

अभिनवगुप्तप्रणीता
ईश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञाविमर्शिनी



DOCTRINE OF
DIVINE RECOGNITION

VOLUME III

K.C. PANDEY

अभिमानवगुलतप्रणीता इश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञाविमर्शिनो

॥

Īśvarapratyabhijñā-Vimarśinī, IPV in short, Critique of the Doctrine of Divine Recognition, is the most important work of the Pratyabhijñā School of Kashmir Śaivism. This is a commentary by the great Abhinavagupta on the Īśvarapratyabhijñā-Sūtra (or -Kārikā) of Utpala, expounded by a commentary Bhāskari of Bhāskarakaṇṭha. The original text with Vimarśinī and the Bhāskari thereon was edited and published by Dr. K.C. Pandey and Professor K.A. Subramania Iyer, along with English Translation of the IPV by Dr. Pandey, in three volumes under the title, Bhāskari, as the Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhawan Texts Nos. 70, 83 and 84 in the years 1938, 1950 and 1954 respectively. These works were out of print for long and are now being re-issued under the general title of Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarśinī of Abhinavagupta, in three volumes.

The Īśvarapratyabhijñā of Utpālacārya has four Adhikāras: Jñāna-, Kriyā-, Āgama- and Tattvasaṅgraha-. The first volume contains the Jñānādhikāra which has eight Āhnikas or chapters along with the Vimarśinī of Abhinavagupta and the Bhāskari of Bhāskarakaṇṭha. The second volume completes the text and the commentaries in the remaining three Adhikāras.

This also carries an Introduction giving in brief the History and Literature and philosophy of the Pratyabhijñā system along with various appendixes for Vol. I and Vol. II. Vol. III gives English translation of the Īśvarapratyabhijñā and the Vimarśinī.

KS-57

इति मन्त्राणां प्रथमोऽङ्गः

इति मन्त्राणां प्रथमोऽङ्गः

III

इति

ISVARA-PRATYABHIJÑĀ-VIMARŚINI
OF ABHINAVAGUPTA

अभिनवगुप्तप्रणीता ईश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञाविमर्शिनी

ĪŚVARA-PRATYABHIJÑĀ-VIMARŚINĪ

OF ABHIṆAVAGUPTA

Doctrine of Divine Recognition

Volume III

English Translation
by

Dr. K. C. PANDEY

General Editor

Professor Dr. R. C. DWIVEDI

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS

Delhi Varanasi Patna Madras

अभिनवगुप्तप्रणीता
ईश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञाविमर्शिनी

तृतीयो भागः

आङ्गलानुवादः

अनुवादकः

डॉ० कान्तिचन्द्र पाण्डेयः

प्रधानसम्पादकः

प्रो० डॉ० रामचन्द्र द्विवेदी

मो ती ला ल ब ना र सी दा स

दिल्ली वाराणसी पटना मद्रास

© MOTILAL BANARSIDASS

Head Office: Bungalow Road, Delhi 110 007

Branches: Chowk, Varanasi 221 001

Ashok Rajpath, Patna 800 004

6 Appar Swamy Koil Street, Mylapore,
Madras 600 004

First published : The Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhavana
Text No. 84, 1954

Reprint : Delhi, 1986

ISBN: 81-208-0022-2

Printed in India by Narendra Prakash Jain at Shri Jainendra Press,
A-45 Naraina, Phase I, New Delhi 110 028 and published by
Shantilal Jain for Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 110 007.

GENERAL EDITOR'S NOTE

Īśvarapratyabhijñā-Vimarśinī, *IPV* in short, (Critique of the Doctrine of Divine Recognition) is the most important work of the Pratyabhijñā school of Kashmir Śaivism. This is a commentary by the great Abhinavagupta on the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-Sūtra* (or *-Kārikā*) of Utpala, expounded by a commentary *Bhāskari* of Bhāskarakaṇṭha. The original text with *Vimarśinī* and the *Bhāskari* thereon was edited and published by my teachers, Dr. K. C. Pandey and Professor K. A. Subramania Iyer, along with English translation of the *IPV* by Dr. Pandey, in three volumes under the title, *Bhāskari*, as the Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhavan Texts Nos. 70, 83 and 84 in the years 1938, 1950 and 1954 respectively. These works were out of print for long and are now being re-issued under the general title of *Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarśinī of Abhinavagupta*, in three volumes. *An Outline of History of Śaiva Philosophy* given by Dr. Pandey in Vol. III of the *Bhāskari* will be issued separately for the sake of general readers and the scholars interested in the history of religions. Reprint of the rare and fundamental works of Kashmir Śaivism will be welcomed by the scholars concerned with the idealistic systems of Indian Philosophy.

It was in the mid-9th century A.D., when the whole of India was fired with the Advaita Vedānta of Ācārya Śaṅkara that the beautiful land of Goddess Śāradā, the Kashmir valley, produced a great ācārya, who systematized the philosophical postulates of the Śaiva non-dualism on the basis of the monistic Śaiva scriptures. His name is Somadeva, better known as Somānanda. He was an older contemporary of another great Śaiva ācārya, Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa who wrote his *Vṛtti* on the *Spanda Sūtras* revealed to Vasugupta. The spanda system hardly differs in its philosophical thought from Somānanda. Their real difference lies in prescribing different means of realizing the philosophical goal. *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* or Vision from Śiva by Somānanda is the first systematic formulation of the philosophy of what is later on conveniently described as the Pratyabhijñā school of Kashmir Śaivism, following the term occurring in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* of Utpala. Somānanda in

his foundational work, the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi*, consisting of seven chapters of 700 verses, declared (I. 2) that Lord Śiva is the essence and identity of all the beings. He shines in all the beings. He is bliss and consciousness whose free will nothing can impede and who manifests himself through his powers of knowledge and action. This concept of the highest reality is basically different from the Buddhistic idea of momentary *vijñāna*, from the *nirguṇa* (hence passive) Brahman of Śāṅkara, from the dualistic conception of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* of the Sāṅkhya and from the later schools of Vaiṣṇava Vedānta. Somānanda not merely propounded his theory of the ultimate reality, he refuted the grammarians' theory of Śabda Brahman, the views of the Śāktas, the dualistic Śaivas, and the followers of the Yoga and demonstrated the lack of logic and consistency in their view of reality. Utpaladeva, Utpalācārya, or simply Utpala, built the great edifice of the Pratyabhijñā on the foundations laid by his teacher Somānanda. He wrote his famous *Īśvarapratyabhijñā Sūtra* or *Kārikā* by working out at great length the germinal ideas of the founder of the system (Utpala treats his *Kārikā* as the reflection of the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi*) and by providing a suitable fencing against the onslaughts of the counter systems of Indian philosophy.

Utpala advocates the permanence and universality of the self and criticises the Vijñānavādin's theory of momentariness and individuality. He asserts that freedom of will, thought and action is basic essence of being. Being must have innate power to become at will. He vehemently opposes the passive Brahman of Vedānta and lack of integrality between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* of the Sāṅkhya. Vasugupta had recognized three ways of final freedom of human beings: *Śāmbhava*, *Śākta* and *Ānava*. These ways required an ascetic life of complete detachment and austere practice of Yoga. Somānanda and Utpala show a new way to freedom and beatitude. The realization in the Pratyabhijñā system, to quote from the Introduction of Vol. II (pp. v-vi) by Dr. K. C. Pandey, "consists, not in the actualisation of the potential, nor in the attainment of something new, but in penetrating through the veil that makes the Maheśvara appear as the individual of which everyone is immediately aware and in recognising the Maheśvara in the individual." The followers of this system daily recite the following verse which sums up the attitude of a Śaiva:

शिवो दाता शिवो भोक्ता, शिवः सर्वमिदं जगत् ।

शिवो यजति यज्ञश्च, यः शिवः सोऽहमेव हि ॥

The following prayer for universal peace and happiness occurring at the end of the manuscript B of the *Vivṛtivismarśinī* of Abhinavagupta quoted by its editor in his Preface to Volume I explains the Śaiva's feelings for the world around him and for his fellow human beings :

शुभमस्तु सर्वजगतां परहितनिस्ता भवन्तु भूतगणाः ।

दोषाः प्रयान्तु शान्तिं सर्वत्र सुखीभवन्तु लोकाः ॥

Utpala holds that the human being is essentially free; freedom is the very nature of the individual. However, the veil of ignorance covers this freedom of man and thus keeps him away from the God within him. Man must remove this ignorance; he must penetrate through the veil to recognize his real self, eternally free, omniscient and omnipotent. Recognition is the way to regain the lost freedom. Incidentally, it is significant to note that the philosophy of Utpala has intimate parallels in the *Dakṣiṇāmūrtistotra* of Ācārya Śaṅkara, as interpreted by his great disciple, Sureśvara (See *Abhinavagupta*, pp. 151-52) and the lyrics of the *Saundaryalaharī*.

According to the tradition, Utpala lived near Vicharnaga to the north of Srinagar and belonged to the end of the 9th and first half of the 10th century A.D. Many of his works are lost, those surviving include *Ajaḍapramāṭṛsiddhi*, *Īśvarasiddhi*, *Sambandhasiddhi* and the commentaries on the latter two works. His commentary on the *Śivadṛṣṭi* is available only in part. His devotional lyrics are collected under the title *Śivastotrāvalī* and quotations from his unknown works are found in the *IPV*. But he is justly famous for his *Īśvarapratyabhijñā Sūtra* or *Kārikā*. This reveals sharpness of his intellect, original thinking and masterly exposition, intimate knowledge of the monistic tradition of the Śaiva Āgamas and the recognitive Sādhana to realize the Lord Maheśvara.

