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Utpaladeva’s Proof of God On the Purpose of the *Īśvarasiddhi**

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IN his short treatise entitled *Īśvarasiddhi* (ĪS),¹ Utpaladeva claims to prove the existence of God or the Lord (*īśvara*)² understood

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¹ Although the fifty-six stanzas of the ĪS and the *Vṛtti* thereon have aroused little scholarly interest so far, two important studies must be mentioned in this respect: Taber 1986, which summarizes the whole treatise and offers a very insightful philosophical analysis of it; and Krasser 2002, an excellent study of the Indian controversy over the existence of God that contains (pp. 149-58) a translation and analysis of some key passages in the ĪS.

² In the context of the proof of *īśvara*, the term “God” might seem most appropriate to the Western reader. Nonetheless I have kept the more literal term “Lord” in the translations at least, because *īśvara* designates first and foremost a person who has power or reigns over something (see, for example, ĪPVV III: 181-82: *yatra yad āyattam sa tatreśvaro rājeva nīje rājye* . . . “That on which something depends is the Lord of →

as an omnipotent and omniscient creator of the universe. As noted by John Taber and Helmut Krasser,³ this very goal seems to be at odds with Utpaladeva's own statement at the beginning of his *magnum opus*, the ĪPK, according to which the Lord can be neither proved nor refuted since it is always experienced in any conscious individual's self-awareness. Several passages scattered in the works of Utpaladeva and his commentator Abhinavagupta show that this should not be considered as a blatant contradiction, since according to them, the ĪS was not written from the ultimate point of view (*paramārtha*) of non-duality (*advaya*)⁴ adopted by Utpaladeva in his Pratyabhijñā works, but from the inferior point of view of duality, which several scholars have recognized as that of Nyāya. Nonetheless, these scant and allusive indications leave open a number of questions: is Utpaladeva's ĪS an original contribution to the Indian debate over the existence of God, or does it merely reformulate arguments put forward earlier? In what way(s) does Utpaladeva's method in the ĪS differ from that which he adopts in his ĪPK? And most of all: why did Utpaladeva take the trouble of writing a treatise that he himself did not consider as an expression of the ultimate truth?

← this [thing], as a king [who is the Lord] of his kingdom . . .”), and the various Indian authors quoted below often use the term in this sense (for an example of this use by Praśastapāda, see Chemparathy 1968: 84; cf. e.g. Rāmakaṇṭha's assertion that the potter is *īśvara* with respect to the pot in KV, p. 73).

³ See Taber 1986: 106-07; Krasser 2002: 149-50.

⁴ Abhinavagupta repeatedly calls the supporters of Utpaladeva's doctrine the “proponents of the non-duality with the Lord” (*īśvarādvayavādin*): see e.g. ĪPVV II: 122 or 129 (quoted in Ratié 2011a: 385, n 44 and 598-99, n 64). This non-duality is primarily to be understood as the identity of the individual's Self (*ātman*) with the Lord, but also as the absolute ontological dependence of the phenomenal world on *īśvara* conceived as an all-encompassing consciousness that creates the universe merely by taking on its various forms.

The Main Argument in the ĪS and Its Naiyāyika Sources

As already noted by several scholars,⁵ the proof establishing the existence of the Lord that Utpaladeva defends in the ĪS belongs to the Nyāya tradition. The argument is an inference “from the fact that [the universe] is an effect” (*kāryatvāt*) requiring a cause. More precisely, this inference is drawn from the fact that the universe is an effect consisting of a specific arrangement (*sanniveśaviśeṣa*) that must have been created by an intelligent agent (*buddhimatkarṭṛ*)⁶ considered as its efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*), as no material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) can account for this specific arrangement;⁷

⁵ See e.g. Taber 1986: 107; Torella 1994: 40; Krasser 2002: 151ff.

⁶ ĪS: 1: *tanukaraṇādikāryaṃ buddhimatkarṭṛpūrvakaṃ sanniveśa-viśeṣavattvāt, yad yat sanniveśaviśeṣavat tat tad buddhimatkarṭṛnirmitaṃ yathā ghaṭaḥ, buddhimatkarṭṛpūrvakaṃ yan na bhavati na tat sanniveśaviśeṣavatkāryaṃ yathā paramāṇvākāśaśaśaviśeṣānādi, tathā ca bhavati sanniveśaviśeṣavat tanvādikāryam, tasmād buddhimatkarṭṛpūrvakaṃ iti*. “An effect such as bodies, organs and so on presupposes an intelligent agent (*buddhimatkarṭṛ*), because it possesses a specific arrangement (*sanniveśaviśeṣa*). Whatever has a specific arrangement was created by an intelligent agent – a pot for instance [was created by a potter; whereas] that which does not presuppose an intelligent agent is not an effect endowed with a specific arrangement – for instance, atoms, space, [non-existing things such as] a rabbit's horn, etc. And thus, there is an effect [consisting of] bodies, etc., [namely, the universe], which possesses a specific arrangement; therefore it presupposes an intelligent agent.” See Krasser 2002: 150-51.

⁷ ĪS: 4: *tathā hi śarīre tāvad upādānakāraṇaṃ śukraśoṇitādi siddham. na cāśya tatsanniveśayogaḥ. cakṣuḥśrotrapāṇipādāder api tad evopādānam atatsanniveśi, bhuvanānām api pārthivādyartharacanātmakānām mṛdādyupādānam atatsanniveśy eva siddham, nātra kimcid durupādānam. lokayātrātrāṇahetuāpi śarīrādeḥ sarvavādisiddhaiva pratyakṣata eva. nātrāsthāne vistaropanyāsaḥ saphalaḥ. tataḥ siddha eva hetuḥ*. “To explain: in a body, to begin with, the material cause, such as sperm and blood, is established. Now, this [material cause

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and given the infinite complexity and internal harmony of the universe, this intelligent agent must be omniscient and omnipotent — i.e. it is God.⁸

This famous Nyāya line of argument apparently found its first formulation in the lost work of Aviddhakarṇa,⁹ and Uddyotakara,

← itself] is not endowed with the arrangement [that the body displays]. [Organs] too, such as the eye, ear, hand, foot and so on, have the same material cause which does not possess this arrangement. [And] worlds too, which consist of arrangements of things such as earth and so on, are established to possess a material cause such as earth which is absolutely devoid of this arrangement — in this regard there is nothing hard to demonstrate. And for all those participating in the debate, it is a [fact] established through mere perception that these bodies, etc. are causes that ensure the pursuit of worldly affairs: a long demonstration would be vain here at [such] an improper place. Therefore the reason [for inferring the Lord] is indeed established.”

⁸ ĪS: 4-5: *īśvarasiddhiparyavasānaś cāyaṁ sādhanārthaḥ. tanvādiṣu hi viśvāparaparyāyeṣu parasparānuguneṣu sarveṣu yāvaj jñānaṁ nāsti tāvat katham nirmitsā syād iti sarvajñatā tāvat sthitā, tathānirmāṇasāmarthyāc cānekatve pramāṇābhāvāc caikasya sarvakartṛtvam iti dharmiviśeṣasambandhaucityād īśvara eva buddhimān paryavasyati.* “And this point of the demonstration amounts to proving [the existence of] the Lord; for if [this inferred cause] had no knowledge of the bodies and so on, which are another expression for the [entire] universe and are all mutually adapted, how could [it] have any desire to create [them]? Therefore, first of all, the omniscience [of their creator] is established; and both because [only an omnipotent agent] is capable of such a creation and because there is no argument [proving] that there may be several [agents of the universe], the omnipotence of a single [agent is established too]. Therefore [this inferred] intelligent [agent] can only be the Lord Himself, because [the Lord only] can have a relationship with the particular subject of the inference (*dharmiviśeṣa*) [i.e. the effect that is the entire universe].”

⁹ See the fragment preserved in the TSP and mentioned as “put forward by Aviddhakarṇa” (*aviddhakarṇopanyasta*) in TSP_s:

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whom Abhinavagupta explicitly mentions as one of the Naiyāyika authors of the proof,¹⁰ alludes to the inference of *īśvara* from the fact that some natural entities are effects¹¹ and defends the

← 52: *dvīndriyagrāhyāgrāhyaṁ vimatyadhikaraṇabhāvāpannam buddhimatkāraṇapūrvakam, svārambhakāvayavasanniveśaviśiṣṭatvād ghaṭādivad vaidharmyeṇa paramāṇava iti.* “That which is either apprehended through two [different] sense-organs or not apprehended [by any sense-organ, and] which is the object of the debate, presupposes an intelligent cause, because it is particularized by an arrangement (*sanniveśaviśiṣṭa*) of the parts that cling together [so as to constitute this entity] itself, just as a pot; the atoms [stand] as a dissimilar example.” Cf. e.g. Vattanky 1984: 17; Krasser 1999: 216; 2002: 35-36, n 39 and p. 151. The reason why Aviddhakarṇa mentions that “which is the object of the debate” is probably that both parties (i.e. the proponents of theism as well as its opponents) acknowledge that human artefacts are created by a conscious agent and that uncomposed natural entities such as atoms are not, whereas they disagree on whether composite natural entities such as bodies are products of an intelligent agent. See NTT: 563: *trayo hi khalu bhāvā jagati bhavanti. prasiddhacetanakartṛkās ca yathā prāsādāttagopuratoriṇādayaḥ, prasiddhatadviparyayās ca yathā paramāṇvākāśādayaḥ, sandigdhatadanakartṛkās ca yathā tanutarumahīmādhārādayaḥ.* “For indeed, there are three [kinds of] entities in this world: [those] that are well known as having a conscious creator, such as palaces, watchtowers, gates, arches and so on; [those] that are well known as not [having such a conscious creator], such as atoms, space and so on; and [those] about which one doubts whether they have a conscious creator, such as bodies, trees, earth, mountains and so on.”

¹⁰ ĪPVV I: 40, quoted below, n 95.

¹¹ Note that in his commentary on NS IV.1.21, Uddyotakara does not use the inferential reason “because it is an effect” (*kāryatvāt*) to prove that the universe has *īśvara* as its efficient cause: rather, he has recourse to the inferential reason “because it is unconscious” (*acetanatvāt*) that he applies to matter, atoms and actions leading to karmic retribution (see below, n 71). Nonetheless, at the end of his lengthy commentary on this *sūtra*, he mentions Aviddhakarṇa’s argument

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thesis that natural entities endowed with specific arrangements (such as bodies) must have an efficient cause which, even though imperceptible, can be inferred on the grounds of their sharing similar features with human artefacts such as pots, since the latter display a specific arrangement (*racanāviśeṣa*, *saṁsthānaviśeṣa*)¹² and have a perceptible efficient cause, i.e. the potter.¹³ The same idea

← while trying to show that in fact the *kāryatvāt* argument formulated by his predecessor amounts to the one resting on the *acetanatvāt* inferential reason. See NV ad NS IV.1.21: 441: *evam kāryatvāt tṛṇādīni pakṣīkr̥tya darśanasparśanaviśayatvād iti vaktavyam. evam yatra yatra vipratipattiḥ kāryatvam ca tat tad* anenaiva nyāyenānena dṛṣṭāntena vāsyādīnā pakṣayitvā sādhyatavyam iti.* [**ca tat tad* NV_C: 957: *ca yat, tad* NV] “In the same way, when one takes grass and so on as the subject of the inference since [they] are effects [and] objects of vision and touch, one can say [that they are controlled by an intelligent agent]. [That is to say,] in the same way, when one takes as the subject of the inference whatever is the object of the debate and involves [the property of] being an effect, one can establish [that this object has the property of being controlled by an intelligent agent] through the same reasoning [, i.e. because of its being unconscious, by having recourse] to the example of the axe and so on, [which are unconscious entities requiring the control of an intelligent agent].” On the probable meaning of “whatever is the object of the debate” here, see above, n 9.

¹² As noted by H. Krasser, in his refutation of this proof Dharmakīrti uses the compound *saṁsthānaviśeṣa* found in the NV rather than *sanniveśa-viśeṣa*, which appears in Aviddhakarna’s fragment (see Krasser 1999: 216, n 7; 2002: 36, n 39; cf. below, n 32).

¹³ See NV ad NS IV.1.22, where Uddyotakara answers the objection according to which “just as a thorn’s sharpness for instance is devoid of efficient cause and [yet] endowed with a material cause, in the same way, in the case of the production of a body, etc., [there is no such thing as an efficient cause]” (*yathā kaṇṭakasya taikṣṇyādi nirmittam copādānavac ca, tathā śarīrādisarge ’pīti*, NV: 441-42). Uddyotakara explains (NV: 442): *kaḥ punar atra nyāyaḥ, animittaracanāviśeṣaḥ śarīrādayaḥ saṁsthānaviśeṣavattvāt kaṇṭakādivad iti. na, anupalabhyamānanimittānām anumānato nimittopalabdheḥ. yasya*

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was elaborated by later Naiyāyika authors who in all probability lived before Utpaladeva, such as Śaṅkarasvāmin and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, or who may have been younger or older contemporaries, such as Trilocana, Vācaspatimiśra or Bhāsarvajña.¹⁴ As for Utpaladeva’s contention that the efficient cause of the universe must be not only omnipotent but also omniscient due to the very nature of its effect, it can also be traced back to earlier, Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya sources such as Praśastapāda’s lost *Ṭikā* on the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras*¹⁵ or Jayanta

← *nimittam pratyakṣato nopalabhyate, tasyānumānato nimittam pratyetyam. kutaḥ – nimittavaddravyasāmānyāt. yāni khalu nimittavanti dravyāṇi saṁsthānaviśeṣavanti tāni ghaṭādīni. saṁsthānaviśeṣavac ca śarīram kaṇṭakādayaś ca. tasmāt te ’pi nimittavanta iti.* “But what is the reasoning [in the objection] here? [Answer:] the body and so on have specific arrangements that are devoid of efficient cause, because, just as a thorn for instance [that has no efficient cause,] they have a specific arrangement. [We answer the objection in the following way:] This is not [true], because the efficient cause of things whose efficient cause is not [directly] perceived can [still] be apprehended through inference: that whose efficient cause is not directly perceived has an efficient cause that can be acknowledged through inference. How? Because of its sharing a common feature (*sāmānya*) with [perceptible] substances that possess an efficient cause. Indeed, the substances that have a [perceptible] efficient cause possess a specific arrangement, pots for instance; and a body possesses a specific arrangement, and [so do] thorns and so on. Therefore they too have an efficient cause.”

¹⁴ On the presentation of the inference of *īśvara* by these authors, see Krasser 2002: 56-126. On the vexed question of relative chronology as regards Naiyāyika authors for the period covering the ninth to eleventh centuries, see e.g. Slaje 1986: Acharya 2006: xviii-xxviii; Muroya 2011.

¹⁵ See TSP_S: 55-56: *tathā cāhuḥ praśastamatiprabhṛtayaḥ: sakalabhuvanahetutvād evāsyā sarvajñatvam siddham, kartuḥ kāryopādānopakaraṇaprayojanasampradānaparijñānāt. iha hi yo yasya kartā bhavati sa tasyopādānādīni jānīte. yathā kulālah kumbhādīnām kartā tadupādānam mṛtpiṇḍam, upakaraṇāni*

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Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī*,¹⁶ and it is also found in Vācaspatimiśra's

← *ca cakrādīni, prayojanam udakāharaṇādi, kuṭumbinam ca sampradānam jānīta ity etat prasiddham; tatheśvaraḥ sakalabhuvanānām kartā, sa tadupādānāni paramāṇvādilaṅkaṇāni, tadupakaraṇāni dharmādharmadikkālādīni, vyavahāropakaraṇāni sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyalakṣaṇāni, prayojanam upabhogaṃ sampradānasamjñakāmś ca puruṣāñ jānīta ity ataḥ siddham asya sarvajñatvam iti.* "And thus, Praśastamati [= Praśastapāda] and [others] have said the following. 'Because the [Lord] is the cause of all worlds, his omniscience is established, because an agent has the full knowledge of the effect, the material cause, the instrumental causes, the purpose and the recipients [of the created object]. For in this [world], the agent of [something] knows this [thing]'s material cause and so on. Just as it is well known that a potter, who is the agent of e.g. pots, knows their material cause, [i.e.] the lump of clay, [their] instrumental causes, [i.e.] the wheel and so on, [their] purpose, [i.e.] containing water and so on, and [their] recipient, [i.e.] someone in charge of the household; in the same way, the Lord, who is the agent of all worlds, knows their material causes, which consist of the atoms and so on, their instrumental causes, [i.e.] merit and demerit, space, time and so on, the instrumental causes of usage (*vyavahāra*) that consist of generality, particularity and inherence, the purpose, [i.e.] the experience [of pleasure and pain], and men, who are designated as the recipients. Therefore the [Lord]'s omniscience is established.'" This fragment probably comes from Praśastapāda's lost *Ṭīkā* (see Chemparathy 1968: 78ff; Bronkhorst 1996a: 285). On the name Praśastamati, see Chemparathy 1970: 249ff.

¹⁶ See NM_{IS}: 98: *yathā ca kulālaḥ sakalakalaśādikāryakalāpotpattisamvidhānaprayojanādyabhijñā bhavaṃs tasya kāryacakrasya kartā, tatheyatas trailokyasya niravadhiprāṇisukhaduḥkhasādhanasya sṛṣṭisamhārasamvidhānam saprayojanam bahuśāstram jānann eva sraṣṭā bhavitum arhati maheśvaraḥ. tasmāt sarvajñah.* "And just as a potter is the agent of all effects [such as pots, etc.] while knowing how to produce all the effects that are dishes and so on, for what purpose [they are], and so on; in the same way, the Great Lord can be the [universal] creator only [if he] knows how to create and destroy these three worlds

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*Nyāyakaṇikā*¹⁷ or Udayana's *Āmatattvaviveka*.¹⁸

The Mīmāṃsaka and Buddhist Objections

The ĪS defends this inference of *īśvara* against Mīmāṃsaka and Buddhist objections. Utpaladeva thus quotes a passage from the ŚV where Kumārila shows that the example of a specific arrangement on which the proponent of God's existence relies (i.e. the pot, which is observed to require the agency of a potter) is problematic: either the pot is considered as the product of the potter (but then the example shows that a specific arrangement is the product of a finite, perishable entity such as a potter instead of proving God's agency, so that the reason invoked is contradictory), or the pot is considered as the product of *īśvara* (but then the example actually lacks the property to be proven since nobody has ever seen God create a pot, and the reason invoked is inconclusive).¹⁹

← which produce pleasure and pain in the innumerable living beings, as well as what the purpose [of these creations and destructions] is, [and] the numerous sciences [required for such an activity]; therefore he is omniscient."

¹⁷ See NKaṇ: 151, quoted below, n 48.

¹⁸ See ĀTV: 410-11; Chemparathy 1972: 166-67.

¹⁹ See ĪS: 6, quoting ŚV, *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 79-80ab: *kumbhakārādyadhiṣṭhānam ghaṭādaḥ yadi ceṣyate* | neśvarādhiṣṭhitatvaṃ syād asti cet sādhyahīnatā || yathāsiddhe ca dṛṣṭānte bhaved dhetor viruddhatā |* [*ceṣyate corr.: veṣyate ĪS (cf. Krasser 1999: 220, n 17)]. "Moreover, if [you] consider that in [the case of] the pot for instance, the controlling agency (*adhiṣṭhāna*) is that of the potter for instance, [then the effects endowed with such a specific arrangement] cannot be controlled by the Lord: if [you consider that they] are [governed by the Lord, then the example] lacks the property to be proven (*sādhyahīnatā*); but if [you understand] the example as it is [normally] understood (*yathāsiddha*), [i.e. if you admit that the controlling agent of the pot is the potter and not the Lord, then] the reason must be contradictory (*viruddha*)." See Taber 1986: 111; Krasser 2002: 220.

Utpaladeva also quotes Dharmakīrti,²⁰ who, while apparently building on Kumāṛila's criticism of the proof,²¹ argues that one can only infer a particular agent from a particular specific arrangement that has previously been observed to be causally dependent on this particular agent — otherwise one could infer that an anthill is the product of a potter from the mere fact that an anthill is also made of clay.²² According to the Buddhist philosopher, the theist's inferential reason is too broad since it appeals to the notion of "specific arrangement" in general, a notion which rests on a mere "verbal similarity" (*śabdasāmya*),²³ instead of referring to particular,

²⁰ On Dharmakīrti's criticism of the inference of *īśvara*, see e.g. Oberhammer 1965: 10-22; Vattanky 1984: 33-39; Jackson 1986; Krasser 1999, 2002: 19ff.

²¹ See Krasser 1999.

²² Utpaladeva thus quotes PV, *Pramāṇasiddhipariccheda* 11 and 13 in ĪS: 8-9: *siddham yādr̥g adhiṣṭhātṛbhāvābhāvānuvṛttimat | sanniveśādi tad yuktam tasmād yad* anumīyate || anyathā kumbhakāreṇa mṛdvikārasya kasyacit | ghaṭādeḥ karaṇāt sidhyed valmikasyāpi tatkr̥tiḥ ||* [**tasmād yad* corr.: *yasmād tad* ĪS] "[Only a controlling agent] inferred from e.g. a [particular] arrangement such that it is established to [exist or not] according to whether a [particular] controlling agent exists or not is correct[ly inferred]. Otherwise, an anthill too would be established to be the [potter]'s creation on the grounds that a particular modification of clay such as a pot is produced by the potter." On these verses see Krasser 2002: 23ff.

²³ PV, *Pramāṇasiddhipariccheda* 12: *vastubhede prasiddhasya śabdasāmyād abhedinaḥ | na yuktānumitiḥ pāṇḍuravyād iva hutāśane ||* "The inference of [something] well known is not right [when it occurs] on account of [something else] that [seems to have] no difference [with a valid reason] due to a [mere] verbal similarity (*śabdasāmya*), whereas [in fact] there is a difference as regards the real entities (*vastu*) [designated by the same words] — for instance, [the inference] of fire on account of [the presence of] a white substance [is not right, since smoke and snow, while being both called 'white substances', are different]." See Krasser 1999: 217; Krasser 2002: 24ff. Utpaladeva was apparently alluding to this verse (and to the notion of

concrete instances of specific arrangements.²⁴

Utpaladeva's Reply to the Mīmāṃsaka and Buddhist Objections

Utpaladeva salvages the inference from Kumāṛila's criticism by explaining that in fact the inference does not establish any particular agent (such as a potter or God), but merely shows the necessary concomitance of any entity possessing a specific arrangement with a cause conceived of as an intelligent being in general (*buddhimanmātra*).²⁵ This means that Kumāṛila cannot rightly compel his opponent to face the alternative between the potter and God as particular causes of a particular arrangement.²⁶ Utpaladeva adds that nonetheless, this inferred notion of an intelligent being in general is particularized by its very relationship with the particular effect from which it is inferred.²⁷ Thus upon seeing smoke over a

← *śabdasāmya* in particular) in his lost *Vivṛti*, albeit in a different context: see ĪPVV II: 165; ĪPV I: 190-91 (for an analysis of these passages see Ratié 2011b: 494-98).

