Utpaladeva’s Proof of God
On the Purpose of the Īśvarasiddhi*

Isabelle Ratié

In his short treatise entitled Īśvarasiddhi (ĪS),1 Utpaladeva claims to prove the existence of God or the Lord (īśvara)2 understood

---

1 Although the fifty-six stanzas of the ĪS and the Vṛtti thereon have aroused little scholarly interest so far, two important studies must be mentioned in this respect: Taber 1986, which summarizes the whole treatise and offers a very insightful philosophical analysis of it; and Krasser 2002, an excellent study of the Indian controversy over the existence of God that contains (pp. 149-58) a translation and analysis of some key passages in the ĪS.

2 In the context of the proof of Īśvara, the term “God” might seem most appropriate to the Western reader. Nonetheless I have kept the more literal term “Lord” in the translations at least, because Īśvara designates first and foremost a person who has power or reigns over something (see, for example, IPVV III: 181-82: yatra yad āyattam sa tatēśvaro rājeva niye rāje . . . “That on which something depends is the Lord of
as an omnipotent and omniscient creator of the universe. As noted by John Taber and Helmut Krasser, this very goal seems to be at odds with Utpaladeva’s own statement at the beginning of his magnum opus, the Íśk, according to which the Lord can be neither proved nor refuted since it is always experienced in any conscious individual’s self-awareness. Several passages scattered in the works of Utpaladeva and his commentator Abhinavagupta show that this should not be considered as a blatant contradiction, since according to them, the Íś was not written from the ultimate point of view (paramārtha) of non-duality (advaya) adopted by Utpaladeva in his Pratyabhijñā works, but from the inferior point of view of duality, which several scholars have recognized as that of Nyāya. Nonetheless, these scant and allusive indications leave open a number of questions: is Utpaladeva’s Íś an original contribution to the Indian debate over the existence of God, or does it merely reformulate arguments put forward earlier? In what way(s) does Utpaladeva’s method in the Íś differ from that which he adopts in his ÍPK? And most of all: why did Utpaladeva take the trouble of writing a treatise that he himself did not consider as an expression of the ultimate truth?

← this [thing], as a king [who is the Lord] of his kingdom . . . ‘), and the various Indian authors quoted below often use the term in this sense (for an example of this use by Praśastapāda, see Champatry 1968: 84; cf. e.g. Rāmakanṭha’s assertion that the potter is īśvara with respect to the pot in KV, p. 73).


4 Abhinavagupta repeatedly calls the supporters of Utpaladeva’s doctrine the “proponents of the non-duality with the Lord” (śvarādāvayādāvin; see e.g. IVV II: 122 or 129 (quoted in Ratié 2011a: 385, n 44 and 598-99, n 64). This non-duality is primarily to be understood as the identity of the individual’s Self (ātman) with the Lord, but also as the absolute ontological dependence of the phenomenal world on īśvara conceived as an all-encompassing consciousness that creates the universe merely by taking on its various forms.

The Main Argument in the Íś and Its Naiyāyika Sources

As already noted by several scholars, the proof establishing the existence of the Lord that Utpaladeva defends in the Íś belongs to the Nyāya tradition. The argument is an inference “from the fact that [the universe] is an effect” (kāryatvā) requiring a cause. More precisely, this inference is drawn from the fact that the universe is an effect consisting of a specific arrangement (sanniveśavīśeṣa) that must have been created by an intelligent agent (buddhimatkartra) considered as its efficient cause (nimittakāraṇa), as no material cause (upādānakāraṇa) can account for this specific arrangement;
and given the infinite complexity and internal harmony of the universe, this intelligent agent must be omniscient and omnipotent — i.e. it is God.8

This famous Nyāya line of argument apparently found its first formulation in the lost work of Aviddhakarna,9 and Uddyotakara,10 alludes to the inference of Īśvara from the fact that some natural entities are effects11 and defends the

---

8 IS: 4-5: tivarsiddhiparyavasānaś cāvaḥ sādhanārthaḥ, tanvadīṣu hi viśvāparaparāyāyeṣu parasparānuguneṣu saraṇeṣu yāvā jānāṃ nāstī tāvat katham nirmittā syād iti sarvajñātā tāvat sthītā, tathānīmirnāsāmārthāya cānakevate pramāṇābhāvaḥ caikasya sarvārthitvam iti dharmīviṣeṣasambandhaunātyāḥ īśvāra eva buddhimān paryavasyati. “And this point of the demonstration amounts to proving [the existence of] the Lord; for if [this inferred cause] had no knowledge of the bodies and so on, which is another expression for the [entire] universe and are all mutually adapted, how could [it] have any desire to create [them]? Therefore, first of all, the omniscience [of their creator] is established; and both because [only an omnipotent agent] is capable of such a creation and because there is no argument [proving that there may be several [agents of the universe], the omnipotence of a single [agent is established too]. Therefore [this inferred] intelligent [agent] can only be the Lord Himself, because [the Lord only] can have a relationship with the particular subject of the inference (dharmīviṣeṣa) [i.e. the effect that is the entire universe].”

9 See the fragment preserved in the TSP and mentioned as “put forward by Aviddhakarna” (aviddhakarnopanyasta) in TSP;

10 Note that in his commentary on NS IV.1.21, Uddyotakara does not use the inferential reason “because it is an effect” (kāryatvā) to prove that the universe has Īśvara as its efficient cause: rather, he has recourse to the inferential reason “because it is unconscious” (acetanatvā) that he applies to matter, atoms and actions leading to karmic retribution (see below, n 71). Nonetheless, at the end of his lengthy commentary on this sūtra, he mentions Aviddhakarna’s argument
thesis that natural entities endowed with specific arrangements (such as bodies) must have an efficient cause which, even though imperceptible, can be inferred on the grounds of their sharing similar features with human artefacts such as pots, since the latter display a specific arrangement (racanāvīśasa, sansthānāvīśasa)\(^{12}\) and have a perceptible efficient cause, i.e. the potter.\(^{13}\) The same idea while trying to show that in fact the kārayatvāt argument formulated by his predecessor amounts to the one resting on the acetanatvatāt inferential reason. See NV ad NS IV.1.21: 441: evam kārayatvāt trīṇādīni paksākṛtya dārśanāsparśanāvīśayatvād iti vaktavyam. evam yatra viprayatpattiḥ kārayatvām ca tat tad* anenaiva nyāyenānena dhyāntena vāsyādānā paksayitvā sādhhayatvam iti. [*ca tat tad NV.: 957: ca yat, tad NV] “In the same way, when one takes grass and so on as the subject of the inference since [they] are effects [and] objects of vision and touch, one can say [that they are controlled by an intelligent agent]. [That is to say,] in the same way, when one takes as the subject of the inference whatever is the object of the debate and involves [the property of] being an effect, one can establish [that this object has the property of being controlled by an intelligent agent] through the same reasoning [, i.e. because of its being unconscious, by having recourse] to the example of the axe and so on, [which are unconscious entities requiring the control of an intelligent agent].” On the probable meaning of “whatever is the object of the debate” here, see above, n 9.

\(^{12}\) As noted by H. Krasser, in his reftu of this proof Dharmaṇī uses the compound sansthānāvīśasa found in the NV rather than sanviśeviśasa, which appears in Aviddhakarṇa’s fragment (see Krasser 1999: 216, n 7; 2002: 36, n 39; cf. below, n 32).

\(^{13}\) See NV ad NS IV.1.22, where Uddyotakara answers the objection according to which “just as a thorn’s sharpness is instance is devoid of efficient cause and [yet] endowed with a material cause, in the same way, in the case of the production of a body, etc., [there is no such thing as an efficient cause]” (yathā kaṅjakasya taṅkṣṇyādā nirnimittam copādānac ca, tathā sārīrādārāge “pitē, NV: 441–42). Uddyotakara explains (NV: 442): kaḥ punarātra nyayaḥ, animittharaacanāvīśeṇā śārīrādāyāḥ samsthānāvīśeṣavattvāt kaṅjakādīvaid iti. na, anupalabhyamānānimittānām anumānato nimittopalabdhāḥ. yasya was elaborated by later Naïyāika authors who in all probability lived before Utpaladeva, such as Saṅkarasvāmin and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, or who may have been younger or older contemporaries, such as Trilocana, Vācaspatimīśra or Bhāsarvajña.\(^{14}\) As for Utpaladeva’s contention that the efficient cause of the universe must be not only omnipotent but also omniscient due to the very nature of its effect, it can also be traced back to earlier, Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya sources such as Praṣastapāda’s lost Tīkā on the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras\(^{15}\) or Jayanta

----------

\(^{14}\) On the presentation of the inference of āvāra by these authors, see Krasser 2002: 56-126. On the vexed question of relative chronology as regards Naïyāika authors for the period covering the ninth to eleventh centuries, see e.g. Slaje 1986: Acharya 2006: xviii–xxvii; Muroya 2011.

\(^{15}\) See TSP.: 55-56: tathā cāahu praṣastamatiprabhṛtayaḥ: sakalabhuvanahetutvād evāsya sarvajñatvam siddham, kartuḥ kāryopādānokaranaprayajanampradānaparjanātāḥ, iha hi yo yasya kartṛ bhavati sa tasyopādānādī jñāte. yathā kulālaḥ kumbhādānām kartṛ tadupādānaṁ mtvpiṇḍam, upakaranānī
Bhaṭṭa’s *Nyāyamañjarī*, and it is also found in Vācaspatimisrā’s

← ca cakrādinni, prayojanam udakāharanādi, kuṭumbinām ca
sampradānām jāntīta ity etat prasiddham; tathēśvarāh
sakalabhuanānāṁ kartā, sa tadupādānāṁ paramāṇavādīlaṃkārāṁ,
tadupakarānāṁ dharmadharmādīkālāṅdini, vyavahāropakarānāṁ
sāmānyavīṣēsaṃavāyālakṣānāṁ, prayojanam upabhogaṁ
sampradānasamajñakānāṁ ca puruṣāḥ jānta ity atah Siddham asya
sarvaṣaṅvatam iti. “And thus, Prāśastamati [= Prāśastapāda] and
[others] have said the following. ‘Because the [Lord] is the cause
of all worlds, his omniscience is established, because an agent has
the full knowledge of the effect, the material cause, the instrumental
causes, the purpose and the recipients [of the created object]. For in
this [world], the agent of [something] knows this [thing]’s material
cause and so on. Just as it is well known that a potter, who is the
agent of e.g. pots, knows their material cause, [i.e.] the lump of
clay, [their] instrumental causes, [i.e.] the wheel and so on, [their]
purpose, [i.e.] containing water and so on, and [their] recipient, [i.e.]
someone in charge of the household; in the same way, the Lord,
who is the agent of all worlds, knows their material causes, which
consist of the atoms and so on, their instrumental causes, [i.e.] merit
and demerit, space, time and so on, the instrumental causes of usage
(vyavahāra) that consist of generality, particularity and inference,
the purpose, [i.e.] the experience [of pleasure and pain], and men, who
are designated as the recipients. Therefore the [Lord]’s omniscience
is established.” This fragment probably comes from Prāśastapāda’s
lost *Tikā* (see Chemparthay 1968: 78ff; Bronkhorst 1996a: 285). On
the name Prāśastamati, see Chemparthay 1970: 249ff.  

16 See NMgs: 98: yathā ca kulālaḥ sakalakalakāśādi kāryakalāpetti-
samvidhānaprayojanādyahijjō bhavams tasya kāryacakrayasya kartā,
tathēyataś trailokayaśa niravadhiprāśisukuduḥkhashādhanasya
ṣṛṣṭisaṃśaṃvāraṇāmaḥ sapravojanam bhūhasāstraṃ jānan eva
sṛṣṭā bhavītum arhati maheśvarah. tasmat sarvajñah. “And just as
a potter is the agent of all effects [such as pots, etc.] while knowing how
to produce all the effects that are dishes and so on, for what purpose [they
are], and so on; in the same way, the Great Lord can be the [universal]
creator only [if he] knows how to create and destroy these three worlds

→

Nyāyakaṇḍikā or Udayana’s *Atmatattvaviveka*.  

The Mīmāṃsaka and Buddhist Objections

The IS defends this inference of īśvāra against Mīmāṃsaka and
Buddhist objections. Upaladeva thus quotes a passage from the ŚV
where Kumārila shows that the example of a specific arrangement
on which the proponent of God’s existence relies (i.e. the pot,
which is observed to require the agency of a potter) is problematic:
either the pot is considered as the product of the potter (but then
the example shows that a specific arrangement is the product of a
finite, perishable entity such as a potter instead of proving God’s
agency, so that the reason invoked is contradictory), or the pot is
considered as the product of īśvāra (but then the example actually
lacks the property to be proven since nobody has ever seen God
create a pot, and the reason invoked is inconclusive).  

← which produce pleasure and pain in the innumerable living beings, as
well as what the purpose [of these creations and destructions] is, [and]
the numerous sciences [required for such an activity]; therefore he is
omniscient.”

17 See NKAś: 151, quoted below, n 48.


19 See IS: 6, quoting ŚV, Sambandhākṣepaparīhāra 79-
80ab: kumbhakārādyadhīsthanaṁ ghaṭādaun yadi ceyate* i
nesvarādhiṣṭhitavam svād asti cet saṃbhavaḥ i yathāśiddha ca
dṛṣṭate bhave dheta viruddhā i [*ceyate corr.: veṣyate IS (cf.
Krasser 1999: 220, n 17)]. “Moreover, if [you] consider that in [the case
of] the pot for instance, the controlling agency (adhiṣṭhāna) is that of
the potter for instance, [then the effects endowed with such a specific
arrangement] cannot be controlled by the Lord; if you consider that
[they] are [governed by the Lord, then the example] lacks the property
to be proven (saṃbhavaḥ); but if [you understand] the example
as is [normally] understood (yathāśiddha), [i.e. if you admit that
the controlling agent of the pot is the potter and not the Lord, then]
the reason must be contradictory (viruddha).” See Taber 1986: 111;
Krasser 2002: 220.
Upaladeva also quotes Dharmakīrti, who, while apparently building on Kumārila’s criticism of the proof, argues that one can only infer a particular agent from a particular specific arrangement that has previously been observed to be causally dependent on this particular agent — otherwise one could infer that an anthill is the product of a potter from the mere fact that an anthill is also made of clay. According to the Buddhist philosopher, the theist’s inferential reason is too broad since it appeals to the notion of “specific arrangement” in general, a notion which rests on a mere “verbal similarity” (sabdasāmya), instead of referring to particular.


Upaladeva thus quotes PV, Pramāṇasiddhipariccheda 11 and 13 in ĪS: 8-9: siddhaṁ yādyād adhiśṭhātyabhāvabhāvānuvyavatimat sanniveśādī tad yuktān tasmād yad* anumāyate wanyathā kumbhakāreṇa mydvikārasya kasyacīt i ṣhatādeḥ karanat sidhyed valmikyasāyāi tatprītya [“tasmād yad corr.: yasmād tad ĪS”] [Only a controlling agent] inferred from e.g. a [particular] arrangement such that it is established to [exist or not] according to whether a [particular] controlling agent exists or not is correct[ly inferred]. Otherwise, an anthill too would be established to be the [potter]’s creation on the grounds that a particular modification of clay such as a pot is produced by the potter.” On these verses see Krasser 2002: 23ff.

PV, Pramāṇasiddhipariccheda 12: vastubhede prasiddhasya sabdasāmyad abhedināh na yuktānunimīḥ pāndudravyād īva hutāsane [“The inference of [something] well known is not right [when it occurs] on account of [something else] that [seems to have] no difference [with a valid reason] due to a [mere] verbal similarity (sabdasāmya), whereas [in fact] there is a difference as regards the real entities (vasu) [designated by the same words] — for instance, [the inference] of fire on account of [the presence of] a white substance [is not right, since smoke and snow, while being both called ‘white substances’, are different].” See Krasser 1999: 217; Krasser 2002: 24ff.

Upaladeva was apparently alluding to this verse (and to the notion of concrete instances of specific arrangements.

Upaladeva’s Reply to the Mīmāṁsaka and Buddhist Objections

Upaladeva salvages the inference from Kumārila’s criticism by explaining that in fact the inference does not establish any particular agent (such as a potter or God), but merely shows the necessary concomitance of any entity possessing a specific arrangement with a cause conceived of as an intelligent being in general (buddhimannāma). This means that Kumārila cannot rightly compel his opponent to face the alternative between the potter and God as particular causes of a particular arrangement. Upaladeva adds that nonetheless, this inferred notion of an intelligent being in general is particularized by its very relationship with the particular effect from which it is inferred. Thus upon seeing smoke over a
forest of khadira trees, we infer the presence there of fire in general, but the general concept of fire is then legitimately particularized as a special type of fire (i.e. a khadira fire) because we see that the smoke is located in a khadira forest, so that the particular substrate (āśraya) of this fire in general can only be a khadira fire. In the same way, in the case of the inference of īśvara, we infer a cause merely conceived of as an intelligent being in general, but we are then led to specify this cause as being God himself due to the specific property of the subject of the inference (paksadharmā).  

← labhata iti paksasambandhañcyatāmāñcāraṇa vyaktīvīṣēṣam kūḷalām kuvindam īśvaram anyam vāpy āśrayaviṣēsam āśrayatvenāvalambate. “Nonetheless, this general form (sāmānyarūpa) is not established without a relationship with a particular (viśeṣasambandha). Therefore [in such an inference we] rely on a particular individual (vyaktīvīṣa), [i.e.] a potter, a weaver, the Lord or any other particular substrate [that we use] as a substrate [for the inferred general form] according to whether [this particular individual] is appropriate for a relationship with the subject of the inference (pākṣa).” Cf. Krasser 2002: 151-52.

28 See IS: 5: yathā dhūmomātrenā dirāt khadiravāyā ‘ghnātām ‘py anumāyāmānā khadiravyāvīṣo dhūmavāvīṣānāpeyā āśrayavāsāt prasaddhiyati. “Just as, when inferring merely fire in general from smoke in general [because we see smoke] in the distance in a forest of khadiras, [we] are well aware of the [fire’s] particularity that is [the property of] being of a khadira type, regardless of the particular smoke, due to the substrate (āśraya) [that is appropriate for a relationship with the forest of khadiras which is the subject of the inference] . . .” Cf. Taber 1986: 109-10. Upatadeva also takes as an example of inference the Sāṅkhya teleological argument that aims at proving the existence of the Self from the fact that things are “for the benefit of another” (parārtha). On this inference, see Watn 2006: 192-202; Eitschinger and Ratíe 2013: 152-72. On Upatadeva’s use of this Sāṅkhya argument here, see Taber 1986: 110.