He wrote two auto-commentaries on his *Kārikā*: *Vṛtti* and *Vivṛti* or *Ṭikā*. No complete MS of either of these two commentaries by Utpala has so far been discovered. The available portion of the *Vṛtti* upto the 20th *kārikā* of the third *adhikāra* was published in the Kashmir Sanskrit Series and the fragment of the

Vivṛti is in the personal collection of Dr. K. C. Pandey, which remains unpublished. The fragment of the *Vivṛti* begins with the 6th *Kārikā* of the *Jñānādhikāra*, *Āhnika* 3 and ends abruptly with the 3rd *Kārikā* of the fifth *Āhnika*. Utpala imparted his new doctrine to Lakṣmaṇagupta who transmitted it to his worthiest disciple, Abhinavagupta, an encyclopaedic writer on Indian aesthetics and Kashmir Śaivism. Abhinava wrote a commentary on the *Vivṛti* of Utpala, known as the *Vivṛtīvimarśinī*. This was published in the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, Nos. LX (1938 A.D.), LXII (1941 A.D.) and LXV (1943 A.D.) in three volumes. Abhinava's direct commentary on the text of Utpala's *Kārikā* is also known as *Vimarśinī* and described as *Laghu Vimarśinī*, being shorter in length than the *Vivṛtī-Vimarśinī*, which is described as the *Bṛhatīvimarśinī*. They are also known as *Catussāhasrī* and *Aṣṭadaśasāhasrī* respectively in accordance with the old method of calculation. The Sūtras or *Kārikās* of Utpala remain unintelligible without a commentary, like the Sūtras of Pāṇini or Bādarāyaṇa. Utpala's own commentaries are more in the nature of independent exposition of the Pratyabhijñā system than actual explanation of the text. Abhinavagupta's *Vimarśinī* offers explanation of the *Kārikā* and also reads like an independent work. It is available in full and it represents the systems comprehensively and correctly. Abhinavagupta's *Vimarśinī* is thus the most authentic commentary of the Pratyabhijñā system, which enjoys the reputation of an original work. However, in spite of its clarity and lucidity and comprehensive treatment of the system, it does require a guide to understand the full implications of the words and the ideas of the *Vimarśinī*. The commentary does not solve the problem fully particularly when the oral tradition of teaching the śāstras is lost and when we know that the original thinker like Abhinava will naturally make fresh points in promoting the tradition and in defending it against newly formulated counter-points in the philosophical circles of India in the 10th century A.D.

It was to obviate this difficulty that Dr. K. C. Pandey set on the search for a commentary on Abhinava's *Vimarśinī*. He struck gold in 1931 when he discovered a commentary *Bhāskari* by Bhāskarakaṇṭha. He belonged to the later half of the 18th century A.D. According to the *Bhāskari* he was of the Dhaumyāyona Gotra and the names of his grand-father and father were Vaidūryakaṇṭha and Avatārakaṇṭha respectively. It was to teach

his son Jagannātha ('*svasutādibodhanārtham*') that Bhāskara wrote his learned commentary giving traditional interpretation of the *Vimarśinī* or the Pratyabhijñā school of Kashmir Śaivism for that matter, which was handed down to him through unbroken chain of ācāryas. Besides this commentary, he translated the mystic sayings of Lalleśvari, *Lallā Vāk*, into Sanskrit, wrote a commentary, available in fragment, on the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* and composed a poem, named *Harṣeśvarastava*, in singing the glory of the Lord on the occasion of his visit to the temple in Kashmir.

Another anonymous commentary on the *Vimarśinī*, *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-Vimarśinī-Vyākhyā* procured by the late Dr. K. C. Pandey from the Government Manuscript Library, Madras and edited by him before his sad demise is under print and will be published before long by Messrs Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi.

According to Mādhava (15th century A.D.), the author of the *Sarvadarśana-Saṃgraha*, (i) *Sūtra* i.e. *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikā* of Utpala and his two commentaries thereon, (ii) *Vṛtti* and (iii) *Vivṛti* and short and long commentaries of Abhinavagupta, namely, (iv) *Vimarśinī* and *Vivṛtivismarśinī* constitute the Pratyabhijñāśāstra which in essence is the exposition of the *Śivadrṣṭi* (spoken of as a *prakaraṇa* of the Śaivaśāstra) of Somānanda:

सूत्रं वृत्तिविवृतिर्लघ्वी बृहतीत्युभे विमर्शिन्यौ ।

प्रकरणविवरणपञ्चकमिति शास्त्रं प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः ॥

(This verse also occurs in the *Sāstraparāmarśa* of Madhuraja where the last word reads as '*pratyabhijñākhyam*'.)

The *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* of Utpalācārya has four *Adhikāras*: *Jñāna*-, *Kriyā*-, *Āgama*- and the *Tattvasaṅgraha*-. The first volume contains the *Jñānādhikāra* which has eight *Āhnikas* or chapters along with the *Vimarśinī* of Abhinavagupta and the *Bhāskari* of Bhāskarakaṇṭha. The second volume completes the text and the commentaries in the remaining three *Adhikāras*. This also carries an Introduction giving in brief the History and Literature and Philosophy of the Pratyabhijñā system along with various appendixes for Vol. I and Vol. II. Vol. III gives English translation of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* and the *Vimarśinī*. As these volumes are essentially photo-prints; the original edition has not been disturbed except in the formal matters where the change of title, publisher etc. is involved. In some cases it might create apparent difficulties. For example, the volumes, although now differently titled will

still be found under the old title of the *Bhāskari* in the contents, Introduction etc. of Dr. K. C. Pandey. In our desire to place these volumes in the hands of readers at the earliest, we did not think it proper to make changes warranted by new circumstances of the publication. I crave the indulgence of the scholars in this matter and hope the reprint of the classic texts of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* system of Kashmir, for which real credit should go to Shri J. P. Jain, the publisher, will help in further promoting the growing interest of Indologists in this branch of Indian Philosophy.

Department of Sanskrit,
University of Rajasthan, Jaipur

R. C. DWIVEDI

CONTENTS

GENERAL EDITOR'S NOTE

Page

v

JÑĀNĀDHIKĀRA

ĀHNIKA I

1-18

(THE INTRODUCTION)

Page

Statement of the purpose	1
Inapplicability of the means of right knowledge to the Lord ..	10
The essential nature of the help in recognitive activity towards the Lord	12
Knowledge and action as the very life of the sentient ..	14
Establishment of the powers of knowledge and action ..	16

ĀHNIKA II

19-31

(STATEMENT OF THE *PRIMA FACIE* VIEW)

Refutation of the permanent self	20
Insufficiency of remembrance as a ground for proving permanent self	22
Refutation of the view that the self as a substratum can be inferred from the qualities such as knowledge etc. ..	24
Criticism of the power of knowledge	25
Criticism of the Sāṅkhya view of knowledge	25
Refutation of the view of action as unity in multiplicity ..	29
Assertion that there is no reason to prove the existence of relation other than that of cause and effect	29
Criticism of the Śaiva view of relation	30

ĀHNIKA III

32-39

(REFUTATION OF THE *PRIMA FACIE* VIEW)

Direct experience cannot shine in remembrance	32
Refutation of the view that remembrance is an error	35
Refutation of the view that every determinate cognition is an error	35
Practical life not possible without remembrance	36
Explanation of remembrance on the Śaiva hypothesis	37

ĀHNIKA IV

40-53

(PRESENTATION OF THE POWER OF REMEMBRANCE)

The Śaiva view of remembrance	40
The subject can illumine the particular object of the former direct experience	42

	<i>Page</i>
Remembrance enters into the direct experience and its object so as to become one with them ..	44
Remembrance does not illumine the former direct experience as an object ..	45
In the experience of another's experience by a Yogin, another's experience does not shine as an object ..	47
The assertion that remembrance does have direct experience as its object is baseless ..	48
Even in determinate experience there is the unification of the present with the past direct experience. ..	50
Remembrance, its subject and its object rest on one Sentient Principle. ..	51

ĀHNIKA V

54-85

(PRESENTATION OF THE POWER OF KNOWLEDGE)	
Essential nature of the power of knowledge ..	55
Luminosity (Prakāśa) as the essential nature of the object	55
Statement of the <i>prima facie</i> view that the existence of the external objects is established by the refutation of the subjectivism of the Vijñānavāda ..	59
Futility of admission of the existence of the external object	63
The essential nature of the object, according to the Pratyabhijñā system. ..	65
Refutation of the view that the existence of the external object is proved by direct perception ..	66
Refutation of the inferability of the external object ..	66
Being of the objects as mere ideas in the Universal Self	68
Self-consciousness as the very life of self-luminosity, which constitutes the essential nature of the subject ..	70
Free conscious Will as the manifester of all objects and limited subjects ..	76
The light of consciousness as the very life of both the knowledge and the knower ..	80
The element of determinacy in indeterminate cognition ..	81
Establishment of the distinction between knowledge and knower ..	84

ĀHNIKA VI

86-97

(PRESENTATION OF THE POWER OF DIFFERENTIATION)	
Indeterminacy as the distinctive feature of the Universal Self-consciousness ..	86
Impossibility of the activity of differentiation in pure self-consciousness ..	87
Impure self-consciousness is determinacy ..	89

	<i>Page</i>
Synthesis also is a determinative activity of the mind ..	92
The creative activity of the Lord consists in Unification etc.	93
All objective manifestations have their being in the Universal Mind ..	94
Difference in the objects of different types of cognitions ..	95
Content of imagination due to freedom ..	96

ĀHNIKA VII 98-110

(PRESENTATION OF THE LORD AS THE ONE BASIS OF ALL)

The essential nature of the one Basis ..	99
The practical life is possible only if there be one Basis of all	100
Presentation of the essential nature of the practical life in terms of the causal relation ..	101
Presentation of the essential nature of the practical life in terms of remembrance ..	102
Presentation of the essential nature of the practical life in terms of differentiation between truth and falsehood	103
Criticism of the Bauddha view of Abhāva ..	106
Reassertion in the conclusion that the explanation of practical life is possible only on the admission of the one Basis of all ..	110

ĀHNIKA VIII 111-118

(PRESENTATION OF THE CHIEF CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LORD)

Two kinds of manifestations, dependent and independent.	112
Ābhāsa as a unity ..	113
Causal efficiency depends on a definite configuration of Ābhāsas ..	114
Internality as the basis of variety in an Ābhāsa ..	115
The essential nature of the externality and its subdivisions	116
The Externality of what is pictured up in imagination ..	116
The powers of knowledge etc. as identical with the Freedom of the Lord ..	117
The essential nature of the Lord ..	117

