. Now Śaṅkuka's view is that the spectator cannot be said to enjoy the *ratyādibhāva* which is after all located in the character portrayed, who is removed both in space and time from the spectator.

5. Note how the BP takes *laya* (p. 184): लयो नाम नृत्तगीतवाद्यानामेकतानतारूपं साम्यम्। But we feel that Gnoli's interpretation, which we follow, is better (see his Int. p. XVIII).

absorbed in an aesthetic experience and unable to concentrate on his duties as an actor). If one were to say (that *rasa*, i. e. *ratyādibhāva* exists) in the spectator, how could there be delight (*camatkāra*)? On the contrary, in *karuṇa* (*rasa*) (i. e. in tragic situations), etc., the spectator would experience (only) pain. Therefore this thesis is incorrect. What then is the correct view? It is not possible (precisely) to imitate any one particular mood because of the endless and ever-changing (*aniyata*) degrees of intensity (of the mental moods). Moreover it would be useless to do so, for if they were reproduced exactly (*viśiṣṭatā*), because (the spectator) would not be moved (*tāṭasthya*), there could result no edification (*vyutpatti*).

Therefore, (here is Śaṅkuka's view:)[1] when this *sthāyi*(*bhāva*), whose nature is not definite (as regards its particular intensity) is combined with the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*, there results an experience (*pratipatti*) of the the *sthāyi*(*bhāva*) (love, etc.) which is inferred as existing in the actor (because he is for the time being the locus of the *rati*, etc.) and is (therefore) confined only to the drama. The nature of this experience is the enjoyment of the *sthāyibhāva* (love, etc.) (thus inferred as existing in the actor) and it is different from memory, because it is the object of the apprehension that "this Rāma (standing before me, as represented by the actor) is happy[2] (because he is with Sītā)". This *rasa* does not depend on any other thing beyond the actor who is apprehended (by the spectator) as non-different from the character being portrayed, and the spectator who is the relisher (of the *ratibhāva*, etc., inferred by him as existing in the actor). Only that much[3] (and nothing more is required for the aesthetic experience of the *rasa*). Therefore, *rasa* exists only in the drama, and not in the characters to be portrayed, etc. This is the view of some (i. e. of Śaṅkuka).

Others[4] say: the appearance (semblance, *avabhāsa*) of a *sthāyi* (*bhāva*) in the actor, which has been brought about by the dramatic accessories (*sāmagrī*) such as *abhinaya*, etc., is like the appearance (semblance) of a

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1. This is a difficult passage. We take *viśiṣṭa* to mean *niyata* (definite, particular, precise.): नटे अनुकार्यरामादिगतविशिष्ट (i. e. नियत) चित्तावृत्तिज्ञानं वर्तते। तेन च नटेन तज्ज्ञानानुसारेणाभिनयः क्रियते। इति स्वीकृते, सामाजिका अपि नासौ पारमार्थिकः रत्यादिभावः किंतु तदनुकरणमात्रम् इति जानीयुः। तेन चानुकरणमात्रत्वज्ञानेन सामाजिकानां ताटस्थ्यं स्यात्। ततश्च व्युत्पत्तेरसंभवः। Very different, however, is Gnoli, p. 110.

2. *Ayaṃ rāmaḥ sukhī* is explained by the BP (p. 185) as *rāmo' yam sītāviṣayakaratimān*.

3. *Adaḥ* means "*idam*". See *Locana* p. 160, where Abhinava uses the same expression. It occurs again on p. 239 and 258 of the *Locana*.

4. It is difficult to identify the person who held this opinion, number 4, given on p. 186. According to Mammaṭa (*KP*. IV, p. 88 of Jhalkikar's ed.) the painted horse analogy (*citraturaganyāya*) belongs to Śaṅkuka, whereas here it is given after his views have already been expounded.

horse (drawn) on a canvas by means of yellow pigment, etc. Because it is enjoyed by an act of cognition, which is otherwise called relish (*āsvāda*), and since it is transcendental, it is called *rasa*. And so the expression *nāṭyarasāḥ* is to be explained as *nāṭyād rasāḥ*, i. e. *rasas* arising from drama.

Others, however, say : the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* alone, being presented (to the spectator) with the help of special stage-equipment (acting, music, dialogue, etc.) (*viśiṣṭasāmagrī*) and being linked (*anuṣakta*) with the instincts (*vāsanā*) appropriate to the mental state in the form of the *sthāyibhāva* which is sought to be produced (*vibhāvanīya*)[1] by these *vibhāvas* and which is intended to be brought within the purview of the experience of the spectators by means of these *anubhāvas*, these (*vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*) becoming the object of the relish in the form of the bliss of the Self (*svanirvṛticarvaṇāviśiṣṭa*),[2]– well, these *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* themselves are *rasa*. Therefore, *rasas*, are nothing but drama. Others say that *rasa* is the *vibhāva* alone, others that it is the *anubhāva* alone, and some that it is the *sthāyibhāva* alone. Others say that *rasa* is the *vyabhicāribhāva*; still others that the combination of these (four) is *rasa*. Some say that *rasa* is the character being portrayed. Others say that *rasa* is the conglomeration of all these (five) things. Anyway, this is enough now.

(Here then is my own, Abhinava's, position) : *rasa* applies to (non-dramatic) poetry as well, where in place of realism[3] (*lokadharmī*) and

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1. This is a difficult passage. *Tadvibhāvanīya* means *vibhāvavibhāvanīya*, "The *sthāyibhāva* which is sought to be produced by those *vibhāvas*." *Tadanubhāvanīya* means *anubhāva–anubhāvanīya*, "The *sthāyibhāva* which is intended to be brought within the purview of the experience of the spectators by means of those *anubhāvas*." विशिष्टसामग्र्या समर्प्यमाणं means अभिनयादिसामग्र्या सामाजिकानां पुरस्तादुपस्थाप्यमानम् ।

2. Note how similar this is to Abhinava's view.

3. On *nāṭyadharmī* and *lokadharmī*, see the long article by Raghavan, *J. O. R.*, Vol. VII, 1933, p. 359–398, part I, and part II, Vol. VIII, 1934, p. 57–75. *Lokadharmī* refers to everything in the drama that is realistic (and applies thus primarily to the *prakaraṇa*), whereas *nāṭyadharmī* refers to all the conventions used only in the theatre : asides that nobody else can hear, monologues, talking animals, gods on the stage, etc. Note that in the thirteenth chapter of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (Vol. II., G. O. S. p. 214) when Bharata begins a long list of the *lakṣaṇas* of each, he speaks of *lokadharmī* as *svabhāvabhāvopagata* (XIII, 71). It is a very embracing topic with Bharata, and includes such diverse elements as the *pravṛttis*, the *prakṛtis*, the dance, etc. Note the very interesting verse that Abhinava quotes from his teacher (Bhaṭṭatauta ? – he only says : यथोक्तम्) :

यदत्रास्ति न तत्रास्य कवेर्वर्णनमर्हति
यन्नासंभवि तत्र स्यात्संभव्यत्र तु धर्मतः ।

The second half of the verse, unless one has *na saṃbhavi*, makes no sense. But the first is all right : "Not everything that is in the world deserves to be described by the poet in his plays." Abhinava more than once points out that not everything in

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convention (*nāṭyadharmī*) (that apply to the theatre) there are the two modes of *svabhāvokti*[1] and *vakrokti* which convey *rasa* by means of transcendental (*alaukika*) *vibhāvas*,[2] etc., which are presented by words possessing such qualities as clarity (*prasanna*), softness (*madhura*) and vigour (*ojasvin*).[3]

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the drama need correspond to real life. As proof of this, he points out that many dances do not have anything to correspond to them in real life. (What in the outside world bears any resemblance whatsoever to Beethoven's last quartets?) Note too, what Abhinava says in the *A. Bh.* vol. I, p. 269: लोके तु कदाचित्न भवत्यपि गृहीतत्वात्। नाट्ये तु त एव जीवितम्। It may be that Abhinavagupta was the first writer ever to have articulated this refutation of strict realism, which has now come to seem so commonplace in modern literature that it needs no defence. This was not so, less than fifty years ago.

1. These are parallel terms, *svabhāvokti* corresponding to *lokadharmī* and *vakrokti* to *nāṭyadharmī* as applied to *kāvya*. Thus Abhinava is using the terms in their widest sense. Bhāmaha too (V. 66 II. 85, I. 30) uses *vakrokit* to apply to all forms of *alaṅkāra*. But he defines *svabhāvokti* (II. 93) as a separate figure of speech. (Thus De's remark, *Vakroktijīvita*, p. 23 : "Kuntaka follows Bhāmaha in rejecting *svabhāvokti* as an *alaṅkāra*" is not true. It stems from the qualifying phrase in Bhāmaha : *iti kecit pracakṣate*, which does indicate doubt on Bhāmaha's part, but not complete rejection.) Daṇḍin (II. 363) divides *vāṅmaya* into two realms : *svabhāvokti* and *vakrokti*. See also Udbhata. III. 8–9. The most elaborate discussion on *svabhāvokti* is found in the first chapter of Kuntaka's *Vakroktijīvita*. *Vakrokti* of course for Kuntaka is just what *dhvani* is for Ānanda, only it is even wider in its embrace. *Svabhāvokti* is the *alaṅkārya*, the *kāvyaśarīra* to which *vakrokti* is applied. See the valuable article by V. Raghavan, "History of Svabhāvokti" in "*Some Concepts*, etc.". It is tempting to see the division in Skt. poetry as that of realism and romanticism. Certainly verses that illustrate *svabhāvokti* tend to be more simple and direct, and to deal with less exalted subjects. Moreover, the passage from the *Locana* supports this conjecture. There are not a great many Skt. poets who excelled in realism. Professor Ingalls has written about one who did, Yogeśvara, in two remarkable articles : "A Sanskrit Poetry of Village and Field : Yogeśvara and His Fellow Poets" *J. A. O. S.* vol. 74 (1954) pp. 119–131; and "Yogeśvara and His Favourite Poets.", Dr. V. Raghavan Felicitation Volume, *Adyar Library Bulletin*, Vols. 21–22, 1967–68, Madras, pp. 185 ff. A poem that deserves to be much better known in this respect is Abhinanda's *Kādambarīkathāsāra*, quoted by Abhinava several times, which contains some remarkable examples of well-observed minor moments in life.

2. Against *Bālapriyā* (p. 186), we take *alaukika* to construe with the *vibhāvas*, etc. In other words, the *vibhāvas* are *alaukika* in so far as they are called *vibhāvas*. It would not make much sense to associate the word with the *guṇas* themselves.

3. These are the *śabdaguṇas* mentioned by Bharata, Daṇḍin and Vāmana. Ānandavardhana completely altered the older teaching of Daṇḍin (I. 41–42) and Vāmana (I. 2. 11) on *guṇas* by bringing them under his system of *rasa*. For him, the *guṇas* are the properties of *rasa* (as opposed to the *alaṅkāras*). See under II. 7 of the *Dhvanyāloka*. Instead of the usual ten *guṇas* accepted by Bharata, Daṇḍin and Vāmana, Ānanda accepts only the three mentioned here. The concept is very complex, and we have dealt with it at some length in our notes to the *Locana*

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Or we could even grant that aesthetic experience (*rasapratīti*) in poetry is distinct in nature from that experienced in drama, since there is a difference in the means whereby it is brought about (in both cases).[1] Nonetheless (*tāvat*), the particular mode by which aesthetic experience is brought about is the only one that will be explained presently (*iyam eva*). This being the case, the criticism (of Bhaṭṭanāyaka) concerning the impossibility of *rasa* being found either in oneself or in someone else, applies only to the first view (i. e. Bhaṭṭalollata's).[2] But in all the views (so far expounded) the unavoidable fact remains that *rasa* is perceived (*pratīti*).[3] For if it were unperceived (as Bhaṭṭanāyaka claims), then we could have no dealings with it, just as we can have no dealings with goblins[4] (since such creatures do not really

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translation to be published shortly. Note that Abhinava, in his discussions on the *guṇas*, has occasion to develop a theory much like the one hinted at by the words *druti*, *vistara* and *vikāsa* as used by Bhaṭṭanāyaka. *Ārdratā* stands for *druti*. *Dīpti* would be the equivalent of *vistara*, and *vyāpakatva* (or *samarpakatva*) of *vikāsa*. They are of course associated with certain *rasas*. See the *Locana* on II. 7–10. The best treatment of the problem is to be found in P. C. Lahiri, "*Concepts of Rīti and Guṇa in Sanskrit Poetics*", University of Dacca, 1937, and V. Raghavan, *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa*, pp. 249–251.

1. There should be a *daṇḍa* after *upāyavailakṣanyād*. *Iyam eva* begins a new sentence.

2. I. e. Lollata's views, which BN refutes so convincingly that Abhinava need not do the work again.

3. This is directed against BN. who had said earlier (p. 182), *tena na pratīyate...rasaḥ*. Abhinava expands this on p. 277 (*A. Bh.* Vol. I, Gnoli, p. 11): प्रतीत्यादिव्यतिरिक्तश्च संसारे को भोग इति न विद्मः। रसेनेति चेत् सापि प्रतिपत्तिरेव। But this is perhaps to interpret BN too rigidly. By saying *na pratīyate rasaḥ*, obviously he could not be claiming that *rasa* does not exist, only that *pratīti* is not an adequate word to express how it is experienced. Perhaps (if he is not merely to be sophistic) BN means that it is not "perceived" the way other things are in the world, i. e. it is not the result of the ordinary *pramāṇas* such as *pratyakṣa*, etc. Moreover, Abhinava accepts what BN says about *rasa* being neither personal (*svagata*) in which case we would become physically involved, nor *paragata*, in which case we would be indifferent. Abhinava also accepts the reason for this statement : *rasa* is made universal, *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*, which is one of the most important concepts of Skt. poetics, first met with (under the name of *bhāvanā*) in BN and universally accepted by later writers.

4. It would seem that Abhinava is saying that *piśācas* (goblins) are merely figments of the imagination. On p.277, vol. I of the *A.Bh.* (Gnoli, p. 11) Abhinava says the same thing : न चाप्रतीतं वस्त्वस्ति व्यवहारेण योग्यम्। If Abhinava is indeed saying that such things as goblins and ghosts are merely products of our fancy, he would be one of the few early Indians to hold such an unorthodox opinion. We think it very likely that this is what he means (how else could we interpret the line?) for he has made similar statements earlier : in the first *Uddyota*, commenting on a verse by his teacher Bhaṭṭendurāja, he says : न ह्यचेतनोपालम्भवदसंभाव्यमानोऽयमर्थो न च न हृद्य। (p. 127).

exist outside of the imagination). Moreover, though as cognition they are the same, nonetheless such forms of perception as direct perception (*prātyakṣikī*), inferential perception (*ānumānikī*), that which arises from verbal testimony (*āgamotthā*), that which is caused by intuition (*pratibhānakṛtā*), and that which stems from yogic sight (*yogipratyakṣajā* i. e. telepathy, etc.) are distinguished from one another by the means through which they are brought about. So also the perception (*pratīti*) of *rasa*, for which other names are *carvaṇā* (relish), *āsvādana* (gustation), *bhoga* (enjoyment), (is a form of perception different from these other types of perception), because the set of factors, namely the *vibhāvas*, etc., helped by sympathetic response (*hṛdayasaṃvāda*), etc., which lie at the base (*nidāna*) of the aesthetic experience are of a transcendental nature. When we say that "*rasas* are perceived" (we are using language loosely) like when we say that "he is cooking the boiled rice"[1] (*odanaṃ pacati*) (where to be more precise we should really say *tandulān pacati*, since *odana* is the finished product), for *rasa* is the process of perception (*pratīyamāna eva hi rasaḥ*)[2] itself; and *rasanā* (aesthetic experience) is a particular kind of perception (i. e. it is brought about by the *sāmagrī* such as *vibhāvas*, etc., in literature) (*pratītir eva viśiṣṭā rasanā*). This perception (of *rasa*) in drama is distinct from every-day cases of inference, though it depends on inference in the initial stages (since one first infers from the *vibhāvas*, etc., the *sthāyibhāva* in the person being portrayed). In poetry too this perception (of *rasa*) is different from other kinds of verbal cognition (i. e. *abhidhā*, *tātparya* and *lakṣaṇā*), but in the initial stages it depends on *abhidhā* as a means (of reaching the suggested sense). Therefore the *pūrvapakṣa* (Lollaṭa's view)[3] has been destroyed (by Bhaṭṭanāyaka) such that it can

1. This refers to the distinction between *taṇḍula*, the raw rice, and *odana*, the finished product. Strictly speaking, we should say : *taṇḍulān pacati*, "he cooks the rice" and not "*odanaṃ pacati.*" But the words are used loosely. In the same way, *rasaḥ pratīyate* is not strictly correct, for *rasa* is the finished product. What we should say is *vibhāvādi pratīyate*. Most probably this is what Bhaṭṭanāyaka meant as well.

2. *Pratīyamāna eva hi rasaḥ* means *pratīyamānatā eva hi rasaḥ*. Abhinava means that *rasa* is the actual process of aesthetic experience, and not the object (*viṣaya*) of that process. Just as *rasa* is described as *rasyamānatā*, in the same way it is here called *pratīyamāna* (i. e. *pratīyamānatā*, *pratītiḥ*, *rasanā*, *āsvādaḥ*). It is identical with experience—it is the aesthetic experience itself. In a similar fashion (and this may well have been the inspiration for Abhinava's view), the *sākṣin*, in *Vedānta*, does not really see another object, or even experience happiness, for it is *sarvaprakāśaka*, and actual *saccidānanda* itself. To say *ātmānubhūyate* is simply loose terminology, since this implies the *triputī*, which is absent in true *anubhava*. Cf. *A. Bh.* p. 285 : सिद्धस्य कस्यचित्प्रमेयभूतस्य रसस्याभावात् ।

3. We take this as a reference to Bhaṭṭalollaṭa's views on the strength of the equivalent passage in the *A. Bh.*, p. 277 (Gnoli, p. 11) : तत्र पूर्वपक्षोऽयं भट्टलोल्लट पक्षानभ्युपगमादेव नाभ्युपगत इति तद्दूषणमनुत्थानोपहतमेव ।

never rise again. (When Bhaṭṭanāyaka) on his part says that (extraordinary) deeds of Rāma (such as building a bridge over the ocean, etc.) do not win sympathetic response from everybody,[1] he is being very rash (*sāhasa*) indeed.[2] For minds are characterised as possessing a great variety of latent impressions (*vāsanā*). As has been said: " *Vāsanās* are endless, because desire is eternal ". " Though separated by species (*jāti*), place (*deśa*) and time (*kāla*), nonetheless there is a correspondence between memory and *saṃskāras* (i. e. though several lives intervene, *vāsanās* still give rise to instinctive reactions to external situations). " [3] Therefore it is now established

1. There is a very interesting passage in the *A. Bh.* Vol. II, p. 412, germane to this issue. Here is the text:

यदि तु मुख्यत्वेनैव देवचरितं वर्ण्यते तत्तावद्विप्रलम्भकरुणाद्भुतभयानकरसोचितं चेन्निबध्यते तन्मानुषचरितमेव संपद्यते, प्रत्युत देवानामधियाधानं प्रसिद्धिविघातकम् । तत्र चोक्तो दोषः, विप्रलम्भाद्यभावे तु का तत्र विचित्रता रञ्जनाया एतत्प्रमाणत्वात् । अत एव सहृदयसंवादोऽपि देवचरिते दुर्लभः, न च तेषां दुःखमस्ति. यत्प्रतीकारोपाये व्युत्पादनं स्यात् । नायिका तु दिव्याप्यविरोधिनी यथोर्वशी नायकचरितेनैव तद्वृत्तस्याक्षेपात् ।

" If however the doings of Gods are described (in a drama) as the main thing, then in case they are presented as appropriate to *vipralambha(śṛṅgāra)*, *karuṇa*, *adbhuta*, and *bhayānaka*, they will turn out to be only the doings of (ordinary) human beings. If on the contrary, the (genuine) doings of Gods are presented unwittingly *(adhiyā ādhānam)*, that would offend what is generally well-known (in the world as possible in the case of human beings). The blemish entailed thereby has been (already) stated. And if there is no presentation of *rasas* such as *vipralambha (śṛṅgāra)*, etc., what charm can result therefrom, since entertainment (of the audience) essentially depends on these (i. e. on *vipralambha*, *karuṇa*, etc.) ? Hence it is, that sympathetic response (from the spectators) is difficult to achieve in the case of the presentation of the doings of Gods. For they (i. e. the Gods) are not subject to any suffering, so that from the description of (that suffering and of) the means used by them to overcome it, the spectators may derive instruction. There is however nothing contradictory in introducing even a divine heroine (as opposed to a hero), as for example Urvaśī (in Kālidāsa's *Vikramorvaśīyam*), for her actions are presumed to be plausible because of the actions of the (human) hero (in that drama). "

We are not certain of the phrase : *pratyuta devānām adhiyādhānaṃ prasiddhivighātakam*. Also, we are not able to understand the exact sense of the last sentence : नायिका तु दिव्याप्यविरोधिनी, यथा उर्वशी, नायकचरितेनैव तद्वृत्तस्याक्षेपात् ।

2. This must be a reference to p. 181 of the *Locana*, where BN said : समुद्रसेतुबन्धादयो विभावास्ते कथं साधारण्यं भजेयुः । But what could he mean by this ? The only logical inference would be that *vīrarasa* in such cases is not genuine, since it involves improbabilities. But this would be an odd position for anyone to take of the *Rāmāyaṇa* (though Abhinava himself acknowledges the truth of this for all but the most famous of exploits, when he says that in the case of the *prakaraṇa*, outlandish events should not take place, since this will prove to be a *vighna* for the spectator – see p. 331 of the *Locana*). Surely the whole point of the *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* doctrine is that it allows such events to become impersonalised, and so imaginatively possible. Could BN have actually said : रामादिचरितं न सर्वस्य हृदयसंवादि ?

3. *Yogasūtra* IV. 10, and IV. 9. On. p. 282 of the *A. Bh.* Abhinava has a very

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that there is the perception of *rasa*. Moreover (Bhaṭṭanāyaka is wrong, because) this perception in the form of aesthetic enjoyment (*rasanā*) *does* arise (*utpadyate*). And in bringing about this perception (*tatra*) the function is the suggestiveness (*dhvanana*), i. e. the *vyañjanā* of the literal sense and denotative words,[1] which is a function different from *abhidhā*. (What Bhaṭṭanāyaka calls) the function of aesthetic relish (*bhogikaraṇa*) with regard to rasa in poetry is nothing other than suggestiveness (*dhvanana*). As for *bhāvakatva*, which (for us) consists in the use (*parigraha*) of proper *guṇas* and *alaṅkāras*,[2] we will speak of this in some detail (later in the second *Uddyota*). What is new about it? When you (Bhaṭṭanāyaka) say that poetry is the producer (*bhāvaka*) of *rasas*, through *bhāvanā*, you have yourself revived the theory of *utpatti* (which you supposedly destroyed).[3] One cannot say that in poetry words alone are productive (of *rasa*)[4] for

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interesting passage where he justifies the nine *sthāyibhāvas* in all human beings (though some predominate in certain people and others in others), and ends by saying: न ह्येतच्चित्तवृत्तिवासनाशून्यः प्राणी भवति। In the course of our beginningless journey through this universe, we have experienced all emotions. Thus nobody fully aware of his own humanity can fail to be moved by another person's experiences. On p. 283 (of the *A. Bh.*). Abhinava quotes a fascinating line from Patañjali II. 4: न हि चैत्र एकस्यां स्त्रियां रक्त इत्यन्यासु विरक्तः। "The fact that Caitra is in love with one woman does not mean that he is out of love with others." This is not meant humorously, but only that when Caitra is in love with one woman, this means that his love for that particular woman is dominant in his mind. It does not mean that his mind is altogether devoid of love for any other woman. He of course has love in his mind for other women also, but this love is more feeble than the other, and hence overpowered by the love he feels for a particular woman at any given moment.

1. Suggestion applies to the *vācya* (e. g. in *vastudhvani*, where the literal meaning suggests the *vyaṅgyārtha*) and to the *vācaka* (since *vācakas* are *vyañjakas*).

2. This is somewhat curious. Where has BN said that *bhāvakatva* is *samucitaguṇālaṅkāraparigraha?* For BN *bhāvanā* is *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*. How can this be associated with *guṇas* and *alaṅkāras?* However, Abhinava himself, in the *A. Bh.* p. 277, uses these very words to characterise BN's views. The wording in the *A. Bh.* is slightly different: दोषाभावगुणालंकारमयत्वलक्षणेन ..... भावकत्वव्यापारेण। The phrase *nibidanijamohasaṅkaṭakāriṇā* on p. 277 of the *A. Bh.* vol. I, is puzzling. Perhaps we must read *saṃkaṭanivṛttikāriṇā*.

3. This is well observed. It is true that BN must use some expression like *utpādyate*, regardless of what word he chooses. Thus when he says *bhāvite ca rase* (*Locana* p. 183), one must paraphrase by *bhāvanayā samarpite ca rase*.

4. Abhinava's point seems to be that BN said (*Locana*, p. 182) that there are three functions of *words*: काव्यात्मनः शब्दस्य त्र्यंशताप्रसादात्। But this is unfair of Abhinava, since he too says over and over that *vyañjanā* is a *śabdavyāpāra*. Surely Bhaṭṭanāyaka must have meant the same thing? It is most unlikely that he would have restricted the function to words. On the other hand, Abhinava himself has argued for the importance of *śabda*. Cf. the interesting passage at the end of the first *Uddyota*, p. 158–159.

if their meaning is not known, no *rasa* can arise. Nor can one say that it is meaning alone (that gives rise to *rasa* in poetry) for if the same meaning is expressed by other words (*śabdāntareṇārpyamāṇatve*) *rasa* does not arise.[1] We (the *Dhvanivādins*) have explained that both word and meaning (are helpful in the presentation of *rasa*) when we said: "Wherever a meaning or a word manifests a suggested meaning,"[2] etc. Therefore by means of the function known as suggestiveness (as a means), and through (the use of) *guṇas, alaṅkāras* and propriety (*aucitya*), etc., as a procedure (*itikartavyatā*), poetry which is possessed of the power of conveying (*bhāvaka*) (*rasas*) conveys (*bhāvayati*) *rasas*, and in this three-fold scheme of *bhāvanā* (as accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas)[3] suggestiveness fits in as the means

1. Cf. what Ānanda says on p. 358 of the *Dhvanyāloka*, *Uddyota* III in the context of *vyañjanā*.

2. *Dhvanyāloka* I. 13. The whole verse reads:

यत्रार्थः शब्दो वा तमर्थमुपसर्जनीकृतस्वार्थौ ।
व्यङ्क्तः काव्यविशेषः स ध्वनिरिति सूरिभिः कथितः ॥

"When the (directly expressive) word and the literal meaning both first subordinate themselves (to the suggested sense), the word subordinating its meaning and the literal meaning subordinating itself, and then reveal that (suggested) sense, that kind of poetry has been called *dhvani* by the wise." This is in fact the major definition of *dhvani* in the *D. Āl.*

3. In brief, the *Mīmāṃsā* position is as follows: *bhāvanā*, creative force, or creative energy, is of two kinds: (1) *śābdī*, and (2) *ārthī*. It is a particular kind of activity in an efficient or operative agent (*bhāvayitṛ*), which is conducive to the production of the effect (or conducive to the coming into being of that which is going to come into being). *śābdī bhāvanā* means verbal creativity, or word-efficient force. *Ārthī bhāvanā* is purposive creativity, or end-efficient force. *Śābdī bhāvanā* is concerned with how the words in a scriptural or secular command operate in bringing about the fulfilment of that command. *Ārthī bhāvanā* is concerned with how a particular action ordered by the scriptures or by a human master is carried out by the person ordered to do it, with a view to achieving the expected result. In this passage we are concerned with *ārthībhāvanā* and not with *śābdībhāvanā*. *Bhāvanā* consists of three elements: (1) *sādhya* (objective aimed at by the action), (2) *sādhana* or *karaṇa* (the means leading to that objective) and (3) *itikartavyatā* (procedure to be followed in reaching the objective) (*kiṃ bhāvayet, kena bhāvayet, kathaṃ bhāvayet*). According to Abhinava, Bhaṭṭanāyaka has borrowed the word *bhāvanā* from the Mīmāṃsakas. In *karmakāṇḍa*, in the case of a sacrifice like *jyotiṣṭoma* (*jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta*), *svarga* is the *sādhya*. The *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice is the *sādhana* or *karaṇa*, and the performance of the minor sacrifices *prayāja, anuyāja*, etc., is the *itikartavyatā*. In poetry and drama, *rasa* (or *rasāsvāda*) is the *sādhya*, *dhvanana* or *vyañjanāvyāpāra* is the *sādhana* or *karaṇa*, and *guṇālaṅkāraucityādi* (i. e. *samuci-taguṇālaṅkāraparigraha*) is the *itikartavyatā*. Thus according to Abhinava, *dhvanana* is the *karaṇa* or *sādhana* by which *rasāsvāda* is brought about. This is what he means by the sentence इति व्यंशायामपि भावनायां करणांशे ध्वननमेव निपतति । He means that *kāvya* is the *bhāvaka* of the *rasāsvāda*, just as the performer of a sacrifice is the *bhāvayitṛ* (i. e. *bhāvaka*) of the *svargarūpaphala*.

(*karaṇa*).[1] Nor does *bhoga* (aesthetic enjoyment) come about through the words used in poetry (alone), but rather (it comes about) through the removal of the obscuration (*saṅkaṭa*) (of the blissful nature of the Self) caused by the blinding darkness which is itself the result of deep ignorance (*moha*). In the transcendental (*lokottara*) aesthetic enjoyment (*bhoga*) that is to be brought about (in this manner), for which another name is *āsvāda* (enjoyment), and which consists of *druti*, *vistara* and *vikāsa*,[2] suggestiveness alone (according to us, should be) given the highest place of honour (*mūrdhābhiṣikta*). When suggestiveness (of poetry in relation to *rasa*) is admitted, this so-called *bhogakṛttva* (of poetry) inevitably follows. For *bhoga* is nothing other than the inexplicable thrill of delight (*camatkāra*) that arises from aesthetic enjoyment (*rasyamānatā*). But it is not correct to say that aesthetic pleasure (*āsvāda*) is divided (only) into three, *druti*, etc., (because there are innumerable variations possible) on account of the endless variety created by the principal–subordinate relation among the (*guṇas*) *sattva*, etc. We admit (with Bhaṭṭanāyaka) that aesthetic enjoyment is similar to the joy (that comes from realising one's identity with) Brahman.[3] (We also admit with Bhaṭṭanāyaka[4] that) the intellectual

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1. This is BN's own position. See *A. Bh.* p. 277 : चतुर्विधाभिनयरूपेण निबिडनिजमोहसङ्कटकारिणा विभावादिसाधारणीकरणात्मनाऽभिधातो द्वितीयेनांशेन भावकत्वव्यापारेण भाव्यमानो रसः etc.

2. This could not be Abhinava's position, since on the next page (190) he will reject this three-fold classification (even though in the *Locana* comm. on II. 7–10 he develops a similar scheme). But if this is BN's position, and not Abhinava's, there should have been some indication to this effect. By ending it with *dhvananavyāpāra eva mūrdhābhiṣiktaḥ*, he has inextricably woven in his own views.

Further on *druti*, *vistara* and *vikāsa*, see Mammaṭa, *KP.* p. 474, Jhalkikar's ed. *Dīpti* is *vistara*, *mādhūrya* is *druti*, but for some reason *vikāsa* is not connected with *prasāda*, as one would expect. The scheme is accepted by Dhanaṃjaya.

3. Note how Mammaṭa (p. 59, Jhalkikar's edition) puts this : परिस्फुरन् हृदयमिव प्रविशन् सर्वाङ्गीणमिवालिङ्गन् अन्यत् सर्वमिव तिरोदधत् ब्रह्मास्वादमिवानुभावयन् अलौकिकचमत्कारकारी शृङ्गारादिको रसः ! This is so well expressed that it has been copied by the *Kāvyapradīpa*, p. 69. Such language became, surely on account of both BN and Abhinava, very common in describing *rasa* (whereas Ānanda does not use the word *camatkāra* in its technical sense), so much so that we find Kuntaka, in describing an exquisite verse (quoted in the *Locana*, p. 163 as well), using similar terms (De's ed. of the *Vakroktijīvita*, p. 35) : अत्र किमपीति (as an explanation of the line in the verse that reads हृदये किमपि ध्वनन्ति) तदाकर्णनविहितायाश्चित्तचमत्कृतेरनुभवैकगोचरत्वलक्षणमव्यपदेश्यत्वं प्रतिपाद्यत ।

4. It would seem, as already noted, that for Abhinava, as for BN, *prīti* is the major goal of poetry. Cf. *Locana* p. 40 (under I. 1), तथापि तत्र प्रीतिरेव प्रधानम् । Thus for Abhinava, *vyutpatti* becomes easier to accept (see p. 336 of the *Locana*) and is the result of *prīti*, but still the major point of poetry is delight. Of course *vyutpatti* means instruction in all the four *vargas*, including *mokṣa* (p. 41 : चतुर्वर्गव्युत्पत्तेरपि चानन्द एव पार्यन्तिकं मुख्यं फलम्) with the result that *vyutpatti* and *prīti* (i. e. *ānanda*) amount finally to the same thing ; Cf. p. 336 : न चैते प्रीतिव्युत्पत्ती भिन्नरूपे एव, द्वयोरपि एकविषयत्वात् ।

refinement (*vyutpādana*) (that results from poetry) is different from that which comes from the *śāstra* through mandates *(śāsana)* and from the *itihāsa* through recommendation (*pratipādana*). In addition (*atirikta*) to the message that poetry provides for the readers in the form of the analogy that they must behave like Rāma,[1] can we help it (or: "who is to be blamed" – *kam upālabhāmahe*)[2] if finally (poetry) creates an intellectual refinement in the form of the development (*vijṛmbhā*) of their critical receptivity? Therefore the following is established: *rasas* are suggested (*abhivyajyante*). They are aesthetically enjoyed[3] by their very perception (*pratītyā eva ca rasyante*) (i. e. *rasa* is aesthetic enjoyment itself). "[4]

And here, finally, is the application of this theory to what has been traditionally regarded as the first actual literary experience. We include here the *Kārikā* and Ānandavardhana's *Vṛtti* on it as well:[5]

(ध्वन्यालोकः, pp. 84–90)

काव्यस्यात्माः, स एवार्थस्तथा चादिकवेः पुरा ।
क्रौञ्चद्वन्द्वियोगोत्थः शोकः श्लोकत्वमागतः ॥

विविधवाच्यवाचकरचनाप्रपञ्चचारुणः काव्यस्य स एवार्थः सारभूतः । तथा चादिकवेर्वाल्मीकेः निहतसहचरीविरहकातरक्रौञ्चाक्रन्दजनितः शोक एव श्लोकतया परिणतः ।

शोको हि करुणस्थायिभावः । प्रतीयमानस्य चान्यभेददर्शनेऽपि रसभावमुखेनैवोपलक्षणं प्राधान्यात् ।

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1. This must be the source of the later dictum, so frequently met with (e. g. *K P.* under I. 2): रामादिवद्वर्तितव्यं न रावणादिवत् ।

2. The idea is: this is the way things are, and nothing can be done about it, with the further implication that this is the way things ought to be as well. (Ānanda uses this idea on p. 406 and Abhinava uses the expression *kiṃ kurmaḥ* often). Thus Gnoli's interpretation is incorrect.

3. Throughout the *Locana*, Abhinava has insisted on the importance of the *sahṛdaya*, the reader. Cf. his opening stanza: *kavisahṛdayākhyam*. See also the *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, IV, where Rājasékhara divides *pratibhā* into two kinds: *kārayitrī* and *bhāvayitrī*, where *bhāvayitrī* corresponds to this type of "imagination" that belongs to the reader, and which is a faculty he brings to his appreciation of poetry.

4. Note what Abhinava says in the *A. Bh.* p. 279: अधिकारी चात्र विमलप्रतिभानशालिहृदयः । See the important definition of the *sahṛdaya*, the "sensitive reader", in the *Locana*, p. 38: येषां काव्यानुशीलनाभ्यासवशाद्विशदीभूते मनोमुकुरे वर्णनीयतन्मयीभवनयोग्यता ते स्वहृदयसंवादभाजः सहृदयाः । "Those people who are capable of identifying with the subject matter, as the mirror of their hearts has been polished through constant repetition and study of poetry, and who sympathetically respond in their own hearts– those (people) are what are known as sensitive readers." Abhinava then quotes a fine verse from the *NŚ*, VII, 7, G. O. S. Vol. I, p. 348:

योऽर्थो हृदयसंवादी तस्य भावो रसोद्भवः । शरीरं व्याप्यते तेन शुष्कं काष्ठमिवाग्निना ॥

"The externalisation (*bhāva*) of that emotion (*artha*) which makes an appeal to the heart is the source (*udbhava*) of *rasa*. The body is suffused by it, as dry wood is suffused by fire." Cf. *Locana*, p. 212.

5. *D. Āl.* I. 5. (pp. 84–90, B. ed.).

KÀRIKÀ V:

It is the (suggested) meaning alone that is the soul of poetry. Thus long ago, the sorrow of the first poet that sprang from the permanent disruption of the sandpipers' love-making was transformed into verse.[1]

VṚTTI:

That (suggested) sense alone is the essence of poetry – poetry which is beautiful because of a richness (*prapañca*) of structure (*racanā*) and of varied words and ideas. And thus the sorrow that was aroused (*janita*, i. e. *uddīpita*) by the cries of the Krauñca bird who was frightened (*kātara*) by the separation (*viraha*) from his murdered wife, in (Vālmīki) the first poet, was turned into a verse. For it has been stated (in the present *Kārikā*) that sorrow is the *sthāyibhāva* of *karuṇarasa*, (and that it is only suggested and not directly expressed). Although there are other varieties of the suggested sense, they are implicitly indicated through *rasa* and *bhāva*, because these are the most important.

Now here is the *Locana* passage, pp. 84–90:

एवं 'प्रतीयमानं पुनरन्यदेव' इतीयता ध्वनिस्वरूपं व्याख्यातम्। अधुना काव्यात्मत्वमितिहासव्याजेन च दर्शयति–

काव्यस्यात्मेति। स एवेति प्रतीयमानमात्रेऽपि प्रक्रान्ते तृतीय एव **रसध्वनिरिति** मन्तव्यम्। इतिहासबलात् प्रक्रान्तवृत्तिग्रन्थार्थबलाच्च। तेन रस एव वस्तुत आत्मा, वस्त्वलंकारध्वनी तु सर्वथा रसं प्रति पर्यवस्येते इति वाच्यादुत्कृष्टौ तावित्यभिप्रायेण '**ध्वनिः** काव्यस्यात्मे'ति सामान्येनोक्तम्। **शोक** इति। क्रौञ्चस्य द्वन्द्ववियोगेन सहचरीहननोद्भूतेन साहचर्यध्वंसनेनोत्थितो यः शोकः स्थायिभावो निरपेक्षभावत्वाद्विप्रलम्भशृङ्गारोचितरतिस्थायिभावादन्य एव, स एव तथाभूतविभावतदुत्थाक्रन्दाद्यनुभावचर्वणया हृदयसंवादतन्मयीभवनक्रमादास्वाद्यमानतां प्रतिपन्नः करुणरसरूपतां लौकिकशोकव्यतिरिक्तां स्वचित्तद्रुतिसमास्वाद्यसारां प्रतिपन्नो रसपरिपूर्णकुम्भोच्छलनवच्चित्तवृत्तिनिःष्यन्दस्वभाववाग्विलासादिवच्च समयानपेक्षत्वेऽपि चित्तवृत्तिव्यञ्जकत्वादिति नयेनाकृतकतयैवावेशवशात्समुचितशब्दच्छन्दोवृत्तादिनियन्त्रितश्लोकरूपतां प्राप्तः—

1. Cf. *Raghuvaṃśa*, XIV. 70:

तामभ्यगच्छद्रुदितानुसारी कविः कुशेध्माहरणाय यातः।
निषादविद्धाण्डजदर्शनोत्थः श्लोकत्वमापद्यत यस्य शोकः॥

It is clear from the context that Kālidāsa means this verse to convey the compassion of Vālmīki, and thus the fact that he will accept the suffering Sītā, and take her into his *āśrama*. Thus Mallinātha remarks: तिरश्चामपि दुःखं न सेहे, किमुतान्येषामिति भावः। Bhavabhūti (*Uttararāmacarita* II. 5) quotes the *mā niṣāda* verse from the *Rāmāyaṇa*, but he quotes it in the context of the first verse written in Skt., and not with regard to the compassion of Vālmīki.

मा निषाद प्रतिष्ठां त्वमगमः शाश्वतीः समाः ।
यत्क्रौञ्चमिथुनादेकमवधीः काममोहितम् ॥ इति ।

न तु मुनेः शोक इति मन्तव्यम् । एवं हि सति तद्दुःखेन सोऽपि दुःखित इति कृत्वा रसस्यात्मतेति निरवकाशं भवेत् । न च दुःखसंतप्तस्यैषा दशेति । एवं चर्वणोचित-शोकस्थायिभावात्मककरुणरससमुच्चलनस्वभावत्वात्स एव काव्यस्यात्मा सारभूतस्वभावोऽपर-शाब्दवैलक्षण्यकारकः ।

एतदेवोक्तं हृदयदर्पणे—'यावत्पूर्णो न चैतेन तावन्नैव वमत्यमुम्' इति । अगम इति च्छान्दसेनाडागमेन । स एवेत्येवकारेणेदमाह—नान्य आत्मेति । तेन यदाह भट्टनायकः

शब्दप्राधान्यमाश्रित्य तत्र शास्त्रं पृथग्विदुः ।
अर्थतत्त्वेन युक्तं तु वदन्त्याख्यानमेतयोः ।
द्वयोर्गुणत्वे व्यापारप्राधान्ये काव्यधीर्भवेत् ॥

इति तदपास्तम् । व्यापारो हि यदि ध्वननात्मा रसनास्वभावस्तन्नापूर्वमुक्तम् । अथाभिधैव व्यापारस्तथाप्यस्याः प्राधान्यं नेत्यावेदितं प्राक् ।

श्लोकं व्याचष्टे—**विविधेति** । विविधं तत्तदभिव्यञ्जनीयरसानुगुण्येन विचित्रं कृत्वा वाच्ये वाचके रचनायां च प्रपञ्चेन यच्चारु शब्दार्थालंकारगुणयुक्तमित्यर्थः । तेन सर्वत्रापि ध्वननसद्भावेऽपि न तथा व्यवहारः । आत्मसद्भावेऽपि क्वचिदेव जीवव्यवहार इत्युक्तं प्रागेव । तेनैतन्निरवकाशम्, यदुक्तं हृदयदर्पणे—'सर्वत्र तर्हि काव्यव्यवहारः स्यात्' इति । **निहत-सहचरीति** विभाव उक्तः । आक्रन्दितशब्देनानुभावः । जनित इति । चर्वणागोचरत्वेनेति शेषः ।

ननु शोकचर्वणातो यदि श्लोक उद्भूतस्तत्प्रतीयमानं वस्तु काव्यस्यात्मेति कुत इत्याशङ्क्याह—**शोको हीति** । करुणस्य तच्चर्वणागोचरात्मनः स्थायिभावः । शोके हि स्थायि-भावे ये विभावानुभावास्तत्समुचिता चित्तवृत्तिश्चर्व्यमाणात्मा रस इत्यौचित्यात्स्थायिनो रस-तापत्तिरित्युच्यते । प्राक्स्वसंविदितं परत्रानुमितं च चित्तवृत्तिजातं संस्कारक्रमेण हृदयसंवाद-मादधानं चर्वणायामुपयुज्यते यतः । ननु प्रतीयमानरूपमात्मा तत्र त्रिभेदं प्रतिपादितं न तु रसैकरूपं, अनेन चेतिहासेन रसस्यैवात्मभूतत्वमुक्तं भवतीत्याशङ्क्याभ्युपगमेनैवोत्तरमाह—**प्रतीयमानस्य चेति** । अन्यो भेदो वस्त्वलंकारात्मा । भावग्रहणेन व्यभिचारिणोऽपि चर्व्य-माणस्य तावन्मात्राविश्रान्तावपि स्थायिचर्वणापर्यवसानोचितरसप्रतिष्ठामनवाप्यापि प्राणत्वं भवतीत्युक्तम् । यथा—

नखं नखाग्रेण विघट्टयन्ती विवर्तयन्ती वलयं विलोलम् ।
आमन्द्रमाशिञ्जितनूपुरेण पादेन मन्दं भुवमालिखन्ती ॥

इत्यत्र लज्जायाः । रसभावशब्देन च तदाभासतत्प्रशमावपि संगृहीतावेव । अवान्तर-वैचित्र्येऽपि तदेकरूपत्वात् । **प्राधान्या**दिति । रसपर्यवसानादित्यर्थः । तावन्मात्राविश्रान्ता-वपि चान्यशाब्दवैलक्षण्यकारित्वेन वस्त्वलंकारध्वनेरपि जीवितत्वमौचित्यादुक्तमिति भावः ॥

TRANSLATION :

Thus by the *Kārikā*: *pratīyamānam punar anyad eva*, etc., he has explained the nature of *dhvani*.[1] Now he shows, under the cover (*vyāja*)[2] of an incident from the epic (*itihāsa*), how it is the soul of poetry. *KĀVYASYĀTMĀ SA EVA*. Although the suggested sense in general is the point at issue, only the third (type of the suggested sense known as) *rasa-dhvani*, should be considered as (the soul of poetry),[3] because of the force of the epic quotation, and because of the force of the meaning of the *Vṛtti* passages that immediately precede (and follow).[4] Therefore really speaking, *rasa* alone is the soul (of poetry). *Vastudhvani* and *alaṅkāradhvani* (really) finally end up in *rasa*.[5] And since they too are far more important

1. Abhinava means that Ānanda has so far explained the nature of *dhvani* (i.e. the suggested sense) by means of the *Kārikā* प्रतीयमानं पुनरन्यदेव वस्त्वस्ति वाणीषु महाकवीनां etc. Now he will begin to expound how the suggested sense is the actual soul of poetry.

2. *Vyājena*, literally "under the pretext of", "under the guise of", which amounts to "on the authority of", or "taking the help of".