²⁴ See Taber 1986: 115.

²⁵ See ĪS: 5: *tathā hi sanniveśaviśeṣasya buddhimanmātreṇānvayaḥ pradarśyate, na tu buddhimadviśeṣeṇa kumbhakāreṇeśvareṇa vā*. "To explain: [the inference] demonstrates the [invariable] co-presence (*anvaya*) of a specific arrangement with an intelligent being in general (*buddhimanmātra*), and not [its invariable co-presence] with a particular intelligent being (*buddhimadviśeṣa*) that would be either the potter or the Lord."

²⁶ See ĪS: 6 (immediately before quoting Kumāṛila): *evam ihāpi neśvareṇa buddhimatā kumbhakāreṇa vānvayapradarśanam yato'siddhānvayatādidoṣodbhāvanam kriyate*. "In the same way, in the case [of the inference of the Lord] as well, [the inference involves] no demonstration of the [invariable] co-presence [of a specific arrangement] with either an intelligent Lord or a potter, since [if it were the case,] this would lead to the fault [consisting of] the fact that the [invariable] co-presence is not established, etc."

²⁷ See ĪS: 5: *tat tu sāmānyarūpaṁ na viśeṣasambandham vinā sthitim* →

forest of *khadira* trees, we infer the presence there of fire in general, but the general concept of fire is then legitimately particularized as a special type of fire (i.e. a *khadira* fire) because we see that the smoke is located in a *khadira* forest, so that the particular substrate (*āśraya*) of this fire in general can only be a *khadira* fire.²⁸ In the same way, in the case of the inference of *īśvara*, we infer a cause merely conceived of as an intelligent being in general, but we are then led to specify this cause as being God himself due to the specific property of the subject of the inference (*pakṣadharmā*),²⁹

← *labhata iti pakṣasambandhaucityānusāreṇa vyaktiviśeṣaṁ kulālaṁ kuvindam īśvaram anyam vāpy āśrayaviśeṣam āśrayatvenāvalambate.* “Nonetheless, this general form (*sāmānyarūpa*) is not established without a relationship with a particular (*viśeṣasambandha*). Therefore [in such an inference we] rely on a particular individual (*vyaktiviśeṣa*), [i.e.] a potter, a weaver, the Lord or any other particular substrate [that we use] as a substrate [for the inferred general form] according to whether [this particular individual] is appropriate for a relationship with the subject of the inference (*pakṣa*).” Cf. Krasser 2002: 151-52.

²⁸ See ĪS: 5: *yathā dhūmamātreṇa dūrāt khadiravane 'gnimātre 'py anumīyamāne khādiratvaviśeṣo dhūmaviśeṣānapekṣayāpy āśrayavaśāt prasiddhyati.* “Just as, when inferring merely fire in general from smoke in general [because we see smoke] in the distance in a forest of *khadiras*, [we] are well aware of the [fire's] particularity that is [the property of] being of a *khadira* type, regardless of the particular smoke, due to the substrate (*āśraya*) [that is appropriate for a relationship with the forest of *khadiras* which is the subject of the inference] . . .” Cf. Taber 1986: 109-10. Utpaladeva also takes as an example of inference the Sāṃkhya teleological argument that aims at proving the existence of the Self from the fact that things are “for the benefit of another” (*parārtha*). On this inference, see Watson 2006: 192-202; Eltschinger and Ratié 2013: 152-72. On Utpaladeva's use of this Sāṃkhya argument here, see Taber 1986: 110.

²⁹ See ĪS 8-9: *na kulālena neśenāpy anvayo 'tra pradarśyate | yato viruddhatāsyā syād asiddhānvayatāpi vā || kevalam buddhimanmātravyāptisaṃdarśanād api | pakṣadharmabalād dhīmān kvacit kaścit pratīyate ||* “In this [inference of the Lord, what

i.e. due to the specific nature of the effect that is the universe, since only an omnipotent and omniscient entity could be the cause of such a complex and harmonious structure.³⁰ And in the inference of God as well as in the inference of the *khadira* fire, the cause is not particularized through any additional means of knowledge, but through the very inferential mechanism that has first led us to assume the existence of a cause in general,³¹ so that the proponent of *īśvara* cannot be accused of being unable to prove more than the fact that the universe has some unspecified cause.³²

← we] demonstrate is not the [invariable] co-presence [of a specific arrangement] with the potter, nor is it [the invariable co-presence of this specific arrangement] with the Lord, since [if it were so,] either the [reason] would be contradictory, or the [invariable] co-presence would not be established [in the example]. Nonetheless, [we] acknowledge [the existence of] a particular intelligent [entity] in a particular [case], although [we gain this knowledge] by demonstrating [only] the invariable concomitance [of a specific arrangement] with an intelligent being in general, by virtue of a [particular] property [belonging to] the subject of the inference (*pakṣadharmabalāt*).” Cf. Krasser 2002: 153.

³⁰ See ĪS: 6: *anyonyopayogitanukaraṇādīsarvakriyāiveśvaratvaṁ yathā mṛtsanniveśaviśeṣakarṭṛtaiva kulālatvam.* “Being the Lord (*īśvaratva*) is nothing but creating everything, [i.e.] bodies, organs and so on, which help each other [in the performance of their respective functions], just as being a potter is nothing but creating a specific arrangement from clay.”

³¹ See ĪS: 6: *tena yathā dhūmenāgniḥ sāmānyena kvacit pradeśe sādhyamānas tatpradeśādhāraviśiṣṭaḥ sāmāthyāt sidhyati na tu tatra pramāṇāntaram upayujyate, tatheśvarasādhane 'pi.* “Therefore a fire, when demonstrated [to exist] as [a fire] in general in a particular place thanks to [the presence of] smoke, is proved by implication (*sāmāthyāt*) [to exist as a fire] particularized by the substrate that is this [particular] place, while no other means of knowledge is used [to prove] this [particularity], in the same way, in the demonstration of the Lord as well [, no additional means of knowledge is needed to prove that the intelligent cause in general is the Lord].”

³² This accusation had been put forward by Kumārila, who had argued

As for Dharmakīrti's criticism, Utpaladeva responds to it by saying that indeed, we infer the existence of a particular intelligent cause (e.g. a potter) from that of a particular specific arrangement (e.g. a pot) when we can observe their invariable concomitance, but that the particular arrangement thus established to be an effect enables us in turn to establish that other particular arrangements of the same kind (*sajātīya*) are also effects of an intelligent cause, just as a particular smoke that has been established by experience to be an effect of fire enables us to consider other particular instances of smoke as effects of fire even though we cannot actually witness the particular fires causing them.³³ Admittedly, the particulars that

← that if the theist merely intends to prove that the universe has a cause in general, he only proves what his opponents too already admit, since the Mīmāṃsakas consider that the specific arrangement of the universe is determined by the individuals' past actions and their karmic retribution. See ŚV, *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 75: *kasyacid dhetumātratvam yady adhiṣṭhātṛteṣyate* | *karmabhiḥ sarvajīvānām tatsiddheḥ siddhasāadhanam* || "If [what] you mean [when talking about] the fact that something is a controlling agent [of the universe] is [merely] the fact that it is a cause in general (*hetumātra*) [of the universe], [then you only] prove what is [already] established [for us too] (*siddhasādhana*), since [we consider that] this [causality in general] is established through the [past] actions (*karman*) of all living beings." As shown in Krasser 1999, this criticism (or at least a very similar one) was appropriated by Dharmakīrti and is mentioned in PV, *Pramāṇasiddhipariccheda* 10: *sthitvāpravṛttisamsthānaviśeṣārthakriyādiṣu* | *iṣṭasiddhir asiddhir vā dṛṣṭānte samśayo 'thavā* || "[The opponents' inferential reasons] such as 'activity after a rest', 'a specific arrangement' and 'fulfilling a purpose' contain [logical faults in so far as they] prove what is already admitted [by us too] (*iṣṭasiddhi*), or [what they must prove] is not established in the example, or there [remains] a doubt [regarding the inferential reasons]." See also Krasser 2002: 22ff.

³³ ĪS: 8: *na cāpi ghaṭādisvalakṣaṇaviśiṣṭa* eva sanniveśaḥ pramāṇena siddha iti sa evānyatra dharmīṇy adṛṣṭakartṛke dṛṣṭasajātīyakam eva kartāraṁ sādhayati na tu sanniveśanāmātram, tasya sāmānyarūpasya kāryatvasiddher iti vācyam; yataḥ svalakṣaṇam eva yady api* →

display a specific arrangement differ from each other (a pot is neither an anthill nor a cloth, etc.) in so far as some of the causes contributing to their production are different, but they are also similar in some respects, i.e. in so far as they share some causal conditions: a pot is similar to an anthill in so far as both have the same material cause, namely clay,³⁴ and since the Buddhists themselves

← *svalakṣaṇāpekṣayā darśanādarśanābhyām kāryam pratīyate, tathāpi tat**svalakṣaṇam kāryatvena tathā siddham sajātīyasvalakṣaṇāntarāny api tatkāraṇasajātīyasvalakṣaṇāntarakāryatvena vyavasthāpayati, yathā sakṛd apy eko dhūmo 'gnikāryatayā siddho dhūmāntarāny apy agnikāryatvena***siddhāny eva karoti.* [**ghaṭādisvalakṣaṇaviśiṣṭa* em. Krasser 2002: 154: *ghaṭādisvalakṣaṇo viśiṣṭa* ĪS. ***tat* em. Krasser ibid.: *tat tathā* ĪS. *** *agnikāryatvena* em. Krasser ibid.: *agnikāryatve* ĪS]. "Moreover, one cannot say[, as Dharmakīrti does:] 'since an arrangement is established [to be an effect] by a [valid] means of knowledge only [if it is] particularized (*viśiṣṭa*) as a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) such as a pot, with respect to another subject of inference whose agent is not perceived, this same [arrangement consisting of a particular merely] proves [the existence of] an agent that [can] only [be] of the same sort (*sajātīya*) as the perceived [one], and not an arrangement in general (*sanniveśanāmātra*), because that which consists of a generality (*sāmānya*) cannot be established to be an effect [, so that it is illegitimate to infer the agency of *īśvara* by analogy with that of the potter.' One cannot say that,] because even though one only grasps an effect that is a particular through the perception and non-perception [that establish invariable concomitance] with respect to a[nother] particular, nonetheless, this particular that is thus established to be an effect establishes in turn other particulars of the same sort (*sajātīya*) as being effects [consisting of] other particulars having a cause of the same sort as the [first particular], just as a single [particular instance of] smoke, even though [it occurs] only once, is established to be an effect of fire [and thus] enables [us] to establish that other [particular instances of] smoke as well are effects of fire." See Taber 1986: 115-16; Krasser 2002: 153-55.

³⁴ ĪS: 8: *tac ca kāryasvalakṣaṇam anekasahakārijanyatayānekavidhasvalakṣaṇāntaraiḥ sajātīyam. tathā ca* →

acknowledge the distinction between material and efficient cause, they must admit these partial similarities.³⁵ Besides, while denying the reality of universals (*jāti*), the Buddhists acknowledge that particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) are similar in so far as they have the same causal efficiency. Now, although we are aware that a pot and a cloth do not have the same specific arrangement, we make efforts to use them as tools because we conceptualize these objects as capable of accomplishing a specific purpose, and we are aware of this purpose because we are aware that both the pot and the cloth were designed to this end by an intelligent agent.³⁶ Since such particulars as the

← *ghaṭasvalakṣaṇaṃ mṛṇmayatvena valmīkādhīḥ, sanniveśena paṭādhīḥ, parivartulatvena piṣṭādimayaśarāvādhīḥ vicchinnavatvena cchinnavṛkṣādhīḥ ity evamādinā krameṇaikaika-jātiyuktāni svalakṣaṇāny ekaikakāraṇakāryāṇi vyavasthāpyante.* “And this particular [established to be] an effect is of the same sort as the other particulars, [although] they are not of the same sort in so far as they are produced by cooperating [causes] (*sahakārin*) that differ. And thus, the particular that is a pot [is of the same sort] as [particulars] such as an anthill in so far as it is made of clay; [it is of the same sort] as [particulars] such as a cloth in so far as it has a [specific] arrangement; [it is of the same sort] as [particulars] such as a bowl full of flour for instance in so far as it is round; [and it is of the same sort] as a cut tree for instance in so far as it is separated [from other things]. It is in such ways that particulars belonging to this or that kind (*ekaikajāti*) are established to be effects of this or that cause.” See Taber 1986: 116; Krasser 2002: 155.

³⁵ *ĪS: 8: tajjātiyārthitāyās tajjātiyakāraṇopādānāya saugatāir apīyaṃ vyavasthā kṛtā, na mṛdaḥ saṁsthānaṃ na kulālān mṛdrūpatety evaṃ vadadbhīḥ.* “The Buddhists themselves, when saying ‘[the pot’s] arrangement does not [come] from clay, the [pot’s property of] consisting of clay does not [come] from the potter’, make such a distinction out of their desire to find [effects] of the same kind so as to grasp causes of the same kind.”

³⁶ *ĪS: 8: vastusthitiś cedṛśy eva, na hi yathā ghaṭaḥ saṁsthānavān buddhimatā puruṣeṇa niyatena tathā paṭo 'pi. tathaiva tu* pratītir ubhayatrāpi prājñakṛtatvapratīter upayogāya ca pravṛttir ity evaṃ* →

pot and the cloth are capable of producing the same awareness in us in spite of their differences, in this respect they have the same causal efficiency, and the Buddhists should accordingly admit their (partial) similarity.³⁷ Natural composite entities display a specific arrangement in which each part is arranged in such a way that it helps the other parts perform their respective functions; and this invariable harmony (for instance between man and woman) is similar to that found in any artefact that we have observed to be designed by an intelligent being; we are therefore entitled to infer that they too were produced by an intelligent agent.³⁸

← *vyavasāya eva**.* [**tu conj.: ca ĪS. **vyavasāya eva em.* Krasser 2002: 154: *vyavasāyaiva ĪS*]. “And the establishment of things [in practical existence occurs] in the same way. For a cloth does not have an arrangement [produced] by a specific intelligent person in the same way as a pot does [, since they differ as regards material or instrumental causes]; yet in both cases, [we] grasp [them] in the same way [as being arrangements produced by a specific intelligent person,] and [we] make effort so as to use [both the pot and the cloth precisely] because we grasp [both of them] as products of an intelligent [cause]: this is exactly [how] determination (*vyavasāya*) occurs.” See Krasser 2002: 155-56.

³⁷ *ĪS: 8: kevalaṃ teṣāṃ pareṣāṃ saugatānāṃ yathā sajātiyatvaṃ jātyā vinaivāvaśyābhyupagantavyaṃ ekapratyayakāritvaṃ svalakṣaṇaniṣṭhaṃ eva tathaivaitad apīti.* “Nonetheless, these Buddhist opponents must necessarily acknowledge that [pots and clothes] are of the same kind [in this respect], even though [they] refuse [to acknowledge the existence per se of] the universal (*jāti*), [when they acknowledge that the pot and the cloth] produce the same apprehension [in so far as they are both grasped as products of an intelligent agent, and when they acknowledge that the production of this same apprehension] rests exclusively on a particular [and not on a universal. Therefore] in the same way, [they must necessarily acknowledge] the [fact that the causes] too [must be of the same kind, i.e. intelligent agents].”

³⁸ *ĪS: 9: ity avyabhicāry eva sanniveśaḥ strīpumsāder ivānyonya-sādhārthakriyānugūnyādiviśeṣitas tanvāder īśvarakartṛtāsādhana iti.* “Therefore the invariable arrangement particularized by the harmony →

The Naiyāyika Sources of Utpaladeva's Reply to the Buddhists and Mīmāṃsakas

How original are Utpaladeva's responses to these antitheistic attacks? John Taber has noticed that Utpaladeva seems to rely on Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī*.³⁹ Indeed, Jayanta replies to Dharmakīrti that in fact God can be inferred as a cause in general since all inferences involve some kind of generality: if we clung to the various particularities of the fire and smoke directly witnessed (e.g. in a kitchen) when first realizing the invariable concomitance between fire and smoke, we would be incapable of inferring later the existence of a fire on a hill from the presence there of a smoke that differs in many respects from the smoke once seen in the kitchen.⁴⁰ And according to him, there is no point in asserting that

← (ānugūṇya) in the functions (*arthakriyā*) [that the parts] perform thanks to each other, as [the functions] of man and woman for instance, establishes that the Lord is the agent of bodies, etc.”

³⁹ Taber 1986: 112-14.

⁴⁰ NM_{JS}: 83: *dhūmo hi mahānase kumbhadāsīphūtkāramārutasaṃdhuḥṣya-mānamandaḥvalanajanmā kṣāprāyaprakṛtir upalabdhaḥ. sa yadi parvate prabalaśamīraṇollasitahutavahapluṣyamānamahāmāhīruḥaskandhendhanaprabhavo bahulabahuḥaḥ khamaṇḍalam akhilam ākrāmann upalabhyate, tat kim idānīm analapramitiḥ mā kāṛṣīt. atha viśeṣarahitam dhūmamātram agnimātreṇa vyāptam avagatam iti tatas tadanumānam. ihāpi sanniveśamātram kartṛmātreṇa vyāptam iti tato 'pi tad anumīyatām.* “For [we] observe that in a kitchen, smoke arises from a weak flame kindled by the air blown by a servant [, and that] its form is usually meager. If [we] see that the [smoke] on a hill arises from the fuel [consisting of] the trunks of big trees burnt by a fire fanned by a strong wind, [and that this smoke] is huge [and] stretches up to the sky, then should [this second smoke perceived] now not produce [in us] the knowledge of fire? If [the opponent answers that we] understand smoke in general, devoid of any particularity, to be invariably concomitant with fire in general, hence the inference of [fire], [we answer that] in the [case of the Lord] as well, an arrangement in

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the general notion of arrangement to which the theist has recourse is based on a mere verbal similarity (*śabdasāmānya*) and not on a real one (*vastusāmānya*), since the Buddhists themselves do not consider such a general notion as “fire” to be real, and yet they consider that we produce this artificial notion through a process of exclusion (*apoha*) of real particulars and that such general notions can lead to a valid inferential knowledge.⁴¹ Jayanta further points out (and here too, his thought seems to find an echo in the *ĪS*) that arrangements are not entirely similar to each other and insists that nonetheless,

← general is invariably concomitant with an agent in general, therefore let it be inferred too!” Cf. *ĀḌ*: 164: *anya eva hi dhūmo'sau kṣājanmā mahānase | anya evāyam adrau ca vyāptavyomadigantaraḥ ||* “For this smoke which arises meagerly in the kitchen is one thing, and that [smoke] on the hill pervading all the quarters of the sky is quite another!”

⁴¹ See NM_{JS}: 83: *nanu sanniveśaśabdasādhāraṇamātram atra, na vastusāmānyam kimcid asti. bhikṣo, dhūme'pi bhavaddarśane kim vastumātram asti.* “[The Buddhist:] But in this [inference of the Lord] there is only a verbal generality (*śabdasādhāraṇa*) ‘arrangement’, [but] no real generality (*vastusāmānya*) at all. [The Naiyāyika:] O monk, in the smoke as well, according to your system, is there any [such thing as a] real general entity (*vastumātra*)?” Jayanta later concludes (*ibid.*: 84): *ihāpi sanniveśavikalpānuvṛttes tvatprakalpitam apoharūpam eva sāmānyam iṣyatām.* “In this [case of the inference of the Lord from a specific arrangement] as well [as in the case of the inference of fire from smoke, you] must admit a generality [even though] it is nothing but an exclusion that you construct in accordance with the concept of arrangement.” (For a translation of the full passage, see Krasser 2002: 106-08). Cf. *ĀḌ*: 166, where the Buddhist's objection “But whereas in other [cases] there is a real generality, in this [case] there is only a verbal generality, and no real generality; and with respect to a [mere] verbal generality there is an overextension [of the reasoning]” (*nanv anyatra vāstavaṁ sāmānyam, iha tu śabdasāmānyamātram na tu vastusāmānyam, śabdasāmānye cātiprasaṅgaḥ*), is answered: “But how could there be a real generality in the house of a Buddhist?” (*kuto bauddhagṛhe vāstavaṁ sāmānyam*).

they do share a partial similarity in so far as they are all specific configurations.⁴² The Naiyāyika also explains that in the inference of *īśvara*, one only infers an agent in general, but that this agent is then particularized as having such specific attributes as omniscience, and among the ways of determining these particularities he mentions the property of the subject of the inference (*pakṣadharmā*) to which Utpaladeva also has recourse while answering Kumārila's objection, and he gives an example (the inference of a sandalwood fire) very similar to that used by Utpaladeva (the inference of a *khadira* fire).⁴³

⁴² See NM_{IS}: 84: *api ca sakartṛkatvābhimateṣv api saṁsthāneṣu na sarvātmanā tulyatvaṁ pratīyate. na hi ghaṭasaṁsthānaṁ paṭasaṁsthānaṁ catuḥśālasaṁsthānaṁ ca susadṛśam iti. saṁsthānasāmānyam tu parvatādāv api vidyate eveti.* "Moreover, although [specific] arrangements are considered as having an agent, [they] are not apprehended as being entirely similar. For the arrangement of a pot is not entirely similar to the arrangement of a cloth or to the arrangement of a building. Nonetheless, the generality 'arrangement' is indeed found in a mountain, etc., as well." Cf. ĀḌ: 166: *dharmam niyatam ālambya bhavati hy anumākramaḥ* | *kva vā sarvātmanā sāmānyam sādhyadṛṣṭāntadharminoh* || "For the inferential process rests on a specific property; in what case could there be a complete similarity between the example [possessing the property] to be established and the subject of the inference?"