28 See IS 8-9: na kuḷālāna neśēṇāpy anvayu ‘tra pradrāṣṭaye yato viruddhatāsyā svād asiddhānyatatāpi vā ni kevalam buddhimāmātreyāvāpiśāntarāśāntā api paksadharmabalād dhūmāmāvacit kaścit pratiṣṭhaye “In this [inference of the Lord, what

← we] demonstrate is not the [invariable] co-presence [of a specific arrangement] with the potter, nor is it [the invariable co-presence of this specific arrangement] with the Lord, since [if it were so,] either the [reason] would be contradictory, or the [invariable] co-presence would not be established [in the example]. Nonetheless, [we] acknowledge [the existence of] a particular intelligent [entity] in a particular [case], although [we gain this knowledge] by demonstrating [only] the invariable concomitant [of a specific arrangement] with an intelligent being in general, by virtue of a [particular] property [belonging to] the subject of the inference (paksadharmalatā).” Cf. Krasser 2002: 153.

30 See IS: 6: anonyopayogitamanārādiśarvakriyāvavārataṁ yathā mṛtyunāvāsīḥakarīṣṭaṁ kuḷālāvāṁ. “Being the Lord (īśvarata) is nothing but creating everything, [i.e.] bodies, organs and so on, which help each other [in the performance of their respective functions], just as being a potter is nothing but creating a specific arrangement from clay.”

31 See IS: 6: tena yathā dhūmenāgniḥ sāmānyena kvacit pradeśe sādhyāmanas tatpradeśāhāvānāsāṁ sāmarthāvat śādhyātvat na tu tatra pramānāntaraṁ upaśuyate, tateśvarasādhanā ‘pti. “Therefore a fire, when demonstrated [to exist] as [a fire] in general in a particular place thanks to [the presence of] smoke, is proved by implication (sāmarthāvāntā [to exist as a fire] particularized by the substrate that is this [particular] place, while no other means of knowledge is used [to prove] this [particularity], in the same way, in the demonstration of the Lord as well [, no additional means of knowledge is needed to prove that the intelligent cause in general is the Lord].”

32 This accusation had been put forward by Kumārila, who had argued
As for Dharmakīrti’s criticism, Utpaladeva responds to it by saying that indeed, we infer the existence of a particular intelligent cause (e.g. a potter) from that of a particular specific arrangement (e.g. a pot) when we can observe their invariable concomitance, but that the particular arrangement thus established to be an effect enables us in turn to establish that other particular arrangements of the same kind (sañjñiya) are also effects of an intelligent cause, just as a particular smoke that has been established by experience to be an effect of fire enables us to consider particular instances of smoke as effects of fire even though we cannot actually witness the particular fires causing them.  

Admittedly, the particulars that ṭat if the theist merely intends to prove that the universe has a cause in general, he only proves what his opponents too already admit, since the Mīmāṃsakas consider that the specific arrangement of the universe is determined by the individuals’ past actions and their karmic retribution. See ŚV, Sambandhākṣeṣaparihāra 75: kasyacid hetumātraṇam yady adhikāṭhātreyate i karmabhīh sarvajñānāṁ tattaddheh Siddhasaḍhanaṁ “If [what] you mean [when talking about] the fact that something is a controlling agent [of the universe] is [merely] the fact that it is a cause in general (hetumātra) [of the universe], then you only] prove what is [already] established [for us too] (siddhasaḍhana), since [we consider that] this [causality in general] is established through the [past] actions (karmas) of all living beings.” As shown in Krasser 1999, this criticism (or at least a very similar one) was appropriated by Dharmakīrti and is mentioned in PV, Pramāṇasiddhāpariccheda 10: sthitāpravrttisamsthānāviśeṣārañkritādiṣu iṣṭasiddhir asiddhir vā dṛṣṭate samśaya ‘thavā “[The opponents’ ‘inferential reasons’ such as ‘activity after a rest’, ‘a specific arrangement’ and ‘fulfilling a purpose’ contain [logical faults in so far as they] prove what is already admitted [by us too] (iṣṭasiddhi), or [what they must prove] is not established in the example, or there [remains] a doubt [regarding the inferential reasons].” See also Krasser 2002: 22ff.

33 IS: 8: na cāpi ghaṭādiśvalaśkananiṣṭa eva sanniveśaḥ pramāṇaḥ siddha iti sa evānvātra dharmīyā adṛṣṭakārtṛke dṛṣṭasajñitvaḥ eva kartāraḥ sādhatya na tu sanniveśānāmātṛam, tasya sāmānvarāpyaya kāryatvāśiddher iti vācyam; yataḥ svalaśaṇam eva yady api  

display a specific arrangement differ from each other (a pot is neither an anhil nor a cloth, etc.) in so far as some of the causes contributing to their production are different, but they are also similar in some respects, i.e. in so far as they share some causal conditions: a pot is similar to an anhil in so far as both have the same material cause, namely clay, and since the Buddhists themselves

↩ svalaśaṇanāpekaṣaya dārśanādāraśaṁbhāyāṁ kāryam praṇīyate, tathāpi tat** svalaśaṇaṁ kāryatvena tathā siddham sañjñiyaḥ vañca sañjñiyaḥ tātāpi tathākāryatvena yavāvahāpaya, yathā sakṛd apy eko dhāmō ‘gnikāryatayā siddho dhūmāntārāpy apy anikāryatvena*** siddhāṇy eva karoti. [*gnaṭādisvalaśkanaṇaviśiṣṭa em. Krasser 2002: 154: gnaṭādisvalaśkanaṇaviśiṣṭa. **sat tathā. Krasser ibid.: tathā IS. *** agnikāryatvena. Krasser ibid.: agnikāryatvena IS]. “Moreover, one cannot say[ as Dharmakīrti does:] ‘since an arrangement is established [to be an effect] by a [valid] means of knowledge only [if it is] particularized (viśiṣṭa) as a particular (svalaśaṇa) such as a pot, with respect to another subject of inference whose agent is not perceived, this same [arrangement consisting of a particular merely] proves [the existence of] an agent that [can] only [be] of the same sort (sañjñiya) as the perceived [one], and not an arrangement in general (sāmveśānāmātṛa), because that which consists of a generality (sāmānya) cannot be established to be an effect [, so that it is illegitimate to infer the agency of īśvara by analogy with that of the potter.’ One cannot say that[,] because even though one only grasps an effect that is a particular through the perception and non-perception [that establish invariable concomitance] with respect to a[nother] particular, nonetheless, this particular that is thus established to be an effect establishes in turn other particulars of the same sort (sañjñiya) as being effects [consisting of] other particulars having a cause of the same sort as the [first particular], just as a single [particular instance of] smoke, even though [it occurs] only once, is established to be an effect of fire [and thus] enables [us] to establish that other [particular instances of] smoke as well are effects of fire.” See Taber 1986: 115-16; Krasser 2002: 153-55.

34 IS: 8: tac ca kāryaśvalaśaṇam anekasaṭaḥ kāriṇya-tāyaṇekavīdhasvalaśaṇāntaraḥ sañjñiyaḥ. tathā ca  

acknowledge the distinction between material and efficient cause, they must admit these partial similarities.\textsuperscript{35} Besides, while denying the reality of universals (jāti), the Buddhists acknowledge that particulars (svalakṣaṇa) are similar in so far as they have the same causal efficiency. Now, although we are aware that a pot and a cloth do not have the same specific arrangement, we make efforts to use them as tools because we conceptualize these objects as capable of accomplishing a specific purpose, and we are aware of this purpose because we are aware that both the pot and the cloth were designed to this end by an intelligent agent.\textsuperscript{36} Since such particulars as the

\textsuperscript{35} IS: 8: tajjāṭi-yārthītāyās tajjāṭi-yākāraṇo-pādānāya saṅgatair api yam vyavasthāḥ kṛtā, na mṛdah saṁsthānaṁ na kulālāṁ mṛdṛpaṇetā evam vaddabhiḥ. “The Buddhists themselves, when saying '[the pot's] arrangement does not [come] from clay, the [pot's property of] consisting of clay does not [come] from the potter', make such a distinction out of their desire to find [effects] of the same kind so as to grasp causes of the same kind.”

\textsuperscript{36} IS: 8: vastusṭhitāḥ cedrīy eva, na hi yathā ghaṭhah saṁsthānavān buddhimatā puruṣena niyatena tathā paṭo ‘pi. tathāiva tu’ pratīti ubhayātāpi prājñākṛtanvapratīti upayogāya ca pravṛttit ity evam

pot and the cloth are capable of producing the same awareness in us in spite of their differences, in this respect they have the same causal efficiency, and the Buddhists should accordingly admit their (partial) similarity.\textsuperscript{37} Natural composite entities display a specific arrangement in which each part is arranged in such a way that it helps the other parts perform their respective functions; and this invariable harmony (for instance between man and woman) is similar to that found in any artefact that we have observed to be designed by an intelligent being: we are therefore entitled to infer that they too were produced by an intelligent agent.\textsuperscript{38}
The Naiyāyika Sources of Utpaladeva's Reply to the Buddhists and Mimāṃsakas

How original are Utpaladeva's responses to these antitheistic attacks? John Taber has noticed that Utpaladeva seems to rely on Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāyaśāstra. Indeed, Jayanta replies to Dharmakīrti that in fact God can be inferred as a cause in general since all inferences involve some kind of generality: if we clung to the various particularities of the fire and smoke directly witnessed (e.g. in a kitchen) when first realizing the invariable concomitance between fire and smoke, we would be incapable of inferring later the existence of a fire on a hill from the presence there of a smoke that differs in many respects from the smoke once seen in the kitchen. And according to him, there is no point in asserting that

← (ānugṛṇa) in the functions (arthakriyā) [that the parts] perform thanks to each other, as [the functions] of man and woman for instance, establishes that the Lord is the agent of bodies, etc.’’

Taber 1986: 112-14.

NMk: 83: dhāṁhi mahānāse kumbhadāśṭhākārāmātūrasamudhukṣya-
mānmandajvalanajānām kṛṣaprayāprakṛṭīr upalabdhāh. sa yadi parvate prabalasamāraṇaṁollāsitaḥtavahālaplyamān-
amahāmāhīruḥkandhendhanaprabhavo bahulabahuluḥ
khamandalam akhilam akṛāmann upalabhyate, tat kim idānīṁ
analapramiṇīṁ mā kārsit. atha viśesaraḥtriṃ dhūrathām
agnimātreṇa vyāpatam avagatam iti tatā tadānūmaṇān. ihāpi
sanniveśaḥsanāmātmaḥ kartāṃmaṇaṛṇa vyāpatam iti tato ‘pi tad anūmaṇītām.

“For we observe that in a kitchen, smoke arises from a weak flame kindled by the air blown by a servant [, and that] its form is usually meager. If we see that the [smoke] on a hill arises from the fuel [consisting of] the trunks of big trees burnt by a fire fanned by a strong wind, [and that this smoke] is huge [and] stretches up to the sky, then should [this second smoke perceived] now not produce [in us] the knowledge of fire? If [the opponent answers that we] understand smoke in general, devoid of any particularity, to be invariably concomitant with fire in general, hence the inference of [fire], [we answer that] in the [case of the Lord] as well, an arrangement in

the general notion of arrangement to which the theist has recourse is based on a mere verbal similarity (śabdasāṁjnyā) and not on a real one (vastussāṁjnyā), since the Buddhists themselves do not consider such a general notion as “fire” to be real, and yet they consider that we produce this artificial notion through a process of exclusion (apoha) of real particulars and that such general notions can lead to a valid inferential knowledge. Jayanta further points out (and here too, his thought seems to find an echo in the IS) that arrangements are not entirely similar to each other and insists that nonetheless,

← general is invariably concomitant with an agent in general, therefore let it be inferred too!” Cf. ĀD: 164: anya eva hi dhūmō’’sau kṛṣajjānā
mahānāse ānva evāyaṁ aḍrau ca vyāpatavomadgantarān’’ “For
this smoke which arises meagerly in the kitchen is one thing, and
that [smoke] on the hill pervading all the quarters of the sky is quite
another!”

41 See NMk: 83: nanu sanniveśaśabdasādhanāmatram atra, na
vastussāṁjnyām kiṁcid asti. bhiṣkho, dhūme ‘pi bhavaddarsāne kīṁ
vastussāṁjnyām asti. “[The Buddhist:] But in this [inference of the Lord]
there is only a verbal generality (śabdasādhanā) ‘arrangement’, [but]
no real generality (vastussāṁjnyā) at all. [The Naiyāyika:] O monk,
in the smoke as well, according to your system, is there any [such thing
as a] real general entity (vastussāmātra)?’’ Jayanta later concludes (ibid.:
84): ihāpi sanniveśaśakalaṇvāṅvatīs tvaprakālopmi apahorāpam eva
sāṁjnyām isyātām. “In this [case of the inference of the Lord from
a specific arrangement] as well [as in the case of the inference of fire
from smoke, you] must admit a generality [even though] it is nothing
but an exclusion that you construct in accordance with the concept
of arrangement.” (For a translation of the full passage, see Krasser
2002: 106-08). Cf. ĀD: 166, where the Buddhist’s objection “But
whereas in other [cases] there is a real generality, in this [case] there
is only a verbal generality, and no real generality; and with respect to
a [mere] verbal generality there is an overextension [of the reasoning]”
(nanu anyatra vāstavam sāṁjnyam, iha tu śabdasāṁjnyāmatram na
tu vastussāṁjnyam, śabdasāṁjnyē cātiprasaṅkālaḥ), is answered: “But
how could there be a real generality in the house of a Buddhist?” (kuto
buddhagṛhaṁ vāstavam sāṁjnyam).
they do share a partial similarity in so far as they are all specific configurations.42 The Naiyāyika also explains that in the inference of īṣvara, one only infers an agent in general, but that this agent is then particularized as having such specific attributes as omniscience, and among the ways of determining these particularities he mentions the property of the subject of the inference (pakṣadharma) to which Utpaladeva also has recourse while answering Kumārila’s objection, and he gives an example (the inference of a sandalwood fire) very similar to that used by Utpaladeva (the inference of a khadira fire).43

---

42 See NM₁₅: 84: api ca sakartṛkatvābhimateṣv api sansthaṇeṣu na sarvātmanā talyataṁ pratiyate. na hi ghatasamsthānam paṭasaṁsthānam catuhśalasamsthānam ca susadṛṣam iti. sansthaṇasaṁśānam tu parvattāvapi vidiyata eveti. “Moreover, although [specific] arrangements are considered as having an agent, [they] are not apprehended as being entirely similar. For the arrangement of a pot is not entirely similar to the arrangement of a cloth or to the arrangement of a building. Nonetheless, the generality ‘arrangement’ is indeed found in a mountain, etc., as well.” Cf. AD: 166: dharmam niyātam alambya bhavati hy anumākramāt iva vā sarvātmanā śāmyaḥ sādhyadṛṣṭaṁtadharminah “For the inferential process rests on a specific property; in what case could there be a complete similarity between the example [possessing the property] to be established and the subject of the inference?”

43 NM₁₅: 97–98: apare pakṣadharmabalād eva viśeṣalābhham abhyapagacchanti. na hādṛṣṣam paridṛṣyamānaṁ anekarūpaṁ aparimāṇam ananta-pranatvatvacitvavrasvakhadbhaksādhanāḥ bhuvanādā kāryam anavastaraṁ puṁsā kartum śākyaṁ iti. yathā candana-dhūnam itaradhamvavisadṛṣam avalokya cāndana eva vahir nir anumāyate, tathā vilakṣaṇāṁ kāryād vilakaṇḍa eva kartāṃmāyaṁ. “Others consider that the particularity [of the inferred agent in general] is obtained by virtue of the sole property of the subject of the inference (pakṣadharmabalā). For such an effect as the worlds, etc., which [we] observe [to be] manifold, unlimited, [and] to produce various pleasures and pains in the innumerable living beings, cannot be produced by an ordinary (anatīṣaya) person. Just as upon seeing sandalwood smoke, which is different from other smokes, one infers a fire that is necessarily a

In this respect John Taber has noticed that Utpaladeva's formulation seems to be an improvement on Jayantaś. For Jayantaś explanation seems to imply that it is the special characteristic of the inferential reason (hetu) itself that enables the specification of the property to be established (sādhyā): it is because one sees a sandalwood smoke that looks different from other kinds of smoke that one can infer the presence of a sandalwood fire; but this explanation is problematic in so far as it “threatens the general connection between sādhyā and hetu (if sandalwood smoke looks different from other kinds of smoke, how do you know that it is the effect of fire?)”.44 In contrast, according to Utpaladeva, the inferential reason is “mere smoke” or “smoke in general”, and the sādhyā’s specification rather “takes place strictly with reference to the subject (pakṣa) of the inference, as a sort of afterthought”.45 Nonetheless, as Jayanta himself makes clear, the argument of the specification through pakṣadharma is no novelty:46 it was put forward by some earlier Naiyāyika47 and it

← sandalwood [fire], in the same way, due to the effect having a peculiar characteristic, one infers an agent that necessarily has a peculiar characteristic.” Cf. AD: 166, where the Buddhist objection “But this effect that is the earth, etc., indeed has a peculiar characteristic!” (nunu vilakaṇda eva kṣitidā kārtyaṃ) is answered in the following way: “But [then] you should admit that [its] agent [too] must have a peculiar characteristic!” (nunu vilakaṇḍa eva kārtyaṃ kāpaṇaḥ bhavantah).