3. After *rasadhvaniḥ* one must understand *kāvyasyātmā*.

4. We are not certain that we have understood *prakrāntavṛttigranthārtha-balāc ca*, on p. 158 (84–85 *B. P.*). (References in this section are to the edition by Kuppuswami Sastri). We take it to mean : "because of the force of the *Vṛtti* both preceding and following". This must be a reference to *iti sthitam* (p. 84 *B. P.*) which speaks of this kind of *pratīyamānārtha* (i. e. *rasādi*) as different from the *vācya*. The immediately following passage, *vividha*, etc., and in particular the words on p. 166, (p. 90 *B. P.*) रसभावमुखेनैवोपलक्षणं प्राधान्यात् again speak of the third kind of *pratīyamānārtha* (namely *rasadhvani*).

5. This is an important point that Abhinava comes back to again and again. He claims that Ānanda uses *vastudhvani* and *alaṅkāradhvani* only to show the difference between the *abhidhāvyāpāra* and the *vyañjanāvyāpāra*. He does not intend these as examples of true poetry, for that title is reserved for *rasa* alone. Earlier (pp. 50–51 *B. P.*) he had noted that one can often find *vastu* and *alaṅkāra* as *svaśabdavācya* (i. e. as no longer cases of *dhvani*). What we think he means is that both of these are capable of paraphrase without any resulting decrease in the aesthetic experience (which is already slight in any case). But *rasadhvani* can never be paraphrased without destroying the poetry in it. In this Abhinava is in agreement with the "New Criticism". Thus in a famous essay on Yeats' great poem "*Sailing to Byzantium*", Elder Olson said : "Although the argument as we have stated it clearly underlies the poem (note : he has just finished explaining the "argument", i. e. the *vācyārtha* of Yeats' poem), it would be erroneous to suppose that this in itself constitutes the poem, for in that case there would be no difference between our paraphrase and the poem itself". He then

(Continued on next page

(*utkṛṣṭa*) (or charming) than the literal meaning, it was said (in *Kārikā* 1) in a general way that dhvani is the soul of poetry.

ŚOKA. That sorrow, the permanent emotion (belonging to *karuṇarasa*) which arose because of the destruction of the coupling (*dvandva*),[1] i. e. because of the destruction of the intimate physical contact (*sāhacarya*) of the Krauñca birds, owing to the killing of the female—[2] this sorrow is different from the *sthāyibhāva rati* (love) that is appropriate to *vipralambhaśṛṅgāra*, because in it there is no hope of reunion (*nirapekṣabhāva*).[3] The sorrow has become capable of being aesthetically enjoyed (*āsvādyamānatā*) through the following stages: first come the *vibhāvas* (both *ālambana* and *uddīpana*), and the *anubhāvas* (i. e. the wailing of the male bird etc.) that arise from them[4] (i. e. the *vibhāvas*). By feeling these deeply (*carvaṇā*), the heart (of the sage Vālmīki) sympathises (with the plight of the male bird), and (finally) he identifies (with the situation). (Once it is aesthetically enjoyable), it becomes *karuṇarasa*, where the sorrow (felt) is different from the ordinary sorrow we feel in everyday life. Its essence became capable of being enjoyed once the mind (of the sensitive sage) had melted[5] (to the point of total

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goes on to say, later in the same essay: "If the basic terms of a lyric poem do not receive their meanings from the chance associations of the reader, neither do they have their dictionary meanings; like terms in most discourse, they take their significance from their context, through juxta-position to other terms with which they are equated, contrasted, correlated or combined." (From "*Five Approaches to Literary Criticism*" edited by W. Scott, N. Y. 1962).

1. Abhinava takes *dvandva* not to mean "pair" but to mean actual "sexual intercourse" (*sāhacarya*), a meaning the dictionaries do not seem to sanction.

2. For the significance of the change that both Abhinava and Ānanda make in the legend by having the female bird killed rather than the male, see J. Masson: "Who Killed Cock Krauñca; Abhinavagupta's Reflections on the Origin of Aesthetic Experience", *Journal of the Oriental Institute*, Baroda, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, 1969.

3. This is a fundamental distinction that goes back to the *NŚ* VI, under verse 50 (p. 309, G. O. S. Vol. I):

करुणस्तु शापक्लेशविनिपतितेष्टजनविभवनाशवधबन्धसमुत्थो निरपेक्षभावः। औत्सुक्यचिन्तासमुत्थः सापेक्षभावो विप्रलम्भकृतः। एवमन्यः करुणोऽन्यश्च विप्रलम्भः इति।

The point is that in *vipralambha* there is some hope of being reunited. But in *karuṇa* there is none. This makes it much closer to "tragedy" than has generally been acknowledged. Thus in speaking of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Abhinava will point out in his *Locana* to the fourth *Uddyota* (p. 580) that Rāma and Sītā are "permanently" separated, thus showing that the final verses of the epic which speak of their reunion in heaven, have no impact on the reader in any aesthetic sense.

4. We take *tadutthākranda* to refer to both the cryings of the male and the female. It will also include her (or his, as described in the *Rāmāyaṇa*) writhing on the ground in pain, one of the *anubhāvas*.

5. *Druti* refers to the "melting" of the mind, i. e. to a state when the mind is exceedingly receptive. There is a very fine verse in Madhusūdanasarasvatī's

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receptivity). (And this aesthetic experience) became transformed into a verse (*śloka*) regulated by (*niyantrita*) proper[1] (words) and metre, etc., because of the unartificiality (*akṛtakatā*) (of the experience) and the complete possession (of Vālmīki). The emotional upheaval in the mind of the sage was like the overflowing of a jug filled to the brim with water, or like the cry of sorrow which is of the nature of the effusion of the mental mood (of grief). The words that the sage uttered (on that occasion) are suggestive of the state of his mind according to the maxim that exclamations (of joy, sorrow, etc.) are suggestive of (the relevant) natural moods, even in the absence of a fixed convention (between them and mental moods, unlike what is the case for words and their literal meanings).[2]

"Oh hunter, may you never, for eternal years, attain to stability (*pratiṣṭhā*) (in this world) since you killed, from a pair of Krauñca birds, the male (when) he was engrossed in love (– making)."[3]

But it should not be supposed that Vālmīki was (actually experiencing) sorrow (in the ordinary sense). For if he were, (that is,) if he were pained on account of the bird's pain, then the point of the *Kārikā*, that *rasa* is the soul of poetry, would be without any basis in the present stanza.[4] Nor is

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Śrībhagavadbhaktirasāyanam, p. 14 (verse 4), explaining the state of receptivity that the mind adopts during an aesthetic experience :

चित्तद्रव्यं हि जतुवत्स्वभावात्कठिनात्मकम् ।
तापकैर्विषयैर्योगे द्रवत्वं प्रतिपद्यते ॥

"The substance of which the the mind is made is like red sealing wax. By nature it is hard. But when it comes in contact with the emotional states (during an aesthetic experience) which act as heating agents, it becomes soft to the point of flowing". He takes this fine analogy a step further, and says that the mind is impressed with the emotions it contemplates. First the mind becomes soft and pliable, and then comes the hard substance like the drama or the play when the mind receives its impression, the way sealing wax is impressed with a seal-ring.

1. In K. Sastri's edition we must understand *śabda* after *samucita*.

2. The point is that there is no fixed convention with regard to the meanings of exclamations that we utter spontaneously. Thus, a shriek can be due to either grief or joy, in the same way that tears can. Nonetheless these signs of joy or grief are "suggestive". This is of course not true in the case of words and their literal meanings, where there is a fixed convention.

3. *Rāmāyaṇa*, I. 2. 15.

4. As the *Kaumudī* says on p. 160 : *śokamātrasya rasatvāsambhavād*. "If this verse simply illustrated sorrow there would be no possibility of *rasa*". Abhinava's point is that *karuṇarasa* arose in the sage, and not the primary emotion of sorrow. He has, therefore, interpreted the whole point of this example to be that the situation described in the *Rāmāyaṇa* is one of *rasapratīti* on the part of Vālmīki. For this to be the case, we must say that he was the audience, as it were, of his own verse ! So, Abhinava envisages the situation something like this : Vālmiki sees

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it possible for somebody burdened with grief [1] to utter a verse (at the very moment of his sorrow).

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the killing of the bird. He is deeply moved to the point of uttering a poem about it. But of course as long as he is simply in sorrow, that is, feeling one of the primary emotions that belong to real-life situations, he does not have the necessary "artistic distance" which would enable him to engage in poetic creation. So, at some magic point he stops feeling sorrow (if in fact Abhinava ever felt that he did), and it is as if he were witnessing a drama in a play-house. It is at this stage of some distance that he speaks his poem. Each time he contemplates what he uttered, he is the *sahṛdaya*, the *rasika*, the spectator (which would explain why he says *kim idaṃ vyāhṛtaṃ mayā* at *Rām.* I. 2. 16). i. e. he is again in an *alaukika* state of aesthetic enjoyment. The *śoka* that he formerly felt has been transformed into art. While this is a profound interpretation of the famous incident, it should be carefully noted that this could hardly have been what the author of the episode in the *Rāmāyaṇa* had in mind. [For the word *śoka* occurs again and again in the account: I. 2. 16 : *śokārtena.....mayā ;* I. 2. 18 : *śokārtasya.....me ;* I. 2. 29 : *śocann eva punaḥ krauñcīṃ ;* I. 2. 30 : *punaḥ..... śokaparāyaṇaḥ.* In I. 2. 13 we read : *kāruṇyaṃ samapadyata.* and in I. 2. 14 *: karuṇaveditvāt.*] Perhaps for the first time in any critical tradition, Abhinava has articulated the distinction between the "primary world" of actual events, and the "secondary world" of literature. These terms have been used by J. R. R. Tolkien in his essay "On Fairy-Stories", published in "Tree & Leaf", Unwin Books, London, 1964. See also "Secondary Worlds" by W. H. Auden, Faber & Faber, London, 1968. The world of the Rāmāyaṇa belongs to what Tolkien calls Faërie, "the perilous realm, and the air that blows in that country". Mortal men only exist there when they are enchanted. In modern times, perhaps only Tolkien himself, in "The Lord of the Rings" has managed to create an entire "secondary" world. It is the greatness of Sanskrit literature that such autonomous worlds have been built — Kṛṣṇa's world in the Bhāgavatapurāṇa, and the dream world of the Yogavāsiṣṭha. The sustained effort of imaginative creation evidenced in the latter work is to our mind unparalleled in any other literature.

1. Another point is that there can be no *duḥkha* in *rasa*, which is a synonym for *ānanda*, "bliss", as Abhinava points out again and again. See De, *H. S. P.* Vol. II, p. 132, and note the passage he quotes from the *Abhinavabhāratī* :

सामाजिकानां हर्षैकफलं नाट्यं न शोकादिफलम् ।

"For the spectators, the whole point of the drama is to produce pleasure, not sorrow, etc." It is almost certain that Viśvanātha's remarks in the third *pariccheda* of the *Sāhityadarpaṇa* were inspired by Abhinavagupta. There he says : (p. 53, Vidyāsāgara's ed.) ननु तर्हि करुणादीनां रसानां दुःखमयत्वाद्रसत्वं न स्यात् (precisely the objection that Abhinava records.)

करुणादावपि रसे जायते यत्परं सुखम् ।
सचेतसामनुभवः प्रमाणं तत्र केवलम् ॥

He then goes on to show that what in the world is a source of unhappiness is transformed in the drama into happiness, for the *vibhāvas* are *alaukika* (an idea taken from Abhinava) :

अलौकिकविभावत्वं प्राप्तेभ्यः काव्यसंश्रयात् ।
सुखं सञ्जायते तेभ्यः सर्वेभ्योऽपीति का क्षतिः ॥

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Thus then, because the nature of the present stanza is the complete overflow (*samucchalana*)[1] of *karuṇarasa* the essence of which is the *sthāyibhāva* sorrow, which is appropriate for aesthetic enjoyment, *rasa* alone is the soul of poetry, its very essence, which produces a charm far beyond the reach of other word-functions[2] (i. e. *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*). This is confirmed by (Bhaṭṭanāyaka) in his *Hṛdayadarpaṇa*:

"The poet does not regurgitate *rasa* until he is completely filled with it."[3]

(In the stanza quoted from the *Rāmāyaṇa*) *agamaḥ*[4] (is used in the sense of an augmentless Aorist) retaining the augment as a Vedic peculiarity

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In the *Vṛtti* to this *śloka* he gives his famous comparison of love-bites, which only produce, in their pain, pleasure :

तेभ्यश्च सुरते दन्ताघातादिभ्य इव सुखमेव जायते।

But it must be pointed out that once again the source of this idea is Abhinavagupta. Thus in the *Abhinavabhāratī*, p. 285 (Vol. I, G. O. S.) we read : तथा ह्येकघनशोकसंविच्चर्वणेऽपि, लोके स्त्रीलोकस्य हृदयविश्रान्तिरन्तरायशून्यविश्रान्तिशरीरत्वात् which refers to precisely this. Cf. the *Pratāparudrīya* (Madras, 2nd Ed., 1931), comm. p. 209 : संभोगसमये स्त्रीणामधरदंशनादौ कृत्रिमदुःखानुभवसीत्कारवदत्राप्युपपत्तिः See further the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, p. 30–31 (KM, 1939 ed.) and Raghavan, "*Number of Rasas*" p. 155, 1st ed. (p. 183, 2nd ed.).

Eṣā daśā refers to the act of creation, *Kaumudī* p. 160 : *ślokaracanārūpe 'tyarthaḥ*. The point is that in pain we cannot create. Creation takes place later, when the experience has been assimilated and is then contemplated. This is another of Abhinava's seminal ideas taken over by the later tradition.

1. Reading *samucchalana*. On p. (160) (86 *B. P.*), top of the page, the term has been used of water overflowing from a jug. Actually though this is an error, for it is not the *karuṇarasa* that overflows, but the original emotion. The word *rasa* is used loosely here to stand for both the final aesthetic result, *rasa* proper, and to mean "emotion" in general.

2. On p. 28 (p. 10, *B. P.*), Abhinava has used this same expression. B. ed. reads "*śābda*" which is a better reading. This is also the earlier reading that we have accepted in our translation of the *Locana*. *Vailakṣaṇya* here means "charm", from the notion of its being something completely different. *Śābda* stands for *śabdavyāpāra*.

3. Is this famous line from Bhaṭṭanāyaka meant to show that the poet must be full of emotion, using *rasa* in the wider sense, before he can write? In other words, is Bhaṭṭanāyaka saying that first one must be overwhelmed by an experience? Or is he using *rasa* in the technical sense to mean that first the poet himself actually has an aesthetic experience, and then records it, so that others may share it? Sanskrit poetic theory is not really clear on precisely what the experience of the poet is in relation to that of the reader. Abhinava seems, in his more rigorous moments ("*nātye eva rasāḥ na tu loke*"), to restrict the aesthetic experience to the reader, in which case the poet would be excluded. Bhaṭṭatauta, (see *Locana*, p. 92 *B. P.*) however, says that this experience (*anubhava*) is the same as that undergone by the reader, the poet and the *nāyaka*! Note the *Rasapradīpa* (quoting DR. IV. 42, p. 23 : काव्यार्थभावनास्वादो नर्तकेऽपि न वार्यते।

4. On this form, see Renou's "*Grammaire Sanskrite*", p. 414 and 439.

(*chāndasena*). *SA EVA*. The use of the word "alone" (*eva*) shows (that it alone is) the *Ātman*, not anything else. Therefore, what Bhaṭṭanāyaka has said, namely:

"Because of the overriding importance of the words used, people class the *śāstra*[1] apart (from poetry and stories). They give the name *ākhyāna* (historical tale) to compositions in which the sense conveyed by words is possessed of paramount importance. When both (word and meaning) are subordinated, and (all) importance is given to the manner (*vyāpāra*), then it is called "poetry",[2]"

is refuted. For if by "manner" he means that (function) whose essence consists in suggestiveness (*dhvanana*) and which is of the nature of aesthetic enjoyment (*rasanā*), he will have said nothing new. If, on the other hand, he means by "manner" *abhidhā*, we have already shown earlier[3] how it cannot be of major importance in poetry.

He now explains the verse: *VIVIDHA*. That which is (made) beautiful because of the high degree of excellence[4] in respect to the ideas (*vācya*), the words, and the structure (*racanā*), having been diversified (*vicitraṃ kṛtvā*) so as to be favourable to the various rasas to be suggested, i. e. that which is endowed with *guṇas* and *alaṅkāras*, both of words and meanings. There-

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1. *Śāstram* here means the Veda. Bhaṭṭanāyaka's point is that in the Veda the "letter" is all-important. In stories, the meaning is important, and finally, in poetry, it is the manner in which something is told that counts the most. Cf. I. A. Richard's famous dictum: "It is never what a poem *says* which matters, but what it is".

2. It is impossible to know just how indebted to Bhaṭṭanāyaka Abhinava really is. We think, however, that the famous comparison of poetry to a loving wife, certainly was either taken directly from Bhaṭṭanāyaka, or was at least inspired by this very passage. Both ideas are in fact synthesised by Śrīdhara in his commentary on the *Kāvyaprakāśa* and by Vidyādhara's *Ekāvalī* (K. P. Trivedi's edition. Bombay, 1903), p. 13:

शब्दप्रधानं वेदाख्यं प्रभुसंमितमुच्यते ।
ईषत्पाठ्यान्यथापाठे प्रत्ययवायस्य दर्शनात् ॥
इतिहासादिकं शास्त्रं मित्रसंमितमुच्यते ।
अस्यार्थवादरूपत्वात् कथ्यतेऽर्थप्रधानता ॥
ध्वनिप्रधानं काव्यं तु कान्तासंमितमीरितम् ।
शब्दार्थौ गुणतां नीत्वा व्यञ्जनप्रवणं यतः ॥

On this difference between *śāstra* and *kāvya*, there is an important passage (from the lost *Bhāmahavivaraṇa?*) of Udbhaṭa in the *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, p. 44: अस्तु नाम निस्सीमा अर्थसार्थः । किंतु द्विरूप एवासौ, विचारितसुस्थः, अविचारितरमणीयश्च । तयोः पूर्वमाश्रितानि शास्त्राणि, तदुत्तरं काव्यानि, इत्यौद्भटाः । Note also the *Vyaktiviveka*, III, p. 122 (T. S. S. ed.) where Bhaṭṭanāyaka's idea is modified but generally accepted.

3. Page 63, (*B. P.*) *Dhvanyālokalocana*.

4. *Prapañca* here must be understood in the sense of *utkarṣa*.

fore, although " suggestiveness " exists everywhere (even in such examples as " the boy is a lion "), we don't use the term " poetry " (in all such cases), just as, in spite of the fact that the *ātman* exists (in all things) we only call certain things " living ". We have already explained this.[1] This thus shows that what (Bhaṭṭanāyaka) has said in the *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* : " In that case the word poetry would apply promiscuously everywhere "[2] is out of place. The expression *nihatasahacarī*[3] (" the killed female ") expresses the *vibhāva*. The word *ākrandita* ("cries") expresses the *anubhāva*. *JANITA*.[4] One must supply : " through attaining to the state of aesthetic enjoyment. " Objection : if the verse arose from the aesthetic enjoyment of " sorrow ", how can one say that the soul of poetry is that suggested thing (viz. *rasa*) ?[5] (i. e. only *śoka* has been mentioned in the stanza, and not *rasa)*. With this doubt in mind he says: *ŚOKO HI*. Sorrow *(śoka)* is the *sthāyibhāva* of *karuṇa* which consists in the aesthetic enjoyment of sorrow.[6] Since the state of mind appropriate to the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* in relation to the *sthāyibhāva śoka*, when aesthetically enjoyed, becomes *rasa*, it is but proper[7] to say that

1. Page 59, *Locana* (B. P. edition).

2. The objection must have been that if one accepts the suggestive function (*dhvanavyāpāra*), which Bhaṭṭanāyaka does not, we will have to admit as examples of poetry, cases which merely include suggestion, but no charm. Thus *sarvatra* means, as the K. says on p. 162 : *siṃho vaṭuḥ ity ādāv api tatheti*. See p. 57 (B.P. ed.) of the text of the *Locana*.

3. Note that K. Sastri, on p. 164 of his *Upalocana* says that this is a *pratīka* that only gives the first words, but that it is meant to read : *nihatasahacarīviraha-kātara*, i.e. that it stands for the male *krauñca* ! But this is mere sophistry. Had Abhinava meant this, he would have said so.

4. Note that Abhinava has said on (p. 79, 80, and 83) of the *Locana* that *rasa* is not *janita*, i. e. the function is not *janana*, " production ". Thus he is of course bothered by the phrase *krauñcākrandajanitaḥ śoka eva*. He therefore says here (p. 89) that one must add the phrase : *carvaṇāgocaratvena*.

5. The objection is that in the *kārikā* only *śoka* is mentioned, not *rasa*. This is perfectly true, for the point of the *Kārikā* is to show the existance of a *pratīyamānārtha* i. e. that *śoka* is here suggested, and not directly stated. However Abhinava and Ānanda are probably correct to go further in their interpretations, for if this is all the author of the *Kārikā* meant, it would be a very weak argument; for in the *Rāmāyaṇa* itself, we are directly told both before and after this verse that Vālmīki was in sorrow ! And of course there can be no doubt that the author of the *Kārikā* knew very well that *śoka* is the *sthāyibhāva* of *karuṇa*.

6. The *sthāyibhāvas*, as soon as they are brought to the state of enjoyment (*carvaṇā*), become *rasa*. A *rasa* is after all only a latent *sthāyibhāva* that has become manifest. Thus the K. says that *śoka* here stands for all the other *sthāyibhāvas* : *śoka ity upalakṣaṇam ratyādeḥ*, p. 167.

7. We have translated *aucityāt* to mean " it is but proper ". But it might mean *upacāra*. Thus the K. says : *upayogitvanimittād upacārād iti yāvat*. This may well be the correct interpretation, for in the *Abhinavabhāratī*, p. 285, we read : *kevalam aucityād evam ucyate sthāyī rasībhūtaḥ*.

the *sthāyin* itself attains the status of *rasa*. For *(yataḥ)* (the *sthāyibhāva*) leads to aesthetic enjoyment in the following manner : the collection (*jāta*) of states of mind (*cittavṛtti*) is first experienced earlier in one's own life;[1] then it is inferred (from outer symptoms) to be existing in others; then by the arousal of the latent impressions (*saṃskāra*) it creates a sympathetic response (in the spectator's) heart[2] (and then it leads to the identification of the spectator with the situation).[3]

Objection : the soul (of poetry) has the form of the suggested sense (in general) and it has already been shown to have three varieties. It does not consist exclusively of *rasa*. But this episode from the epic seems to suggest that only *rasa* is the soul (of poetry). (Ānandavardhana) replies to this objection by accepting it ! *PRATĪYAMĀNASYA CA*. " Other varieties " refers to *vastu* and *alaṅkāra*. The word *bhāva* (in *rasabhāvamukhena)* shows that one can (in a loose manner of speaking) refer to the *vyabhicāribhāvas* as the essence (of poetry), even though when they are aesthetically enjoyed they do not come to rest only in themselves (*tāvanmātra* i. e. *svasmin*– aesthetic enjoyment does not terminate in *bhāvadhvani*),[4] and even though they do not attain the pre–eminent position (*pratiṣṭhā)* of a *rasa* which take place on culmination in the aesthetic enjoyment of the *sthāyi (bhāva)*.

" Rubbing one toe-nail with the tip of her other toe-nail, turning the loose bracelet on her wrist, and slowly scratching the ground with her foot whose anklet makes a deep sound ".

In this stanza shyness (has been suggested as the essence of the verse). The word *rasabhāva* includes *rasābhāsa, bhāvābhāsa* and *bhāvapraśāma*, for in spite of minor difference between, them in essence they are one and the same. *Prādhānyāt* means because (*vastudhvani* and *alaṅkāradhvani*) terminate in

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1. Note again that *rasa* is the *cittavṛtti* that is induced in the reader. It is latent there all along, as a *sthāyibhāva*.

2. We must insert *tanmayībhavana* here to complete the series, as the K. does

3. Here is the K. on this sequence (p. 165) :

व्यवहारदशायां स्वस्मिन्नात्मनि संविदितमिदानीं विलापादिकार्यदर्शनात् परस्मिन्ननुमीयते, तदनन्तरं संस्कारोद्बोधः, तदनन्तरं निर्मलतया हृदयस्य संवादः, तदनन्तरं तन्मयीभावः—इत्येवं स्थायिचित्तवृत्तेश्चर्वणोपायत्वात् स्थायिभाव एव रस इत्युपचर्यत इत्यर्थः।

" That which was known in one's own self in day–to–day life is now, from the cries etc. (of the bird) and other effects, inferred to be existent elsewhere. After that, one's own latent impressions are awakened ; then there is a sympathy of one's heart because it is pure (i. e. free from inhibitions). After that, one identifies. Thus in this manner, because the stable mental mood is the means to aesthetic enjoyment, the *sthāyibhāva* itself is called rasa, metaphorically speaking ".

Perhaps we should omit *yataḥ*, with three MSS (K. Sastri's edition, p. 166, fn. 1).

4. *Tāvanmātra* is paraphrased by the K. as *svarūpamātre*.

rasa. Even though there is no full aesthetic repose in *vastudhvani* and *alaṅkāra-dhvani*, nevertheless, because they give rise to an extraordinary charm that is beyond the reach of other word-functions (i. e. *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*), by extension (*aucitya=upacāra*) we can say that *vastudhvani* and *alaṅkāradhvani* are the essence (of poetry).

We can thus see that all of Abhinava's efforts focus on one important need : to crack the hard shell of the " I " and allow to flow out the higher Self which automatically identifies with everyone and everything around. We can see this preoccupation in all of his work, and in many of the verses he quotes. He takes especial pleasure in a displacement of the " I ", as in the *Vijñānabhairava* passages he is so fond of, where the " I " is dissolved by staring long into empty space. Even the verse from the *D. Āl.* for which he evinces a particular liking, speaks of lovers reaching " other shores " of ecstasy. [1]

With this background we are now in a position to understand the importance for Abhinava of *śāntarasa* – how much support he derived from a theory which demanded the transcendence of personality, and which ends in a feeling of cosmic peace.

1. *D. Āl.* IV., p. 524–25.

PART II

ŚĀNTARASA

Our primary concern in this part of the book is to translate and annotate the notoriously difficult section of Abhinavagupta's *Abhinavabhāratī* that deals with *śāntarasa*. This is the most extensive and the most important passage in Sanskrit literature on *śāntarasa*. In order to permit the reader to see the background in some perspective, we have also translated all passages relating to *śāntarasa* prior to Abhinavagupta. We have decided to let the passages speak for themselves in our translation, and to utilize the limited space available to us for textual notes.

The first passage is found in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*,[1] but is most probably a later interpolation.

Nāṭyaśāstra G. O. S. ed. vol. I, pp. 332–335 :

अथ शान्तो नाम शमस्थायिभावात्मको मोक्षप्रवर्तकः । स तु तत्त्वज्ञानवैराग्याशयशुद्ध्यादिभिर्विभावैः समुत्पद्यते । तस्य यमनियमाध्यात्मध्यानधारणोपासनसर्वभूतदयालिङ्गग्रहणादिभिरनुभावैरभिनयः प्रयोक्तव्यः । व्यभिचारिणश्चास्य निर्वेदस्मृतिधृतिसर्वाश्रमशौचस्तम्भरोमाञ्चादयः । अत्रार्याः श्लोकाश्च भवन्ति—

मोक्षाध्यात्मसमुत्थस्तत्त्वज्ञानार्थहेतुसंयुक्तः ।
नैःश्रेयसोपदिष्टः शान्तरसो नाम सम्भवति ॥
बुद्धीन्द्रियकर्मेन्द्रियसंरोधाध्यात्मसंस्थितोपेतः ।
सर्वप्राणिसुखहितः शान्तरसो नाम विज्ञेयः ॥
न यत्र दुःखं न सुखं न द्वेषो नापि मत्सरः ।
समः सर्वेषु भूतेषु स शान्तः प्रथितो रसः ॥
भावा विकारा रत्याद्याः शान्तस्तु प्रकृतिर्मतः ।
विकारः प्रकृतेर्जातः पुनस्तत्रैव लीयते ॥
स्वं स्वं निमित्तमासाद्य शान्ताद्भावः प्रवर्तते ।
पुनर्निमित्तापाये च शान्त एवोपलीयते ॥
एवं नवरसा दृष्टा नाट्यज्ञैर्लक्षणान्विताः ।

1. *NŚ.* VI, after verse 82, p. 332 of the G. O. S. ed., Vol. I.

" Now[1] *śānta*, which has *śama* for its *sthāyibhāva*, and which leads to *mokṣa*, arises from the *vibhāvas* such as knowledge of the truth,[2] detachment *(vairāgya)*, purity of mind etc. It should be acted out by means of the *anubhāvas*, such as *yama*[3] and *niyama*,[4] meditation on the Self, concentration of the mind on the Self (*dhāraṇā*)[5] devotion (*upāsanā*), compassion towards all creatures, and the wearing of religious paraphernalia (*liṅgagrahaṇa*).[6] Its *vyabhicāribhāvas* are disgust with the world *(nirveda)*, remembrance, firmness of mind, purity in all the four stages of life (*āśrama*), rigidity (of the body) (*stambha*), horripilation, etc.[7] The following *Āryās*[8] and *Ślokas* exist on this subject :

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1. It is clear that this passage does not belong to the original *NŚ*. For one thing, it is found in only one of the many MSS. of the *NŚ*. For another, Abhinava does not comment on it directly. It is however obvious from what Abhinava says on p. 339, G. O. S., Vol. I (p. 115, Raghavan's text, 2nd. edition) namely : तथा च चिरन्तनपुस्तकेषु " स्थायिभावान् रसत्वमुपनेष्यामः " (which is actually found on p. 299 of the G. O. S., Vol. I) इत्यनन्तरं शान्तो नाम शमस्थायिभावात्मक इत्यादि शान्तलक्षणं पठ्यते, that he read some definition, of which the first few words correspond to what we have printed He read this not at the end of the definition of the various rasas, but at the beginning. He might well have been aware of the fact that this was an interpolation, for he says : " in (some) old manuscripts ". On the other hand, he was eager to attempt to show that Bharata in fact sanctioned *śāntarasa*, even though he may not have said this in so many words. This comes out even in the adjective he applies to *pustaka*, *cirantana*, thereby attempting to give them some prestige and worth in the eyes of his readers.

2. If further proof is needed that Abhinava did not have this very same text before him, note that *tattvajñāna* is given here as one of the *vibhāvas* of *śānta*, whereas for Abhinava it is exclusively the *sthāyibhāva* of *ŚR*.

3. Yama means the five " abstentions " given in the *YS*. II, 30 as *ahiṃsā*, *satya*, *asteya*, *brahmacarya* and *aparigraha*.

4. *Niyama* refers to the " observances " given in *YS*. II, 32 as : *śauca*, *santoṣa*, *tapas*, *svādhyāya* and *īśvarapraṇidhāna*.

5. *Dhāraṇā* refers to keeping the mind collected, *cittasya ekāgratā* (See *YS*. II, 53).

6. *Liṅgagrahaṇa* refers to taking on the outer garments of an ascetic, as well as all the other paraphernalia of a religious mendicant.

Surely these refer to the eight elements of *Yoga*. Cf. *Yogasūtra*, II. 29 :

यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयोऽष्टावङ्गानि ।

7. Note that all these *vyabhicāribhāvas* are given by Bharata and apply to various other *rasas*. In fact, even *tattvajñāna* itself is given as one of the *vibhāvas* of *nirveda* (VII. 28) ! For Bharata, the *vyabhicāribhāvas* can become *sthāyibhāvas* and vice-versa. *Nirveda* is mentioned as an *anubhāva* of *śṛṅgāra* and of *karuṇa*. At VII, 56, *dhṛti* is said to arise from *vijñāna* ! At VII, 108, thinking about the *śāstras* is given as a *vibhāva* of *mati*. *Devaprasāda* is a *vibhāva* of *harṣa*. *Dhṛti*, *mati*, *smṛti* and *romāñca* are *vyabhicāribhāvas* of *vīra*. *Stambha* is given as a *vyabhicāribhāva* of *adbhuta* (p. 386) and of *bhayānaka*. The present passage is thus merely a pastiche from these various sources.

8. There is something wrong with this introduction : there are only two *Āryās* here, and thus the dual (*ārye*) should have been given.

"*Śāntarasa* has been taught as a means to the highest happiness (*naiḥśreyasa*). It arises from a desire to secure the liberation of the Self and leads to knowledge of the Truth."[1]

"*Śāntarasa* should be known as that which brings happiness and welfare to all beings and which is accompanied by the stabilization (*saṃsthita*) in the Self[2] that results from the curbing of the organs of perception and the organs of physical activity."[3]

"*Śāntarasa*[4] is that state wherein one feels the same towards all creatures, wherein there is no pain, no happiness, no hatred and no envy."

"*Śānta* is one's natural state of mind (*prakṛti*). Other emotions such as love, etc., are deformations (of that original state). The deformations arise out of this natural state of the mind and in the end again merge back into it."

"The emotions arise out of *śānta* depending on their particular respective causes. And when the specific causes cease to function, they all merge back into *śānta*."[5]

"Those who know dramaturgy see nine *rasas* along with their characteristics in this manner."

RUDRAṬA'S *Kāvyālaṅkāra* XV, 15–16[6]

सम्यग्ज्ञानप्रकृतिः शान्तो विगतेच्छनायको भवति ।
सम्यग्ज्ञानं विषये तमसो रागस्य चापगमात् ॥
जन्मजरामरणादित्रासो वैरस्यवासना विषये ।
सुखदुःखयोरनिच्छाद्वेषाविति तत्र जायन्ते ॥

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1. *Tattvajñānārthahetusaṃyuktaḥ* is very clumsy, since *artha* and *hetu* mean exactly the same thing.

Mokṣādhyātmasamutthaḥ is equally clumsy. We think *mokṣādhyātma* should be understood as standing for *adhyātmamokṣa*, i. e. "liberation of the Self". *Adhyātma* would mean : *ātmānam adhikṛtya*, "with reference to the Self".

This stanza is quoted, anonymously, by Abhinava in the *Abhinavabhāratī*, p. 340 (p. 115, Raghavan's, text 2nd ed.). He introduces it as a *Saṅgrahakārikā*, thus making it clear that it is not by Bharata.

2. We take *adhyātma* here to be used in the sense of the locative *ātmani*.

3. *Buddhīndriya* means the same as *jñānendriya*, the eyes, the ears, the nose, the skin and the tongue. *Karmendriya* means the organs of physical activity, such as hands, feet, speech, etc.

4. Cf. *Daśarūpāvaloka*, under IV. 45, p. 135.

5. Abhinava quotes this verse (*svaṃ svam*, etc.) in the *A. Bh.*, p. 340. He also quotes it in the *Locana*, p. 391, with the remark : अन्ये तु.....इति भरतवाक्यं दृष्टवन्तः । thereby ascribing it to Bharata.

6. Rudraṭa's *Kāryālaṅkāra*, *Adhyāya*, 15, 15–16, p. 166 of the *Kāvyamālā* edition by Durgaprasad and Pansikar, with Namisādhu's commentary, 3rd edition, N. S. P., 1928.

"*Śānta* (*rasa*) has for its cause (i. e. as its *sthāyibhāva*) right knowledge, and its hero is one whose passions are completely gone. Right knowledge arises from the disappearance of ignorance and of attachment to pleasure. Fear of birth, old age, death, etc., an attitude of disgust towards objects of enjoyment, and indifference to pleasure and pain arise (as its *anubhāvas*)."[1]

Dhvanyāloka pp. 388–394:

एवमैकाधिकरण्यविरोधिनः प्रबन्धस्थेन स्थायिना रसेनाङ्गभावगमने निर्विरोधित्वं यथा तथा तदर्शितम्। द्वितीयस्य तु तत्प्रतिपादयितुमुच्यते—

एकाश्रयत्वे निर्दोषो नैरन्तर्ये विरोधवान्।
रसान्तरव्यवधिना रसो व्यङ्ग्यः सुमेधसा ॥ २६ ॥

यः पुनरेकाधिकरणत्वे निर्विरोधो नैरन्तर्ये तु विरोधी स रसान्तरव्यवधानेन प्रबन्धे निवेशयितव्यः। यथा शान्तशृङ्गारौ नागानन्दे निवेशितौ।

शान्तश्च तृष्णाक्षयसुखस्य यः परिपोषस्तल्लक्षणो रसः प्रतीयत एव। तथा चोक्तम्—

यच्च कामसुखं लोके यच्च दिव्यं महत्सुखम्।
तृष्णाक्षयसुखस्यैते नार्हतः षोडशीं कलाम्॥

यदि नाम सर्वजनानुभवगोचरता तस्य नास्ति नैतावतासावलोकसामान्यमहानुभावचित्तवृत्तिविशेषः प्रतिक्षेप्तुं शक्यः। न च वीरे तस्यान्तर्भावः कर्तुं युक्तः। तस्याभिमानमयत्वेन व्यवस्थापनात्। अस्य चाहंकारप्रशमैकरूपतया स्थितेः। तयोश्चैवंविधविशेषसद्भावेऽपि यद्यैक्यं परिकल्प्यते तद्वीररौद्रयोरपि तथा प्रसङ्गः। दयावीरादीनां च चित्तवृत्तिविशेषाणां सर्वाकारमहंकाररहितत्वेन शान्तरसप्रभेदत्वं, इतरथा तु वीरप्रभेदत्वमिति व्यवस्थाप्यमाने न कश्चिद्विरोधः। तदेवमस्ति शान्तो रसः।

TRANSLATION OF *Dhvanyāloka* III. 26:

So now it has been shown how one can avoid the opposition of a *rasa* that is opposed to the pervading *rasa* of the work because of their being in a single character, by assigning to it a subsidiary position. Now the following is said to show that one can avoid opposition in the case of the second variety as well:

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1. Here is Namisādhu's commentary: *sugamaṃ na varam* (which should be read *navaram*, from Sanskrit *na param* — so this phrase will mean: "The stanza is (generally) easy to understand, but (the following explanations are necessary)":

सम्यग्ज्ञानं स्थायिभावः। विभावस्तु शब्दादिविषयस्वरूपम्। अनुभावो जन्मादित्रासादयः। कैश्चिच्छान्तस्य रसत्वं नेष्टम्। तदयुक्तम्। भावादिकारणानां अत्रापि विद्यमानत्वात्।

This last sentence only begs the question of course.

Even when there is no opposition between two *rasas*, though they are found in one character,[1] there might still be opposition because of (the opposing *rasa*) occurring [immediately after (the major *rasa*). (In such a case) the intelligent (poet) will introduce[2] a (third) *rasa* that will intervene (between the two opposed *rasas*). (26).[3]

The *rasa* that is not opposed (to the principal *rasa*), though occurring in the same character, but is opposed because of its immediate occurrence (after it), should be introduced into the work only after the intervention of a third *rasa*. As, for instance, *śānta* and *śṛṅgāra* have been introduced into the *Nāgānanda*[4] (with the intervention of *adbhuta*). *Śānta*, which is characterised by the full development of the happiness that comes from the destruction of desires,[5] is indeed apprehended (as one of the *rasas* by sensitive readers).[6] And so it has been said :

1. Insert *rasasya* after *aikādhikaraṇyavirodhinaḥ*.

2. The *KM* edition records *nyasyaḥ* as an alternative to *vyaṅgyaḥ*.

3. By *ekāśrayatve nirdoṣo*, we think that the author of the *Kārikās* meant to convey the fact that two opposing *rasas* may reside in one person if a long time elapses. I. e. a man can be a *kāmin* in one part of a poem and eventually become a *virāgin* in another. Bhartṛhari's *śatakatrayam* ?

4. The idea in citing the *Nāgānanda* is that two opposing *rasas*, namely *śṛṅgāra* and *śānta*, are interrupted by a third *rasa*, *adbhuta*, that is not opposed to either of them. Abhinava has a long passage where he gives quotations from the drama exemplifying all the three *rasas*. The only noteworthy expression there is *kramaprasarasambhāvanābhiprāya*, which means the orderly progression of the *rasas*. First comes *śāntarasa*, right at the very beginning of the drama (in fact in the *Prastāvanā*), when Jīmūtavāhana goes off to the forest. Then the *sthāyibhāva* of *adbhuta*, namely *vismaya* (over the beautiful singing), is introduced, and this forms the transitional phase to *śṛṅgāra*. But note that this is a weak argument, for *adbhuta* hardly forms an important element in this drama. It is there, formally, only because of the one phrase : *aho gītam, aho vāditram*, which Jīmūtavāhana says when he first hears *Malayavatī* singing and playing on the lute. Moreover, all of these three *rasas* occur in the first act. The rest of the drama is exclusively concerned with the hero's efforts to give up his life for the sake of another.

5. This definition of *śānta* is needlessly complicated. A single long compound would have been more clear : तृष्णाक्षयसुखपरिपोषलक्षणः शान्तः ।

6. Ānanda is seriously concerned with showing that *śāntarasa* does exist (*pratiyata eva* and *asti śānto rasaḥ*). It is, therefore, likely that this was a controversial point in the ninth century (indeed it has remained controversial until the present day). Since the *Kārikās* mention all of the eight *rasas* by name, at some point or another, there is absolutely no reason why they should not have mentioned *śānta*, had *śānta* been known to their author. The fact that *śānta* is never mentioned in a single *Kārikā* leads us to believe that their author was unaware of its existence (at least of its formal existence as a *rasa*, though there is no reason why he should not have known about *śānta* as an attitude), and most probably, therefore, lived before the time of Udbhaṭa, the first author to mention *śānta* as a *rasa*.

"The pleasures of love, as well as the great pleasures of heaven, do not equal even the sixteenth part of the happiness that succeeds the destruction of desire."[1]

Even should it be claimed that this is not within the range of experience of all men, still it is not possible simply on this account[2] to reject what is the special state of mind of great men who are not like ordinary people. Nor is it correct to include *śānta* within *vīrarasa*, because *vīra* depends on egoism, whereas *sānta* consists exclusively in the destruction of any feeling of self.[3] If, in spite of this distinction, one should still claim that *śānta* and *vīra* are one and the same, then the same absurd reasoning would apply to *vīra* and *raudra*. In the case of the states of mind in *vīra* which depend on compassion, etc., when there is a total absence of egoism, they can be considered as varieties of *śāntarasa*. If, however, egoism remains, then they should be considered varieties of *vīra*. If we understand things in this way, there will be no contradiction. And therefore there is *śāntarasa*. There is nothing wrong with including, in a work dealing with *śāntarasa*, a *rasa* (intrinsically) opposed to *śānta*, as long as a third and neutral (*aviruddha*) *rasa* intervenes.

Locana pp. 390–394 :

ननु नास्त्येव शान्तो रसः, तस्य तु स्थाय्येव नोपदिष्टो मुनिनेत्याशङ्क्याह—**शान्तश्चेति**। तृष्णानां विषयाभिलाषाणां यः क्षयः सर्वतो निवृत्तिरूपो निर्वेदः तदेव सुखं तस्य स्थायिभूतस्य यः परिपोषो रस्यमानताकृतस्तदेव लक्षणं यस्य स शान्तो रसः। **प्रतीयत एवेति**। स्वानुभवेनापि निवृत्तभोजनाद्यशेषविषयेच्छाप्रसरत्वकाले सम्भाव्यत एव।

अन्ये तु सर्वचित्तवृत्तिप्रशम एवास्य स्थायीति मन्यन्ते। तृष्णाऽसद्भावस्य प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधरूपत्वे चेतोवृत्तित्वाभावेन भावत्वायोगात्। पर्युदासे त्वस्मत्पक्ष एवायम्।

अन्ये तु—

स्वं स्वं निमित्तमासाद्य शान्ताद्भावः प्रवर्तते।
पुनर्निमित्तापाये तु शान्त एव प्रलीयते॥

इति भरतवाक्यं दृष्टवन्तः सर्वरससामान्यस्वभावं शान्तमाचक्षाणा अनुपजातविशेषान्तरचित्तवृत्तिरूपं शान्तस्य स्थायिभावं मन्यन्ते। एतच्च नातीवास्मत्पक्षाद्दूरम्। प्रागभावप्रध्वंसाभावकृतस्तु विशेषः। युक्तश्च प्रध्वंस एव तृष्णानाम्। यथोक्तम्—'वीतरागजन्मादर्शनात्' इति। **प्रतीयत एवेति**। मुनिनाप्यङ्गीक्रियत एव 'क्वचिच्छमः' इत्यादि वदता।

1. *Mahābhārata*, XIII, 174, 46. The verse has become (because of Ānanda's quotation ?) a *subhāṣita*, quoted even in elementary primers of Sanskrit in India.
2. *etāvatā*—"simply because of that".
3. *Tasya* and *asya* refer to *vīrarasa* and *śāntarasa* respectively.