KRIYĀDHIKĀRA

ĀHNIKA I 119-126

(PRESENTATION OF THE POWER OF ACTION)

Refutation of the <i>prima facie</i> view about action (Kriyā)	119
The essential characteristic of the empirical action, the succession, not possible in the transcendental action of the Lord. ..	120

	<i>Page</i>
Time as succession	121
The essential nature of succession	122
The spheres of succession and simultaneity differentiated ..	123
Both have their being in the One	125

ĀHNIKA II

127-138

(DISCUSSION ON THE UNITY IN MULTIPLICITY)

Action etc. are real, though they cannot be accounted for in terms of the Realistic philosophy. ..	128
Accounting for action etc. in terms of Concrete Monism ..	129
The characteristics of action etc. become clear in determinate cognition only	130
Action etc. as mental constructs	131
The basis of the idea of Relation	134
Universal etc. as unity in multiplicity	134
The essential nature of the relation of predicate and subject etc.	135
Utility of relation etc. in practical life	136

ĀHNIKA III

139-165

(THE DISCUSSION ON THE MEANS OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE)

The essential nature of the means of right knowledge and its effect	140
Determinate perception	142
Inference (Anumāna)	144
Scriptural authority (Āgama)	145
Determinative grasp of manifestations (Ābhāsa) by intellectual reaction, according to taste etc. ..	147
The means of right knowledge operate on each isolated manifestation	148
The causal efficiency of the "Ābhāsa"	150
Inference in the light of Ābhāsavāda	152
Essential nature of the erroneous knowledge	157
Possibility of establishing the essential nature of the object of knowledge on the basis of the theory of God, presented here.	159
The means of knowledge do not operate on the Lord	160
The system removes the ignorance about "I"	163

ĀHNIKA IV

166-188

(PRESENTATION OF THE ESSENTIAL NATURE
OF THE CAUSAL RELATION)

The identity of the relation of cause and effect with that which holds between the creator and the object of creation	166
Refutation of the causality of the insentient	167
Causality in reality belongs to the sentient only	169
The possibility of inference depends upon the power of Niyati	175
The Bauddha conception of causality ultimately follows that of the Śaiva	180
The Sāṅkhya conception of causality does not stand to reason	182
Criticism of the Vedānta metaphysics	185
The Will as the cause, the agent and the action	188

ĀGAMĀDHIKĀRA

ĀHNIKA I

189-201

(PRESENTATION OF THE CATEGORIES)

Definition of Śiva	190
Definitions of Sadāśiva and Īśvara	191
Definition of Sadvidyā	192
Reasons in support of the view that Sadvidyā is a pure category	193
Sadāśiva and Īśvara as categories distinguished from the presiding deities of the same names	194
Another view of the Śuddha Vidyā	195
Utpalācārya's view of the Śuddha Vidyā	196
Definition of Māyā	196
Elucidation of the concept of Tirodhāna	196
Presentation of the limiting conditions of the individual subject, Kalā, Vidyā, Rāga, Niyati and kāla.	197
Definition of Pradhāna	199
Presentation of the twenty-three objective categories	200

AHNIKA II

202-218

(PRESENTATION OF THE ESSENTIAL NATURE
OF THE SUBJECT)

	<i>Page</i>
The essential nature of the trinity, Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra.	202
Definitions of Pati and paśu	203
Three impurities, Ānava, Kārma and Māyīya	204
The subjects which have no 'freedom'	205
Vijñānakevala	205
Pralayākala	206
Vidyēśvara	207
Gods have all the three impurities	207
The two states of the transmigratory souls, according as they are under the influence of impurities or rise above them.	208
The Turiya and the Turiyātīta states	209
Two types of deep sleep and Śūnya Pramātā	210
Dream and wakeful states differentiated	213
Wakeful, dream and deep sleep states should be abandoned and Turiya and Turiyātīta should be realised.	214
Difference in the conditions of the vital airs in the five states	215

TATTVA SAṄGRAHĀDHIKĀRA

ĀHNIKA I

219-232

(PRESENTATION OF A SUMMARY—VIEW)

Maheśvara as the self of all living beings	219
The essential nature of the bondage	220
The essential nature of the limited subject	220
The essential nature of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas	221
Sattva, Rajas and Tamas as qualities	221
Pleasure, pain and senselessness	222
The object in relation to Pati	224
The object in relation to the limited subject (Paśu)	224
The world of imagination	225
Two types of creation, common and uncommon	226
Possibility of Mokṣa even when there are Vikalpas	227
The bound and the liberated look upon the objective world differently	227
The relation of the objective world to the Parama Śiva	228
The conclusion that follows from the discussion in the four Adhikāras	228

	<i>Page</i>
Line of teachers	229
Illustration to show that the internal causal efficiency depends upon recognition	230
The conclusion	231
INDEX	233

ĪŚVARA PRATYABHIJÑĀ VIMARŚINĪ

JÑĀNĀDHIKĀRA

—: o :—

ĀHNIKA I

(1) I bow to that Absolute, which is unity of Paramaśiva and Sakti; the Unity, which from its ultimate state, first of all manifests the Pure Ego 'I' and then, through its will, divides its power into two; the Ultimate State, which, being without any manifestation, is self-contained and is responsible for Creation and Dissolution through the play and suspension respectively of its Power.

(2—4) Having been taught by Lakṣmaṇagupta, I, Abhinavagupta, grand-disciple of him, who wrote the flawless work, called Īśvarapratyabhijñā, am writing this brief commentary on his (Utpala's) work: the work which is a representation of the system of somānanda, a gem in the family of Tryambaka, and is a means to the attainment of the purely subjective supreme human goal.

(5) Of this work, the author himself has given the substance in the Vṛtti and exposition in the Tīkā. I, therefore, in order to elucidate the concept of Recognition to people of slow understanding, shall fully explain the contents of the work as follows:--

(6) May this exposition be helpful to all people of slow understanding, or to some of keen understanding, but if to none, at least to myself.

Desiring to bring about in others the identification with the Highest Reality, the power of which he had himself realised within, and thinking that it could safely be brought about if he starts with referring to his own identification, the author, with a view to make others fit for the same, states the object. Here (in this verse) the statement of the object occupies a subordinate position to (the statement of) the realisation of identity with the highest aspect of the Ultimate :—

(1) "Having somehow realised my identity with the Supreme and wishing to render service to humanity, I am establishing 'Self-Recognition' which is a means of attaining all that is of value."

In this system, salutation means 'surrender' consisting in the dedication of body, speech and mind exclusively to Him. A wise man ought to make that surrender only if he realises the superiority of the object of his devotion to all others. Otherwise if he, unaware of any justification, bows to that which is not the supreme, he would fall in the category of ordinary men, as has been said :—

"Persons, affected by limited knowledge and attachment, do not reach the Supreme Deity."

In so far as he is impelled by the limited powers of knowledge, will and action, which are the creations of Māyā, he is still in bondage. But he might also be considered to be superior to others, because he has already passed some of the stages : as has been said by the illustrious Vidyāpati:—

"How can there arise the desire to praise any Boon-giver other than you, even through lower delusion, in him, who sees your glory unimpaired through the natural means of knowledge."

We shall deal with this topic in the Āgamakāṇḍa. Therefore, in any salutation a clear consciousness of superiority of the deity to others should be accepted as essential.

The All-Inclusive Universal Consciousness is spontaneously realised by him, on whom the higher Grace of God has fallen, and personal effort plays no part in it. For, all that being essentially a manifestation of Māyā, the principle of obscurity and, therefore, unilluminative like darkness, cannot be a means to the knowledge of the pure light, which is beyond Māyā and, therefore, is the opposite of the manifestation. The pure light, as presented above, should, however, be clearly apprehended by calling to mind some such word as 'Jayati' which stands for all-surpassing greatness, with a view to bringing it before one's own as well as other people's consciousness by means of inner visualisation and an outer expression respectively. Therefore, when a word, expressive of salutation, is used the meaning of 'Jayati' should be considered to be implied in it. Even while uttering the word 'jaya', if a person does not surrender himself to Him, who is possessed of Supreme Greatness, and remains indifferent to Him, he does a great disservice to himself. Therefore, (when 'jaya' is used) surrender, which is involved in the visualisation of Supreme Greatness, must be understood to be implied. Accordingly, when either 'jaya' or 'namaskāra' is used, the other should be necessarily considered to be implied. The same thing holds good of 'Vandana', 'Namana', 'Smarana' and Pradhyāna etc.,

because their real meaning is nothing more than the feeling of surrender, coupled with the visualisation of the supremacy of the Supreme. Here, however, the author has adopted such a method that both these ideas are conveyed by means of direct expression. This will be made clear in the course of the explanation of the meanings of the words.

Reference by means of a conventional expression is reasonable, because it is good for all; indeed it goes straight, appeals, to the heart of everybody; an implied meaning, on the other hand, (appeals) only to that of some, because all cannot get at the implied meaning, which the power of visualisation (Pratibhā) alone arouses. And consciousness of the word which is devoid of 'meaning', is no consciousness at all. This will become clear in the sequel. With this idea in mind the author has followed this method of salutation, without the use of a well known word, such as 'Jaya' and 'Namas' etc.

In this world whatever enters into consciousness is a mere manifestation of the Self, the Ultimate Reality to be defined later. Amongst the manifested, the causal relation, such as exists between the means and the end and so on, is also real, because all this is a fact of consciousness and the reality of what enters into consciousness cannot be denied. This is what Bhaṭṭa Divākaraṇa has stated in his Vivekāñjana in the verses beginning with :—

"The objects shine"

and ending in :—

"It does not cease to be by a mere emphatic denial."

In the practical world, however, this causal relation often appears to be indirect, because of the appearance of the limited self, due to the multiplicity of the manifested, which is essentially the infinite group of powers, which are invariably within the Supreme Creative Power, characterized by Perfect Will. That indirect causality will be proved to be a manifestation of Māyā. It is of innumerable kinds, due to the innumerable subdivisions of the sentient and the insentient. It is this which is responsible for the relation between the creator and the created and the object and means of knowledge as we perceive in ordinary life.