44 Taber 1986: 114.

45 Ibid.

46 See above, n 43: Jayanta presents the argument as belonging to “others”.

47 According to Oberhammer 1965: 32, this earlier Naiyāyika may have been Trilocana. Note, however, that Krasser 2002: 101 emphasizes the distance between the known fragments of Trilocana’s work and the argument of specification through pakṣadharma found e.g. in Vācaspatimiśra’s NKaṇ (see below, n 48).
recurs in other Naiyāyika works such as those of Vācaspatimiśra\textsuperscript{48} or Vittoka.\textsuperscript{49} Besides, the idea that this specification only comes as an “afterthought” while not being the product of a second inference, i.e. is only the explicit development of an implicit necessity involved in the very inferential process which establishes a cause in general, is a topos of earlier Nyāya literature.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{48} See NKaṇ: 151 (as edited in Krasser 2002: 93): \textit{tad ayuktam, sāmānyamātrayāyāt\textsc{ā} \textit{apya antarbhāvavivaśasyaiva sāmānyasya paksadharmatāvaśeṇa sādhyadharmīṇy anumāṇe, itarathā sarvānunānccedraprasanīga.} “This is not correct, because even though there is an invariable concomitance between [two] mere generalities (\textit{sāmānyamātra}), with respect to that which must be established to bear the property, one infers a generality that necessarily includes a particularity, thanks to the fact that the subject of the inference has a [particular] property (\textit{paksadharmatāvaśeṇa}); since otherwise, as a consequence all inferences would be annihilated.” See also NKaṇ: 151 (as edited in Krasser 2002: 98): saty \textit{apy utpattimattavasyācetanopādāntavasya copādānopakaranasampradānaprayojanañjānakartṛmātrayāyāt\textsc{ā}t\textit{ve vivādādhīśīṣeṣa paksadharmatāvabāld vīśīṣṭasya tasya siddhiḥ. anyathā sāmānyasyāpyāyābhīmataśasyāsiddhiḥ syat, nirvīśēṣasyasāṃbhavāt, vīśēṣasya cāṇyāśaṇyāpapatthe, caśarvājīṣyā\textit{a cātārḍyāśidbheviṣyā\textit{ā}naraśiṣyā\textit{ā}ṣyā\textit{ā}ṣyāṣyāṣyā bāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvायā\textit{a kartṛmātrayāyāt\textsc{ā} taviṣayā iti viśēṣavāyam anumāṇam. “Even though there is an invariable concomitance of [the properties] ‘being produced’ and ‘having an unconscious material cause’ with [the existence of] an agent in general (\textit{kartṛmātra}) who knows the material cause, the instrumental causes, the recipient and the purpose [of the effect], with respect to the [things] that are in dispute [i.e. natural composite entities that are not unanimously considered as effects,] this [agent] is established as [being] particularized [by omniscience] by virtue of the fact that the subject of the inference possesses a [particular] property (\textit{paksadharmatāvabāld}); otherwise, the generality considered as invariably concomitant would not have been established, because [such an invariable concomitance] is not possible for [something] that is not particularized, and because no other particularity is possible [as regards this agent]. Since in this [case] someone who is not omniscient [and therefore who] does not know the various [unconscious instrumental causes] such as the invisible [force] (\textit{adṛśī}) could not be a controller (\textit{adhiśṭātr}), the particularity consisting in [being] omniscient necessarily follows [for this agent]. Therefore even though the invariable concomitance regards [only the property of] having a conscious agent, nonetheless, one understands this particularity due to the fact that the subject of the inference has a [particular] property (\textit{paksadharmatāvabāld}) — therefore the inference regards a particularity [and not a mere generality].” While commenting on Jayanta’s mention of the \textit{paksadharmatā} argument, H. Krasser remarks that we cannot determine with certainty who formulated it in the first place and that among Naiyāyikas, only Vācaspatimiśra and Vittoka seem to have propounded such a theory, but that the latter seems to be later than Jayanta. If the dates proposed for Vācaspatimiśra (i.e. c. 950-1000) in Acharya (2006: xviii-xviii) are right, Vācaspatimiśra cannot have been Jayanta’s source either. In any case Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925-75) certainly knew Jayanta’s NM, but (as far as I know) it is not impossible that he also knew at least some of Vācaspatimiśra’s writings (on the proximity of Utpaladeva’s argument with Vācaspati’s, see Krasser 2002: 152, n 211).

\textsuperscript{49} See Krasser 2013: 136.

\textsuperscript{50} See e.g. the Naiyāyika \textit{pūrṇapakṣa} presented by Kamalāśīla in \textit{TSP}; 65 (see Krasser 2002: 81, n 117): \textit{yāvatā sāmān\textsc{ya} buddhimatprāvanatvāmānaṃ sādhyate, tasmāntaṃ ca siddhe tvanvādāniṃ sāmārthyaḥ tīṣaḥ kartā sādhyati, na hi ghatādīvata tēṣām kulālāḥ kartā sambhavāt. t\textit{ēna sāmānyasya viśēṣavāyam atvād uṣha\textit{a} kartā āsambhavāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvायā\textit{a kartṛmātrayāyāt\textsc{ā} taviṣayā iti viśēṣavāyam anumāṇam. “It is only [the property of] presupposing an intelligent [agent] that [we] prove as this mere generality; and once this [mere generality] is established, as an implication (\textit{sāmārthya}) [of it, we] establish that the agent of bodies and so on is the Lord. For their agent cannot be a potter for instance, contrary to [the case] of e.g. a pot. Therefore, because the generality is particularized by this
The Sāṅkhya Objection

Finally, Utpaladeva presents a lengthy defence of the Naiyāyika inference against the Sāṅkhya objection that specific designs can in fact be the result of the sole unconscious primordial nature (prakṛti) or matter (pradhāna).\(^5\) He thus answers an objection that was put forward by Sāṅkhya authors who may not have denied the very existence of ēśvara\(^5\) but who none the less set out to refute his agency and argued that the universe is nothing but the activity of prakṛti.\(^\text{33}\) To the argument that primordial nature can only be considered as a material cause (upādāna) and not as the efficient cause (nimitta) that is precisely the point in debate,\(^\text{54}\)

\(\leftarrow\) particularity, and because with respect to bodies and so on, another agent is impossible, as an implication, even if [we] do not have the full grasp of the particularity, it is the Lord that is established to be their agent". Jñānārāmīśa’s ĪV: 239 attributes this line of argument to Trilocana (see Krasser 2002: 79-80). On the fact that this strategy is common in the Nyāya (and also recurs in the works of later Naiyāyikas such as Udayana), see Chemparathy 1972: 88-89.

\(^{51}\) See Taber 1986: 120ff.

\(^{52}\) See Bronkhorst 1983, which argues that originally the distinction between seśvara and anīśvara Sāṅkhya referred to the difference between the Sāṅkhya who accepted the agency of God in the creation of the universe and those who did not, and that up to a rather late period (i.e. at least the end of the first millennium) the so-called anīśvara Sāṅkhya did not deny the existence of God but only its causal role in the cosmic manifestation. Note that in ĪS 26, Utpaladeva designates his opponent as sāṅkhyaam anīśvaram.

\(^{53}\) Such Sāṅkhya refutations of ēśvara as the cause of the universe can be found in GB: 54 and MV: 55-56 ad SK 61, in YD ad SK 15: 157ff (see Chemparathy 1965 for a translation and analysis), or in TK ad SK 57: 164.

\(^{54}\) ĪS: 12: na hi pradhānasyātādhiṣṭhānaṁ prakṛtiṣvad upādāna kāraṇatāyā paramānūsthāna eva pradhānasya mālakāraṇatvena samarthaḥ. tac ca pradhānena paramānūvāda eva yadi paramānātīrto tataḥ pradhānāvyavasthā viśva-

\(\rightarrow\) the Sāṅkhya opponent portrayed by Utpaladeva replies in turn that primordial nature does not transform itself randomly, nor for its own sake (svārtha),\(^\text{55}\) but for the sake of the pure, passive consciousness that the Sāṅkhya calls purusā; and according to him, the efficient cause of the universe is nothing but primordial nature’s property of being “for the benefit of the Person” (purusārtha).\(^\text{56}\)

\(\leftarrow\) syopādānākāraṇācārāprastāvā prameyībhavati, na tu nimittakāraṇopādānaprakram. [*nirākriyāte conj.: nirākriyāta IS] “For the Lord cannot be refuted merely by establishing matter, since matter is proved to be the primordial cause [of the universe only] in so far as it is [proved to be] the material cause instead of atoms. And as a consequence, if it is only atomism that is refuted by [establishing] matter, then establishing matter is an object fit for the topic of the examination of the universe’s material cause, but not for the topic of the explanation of [its] efficient cause.”

\(^{55}\) See Taber 1986: 122-23.

\(^{56}\) ĪS: 12: rad evam mālaprakṛtiḥ satvarajastamahsaṁjñāgna
trayasyāmātmikā prakṛtitaiva prasava-dharmin guṇadān evāṅgāṅgibhāvagamanena yāvan mahādāvākāhapehā yāvan mālaprakṛtiḥ satvarajastamaṁ mahādāvākārapehā paramāṇam, tāvat purusārthaḥvam eva tatra tasyāh svabhāvabhātatah nimittam.

“Therefore primordial nature, which consists of a state of balance between the three qualities (guna) called satva, rajas and tamas, [and which], precisely because it is a prakṛti [i.e. literally, ‘that which generates’], has the property of generating, transforms itself by bringing these very qualities to a state [in which they] serve each other (āṅgāṅgibhāva), [and it brings them to this state through an activity] consisting in transforming [them] into the Great [i.e. the intellect (buddhi)], etc. In so far as [primordial nature acts thus,] the efficient cause (nimitta) of this [transformation] is nothing but [primordial nature’s property of] being for the benefit of the Person (purusārtha); [i.e. the efficient cause] is the very nature of this [prakṛti].” Here the Sāṅkhya opponent seems to rely on SK 56-57 while playing on the meanings of the term nimitta (apparently rather used in the SK in the sense of “goal”): ity esa prakṛtiketo mahādāvākārapehātye purusārthaḥ śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śā śामृति
This specific purpose of prakṛti explains away the seemingly pre-

established harmony of the universe: 57 primordial nature transforms itself into the variegated structures that constitute the phenomenal world so as to fulfil a double purpose for the sake of the puruṣa, namely, enabling the individual to experience pain and pleasure according to his merit and demerit, and leading him to liberation through the discrimination between prakṛti and puruṣa. 58 Since such

57 IS: 12: na hi yadṛcchayā vartamānāyāḥ kāryavargasya
devamānyaṣayatigonyonirūpasya tavātāntaraṣāṣṭiṣāṣṭiṣāṣṭiṣīavatavat
nīyamena

58 See IS: 12: arthavattvam ca sukhaduhkhopalamabha-
sampādanarthātāvai sarvasyaivārtharūpasya parapara

paraṇaṇaṇa. “And [stating that nature does not act randomly] amounts [to saying that] it has a purpose, since precisely, the purpose [of nature] is to successively bring about the perception of pleasure and pain as regards everything that consists of an object.” See also IS: 13: tato yaḥā
sukhaduhkhomahayasyārāṣaḥsaviṇanavatvam* puruṣārtha tathā
sātropadiṣṭānāmopamānānāṁ gunapuruṣāntaropalabdhibhr api
tad ubhayam apī pravojanaḥ bhogapavargarūpaḥ** gunaparītve

taprajanaśampādānayogyasabavabhavaḥ ca nimittikārama

ucyate. **[sarvārāṣaḥsaviṇanam con.] pārārthaśvamadhanam IS.

***[sarvārāṣaḥsaviṇanam con.] * rūpa * IS. “Therefore the benefit of the Person is the awareness of all objects consisting of pleasure, pain and delusion [which constitute the three qualities], but also the perception that the qualities and the Person are distinct, [a perception which occurs] for instance thanks to the inferences and comparisons taught in treatises. As a consequence, both of these, i.e. experience (bhoga) and liberation
a primordial nature acting for the benefit of the Person is enough to account for the specific arrangements that constitute the universe, there is no need to postulate īśvara as their efficient cause.\(^{39}\)

**Utpaladeva’s Reply to the Sāṁkhya Objection**

In response to this objection, Utpaladeva explains first that if the purposefulness of prakṛti were the sole efficient cause of all things possessing design, a pot would not need a potter: the very fact that its material cause is for the benefit of individuals would be enough to produce it.\(^{60}\) But if the Sāṁkhya concedes that in the case of the āparāvarga, are the goal of the activity of qualities. And what is called ‘efficient cause’ is [nothing but] the fact that [primordial nature] has a nature capable of accomplishing this goal.” Cf. MV: 54: sa cārtho dvividhah. sābdādyupalabdhir ādir guṇapurusāntaropalabdhir antaś ca. trīṣa lokeṣu sābdādviṣayāt puruṣaṁ yo jayati. ante ca guṇapurusāntaropalabdhya mokṣan karute. “And this benefit [of the Person] is twofold: first, it is the perception of [objects] such as sound, and finally, it is the perception that qualities and the Person are distinct. In the three worlds, [primordial nature acting for this benefit] connects the Person with objects such as sound, and finally it induces liberation through the perception that qualities and the Person are distinct.”

\(^{39}\) See IS: 18: aha pradhānasyayām api svabhāvaviśeṣa eva, yad ghatasanniveśādau dandacakravadbhūtadapēkṣā, tāvatā pradhānikeṇa kāraṇa-kārāṇa-purūṣārthopiyatvam samāsā vadhāvastusūdhaḥ. tad evaṃ eva tānukaraṇātā tādhāvyo priyā pradhānīkāt tathāvyābhāvyavagat kathām tātānaḥ pradhāvyāyagya-buddhādāpeṣā nesāte. “If [on the other hand, you consider that] matter has this particular feature that with respect to the [specific] arrangement of a pot for instance, it requires an intelligent [agent] equipped with a stick and a wheel, because it is through all these causes which belong to matter as transformations of it that the realization of the thing that is a pot having this [specific] arrangement contributes to the benefit of the Person, then, since [you acknowledge that] matter possesses such a nature, [you must admit that] it is exactly the same with respect to the cause of [such things] as bodies and organs as well: why [then] do [you] refuse to admit the requirement of an intelligent [agent] fit for such a creation [as the universe]?”

\(^{60}\) IS: 18: tatḥaitān sāṁkhyaḥ pratī ucayate, yathā nāvagato bhavadbhiḥ sādhanaṁ iti. yadi hi sarvavacīrasamśāntakāryapādaneṣu pradhānasyavai yā puruṣabhogārthata saivam nimitatākaraṇaṁ kīm īśavareṇy ucayate tā kumbhakārenāpi kīṁ ghaṭakarane. tatātā pradhānākṣaṁ mahātyādēḥ puruṣārthasvabhāva-vāvasāḥ eva tathābhūtanādāvād-ghaṭakarāṇasya-sāmarthyaṁ syāḥ. “In this regard, [we] reply to these Sāṁkhyas in [the following] way: you have not understood the point of the demonstration. For [you ask:] ‘if it is matter’s [property of] having as its purpose the experience [of pain and pleasure] by the Person that is the efficient cause with regard to the pot, the specific arrangement requires a potter, why not assume it in the case of the universe as well?” Utpaladeva also points out that a material cause cannot give rise to a structure specifically designed to serve a human purpose, because it is unconscious: such a creation requires a creative desire (cikīrṣā) or will (icchā) as well as a synthetic awareness (anusamānā) of what should be done or avoided so as to obtain a specific effect, and these are not found in material entities.\(^{62}\) Admittedly, according to the Sāṁkhya,
primordial nature, although unconscious, is capable of knowledge in so far as it transforms itself into the intellect (buddhi), which in turn is capable of desire or will and synthetic awareness, since it produces determination (adhyavasāya), so that it can know the desire to act (cikirsā), various [specific] arrangements cannot arise. [Without it, material elements] may [gather into] gross [perceptible wholes,] but there can be no arrangement useful to people, [occurring] invariably, varied [and] containing [different] species." On the required synthetic awareness, see e.g. IS: 19-20: tathā hi yāvac idam ito bhavati kimcidadhikaviśeṣāt punar ata evānena viśeṣena saviśeṣāṃ idam eva bhavati, aparaviśeṣayuktāt punar asmad evānanda evānajātiyam eva kāryaṁ jāyate, tataḥ saṁpraty evanviśdham upavijyate tathaiva karomīty evam viçāracaturā matir na syāt, tāvat kaṭhaṁ tathābhūtvaiśeṣakaraṇā yāhāpādāne syātān. "To explain: [if only material, intentent causes were to produce specific arrangements designed to contribute to the benefit of the Person,] how could [they] reject [some auxiliary causes] and use [others] so as to produce such a specific [arrangement], in so far as [these causes] could have no such fourfold understanding as this: ‘this [thing A] exists due to that [thing B]; but this same [thing A] exists while having a particularity due to this same [thing B] when this [thing B] has some added particularity, [precisely] because of this particularity [of B]; [and] in turn, when this [thing B] has another particularity, it produces another effect, which is of another sort than [A]; therefore now, such a [cause] can contribute [to producing this particular effect,] and [I am going to act exactly in this way?]"

65 See SK 22: prakṛtam mahāṁs tato 'hamkāras tasmād gaṇaśa ca sōdaśakaḥ i tasmād api sōdaśakaḥ pañcabhyah pañca bhūtāni u "‘From primordial nature arises the Great [, i.e. the intellect]; from the [Great] arises egoity (ahamkāra); and from [egoity], the group of the sixteen [i.e. the group of the five subtle elements, the five organs of perception, the five organs of action and the mind (manas)]; and in turn, from the five [subtle elements] within these sixteen [arise] the five gross [elements]."

66 See SK 23a: adhyavasāya buddhiḥ . . . “The intellect is determination. . .” Cf. GBh: 25: adhyavasāya buddhilaṁkṣaṇam. adhyavasānam benefit of the Person.65 But Utpaladeva argues that determination, will or synthetic knowledge cannot be manifest before primordial nature starts transforming itself, since according to the Sāṅkhya, at that time primordial nature is unmanifest.66 And even assuming that matter takes the form of the intellect in order to manifest them, since buddhi is a material entity, it needs to be reflected upon by a conscious entity, i.e. a puruṣa, because will and synthetic awareness are types of awareness.65 But again, since this manifestation of the

← adhyavasāyaḥ. yathā bije bhaviṣyadveśām kūrata tadvad adhyavasāyaḥ. ayam ghato ’yaṁ paṭa ity evaṁ satya yā śiḥ buddhir iti lakṣyate. “Determination is the characteristic of the intellect; it is the act of determining. Just as the sprout that will occur later is [contained] in the seed, in the same way, determination [is contained in the intellect]. It is defined as the intellect when such a [thought] occurs: ‘this is a pot’, ‘this is a cloth’.”

65 See SK 36: ete pradiplakpāḥ parasaravilakṣaṇā purusāsthiḥ prakāśya buddhau pravacchanti. “The [external organs, egoity and mind,] which differ from each other [and] are particular [modifications] of the qualities, [functioning] like a lamp, manifest the entire benefit of the Person and place [it] in the intellect.”

66 IS: 23: na ca pradhānasyaiva mālakārānasya vyavasāyādīrbhir vyaktir asti tat kaṭhām tasyeccchādiyogaḥ puruṣārthahdhasāntiḥ syād yātā pravṛttir bhavet. “And matter alone, [considered as] the primordial cause, [cannot be manifest in the form of determination, will and synthetic knowledge; therefore [at that time,] how could it possess will, synthetic knowledge and determination], which would enable it to be aimed at the benefit of the Person, so that the activity [of matter] could take place?”