⁴³ NM_{IS}: 97-98: *apare pakṣadharmabalād eva viśeṣalābham abhyupagacchanti. na hīdṛśam paridṛśyamānam anekarūpam aparimitam anantaprāṇigatavicitrasukhaduḥkhasādhanaṁ bhuvanādi kāryam anatiśayena puṁsā kartum śakyam iti. yathā candanadhūmam itaradhūmavisadṛśam avalokya cādana eva vahnir anumīyate, tathā vilakṣaṇāt kāryād vilakṣaṇa eva kartānumāsyate.* "Others consider that the particularity [of the inferred agent in general] is obtained by virtue of the sole property of the subject of the inference (*pakṣadharmabalāt*). For such an effect as the worlds, etc., which [we] observe [to be] manifold, unlimited, [and] to produce various pleasures and pains in the innumerable living beings, cannot be produced by an ordinary (*anatiśaya*) person. Just as upon seeing sandalwood smoke, which is different from other smokes, one infers a fire that is necessarily a

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In this respect John Taber has noticed that Utpaladeva's formulation seems to be an improvement on Jayanta's. For Jayanta's explanation seems to imply that it is the special characteristic of the inferential reason (*hetu*) itself that enables the specification of the property to be established (*sādhyā*): it is because one sees a sandalwood smoke that looks different from other kinds of smoke that one can infer the presence of a sandalwood fire; but this explanation is problematic in so far as it "threatens the general connection between *sādhyā* and *hetu* (if sandalwood smoke looks different from other kinds of smoke, how do you know that it is the effect of fire?)"⁴⁴ In contrast, according to Utpaladeva, the inferential reason is "mere smoke" or "smoke in general", and the *sādhyā*'s specification rather "takes place strictly with reference to the subject (*pakṣa*) of the inference, as a sort of afterthought".⁴⁵ Nonetheless, as Jayanta himself makes clear, the argument of the specification through *pakṣadharmā* is no novelty:⁴⁶ it was put forward by some earlier Naiyāyika⁴⁷ and it

← sandalwood [fire], in the same way, due to the effect having a peculiar characteristic, one infers an agent that necessarily has a peculiar characteristic." Cf. ĀḌ: 166, where the Buddhist objection "But this effect that is the earth, etc., indeed has a peculiar characteristic!" (*nanu vilakṣaṇam evedam kṣityādi kāryam*) is answered in the following way: "But [then] you should admit that [its] agent [too] must have a peculiar characteristic!" (*nanu vilakṣaṇam eva kartāram kalpayantu bhavantaḥ*).

⁴⁴ Taber 1986: 114.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ See above, n 43: Jayanta presents the argument as belonging to "others".

⁴⁷ According to Oberhammer 1965: 32, this earlier Naiyāyika may have been Trilocana. Note, however, that Krasser 2002: 101 emphasizes the distance between the known fragments of Trilocana's work and the argument of specification through *pakṣadharmatā* found e.g. in Vācaspatiśra's NKaṇ (see below, n 48).

recurs in other Naiyāyika works such as those of Vācaspatimiśra⁴⁸

⁴⁸ See NKaṇ: 151 (as edited in Krasser 2002: 93): *tad ayuktam, sāmānyamātravyāptāv apy antarbhāvitaviśeṣasyaiva sāmānyasya pakṣadharmatāvaśena sādhyadharmiṇy anumānāt, itarathā sarvānumānocchedaprasaṅgāt*. “This is not correct, because even though there is an invariable concomitance between [two] mere generalities (*sāmānyamātra*), with respect to that which must be established to bear the property, one infers a generality that necessarily includes a particularity, thanks to the fact that the subject of the inference has a [particular] property (*pakṣadharmatāvaśena*); since otherwise, as a consequence all inferences would be annihilated.” See also NKaṇ: 151 (as edited in Krasser 2002: 98): *saty apy utpattimattvasyācetanopādānatvasya copādānopakaraṇasampradānaprayojanaññakartṛmātravyāptatve vivādādhyāsiteṣu pakṣadharmatābalād viśiṣṭasya tasya siddhiḥ. anyathā sāmānyasyāpi vyāpakābhimatasyāsiddhiḥ syāt, nirviśeṣasyāsambhavāt, viśeṣasya cānyasyānupapatteḥ. asarvajñasya cātrādṛṣṭādibhedavijñānarahitasyādhiṣṭhātṛbhāvāsambhavāt sarvajñātmaka eva viśeṣo balād āpatati. tena yady apy upalabdhimatkarṭṛkatvaṁ vyāptiviśayaḥ, tathāpi tadviśeṣasya pakṣadharmatābalāt pratilambha iti viśeṣaviśayam anumānam*. “Even though there is an invariable concomitance of [the properties] ‘being produced’ and ‘having an unconscious material cause’ with [the existence of] an agent in general (*karṭṛmātra*) who knows the material cause, the instrumental causes, the recipient and the purpose [of the effect], with respect to the [things] that are in dispute [i.e. natural composite entities that are not unanimously considered as effects,] this [agent] is established as [being] particularized [by omniscience] by virtue of the fact that the subject of the inference possesses a [particular] property (*pakṣadharmatābalāt*); otherwise, the generality considered as invariably concomitant would not be established, because [such an invariable concomitance] is not possible for [something] that is not particularized, and because no other particularity is possible [as regards this agent]. Since in this [case] someone who is not omniscient [and therefore who] does not know the various [unconscious instrumental causes] such as the invisible [force] (*adrṣṭa*) could not be a controller (*adhiṣṭhātṛ*), the particularity consisting in [being]

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or Vittoka.⁴⁹ Besides, the idea that this specification only comes as an “afterthought” while not being the product of a second inference, i.e. is only the explicit development of an implicit necessity involved in the very inferential process which establishes a cause in general, is a *topos* of earlier Nyāya literature.⁵⁰

← omniscient necessarily follows [for this agent]. Therefore even though the invariable concomitance regards [only the property of] having a conscious agent, nonetheless, one understands this particularity due to the fact that the subject of the inference has a [particular] property (*pakṣadharmatābalāt*) — therefore the inference regards a particularity [and not a mere generality].” While commenting on Jayanta’s mention of the *pakṣadharmatā* argument, H. Krasser remarks that we cannot determine with certainty who formulated it in the first place and that among Naiyāyikas, only Vācaspatimiśra and Vittoka seem to have propounded such a theory, but that the latter seems to be later than Jayanta. If the dates proposed for Vācaspatimiśra (i.e. c. 950–1000) in Acharya (2006: xviii–xxviii) are right, Vācaspatimiśra cannot have been Jayanta’s source either. In any case Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–75) certainly knew Jayanta’s NM, but (as far as I know) it is not impossible that he also knew at least some of Vācaspatimiśra’s writings (on the proximity of Utpaladeva’s argument with Vācaspati’s, see Krasser 2002: 152, n 211).

⁴⁹ See Krasser 2002: 136.

⁵⁰ See e.g. the Naiyāyika *pūrvapakṣa* presented by Kamalaśīla in TSP_s: 65 (see Krasser 2002: 81, n 117): *yāvataḥ sāmānyena buddhimatpūrvakatvamātram sādhyate, tasmiṁś ca siddhe tanvādīnām sāmāthyād īśvaraḥ kartā siddhyati. na hi ghaṭādivat teṣāṁ kulālādiḥ kartā sambhavati. tena sāmānyasya viśeṣaviśiṣṭatvāt, tanvādiṣu* cānyasya kartur asambhāvyamānatvāt, sāmāthyād viśeṣaparigraham antareṇāpīśvara eva kartāmīṣāṁ sidhyatīti*. [**tanvādiṣu* TSP_s: *tarvādiṣu* TSP_k] “It is only [the property of] presupposing an intelligent [agent] that [we] prove as this mere generality; and once this [mere generality] is established, as an implication (*sāmāthyāt*) [of it, we] establish that the agent of bodies and so on is the Lord. For their agent cannot be a potter for instance, contrary to [the case] of e.g. a pot. Therefore, because the generality is particularized by this

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The Sāṃkhya Objection

Finally, Utpaladeva presents a lengthy defence of the Naiyāyika inference against the Sāṃkhya objection that specific designs can in fact be the result of the sole unconscious primordial nature (*prakṛti*) or matter (*pradhāna*).⁵¹ He thus answers an objection that was put forward by Sāṃkhya authors who may not have denied the very existence of *īśvara*⁵² but who none the less set out to refute his agency and argued that the universe is nothing but the activity of *prakṛti*.⁵³ To the argument that primordial nature can only be considered as a material cause (*upādāna*) and not as the efficient cause (*nimitta*) that is precisely the point in debate,⁵⁴

← particularity, and because with respect to bodies and so on, another agent is impossible, as an implication, even if [we] do not have the full grasp of the particularity, it is the Lord that is established to be their agent". Jñānaśrimitra's IV: 239 attributes this line of argument to Trilocana (see Krasser 2002: 79-80). On the fact that this strategy is common in the Nyāya (and also recurs in the works of later Naiyāyikas such as Udayana), see Chemparathy 1972: 88-89.

⁵¹ See Taber 1986: 120ff.

⁵² See Bronkhorst 1983, which argues that originally the distinction between *śeṣvara* and *anīśvara* Sāṃkhya referred to the difference between the Sāṃkhyas who accepted the agency of God in the creation of the universe and those who did not, and that up to a rather late period (i.e. at least the end of the first millenium) the so-called *anīśvara* Sāṃkhya did not deny the existence of God but only its causal role in the cosmic manifestation. Note that in ĪS 26, Utpaladeva designates his opponent as *sāṃkhyam anīśvaram*.

⁵³ Such Sāṃkhya refutations of *īśvara* as the cause of the universe can be found in GB: 54 and MV: 55-56 ad SK 61, in YD ad SK 15: 157ff (see Chemparathy 1965 for a translation and analysis), or in TK ad SK 57: 164.

⁵⁴ ĪS: 12: *na hi pradhānasiddhimātreṇaiveśvaranirākṛtiḥ syad upādānakāraṇatayā paramāṇusthāna eva pradhānasya mūlakāraṇatvena samarthanāt. tac ca pradhānena paramāṇuvāda eva yadi param nirākriyate** tataḥ pradhānavyavasthā viśva- →

the Sāṃkhya opponent portrayed by Utpaladeva replies in turn that primordial nature does not transform itself randomly, nor for its own sake (*svārtha*),⁵⁵ but for the sake of the pure, passive consciousness that the Sāṃkhya calls *puruṣa*; and according to him, the efficient cause of the universe is nothing but primordial nature's property of being "for the benefit of the Person" (*puruṣārtha*).⁵⁶

← *syopādānakāraṇavicāraprastāve prameyibhavati, na tu nimittakāraṇo-papādanaprakrame. [*nirākriyate conj. : nirākriyeta ĪS]* "For the Lord cannot be refuted merely by establishing matter, since matter is proved to be the primordial cause [of the universe only] in so far as it is [proved to be] the material cause instead of atoms. And as a consequence, if it is only atomism that is refuted by [establishing] matter, then establishing matter is an object fit for the topic of the examination of the universe's material cause, but not for the topic of the explanation of [its] efficient cause."

⁵⁵ See Taber 1986: 122-23.

⁵⁶ ĪS: 12: *tad evaṃ mūlaprakṛtiḥ sattvarajastamaḥsamjñaguṇa-trayasāmyātmikā prakṛtitayaiva prasavadharminī guṇānām evāṅgāṅgibhāvagamana eva yāvan mahadādivikārātmanā pariṇamate, tāvat puruṣārthatvam eva tatra tasyāḥ svabhāvabhūtaṃ nimittam.* "Therefore primordial nature, which consists of a state of balance between the three qualities (*guṇa*) called *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, [and] which, precisely because it is a *prakṛti* [i.e. literally, 'that which generates',] has the property of generating, transforms itself by bringing these very qualities to a state [in which they] serve each other (*aṅgāṅgibhāva*), [and it brings them to this state through an activity] consisting in transforming [them] into the Great [, i.e. the intellect (*buddhi*)], etc. In so far as [primordial nature acts thus,] the efficient cause (*nimitta*) of this [transformation] is nothing but [primordial nature's property of] being for the benefit of the Person (*puruṣārtha*); [i.e. the efficient cause] is the very nature of this [*prakṛti*]." Here the Sāṃkhya opponent seems to rely on SK 56-57 while playing on the meanings of the term *nimitta* (apparently rather used in the SK in the sense of "goal"): *ity eṣa prakṛtikṛto mahadādiviśayabhūtaparyantaḥ pratipurūṣavimokṣārthaṃ svārtha iva parārtha ārambhaḥ || vatsavivṛddhinimittam kṣīrasya yathā pravṛttir* →

This specific purpose of *prakṛti* explains away the seemingly pre-

← *ajñāsyā* | *puruṣavimokṣanimittam tathā pravṛtṭiḥ pradhānasya* ||

“This [world,] from the Great [i.e. the intellect] to the elements that are [sensory] objects, is produced by primordial nature for the benefit that is the liberation of each Person; this activity is for the benefit of another (*parārtha*) [, i.e. the Person, although it] seems to be for [nature’s] own benefit. Just as milk, which is unconscious, acts so as to (*nimitta*) make the calf grow, in the same way, matter acts so as to free the Person.” Several commentaries interpret SK 56 as a refutation of *īśvara*’s role as an efficient cause. See JM: 111: *prakṛtikṛta iti pradhānakṛtaḥ, neśvarādikṛta ity arthaḥ*. “Produced by primordial nature [means] ‘produced by matter’; i.e. it is not produced by the Lord for instance.” Cf. TK: 164: *neśvarādhiṣṭhitapṛakṛtikṛto nirvyāpārasyādhiṣṭhātṛtvāsambhavāt. na hi nirvyāpāras takṣā vāsyādy adhiṣṭhati*. “It is not produced by a primordial nature that would be controlled (*adhiṣṭhita*) by the Lord, because [the Lord,] who does not act, cannot be a controller; for a carpenter who does not act does not control the axe and so on.” Vācaspatimiśra further interprets SK 57 as a justification of the fact that primordial nature, although unconscious, can act as an efficient cause in so far as it exists for the benefit of the *puruṣa*. See TK, *ibid.*, where the objection answered by SK 57 is stated in the following way: *syād etat. svārtham parārtham vā cetanaḥ pravartate. na ca prakṛtir acetanaivaṁ bhavitum arhati. tasmād asti prakṛter adhiṣṭhātā cetanaḥ. na ca kṣetrajñās cetanā api prakṛtim adhiṣṭhātum arhanti, teṣāṁ prakṛtirūpānabhiññatvāt. tasmād asti sarvārthadarśī prakṛter adhiṣṭhātā, sa ceśvara iti. ata āha . . .* “Suppose that [the following] be [urged]: a conscious [entity] acts either for its own benefit or for the benefit of something else; now, primordial nature, which is unconscious, is incapable of [acting] thus; therefore there is a conscious controller of primordial nature. And the individuals, although they are conscious, are not capable of controlling primordial nature, since they are ignorant of the [various] forms of primordial nature. Therefore there is a controller of primordial nature who knows all things; and this controller is the Lord. In response to this [the author] states . . .”

established harmony of the universe: ⁵⁷ primordial nature transforms itself into the variegated structures that constitute the phenomenal world so as to fulfil a double purpose for the sake of the *puruṣa*, namely, enabling the individual to experience pain and pleasure according to his merit and demerit, and leading him to liberation through the discrimination between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. ⁵⁸ Since such

⁵⁷ *ĪS: 12: na hi yadṛcchayā vartamānāyāḥ kāryavargasya devamānuṣatiryagyonirūpasya tadavāntarajātivaicitryavato niyamena strīpūṃsasamsthānadvayasya vānyonyānugūṇyam upapadyate. tad etat sanniveśaviśeṣarūpatayābhyupetaṁ īśvaravādināpi*. “For the mutual harmony (*ānugūṇya*) [found to occur] invariably in all the effects that are [divided into] gods, men and animals [and that] comprise [a whole] variety of [different] species within [these divisions], or [the mutual harmony found to occur invariably] in the two [bodily] structures of a woman and man, cannot arise from [matter] if [matter] transforms itself randomly (*yadṛcchayā*) [rather than for the benefit of the Person]. Even the proponent of the Lord [as the cause of the universe] admits this in so far as [he acknowledges that the universe] is a specific arrangement.”

⁵⁸ See *ĪS: 12: arthavattvaṁ ca sukhaduḥkhopalambhasampādanārthatayaiva sarvasyaivārtharūpasya paramparayā paryavasyati*. “And [stating that nature does not act randomly] amounts [to saying that] it has a purpose, since precisely, the purpose [of nature] is to successively bring about the perception of pleasure and pain as regards everything that consists of an object.” See also *ĪS: 13: tato yathā sukhaduḥkhamohamayasarvārthasamvedanam* puruṣārthas tathā śāstropadiṣṭānumānopamānādinā guṇapuruṣāntaropalabdhir api. tad ubhayam api prayojanam bhogāpavargarūpam** guṇapṛavṛtteḥ. tatprayojanasampādanayogyasvabhāvatā ca nimittakāraṇam ucyate*. [**sarvārthasamvedanam* conj.: *°parārthasamvedanam* *ĪS*. ***°rūpam* conj.: *°rūpa°* *ĪS*]. “Therefore the benefit of the Person is the awareness of all objects consisting of pleasure, pain and delusion [which constitute the three qualities], but also the perception that the qualities and the Person are distinct, [a perception which occurs] for instance thanks to the inferences and comparisons taught in treatises. As a consequence, both of these, i.e. experience (*bhoga*) and liberation

a primordial nature acting for the benefit of the Person is enough to account for the specific arrangements that constitute the universe, there is no need to postulate *īśvara* as their efficient cause.⁵⁹

Utpaladeva's Reply to the Sāṃkhya Objection

In response to this objection, Utpaladeva explains first that if the purposefulness of *prakṛti* were the sole efficient cause of all things possessing design, a pot would not need a potter: the very fact that its material cause is for the benefit of individuals would be enough to produce it.⁶⁰ But if the Sāṃkhya concedes that in the case of the

← (*apavarga*), are the goal of the activity of qualities. And what is called 'efficient cause' is [nothing but] the fact that [primordial nature] has a nature capable of accomplishing this goal." Cf. MV: 54: *sa cārtho dvidvidhaḥ. śabdādyupalabdhir ādir guṇapuruṣāntaropalabdhir antaś ca. triṣu lokeṣu śabdādiviṣayaiḥ puruṣaṁ yojayati. ante ca guṇapuruṣāntaropalabdhya mokṣaṁ kurute*. "And this benefit [of the Person] is twofold: first, it is the perception of [objects] such as sound, and finally, it is the perception that qualities and the Person are distinct. In the three worlds, [primordial nature acting for this benefit] connects the Person with objects such as sound, and finally it induces liberation through the perception that qualities and the Person are distinct."

⁵⁹ See ĪS 21: *ata eva pradhānasya mahattvapariṇāmināḥ nimittakāraṇaṁ nānyat puruṣārthodyamād ṛte* || "For this very reason, there is no efficient cause besides the effort that matter makes for the benefit of the Person while transforming itself into the Great [, i.e. the intellect, etc.]"

⁶⁰ ĪS: 18: *tatraitān sāmkyān praty ucyate, yathā nāvagato bhavadbhiḥ sādhanārtha iti. yadi hi sarvavicitrasamsthānakāryotpādaneṣu pradhānasyaiva yā puruṣabhogārthatā saiva nimittakāraṇaṁ kim īśvareṇety ucyate tat kumbhakāreṇāpi kim ghaṭakaraṇe. tatrāpi prādhānikasya mṛtipiṇḍādeḥ puruṣārthasvabhāvatāvaśād eva tathābhūtasanniveśavadghaṭakaraṇasāmarthyam syāt*. "In this regard, [we] reply to these Sāṃkhyas in [the following] way: you have not understood the point of the demonstration. For [you ask:] 'if it is matter's [property of] having as its purpose the experience [of pain and pleasure] by the Person that is the efficient cause with regard to the

pot, the specific arrangement requires a potter, why not assume it in the case of the universe as well?⁶¹ Utpaladeva also points out that a material cause cannot give rise to a structure specifically designed to serve a human purpose, because it is unconscious: such a creation requires a creative desire (*cikīrṣā*) or will (*icchā*) as well as a synthetic awareness (*anusamdhāna*) of what should be done or avoided so as to obtain a specific effect, and these are not found in material entities.⁶² Admittedly, according to the Sāṃkhya,

← production of all the various effects that are [specific] arrangements, what is the point of the Lord?' [But to this we] reply: then what is the point of the potter as well in the production of a pot? [If we followed your reasoning,] in the [case of the pot] as well, the capacity to produce a pot endowed with such a [specific] arrangement would be due to the mere fact that a material [entity] such as the lump of clay has as its nature to be for the benefit of the Person."

⁶¹ ĪS: 18: *atha pradhānasyāyam api svabhāvaviśeṣa eva, yad ghaṭasanniveśādaḥ daṇḍacakravadbuddhimadapekṣā, tāvatā prādhānikena kāraṇakalāpena puruṣārthopayogitatsanniveśavadghaṭavastusiddheḥ. tad evam eva tanukaraṇādikāraṇasyāpi prādhānikāt tathāsvabhāvayogāt katham tathākaraṇayogyabuddhimadapekṣā neṣyate*. "If [, on the other hand, you consider that] matter has this particular feature that with respect to the [specific] arrangement of a pot for instance, it requires an intelligent [agent] equipped with a stick and a wheel, because it is through all these causes which belong to matter [as transformations of it] that the realization of the thing that is a pot having this [specific] arrangement contributes to the benefit of the Person, then, since [you acknowledge that] matter possesses such a nature, [you must admit that] it is exactly the same with respect to the cause of [such things] as bodies and organs as well: why [then] do [you] refuse to admit the requirement of an intelligent [agent] fit for such a creation [as the universe]?"