Where, however, the unlimited light of Self, possessed of All-Transcending Power, which is nothing but the essential nature of the Pure Self, is the Cause, and there is no intervention of the limited self, a manifestation of Māyā, there the causality

is conceived to be that of the Supreme. This is called "Grace" the fifth and the last act of the Supreme Power, which leads to the attainment of the highest human goal. For, Perfect Freedom is due to that alone. As for the liberation taught by other systems, it will be said later that it is partial and not complete and, therefore, an illusory one. The Grace is the other causal relation: the Grace, which cannot be clearly conceived, because it is different from the well-known causal relation, established by invariable concomitance and logical discontinuance in ordinary life; the Grace, the essential nature of which is revealed by the liberation, which sometimes occurs; the miraculous nature of which is due to the operation of the Supreme Creative Power, characterised by the bringing about of the impossible; and which cannot be attained merely by hundreds of longings for the removal of the beginningless dark veil, which hides the true nature of the Self. And it (the Grace) is referred to as such by the word 'Katham' together with the suggestive particle 'Cit'. The word "Kathañcit" means "somehow" by devotion, which is inspired by the Lord Himself, to the teacher who has identified himself with the Lord. As has been said :—

"The Union is very difficult to attain."

In the word 'āsādyā' 'ā' means 'from all sides' i.e. 'completely', and sādayitvā (Sādyā) means, 'having made it fully fit for realisation' by one's own self. Thus, because of his having known the knowable, his competence to present the system for others is shown. Otherwise, he would have been a mere deceiver. By means of the past time (which is expressed by 'lyap') immediate sequence is intended to be implied here. Otherwise the highest stage of identification having been reached and the affections of the impurities of Māyā having been destroyed, how could there remain the possibility of imparting instruction to others?

There do exist powerful deities within the sphere of Māyā, such as Viṣṇu, Viriñca etc. Further, there are beings partly pure, namely, Mantra, Mantreśa, and Mantra Mahesa, who are within the sphere of Mahāmāyā, beyond the Māyā; and finally, there are pure beings Sadāśiva etc. But Maheśvara is that glorious One, by the sparks of whose Power they have attained Godhead and whose essential nature is perfect Freedom, consisting in unbroken self-luminosity and self-consciousness (Ananda). By speaking of identity with 'Him', the author indicates that establishing of His Recognition is of very great consequence. The word 'Dāsyā' means a state of the 'devotee'

to whom the Lord gives all that is desired. By means of this word, the author represents himself to be the recipient of the perfect Power of Will, which is not different from the Highest Lord himself. The word 'Janasya' means 'of whatever that is born'. Thus, he means to point out that there is no restriction of any kind in regard to the right to follow this system. Whosoever realises the true nature of the Self, attains the highest goal, because self-realisation is the highest goal and that cannot be impeded by anything which is regarded as an impediment. For, whatever is realised is realised. It has been said :—

"Here no beginning is futile; nor is there any impediment. Even a little of this spiritual attainment saves a man from great fear."

My great-grand-teacher also has said in his Śivadṛṣṭi:—

"Once, one gets the unshakable knowledge of the Omnipresence of Siva, through the means of right knowledge, scripture, or preceptorial instruction, the instruments of knowledge and meditation, become perfectly useless. For, once gold is known as such, are the instruments necessary to reveal its genuineness? At all times, the certainty is due to a firm belief, as in the case of one's parents etc."

The word 'janasya' means, of one who is constantly troubled by births and deaths. By this word, he declares the transmigrating souls to be deserving of help, because of their being objects of compassion. *The word 'api' indicates his identity with the Supreme and precludes the possibility of any other motive in him than the good of others; because he has attained perfection. The good of others is also really a motive, because the definition of motive applies to it. There is no divine curse that only one's own good can become a motive and not that of others. Even one's own good, if it does not come within the definition, is not a motive at all. That which is fixed upon as the main object of attainment and, therefore, urges one on to action, is motive (Prayojana). Hence the founder of the Nyāya system in order to show that, even according to Dualism, the motive of God in creating the world etc. is the good of others, has defined 'motive' as follows :—

"Motive is that, aiming at which man acts."

*According to Bhāskara the translation would be as follows:—

The word 'api' indicates the author's identification with the persons to be helped and, therefore completely precludes the possibility of any other motive in him.

By means of the present participial affix (Śatr) in 'icchan' he points out that the object aimed at is the cause of action. We shall show that the will-power as it gradually grows, develops into the power of action. The word 'Upa' means 'near'. Therefore, the aim here is to bring the ordinary mortal nearer the state of the Highest Reality. Therefore, it is that he used the word 'all' (samasta). Once the state of the Highest Reality is reached, all attainable things, which merely flow from it, are automatically attained, just as all the gems are, when the mountain of gems, called 'Rohana', is acquired. To one who has missed the Highest Reality, namely, the Self, other attainments are useless. By one who has attained that Highest Reality, there is nothing else to be desired. As the author himself has stated :—

"Those who are rich in the wealth of devotion have nothing left to be desired. To those who are poor in it, what is the use of a quest for other things?"

Thus, by taking 'samasta' etc., as a genitive compound, the purpose has been stated: but, by taking it as an attributive compound, the means is indicated:— "That Recognition of the Ultimate, in which (yasyām) the clear consciousness (Samavāpti) of the essential nature (sapat) of the external and internal objects, both existing and non-existing, such as 'blue' and 'pleasure' etc. (Samasta) is the cause (hetu)." Indeed, it is taught in this system that the attainment of the true self is possible only through an investigation of the ultimate source of the knowledge of 'blue' and 'pleasure' etc. which so distinctly affect the consciousness. As has been stated elsewhere :—

"The ultimate end of all objective consciousness, 'this', is its merging in the Self. The consciousness 'I am that' stands for it."

In the same context it is further stated :—

"Ahambhāva has been declared to be the merging of the object in the subject. The same is called the rest (viśrānti) the perfect Freedom, the supreme causal agency and supreme creative power, because it involves the disappearance of all desires".

By this, all apprehension that the means is difficult to adopt, has been set aside. He will state at the end of the work:—

"This new path is smooth" (4-1-16).

"Tasya" means 'of Maheśvara'. 'Recognition' means shining (Jñā-jñāna) as facing oneself (ābhimukhyena) of what was forgotten. "Pratipam" implies that it is not that the consciousness

of the Self has never before been a fact of experience, because it always shines; but that, as will be explained later, through His own power, it appears as though cut off, or limited. Recognition consists in the unification of what appeared once with what appears now, as in the judgment "This is the same Caitra". It is a cognition, which refers to an object, which is directly present. It is reached through unification of experiences. In ordinary life, in such statements as "So and so has been made to be recognised by the king" recognition means cognition, consisting in unification of experiences at the time of the subsequent apprehension of one who was known before, either in general terms or in particular, as the son of so and so, of such and such description and qualities. In the present context also the knowledge of the Lord as possessed of Supreme Power, having been got through the well known Purāṇas, Siddhānta, Āgama and inference etc., and the immediate apprehension of one's own self being always there, recognition arises through the unification of the two experiences in the form : "Certainly I am that very Lord". "I shall establish that Recognition". In 'Upapādayāmi' the root with prefix (upapad-upapatti) means potential existence. The causal affix means that potentiality being there, I, through my causal agency, bring it into play. Indeed, there is the potentiality of recognition, because the Self is ever shining. Bringing about is no more than the removal of the influence of Māyā, which is considered to be a force of obscuration. The active voice has been used in 'upapādayāmi' because in the bringing about of recognition, the distinction between oneself and others being absent (in the agent), there is no possibility of the agent's being affected by any purpose etc.

The following is the prose-order of this stanza : —

"Having somehow got union with the Highest, which is the cause of the attainment of all that is attainable, and desiring the benefit of ordinary mortals by helping them in getting union with the Highest Reality, which is the means of attaining all that is attainable, through somehow bringing about His recognition, I establish His Recognition which is the means of attainment of all that is attainable."

In the word 'āsādyā' when it is used in the construction a second time, there are two causal affixes (ñic).

The writer of the Vṛtti has not taken the trouble of giving such a detailed explanation, because his object was simply to state the implication. This is what has been said : —

"(In the Vṛtti) which is intended to explain briefly what is obscure in the aphorisms."

The writer of the Tīkā also, being concerned with the exposition of the Vṛtti only, has not touched this point. We have, however, explained it in detail, because our attempt is to give a full exposition of the aphorism. This holds good everywhere.

Thus, in this verse, the subject-matter, the object, its object and the object of the latter, the statement of the qualification of the person, for whom this system is meant, the preceptorial line and the relation are shown. By dissolving the compound as an instrumental attributive, the means to a spiritual path has been determined. The objective world, (represented by 'blue' 'pleasure' etc.) constitutes the entire possession, and is at first the cause of sin and merit etc., the root cause of transmigration. By this Sāstra the same is made to be recognised as the sure means to spiritual path. Thus, the author who, at the end of the work, refers to his power of accomplishing what is difficult by the words "New Path" (4.1.16), has indicated that the statement of means is the subject-matter of the work. That is why he will begin another stanza with the words :—

"Thus, of the insentient" (1.1.4.)

The object is the knowledge of the means of recognition; the object of the object is the recognition itself, the object of the latter is the exclusive consciousness of the Ultimate Reality, which is all that is attainable. There is nothing beyond it, because even a fraction of it is the ultimate goal of all goals. This is what I have myself said in a Stotra :—

"O Lord! the ultimate aim of all worldly or religious acts is the identification with you. Those who seek some other end in this unification also, will ever remain in a state of ignorance."

He will himself say later on in a hemistich.

"Therefore, setting foot on that." (4. 1. 16.)

By the word 'of the ordinary mortal' (janasya) the person, for whom the system is meant, is indicated, as he will say in conclusion :—

"Always concentrating on this" (4. 2. 1.)

By the word 'somehow' (kathañcit) the preceptorial line is shown; as he will say :—

"As the great teacher has said in his work, the Śivadr̥ṣṭi." (4.2.1.)