67 IS: 23: yady api ca buddher astīcchānusāndhānāṃ ca vyāpāras tathāpi puruṣasannidhiḥ syāvān na ceyamāną prakāśaṁānu ‘sau sampannas tāvan neccchādirūpataṁ dhatte tathālakṣaṇatvaṁ iṣṭcchānusāndhānāṁ. “And even if an activity of the intellect does occur [at the beginning of the universe’s manifestation, namely,] will and a synthetic awareness, nonetheless, if [this activity of the intellect, which is of a material nature,] is not reflected upon due to the presence of a Person, [i.e. if it] does not obtain [to be] manifest
intellect and its apprehension by a conscious entity supposedly constitute the very cause of primordial nature's evolution, they must take place before primordial nature has evolved into an intellect differentiated according to each individual, ⁶⁶ and given that these creative will and synthetic awareness must concern the whole universe, they can only belong to a special puruṣa transcending individuality and endowed with omniscience, i.e. Īśvara. ⁶⁷

← [for a consciousness], it cannot reach the status of will and [synthetic awareness], because will, synthetic awareness and so on consist in such a [conscious state].” On the Śaṅkhya’s endeavour to solve the problem of the relationship between the material buddhi and the puruṣa’s consciousness, and on Utpaladeva’s criticism of this solution in the Pratyabhijñā treatise, see Torella 1994: 93, n 12; Ratié 2011a: 94-106, 276-89.

⁶⁶ See IS: 23: atha sarvapuruṣasadānāsanayakṣayāpi buddhaiva tasyān bhidyate, mahatkarānāsmiṭājanmano vā manahsājākaranaśya, eṣāḥya bhasādyavītṛḥ pratyekapuruṣanīyatāstā, na tayottarakālākhaḥvīnā pradhānāya mahato vā puruṣārthānāmandhānacchāvattā yujvate. “But if [you reply that] although one, [i.e.] common to all Persons, the principle of the intellect (buddhitattva) called the Great, or the organ called mind (manas) which arises from egoity (asmiita) that [in turn] has as its cause the Great, transforms itself into [a manifestation] characterized as determination (adhavaśāya) [and] is in fact differentiated according to each Person, [then] this transformation into determination and so on must be restricted to each Person, [but] neither matter nor the [principle of the intellect called] the Great can be endowed with synthetic knowledge and will regarding the benefit of the Person through this [transformation] since [this transformation only] arises at a later time.”

⁶⁷ See IS: 23-24: kim tu pradhānāyaiva prathamakoikārakaraṇa eva sarvapuruṣoddeśeṇa sāmānyanāṇāmnadhānacchāvayāvādyavītṛḥ prathamaḥ buddhisaniḥjāyādvy eva, yena tasyāḥ buddhiprakārița syāt, tadaiva tad api na duktaḥ, pradhānāya sarvathāvāya vikaṭarūpatalpuṇānupalasāvādyavītītvā, na ca vṛttau puruṣeṇāsanvidityām icchānāmnādādirūpataḥ sambhavati, →

The Naiyāyika Sources of Utpaladeva’s Reply to the Śaṅkhya Objection

John Taber finds rather strange the length of this discussion with Śaṅkhya (which spreads over about two thirds of Utpaladeva’s tract), since according to him, Utpaladeva’s zeal in attacking the Śaṅkhya position contrasts with the Nyāya’s relative indifference to this opponent, and since the Śaṅkhya does not seem to have been an

← puruṣenāpi pradhānāvṛtthā kena sañvedyamānāt sarvapuruṣoddhēsāna sāmānyapradhānāt, ekaikena cet tat tasya sarva jñatvam syāt . . . “Rather, when matter first transforms itself, there must be a first transformation into synthetic knowledge, will, determination and so on which is called ‘intellect’ [and] is universal (sāmānyam), [i.e.] concerns all Persons, [and it] is thanks to [this transformation] that even [matter] can be an intelligent agent. [But again,] at that very moment [when matter starts transforming itself], this too is impossible, because the transformation of matter cannot be perceived, since its nature is absolutely unmanifest. And if no Person is aware of this activity, it cannot consist of will, synthetic knowledge and so on; and which Person is aware of this transformation of matter, since this activity is universal (sāmānyam), [i.e. since it] concerns all Persons? If [you reply]: each of them, then [each of] them should be omniscient . . . “

See also IS: 24: atha sāmānyarūpajñānaiva sarvajaiva ca puṣṭvāsabheṣeṇa sāmānyapradhānāvṛtthām sañvedyamānāt tat sa evēśoro ‘stu, tasyaiva viśvanirmītā sañvedyā saūti sambhānti bhavātti. “But [if you reply] that it is a special Person (puṣṭvāsabheṣa), who has a universal form [and not an individual one] and who is omniscient, who is aware of the universal transformation of matter, then let [us] admit that this [Person] is the Lord himself, since only he can have the desire to create the universe while being aware of it.” Cf. IS 41cd-42ab: athāpi sarvapuruṣābhinnenaikena kenaicit tv evyādā sa vaiśa śarhy ekāh kartā jñātā sa ceṣevarāh i “But if [the Śaṅkhya opponent had] rather [reply that] a certain unique [entity] which is not distinct from all Persons (sarvapuruṣābhinna) is aware of this [desire to create,] then [he must concede the existence of] a single agent [and] knower, and this is [what we call] the Lord.”
influential school in Utpaladeva’s time. However, it is worth noting that Uddyotakara, the only Naiyāyika author whom Abhinavagupta explicitly mentions in connection with the demonstration of the existence of īśvara, devotes an important part of his proof to the refutation of the Sānkhya position. Thus Uddyotakara sets out to show that primordial nature requires an intelligent controller, and he too attempts to refute the Sānkhya thesis that the efficient cause of these arrangements is nothing but matter’s property of being for the benefit of the puruṣa. He argues (as Utpaladava does later) that there can be no awareness of objects or of the distinction between primordial nature and the Person (although this awareness constitutes the puruṣārtha) at the very moment when matter starts acting, since according to the Sānkhya system, such an awareness can only arise when matter has already transformed itself into the intellect. Uddyotakara also criticizes the Sānkhya contention that matter can act although it is unconscious by pointing out that this is a dogmatic assertion rather than a demonstrated fact.

---

70 Taber 1986: 119, 128.
71 See NV ad NS IV.1.21: 433: kaḥ punar īśvarasya kāraṇaīvye naṁ āyaṇaṁ ‘bhūdhīyaṁ. pradhānāparaṁśu-karmāṇi prakṛ pravṛtteter buddhimātrāṇādhiśhīṭiṁ pravartante’ cetaḥ-sād vāsād vād iti, yathā vāyād buddhimātā iṣṭādyādhiśhīṭam acetanatvāt pravartate, tatā pradhānāparaṁśu-karmāṇaṁ acetanāṁ pravartante. tasāṁ tāṁ api buddhimātrāṇādhiśhīṭastīti. “But what is the reasoning [proving] that the Lord is the cause [of the universe]? Here is how we formulate this argument: before [they] start acting, matter, atoms and actions [that lead to karmic retribution] are prompted [to act in so far as they are] controlled (adhiśhita) by an intelligent cause, because they are unconscious, just as an axe. [For] just as an axe for instance is prompted [to cut a tree in so far as it is] controlled by an intelligent woodcutter, because it is unconscious, in the same way, matter, atoms and actions, which are unconscious, are prompted [to act so as to produce the universe]; therefore they too are controlled by an intelligent cause.”
72 See ibid.: tatra pradhānākāraṇikās tāvat puruṣārtham adhiśhīyakam pradhānāsyā varṇavyasti. puruṣārthena pravṛttaṁ pradhānaṁ pravartata iti. puruṣārthā ca救治 bhavati, śabdādvyupalabdhir gunapuruṣāntara-darāsaṁ ceti. tadabhayaṁ pradhānapravṛttyā vinā na bhavatīti. “In this regard, first of all, those who consider matter as the cause [of the universe] explain that [what] controls matter is the benefit of the Person (puruṣārtha), [i.e.] that matter is prompted [to act] while being directed by the benefit of the Person. And the benefit of the Person is twofold: [on the one hand, it is] the perception of [objects] such as sound, and [on the other hand,] the realization that

---

← qualities and the Person are distinct. And these two [sorts of benefit of the Person] cannot occur without the activity of matter.”
73 See NV ad IV.1.21: 433: na, prakṛ pravṛttes tadabhāvaṁ. yāvat pradhānaṁ mahadādhibhāvena na prāparīṁ, tāvan na śabdādvyupalabdhir asti, na gunapuruṣāntaraparēdiaṁ iti hetvabhāva pradhānapravṛttyā na yuktā. “[This is] not [correct], because prior to [matter’s] activity, this [twofold benefit of the Person] does not exist: as long as matter does not transform itself into the Great [i.e. the intellect], etc., there cannot be any perception of sound and so on, nor [can there be] any perception that qualities and the Person are distinct. Therefore, since this [so-called] cause [of the activity of matter] does not exist [at that time], the activity of matter is impossible.” Note that this argument is part of a dilemma; thus Uddyotakara adds (NV: 433-34): athātāṁ nāsaṁ ātmāṁ labhaṁ na sam nirūdhyaṁ ēvaṁ ca sati vidyāmāṇaṁ puruṣāṛthāṁ pradhānam pravartayaṁ na puruṣārthāṁ pradhānāsyā pravṛttyā. na hi loke yad yasya bhavati sa tadartham punar yatata iti. “But if the Sānkhya opponent answers that in fact this cause is present [at that time, on the grounds] that what is non-existent cannot obtain existence [and that] what exists cannot cease [to exist], [we answer that] if it is the case, since the benefit of the Person prompts matter to act [whereas it already] exists, the activity of matter [can] not be for the benefit of the Person; for in the [ordinary] world, one does not make again an effort to [achieve] a benefit that is [already achieved].”
74 Thus in NV: 434, while arguing with other opponents who contend that atoms controlled by individuals’ actions (rather than primordial nature) are the cause of the universe, Uddyotakara comes back to the Sānkhya assertion that unconscious matter can act and alludes →
Nonetheless, John Taber rightly emphasizes that Utpaladeva’s treatment of the Sāṁkhya objection seems to go “somewhat beyond the measure of interest in this school among Naiyāyikas.” Besides, Uddyotakarā’s arguments often differ from those found in the IS in so far as the former mainly target the Sāṁkhya doctrine of satkārayāda and the corollary principle that nothing new can be brought into existence, whereas Utpaladeva’s main line of argument against the Sāṁkhya (namely, the idea that action requires a will and knowledge only found in conscious entities, and that they cannot be a mere product of the intellect understood as a material entity) seems to be found only in embryonic form in the Nyāyavārttika. It does appear in Bhāsarvajña’s criticism of the Sāṁkhya thesis, but Utpaladeva and Bhāsarvajña seem to have

been more or less contemporary, and I am not aware of any clue that would entitle us to determine which author may have borrowed from the other. Furthermore, Bhāsarvajña is known to have entertained

---

56) argues that agency can belong to conscious entities “because an unconscious entity such as milk is seen to act independently, for the purpose of making the calf grow” (vatsādīvivṛddhyartham acetanasya kṣīrādeḥ svātantryena pravṛttiypalambhāḥ, NBḥūṣ: 447). According to Bhāsarvajña, this position is refuted by inference as well as scripture: tathā hi loke ‘pi śāstraśīlpādikāryaviseṣaṁ dvṛṣṭā jñānāviseṣaṁ tatkartur anumāni, taḥjñānārāhitaṁ cākārtṛtvam eveti. āgāmeṣ anip vedasṁtipūrāṇāda jñānina eva kārtṛtvam śrāvate. vidvān vajeta ityādvacanaṁ dharmaśākarātvam api cetanasyaiva. “To explain: in the world too, upon seeing a particular effect such as a treatise or a work of art, [we] infer that its agent must have a particular knowledge, whereas those who are devoid of this knowledge cannot be the agents [of this particular effect]. And in scriptures too, such as the Vedas, Śmṛti, Purāṇas and so on, it is stated that agency exclusively belongs to [someone] who knows: through such words as ‘to know who should sacrifice’, the agency of dharma and so on also is ascribed solely to the conscious.” The Sāṁkhya, however, objects (ibid.) that in fact this agency belongs to that which is capable of knowledge, will and effort, i.e. the intellect, which is a mere evolutive of the sentient primordial nature: nanu ca śāstraśīlpādikārtṛtvam jñāneccāhpratayatnāvato cetanasaiva buddhiatvasya, na tu cetanasyetī. “But it is [something] unconscious, [namely] the principle of the intellect that possesses knowledge, will and effort, which is the agent of such [effects] as a treatise or a work of art and not [something] conscious [as you claim].” Bhāsarvajña answers (ibid.) that only a conscious entity, i.e. the Self, can be the substrate of knowledge, will and effort: tad idam mahāmahohijīvhitam yaśijñānavacacetanayati ti. yo ’sau jñānecchādānām āśrayaḥ, sa eva hy atmā, na tato ‘nya cetana ‘stittī vakṣyāmah. “The [notion] that the unconscious knows spreads from a great delusion; for the substrate of knowledge, will and so on is nothing but the Self, [and] we will explain that nothing is conscious apart from this [Self].”

---


70) See the discussion in NV: 434, too long to be quoted here.

71) Thus, while defending the proof of iśvara’s existence as the efficient cause of the universe, Bhāsarvajña argues that only conscious entities can act (NBḥūṣ: 447): cetanasaiva hi kārtṛtvam. svatantro hi kārtṛtvam ucyate. śāriṇḍeśe ca svātantryaṁ nāsti puruṣābhikāryāyānuvidhyātivān maśāśiṇādeḥ kārtṛtvānupalambhāḥ ca. “For agency belongs exclusively to [what is] conscious. For [we only] call [something that is] independent an ‘agent’. And the body and so on have no independence, because they conform to the intention of the person, and because [we] do not observe that corpses for example have any agency.” He then answers a Sāṁkhya objector who, relying on SK 57 (see above, n
a view of the Self heterodox in Nyāya,\textsuperscript{78} and his refutation of the Śāṅkhya objection, which involves this peculiar definition of the Self, may not reflect the orthodox Naiyāyika position.

**How Original Is Utpaladeva’s Proof of God?**

To sum up, although Utpaladeva’s formulation of the Nyāya proof of īśvara might have influenced some of the later authors engaging in this controversy,\textsuperscript{79} on the whole, the IS does not seem to bring anything new in the debate: it merely reformulates older Naiyāyika arguments.\textsuperscript{80} The only exception appears to be Utpaladeva’s treatment of the Śāṅkhya position. Does this exception constitute a real novelty (perhaps motivated by Utpaladeva’s desire to refute at length a theory that leaves no room whatsoever for consciousness

\textsuperscript{78} While most Naiyāyikas consider that consciousness is only an adventitious quality of the Self, Bhaṭṭārka argues that the Self is by nature conscious, and Abhinavagupta himself mentions with approval Bhāṣāpatra’s heterodox position in IPV V 1: 134-35. See Ratié 2011a: 88-91.

\textsuperscript{79} See Krasser 2002: 157, which mentions a number of formal similarities between the IS and the theistic argument attacked by the Kashmiri Buddhist Śāṅkarananda in the Īśvarāpākaparanasūktā, and suggests that Śāṅkarananda’s pūrvapakṣa might be at least in part based on Utpaladeva’s work.

\textsuperscript{80} While conceding that Utpaladeva’s treatise “remains quite within the Nyāya framework” (Taber 1986: 127), J. Taber considers that the IS’s argument is “highly original in that it is unmistakably an argument from design. The reason why God must have created the world is, for Utpala – unlike for many Naiyāyikas – not simply because it is an artifact (kāryavatā), but because it is a very unusual kind of artifact which only a conscious, intelligent being, to say the least, could have produced.” Indeed, as emphasized by J. Taber, Utpaladeva keeps pointing out the complexity and harmony of natural arrangements; nonetheless, as seen above, the argument resting on the notion of a specific arrangement (sanniveśaviṣēṣa, etc.) is commonplace in Nyāya literature.

\textsuperscript{81} This hypothesis is mentioned in Taber 1986: 128: “Śāṅkhya could well have represented to Utpala [. . .], as a system of materialism, a challenge to his own mature theology. That theology consists in a system of idealism in which Śiva as consciousness is the ultimate reality [. . .]. The refutation of Śāṅkya, then, does away [. . .] with a view of the world in which consciousness has virtually no role.” In this connection it should be noted that in IPK II.4.17-19, Utpaladeva refutes at length the Śāṅkhya view of causality by showing that pradhāna can transform itself into the universe only if it is a manifestation of the ultimate consciousness.

\textsuperscript{82} IS 56: svāmānāvānāṃ sphurati sakalaprabhāvānāṃ īśvara’ntaḥ kartā jñātāpi ca yadi param pratyabhijñāya sādhyā iva cāsaṃbhār viḥitaghaṭanāvantara kim tv īśasiddhi dvai ‘py astity uci tam adhikām bāti vahīr niśīthe
bound to objectify whatever it talks about. Nevertheless, because īśvara playfully forgets his own sovereignty while assuming the role of limited, suffering individuals, these individuals must be led to recognize themselves as the Lord, and such a recognition can be brought about by making them aware of their own powers of knowledge and action, which are precisely those of the Lord. This recognition, far from producing any new knowledge, merely uncovers or unveils a knowledge of which the individual was never deprived but to which he no longer pays attention due to

83 ÍPK I.1.2: kartari jñātari svātmā adīśiddhe mahēśvare i ajñātāmā nīśedham và sidhih và vidadhita kah “What sentient Self could produce either the refutation or the demonstration [of the existence of] the agent, the knowing subject, the Self that is always already established, the Great Lord?” See also Torella 1994: 86 n 8.

84 Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta thus exploit Dhamakirti’s famous definition of the means of knowledge in PV, Pramāṇasiddhāpariccheda 1ab and 5c: pramāṇam avaisānvādī jñānām... ajñātārthapratkāśo và. “The means of knowledge is a cognition that does not deceive [ . . . ] or the manifestation of an object that was not known [so far].” (See Torella 1994: 161 n 2). The second part of the definition (in fact borrowed from the Mīmāṃsakas: see Krasser 2001 and Kataoka 2003) is explicitly included in Utpaladeva’s own definition of the means of knowledge (see ÍPK II.3.1: the means of knowledge is a manifestation that “arises while being new”, abhinavodayaḥ).