न च तदीया पर्यन्तावस्था वर्णनीया येन सर्वचेष्टोपरमादनुभावाभावेनाप्रतीयमानता स्यात्। शृङ्गारादेरपि फलभूमाववर्णनीयतैव, पूर्वभूमौ तु 'तस्य प्रशान्तवाहिता संस्कारात। तच्छिद्रेषु प्रत्ययान्तराणि संस्कारेभ्यः' इति सूत्रद्वयनीत्या चित्राकारा यमनियमादिचेष्टा राज्यधुरोद्वहनादिलक्षणा वा शान्तस्यापि जनकादेर्दृष्टैवेत्यनुभावसद्भावाद्यमनियमादिमध्यसंभाव्यमानभूयोव्यभिचारिसद्भावाच्च प्रतीयत एव।

ननु न प्रतीयते नास्य विभावाः सन्तीति चेत्–न; प्रतीयत एव तावदसौ। तस्य च भवितव्यमेव प्राक्तनकुशलपरिपाकपरमेश्वरानुग्रहाध्यात्मरहस्यशास्त्रवीतरागपरिशीलनादिभिर्विभावैरितीयतैव विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिसद्भावः स्थायी च दर्शितः। ननु तत्र हृदयसंवादाभावाद्रस्यमानतैव नोपपन्ना। क एवमाह नास्तीति, यतः प्रतीयत एवेत्युक्तम्।

ननु प्रतीयते सर्वस्य श्लाघास्पदं न भवति। तर्हि वीतरागाणां शृङ्गारो न श्लाघ्य इति सोऽपि रसत्वाच्च्यवतामिति तदाह–**यदि नामेति**। ननु धर्मप्रधानोऽसौ वीर एवेति संभावयमान आह–**न चेति**। तस्येति वीरस्य। **अभिमानमयत्वेनेति**। उत्साहो ह्यहमेवंविध इत्येवंप्राण इत्यर्थः। **अस्य चेति** शान्तस्य। **तयोश्चेति**। ईहामयत्वनिरीहत्वाभ्यामत्यन्तविरुद्धयोरपीति चशब्दार्थः। वीररौद्रयोरत्यन्तविरोधोऽपि नास्ति। समानं रूपं च धर्मार्थकामार्जनोपयोगित्वम्।

नन्वेवं दयावीरो धर्मवीरो दानवीरो वा। नासौ कश्चित्, शान्तस्यैवेदं नामान्तरकरणम्। तथा हि मुनिः–

दानवीरं धर्मवीरं युद्धवीरं तथैव च।
रसं वीरमपि प्राह ब्रह्मा त्रिविधसंमितम्॥

इत्यागमपुरःसरं त्रैविध्यमेवाभ्यधात्। तदाह–**दयावीरादीनां चेत्यादिग्रहणेन**। विषयजुगुप्सारूपत्वाद्बीभत्सेऽन्तर्भावः शङ्क्यते। सा त्वस्य व्यभिचारिणी भवति न तु स्थायितामेति, पर्यन्तनिर्वाहे तस्या मूलत एव विच्छेदात्। आधिकारिकत्वेन तु शान्तो रसो न निबद्धव्य इति चन्द्रिकाकारः। तच्चेहास्माभिर्न पर्यालोचितं, प्रसङ्गान्तरात्। मोक्षफलत्वेन चायं परमपुरुषार्थनिष्ठत्वात्सर्वरसेभ्यः प्रधानतमः। स चायमस्मदुपाध्यायभट्टतौतेन काव्यकौतुके, अस्माभिश्च तद्विवरणे बहुतरकृतनिर्णयपूर्वपक्षसिद्धान्त इत्यलं बहुना॥

TRANSLATION OF THE *Locana* ON *Dhvanyāloka* III, 26.:

Objection[1]: "There is no *śāntarasa* at all, for Bharata has not taught its *sthāyibhāva.*" In order to answer this objection, (Ānanda-

1. Note what Kane has to say on the date of the *Avaloka*: "The *daśarūpa* and its commentary *Avaloka* were probably composed before Abhinavagupta wrote the *Abhinavabhāratī*. The earliest datable work of Abhinavagupta is the *Kramastotra* composed in 990 A. D. It has been shown above that the *Daśarūpa* was composed between

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vardhana) has said : " And *śānta*, etc." The complete extinction of desires, that is, love for sense-objects, in the form of the withdrawal (of the mind) (from every object of the sense), (also called) detachment,[1] that alone is happiness. The development of this, which arises from the aesthetic enjoyment of this detachment, when it turns into an abiding mental state, constitutes the definition of *sāntarasa*. " It is indeed apprehended. " It is possible (for ordinary people) to imagine what it is like from their own experience at the time when the course of their desires for all objects of the senses, such as food etc., has completely ceased (because of having eaten to satiation etc.).[2] Others, however, believe that the *sthāyibhāva* of *śāntarasa* is the calming down of all mental activity. If the absence of desires (which is the meaning of *tṛṣṇākṣaya*) is understood in the sense of a complete negation of their existence, then it would amount to the absence of all mental activity and could not be regarded as a *bhāva* (i. e. a positive mental state). But if it is understood in the sense

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974–996 A. D, and the commentary of Dhanika was composed not before 1000 A. D. Therefore, Dhanaṃjaya and Dhanika were contemporaries of Abhinavagupta. At all events the two works do not refer to each other, though (sic) they differ in several important respects." P. V. Kane, *op. cit.* p. 248. We think, though, that the *Locana* passage we are dealing with has in mind the criticisms of Dhanika, for in at least 5 places Abhinava refers to views that Dhanika has either mentioned or espoused. We think, for instance, that the passage on p. 390, ननु नास्त्येव शान्तो रसः तस्य तु स्थाय्येव नोपदिष्टो मुनिनेत्याशङ्क्याह is a reference to Dhanika, under IV, 35, इह शान्तरसं प्रति वादिनामनेकविधा विप्रतिपत्तयः, तत्र केचिदाहुः — नास्त्येव शान्तो रसः — तस्याचार्येण विभावाद्यप्रतिपादनाल्लक्षणाकरणात् । (p. 147). The passage in the *Locana* on page 391, न च तदीया पर्यन्तावस्था वर्णनीया येन सर्वचेष्टोपरमादनुभावेनाप्रतीयमानता स्यात् might well be a reference to Dhanika, p. 148, सर्वथा नाटकादावभिनयात्मनि स्थायित्वमस्माभिः शमस्य निषिध्यते — तस्य समस्तव्यापारप्रविलयरूपस्याभिनयायोगात् । (See also the more elaborate argument on this subject given in the *Abhinavabhāratī*). The passage on p. 393, नन्वेवं दयावीरो धर्मवीरो दानवीरो वा could well be a reference to the passage in Dhanika, p. 148, where he says :

अतो दयावीरोत्साहस्यैव तत्र स्थायित्वम् ।

The passage on p. 394 of the *Locana*, विषयजुगुप्सारुपत्वाद्बीभत्सेऽन्तर्भावः शङ्क्यते, might be a reference to the reported view on p. 147 of the *Avaloka* : अन्ये तु वीरबीभत्सादावन्तर्भावं वर्णयन्ति. Finally, the remark in the *Locana*, on p. 392, ननु तत्र हृदयसंवादाभावाद्रस्यमानतैव नोपपन्ना could well be aimed at Dhanika. p. 165, just before IV, 46 : न च तथाभूतस्य शान्तरसस्य सहृदयाः स्वादयितारः सन्ति. Of course, there is no guarantee that these were not merely general views, held in common by a number of authors.

1. Note then that Abhinava is not saying that Ānanda's *sthāyibhāva*, *tṛṣṇākṣayasukha*, is different from *nirveda*.

2. *Nivṛtta* goes with *icchāprasara*. We think the idea is that after one has taken a large meal, food is no longer attractive. From this we can infer that for the sage, worldly pleasures are no longer attractive, and thus we have a basis for understanding *śāntarasa* from our own experience.

of exclusion (of all desires), then this view will fall within our position.[1] Others, however, have taken their stand on the following verse of Bharata :[2]

" Various feelings, because of their particular respective causes, arise from *śānta* (a state of mental calm). But when these causes disappear, they melt back into *śānta*; "[3] and they then claim that *śānta* is common to all *rasas* and consider the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta* to be that state of mind which has not been particularised into any other mood. This opinion is not very far removed from our position. The difference is one of *prāgabhāva* (" non-existence of something before its origination ") and *pradhvaṃsābhāva* (non-existence of something when it is destroyed). And it is correct for desires to be destroyed. As has been said : " We can never find a man who is without desires from his birth. " (I. e. a person achieves this state at some later point in his life, and therefore desires can be destroyed.) Even Bharata has shown his agreement by saying : " Sometimes peace ",[4] etc. The culmina-

1. The point is this : what kind of negative is *tṛṣṇākṣaya ?* Is it *prasajya-pratiṣedha*, or *paryudāsapratiṣedha ?* If it is the former, then there could be no question of a *bhāva* at all, and therefore this is unacceptable. *Paryudāsa*, which means " exclusion of something with the possibility of including its opposite ", is however acceptable. The two kinds of negation are paralleled by the two forms of absence, *prāgabhāva* and *pradhvaṃsābhāva* which will be mentioned later.

2. This is from the *NŚ* VI. 106–8 and forms part of the interpolated *śānta* passage in that text.

3. Note that this verse does not necessarily mean that their author accepted *śāntarasa*. *Śānta* is simply the absence of emotion, the *tabula rasa* of the emotional board. It has nothing to do, necessarily, with *mokṣa* or religious views in general.

The stanza is given under the heading of *Āryā* verses and was, therefore, most probably part of a floating tradition, and not part of a continuously argued passage. On p. 326 of the *NŚ* (Vol. I), several verses are introduced with these words : *atrāryāḥ* (with a variant reading of *atrānuvaṃśyā āryā bhavanti*) on which Abhinava has a most important remark : ता एता ह्यार्या एकप्रघट्टकतया (Abhinava is fond of this rather rarely used word) पूर्वाचार्यैर्लक्षणत्वेन पठिताः । मुनिना सुखसंग्रहाय यथास्थानं निवेशिताः । It is, therefore, clear that these verses are not by Bharata himself. Some of them, however, might well be his own, and in this the situation resembles that of the *Dhvanyāloka*, where some of the *Saṅgrahaślokas* must be by Ānanda, and some must be by earlier or contemporary writers. Kane quotes *Vanaparva* 129, 8 : अत्रानुवंशं पठतः शृणु मे कुरुनन्दन । on which Nīlakaṇṭha says : परम्परागतमाख्यानश्लोकम् । (For more references, see Kane, *op. cit.*, p. 17). Note that Abhinava explains this term (*ānuvaṃśya*) as : अनुवंशे भवौ शिष्याचार्यपरम्परासु वर्तमानौ श्लोकाख्यौ वृत्तविशेषौ सूत्रार्थसंक्षेपप्रकटीकरणेन कारिकाशब्दवाच्यौ भवतः । Vol. I, p. 290 (second paragraph).

4. This is a reference to the *NŚ*, I. 106 :

क्वचिद्धर्मः क्वचित्क्रीडा क्वचिदर्थः क्वचिच्छमः ।
दुःखार्तानां श्रमार्तानां शोकार्तानां तपस्विनाम् ॥
विश्रान्तिजननं काले नाट्यमेतद्भविष्यति ।
ब्रह्मर्षीणां च विज्ञेयं नाट्यं वृत्तान्तदर्शनम् ॥

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ting stage of *nirveda* is not to be described (in *śānta*), so that one could say it cannot be perceived, because of the absence of any (visible) symptoms due to the cessation of all activity. This applies equally to *śṛṅgāra*,[1] etc., where the culminating stage (for example, actual sexual intercourse) cannot be described.[2] But in earlier stages, according to the two *Sūtras* (of Patañjali)[3]: " This (mind-stuff) flows peacefully by reason of the subliminal-impression." and " In the intervals of this (mind-stuff) there are other presented-ideas (coming) from subliminal-impressions," such diverse actions as *yama, niyama*, etc., or activities such as ruling the kingdom of the earth, etc., are perceived even in the case of Janaka and others who are nonetheless *śānta* (i. e. full of mental calm). And so it must be admitted that *śānta* is apprehended because of the existence of such outwardly visible symptoms and because of the existence of many *vyabhicāribhāvas* which are imaginable in the intervals of (the accessories of *yoga* such as)[4] *yama, niyama*, etc. Should one object that it is not perceived, as there are no *vibhāvas* belonging to it, we reply, no, it *is* perceived, and its *vibhāvas* such as acquaintance with people who are devoid of desire, fruition of one's former good deeds, grace of the highest God, and acquaintance with the secret teaching relating to

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It is one of the key passages for those who believe that Bharata really did accept *śānta* as a *rasa*. But there is no reason to believe that these correspond exactly to any of the *rasas*. They refer rather to the *puruṣārthas*. One wonders, though, precisely what Bharata had in mind by including *mokṣa* (corresponding to *śama*) as suitable for the drama.

1. Delete the quotation mark before *śṛṅgārāder api*, in the B. P. ed.

2. This is an important distinction, but it is difficult to know exactly what Abhinava has in mind. He admits that it is impossible to show the *anubhāvas* of the last phases of *śāntarasa*, because at that point there is a complete absence of activity. (This is an old Advaita problem, whether the *Jīvanmukta* engages in activity or not. The conundrum had passed into *Zen*, where it has formed the basis of elaborate discussions concerning the identity of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*). But Abhinava says that the same is true of *śṛṅgāra*, etc. What does he mean ? We suppose he is referring to actual sexual intercourse. Now, why, precisely, does he say that this cannot be portrayed ? On the analogy of the earlier example of *śānta*, it would seem to be because there is no physical activity. But this, of course, is not true. Or does he mean, not only sexual intercourse in general, i. e. not only the act of penetration, but also the actual moment of ejaculation ? In this case, he might well mean that there is little or no activity. (Which does not, however, imply that one cannot describe it, or even present it on the stage). Perhaps Abhinava simply means that it would be a breach of good taste to portray actual sexual intercourse on the stage. But if this is what he means, it is hard to see how this is relevant to *śāntarasa* and the absence of activity. Moreover, in the *Abhinavabhāratī*, Abhinava makes the same remark concerning *karuṇarasa*.

3. From the *Yogasūtra*, III, 10 and IV, 27. Our translation is taken directly from James Haughton Wood's " *The Yoga System of Patañjali* ", Harvard Oriental Series, 17, Cambridge, 1914.

4. After *vyabhicārisadbhāvāc ca* add *śāntarasaḥ*.

the Self, must be presumed. And so by all this we have shown that *vibhāvas, anubhāvas, vyabhicāribhāvas,* and a *sthāyibhāva* for *śānta* all exist. Objection[1] : "In *śāntarasa* no act of relishing can arise because of the lack of sympathetic response." Who said that there is no sympathetic response ? For it has already been said that it is perceived. Objection : "(Though it may be) perceived, it is not esteemed by everybody."[2] Yes, but according to this reasoning, men devoid of desire will not find love very praiseworthy either, and so it will have to be removed from the annals of *rasa* history ![3] And so Ānandavardhana says : "Even if". Objection : "It is possible to consider this (*śānta*) as identical with that variety of *vīra* which consists primarily of *dharma*". He answers this by saying : "And not." *tasya* refers to *vīra*. "Is full of egoism," because the essence of *utsāha* (energy, the *sthāyibhāva* of *vīra*) is to feel and say that "I am such and such", etc. *Asya ca* refers to *śānta*. "Between the two" : *ca* here means 'although they are extremly opposed to each other because the one (*vīra*) is full of desire and the other (*śānta*) is devoid of desire.' But *vīra* and *raudra* are not even very much opposed, because their similarity consists in this, that in attaining *dharma, artha* or *kāma,* both are (equally) helpful (*upayogitva*). Objection : "If this is so, then compassionate heroism (*dayāvīra*) is either religious heroism (*dharmavīra*) or generous heroism (*dānavīra*) (but not *sānta*)."[4] No, it is neither of these two, because

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1. The point of the objection is that *śānta* is never experienced by ordinary people in everyday life, and therefore they will have no *vāsanās* that will enable the acting to heighten the *sthāyibhāva* in them to the status of a *rasa*. Abhinava replies that *śānta* is, in fact, experienced by ordinary men. He refers, we believe, to the analogy of feeling sated after a full meal.

2. The opponent's argument, that *śāntarasa* appeals only to a select few, is very strong and deserves a serious reply. Abhinava's reply that for a *vītarāga*, a man with no passions, *śṛṅgāra* will also hold no appeal, is very weak. The point, surely, is that *śṛṅgāra* is, or has been, within the experience of all men, whereas *śānta* is not, (There are after all philosophical schools in India which denied the very existence of *mokṣa*, but none that ever denied the existence of *śṛṅgāra* !) This is presumably what the *pūrvapakṣin* means by *ślāghāspadam*. Moreover Abhinava has himself made fun of these very *vītarāgas* who are unable to appreciate love. Dry Mīmāṃsaka scholars he calls them. Of course, from a modern point of view, both objections can be simply met : it is not necessary to believe in something in order to enjoy it, for otherwise no atheist would find any pleasure in reading religious poetry, or even the *Upaniṣads* for that matter. Brigid Brophy has said that most of us "have replaced belief in fairies by a Midsummer Night's Dream".

3. Abhinava must have in mind the passage in the *NŚ*. 27, 59 :

तुष्यन्ति तरुणाः कामे विदग्धाः समयाश्रिते । अर्थेष्वर्थपराश्चैव मोक्षेष्वथ विरागिणः ॥

on which he comments : हृदयसंवादोऽपि तथाविधतत्त्वज्ञानबीजसंस्कारभावितानां भवत्येव, यद्वक्ष्यति "मोक्षे चापि विरागिणः" इति । (Vol. I. p. 340)

4. The punctuation of the *Bālapriyā* text is wrong. Place a *daṇḍa* after *dānavīro vā. nāsau kaścit* is a separate sentence, a reply to this objection.

(compassionate heroism) is simply another name for *śānta*. For the sage has said :

" Brahmā has said that *vīrarasa* is of three kinds : generous heroism, religious heroism, and battle heroism ".[1]

And so, using the tradition (*āgama*) as authority, he (i. e. the sage), declared (*vīra*) to have only three varieties.[2] And so Ānanda has said : " compassionate heroism, etc., " where the word " etc. " (refers to *dānavīra* and *dharmavīra*).[3] It might be (wrongly) suspected that (*śānta*) could be included under *bībhatsa*, because in both cases there is disgust with worldly objects. But while disgust[4] can be a *vyabhicāribhāva* of *śānta* (in the sense that it is transitory), it cannot be its *sthāyibhāva*; because in the last phases of *śānta*, it is completely rooted out. The author of the *Candrikā* claims that *śāntarasa* should not be employed as the major *rasa* (in a work). We have not examined this opinion here since that would lead to digression (*prasaṅgāntarāt*).[5] Because *śānta* is grounded on the highest goal of man,

1. Read *rasaṃ vīram* and not *rasavīram*. It means *vīrarasa*.

2. The point of the verse is that Bharata does not even mention *dayāvīra*, and therefore it is not *vīra* at all, but *śānta*. (*NŚ*. VI, 79. p. 331) The real question to ask Abhinava would have been how he intends to understand *dharmavīra*. How does this really differ from *dayāvīra* ?

3. Something has been dropped from the *Locana* passage *dayāvīrādīnāñ cetyādigrahaṇena*. The *Bālapriyā* says that one must supply *dharmavīradānavīrayor grahanam*. But this seems a contradiction, for Abhinava has just finished saying that *dharmavīra* and *dānavīra* are *vīrarasa*, not *śāntarasa*, whereas *dayāvīra* is *śānta*. However, this seems to be what Ānanda has in mind, for otherwise it is difficult to know what *ādi* will stand for. The view of Ānanda is that all the three, *dayāvīra*, *dharmavīra* and *dānavīra*, are to be regarded as varieties of *śānta* (as far as one can judge from his *Vṛtti*), if they are free from all traces of egoism. If not, they should be regarded as varieties of *vīrarasa*. Thus, Ānanda does not appear to have shared Abhinava's view that any form of *dayāvīra* is necessarily *śānta* itself. Abhinava holds the view that *dayāvīra* is not to be identified either with *dānavīra* or with *dharmavīra*. He believes that *dānavīra* and *dharmavīra* are also to be regarded as varieties of *śānta* if they are divested of all traces of egoism. The difference between the positions of Ānanda and Abhinava seems to be this : that, whereas Ānanda regards *dayāvīra* as identical with *śānta* only in certain circumstances (viz. when there is no egoism), Abhinava regards *dayāvīra* as identical with *śānta* in all circumstances. This implies that there can be no egoism in *dayāvīra* for Abhinava. Cf. *Locana*, p. 514 : *dayāvīra-śabdena vā śāntaṃ vyapadiśati*.

4. The idea is that *jugupsā* is not really a part of *śānta*, or rather, it is not an abiding element (though it can be regarded as a *vyabhicāribhāva* of *śānta*), since at the moment of realisation, नाभिनन्दति न द्वेष्टि तस्य प्रज्ञा प्रतिष्ठिता।

5. Note Raghavan, " *Number of Rasas* ", p. 22, " Evidently, the Candrikākāra also held the view that *Vīra* and *Śṛṅgāra* are the *Rasa-s* in the *Nāgānanda* in accordance with the ending in the attainment of *vidyādhara-cakravartitva*, the overlordship of the kingdom of Vidyādhara-s, and the sustained love-theme, and that the *śānta* came in there as a subsidiary idea to give a new variety of *Vīra* called *Dayā-vīra*.

(*Continued on next page*

i. e. because it gives rise to *mokṣa*, it is the most important of all the *rasas*.[1] And this has been demonstrated at great length, stating both pro-and contra-positions, in the *Kāvyakautuka* of our teacher Bhaṭṭatauta and in our commentary on that work. So enough of further discussion here.

Dhvanyāloka pp. 529-533 :

तथा च रामायणमहाभारतादिषु संग्रामादयः पुनः पुनरभिहिता अपि नवनवाः प्रकाशन्ते। प्रबन्धे चाङ्गी रस एक एवोपनिबध्यमानोऽर्थविशेषलाभं छायातिशयं च पुष्णाति। कस्मिन्निवेति चेत्—यथा रामायणे यथा वा महाभारते। रामायणे हि करुणो रसः स्वयमादिकविनासूत्रितः 'शोकः श्लोकत्वमागतः' इत्येवंवादिना। निर्व्यूढश्च स एव सीतात्यन्तवियोगपर्यन्तमेव स्वप्रबन्धमुपरचयता। महाभारतेऽपि शास्त्ररूपे काव्यच्छायान्वयिनि वृष्णिपाण्डवविरसावसानवैमनस्यदायिनीं समाप्तिमुपनिबध्नता महामुनिना वैराग्यजननतात्पर्यं प्राधान्येन स्वप्रबन्धस्य दर्शयता मोक्षलक्षणः पुरुषार्थः शान्तो रसश्च मुख्यतया विवक्षाविषयत्वेन सूचितः। एतच्चांशेन विवृतमेवान्यैर्व्याख्याविधायिभिः। स्वयमेव चैतदुद्गीर्णं तेनादीर्णमहामोहमग्नमुज्जिहीर्षता लोकमतिविमलज्ञानालोकदायिना लोकनाथेन—

यथा यथा विपर्येति लोकतन्त्रमसारवत्।
तथा तथा विरागोऽत्र जायते नात्र संशयः॥

इत्यादि बहुशः कथयता। ततश्च शान्तो रसो रसान्तरैर्मोक्षलक्षणः पुरुषार्थः पुरुषार्थान्तरैस्तदुपसर्जनत्वेनानुगम्यमानोऽङ्गित्वेन विवक्षाविषय इति महाभारततात्पर्यं सुव्यक्तमेवावभासते। अङ्गाङ्गिभावश्च यथा रसानां तथा प्रतिपादितमेव।

पारमार्थिकान्तस्तत्त्वानपेक्षया शरीरस्येवाङ्गभूतस्य रसस्य पुरुषार्थस्य च स्वप्राधान्येन चारुत्वमप्यविरुद्धम्। ननु महाभारते यावान्विवक्षाविषयः सोऽनुक्रमण्यां सर्व एवानुक्रान्तो न चैतत्तत्र दृश्यते, प्रत्युत सर्वपुरुषार्थप्रबोधहेतुत्वं सर्वरसगर्भत्वं च महाभारतस्य तस्मिन्नुद्देशे स्वशब्दनिवेदितत्वेन प्रतीयते। अत्रोच्यते—सत्यं शान्तस्यैव रसस्याङ्गित्वं महाभारते मोक्षस्य

Continued from previous page)

Abhinavagupta, however, rejects this view of the *Candrikā* in his *Locana*. *Ādhikārikatvena tu śānto raso (raso na) nibaddharya iti candrikākāraḥ, tac cehāsmābhir na paryālocitam.*" This does not seem justified by the passage Dr. Raghavan quotes. Abhinava has not said that he rejects the views of the *Candrikā*, but only that a discussion of these views would involve digressing from his main theme. We have translated the whole passage on page 102. Cf. *A. Bh.*, Vol. II, p. 451.

1. Note that what Abhinava says here : *sarvarasebhyaḥ pradhānatamaḥ* is directly contrary to what Ānanda will say on p. 397 of the *D, Āl.* : शृङ्गाररसः...सर्वरसेभ्यः... प्रधानभूतः। Moreover he himself will admit in the *Abhinavabhāratī* that *śānta* is *apradhāna* : अत एव शान्तस्य स्थायित्वेऽप्यप्राधान्यम्। (Vol. I, p. 339). And again in the *A. Bh.* IV, p. 78 : *uktam hi – na śāntarasapradhānatā prayogasya bhavati. sato'pi* (*sann api*?) *hi rasāntaroparakta eva prayogayogyo nānyatheti.*

च सर्वपुरुषार्थेभ्यः प्राधान्यमित्येतन्न स्वशब्दाभिधेयत्वेनानुक्रमण्यां दर्शितम्, दर्शितं तु व्यङ्ग्यत्वेन—

'भगवान्वासुदेवश्च कीर्त्यतेऽत्र सनातनः'

इत्यस्मिन् वाक्ये। अनेन ह्ययमर्थो व्यङ्ग्यत्वेन विवक्षितो यदत्र महाभारते पाण्डवादिचरितं यत्कीर्त्यते तत्सर्वमवसानविरसमविद्याप्रपञ्चरूपं च, परमार्थसत्यस्वरूपस्तु भगवान् वासुदेवोऽत्र कीर्त्यते। तस्मात्तस्मिन्नेव परमेश्वरे भगवति भवत भावितचेतसो, मा भूत विभूतिषु निःसारासु रागिणो गुणेषु वा नयविनयपराक्रमादिष्वमीषु केवलेषु केषुचित्सर्वात्मना प्रतिनिविष्टधियः। तथा चाग्रे—पश्यत निःसारतां संसारस्येत्यमुमेवार्थं द्योतयन् स्फुटमेवावभासते व्यञ्जकशक्त्यनुगृहीतश् चशब्दः। एवंविधमेवार्थं गर्भीकृतं संदर्शयन्तोऽनन्तरश्लोका लक्ष्यन्ते—'स हि सत्यम्' इत्यादयः।

अयं च निगूढरमणीयोर्थो महाभारतावसाने हरिवंशवर्णनेन समाप्तिं विधदता तेनैव कविवेधसा कृष्णद्वैपायनेन सम्यक्स्फुटीकृतः। अनेन चार्थेन संसारार्तीते तत्त्वान्तरे भक्त्यतिशयं प्रवर्तयता सकल एव सांसारिको व्यवहारः पूर्वपक्षीकृतो न्यक्षेण प्रकाशते। देवतातीर्थतपःप्रभृतीनां च प्रभावातिशयवर्णनं तस्यैव परब्रह्मणः प्राप्त्युपायत्वेन तद्विभूतित्वेनैव देवताविशेषाणामन्येषां च। पाण्डवादिचरितवर्णनस्यापि वैराग्यजननतात्पर्याद्वैराग्यस्य च मोक्षमूलत्वान्मोक्षस्य च भगवत्प्राप्त्युपायत्वेन मुख्यतया गीतादिषु प्रदर्शितत्वात्परब्रह्मप्राप्त्युपायत्वमेव। परम्परया वासुदेवादिसंज्ञाभिधेयत्वेन चापरिमितशक्त्यास्पदं परं ब्रह्म गीतादिप्रदेशान्तरेषु तदभिधानत्वेन लब्धप्रसिद्धि माथुरप्रादुर्भावानुकृतसकलस्वरूपं विवक्षितं न तु माथुरप्रादुर्भावांश एव, सनातनशब्दविशेषितत्वात्। रामायणादिषु चानया संज्ञया भगवन्मूर्त्यन्तरे व्यवहारदर्शनात्। निर्णीतश्चायमर्थः शब्दतत्त्वविद्भिरेव।

तदेवमनुक्रमणीनिर्दिष्टेन वाक्येन भगवद्व्यतिरेकिणः सर्वस्यान्यस्यानित्यतां प्रकाशयता मोक्षलक्षण एवैकः परः पुरुषार्थः शास्त्रनये, काव्यनये च तृष्णाक्षयसुखपरिपोषलक्षणः शान्तो रसो महाभारतस्याङ्गित्वेन विवक्षित इति सुप्रतिपादितम्। अत्यन्तसारभूतत्वाच्चायमर्थो व्यङ्ग्यत्वेनैव दर्शितो न तु वाच्यत्वेन। सारभूतो ह्यर्थः स्वशब्दानभिधेयत्वेन प्रकाशितः सुतरामेव शोभामावहति। प्रसिद्धिश्चेयमस्त्येव विदग्धविद्वत्परिषत्सु यदभिमततरं वस्तु व्यङ्ग्यत्वेन प्रकाश्यते न साक्षाच्छब्दवाच्यत्वेन।

Dhvanyāloka, Uddyota IV.[1]:

... Thus in the *Rāmāyaṇa,* in the *Mahābhārata,* and other works, though battles and the like are described again and again, they seem new each

1. *D. Āl.* pp. 529 ff.

time.[1] When one single *rasa* is presented as dominant in a large work, this creates originality[2] in the subject matter and (gives rise to) great beauty as well. "Such as where?" Well, for instance in the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*. For in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, *karuṇarasa* has been hinted at by Vālmīki when he says: "Sorrow was transformed into poetry."[3] It is that very (*rasa*) that has been sustained till the very end, since Vālmīki ends his work with (Rāma's) final separation from Sītā.[4] (The same applies to) the *Mahābhārata* also, (that work) which has the form of a philosophical (or didactic) text[5] and possesses the beauty of poetry. When the great sage (Vyāsa) ends his work in such a way that it makes us feel melancholy (*vaimanasyadāyinī*) by having the Vṛṣṇis and the Pāṇḍavas all finish in a pathetic way,[6] and shows how his book puts emphasis on the creation of world-weariness (*vairāgya*), he suggests by this emphasis that (among the *rasas*) *śāntarasa* is meant to be predominant, and (among the goals of life), *mokṣa* is primarily intended. Moreover this has been partially explained by other commentators as well. The father of the world (*lokanātha*), who wishes to lift people out of the morass of rampant (*udīrṇa*) ignorance in which they have fallen, and provide them with the pure light of knowledge, has himself asserted this very thing when he said the following and many other things like it over and over:

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1. What makes the battles seem original each time, is not, we think, the use of *dhvani* in each particular description (though *vīra*, *bhayānaka*, *bībhatsa*, and *raudra* can all exist therein), but their subordination to a more general aesthetic goal. So in the case of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the constant expressions involving pain, sorrow, separation, etc., all conduce to the over-all end of the work, a feeling of *karuṇa*. In the *Mahābhārata*, the more battles are described, the more distasteful war becomes and the more firmly grounded our feeling of detachment, of world-weariness (*vairāgya*). This theory, advanced as it is, would be appropriate to a work where the subject is a unified one, but it can hardly be applied to a work as varied (in authorship as well) as the *Mahābhārata*, which contains several *rasas*, and cannot be viewed as a unity. Ānanda of course could not have agreed.

2. *Arthaviśeṣa* here means *arthanavatva*.

3. See the passage translated from the *Locana* on the first *Uddyota* of the *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 79. The passage here is *Rāmāyaṇa* I, 2. 40.

4. This refers to Sītā's being swallowed up by the earth. At the very end of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Rāma is promised a heavenly reunion. One wonders whether this obvious interpolation existed at the time of the *Dhvanyāloka*. If it did, then Ānanda in an unprecedented critical attitude seems to suggest that this cannot concern the literary critic, which is a remarkably advanced view.

5. Read *śāstrarūpe* on p. 530.

6. Note what the *Dīdhiti* commentary (p. 611) says on this : तेषामेव यदीदृशः परिणामः तर्हि का कथान्येषाम् ? "If even they ended up like this, what hope is there for the rest of us?" The *mahāprasthāna* episode, especially the *svargārohaṇa*, does indeed convey an atmosphere of dejection. After all, the brothers undertook this suicidal voyage because things looked so bleak. Yudhiṣṭhira especially strikes one as a tired man, battle-weary and without illusions about man's perfectability.

"The more the course of the world (*lokatantra*) unfolds itself before us as vain and insubstantial, the more, surely, does (our) detachment grow."[1]

From this the ultimate meaning of the *Mahābhārata* appears most clearly: the two subjects intended as predominant are *śāntarasa*, with other *rasas* in a subordinated position, and *mokṣa*, with other aims of life likewise subordinated. The topic of the predominance and subordination of the different *rasas* has already been dealt with.[2] It is no contradiction to say that if we do not take into consideration the ultimate (*pāramārthika*) inner truth (of the *Mahābhārata*), other subsidiary goals of life (besides *mokṣa*) and other subsidiary *rasas* (besides *śāntarasa*) are beautiful in their own way (*svaprādhānyena*, i. e. *svaviṣaye*), just as the body, when we do not take the soul into consideration, is thought of as beautiful, though it is really only subsidiary (to the soul). "But", (someone might argue), "in the *Mahābhārata* all of the subjects to be presented have been given in the table of contents, and this one (that you mention) is not found there.[3] On the contrary, we can understand, through the very words used (*svaśabdanivedatatva*) in that section (*uddeśa*), that the *Mahābhārata* teaches all the goals of man, and contains all the *rasas*." We reply: What you say is true. In the table of contents it has not been said in so many words that in the *Mahābhārata*, *śāntarasa* is the main (*rasa*) nor that *mokṣa* is more important than all other human preoccupations. But it has been shown through suggestion, as in the following phrase: "And the blessed eternal Vāsudeva is praised herein."[4] The intended meaning, arrived at through suggestion, is that the deeds of the Pāṇḍavas, etc., which are recited in the *Mahābhārata*, all end pathetically and are only a manifestation of cosmic ignorance; and that the blessed Vāsudeva, whose form is the highest truth, is glorified there. "Therefore turn your minds devoutly to that revered, highest God alone. Do not set your hearts on the empty outward shapes of things, and do not exclusively fix your thoughts on mere worldly virtues like political sagacity, enforcement

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1. We have not succeeded in tracing this stanza in the *Mahābhārata*.

The verse might appear to an impartial reader (that is, outside of the context of the *D. Āl.*) as a rather cynical comment: "only when things go badly do they appear unreal." Without the context, we cannot say whether Ānanda's interpretation is the correct one.

2. *D. Āl.* III. 20 and following.

3. The passage the Pūrvapakṣin seems to have in mind is *Mahābhārata* I. 1. 48:

वेदयोगं सविज्ञानं धर्मोऽर्थः काम एव च।
धर्मार्थकामशास्त्राणि शास्त्राणि विविधानि च॥

4. *Mahābhārata*, I. 1. 256.

of discipline, valour, etc." And further on, the word "and" (*ca*) helped by its suggestive power, is here clearly seen to suggest the following idea: "Take into account the hollowness of worldly existence." The verses immediately following, such as "He indeed is the Truth", etc., are (also) seen to contain implied in them similar ideas.

By completing his work at the end of the *Mahābhārata* with the description of *Kṛṣṇa*'s genealogy (*harivaṃśa*), the poet–creator *Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana* has made this hidden beautiful sense wonderfully patent. And because this (hidden) meaning impels us to great devotion for another truth, beyond the phenomenal world, all worldly activities assume a preliminary[1] and vincible position (*pūrvapakṣa*)[2] as being fit to be ignored (*nyakṣa*).[3] The description of the exceptional power of gods, holy places, penance, etc., is (only) a means to attaining the highest Brahman, because the various particular gods and other things (i.e. holy places, penance, etc.) are its manifestations (*vibhūti*).[4] The description of the life of the Pāṇḍavas etc., gives rise to

1. Cf. Raghavan, "*The Number of Rasas*", p. 36: "The author of the *Bhāgavata* in his criticism of the Bhārata, says that in the Great Epic, Vyāsa has described "*Pravṛtti*" (as *Pūrvapakṣa*) so much and so well, that man who is by nature attached to it has mistaken the *Pūrvapakṣa* itself for the *Siddhānta*". Here is the verse, as quoted by Raghavan:

जुगुप्सितं धर्मकृतेऽनुशासतः
स्वभावरक्तस्य महान् व्यतिक्रमः।
यद्वाच्यतो धर्म इतीतरः स्थितो
न मन्यते तस्य निवारणं जनः॥ (*Bhāgavata*, I. 5. 15)

Note the important verse of Abhinavagupta in his *Gītārthasaṅgraha* (edited by V. L. Shastri Pansikar in his edition of the *Gītā*, N. S. P., Bombay 1912 with 8 commentaries), p. 2:

द्वैपायनेन मुनिना यदिदं व्यधायि
शास्त्रं सहस्रशतसंमितमत्र मोक्षः।
प्राधान्यतः फलतया प्रथितस्तदन्य–
धर्मादि तस्य परिपोषयितुं प्रणीतम्॥

2. Professor Daniel H. H. Ingalls has kindly directed our attention to an interesting remark of Nilakaṇṭha on *M. Bh.*, I. 1. 275 (Poona Ed. p. 24), where an adversary is made to remark: अत्रानर्थको युद्धादिप्रलापो भूयान् दृश्यते to which the reply is: एवं भारतेऽपि धर्मब्रह्मप्रतिपादन एव परमतात्पर्यम्। अर्थवादजातमपि युधिष्ठिरादिवद्व्यवहर्तव्यं न दुर्योधनादिवदित्याशयेनोक्तम् ..... तथा च सर्वस्मादपि ग्रन्थात्सारमेवादेयमितरत् त्याज्यमिति श्रूयते। Note how similar this is to the last two verses of the *Saundarananda* of Aśvaghoṣa quoted above, p. 4.

3. Jacobi (p. 334, *ZDMG.* vol. 57, 1903) remarks that for *adhyakṣyeṇa*, *ādhyakṣyeṇa* or *adhyakṣeṇa* should be read. He translates: "... erscheint das ganze weltliche Treiben *ganz deutlich* als überwundener Standpunkt." The *Bālapriyā* takes *nyakṣeṇa* to mean "entirely" (*kārtsnyena*), but we do not believe it has that meaning. Surely it means "despised" (Cf. *nyakkṛta*), literally "looked down upon" from *ni* and *akṣa*.

4. See *Gītā* X. 16 and 41, for this meaning of *vibhūti*.

vairāgya ; *vairāgya* is at the base of *mokṣa*; and *mokṣa* is a means to attaining the blessed one, as has been principally shown in the *Gītā*, etc.; and thus the description of the life of the Pāṇḍavas is indirectly[1] a means of attaining the highest Brahman. By designations such as Vāsudeva, etc., is meant the highest Brahman, the abode of unlimited power, which is well-known in the *Gītā* and other parts (of the *Mahābhārata*)[2] under the name of Vāsudeva (lit. "as denoted by such words as Vāsudeva — *tadabhidhānavatvena*),[3] the whole of whose essential nature was reflected in the incarnation at Mathura.[4] This is proved by the fact that the name Vāsudeva is qualified (in the quotation from the *Mahābhārata* given above) by the adjective "eternal" (which could not qualify an individual); and (further) because this appellation is used of other manifestations of Viṣṇu in the *Rāmāyaṇa* etc.[5] This matter has been decided (*nirṇīta*) by the grammarians themselves.[6] And so, through the sentence found in the table of contents, it is revealed that everything different from the blessed one is ephemeral, and thereby it is well-established that looking at the *Mahābhārata* as a *śāstra*, the highest goal of man, namely *mokṣa*, is alone intended as the most important (of the goals of life), and looking at it as poetry, *śāntarasa*, which is characterised by the nourishing of the happiness that succeeds the destruction of desire,[7] is intended as the most important (of all the *rasas*). Because it is the very essence of the whole work, this meaning has been conveyed through suggestion, and not directly. For an essential idea, if it is revealed without directly stating it in so many words,[8] carries a far greater beauty. It is

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1. *Paramparayā* obviously goes with the preceding series, and thus the *daṇḍa* should be removed and placed after *paramparayā*.

2. *Gītādipradeśeṣu* can mean : "in passages in the *Gītā*, etc.", or "in places (of the *Mahābhārata*) like the *Gītā*, etc."

3. Read *tadabhidhānavattvena* instead of *tadabhidhānatvena*.

4. Understand *aṅgirūpam* after माथुरप्रादुर्भावानुकृतसकलस्वरूपम्.

Māthuraprādurbhāva refers to Kṛṣṇa as an incarnation, being only a part (*aṃśa*) of the highest Brahman. Vāsudeva does not refer to this limited individual (since qua *avatāra* he is not eternal), but to the principle lying behind it. To limit him to a specific place (Mathurā) obviously shows that this is only a part, not the *aṃśin* or *aṅgin*, the whole.

5. Both Tripāṭhi (p. 1349) and the *Dīdhiti* (p. 621) quote the following verse from the *Rāmāyāṇa* to support Ānanda's statement :

यस्येयं वसुधा कृत्स्ना वासुदेवस्य धीमतः।
महिषी माधवस्यैषा स एव भगवान् प्रभुः ॥

6. See *Kāśikā* on Pāṇini IV. 1. 114.

7. *Tṛṣṇākṣayasukha* is, according to Ānanda (see p. 390, *D. Āl.* third *Uddyota*), the *sthāyibhāva* of *śāntarasa*.

8. *Svaśabdanivedita* is a key concept in Ānanda's system. See above, p. 7–8, and also *Locana*, on p. 528 : *śabdaspṛṣṭe 'rthe kā hṛdyatā*. See also the discussion in

(Continued on next page

well-known among the assemblies of the cultured and the learned that something which is highly prized should be revealed by suggestion and not in so many words".

Locana pp. 530–533 :

अत्यन्तग्रहणेन निरपेक्षभावतया विप्रलम्भाशङ्कां परिहरति। वृष्णीनां परस्परक्षयः, पाण्डवानामपि महापथक्लेशेनानुचिता विपत्तिः, कृष्णस्यापि व्याधाद्विध्वंस इति सर्वस्यापि विरसमेवावसानमिति। **मुरुयतये**ति। यद्यपि "धर्मे चार्थे च कामे च मोक्षे चे"त्युक्तं, तथापि चत्वारश्चकारा एवमाहुः—यद्यपि धर्मार्थकामानां सर्वस्वं तादङ्नास्ति यदन्यत्र न विद्यते, तथापि पर्यन्तविरसत्वमत्रैवावलोक्यताम्। मोक्षे तु यद्रूपं तस्य सारतात्रैव विचार्यतामिति।

यथायथेति। लोकैस्तन्त्र्यमाणं यत्नेन संपाद्यमानं धर्मार्थकामतत्साधनलक्षणं वस्तुभूततयाभिमतमपि। येन येनार्जनरक्षणक्षयादिना प्रकारेण। असारवत्तुच्छेन्द्रजालादिवत्। विपर्येति। प्रत्युत विपरीतं संपद्यते। आस्तां तस्य स्वरूपचिन्तेत्यर्थः। तेन तेन प्रकारेण अत्र लोकतन्त्रे। **विरागो जायत** इत्यनेन तत्त्वज्ञानोत्थितं निर्वेदं शान्तरसस्थायिनं सूचयता तस्यैव च सर्वेतरासारत्वप्रतिपादनेन प्राधान्यमुक्तम्।

ननु शृङ्गारवीरादिचमत्कारोऽपि तत्र भातीत्याशङ्क्याह—**पारमार्थिके**ति। भोगाभिनिवेशिनां लोकवासनाविष्टानामङ्गभूतेऽपि रसे तथाभिमानः, यथा शरीरे प्रमातृत्वाभिमानः प्रमातुर्भोगायतनमात्रेऽपि। **केवलेष्वि**ति। परमेश्वरभक्त्युपकरणेषु तु न दोष इत्यर्थः। विभूतिषु रागिणो गुणेषु च निविष्टधियो मा भूतेति संबन्धः। **अग्र** इति। अनुक्रमण्यनन्तरं यो भारतग्रन्थः तत्रेत्यर्थः। ननु वसुदेवापत्यं वासुदेव इत्युच्यते, न परमेश्वरः परमात्मा महादेव इत्याशङ्क्याह — वासुदेवादिसंज्ञाभिधेयत्वेनेति।

बहूनां जन्मनामन्ते ज्ञानवान् मां प्रपद्यते।
वासुदेवः सर्वम्

इत्यादौ अंशिरूपमेतत्संज्ञाभिधेयमिति निर्णीतं तात्पर्यम्। **निर्णीतश्चे**ति। शब्दा हि नित्या एव सन्तोऽनन्तरं काकतालीयवशात्तथा संकेतिता इत्युक्तम् — "ऋष्यन्धकवृष्णिकुरुभ्यश्च" इत्यत्र।

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the first *Uddyota*, pp. 78–83 (*Bālapriyā* ed.). Cf. also D. Āl. p. 78; 245; 248. Locana, p. 525; 528. For a devastating criticism of Udbhaṭa IV. 3, see Kuntaka's *Vakroktijīvita*, III. 37 (p. 159, De's ed.). Contrary to the general view, Ānanda did *not* hold that the *vyabhicāribhāvas* can be directly expressed. See M. V. Patwardhan and J. L. Masson : "Solution to a Long-confused Issue in the *Dhvanyāloka*", soon to appear. in B. S. O. A. S. For a fuller treatment of the issues involved in *svaśabdavācya*, see J. Masson, "*Svaśabdaniveditatva* – Telling, not Conveying", to appear in J. O. I., Baroda.

शास्त्रनय इति। तत्रास्वादयोगाभावे पुरुषेणार्थ्यत इत्ययमेव व्यपदेशः सादरः, चमत्कारयोगे तु रसव्यपदेश इति भावः। एतच्च ग्रन्थकारेण तत्त्वालोके विवृत्योक्तमिह त्वस्य न मुख्योऽवसर इति नास्माभिस्तद्दर्शितम्। **सुतरामेवेति** यदुक्तं तत्र हेतुमाह–**प्रसिद्धिश्चेति**। चशब्दो यस्मादर्थे। यत इयं लौकिकी प्रसिद्धिरनादिस्ततो भगवद्व्यासप्रभृतीनामप्ययमेवास्वशब्दाभिधाने आशयः, अन्यथा हि क्रियाकारकसंबन्धादौ 'नारायणं नमस्कृत्ये'त्यादिशब्दार्थनिरूपणे च तथाविध एव तस्य भगवत आशय इत्यत्र किं प्रमाणमिति भावः। विदग्धविद्वद्ग्रहणेन काव्यनये शास्त्रनये इति चानुसृतम्।

TRANSLATION OF THE *Locana* :

The word *atyanta* (in the expression *sītātyantaviyoga*), since it shows that they have no hope of meeting, indicates that this is (*karuṇa* and) not *vipralambha* (*śṛṅgāra*).[1] The mutual destruction of the Vṛṣṇis, the end of the Pāṇḍavas by experiencing undeserved troubles on their great journey (north, to death), and Kṛṣṇa's destruction by a hunter show that everybody's end was pathetic. *MUKHYATAYÀ*. Although it has been said : " And in *dharma*, and in *artha*, and in *kāma*, and in *mokṣa*, "[2] nonetheless the four " ands " amount to this, that although the essence of *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* (as described in the *Mahābhārata*) can be found elsewhere (i. e. in works other than *Mahābhārata*), nonetheless, the fact that they ultimately come to a pathetic end is to be found here only. But the paramount importance (*sāratā*) of the nature of *mokṣa* (*mokṣe yad rūpaṃ tasya*) can be seen only here (in the *Mahābhārata*). *YATHÀ YATHÀ*. (*Tantryamāṇa* means) that which people tend towards, i. e. what is sought by them (*sampādyamāna*) with effort. This refers to *dharma, artha*, and *kāma,* and the means leading to them, though people consider them to be real (and essential). *YATHÀ YATHÀ* means (the goals and their means) characterised by the working for their acquisition and for their protection (once they are obtained) and (finally) by (their) destruction. *Asāravat* means like an insubstantial magic show. *Viparyeti* means :[3] on the contrary they turn out the opposite (of what we had hoped for), so there is no question of their being regarded as real and abiding. *Tathā tathā* means (the goals and their means) characterised by (acquisition, protection and eventual destruction). *VIRAGO JÀYATE*. This

1. This is a fundamental distinction that goes back to the *NŚ*. VI, under verse 50, p. 310 G. O. S. (1st ed.). The point is that in *vipralambha* there is some hope of being reunited (*sāpekṣabhāva*), but in *karuṇa* there is none (*nirapekṣabhāva*). For the actual passage, see above, p. 82.