This stanza, because it puts together all that is to be said about 'recognition' is a summary statement of the subject-matter

and authorial undertaking. The mid-portion of the work states the reasons etc., and the last verse:—

“Thus I have shown” etc. (4. 1. 16.)

is the conclusion. Thus, this work, which presents the subject-matter in a syllogistic form including five terms has the instruction of others as its object. The idea of the author that in the creations of Māyā, the point of view of the Naiyāyika is the right one, will become clear in such statement as “Action, Relation, Generality.” (2. 2. 1.)

This is the substance of the work.

Just as a good man, familiar with the lord of the land, brings about the approach of an ordinary mortal, endowed with the qualities of a servant, to the lord and reveals the lord as possessed of the group of qualities such as approachability to the ordinary mortal: so the author, who has realised the Supreme, being a good man, brings about the recognition of the Supreme by the ordinary man. This much meaning is conveyed by the dissolution of ‘Tatpratyaabhijñā’ as the genitive determinative compound “His Recognition”.

At the time of hearing this stanza the identity of the pupils with the Ultimate takes place through understanding of this śloka. That is as follows:— On hearing the word “of the ordinary mortal (janasya)” the meaning of the treatise on the system is reflected in the consciousness of the deserving disciple, as a reflection on the mirror; not when he takes it indifferently, but when the third person of the various tenses ‘lot’, ‘lin’ etc. appeals to him as the first person, as follows:—

“We are the persons, who are troubled by birth and death and have various kinds of attachments. This teacher, desiring our benefit, having realised his identity with the Supreme, establishes His Recognition, which is the means of attaining all that is attainable and, therefore, we have as good as attained His Recognition of the above nature.”

Otherwise, there would be no difference between the meanings understood by the deserving and the undeserving.

When the meaning of the sentence ‘Persons, desiring health, should use the yellow myrobalan’ or ‘You should use the yellow myrobalan’ appears in the consciousness of the deserving as “Let us use etc.”, that is the second stage. But the second stage will be reached only by him, who imagines himself to be free from the limitations of time, as he really is, who believes that the third stage, namely, the use of the yellow myrobalan, is the

attainment of the end, which is really reached only in the fourth stage; and whose knowledge is free from all limitations and, therefore, beautiful, because of his having realised perfection within himself. Others are undeserving; because they are really indifferent, and, therefore, are not of this nature. This will suffice; because it is a digression and rather abstruse. Thus, the point is established. By means of this śloka, the approach of the disciples to the Lord is brought about, and the object etc. are stated. (1)

"We always praise that Śiva, whose initial Creative Stir (param spandanam) is the beginning of the manifestation of the innumerable variety of objects."

Well, first of all, Īśvara has to be proved.

What is meant by proving (Siddhi)? It cannot mean 'bringing into being', because He is eternal. Even those who prove the existence of the Supreme do not bring Him into being. But if you mean by the word 'proving' 'revealing', it is of no use in the case of Him who is of unlimited light, because proving consists in throwing light by means of right knowledge.

How do you know that His light is unlimited? For, we do not see His light in ordinary objects like 'blue' and 'pleasure'. Still less we do so in deep sleep and unconsciousness, where the wordly objects do not appear at all. Even if the Supreme be self-shining, why is it that the cognitive activity of the subject in reference to Him is useless? With this objection in mind, the author says:—

- (i) "Which sentient being can prove or disprove the Supreme Lord, who is essentially Omnipotent, omniscient and eternal?"

The Universe being merely His manifestation, who, by what means of knowledge, regarding what kind of Lord can advance proof or disproof, leading to the knowledge of His being or not-being? If you say "The subject" what is that? Is it the insentient body etc. or something different from them, called by some such word as 'self'? And is that too essentially self-shining or not? If it be the insentient body etc., how can that, not being self-shining, make something else shine? The self also, if it be not self-shining, would naturally be insentient and, therefore, no better than the former. If it be essentially self-shining; (the question will arise) "What is the essential nature of its self-shining?" If it shines merely in the form of unchanging pure consciousness, then the differentiation of cognitions and the putting together of the differentiated by internal unification,

will not be possible. Therefore, it has to be admitted that it shines as free self-shining entity. Shining as such, what kind of Lord will it prove or disprove? If it be one that knows and acts i.e. possesses the powers of knowledge and action, the subject itself being such, how is the Lord different from it? It cannot be argued that the subject is neither omniscient nor omnipotent; because, the 'meaning' of the word 'omni' (Sarva) does not imply any difference in the essential nature of the powers of action and knowledge. For, even according to the dualistic system, the knowledge, desire and action of the Lord, being eternal, are not affected i.e. added to, in any way by the objects, which are not their causes. If it be said that the objectivity of an object consists in being made to shine (by the subject), we will reply that what is essentially not-light cannot be made to shine. But if the object be held to be of the nature of light, then it is light in every way. Thus the ultimate truth being that the light shines, what would be the essential distinction between all-knowing and one who knows little. The same question as to whether it is self-shining or not may be raised in regard to the means of right knowledge and in the case of the proving (siddhi) itself also. Therefore, assuming the form of what is ordinarily known as the object, the Self itself shines, free from all limitations. It shines even to one who is in deep sleep (I) because otherwise, the remembrance of it would be impossible, (II) because the light is eternal, as there is nothing to limit it : and (III) because it shines to other subjects. As for the difference of subjects from one another, which is due to Prakāśa itself, it will be represented to be a manifestation of Māyā.

He (The Lord) is free. And it will be explained that His Freedom is manifold and consists in bringing about diversity in unity and unity in diversity by internal unification. The word Kartari has been put first, because this represents His omnipotential ultimate nature, which consists in 'Ānanda', "Freedom". To point out an aspect of that very Freedom, the word 'jñātari' has been used later. It will be explained later that action is essentially an offshoot of knowledge. Therefore, the words 'kartari' and 'jñātari' in the text mean the same thing as "the one who is perfectly free in all actions, and is omnipotent". This very Freedom constitutes the essential nature of consciousness (Saṁvid). It will be stated later that if it be referred to by the word 'Saṁvit', then that would mean that it is an object of determinate knowledge and, therefore, objective and created, and as such it is not the ultimate Reality. The use of the nominative forms 'Kartā' 'Jñātā' and 'Mahēśvara', would involve

the same difficulty. Therefore, an effort had to be made as far as possible, to avoid the taint of degradation consisting in bringing it down to the state of objectivity. Therefore, reference has been made in a case, expressive of an accomplished state: because, at the time of instruction, it is impossible to avoid objectivity in every way.

By the word 'Svātmani' which means 'in his own unchanging nature', there is a refutation of the insentient self, accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas etc. 'Ādisiddhe' means 'of the unlimited light'. The Supreme Creative Power implied by the word 'maheśvare' consists in manifesting oneself as omniscient and omnipotent on account of having unlimited light. The word 'Ajaḍātmā' implies : "Let the Vaiśeṣikas etc., according to whom self is really insentient, try to prove the Lord. And let the Sāṅkhya disprove Him. For, the Sāṅkhya also in holding the cognition, (jañāna) the nature of which is to illumine objects, to be a quality of the Buddhi, really declares the Self to be insentient. And an insentient self, which can hardly shine itself independently, cannot, like a stone, prove or disprove anything." Nor can one, according to whom the self is sentient, do this. For, how would he, being an Ajaḍātmavādin, prove the Self? The reason may be stated as follows:—

If the Self, as conceived by him, appears to him as new, it would mean that it did not shine before, and if it did not shine before, it comes to be insentient. And how would he, being an Ajaḍātmavādin, disprove ? For, if it does not shine, it is insentient and it has already been said that neither the insentient nor the sentient can do it (i.e. prove or disprove Maheśvara). Therefore, the light of the external object is non-different from the light of the Self. It has no truly independent existence. And the Self is nothing but light. Therefore, just as there is no activity of a causal agent in relation to Maheśvara, so there is neither that of the means of right knowledge; because He is eternal and self-shining. (1)

But if neither the causal agent nor the means of right knowledge can be operative in relation to Maheśvara, what is then the nature of the activity which is referred to in the statement "I shall help in bringing about His recognition" ? To this objection the author replies as follows:—

- (2) "But the help in bringing about the recognition of Self is nothing but bringing to notice the powers of Self, which, though known, yet is not fully realised, because its powers are obscured by the veil of Māyā."

There is no doubt about it that the Self, which is omnipotent, manifests itself. It is free in its manifestation; therefore, there is no form in which it does not manifest itself. It shines in forms, which are self-luminous, as well as those which lack luminosity. While manifesting itself as self-luminous it manifests itself as either wholly self-luminous or as partly so. In manifesting itself as partly self-luminous, it manifests itself either as distinct from the rest (e.g. jīva) or as identical with them (e.g. Mantra-maheśa). It also manifests itself as distinct from some (e.g. Vidyeshvara) or as identical with some (e.g. Vijñānakala) or as including within itself all the forms, mentioned above. Thus there are seven forms.

Of these the first is insentient (jaḍa) and the last is the Absolute (Paramaśiva). But those which come in between these two are the limited sentient beings (jīvas). That very power of the Great Lord, which is responsible for obscurity, and is called Māyā, partly obscures the Self, which is ever self-luminous. Self, therefore, is not fully visualised, is not realised in all its aspects, and consequently it has no causal efficiency, such as it shows when it is fully realised. Hence, in order to arouse the consciousness of perfection of Self, the way to recognition, which has been explained already (in the 1st verse), is being shown. How? By exposing to view the perfect powers of knowledge and action, which are known to belong to the Lord. For, that which can be brought about by full conviction cannot be produced unless that conviction itself is produced. Accordingly the author gives an illustration :—"By those various entreaties" etc.