85 See Vṛti ad ÍPK I.1.2: 2 (svasaṁvedanasiddham aśvaryaṃ. “The fact that one is the Lord (aśvarya) is established through self-awareness”) and Torella 1994: 86.
some delusion (moha) through which consciousness hides its very nature from itself.88

Admittedly, Abhinavagupta acknowledges that the Pratyabhijña treatise too takes the form of what the Naiyāyikas call an inference for others.89 Nonetheless this inference, far from resting on “an inferential reason that is an effect” (kāryahetu) in the manner of the Naiyāyikas’ kārya argument, is based on “an inferential reason that is a nature” (svabhāvahetu): 90 instead of proving īśvara as the cause of a universe conceived as an effect distinct from it, it proves that the individual’s Self is the Lord on the grounds that this Self is endowed with the very powers ascribed to the Lord. And contrary to a kāryahetu inference, a svabhāvahetu inference does not produce any new knowledge, but merely establishes the validity of a usage (vyavahāra).91 In other words, it does not prove

88 See ṚP K 1.1.3: kintu mohavasād asmin dṛṣṭe ‘py anupalakṣite śāktīvāksaraneyam pratyabhijñopadāśyate “However, since the [Self], although perceived (dṛṣṭa), is not apprehended [as it really is] (anupalakṣita) because of a delusion (moha), this recognition is shown through making [the Self’s] powers obvious.”
89 See ṚP V I: 2.5; for analyses and translations, see Lawrence 2000: 50ff; Ṛatié 2009: 352 n 9.
90 As noted in Torella 1994: 173 n 33.
91 According to the Buddhist logicians to whom Utpaladeva borrows this terminology, the svabhāvahetu inference does not establish the existence of the thing itself (vasti) but only a particular usage (vyavahāra), since the inference “this is a tree because this is a śīṃsapa” only justifies the use of the word “tree” with respect to the object called “śīṃsapa” (which designates a particular variety of tree) by relying on some properties that the tree and the śīṃsapa share (such as having branches). On Dharmottara’s statement that the svabhāvahetu inference only establishes a vyavahāra, see Ṛatié 2007: 357 n 90. Cf. ṚP V I: 87: ānun ca siddhe vavastu yat pramāṇam, tat kila vyavahārasādhanaṃ iti prasiddham. “But it is well known that purely, the means of knowledge with respect to an entity [the existence of which is already] established [only] establishes a usage.”

the hitherto unestablished fact that the Lord is the Self: it merely shows that it is legitimate to say that the Self is the Lord and to behave accordingly, just as showing that an object seen in front of us is a pot because it possesses the features that characterize a pot does not make us know the pot (which we already perceive), but enables us to talk and act in accordance with the fact that it is a pot.92 And if all inferential knowledge is bound to objectify the pure subjectivity in which īśvara consists, the Pratyabhijña path is paradoxically conceived as a rational path capable of bringing about recognition because it leads the subject to the very limit of rationality: in the inference of the Pratyabhijña treatise, the nature (svabhāva) that is to be recognized as that of īśvara is precisely the individual’s experience that he or she cannot be reduced to a mere object of knowledge, and inducing recognition consists in letting the individual realize that the aspect of him or her which resists any attempt of conceptualization, or which “cannot bear to be grasped as a [mere] object” (idantāvimārsūśaśiṣṭu),93 is precisely the Lord.94

92 See ṚP K II.3.17 (apravartitapiśro ‘tra kevalam mūdhatāvasā śāktiprayāśe śāvyavahāra pravartyate “It is only that manifesting the powers [of the Self through the treatise] makes possible the usage [of the terms] ‘Lord’, etc. which were not used before with respect to this [Self] because of delusion” and Abhinavagupta’s commentaries thereon (see Ṛatié 2011a: 729-39; 2013: 427-38).
93 ṚP V I: 106 (see Ṛatié 2007: 363, n 101). In fact, in this passage Abhinavagupta is describing the process through which we come to recognize the existence of other conscious beings, but as shown in Ṛatié (2007: 360ff), this recognition is very close to his definition of the Recognition of the Lord: according to Abhinavagupta, the recognition of other individual conscious entities already involves the (partial) realization of īśvara’s nature.
94 See ṚP V III: 181: sadbhāvikāpa īśvarāḥ pramāṇāt sarvasākṣer ātmāvety upadesāvasare vyavahārasādhanaḥ prameyataḥ nityasyāpi paramārthaparāmarṣe ‘hantātmani viśrāma iti. “In the verbal concept that arises through establishing a usage (vyavahāra) when teaching that the Lord, who is a knowing subject endowed with all
In the Pratyabhijña treatise, Utpaladeva thus accuses those who endeavour to prove the existence of God of labouring under a fundamental misapprehension: they consider that the existence of īśvara requires a proof because they erroneously apprehend it as a distant, imperceptible entity that can only be grasped through an inference as the cause of an effect essentially distinct from it. Thus according to Abhinavagupta’s commentary, in his lost Vivṛti, Utpaladeva was emphasizing that those who engage in an īśvarasiddhi are driven by the presupposition that īśvara is imperceptible:

[Utpaladeva] states [the sentence beginning with] “But . . .” [in his Vivṛti] with the intention [of expressing the following objection to his own thesis]: “The Lord is not the object of a mere means of knowledge establishing [nothing but] a usage [instead of producing a new knowledge],” because this [Lord] is not [immediately] manifest in any way. For the Lord is never manifest anywhere to anybody.” And [with the compound] siddhasattāka [this opponent means] that [the Lord’s] very existence is not established; [since] in this [case], being established would be being manifest. [And with the words] “It is this very . . .” [the opponent means] that this [very] existence must be established. [In other words, according to the opponent,] with regard to this [existence of the Lord, we] must state a means of knowledge such that it may lead to a knowledge consisting in the manifestation of [something] that was not [manifest] so far; and accordingly, Uddyotakara and [others] have produced a discourse in the form of a “proof of the Lord” (īśvarasiddhi). 96

Utpaladeva was also emphasizing in his Vivṛti ad II.3.17 that this mistake (assuming that the Lord is not manifest and therefore stands in need of a proof) is an obstacle particularly difficult to overcome as it threatens the very possibility of recognition,97 and in his commentary on I.1.2, Abhinavagupta goes as far as saying that the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas who attempt to prove the existence of īśvara are no better than the Śāṅkhyas who attempt to refute it: both parties are fundamentally deluded in so far as they are incapable of paying attention to their most inner experience, and they both engage in the equally absurd tasks of proving or refuting the Lord because they misunderstand their own Self to the point that they no longer recognize its sentience.98

← na siddhētī ca. siddhatvam atra prakāśamānātva[vam. saivēti sattā sādhya. apiyoprakāśānaśānaṃ tatra jñānaṃ yato bhavati. tādṛk pramānaṃ vaktavam. tathā coddhotakāraśvāyaś śiṣvānaśīdhiti ity evam vyavahāro naśākṣṛ. [*coddhotakāraśvāya corr.: coddhotakāraśvāya ĪPPV].

96 See ĪPPV III: 166: dārabhuvanaviśeṣaṃ śvāt skāram praty aprakāśamānārtheśāhahabhanāsālā ’sāv aśāvavyaḥaḥārah śvāmati tathābhātāpurāṇapūrṇapūrṇavāvhoṣīriṇi viruddha iti yo vyāmohas tena upapratyābhicah tadā tathā vyāvahārey. “How could [someone] adopt such a usage (vyavahāre) [as ‘the Lord’ with respect to oneself] while having one’s heart interwoven (otaprotā) with this delusion: ‘This usage, “being the Lord”, is contradictory with respect to the Self, [because] this [expression “being the Lord”] is by nature incapable of denoting something that never manifests itself as new to us, [i.e. something that is always manifest]; since, for instance, [the Lord] is imperceptible for [limited subjects] such as due to its existing in some distant particular world; [whereas the Self] is devoid of such a nature [, since it is always already manifest to us].’”

97 See ĪPPV I: 34 (commenting on ĪPPK 1.1.2cd, according to which no “sentient Self” can prove or refute the Lord): ajādāmyati, yasya tu vāśeṣkJāda’a vma sa siddhiḥ karott īśvarasvāyām; anyas tuśāṁkhyādir niśedham; śāṅkhyo ’pi vyāvahāṣānaśānaṃ jñānaṃ
According to its own author, the IS expresses an inferior point of view (which the Pratyabhijñā treatise transcends) because it attempts to prove the unprovable (or rather, the always already proven) and because in doing so, it transforms the very core of subjectivity into a mere object.

But the IS’s perspective is also inferior in so far as it presents Īśvara as an efficient cause acting together with other, material and auxiliary causes that are unconscious and ontologically distinct from the efficient cause. Thus in the Pratyabhijñā treatise, Utpaladeva and his commentator Abhinavagupta explain that if the “Naiyāyikas, etc.” are right to present the Lord as the efficient cause of the universe, they are wrong to admit other causes distinct from it, because only consciousness is capable of agency: the ultimate truth (paramārtha) is rather that the Lord, understood as an all-encompassing consciousness, is the one and only cause and acts merely by taking on this or that appearance. In the Viveśvarārṣiṇī,

<− buddhidharmam icchann atmānāṃ vastuto jadam evopaiti. na ca jadātmā svāmāny api durlabhprakāśāsvāntrayaleśāḥ kīcīt sādhyātum nisuddhum vā prabhavīṣṇuḥ pāśāna iva. “[With the expression]’sentient Self’ [Utpaladeva means the following:] On the one hand, let the Vaiśeṣikās and so on, for whom the Self is sentient, produce a proof of the Lord; on the other hand, let other[s], such as the Sāṅkhya[s], produce a refutation [of the Lord]—for even a Sāṅkhya, who considers knowledge, which consists in manifesting an object, as a property of the intellect, actually ends up making the Self sentient—or; now, an sentient Self, in which the faintest trace of manifesting consciousness (prakāśa) and freedom cannot be found, does not have the power to prove or refute anything, just like a stone!”

<− kriyāvibhāgādikramāyāt paramānvinādvīdārakatayā, samavāyikāraṇaniyayāvārāmbhāpararamparayā tu tata śvarād anyasyāyā bijabhumijalād utetā kathā. satyam kathā, sa tu nāpapadyate, utkayuktā═ jadasya utetūgatā═ tataḥ cesvara eva bijabhumijalābhasaḥsāhitvamānā bhāṣata iti yān atra paramārthah. “Since thus, only a conscious [entity] is a creator, for this very reason the Naiyāyikas, etc. consider that the Highest Lord, who must be intelligent (budhīmān), is the cause of the sprout and so on. [—Object:] Granted, they admit that he is the efficient cause (nīmatkāraṇa) inasmuch as he is what enables the atoms, [atom dyads] and so on to go through the succession (krama) of activities (kṛitya), disjunctions (vibhāga) and [conjunctions that lead to the formation of the perceptible universe]. Nonetheless, [these Naiyāyikas, etc. also] claim that [entities such as the seed, earth, water and so on, although distinct from the Lord, are [also] causes [of the sprout], because of the series of combinations (ārambhā) [of atom dyads and so on] that has their own parts as an inheritance cause (samavayikaraṇa). [—Answer:] True; [they] claim [that other things are also causes]. But this [claim] is not sound, because according to the reasoning that [we] have already stated, the sentient cannot be a cause; and therefore it is the Lord that manifests himself as the sprout accompanied by the manifestations of the seed, earth and water; such only is the ultimate truth in this regard.”

Abhinavagupta is probably alluding here to the Vaiśeṣika theory of cosmic creation. See PDhS: 48–49, which describes in the following way the beginning of the universe: tataḥ punah prāṇināṁ bhogabhātye mahēśvarasīrṣāntaranam sarvātmanagatavyārvadbhājyāteṣānabhyeṣābhyas tattvamobyabhyah pavanaparāmānusuparamātmantrapatatvam tadāparasparamoyebhyh dyuṣvanakādipakramena mahān vāyuḥ samuppanna nabhās doshdhyāmanās sitthi. “Then, again, the Great Lord has a desire to create [the universe] so as to [provide] living beings with a wealth of experiences; immediately afterwards, after the arisal of an activity (karma) in the atoms of air due to the conjunctions (samṣaya) of these [atoms] that depend on the unseen [force] (adṛśa) which has started to operate inside all the [individual’s] Selves, due to the mutual conjunctions of these [atoms], through the succession

302 | ISABELLE RATIÉ

UTPALADEVA’S PROOF OF GOD | 303

303
of inferring īśvara as a cause in general of the universe, adds that there is no need to explain it further since it has been dealt with in detail in the IS, but that in the Pratyabhijñā treatise, Utpaladeva rather gives the ultimate truth regarding the Lord’s agency — namely, the fact that only īśvara can be considered a cause:

Although [the Naiyāyikas, etc. acknowledge that] the Lord is a cause, they admit that other [things] as well, which are distinct from the Lord [and] insentient, are causes; but in fact this [causality] is not possible for that which does not act deliberately. For [according to the Naiyāyikas, etc.] what [we] call an “arrangement” consists in the fact that [various elements] are placed together while being combined [in a particular way]; it is associated with a material cause [such as] clay [, and it] enables [us] to distinguish, for instance with regard to a pot, a plate and a bowl, between [their] being of the same sort [in so far as they have the same material cause] and their being of a different sort [in so far as they have different arrangements; and] once [we] have observed in [only] one occasion [, upon seeing a potter at work,] that [this arrangement] is produced by [an entity] the nature of which is conscious, [we] must necessarily conclude that in all cases, [including the arrangements of worlds and so on,] an arrangement must be, exactly in the same way, [the effect of a conscious entity]. As for what [some] say, namely, that although this [invariable co-presence] is observed [in the particular case of a pot], the understanding that [the universe too] is the product of a [conscious agent is not correct because this conscious agent is only inferred as a generality],99 they] say it because they are deluded by their partiality towards their own view [that the Lord does not exist]; since [in fact,] in the case of smoke as well, the [inferred cause is necessarily apprehended as] a general [entity]. But] enough with this digression; for this has been explained in detail by the author himself in the Īśarasiddhi, whereas here, it is the ultimate truth (paramārtha) [that Utpaladeva states], namely: it is the Lord, by conforming to his own power of necessity (niyatiśakti), who manifests himself as the sprout in his own

---

99 My conjecture (below, n 100) as well as the additions in brackets in the translation are only tentative and I might be misunderstanding this passage. According to the edited text (tadādarsane pi taitītavatpratipattar ityādi), the objection examined here is: “even though there is no perception of it, one understands that it is an effect of that”, but given the way Abhinavagupta replies to it, it seems to me that it should rather be an allusion to Dharmakīrti’s objection that only a particular conscious agent can be inferred from a particular arrangement when their invariable concomitance has first been ascertained. I am assuming that this objection is the quotation of the beginning of a sentence in Utpaladeva’s lost Viśrī, but this might rather be a quotation from some other text that I have failed to identify.
limpid self-manifesting consciousness (svaprakāśa), by making the phenomena of the seed, earth and water predominant.  

So why did Utpaladeva write a treatise that he himself did not consider as an expression of the ultimate truth?

A Plausible Purpose for the Īśvarasiddhi: Utpaladeva’s Inclusivist Strategy Towards Nyāya

John Taber has suggested that Nyāya may have been a step in the development of Utpaladeva’s thought and that he may have got rid of it later through the influence of Buddhism in particular.  

However, this hypothesis would hardly explain why Utpaladeva took the trouble of writing the ĪŚ after elaborating his “mature system” (as the last verse of the treatise clearly indicates); and admittedly, Utpaladeva's thought was profoundly influenced by that of Dharmakīrti and his followers, but his rejection of Nyāya dualism, as well as his interpretation of Buddhist concepts, was obviously determined by his belonging to a pre-existing Śaiva non-dualistic tradition that presented Śiva as a unique, infinite and dynamic consciousness: it is much more likely that he chose to reject or retain this or that doctrinal element from both Nyāya and Buddhism according to their compatibility with the metaphysical background of his own religious tradition.

However, John Taber also remarks that the ĪŚ’s last verse seems to indicate that Utpaladeva “wished to defeat the opponent on his own turf” and he quotes in this respect Abhinavagupta’s assertion that “the opinion of the author [of the IPK] is that in the sphere of māyā, it is the Naityāyikas’ method that is ultimately true”. The Śaiva non-dualists acknowledge the validity of the Nyāya point of view at the ontologically inferior level where consciousness playfully manifests itself as differentiated, although they consider that from the perspective of the ultimate truth, i.e. non-duality, this point of view remains incomplete. The ĪŚ may thus be understood as one of the outcomes of an inclusivistic strategy through which Śaiva non-dualism presents itself as encompassing and transcending all doctrines instead of plainly rejecting them.

As Raffaele Torella
has emphasized:

In a sense Utpaladeva inaugurates what was to become a salient feature of the whole Trika in Abhinavagupta's synthesis: namely, the tendency not to constitute a monolithic doctrine and a world of religious experience to oppose en bloc everything that does not coincide with it [. . .] but to distinguish planes, that are hierarchically ordered but in which the “higher” does not automatically cancel the “lower” [. . .]. This is the perspective of the paramādha'nīta, such an elevated viewpoint that it does not fear what is different from itself, is not put in a critical position by it, is not forced to make a choice.\textsuperscript{106}

By writing the IS, Utpaladeva may thus have meant to show to the Naiyāyikas (among which “Śaiva faith was known to be pre-eminent”)\textsuperscript{107} that his Śaivism was not incompatible with their system and that it sided with Nāya against the opponents of īśvara, while giving them a hint that his own system was superior; and indeed, as noted by Raffaele Torella, the IS's last verse “enables us to see the right perspective”\textsuperscript{108} by making clear that duality remains an inferior plane.