2. This verse has been omitted from the critical ed. of the *M. Bh.* One wonders whether Sukthankar had seen it. Will his critical principles permit him to omit from the text a verse vouchsafed by as old an authority as Abhinavagupta ?

3. Remove the *daṇḍa* after *sampadyate* on p. 530.

suggests the *sthāyi* (*bhāva*) of *śāntarasa*, i. e. *nirveda* ("world-weariness"), which arises from knowledge of the truth (*tattvajñāna*).[1] And its[2] (namely *śāntarasa's*) supreme importance is suggested (*ukta*) by demonstrating that all the other goals of human life are insubstantial. Objection: "In the *Mahābhārata*, *śṛṅgāra*, *vīra*, etc., are charming as well." Anticipating this doubt he says: *PĀRAMĀRTHIKA*. Although these other *rasas* are subsidiary (*aṅgabhūta*), yet people who are exclusively interested in pleasures and who are overcome by worldly desires think of them as predominant, just as (foolish people) think of this body as the cognising Self, although it is merely an instrument (*āyatana*) for the enjoyment (of pleasures) by the conscious Self. *KEVALEṢU*. There is no harm (in fixing one's thoughts on virtues) helfpul to one's devotion to the highest God. The construction is this: don't have your minds attached to worldly goods, and exclusively interested (even) in worldly virtues. *AGRE*. In the text of the *Mahābhārata*, right after the *Anukramaṇī*. Objection: "Surely Vāsudeva is used in the sense of the son of Vasudeva, and not in the sense of the highest Lord, the Ātman, the supereme God." Anticipating this doubt he says: *VĀSUDEVĀDISAMJÑĀBHIDHEYATVENA*.

"At the end of many births, the wise man reaches me, (thinking that) Vāsudeva is everything."[3]

(In) this and other (passages like it) the final meaning (*tātparya*) (of the word Vāsudeva) has been established to be the whole (truth, the highest Brahman), which is the content (*abhidheya*) of that designation (i. e. Vāsudeva).

NIRṆĪTAṢ CA. In discussing (the *Sūtra* of Pāṇini): "*ṛṣyandhakavṛṣṇikurubhyaṣ ca*", it has been said that words (i. e. names of individuals) are really eternal, but are assigned conventional meanings (in the form of particular individuals) only by accident.[4] *ŚĀSTRANAYE*. The designation of *puruṣārtha* (in general) is appropriate (for the subjectmatter of the

1. According to what Abhinava says, *tattvajñāna* would have to be regarded as a *vibhāva* (i. e. an *uddīpanavibhāva*) of *śānta*. This is precisely the opposite of what he says in the *Abhinavabhārati* (p. 106, Raghavan's text): किं च निर्वेदो नाम सर्वत्रानुपादेयताप्रत्ययो वैराग्यलक्षणः, स च तत्त्वज्ञानस्य प्रत्युतोपयोगी, where it is *nirveda* that must be regarded as an *uddīpanavibhāva* of *śānta*, with *tattvajñāna* as the *sthāyibhāva*. It is a strange contradiction for which there seems to be no plausible explanation.

2. *Tasya* would seem to mean *śāntarasasya* (which is how the *Bālapriyā* takes it).

3. *Gītā*, VII. 19. The rest of the verse is:

इति स महात्मा सुदुर्लभः।

4. See *Kāśikāvṛtti* on Pāṇini, IV. 1. 114.

Mahābhārata), in the sense of that which is sought after by men, there being no question of aesthetic pleasure.[1] But the designation of *rasa* (in general) is appropriate (for the subject matter of the *Mahābhārata*) from the point of view of aesthetic delight. This is what is meant. This has been dealt with in detail by Ānandavardhana in his book the *Tattvāloka*.[2] Since it is not the main subject here, we have not gone into the problem.

He now explains the reason for saying "far greater beauty." *PRASIDDHIŚ CA*. The word *ca* is used in the sense of "since". As this matter is well-known in the world since beginningless time, therefore, in not saying directly (that *mokṣa* and *rasa* are the subjects of supreme importance in the *Mahābhārata*) the intention of the revered Vyāsa and others must have been just that (i. e. they did not use direct words because this is not the practice in assemblies of the wise). For[3] otherwise in regard to the relations of actions and the senses conveyed by the various case-endings, etc., while explaining the meanings of the words in a stanza like "Paying my homage to Nārāyaṇa etc." (the first verse of the *Mahābhārata*), what evidence is there to show that Vyāsa had the same intention (as the one which is in conformity with *lokaprasiddhi*)? This is what he means. The words "cultured and learned" correspond to the method of poetry (*kāvyanaya*) and the method of philosophy (*śāstranaya*) respectively.

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1. Understand *sati* after *āsvādayogābhāve*.

2. There are two references to the *Tattvāloka* of Ānandavardhana in the *Locana*: this one, and another on p. 67 in the first *Uddyota*. Unfortunately this work is lost to us. It would have been unique, for nowhere has the relationship between *śāstra* and *kāvya* been discussed in Indian philosophy. Obviously Ānanda (like Abhinava) with his interest in both fields would have been an ideal person to write about this question. One wonders whether his idea of the *Mahābhārata* as both a *śāstra* and a *kāvya* did not inspire the book and if this was not one of the most important works discussed. Note that here, as elsewhere, Ānanda is interested in things that seem to have passed unnoticed before among his fellow Indians. If Abhinava really did comment on the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, and if Ānanda is really quoted therein (see above, p. 29), then it is possible that the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* was inspired by Ānanda's lost *Tattvāloka*.

3. This line *anyathā hi kriyākārakasambandhādau*, etc., involves a rather complex point. Here is the what Abhinava means:

Vyāsa has made use of countless sentences in the *M. Bh.* in describing the main events in the story, the various episodes and incidents introduced from time to time, and in discourses on various worldly and philosophical topics. He has also commenced the *M. Bh.* with the verse *nārāyaṇaṃ namaskṛtya*, etc., which is a sentence. Now a sentence is nothing but a combination of an action (*kriyā*) with various efficient causal factors or relations (*kārakas*) (such as *kartṛ*, *karma*, *karaṇa*, etc.). A sentence is the relation between an action and its various contributory factors (*kriyākārakasambandhādau vākye*); and this action and its various causal factors are displayed in a sentence according to well-known and generally accepted

(Continued on next page

Abhinavabhāratī

शान्तरसप्रकरणम् ।

ये पुनर्नव रसा इति पठन्ति, तन्मते शान्तस्वरूपमभिधीयते। तत्र केचिदाहुः—शान्तः शमस्थायिभावात्मकः तपस्यायोगिसंपर्कादिभिः विभावैरुत्पद्यते। तस्य कामक्रोधाद्यभावरूपैरनुभावैरभिनयः। व्यभिचारी धृतिमतिप्रभृतिरिति ॥

एतदपरे न सहन्ते, शमशान्तयोः पर्यायत्वात्, एकान्नपञ्चाशद्भावा इति संख्यात्यागात्। किंच विभावा ऋतुमाल्यादयः तत्समनन्तरभाविनि शृङ्गारादावनुसंधीयन्त इति युक्तम्। तपोऽध्ययनादयस्तु न शान्तस्य समनन्तरहेतवः। तत्त्वज्ञानस्य अनन्तरहेतव इति चेत् पूर्वोदिततत्त्वज्ञानेऽपि तर्हि प्रयोज्येतेति तपोऽध्ययनादीनां विभावता त्यक्ता स्यात्। कामाद्यभावोऽपि नानुभावः, शान्ताद्विपक्षादव्यावृत्तेः, अगमकत्वात्, प्रयोगासमवायित्वाच्च; न हि चेष्टाव्युपरमः प्रयोगयोग्यः। सुप्तमोहादयोऽपि हि निःश्वासोच्छ्वासपतनभूशयनादिभिः चेष्टाभिरेवानुभाव्यन्ते। धृतिप्रभृतिरपि प्राप्तविषयोपरागः कथं शान्ते स्यात्। न चाकिंचित्करत्वमात्रेण तत्त्वज्ञानोपाये व्युत्पाद्यन्ते विनेयाः। नैते परदुःखदुःखितमनसो दृश्यन्ते सम्यग्दर्शनसमावस्थां प्राप्ताः, अपि तु संसारे। तन्न शान्तो रस इति।

अत्रोच्यते—यथा इह तावत् धर्मादित्रितयम्, एवं मोक्षोऽपि पुरुषार्थः शास्त्रेषु स्मृतीतिहासादिषु च प्राधान्येनोपायतो व्युत्पाद्यत इति सुप्रसिद्धम्। यथा च कामादिषु

Continued from previous page)

rules and conventions of syntax, which are as old as time (i. e. practically beginningless). And Vyāsa and other sages (like Vālmīkī) have strictly adhered to these well-known and generally accepted rules of sentence-structure (or syntax). In explaining the various syntactical relations in the sentences in the *M. Bh.* and other works and in explaining the meaning of the stanza *nārāyaṇaṃ namaskṛtya*, etc., we take it for granted that in constructing these sentences, Vyāsa has strictly followed the generally accepted principles, and we proceed on this assumption at the time of reading the sentences in the *M. Bh.* and understanding their sense; and we have the satisfaction of having understood exactly what Vyāsa intended to convey. Thus, if we take it for granted that Vyāsa and others have followed the well-known and generally accepted (*lokaprasiddha*) laws of sentence-structure (as laid down by grammarians), we must also take it for granted that Vyāsa has also followed the well-known principle, generally accepted in circles of refined critics and scholars (*vidagdhavidvatpariṣatsu*), namely that a matter close to the heart (i. e. a matter of primary importance) should be conveyed by suggestion and not by direct expression (and that comparatively unimportant matters should be expressed directly). If Vyāsa and others have followed *laukikaprasiddhi* in the matter of sentence-structure, then we can safely assume that they must have followed *vidagdhavidvatpariṣatprasiddhi* in the matter of conveying *abhimatataravastu* (i. e. a *pradhānavastu*) by suggestion (and an *apradhānavastu* by direct expression).

समुचिताश्चित्तवृत्तयो रत्यादिशब्दवाच्याः कविनटव्यापारेण आस्वादयोग्यताप्रापणद्वारेण तथाविधहृदयसंवादवतः सामाजिकान् प्रति रसत्वं शृङ्गारादितया नीयन्ते, तथा मोक्षाभिधान-परमपुरुषार्थोचिता चित्तवृत्तिः किमिति रसत्वं नानीयत इति वक्तव्यम्। या चासौ तथाभूता चित्तवृत्तिः सैवात्र स्थायिभावः। एतत्तु चिन्त्यम्—किंनामासौ? **तत्त्वज्ञानोत्थितो निर्वेद** इति केचित्। तथा हि—दारिद्र्यादिप्रभवो यो निर्वेदः ततोऽन्य एव, हेतोस्तत्त्वज्ञानस्य वैलक्षण्यात्। स्थायिसंचारिमध्ये चैतदर्थमेवायं पठितः, अन्यथा माङ्गलिको मुनिः तथा न पठेत्। जुगुप्सां च व्यभिचारित्वेन शृङ्गारे निषेधन् मुनिर्भावानां सर्वेषामेव स्थायित्वसंचारित्वचित्तजत्वानुभावत्वानि योग्यतोपनिपतितानि शब्दार्थबलाकृष्टानि अनुजानाति। तत्त्वज्ञानजश्च निर्वेदः स्थाय्यन्तरोपमर्दकः। भाववैचित्र्यसहिष्णुभ्यो रत्यादिभ्यो यः परमः स्थायिशीलः, स एव किल स्थाय्यन्तराणामुपमर्दकः।

इदमपि पर्यनुयुञ्जते–तत्त्वज्ञानजो निर्वेदोऽस्य स्थायीति वदता तत्त्वज्ञानमेवात्र उक्तं स्यात्। वैराग्यसबीजादिषु कथं विभावत्वम्? तदुपायादिति चेत् कारणकारणेऽयं विभावताव्यवहारः, स चातिप्रसङ्गावहः। किंच निर्वेदो नाम सर्वत्रानुपादेयताप्रत्ययो वैराग्यलक्षणः, स च तत्त्वज्ञानस्य प्रत्युतोपयोगी। विरक्तो हि तथा प्रयतते, यथास्य तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यते; तत्त्वज्ञानाद्धि मोक्षः, न तु तत्त्वं ज्ञात्वा निर्विद्यते, निर्वेदाच्च मोक्ष इति। 'वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः' इति हि तत्रभवन्तः। ननु तत्त्वज्ञानिनः सर्वत्र दृढतरं वैराग्यं दृष्टम्। तत्रभवद्भिरप्युक्तम्—'तत्परं पुरुषख्यातेर्गुणवैतृष्ण्यम्' इति। भवत्येवम्; 'तादृशं तु वैराग्यं ज्ञानस्यैव परा काष्ठा' इति भुजङ्गविभुनैव भगवताभ्यधायि। ततश्च तत्त्वज्ञानमेवेदं तत्त्वज्ञानमालया परिपोष्यमाणमिति न निर्वेदः स्थायी; किंतु **तत्त्वज्ञानमेव स्थायी भवेत्**। यत्तु व्यभिचारिव्याख्यानावसरे वक्ष्यते तच्चिरकालविभ्रमविप्रलब्धस्योपादेयत्वनिवृत्तये यत्सम्यग्ज्ञानम्, यथा—

वृथा दुग्धोऽनड्वान् स्तनभरनता गौरिति परं
परिष्वक्तः षण्डो युवतिरिति लावण्यरहितः।
कृता वैदूर्याशा विकचकिरणे काचशकले
मया मूढेन त्वां कृपणमगुणज्ञं प्रणमता॥

इति तन्निर्वेदस्य खेदरूपस्य विभावत्वेन; एतच्च तत्रैव वक्ष्यामः।

ननु मिथ्याज्ञानमूलो विषयगन्धः तत्त्वज्ञानात् प्रशाम्यतीति दुःखजन्मसूत्रेण अक्षपादपादैः भगवद्भिः मिथ्याज्ञानापचयकारणं तत्त्वज्ञानं वैराग्यस्य दोषापायलक्षणस्य कारणमुक्तम्। ननु ततः किम्? ननु वैराग्यं निर्वेदः? क एवमाह? निर्वेदो हि शोकप्रवाहप्रसररूपश्चित्तवृत्तिविशेषः। वैराग्यं तु रागादीनां प्रध्वंसः। भवतु वा वैराग्यमेव निर्वेदः।

तथापि तस्य स्वकारणवशात् मध्यभाविनोऽपि न मोक्षे साध्ये सूत्रस्थानीयता प्रत्यपादि आचार्येण। किंच तत्त्वज्ञानोत्थितो निर्वेद इति शमस्यैवेदं निर्वेदनाम कृतं स्यात्। शमशान्तयोः पर्यायत्वं तु हासहास्याभ्यां व्याख्यातम्; सिद्धसाध्यतया, लौकिकालौकिकत्वेन, साधारणासाधारणतया च वैलक्षण्यं शमशान्तयोरपि सुलभमेव। तस्मान्न निर्वेदः स्थायीति।

अन्ये मन्यन्ते रत्यादय एवाष्टौ चित्तवृत्तिविशेषा उक्ताः। त एव कथितविभावविविक्त-श्रुताद्यलौकिकविभावविशेषसंश्रयाः विचित्रा एव तावत्। ततश्च तन्मध्यादेव अन्यतमोऽत्र स्थायी। तत्र अनाहतानन्दमयस्वात्मविषया रतिरेव मोक्षसाधनमिति, सैव शान्ते स्थायिनीति। यथोक्तम्—

यश्चात्मरतिरेव स्यात् आत्मतृप्तश्च मानवः।
आत्मन्येव च संतुष्टः तस्य कार्यं न विद्यते॥

इति। एवं समस्तविषयं वैकृतं पश्यतः, विश्वं च शोच्यं विलोकयतः, सांसारिकं च वृत्तान्तम् अपकारित्वेन पश्यतः, सातिशयमसंमोहप्रधानं वीर्यम् आश्रितवतः, सर्वस्मात् विषयसार्थाद् बिभ्यतः, सर्वलोकस्पृहणीयादपि प्रमदादेः जुगुप्समानस्य, अपूर्वस्वात्मातिशय-लाभात् विस्मयमानस्य मोक्षसिद्धिरिति रतिहासादीनां विस्मयान्तानाम् अन्यतमस्य स्थायित्वं निरूपणीयम्। न चैतन्मुनेर्न संमतम्। यावदेव हि विशिष्टान् भावान् परिगणयति रत्यादि-शब्देन चशब्देन च तत्प्रकारानेव अन्यान् संगृह्णीते, तावदेव तद्व्यतिरिक्तालौकिकहेतूपनतानां रत्यादीनामनुजानात्येव अपवर्गविषयत्वम्। एवंवादिनां तु परस्परमेव विशारयताम् एकस्य स्थायित्वं विशीर्यत एव। तदुपायभेदात् तस्य तस्य स्थायित्वमित्यप्युच्यमानं प्रत्युक्तमेव। स्थायिभेदेन प्रतिपुरुषं रसस्याप्यानन्त्यापत्तेः। मोक्षैकहेतुत्वाद् एको रस इति चेत्, क्षयैक-फलत्वे वीररौद्रयोरप्येकत्वं स्यात्।

अन्ये तु पानकरसवदविभागं प्राप्ताः सर्व एव रत्यादयोऽत्र स्थायिन इत्याहुः। चित्तवृत्तीनामयुगपद्भावात्, अन्योन्यं च विरोधाद् एतदपि न मनोज्ञम्।

कस्तर्ह्यत्र स्थायी? उच्यते—इह तत्त्वज्ञानमेव तावन्मोक्षसाधनमिति तस्यैव मोक्षे स्थायिता युक्ता। तत्त्वज्ञानं च नामात्मज्ञानमेव। आत्मनश्च व्यतिरिक्तस्य विषयस्येव ज्ञानम्; परो ह्येवमात्मा अनात्मैव स्यात्। विपञ्चितं चैतदस्मद्गुरुभिः। अस्माभिश्चान्यत्र वितन्यत इति इह नातिनिर्बन्धः कृतः। तेन आत्मैव ज्ञानानन्दादिविशुद्धधर्मयोगी परिकल्पितविषयो-पभोगरहितोऽत्र स्थायी। न चास्य स्थायितया स्थायित्वं वचनीयम्। रत्यादयो हि तत्तत्का-रणान्तरोदयप्रलयोत्पद्यमाननिरुध्यमानवृत्तयः कंचित् कालम् आपेक्षिकताया स्थायिरूपात्म-

भित्तिसंश्रयाः सन्तः स्थायिन इति उच्यन्ते। तत्त्वज्ञानं तु सकलभावान्तरभित्तिस्थानीयं सर्वस्थायिभ्यः स्थायितमं सर्वा रत्यादिकाः चित्तवृत्तीः व्यभिचारीभावयन् निसर्गत एव सिद्धस्थायिभावमिति तन्न वचनीयम्। अत एव पृथगस्य गणना न युक्ता। न हि खण्ड-मुण्डयोर्मध्ये तृतीयं गोत्वमिति गण्यते। तेन एकान्नपञ्चाशद्भावा इत्यव्याहतमेव। अस्यापि कथं न पृथग्गणनेति चेत् पृथग् आस्वादायोगादिति ब्रूमहे। न हि रत्यादय इवेतरासंपृक्तेन वपुषा तथाविधमात्मरूपं लौकिकप्रतीतिगोचरः। स्वगतमपि अविकल्परूपं व्युत्थानावसरेऽनु-संधीयमानं चित्तवृत्त्यन्तरकलुषमेवावभाति।

भासतां वा लोके तथा। तथापि न संभवन्मात्रस्थायिनां गणनम्, रसेषूक्तेषु अनुपयोगात्; अपि तु व्यभिचारित्वेन लक्षणीयत्वं विज्ञायते, नेतरथा। तथा ह्येकान्नपञ्चा-शद्भावैरिति एतत्प्रघट्टकोपपत्तिः। न चास्यात्मस्वभावस्य व्यभिचारित्वम्; असंभवात्, अवैचित्र्यावहत्वात्, अनौचित्याच्च। शम आत्मस्वभावः; स शमशब्देन मुनिना व्यपदिष्टः। यदि तु स एव शमशब्देन व्यपदिश्यते, निर्वेदशब्देन वा, तन्न कश्चिद्बाधः। केवलं शमश्चित्तवृत्त्यन्तरं निर्वेदोऽपि दारिद्र्यादिविभावान्तरोत्थितनिर्वेदतुल्यजातीयः स भवति। तज्जातीय एव हेतुभेदेऽपि तद्व्यपदेश्यो रतिभयादिरिव। तदिदमात्मस्वरूपमेव तत्त्वज्ञानं शमः, तथा च यत्कालुष्योपरागविशेषा एवात्मनो रत्यादयः, तदनुगमेऽपि शुद्धमस्य रूपम अव्यवधानसमाधिबलाद् अधिगम्य, व्युत्थानेऽपि प्रशान्तता भवति। यथोक्तम् 'प्रशान्तवा-हितासंस्कारात्' इति। तत्त्वज्ञानलक्षणस्य च स्थायिनः समस्तोऽयं लौकिकालौकिक-चित्तवृत्तिकलापो व्यभिचारितामभ्येति। तदनुभावा एव च यमनियमाद्युपकृता अनुभावाः उपाङ्गाभिनयाद्यध्यायत्रये च ये स्वभावाभिनया वक्ष्यन्ते। अत एते एतद्विषया एव। अयमेव हि स्वभावः। विभावा अपि परमेश्वरानुग्रहप्रभृतयः, प्रक्षयोन्मुखाश्च रत्यादयोऽत्रास्वाद्याः। केवलं यथा विप्रलम्भे औत्सुक्यम्, संभोगेऽपि वा 'प्रेमासमाप्तोत्सवम्' इति, यथा च रौद्रे औग्र्याम्, यथा च करुणवीरभयानकाद्भुतेषु निर्वेदधृतित्रासहर्षाः व्यभिचा-रिणोऽपि प्राधान्येन अवभासन्ते, तथा शान्ते जुगुप्साद्याः सर्वथैव रागप्रतिपक्षत्वात्। तथा हि महाव्रते नृकपालादिधारणम्, असुभार्यादिसमुदायादिविस्तारसंक्षेपातिकर्मीकृतिर्हि धर्मे (?)। जुगुप्साहेतुत्वेनैव निजाभ्यञ्जनं च देवरात् पुत्रजन्मनि उपदिष्टम्। स्वात्मनि च कृतकृत्यस्य परार्थघटनायामेवोद्यम इति उत्साहोऽस्य परोपकारविषयेच्छाप्रयत्नरूपो दयापरपर्यायोऽभ्यधिकोऽन्तरङ्गः। अत एव एतद्व्यभिचारिबलात् केचिद् दयावीरत्वेन व्यपदिशन्ति, अन्ये धर्मवीरत्वेन।

ननूत्साहोऽहंकारप्राणः शान्तस्त्वहंकारशैथिल्यात्मकः। व्यभिचारित्वं हि विरुद्धस्यापि न नोचितम्, रताविव निर्वेदादेः। 'शय्या शाद्वलम्' इत्यादौ हि परोपकारकरणे ह्युत्साहस्यैव प्रकर्षो लक्ष्यते। न तु उत्साहशून्या काचिदप्यवस्था; इच्छाप्रयत्नव्यतिरेकेण पाषाणतापत्तेः। यत एव च परिदृष्टपरावरत्वेन स्वात्मोद्देशेन कर्तव्यान्तरं नावशिष्यते। अत एव शान्तहृदयानां परोपकाराय शरीरसर्वस्वादिदानं न शान्तविरोधि। 'आत्मानं गोपायेत्' इत्यादिना ह्यकृतकृत्यविषयं शरीररक्षणमुपदिश्यते, संन्यासिनां तद्रक्षादितात्पर्याभावात्। तथा हि—

धर्मार्थकाममोक्षाणां प्राणाः संस्थितिहेतवः।
तान्निघ्नता किं न हतं रक्षता किं न रक्षितम्॥

इति सुप्रसिद्धचतुर्वर्गसाधकत्वमेव देहरक्षाया निदानं दर्शितम्। कृतकृत्यस्य जलेऽग्नौ श्वभ्रे वा पतेदिति संन्यासित्वे श्रवणात्। तद्यथाकथंचित् त्याज्यं शरीरम्। यदि परार्थं त्यज्यते तत् किमिव न संपादितं भवति? जीमूतवाहनादीनां न यतित्वमिति चेत्, किं तेन नः? तत्त्वज्ञानित्वं तावदवश्यमस्ति। अन्यथा देहात्ममानिनां देह एव सर्वस्वभूते धर्माद्यनुद्देशेन परार्थे त्यागस्य असंभाव्यत्वात्। युद्धेऽपि हि न वीरस्य देहत्यागायोद्यमः, परावजयोद्देशेनैव प्रवृत्तेः। भृगुपतनादावपि शुभतरदेहान्तरसंपिपादयिषैवाधिकं विजृम्भते। तत् स्वार्थानुद्देशेन परार्थसंपत्त्यै यद्यच्चेष्टितं देहत्यागपर्यन्तमुपदेशदानादि तत्तदलब्धात्मतत्त्वज्ञानानामसंभाव्यमेवेति। तेऽपि तत्त्वज्ञानिनः। ज्ञानिनां सर्वाश्रमेषु मुक्तिरिति स्मृतिषु श्रुतिषु च। यथोक्तम्—

'देवार्चनरतस्तत्त्वज्ञाननिष्ठोऽतिथिप्रियः।
श्राद्धं कृत्वा ददद् द्रव्यं गृहस्थोऽपि हि मुच्यते॥'

इति। केवलं परार्थाभिसंधिजात् धर्मात् परोपकारात्मकफलत्वेनैव अभिसंहितात् पुनरपि देहस्य तदुचितस्यैव प्रादुर्भावो बोधिसत्त्वादीनां तत्त्वज्ञानिनामपि।

दृष्टः अङ्गेष्वपि विश्रान्तिलाभः, स्वभावौचित्यात्, यथा रामस्य वीराङ्गे पितुराज्ञां पालयतः। एवं शृङ्गाराद्यङ्गेष्वपि मन्तव्यम्। अत एव शान्तस्य स्थायित्वेऽपि अप्राधान्यम्। जीमूतवाहने त्रिवर्गसंपत्तेरेव परोपकृतिप्रधानायाः फलत्वात्। अनेनैवाशयेन नाटकलक्षणे वक्ष्यते— 'ऋद्धिविलासादिभिर्गुणैः' इति। अनेन हि ऋद्धिविलासप्रधानमर्थकामोत्तरं सर्वं चरितं सकललोकहृदयसंवादसुन्दरप्रयोजनं नाटके निवेशयितव्यमित्युक्तम्। एतच्च तत्रैव वर्णयिष्यामः। अनेनैव चाशयेन न शान्ते कश्चन मुनिना जात्यंशको विनियोक्ष्यते। तेन जात्यंशविनियोगाभावात् तदसत्त्वमिति प्रत्युक्तम्।

अन्ये तु जीमूतवाहनः 'कस्ते पुत्र त्राता भविष्यति' इति शरणार्थिनीं वृद्धामेव त्रातवान्। शक्तिश्चास्य न काचित्। परहिंसा च न काचिदित्येवमाहुः। तच्चानुमतमेव; न हि बोधिसत्त्वानां पुनः अभ्युत्थानात्मकजीवितमभिसंधानानुप्रविष्टं शक्तिश्चेदिति। न च काकतालीयवृत्त्या शास्त्रमुपदिशति। तत् सिद्धं दयालक्षणो ह्युत्साहोऽत्र प्रधानम्।

अन्ये तु व्यभिचारिणो यथायोगं भवन्तीति। यथोक्तम् 'तच्छिद्रेषु प्रत्ययान्तराणि संस्कारेभ्यः' इति। अत एव निश्चेष्टत्वादनुभावाभाव इति प्रत्युक्तम्। यदा तु पर्यन्तभूमिकालाभेऽनुभावाभावः, तदास्य अप्रयोज्यत्वम्, रतिशोकादावपि पर्यन्तदशायाम् अप्रयोगस्य युक्तत्वात्॥

हृदयसंवादोऽपि तथाविधतत्त्वज्ञानबीजसंस्कारभावितानां भवत्येव; यद्वक्ष्यति 'मोक्षे चापि विरागिणः' इति। सर्वस्य न सर्वत्र हृदयसंवादः, भयानके वीरप्रकृतेरभावात्। ननु तादृशि प्रयोगे वीरस्य क आस्वादः। उच्यते — यत्रायं निबध्यते, तत्रावश्यं पुरुषार्थोपयोगिनि शृङ्गारवीराद्यन्यतममस्त्येव। तन्निष्टस्तेषामास्वादः। यत्रापि प्रहसनादौ हास्यादेः प्रधानता तत्राप्यनुनिष्पादिरसान्तरनिष्ठ एवास्वादः। भिन्नभिन्नाधिकार्यास्वादोद्देश एव रूपकभेदचिन्तने निमित्तमिति केचित्।

तस्मादस्ति शान्तो रसः। तथा च चिरंतनपुस्तकेषु 'स्थायिभावान् रसत्वमुपनेष्यामः' इत्यनन्तरं शान्तो नाम शमस्थायिभावात्मक इत्यादि शान्तलक्षणं पठ्यते। तत्र सर्वरसानां शान्तप्राय एवास्वादः, विषयेभ्यो विपरिवृत्त्या। तन्मुख्यतालाभः केवलं वासनान्तरोपहित इति। अत्र सर्वप्रकृतित्वाभिधानाय पूर्वमभिधानम्। लोके च पृथक् पृथक् सामान्यस्य न गणनमिति स्थाय्यस्य पृथङ् नोक्तः। सामान्यमपि तु विवेचकेन पृथगेव गणनीयमिति विवेचकाभिमतसामाजिकास्वादलक्षणप्रतीतिविषयतया स पृथग्भूत एव। इतिहासपुराणाभिधानकोशादौ च नव रसाः श्रूयन्ते, श्रीमत्सिद्धान्तशास्त्रेष्वपि। तथा चोक्तम्—

'अष्टानामिह देवानां शृङ्गारादीन प्रदर्शयेत्।
मध्ये च देवदेवस्य शान्तं रूपं प्रदर्शयेत्॥

तस्य च वैराग्यसंसारभीरुतादयो विभावाः। स हि तैरुपनिबद्धैर्विज्ञायते। मोक्षशास्त्रचिन्तादयोऽनुभावाः। निर्वेदमतिस्मृतिधृत्यादयो व्यभिचारिणः। अत एव ईश्वरप्रणिधानविषये भक्तिश्रद्धे स्मृतिमतिधृयुत्साहानुप्रविष्टेऽन्यथैवाङ्गमिति न तयोः पृथग्रसत्वेन गणनम्। अत्र संग्रहकारिका—

मोक्षाध्यात्मनिमित्तस्तत्वज्ञानार्थहेतुसंयुक्तः ।
निःश्रेयसधर्मयुतः शान्तरसो नाम विज्ञेयः ॥

विभावस्थाय्यनुभावयोगः क्रमात् विशेषणत्रयेण दर्शितः ।

स्वं स्वं निमित्तमादाय शान्तादुत्पद्यते रसः ।
पुनर्निमित्तापाये तु शान्त एव प्रलीयते ॥

इत्यादिना रसान्तरप्रकृतित्वमुपसंहृतम् ।

यत्तु डिमे हास्यशृङ्गारपरिहारेण षड्रसत्वं च वक्ष्यते, तत्रायं भावः । 'दीप्तरसकाव्ययोनिः' इति भाविना लक्षणेन रौद्रप्रधाने तावद्डिमे तद्विरुद्धस्य शान्तस्य संभावनैव न, किं निषेधेन । शान्तासम्भवे तु दीप्तरसकाव्ययोनिरित्येतेन किं व्यवच्छेद्यम् ? शृङ्गारहास्यवर्जं षड्रसयुक्त इति ह्युक्ते तत्र प्रसङ्गः । ननु करुणबीभत्सभयानकप्राधान्यमनेन पादेन व्यवच्छेद्यते । नैतत्, सात्त्वत्यारभटीवृत्तिसंपन्न इत्यनेनैव तन्निरासात् । शान्ते तु सात्त्वत्येव वृत्तिरिति न तद्व्यवच्छेदकमेवैतत् । तेन डिमलक्षणं प्रत्युत शान्तरसस्य सद्भावे लिङ्गम् । शृङ्गारस्तु प्रसभसेव्यमानः संभाव्य एव । तदङ्गं च हास्य इति तयोरेव प्रतिषेधः कृतः, प्राप्तत्वात् ।

सर्वसाम्याच्च विशेषतो वर्णदेवताभिधानमनुचितमप्यस्य तत्कल्पितमिति ज्ञेयम् । उत्पत्तिस्तु शान्तस्यापि दर्शितैव । सत्वभावो हि हास्यस्सः (?) । विभावत्वेन चास्य वीरबीभत्सौ (?) । अत एवास्य रसस्य यमनियमेश्वरप्रणिधानाद्युपदेशः अभिनयोपयोगितया महाफलत्वं सर्वप्राधान्यमितिवृत्तव्यापकत्वं चोपपन्नमिति अलमतिप्रसङ्गेन ।

तत्त्वास्वादोऽस्य कीदृशः ? उच्यते — उपरागदायिभिः उत्साहरत्यादिभिरुपरक्तं यदात्मस्वरूपं तदेव विरलोन्मिषितरत्नान्तरालनिर्भासमानसिततरसूत्रवद् यदाहिततत्स्वरूपं सकलेषु रत्यादिषु उपरञ्जकेषु तथाभावेनापि सकृद्विभातोऽयमात्मेति न्यायेन भासमानं पराङ्मुखतात्मकसकलदुःखजालहीनं परमानन्दलाभसंविदेकत्वेन काव्यप्रयोगप्रबन्धाभ्यां साधारणतया निर्भासमानं अन्तर्मुखावस्थाभेदेन लोकोत्तरानन्दानयनं तथाविधहृदयं विधत्त इति ।

एते नवैव रसाः, पुमर्थोपयोगित्वेन रञ्जनाधिक्येन वा इयतामेव उपदेश्यत्वात् । तेन रसान्तरसंभवेऽपि पार्षदप्रसिद्धया संख्यानियम इति यदन्यैरुक्तं तत्प्रत्युक्तम् । भावाध्याये चैतद्वक्ष्यते । आर्द्रतास्थायिकः स्नेहो रस इति त्वसत् । स्नेहो ह्यभिषङ्गः । स च सर्वो रत्युत्साहादावेव पर्यवस्यति । तथा हि बालस्य मातापित्रादौ स्नेहः भये विश्रान्तः, यूनो मित्रजने रतौ, लक्ष्मणादेः भ्रातरि स्नेहः धर्मवीर एव । एवं वृद्धस्य पुत्रादावपि द्रष्टव्यम् । एषैव गर्धस्थायिकस्य लौल्यरसस्य प्रत्याख्याने सरणिर्मन्तव्या, हासे वा रतौ वा अन्यत्र पर्यवसानात् । एवं भक्तावपि वाच्यमिति ।

Translation :[1]

The[2] nature of *śānta* will now be explained according to those who follow the reading *nava rasāḥ* (nine *rasas*), (instead of the reading *aṣṭau rasāḥ*). In this connection some say that *śama* is the *sthayibhāva* of *śānta* and that it arises from *vibhāvas* such as ascetic practices, association with Yogins, etc. It can be represented on the stage by *anubhāvas* such as the absence of lust, anger, etc. Its *vyabhicāribhāvas* will be firmness, wisdom, etc. Others however do not accept this, because, they say, *śama* and *śānta* are synonyms. Nor do they wish to relinquish the figure of 49 *bhāvas*[3] (that was given by Bharata). Moreover, they say that it is proper for the *vibhāvas* such as the seasons, flowers, etc., to be connected with love, etc., which arise immediately after these (*vibhāvas* are apprehended). But ascetic practices, Vedic recitation, etc., do not immediately give rise to *śānta*. Should

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1. The text used here is that given by Dr. V. Raghavan in the revised edition of "*The Number of Rasas* ", published in 1967, p. 104 ff. All textual corrections will be found in the notes.

2. The three largest discussions in the *Abhinavabhāratī* are all in the sixth chapter of the *NŚ*. (All of the seventh chapter of the *Abhinavabhāratī* but the very beginning has been lost, which is a great misfortune, since Abhinava refers to it frequently. It must have been a large and important section of the *A. Bh.*). One deals with *śṛṅgāra*, the other (ed. and tr. by Gnoli) is on the arisal of *rasa*, and this is the third. But Abhinava was to some extent aware that there was something artificial about the *śāntarasa* section, for he says : *ye punar nava rasā iti paṭhanti*, thereby clearly suggesting that this was a *pāṭhāntara*, and not an established part of the text. (Note that on page 83 of the *Locana*, Abhinava quotes the text of the *NŚ* that reads : *ity aṣṭau nāṭye rasāḥ smṛtāḥ*, which shows that he must have regarded this as a more authoritative text). He uses this same type of expression when discussing the god of *śānta* (*buddha* !) and the colour (*svaccha*). (See also *A.Bh.* p. 267 : तेन प्रथमं रसाः । ते च नव । शान्तापलापिनस्त्वष्टाविति तत्र पठन्ति । This on *NŚ*. VI 15, which gives the list as follows :

शृङ्गारहास्यकरुणा रौद्रवीरभयानकाः ।
बीभत्साद्भुतसंज्ञौ चेत्यष्टौ नाट्ये रसाः स्मृताः ॥

It is odd that it never occurred to Abhinava to say that the figure 8 only applied to the drama, and that Bharata might have sanctioned the ninth *rasa* for poetry. But of course Abhinava did not want to compromise even this much.) Now does Abhinava mean that he too "read" *nava rasāḥ* ? He must, for otherwise we cannot understand the sentence : *tanmate śāntasvarūpam abhidhīyate*. But it is clear that he was not the first to do so. (Cf. *NŚ*. on I. 1, the *A. Bh.*, p. 5, where Bhaṭṭanāyaka's view is quoted from the *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* : इति लोकोत्तरपरमपुरुषार्थसूचनेन शान्तरसोपक्षेपोऽयं भविष्यति ।) It is, however, doubtful that he had in front of him the text of the *NŚ* on *śāntarasa* as we have it.

3. The forty-nine *bhāvas* are : eight *sthāyibhāvas*, eight *sāttvikabhāvas* and thirty-three *vyabhicāribhāvas*. This means that the exact number of *vibhāvas* (which are really innumerable), and of *anubhāvas*, is not given. Of course Bharata does mention, for each *rasa*, its *anubhāvas* as well as its *vibhāvas*, though he does not separately enumerate them in a *Kārikā*.

one argue[1] that ascetic practices, Vedic recitation, etc., are the immediate causes of the knowledge of the truth, then, since the knowledge of the truth which precedes (*śānta*) is their (immediate) effect, they cease to be the *vibhāvas* of *śānta*. Even the absence of lust, etc., cannot be the *anubhāva*, because it is not conclusive evidence (of *śānta*), inasmuch as it is found to be present in *rasas* other than *śānta* as well[2], and because it cannot be combined with a stage-representation (*prayoga*). After all, it is not possible to display a cessation of activity. For example, even the *anubhāvas* sleep, swoon, etc., can be shown by actions like breathing in and out, falling down, lying on the ground, etc. (As for *vyabhicārabhāvas*), how can firmness of mind, etc., which is accompanied by a desire for the attainment of objects,[3] be appropriate to *śānta*? Those to be instructed cannot be taught how to attain the knowledge of the truth by means of a state of complete inactivity.[4] Those people whose minds are pained by the sufferings of other people have not (yet) reached a state of tranquillity characterised by correct perception (of the highest truth), but rather they are (still) caught in the turmoil of worldly life.[5] Therefore *śāntarasa* does not exist. The reply is

1. *Vibhāva* can be equated with *kāraṇa*, the immediate cause that arouse the *sthāyibhāva* of a *rasa*. The argument here then is that Vedic recitation, etc., do not immediately precede the *sthāyibhāva* (*śama*) of *śānta*. The Pūrvapakṣin's point is that if Vedic recitation, etc., are the immediate causes of *tattvajñāna*, then they cannot also be the *vibhāvas* of *śānta*, for they would be at one remove.

2. This line, *śāntād vipakṣād avyāvṛtteḥ*, is difficult. If we take *vipakṣa* to mean "opposite" which is its usual meaning, the passage will make no sense, for then it will be saying that even in the emotion which is the opposite of *śānta* (i. e. "love") there will be *kāmādyabhāva*, i. e., there will be no "love" in "love"! We will have to interpret *vipakṣa* to mean "anything different from *śānta*," i. e., any other *rasa* besides *śānta*. In other words, there is no *kāma*, etc., in such *rasas* as *raudra* and *bhayānaka*.

3. *Prāptaviṣayoparāga*. Pandit Srinivasa Shastri of the Deccan College, who was kind enough to read over some of the more difficult passages with us, says that *uparāgaḥ* here means *sambandhaḥ*, so that the phrase will mean : यत्र विषयस्य संबन्धः प्राप्तो भवति । According to him, since *śānta* is a state of no mental activity at all, how can there be any contact with *viṣayas* therein ? But another interpretation is possible : *dhṛti* is defined in the 7th ch. of the *NŚ*. (Vol. I, p. 363, VII, 56) as arising from, among other things, *manorathalābha*. These are its *vibhāvas* (note that for Bharata the *vyabhicāribhāvas* can become *sthāyibhāvas* and have their own *vibhāvas*, etc., as Abhinava will point out later in this passage). Its *anubhāvas* are : तामभिनयेत् प्राप्तानां विषयाणामुपभोगात् etc. Therefore we think it is possible to take *uparāgaḥ* simply in the sense of *upabhogaḥ*, "pleasure," and interpret as : "accompanied by a desire for the attainment of sense-objects".

4. We interpret *akiñcitkaratvamātra* here as the complete absence of any action, which is supposed to result from the state of *tattvajñāna*.

5. The point is that we can only sympathise with another person's pain if we still identify with the body. For the *Jīvanmukta* (i. e. the सम्यग्दर्शनसमवस्थाप्राप्तपुरुष—

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as follows :[1] Just as in this world there is the triology *dharma*, etc., so also, it is quite well-known that *mokṣa* too is one of the goals of life, and it is found to be taught predominantly in the *śāstras* and in the *smṛtis* and *itihāsas*, etc., by specifying the means leading to its attainment. Just as the states of mind that are proper to love, etc. and expressed by such words as sexual love (*rati*) etc., by being made capable of being relished through the activity of the poet and the actor, are brought to the status of *rasas* such as *śṛṅgāra*, etc., in relation to the spectators who are possessed of the proper sympathetic response; in the same way, we ask you to tell us why the state of mind which is appropriate to the highest goal of man known as *mokṣa* cannot be

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—note how this phrase *samyagdarśana* is often used in Buddhism in many variations *samygbodhi*, etc.), such identifications are not possible. The main character of *śānta* dramas is supposed to be *paramakāruṇikatva*. The Pūrvapakṣin objects that this kind of sympathy is found in worldly life and not in transcendental mystic states.

1. We take *atrocyate* as Abhinava's own position. He is of course quite right in pointing out that *moṣka* was already a well-known *puruṣārtha* long before the *NŚ*. But that *mokṣa* should be prevalent in the *smṛtis* and *itihāsa* does not, *ipso facto*, establish any connection of it with literature. We must remember that for people like Abhinavagupta, the *smṛtis* and *itihāsas* were not literature in the strict sense of the word. Nobody, of course, would have argued that *śānta* in the sense of *mokṣapuruṣārtha* does not occur in such works. The point was whether it could occur in the far more refined *Nāṭakas* and *Kāvyas*. It simply never occurred to these older writers that one can apply the term literature to many of these works, as well as to a large number of purely religious works, e. g. the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* in Pāli, and several of the Sanskrit *Mahāyāna Sūtras*, e. g., the *Vajracchedikā*, or the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* (not available in Sanskrit, but recently so beautifully translated into French by Professor Ét. Lamotte). Even the *Gītā*, in spite of the fact that Ānandavardhana (p. 293) quotes the verse *yā niśā sarvabhūtānām*, etc., as an example of *dhvani*, was not really considered "literature" in the strict, and restricted, sense of the term that the Indians used it. This restriction was a great loss to the theory, for *dhvani* would have been more faithfully served, in illustrations, by passages from many of these religious or secular texts (e. g. the *Bṛhatkāthāślokasaṅgraha*) than by the *Nāṭakas* and the *Kāvyas*, many of which were artificially composed to conform to a given *rasa* and its definition by Bharata. One has only to think of some of the literary passages in the *Upaniṣads* (e. g. Satyakāma Jābala, or Raikva with the Cart) to realise how much the Indians lost by such a restriction. If later writers like Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja widened the definition of *Kāvya* (*ramaṇīyārthapratipādakaḥ śabdaḥ kāvyam*) it still does not mean that they went for their examples to this non-literary literature. Viśvanātha comes closest when he says : *vākyaṃ rasātmakaṃ kāvyam*, but even he never uses the vast literature that true obedience to such a phrase would make available. It was only the Bengal school of Vaiṣṇavism that opened itself to the influence of religious literature, but its purpose was more religious than it was aesthetic, and was confined, for the most part, to such works as the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*. (One thinks of some of the fine examples that Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, a strict Advaitin, chose from the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* in his *Bhagavadbhaktirasāyanam*).

raised to the status of a *rasa*?[1] That state of mind just described is indeed the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta*. But one must consider what its name is. Some say that it is complete detachment (*nirveda*—world-weariness)[2] that is born from a knowledge of truth. For this detachment is quite different from the detachment that arises from poverty, etc., because its cause, viz. knowledge of the truth, is different. It was for this very reason (i. e. because *nirveda* is the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta*) that it has been mentioned (by Bharata) midway between the *sthayibhāvas* and the *sañcāribhāvas* (i. e. *vyabhicāribhāvas*).[3]

1. There seems to us no doubt in reading through the objections made against *śāntarasa* that the objectors had a real point. There is something about *ŚR* that forces it apart from all the other *rasas*. It is true, as the Pūrvapakṣin argues, that we find that all people are open to love, to fear, to terror etc. (some more than others, and some only to certain emotions of course — as Abhinava points out in his commentary on the famous *rasasūtra* of the *NŚ*, we have, in the course of our many lives, experienced all of the primary emotions, the *sthāyibhāvas*). But *śānta* is peculiar. Truly to be able to enjoy it, one must be religious (at least this was the Indian view – today we are more sophisticated : it is perfectly possible to be moved by a religious spectacle without feeling primary "religious sentiments"), and if the *śāntarasa* experience truly takes place during a drama, it must change our lives. It is not like the other *rasas*, which simply enrich us, provide great scope for our imagination, refine our sensibilities, in short do all the things that great literary experiences are supposed to do. It is not that it demands a suspension of judgment as do the other *rasas*, a momentary identification with different emotions. It means a complete reversal of our personality, what the Buddhists call *parāvṛtti* (see the controversial article on this word by A. Coomaraswamy, "Transformation, Regeneration, Anagogy", in *Festschrift Ernst Winternitz*, 1933). We believe that it was this difference, this sense of the "completely other" in *ŚR* that bothered so many literary critics in ancient India. While one sympathises with their hesitation, one can also understand the point of view of people like Abhinava, for whom these religious experiences were an integral part of their everyday life and especially of their literary life. Witness the great number of hymns attributed to people like Śaṅkara, and the surviving ones of Abhinava and Ānanda. The conflict, the real conflict, which we see as one between the secular-minded literary critic and the religious-minded literary critic, never really came out into the open, except in this one argument over *ŚR*, for it was assumed, by all, that nearly everybody was religious. From our perspective, however, it is clear that some critics were more religious than others.