⁶² ĪS 31cd-33ab: *lokayātrānusamdhānavatīm prajñāṁ vinā na hi || tathā cikīrṣāṁ ca vinā vicitraracanodbhavaḥ || sthūlatāmātram eva syān na tu lokopayoginī || racanā niyamena syād vicitrā jātirūpiṇī* || "For without a knowledge (*prajñā*) involving the synthetic awareness (*anusamdhāna*) of the course of the world, and similarly, without a

primordial nature, although unconscious, is capable of knowledge in so far as it transforms itself into the intellect (*buddhi*),⁶³ which in turn is capable of desire or will and synthetic awareness, since it produces determination (*adhyavasāya*),⁶⁴ so that it can know the

← desire to act (*cikīrṣā*), various [specific] arrangements cannot arise. [Without it, material elements] may [gather into] gross [, perceptible wholes,] but there can be no arrangement useful to people, [occurring] invariably, varied [and] containing [different] species.” On the required synthetic awareness, see e.g. ĪS: 19-20: *tathā hi yāvad idam ito bhavati kiṁcidadhikaviśeṣāt punar ata evānena viśeṣeṇa saviśeṣam idam eva bhavati, aparaviśeṣayuktāt punar asmād evānyad evānyajātīyam eva kāryam jāyate, tataḥ sampraty evamvidham upayujyate tathaiva karomīty evam vicāracaturā matir na syāt, tāvat katham tathābhūtaviśeṣakaraṇāya hānopādāne syātām*. “To explain: [if only material, insentient causes were to produce specific arrangements designed to contribute to the benefit of the Person,] how could [they] reject [some auxiliary causes] and use [others] so as to produce such a specific [arrangement], in so far as [these causes] could have no such fourfold understanding as this: ‘this [thing A] exists due to that [thing B]; but this same [thing A] exists while having a particularity due to this same [thing B] when this [thing B] has some added particularity, [precisely] because of this particularity [of B]; [and] in turn, when this [thing B] has another particularity, it produces another effect, which is of another sort than [A]; therefore now, such a [cause] can contribute [to producing this particular effect], [and] I am going to act exactly in this way.’”

⁶³ See SK 22: *prakṛter mahāns tato ’hamkāras tasmād gaṇaś ca ṣoḍaśakaḥ* | *tasmād api ṣoḍaśakāt pañcabhyaḥ pañca bhūtāni* || “From primordial nature arises the Great [, i.e. the intellect]; from the [Great] arises egoity (*ahamkāra*); and from [egoity], the group of the sixteen [i.e. the group of the five subtle elements, the five organs of perception, the five organs of action and the mind (*manas*)]; and in turn, from the five [subtle elements] within these sixteen [arise] the five gross [elements].”

⁶⁴ See SK 23a: *adhyavasāyo buddhiḥ* . . . “The intellect is determination. . .”. Cf. GBh: 25: *adhyavasāyo buddhilakṣaṇam. adhyavasānam*

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benefit of the Person.⁶⁵ But Utpaladeva argues that determination, will or synthetic knowledge cannot be manifest *before* primordial nature starts transforming itself, since according to the Sāṃkhya, at that time primordial nature is unmanifest.⁶⁶ And even assuming that matter takes the form of the intellect in order to manifest them, since *buddhi* is a material entity, it needs to be reflected upon by a conscious entity, i.e. a *puruṣa*, because will and synthetic awareness are types of awareness.⁶⁷ But again, since this manifestation of the

← *adhyavasāyaḥ. yathā bīje bhaviṣyadvṛttiko ’ṅkuras tadvad adhyavasāyaḥ. ayam ghaṭo ’yam paṭa ity evam sati yā sā buddhir iti lakṣyate*. “Determination is the characteristic of the intellect; it is the act of determining. Just as the sprout that will occur later is [contained] in the seed, in the same way, determination [is contained in the intellect]. It is defined as the intellect when such a [thought] occurs: ‘this is a pot’, ‘this is a cloth’.”

⁶⁵ See SK 36: *ete pradīpakalpāḥ parasparavilakṣaṇā guṇaviśeṣāḥ | kṛtsnam puruṣasyārtham prakāśya buddhau prayacchanti*. “The [external organs, egoity and mind,] which differ from each other [and] are particular [modifications of] the qualities, [functioning] like a lamp, manifest the entire benefit of the Person and place [it] in the intellect.”

⁶⁶ ĪS: 23: *na ca pradhānasyaiva mūlakāraṇasya vyavasāyādibhir vyaktir asti tat katham tasyecchādiyoḥ puruṣārthoddeśānītaḥ syād yataḥ pravṛttir bhavet*. “And matter alone, [considered as] the primordial cause, [can]not be manifest in the form of determination, [will and synthetic knowledge]; therefore [at that time,] how could it possess will [, synthetic knowledge and determination], which would enable it to be aimed at the benefit of the Person, so that the activity [of matter] could take place?”

⁶⁷ ĪS: 23: *yady api ca buddher astīcchānusamdhānam ca vyāpāras tathāpi puruṣasannidhānād yāvan na cetyamānaḥ prakāśamāno ’sau sampannas tāvan necchādirūpatām dhatte tathālakṣaṇatvād icchānusamdhānādīnām*. “And even if an activity of the intellect does occur [at the beginning of the universe’s manifestation, namely,] will and a synthetic awareness, nonetheless, if [this activity of the intellect, which is of a material nature,] is not reflected upon due to the presence of a Person, [i.e. if it] does not obtain [to be] manifest

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intellect and its apprehension by a conscious entity supposedly constitute the very cause of primordial nature's evolution, they must take place *before* primordial nature has evolved into an intellect differentiated according to each individual;⁶⁸ and given that these creative will and synthetic awareness must concern the whole universe, they can only belong to a special *puruṣa* transcending individuality and endowed with omniscience, i.e. *īśvara*.⁶⁹

← [for a consciousness], it cannot reach the status of will and [synthetic awareness], because will, synthetic awareness and so on consist in such a [conscious state].” On the Sāṃkhya's endeavour to solve the problem of the relationship between the material *buddhi* and the *puruṣa*'s consciousness, and on Utpaladeva's criticism of this solution in the Pratyabhijñā treatise, see Torella 1994: 93, n 12; Ratié 2011a: 94-106, 276-89.

⁶⁸ See ĪS: 23: *atha sarvapuruṣasādhāraṇasyaikasyāpi buddhitattvasya mahatsamjñakasya pratipuruṣam adhyavasāyalakṣaṇavṛttiḥ satyaṁ bhidyate, mahatkāraṇāsmiṭājanmano vā manaḥsamjñakaraṇasya, eṣādhyaavasāyādivṛttiḥ pratyekapuruṣaniyatāstu, na tayottarakālabhāvinyā pradhānasya mahato vā puruṣārthānusaṁdhānecchāvattā yujyate*. “But if [you reply that] although one, [i.e.] common to all Persons, the principle of the intellect (*buddhitattva*) called the Great, or the organ called mind (*manas*) which arises from egoity (*asmitā*) that [in turn] has as its cause the Great, transforms itself into [a manifestation] characterized as determination (*adhyavasāya*) [and] is in fact differentiated according to each Person, [then] this transformation into determination and so on must be restricted to each Person, [but] neither matter nor the [principle of the intellect called] the Great can be endowed with synthetic knowledge and will regarding the benefit of the Person through this [transformation,] since [this transformation only] arises at a later time.”

⁶⁹ See ĪS: 23-24: *kiṁ tu pradhānasyaiva prathamavikāraṇa eva sarvapuruṣoddeśena sāmānyānusaṁdhānecchāvyavasāyādivṛttiḥ prathamā buddhisamjñāsty eva, yena tasyāpi buddhipūrvakāritā syāt. tadaiva tad api na yuktam, pradhānasya sarvathāivavyaktarūpatvenānupalakṣaṇīyavṛttivāt. na ca vṛttau puruṣeṇāsamviditāyām icchānusaṁdhānādirūpatvaṁ sambhavati*, →

The Naiyāyika Sources of Utpaladeva's Reply to the Sāṃkhya Objection

John Taber finds rather strange the length of this discussion with Sāṃkhya (which spreads over about two thirds of Utpaladeva's tract), since according to him, Utpaladeva's zeal in attacking the Sāṃkhya position contrasts with the Nyāya's relative indifference to this opponent, and since the Sāṃkhya does not seem to have been an

← *puruṣeṇāpi pradhānavṛtteḥ kena saṁvedyamānatā sarvapuruṣoddeśena sāmānyappravṛtteḥ, ekaikena cet tat tasya sarvajñatvaṁ syāt* . . . “Rather, when matter first transforms itself, there must be a first transformation into synthetic knowledge, will, determination and so on which is called ‘intellect’ [and] is universal (*sāmānya*), [i.e.] concerns all Persons, [and it is] thanks to [this transformation] that even [matter] can be an intelligent agent. [But again,] at that very moment [when matter starts transforming itself], this too is impossible, because the transformation of matter cannot be perceived, since its nature is absolutely unmanifest. And if no Person is aware of this activity, it cannot consist of will, synthetic knowledge and so on; and which Person is aware of this transformation of matter, since this activity is universal (*sāmānya*), [i.e. since it] concerns all Persons? If [you reply]: each of them, then [each of] them should be omniscient . . .” See also ĪS: 24: *atha sāmānyarūpeṇaiva sarvajñena ca puruṣaviśeṣeṇa sāmānyapradhānavṛtteḥ saṁvedyamānatā tat sa eveśvaro 'stu, tasyaiva viśvanirmitsā saṁvedyā satī sambandhinī bhavātīti*. “But [if you reply that] it is a special Person (*puruṣaviśeṣa*), who has a universal form [and not an individual one] and who is omniscient, who is aware of the universal transformation of matter, then let [us] admit that this [Person] is the Lord himself, since only he can have the desire to create the universe while being aware of it.” Cf. ĪS 41cd-42ab: *athāpi sarvapuruṣābhinnena kenacit || vedyā sā vaiṣa tarhy ekaḥ kartā jñātā sa ceśvaraḥ* . . . “But if [the Sāṃkhya opponent had] rather [reply that] a certain unique [entity] which is not distinct from all Persons (*sarvapuruṣābhinna*) is aware of this [desire to create,] then [he must concede the existence of] a single agent [and] knower, and this is [what we call] the Lord.”

influential school in Utpaladeva's time.⁷⁰ However, it is worth noting that Uddyotakara, the only Naiyāyika author whom Abhinavagupta explicitly mentions in connection with the demonstration of the existence of *īśvara*, devotes an important part of his proof to the refutation of the Sāṃkhya position. Thus Uddyotakara sets out to show that primordial nature requires an intelligent controller,⁷¹ and he too attempts to refute the Sāṃkhya thesis that the efficient cause of these arrangements is nothing but matter's property of being for the benefit of the *puruṣa*.⁷² He argues (as Utpaladeva does

⁷⁰ Taber 1986: 119, 128.

⁷¹ See NV ad NS IV.1.21: 433: *kaḥ punar īśvarasya kāraṇatve nyāyaḥ – ayaṃ nyāyo 'bhidhīyate. pradhānaparamāṇukarmāṇi prāk pravṛtter buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitāni pravartante' cetanatvād vāsyādivad iti. yathā vāsyādi buddhimatā takṣṇādhiṣṭhitam acetanatvāt pravartate, tathā pradhānaparamāṇukarmāṇy acetanāni pravartante. tasmāt tāny api buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitānti.* "But what is the reasoning [proving] that the Lord is the cause [of the universe]? Here is [how we] formulate this argument: before [they] start acting, matter, atoms and actions [that lead to karmic retribution] are prompted [to act in so far as they are] controlled (*adhiṣṭhita*) by an intelligent cause, because they are unconscious, just as an axe. [For] just as an axe for instance is prompted [to cut a tree in so far as it is] controlled by an intelligent woodcutter, because it is unconscious, in the same way, matter, atoms and actions, which are unconscious, are prompted [to act so as to produce the universe]; therefore they too are controlled by an intelligent cause."

⁷² See *ibid.*: *tatra pradhānakāraṇikās tāvat puruṣārtham adhiṣṭhāyakaṃ pradhānasya varṇayanti. puruṣārthena prayuktaṃ pradhānaṃ pravartata iti. puruṣārthaś ca dvedhā bhavati, śabdādyupalabdhir guṇapuruṣāntaradarśanaṃ ceti. tadubhayaṃ pradhānapravṛttiṃ vinā na bhavātīti.* "In this regard, first of all, those who consider matter as the cause [of the universe] explain that [what] controls matter is the benefit of the Person (*puruṣārtha*), [i.e.] that matter is prompted [to act] while being directed by the benefit of the Person. And the benefit of the Person is twofold: [on the one hand, it is] the perception of [objects] such as sound, and [on the other hand,] the realization that

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later) that there can be no awareness of objects or of the distinction between primordial nature and the Person (although this awareness constitutes the *puruṣārtha*) at the very moment when matter starts acting, since according to the Sāṃkhya system, such an awareness can only arise when matter has already transformed itself into the intellect.⁷³ Uddyotakara also criticizes the Sāṃkhya contention that matter can act although it is unconscious by pointing out that this is a dogmatic assertion rather than a demonstrated fact.⁷⁴

← qualities and the Person are distinct. And these two [sorts of benefit of the Person] cannot occur without the activity of matter."

⁷³ See NV ad IV.1.21: 433: *na, prāk pravṛttes tadabhāvāt. yāvat pradhānaṃ mahadādibhāvena na pariṇamate, tāvan na śabdādyupalabdhir asti, na guṇapuruṣāntaropalabdhir iti hetvabhāvāt pradhānapravṛttir na yuktā.* "[This is] not [correct], because prior to [matter's] activity, this [twofold benefit of the Person] does not exist: as long as matter does not transform itself into the Great [i.e. the intellect], etc., there cannot be any perception of sound and so on, nor [can there be] any perception that qualities and the Person are distinct. Therefore, since this [so-called] cause [of the activity of matter] does not exist [at that time], the activity of matter is impossible." Note that this argument is part of a dilemma; thus Uddyotakara adds (NV: 433-34): *athāsti nāsad ātmānaṃ labhate na san nirudhyata ity evaṃ ca satī vidyamānaḥ puruṣārthaḥ pradhānaṃ pravartayatīti na puruṣārthā pradhānasya pravṛttiḥ. na hi loke yad yasya bhavati sa tadarthaṃ punar yatata iti.* "But [if the Sāṃkhya opponent answers that in fact this cause] is present [at that time, on the grounds] that what is non-existent cannot obtain existence [and that] what exists cannot cease [to exist], [we answer that] if it is the case, since the benefit of the Person prompts matter to act [whereas it already] exists, the activity of matter [can] not be for the benefit of the Person; for in the [ordinary] world, one does not make again an effort to [achieve] a benefit that is [already achieved]."

⁷⁴ Thus in NV: 434, while arguing with other opponents who contend that atoms controlled by individuals' actions (rather than primordial nature) are the cause of the universe, Uddyotakara comes back to the Sāṃkhya assertion that unconscious matter can act and alludes

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Nonetheless, John Taber rightly emphasizes that Utpaladeva's treatment of the Sāṃkhya objection seems to go "somewhat beyond the measure of interest in this school among Naiyāyikas".⁷⁵ Besides, Uddyotakara's arguments often differ from those found in the ĪS in so far as the former mainly target the Sāṃkhya doctrine of *satkāryavāda* and the corollary principle that nothing new can be brought into existence,⁷⁶ whereas Utpaladeva's main line of argument against the Sāṃkhya (namely, the idea that action requires a will and knowledge only found in conscious entities, and that they cannot be a mere product of the intellect understood as a material entity) seems to be found only in embryonic form in the *Nyāyavārttika*. It does appear in Bhāsarvajña's criticism of the Sāṃkhya thesis,⁷⁷ but Utpaladeva and Bhāsarvajña seem to have

← to SK 57 (see above, n 56): *kṣīrādivad acetanasyāpi pravṛttir iti cet, yathāpatyabharaṇārtham kṣīrāder acetanasya pravṛttir evam paramāṇavo'cetanāḥ santaḥ puruṣārtham pravartīṣyanta iti, tan na yuktaṁ sādhyasamatvāt*. "If [the opponent argues] that just as in the case of milk, [something can] have an activity although it is unconscious, [i.e. if he argues that] just as milk for instance, although unconscious, acts so as to nourish an offspring, in the same way, atoms, which are unconscious, must act for the benefit of the Person, [we answer that] this is not correct, because of the [fault that this] is identical with what is to be established (*sādhyasama*)."

⁷⁵ Taber 1986: 128.

⁷⁶ See the discussion in NV: 434, too long to be quoted here.

⁷⁷ Thus, while defending the proof of *īśvara*'s existence as the efficient cause of the universe, Bhāsarvajña argues that only conscious entities can act (NBhūṣ: 447): *cetanasyaiva hi kartṛtvam. svatanthro hi kartety ucyate. śarīrādeḥ ca svātantryaṁ nāsti puruṣābhiprāyaṇuvidhāyivān mṛtaśarīrādeḥ kartṛtvānupalambhāc ca*. "For agency belongs exclusively to [what is] conscious. For [we only] call [something that is] independent an 'agent'. And the body and so on have no independence, because they conform to the intention of the person, and because [we] do not observe that corpses for example have any agency." He then answers a Sāṃkhya objector who, relying on SK 57 (see above, n →

been more or less contemporary, and I am not aware of any clue that would entitle us to determine which author may have borrowed from the other. Furthermore, Bhāsarvajña is known to have entertained

← 56), argues that agency can belong to conscious entities "because an unconscious entity such as milk is seen to act independently, for the purpose of making the calf grow" (*vatsādivivṛddhyartham acetanasya kṣīrādeḥ svātantryeṇa pravṛtṭyupalambhāt*, NBhūṣ: 447). According to Bhāsarvajña, this position is refuted by inference as well as scripture: *tathā hi loke 'pi śāstraśilpādikāryaviśeṣaṁ dṛṣṭvā jñānaviśeṣaṁ tatkartur anuminoṭi, tajjñānarahitānāṁ cākartṛtvam eveti. āgameṣv api vedasmṛtipurāṇādiṣu jñānina eva kartṛtvam śrūyate. vidvān yajeta ityādivacanād dharmādikartṛtvam api cetanasyaiveti*. "To explain: in the world too, upon seeing a particular effect such as a treatise or a work of art, [we] infer that its agent must have a particular knowledge, whereas those who are devoid of this knowledge cannot be the agents [of this particular effect]. And in scriptures too, such as the Vedas, Smṛti, Purāṇas and so on, it is stated that agency exclusively belongs to [someone] who knows: through such words as 'he who knows should sacrifice', the agency of *dharma* and so on also is ascribed solely to the conscious." The Sāṃkhya, however, objects (*ibid.*) that in fact this agency belongs to that which is capable of knowledge, will and effort, i.e. the intellect, which is a mere evolute of the insentient primordial nature: *nanu ca śāstraśilpādikartṛtvam jñānecchāprayatnavato 'cetanasyaiva buddhitattvasya, na tu cetanasyeti*. "But it is [something] unconscious, [namely] the principle of the intellect that possesses knowledge, will and effort, which is the agent of such [effects] as a treatise or a work of art and not [something] conscious [as you claim]." Bhāsarvajña answers (*ibid.*) that only a conscious entity, i.e. the Self, can be the substrate of knowledge, will and effort: *tad idaṁ mahāmohaviṣṇubhitaṁ yajjñānavān acetana iti. yo 'sau jñānecchādīnāṁ āśrayaḥ, sa eva hy ātmā, na tato 'nyaś cetano 'stīti vakṣyāmaḥ*. "The [notion] that the unconscious knows spreads from a great delusion; for the substrate of knowledge, will and so on is nothing but the Self, [and] we will explain that nothing is conscious apart from this [Self]."

a view of the Self heterodox in Nyāya,⁷⁸ and his refutation of the Sāṃkhya objection, which involves this peculiar definition of the Self, may not reflect the orthodox Naiyāyika position.

How Original Is Utpaladeva's Proof of God?

To sum up, although Utpaladeva's formulation of the Nyāya proof of *īśvara* might have influenced some of the later authors engaging in this controversy,⁷⁹ on the whole, the *ĪS* does not seem to bring anything new in the debate: it merely reformulates older Naiyāyika arguments.⁸⁰ The only exception appears to be Utpaladeva's treatment of the Sāṃkhya position. Does this exception constitute a real novelty (perhaps motivated by Utpaladeva's desire to refute at length a theory that leaves no room whatsoever for consciousness

⁷⁸ While most Naiyāyikas consider that consciousness is only an adventitious quality of the Self, Bhāsarvajña argues that the Self is by nature conscious, and Abhinavagupta himself mentions with approval Bhāsarvajña's heterodox position in *ĪPVV* I: 134-35. See Ratié 2011a: 88-91.

⁷⁹ See Krasser 2002: 157, which mentions a number of formal similarities between the *ĪS* and the theistic argument attacked by the Kashmiri Buddhist Śāṅkaranandana in the *Īśvarāpākaraṇasamkṣepa*, and suggests that Śāṅkaranandana's *pūrvapakṣa* might be at least in part based on Utpaladeva's work.

⁸⁰ While conceding that Utpaladeva's treatise "remains quite within the Nyāya framework" (Taber 1986: 127), J. Taber considers that the *ĪS*'s argument is "highly original in that it is unmistakably an argument from design. The reason why God must have created the world is, for Utpala – unlike for many Naiyāyikas – not simply because it is an artifact (*kāryatvāt*), but because it is a very unusual kind of artifact which only a conscious, intelligent being, to say the least, could have produced." Indeed, as emphasized by J. Taber, Utpaladeva keeps pointing out the complexity and harmony of natural arrangements; nonetheless, as seen above, the argument resting on the notion of a specific arrangement (*sanniveśaviśeṣa*, etc.) is commonplace in Nyāya literature.

in cosmic creation),⁸¹ or is this apparent oddity due (at least to some extent) to the fact that Utpaladeva is in fact relying on other texts that we have not examined so far? Before answering this question, let us first inquire into the meaning that Utpaladeva himself ascribes to the *ĪS*.