Another Aspect of the Issue:
The Śaiva Siddhānta and the Proof of īśvara

However, Utpaladeva is not the first to have integrated the Nāya proof of īśvara to his system. It is also the case of the Śaiva Siddhānta, the dualistic Śaiva religious trend that was dominant in Kashmir in Utpaladeva's time.\textsuperscript{109} Thus the assertion that the Lord, although imperceptible, can be inferred from the fact that the universe is an effect, is found in the scriptures of the Śaiva Siddhānta that belong to the last phase of its early scriptural development (i.e. around the eighth and ninth centuries CE). The KT\textsuperscript{110} for instance contains such a statement and argues that the cause of the universe cannot be past actions leading to karmic retribution since these are unconscious;\textsuperscript{111} and the PT displays a lengthy defence of the inference of īśvara\textsuperscript{112} that seems to presuppose an awareness of Kumārila's antitheistic critique.\textsuperscript{114} It addresses a number of objections, most notably that of the illegitimacy of the inference since it rests on a relation of cause and effect that cannot be perceived,\textsuperscript{115} but also that of the

\textsuperscript{106} Torella 1994: xxi.
\textsuperscript{107} Torella 1994: xxii (cf. the remark in Taber 1986: 129, quoted above, n 101). Torella adds: “It is probably for this reason that we see Utpala assuming a Naiyāyika guise in the IS.”
\textsuperscript{108} Torella 1994: xxi n 25.
\textsuperscript{109} See Sanderson 1985: 203.
\textsuperscript{110} On its date, see Goodall 1998: xlvi-1xxvi.
\textsuperscript{111} KT III.11cd-12: vyāpāra na ca dhīyate kāryam icchā pratiyāte | sthālam vicitra'kah kāryam nāyathā ghaṭavad bhavet i asi hetur atah kaścit karma ca na hy aceitānam | “And [although] the [Lord’s] cosmic activity is not perceived, [its] effects [are, so that his creative] will is known. [The universe,] which is coarse [and] diverse, is an effect, just as a pot — it could not be otherwise. Therefore [it] must have some cause; if [one says that this cause] is [past] action[s], [the answer to this is:] no, for [past actions are] unconscious.” See Goodall 1998: 273-78.
\textsuperscript{112} On its date, see Goodall 2004: xxxv-iviii.
\textsuperscript{113} The inference itself is formulated as follows (PT II.2-3): mārtāh sāvayā śāyā jñānām nānārūpaparicchadāh | sthālāvāyavasyaśtāvatād | buddhimaddhetuvārvakāh | ato 'sti buddhīmān kaścid īśvarah samavasthātaḥ | pratipanahā swākāyena dyēṣṭeṇāt nambūnatah | “The material things that have parts [and] are endowed with various forms presuppose an intelligent cause, because they are particularized by gross [i.e. perceptible] parts. Therefore there is some intelligent [cause] that is established [to be] the Lord. In this [system he is] known through an inference from his perceived effect.” See Goodall 2004: 165-66.
\textsuperscript{114} See Goodall 2001: 332-33; 2004: xliii-l.
\textsuperscript{115} See the objection in PT 2.4: kāryakāranasambhandho na gṛhito yata tayoḥ | tena tatkārānābhāvān na khyāyaṁ kāryadarśanam | “Since [we] do not perceive the relation of cause and effect between the [Lord] and the universe, and since therefore there is no [known] cause of this
possibility of accounting for the universe's existence through the sole mechanism of karmic retribution, and it argues that the universe must have an efficient cause distinct from material and

[universe,] one cannot say that the effect is perceived [since we do not know whether the universe is an effect].” (See Goodall 2004: 166.) The objection is answered mainly by arguing that the Lord is inferred through a necessary assumption (arthāpatīti) defined as a sāmānyata drṣṭam reasoning, i.e. as an inference that shows the necessity of the Lord's existence (conceived as an intelligent cause in general) from the impossibility of accounting for its effect otherwise. See PT 2.9ab and 11: arthāpatītī ihan proktā mānaṁ sāmānyādarsīkā . . . tena sāmānyato drṣṭād anumāṇena buddhimān kāraṇaṁ sthālakāryasya kṣitiśāyādikasya saḥ ii “This necessary assumption [through which one also infers the imperceptible causality of past actions] is proclaimed [to be] a [valid] means of knowledge that demonstrates a generality (sāmānya) [. . .]. Therefore this [Lord, who is an] intelligent [entity, is known] through an inference from [what is] apprehended as a generality (sāmānyato drṣṭāt) [as] the cause of the coarse effect [that is the universe, i.e.] first, the effect that is the earth [, etc.]” See Goodall 2004: 169.

See PT 2.12: kṣītra evamvīdhāma rūpaṁ na kadācid anātrānaṁ ānaṁ kāraṇaṁ karma kalpitena matena kim ii “The form of the earth is as [we now see it and] was never otherwise; [as for] the cause of bodies and so on, it is [past] action[s]; [so] what is the point of [this] artificial theory [about the Lord]?“ (See Goodall 2004: 169-70.) As in the KT, the answer is mainly that because the universe is coarse (sthūla), it is an effect built by an intelligent agent, so that karman, which is unconscious, can only be an instrument of that intelligent agent. See PT 2.13ab (yad yat sthīlam bhaved vastu kṛtakam tad viniścitam i “Whatever entity is coarse is established to be constructed”) and PT 2.16: buddhimāṁs tenā kartāsaṁ tāvāṃ vinnānāṁ iha sthitām ā tuḥ no hetur bhavet karma kim tadojītah bhavet ii “Therefore this intelligent agent of coarse and so on is established [to exist] here; so [past] action[s] cannot be the cause [of bodies and so on]; rather, [they] must be [instruments] used by this [cause],” See Goodall 2004: 170-71.

auxiliary causes since all effects are found to require these three kinds of cause. Besides, the PT states that īśvāra is inferred as a mere intelligent cause in general, but that this general cause must nonetheless be characterized as omniscient since it creates everything.

PT 2.29-30: nimittam īśvarākyam yat tad drṣṭam saha-kāraṇam upādānām ca yat sūkṣmaṁ sarvakārye suhītam kāraṇānāṁ trayaṁ tena sarvakārye numītaye ē yato na janaṁ ca taṁ sahaṁ sāmāgri janiṁ kāhaṁ niṁmatkāraṇāṁ tena kartā sa parameśvarāṁ ē “The efficient cause is [what is] called ‘Lord’; the auxiliary cause is what is seen [such as the potter’s stick, wheel and so on]; and the material cause is subtle [matter]. [These] three causes are connected with all effects; therefore [they are] legitimately inferred with respect to the effect that is the universe. And since one [of them] cannot produce [it on its own], [it is] this set [of causes] that must produce [it]: therefore the efficient cause is the agent [who is] the Highest Lord.” (See Goodall 2004: 174-78.)

See above, n 115.

See PT 2.62cd-65ab: sarvajñāḥ sarvakartrtvād yatas taj jñānapūrvaṁ śūddhanāgāpadaṁ śārdharāṁ vittī sarvam idam tataḥ ē yathā tāntvādīvitkārtā viśayaṁ tāṁ sañ ē tasmin pravartate kārye tadvat tasmin paraṁ śīvāḥ sarvakāryeṇa ājñānam yaṁ vijñaptāṁ yena sāpavyamāṁ nikhilājānahāyogyātā sarvajñāḥ paramēśvarāṁ ē “[This Lord] is omniscient, because [he is] omnipotent, since the [power to act] presupposes knowledge. Therefore he knows all the [universe] along with the means of accomplishing it, its parts and [its] fruits. Just as an agent who knows the threads and [whatever is required to make a cloth] engages in the activity (kārya) [of weaving] after taking these [things] as the object [of his thought], in the same way, the Highest Śiva [engages in cosmic activity after taking the universe as the object of his thought]. Since the knowledge of the [things required so as to create] is invariably found to be present in all activities (kṛtya), the Highest Lord is omniscient, because he [must] know everything.” (See Goodall 2004: 185-86.)
Sadyojyotis’s Inference of Ḫvara and His
Reply to the Buddhist and Mīmāṃsaka Objections

This inference of Ḫvara from the universe considered as his effect is also mentioned by various Saiddhāntika exegetes who wrote after Utpaladeva,120 but of more importance is the fact that it is

120 See Rāmākanṭha’s lengthy commentary in KV ad KT III.1cd-12 and Goodall 1998: 273-78. Later commentators also tend to forcibly read the inference in scriptures that do not mention them. See Nārāyanaṅkṛtha’s MTṬ on MT, Vidyāpāda 2.3-4 (which does not mention the Nyāya inference but merely states that the fivefold cosmic activity and its effects must belong to the Lord who is “established by his own nature”, svabhāvasiddha), p. 54: etac ca na māyādbhibhā karmabhīr vā nirvartayitum śāyam acāitablyāt, nāpi puruṣaṇāyā malaniruddhaśaktivat. na ca nāṁśvaro’gra kartā yuktah. yaś caicit sṛṣṭīd vartum saktoti, so ’vaṣyaṃ tadaviseyaḥca cikīrṣṭakaṁyavayāmāṃ jñānaviseṣāṅām amśenāpi vaikalye tattakāryāṁsātmet. atāś ca sarvaśeṣa sarvaśeṣa tēna ca svabhāvasiddha jihata kartā bhavatvayam. “And this [fivefold cosmic activity of creation, maintenance, destruction, obscuration and grace] cannot be performed by matter (māyā), for instance, nor by [past] actions (karma), because [these] are unconscious, nor by the individual (purusa), because his powers are restrained by the stain (mala) [that binds him in samsara]. Nor can this [fivefold activity] have an agent that would not be a Lord, and he who can perform this [fivefold activity of] creation and so on necessarily knows the object of this [activity], because if the particular knowledges regarding the effects that one wants to create are lacking, even in part, it is impossible to bring about this or that [particular] effect. And as a consequence, there must be an agent of the world who is omnipotent and omniscient, and therefore [as the scripture states here,] ‘established by its own nature’.” (See Hulin 1980: 58ff.) See also Aghoraśa’s TSṬ: 103: atāś ca jagatāh sannivesadhyaṅtena kāyavatvā tatkartātyayeśvarasiddhir iti bhavāh. etena prakṛtikarmapuruṣesvaravādino ‘pi nirastāh, prakṛtikarmano acetanavatvā puruṣasya ca samalatvendavyavatvāt. “And therefore, because the world is an effect in so far as it possesses a [specific] arrangement, etc., the Lord is established to be its agent

found as well in another, non-scriptural Saiddhāntika source that Utpaladeva certainly knew. Raffaele Torella has noticed that the first chapter of the NP by Sadyojyotis (an important Saiddhāntika figure who probably wrote c. 675-725)121 is likely to have influenced the Pratyabhijñā treatise at least regarding Utpaladeva’s attitude towards Buddhist epistemology.122 Now, the second chapter of the same work happens to be entirely devoted to the proof of Ḫvara,123 and its main line of argument is “virtually identical to the Nyāya argument for the existence of God”.124 Sadyojyotis infers the existence of Ḫvara from the fact that the universe, which is an effect endowed with parts, must have an intelligent agent,125

← — this is the implicit idea. This also refutes those who say that the Lord [presiding over the universe is in fact] primordial nature, [past] actions or individuals, because primordial nature and [past] actions are unconscious, and the individual does not act independently due to the stain (mala) [that binds him].”

121 See Sanderson 2006.
123 For a summary and analysis of this chapter, see Hannote 1987: 238-338.
125 Note, however, that Sadyojyotis does not use the term sanniveśa (arrangement) whereas his commentator Rāmākanṭha (who is posterior to Utpaladeva) does. On the proof that Sadyojyotis defends, see NP II.1.2 (kṣaṭādeśa savyāvattvena kumbhavat kāryaṁ matāt “The earth and so on are known to be effects, because they have parts, just as a pot”), NP II.3 (upādānādi tasveṣaṁ vivahāt kartprākāre at aha sar sādhyaṁ smūḥhis tatkartā śaṅkaraṁ śhuṭaṁ “The material cause (upādāna) and [auxiliary causes] of this [effect] are admitted [by all, but] there is a disagreement as regards the regard of action that is the agent (karta); therefore we demonstrate that the agent of this [effect] is clearly Śaṅkara” and NP II.4ac adṛṣṭakartāyaḥādikāryam prayāvāt kṛtam i kumbhavat “The effect [constituted by] bodies and so on, the agent of which is not perceived, [must be] produced by an intelligent [agent], as in the case of a pot.”). Cf. NPP: 117-18: yad yat kāryaṁ tat tad viṣṇuṣṭijānākriyāyuktakartprārpaṇaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ yathā ghaṭādi, kāryaṁ ca
and the whole chapter defends this inference against various antitheistic attacks also dealt with by Utpaladeva, among which Dharmakīrti’s objection that one can only infer a particular agent from a particular effect when their invariable concomitance is already established through perception. 126 Sadyojyotis answers it by claiming that since the pot on the one hand and natural composite entities on the other hand are similar at least in so far as they are effects, the inference is legitimate. 127 In his long commentary on this verse, Rāmakaṇṭha (who may have been influenced in turn by

← tanukaravobhavanādy adrṣṭakartkāṁ sarvam eva jagat pratipāditam, tasmād idam api∗viṣṭaṭhānākṛtyātmakakartāpyākām siddham iti yasya kartā sa paraṃśvaraḥ siddhah. [*idam api conj.: api NPP. “[We] observe that whatever is an effect, such as a pot for instance, presupposes an agent endowed with a particular knowledge and action, and the whole universe, [i.e.] bodies, organs, worlds and so on, is an effect the agent of which is not perceived. Therefore this [universe] too is established to presuppose an agent characterized by a particular knowledge and action, so its agent is established to be the Highest Lord.”

126 See NP II.5ab: dhīmaṅktamaḥ tu yat kāryaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ tasyaiva dārṣtanaṃ & dhīmato’numitī yaktā dehāder na viparyayāt | “[Objection:] But only the inference of an intelligent [agent] from the perception of an effect that is seen to be produced by an intelligent [agent] is legitimate, whereas the inference of an intelligent agent from the body and so on is not, because [the body and so on are] not thus [seen to be effects of an intelligent agent]. Cf. NPP: 122: yad eva hi yasya kāryavatena siddham tad eva tasyānamūpakam na kāryamātram . . . “For only that which is established to be an effect enables [us] to infer this [intelligent agent, and] not an effect in general (kāryamātra) . . .” Rāmakaṇṭha explicitly ascribes this objection to “the Buddhists” (saugata, ibid.) and quotes PV, Pramaṇasiddhipariccheda 11-13 (on which see above, nn 22-23) and 15.

127 NP II.6: kāryavād eva kumbhāder dehādi* na vilakṣanām 1 kāryaṃ ca na kvacid dṛṣṭaṃ prajñāvatkāraṇam vinā | “[dehādi conj.: dehādir NP]. “The body, etc., are not different from the pot, etc. in so far as (eva) they are effects; and no effect is ever seen [to exist] without an intelligent cause.”

Utpaladeva) explains that the Buddhists themselves have recourse to the notion of generality without hypostasizing universals (jūti), and his arguments sound very similar to Utpaladeva’s. 128 Sadyojyotis also argues that if inference were restricted to particulars that are seen to entertain a causality relation, it would be useless, since it would be confined to these singular entities, and it could not establish anything that would not already be known through perception. 129 Furthermore, Sadyojyotis also addresses

128 See the summary in Hannotte 1987: 273-88. Rāmakaṇṭha argues in particular that the Buddhists too acknowledge that some things share common features in so far as they are of the same sort (saujītya) even though in other respects they may be said to be of a different sort (wijītya): compare for instance the discussion in NPP: 126 (too long to be quoted here) with IS: 8 (quoted above, n 33).

129 See NP 7: na ca yadyaktaśambuddhā vyakti vaiyeva saṁmatā | tasyā eva nāmaṇaṁ syāt punas tadupalabhitāt || “And [if] inference [were aimed at establishing] only the [particular] individual entity (vyakti) to which the individual entity that is considered in this [particular case as an effect] is linked, [it] could not take place again [with respect to any other subject of inference, nor could it take place in the case of this particular individual entity itself, because this [individual entity] would [already] be perceived.” Cf. NPP: 128: yady evam, sakalasajātyāvijñātasyāvijñātena svalaksanenaivāgyadā mahānaśādau dhīmāder svalaksanaśayava pratīdhanāh siddhah, tasya cāyatayāyātvaḥ na dharmāntare ’nāmaṇaṁ saṁbhavatā nāpi tatraiva pratīkṣasyāsiddhāḥ anumāṇāvyogāḥ iti nivṛttedānāṁ anumāṇavārtā. “If it were the case, [inference could] establish only the relation of a particular (svalaksana) such as a smoke in e.g. the kitchen with a[nother] particular such as a fire [in that kitchen], to the exclusion of any [other entity] of the same kind or of another kind; and because no [other entity] could conform to this [singular fire, this] inference would not be possible with respect to any other subject of inference [such as a distant hill above which one can see smoke], nor [would it be possible] in that very case [of the kitchen], because inference would not apply, since [its object] would [already] be established through perception, so that this [whole] business of inference would
Kumārila's objections and it is noteworthy that his commentator Rāmakaṇṭha has recourse to the paksadharma argument.

← immediately be reduced to naught." In his commentary, Rāmakaṇṭha repeatedly puts forward the argument already mentioned by Jayanta that generality is necessary in the inferential process, otherwise one could never infer the presence of fire on a mountain thanks to the knowledge of the concomitance between a particular fire and a particular smoke observed in a kitchen. See NPP: 134: vahnyādir api parvatāsambandhi mahānāsādāv adhyatvān na dhāmādīnā śādhyā iti sarvānumātībhāvaprasaṅgagah. “[In that case] the fire belonging to a mountain too, for instance, could not be established thanks to, e.g. [the presence of] smoke, since it is not seen, e.g. in a kitchen, so that as a consequence no inference at all could occur.”

In NP II.8-12; see Hannotte 1987: 289ff; Goodall 2004: 185 n 158. In his introduction ad NP II.8, Rāmakaṇṭha quotes ŚV, Sambhādhēksēpaparīhāra 80, and in his commentary ad NP II.9, he quotes ŚV, Sambhādhēksēpaparīhāra 79 (both verses are also quoted in the IS: see above, n 19).

See NPP: 135: nanu paksadharmaḥtālān niyatasya dhūmasyā grahanān niyato vahnih pratiyāte. "But due to the fact that the subject of the inference has a [specific] property (paksadharmaḥtālā), because one grasps a specific property, one grasps a specific fire [as its cause]." After showing that the Buddhists themselves should admit this thesis since it is not contradictory with their own principles, Rāmakaṇṭha concludes (ibid.): yady evam ihāpy apratīṣṭhātvedah kāravyasye eva kārtvyavāyatiḥ śiddha iti tattvārāhahvībhavānādeh kāryātmano * rthasya śaktiyā tatkartur api viśiṣṭasya svakāryavayam amalavesavajñānaveccāmātārakārttvādy api śiṣṭavatāṃ śiddhyati [*kāryātmano corr.: kāryātmano NPP]. “Since it is so, in this [case of the inference of the Lord] as well, it is a particular effect that is established to be invariably concomitant with a particular agent, [although this particular effect] is not established to be different [from the pot in so far as it too is an effect]. Therefore its agent too, who is particularized [as the agent producing] through [his] power an object is that an effect such as bodies, organs, worlds and so on, is established to be stainless [and] omniscient [and] to create through mere will

← (icchāmāatra) and so on [: i.e. it is established] to be the Lord, [since these properties] correspond to his own [particular] effect.”