2. *Nirveda* can mean two things : it can have an ordinary, everyday sense of "disgust", and it can have the more subtle and religious sense of "total detachment" from the world. Abhinava is here implicilty referring to this distinction.

3. This is a very curious, and we believe, a very weak argument : Bharata has begun his list of the *vyabhicāribhāvas* (VII. 28, p. 356) with *nirveda* at the top (*tatra nirvedo nāma dāridryavyādhi*, etc.). Now, it is said by "some people" as reported by Abhinava, that Bharata had great respect for the idea of the *maṅgala*, that is, beginning a new topic with an auspicious word. *Nirveda* is not an auspicious word, therefore, Bharata (since he cannot be presumed to be in error), must have had some special intention in mind. According to these "some people" it is to show that *nirveda* is actually a *sthyāyibhāva* and also a *vyabhicāribhāva*. The view regarding the dual character of *nirveda* as both *sthyāyibhāva* and *vyabhicāribhāva* is expressed by Mammaṭa in the *KP*, IV (p. 116, Jhalkikar's ed. BORI — see his comments, p. 116, last paragraph).

Otherwise (i. e. if *nirveda* had not been intended by Bharata as the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta*), the sage who had great regard for uttering an auspicious word at the commencement of a section of his work (*māṅgalika*) would not have mentioned *nirveda* at that place (i. e. he would not have put the inauspicious word *nirveda* at the head of the list of *vyabhicāribhāvas*). When Bharata forbade the use of disgust (*jugupsā*) as a *vyabhicāribhāva* of *śṛṅgāra*, he sanctioned (by implication)[1] the interchangability of the characters of the *sthāyibhāvas*, the *sañcāribhāvas*, the *sāttvikabhāvas*, and the *anubhāvas*, in the case of all the 49 *bhāvas* as demanded by the requirements of a particular situation and as presented by the power of words and their senses. *Nirveda* arises from knowledge of the truth and overwhelms the other *sthāyins*. For only that (emotion) which is more highly stable than any of the other *sthāyins* such as love etc. which can tolerate co-existence with a variety of emotions,[2] that alone (namely *nirveda*), they say, can overwhelm other *sthāyins*.

They also raise the following objection : if *nirveda* which arises from knowledge of the truth, is said to be the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta*, [this amounts to saying that knowledge of the truth is the *vibhāva* (i. e. cause) of *nirveda*], in which case how could *vairāgya* (detachment) and similar other things[3] (e. g. *samādhi*, which have been mentioned as *vibhāvas* of *nirveda*) be the *vibhāva* of *nirveda*? If one were to claim that detachment, etc., become the *vibhāva* of *nirveda* because they are the means of attaining to the knowledge of the truth, then it would mean that you are giving the name *vibhāva* to that which is the cause of another cause,[4] and that would involve you in a great absurdity (since *vibhāva* means the direct cause of a *sthāyibhāva* and not the distant or remote cause). Moreover *nirveda* is an attitude of rejecting everything (i. e. an attitude of not being attached to anything), and it

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1. The point is that normally *jugupsā* is the *sthāyibhāva* of *bībhatsa*. It is not given in the list of the thirty-three *vyabhicāribhāvas*, but the very fact that Bharata says that it should not be used in love shows that he felt that it could be a *vyabhicāribhāva* as well as a *sthyāyibhāva*. He therefore, felt that under certain circumstances, ordinary *vyabhicāribhāvas* could become *sthāyibhāvas*, and *sthāyibhāvas* could become *vyabhicāribhāvas*. This is an important point. Abhinava has expressed a similar view in the *Locana* on the third *Uddyota* of the *Dhvanyāloka*, while commenting on *bahūnāṃ samavetānām*, on p. 386 of the B. P. ed.

2. *Bhāvaicitryasahiṣṇubhyaḥ*, "which can tolerate co-existence with a variety of emotions". Does this mean that whereas *rati*, etc., can tolerate the presence of other *sthāyibhāvas*, *nirveda* the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta* cannot?

3. We take *sabīja* to mean *sadṛśa*, just as *sajātīya* is taken to mean *sadṛśa*. Literally it means "coming from the same seed", i. e. the same source. The word *ādi* in the compound *vairāgyasabījādiṣu* (i. e. *vairāgyasadṛśeṣu*) is redundant. We have, therefore, ignored it in the translation.

4. Again, *vibhāva* cannot mean both "cause" and "cause of the cause". See page 121, note 1.

would on the contrary be helpful to the emergence of the knowledge of the truth (i. e. far from being the effect of the knowledge of the truth, it would be a cause leading to it), because a detached person will strive in such a fashion that the knowledge of the truth arises in him. And *mokṣa* comes from a knowledge of the truth. It is not that one knows the truth, and then feels detached, and from that detachment *mokṣa* would arise. For Īśvarakṛṣṇa says :

" From detachment comes (only) *prakṛtilaya*, (i. e. dissolution into the eight causes, *pradhāna*, *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra*, and the *pañcatanmātras*, and not *mokṣa* ").[1] Objection : " Everywhere one sees a very great detachment on the part of those who know the truth. Even Patañjali has said :

" Thereafter from that knowledge of the truth (*puruṣakhyāti*) arises an extreme aversion to the *guṇas* (i. e. detachment)".[2] That is true (*bhavaty evam*). But Patañjali himself[3] has said : " Such detachment is really the highest state (*kāṣṭhā*) of knowledge. " Thus[4] then, knowledge of the truth (leading to aversion according to *Yogasūtra* I. 16) means nothing but knowledge of the truth reinforcing itself from state to stage.[5] And so *nirveda* is not the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta*. On the other hand, knowledge of the truth alone would be the *sthāyibhāva*. As for right perception, which will be mentioned (by Bharata) while describing *nirveda* as a *vyabhicārabhāva*, as a *vibhāva* of

1. *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 45. This means that if a person has *vairāgya* only, but no knowledge of the truth, he becomes, on his death, dissolved into the eight causes (namely, *pradhāna*, *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and the *pañca-tanmātras*) but he does not obtain *mokṣa*. Thus, it would seem that Īśvarakṛṣṇa holds the view that *vairāgya* does not directly lead to *mokṣa*.

2. *Yogasūtra*, I. 16.

3. Vyāsa's *Bhāṣya* on the *Yogasūtra*, (Ānandāśrama ed. p. 20). Patañjali, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, is considered to be an incarnation of Śeṣa (*bhujaṅga-vibhu*). Therefore it would seem that Abhinava thought Patañjali the author of the *Yogasūtras* to be identical with the Patañjali of the *Mahābhāṣya* (which of course he is not). Raghavan has pointed out (p. 106) that the quotation is not from Patañjali, but from Vyāsa. Did Abhinava simply make an error in the ascription, or did he believe that Vyāsa and Patañjali were one and the same ? See V. Raghavan, " Abhinavagupta and the *Bhāṣya* on the *Yogasūtra* ", *A. O. R.* Madras, Vol. XII, Part II, 1938–39.

4. This passage : किं तु तत्त्वज्ञानमेव स्थायी भवेत् is Abhinava's own position. *Bhavet* here must be used (according to Pāṇini III. 3. 161) in the sense of *bhavitum arhati*.

5. *Tattvajñānamālā* means a series or succession of *tattvajñānas*. The idea seems to be that the *tattvajñāna* referred to by the word *puruṣakhyāti* in *Yogasūtra* I. 16 is a lower *tattvajñāna* which grows or develops into a higher stage of *tattvajñāna* (referred to by the word *guṇavaitṛṣṇyan* in the *Yogasūtra*). *Idaṃ tattvajñānam* therefore would mean : गुणवैतृष्ण्यशब्दवाच्यं तत्त्वज्ञानम् । तत्त्वज्ञानमालया परिपोष्यमाणं would mean: पुरुषख्यातिशब्दवाच्येन तत्त्वज्ञानेन परिपोष्यमाणम्, उत्तरोत्तरं प्रकर्षावस्थां नीयमानम् ।

nirveda, and which leads to the dissipation of the attitude of acceptance (or attachment to unworthy objects) on the part of a person who has been deceived by a delusion of long standing, as exemplified in the following stanza :

" In vain did I milk a bull mistaking it for a cow bending under the burden of her full udder; in vain[1] did I embrace an ugly eunuch thinking him to be a young girl; in vain did I cherish a longing for a piece of glittering glass thinking it to be beryl. All this I did when bemused as I was, I bowed to you, a miser unable to appreciate merit "—

well, that perception of truth has been mentioned as a *vibhāva* (cause) of only the ordinary kind of *nirveda*[2] whose nature is sadness (arising from a realisation of one's stupidity in wasting energy in a worthless cause).[3] We will speak of this (perception of truth) there[4] (i. e. in the seventh chapter while commenting on the section on *nirveda*). Objection : " Attachment to the sense-objects is rooted in false knowledge. It will cease when knowledge of the truth arises.[5] This is what the revered Akṣapāda has

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1. The second comparison in this poor verse (it is interesting that it is the only verse quoted by Abhinava in the whole *śāntarasa* section. It is strange that he should have chosen to give no effective examples of *śāntarasa*, considering that there was such a large variety to choose from, and it would have been very much to the point) is somewhat odd, for if the " boy " was *lāvaṇyarahitaḥ*, we can only assume that he was embraced due to inadequate lighting !

2. *Samyagjñāna*, therefore, means here only a worldly kind of " right knowledge " and is not used in the higher sense of the term.

3. This is a reference to *NŚ* VII, 28, pp. 356–357. Abhinava's point seems to be that *nirveda* as a *vyabhicāribhāva* is the ordinary kind of worldly *nirveda* (*khedarūpanirveda*), while *nirveda* as a *sthāyibhāva* is a higher, philosophical *nirveda*. It is, however, interesting to note that among the *vibhāvas* of *nirveda*, Bharata mentions *tattvajñāna*. At *NŚ* VII, 30 (G. O. S. Vol. I. p. 357) Bharata says :

बाष्पपरिप्लुतनयनः पुनश्च निःश्वासदीनमुखनेत्रः ।
योगीव ध्यानपरो भवति हि निर्वेदवान् पुरुषः ॥

The idea here seems to be that *nirveda* is to be acted out by means of, among other things, absorption in thought (*dhyānaparatva*) similar to that of a Yogin. However, it does not follow that Bharata had any religious notion about *nirveda* while writing this stanza, although it is true that the term *tattvajñāna* will then be puzzling.

4. The promised discussion is not available. Unfortunately this section of the the seventh chapter of the *Abhinavabhāratī* has never been found. The editor (Kavi) writes (p. 347) :

एतस्मात्प्रभृति नवमाध्यायपर्यन्तं व्याख्या नोपलब्धा । यदि लब्धभागस्य ग्रन्थान्तं मुद्रणावस्थायामन्वहं प्रयतमानानामस्माकं त्रुटितो व्याख्याभागो नोपलभ्येत तदा महाग्रन्थसूत्रविच्छेदामङ्गलपरिहरणाय सुकुमारजनमनःपरिबोधनाय चास्माभिरेव रचितां व्याख्यां सर्वथानुचितामप्यस्मिन्नेव ग्रन्थान्ते योजयिष्यामः। However, Kavi did not live to fulfill his promise.

5. This is a reference to *Nyāyasūtra*, I. I. 2 : दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः । The upshot of the preceding argument based on the

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said in his *Sūtra* beginning with the words *duḥkhajanma* etc., when he says that knowledge of the truth is caused by the removal of false knowledge and that it is further the cause of *vairāgya* which is of the nature of the removal of all faults (*doṣa*) (such as attachment to worldly pleasures)". "So what ?" "Well, *vairāgya* and *nirveda* are the same thing[1] (and therefore, *nirveda* is the *sthāyin* and *tattvajñāna* is a *vibhāva*)". Who says so ? For *nirveda* is a certain state of mind which is characterised by a flow of sadness, whereas *vairāgya* is the complete destruction of *rāga*, etc. (including *śoka*, i. e. *vairāgya* is a higher form of detachment than is *nirveda*, for the latter is often used non-technically to mean simply "weariness" or "disgust"). Even granting that *vairāgya* and *nirveda* are indentical, still Gautama placed it in the midst of several (other causes of *mokṣa*) and did not mention it as the immediate cause of *mokṣa* (for it is only the remote cause), (and so it does not follow that according to Akṣapāda *nirveda*, that is, *vairāgya*, is the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta*). Moreover[2] to say that *nirveda* arising from *tattva-*

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sūtra of Akṣapāda is that *mithyājñānāpacaya* leads to *tattvajñāna* and *tattvajñāna* leads to *vairāgya*. The opponent thinks that *vairāgya* is the same thing as *nirveda*. Hence according to Akṣapāda the causal chain is : *mithyājñānāpacaya* gives rise to *tattvajñāna* which gives rise to *nirveda*. So, this means that according to Akṣapāda, *nirveda* leads to *mokṣa* and hence, *nirveda* (and not *tattvajñāna*) must be regarded as the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta*. Now, the opponent challenges the position that *vairāgya* and *nirveda* are identical, and then proceeds to point out the difference between *nirveda* and *vairāgya*. He says that *nirveda* is a particular attitude of mind which is of the nature of unbroken sadness (*śokapravāhaprasara*), while *vairāgya* is the destruction of *rāga*, *dveṣa*, *moha*, etc. The opponent of *kecinmata* (this refers to the view mentioned on p. 105 of Raghavan's text, that *nirveda* born of *tattvajñāna* is the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta*, see foot-note 2, p. 123, above) first challenges the position that *vairāgya* and *nirveda* are identical. But then he concedes it for the sake of argument in the sentence *bhavatu vā vairāgyam eva nirvedaḥ*. Even granting that *nirveda* and *vairāgya* are identical, it does not follow that according to Akṣapāda *nirveda* (i. e. *vairāgya*) is the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta*. For although *nirveda* has a place in the causal sequence given above [the whole chain is : *mithyājñānāpacaya*) (i. e. *tattvajñāna* leads to *doṣāpāya* (i. e. *nirveda* or *vairāgya*), which leads to *pravṛttyapāya*, which leads to *janmāpāya*, which leads to *duḥkhāpāya*, which leads to *mokṣa*], still it is not actually stated in the *Sūtra* to be the direct cause leading to *mokṣa*, but rather it is given as a remote cause (*mokṣe sādhye sūtrasthāniyatā na pratyapādi ācāryeṇa*). Thus according to the opponent of *kecinmata*, the authority of Akṣapāda cannot be cited in support of the view that *nirveda* is the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta*. For if at all anything is to be the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta*, it must be the direct and immediate cause of *mokṣa*.

1. The question mark in Raghavan's text after *nanu vairāgyam nirvedaḥ* should be removed.

2. This is a complex passage. *Kiṃca tattvajñānotthito* etc. is the position of the Siddhāntin, that is, of Abhinava. It is an objection against the *kecinmata* (namely that *tattvajñānajanirveda* is the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta*). The essence of the objection seems to be that the words denoting the *sthāyibhāva* and the *rasa* become

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jñāna is the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta* means that you are giving to *śama* the name *nirveda*[1]. (Reply:) *śama* and *śānta* have been explained as synonyms like *hāsa* and *hāsya* (i. e. *sthāyibhāva* and *rasa*). (But the synonymity in the case of *śānta* and *śama* is only apparent and not real). There is a real difference between *śānta* (the *rasa*) and *śama* (the *sthāyibhāva*), for *śama* is *siddha*, an accomplished fact, while *śānta* is *sādhya*, something to be accomplished; *śama* is *laukika*, worldly, while *śānta* is *alaukika*, other-worldly; *śama* is *sādhāraṇa*, ordinary, while *śānta* is *asādhāraṇa*, extraordinary.[2] Therefore, *nirveda* cannot be the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta*.

Others believe that only eight mental states have been mentioned (by Bharata), such as love, etc. Those same[3] mental states when depending on extraworldly *vibhāvas* such as *śruta* (study of the scriptures and especially of the *Upaniṣads*), which are different from the ordinary (*kathita*) *vibhāvas*, become indeed unusually lovely (*vicitra*). And from out of their midst one can become the *sthāyin* here (i. e. in the case of *śāntarasa*). Out of them (*tatra*), *rati* alone, having for its object one's own Self consisting of undisturbed bliss, is the means of attaining *mokṣa*. And so, that *rati* itself is the *sthāyin* in *śānta*. For it has been said:

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synonymous, which is improper. The next sentence continues the view of the Siddhāntin : शमशान्तयोः पर्यायत्वं तु हासहास्याभ्यां व्याख्यातम् । and contains within it the objection that the Pūrvapakṣin might make, namely that *hāsa* and *hāsya* are synonymous as well. Abhinava replies that this has already been explained. But now what follows does not make sense if it is explained as the view of the Siddhāntin. For Abhinava says : सिद्धसाध्यतया, लौकिकालौकिकत्वेन, साधारणासाधारणतया च वैलक्षण्यं शमशान्तयोरपि सुलभमेव । Now these distinctions are well-known as being the major distinctions between the *sthāyibhāva* and *rasa*. The *sthāyibhāva* is always *laukika*, whereas rasa is always *alaukika*. The same thing would therefore apply to *śama* and *śānta*, namely one would be the *laukikasthāyibhāva*, and the other the *alaukika-rasa*. Now why does Abhinava say this; for it only lends support to the Pūrvapakṣin? Moreover *tasmān na nirvedaḥ sthāyīti* does not follow from it. On the other hand, if we take the words *śamaśāntayoḥ*, etc., as stating the view of the Pūrvapakṣin, the next sentence *tasmān na nirvedaḥ sthāyīti* presents a real difficulty. For if the Pūrvapakṣin is speaking, and has just made a valid point, it makes no sense for the Siddhāntin to reply by saying : " therefore our position is proved ". Thus both solutions are unsatisfactory.

1. Note that on p. 268, Vol. III, *NŚ*, *nirveda* is given as the *sthāyin* of *śānta*!

2. We cannot ascertain any difference between *laukika* and *alaukika* on the one hand, and *sādhāraṇa* and *asādhāraṇa* on the other, such that Abhinava would be justified in using both terms. Surely *sādhaāraṇa* and *laukika* mean precisely the same thing.

3. Raghavan reads *tata eva*. But the Baroda ed. has *ta eva* (i. e. *te eva*) which seems to us a better reading.

"That man whose love is centered in the Self, who is gratified in his Self, and who takes all delight in the Self – for such a man there is nothing any longer to be accomplished".[1]

In the same way,[2] any of the *sthāyibhāvas* beginning with *rati* and *hāsa* and ending with *vismaya* can be explained as the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta*, because we find that a person attains to liberation if he realises the oddity of everything in the world (*hāsa*); if he sees that the whole world is lamentable (*śoka*); if he perceives the happenings in the world as harmful to his spiritual well-being (and, angry with them, desires to conquer them) (*krodha*); if he resorts to extraordinary energy dominated by the absence of delusion[3] (in order to overcome worldly temptations) (*utsāha*); if he feels afraid of all the objects of the senses (*bhaya*); if he feels disgust for young women, etc., though they are desirable for all other people (*jugupsā*); if he feels astonished at his unprecedented realisation of his own self (*vismaya*). And Bharata agrees with this position. For while (Bharata) enumerates particular *bhāvas* by using words like *rati*, etc., and includes thereunder other varieties of the same by using the word *ca*,[4] he does admit[5] their ability to lead to liberation, provided that they are the result of extraordinary causes (i. e. *vibhāvas*) different from ordinary causes. But in the case of those people who hold this view (namely that any one of the *sthāyibhāvas* such as *rati*, etc., can be the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta*), the different *sthāyibhāvas* would cancel each other out and so not even one of them could be regarded as the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta*. If it is said that the different *sthāyibhāvas* can be the *sthāyibhāvas* of *śānta* because of the different approaches leading to it, that is (as good as) already refuted. (Further), because of the different *sthāyibhāvas* of *śānta* depending on the approaches of the persons concerned, there would be an infinity of *śāntarasas*. If it is said

1. *Gītā*, III, 17.

2. All eight of the *sthāyibhāvas* can be accepted as the *sthāyibhāvas* of *śāntarasa*. For instance, *hāsa* can become the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta*, if we look at everything around us as *vaikṛta*, "odd" or "deformed" (note that the Vidūṣaka, the main representative of *hāsa*, is described in the texts as being deformed and thereby amusing), etc. *Rati* is considered in the sentence immediately preceding the quotation from the *Gītā*.

3. *Asaṃmoha* is one of the *uddīpanavibhāvas* of *vīrarasa*. See *NŚ*, Vol. I. p. 378. Cf. Abhinava's explanation of Ānanda's *maṅgalaśloka* of the *Dhvānyāloka*, p. 17, K. Sastri's ed.

4. *Ca* refer to *NŚ*., VI. 17, which enumerates the eight *sthāyibhāvas* and uses a *ca* after *hāsa* and *śoka*. According to Abhinava, the use of the particle *ca* is intended to convey the inclusion of other varieties of the eight *sthāyibhāvas*. It is not however clear what these varieties are.

5. Does *etad* (in *na caitan muner na sammatam*) refer to the interchangeability of *vyabhicāribhāvas* and *sthāyibhāvas;* or to the fact that the *sthāyibhāvas* of other *rasas* can induce an attitude leading to *mokṣa* ?

that there would be only one[1] *śāntarasa* (and not countless *śāntarasas*) because of its being the cause of one single result, namely *mokṣa*, then even *vīra* and *raudra* would have to be regarded as one *rasa* because both lead to one single result, namely destruction (of one's enemy). Others say that all the *sthāyibhāvas*, *rati*, etc., become merged together, just as (different flavours merge together) in a beverage,[2] and when so merged they become the *sthāyibhāvas* (of *śānta*). But because different states of mind cannot co-exist at one time, and because (some) are mutually antagonistic, even this is not a very attractive thesis.

What then is the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta* ? The reply is as follows :[3] knowledge of the truth alone is the means of attaining *mokṣa* and so it would be proper to regard that alone as the *sthāyibhāva* of *mokṣa*.[4] Knowledge of the truth is just another name for knowledge of the Self. The knowledge of any object other than the Self is the knowledge of worldly objects.[5] For anything that is different from the Self is nothing but non-self. Our teacher has dealt with this at great length. And we have gone into it in some detail elsewhere, and so at this moment there is no point in dilating. Therefore,[6]

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1. *Eko rasaḥ* means *śāntarasa* since the whole of the preceding discussion is concerned with *śāntarasa* and is intended to show how all the *sthāyibhāvas* can be connected with *śāntarasa*. To this it was replied, on p. 108, that (1) the different *sthāyibhāvas* would cancel one another out, with the result that there would be not a single *sthāyibhāva* for *śānta*, and (2) such a view would lead to not one *rasa* (called *śāntarasa*) but to an infinite number of *śantarasas* depending on the divergent attitudes and approaches of different persons. The opponent replies to this by saying that since all these *sthāyibhāvas* (helping the emergence of *śāntarasa*) would lead finally to *mokṣa*. there would not be an infinity of *śāntarasas*, but only one. To this the reply is given on p. 109 : " In that case since both *vīra* and *raudra* lead to a single result, namely destruction of one's enemy, they too would have to be regarded as constituting a single *rasa* ". But we are not absolutely certain of this interpretation.

2. The comparison with *pānakarasa* is used again and again, both in the *Locana* and in the *Abhinavabhāratī*. Cf. *A.Bh.* p. 286 : पानकरसास्वादोऽपि किं गुडमरिचादिषु दृष्ट इति समानमेतत् । See also the *NŚ.* Vol. I., p. 287 ff.

3. After *ucyate* begins the *siddhānta* view.

4. The word *mokṣa* in the phrase : इति तस्यैव मोक्षे स्थायिता युक्ता is odd. One expects *śānte*.

5. आत्मनश्च व्यतिरिक्तस्य विषयस्येव ज्ञानम् is very clumsily worded. We think the distinction is between knowledge of the Self and ordinary knowledge (cf. the *Gītā* distinction between *vijñāna* and *jñāna*). Whatever knowledge is different from the Self is simply worldly knowledge, *jñānam*. The next sentence, *paro hy evam ātmā anātmaiva syāt* is also very clumsy. How are we to understand *paro* ? We would expect the noun governed by this adverb to be in the ablative : " different from the Self ". Raghavan records the reading *ātmanā*, instrumental singular, which would also be irregular, but somewhat better than the nominative. Note that we read *viṣaya-syaiva* instead of *viṣayasyeva*.

6. It is important to realise that at this point Abhinava abandons practical considerations of drama, and gives the philosophic base underlying his views on *śānta*. It is not different from the philosophical justification of an Advaitin — the additions from his school of Kashmir Śaivism are very slight.

the *Ātman* alone possessed of such pure qualities as knowledge, bliss, etc., and devoid of the enjoyment of imagined sense-objects, is the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta*. Its status as a *sthāyibhāva* should not be explained in the same terms as the status, as a *sthāyibhāva*, in the case of other *sthāyibhāvas* (i.e. there is a great difference between the *Atman's* status as a *sthāyibhāva* and the other *sthāyibhāvas'* status as *sthāyibhāvas*). For *rati*, etc., which arise and disappear due to the emergence and disappearance of their respective causes, are called *sthāyibhāvas* in so far as they attach themselves for some time to the canvas[1] (wall) in the form of the *ātman* which is of an unchanging nature relative to them. But knowledge of the truth is the canvas behind all emotions, and so it is the most stable of all the *sthāyibhāvas*. It transforms all the states of mind such as love, etc., into transitory feelings, and its status as a *sthāyibhāva*, having been established by its very nature, need not be specifically mentioned. And therefore it is not proper to count (knowledge of the truth) separately (in addition to the eight *sthāyibhāvas*). Between a lame bull and a dehorned bull,[2] *bullness* (which is the generic property present in both of the bulls) is not considered as a third thing. And so the number, viz. forty-nine, of the *bhāvas* is not disturbed. Should one demand to know why then knowledge of the truth is separately considered (as a *sthāyibhāva*) (by me, Abhinavagupta), we reply that it is so because it can be separately enjoyed.[3] For whereas *rati*, etc., can be the subject of ordinary perception (in their pure form), without being mingled with anything else, the nature of the Self is (of course) not the subject of ordinary perception in its pure form without being mingled with anything else, the way *rati* etc., are. (But) even though in its pure nature[4] it is of an indeterminate form, still when it is investigated at the time of the return from abstract meditation,[5] it invariably appears as mingled with various mental states.

Or[6] let it appear like that (i.e. let the nature of the Self appear as you say, soiled by the various mental states). Still you cannot consider as

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1. Is this comparison of the *Ātman* to the canvas of the painter found elsewhere? We know that it occurs several times in the *Yogavāsiṣṭhamahārāmāyaṇa*.

2. *Muṇḍa* cannot of course mean shaven here. The practice is to cut the horns of bulls so that they cannot harm anyone.

3. The reading as printed by Raghavan is: अस्यापि कथं न पृथग्गणनेति चेत् पृथगास्वादायोगादिति ब्रूमहे। But he notes readings in M. & G. which have: अस्यापि कथं पृथग्गणनेति चेत् पृथगास्वादयोगादिति ब्रूमहे। which seems to us to give a more rational sense. As for the next sentence, we think it means that the *Ātman* is not *laukika-pratītigocara* as is *rati*, etc., because it is not mixed with any other form.

4. *Svagatam* means, according to Srinivasa Shastri, *svasmin ātmani*.

5. On *vyutthāna*, see *Yogasūtras*, III. 9, and III. 37.

6. It would appear from this concession, *bhāsatām vā loke tathā*, that this is Abhinava speaking. This means that the last sentence in the preceding paragraph must belong to the Pūrvapakṣin. But what precisely his point would be, we fail to see.

sthāyibhāvas all possible stable moods of the mind, for they are of no use so far as the (eight) *rasas* actually mentioned (by Bharata) are concerned. They rather deserve to be regarded as transitory feelings and not otherwise (i. e. not as *sthāyibhāvas*). And thus only can the statement (*praghaṭṭaka*) that there are in all forty-nine *bhāvas* be justified. This nature of the Self cannot be said to be transitory because it would be impossible, unimaginative (*avaicitryāvaha*) and improper. *Śama* is the nature of the Self. Bharata has designated it (i. e. the nature of the Self) by the word *śama*. If that same (nature of the Self) is called *śama* or *nirveda*, there is no objection. Only (note that) *śama* is a different (kind of) state of mind (altogether). And this (special) *nirveda* is (only apparently) similar to the *nirveda* that arises from other causes such as poverty, etc. Although their causes are different, (nonetheless, because) they are similar, they are both called *nirveda*. This is similar (to what takes place in) love, fear, etc. (?)[1] Therefore the nature of the Self is itself the knowledge of the Truth, and it is also tranquillity. Further (*tathā ca*) *rati*, etc., are (only) particular dark colorations (*kāluṣyoparāgaviśeṣāḥ*) of the Self (or of *śānta*?). Having by means of continued concentration realised its form as being pure, though connected with them (i. e. *rati*, etc.), there is even at the time of withdrawing from meditation (*vyutthāna*), complete tranquility (of the spiritual aspirant, the *sādhaka*). As has been said : *praśāntavāhitā saṃskārāt*[2]. This entire collection of ordinary and extraordinary states of mind can become the helper of the major (emotion) known as knowledge of the Truth. Its *anubhāvas* are *anubhāvas* helped by *yama*, *niyama*, etc., and also the *svabhāvābhinayas*[3] which will be described in the three chapters beginning with *upāṅgābhinaya*. And so they (i. e. these *anubhāvas*) are concerned with *śāntarasa* itself. This itself is its nature (i. e. the nature of *śāntarasa*).[4] The *vibhāvas* are the grace of God, etc.[5] And love etc., which are soon to be completely destroyed, can be aesthetically enjoyed in *śānta* (as subsidiary, momentary elements). Just as the *vyabhicāri* "eagerness" appears as important in love-during-separation or even in love-during-union, as said in the phrase: "love whose festivity never comes to an end";[6] and just as *augrya*, a *vyabhicārin*, appears as prominent in *raudra*; and just as *nirveda*,

1. We simply cannot understand the simile *ratibhayādiriva*.

2. *Yogasūtra*, III. 10. But we cannot understand what bearing this has on the word *praśāntatā* used by Abhinava in the preceding sentence.

3. We cannot make out what *svabhāvābhinaya* means. The phrase *upāṅgābhinayādyadhyāyatraye* refers to chaps. VIII, IX, and X of the *NŚ*

4. We are not sure we have understood *ayam eva hi svabhāvaḥ*.

5. Drop the comma after *parameśvarānugrahaprabhṛtayaḥ* and add a full stop.

6. *Tāpasavatsarāja*, I. 14.

dhṛti (firmness of mind), *trāsa* (fear) and *harṣa* (joy), though really *vyabhicāribhāvas*, appear as prominent in *karuṇa, vīra, bhayānaka* and *adbhuta*; so in *śāntarasa, jugupsā* (disgust), etc., appear predominantly, since they are completely opposed to love.[1] For in the *mahāvrata* (ceremony) one carries about a human skull ..... (obscure).[2] At the time of begetting a son (by a widow) from her brother-in-law, anointment of one's own body (with oil) has been recommended with a view to creating a sense of disgust.[3] For the man who has done all that must be done with regard to his Self, (i. e. who has realised the true nature of his Self), his efforts are all for promoting the good of other people, and so his energy takes the form of an effort that is prompted by the wish to help others. This is a synonym for compassion, and it is very intimately connected with *śānta*. And so some people call *śāntarasa, dayāvīra* (compassionate heroism) and some call it *dharmavīra* (religious heroism) because of the intensity of this energy (*utsāha*) which becomes its *vyabhicāribhāva*.

Objection : " Energy is based on egoism as its essence, whereas *śānta* consists primarily in a loosening of egoism. " (Reply :) It is not improper for an opposing mood to be a *vyabhicāribhāva* (in *śānta*), for we find, for instance, *nirveda* (as a *vyabhicāribhāva*) in love. In the verse " With the forest-ground overgrown with grass as my bed "[4] and other similar stanzas, we find a high degree of *utsāha* in helping others. There is no state that is devoid of *utsāha*. For in the absence of desire and effort, one would be like a stone. And so because one has understood the higher (Self) and the lower (Self), there is nothing left to do with regard to one's own Self, and therefore, for those whose hearts are tranquil, to give their all-in-all, i. e. to give their bodies, for the sake of helping another is not contrary to *śānta*. " One should preserve one's self "[5], such and similar advice is meant in the sense of guarding one's body and is meant for those who have not realised their Self, because ascetics are not concerned with guarding their bodies at all. For it has been said :

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1. The main point of this argument escapes us.

2. As Raghavan has noted, this passage is extremely corrupt. We are unable to make any sense of the lines तथा हि महाव्रते नृकपालादिधारणमसुभार्यादिसमुदायादि-विस्तारसंक्षेपातिकर्मोकृतिर्हि धर्मे ।

3. This is a reference to the fact that when levirate takes place, it should be without any sexual desire, but only for the sake of procreation. Therefore, in order to create a sense of disgust for the body, both partners smear themselves with foul-smelling oil. Jayaratha quotes a verse on this subject in his commentary to the *Tantrāloka*. Vol. XI, p. 73. (Part II).

4. *Nāgānanda* IV. 2.

5. *Gautamadharmasūtra*, I. 9, 35.

" The life-breaths (*prāṇāḥ*) are the cause of attaining *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*. When they are destroyed what is not destroyed ? When they are guarded, what is not guarded ? (i. e. all is guarded) ".[1]

In this stanza the motive (*nidāna*) for the preservation of the body is shown to be its capacity to achieve the well-known four goals of life. In the case of the man who has realised his Self (however), it is (often) heard, in the context of *saṃnyāsa* that he should throw his body into water, fire or a pit.[2] Thus the idea is that (since) somehow the body is to be renounced (sometime or other), if it be given up for the sake of another, what would not be achieved ? (i. e. so much is thereby gained). Should one argue that Jīmūtavāhana and others were not ascetics, we should ask how that matters to us ?[3] Certainly they had attained to knowledge of the Truth. For it would be inconceivable that those who consider their body as their soul should abandon for the sake of others the very body which is (to them) their all-in-all, for (in their case there would be no) urge for *dharma*, etc. In a battle, a warrior has no intention of abandoning his body (for a religious cause), but rather he enters (the battle) only in order to conquer his enemy. (In suicide) by jumping off a cliff, etc., the main (purpose) is the desire to attain a more beautiful body in the life to come. Therefore whatever deeds, beginning with the imparting of (spiritual) advice and culminating in the renunciation of one's body, are performed in order to achieve the benefit of others and without reference to one's own benefit, are certainly inconceivable in the case of people who have not attained to a knowledge of the true nature of the *Ātman*. And they (i. e. people who do these deeds) are also knowers of the Truth. For those who know (the Truth), there is liberation in all the (four) stages (*āśrama*) of life. This is (what is taught) in the *Smṛtis* and in the *Śrutis*. As has been said :

" A man who is attached to worship of the gods, who is grounded in the knowledge of the Truth, who is gracious to guests, who, having performed the ceremonial rites to his ancestors (*śrāddha*), gives out wealth, even though he be (only) a house-holder, (this man) is freed ".[4]

However (*kevalam*) in the case of Bodhisattvas, etc., although they have known the truth, there is, because of their religious (or righteous) actions springing from a desire to do good to others and expected by them to

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1. Not traced.

2. We should keep in mind the legend, still current in Kashmir, (see Pandey, " *Abhinavagupta* ", p. 23) that " one day Abhinavagupta ..... along with twelve hundred disciples walked into the Bhairava cave and was never seen again. "

3. Jīmūtavāhana was a Vidyādhara. Abhinava replies : so what ?

4. Not traced.

result in the benefit of others, a reappearance of a body appropriate to that (i. e. to those actions that they have performed).[1]

Even in the case of *rasas* which occupy a subsidiary position (in a poetic work), the attainment of "repose"[2] (i. e. aesthetic enjoyment) is met with, because that is only appropriate to their nature (as *rasas*). For instance, (in the *Rāmāyaṇa*), in the case of Rāma when he obeys his father's orders (and goes into exile), repose is met with in this, though this aesthetic repose is only subsidiary. The same should be understood in the case of *śṛṅgāra* and other *rasas* (when they occupy a subsidiary position in a poetic work). Hence although *śāntarasa*[3] has come to stay[4] (in the *Nāgānanda*), it is not the major rasa, because (in that play) the achievement of the three goals of human life (*dharma, artha* and *kāma*), with special emphasis on helping others, is the final result in the case of

1. We cannot decide whether this means that Bodhisattvas and others who give up their bodies for the sake of others are reborn on earth, i. e., whether this contains a veiled reference to the famous *apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa* theory (on which see S. Lévi's tr. of the *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, III, 3, note 4 — in brief a Bodhisattva never enters *Nirvāṇa* but is reborn again and again *svātantryeṇa* in order to benefit mankind); or whether Abhinava means that Bodhisattvas, etc., receive an appropriate body in heaven. Or could he even mean (since heaven is a rather crude notion for Bodhisattvas and Jivanmuktas) that the Bodhisattvas receive the *dharmakāya*?

2. *Viśrāntilābhaḥ* really means *rasapratītiḥ*.

3. A passage from the *A. Bh.*, Vol. II, p. 451 (*abhyāya* 18) has an important bearing on this issue. Here is the Sanskrit text:

एवं तावद्वीररौद्रशृङ्गारा यथास्वं (किं) पुमर्थत्रयप्राणभूतत्वेन वर्तमाना, एतेषु प्रयोगेषु शान्त-बीभत्सरसौ तु चरमपुमर्थयोगात्, तत्र च सर्वस्य नाधिकारो, अपि कस्यचिदपश्चिमजन्मनोऽधिकारात्। नाटके यद्यपि तत्फलप्रधानतया प्राधान्यमवलम्बेयातां, तथापि नासौ प्रचुरप्रयोग इति तयोः पुरुषार्थ-प्रवरप्राणितयोरपि वीरादिरसान्तराद्यावापेनावस्थापनम्। एवं तावत्पुमर्थविषयो रूपकरसविषय एव परमार्थतः, तथापि त्वितिवृत्तवैतत्याद्रसान्तरप्रयोगोऽपि तदङ्गतया तत्र भवति।

The passage has been translated by Professor Wright, *BSOAS*, Vol. 26, 1963, p. 115: "Thus *vīra, raudra, śṛṅgāra* (are used there) respectively, occurring in these works by being engendered by (the aims of the character portrayed) *dharma, artha* and *kāma*, while *śānta* and *bībhatsa* occur in connexion with *mokṣa*. But not every character can carry the main role in this (latter) case, only the occasional saint. Although in the *nāṭaka, śānta* or *bībhatsa* may be the principal *rasa* when *mokṣa* is the principal goal, this is not a common practice, so they, although engendered by the best of human aims (the character's pursuit of *mokṣa*) are considered subordinate to the other *rasas* – *vīra, raudra*, and *śṛṅgāra*. Thus the main *rasa* of a drama is really governed by the *puruṣārtha* it portrays, but other *rasas* occur in support of it as a result of the variety of subject matter included.

4. What does Abhinava mean by अत एव शान्तस्य स्थायित्वेऽपि अप्राधान्यम्? How are we to take *sthāyitva*? We can translate as "firmly entrenched", i. e., Abhinavagupta is simply insisting that *śāntarasa* is actually present in the *Nāgānanda*.

Jīmūtavāhana.[1] With this thought in mind, Bharata will say (*NŚ*, XVIII. 11) while defining a *Nāṭaka*, that "it is possessed of qualities such as wealth, flirtatious ways, etc.".[2] This means that a dramatist should introduce into the *Nāṭaka* all kinds of actions in which opulence and flirtation are predominant and in which emphasis is placed on the two goals of life, *artha* and *kāma*, because such actions have the charming purpose of winning a sympathetic response from all people (i. e. because such actions have a universal appeal). We will describe this in that very section (dealing with the definition of a *Nāṭaka*). With this in mind, Bharata will not prescribe any *jātyaṃśaka* in *śānta*.[3] Hence the view (of some) that *śāntarasa* does not exist in as much as Bharata has not prescribed any *jātyaṃśaka* in its case, is refuted.

Others however say: "Jīmūtavāhana saved an old woman who needed protection, and who said: 'Oh son, who will save you?'[4] He had no

1. By saying that *śānta* is *apradhāna*, Abhinava is not necessarily saying that *śāntarasa* can never be *pradhāna*, but only that it is not the *pradhānarasa* in this particular play. But it is an odd statement, since if any emotion is prominent in the *Nāgānanda* it is *śānta*. *Śṛṅgāra* is brief in its appearance, and *vīra* almost non-existent. Perhaps Abhinava was conceding a point belaboured by his critics. But if he does not allow *śāntarasa* as *pradhāna* in this play, where was it *pradhāna*? For this is the only play Abhinava quotes in the context of *śāntarasa*, and indeed the only play that all the early writers quote. Therefore, by implication, it would seem that Abhinava concedes that *śānta* is never the *pradhānarasa* in drama. But then what does he mean by saying that it is the most important (and he uses the very word *pradhāna*), of all the *rasas*? See *Locana* on the third *Uddyota*, p. 394 : मोक्षफलत्वेन चायं परमपुरुषार्थनिष्ठत्वात् सर्वरसेभ्यः प्रधानतमः ।

2. *NŚ*., XVIII. 11 (G. O. S., Vol. II, p. 488) :

नानाविभूतिभिर्युक्तमृद्धिविलासादिभिर्गुणैश्चैव । अङ्कप्रवेशकाढ्यं भवति हि तन्नाटकं नाम ॥

"That which is called *nāṭaka* is accompanied by diverse kinds of spendour (i. e. according to Abhinava, by the magnificence of *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*) (in general), and (in particular) it is possessed of such qualities as wealth, flirtatious ways, etc. It is rich in *aṅkas* (acts) and *praveśakas* (minor scenes)".

3. The topic of the *jātyaṃśakas* is discussed in stanzas 1–13 of the *NŚ* XXIX (Vol. IV of the G. O. S. ed.). This same objection is raised in the *A. Bh.*, Vol. IV, p. 78 : *nanu śāntārase na kenacid aṃśakena gānam uktam*. The reply that Abhinava gives is curious : *vismaraṇaśīlo'si. smaryase(te) uktaṃ hi – na śāntarasapradhānatā prayogasya bhavati. sato'pi* (surely we must read *sann api*) *hi rasāntaroparakta eva prayogayogyo nānyatheti*. But where has this been said? Not in the *NŚ* itself. Nor do we find this actually quoted in the *A. Bh.* Perhaps Abhinava is in fact referring to this idea (and not the actual words) as explained in the *A. Bh.* in the *śāntarasaprakaraṇa*. The passage is puzzling.

4. *Nāgānanda* IV, 10. Śaṅkhacūḍa's mother is speaking, asking who will save her son: हा पुत्रक, यदा नागलोकपरिरक्षकेन वासुकिना परित्यक्तोऽसि तदा कस्तेऽपरः परित्राणं करिष्यति? Just at that moment Jīmūtavāhana appears (*nanv aham*) and offers to help (*amba, mā bhaiṣīḥ*). The mother had said she would end her own life as well (IV, under v. 20 — *tad ihaiva tvayā saha mariṣyāmi*), so Jīmūtavāhana saves her life by his action too.

power. He wanted to harm nobody." We agree with this. Should it be further argued that there is no power, ... of Bodhisattvas (?). But the *Śāstra* does not teach by means of *kākatālīya(nyāya)* (?).[1] Therefore it is proved : *utsāha* is principally intended (in this play and therefore *vīra* is the major *rasa*), and it is characterised by compassion.[2] (In the *Nāgānanda*) other moods (like love for Malayavatī, detachment, etc.,) become subsidiaries according to the circumstances (*yathāyogam*).[3] As has been said :

तच्छिद्रेषु प्रत्ययान्तराणि संस्कारेभ्यः ।[4]

And so we have refuted the contention that *anubhāvas* cannot exist because of a complete absence of action (in the case of the man who is *śānta*). When, however, one has reached the culminating state (of *śānta*) and all *anubhāvas* are absent, this (*śānta*) cannot be represented. In love and sorrow, etc.,also, in the culminating stages,[5] it is correct that there is no possibility of representation.

Sympathetic indentification however is possible for those who have (planted) in them the *saṃskāras* that are the seeds of such knowledge of the Truth. As Bharata will say :

" People devoid of passion (take delight) in *mokṣa* ".[6]

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1. *Śaktiś cāsya na kācid* to *śāstram upadiśati* : we cannot, in spite of repeated attempts and devious explanations, make any sense of this passage.