The Inferior Point of View of the *Īśvarasiddhi*, or the Difference between Proof (*siddhi*) and Recognition (*pratyabhijñā*)

In the final verse of the *ĪS*, Utpaladeva explains:

If the Lord shines forth internally [as] the very Self of all living beings, [as] the agent and knower, only the recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) [that] this [Lord is ourselves] is to be performed. And I have explained elsewhere how it can be brought about; nonetheless, it is [also] appropriate [to show] that even in duality (*dvaita*), there is a proof of the Lord (*īśvarasiddhi*) – a fire burns brighter in the night.⁸²

Utpaladeva himself considers that in fact no *īśvarasiddhi* is possible: the Lord cannot be proved to exist but only "recognized". The reason for this is that according to the non-dualistic doctrine

⁸¹ This hypothesis is mentioned in Taber 1986: 128: "Sāṃkhya could well have represented to Utpala [. . .], as a system of materialism, a challenge to his own mature theology. That theology consists in a system of idealism in which Śiva as consciousness is the ultimate reality [. . .]. The refutation of Sāṃkhya, then, does away [. . .] with a view of the world in which consciousness has virtually no role." In this connection it should be noted that in *ĪPK* II.4.17-19, Utpaladeva refutes at length the Sāṃkhya view of causality by showing that *pradhāna* can transform itself into the universe only if it is a manifestation of the ultimate consciousness.

⁸² *ĪS* 56: *svātmaivāyaṃ sphurati sakalaprāṇinām īśvaro'ntaḥ kartā jñātāpi ca yadi param pratyabhijñāsyā sādhyā | sā cāsmābhir vihitaghaṭanānyatra kiṃ tv īśasiddhir dvaita'py astīty ucitam adhikam bhāti vahnir nīṣṭhe* ||

propounded by Utpaladeva in the Pratyabhijñā treatise, nothing exists apart from the Lord understood as an omnipotent and omniscient consciousness that playfully manifests itself in the innumerable forms that constitute the universe, and living beings are nothing but this all-encompassing consciousness freely choosing to appear as this or that limited individual. From this perspective, no demonstration of *īśvara* is possible, because *īśvara* is the very Self (*ātman*) of all living beings, and because this Self is “always already established” (*ādisiddha*):⁸³ no means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) can establish its existence because by definition, means of knowledge function by bringing about a new knowledge,⁸⁴ but any individual is always already aware of the Lord through the most immediate experience, i.e. self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*).⁸⁵ Besides, all inferential knowledge is useless when it comes to *īśvara*, because *īśvara* is a pure transcendental subjectivity that cannot be grasped as an object of knowledge (*prameya*), whereas rational discourse is

⁸³ ĪPK I.1.2: *kartari jñātari svātmany ādisiddhe maheśvare | ajaḍātmā niṣedham vā siddhim vā vidadhīta kaḥ* || “What sentient Self could produce either the refutation or the demonstration [of the existence of] the agent, the knowing subject, the Self that is always already established, the Great Lord?” See also Torella 1994: 86 n 8.

⁸⁴ Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta thus exploit Dharmakīrti’s famous definition of the means of knowledge in PV, *Pramāṇasiddhipariccheda* 1ab and 5c: *pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam . . . ajñātārthaprakāśo vā*. “The means of knowledge is a cognition that does not deceive [. . .] or the manifestation of an object that was not known [so far].” (See Torella 1994: 161 n 2). The second part of the definition (in fact borrowed from the Mīmāṃsakas: see Krasser 2001 and Kataoka 2003) is explicitly included in Utpaladeva’s own definition of the means of knowledge (see ĪPK II.3.1: the means of knowledge is a manifestation that “arises [while being] new”, *abhinavodayaḥ*).

⁸⁵ See *Vṛtti* ad ĪPK I.1.2: 2 (*svasaṃvedanasiddham aiśvaryaṃ*. “The fact that one is the Lord (*aiśvarya*) is established through self-awareness”) and Torella 1994: 86.

bound to objectify whatever it talks about.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, because *īśvara* playfully forgets his own sovereignty while assuming the role of limited, suffering individuals, these individuals must be led to recognize themselves as the Lord, and such a recognition can be brought about by making them aware of their own powers of knowledge and action, which are precisely those of the Lord. This recognition, far from producing any new knowledge, merely uncovers or unveils a knowledge of which the individual was never deprived⁸⁷ but to which he no longer pays attention due to

⁸⁶ Thus, while commenting on ĪPK I.1.2ab (see above, n 83), Abhinavagupta explains (ĪPV I: 32-33): *saṃvid iti tūcyamānā vikalpyatvena prameyatām spr̥śantī spr̥śatvān na paramārthasaṃvid iti vakṣyāmaḥ. kartā jñātā ca maheśvara ity abhidhāne’pi sa eva prakāra āpated iti yathā yathā prameyabhūmikāpādananyakkāraḥ kaparihāraḥ śakyas tathā tathā yāvadgati yatitavyam iti bhūtavibhaktiā nirdeśaḥ kṛtaḥ. upadeśāvasare hi sarvātmanā tāvat sā prameyatāsyā parihartum aśakyā*. “But we will state [later] that the ‘consciousness’ of which [people] talk as [if it were] a conceptual object (*vikalpya*) is not consciousness in the ultimate sense (*paramārtha*), because [this consciousness that] has the status of an object of knowledge (*prameya*) is [merely] a created [object and not the creative subject]; and when one mentions ‘the agent’ and ‘the knower’, [or] ‘the Great Lord’, the same consequence must follow. Therefore, since [we] must strive as much as possible to avoid the stain of debasing [this consciousness] by letting it fall to the level of an object of knowledge, [Utpaladeva] has expressed it with a case [i.e. the locative] that expresses an accomplished state; for surely, when teaching, it is impossible to avoid this objectification altogether.”

⁸⁷ See ĪPV I: 20, where Abhinavagupta explains that the goal of the treatise is not a cognition but a recognition (*praty-abhijñā*, where *praty-* stands for *pratīpam*, “again”) for the following reason: *pratīpam iti svātmābhāso hi nābhūtapūrvō* ’vicchinna prakāśatvāt tasya. [*nābhūtapūrvō corr. (see Ratié 2011a: 27): nānanubhūtapūrvō — Bhāskari, KSTS]*. “[It is a] *re*-[cognition], for the Self’s manifestation is not [something] that did not exist before, since this [Self] is an uninterrupted manifesting consciousness.”

some delusion (*moha*) through which consciousness hides its very nature from itself.⁸⁸

Admittedly, Abhinavagupta acknowledges that the Pratyabhijñā treatise too takes the form of what the Naiyāyikas call an inference for others.⁸⁹ Nonetheless this inference, far from resting on “an inferential reason that is an effect” (*kāryahetu*) in the manner of the Naiyāyikas’ *kāryatva* argument, is based on “an inferential reason that is a nature” (*svabhāvahetu*):⁹⁰ instead of proving *īśvara* as the cause of a universe conceived as an effect distinct from it, it proves that the individual’s Self is the Lord on the grounds that this Self is endowed with the very powers ascribed to the Lord. And contrary to a *kāryahetu* inference, a *svabhāvahetu* inference does not produce any new knowledge, but merely establishes the validity of a usage (*vyavahāra*).⁹¹ In other words, it does not prove

⁸⁸ See ĪPK I.1.3: *kintu mohavaśād asmin dr̥ṣṭe ’py anupalakṣite | śaktyāviṣkaraṇeneyam pratyabhijñopadarśyate* || “However, since the [Self], although perceived (*dr̥ṣṭa*), is not apprehended [as it really is] (*anupalakṣita*) because of a delusion (*moha*), this recognition is shown through making [the Self’s] powers obvious.”

⁸⁹ See ĪPV I: 25; for analyses and translations, see Lawrence 2000: 50ff.; Ratié 2009: 352 n 9.

⁹⁰ As noted in Torella 1994: 173 n 33.

⁹¹ According to the Buddhist logicians to whom Utpaladeva borrows this terminology, the *svabhāvahetu* inference does not establish the existence of the thing itself (*vastu*) but only a particular usage (*vyavahāra*), since the inference “this is a tree because this is a *śimśapā*” only justifies the use of the word “tree” with respect to the object called “*śimśapā*” (which designates a particular variety of tree) by relying on some properties that the tree and the *śimśapā* share (such as having branches). On Dharmottara’s statement that the *svabhāvahetu* inference only establishes a *vyavahāra*, see Ratié 2007: 357 n 90. Cf. ĪPVV I: 87: *nanu ca siddhe vastuni yat pramāṇam, tat kila vyavahārasāadhanam iti prasiddham*. “But it is well known that surely, the means of knowledge with respect to an entity [the existence of which is already] established [only] establishes a usage.”

the hitherto unestablished fact that the Lord is the Self: it merely shows that it is legitimate to *say* that the Self is the Lord and to *behave* accordingly, just as showing that an object seen in front of us is a pot because it possesses the features that characterize a pot does not make us know the pot (which we already perceive), but enables us to talk and act in accordance with the fact that it is a pot.⁹² And if all inferential knowledge is bound to objectify the pure subjectivity in which *īśvara* consists, the Pratyabhijñā path is paradoxically conceived as a *rational* path capable of bringing about recognition *because it leads the subject to the very limit of rationality*: in the inference of the Pratyabhijñā treatise, the nature (*svabhāva*) that is to be recognized as that of *īśvara* is precisely the individual’s experience that he or she cannot be reduced to a mere object of knowledge, and inducing recognition consists in letting the individual realize that the aspect of him or her which resists any attempt of conceptualization, or which “cannot bear to be grasped as a [mere] object” (*idantāvimarśāsahisṇu*),⁹³ is precisely the Lord.⁹⁴

⁹² See ĪPK II.3.17 (*apravartitapūrvō ’tra kevalam mūḍhatāvaśāt | śaktiprakāśeṇeśādivyavahāraḥ pravartyate* || “It is only that manifesting the powers [of the Self through the treatise] makes possible the usage [of the terms] ‘Lord’, etc. which were not used before with respect to this [Self] because of delusion” and Abhinavagupta’s commentaries thereon (see Ratié 2011a: 729-39; 2013: 427-38).

⁹³ ĪPVV I: 106 (see Ratié 2007: 363, n 101). In fact, in this passage Abhinavagupta is describing the process through which we come to recognize the existence of other conscious beings, but as shown in Ratié (2007: 360ff.), this description is very close to his definition of the Recognition of the Lord: according to Abhinavagupta, the recognition of other individual conscious entities already involves the (partial) realization of *īśvara*’s nature.

⁹⁴ See ĪPVV III: 181: *śabdavikalpa īśvaraḥ pramātā sarvaśaktir ātmaivety upadeśāvasare vyavahārasāadhanabalopanate śabdaiḥ prameyatām nītasyāpi paramārthaparāmarśe ’hantātmani viśrama iti*. “In the verbal concept that arises through establishing a usage (*vyavahāra*) when teaching that the Lord, who is a knowing subject endowed with all

In the Pratyabhijñā treatise, Utpaladeva thus accuses those who endeavour to prove the existence of God of labouring under a fundamental misapprehension: they consider that the existence of *īśvara* requires a proof because they erroneously apprehend it as a distant, imperceptible entity that can only be grasped through an inference as the cause of an effect essentially distinct from it. Thus according to Abhinavagupta's commentary, in his lost *Vivṛti*, Utpaladeva was emphasizing that those who engage in an *īśvarasiddhi* are driven by the presupposition that *īśvara* is imperceptible:

[Utpaladeva] states [the sentence beginning with] “But . . .” [in his *Vivṛti*] with the intention [of expressing the following objection to his own thesis]: “The Lord is not the object of a mere means of knowledge establishing [nothing but] a usage [instead of producing a new knowledge,] because this [Lord] is not [immediately] manifest in any way. For the Lord is never manifest anywhere to anybody.” And [with the compound] *siddhasattāka* [, this opponent means] that [the Lord's] very existence is not established; [since] in this [case], being established would be being manifest. [And with the words] “It is this very . . .” [, the opponent means] that this [very] existence must be established. [In other words, according to the opponent,] with regard to this [existence of the Lord, we] must state a means of knowledge such that it may lead to a knowledge consisting in the manifestation of [something] that was not [manifest] so far; and accordingly, Uddyotakara and [others] have produced a discourse in the form of a “proof of the Lord” (*īśvarasiddhi*).⁹⁵

← powers, is the Self itself, [that which is taught,] although transformed by words into an object of knowledge, rests on the ultimate realization (*paramārthaparāmarśa*), that is, [pure] subjectivity (*ahantā*).” For an analysis of the role of subjectivity in the inferential process of recognition, see Ratié 2011a: 734–39.

⁹⁵ ĪPVV I: 40: *īśvaro na vyavahārasādhanaḥ pramāṇamātraviśayaḥ kathañcid apy anavabhāsamānatvāt, na hīśvaro viśvatra kasyacit kadācid bhāsata ity āśayenāha nanv iti. siddhasattākasyeti sattaiva* →

Utpaladeva was also emphasizing in his *Vivṛti* ad II.3.17 that this mistake (assuming that the Lord is not manifest and therefore stands in need of a proof) is an obstacle particularly difficult to overcome as it threatens the very possibility of recognition,⁹⁶ and in his commentary on I.1.2, Abhinavagupta goes as far as saying that the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas who attempt to prove the existence of *īśvara* are no better than the Sāṃkhya who attempt to refute it: both parties are fundamentally deluded in so far as they are incapable of paying attention to their most inner experience, and they both engage in the equally absurd tasks of proving or refuting the Lord because they misunderstand their own Self to the point that they no longer recognize its sentiency.⁹⁷

← *na siddheti ca. siddhatvam atra prakāśamānatvam. saiveti sattā sādhyā. apūrvaprakāśanarūpaṁ tatra jñānaṁ yato bhavati, tādrk pramāṇam vaktavyam. tathā codyotakarādaya*īśvarasiddhir ity evaṁ vyavahāram akārṣuḥ. [*codyotakarādaya corr.: codyotakarādaya ĪPVV].*

⁹⁶ See ĪPVV III: 166: *dūrabhuvanaviśeṣavṛttitvād asmadādyadrśyatvādināpūrveṇāsmān praty aprakāśamānenārthenāsahabhavanāśilo 'sāv aiśvaryavyavahāraḥ svātmani tathābhūtāpūrvarūpavirahiṇi viruddha iti yo vyāmohaḥ tenautaprotahṛdayaḥ katham tathā vyavahāret.* “How could [someone] adopt such a usage (*vyavahāret*) [as ‘the Lord’ with respect to oneself] while having one’s heart interwoven (*otaprotā*) with this delusion: ‘This usage, “being the Lord”, is contradictory with respect to the Self, [because] this [expression “being the Lord”] is by nature incapable of denoting something that never manifests itself as new to us, [i.e. something that is always manifest]; since, for instance, [the Lord] is imperceptible for [limited subjects] such as us due to its existing in some distant particular world; [whereas the Self] is devoid of such a nature [, since it is always already manifest to us].”

⁹⁷ See ĪPV I: 34 (commenting on ĪPK I.1.2cd, according to which no “sentient Self” can prove or refute the Lord): *ajādātmeti, yasya tu vaiśeṣikāder jaḍa ātmā sa siddhiṁ karotv īśvaraviśayām; anyas tu sāmkyādir niṣedham; sāmkyo 'pi viśayābhabhāsanarūpaṁ jñānaṁ* →

According to its own author then, the ĪS expresses an inferior point of view (which the Pratyabhijñā treatise transcends) because it attempts to prove the unprovable (or rather, the always already proven) and because in doing so, it transforms the very core of subjectivity into a mere object.

But the ĪS's perspective is also inferior in so far as it presents *īśvara* as an efficient cause acting together with other, material and auxiliary causes that are unconscious and ontologically distinct from the efficient cause. Thus in the Pratyabhijñā treatise, Utpaladeva and his commentator Abhinavagupta explain that if the "Naiyāyikas, etc." are right to present the Lord as the efficient cause of the universe, they are wrong to admit other causes distinct from it, because only consciousness is capable of agency: the ultimate truth (*paramārtha*) is rather that the Lord, understood as an all-encompassing consciousness, is the one and only cause and acts merely by taking on this or that appearance.⁹⁸ In the *Vivṛtivismarśinī*,

← *buddhidharmam icchann ātmānam vastuto jaḍam evopaiti. na ca jaḍātmā svātmāny api durlabhaprakāśasvātantryaleśaḥ kiñcit sādhayitum niṣeddhūṃ vā prabhaviṣṇuḥ pāṣāṇa iva.* "[With the expression] 'sentient Self' [Utpaladeva means the following:] On the one hand, let the Vaiśeṣika[s] and so on, for whom the Self is insentient, produce a proof of the Lord; on the other hand, let other[s], such as the Sāṃkhya[s], [produce] a refutation [of the Lord] – for even a Sāṃkhya, who considers knowledge, which consists in manifesting an object, as a property of the intellect, actually ends up making the Self insentient –; now, an insentient Self, in which the faintest trace of manifesting consciousness (*prakāśa*) and freedom cannot be found, does not have the power to prove or refute anything, just like a stone!"

⁹⁸ See ĪPK II.4.8: *ata evāṅkure 'pīṣṭo nimittam parameśvaraḥ tadanyasyāpi bijāder hetutā nopapadyate* || "For this very reason, [some] consider the Highest Lord as the efficient cause (*nimitta*) of the sprout as well; [but] nothing distinct from [him], such as the seed and so on, can also be a cause." Cf. ĪPV II: 145-46: *yata evam cetana eva nirmātā, ata eva naiyāyikādibhir ankurādaḥ buddhimān eva parameśvaro hetutveneṣṭaḥ. nanu tair nimittakāraṇatāsyāṅgikṛtā*

Abhinavagupta, after alluding to the discussion over the legitimacy

← *kriyāvibhāgādikramāyātāparamāṇvādidvārakatayā, samavāyikāraṇanijāvayavārambhaparamparayā tu tata īśvarād anyasyāpi bījabhūmijalāder hetutā kathitā. satyam kathitā, sā tu nopapadyate, uktayuktyā jaḍasya hetutāyogāt; tataś ceśvara eva bījabhūmijalābhāśasāhityenāṅkurātmanā bhāsata itīyān atra paramārthaḥ.* "Since thus, only a conscious [entity] is a creator, for this very reason the Naiyāyikas, etc. consider that the Highest Lord, who must be intelligent (*buddhimān*), is the cause of the sprout and so on. [–Objection:] Granted, they admit that he is the efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) inasmuch as he is what enables the atoms, [atom dyads] and so on to go through the succession (*krama*) of activities (*kriyā*), disjunctions (*vibhāga*) and [conjunctions that lead to the formation of the perceptible universe]. Nonetheless, [these Naiyāyikas, etc. also] claim that [entities] such as the seed, earth, water and so on, although distinct from the Lord, are [also] causes [of the sprout], because of the series of combinations (*ārambha*) [of atom dyads and so on] that has their own parts as an inherence cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*). [– Answer:] True; [they] claim [that other things are also causes]. But this [claim] is not sound, because according to the reasoning that [we] have already stated, the insentient cannot be a cause; and therefore it is the Lord that manifests himself as the sprout accompanied by the manifestations of the seed, earth and water; such only is the ultimate truth in this regard." Abhinavagupta is probably alluding here to the Vaiśeṣika theory of cosmic creation. See PDhS: 48-49, which describes in the following way the beginning of the universe: *tataḥ punaḥ prāṇinām bhogabhūtaye maheśvarasirṣkṣānantaram sarvātmagatavṛttilabdḥādrṣṭāpekṣebhyas tatsamyogebhyaḥ pavanaparamāṇuṣu karmotpattau teṣāṃ parasparasamyogebhyo dvyanukādiprakrameṇa mahān vāyuh samutpanno nabhasi dodhūyamānas tiṣṭhati.* "Then, again, the Great Lord has a desire to create [the universe] so as to [provide] living beings with a wealth of experiences; immediately afterwards, after the arising of an activity (*karma*) in the atoms of air due to the conjunctions (*samyoga*) of these [atoms] that depend on the unseen [force] (*adrṣṭa*) which has started to operate inside all the [individual's] Selves, due to the mutual conjunctions of these [atoms], through the succession

of inferring *īśvara* as a cause in general of the universe, adds that there is no need to explain it further since it has been dealt with in detail in the *ĪS*, but that in the *Pratyabhijñā* treatise, Utpaladeva rather gives the ultimate truth regarding the Lord's agency — namely, the fact that only *īśvara* can be considered a cause:

Although [the Naiyāyikas, etc. acknowledge that] the Lord is a cause, they admit that other [things] as well, which are distinct from the Lord [and] insentient, are causes; [but in fact] this [causality] is not possible for that which does not act deliberately. For [according to the Naiyāyikas, etc.] what [we] call an “arrangement” consists in the fact that [various elements] are

← of the atom dyads, etc. a great wind comes to being, trembling in the sky.” However, oddly enough, in the *ĪPV*, action is first, disjunction second, and conjunction only appears implicitly with *-ādi* (“and so on”), whereas according to *Praśastapāda*, conjunction is first and action is second. *Bhāskarakaṇṭha* solves the problem by explaining that the sequence alluded to by *Abhinavagupta* is the following (*Bhāskari* II: 164): *pūrvam kriyā tato vibhāgas tataḥ pūrvasamyoganivṛttis tata uttarasamyogotpādādiḥ*. “First activity, then disjunction, then the disappearance (*nivṛtti*) of the previous conjunction, then the arising of the new conjunction.” In other words, according to *Bhāskarakaṇṭha*, in fact, the succession alluded to in the *ĪPV* starts earlier in the *Vaiśeṣikas*' description of cosmic activity, i.e. during the destruction of the universe, which begins with an activity that leads to disjunctions down to the destruction of all atomic combinations before the universe can begin again with new conjunctions. See PDhS: 48: *maheśvareccchātmāṇusamyogajakarmabhyah śarīrendriyakāraṇāṇuvibhāgebhyas tatsamyoganivṛtttau teṣām āparamāṇvanto vināśaḥ*. “Due to the activities (*karman*) produced by the will of the great Lord and the conjunctions of the atoms with the selves, disjunctions (*vibhāga*) between the atoms that are the causes [constituting] the bodies and sense-organs [occur, and] due to [these disjunctions there is] a disappearance (*nivṛtti*) of the conjunctions between [these atoms]; when [they have thus ceased], there is a disappearance of these down to the atoms.”

placed together while being combined [in a particular way]; it is associated with a material cause [such as] clay [, and it] enables [us] to distinguish, for instance with regard to a pot, a plate and a bowl, between [their] being of the same sort [in so far as they have the same material cause] and their being of a different sort [in so far as they have different arrangements; and] once [we] have observed in [only] one occasion [, upon seeing a potter at work,] that [this arrangement] is produced by [an entity] the nature of which is conscious, [we] must necessarily conclude that in all cases, [including the arrangements of worlds and so on,] an arrangement must be, exactly in the same way, [the effect of a conscious entity]. As for what [some] say, namely, that although this [invariable co-presence] is observed [in the particular case of a pot], the understanding that [the universe too] is the product of a [conscious agent is not correct because this conscious agent is only inferred as a generality,⁹⁹ they] say it because they are deluded by their partiality towards their own view [that the Lord does not exist]; since [in fact,] in the case of smoke as well, the [inferred cause is necessarily apprehended as] a general [entity. But] enough with this digression; for this has been explained in detail by the author himself in the *Īśvarasiddhi*, whereas here, it is the ultimate truth (*paramārtha*) [that Utpaladeva states], namely: it is the Lord, by conforming to his own power of necessity (*niyatiśakti*), who manifests himself as the sprout in his own

⁹⁹ My conjecture (below, n 100) as well as the additions in brackets in the translation are only tentative and I might be misunderstanding this passage. According to the edited text (*tadadarśane'pi tatkr̥tatvapratipattir ityādi*), the objection examined here is: “even though there is no perception of it, one understands that it is an effect of that”, but given the way *Abhinavagupta* replies to it, it seems to me that it should rather be an allusion to *Dharmakīrti*'s objection that only a particular conscious agent can be inferred from a particular arrangement when their invariable concomitance has first been ascertained. I am assuming that this objection is the quotation of the beginning of a sentence in Utpaladeva's lost *Vivṛti*, but this might rather be a quotation from some other text that I have failed to identify.

limpid self-manifesting consciousness (*svaprakāśa*), by making the phenomena of the seed, earth and water predominant.¹⁰⁰

So why did Utpaladeva write a treatise that he himself did not consider as an expression of the ultimate truth?