See above, nn 29, 43 and 48.

This stress on the Sāṁkhya objection may be due at least in part to the fact that the cosmology of Śaiva scriptures has borrowed from Sāṁkhya a number of doctrinal elements (such as the cosmic evolution through a scale of tattvas): on the importance of the Sāṁkhya tradition in Śaiva literature, see Torella 1999.

See NP 14ff.

NP 14ab: bijakarmāṇubhiḥ kecid atraḥuḥ sidhasiddhyatam “With respect to this [inference of the Lord,] some claim that what is to be established [i.e. that the universe has an agent,] is [in fact already] established thanks to primordial nature (bijā), [past] actions and individuals.” Cf. NPP:139: jagataḥ kārtṛpūrvaatvaṃ hi bhavadvibhiḥ sādhyate, sa copādānākāranatyaḥ bijāsadbavacyaḥ pradhānākāhyāh siddha eva, tat kim sādhyāt iti sāṁkhyāḥ. "For the Sāṁkhya [object the following:] You are endeavours to demonstrate the fact that the universe presupposes an agent; now, [what] is called matter [and] expressed [here] by the word bijā is already established as the material cause; therefore what [remains] to be demonstrated?” Rāmakaṇṭha ascribes the two other positions to the Mīmāṃsakas and Lokāyatas (ibid.).

also found in Utpaladeva’s IS.
answers that it is not the case, since what is to be established is that the universe is the effect of a conscious agent, and he emphasizes that primordial nature, which is unconscious, has no independence (svātāntrya) and is therefore incapable of acting by itself. The Śaṅkhya opponent replies by alluding to the SK, according to which unconscious entities too can act for the benefit of some other entity and Sadyojayotis answers (as Uddyotakara before him) that this point remains to be demonstrated. Besides, the qualities of matter do not serve each other by nature but because they are prompted to act thus by some conscious agent, and since

136 NP 14cd: na pūrvābhyaṁ viśiṣṭavād dihyā sādhyasya sā bhavet || “[What is to be established] cannot be [already established] thanks to the first two [afore-mentioned causes, i.e. primordial nature or past actions,] because what is to be established is particularized by consciousness.”

137 NP 15cd: nācātayāt pravṛttih syā svātāntrayād bijakaranām || “Primordial nature and [past] actions could not have any activity [arising] independently (svātāntrayā), because they [are] unconscious.”

138 NP 16a: payovac ceto… “If [the opponent replies that primordial nature can have an activity although it is sentient,] as in the case of milk…” Rāmadanaka stipulates (NPP:142) that this is an allusion to SK 57 (on which see above, n 56).

139 See above, n 74.

140 NP 16b: na sādhyatvān mṛddanādād va dūrashrin it “[We answer:] no, because [the ability of unconscious entities to act] remains to be established, since one does not observe that clay, the stick, and [other unconscious items used by a potter for instance] are capable of acting independently.”

141 NP16cd: angāṅgītvam ca sattvadeḥ svābhāvyān naktahetutah || “And the fact that [the three qualities, i.e. satvā, rajas and tamas,] serve each other (angāṅgītva) is not due to their nature, for the reason [already] stated.” Cf. NPP: 143: acetanātva eva tesān na svabhāvatah parāsparopakārāh, kintu pradīpādivad eva cetanākartrprayuktānām iti nācetanasya kārtvāsiddhiḥ. “Precisely because they are unconscious, they do not serve each other by nature; rather, just as in the case of lamps for instance, [the qualities serve each other only] if

→ they are used by a conscious agent; therefore the agency of what is unconscious is not established.”

142 NP 17ab: sthitā kriyā ca bijasya nāciśa cetanām vinā || “Besides, primordial nature, which is unconscious, cannot act after being inactive (sthitā) without a conscious [entity that prompts it to do so].”

143 NP 17c: nānu jñānām pradhāñe ‘sti || See NPP: 143: pradhānakāryasya buddher jñānābhavyapagamāt pradhānam api jñānātmaścaktiḥ syāt adhyāmya. “Since [we Śaṅkhya] admit that the intellect, which is an effect of matter, possesses knowledge, matter too is established to consist of knowledge; therefore why infer other [knowing entity]?” Rāmadanaka refers (ibid.) to SK 23 (on which see above, n 64).

144 NP 17d: nācātānān mṛdādīvat || “No, because [the intellect too] is unconscious, just as clay and so on.”

145 NP 18b: astu va śaktiśpatvād agrāhī tād asatsam || “Or [if the Śaṅkhya opponent explains that] the [intellect endowed with knowledge] must exist [in primordial nature], because it consists of a potentiality (sakti) [within matter], [we reply that since] it does not grasp [its own knowledge by itself], this [principle of the intellect] is as good as non-existent. Cf. NPP: 144: tathābhūtām api tat pradhāñe kārānanāmi na vyaktam, api tā sāktyānāvāsthitām iti adhyāyasāyataṁ ca vākāryasyākaraṇaṁ asatsamam. Tatāś rādhāyasyātmano ‘pi jñānasābhāvān nāsa kārtvām iti karantratrasiddhiḥ. “[If the Śaṅkhya explains that] although [the principle of the intellect] is thus [i.e. endowed with knowledge], it is

material starts acting after being inactive, some conscious entity must prompt it to leave its passive state.” The Śaṅkhya objects that “however, knowledge exists within matter” since matter is capable of transforming itself into the intellect. Just as Utpaladeva in the IS, Sadyojayotis replies by pointing out that intellect too is a material, unconscious entity, and that even if it is assumed to exist within primordial nature in some potential state before matter starts transforming itself, it is not capable of grasping by itself its own knowledge (since this requires the purusa’s consciousness), so that its so-called effect, determination (adhyavasāya), must in fact be produced by some other entity that is conscious. And the
Sāṁkhya cannot argue that the proponent of the Lord's existence must admit the independent action of primordial nature just as he acknowledges that the Lord is not prompted to act by anything else, since the crucial difference between primordial nature and the Lord resides in the latter's consciousness:¹⁴⁷ we observe that contrary to material entities, people act without being prompted by any external cause, and admittedly, a person can sometimes prompt another to act, but only because this person has power over the others; and since the entity presiding over the universe must be almighty, no other entity can prompt it to act.¹⁴⁸

---

¹⁴⁷ NP 18cd-19ab: sthītvā vyāpīryāmānyavāc chambhore api parerāṣṭram \[ naivāṃ* bijasya no sāmyam prajāhāvān īśvaro yatah \| naivāṃ conj.: novā NP\] “[Object:ion:] “[According to you, it is not [true] that the Lord himself is prompted to act by something else because it acts after remaining inactive; [so] in the same way, [it is not true that] primordial nature is prompted to act by something else. [Answer:] there is no similarity [between the Lord and primordial nature,] since [contrary to primordial nature], the Lord is conscious.”

¹⁴⁸ NP 19cd-21ab: anekaṁ devadattād dhṛṣṭān loke dhiyāṇvītam \| sthitā pravartamānāṃ hi pākādvā apareritam \| pareritam apiṣṭa amā tipaṣṭa iṣyāvā tīṣyāvāṅkitam\| “For in the world, [we] observe that many [entities] endowed with consciousness, such as Devadatta, when performing [the act of] cooking for instance after being inactive, are not prompted [to do so] by anything else; [if you object] that [sometimes they] are also prompted [to do so] by something else, [we answer that] for this reason there is no doubt as regards the Great Lord, since later we will explain that the Lord is characterized by an absolute [power] (ātiṣṭaya).”

---

Utpaladeva's Īśvarasiddhi as a Message to the Saiddhāntikas

To sum up, although Utpaladeva's criticism of the Sāṁkhya argument often seems more refined than Sadyojyotis', both refutations focus on the idea that a complex effect can only be the product of a conscious entity, and that intellect, if conceived as a material entity, cannot account for the universe. Utpaladeva's treatise thus seems to emphasize a principle shared by both dualist and non-dualist Śaivas, namely the idea that only the conscious is independent (svaṭantra) and therefore capable of action, whereas unconscious entities only seem to act in so far as their actions are always prompted by consciousness.¹⁴⁹ Moreover, while Utpaladeva's goal when writing the IS may have been to show to the Naiyāyikas that Śaiva non-dualists too are capable of defending īśvara while using Nyāya concepts, it may also have been, perhaps more crucially, to show to the Saiddhāntikas that Śaiva non-dualists too can appropriate the Nyāya inference of the Lord. With the IS, Utpaladeva ostentatiously follows the Saiddhāntikas' tradition of integrating Nyāya arguments and thus presents himself as siding with them. This strategy seems to have been successful at least to a certain extent, since the Saiddhāntika Nārāyanakāntha for instance quotes the IS with approval,¹⁵⁰ and as seen above, the commentary on Sadyojyotis' NS by Rāmānātha (who was Nārāyanakāntha's own son) sometimes seems to echo Utpaladeva's treatise. At the same time, by explaining at the very end of his treatise that the perspective

¹⁴⁹ This doctrinal feature has often been pointed out with respect to Śaiva non-dualism (see Bronkhorst 1996b), but as noted in Watson 2006: 90-91, Utpaladeva shares it with the Saiddhāntikas.

¹⁵⁰ As noted in Sanderson 2006: 45, MTT: 30-31 on MT, Vidyāpāda 1.1, quotes IS 55 (samājvanal byłahāsurasādhiḥ 'py upati siddhiḥ na vimadhacetasāṁ maheśvarāḥ pāṇītasāñho 'pi san palāyate daivaśatasya samanāṁ) \| “Even though he may be demonstrated by innumerable, blazing[ly clear] reasonings, the Great Lord is not proved for those whose mind is confused; although this authentic gem stands in the palm of one’s hand, it escapes the ill-fated.”
of duality remains inferior, Utpaladeva is in all probability alluding to the Śaiva Siddhānta's dualism at least as much as he is alluding to the Nyāya: if Śaiva non-dualism tends to include the scriptures of the Śaiva Siddhānta within its own tradition as a lower form of revelation,\(^{151}\) it also includes as a lower form of reasoning the philosophical justifications of its dualist counterpart.

**Are Saiddhāntika Interlocutors Completely Absent in the Pratyabhijñā Treatise? The Nature of Īśvara’s Agency and the Analogy with Yogic Creations**

In this respect it is worth noting that although Utpaladeva was obviously much influenced in this Pratyabhijñā treatise by Sadoyojotos’ works,\(^{152}\) one of the most striking features of the IPK is that in them, “the Śaiva Saiddhāntikas virtually disappear, at least as direct targets”.\(^{153}\) Raffaele Torella has pointed out that openly targeting the Buddhists rather than the Saiddhāntikas is “a message Utpaladeva addresses to his dualist cousins, whom […] the Trika does not intend to defeat, but to use as a basis for its emergence from the dimension of a restricted circle […]. Choosing Buddhism, and particularly its logical school, as number one enemy means reinforcing the undeclared alliance with the Śaivasaiddhāntins.”\(^{154}\)

However, while openly debating in the Pratyabhijñā treatise with Buddhist and Brahmical opponents, Utpaladeva seems to carry on with an underlying criticism of the Śaiva Siddhānta. This implicit discussion with fellow Śaivas in the midst of arguments explicitly targeting non-Śaiva rivals is perceptible for instance in the way Utpaladeva compares the Lord’s activity of cosmic creation to that of a yogin creating “by virtue of his will” (icchāvasātan)

\(^{155}\) See IPK 1.5.7: cidātmaiva hi devo ‘nāthaśhitam icchāvasād bahih yogīna nirupādānam arthajātān prakāśayet || “For the Lord, who consists of nothing but consciousness, must manifest externally all objects that [actually remain] internal [to him] by virtue of his will, without any material cause, just as a yogin.” The yogin’s creation recurs in IPK II.4.10, where Utpaladeva specifies again that it is devoid of material cause: yoginām api mṛddhī vināveccāvāsena tat īṣṭa jāyate tat tat sthiravārthakriyākāram || “This [production] also occurs by virtue of the will of yogins, without any [material cause] such as clay [for a pot] or a seed [for a sprout]; various [objects,] such as a pot and so on, arise [thus while] having an efficiency of their own and while lasting [just as ordinary objects].” On the special powers which, in the Yoga tradition, enable yogins to create objects out of mere will, see YBh: 165, which describes the last three members of a list of eight yogic “perfections” (śiddhi) in the following way: vaśītvām bhūtabhautikēṣa vaśī bhavaty avāsāyaś cānayeṣām. īṣṭātvām teṣām prabhavāpyayayvāyāvāyāhānām īṣṭe. yatracakāmavasāyītvam* satyasānkalpatāḥ yathā sāmkalpaṃ tathā bhūtaprakārīnām avasthānam. [*yatracakāmavasāyītvam corr.: yatra kāmāvasāyītvam YBh.] “Mastery [is the perfection of a yogin who] is the master of elements and their products and is not [himself] mastered by others; sovereignty [is the perfection of a yogin who] is sovereign upon the production, disappearance and arrangement of the [elements and their products; and] the determination [of things] according to one’s desire [is the perfection of a yogin when] what [he] becomes real (satyasāmkalpa); [i.e.,] it is the determination of the material causes of elements according to one’s fancy.” On God’s cosmic activity compared to this yogic creation in the Pratyabhijñā treatise, see Alper 1979; Ratī 2010; 2011a: 403-41.


\(^{154}\) Torella 1994: xxi.

\(^{155}\) Ibid.: xxi-xxii. See also Torella 2008: 516.
be seen as an attack on the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika conception

← yogins, and [in such cases] there is no means [of producing them] such as clay, etc. apart from the Lord’s will, in the same way, it is the Lord’s will that arises as being such [i.e. in the form of the universe].” See Nemec 2011: 143. See also ŠD 3.35-37 (and Nemec 2011: 236-37) as well as ŠDV ad loc: 112: na hy asay yogi svātmano mṛtyʹindaṣya va śīvakāṭapākādīrāpavikāraparīnāmakramena kumbhakāra iva ghaṭam iva bhāvamanandalan janayaty api tu yasya yādṛṣicchā tatsuamanantaram evetakāryātmābhilāṣātmatayā śhitīḥ, tathā cidādina ‘pi. [* śīvakāṭapākādīrāpavikāraparīnāmakramena corr.: śībakāṭapākādīrāpavikāraparīnāmakramena ŠDV: śībistāpākādīrāpavikāraparīnāmakramena em. Nemec 2011]. “For the yogin does not produce all [objective] entities as a pot [produces] a pot, through a process of transformation [of the clay involving various] changes of form such as [the ones called] śīvaka, stūpaka, etc.; rather, whatever is [the object] of such a will [as the yogin’s] immediately exists while having as its nature [the yogin’s] desire, [i.e.] while consisting in the desired effect; and the same goes for [the Lord] whose nature is consciousness.” According to Nemec 2011: 368, śībakāṭapāka should be amended into śībistāpāka, and the latter designates (ibid.: 237 and n 177) a “small stūpa of the King of Śibi”, i.e. the character of a famous jātaka; but the reason why such a character should appear in this particular context (that of a potter making various forms with clay) remains unclear. Nemec tries to explain it by stating that in memory of King Śibi’s sacrifice a “beautifully adorned stūpa” was erected and that “the present example thus serves to suggest that what is made from the clay is a thoroughly intricate and ornate object, one requiring much detailed work on the part of the sculptor”. However, the technical terms śīvika and stūpaka often occur in Abhinavagupta’s works, where they obviously designate not one but two distinct things that have nothing to do with the Buddhist jātaka — namely, two different states of the clay being modelled by the potter who is in the process of making a pot. See Bhāskari 1: 116: stūpakah — gaṭāṇimāṇarathum upāttaṣya mṛtyṇḍasya kulālena prathamaṃ kriyāmāno rvacanavīśeṣaḥ. śīvakah — unnatavasturiṇa rvacanavīśeṣaḥ. “The stūpaka is a specific arrangement that the potter first makes with a lump of clay [thus] shaped in order to create a pot.

→

of īśvara as an efficient cause that performs its action out of mere will (icchāmātṛena, icchāmātrāt) in so far as this action does not require a body,157 but that merely gives a specific form to a material

← The śīvika is [also] a specific arrangement consisting in [the same] thing [but] tall[er].” In other words, Utpaladeva is emphasizing here that contrary to a potter’s creation, which must undergo various stages before reaching its final state, the yogin’s creation is immediately complete because it is nothing but the yogin’s will taking this or that particular form.