2. This is very curious, for in the *Locana* (p. 393) Abhinava has said that *dayāvīra*, is only another name for *śāntarasa* and that it is not to be regarded as a variety of *vīrarasa*, since Bharata has recognised only three varieties, *dānavīra*, *dharmavīra* and *yuddhavīra*. Now he has just said that *śāntarasa* is not the *pradhānarasa* of the *Nāgānanda*. But *dayāvīra* is. How are we to solve this contradiction ?

3. Does this passage, *anye tu vyabhicāriṇo*, etc., mean that in the *Nāgānanda* other emotions like love for Malayavatī, detachment, etc., become subsidiary to *dayāvīra* according to circumstances ?

4. *Yogasūtra*, IV. 27. We don't know what Abhinava means.

5. What is the culminating stage of *karuṇarasa* — death ?

6. This is *NŚ.*, XXVII, 58. It is one of Abhinava's most important reasons for thinking that Bharata really did feel that there was such a thing as *mokṣa* that could be dramatically treated and displayed on the stage. Here is the verse :

तुष्यन्ति तरुणाः कामे विदग्धाः समायाश्रिते । अर्थेष्वर्थपराश्चैव मोक्षे चाथ विरागिणः ॥

" Young people are delighted with (watching spectacles of) love, the learned with (watching spectacles concerned with) doctrinal matters (philosophy), those interested in wealth are delighted with (watching spectacles concerning) material gain, and those without passion are interested in (spectacles dealing with) *mokṣa* ".

This is certainly curious, for one wonders just where Bharata would include such spectacles, i. e. under what *rasa* ? It is odd that he should be silent on such an important point. Perhaps the verse is not by Bharata himself. Note verse 61 :

धर्माख्यानपुराणेषु वृद्धास्तुष्यन्ति नित्यशः ।

What would the *rasa* be of such *dharmākhyānas* and *purāṇas* ?

(After all,) not everybody is always sympathetic to everything. For instance, a man whose nature is heroic (will not sympathetically identify with a character) in *bhayānaka*. Objection : " How can a heroic type of person take any delight in such a presentation ? "[1] The reply is : in a work where this (*śānta*) is presented, surely there is one or other of the (other *rasas*) such as *śṛṅgāra, vīra,* etc. since the work is intended to be useful to the goals of life (other than liberation). Its aesthetic relish is grounded in *śānta* (however). In *Prahasanas,* etc. too, where *hāsya,* etc., are principal, the aesthetic relish is grounded in other *rasas* which arise in their wake (*anuniṣpādi*). According to some, the justification for the exposition of the different drama-types is the intention to cater to aesthetic enjoyment in the case of different kinds of spectators (*adhikārin*). Therefore *śāntarasa* does exist. And so in (certain) old manuscripts,[2] after the passage[3] " we will show how the *sthāyibhāvas* develop into the *rasas* ", is read the definition of *śānta* in the phrase " What is called *śānta* has for its *sthāyibhāvas śama,* " etc. In this connection, the aesthetic enjoyment of all *rasas* is similar to that of *sānta,* because it (i. e. this aesthetic enjoyment) is turned away from actual sense-object contact. [Because we are particularly concerned with one *rasa,* except that it is mixed with

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1. In the *Locana* Abhinava has simply replied to this important question with an arrogant response (p. 392-393). Here he considers it more seriously (the *Locana* was written before the *Abhinavabhāratī,* for we find that the *A.Bh.* refers to the *Locana,* e. g. p. 343, Vol. I : तच्च मदीयादेव तद्विवरणात् सहृदयालोकलोचनादवधारणीयम् ।)

But it is interesting that his reply makes bad sense. For he is saying that there are other *rasas* in every *śānta* play which will appeal to other people. This is of course true, but not a reply to the important objection that *śānta* is not an emotion that belongs to mankind universally, whereas the other *rasas* are. He fails to catch the point that it is qualitatively different from the example he counters with, namely that a *vīra* will take no pleasure in *bhayānaka.* He might not, but he could, since he must be aware of fear in himself though it may not be dominant. Cf. the curious remarks on p. 323 of the *A. Bh.*, Vol. I, last 3 sentences of the first paragraph.

2. From this passage : तथा च चिरंतनपुस्तकेषु स्थायिभावान् etc., it is clear that *śāntarasa* was defined, in certain MSS *before* all the other *rasas,* and not *after* them. For these words, *sthāyibhāvān,* etc., are the last words before the description of the eight *rasas.* But note that in the *A. Bh.* Abhinava does not comment directly on whatever he read there. Why ? Is it because he did not believe it was part of the *NŚ* ? It is in fact quite possible that this section on *śāntarasa* was a totally separate " book ", not intended to fit into the *NŚ* at all. In any case, it could not have come at the end of the *rasa* section, i. e. the end of the sixth *adhyāya* as it is printed in the G. O. S. edition.

3. Does he mean : (a) " I do not have *śānta* in my text "; or (b) " It is given in the beginning only in some books " ? The implication is that most MSS did not contain a *śāntarasaprakaraṇa.* Oddly enough Abhinava does not justify this ommission.

other latent mental impressions (*vāsanā*). ?][1] In order to indicate that it (*śānta*) is at the root of all (*rasas*), it was named at the beginning. In ordinary worldly dealings, one does not mention separately a thing common to all, and so its *sthāyin* was not separately given. But even a thing which is common to a number of other things deserves to be separately reckoned by the discriminating man, and so it (*śāntarasa*) has become separate as the object of cognition in the form of the aesthetic enjoyment of the spectator who is admitted to be a discriminating reader. In the *Itihāsas*, the *Purāṇas*, dictionaries, etc., we hear of nine *rasas* as well as in the revered *Siddhāntaśāstra*. Thus it is said :

" He should display the eight *rasas* in the places alloted to the eight gods. And in the centre he should display *śāntarasa* in the place of the supreme God (Śiva)".[2]

Its *vibhāvas* are *vairāgya*, fear of *saṃsāra*, etc. *Śānta* is known through the portrayal of these. Its *anubhāvas* are thinking about *mokṣa*–texts, etc. Its *vyabhicāribhāvas* include world–weariness, wisdom, contentment (*dhṛti*), etc. And as *bhakti* and *śraddhā* which are directed towards meditation on God and which are reinforced by *smṛti, mati, dhṛti* and *utsāha*, are in any case (*anyathaiva*) helpful (to *śānta*), neither of them should be counted as a separate *rasa*. Here is a *Saṅgrahakārikā* on this matter :

" *Śānta rasa* is to be known as that which arises from a desire to secure the liberation of the Self, which leads to a knowledge of the Truth, and is connected with the property of highest happiness ".[3]

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1. We cannot arrive at a meaning for this sentence.

2. This refers, most likely, to the drawing of a mystic circle (*cakra*) as practised in Tantric rituals. The eight gods are represented on the outside of the circle. By *pradarśayet* probably " *likhet* " is meant. The point is that one draws the gods, and then writes in underneath the *rasa* that accompanies them. There is one difficulty however : *devadeva* must refer to Śiva. Now in the *NŚ*, VI. 44 (Vol. I, p. 299) Śiva is given as the god of *raudrarasa* (*raudro rudrādhidaivatyaḥ*). Moreover, in the *A. Bh.* commentary on that stanza, Abhinava has associated *śāntarasa* with the Buddha ! " बुद्धः शान्तेऽब्जजोऽद्भुते " इति शान्तवादिनः केचित् पठन्ति । But as this is a quotation from a different (and untraced) source, it need not agree with the *NŚ*. One can also take *rūpa* to refer to the actual pictorial representation. *Pradarśayet* would, therefore, mean " draw ". One should draw each of the gods according to the *rasa*, i. e. such and such a god looking angry (*raudra*), another looking amorous (*śṛṅgāra*), etc., and Śiva should be shown in *samādhi*. In the original, the genitive in *aṣṭānām devānām* might also be taken as used in the sense of *sambandha* (*aṣṭadeva-sambaddhān rasān*). The idea is that the eight *rasas* are to be pictorially represented as symbolised by the eight presiding gods, i. e., by means of the characteristic forms of the eight gods.

3. This is a verse actually found in the so–called *śāntarasaprakaraṇa* of the *NŚ* (p. 333, Vol. I, *A. Bh*), introduced with the words : *atrāryāḥ ślokāś ca bhavanti*

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By the three adjectives qualifying *śānta* in this verse, the *vibhāvas, sthāyi-bhāva* and *anubhāvas* are shown respectively.

" Various feelings, because of their particular respective causes arise from *śānta* (a state of mental calm). But when these causes disappear, they melt back into *śānta* ".[1]

In this verse and others it has been summarily shown that *śānta* is the source of (all) other *rasas*.

As for the statement that will be made by Bharata[2] to the effect that in the *Ḍima* (type of drama) there are six *rasas*, excluding both *hāsya* and *śṛṅgāra*,[3] here is what is meant : by giving the definition : " It is based on a composition with an exciting *rasa* ", there can be no question at all of *śānta*, as it is opposed to *raudra* which is predominant (in the *Ḍima*). So what is the point of (separately) excluding it ? Since *śānta*

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(which is really incorrect, since there are only two *āryās* and three *ślokas*. The dual *ārye*, therefore, should have been used). The reading is slightly different. The last line reads : नैःश्रेयसोपदिष्टः शान्तरसो नाम संभवति । It is clear from this quotation that Abhinava is not commenting on the actual passage of the *NŚ*.

The following remark of Abhinava does not seem to agree with the stanza. For how can *niḥśreyasa* be said to represent an *anubhāva* ? The first two correspond, but not the third.

1. *NŚ*, VI, 87, p. 335.

2. See *NŚ*, Vol. III, p. 105.

3. This is *NŚ*. 18. 85, under the definition of *Ḍima*. Here is the passage from the *NŚ*, XVIII, 83 ff. (Vol. II, p. 443 G. O. S. ed.) :

डिमलक्षणं तु भूयो लक्षणयुक्त्या प्रवक्ष्यामि ।
प्रख्यातवस्तुविषयः प्रख्यातोदात्तनायकश्चैव ॥
षड्रसलक्षणयुक्तश्चतुरङ्को वै डिमः कार्यः ।
शृङ्गारहास्यवर्जैः शेषैः सर्वैः रसैः समायुक्तः ॥
दीप्तरसकाव्ययोनिर्नानाभावोपसंपन्नः ।

And verse 88 : षोडशनायकबहुलः सात्त्वत्यारभटिवृत्तिसंपन्नः ।

Now Abhinava's argument is this : *Ḍima* deals mainly with *raudrarasa*. There can be no question of *śānta* at all, and so *śānta* was not specifically excluded by Bharata. We can also translate the sentence शान्तासंभवे तु दीप्तरसकाव्ययोनिरित्येतेन, etc., as follows : " Since *śānta* is impossible, what else can be excluded but *śṛṅgāra* and *hāsya*, by the phrase ' viz. the *Ḍima* has as its source (i. e. is based on) an exciting theme ' ? Had he said (merely) that it can be associated with six *rasas* (and had he not said *dīptarasakāvyayoniḥ*), then there would be the undesirable contingency of that (i. e. *śānta*) being included. " As for the sentence शान्ते तु सात्त्वत्येव वृत्तिरिति न तद्व्यवच्छेदकमेवैतत् (p. 116), we think the *na* should be dropped (Raghavan notes that MSS. M and G omit it). If we do so, the translation of the sentence will be as follows : " But *śanta* uses only the *sāttvati* style, and therefore this (qualification, namely *sāttvatyārabhaṭivṛttisampannaḥ*) is quite sufficient to exclude it. "

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is impossible and since the *Ḍima* has as its source (i. e. since it is based on) an exciting *rasa*, what else can be excluded (but *śānta*)?[1] Had he (only) said that it can be associated with six *rasas*, excluding *śṛṅgāra* and *hāsya*, (without adding the qualifying phrase *dīptarasakāvyayoniḥ*), *śānta* would not have been excluded. Objection : "This quarter stanza (*dīptarasa-kāvyayoniḥ*) excludes *karuṇa*, *bībhatsa* and *bhayānaka* as predominant *rasas*." This is not true, because when (he says) that the (*Ḍima*) is associated with the styles called *Sāttvatī* and *Ārabhaṭī*,[2] they are automatically excluded (since they belong to the style *Kaiśikī*). But *śānta* uses only the *Sāttvatī* style, and therefore this (qualification) alone would not be enough to exclude it. And therefore the definition of the *Ḍima*, far from arguing against the existence of *śānta*, is evidence for its existence. *Śṛṅgāra* however would be possible (in a *Ḍima*) because (demons) make love in a violent manner.[3] *Hāsya* is helpful to *śṛṅgāra* and therefore only their exclusion was specifically mentioned, because both are possible (and only a possible thing can be excluded, but not an impossible thing such as *śānta*).

Because (*śānta*) is common to all (*rasas*), it would be improper to name especially a colour[4] or god[5] (that is appropriate to it, as one has

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Abhinava's point is this : all the six *rasas* are *dīptarasas*, except for *śānta*. This word, therefore, excludes *śānta*, for otherwise there would be no point in saying *dīptarasa*, since that is just what the other six are (though this is in fact wrong, since there is no reason to believe that Bharata uses each adjective to exclude something). Surely this *is* tautologous in the sense that it is an explanation of *ṣadrasa*. Bharata is not so subtle as Abhinava wants him to be.

1. In an important article (*Vṛtti* in *Daśarūpakavidhānādhyāya* of *Abhinava-bhāratī*, *B. S. O. A. S.* 1963, p. 113), Professor Wright translates Abhinava's comments on the *Ḍima* passage. Unfortunately, he has been misled by the use of the word *syāt* into misunderstanding the passage. The passage in the *A. Bh.* reads (Vol. II, p. 443, 1-3) : नाटकतुल्यं सर्वमन्यत्केवल संधीनां चासमग्रता च शृङ्गारहास्यवर्जं षड्रसत्वे पर्यायेण शान्तस्य प्रयोग: स्यादित्याह दीप्तरसेति । This Professor Wright translates as follows : "All is as in the *nāṭaka*, the only difference is the incompleteness of *sandhis* and *rasas*. *diptarasa* — enjoins the use of *śānta* since (in its normal sense) it would be (tautological, being) synonymous with the injunction that it should have six *rasas* to the exclusion of *śṛṅgāra* and *hāsya*". But *śāntasya prayogaḥ syād* does not mean "enjoins the use of *śānta*" but precisely the opposite, namely that unless this adjective were there, *śāntarasa* would be included, which is precisely what is not wanted. *Śāntarasa* is excluded from the *Ḍima*, not included, as is clear from the *śāntarasaprakaraṇa*. *Paryāyeṇa* in the above quotation is obscure, and we can make no sense of it.

2. Note that *bhayānaka* is associated with *ārabhaṭī* ! (*NŚ*, III, p. 106.)

3. Abhinava has taken this notion of demons making love in a violent manner from the *NŚ* definition of *Raudra*, Vol. I, p. 322 : शृङ्गारश्च तै: प्रायश: प्रसभं सेव्यते ।

4. The colour of *śānta* is *svaccha* (Vol. I, p. 298—*svacchapītau śamādbhutau*).

5. The god of *śānta* is, note this, Buddha ! *NŚ*, Vol. 1. p. 299 :
"बुद्ध: शान्तेऽब्जजोऽद्भुते" इति शान्तवादिन: केचित् पठन्ति । बुद्धो जिन: परोपकारैकपर: प्रबुद्धो वा ।

done for the other *rasas*), but they have been invented (by some). And so the reasonableness[1] of *śānta* has been shown. Its true nature is *hāsya*. (?!)[2] *Vīra* and *bībhatsa* tend to lead towards it.[3] Therefore there is in the case of *śānta* the advice about the practice of *yama, niyama*, meditation on God, etc. It stands to reason that it leads to a great result (i. e. *mokṣa*), as it eschews enjoyment (of worldly objects) (*anupabhogitayā*),[4] that it is more important than any other (*rasa*), and that it pervades the entire plot (?). And so enough of further elaboration.

What is the nature of its true relish ? It is the following : The nature of the soul is tinged by *utsāha, rati*, etc., which are capable of imparting their (peculiar) tinges to it. It is like a very white thread that shines through the interstices of sparsely threaded jewels. It assumes the forms of all the various feelings like love. etc., (which are superimposed on it), because all these feelings are capable of imparting their tinges to it. Even then (*tathā-bhāvenāpi*) it shines out (through them), according to the maxim that once this *Ātman* shines, (it shines for ever).[5] It is devoid of the entire collection of miseries which consist in (i. e. which result from) turning away (from the *Ātman*). It is identical with the consciousness of the realisation of the highest bliss. It takes its effect through the process of generalisation[6] in poetry and drama. It makes such a heart (i. e. the heart of the sensitive spectator or reader) the receptacle of an other-worldly bliss[7] by inducing a peculiar kind of introspection (*antarmukhāvasthābheda*).

There are only these nine *rasas*, because only they deserve to be taught, as they are useful to the (four) goals of life or are exceptionally pleasant.

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1. Following the reading *upapattiś ca* in M. and G. (Raghavan, p. 116).

2. Does *sattvabhāvaḥ* mean *sāttvikabhāvaḥ* ? "Its *sāttvikabhāva* is *hāsya*"? But now can *hāsya* be regarded as a *sāttvikabhāva* ? Raghavan implies that this is corrupt. Perhaps we could emend as follows : *śānto hi hāso 'sya*. *Hāsa* would stand for the smile of joy. Or one thinks of Śiva's *aṭṭahāsa*. Note the idea of the white colour associated with *śānta*.

3. Raghavan implies that this is corrupt. But perhaps the meaning is this : *vīra* and *bībhatsa* tend to lead towards *śānta*. *Bībhatsa*, because it creates *jugupsā*, *vīra*, because after all it is the major *rasa* of the *Nāgānanda*.

4. We follow the reading *anupabhogitayā* (as in Raghavan's 1940 ed. p. 105). In the 1967 ed. (p. 116), Raghavan has adopted the reading *abhinayopayogitayā*. Thus the phrase *abhinayopayogitayā mahāphalatvam* would mean : "It stands to reason that it leads to a great result (namely *mokṣa*) by reason of its being useful for acting." But we cannot see in what sense *śānta* can be said to be "useful for acting", nor how its being useful for acting would lead to *mokṣa*.

5. This is only a partial analogy, and we cannot know exactly what Abhinava meant.

6. Is *sādhāraṇatāyā* a reference to *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* ? I. e. do the *vibhāvas* etc., undergo the process of depersonalisation necessary in the theatre ?

7. *Lokottarānandānayanam* is a *bahuvrīhi* compound : लोकोत्तरस्यानन्दस्यानयनं यस्मिन् ।

Therefore, what others say,[1] namely that this restriction on numbers is because only these nine are well-known to enlightened literary critics, though other *rasas* are possible, has been refuted. This will be explained in the chapter on the *bhāvas*. It is wrong to say that affection, with a *sthāyibhāva* of being moved (*ārdratā*) can be a *rasa*, because affection is (nothing other than) attachment, and all attachment culminates in *rati*, *utsāha* (or some other such accepted *sthāyibhāva*). For instance, the love of a child for its mother and father terminates in (i. e. can be included under) "fear".[2] The affection of a young man for his friends terminates in *rati*. The affection, as of Lakṣmaṇa, etc., for his brother terminates in (i. e. can be included under) *dharmāvīra*. The same is true (of the affection) of an old man for his son, etc.[3] The so-called *rasa* "cupidity" with the *sthāyibhāva* of "greed" can be refuted in the same manner, because it will terminate in some other (*sthāyibhāva*) such as *hāsa* or *rati*. The same holds true of *bhakti*.

Daśarūpaka, II, 4 and commentary thereon :

अथ धीरोदात्तः –

महासत्त्वोऽतिगम्भीरः क्षमावानविकत्थनः ।
स्थिरो निगूढाहङ्कारो धीरोदात्तो दृढव्रतः ॥

Avaloka :

महासत्त्वः शोकक्रोधाद्यनभिभूतान्तःसत्त्वः, अविकत्थनः अनात्मश्लाघनः, निगूढाहङ्कारः विनयच्छन्नावलेपः, दृढव्रतः अङ्गीकृतनिर्वाहको धीरोदात्तः, यथा नागानन्दे जीमूतवाहनः–

शिरामुखैः स्यन्दत एव रक्तमद्यापि देहे मम मांसमस्ति ।
तृप्तिं न पश्यामि तवैव तावत्किं भक्षणात्त्वं विरतो गरुत्मन् ॥

यथा च रामं प्रति–

आहूतस्याभिषेकाय विसृष्टस्य वनाय च ।
न मया लक्षितस्तस्य स्वल्पोऽप्याकारविभ्रमः ॥

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1. Cf. the *A. Bh.* I, p. 298 :

एतावन्त एव रसा इत्युक्तं पूर्वम् । तेनानन्त्येऽपि पार्षदप्रसिद्धयैतावतां प्रयोज्यत्वमिति यद्भट्टलोल्लटेन निरूपितं तदवलेपेनापरामृश्येत्यलम् ।

"We already said earlier that there are only these many *rasas*. So that when Bhaṭṭalollaṭa says that really there are an endless number of *rasas*, but that these (eight alone), since they are familiar to the audience (*pārṣada*), are fit to be portrayed, he says this without thinking, out of haughtiness."

2. The point seems to be that a child is afraid of its mother and father, and its "love" can therefore be included under *bhayānaka* !

3. This is not a very good argument since surely these feelings are different in kind from *śṛṅgāra*.

यच्च केषांचित्स्थैर्यादीनां सामान्यगुणानामपि (नायक–) विशेषलक्षणे क्वचित्संकीर्तनं तत्तेषां तत्राधिक्यप्रतिपादनार्थम्।

ननु च कथं जीमूतवाहनादिर्नागानन्दादावुदात्त इत्युच्यते? औदात्त्यं हि नाम सर्वोत्कर्षेण वृत्तिः, तच्च विजिगीषुत्व एवोपपद्यते, जीमूतवाहनस्तु निर्जिगीषुतयैव कविना प्रतिपादितः। यथा–

तिष्ठन्भाति पितुः पुरो भुवि यथा सिंहासने किं तथा
यत्संवाहयतः सुखं हि चरणौ तातस्य, किं राज्यतः।
किं भुक्ते भुवनत्रये धृतिरसौ भुक्तोज्झिते या गुरो-
रायासः खलु राज्यमुज्झितगुरोस्तत्रास्ति कश्चिद्गुणः॥

इत्यनेन।

पित्रोर्विधातुं शुश्रूषां त्यक्त्वैश्वर्यं क्रमागतम्।
वनं याम्यहमप्येष यथा जीमूतवाहनः॥

इत्यनेन च। अतोऽस्यात्यन्तशमप्रधानत्वात्परमकारुणिकत्वाच्च वीतरागवच्छान्तता। अन्यच्चात्रायुक्तं, यत्तथाभूतं राज्यसुखादौ निरभिलाषं नायकमुपादायान्तरा तथाभूतमलयवत्यनुरागोपवर्णनम्। यच्चोक्तम्— 'सामान्यगुणयोगी द्विजादिर्धीरशान्तः' इति तदपि पारिभाषिकत्वादवास्तवमित्यभेदकम्। अतो वस्तुस्थित्या बुद्ध्युधिष्ठिरजीमूतवाहनादिव्यवहाराः शान्ततामाविर्भावयन्ति।

अत्रोच्यते— यत्तावदुक्तं सर्वोत्कर्षेण वृत्तिरौदात्त्यमिति न तज्जीमूतवाहनादौ परिहीयते। न ह्येकरूपैव विजिगीषुता। यः केनापि शौर्यत्यागदयादिनाऽन्यानतिशेते स विजिगीषुः, न यः परापकारेणार्थग्रहादिप्रवृत्तः। तथात्वे च मार्गदूषकादेरपि धीरोदात्तत्वप्रसक्तिः। रामादेरपि जगत्पालनीयमिति दुष्टनिग्रहे प्रवृत्तस्य नान्तरीयकत्वेन भूम्यादिलाभः। जीमूतवाहनादिस्तु प्राणैरपि परार्थसंपादनाद्विश्वमप्यतिशेत इत्युदात्ततमः। यच्चोक्तं— "तिष्ठन्भाति" इत्यादिना विषयसुखपराङ्मुखतेति, तत्सत्यम्— कार्पण्यहेतुषु स्वसुखतृष्णासु निरभिलाषा एव जिगीषवः। तदुक्तम्–

स्वसुखनिरभिलाषः खिद्यसे लोकहेतोः
प्रतिदिनमथवा ते वृत्तिरेवंविधैव।
अनुभवति हि मूर्ध्ना पादपस्तीव्रमुष्णं
शमयति परितापं छाययोपाश्रितानाम्॥ इत्यादिना।

मलयवत्यनुरागोपवर्णनं त्वशान्तरसाश्रयं शान्तनायकतां प्रत्युत निषेधति । शान्तत्वं चानहंकृतत्वं, तच्च विप्रादेरौचित्यप्राप्तमिति वस्तुस्थित्या विप्रादेः शान्तता न स्वपरिभाषामात्रेण। बुद्धजीमूतवाहनयोस्तु कारुणिकत्वाविशेषेऽपि सकामनिष्कामकरुणत्वादिधर्मत्वाद्भेदः। अतो जीमूतवाहनादेर्धीरोदात्तत्वमिति ।

Daśarūpaka IV. 35 and commentary thereon :

रत्युत्साहजुगुप्साः क्रोधो हासः स्मयो भयं शोकः ।
शममपि केचित्प्राहुः पुष्टिर्नाट्येषु नैतस्य ॥

इह शान्तरसं प्रति वादिनामनेकधा विप्रतिपत्तयः । तत्र केचिदाहुः – नास्त्येव शान्तो रसः, तस्याचार्येण विभावाद्यप्रतिपादनाल्लक्षणाकरणात्। अन्ये तु वस्तुतस्तस्याभावं वर्णयन्ति, अनादिकालप्रवाहायातरागद्वेषयोरुच्छेत्तुमशक्यत्वात् । अन्ये तु वीरबीभत्सादावन्तर्भावं वर्णयन्ति । एवं वदन्तः शममपि नेच्छन्ति । यथा तथास्तु । सर्वथा नाटकादावभिनयात्मनि स्थायित्वमस्माभिः शमस्य निषिध्यते – तस्य समस्तव्यापारप्रविलयरूपस्याभिनयायोगात् ।

यत्तु कैश्चिन्नागानन्दादौ शमस्य स्थायित्वमुपवर्णितम्, तत्तु मलयवत्यनुरागेणाऽऽप्रबन्धप्रवृत्तेन विद्याधरचक्रवर्तित्वप्राप्त्या विरुद्धम् । न ह्येकानुकार्यविभावालम्बनौ विषयानुरागापरागावुपलब्धौ। अतो दयावीरोत्साहस्यैव तत्र स्थायित्वं, तत्रैव शृङ्गारस्याङ्गत्वेन चक्रवर्तित्वावाप्तेश्च फलत्वेनाविरोधात् । ईप्सितमेव च सर्वत्र कर्तव्यमिति परोपकारप्रवृत्तस्य विजिगीषोर्नान्तरीयकत्वेन फलं संपद्यत इत्यावेदितमेव प्राक् । अतोऽष्टावेव स्थायिनः ।

Daśarūpaka IV, 45 and commentary thereon :

शान्तरसस्य चानभिनेयत्वाद् यद्यपि नाट्येऽनुप्रवेशो नास्ति तथापि सूक्ष्मातीतादिवस्तूनां सर्वेषामपि शब्दप्रतिपाद्यताया विद्यमानत्वात् काव्यविषयत्वं न निवार्यते, अतस्तदुच्यते ।

शमप्रकर्षोऽनिर्वाच्यो मुदितादेस्तदात्मता ।

शान्तो हि यदि तावत्–

"न यत्र दुःखं न सुखं न चिन्ता न द्वेषरागौ न च काचिदिच्छा ।
रसस्तु शान्तः कथितो मुनीन्द्रैः सर्वेषु भावेषु शमप्रधानः ॥"

इत्येवंलक्षणः, तदा तस्य मोक्षावस्थायामेवात्मस्वरूपापत्तिलक्षणायां प्रादुर्भावात् (प्रादुर्भावः), तस्य च स्वरूपेणानिर्वचनीयतां श्रुतिरपि – "स एष नेति नेति" – इत्यन्यापोहरूपेणाह । न च तथाभूतस्य शान्तरसस्य सहृदयाः स्वादयितारः सन्ति, अथापि तदुपायभूतो मुदितामैत्रीकरुणोपेक्षादिलक्षणस्तस्य च विकासविस्तरक्षोभविक्षेपरूपतैवेति तदुक्त्यैव शान्तरसास्वादो निरूपितः ।

Translation of the *Daśarūpaka*, II, 4 :[1]

Now the definition of the *dhīrodātta* (*nāyaka*)[2] is given.

" The *dhīrodātta* (*nāyaka*) is a great being, very profound, tolerant, not boastful, steady; his sense of ego is kept in check and he is firm in his commitments. "

Translation of the *Daśarūpakāvaloka* on II, 4 :

" Great being " means that his inner nature is such that he does not experience sorrow, anger, etc. " Not boastful " means that he does not praise himself. " His sense of ego is kept in check" means that his pride is hidden by modesty. " Firm in his commitments " means that he carries out till completion whatever he agrees to do. An example of this *dhīrodātta* (*nāyaka*) is Jīmūtavāhana in the *Nāgānanda* :[3]

" Blood is oozing from the openings in my veins, and on my body there is still flesh. O Garuḍa, I see that you are not yet satisifed, so why have you stopped devouring me ? "

Or as with regard to Rāma (it was said) :[4]

" I did not perceive the slightest change in his appearance, neither when he was called to be consecrated (as king), nor when he was banished to the forest ".

When in the definition of a particular type (of hero) there is a (special) mention of some of the general qualities like firmness,[5] etc. (mentioned in II. 1–2), that (special mention) is intended to show that those qualities are present in this particular (hero) in a very great degree. Objection : How can you say that Jīmūtavāhana and other similar heroes, in the Nāgānanda and other such plays, are exalted (*udātta*) ? Because exaltedness means superiority to all others[6] and is possible only in the case of

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1. We have used the edition by Pandit Sudarshanāchārya Shāstri, printed at the Gujarati Printing Press, Bombay, 1914. This contains a brief commentary, mainly on the *Avaloka*, by the editor.

2. It is somewhat odd that Dhanañjaya should give, as one of the four types of heroes, the *dhīraśānta* (p. 36), if he does not allow *śāntarasa* in dramas. Apparently he has in mind Cārudatta in the *Mṛcchakaṭika*. At the very least, it is a bad choice of words. Note the definition of the *śāntanāyaka* : सामान्यगुणयुक्तस्तु धीरशान्तो द्विजादिकः, which would rule out Jīmūtavāhana, who is a Vidyādhara.

3. *Nāgānanda* V, 16.

4. *Mahānāṭaka* III, 23.

5. The point seems to be that *sthīraḥ* had already been mentioned in II. 1 among the general characteristics of all *nāyakas*. *Keṣāṃcit* construes with *sthairyādināṃ*. It does not refer to people of a different persuasion (i. e. *keṣāṃcit matānusāreṇa*). Before *viśeṣalakṣaṇe* we should understand the word *nāyaka* which makes the sense clearer.

6. *Vṛtti* here does not mean " behaviour ". It means only " existence ".

a man who has worldly ambition (*vijigīṣutva*),[1] whereas Jīmūtavāhana has been described by the poet (Harṣa) as devoid of worldly ambition, as for example in the following stanza :

" Does a man shine as (brilliantly) when he is seated on a throne as he does when he stands on the bare ground before his father ? Can the happiness he receives from his kingdom be compared to the happiness he derives from massaging the feet of his father? Is the contentment he experiences from enjoying the whole universe comparable to what he feels when he eats the left–overs from his father's meal ? Kingship is indeed only a misery for the man who has abandoned his parents. Is there any virtue in such kingship ? " [2]

And also (in the following verse) :

" In order to dedicate myself to serving my parents, I am going to renounce my inherited fortune and go to the forest, just as did Jīmūtavāhana " .[3]

Therfore, because Jīmūtavāhana is predominantly peaceful and because he is very compassionate, he is a *śānta* hero,[4] like a sage who has subdued his passions. Moreover (?) [5] this is improper, that having introduced (*upādāya*) a hero who is without any desire for the pleasure of kingship, etc., the poet has indulged, in the course of the play (*antarā*), in a description of his intense (*tathābhūta*) love for Malayavatī. As for the statement : " The *dhīraśānta* is a twice–born, etc., who is endowed with general virtues " (II, 4.), (this definition) is not realistic, because it is meant to be technical (or formal)

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1. *Vijigīṣutva* literally means " a desire to conquer " and is often used of kings and heroes. But here we think it has the larger sense of worldly ambition.

2. *Nāgānanda*, I. 6.

3. *Nāgānanda*, I. 4, in the *prastāvanā*, spoken by the Sūtradhāra to introduce Jīmūtavāhana.

4. We take *śāntatā* to construe with *asya*. In this case the argument is for Jīmūtavāhana's being a *dhīraśāntanāyaka*. But surely the whole point of the *pūrvapakṣa* is not only that he is such a type of hero, but that this should further imply that the *rasa* of the *Nāgānanda* is *śānta*.

5. *anyac ca* means " and further, moreover". It cannot construe with *ayuktam* (to give " there is something else that is improper "), because there was no first thing given to which this would be the second. The construction is nonetheless peculiar. Understand *idam* between *anyac ca* and *atra* : *anyac ca idam atrāyuktam*. But it is odd that the *Pūrvapakṣin* should use an argument against himself. For he claims that Jīmūtavāhana as a *dhīraśānta* hero should not be open to sexual passion. As Dhanika will point out, this must be used against him. Why then should the *Pūrvapakṣin* have provided such ammunition ? However, since Dhanika accepts Cārudatta in the *Mṛcchakaṭika* as an example of *dhīraśānta*, though he is greatly interested in sexual love, it is consistent on his part to use this as an argument against the possibility of *dhīraśānta* in the case of Jīmūtavāhana.

and thus it is not exclusive.[1] Therefore, in reality, the behaviour of the Buddha, of Jīmūtavāhana and of Yudhiṣṭhira shows that they are *śānta* heroes. Here is our reply (to all the above points) : First of all (*tāvad*), the statement " Exaltedness means superiority to all others " is not inappropriate to the case of Jīmūtavāhana and others (as you claim), because worldly ambition takes many forms. If anyone exceeds others in heroism, or in liberality, or in compassion, he is said to be " possessed of worldly ambition ". This description is not used in the case of one who wishes to seize wealth by harming another person, otherwise we would find ourselves defending the ridiculous position that highwaymen are *dhīrodātta(nāyakas)* ! In the case of Rāma etc., they felt that they must protect the world and so they set out to punish the wicked (and) it was only incidentally (*nāntarīyakatva*) that they obtained (lordship over) the earth. But Jīmūtavāhana and others like him were superior to all, because they were willing to give up even their own life to help others. And so they are to be regarded as the most exalted (*udāttatama*) (and not merely exalted). As for the verse that begins : "Does a man shine", etc., it is true that it shows (Jīmūtavāhana's) revulsion from sensual pleasures; but those who are ambitious are not concerned with their own personal pleasures that are the cause of misery. Thus it has been said :

" Indifferent to your own pleasure, you work hard for the sake of others. Or perhaps this is your natural disposition. For a tree carries on its head the most intense heat, and cools, through its shade, the heat of those who come to it for protection (from the the sun) ".[2]

On the contrary, the description of (Jīmūtavāhana's) love for Malayavatī which is not in keeping with *śāntarasa*, (*aśāntarasāśraya*) rules out his being

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1. The *Pūrvapakṣin* is objecting to Dhanañjaya's definition of the *dhīraśāntanāyaka* (II, 4). He says that this definition is not realistic, but only technical. For it says that the *dhīraśāntanāyaka* is endowed with the general qualities of a *nāyaka*. These include such qualities as *vinītatva*, *madhuratva*, *dakṣatva*, etc. Now these qualities are not all possible in the case of a *dhīraśānta* hero, because they are inconsistent with the state of being without desires which follows from his being a *dhīraśānta* hero. It is only technical or formal since it is a consequence of his being a hero (in general). Since the possession of the general qualities is thus unreal in the case of a *dhīraśānta* hero, it cannot be said to distinguish him from the other types of heroes (*abhedakam*). This means that according to the *Pūrvapakṣin*, the definition of the *dhīraśānta* hero as given by Dhanañjaya is unscientific. One cannot help agreeing, for surely the differentiation that Dhanañjaya makes (namely that he is a *dvija* and has the general characteristics of a hero) is hardly consistent with *śānta* in any form. It is, therefore, most surprising that Dhanika, although he takes up and answers all the other objections, does not deal with this one ! It is almost as if he were admitting its justice. Could this possibly mean that he is himself criticising his brother under the guise of a *Pūrvapakṣin* ?

2. *Śakuntalā*, V, 7.

a *śānta* (i. e. a *dhīraśānta*) hero. The state of being tranquil involves the absence of egoism, and *this* is naturally met with in the case of learned Brahmins etc., and therefore learned Brahmins, etc., are really *śānta* heroes in the real sense of the term and not simply in a technical or formal way. In the case of the Buddha and Jīmūtavāhana, though it is true that there is no distinction in terms of their compassion (i. e. though they are both equally compassionate), still there is this difference : that the Buddha is compassionate without any desire (*niṣkāma*) and Jīmūtvāhana is compassionate with desire (*sakāma*).[1] Thus it is established that Jīmūtavāhana and others like him are *dhīrodātta* (*nāyakas*).

TRANSLATION OF THE *Daśarūpaka* IV, 35 :

" (The *sthāyibhāvas* are) love, energy, disgust, anger, mirth, amazement. fear and sorrow. Some add peace (*śama*), but it cannot be developed in plays."

TRANSLATION OF THE *Avaloka* on IV, 35 :

There are a great number of differing opinions among disputants in the case of *śāntarasa*. Some say there is no *śāntarasa* because Bharata did not mention its *vibhāvas*, etc., and because he did not define it. Others, however argue that (regardless of whether Bharata mentioned it or not) in actual reality it cannot exist, because, (they claim), it is impossible to root out love and hate which have been continously cultivated (inside man) from time immemorial. Others claim that it can be included within *vīra*, *bībhatsa*, etc. Those who speak this way do not accept even *śama* (as a *sthāvibhāva*). Accept whichever opinion you like (*yathā tathāstu*)), in all events, however, we cannot allow *śama* to be a *sthāyibhāva* in a *Nāṭaka*, etc., where acting is essential, because, after all, *sama* consists in the complete cessation of all activity and therefore cannot be acted out. As for what some have claimed, namely that in the *Nāgānanda*, etc., *śama* is a *sthāyibhāva*, this is contrary to the portrayal of Jīmūtavāhana's love for Malayavatī, which persists right through the entire play and is also opposed to his (finally) obtaining the universal sovereignity of the Vidyādharas.[2] For we never come acoss both love for

1. We are not sure which of the two senses of *sakāma* and *niṣkāma* is meant here. We have translated them in the *Gītā* sense of the terms. But Sylvain Lévi has translated this line in a discussion concerning types of *nāyakas* as follows : " En outre, Buddha et Jīmūtavāhana ne peuvent être classés ensemble; l'un et l'autre sont des modèles de compassion, mais l'un est étranger à l'amour, l'autre y est sensible. " (" *Théatre Indien* ", p. 66, 2nd ed.) We take it that Lévi refers to his love for Malayavatī.

2. This first criticism, that Jīmūtavāhana loves Malayavatī, is of course true. It is a fault of the drama, for in actual fact the description of Jīmūtavāhana would

(*Continued on next page*

sense-objects and detachment from sense-objects subsisting in one single character.[1] And so *utsāha* (energy) connected with *dayāvīra* (as the major *rasa*) is the *sthāyibhāva* (of the *Nāgānanda*). For (in that play) love being a subsidiary of that (*dayāvīrotsāha*), there is no objection to the attainment of universal sovereignty as the final result (of the dramatic action). We have already said that even though an ambitious (*dhīrodātta*) hero may set out with the primary object of doing good to others with a view to achieving that which is sought by them, worldly advancement may very well follow incidentally in his case.[2] Therefore there are only eight *sthāyins* ".

TRANSLATION OF *Daśarūpaka*, IV, 45 ALONG WITH DHANIKA'S COMMENTARY THEREON :

Commentary : " Although *sāntarasa* cannot be introduced into a play, as it cannot be presented by means of acting, still because all things, though they be very subtle or long past, can be conveyed through words, its presentation is not forbidden in poetry.[3] And so this is said :

Continued from previous page)

seem to preclude his falling in love. We are given absolutely no pyschological preparation for this. Quite the contrary, we would rather expect him to remain detached, if not actually repelled by sensual contact. It is only the *Pūrvapakṣin* who seems aware of this when he calls it *ayuktam*. As for his attaining lordship over the Vidyādharas, this is perhaps the weakest moment in an altogether weak play. He does absolutely nothing to achieve this. It is bestowed upon him by Gaurī (what is she doing in this supposedly Buddhist play in any case ?) in a single verse at the end of the play, and this must strike any non-devotee of Gaurī as highly inappropriate.

1. *Ekānukāryavibhāvālambanau* means " as subsisting in one single character as their locus " : *ekānukāryarūpaḥ yaḥ vibhavaḥ, tadālambanau tadāśrayau.*

2. This refers to page 144, line 21 :

रामादेरपि जगत्पालनीयमिति दुष्टनिग्रहे प्रवृत्तस्य नान्तरीयकत्वेन भूम्यादिलाभः ।

3. Note Raghavan (" *The Number of Rasas* ", 2nd revised edition, p. 51) : " The critics who do not accept *śānta* are mainly writers on Dramaturgy proper. They think they are loyal to Bharata by denying it. This attitude begins, as far as extant works go, in the *Daśarūpaka*, the model and source for many a later work on *Rūpaka*. Dhanaṃjaya and Dhanika, both refute it and argue for its impossibility in drama.

शममपि केचित् प्राहुः पुष्टिर्नाट्येषु नैतस्य ।

From this it would appear that Dhanaṃjaya denies *Śānta* only in drama but accepts it in *Kāvya*. But, as a matter of fact, Dhanaṃjaya, as interpreted by Dhanika, does not recognise it even in *Kāvya* (see p. 124)". S.K. De says more or less the same thing in his arcticle " The *Śāntarasa* in the *Nātya Śāstra* and the *Daśa-Rūpaka* " : " Dhanaṃjaya himself would object to *śānta* only in the *Nātya*, which requires the delineation of the *Rasa* through its *anubhāvas*, etc. ; but he would permit it in the *Kāvya*, because what cannot be acted can at least be described. But his commentator Dhanika would not allow *śānta* even in poetry. There can be, in his opinion, no such *sthāyibhāva* as *śama* or *nirveda* ". Both De and Raghavan follow the reading in the NSP. ed.; see addendum for discussion.

(*Kārikā*) : " *Sāntarasa* (*śamaprakarṣa*) need not be mentioned (separately[1] and specifically), because the mental attitudes such as *muditā*, etc., out of which it is developed, are of the same nature (as *vikāsa, vistara, kṣobha* and *vikṣepa*, which are at the root of the other eight *sthāyibhāvas*) ".

If *śāntarasa* is of the following nature, namely :

" Where there is no sorrow and no happiness, no anxiety, no hate or love and no desire at all, this is called *śāntarasa* by great sages, and it has *śama* as its *sthāyibhāva* ",

then (it must be noted that) it appears only in the state of *mokṣa*, which is defined as the realisation of the true nature of the Self. Even the scriptures speak of this state as indescribable by saying " it is not thus, it is not thus ", thereby denying all positive attributes (in its case). Moreover, there are no sensitive readers who can be said to aesthetically enjoy *śāntarasa* as described above. Still[2] *muditā, maitrī, karuṇā*, and *upekṣā*,[3] which are means leading to it, are of the nature of *vikāsa, vistara, kṣobha* and *vikṣepa*, and since these latter (four mental states) have been mentioned earlier (in connection with the eight *sthāyibhāvas*) the aesthetic enjoyment of *śāntarasa* is as good as already described.

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1. This is a difficult passage. Haas reads *nirvācyaḥ*, whereas Shastri reads *anirvācyaḥ* (which he interprets, wrongly we feel, as *vaktum aśakyaḥ*) ; we accept the latter and translate it as : " need not be (separately) mentioned ". *Śamaprakarṣa* means the same as *śāntarasa* (see *bhayotkarṣa* in the sense of *bhayānaka* used in the preceding verse). For such a controversial subject this line is hardly sufficient. What are its implications ? Apparently that *śānta* exists, but can be subsumed under the other *rasas*. However, Haas translates as follows : " The Quietistic Sentiment, (which arises) from happiness and the like, is to be defined as a state having that (i. e. happiness) as its essential nature ". This is in any case not how Dhanika understands the line. See addendum.

2. *Athāpi* would mean " nonetheless ". So, it would seem that we should understand the phrase : न च तथाभूतस्य शान्तरसस्य सहृदयाः स्वादयितारः सन्ति, to mean that *sahṛdayas* do not enjoy it.

3. *Muditā* etc.. are of course of great fame in Buddhism, forming a separate chapter of the *Visuddhimagga*. They are equally known to the Hindu tradition (*Yogasūtra*. I, 33). Here Dhanika equates them with the four states of mind mentioned in IV, 52, where *vikāsa* (expansion or dilation) applies to *śṛṅgāra* and *hāsya* ; *vistara* (exaltation or elevation) to *vīra* and *adbhuta* ; *kṣobha* (excitation) to *bībhatsa* and *bhayānaka* ; and *vikṣepa* (perturbation) to *raudra* and *karuṇa*. It would seem that *śānta* arises from *upekṣā* (which is correct), which would then be assimilated to *vikṣepa* (?). The construction of Dhanika's passage is somewhat complicated. Our translation best explains how we have understood it. (Note that we have emended *prādurbhāvāt* to *prādurbhāvaḥ*).

CONCLUSION

Abhinava's final view on the relation between *brahmāsvāda* and *rasāsvāda* seems to us best summarised by his commentary on a very unusual verse by Ānandavardhana. The verse is found in the third Uddyota of the *Dhvanyāloka,* in a long passage where Ānanda illustrates various combinations of *dhvani* with other types of poetry. The verse in question is meant to illustrate the conmingling (*saṅkīrṇatva*) of *arthāntarasaṅkramitavācyadhvani* with *virodhālaṅkāra,* but the verse is interesting for completely different reasons.