A Plausible Purpose for the *Īśvarasiddhi*: Utpaladeva's Inclusivist Strategy Towards Nyāya

John Taber has suggested that Nyāya may have been a step in the development of Utpaladeva's thought and that he may have got rid of it later through the influence of Buddhism in particular.¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ ĪPVV III: 192: *saty apīśvare kāraṇe tato 'nyasyāpīśvarād atiriktasya jaḍasya yā hetutā tair upagatā, sā na sambhavaty apreksāpūrvakāriṇa iti. sanniveśo hi nāma sajātīyavijātīyatāvibhāgotthāpako ghaṭaśarāvakuṇḍādaḥ mṛdupādānasambhāvī sambhūyaniviṣṭatārūpaś cidrūpakārya ity ekavāram avalokite sarvatra sanniveśena tathaiva bhāvyaḥ ity ekānta evāyam. yat tūcyate taddarśane 'pi* tatkr̥tatvapratipattir ity ādi tat svadṛṣṭipakṣapātavyāmohavyāhṛtaḥ dhūme 'pi samānatvādasyetyalamavāntareṇa. etad dhi granthakāreṇaiva vitānitam īśvarasiddhau, iha tv eṣa paramārtha īśvara eva niyatiśaktim nijam anurundhāno bijabhūmijalābhāsapuraḥsarikāreṇāṅkurātmānam svacche svaprakāśe nirbhāsayatīti. [*taddarśane 'pi conj. (see above, n 99): tadadarśane 'pi ĪPVV].*

¹⁰¹ See Taber 1986: 129-30: "It is well known that Naiyāyikas were, as a rule, Śaivas; Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña, the two major Naiyāyikas closest to Utpala in time and place, were outspokenly so. And it is evident that Utpala received formal training in Nyāya at the hands of Naiyāyikas, so skilfully does he handle Nyāya principles. Thus, one might reasonably hypothesize that Utpala developed his theology in connection with reflection on the Nyāya system. While he retained the theism of the Nyāya — indeed Śiva in Utpala's system is not the featureless, inactive Absolute of Advaita Vedānta but a vital, personal, absolute Deity — he came, ultimately, to reject its realism, due to the impression made upon him by the Mahāyāna Buddhists, among others. Thus, the treatment of problems regarding the existence of God from strictly within the framework of Nyāya would not have been just an

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However, this hypothesis would hardly explain why Utpaladeva took the trouble of writing the *ĪS* after elaborating his "mature system" (as the last verse of the treatise clearly indicates); and admittedly, Utpaladeva's thought was profoundly influenced by that of Dharmakīrti and his followers,¹⁰² but his rejection of Nyāya dualism, as well as his interpretation of Buddhist concepts, was obviously determined by his belonging to a pre-existing Śaiva non-dualistic tradition that presented Śiva as a unique, infinite and dynamic consciousness: it is much more likely that he chose to reject or retain this or that doctrinal element from both Nyāya and Buddhism according to their compatibility with the metaphysical background of his own religious tradition.

However, John Taber also remarks that the *ĪS*'s last verse seems to indicate that Utpaladeva "wished to defeat the opponent on his own turf"¹⁰³ and he quotes in this respect Abhinavagupta's assertion that "the opinion of the author [of the *ĪPK*] is that in the sphere of *māyā*, it is the Naiyāyikas' method that is ultimately true".¹⁰⁴ The Śaiva non-dualists acknowledge the validity of the Nyāya point of view at the ontologically inferior level where consciousness playfully manifests itself as differentiated, although they consider that from the perspective of the ultimate truth, i.e. non-duality, this point of view remains incomplete. The *ĪS* may thus be understood as one of the outcomes of an inclusivistic strategy through which Śaiva non-dualism presents itself as encompassing and transcending all doctrines instead of plainly rejecting them.¹⁰⁵ As Raffaele Torella

← intellectual exercise for Utpala. Rather, it would have been partly an expression of convictions which were, at least at one stage, central to his thought and which played an important role in the development of his mature system."

¹⁰² See Torella 1992.

¹⁰³ Taber 1986: 129.

¹⁰⁴ ĪPV I: 25: *naiyāyikakramasyaiva māyāpade pāramārthikatvam iti granthakārābhiprāyaḥ*.

¹⁰⁵ On the "inclusivistic hierarchy" of Śaiva non-dualism, see Hanneder 1998: 6ff.

has emphasized:

In a sense Utpaladeva inaugurates what was to become a salient feature of the whole Trika in Abhinavagupta's synthesis: namely, the tendency not to constitute a monolithic doctrine and a world of religious experience to oppose en bloc everything that does not coincide with it [. . .] but to distinguish planes, that are hierarchically ordered but in which the "higher" does not automatically cancel the "lower" [. . .]. This is the perspective of the *paramādvaita*, such an elevated viewpoint that it does not fear what is different from itself, is not put in a critical position by it, is not forced to make a choice.¹⁰⁶

By writing the *ĪS*, Utpaladeva may thus have meant to show to the Naiyāyikas (among which "Śaiva faith was known to be pre-eminent")¹⁰⁷ that his Śaivism was not incompatible with their system and that it sided with Nyāya against the opponents of *īśvara*, while giving them a hint that his own system was superior; and indeed, as noted by Raffaele Torella, the *ĪS*'s last verse "enables us to see the right perspective"¹⁰⁸ by making clear that duality remains an inferior plane.

Another Aspect of the Issue:

The Śaiva Siddhānta and the Proof of *īśvara*

However, Utpaladeva is not the first to have integrated the Nyāya proof of *īśvara* to his system. It is also the case of the Śaiva Siddhānta, the dualistic Śaiva religious trend that was dominant in Kashmir in Utpaladeva's time.¹⁰⁹ Thus the assertion that the Lord, although imperceptible, can be inferred from the fact that the universe is an effect, is found in the scriptures of the Śaiva

¹⁰⁶ Torella 1994: xxi.

¹⁰⁷ Torella 1994: xxii (cf. the remark in Taber 1986: 129, quoted above, n 101). Torella adds: "It is probably for this reason that we see Utpala assuming a Naiyāyika guise in the *ĪS*."

¹⁰⁸ Torella 1994: xxi n 25.

¹⁰⁹ See Sanderson 1985: 203.

Siddhānta that belong to the last phase of its early scriptural development (i.e. around the eighth and ninth centuries CE). The KT¹¹⁰ for instance contains such a statement and argues that the cause of the universe cannot be past actions leading to karmic retribution since these are unconscious;¹¹¹ and the PT¹¹² displays a lengthy defence of the inference of *īśvara*¹¹³ that seems to presuppose an awareness of Kumārila's antitheistic critique.¹¹⁴ It addresses a number of objections, most notably that of the illegitimacy of the inference since it rests on a relation of cause and effect that cannot be perceived,¹¹⁵ but also that of the

¹¹⁰ On its date, see Goodall 1998: xlvii-lxxvi.

¹¹¹ KT III.11cd-12: *vyāpāro na ca dṛśyate kāryam icchā pratīyate || sthūlaṃ vicitrakam kāryam nānyathā ghaṭavad bhavet | asti hetur ataḥ kaścit karma cen na hy acetanam ||* "And [although] the [Lord's cosmic] activity is not perceived, [its] effects [are, so that his creative] will is known. [The universe,] which is coarse [and] diverse, is an effect, just as a pot — it could not be otherwise. Therefore [it] must have some cause; if [one says that this cause] is [past] action[s], [the answer to this is:] no, for [past actions are] unconscious." See Goodall 1998: 273-78.

¹¹² On its date, see Goodall 2004: xxxv-lviii.

¹¹³ The inference itself is formulated as follows (PT II.2-3): *mūrtāḥ sāvayavā ye 'rthā nānārūpaparicchadāḥ | sthūlāvayavaśiṣṭatvād buddhimaddhetupūrvakāḥ || ato 'sti buddhimān kaścid īśvaraḥ samavasthitaḥ | pratipannaḥ svakāryeṇa dṛṣṭenātrānumānataḥ ||* "The material things that have parts [and] are endowed with various forms presuppose an intelligent cause, because they are particularized by gross [i.e. perceptible] parts. Therefore there is some intelligent [cause] that is established [to be] the Lord. In this [system he is] known through an inference from his perceived effect." See Goodall 2004: 165-66.

¹¹⁴ See Goodall 2001: 332-33; 2004: xlix-l.

¹¹⁵ See the objection in PT 2.4: *kāryakāraṇasambandho na grhīto yatas tayoh | tena tatkāraṇābhāvān na khyāpyam kāryadarśanam ||* "Since [we] do not perceive the relation of cause and effect between the [Lord] and the [universe, and] since therefore there is no [known] cause of this →

possibility of accounting for the universe's existence through the sole mechanism of karmic retribution,¹¹⁶ and it argues that the universe must have an efficient cause distinct from material and

← [universe,] one cannot say that the effect is perceived [, since we do not know whether the universe is an effect].” (See Goodall 2004: 166.) The objection is answered mainly by arguing that the Lord is inferred through a necessary assumption (*arthāpatti*) defined as a *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam* reasoning, i.e. as an inference that shows the necessity of the Lord's existence (conceived as an intelligent cause in general) from the impossibility of accounting for its effect otherwise. See PT 2.9ab and 11: *arthāpattir iyaṁ proktā mānaṁ sāmānyadarśikā* । . . . *tena sāmānyato dṛṣṭād anumānena buddhimān* । *kāraṇaṁ sthūlakāryasya kṣitīkāryādikasya saḥ* ॥ “This necessary assumption [through which one also infers the imperceptible causality of past actions] is proclaimed [to be] a [valid] means of knowledge that demonstrates a generality (*sāmānyā*) [. . .]. Therefore this [Lord, who is an] intelligent [entity, is known] through an inference from [what is] apprehended as a generality (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭāt*) [as] the cause of the coarse effect [that is the universe, i.e.] first, the effect that is the earth [, etc.]” See Goodall 2004: 169.

¹¹⁶ See PT 2.12: *kṣiter evaṁvidhaṁ rūpaṁ na kadācid anīdṛṣam* । *tanvādeḥ kāraṇaṁ karma kalpitena matena kim* ॥ “The form of the earth is as [we now see it and] was never otherwise; [as for] the cause of bodies and so on, it is [past] action[s]; [so] what is the point of [this] artificial theory [about the Lord]?” (See Goodall 2004: 169-70.) As in the KT, the answer is mainly that because the universe is coarse (*sthūla*), it is an effect built by an intelligent agent, so that *karman*, which is unconscious, can only be an instrument of that intelligent agent. See PT 2.13ab (*yad yat sthūlaṁ bhaved vastu kṛtaṁ tad viniścitaṁ* । “Whatever entity is coarse is established to be constructed”) and PT 2.16: *buddhimāns tena kartāsau tanvādīnām iha sthitaḥ* । *tan no hetur bhavet karma kim tadyojitaṁ bhavet* ॥ “Therefore this intelligent agent of bodies and so on is established [to exist] here; so [past] action[s] cannot be the cause [of bodies and so on;] rather, [they] must be [instruments] used by this [cause].” See Goodall 2004: 170-71.

auxiliary causes since all effects are found to require these three kinds of cause.¹¹⁷ Besides, the PT states that *īśvara* is inferred as a mere intelligent cause in general,¹¹⁸ but that this general cause must nonetheless be characterized as omniscient since it creates everything.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ PT 2.29-30: *nimittam īśvarākhyam yat tad dṛṣṭam sahakāraṇam* । *upādānaṁ ca yat sūkṣmaṁ sarvakāryeṣu saṁhitam* । *kāraṇānāṁ trayam tena sarvakārye'numīyate* । *yato na janakaṁ caikaṁ sāmāgrī janikā bhavet* । *nimittakāraṇam tena kartā sa parameśvaraḥ* ॥ “The efficient cause is [what is] called ‘Lord’; the auxiliary cause is what is seen [, such as the potter's stick, wheel and so on]; and the material cause is subtle [matter]. [These] three causes are connected with all effects; therefore [they] are [legitimately] inferred with respect to the effect that is the universe. And since one [of them] cannot produce [it on its own], [it is] this set [of causes] that must produce [it]; therefore the efficient cause is the agent [who is] the Highest Lord.” (See Goodall 2004: 174-78.)

¹¹⁸ See above, n 115.

¹¹⁹ See PT 2.62cd-65ab: *sarvajñaḥ sarvakartṛtvād yatas taj jñānapūrvakam* । *sādhanaṅgaphalaiḥ sārdaṁ vetti sarvam idaṁ tataḥ* । *yathā tantvādivitkartā viṣayīkṛtya tāni saḥ* ॥ *tasmin pravartate kārye tadvat tasmin paraḥ śivaḥ* । *sarvakṛtyeṣu tajjñānaṁ vyāpitaṁ yena sāvayam* । *nikhilajñānayogitvāt sarvajñaḥ parameśvaraḥ* । “[This Lord] is omniscient, because [he] is omnipotent, since the [power to act] presupposes knowledge. Therefore he knows all the [universe] along with the means [of accomplishing it, its] parts and [its] fruits. Just as an agent who knows the threads and [whatever is required to make a cloth] engages in the activity (*kārya*) [of weaving] after taking these [things] as the object [of his thought], in the same way, the Highest Śiva [engages in cosmic activity after taking the universe as the object of his thought]. Since the knowledge of the [things required so as to create] is invariably found to be present in all activities (*kṛtya*), the Highest Lord is omniscient, because he [must] know everything.” (See Goodall 2004: 185-86.)

Sadyojyotis's Inference of *īśvara* and His Reply to the Buddhist and Mīmāṃsaka Objections

This inference of *īśvara* from the universe considered as his effect is also mentioned by various Saiddhāntika exegetes who wrote after Utpaladeva,¹²⁰ but of more importance is the fact that it is

¹²⁰ See Rāmakaṇṭha's lengthy commentary in KV ad KT III.11cd-12 and Goodall 1998: 273-78. Later commentators also tend to forcibly read the inference in scriptures that do not mention them. See Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha's MTṭ on MT, *Vidyāpāda* 2.3-4 (which does not mention the Nyāya inference but merely states that the fivefold cosmic activity and its effects must belong to the Lord who is "established by his own nature", *svabhāvasiddha*), p. 54: *etac ca na māyādibhiḥ karmabhir vā nirvartayitum śakyam ācāitanyāt, nāpi puruṣeṇāsyā malaniruddhaśaktivāt. na cānīśvaro'tra kartā yuktaḥ. yaś caitat sṛṣṭyādi kartum śaknoti, so'vaśyaṁ tadviṣayañāś cikīrṣitakāryaviṣayañāṁ jñānaviśeṣāñāṁ aṁśenāpi vaikalye tattatkāryāniṣpatteḥ. ataś ca sarvakartrā sarvajñena tena ca svabhāvasiddhena jagataḥ kartrā bhavitavyam.* "And this [fivefold cosmic activity of creation, maintenance, destruction, obscuration and grace] cannot be performed by matter (*māyā*), for instance, nor by [past] actions (*karman*), because [these] are unconscious, nor by the individual (*puruṣa*), because his powers are restrained by the stain (*mala*) [that binds him in *saṁsāra*]. Nor can this [fivefold activity] have an agent that would not be a Lord, and he who can perform this [fivefold activity of] creation and so on necessarily knows the object of this [activity], because if the particular knowledges regarding the effects that one wants to create are lacking, even in part, it is impossible to bring about this or that [particular] effect. And as a consequence, there must be an agent of the world who is omnipotent and omniscient, and therefore [, as the scripture states here,] 'established by its own nature'." (See Hulin 1980: 58ff.) See also Aghoraśiva's TSṬ: 103: *ataś ca jagataḥ sanniveśādimattvena kāryatvāt tatkarṣṭatayeśvarasiddhir iti bhāvaḥ. etena prakṛtikarmapuruṣeśvaravādinō 'pi nirastāḥ, prakṛtikarmaṇor acetanatvāt puruṣasya ca samalatvenāsvaśatvāt.* "And therefore, because the world is an effect in so far as it possesses a [specific] arrangement, etc., the Lord is established to be its agent

found as well in another, non-scriptural Saiddhāntika source that Utpaladeva certainly knew. Raffaele Torella has noticed that the first chapter of the NP by Sadyojyotis (an important Saiddhāntika figure who probably wrote c. 675–725)¹²¹ is likely to have influenced the Pratyabhijñā treatise at least regarding Utpaladeva's attitude towards Buddhist epistemology.¹²² Now, the second chapter of the same work happens to be entirely devoted to the proof of *īśvara*,¹²³ and its main line of argument is "virtually identical to the Nyāya argument for the existence of God":¹²⁴ Sadyojyotis infers the existence of *īśvara* from the fact that the universe, which is an effect endowed with parts, must have an intelligent agent,¹²⁵

← — this is the implicit idea. This also refutes those who say that the Lord [presiding over the universe is in fact] primordial nature, [past] actions or individuals, because primordial nature and [past] actions are unconscious, and the individual does not act independently due to the stain (*mala*) [that binds him]."

¹²¹ See Sanderson 2006.

¹²² Torella 1994: xxii.

¹²³ For a summary and analysis of this chapter, see Hannotte 1987: 238-338.

¹²⁴ Hannotte 1987: 245.

¹²⁵ Note, however, that Sadyojyotis does not use the term *sanniveśa* (arrangement) whereas his commentator Rāmakaṇṭha (who is posterior to Utpaladeva) does. On the proof that Sadyojyotis defends, see NP II.1ab (*kṣmādeḥ sāvaṃyavatvena kumbhavad kāryatā matā* | "The earth and so on are known to be effects, because they have parts, just as a pot"), NP II.3 (*upādānādi tasyeṣṭam vimatiḥ kartṛkārake* | *ataḥ sa sādhyate 'smābhis tatkartā śaṅkaraḥ sphuṭam* || "The material cause (*upādāna*) and [auxiliary causes] of this [effect] are admitted [by all, but] there is a disagreement as regards the factor of action that is the agent (*karṭṛ*); therefore we demonstrate that the agent of this [effect] is clearly Śaṅkara" and NP II.4ac (*adrṣṭakartṛkāyādikāryam prajñāvatā kṛtam* | *kumbhavad* . . . "The effect [constituted by] bodies and so on, the agent of which is not perceived, [must be] produced by an intelligent [agent], as in the case of a pot."). Cf. NPP: 117-18: *yad yat kāryam tat tad viśiṣṭajñānakriyāyuktakartṛpūrvam dṛṣṭam yathā ghaṭādi, kāryam ca*

and the whole chapter defends this inference against various antitheistic attacks also dealt with by Utpaladeva, among which Dharmakīrti's objection that one can only infer a particular agent from a particular effect when their invariable concomitance is already established through perception.¹²⁶ Sadyojyotis answers it by claiming that since the pot on the one hand and natural composite entities on the other hand are similar at least in so far as they are effects, the inference is legitimate.¹²⁷ In his long commentary on this verse, Rāmakaṇṭha (who may have been influenced in turn by

← *tanukaraṇabhuvanādy adṛṣṭakartṛkaṁ sarvam eva jagat pratipāditam, tasmād idam api*viśiṣṭajñānakriyātmakakartṛpūrvakaṁ siddham iti yas tasya kartā sa paramēśvaraḥ siddhaḥ*. [**idam api* conj.: *api* NPP]. “[We] observe that whatever is an effect, such as a pot for instance, presupposes an agent endowed with a particular knowledge and action, and the whole universe, [i.e.] bodies, organs, worlds and so on, is an effect the agent of which is not perceived. Therefore this [universe] too is established to presuppose an agent characterized by a particular knowledge and action, so its agent is established to be the Highest Lord.”

¹²⁶ See NP II.5ab: *dhīmatkṛtaṁ tu yat kāryaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ tasyaiva darśanāt | dhīmato'numitir yuktā dehāder na viparyayāt* || “[–Objection:] But only the inference of an intelligent [agent] from the perception of an effect that is seen to be produced by an intelligent [agent] is legitimate, [whereas the inference of an intelligent agent] from the body and so on is not, because [the body and so on are] not thus [seen to be effects of an intelligent agent]. Cf. NPP: 122: *yad eva hi yasya kāryatvena siddham tad eva tasyānumāpakaṁ na kāryamātraṁ* . . . “For only that which is established to be an effect enables [us] to infer this [intelligent agent, and] not an effect in general (*kāryamātra*) . . .” Rāmakaṇṭha explicitly ascribes this objection to “the Buddhists” (*saugata*, *ibid.*) and quotes PV, *Pramāṇasiddhipariccheda* 11-13 (on which see above, nn 22-23) and 15.