Thus according to Praśastapāda (PDhS: 46), God creates the universe by putting atoms together so as to form a cosmic egg, and this conjunction of atoms results “from the Great Lord’s mere will” (mahēśvarasyābhidhāṃnamātrāt) (cf. Vyomavati, p. 301, which glosses abhidhāyā with the word icchā). See Chemparathy 1968: 72, 81-83; Bronkhorst 1996a: 286-87. Kumārila attacks this conception in ŚV, Sambandhākṣepaparāhāra 81-82ab: kulālavac ca naistasya vyāpāro yadi kalpyate vacanamah kathmah bhavas ude cmām anumuddhyate vasmān na paramāṇväder ārambhah syāt tadicchayā i’ “And if [you] do not conceive the activity of this [Lord] as [that of] the potter, how can an unconscious entity conform to his will? Therefore the atoms and so on do not cling together by virtue of his will.” (See Krasser 1992: 220-21.) The idea is also found in the Nyāya. See NMk 103, where Jayanta answers Kumārila’s objection by explaining: jñānacikīrṣāprayatnayogayavāh kārtvāṃ vacanam ah ācakṣate. tac ceśvare vidyata evety uktam etat. svāsārāpapraśe ca dṛṣṭam asārāpayāpyātmanah kārtvāṃ “[We] observe that being an agent is being endowed with knowledge, a desire to act, and effort; and [we] have [already] explained that this [agency] is found in the Lord. And [we] observe that the Self is the agent prompting one’s own body to act although it does not have a body.” See also ibid.: “Because the [Lord] acts my mere will . . . (icchāmātṛena ca tasya kārtvāt . . .). Cf. NBhīṣ: 453-54, which defends the idea of a cosmic creation icchāmātrāt. On this same idea in Udayana’s works, see Chemparathy 1972: 145 n 306, p. 146. Cf. Utpaladeva’s gloss of Somānanda’s icchāyā (ŚD 1.44ab, see above, n 156) as icchāmātṛena (ŚDV: 32), or Abhinavagupta’s gloss of Utpaladeva’s icchāvaśāt in IPK 1.5.7 again as icchāmātṛena (IPV 1: 183).
cause that remains ontologically independent from it. And indeed, Abhinavagupta’s commentaries on the verses in which Utpaladeva presents the analogy seem to confirm that it is meant at least in part as a criticism of the Vaiśeṣika representation of cosmic creation: there Abhinavagupta attacks some opponents who contend that yogins’ creations are merely the result of their capacity to instantly assemble pre-existing atoms (paramāṇu), just as, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, God creates the universe by arranging atoms.158

Nonetheless, the Saiddhāntikas hold a dualistic conception of cosmic creation somewhat similar to that of the Vaiśeṣikas (although contrary to the latter they do not identify the material cause of the universe with atoms but with māya),159 and the analogy with yogic creations used by Somānanda and Utpaladeva seems to target the Saiddhāntikas too. Thus it seems to echo a Saiddhāntika scripture: the KT (which Somānanda undoubtedly knew)160 asserts that Śiva creates out of mere will, i.e. without any other instrument (karaṇa), just as a yogin does.161 By having recourse to the same image, Somānanda hints that his presentation of īśvara’s agency is in accordance with the depiction of cosmic activity in the Saiddhāntika scriptures;162 but by the same token, in contrast he also emphasizes one of his main points of disagreement with the Saiddhāntikas’ metaphysical doctrine: according to him, the consciousness presiding over the creation of the universe indeed acts out of mere will, but in the sense that it does not have recourse to any kind of matter163 that would exist apart from it. That Utpaladeva in turn borrows this analogy from the ŚD is worth noting, because in many ways Utpaladeva’s main treatise diverges from that of his teacher,164 but in this particular respect the two works offer a striking parallel. And while commenting on the analogy in ĪP K 1.5.7, Abhinavagupta takes the trouble of specifying that māya is not really the material cause of the universe, but rather, the power through which the Lord makes what is imprintent appear as if it were the material cause of the universe,165 thus making clear that the analogy is also meant as

159 On the distinction in the Śaiva Siddhānta between the material cause (i.e. māya) and the efficient cause (i.e. īśvara) of the universe, see PT 2.30cd (quoted above, n 117), TTNS: 134 (māya hi jagata upādānakaśāntvāt ... “For māya, since it is the material cause of the universe . . .”) and Goodall 2004: 174-77 n 128. On the idea that God creates through his sole will, see NPP: 135 (quoted above, n 131). It should be noted that the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas may have originally borrowed the notion of a creation by mere will from an ancient Śaiva source: see Champenchara 1965 and Bronkhorst 1996a: 289, on the attribution by the YD of the doctrine of īśvara to pāśupatavisēṣika, “Pāśupatas and Vaiśeṣikas” or “Vaiśeṣikas who are Pāśupatatas”. See also Bronkhorst 1996a: 290, on the hypothesis that Praśastapāda drew his depiction of cosmic creation from some “Śaiva work”.
160 As noted in Goodall 1998: lxvi, Somānanda explicitly refers to the KT in ŚD 3.16ab (on which see Nemec 2011: 223 and n 77).
161 KT 3.10-11ab: yathā kālo hy amārtro ‘pi dṛṣyaḥ phalasādhaṅkah evam śīvo hy amārtro ‘pi kurate kāryāḥ icchayā । iṣṭhaiva karaṇāḥ tasya yathā sadyogino matā । “For just as [we] observe that time, although devoid of any corporeal form, produces a result, in the same way, Śiva, although devoid of any corporeal form, produces an effect by virtue of [his] will; [and] his instrument is nothing but this will, just as the [will] of a true yogin is known [to be his sole instrument].” See Goodall 1998: 272.
162 John Nemec has emphasized that Somānanda “favourably quotes Saiddhāntika sources in a number of places” rather than simply dismissing them as a lower form of revelation (Nemec 2011: 58-59).
163 ŚD 1.44cd thus specifies that a yogin creates without any means “such as clay, etc.” (see above, n 156).
165 See ĪPVV II: 147: māya ca bhagavacchaktivijjānaṁ viśvopādānārūpānāṁ pāṛtavābhāsitaṁ dātavasvabha-vātavatvātvarūpāḥ. “And māya, although it is [in fact nothing but] the unfolding of the Lord’s power, consists in something unreal in so far as its nature is an insensitency
a criticism of the Saiddhāntikas’ dualistic view of cosmic creation.

**Conclusion: On the Discrete Philosophical Dialogue Between Śaiva Dualists and Non-dualists**

Utpaladeva’s IS has so far been interpreted mainly as an attempt to integrate Nyāya concepts within Śaiva non-dualism as an inferior point of view transcended by the Pratyabhijñā metaphysics. While this interpretation is certainly valid, we should bear in mind that the inference of the Lord defended by Utpaladeva in this short treatise was integrated to the scriptures of the Śaiva Siddhānta before Utpaladeva undertook to write the IS, and that the Saiddhāntika Sadyojyotis had already composed in the second chapter of his NP an īśvarasiddhi that displays many similarities with Utpaladeva’s short treatise as regards its structure, the choice of its opponents or the strategy employed to refute them. By writing a text so blatantly at odds with his own metaphysical principles and so obviously relying on arguments put forward by earlier authors, Utpaladeva probably meant to include Nyāya concepts within the scope of his system while presenting them as a lower perspective; but it is also very likely that he primarily saw these Naiyāyika arguments as the philosophical justification of the Saiddhāntikas’ dualist understanding of the relationship between īśvara and the Self. The IS can therefore be read as a message sent to the Saiddhāntikas and emphasizing Utpaladeva’s philosophical solidarity as a Śaiva author (but also the capacity of non-dualism to integrate the conceptual tools already appropriated by the Saiddhāntikas) while hinting at the inferiority of the Saiddhāntikas’ metaphysics from the ultimate viewpoint of non-dualism.

This point is of interest in the more general perspective of Utpaladeva’s relationship with the Śaiva Siddhānta. Modern scholarship has often emphasized that with the Pratyabhijñā treatise, Utpaladeva engages in the Brahmanico-Buddhist philosophical debate and relegates at its background religious issues, most notably by avoiding to have recourse to the authority of scriptures. But Utpaladeva’s attempt to present the metaphysical tenets of Śaiva non-dualism in the religiously quasi-neutral discourse of Brahmanico-Buddhist epistemological controversies should not be interpreted as a sign that Utpaladeva lacked interest in his Śaiva rivals’ metaphysics, first and foremost because this attempt had a prestigious precedent in the Śaiva Siddhānta itself: Sadyojyotis had already departed from mere scriptural exegesis by writing an independent treatise targeting various Buddhist and Brahmanical opponents, and in this respect the IPK seem to have been profoundly influenced by the NP’s method and strategies. Besides, while conspicuously engaging in a dialogue with non-Śaiva authors, Utpaladeva also sustained an implicit debate with the Saiddhāntikas that, however discrete, is perceptible for instance in the key passages of the Pratyabhijñā treatise where īśvara’s cosmic creation is compared to the creations ascribed to yogins.

It is also likely that Utpaladeva’s works have in turn influenced later Saiddhāntikas: in his commentary on Sadyojyotis’ demonstration of God, Rāmakṛṣṇa apparently relies on some of the arguments found in the IS, but he also seems to answer Utpaladeva’s criticism of the Saiddhāntika notion of īśvara. Thus, as seen above, the IPKs oppose the idea that because the Lord is imperceptible, his existence needs to be inferentially proved, and they reject the very possibility of an īśvarasiddhi on the grounds that the Lord is “always already established” (adisiddha) in so far as the individual subject is always aware of his being the Lord through mere self-awareness (svasamvedana). Abhinavagupta (who may be relying here, as he so often does, on Utpaladeva’s lost Vivṛti) explains in

---


167 Alternatively, Abhinavagupta may have been aware of the NPP passage quoted below (Abhinavagupta already knew at least one of
this connection that although there may be a difference of degree between the individual’s powers of knowledge and action and those of the Lord, there is no difference of nature between them, so that the individual’s experience of these powers is already the very experience of the Lord’s powers. In his introduction to the second chapter of the NP, Rāmakānta presents a similar objection: if the individual knows by mere self-awareness his powers of knowledge and action, what is the point of demonstrating the Lord’s existence, and why did Sadyojyotis take the trouble of writing a distinct chapter on the Lord once he had composed the chapter on the individual

---

See IPV I: 30: kartiṣṭhāṇsvabhāvam iti cten nanu sa pramātāiva tahābhūta iti ko ‘nyah sah. nanu svavakarṣtvavasvajñatvāvam pramātār na stāh, na khalu sarvasabdārtha jñātkarṣtvavoh svarūpam bhinnavi, bhedadarśane ‘piśvarajñānakīrṣāt nātāder nītasya viṣayendāranabhūtānādheśyātāvatāvi. “If [the opponent replies] that [one must prove the existence of the Lord] whose nature is that of an agent and knower, [we answer]: ‘But since the knowing subject himself is of such a nature, who could be this other [agent and knower]?’ [If the opponent replies:] ‘But [contrary to the Lord,] the knowing subject does not have omnipotence and omniscience!’, [we answer in turn that] the meaning of the prefix ‘omni-’ (sarva) [in ‘omniscient’ and ‘omnipotent’] does not involve any difference in the [very] nature of [the powers consisting in] being a knower and an agent, because even in a dualistic system (bhedadarśana), the Lord’s knowledge, desire to act or effort [to act, since they are] permanent, are not made superior (atiśaya) [than they were] by the [particular] object [on which they focus, since this object cannot be the case] of [any change in their permanent nature].’ Cf. Bhāskarī I: 51: na hi kanabhāvacayabhāvay or aghan svapāabheda ity uttaravāyābhājprāyāh. “The [author’s] intention in the sentence [given in] reply is [to convey] that there is no difference in the nature of fire, whether it exists as a [mere] spark or as a heap [of flames].”

---

NPP: 113: atha purusāparikṣānutaram īṣvaraparikṣā. nanu yakṣam etad anāṁtaśvavānām vākṣum, iha tu jñātvakarṣtvavabhāve punyāvaraṇabhavahavabhāvānām savitarāvapramahāviṣayate svanānvedanāvapramahāvānām prayātikṣītā prayātikṣiti śvilpamaḥaut śvaravoh sādāhiḥ sītihāva jñātvakarṣtvavāpaśvadv īṣvaravetvām kim anvayā tatprakāreśwraya: i {etad anāṁtaśvavānām con]; etāt tattvāntaryam — NPP}. “Now, immediately after the examination of the individual, [Sadyojyotis undertakes] an examination of the Lord. —Object:] Surely this is an appropriate [thing] to say with respect to [entities] that are not connected; but here, since the individual has as its nature to be a knower and an agent, [and] since [this individual] is [already] established in the manner that has already been stated, through its perceptibility in self-awareness (svaśaśaśana) and through inference, given that the Lord’s nature is [also] to be a knower and an agent, the demonstration of both Lords [endowed with the powers of knowledge and action, i.e. the individual, who is] a small [Lord since he has limited powers] and the Great [one, whose powers are unlimited,] is ipso facto completed, just as the sun [although one,] can be [known as] a small or a great object [of knowledge] according to whether a veil covering [it] (āvarana) is present or not.” As a matter of fact, the Śaiva non-dualists describe as a veil (āvarana) the delusion (moha) through which the individual does not recognize himself as the Lord and therefore sees himself as limited. See IPV I: 12, which mentions this “veil covering the Self’s light with an appearance of stain” (kālākāravasprakāsaśāvaraṇa), or IPV II: 203, which explains that māyāsakti deludes (vimohini) in so far as it veils (āvṛnate) the Self’s nature. See also IPV II: 24 (dehamākānvidātāvarānāpabhīmaśāvasma ca tanukaranapraṇābabuddhiśūnyavaranāntarvarvānti sanvidam amalā śaśāśāhaśaśāsaharaprakāśavat... “Consciousness, which [remains in fact] devoid of stain, which is different from the [wrong] identification with that thickest of veils that is the body, [and] which remains internally present despite the veils that are the bodily organs, vital breath, intellect and the void [to which individuals wrongly identify], just as the light of the sun on which autumnal clouds have gathered...” cf. Torella 2007: 928-29) or Bhāskarī I: 38, which
the Lord is not known through mere self-awareness (since the Self of the Lord and that of the individual are distinct) and remains imperceptible, so that the Lord's agency in the cosmic creation must still be proved. ¹⁷⁰ With this answer, Rāmākaṇṭha seems to continue the discrete dialogue initiated by Somānanda and Utpaladeva between the Śaiva Siddhānta and Śaiva non-dualism—a dialogue that remains largely unexplored, and on which a comparative study of the demonstrations of the Self by Utpaladeva and Rāmākaṇṭha

← explains that recognition does not bring about any new knowledge but merely removes the veil covering the Self's true nature by stating: *na hi vātenāpasāritameghāvaranāḥ sūryas tadatpādita iti kathyate.* “For when the veil (āvarana) of clouds [preventing us from seeing the sun] is taken away by the wind, [we] do not say that the sun is established by the [wind].”

¹⁷⁰ NPP. 113: satyam etat, jagaddhethubhātunāśvaraparikṣā tv iyam anyāvete avirodhaḥ. tathā hi na tāvad asāv asmadaddānām ātmavat svasaṁvedanapratyakṣasiddho bhinnānārāpaṭvena tasya tato ‘nyavat, na hy ātmānām svasaṁvedanamātāmāḥ samktiranyāt ity uktam. nāpindriyapratyakṣena parasparam svabhāvād evendriyātivatwa teṣām siddheḥ, tattvānām indriyaṇatitvasiddhāv api viśistaḥānākriyātmakaś arṣevatāraṇyāv asiddheḥ. “This is true; nonetheless, this examination of the beginningless Lord who is the cause of the world is different [from the examination of the individual], so that there is no contradiction [in writing a distinct chapter on the Lord]. To explain: to begin with, for [limited subjects] such as us, the [Lord] is not established through the direct perception that is self-awareness, contrary to the Self, because he is different from this [Self], given that he has as his nature a distinct Self. For [we have already] explained that the pure self-awarenesses of [distinct] Selves do not mix. Nor [is the Lord known] through a direct sensory perception, because it is [now] established that by their very nature these [different Selves] are beyond the reach of senses for each other, and because, although their bodies have been established not to be beyond the reach of senses, there is no demonstration that [both] the Lord and [the individual] who is different from the Lord are Selves [endowed with] particular [powers of] knowledge and action.”

for instance¹⁷¹ could certainly shed some light.

**References**

**PRIMARY LITERATURE**


ÅTV = The Ātmatattaviivēka of Śri Udayanācārya with the Commentary of Śri Nārāyanācārya Ātreya and the Didhiti Commentary of Śri Raghuṇātha Śiromaṇi, with Baudhādhikāra Vivṛti of Śri Gajādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, ed. D. Śāstrī, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 84, Benares: 1940.


İS = [Īsvarasiddhi, in] Siddhitrayi and Pratyabhijñā-kārikā-vṛtti of

¹⁷¹ For a particularly thorough analysis of some important passages in the first chapter of the NPP, see Watson 2006. Ratī 2006 mentions a number of striking similarities between Rāmākaṇṭha’s demonstration of the Self in the first chapter of the NPP and Utpaladeva’s in the Jñānādhiṣṭhāra of the İPK, while emphasizing their main divergence (see in particular n 160, p. 96).
Rājānaka Utpaladeva, ed. M.K. Śastri, KSTS 34, Srinagar: 1921.


JM = [Jayamangalā]. See SK.


KV = [Kiranavṛtti]. See KT.

MT = The Śrī Mṛgendra Tantram (Vidyāpāda and Yogapāda) with the Commentary of Nārāyaṇa-kantha, ed. M.K. Śastri, KSTS 50, Bombay: 1930.

MTT = [Mṛgendranatratatikā]. See MT.

MV = [Māṭhavarṇṛtti]. See SK.


NK = [Nyāyakandali]. See PDhS.


NM = [Nyāyamanjari, Īśvarasiddha section]. See Kataoka 2005.


NPC = [Narēśvaraparikṣāprakāśā]. See NP.

NS = [Nyāyasūtra]. See NV.


ŚD = Śivādṛṣṭi of Śrīśomānanānātha with the Vṛtti by Utpaladeva, ed. M.K. Śastri, KSTS 54, Srinagar: 1934.

ŚDV = [Śivādṛṣṭiśāstra]. See ŚD.


Vṛtti = Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti]. See ĪPK.


SECONDARY LITERATURE


———, 1972, An Indian Rational Theology. Introduction to Udayana’s Nyāyakusumāñjali, de Nobili Research Library 1, Vienna.


Goodall, D., 1998. See KT.


———, 2004. See PT.


Alamkāras in the Stotras of Utpaladeva

Radhavallabh Tripathi

The concept of *alamkāra* in Sanskrit poetics is marked with a comprehensive approach to arts. Bharatamuni says that there are two aspects of creativity in art — *svabhāva* and *alamkāra*.¹ The former indicates natural acquisitions and the latter extraordinariness attained through practice and devotion. In a dramatic performance they culminate into the renderings of *lokadharmi* and *nātyadharmi*, and in literature into *svabhāvakoti* and *vākrokti*. The effects created by the process of *alamkāra* lead to transgressing whatever may be commonplace or trivial. By etymology the term *alamkāra* (making perfect) stands in agreement with this approach. *Amarakośa* has given four meanings of the term *alam-*, i.e. *bhūṣana* (decoration or embellishment), *vāraṇa* (negation or elimination), *paryāpti* (sufficiency) and *sakti* (power).² They are related to surface structure, deep structure and deeper structures in an art form. They are not isolated. The process of beautification (*bhūṣana*) starts from the outer structure and basically relates to the form, but it is always linked to the content. This linkage necessitates the activity of elimination or exclusion (*vāraṇa*) and both these processes of *bhūṣana* and *vāraṇa* work together to bring in *paryāpti* (sufficiency). Thus a piece of art attains the state of fulfillment through *bhūṣana*, *vāraṇa* and *paryāpti* and in this attainment lies its *sakti*. The

¹ NŚ, XXXIII.6.
² *alam bhūṣanaparyāptiśaktīvāraṇavācaham* — *Amarakośa* III.3.252; *mā smā mā alam ca vāraṇe* — ibid. 3.4.11.
Utpaladeva,
Philosopher of Recognition

Edited by
Raffaele Torella
Bettina Bäumer