The crux of the whole discussion may be stated as follows:—

The act of bringing about recognition of the Lord, is not the act of causal agent, nor that of one who makes things known. It is simply the removal of the ignorance. For, the efficiency of the means of right knowledge, on which the practical life depends, consists in that much only. For instance, the statement, "this, that lies in front, is a jar, because it is directly perceived" does not make the jar known. For, it is already known; because otherwise, the reason (because it is directly perceived) would be non-existent in the minor term. It simply removes the ignorance. Both, the ignorance and its removal, are simply manifestations of the Lord and nothing more. This has already been stated and shall also be asserted later on. (2)

Here one may ask: among the multiple objects of experience, whose power is revealed and to whom? For, there is no difference of opinion on this that insentients do not possess the power of knowledge. And the power of action also, which owes

its being to freedom, is impossible in them, because they have lost their freedom. It is for this reason that some maintain that in statements such as "Chariot is going" the use of the verb "go" is due to transference of epithet (upacāra). The position, therefore, that the power is revealed to the insentients is not at all reasonable. But if it be said that both have reference to the sentient living beings, then the hope to establish that Maheśvara is the Self of all becomes still more distant. Having raised this question, the author replies as follows:—

- (3) "The being of the insentient depends entirely on the sentient; and (the powers of) knowledge and action are the very life of the sentient beings."

The word "Tathāhi" indicates the commencement of the argument. It means "look here". Others hold that the word 'Tathā' indicates what is to be proved and the word "hi" stands for the reason. It means that the statement of major term has the support of reason. Or the word 'Tathāhi' means that all that has been said is right, in view of the reasons, which are going to be stated in the book, which is, as yet, only in the mind of the author and is tried to be brought before the mind's eye.

It is to be admitted that the multiplicity of the objects of world is as it is determinately apprehended; because the being, (Astitva), which depends on the light of consciousness (Prakāśa), shines on the basis of determinate cognition, which refers to objects of experience. For, otherwise what will be the reply if some one were to ask:—"Why is it that what has not been determinately apprehended is neither blue nor yellow, neither of the nature of 'being' nor that of 'not-being'?" Therefore, a thing is as it is determinately apprehended, for as long a time as it remains uncontradicted. Hence it is that it will be asserted in the sequel, in the verse: "Action, relation and universal" that substance, action and relation which involve temporal and spatial order, are real; because, every one of them shines in a separate determinate cognition.

Therefore, the whole of this vast universe, can be divided into (i) insentient and (ii) sentient, if we take a summary view of it. Of these also, the insentients, as objects of determinate cognition, have no independent being. For, objectivity to cognition is not their inherent quality, because in that case they will cease to be insentient. The insentients, though they are essentially of the nature of consciousness (Cinmayatvepi); yet they are reduced to the state of insentiency by the power of the Lord, called Māyā. They, therefore, have their being only as related to and dependent

upon sentient subject, as is testified by perceptual judgements such as "the blue shines to me" and "the blue is the object of my knowledge." Hence the insentients have no separate independent being. This is what the author himself has said in the following verse:—

"Thus, these insentients, which are as good as non-existent in themselves, have their being only in relation to Light of consciousness (Prakāśa). Light of consciousness alone has independent being and shines as both self and not-self."

That alone has independent being which shines independently of others. And because the so-called insentient is nothing independently of the Light of consciousness, therefore, the view that the power of insentients is revealed to insentients is baseless. As regards those which are known to be sentients as distinct from the insentients, their bodies, vital airs, group of eight (Puryaṣṭaka) and nihility (Sūnya) are insentient. Therefore, we cannot attribute powers of knowledge and action to them. Hence only that, on the background of which alone the so-called existing things, such as jar, body, vital air and pleasure and their not-being, shine, is sentient and true. And although apparently it appears to be multiple, yet its multiplicity is due to the limiting conditions, constituted by body etc., which are essentially insentient. Hence its multiplicity is unreal, because it involves logical fallacy, called "Anyonyāśraya". For, variety of the sentients is due to variety of the insentients, and the difference of the insentients is due to that of the sentients e. g. "this is his body" and "this is his object of knowledge". The variety of particular objects such as blue and yellow; as it shines on the background of subject, so it has multiplicity only. What of that? Therefore, it is established that all the individual subjects are really one and that subject is characterised by life. And life consists in doing the act of living in the form of knowing and acting. For, only he is said to be living who knows and acts. Therefore, the individual subject is to be looked upon as Lord (because he possesses the powers of knowledge and action) like the Lord, of whom we know from Purāṇa and Itihāsa. Even if He be not known as such from the Purāṇic tradition, He has to be admitted as such. For, lordliness (aiśvarya) is essentially nothing more than the possession of powers of knowledge and action, in relation to all objects, because it is dependent on that much only. The basis of this admission is the knowledge of invariable concomitance of the two, acquired from such instances as acknowledged king etc. e. g. "He, who has freedom of knowing and acting in a particular

field, is the lord of it, like a king" : because it is against the essential nature of one who is not lord to have freedom of knowledge and action. And it is the self which knows and acts in all fields. Therefore, this doctrine of recognition is proved.

The two transcendental categories: (1) Sadāśiva and (II) Īśvara, are nothing more than powers of knowledge and action respectively, before the rise of gross distinction between them and their objects, Vidyā and Kalā are due to the rise of general distinction between them and their objects. Similarly the group of powers of sense-organs and organs of action is due to the rise of specific distinction. At the time of imparting instruction there is the consciousness of distinction between the insentient as lifeless and the sentient as living, but there is no consciousness of Saṁvīt (in its essential nature, as one which manifests itself in all forms). Hence the word "jivatām" in the text stands for the sentient subjects. (3)

But it may be asked: how do you establish the existence of powers of knowledge and action (in the individual subject) which alone can justify the attribution of possession of lordliness to him? To answer this question the author says : —

- (4) "Of these (the power of) knowledge is self-established; and so also is (the power of) action. The latter, when associated with a particular body, is perceptible to other limited perceivers. From that the presence of (the power of) knowledge in others is guessed."

All the three forms of cognition: (I) I know (II) I knew (III) I shall know, shine on the background of self-luminous self-consciousness only. There is nothing more to be discussed about it. For, if the self were not shining, the whole world would be nothing but mass of darkness, or it would not be even that. Even (the Statement of) a child conveys the idea of self-luminosity of self. This is what is asserted in : —

"Through what means of knowledge can the knower be known."

If we deny self-shining nature to subject, there remains no room for question and answer. In the cognitive experience such as "I know" there is consciousness (not only of self-luminous self but) of association with a stir (Spanda) also. It is because of this stir that self is admitted to be of sentient nature, as distinct from the qualities such as white etc., which are extremely

insentient. This stir is technically called "Vimarsā". It is the power of action. This is what has been asserted by our great-grand-teacher, Somānanda : —

"At the time of cognition of jar etc. the subjective stir in relation to jar is action."

Therefore, internal power of action, like that of cognition, is self-established and self-shining. That very internal power of action, because of its inherent power, enters into body, through vital air and 'the group of eight', and being of stirring nature in itself, becomes directly perceptible as physical action in the sphere of Māyā. That physical action, when seen in another person's body, logically makes us guess (the presence of) the power of knowledge (jñāna) which is its essential nature. And the light of consciousness (jñāna) does not shine as "this". For, "thisness" is negation of knowledge (ajñāna). And a thing that is cognised in the form of something else cannot be said to be truly cognised. But the fact that the light of consciousness shines, cannot be denied. And that which shines is the essential nature of the subject. Hence the light of consciousness, which is associated with another person at the empirical level, is non-different from the light of consciousness of the cognising subject. The otherness is due to the limiting conditions of it. And if we proceed to think rationally, we discover that the limiting condition itself is non-different from Self. Hence, from the philosophical point of view, all the subjects are One. That One alone is. This is asserted in the following :—

"It is one and the same Self that shines as one's own self as well as selves of others."

Therefore, all knowledge, whether it be in Sadāśiva or in a worm, is the knowledge of one knower. Hence the omniscience of the subject is established as a conclusion from the premises. The same can be asserted in regard to the action of the subject. This is what has been asserted by our great-grand-teacher in his Sivadr̥ṣṭi : —

"Jar (is one with myself at the time of my desire to know and therefore) knows as one with myself. And I am one with jar in knowing. Sadāśiva knows as myself. And I know as Sadāśiva. Śiva alone shines, knowing himself through the multiplicity of objects."etc.

The word 'is guessed' (Ūhyate) indicates that the power of knowledge is not an object of any means of right knowledge. Otherwise he would have used the word "is inferred" (Anumīyate)

Thus, those, who have not been altogether blinded by (the fall of dust of) discourse of logicians to this path, enter into Him when they realise through the above dialectic the identity of the individual self and the universal and merge everything, such as jar, body, vital air and pleasure and even their not-being, in Him. Therefore, this is introduction (upodghāta), because, like a chisel, it is instrumental in bringing out the distinctive features of the rise (Utkarṣa), due to recognition. This much alone is the purpose of this book.

It (the first Āhnika) can be spoken of as an introduction for the reason that through brief presentation of the system, it removes ignorance about what is primarily to be presented in the book; or the root 'Han' may be taken to mean 'to know', because it means to go; and, therefore, it may be called introduction, because through this the purport of the book is known. Some, however, hold that the meaning of 'Han' 'to go' is limited to going to women. Thus, through undisturbed contemplation on the meaning of the above four verses Paramaśiva is attained. The Chapter ends (4).

Here ends the first, the introductory, chapter of the jñānādhikāra (section dealing with the power of knowledge) in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśini, written by illustrious teacher, Abhinavagupta, who was a pupil of illustrious teacher, Lakṣmaṇagupta, who himself was a pupil of illustrious teacher, Utpaladeva. (1)

ĀHNIKA II

We bow to that Śiva who, having manifested the diversity of the universe as the *prima facie* view, leads it up to unity, the real view.

The ultimate Reality, conceived by this system, is made quite clear if the opposite views are first postulated and then refuted. As Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa has said :—

“Homage to the Deity, which at first creates the illusion for those who are deluded in the world and then dispels it, and which at first conceals the unitary bliss of pure Self-Consciousness and then reveals it.”