¹²⁷ NP II.6: *kāryatvād eva kumbhāder dehādi* na vilakṣaṇam | kāryaṁ ca na kvacid dṛṣṭaṁ prajñāvatkāraṇaṁ vinā* || [**dehādi* conj.: *dehādir* NP]. “The body, etc., are not different from the pot, etc. in so far as (*eva*) they are effects; and no effect is ever seen [to exist] without an intelligent cause.”

Utpaladeva) explains that the Buddhists themselves have recourse to the notion of generality without hypostasizing universals (*jāti*), and his arguments sound very similar to Utpaladeva's.¹²⁸ Sadyojyotis also argues that if inference were restricted to particulars that are seen to entertain a causality relation, it would be useless, since it would be confined to these singular entities, and it could not establish anything that would not already be known through perception.¹²⁹ Furthermore, Sadyojyotis also addresses

¹²⁸ See the summary in Hannotte 1987: 273-88. Rāmakaṇṭha argues in particular that the Buddhists too acknowledge that some things share common features in so far as they are of the same sort (*sajātiya*) even though in other respects they may be said to be of a different sort (*viajātiya*): compare for instance the discussion in NPP: 126 (too long to be quoted here) with ĪS: 8 (quoted above, n 33).

¹²⁹ See NP 7: *na ca yadvyaktisambaddhā vyaktir yaiveha saṁmatā | tasyā evānumānaṁ syāt punas tadupalabdhitaḥ* || “And [if] inference [were aimed at establishing] only the [particular] individual entity (*vyakti*) to which the individual entity that is considered in this [particular case as an effect] is linked, [it] could not take place again [with respect to any other subject of inference, nor could it take place in the case of this particular individual entity itself,] because this [individual entity] would [already] be perceived.” Cf. NPP: 128: *yady evam, sakalasajātiyaviajātiyavyāvṛttena svalakṣaṇenaivāgnyādinā mahānasādaḥ dhūmādeḥ svalakṣaṇasyaiva pratibandhaḥ siddhaḥ, tasya cānanuṣṛityān na dharmyāntare 'numānaṁ sambhavati nāpi tatraiva pratyakṣasiddher anumānāyogād iti nivṛttedānīm anumānavarttā*. “If it were the case, [inference could] establish only the relation of a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) such as a smoke in e.g. the kitchen with a[nother] particular such as a fire [in that kitchen], to the exclusion of any [other entity] of the same kind or of another kind; and because no [other entity] could conform to this [singular fire, this] inference would not be possible with respect to any other subject of inference [such as a distant hill above which one can see smoke], nor [would it be possible] in that very case [of the kitchen], because inference would not apply, since [its object] would [already] be established through perception, so that this [whole] business of inference would →

Kumārila's objections¹³⁰ and it is noteworthy that his commentator Rāmakaṇṭha has recourse to the *pakṣadharmā* argument¹³¹

← immediately be reduced to naught." In his commentary, Rāmakaṇṭha repeatedly puts forward the argument already mentioned by Jayanta that generality is necessary in the inferential process, otherwise one could never infer the presence of fire on a mountain thanks to the knowledge of the concomitance between a particular fire and a particular smoke observed in a kitchen. See NPP: 134: *vahnyādir api parvatasambandhī mahānasādāv adṛṣṭatvān na dhūmādinā sādhyā iti sarvānumānābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ*. "[In that case] the fire belonging to a mountain too, for instance, could not be established thanks to, e.g. [the presence of] smoke, since it is not seen, e.g. in a kitchen, so that as a consequence no inference at all could occur."

¹³⁰ In NP II.8-12; see Hannotte 1987: 289ff; Goodall 2004: 185 n 158. In his introduction ad NP II.8, Rāmakaṇṭha quotes ŚV, *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 80, and in his commentary ad NP II.9, he quotes ŚV, *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 79 (both verses are also quoted in the ĪS: see above, n 19).

¹³¹ See NPP: 135: *nanu pakṣadharmatābalān niyatasya dhūmasya grahaṇān niyato vahnīḥ pratiyate*. "But due to the fact that the subject of the inference has a [specific] property (*pakṣadharmatābalāt*), because one grasps a specific smoke, one grasps a specific fire [as its cause]." After showing that the Buddhists themselves should admit this thesis since it is not contradictory with their own principles, Rāmakaṇṭha concludes (ibid.): *yady evam ihāpy apratiṣṭhitabhedāḥ kāryaviśeṣa eva kartṛviśeṣavyāptāḥ siddha iti tanukaraṇabhuvanādeḥ kāryātmano* rīhasya śaktyā tatkartur api viśiṣṭasya svakāryaviṣayam amalātvasarvajñatvecchāmātrakartṛtvādy apīśvaratvaṁ siddhyati* [*kāryātmano corr.: *karyātmano* NPP]. "Since it is so, in this [case of the inference of the Lord] as well, it is a particular effect that is established to be invariably concomitant with a particular agent, [although this particular effect] is not established to be different [from the pot in so far as it too is an effect]. Therefore its agent too, who is particularized [as the agent producing] through [his] power an object that is an effect such as bodies, organs, worlds and so on, is established to be stainless [and] omniscient [and] to create through mere will

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also found in Utpaladeva's ĪS.¹³²

Sadyojyotis's Reply to the Sāṃkhya Objection

But most importantly, just as Utpaladeva in his ĪS, the Saiddhāntikas seem to ascribe a particular importance to the refutation of the Sāṃkhya objection:¹³³ Sadyojyotis devotes a large part of the NP chapter on *īśvara* to the critical examination of the Sāṃkhya position (an examination which, as in the ĪS, takes place once the Buddhist and Mīmāṃsaka objections have been answered).¹³⁴ Thus according to Sadyojyotis, "some" object that what is to be established by the inference is in fact already admitted by the opponents, since the universe can be accounted for by having recourse to other causes besides God, among which primordial nature.¹³⁵ Sadyojyotis

← (*icchāmātra*) and so on [; i.e. it is established] to be the Lord, [since these properties] correspond to his own [particular] effect."

¹³² See above, nn 29, 43 and 48.

¹³³ This stress on the Sāṃkhya objection may be due at least in part to the fact that the cosmology of Śaiva scriptures has borrowed from Sāṃkhya a number of doctrinal elements (such as the cosmic evolution through a scale of *tattvas*): on the importance of the Sāṃkhya tradition in Śaiva literature, see Torella 1999.

¹³⁴ See NP 14ff.

¹³⁵ NP 14ab: *bījakarmāṇubhiḥ kecid atrāhuḥ siddhasādhyatām* "With respect to this [inference of the Lord,] some claim that what is to be established [; i.e. that the universe has an agent,] is [in fact already] established thanks to primordial nature (*bīja*), [past] actions and individuals." Cf. NPP:139: *jagataḥ kartṛpūrvakatvaṁ hi bhavadbhiḥ sādhyate, sa copādānakāraṇatayā bījaśabdavācyaḥ pradhānākhyāḥ siddha eva, tat kim sādhyata iti sāmkyāḥ*. "For the Sāṃkhyas [object the following:] 'You are endeavouring to demonstrate the fact that the universe presupposes an agent; now, [what] is called matter [and] expressed [here] by the word *bīja* is already established as the material cause; therefore what [remains] to be demonstrated?'" Rāmakaṇṭha ascribes the two other positions to the Mīmāṃsakas and Lokāyatas (ibid.).

answers that it is not the case, since what is to be established is that the universe is the effect of a *conscious* agent,¹³⁶ and he emphasizes that primordial nature, which is unconscious, has no independence (*svātantrya*) and is therefore incapable of acting by itself.¹³⁷ The Sāṃkhya opponent replies by alluding to the SK, according to which unconscious entities too can act for the benefit of some other entity.¹³⁸ Sadyojyotis answers (as Uddyotakara before him)¹³⁹ that this point remains to be demonstrated.¹⁴⁰ Besides, the qualities of matter do not serve each other by nature but because they are prompted to act thus by some conscious agent;¹⁴¹ and since

¹³⁶ NP 14cd: *na pūrvābhyām viśiṣṭatvād dhiyā sādhyasya sā bhavet* || “[What is to be established] cannot be [already established] thanks to the first two [afore-mentioned causes, i.e. primordial nature or past actions,] because what is to be established is particularized by consciousness.”

¹³⁷ NP 15cd: *nācāitanyāt pravṛttiḥ syāt svātantryād bījakarmaṇām* || “Primordial nature and [past] actions could not have any activity [arising] independently (*svātantryāt*), because [they] are unconscious.”

¹³⁸ NP 16a: *payovac cet . . .* “If [the opponent replies that primordial nature can have an activity although it is insentient,] as in the case of milk . . .” Rāmakaṇṭha stipulates (NPP:142) that this is an allusion to SK 57 (on which see above, n 56).

¹³⁹ See above, n 74.

¹⁴⁰ NP 16b: *na sādhyatvān mṛdāṇḍāder adarśanāt* || “[We answer:] no, because [the ability of unconscious entities to act] remains to be established, since one does not observe that clay, the stick and [other unconscious items used by a potter for instance are capable of acting independently].”

¹⁴¹ NP16cd: *aṅgāṅgitvaṃ ca sattvādeḥ svābhāvīyān noktahetutaḥ* || “And the fact that [the three qualities, i.e.] *sattva*, [*rajas* and *tamas*,] serve each other (*aṅgāṅgitva*) is not due to their nature, for the reason [already] stated.” Cf. NPP: 143: *acetanatvād eva teṣāṃ na svabhāvataḥ parasparopakāraḥ, kintu pradīpādivad eva cetanakartṛprayuktānām iti nācetanasya kartṛtvasiddhiḥ*. “And precisely because they are unconscious, they do not serve each other by nature; rather, just as in the case of lamps for instance, [the qualities serve each other only] if

matter starts acting after being inactive, some conscious entity must prompt it to leave its passive state.¹⁴² The Sāṃkhya objects that “however, knowledge exists within matter”¹⁴³ since matter is capable of transforming itself into the intellect.¹⁴⁴ Just as Utpaladeva in the ĪS, Sadyojyotis replies by pointing out that intellect too is a material, unconscious entity,¹⁴⁵ and that even if it is assumed to exist within primordial nature in some potential state before matter starts transforming itself, it is not capable of grasping by itself its own knowledge (since this requires the *puruṣa*’s consciousness), so that its so-called effect, determination (*adhyavasāya*), must in fact be produced by some other entity that is conscious.¹⁴⁶ And the

← they are used by a conscious agent; therefore the agency of what is unconscious is not established.”

¹⁴² NP 17ab: *sthitvā kriyā ca bījasya nācitas cetanaṃ vinā* || “Besides, primordial nature, which is unconscious, cannot act after being inactive (*sthitvā*) without a conscious [entity that prompts it to do so].”

¹⁴³ NP 17c: *nanu jñānaṃ pradhāne’si . . .*

¹⁴⁴ See NPP: 143: *pradhānakāryasya buddher jñānābhyupagamāt pradhānam api jñānātmakam siddhyatīti kim anyad anumīyate*. “Since [we Sāṃkhyas] admit that the intellect, which is an effect of matter, possesses knowledge, matter too is established to consist of knowledge; therefore why infer some other [knowing entity]?” Rāmakaṇṭha refers (ibid.) to SK 23 (on which see above, n 64).

¹⁴⁵ NP 17cd: *nācāitanān mṛdādivat* || “No, because [the intellect too] is unconscious, just as clay and so on.”

¹⁴⁶ NP 18ab: *astu vā śaktirūpatvād agrāhi tad asatsamam* || “Or [if the Sāṃkhya opponent explains that] the [intellect endowed with knowledge] must exist [in primordial nature], because it consists of a potentiality (*śakti*) [within matter], [we reply that since] it does not grasp [its own knowledge by itself], this [principle of the intellect] is as good as non-existent. Cf. NPP: 144: *tathābhūtam api tat pradhāne kāraṇātmani na vyaktam, api tu śaktyātmanāvasthitam ity adhyavasāyātmanaḥ svakāryasyākaraṇād asatsamam. tataś cādhyavasāyātmano ’pi jñānasyābhāvān nāsyā kartṛtvam iti kartrantarasiddhiḥ*. “[If the Sāṃkhya explains that] although [the principle of the intellect] is thus [i.e. endowed with knowledge], it is

Sāṃkhya cannot argue that the proponent of the Lord's existence must admit the independent action of primordial nature just as he acknowledges that the Lord is not prompted to act by anything else, since the crucial difference between primordial nature and the Lord resides in the latter's consciousness:¹⁴⁷ we observe that contrary to material entities, people act without being prompted by any external cause, and admittedly, a person can sometimes prompt another to act, but only because this person has power over the others; and since the entity presiding over the universe must be almighty, no other entity can prompt it to act.¹⁴⁸

← not manifest in matter, which is [its material] cause; rather, it exists [only] as a potentiality, [we reply that then this principle of the intellect] is as good as non-existent, since it does not produce its own effect, i.e. determination (*adhyavasāya*). And as a consequence, since [matter] possesses no knowledge, even in the form of determination, it is not an agent, so that it is established that [there is] another agent."

¹⁴⁷ NP 18cd-19ab: *sthitvā vyāpriyamāṇatvāc chambhor api pareraṇam* || *naivam* bījasya no sāmyaṃ prajñāvān īśvaro yataḥ* || [**naivam* conj.: *navā* NP] "[Objection:] '[According to you, it is] not [true] that the Lord himself is prompted to act by something else because it acts after remaining inactive; [so] in the same way, [it is not true that] primordial nature is prompted to act by something else. [Answer:] there is no similarity [between the Lord and primordial nature,] since [contrary to primordial nature], the Lord is conscious."

¹⁴⁸ NP 19cd-21ab: *anekaṃ devadattādi dṛṣṭam loke dhiyānvitam* || *sthitvā pravartamānaṃ hi pākādāv apareritam* | *pareritam apīty asmāt saṃśayo na maheśvare* || *upariṣṭād yato devaṃ vakṣyāmo'tiśayāṅkitam* | "For in the world, [we] observe that many [entities] endowed with consciousness, such as Devadatta, when performing [the act of] cooking for instance after being inactive, are not prompted [to do so] by anything else; [if you object] that [sometimes they] are also prompted [to do so] by something else, [we answer that] for this reason there is no doubt as regards the Great Lord, since later we will explain that the Lord is characterized by an absolute [power] (*atiśaya*)."

Utpaladeva's *Īśvarasiddhi* as a Message to the Saiddhāntikas

To sum up, although Utpaladeva's criticism of the Sāṃkhya argument often seems more refined than Sadyojyotis', both refutations focus on the idea that a complex effect can only be the product of a conscious entity, and that intellect, if conceived as a material entity, cannot account for the universe. Utpaladeva's treatise thus seems to emphasize a principle shared by both dualist and non-dualist Śaivas, namely the idea that only the conscious is independent (*svatantra*) and therefore capable of action, whereas unconscious entities only seem to act in so far as their actions are always prompted by consciousness.¹⁴⁹ Moreover, while Utpaladeva's goal when writing the *ĪS* may have been to show to the Naiyāyikas that Śaiva non-dualists too are capable of defending *īśvara* while using Nyāya concepts, it may also have been, perhaps more crucially, *to show to the Saiddhāntikas that Śaiva non-dualists too can appropriate the Nyāya inference of the Lord*. With the *ĪS*, Utpaladeva ostentatiously follows the Saiddhāntikas' tradition of integrating Nyāya arguments and thus presents himself as siding with them. This strategy seems to have been successful at least to a certain extent, since the Saiddhāntika Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha for instance quotes the *ĪS* with approval,¹⁵⁰ and as seen above, the commentary on Sadyojyotis's NP by Rāmakaṇṭha (who was Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha's own son) sometimes seems to echo Utpaladeva's treatise. At the same time, by explaining at the very end of his treatise that the perspective

¹⁴⁹ This doctrinal feature has often been pointed out with respect to Śaiva non-dualism (see Bronkhorst 1996b), but as noted in Watson 2006: 90-91, Utpaladeva shares it with the Saiddhāntikas.

¹⁵⁰ As noted in Sanderson 2006: 45, MTT: 30-31 on MT, *Vidyāpāda* 1.1, quotes *ĪS* 55 (*samujjvalannyāyasahasrasādhito 'py upaiti siddhiṃ na vimūḍhacetāsām* | *maheśvaraḥ pāṇitalasthito 'pi san palāyate daivahatasya sanmaṇiḥ* || "Even though he may be demonstrated by innumerable, blazing[ly clear] reasonings, the Great Lord is not proved for those whose mind is confused; although this authentic gem stands in the palm of one's hand, it escapes the ill-fated."

of duality remains inferior, Utpaladeva is in all probability alluding to the Śaiva Siddhānta's dualism at least as much as he is alluding to the Nyāya's: if Śaiva non-dualism tends to include the scriptures of the Śaiva Siddhānta within its own tradition as a lower form of revelation,¹⁵¹ it also includes as a lower form of reasoning the philosophical justifications of its dualist counterpart.

Are Saiddhāntika Interlocutors Completely Absent in the Pratyabhijñā Treatise? The Nature of Īśvara's Agency and the Analogy with Yogic Creations

In this respect it is worth noting that although Utpaladeva was obviously much influenced in this Pratyabhijñā treatise by Sadyojyotis' works,¹⁵² one of the most striking features of the ĪPK is that in them, "the Śaiva Saiddhāntikas virtually disappear, at least as direct targets".¹⁵³ Raffaele Torella has pointed out that openly targetting the Buddhists rather than the Saiddhāntikas is "a message Utpaladeva addresses to his dualist cousins, whom [. . .] the Trika does not intend to defeat, but to use as a basis for its emergence from the dimension of a restricted circle [. . .]. Choosing Buddhism, and particularly its logical school, as number one enemy means reinforcing the undeclared alliance with the Śaivasiddhāntins."¹⁵⁴

However, while openly debating in the Pratyabhijñā treatise with Buddhist and Brahmanical opponents, Utpaladeva seems to carry on with an underlying criticism of the Śaiva Siddhānta. This implicit discussion with fellow Śaivas in the midst of arguments explicitly targetting non-Śaiva rivals is perceptible for instance in the way Utpaladeva compares the Lord's activity of cosmic creation to that of a *yogin* creating "by virtue of his will" (*icchāvaśāt*)

¹⁵¹ See Sanderson 1985: 204-05; 1988: 692; 1995: 20-21; 2007: 376; Torella 1994: xxi; Hanneder 1998: 6ff.

¹⁵² See the brief remarks in Dyczkowski 1987: 19-20; 1992: 33.

¹⁵³ Torella 1994: xxi.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.: xxi-xxii. See also Torella 2008: 516.

and without any material cause (*nirupādānam*) various objects of perception that are nothing but manifestations of his own consciousness.¹⁵⁵

This analogy, which is already found in Somānanda's ŚD,¹⁵⁶ can

¹⁵⁵ See ĪPK I.5.7: *cidātmaiva hi devo 'ntaḥsthitam icchāvaśād bahiḥ | yogīva nirupādānam arthajātaṁ prakāśayet* || "For the Lord, who consists of nothing but consciousness, must manifest externally all objects that [actually remain] internal [to him] by virtue of his will, without any material cause, just as a *yogin*." The *yogin*'s creation recurs in ĪPK II.4.10, where Utpaladeva specifies again that it is devoid of material cause: *yoginām api mṛdbīje vinaivecchāvaśena tat | ghaṭādi jāyate tat tat sthirasvārthakriyākaram* || "This [production] also occurs by virtue of the will of *yogins*, without any [material cause] such as clay [for a pot] or a seed [for a sprout]; various [objects,] such as a pot and so on, arise [thus while] having an efficiency of their own and while lasting [just as ordinary objects]." On the special powers which, in the Yoga tradition, enable *yogins* to create objects out of mere will, see YBh: 165, which describes the last three members of a list of eight yogic "perfections" (*siddhi*) in the following way: *vaśitvaṁ bhūtabhautikeṣu vaśī bhavaty avaśyaś cānyeṣām. īśīṭvaṁ teṣām prabhavāpyayavyūhānām īṣṭe. yatrakāmāvasāyitvaṁ* satyasankalpataṁ yathā sankalpas tathā bhūtaprakṛtīnām avasthānam.* [**yatrakāmāvasāyitvaṁ* corr.: *yatra kāmāvasāyitvaṁ* YBh.] "Mastery [is the perfection of a *yogin* who] is the master of elements and their products and is not [himself] mastered by others; sovereignty [is the perfection of a *yogin* who] is sovereign upon the production, disappearance and arrangement of the [elements and their products; and] the determination [of things] according to one's desire [is the perfection of a *yogin* when] what [he] fancies becomes real (*satyasaṅkalpa*); [i.e.,] it is the determination of the material causes of elements according to one's fancy." On God's cosmic activity compared to this yogic creation in the Pratyabhijñā treatise, see Alper 1979; Ratié 2010; 2011a: 403-41.