Here is the verse along with Abhinava's remarkable commentary on it:

प्रभेदान्तराणामपि कदाचित् सङ्कीर्णत्वं भवत्येव । यथा ममैव–

या व्यापारवती रसान् रसयितुं काचित्कवीनां नवा
दृष्टिर्या परिनिष्ठितार्थविषयोन्मेषा च वैपश्चिती ।
ते द्वे अप्यवलम्ब्य विश्वमनिशं निर्वर्णयन्तो वयं
श्रान्ता नैव च लब्धमब्धिशयन त्वद्भक्तितुल्यं सुखम् ॥

इत्यत्र विरोधालंकारेणार्थान्तरसंक्रमितवाच्यस्य ध्वनिप्रभेदस्य संकीर्णत्वम् ।

Locana p. 508 :

व्यापारवतीति । निष्पादनप्राणो हि रस इत्युक्तम् । तत्र विभावादियोजनात्मिका वर्णना, ततः प्रभृति घटनापर्यन्ता क्रिया व्यापारः, तेन सततयुक्ता । **रसानि**ति । रस्यमानतासारान् स्थायिभावान् रसयितुं रस्यमानतापत्तियाग्योन् कर्तुम् । **काचिदि**ति । लोकवार्तापतितबोधावस्थात्यागेनोन्मीलन्ती । अत एव ते कवयः वर्णनायोगात् तेषाम् । **नवे**ति । क्षणे क्षणे नूतनैर्नूतनैर्वैचित्र्यैर्जगन्त्यासूत्रयन्ती । **दृष्टिरि**ति । प्रतिभारूपा, तत्र दृष्टिश्चाक्षुषं ज्ञानं षाडवादि रसयतीति विरोधालंकारोऽत एव नवा । तदनुगृहीतश्च ध्वनिः, तथा हि चाक्षुषं ज्ञानं नाविवक्षितमत्यन्तमसम्भवाभावात् । न चान्यपरम् । अपि त्वर्थान्तरे ऐन्द्रियकविज्ञानाभ्यासोल्लसिते प्रतिभानलक्षणेऽर्थे संक्रान्तम् । संक्रमणे च विरोधोऽनुग्राहक एव । तद्वक्ष्यति–' विरोधालंकारेण ' इत्यादिना । या चैवंविधा दृष्टिः परिनिष्ठितोऽचलः अर्थविषये निश्चेतव्ये विषये उन्मेषो यस्याः । तथा परिनिष्ठिते लोकप्रसिद्धेऽर्थे न तु कविवदपूर्वस्मिन्नर्थे उन्मेषो यस्याः सा । विपश्चितामियं वैपश्चिती । **ते अवलम्ब्ये**ति । कवीनामिति वैपश्चितीति वचनेन नाहं कविर्न पण्डित इत्यात्मनोऽनौद्धत्यं ध्वन्यते । अनात्मीयमपि दरिद्रगृह इवोपकरणतयान्यत आहृतमेतन्मया दृष्टिद्वयमित्यर्थः । ते द्वे **अपी**ति । न ह्येकया दृष्ट्या

सम्यङ्निर्वर्णनं निर्वहति। **विश्वमित्यशेषम्**। **अनिशमिति**। पुनः पुनरनवरतम्। निर्वर्णयन्तो वर्णनया, तथा निश्चितार्थं वर्णयन्तः इदमित्थमिति। परामर्शानुमानादिना निर्भज्य निर्वर्णनं किमत्र सारं स्यादिति तिलशस्तिलशो विचयनम्। यच्च निर्वर्ण्यते तत्खलु मध्ये व्यापार्यमाणया मध्ये चार्थविशेषेषु निश्चितोन्मेषया निश्चलया दृष्टया सम्यङ्निर्वर्णितं भवति। **वयमिति**। मिथ्यातत्त्वदृष्टयाहरणव्यसनिन इत्यर्थः। **श्रान्ता** इति। न केवलं सारं न लब्धं यावत्प्रत्युत खेदः प्राप्त इति भावः। चशब्दस्तुशब्दस्यार्थे। **अब्धिशयनेति**। योगनिद्रया त्वमत एव सारस्वरूपवेदी स्वरूपावस्थित इत्यर्थः। श्रान्तस्य शयनस्थितं प्रति बहुमानो भवति। **त्वद्भक्तीति**। त्वमेव परमात्मस्वरूपो विश्वसारस्तस्य भक्तिः श्रद्धादिपूर्वक उपासनाक्रमजस्तदावेशस्तेन तुल्यमपि न लब्धमास्तां तावत्तज्जातीयम्।

एवं प्रथममेव परमेश्वरभक्तिभाजः कुतूहलमात्रावलम्बितकविप्रामाणिकोभयवृत्तेः पुनरपि परमेश्वरभक्तिविश्रान्तिरेव युक्तेति मन्वानस्येयमुक्तिः। सकलप्रमाणपरिनिश्चितदृष्टादृष्टविषयविशेषजं यत्सुखं यदपि वा लोकोत्तरं रसचर्वणात्मकं तत उभयतोऽपि परमेश्वरविश्रान्त्यानन्दः प्रकृष्यते तदानन्दविप्रुण्मात्रावभासो हि रसास्वाद इत्युक्तं प्रागस्माभिः। लौकिकं तु सुखं ततोऽपि निकृष्टप्रायं बहुतरदुःखानुषङ्गादिति तात्पर्यम्।

TRANSLATION OF *Dhvanyāloka*, III :[1]

"There is also a mixture of a figure of speech in varieties of *dhvani* (other than *rasadhvani*) as well. For instance in the verse :

"The new and wondrous (*kācit*) vision (*dṛṣṭi*) of poets which concerns itself (*vyāpāravatī*) with turning permanent emotional states (*rasas*; i. e. *sthāyibhāvas*) into aesthetic experiences, and that philosophic (or analytic, *vaipaścitī*) vision that reveals the realm of already existing (i.e. not depending on the poet's creative imagination) objects — we have employed both of these constantly to examine and describe the world (we live in). We have become weary in so doing, but have not found happiness therein, in any sense comparable to the joy we feel in our devotion to you, who sleep on the ocean".

In this verse, there is a mixture of *arthāntarasaṅkramitavācya* and the figure of speech (known as) (apparent) contradiction (*virodha*)."

TRANSLATION OF *Locana* III :

"*VYĀPĀRAVATĪ* : For we have (already) said that *rasa* is identical with the process of conveyance itself (*niṣpādanaprāṇo hi rasaḥ*).[2] (Poetic

1. *D. Āl.* p. 507, 508. Abhinava quotes this verse in the *A. Bh.* Vol. I., p. 300.

2. This refers to Abhinava's doctrine, explained in the second *Uddyota* on p. 187, (B. P. ed.) that *rasa* is the process of perception itself (*pratīyamāna eva hi rasaḥ*), i. e., it is not an object of cognition in much the same way that the *sākṣin* (the subject) in *Advaita* can never be the object of cognition. In this sense, *rasa* is purely subjective, and is not amenable to ordinary means of cognition.

vision is) constantly engaged in that activity (*vyāpāra*), i. e., that action which begins with a description consisting in the combination (i. e. presentation) of the *vibhāvas*, etc., and ending with sentence-structure (*ghaṭanā*).[1] *Rasān* refers to the *sthāyibhāvas*, the essence of which consists in the state of being enjoyed aesthetically (*rasyamānatā*). *Rasayitum* means to make the *sthāyibhāvas* fit for attaining to this status of being aesthetically enjoyed. *Kācid* (" wondrous ") means revealing itself (*unmīlantī*) by abandoning (and becoming superior to) the state of the cognition of ordinary worldly things. And so (i. e. because they are endowed with such a vision), they are poets by virtue of their power to describe[2] (things in an extraordinary way). *Navā* means, it reveals (*āsūtrayantī*) worlds at every instant in ever new and variegated forms. *DṚṢṬIḤ*. (The vision) is of the form of poetic imagination (*pratibhā*). Since " vision " refers (primarily) to knowledge we derive from our eyes and since it is here said to enable (one) to enjoy (such beverages and edibles as) *ṣāḍava*,[3] etc., there is the figure of speech known as (apparent) contradiction (*virodha*).[4] And so this vision is called " new " (i. e. marvellous).[5] And the (*arthāntarasaṅkramitavācya*)*dhvani* (in the word *dṛṣṭi*) is helped by this figure of speech. For actually eyesight (the literal sense of the word *dṛṣṭi*) is not here altogether unintended,[6] since it is not totally impossible (to think of physical eyesight being of use to the poet in observing the world before describing it). Nor is actual eyesight (wholly intended) (and) subservient to some other suggested sense (*anyapara* = *vivakṣitānyaparavācya*). Rather the literal meaning (of sight) passes over

1. This refers to those passages in the first *Uddyota* (p. 88 and 104) that speak of *guṇas* and *alaṅkāras* as contributing to the beauty of poetry. In the second *Uddyota* (p. 188) there is a passage in the *Locana* where the phrase *samucitaguṇālaṅkāra* is actually used. See also *Locana*, p. 88.

2. *Varṇanāyogāt* means *lokottaravarṇanayogāt*. See *KP* I. p. 10 (Jhalkikar's edition).

3. Abhinava speaks of *ṣāḍava* in the *A. Bh.* Vol. I, (p. 288).

4. Place a *daṇḍa* after *virodhālaṅkāro* on p. 508.

5. This expression, *dṛṣṭiḥ* (i.e. *cākṣuṣaṃ jñānam*) *rasān rasayituṃ vyāparavatī* involves a contradiction, something illogical and queer, and that is the reason for calling the vision *navā* (novel, out of the ordinary). Of course it is true that the contradiction is removed later on by taking *dṛṣṭiḥ* to mean " poetic vision " and *rasān rasayitum* to mean " to bring about aesthetic experience in the minds of the readers or spectators ", but as soon as we understand the words metaphorically in this manner, the " novelty " or " marvellousness " also disappears. The words *ata eva navā* refer to the contradiction between the prima facie senses of *dṛṣṭi* and *rasān rasayitum*.

6. *Atyantam* can be taken both with *avivakṣitam* and with *asambhavābhāvāt*. The idea is that this is not *atyantatiraskṛtavācya* (a subvariety of *avivakṣitavācya*), because the literal meaning of " sight " is slightly retained in the sense that careful observation of the world around us is useful for the aspiring poet.

into the meaning of "poetic vision" that is the result of the repetition of the "sensual" (ocular) perception (of the world) (*aindriyakavijñāna*).[1] This passing over (into another meaning) is helped by the figure of speech known as "contradiction".[2] So, Ānanda will say : "(there is the combination of *arthāntarasaṅkramitavāćya*) with *virodhālaṅkāra*".[3] (The compound *pariniṣṭhitārtha viṣayonmeṣā* can be explained as follows :) (First) *yā ca* means sight as just described, i. e. the functioning (*unmeṣa*) of which with respect to objects to be cognised is fixed (or stable) that is, immoveable (definite). Or else (we can analyse the componnd as follows :) That sight the functioning (*unmeṣa*) of which is with respect to objects that are firm (*pariniṣṭhita*), that is, well-known in worldly experience, and not with respect to completely unprecedented (new) objects as is the case with poets (i. e. poets create new worlds whereas philosophers analyse the one we live in). The word (*vaipaścitī*) is explained as *vipaścitām iyam* ("pertaining to philosophers). When Ānanda says[4] : "drawing on both sorts of vision", "that of poets" and "that of philosophers", his own modesty is suggested, for he means : "I am neither a poet nor a scholar." "I have borrowed this double vision (poetic and philosophic) which does not really belong to me, the way a poor man in an ill-equipped house will borrow provisions (and articles of furniture, etc.) from somebody else's house in order to entertain (a guest)."

TE DVE API : One sort of vision alone is not sufficient for accomplishing a proper scrutiny and interpretation (*nirvarṇanam*). *Viśvam* (in addition to the sense "world") means "all". *Anišam* means again and again

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1. The compound *aindriyakavijñānābhyāsollasite* (where *ullasita* must mean something like "being the result of") can also be understood in a totally different way : We can split the compound after *aindriya*, and read *kavijñāna*. This would then translate as : "The result of the repetition of the ocular perception (of the world) on the part of the poet".

2. How is the *arthāntarasaṅkramitavāćyadhvani* helped by *virodha* ? The point is this : the initial contradiction between *dṛṣṭi* (eye-sight) and *rasān rasayitum vyāpāravatī* ("engaged in bringing about the experience of physical flavours or tastes") is responsible for giving rise to the *arthāntarasaṅkramitavaćyadhvani*. The suggested *prayojana* in the *ajahallakṣaṇā* is *pratibhānasya atisphuṭatvam* (extreme clarity of poetic vision). Had the *virodha* (i. e. failure of the literal sense of sight) not been there, there would have been no *ajahallakṣaṇā*, and consequently no suggestion of the *prayojana*. Thus the *arthāntarasaṅkramitavāćyadhvani* is supported by (or based upon) *virodha*. So *virodha* is *anugrāhaka* of the *arthāntarasaṅkramitavāćyadhvani* (which is the *anugrāhya*). *Virodha* is the *aṅga* and *arthāntarasaṅkramitavāćyadhvani* is the *aṅgin*. So this is a case of *aṅgāṅgibhāvasaṅkara* or *anugrāhyānugrāhakabhāvasaṅkara*.

3. P. 510.

4. Remove the *daṇḍa* after *te avalambyeti* on p. 509, since this is part of the series of three quotations that Abhinava enumerates.

without stopping. We have been describing (the world) through (poetic) descriptions (as explained above), and also describing in a definite (categorical) manner as follows : This is really like this[1] (i. e. making careful analytic descriptions).[2] A description (of this kind) involves analysis through direct perception (*parāmarśa*),[3] inference, etc., so as to discover wherein the essence might lie, i. e. dissecting things very minutely (*tilaśas tilaśaḥ*) (and carefully). It is well-known (*khalu*) that things to be described are well and properly (or completely) described when they are presented at times by means of the poetic vision (employed for bringing about aesthetic experience) and at times by means of the stable philosophic vision which definitely and categorically reveals their particular (i. e, true) nature. *Vayam* means " we who have been engaged in using both illusory[4] (i. e, poetic) vision and analytic (i. e. philosophic) vision ". *Śrāntāḥ* means : " not only have we not discovered anything substantial, but quite the contrary, we have only found weariness ". The word " and " is used in the sense of " but ". *Abdhiśayana.* (" O you who are sleeping on the ocean "), because of your Yogic sleep, (having withdrawn the whole universe into yourself).[5] And thus you know the true nature of the real essence, i. e, you remain in your true nature. A person who is tired (naturally) feels respect (bordering on envy) for one who manages to be lying down ! *TVADBHAKTI.* You alone are the true nature of the highest Self, the essense of every thing. " Devotion to you " means infusion with devotion preceded by faith (*sraddhā*), etc., which (infusion) arises in due order from *upāsanā* (adoration), etc. We have not obtained any (joy) (even remotely) com-

1. Abhinava uses this same expression on p. 97 of the *Locana*, in explaining how a poet, even though he be gifted with imagination (*pratibhā*) must nonetheless put in hard work in the form of revision, etc. : यद्यपि स्वयमस्यैतत्परिस्फुरति, तथापीदमित्थमिति विशेषतो निरूप्यमाणं सहस्रशाखीभवति । Of course the two terms are slightly different in meaning.

2. Place a *daṇḍa* after *idam itham iti* in the B. P. edition.

3. We take *parāmarśa* to stand for *pratyakṣa* in general, rather than for *liṅgaparāmarśa* (i. e. as part of *anumāna*).

4. *Mithyā* refers to poetic knowledge, because, as Ānanda says in the fourth *Uddyota* (p. 527), quoting some unknown *mahākavi* : " The literary utterance of great poets is glorious. For it causes various ideas to enter the heart (of the reader) and appear (there) in a form which is different, as it were, from their real form ". The Skt. *chāyā* for this is : अतथास्थितानपि तथासंस्थितानिव हृदये या निवेशयति । अर्थविशेषान्, सा जयति विकटकविगोचरा वाणी ॥ See also the fine verses by Ānanda quoted in the third *Uddyota*, p. 498. See above, p. 12.

5. We propose placing a *daṇḍa* after *yoganidrayā*, which is the word added by Abhinava to bring out the implication of *abdhiśayana.* " You are lying on the ocean in your Yogic repose. " त्वमत एव सारस्वरूपवेदी, स्वरूपावस्थितः इत्यर्थः, should be taken as a separate sentence. Cf., on the notion of *Yoganidrā*, *Raghuvaṃśa*, XIII. 6.

parable to that arising from devotion to you, let alone an identical (joy). This stanza is the utterance of the author (Ānanda), who began by first being a devotee of God, and then, simply out of curiosity, adopted both the viewpoints of the poet and the philosopher (but found them ultimately unsatisfying) and once again came to believe that rest in devotion to God was inevitable (*yuktā*).[1]

For we have already explained[2] that the happiness which results from (conceptual understanding) of both seen and unseen objects which are ascertained (*pariniścita*), by all the means of valid cognition (i. e. philosophy) or even that transcendent joy which consists in relishing an aesthetic experience – to both of these the bliss that comes from finding rest in God is far superior (*prakṛṣyate*); and that aesthetic pleasure (*rasāsvāda*) is only the reflection (*avabhāsa*) of a drop (*vipruṣ*) of that mystic bliss.

But ordinary worldly happiness is for the most part (*prāya*) inferior to even that aesthetic delight, because it is mixed with abundant (*bahutara*) suffering as well. This is the essence of what he means."

This then, is Abhinava's final position. To have provided a coherent philosophy of aesthetic experience is no small achievement. Clearly it was owing to Abhinava's influence that so many later writers (primarily among the *ālaṅkārikas*, and only very rarely among pure philosophers, for reasons that still puzzle us) were able to draw upon this precious analogy of religious experience and aesthetic experience, and to make their own contributions. It is not our purpose to provide anything more than the briefest glance into some of the more noteworthy passages in which interesting distinctions can

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1. Is Abhinava just guessing that this is the case from the single poem here given, or is he actually privy to some information about the life of Ānandavardhana that has not come down to us? One might be inclined to believe that he is simply saying what has become a cliché (cf. the popular notions about the life of Bhartṛhari, the author of the *śatakatrayam*) namely that one is first inclined towards worldly life, but eventually, in the wisdom of age, one comes to religion. But here Abhinava says that Ānanda was *first* a devotee, then went through a middle period of interest in poetry and philosophy, and finally came back to religion. This is too unusual to be simply invented, and we think that the likelihood of Abhinava reporting an actual detail of Ānanda's life is strong. Otherwise the expression *prathamam* would be out of place, since there is nothing in the verse itself to warrant this assumption. This is important, because it is the only detail that we know of his life, for no other legends or reports have come down to us.

2. By *ity uktaṃ prāg asmābhiḥ*, Abhinava must be referring to the *Locana* itself (and not to an earlier work). But we have not come across any explanation in our reading of the text of the *Locana*. A puzzle.

be found. One is found in the *Vyaktiviveka* of Mahimabhaṭṭa.[1] Mahima is objecting to the use of the word *viśeṣa* by Ānandavardhana in the expression *kāvyaviśeṣa* in *Kārikā* 13 of the first *Uddyota*: "It is also not possible to speak of excellence (*viśeṣa* i. e. *atiśaya*) in the case of poetry, for *kāvya* (i. e. *rasa*) consists in the relish of the highest happiness".[2] Mahima means that one cannot use the expression *kāvyaviśeṣa*, since all poetry is *rasātmaka* and is therefore in and by itself *niratiśayasukhāsvādalakṣaṇa*. (He is thus not referring to the division of poetry into *uttama*, *madhyama*, etc.). In support of his contention he quotes the following very interesting verse :[3]

"When, from the recitation[4] and singing of the *Dhruvā* songs, *rasa* reaches its peak (i. e. the spectator is filled with *rasa*), he turns his attention inwards (*antarmukha*) for the moment, concentrated entirely on enjoying that profusion (*bhara*) (of *rasa*) and becomes delighted. At that moment (*tataḥ*) when (he) is immersed in his own true nature (*svarūpa*) and he is unaware of any outside object (*nirviṣaya*), his own deep flow (*niṣyanda*) of joy becomes manifest, by which even Yogins are pleased".[5]

Madhusūdanasarasvatī in his *Śrībhagavadbhaktirasāyanam*, I. 12, differentiates between *rasāsvāda* and *brahmāsvāda*. He says that whereas brahman is *sat* (existence) and *ajñāta* (unknown by ordinary people), worldly objects like a beautiful woman, etc., are knowable (*meya*) by means of valid knowledge. But a beautiful woman, etc., as presented in literary works appears to the *sahṛdaya* in the form of pure consciousness (*caitanya*) as limited by the beautiful woman, etc., when the covering mantle disappears (*māyāvṛtitirodhāne*, paraphrased in the commentary as *vyāvaraṇa-*

1. *VV.* p. 100 (Kashi Skt. Series ed. 1964.)

2. *VV.* p. 100 : न च तस्य विशेषः संभवति निरतिशयसुखास्वादलक्षणत्वात्तस्य ।

3. *VV.* p. 100 : यदाहुः —

पाठ्यादथ ध्रुवागानात्ततः संपूरिते रसे । तदास्वादभरैकाग्रो हृष्यत्यन्तर्मुखः क्षणम् ॥
ततो निर्विषयस्यास्य स्वरूपावस्थितौ निजः । व्यज्यते ह्लादनिष्यन्दो येन तृप्यन्ति योगिनः ॥

4. We take *pāṭhya* to mean : "anything to be recited", and thus it can denote the recitation of the *nāndī*, the recitation of the speeches assigned to the different characters, and also the recitation of non-dramatic poems. *Dhruvāgāna* applies not only to the songs sung in the *pūrvaraṅga*, but to all songs sung in the actual course of the play, such as that sung at the time of the entry of a character (*prāveśikī dhruvā*) and that sung at the exit of a character (*naiṣkrāmikī dhruvā*). Ruyyaka (in his comm. on the VV., p. 99) takes *pāṭhya* to be a reference to *Kāvya*, and *dhruvā* to be a reference to the *Nāṭya* : पाठ्यादित्यादिना, ध्रुवाख्यगीतिसामर्थ्यानुगुण्येन नाट्यविषयरसस्वरूपवर्णनम् । काव्यविषये तु गानवर्जमिति तदेव रसस्वरूपम् । Note that Ruyyaka, p. 100, takes *asya* as a reference to the reader or spectator : *asya carvayituḥ*.

5. Gnoli (*op. cit.* first edition, Rome, p. 57), says that this verse is "……certainly from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka."

tirodhāne), because the mind of the *sahṛdaya*, stabilised in *sattvaguṇa*, becomes for a moment identified with pure consciousness. But because it is after all worldly objects (*viṣaya*) that are perceived under the form of the highest bliss (*paramānandarūpaviṣayopādānāt*) and because there is the non-perception (*abhāne*) of the true nature of pure consciousness as it is limited by worldly objects (*tattadavacchinnacaitanyasvarūpa*),[1] there is neither immediate release, nor any damage to the self-luminosity (of pure consciousness).[2] What follows from this ?

"Therefore, when this (consciousness limited by worldly objects) becomes manifest in the mind, it turns into *rasa*, although owing to its being mixed with insentient objects it is somewhat less (than the joy of pure consciousness)".[3]

Curiously enough, we have only come across one author who makes the comparison in favour of *rasāsvāda* (with the possible exception, depending on how it is interpreted, of the verse from Bhaṭṭanāyaka, quoted on p. 23), and this is Jayadeva in his *Prasannarāghava* :

"Neither the knowledge of Brahman (i.e. spiritual bliss) nor the wealth of a king can be compared to poetry. Like a daughter married to an uncommonly worthy man, it creates joy in the heart when it is appreciated by an exceptional person".[4]

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1. We propose reading *tattadavacchinna* for *caitanyāvacchinna*, because this latter makes no sense. If we read the former, *tattad* can refer to *kāntādiviṣaya*. The expression *tattadavacchinnacaitanya* actually occurs in the commentary, in the fourth line from the beginning.

2. *BR.* I. 12 :

सदज्ञानञ्च तद्ब्रह्म मेयं कान्तादिमानतः ।
मायावृतितिरोधाने वृत्त्या सत्त्वस्थया क्षणम् ॥

Note the commentary (by M. himself) :

वस्तुतः परमानन्दरूपविषयोपादानचैतन्यावच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्वरूपाभानाच्च न सद्यो मुक्तिः स्वप्रकाशभङ्गो वा ।

3. *BR.* I. 13 : ततः किं अताह—

अतस्तदाविर्भावित्वं मनसि प्रतिपद्यते ।
किञ्चिन्न्यूनाञ्च रसतां याति जाड्यविमिश्रणात् ॥

Note the commentary : लौकिकरसे तु विषयावच्छिन्नस्यैव चिदानन्दांशस्य स्फुरणात् आनन्दस्य न्यूनतैव ।

4. *Prasannarāghava*, (ed. by V. L. S. Pansikar, NSP. 1922, p. 6). *prastāvanā*, verse 23 (last stanza) :

न ब्रह्मविद्या न च राजलक्ष्मीस्तथा यथेयं कविता कवीनाम् ।
लोकोत्तरे पुंसि निवेश्यमाना पुत्रीव हर्षं हृदये करोति ॥

Note the pun on the words *lokottare puṃsi niveśyamānā*.

Looking back over the many passages[1] quoted from Abhinava, what can we pick out as the main similarities and the main differences[2] between *rasāsvāda* and *brahmāsvāda*?

SIMILARITIES

(1) There is no pain in drama, for everything is blissful when we attain the state of *rasa*. This is equally true of any higher ecstatic experience.

(2) During an actual dramatic performance, we forget the self.

(3) We have no hope of material gain from art. The same is true on the religious level, since to become seriously religious in India generally means abandoning one's acquired wealth.

(4) Both experiences are *alaukika*. We have seen how often Abhinava uses this term.

(5) Both experiences are *ānandaikaghana*.

(6) In both cases, the distance between the subject and the object is removed. Thus Abhinava stressed that *rasa* is not objective.

(7) Time and space disappear for the duration of the experience. We are not conscious of our surroundings during a drama, or at least we ought not to be, according to Abhinava.

(8) During both experiences there is total immersion. In the case of *samādhi* there is *vyutthāna*, which could correspond (perhaps forcibly, however) to leaving the theatre and re-entering ordinary life. We have all certainly experienced the curious feeling of being let-down, even of depression, upon leaving a theatre.

(9) In both cases, special preparation is necessary: music and dance in the theatre, and perhaps one might include *bhajans* and other paraphernalia of *bhakti* in the case of religion.

(10) In both cases, what appears is not something that is "created" anew, but something that is "manifested", or "suggested". *Rasa* is not "produced", it is "suggested". So also, the identity of the *ātman* and

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1. See also the *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍanamiśra, Ch. 1, p. 5, Kuppuswami Shastri's edition: एवं च लौकिकानन्द एवास्य (ब्रह्मानन्दस्य) मात्रेति युज्यते।

2. Note what the *Saṅgītaratnākara*, III. 1266 says: ब्रह्मसंविद्विसदृशी संवित्।
The *Bhāvaprakaśāna*, II. (p. 53) also deals with the distinction between *rasāsvāda* and *brahmāsvāda* and then ends by saying:

शिवागमज्ञैरर्थोऽयमेवमुक्तः पुरातनैः।

Śāradātanaya, as is clear from Ch. I, p. 26-27, and Ch. II, p. 47, does not accept *śānta*. However, at II, p. 48, a certain Vāsuki is quoted who does accept *śānta*. On this problem, see Raghavan, "*The Number of Rasas*," p. 11.

brahman is only a question of removing ignorance (i. e. nothing " new " is to be acquired). In *Vedānta* the term *abhivyakti* is often used for this process, just as both Ānanda and Abhinava use the same expression for *rasa*.

(11) In *Vedānta, avidyā* is removed by means of *śravana, manana* etc. In *rasaniṣpatti,* Abhinava emphasises how the *vighnas* must be removed before *rasa* can manifest itself.

(12) In both cases there is a sense of rest (*viśrānti*), of having reached the goal (cf. the Vedāntic expression *kṛtakṛtya*) beyond which there is nothing to be accomplished.

(13) In the aesthetic experience, Ānanda (and Abhinava) make light of the " means " that have brought it about, especially of the *vācya* sense, which is compared to a lamp (*D. Āl.* I. 9) which is useful for illuminating objects, but which is not the goal of our efforts. Similarly, in *Vedānta,* Śaṅkara speaks of the *upāyas* as being similar to a raft which we leave behind after our destination has been reached.

DIFFERENCES

The differences are no less striking, and certainly ought not to be lightly dismissed. Abhinava himself makes the distinction in a difficult passage in the *Abhinavabhārati* :[1]

" Aesthetic experience (*carvaṇā*) is different from the perception of love, etc., that arises because of ordinary valid means of cognition such as direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), textual authority (*āgama*), simile (*upamāna*) and others. It is also (an experience) different from the indifferent (*taṭastha*) knowledge of another person's thoughts that arises from direct vision in a Yogin, and from the experience that consists of a single mass of the bliss (*ānandaikaghana*) of one's own Self that belongs to the highest Yogin and which, being pure (*suddha*), is devoid of contact (*uparāga*) with any object of the senses. The reason why aesthetic experience differs from all the above, is because of the absence of beauty caused respectively by the appearance of distractions such as the desire to acquire (*arjanādi*), the absence of active participation, the absence of clarity (*asphuṭatva*), and being at the mercy of the object (of contemplation). "

1. *A. Bh.* I, 285. Gnoli, p. 21 :

किं त्वलौकिकविभावादिसंयोगबलोपनतैर्वेद्यं चर्वणा । सा च प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमोपमानादिलौकिकप्रमाणजनितरत्याद्यवबोधतस्तथा योगिप्रत्यक्षजतटस्थपरसंवित्तिज्ञानात्सकलवैषयिकोपरागशून्यशुद्धपरयोगिगतस्वात्मानन्दैकघनानुभवाच्च विशिष्यते, एतेषां यथायोगमर्जनादिविघ्नान्तरोदयतादस्थ्यास्फुटत्वविषयावेशवैवश्यकृतसौन्दर्यविरहात् ।

Other differences are :

(1) The final state in *Vedānta* is almost always described (!) as ineffable,[1] whereas Ānanda is clear that such an adjective can never be predicated of *dhvani*. Whether Abhinava agreed or not is not evident.

(2) The *Adhikārin* in the case of liberation is much more strictly defined that he is for literature. After all, children are perfectly capable of watching a drama, though they might not take away as much as a qualified adult. *Sahṛdayatva* is a much more worldly and concrete qualification than is *mumukṣā*.

(3) The drama is not expected (at least Abhinava never says anything about this) to change one's life radically. To have a profound aesthetic experience is simply satisfying and does not imply that one will be in any sense profoundly altered. One cannot say the same for mystic experiences. Quite apart from the concept of *sadyomukti*, any deep religious experience is very likely to make a manifest, sometimes drastic, change in a person's outward life.

(4) It is significant that most writers, (Abhinava is an exception), do not use the term *ānanda* to describe the purpose of poetry as often as they use the less ethereal term *prīti* and even more often *vinoda*, "entertainment". It is perfectly legitimate to give curiosity as the reason for wishing to see any given drama. But to say the same of religious experience would be unthinkable, at least in ancient India.

(5) With the exception of Abhinava, (who has highly "spiritual" ideas about love, see p. 14) most writers regard the highest expression of drama to be sexual love, without any philosophical implications.

In spite of these differences, such sentiments in regard to aesthetic experience as Abhinava provided, became very common. For instance in the *Alaṅkāramahodadhi* of Narendraprabha Sūri we read :

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1. E. g. Gaudapāda, III, 47 : स्वस्थं शान्तं सनिर्वाणमकथ्यं सुखमुत्तमम् । Ānandavardhana is quite clear that such an adjective can never be predicated of *dhvani* : येऽपि सहृदयहृदयसंवेद्यमनाख्येयमेव ध्वनेरात्मानमाश्वासिषुस्तेऽपि न परीक्ष्यवादिनः । (*D. Āl.* p. 162–63). *Sahṛdayahṛdayasaṃvedyam* is *not* ambiguous and cannot be Ānanda's own position, for if it were, this would in no way prove that *dhvani* was "speakable" but only that it was "knowable" which is not the same thing at all. Moreover, this is confirmed by the passage in the *D. Āl.*, p. 33, where this adjective is given as part of the *anākhyeyavāda*. We feel that it is quite possible that Abhinava himself, however, did not really agree with this position. It is interesting that he does not comment extensively on the *anākhyeyavāda* except to hint that it is a Buddhist position, with which Ānanda has dealt elsewhere (*Locana*, p. 519).

" (Aesthetic experience is that state) wherein the mind sinks for a moment, where it bathes with ambrosia for a moment, where it gets drunk for a moment, where it melts away for a moment ". [1]

Even such a staunchly *Vedānta* work as the *Pañcadaśī* of Vidyāraṇya seems to have been influenced by aesthetic speculations in four lovely verses :

" The lamp which is in the theatre lights up equally the manager, the audience and the dancer. Even if they are not present, it shines ". [2]

" The manager is the ego. The audience are the sense–objects. The dancer is the mind. The keepers of time, etc., are the sense–organs. The illuminating lamp is the Witness (i. e. the Self) ". [3]

" Whatever forms can be imagined with the mind, illuminating all of these, he becomes the Witness of all of them. By himself however he is beyond the reach of words and mind ". [4]

" How can I experience such a Self ? If you feel this way, then do not (try) to experience it. When all experiences cease, then the Witness alone is left ". [5]

Here is a verse quoted by Jayaratha in the *Tantrāloka* which seems to sum everything up in a very fine analogy :

" Just as when various objects such as pieces of wood, leaves, stones, etc., fall into a salt–mine they turn into salt, so also emotions (turn into bliss when they fall into) the pure consciousness that is our very Self ". [6]

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1. *Alaṅkāramahodadhi of Nārendraprabha Sūri*, ed. by L. B. G. J. Pandit, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1942 (G. O. S. XCV) :

मज्जतीव क्षणं चेतः स्नातीव सुधाया क्षणम् । माद्यतीव क्षणं यत्र विलीयत इव क्षणम् ॥

The Agnipurāṇa too uses the same terminology as Abhinava :

अक्षरं परमं ब्रह्म सनातनमजं विभु । वेदान्तेषु वदन्त्येकं चैतन्यं ज्योतिरीश्वरम् ॥

आनन्दः सहजस्तस्य व्यज्यते स कदाचन । व्यक्तिः सा तस्य चैतन्यचमत्काररसाह्वया ॥

Ch. 309, vv. 1–2 These verses seem to us clearly derived from Abhinava.

2. *Pañcadaśī*, X. 11 :

नृत्यशालास्थितो दीपः प्रभुं सभ्यांश्च नर्तकीम् । दीपयेदविशेषेण तदभावेऽपि दीप्यते ॥

3. *P.D.* X. 14 :

अहंकारः प्रभुः सभ्या विषया नर्तकी मतिः । तालादिधारीण्यक्षाणि दीपः साक्ष्यवभासकः ॥

4. *P.D.* X. 23 :

यद्यद्रूपादि कल्प्येत बुद्धया तत्तत्प्रकाशयन् । यस्य तस्य भवेत्साक्षी स्वतो वाग्बुद्धयगोचरः ॥

5. *P.D.* X. 24 :

कथं तादृङ्मया ग्राह्य इति चेन्मैव गृह्यताम् । सर्वग्रहोपसंशान्तौ स्वयमेवावशिष्यते ॥

6. *T. Āl.* Vol. I, p. 30, part two, second *āhnika*, under verse 35 :

यथा रूमायां पतिताः काष्ठपर्णोपलादयः । लवणत्वाय कल्पन्ते तथा भावाश्चिदात्मनि ॥

APPENDIX

LATER WRITERS ON *Śāntarasa* AND *Rasāsvāda* :

It is not our main purpose to examine in any detail how the writers of the later tradition deal with the themes supplied by Abhinavagupta. Nonetheless there are certain passages which we feel deserve to be noticed. The three main texts that should be seen are the *Kāvyaprakāśa*, the *Sāhityadarpaṇa* and the *Rasagaṅgādhara*. There are two areas in which we are interested : *śāntarasa* and *rasāsvāda*. The *Kāvyaprakāśa* is quite brief on *śāntarasa*. At IV. 29 Mammaṭa says :

"*Śṛṅgāra, hāsya, karuṇa, raudra, vīra, bhayānaka, bībhatsa* and *adbhuta*—these are stated to be the eight rasas in drama."

Later, at IV. 35 he says :

"*Śānta* is the ninth *rasa*, of which *nirveda* is the *sthāyibhāva*" and then he gives the stanza *ahau vā hāre vā kusumaśayane vā dṛṣadi vā* as an example of *śāntarasa*.[1] It would seem therefore that according to Mammaṭa, *śāntarasa* has no place in drama, but only in *kāvya*. But his statement is not unambiguous, and it is possible to interpret him to mean that generally only eight *rasas* are admitted, but that he would admit also *śānta* as a ninth.

Viśvanātha, in the *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, III. 45 ff., has the following remarks on *ŚR* :

Sāhityadarpaṇa III. 245–250 :

अथ शान्तः –

शान्तः शमस्थायिभाव उत्तमप्रकृतिर्मतः ॥
कुन्देन्दुसुन्दरच्छायैः श्रीनारायणदैवतः ।
अनित्यत्वादिनाशेषवस्तुनिःसारता तु या ॥
परमात्मस्वरूपं वा तस्यालम्बनमिष्यते ।
पुण्याश्रमहरिक्षेत्रतीर्थरम्यवनादयः ॥
महापुरुषसंङ्गाद्यास्तस्योद्दीपनरूपिणः ।
रोमाञ्चाद्याश्रानुभावास्तथा स्युर्व्यभिचारिणः ॥
निर्वेदहर्षस्मरणमतिभूतदयादयः ।

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1. According to Kṣemendra, *Aucityavicāracarcā* 29 (Minor works of Kṣemendra, Sanskrit Academy Series No. 7, Hyderabad, 1961, edited by E. V. V. Rāghavācārya and D. G. Padhye), this stanza was written by Utpalarāja. Kosambi ("*The Epigrams Attributed to Bhartṛhari*", Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1948, p. 85) includes it among the *Saṃśayitaślokas*, as no. 213.

यथा—

रथ्यान्तश्चरतस्तथा धृतजरत्कन्थालवस्याध्वगैः
सत्रासं च सकौतुकं च सदयं दृष्टस्य तैर्नागरैः ।
निर्व्याजीकृतचित्सुधारसमुदा निद्रायमाणस्य मे
निःशङ्कः करटः कदा करपुटीभिक्षां विलुण्ठिष्यति ॥

पुष्टिस्तु महाभारतादौ द्रष्टव्या ।

निरहंकाररूपत्वाद्दयावीरादिरेष नो ॥

दायवीरादौ हि नागानन्दादौ जीमूतवाहनादेरन्तरा मलयवत्याद्यनुरागादेरन्ते च विद्याधरचक्रवर्तित्वाद्याप्तेर्दर्शनादहंकारोपशमो न दृश्यते । शान्तस्तु सर्वाकारेणाहंकारप्रशमैकरूपत्वान्न तत्रान्तर्भावमर्हति । अतश्च नागानन्दादेः शान्तरसप्रधानत्वमपास्तम् ।

ननु

'न यत्र दुःखं न सुखं न चिंता न द्वेषरागौ न च काचिदिच्छा ।
रसः स शान्तः कथितो मुनीन्द्रैः सर्वेषु भावेषु समप्रमाणः ॥'

इत्येवंरूपस्य शान्तस्य मोक्षावस्थायामेवात्मस्वरूपापत्तिलक्षणायां प्रादुर्भावात्तत्र संचार्यादीनामभावात्कथं रसत्वमित्युच्यते—

युक्तवियुक्तदशायामवस्थितो यः शमः स एव यतः ।
रसतामेति तदस्मिन्संचार्यादेः स्थितिश्च न विरुद्धा ॥

यश्चास्मिन्सुखाभावोऽप्युक्तस्तस्य वैषयिकसुखपरत्वान्न विरोधः ।

उक्तं हि—

'यच्च कामसुखं लोके यच्च दिव्यं महत्सुखम् ।
तृष्णाक्षयसुखस्यैते नार्हतः षोडशीं कलाम् ॥'
सर्वाकारमहंकाररहितत्वं व्रजन्ति चेत् ।
अत्रान्तर्भावमर्हन्ति दयावीरादयस्तथा ॥

आदिशब्दाद्धर्मवीरदानवीरदेवताविषयरतिप्रभृतयः ।

तत्र देवताविषया रतिर्यथा—

कदा वाराणस्यामिह सुरधुनीरोधसि वस-
न्वसानः कौपीनं शिरसि निदधानोऽञ्जलिपुटम् ।
अये गौरीनाथ त्रिपुरहर शम्भो त्रिनयन
प्रसीदेति क्रोशन्निमिषमिव नेष्यामि दिवसान् ॥

" *Śāntarasa* has calmness (*śama*) as its basic mood. It belongs to the very best of men. It has the white complexion of the Kunda (jasmine) and the moon, and the revered Nārāyaṇa as its presiding deity. Its *ālambana-vibhāva* is the emptiness (or vanity) of all things because of their transient nature, or it is the nature of the supreme Self. Its *uddīpanavibhāvas* are holy hermitages, sacred places (*harikṣetra*), places of pligrimage, pleasant groves, etc., and the company of great men etc. Its *anubhāvas* are horripilation, etc. Its *vyabhicāribhāvas* are self-disparagement, joy, recollection, resolve, kindness towards all beings, etc. Here is an example :

" When will the crows fearlessly carry away the food placed as alms in my joined hands, as I move along the highway wearing an old, worn-out, tattered and inadequate garment, looked at by the citizens on the road with fear, curiosity and pity, sleeping in the unfeigned bliss of relishing the nectar of spirituality ? "

The full development (of *śāntarasa*) is to be seen in the *Mahābhārata*, etc.

" *Dayāvīra* (in which the *sthāyibhāva utsāha* is based on or is concerned with mercy or benevolence), etc., are not identical with this (*śānta*), as (*śānta*) is without even the slightest trace of egoism (while *dayāvīra*, etc., are marked by egoism) ".

In *dayāvīra*, etc., such as for example in the case of Jimūtavāhana, etc., we do not find an extinction of egoism, in as much as we observe in the middle of the play, Jimūtavāhana's love for Malayavatī, and in the end his attainment of the status of sovereignity over the Vidyādharas. *Śānta*, however, cannot be included under *dayāvīra*, etc., because its exclusive nature is the extinction of egoism in every way. Hence the view that in the *Nāgānanda*, *śānta* is the dominant sentiment, is refuted.

It may be objected as follows :

" Where there is neither pain, nor pleasure, nor worry, nor hatred, nor affection, that is styled as *śāntarasa* by the chief among the sages, that which consists in equality towards all objects ". [1]

How can *śāntarasa* which is of the nature described above, and which manifests itself only in the state of emancipation (*mokṣa*), where there is the complete absence of the auxiliary feelings (and the abiding mental moods such as love, etc.) be regarded as a *rasa* ? We reply as follows :

" Since that tranquillity alone which exists in the state wherein the mind is joined to and also disjoined from the soul (i. e. wherein the soul is not

1. Reading *sarveṣu bhāveṣu samapramāṇaḥ*, while in the *Daśarūpa*, under IV, 45, the reading is *sarveṣu bhāveṣu śamapradhānaḥ*.

completely absorbed into the absolute) attains to the nature of *rasa*, the presence of the auxiliary feelings etc. (i. e. of the abiding mental moods, the excitants and the ensuants) is not ruled out".

As for the statement that there is in *śānta* the absence even of pleasure, that refers only to worldly pleasure (*vaiṣayikasukha*), and hence, there is no contradiction. For it has been stated:

"The earthly pleasure arising from fulfilment of desires as well as the great pleasure which is attained in heaven — these are not equal to even a sixteenth part of the happiness arising from the extinction of all desires".

Dayāvīra, etc., deserve to be included under *sānta*, provided that they are completely divested of egoism in every way.

The word "etc.", stands for *dharmavīra*, *dānavīra*, love having a deity for its object, etc. Amongst these, love having a deity for its object is illustrated in the following stanza:

"When shall I pass my days as a moment, dwelling in Vārāṇasī, on the bank of the divine river (Ganges) wearing a loin-cloth, holding my hands joined on my head and crying out: "O lord of Gaurī, destroyer of Tripura, three-eyed Śambhu, be merciful towards me!"

The commentary of the *Sāhityadarpaṇa* on *rasāsvāda*, while interesting, is too long to include here (see SD III. 1 and ff.). This and the commentary of the *Kāvyaprakāsa* on *rasāsvāda* (III. pp. 91–95, Jhalkikar) are readily available, since there exist translations into English of both these texts (see Bibliography). The *Rasagaṅgādhara*, however, is a different matter, since it has never been translated before. We therefore thought it worthwhile to translate in full Jagannātha's remarks on *śāntarasa*, and to provide an explanatory translation of his remarks on Abhinava's views on *rasāsvāda*.