Here the author, wishing to reveal the Reality after having dispelled the illusion of those who deny both the Self and God, presents the illusion in eleven verses, beginning with “Nanu svalakṣaṇābhāsam” and ending in “Tena kartāpi kalpitah”. In the first two verses, the being of the eternal Self, as conceived by those who maintain the direct perceptibility of the self, is denied, because it is not perceived as such. In the next three verses the position of those who maintain the inferability of the self is refuted, on the ground that the unification of experiences, involved in remembrance, can be explained in terms of the residual traces and, therefore, is not sufficient for the inference of the self. In the next one, the inference, that through the qualities, like knowledge etc., the substratum can be inferred, is refuted. Having thus refuted the self, the next two verses make it clear that the conception of ‘knowledge’ as distinct from the self, as held by other opponents (Vaiśeṣika) as well as the Sāṅkhya conception of it, do not stand to reason. This is done only to refute the view that the Ultimate is Omnipotent and Omniscient, because of the possession of powers of knowledge and action. In the next one, it is declared that action as such has no external existence anywhere. Having refuted the arguments in support of it, he states the arguments against it. Then in the next verse, he denies the existence of relation on the ground that there is no proof in support of it. Then in the next verse, he gives the argument against it. The last verse states the Buddhistic theory that there is no eternal Self nor are knowledge and action its characteristics. This is the summary of the *prima facie* view.

Now the meaning of the text is being explained.

(1-2) “The objector says—“Indeterminate cognition has no variety. But the determinate cognition, which admits of linguistic expression, is of many kinds. Neither belongs to an eternal

experiencer, because none such is experienced. The I—consciousness has reference only to the body etc.”

“Nanu” means objection. It has been stated that the self which is essentially consciousness, is permanent. But that is not right. For, such an eternal self-luminous self is not experienced. It is as follows:—

Cognitions (jñāna) alone shine, associated with different times, objects and forms, such as indeterminate cognition of jar, determinate cognition of it, recognition of it, remembrance of it and imagination of it. Indeterminate knowledge of ‘blue’ is that in which the characteristics of the object of knowledge are cognised as common to nothing else, (Svalakṣaṇābhāsam jñānam). “Sva” means not applicable to others, i.e., self-confined. “Lakṣaṇa” consists of limitations of time, space and form. Ābhāsa means light of the object facing the subject. Thus, indeterminate knowledge is that extrovert light of consciousness, wherein ‘svalakṣaṇa’ as defined above, shines. Its essential nature does not change in spite of the change in the object. For, there is no cause to bring about any variety in its nature. In the case of determinate knowledge, expression is the cause of variety; but that is absent here. For, expression is not an attribute of the object, the ‘blue’; nor is it perceived by the eye. Therefore, it is something which was known before and is to be remembered now. In the absence of the revival of the residual trace, there is no remembrance. The revival is due to the determinate perception of the object. Therefore, at the time of the indeterminate perception of object, there is no remembrance of the expression.

Determinate knowledge is different from it. For, all determinate knowledge springs from the indeterminate directly or indirectly. The word “param” means “of a different nature”. The object of determinate knowledge is a thing, which is characterised by a universal. “Svalakṣaṇa” is extremely self-confined. Hence, there is no possibility of the use of conventional expression in regard to indeterminate cognition; because whether it be acquired through the observations of the transactions of the elders or through teaching, it involves elaborate determinate knowledge. Even if it be used, it would serve no useful purpose, because it cannot be applied to another object and, therefore, cannot be used in practical life.

Determinate knowledge is of many kinds, because it is invariably associated with expression, which is nothing more than inner speech. Expression is of many kinds : “this, that, that is

this, it may be this, this or this etc.". It (the expression) does not belong to the object ; on the contrary, it gives variety of forms to cognition. Hence determinate knowledge is of various kinds. Thus, the chain of indeterminate and determinate cognitions is self-shining.

It may be so. But the view that the substratum of these cognitions is also self-shining is not sound: because both these types of cognition, the determinate and the indeterminate, are not related to any cogniser different from themselves. If we accept the theory of the existence of the external object, they may be spoken of as related to the perceptible. The reason is this:—The cogniser is admitted to be essentially of the nature of consciousness. This implies that it is self-shining. As such, it should be cognisable. But there is no consciousness of it in either of these two types of cognition. It cannot be maintained that this negative reasoning is invalid, because the self does shine, as in the following:—"I know, I am certain, I remember this". In all these forms of cognition the persisting "I" shines as persisting through all of them. It is distinct from the direct apprehension and remembrance etc., which represent the meanings of the roots "Vid" etc., as also from the thing which is the object of cognitive activity such as "this". Who says it shines? For, "to shine" is indeterminacy, but the self-consciousness is a form of determinate knowledge, because it is associated with the expression 'I'. Even then it may be asked : "What does this word 'I' determine"? does it determine the chain of physical consciousness, because the 'I-consciousness' is associated with it, as in 'I am thin' : or does it determine the chain of feelings, because of the experience "I am happy, etc.?" For, the possessive affix refers to the chain only and nothing outside. This has been asserted (in kārikā) in "Even the self-consciousness refers to the body". By the word 'etc.' (ādi) feeling is implied. Surely, the "I" determines it (body etc.) as a chain, because the 'I-consciousness' is affected by the residual traces, due to the past experiences of the different similar moments in the chain. "This" (eṣā) means that which is not denied by us, because it is implied in the statement:—"Determinate knowledge is associated with expressions". The crux may be stated as follows:—

The I—consciousness itself is not the self, because it is a determinate cognition and it is transitory in its nature. There is nothing different from body etc. which is referred to by this "I-consciousness". And even if there be, it would be objective in its nature. Thus no self, different from the cognition and the

Object thereof, is established. This is the implication of the word "api". Therefore, there is no self, different from the cognition and its object, because it is not experienced as it should be (1—2).

Now the upholder of the self takes recourse to inference.

(3) "If the experiencing self were not permanent, how can there be the rise of memory, which so closely resembles direct perception, and is consequent on the destruction of the direct experience?"

It is immaterial whether the object of remembrance persists or does not, at the time of recollection. But there is no difference of opinion on this point that the experience does not persist. And remembrance closely follows the direct perception. It is as follows:—

In remembrance the object does not shine indeterminately; nor is there any determinative activity related to it; nor do the object and the experience shine separately like two fingers; nor does the object shine as qualified by the experience, as does the man by the stick; because then the judgment would be 'this'.

In memory, the direct experience shines predominantly. But as (the light of) the object is an essential constituent of the experience, so that object invariably shines in the experience. If, however, the experience be destroyed in every way, how can remembrance, in which the chief element is the former experience, have objective reference through it? All worldly transactions depend on memory. Its being cannot, therefore, be denied. It is, therefore, indicative of the existence of something after the destruction of experience. And that something is the experiencer, the essential nature of which is to experience. That is the permanent experiencing self. This is the whole basis of the proof of the existence of the self. More than this has not been mentioned by the author here in order that the statement of the *prima facie* view may not end here; because subsequently he wants to say something more, that remains. The implication of 'how can there be' (katham bhavet) may be stated as follows:—

The object can in no way be responsible for memory. And the experience has been destroyed. The rise of memory, therefore, would be out of the question. In the absence of it there would be no determinate knowledge, which depends upon the memory of the conventional expression. In the absence of the determinate knowledge, people would be no better than the blind, the deaf and the dumb, and would perish without being able to cry for help. (3)

The cause, as distinct from the effect, has to be so conceived as to be efficient to bring about the effect. The self is not such (as can account for remembrance). The object is surely remembered and that is through the shining of the direct experience. It has been said that the direct experience is gone. Therefore, even if there be something like self, what of that? One might as well say that ether (Ākāśa) also exists. If it be said: "It (memory) is to be accounted for, not by the mere self, but the residual traces also play a part in it". Well then, let that alone be admitted. What is the use of this (self)? This is presented in the following verse:—

(4) **"Even if there be a self, the direct experience being destroyed, how could there be memory of things, experienced through that? But if it be said that memory also refers to the same as does the direct experience."**

In the remembrance of the seen, i.e. objects of direct experience, the direct experience is the means of its relation to the object. And that experience is lost, though the self may persist. For, if that be not lost, the object would continuously shine as "this". Therefore, there would be no remembrance. How can, therefore, the (admission of) Experiencer explain it?

"Tatpadā" is an attributive compound. It means: the object of remembrance, the remembered, is the same as that of direct experience. "Sā" stands for remembrance. (4)

The objection, "How can memory claim to have the same object as that of some other cognition?", is answered as follows:—

(5) **"Because the rise of memory is due to the residual traces of the former direct experience."**

(Reply to the above). "If it be so, why then admit the useless permanent self?"

The direct experience produces a befitting residual trace and this residual trace (Saṃskāra) is responsible for the restoration of the former condition (of the subject) as in the case of the branch of a tree forced down, or the birch-bark, kept rolled up for long and then spread out. Therefore, in the present case also, the residual trace, will make the memory conform to the former experience. Thus the object of the direct experience becomes the object of memory.

If so, what is the use of the self? For, just as carrying of a useless thing means unnecessary trouble, so the admission of permanent self means unnecessary and troublesome speculation. All worldly transactions can be accounted for in terms of residual traces. (5)

The objection:—But the substratum of the residual trace has to be stated. For, the residual trace is a quality and, therefore, needs a substratum. That substratum itself is the self (Ātmā). To this objection the author replies as follows:—

(6) “Though the residual traces be admitted to be different from self, yet, there being no change in the essential nature of self (due to residual traces), remembrance has to be admitted to be due to residual trace. Hence the separate rememberer is a mere supposition just like the doer.”

If in consequence of the rise of residual trace some change takes place in the self, that change being in the self itself, it cannot be maintained to be eternal. But if it be asserted that the self remains unaffected (by the residual trace), then it is useless for the self. If (following the Vaiśeṣika) the residual trace be admitted to be a particularity of self, then it means that self is not different from other changing things; that residual traces arise in sentient self and that it is transient. For, the (admission of) residual trace implies that it is distinct from direct experience and that it indirectly produces a peculiar effect, called remembrance. But if it be asserted that Viśeṣa (as admitted by the Vaiśeṣika) is distinct from self. What is it then to self? And we shall combat the view of independent being of relation. The same may be asserted about cognition, pleasure, desire, aversion, effort, merit and demerit.