¹⁵⁶ ŚD 1.44-45ab: *yoginām icchayā yadvan nānārūpopapattitā | na cāsti sādhanam kiñcin mṛdādīcchām vinā prabhoḥ | tathā bhagavadicchaiva tathātvena prajāyate* || "Just as various forms can arise by the will of

be seen as an attack on the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika conception

← *yogins*, and [in such cases] there is no means [of producing them] such as clay, etc. apart from the Lord's will, in the same way, it is the Lord's will that arises as being such [i.e. in the form of the universe].” See Nemec 2011: 143. See also ŚD 3.35-37 (and Nemec 2011: 236-37) as well as ŚDV ad loc: 112: *na hy asau yogī svātmano mṛtpiṇḍasyeva śivikastūpakādirūpavikārapariṇāmakrameṇa* kumbhakāra iva ghaṭam iva bhāvamaṇḍalaṁ janayaty api tu yasya yādṛśicchā tatsamanantaram eveṣṭakāryātmābhilāṣāmatayā sthitiḥ, tathā cidātmano 'pi*. [* *śivikastūpakādirūpavikārapariṇāmakrameṇa* corr.: *śibikastūpakādirūpavikārapariṇāmakrameṇa* ŚDV: *śibistūpakādirūpavikārapariṇāmakrameṇa* em. Nemec 2011]. “For the *yogin* does not produce all [objective] entities as a potter [produces] a pot, through a process of transformation [of the clay involving various] changes of form such as [the ones called] *śivika*, *stūpaka*, etc.; rather, whatever is [the object] of such a will [as the *yogin*'s] immediately exists while having as its nature [the *yogin*'s] desire, [i.e.] while consisting in the desired effect; and the same goes for [the Lord] whose nature is consciousness.” According to Nemec 2011: 368, *śibikastūpaka* should be amended into *śibistūpaka*, and the latter designates (ibid.: 237 and n 177) a “small *stūpa* of the King of Śibi”, i.e. the character of a famous *jātaka*; but the reason why such a character should appear in this particular context (that of a potter making various forms with clay) remains unclear. Nemec tries to explain it by stating that in memory of King Śibi's sacrifice a “beautifully adorned *stūpa*” was erected and that “the present example thus serves to suggest that what is made from the clay is a thoroughly intricate and ornate object, one requiring much detailed work on the part of the sculptor”. However, the technical terms *śivika* and *stūpaka* often occur in Abhinavagupta's works, where they obviously designate not one but two distinct things that have nothing to do with the Buddhist *jātaka* — namely, two different states of the clay being modelled by the potter who is in the process of making a pot. See *Bhāskarī* I: 116: *stūpakāḥ — ghaṭanirmāṇārtham upāttasya mṛtpiṇḍasya kulālena prathamam kriyamāṇo racanāviśeṣaḥ. śivikāḥ — unnatavasturūpo racanāviśeṣaḥ*. “The *stūpaka* is a specific arrangement that the potter first makes with a lump of clay [thus] shaped in order to create a pot.

→

of *īśvara* as an efficient cause that performs its action out of mere will (*icchāmātreṇa*, *icchāmātrāt*) in so far as this action does not require a body,¹⁵⁷ but that merely gives a specific form to a material

← The *śivika* is [also] a specific arrangement consisting in [the same] thing [but] tall[er].” In other words, Utpaladeva is emphasizing here that contrary to a potter's creation, which must undergo various stages before reaching its final state, the *yogin*'s creation is immediately complete because it is nothing but the *yogin*'s will taking this or that particular form.

¹⁵⁷ Thus according to Praśastapāda (PDhS: 46), God creates the universe by putting atoms together so as to form a cosmic egg, and this conjunction of atoms results “from the Great Lord's mere will” (*maheśvarasyābhidhyānamātrāt*) (cf. *Vyomavatī*, p. 301, which glosses *abhidhyāna* with the word *icchā*). See Chemparathy 1968: 72, 81-83; Bronkhorst 1996a: 286-87. Kumārila attacks this conception in ŚV, *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 81-82ab: *kulālavac ca naitasya vyāpāro yadi kalpyate acetanaḥ katham bhāvas tadicchām anurudhyate* || *tasmān na paramāṇvāder ārambhaḥ syāt tadicchayā* | “And if [you] do not conceive the activity of this [Lord] as [that of] the potter, how can an unconscious entity conform to his will? Therefore the atoms and so on do not cling together by virtue of his will.” (See Krasser 1999: 220-21.) The idea is also found in the Nyāya. See NM_{is}: 103, where Jayanta answers Kumārila's objection by explaining: *jñānacikīrṣāprayatnayogitvaṁ kartṛtvam ācakṣate. tac ceśvare vidyate evety uktam etat. svaśarīrapreraṇe ca dṛṣṭam aśarīrasyāpy ātmanaḥ kartṛtvam*. “[We] observe that being an agent is being endowed with knowledge, a desire to act, and effort; and [we] have [already] explained that this [agency] is found in the Lord. And [we] observe that the Self is the agent prompting one's own body to act although it does not have a body.” See also ibid.: “Because the [Lord] acts my mere will . . .” (*icchāmātreṇa ca tasya kartṛtvāt* . . .). Cf. NBhūṣ: 453-54, which defends the idea of a cosmic creation *icchāmātrāt*. On this same idea in Udayana's works, see Chemparathy 1972: 145 n 306, p. 146. Cf. Utpaladeva's gloss of Somānanda's *icchayā* (ŚD 1.44ab, see above, n 156) as *icchāmātreṇa* (ŚDV: 32), or Abhinavagupta's gloss of Utpaladeva's *icchāvaśāt* in ĪPK I.5.7 again as *icchāmātreṇa* (ĪPV I: 183).

cause that remains ontologically independent from it. And indeed, Abhinavagupta's commentaries on the verses in which Utpaladeva presents the analogy seem to confirm that it is meant at least in part as a criticism of the Vaiśeṣika representation of cosmic creation: there Abhinavagupta attacks some opponents who contend that *yogins'* creations are merely the result of their capacity to instantly assemble pre-existing atoms (*paramāṇu*), just as, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, God creates the universe by arranging atoms.¹⁵⁸

Nonetheless, the Saiddhāntikas hold a dualistic conception of cosmic creation somewhat similar to that of the Vaiśeṣikas (although contrary to the latter they do not identify the material cause of the universe with atoms but with *māyā*),¹⁵⁹ and the analogy with yogic creations used by Somānanda and Utpaladeva seems to target the Saiddhāntikas too. Thus it seems to echo a Saiddhāntika scripture: the KT (which Somānanda undoubtedly knew)¹⁶⁰ asserts that Śiva creates out of mere will, i.e. without any other instrument (*karaṇa*),

¹⁵⁸ See ĪPV I: 183-84; ĪPVV II: 145 or ĪPV II: 152-53, translated and analysed in Ratié 2011a: 406-07.

¹⁵⁹ On the distinction in the Śaiva Siddhānta between the material cause (i.e. *māyā*) and the efficient cause (i.e. *īśvara*) of the universe, see PT 2.30cd (quoted above, n 117), TTNV: 134 (*māyā hi jagata upādānakāraṇāt* . . . "For *māyā*, since it is the material cause of the universe . . .") and Goodall 2004: 174-77 n 128. On the idea that God creates through his sole will, see NPP: 135 (quoted above, n 131). It should be noted that the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas may have originally borrowed the notion of a creation by mere will from an ancient Śaiva source: see Chemparathy 1965 and Bronkhorst 1996a: 289 on the attribution by the YD of the doctrine of *īśvara* to *pāśupatavaiśeṣika*, "Pāśupatas and Vaiśeṣikas" or "Vaiśeṣikas who are Pāśupatas". See also Bronkhorst 1996a: 290, on the hypothesis that Praśastapāda drew his depiction of cosmic creation from some "Śaiva work".

¹⁶⁰ As noted in Goodall 1998: lxxvi, Somānanda explicitly refers to the KT in ŚD 3.16ab (on which see Nemec 2011: 223 and n 77).

just as a yogin does.¹⁶¹ By having recourse to the same image, Somānanda hints that his presentation of *īśvara*'s agency is in accordance with the depiction of cosmic activity in the Saiddhāntika scriptures;¹⁶² but by the same token, in contrast he also emphasizes one of his main points of disagreement with the Saiddhāntikas' metaphysical doctrine: according to him, the consciousness presiding over the creation of the universe indeed acts out of mere will, but in the sense that it does not have recourse to any kind of matter¹⁶³ that would exist apart from it. That Utpaladeva in turn borrows this analogy from the ŚD is worth noting, because in many ways Utpaladeva's main treatise diverges from that of his teacher,¹⁶⁴ but in this particular respect the two works offer a striking parallel. And while commenting on the analogy in ĪPK I.5.7, Abhinavagupta takes the trouble of specifying that *māyā* is not really the material cause of the universe, but rather, the power through which the Lord makes what is insentient *appear* as if it were the material cause of the universe,¹⁶⁵ thus making clear that the analogy is also meant as

¹⁶¹ KT 3.10-11ab: *yathā kālo hy amūrto 'pi dṛśyate phalasādhakaḥ | evaṁ śivo hy amūrto 'pi kurute kāryam icchayā || icchaiva karaṇam tasya yathā sadyogino matā* | "For just as [we] observe that time, although devoid of any corporeal form, produces a result, in the same way, Śiva, although devoid of any corporeal form, produces an effect by virtue of [his] will; [and] his instrument is nothing but this will, just as the [will] of a true *yogin* is known [to be his sole instrument]." See Goodall 1998: 272.

¹⁶² John Nemec has emphasized that Somānanda "favourably quotes Saiddhāntika sources in a number of places" rather than simply dismissing them as a lower form of revelation (Nemec 2011: 58-59).

¹⁶³ ŚD 1.44cd thus specifies that a *yogin* creates without any means "such as clay, etc." (see above, n 156).

¹⁶⁴ See Torella 1994: xii-xxxvi, 2008; Nemec 2011: 31-34.

¹⁶⁵ See ĪPVV II: 147: *māyā ca bhagavacchaktivijṛmbhāpi viśvopādānarūpatāvabhāsitajaḍatvasvabhāvātattvarūpā*. "And *māyā*, although it is [in fact nothing but] the unfolding of the Lord's power, consists in something unreal in so far as its nature is an insentiency

a criticism of the Saiddhāntikas' dualistic view of cosmic creation.

**Conclusion: On the Discrete Philosophical Dialogue
Between Śaiva Dualists and Non-dualists**

Utpaladeva's *ĪS* has so far been interpreted mainly as an attempt to integrate Nyāya concepts within Śaiva non-dualism as an inferior point of view transcended by the Pratyabhijñā metaphysics. While this interpretation is certainly valid, we should bear in mind that the inference of the Lord defended by Utpaladeva in this short treatise was integrated to the scriptures of the Śaiva Siddhānta before Utpaladeva undertook to write the *ĪS*, and that the Saiddhāntika Sadyojyotis had already composed in the second chapter of his NP an *īśvarasiddhi* that displays many similarities with Utpaladeva's short treatise as regards its structure, the choice of its opponents or the strategy employed to refute them. By writing a text so blatantly at odds with his own metaphysical principles and so obviously relying on arguments put forward by earlier authors, Utpaladeva probably meant to include Nyāya concepts within the scope of his system while presenting them as a lower perspective; but it is also very likely that he primarily saw these Naiyāyika arguments as the philosophical justification of the Saiddhāntikas' dualist understanding of the relationship between *īśvara* and the Self. The *ĪS* can therefore be read as a message sent to the Saiddhāntikas and emphasizing Utpaladeva's philosophical solidarity as a Śaiva author (but also the capacity of non-dualism to integrate the conceptual tools already appropriated by the Saiddhāntikas) while hinting at the inferiority of the Saiddhāntikas' metaphysics from the ultimate viewpoint of non-dualism.

This point is of interest in the more general perspective of Utpaladeva's relationship with the Śaiva Siddhānta. Modern scholarship has often emphasized that with the Pratyabhijñā treatise, Utpaladeva engages in the Brahmanico-Buddhist

← that is manifested (*avabhāsita*) as consisting of the universe's material cause."

philosophical debate and relegates at its background religious issues, most notably by avoiding to have recourse to the authority of scriptures.¹⁶⁶ But Utpaladeva's attempt to present the metaphysical tenets of Śaiva non-dualism in the religiously quasi-neutral discourse of Brahmanico-Buddhist epistemological controversies should not be interpreted as a sign that Utpaladeva lacked interest in his Śaiva rivals' metaphysics, first and foremost because this attempt had a prestigious precedent in the Śaiva Siddhānta itself: Sadyojyotis had already departed from mere scriptural exegesis by writing an independent treatise targeting various Buddhist and Brahmanical opponents, and in this respect the *ĪPK* seem to have been profoundly influenced by the NP's method and strategies. Besides, while conspicuously engaging in a dialogue with non-Śaiva authors, Utpaladeva also sustained an implicit debate with the Saiddhāntikas that, however discrete, is perceptible for instance in the key passages of the Pratyabhijñā treatise where *īśvara*'s cosmic creation is compared to the creations ascribed to *yogins*.

It is also likely that Utpaladeva's works have in turn influenced later Saiddhāntikas: in his commentary on Sadyojyotis' demonstration of God, Rāmakaṇṭha apparently relies on some of the arguments found in the *ĪS*, but he also seems to answer Utpaladeva's criticism of the Saiddhāntika notion of *īśvara*. Thus, as seen above, the *ĪPKs* oppose the idea that because the Lord is imperceptible, his existence needs to be inferentially proved, and they reject the very possibility of an *īśvarasiddhi* on the grounds that the Lord is "always already established" (*ādisiddha*) in so far as the individual subject is always aware of his being the Lord through mere self-awareness (*svasaṁvedana*). Abhinavagupta (who may be relying here, as he so often does, on Utpaladeva's lost *Vivṛti*)¹⁶⁷ explains in

¹⁶⁶ See Frauwallner 1962: 22; Sanderson 1985: 203; 1988: 694; Torella 1994: xiii; Ratié 2011a: 4-14.

¹⁶⁷ Alternatively, Abhinavagupta may have been aware of the NPP passage quoted below (Abhinavagupta already knew at least one of

this connection that although there may be a difference of degree between the individual's powers of knowledge and action and those of the Lord, there is no difference of nature between them, so that the individual's experience of these powers is already the very experience of the Lord's powers.¹⁶⁸ In his introduction to the second chapter of the NP, Rāmakaṇṭha presents a similar objection: if the individual knows by mere self-awareness his powers of knowledge and action, what is the point of demonstrating the Lord's existence, and why did Sadyojyotis take the trouble of writing a distinct chapter on the Lord once he had composed the chapter on the individual

← Rāmakaṇṭha's works when he composed his *Tantrāloka*: see Sanderson 2006: 44) and the IPV passage may be an answer to Rāmakaṇṭha (who in turn was replying to Utpaladeva).

¹⁶⁸ See IPV I: 30: *kartṛjñātṛsvabhāvam iti cen nanu sa pramātaiva tathābhūta iti ko 'nyaḥ saḥ. nanu sarvakartṛtvasarvajñatve pramātur na staḥ, na khalu sarvaśabdārtho jñātṛkartṛtvayoḥ svarūpaṁ bhinatti, bhedadarśane 'pīśvaraḥ jñānacikīrṣāyatnāder nityasya viṣayeṇākāraṇabhūtenānādheyātīśayatvāt.* "If [the opponent replies] that [one must prove the existence of the Lord] whose nature is that of an agent and knower, [we answer]: 'But since the knowing subject himself is [of] such [a nature], who could be this other [agent and knower]?' [If the opponent replies:] 'But [contrary to the Lord,] the knowing subject does not have omnipotence and omniscience!', [we answer in turn that] the meaning of the prefix 'omni-' (*sarva*) [in 'omniscient' and 'omnipotent'] does not involve any difference in the [very] nature of [the powers consisting in] being a knower and an agent, because even in a dualistic system (*bhedadarśana*), the Lord's knowledge, desire to act or effort [to act, since they are] permanent, are not made superior (*atīśaya*) [than they were] by the [particular] object [on which they focus, since this object] cannot be the cause [of any change in their permanent nature]." Cf. *Bhāskari* I: 51: *na hi kaṇabhāvacyabhāvayor agneḥ svarūpabheda ity uttaravākyaḥ bhiprāyaḥ.* "The [author's] intention in the sentence [given in] reply is [to convey] that there is no difference in the nature of fire, whether it exists as a [mere] spark or as a heap [of flames]."

subject?¹⁶⁹ Rāmakaṇṭha replies that contrary to the individual Self,

¹⁶⁹ NPP: 113: *atha puruṣaparīkṣānantaram īśvaraparīkṣā. nanu yuktam etad anāntarīyakānām* vaktum, iha tu jñātvakartṛtvasvabhāve puṁsy avaraṇabhavabhavābhyām savitarīvālpamahāviśayatve svasamvedanavogyatanumanābhyām pūrvoktarītyā pratipādite svalpamahator īśvarayor siddhiḥ sthitaiva jñātvakartṛtvarūpatvād īśvarasyeti kim anyaya tatparīkṣaya* + [**etad anāntarīyakānām* conj.]: *etat tannāntarīyānam* — NPP]. "Now, immediately after the examination of the individual, [Sadyojyotis undertakes] an examination of the Lord. [–Objection:] Surely this is an appropriate [thing] to say with respect to [entities] that are not connected; but here, since the individual has as its nature to be a knower and an agent, [and] since [this individual] is [already] established in the manner that has already been stated, through its perceptibility in self-awareness (*svasamvedana*) and through inference, given that the Lord's nature is [also] to be a knower and an agent, the demonstration of both Lords [endowed with the powers of knowledge and action, i.e. the individual, who is] a small [Lord since he has limited powers] and the Great [one, whose powers are unlimited,] is *ipso facto* completed, just as the sun [, although one,] can be [known as] a small or a great object [of knowledge] according to whether a veil covering [it] (*āvaraṇa*) is present or not." As a matter of fact, the Śaiva non-dualists describe as a veil (*āvaraṇa*) the delusion (*moha*) through which the individual does not recognize himself as the Lord and therefore sees himself as limited. See IPV I: 12, which mentions this "veil covering the Self's light with an appearance of stain" (*kālikākārasvaparakāśāvaraṇa*), or IPV II: 203, which explains that *māyāśakti* deludes (*vimohinī*) in so far as it veils (*āvṛṇute*) the Self's nature. See also IPV II: 24 (*dehātmanivīḍatarāvaraṇābhimānaviśamā ca tanukaraṇaprāṇabuddhiśūnyāvaraṇāntarvartinī samvid amalā śaradabhropahitaraviprakāśavat . . .* "Consciousness, which [remains in fact] devoid of stain, which is different from the [wrong] identification with that thickest of veils that is the body, [and] which remains internally present despite the veils that are the bodily organs, vital breath, intellect and the void [to which individuals wrongly identify], just as the light of the sun on which autumnal clouds have gathered . . ." cf. Torella 2007: 928-29) or *Bhāskari* I: 38, which

the Lord is not known through mere self-awareness (since the Self of the Lord and that of the individual are distinct) and remains imperceptible, so that the Lord's agency in the cosmic creation must still be proved.¹⁷⁰ With this answer, Rāmakaṇṭha seems to continue the discrete dialogue initiated by Somānanda and Utpaladeva between the Śaiva Siddhānta and Śaiva non-dualism – a dialogue that remains largely unexplored, and on which a comparative study of the demonstrations of the Self by Utpaladeva and Rāmakaṇṭha

← explains that recognition does not bring about any new knowledge but merely removes the veil covering the Self's true nature by stating: *na hi vātenāpasāritameghāvaraṇaḥ sūryas tadutpādita iti kathyate*. "For when the veil (*āvaraṇa*) of clouds [preventing us from seeing the sun] is taken away by the wind, [we] do not say that the sun is established by the [wind]!"

¹⁷⁰ NPP: 113: *satyam etat, jagaddhetubhūtānādīśvaraparikṣā tv iyam anyāivety avirodhaḥ. tathā hi na tāvad asāv asmadādīnām ātmavat svasaṁvedanapratyakṣasiddho bhinnātmarūpatvena tasya tato 'nyatvāt, na hy ātmanām svasaṁvedanamātrāḥ saṁkīryanta ity uktam. nāpīndriyapratyakṣeṇa paraspam svabhāvād evendriyātītātvena teṣāṁ siddheḥ, taccharīrāṇām indriyānatītātvasiddhāv api viśiṣṭajñānakriyātmānor īśvaretarāyor asiddheḥ*. "This is true; nonetheless, this examination of the beginningless Lord who is the cause of the world is different [from the examination of the individual], so that there is no contradiction [in writing a distinct chapter on the Lord]. To explain: to begin with, for [limited subjects] such as us, the [Lord] is not established through the direct perception that is self-awareness, contrary to the Self, because he is different from this [Self], given that he has as his nature a distinct Self. For [we have already] explained that the pure self-awarenesses of [distinct] Selves do not mix. Nor [is the Lord known] through a direct sensory perception, because it is [now] established that by their very nature these [different Selves] are beyond the reach of senses for each other, and because, although their bodies have been established not to be beyond the reach of senses, there is no demonstration that [both] the Lord and [the individual] who is different from the Lord are Selves [endowed with] particular [powers of] knowledge and action."

for instance¹⁷¹ could certainly shed some light.

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¹⁷¹ For a particularly thorough analysis of some important passages in the first chapter of the NPP, see Watson 2006. Ratié 2006 mentions a number of striking similarities between Rāmakaṇṭha's demonstration of the Self in the first chapter of the NPP and Utpaladeva's in the *Jñānādhikāra* of the ĪPK, while emphasizing their main divergence (see in particular n 160, p. 96).

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8

Alaṃkāras in the Stotras of Utpaladeva

Radhavallabh Tripathi

THE concept of *alaṃkāra* in Sanskrit poetics is marked with a comprehensive approach to arts. Bharatamuni says that there are two aspects of creativity in art — *svabhāva* and *alaṃkāra*.¹ The former indicates natural acquisitions and the latter extraordinariness attained through practice and devotion. In a dramatic performance they culminate into the renderings of *lokadharmī* and *nāṭyadharmī*, and in literature into *svabhāvokti* and *vakrokti*. The effects created by the process of *alaṃkāra* lead to transgressing whatever may be commonplace or trivial. By etymology the term *alaṃkāra* (making perfect) stands in agreement with this approach. *Amarakośa* has given four meanings of the term *alam-*, i.e. *bhūṣaṇa* (decoration or embellishment), *vāraṇa* (negation or elimination), *paryāpti* (sufficiency) and *śakti* (power).² They are related to surface structure, deep structure and deeper structures in an art form. They are not isolated. The process of beautification (*bhūṣaṇa*) starts from the outer structure and basically relates to the form, but it is always linked to the content. This linkage necessitates the activity of elimination or exclusion (*vāraṇa*) and both these processes of *bhūṣaṇa* and *vāraṇa* work together to bring in *paryāpti* (sufficiency). Thus a piece of art attains the state of fulfilment through *bhūṣaṇa*, *vāraṇa* and *paryāpti* and in this attainment lies its *śakti*. The

¹ NS, XXXIII.6.

² *alam bhūṣaṇaparyāptiśaktivāraṇavācakaṃ* — *Amarakośa* III.3.252; *mā sma mā alaṃ ca vāraṇa* — *ibid.* 3.4.11.

Utpaladeva, Philosopher of Recognition

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