Here is the first text:

Rasagaṅgādhara

स च—

'शृङ्गारः करुणः शान्तो रौद्रो वीरोऽद्भुतस्तथा।
हास्यो भयानकश्चैव बीभत्सश्चेति ते नव॥'

इत्युक्तेर्नवधा। मुनिवचनं चात्र मानम्।

केचित्तु—

'शान्तस्य शमसाध्यत्वान्नटे च तदसंभवात्।
अष्टावेव रसा नाट्ये न शान्तस्तत्र युज्यते॥'

इत्याहुः। तच्चापरे न क्षमन्ते। तथा हि नटे शमाभावादिति हेतुरसङ्गतः, नटे रसाभिव्यक्तेरस्वीकारात्। सामाजिकानां शमवत्त्वेन तत्र रसोद्बोधे बाधकाभावात्। न च नटस्य शमाभावात्तदभिनयप्रकाशकत्वानुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम्। तस्य भयक्रोधादेरप्यभावेन तदभिनयप्रकाशकताया अप्यसंगत्यापत्तेः। यदि च नटस्य क्रोधादेरभावेन वास्तवतत्कार्याणां वधबन्धादीनामुत्पत्त्यसंभवेऽपि कृत्रिमतत्कार्याणां शिक्षाभ्यासादित उत्पत्तौ नास्ति बाधकमिति निरीक्ष्यते, तदा प्रकृतेऽपि तुल्यम्। अथ नाट्ये गीतवाद्यादीनां विरोधिनां सत्त्वात् सामाजिकेष्वपि विषयवैमुख्यात्मनः शान्तस्य कथमुद्रेक इति चेत्, नाट्ये शान्तरसमभ्युपगच्छद्भिः फलबलात्तद्गीतवाद्यादेस्तस्मिन्विरोधिताया अकल्पनात्। विषयचिन्तासामान्यस्य तत्र विरोधित्वस्वीकारे तदीयालम्बनस्य संसारानित्यत्वस्य तदुद्दीपनस्य पुराणश्रवणसत्सङ्गपुण्यवनतीर्थावलोकनादेरपि विषयत्वेन विरोधित्वापत्तेः। अत एव च चरमाध्याये संगीतरत्नाकरे—

अष्टावेव रसा नाट्येष्विति केचिदचूचुदन्।
तदचारु, यतः कंचिन्न रसं स्वदते नटः॥

इत्यादिना नाट्येऽपि शान्तो रसो अस्तीति व्यवस्थापितम्। यैरपि नाट्ये शान्तो रसो नास्तीत्यभ्युपगम्यते तैरपि बाधकाभावान्महाभारतादिप्रबन्धानां शान्तरसप्रधानताया अखिललोकानुभवसिद्धत्वाच्च काव्ये सोऽवश्यं स्वीकार्यः। अत एव 'अष्टौ नाट्ये रसाः स्मृताः' इत्युपक्रम्य 'शान्तोऽपि नवमो रसः' इति मम्मटभट्टा अप्युपसमहार्षुः।

Rasagaṅgādhara[1]

Rasa is ninefold, because of the statement :

"*Śṛṅgāra, karuṇa, śānta, raudra, vīra, adbhuta,*
hāsya, bhayānaka, and *bībhatsa* — thus they are nine".[2]

And in this matter[3] the statement of the Sage (Bharata) is the final authority.

But there are some who say :[4]

"Because *śānta* can be developed only from (the *sthāyibhāva*) *śama,* and because *śama* is impossible in an actor, there are only eight *rasas* in drama; *śānta* has no place in it". This is not, however, accepted by others. They say that the argument advanced (by the advocates of eight *rasas*) namely that

1. We have used the KM (12) Ed. 1939, p. 35 ff.

2. We do not know where this verse could come from. We take it that Jagannātha is saying that it is based on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, not that it comes from the *NŚ*.

3. *Atra* means : *asmin viṣaye*, namely *rasasaṅkkyāviṣaye*.

4. *Apare* includes Jagannātha himself. He of course accepts the existenee of *śāntarasa*.

śama is not possible in an actor, does not stand to reason, because we do not accept that the revelation (i.e. aesthetic enjoyment) of *rasa* (ever) takes place in an actor.[1] As the spectators (on the other hand) can experience tranquillity, there is no difficulty in the arousal of (*śānta*) *rasa* in them. It would not be proper to say that as the actor (himself) is devoid of *śama*, he cannot be capable of acting in a manner congenial to *śama*. For in that case, it will have to be accepted that, since an actor is devoid of (genuine) fear and (genuine) anger, etc., he would not be capable of acting in a manner congenial to fear, anger, etc. also. Now, if there is nothing objectionable in the actor's being able to manifest, through special training, repeated practice, etc., the artificial effects of anger, etc., although there is no possibility in his case of the real effects of anger, etc., i.e. although he cannot actually kill or imprison (the object of his anger), then the same should apply in the case of *śama* as well. It may now be asked : " How can there be the emergence (*udreka*) of *śānta* in the minds of spectators (of a drama), since there is in a drama vocal and instrumental music, etc., all of which are opposed (to the suggestion of the *sthyāyibhāva śama*), and since *śānta* is by its nature averse to the contemplation of worldly objects (e.g. music, dance, etc.)? " The reply is that those who admit the existence of *śānta* in drama, do not believe that the presence of vocal and instrumental music in a drama acts as a hindrance to the emergence of *śānta*, for the very reason that the result (namely the emergence of *śānta*) is actually experienced (*phala-balāt*). If now it is maintained (by the opponent) that the contemplation of *any* worldly object is detrimental to the emergence of *śānta*, then (even in the case of non-dramatic poetry), the *ālambanavibhāva* of *śama* such as the transitory nature of worldly existence, and its *uddīpanavibhāvas* such as listening to the recitation of the *Purāṇas*, association with saintly people, visiting sacred penance-groves and holy places (*tīrtha*), being worldly objects (after all), will have to be regarded as detrimental to the emergence of *śānta* (in the minds of the readers of non-dramatic poetry). It is for this very reason that in the last chapter of the *Saṅgītaratnākara*, it has been said :

" Some have urged that in dramatic compositions (*nāṭyeṣu*) there are only eight *rasas*. But that is not (at all) correct (*acāru* — unconvincing), because no actor ever actually relishes any *rasa* whatsoever ". [2]

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1. Jagannātha does not accept the fact that the actor has *rasa*. Bhaṭṭalollaṭa, however, *A. Bh.*, p. 264 (Vol. I) believed that he does : *rasabhāvānām api vāsanāveśavaśena naṭe saṃbhavād anusaṃdhibalāc ca layādyanusaraṇāt* (for this phrase cf. *Locana*, *Uddyota*, II, p. 184, last line). Note too *Daśarūpa*, IV. 42 — *kāvyārtha-bhāvanāsvādo nartakasya na vāryate.*

2. *Saṅgītaratnākara*, VII. 1360, p. 400 of the Ed. by G. S. Sastri, Vol. IV, Adyar Library, 1933, Madras.

By means of this and similar arguments it has been established (in that work) that *śāntarasa* exists (even in dramatic poetry). Even those who hold the view that *śāntarasa* has no place in dramatic poetry (*nāṭya*) will have necessarily to accept its existence in non-dramatic poetry (*kāvya*), (firstly) because there are no such objections (to its acceptance in non-dramatic poetry) as given earlier, and (secondly) because it has been established on the strength of all people's actual experience that works like she *Mahābhārata* have *śāntarasa* as their dominant emotional mood. It is for this very reason that (a great schoiar like) Mammaṭabhaṭṭa first opened his discussion (on the number of *rasas*) with the words "eight are the *rasas* in drama"[1] and concluded his treatment of the subject with the remark: "*śānta* too has to be admitted as the ninth *rasa* (in non-dramatic poetry)".[2]

Of these — love, sorrow, disaffection, anger, enthusiasm, wonder mirth, fear and disgust are the abiding mental moods respectively".[3]

ON THE *sthāyābhāva* OF *śānta*

(The *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta*, namely) *nirveda*[4] ("world-weariness") is a peculiar state-of-mind (*cittavṛttiviśeṣa*) which is also called by the name *viṣayavirāga* ("aversion to worldly objects of enjoyment") arising from contemplation on the eternal Reality (*nityavastu*) and the non-eternal phenomenal appearances in the world (*anityavastu*). If, however, *nirveda* is (not the result of such contemplation, but is) the result of domestic quarrels, etc., it is regarded as a *vyabhicāribhāva* (a transient mood) (since it is of a transitory nature).[5]

Now here is a difficult passage from the *Rasagaṅgādhara* on *rasa*:[6]

समुचितललितसंनिवेशचारुणा काव्येन समर्पितैः सहृदयहृदयं प्रविष्टैरतदीयसहृदयतासहकृतेन भावनाविशेषमहिम्ना विगलितदुष्यन्तरमणीत्वादिभिरलौकिकविभावानुभावव्यभिचारिशब्दव्यपदेश्यैः शकुन्तलादिभिरालम्बनकारणैः, चन्द्रिकादिभिरुद्दीपनकारणैः, अश्रुपातादिभिः कार्यैः, चिन्तादिभिः सहकारिभिश्च, संभूय प्रादुर्भावितेनालौकिकेन व्यापारेण तत्कालनिवर्तितानन्दांशावरणाज्ञानेनात एव प्रमुष्टपरिमितप्रमातृत्वादिनिजधर्मेण प्रमात्रा स्वप्रकाशतया वास्तवेन निजस्वरूपानन्देन सह गोचरीक्रियमाणः प्राग्विनिविष्टवासनारूपो रत्यादिरेव रसः !

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1. *KP.*, IV. p. 98 (Jhalkikar's edition).
2. *KP.*, IV. 35, p. 117.
3. रतिः शोकश्च निर्वेदक्रोधोत्साहाश्च विस्मयः । हासो भयं जुगुप्सा च स्थायिभावाः क्रमादमी ॥
4. नित्यानित्यवस्तुविचारजन्मा (चित्तवृत्तिविशेषः) विषयविरागाख्यो निर्वेदः गृहकलहादिजस्तु व्यभिचारी ।
5. On the two kinds of *nirveda*, see the *A. Bh.*, (Raghavan's ed. p. 105), surely the source of Jagannātha's remarks.
6. Pages 25-27 KM. edition 1939.

तथा चाहुः — 'व्यक्तः स तैर्विभावाद्यैः स्थायिभावो रसः स्मृतः' इति। व्यक्तो व्यक्तिविषयीकृतः। व्यक्तिश्च भग्नावरणा चित्। यथा हि शरावादिना पिहितो दीपस्तन्निवृत्तौ संनिहितान्पदार्थान्प्रकाशयति, स्वयं च प्रकाशते, एवमात्मचैतन्यं विभावादिसंवलितान् रत्यादीन्। अन्तःकरणधर्माणां साक्षिभास्यत्वाभ्युपगतेः। विभावादीनामपि स्वप्नतुरगादीनामिव रङ्गरजतादीनामिव साक्षिभास्यत्वमविरुद्धम्। व्यञ्जकविभावादिचर्वणाया आवरणभङ्गस्य वोत्पत्तिविनाशाभ्यामुत्पत्तिविनाशौ रसे उपचर्येते वर्णनित्यतायामिव व्यञ्जकताल्वादिव्यापारस्य गकारादौ। विभावादिचर्वणावधित्वादावरणभङ्गस्य, निवृत्तायां तस्यां प्रकाशस्याऽऽवृतत्वाद्विद्यमानोऽपि स्थायी न प्रकाशते।

यद्वा विभावादिचर्वणामहिम्ना सहृदयस्य निजसहृदयतावशोन्मिषितेन तत्तत्स्थाय्युपहितस्वस्वरूपानन्दाकारा समाधाविव योगिनश्चितवृत्तिरुपजायते, तन्मयीभवनमिति यावत्। आनन्दो ह्ययं न लौकिकसुखान्तरसाधारणः अनन्तःकरणवृत्तिरूपत्वात्। इत्थं चाभिनवगुप्तमम्मटभट्टादिग्रन्थसारस्येन भग्नावरणचिद्विशिष्टो रत्यादिः स्थायी भावो रस इति स्थितम्।

वस्तुतस्तु वक्ष्यमाणश्रुतिस्वारस्येन रत्याद्यवच्छिन्ना भग्नावरणा चिदेव रसः। सर्वथैव चास्या विशिष्टात्मनो विशेषणं विशेष्यं वा चिदंशमादाय नित्यत्वं स्वप्रकाशत्वं च सिद्धम्। रत्याद्यंशमादाय त्वनित्यत्वमितरभास्यत्वं च। चर्वणा चास्य चिद्गतावरणभङ्ग एव प्रागुक्ता, तदाकारान्तःकरणवृत्तिर्वा। इयं च परब्रह्मास्वादात्समाधेर्विलक्षणा, विभावादिविषयसंवलितचिदालम्बनत्वात्। भाव्या च काव्यव्यापारभावात्। अथास्यां सुखांशभाने किं मानमिति चेत्समाधावपि तद्भाने किं मानमिति पर्यनुयोगस्य तुल्यत्वात्। 'सुखमात्यन्तिकं यत्तद्बुद्धिग्राह्यमतीन्द्रियम्' इत्यादिः शब्दोऽस्ति तत्र मानमिति चेत्, अस्त्यत्रापि 'रसो वै सः, रसं ह्येवायं लब्ध्वानन्दी भवति' इति श्रुतिः, सकलसहृदयप्रत्यक्षं चेति प्रमाणद्वयम्। येयं द्वितीयपक्षे तदाकारचित्तवृत्त्यात्मिका रसचर्वणोपन्यस्ता सा शब्दव्यापारभाव्यत्वाच्छाब्दी। अपरोक्षसुखालम्बनत्वाच्चापरोक्षात्मिका। तत्त्वंवाक्यजबुद्धिवत्। इत्याहुरभिनवगुप्ताचार्यपादाः।

"*Rasa*—aesthetic enjoyment—is the *sthāyibhāva rati*, etc., which is of the form of a mental impression, already crystallised in the mind and implanted in the mind since the time of birth (or since time immemorial) and cognised (or perceived) by the cogniser (i. e. by the reader or spectator) along with the joy of self-realisation (*nijasvarūpānandena saha*) which is absolutely real (and not imaginary), as it is self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*)

(and does not require anything else to illuminate it). This cognition of a *sthāyibhāva* (such as *rati*, etc.,) is the result of an extraordinary function (of words and senses) (i. e. it is brought by the function called suggestion). (This suggestion) is produced (*prādurbhāvita*) by the appropriate *ālambana-vibhāvas*, *uddīpanavibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* (described in the poem or represented on the stage) acting jointly and simultaneously (*sambhūya*). The extraordinary function (namely suggestion) which is thus brought into play as a result of the *vibhāvas*, etc., immediately removes the ignorance which acts as a screen (or veil) covering up (or obscuring) the blissful consciousness of the Self. And when the screen of ignorance is thus removed, the cogniser rises superior to and becomes divested of his peculiar properties such as being a limited cogniser (etc.).

The *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* are first presented by the poet or dramatist to the reader (or spectator) through the medium of the poem (or drama) which is charming because of the appropriate and beautiful literary style (adopted for conveying the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*). These *vibhāvas*, etc., enter (i. e., make an impression on) the mind of the appreciative, sympathetic reader (or spectator). Then by the power of the peculiar mental reflection (on the *vibhāvas* etc.), on the part of the reader and in cooperation with his appreciative attitude, the *vibhāvas* etc., become divested of their individualistic limitations and become universalised (or generalised), and *vibhāvas* like Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā lose their individualistic natures as Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā and stand out before us in the universal character of manhood and womanhood in general. In the realm of poetics, fundamental causal factors like Śakuntalā, exciting causal factors like moonlight, effect-factors like the shedding of tears and collateral, accessory effect-factors, like anxiety etc., are designated by the names *ālambanavibhāva*, *uddīpanavibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicāribhāva* respectively. They are extraworldly (*alaukika*, i. e. they are idealised (and not presented as they exist in ordinary life) so as to serve the purpose of awakening and nourishing a particular mental mood (such as love etc.). In the ordinary world they are called *ālambanakāraṇa*, *uddīpakāraṇa*, *kārya* and *sahakārin*, but when idealised so as to suit the atmosphere of poetry and drama, they are known by the names *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*.

"For it has been said that a *sthāyibhāva* revealed (or suggested) by the *vibhāvas* etc. is called by the name of *rasa*".[1] Revealed (or suggested) means "made the object of revelation (or suggestion)". Now *vyakti* (revelation) (in the context of *rasa*-realisation) means consciousness (pure,

1. KP. IV. 28, p. 86, (Jhalkikar's edition).

blissful consciousness of the Self), from which the enveloping screen is (temporarily) removed (*bhagnāvaraṇā cid*). Just as a lamp covered by an earthen bowl (or wicker-basket) begins to shine by it self, and illumines nearby objects as soon as the cover is taken away, in the same way pure consciousness in the form of the *ātman*(i. e. the *ātman* who is pure consciousness and supreme bliss), which is covered by ignorance, desire etc. begins to shine on its own (*svayaṃ prakāśate*) and illumines the *sthāyibhāvas* like *rati*, etc., along with (appropriate) *vibhāvas*, etc. For the *sthāyibhāvas* like *rati* are the properties (or attributes) of the mind (in as much as they are of the form of mental impressions or instincts embedded in the mind) and hence they are admitted (by rhetoricians and Vedāntins) to be capable of being illumined by the *sākṣin* (i. e. the *ātman* consisting of pure consciousness) (as soon as the enveloping veil in the form of ignorance, desire etc., is removed). There should be no difficulty in accepting that even the *vibhāvas, anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* are illumined by the *ātman* (although they possess an objective character and are objective entitities like *ghaṭa, paṭa*, etc.), on the analogy of the horse etc. seen in a dream, or on the analogy of the silver (erroneously) perceived in a piece of tin (*raṅgarajata*). According to this view *rasa* is nothing but the subtle, latent instincts like love etc. As these instincts are permanent moods of the mind, *rasa* also is permanent in character. Now the question arises, how *rasa* is said to come into existence and cease to exist if it is permanent in its nature. The answer is that origination (*utpatti*) and cessation (*vināśa)* really belong to the aesthetic experience (*carvaṇā*) of the *vibhāvas, anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* which are the suggestors of the *rasa*. Or origination and cessation may be said to belong to the *āvaraṇabhaṅga* (removal of the screen in the form of ignorance, desire etc. which covers up the blissful conciousness). But the origination and cessation are metaphorically transferred to *rasa* by *lakṣanā* (*rase upacaryete*). For this an illustration is given from the *sphoṭa* doctrine of the grammarians. The letters in the form of *sphoṭa* are really eternal. But they are in ordinary language spoken of as subject to origination and cessation, only in a metaphorical sense. They are said to be subject to origination and cessation because of the origination and cessation of the contacts between the places of articulation (palate etc.) and the articulators (tip of the tongue etc.). The duration of the removal of the screen of ignorance, desire, worldly distractions etc., is conditioned by the enjoyment (*carvaṇā*) of the *vibhāvas, anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* (i. e. the removal of the screen of ignorance etc., lasts only so long as the enjoyment of the *vibhāvas* etc., last). The moment the enjoyment of the *vibhāvas* etc., comes to an end, the light of one's own blissful consciousness becomes veiled once again by the power of ignorance, desire, worldly distractions etc., and the light of consciousness that until now illumined the *sthāyi-*

bhāvas being itself enveloped, the *sthāyibhāvas* though permanent (i. e. though present and exisiting all along), do not shine any longer, and their enjoyment comes to an end. This is the reason why, and this is the sense in which, *rasa* is said to be subject to origination and cessation.

Or we may say as follows : because of the enjoyment of the *vibhāvas, anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas,* which enjoyment is evoked (or is called into play, *unmiṣita*) by the sympathetic attitude of the appreciative reader or spectator), the mind of the appreciative reader or spectator dwelling on the various *sthāyibhāvas*, becomes transformed into the blissful consciousness which is the nature of the *ātman*, just as in the case of a Yogin, his mind becomes transformed into blissful consciousness during deep meditation (*samādhi*). This transformation of the mind into the blissful consciousness (which is the real nature of the *ātman*) amounts to the identification of the mind with blissful consciousness (*tanmayībhavana*). Now this bliss is not comparable with any of the ordinary worldly joys; because ordinary worldly joys are a property of the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*), (while this bliss, *kāvyānanda*, is the essence of the *ātman* itself). (Really speaking *kāvyānanda* is not identical with *brahmānanda* or *brahmāsvāda*, because it is produced by the *laukikasāmagrī*, such as the contemplation of the *vibhāvas, anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* as described in a poem or exhibited in a drama, and so it is essentially *laukika*. But still it is *alaukika* in the sense that it is not comparable to any of the joys of this world. At the time of experiencing worldly joys, the *ātman* enters into contact with the mind so that *laukikānanda* is *cittavṛttisaṃyuktacaitanyasvarūpa*. But *Kāvyānanda*–or *rasacarvaṇājanyānanda*–is *śuddhacaitanyarūpa*, i. e. at the time of experiencing *rasāsvāda* the *cittavṛtti* itself becomes transformed into the bliss of pure consciousness). Jagannātha sums up the view of Abhinavagupta and his followers on *rasa* realisation as follows :

" Thus in the light of the real intention (*svārasya* i.e. *abhiprāya*) of the works of Abhinavagupta and of Mammaṭa and others, *rasa* is a *sthāyibhāva* such as *rati*, characterised by blissful consciousness (i. e. becoming the object of pure, blissful consciousness which is the *ātman's* real nature) from which the covering lid has been removed (*bhagnāvarāṇacidviśiṣṭaḥ*, i. e. *bhagnāvaraṇacidviṣayabhūtaḥ*). But, says Jagannātha, really speaking the view of Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa ought to be stated as follows : *rasa* is the blissful consciousness itself from which the covering lid (of ignorance, desire and worldly distractions) has been removed and of which the *sthāyibhāvas* like *rati* have become the object (*ratyādyavacchinnā bhagnāvaraṇā cid eva rasaḥ*). This emended statement of the view of Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa is based on the *śruti* passage : *raso vai saḥ. rasaṃ hy evāyaṃ labdhvā ānandī bhavati.* The difference between the two statements of Abhinava-

gupta's and Mammaṭa's view consists in the shifting of the *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣya-bhāva*. According to the first statement *bhagnāvaraṇā cid* becomes the *viśeṣaṇa* and *ratyādisthāyibhāva* becomes the *viśeṣya*. According to the second statement, *ratyādisthāyibhāva* becomes the *viśeṣaṇa* and *bhagnāvaraṇā cid* becomes the *viśeṣya*. But according to Jagannātha, the second statement is much more in harmony with the *śruti* passage quoted above, although the first statement is in keeping with what Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa have actually said in their works. " But in any case, (i. e. under both the statements) the element of consciousness (*cidaṃśa*) is either a *viśeṣaṇa* (in the first statement) or a *viśeṣya* (in the second statement), and one thing is certain (or established) that *rasa* is eternal (*nitya*) and self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*), because *rasa* is vitally connected with the *cidaṃśa* (either as *viśeṣaṇa* or as *viśeṣya*) and the *cidaṃśa* is eternal and self-luminous. Thus from the point of view of the *cidaṃśa*, *rasa* is eternal and self-luminous, though from the point of view of the *ratyādisthāyi-bhāva* it is non-eternal (*anitya*) and illumined by something else (*para-prakāśa* or *itarabhāsya*)". (Hence both the remarks, namely *rasaḥ nityaḥ svaprakāśaś ca* and *rasaḥ anityaḥ itarabhāsyaś ca*, are justifiable from their respective viewpoints.)

Jagannātha then goes on to say that the relishing of *rasa* is nothing but the breaking off (or withdrawal) of the screen (or mantle) (of ignorance, etc.) covering the pure consciousness (*cidgatāvaraṇabhaṅgaḥ*) or the transformation of the mind into the bliss of pure consciousness which is the nature of the *ātman* (*tadākārā*, i. e. *svasarūpānandākārā, antaḥkaraṇavṛttiḥ*). Now this aesthetic enjoyment (*rasacarvaṇā*) is different from (and is not identical with) the meditational trance (*samādhi* or *brahmāsvāda*). For it has for its object (*ālambana*) the bliss of pure consciousness blended with the cognition (or consciousness) of the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāri-bhāvas*—which are worldly or mundane matters (*viṣaya*, i. e. *sāṃsārikapadārtha*). But *brahmāsvāda* or *parabrahmasākṣātkāra* is not mixed or blended with the cognition (or consciousness) of worldly matters. (It is *viśuddha-brahmaviṣayaka* or *ātmānandaviṣayaka*). Further, aesthetic enjoyment (*rasāsvāda* or *rasacarvaṇā*) is the outcome of the special function, namely *vyañjanā* peculiar to poetry, while *brahmāsvāda* is the outcome of the process laid down in the *Upaniṣads*, viz. *śravaṇa, manana, nididhyāsana*, etc. [Thus there is a difference between *rasāsvāda* and *brahmāsvāda* with regard to the *viṣaya* (object) and the means (*karaṇa* or *sādhana*)].

We translate the next section (beginning : *athāsyāṃ sukhāṃśabhāne*, etc.) :

"Objection : what evidence or authority (*mānam*) is there for holding that in *rasāsvāda* (or *rasacarvaṇā*) there is the experience of an element of happiness (joy or pleasure) (*sukhāṃśa*) ?

Reply : A similar counter-question (*paryanuyoga*) could be raised in regard to *samādhi* (or *brahmāsvāda*). In other words it may be asked : what is the evidence (or authority) for saying that in meditational trance also there is the experience of happiness (or bliss)?

Objection : Why, there is the following evidence (in the form of a quotation from the *Bhagavadgītā*, to prove that in *brahmāsvāda* there is the experience of bliss). The *Gītā* says (VI. 21) : *sukham ātyantikaṃ yat tad buddhigrāhyam atīndriyam*—which means that *brahmāsvāda* is full of happiness which is super-sensuous, which is perceptible directly by the intellect (intuition) and which is *ātyantika*, i. e. transcending every other kind of mundane joy.

Reply : we (too) have the authority of a scriptural (*upaniṣadic*) statement to prove that *rasāsvāda* is full of happiness. The scriptural statement is : *raso vai saḥ. rasaṃ hy evāyaṃ labdhvā ānandī bhavati.*"

[Actually, however, this scriptural statement refers to the *ātman* and not to aesthetic experience. The proper meaning of the statement is : " That (*ātman*) is surely *(vai) rasa* (joy or bliss). Having realised the (*ātman* which is) *rasa* (bliss) he becomes happy or blissful. " In the first part of the quotation, the *ātman* is equated with *rasa* (i. e. *ānanda* — supreme joy or bliss). In the second part of the quotation it is said that having realised that *ātman* which is *rasarūpa* or *ānandarūpa*, he, i. e. the spiritual aspirant (*sādhaka*), becomes supremely happy (*ānandī bhavati*). But Jagannātha seems to have understood both parts of the quotation as referring to rasa in poetry or drama, i. e. as referring to aesthetic experience. He understood the second part to mean : " having realised *rasa*, i. e. the emotional flavour, he (i. e. the *sahṛdaya* or *sāmājika*) becomes supremely happy ". But we doubt very much if the quotation from the *Upaniṣad* is capable of such an interpretation].

" In addition to this scriptural statement serving as evidence to show that *rasāsvāda* is *ānandarūpa*, the *ānandarūpatva* of *rasāsvāda* is borne out by a second authority, namely the direct experience of the *sahṛdaya*." Jagannātha means that just as the *ānandarūpatva* of the *brahmāsvāda* is supported by the quotation from the *Bhagavadgītā*, and by actual experience of the Yogins, in the same way the *ānandarūpatva* of *rasāsvāda* is supported by the scriptural passage given above (namely : *raso vai saḥ. rasaṃ hy evāyaṃ labdhvā ānandī bhavati*) and by the direct experience of the *sāhṛdaya.*

Here is our translation of the next section : *yeyaṃ dvitīyapakṣe*, etc. :

"The *rasacarvaṇā* (or *rasāsvāda*) which has been described by us above in connection with the second statement of Abhinavagupta's view as consisting in a mental condition transformed into the bliss which is the *ātman*, well,

that *rasacarvaṇā* (or *rasāsvāda*) is both *śābda* (verbal) and *aparokṣa* (i. e. of the nature of direct experience — *pratyakṣarūpa*)". Jagannātha means that it is *śābda* because it is induced by *sabdavyāpāra,* namely *vyañjanā,* and by *abhidhā* which always precedes *vyañjanā. Rasacarvaṇā* (or *rasāsvāda*) is *aparokṣa* (i. e. *pratyakṣarūpa*) because its object is *ātmānanda* (*aparokṣa-sukhālambanatvāt*). Thus *rasāsvāda* is both *śābda* (i. e. *śabdavyāpārabhāvya*) and *aparokṣa,* just as the knowledge of the identity between the *jīvātman* and the *paramātman,* arising out of the *Upaniṣadic* statement—*tat tvam asi*—, is *śābda* in so far as it is the outcome of the sentence *tat tvam asi,* and is also *aparokṣa* (i. e. *pratyakṣarūpa*) as it is a matter of direct, actual experience (*sākṣtkāra*) for the spiritual aspirant (*yogin*).

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ADDENDUM

P. IV, fn. 1. : See the article by M. V. Patwardhan and J. L. Masson : "Jagannātha on the Definition of Poetry", Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda (to appear shortly).

P. IX, line 12 : We must point out in all fairness, that this ascription is given only in the commentary of Ravicandra (see the *Bhūmikā* to the third edition of the *Amaruśataka* in the NSP, 1954) and not in the Vedānta tradition itself. Mādhava (Vidyāraṇya) does not mention the legend in the *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* even though he does tell the story of his seeking sexual knowledge in order to respond to the questions of Sāradā, Maṇḍanamiśra's wife. After having studied and put into practice Vātsyāyana's *Kāmasūtra*, he is also credited with a work on erotics :

svayaṃ vyadhattābhinavārthagarbhaṃ nibandham ekāṃ nṛpaveṣadhārī |
(from Narāyaṇa Rāmācārya's Bhūmikā, p. 1 to the Amaru).

The most commonly held belief of the Vedāntasampradāya in relation to sexual love is expressed very graphically by Vidyāraṇya in his Śaṅkaradigvijaya, VIII. 25 (p. 303, Ānandāśrama ed.) :

yāsāṃ stanyaṃ tvayā pītaṃ yāsāṃ jāto 'si yonitaḥ |
tāsu mūrkhatama strīṣu paśuvad ramase katham ||

But then, with the honorable exception of Kashmir Śaivism, what religious system has been fair to women ?

P. XIV, line 11 : Abhinava uses this same simile again in the Locana, p. 212 and adds : *akaluṣodakadṛṣṭāntena*, on the analogy of a clean piece of cloth that is dipped into clear water and absorbs all the water. In the same way the sensitive reader absorbs poetry.

P. 2, fn. 1 : On p. 223, Vol. II of the A. Bh., Abhinava disagrees with Bhaṭṭatauta. It should be noted that Ānanda too is not bound by tradition. Thus on p. 340 of the D. Āl. he says that it is a mistake to slavishly follow the doctrine of Bharata :

.....*na tu kevalam śāstrasthitisampādanecchayā*, and again .....*bharatamatānusaraṇamātrecchayā ghaṭanam.*

P. 2, fn. 3, line 7 : There is no doubt that Ānandavardhana knew Vākpatirāja's poem, for on p. 173 (B. P. ed.) of the D. Āl. he quotes a Prākrit verse which is No. 406 of the *Gaüḍavaho*. See J. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan : "The Dhvanyāloka and the Gaüḍavaho", to be published in the

commemoration volume for D. D. Kosambi (M. A. C. S. Research Institute, Popular Book Depot, Bombay).

P. 3. fn. 2 : In view of Abhinava's elaborate commentary on the Nāṭya-śāstra, it is needless to stress the importance of this work for his own theories of aesthetics. See the present authors' forthcoming book : " Nāṭyaśāstra VI, with Translated Excerpts from the Abhinavabhāratī ", Deccan College Monograph Series.

P. 3, fn. 1 : See J. Masson : " On the Authenticity of the so-called Bhāmahavivaraṇa of Udbhaṭa " forthcoming in the Indo-Iranian Journal.

P. 4, line 10 : Cf. Bhāmaha, V. 3, quoted on p. 55.

P. 5, last line of the footnote : this verse is also found in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Ayodhyākāṇḍa, 105, 24.

P. 6, line 8 : Ānanda's main contribution to literary criticism in India was that he asked, for the first time, the really serious and fundamental questions, e. g. : " What distinguishes great poetry from good poetry ? " " Where does the essence of poetic experience really lie ? " " What is the true purpose of figures of speech ? " " How important is style ? " See J. Masson : " Philosophy and Literary Criticism in Ancient India ", in the forthcoming " International Journal of Indian Philosophy " Vol. I, No. 1, edited by B. K. Matilal.

P. 14, line 1 : In Vol. III. of the NŚ (G. O. S.), p. 185, Bharata says that love lies at the base of all emotions. प्रायेण सर्वभावानां कामाच्चिऽपत्तिरिष्यते । At XXII, 99 Bharata says that women are the source of all pleasure ! सुखस्य हि स्त्रियो मूलम् । Perhaps love was chosen as all-important by literary critics because in the drama, as in real life, it is its own reward. Cf. the lovely verse from Bhoja's *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* V. 74 :

yad eva rocate mahyaṃ tad eva kurute priyā /
iti vetti, na jānāti tat priyaṃ yat karoti sā //

" He thinks : " My beloved does whatever pleases me. " He does not know that whatever she does is (automatically) pleasant. "

P. 16, fn. 2: By oversight, we omitted the translation of the first three lines of the Skt. text from the A. Bh. Here they are: " Only those (spectators) whose hearts are like a clean mirror do not, at the time of watching a play (*tatra*), come under the influence of emotions like anger, infatuation, sexual desire, etc., which are (emotions only) appropriate to everyday life, (and not to the changes we undergo when watching a drama). For those (self-controlled people), when they listen to the ten types of drama, the collection of *rasas* (i. e. the various *rasas*) presented by means of dramatic representation (i. e. presented in a drama — *nāṭyalakṣaṇaḥ*) and

perceived through aesthetic experience consisting in generalised (i. e. depersonalised) imaginative delight (*rasanā*) is of course quite evident (*sphuṭa eva*). But for those who are not able to control their everyday emotions...

P. 18, line 13: Abhinava quotes the following definition of *pratibhā* in the Locana, p. 91: *pratibhā apūravastunirmāṇakṣamā prajñā.* "Imagination is that form of intelligence which is able to create new things."

P. 20, line 15: We wonder though, if it is not possible to interpret the words *sāmānyaguṇayogena* in the line: *yadi kāvyārthasaṃśritair vibhāvānubhāvavyañjitair ekonapañcāśadbhāvaiḥ sāmānyaguṇayogenābhiniṣpadyante rasās tat kathaṃ sthāyina eva bhāvā rasatvam āpnuvanti,* found in the NŚ, VII. after verse 7 (p. 349, Vol. I of the G. O. S. ed.), as a reference to *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa.* It would be most interesting to see how Abhinava comments on this line. Unfortunately, his commentary on the 7th Adhyāya has not been found yet.

P. 22, line 1: Note Abhinava in Vol. III. p. 124 of the A. Bh. on the *paramātman* and drama.

P. 24, fn. 3, line 11: Cf. A. Bh. Vol. III. p. 309: *yat tu bhaṭṭanāyakenoktaṃ "siddher api naṭāder aṅgatvaṃ vrajantyās tatpakṣe 'yam iti" tena nāṭyāṅgatā samarthitaphalañ ca puruṣārthatvād iti kevalaṃ jaiminir anuṣṛta ity alam anena.*

P. 29, line 16: This is an error on our part for which we apologise. What Professor Pandey actually wrote (in a personal letter to Mr. Masson, May 1, 1969) is: "Bhāskara Kaṇṭha, the author of the commentary *Bhāskarī* on the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī of Abhinavagupta wrote a long commentary on it, the fragment of which I saw in Srinagar which his descendants possess."

P. 34, fn. 1: Ānandavardhana, on p. 487 of the D. Āl. quotes a stanza which earlier writers claimed to be an example of *vyājastuti* (which Ānanda rejects, since there can be no *guṇībhūtavyaṅgyatā* in V. and Ānanda regards this verse as an ex. of *aprastutaprāśaṃsā*). On page 489 he says that the stanza is commonly attributed to Dharmakīrti: *tathā cāyaṃ dharmakīrteḥ śloka iti prasiddhiḥ.* He then goes on to say that that is perfectly possible in the light of another stanza (which he quotes) that is definitely (Locana: *nirvivādatadīyaśloka*) by Dharmakīrti.

P. 34. fn. 1, line 10: *Tat tanmataparīkṣāyāṃ granthāntare nirūpayiṣyāmaḥ* means: "We will deal with this in another work, in the examination of the Buddhist views". Now the most usual way of understanding this is to assume that Ānanda wrote a general work of philosophy (like the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*), in which he examined critically several different philoso-

phies. Abhinava's remarks, which are based on first-hand knowledge, are confusing. Dharmottara wrote a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya called the Viniścayaṭīkā, that has been preserved in the Tibetan Tanjur, though not in Sanskrit (see *Dharmottarapradīpa*, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. II, Patna, 1955 – We are indebted to Professor J. W. de Jong for this information). *Vivṛti* can either mean" an explanation" in general, or it can be an actual commentary (e. g. *Nāṭyavedavivṛti*, and *Pratyabhijñāvivṛti*). We could translate Abhinava's remarks as follows : " Another work " refers to the commentary (vivṛti) called *Dharmottarī* on the *Viniścayaṭīkā* by the author of this work (i. e. the D. Āl., that is, Ānandavardhana). This (issue) has been explained in that work. " Or Dharmottarī could be the name of the commentary on the Viniścaya (i.e. Darmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya). In this case the meaning would be : " That issue has been discussed in the gloss which was written by this author (namely Ānanda) on the Dharmottarī, a commentary on the Viniścaya. " This would mean that Ānanda wrote an actual commentary on a Buddhist text. To our knowledge, there is no commentary by a Hindu writer on a Buddhist text. The work, therefore, would be unique. But we have seen that much of what Ānandavardhana did was unique, and this need not deter us from explaining the lines in the manner we have. Jacobi (ZDMG Vol. 57, p. 328) writes : Nach Abhinavagupta in Niścayaṭīkā, bei der Erklärung der Dharmottarā. Es scheint nämlich *dharmottamāyā* statt *dharmottamāyām* gelesen werden zu müssen. " The reading *dharmottamāyā* is found in the KM ed. of the D. Āl. (1935 ed.)

P. 46, fn. 1 : Note that Viśvanātha speaks of this Nārāyaṇa as being his great-great grandfather (*vṛddhaprapitāmaha* i. e. *prapitamahapitā*) SD. III. 2–3.

P. 51, line 12 : cf. NŚ XIX. 146 (Vol. III, p. 80) :

yasmāt svabhāvaṃ santyajya sāṅgopāṅgagatikramaiḥ /
prayujyate jñāyate ca tasmād vai nāṭakaṃ smṛtam //

P, 53, Note that Abhinava in the A. Bh. Vol. III. p. 124, remarks that the spectator does not think he is watching an actor, but feels it is the original character he is watching : *prekṣakapakṣe na naṭābhimānas, tatra hi rāmābhimāna iti darśayati.*

P. 99, last line of text : In the A. Bh. *śāntarasaprakaraṇa*, Abhinava twice (once in the case of the *jātyaṃśakas* and again for the *Ḍima*) justifies the fact that Bharata does not mention *śāntarasa* separately. But we find it curious that Abhinava is silent on the many passages where Bharata speaks of all eight *rasas* but omits *śānta*. For instance : in XX. 72, Vol. III. p. 105, Bharata mentions the different *Vṛttis* as they apply to each *rasa*. *Śānta* is

not mentioned, nor does Abhinava defend its omission. In chapter XVII verses 128–129, the various forms of *kāku* are mentioned for each rasa, excluding *śānta*, and again Abhinava (Vol. II. p. 396) has no explanation. The same is true of XVII 103–104, where the *svaras* are mentioned for each *rasa*, and Vol. II, p. 398, where the *pāṭhas* are given for each *rasa*, excluding *śānta*.

P. 139, fn, 2 line: This might refer to a *pāṭhāntara* of the NŚ text itself.

P. 145, line : We drop *nanu* as in the NSP ed. of the Daśarūpaka.

P. 150, note 3 : We cannot agree with Dr. Raghavan and the late S. K. De when they hold that Dhanika did not allow *śāntarasa* even in poetry. We think he did. Clearly both scholars have followed the NSP edition, which reads, in the *avataraṇikā* to verse 45 (ch. VI) nanu before śāntarasasya (as well as anabhidheyatvāt in place of anabhineyatvāt), which would turn this passage into the words of the Pūrvapakśin. Thus the final phrase : kāvyaviṣayatvaṃ na nivāryate is the position of the Pūrvapakṣin. Now comes the difficulty : who speaks the words *atas tad ucyate*? If we suppose that this is the Pūrvapakṣin, who is seeking support in the line of Dhanañjaya, then the pūrvapakṣa must continue with śānto hi yadi tāvat up till svādayitāraḥ santi. But these two positions are contradictory : in the first part, śānta is admitted in poetry, and in the second part it is excluded. So the words *atas tad ucyate* must be the words of Dhanika. But this also makes bad sense, because if Dhanika is responding to the pūrvapakṣa, he would be interpreting verse 45 to mean that there is no śāntarasa at all. In that case, what would the words at the end of the paragraph: taduktyaiva śāntarasāsvādo nirūpitaḥ mean? Obviously they are meant to establish some sort of existence for śāntarasa. In view of these arguments, we feel that the reading nanu is not correct, since it seems to us clear, both from our interpretation of VI. 45, and from the concluding lines of the *Avaloka* thereon, that Dhanika did accept śāntarasa in poetry. Without nanu, the *avataraṇikā* is by Dhanika himself, and is meant to introduce the notion of śāntararasa in kāvya. Atas tad ucyate follows most logically : "Therefore, the following is said:". Now the words śānto hi yadi tāvat represent Dhanika's objections to the description of śāntarasa given in the verse na yatra duḥkham etc. He ends his objection by saying: na ca tathābhūtasya śāntarasasya sahṛdayāḥ svādayitāraḥ santi, "There are no sensitive readers who could enjoy such a śāntarasa." In the Gujerati Press ed. the next words are athāpi, namely, "nonetheless", i. e. in spite of this definition of śāntarasa, we can admit its existence by understanding it to be, not an indescribable state, but one in which there is muditā etc. In other words, Dhanika accepts

śāntarasa, but he refuses to characterise it as negative the way the definition he quotes does. The reading of the NSP ed., simply *atha*, makes bad sense, for this would have to be part of the pūrvapakṣa, which would, in that case, never be answered by the siddhānta. It is clear from IV. 45, that Dhanañjaya accepted some form of śāntarasa. We accept the reading anirvācya, since nirvācya would mean simply: It can be defined, or explained. But if this is what Dhanañjaya felt, why did he not mention it among the 8 sthāyibhāvas? The reason is that it follows automatically, since it consists of muditā etc., which are the same as vistara, vikāsa, etc. which were already mentioned in IV. 43, and so there is no need to mention it separately. This is what is meant by anirvācya. If Raghavan and De are correct, how would they explain the line in the Avaloka : taduktyaiva śāntarasāsvādo nirūpitaḥ, which clearly indicates that śāntarasa can be aesthetically enjoyed ?

INDEX

References are to page numbers, with n after a number indicating that it is found in the notes. All entries are according to the Roman alphabet. Diacritical marks are ignored. Thus, s, ṣ and ś will all be found under s.

ERRATA

Page	*Line*	*For*	*Read*
I	fn. 2, line 8	Sanskvit	Sanskrit
I	fn. 2, line 17	Philosohhy	Philosophy
II	13	Vakrotkijivita	Vakroktijivita
VI	fn. 1, line 5	consgined	consigned
X	9	dessicate	desiccate
XI	30	hierachy	hierarchy
XIV	fn. 3, line 3	Locanu	Locana
7	1	fulfill	fulfil
11	2	love-makiug	love-making.
15	30	perosn	person
17	fn. 1, line 4	p. 1937	p. 57, 1937.
17	fn. 2, line 1	E. I.	E. g.
18	fn. 4, line 4	Add a daṇḍa after kāvyam	
21	8	was	were
19	fn. 2, line 3	Śūtra	Sūtra
27	25	fas	far
29	1	Trantric	Tantric
38	18	Dhanyaśloka	Dhānyaśloka
40	21	bocomes	becomes
46	32	सच्छाआइं	सच्छआइँ
49	15	now	not
49	28	सातिशाये	सातिशये
53	20	*mūiabijasthāniyāḥ*	*mūlabijasthāniyaḥ*
62	5	तासामनादित्वं	तासामनादित्वम्
66	34	Should	should
63	30	ब्रह्मस्वाद	ब्रह्मास्वाद
68	16	Hiriyana	Hiriyanna
72	26	रसेनेति	रसनेति
72	45	हृद्य	हृद्यः
73	39	*saccidānauda*	*saccidānanda*
73	43	भट्टलोल्लटपक्षा	भट्टलोल्लटपक्षा–
77	37	प्रतिपोद्यत	प्रतिपाद्यते
83	23	the the	the
85	21	*ślokaracanārūpe*	*ślokaracanārūpe–*
85	22	*' tyarthaḥ*	*tyarthaḥ*
85	44–45	Drop the sentence	"Note the *Rasapradīpa* etc...."
88	19	take	takes

Page	Line	For	Read
88	24	*bhāvapraśāma*	*bhāvapraśama*
88	25	between, them	between them,
89	3	rcach	reach
92	35	thcse	these
93	28	*adhikṛtyo*	*adhikṛtya*
94	14	तृष्णा	तृष्णा
98	32	°जुगुप्सारुपत्वाद्	°जुगुप्सारूपत्वाद्
99	26	*Āryā* verses	*Āryā* verses and śloka verses
102	23	*grahanam*	*grahaṇam*
103	13	तेनादीर्ण	तेनोदीर्ण
109	18	संबंन्धः	संबन्धः
110	33	p. 310	p. 309
111	10	enjoyment (of pleasures)	experience (of pleasures and sufferings)
115	6	तावत्	तावत्
115	14	विस्पयमानस्य	विस्मयमानस्य
116	5	पृथग्	पृथग्
116	15	रूपम	रूपम्
116	22	औग्रथाम्	औग्रयम्
117	20	धर्मात	धर्मात्
118	2	शक्तिश्चेदिति	शक्तिश्चेति
118	22	शृङ्गारादीन	शृङ्गारादीन्
121	18	arouse	arouses
121	45	सम्यग्दर्शनसमवस्था	सम्यग्दर्शनसमावस्था
124	21	*vibhāva*	*vibhāvas*
133	8	gust[8]	gust[3]
136	43	°परिरक्षकेन	°परिरक्षकेण
143	11	dharmāvīra	dharmavīra
163	6	that	than
165	28	°संङ्गाद्यास्तथा	°सङ्गाद्यास्तथा
169	23	who say[4]	who say
169	25	accepted by others.	accepted by others.[4]
170	16	are	is
171	Foot Note 5	Raghavan's ed,	Raghavan's "Number of Rasas"
173	3	brought	brought about
191	5	*apūrava*	*apūrva*
193	13	Ch. VI	Ch. IV
193	27	VI. 45,	IV. 45,
193	37	words are	word is

Śiva's cosmic dance has no purpose. It is the spontaneous expression of overflowing bliss; it is art.

Abhinavagupta (10th cen.)

Descriptions of love-making among the gods may offend some people's notions of propriety, but if the poet is gifted with imaginative genius, the sensitive reader will not find them obscene.

Ānandavardhana (9th cen.)

This whole universe is no less a figment of one's imagination than is the world created in drama. Nor is it less beautiful.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka (10th cen)

There are poets, blind from birth, who see more deeply than the rest of us. Their eye of imagination never closes.

Rājaśekhara (9th cen.)

To respond deeply to literature and to understand one's own Self are the same thing.

Abhinavagupta.

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