The crux is this:—

Therefore, even if we admit the attributes to be distinct from self, there being no change in the essential nature of self in spite of their presence, self cannot be said to remember, because its original unremembering and unaffected nature is intact. Therefore, memory can be established on the basis of residual traces only. And the rememberer, who figures in judgment: “I remember,” is identical with either the physical or the cognitive chain. Hence it is like perceiver. For, it has been stated in an earlier verse that the “I—Consciousness” refers to body etc. Thus, all arguments, based on perception and inference, in support of the existence of self, have been refuted. And some arguments against it have been hinted at: (I) If self is affected by qualities, it ceases to be eternal: (II) Otherwise (if it retains its original nature in spite of affection by qualities) the admission of affection is meaningless. This is asserted in the following:—

“If it (self) be like skin it is transient. If it be like ether (kha) it is as good as nought. For, ether is unaffected by heat and shower. Their effect is on skin only” (6).

Thus, after refuting (the existence of) self, in order to refute its possession of powers, the opponent examines omniscience as follows:—

(7) “And if (power of) cognition be admitted to be self-manifest (citsvarūpa) then is it transient like self ? But if it be insentient, how can it illumine or make manifest the objects?”

Here the objector admits the view of the exponent, thinking that thus he will be able to strengthen his own position by pointing out the logical defects in it. Those, who admit the self, prove its eternality as follows:—

The so called time, becoming an attribute of what is characterised by “thisness”, delimits it and makes it transient through this delimitation. But the self is sentient and, therefore, is not experienced as “this”. Hence it is not delimited by the attribute (of time). For, the substance-attribute-relation depends upon a unifier; and there is no such unifier in the case of the self-shining self.

He who maintains the position, just stated, may be asked the following questions:—

The (power of) cognition also is admitted to be self-shining. The same logic, therefore, applies to it also. Why is then (the power of) cognition not eternal? Further, there is no relation between two eternal. For, there is no other relation than the causal, (as will be shown soon). Therefore, the position that the self possesses the power of knowledge falls to the ground. But if cognition be not admitted to be self-shining, it will not be able to illumine the objects. For, cognition illumines the objects by taking them into its own self-luminosity. Therefore, if it be devoid of self-luminosity in itself, just like any object, it will not be able to illumine any object.(7).

Now the author puts forth, as *prima facie* view, the theory of the Sāṅkhya, that cognition, though insentient in itself, illumines the external object, as follows:—

(8) “If it be said that *Buddhi* assumes the sentiency of the self, exactly as it does the form of external object.”

In our practical life we say “I know the object.” Such a statement really means “the object is manifest to me”. But manifestedness or luminosity cannot be asserted to be the essential nature of the object. For, then it would be manifest either to all or to none, and thus all would be either all-knowing or perfectly ignorant. Nor can the luminosity be supposed to have come to object from elsewhere. For, in that case also there

will be the same flaw. Therefore, it has to be admitted that this luminosity belongs to some other Tattva.

To the question: "How even on that supposition does the object become luminous?" the reply is that the object is reflected in that Tattva. That Tattva is capable of receiving reflection; because the quality of Sattva predominates in it. However, it cannot receive reflections of all simultaneously, because it is enveloped by the quality of Tamas. But this Tamas is partly removed by Rajas. Hence it receives the reflection of some object only. That Tattva is technically called "Buddhi" and cognition (jñāna) is nothing but the reflection of external object (on Buddhi). It is a form of Buddhi. It is a peculiar modification (of Buddhi), different from that of milk into curd, which is responsible for substitution of the former name (Buddhi) by another (jñāna). Thus, Buddhi assumes the form of external object.

But both 'Prakṛti' and 'Buddhi' are insentient because Sattva etc. (which constitute them) being essentially of the nature of pleasure, pain and ignorance, are objects of experience. Hence Buddhi lacks self-luminosity, like a mirror. An experiencer, therefore, which is different from Buddhi, has to be admitted, because it does not stand to reason to admit Buddhi, which is an object of experience and, therefore, without luminosity, to be an experiencer, which is its opposite and is characterised by self-luminosity. The experiencer, therefore, has to be essentially different from it. The essential nature of the experiencer is self-luminosity. For, how can the objectivity, which is of an opposite nature and lacks self-luminosity, be possibly supposed to be the essential nature of the experiencer. And if he were the illuminator of the objective world simply because of his self-luminosity, then the entire objective world should shine simultaneously and there should be no distinction between the cognition of jar and that of cloth and, therefore, confusion should reign supreme in the world. The experiencer, however, is different from the reflection, the thing that casts it and the Buddhi Tattva, on which it is cast, and is unrelated to them. How can he then illumine the object? Therefore, (it has to be admitted that) Buddhi itself, because of its crystalline purity, receives the reflection of the self-luminous self also. Thus, the objects become manifest to self-luminous subject (reflected in Buddhi) when he comes in touch with external object, which also is reflected on the Buddhi Tattva, on which his own luminosity is reflected, because it (Buddhi) is capable of receiving the reflection

of subjective luminosity. This is the explanation of the practical life. Thus, cognition, though insentient in itself, because it is non-different from the insentient *Buddhi*, illumines the object, because it is in contact with the reflection of self-luminous subject. This is an unreasonable supposition that self-luminous subject casts its reflection on *Buddhi*. For, we see that one thing casts its reflection on another, which is similar in quality and is more crystalline than that which is reflected ; for instance, form of a jar is reflected in a perceptible mirror. But the difference between the subject and the *Buddhi* is very great and *Buddhi* is not more crystalline than the subject. The word 'Atha' implies that this much will do.

But even the theory of reflection does not answer the objection (against permanent subject). The author demonstrates this as follows:—

(The following is the last part of verse no. 8).

"Thus, the *Buddhi* shall have to be admitted to be sentient. For, in that which is insentient there cannot be the capacity of making others manifest."

If, in consequence of the contact with the reflection of the sentient, that, on which the self-luminous subject is reflected, does not itself become sentient, the reflection will serve no purpose. For, the mirror, on which the heap of fire is reflected, cannot burn anything. But if you say that, on which reflection falls, becomes essentially the same as the original luminosity, then the latter is non-different from *Buddhi*. Thus, *Buddhi* becomes identical with the original luminosity. The opponent, however, had propounded the theory of reflection for fear of the error of attributing an opposite quality (sentieny) to *Buddhi*. It is, therefore, that (attributed opposite quality) which manifests its power of effulgent light. Why then not assume the *Buddhi* to be sentient (*cinmayī*) ; what is the use of assuming separate existence of *Puruṣa* ? Thus, if *Buddhi* assumes the form of the object, reflection of which falls on it: this view is then exactly what the *Vijñāna-Vādin* holds. But if any body were to question: Why does it assume the form of the object?" the reply is 'because of the already existing chain of causation (i.e. the revival of the previous beginningless *Vāsanā*).'

Thus, if *Buddhi* itself be admitted to be sentient, its eternality will naturally follow. But if even the sentient is not eternal, then there is no eternal self, which may be represented to possess the cognitive power. Therefore, *jñāna* alone is. Its essential

nature is to make the objects manifest. It is of different types, such as determinate knowledge and the remembrance. This explains all worldly transactions. This is the gain, accruing from the refutation of unwelcome conclusion (that follows from the assumption of the Sāṅkhya theory as correct). This is the substance of the preceding two verses : "And if cognition (jñāna) be admitted to be sentient," etc. (8).

Having examined the cognition (jñāna) the author now begins to examine 'action'.

(9) "Action also is nothing else than the presence of such external things as body etc., at various places etc. For, nothing else is perceived."

In the perceptible movement, which, at the empirical level, is referred to as "He goes", "He moves", "He falls" etc., we find nothing more than a certain form, such as that of Devadatta, which was at first at a place in the house, but subsequently is found at another place outside it. We do not perceive anything more than this which may be called action. Similarly in the experience "Devadatta sits for a day" the form of Devadatta, which was associated with the morning time, is experienced as connected with another unit of time. In the experience "milk changes" that which was experienced as sweet and liquid, is experienced as sour and solid. Thus, the thing (the chain of momentary beings) itself appears associated with different times, places and forms. In spite of these differences (in associated space and time) recognition of the thing as the same is due to similarity; for instance, we recognise a person to be the same even when there is difference in body, hair and nail. When there are spatial and formal differences, the temporal difference is bound to be. Similarly when there are spatial and temporal differences (the formal difference is bound to be.). Although all differences, temporal, spatial or formal are included in the formal, because space is nothing but form, and temporal difference also involves the formal; yet from practical point of view they differ from one another. Therefore, the Bauddhas speak of them separately. This is the substance (of the verse).

Thus, 'action' is not directly perceived anywhere, and because there is no direct perception, therefore, we cannot infer it either. For, inference depends upon the former (direct perception). And the effect, such as reaching the village etc., is non-different from the succeeding momentary existence of a particular time, thing and form etc. Therefore, it (kriyā) cannot be assumed for the reason that the effect is not possible without it.

Thus, the statement: "it is known through neither of the two means of right knowledge, direct perception and inference" asserts the absence of arguments to justify the assumption of "action" (Kriyā). Now he states also the reason to refute it:—

(The following is the last part of verse no. 9.)

"The view that it (action) is one and successive and belongs to one (agent) is also not sound."

The priority or the posteriority of moments is due to their unification by determinate cognition. Nothing in itself is prior or posterior. Each thing is only itself (has no priority or posteriority in itself). Therefore, the characteristic feature of action, which consists in succession, the chain of the prior and the posterior, which is due to determinate cognition, does not refer to what is real. Every one of them (links of the chain) is distinct from the rest. How then can action be represented to be one? Moreover, succession necessarily involves diversity. For, if there be no diversity there can be no succession either. Unity is opposite of diversity. How can then action be conceived as successive and one? Nor can it be said that it is one because of its residing in one. For, there is no experience of the substratum different from the moments. The moments alone, coming in succession, are experienced. Moreover, how can the substratum, being affected by various moments of action, characterised by temporal, spatial and formal differences, be spoken of as one? Hence recognition, which is due to similarity, as expressed in: "It is the same Devadatta, who has reached the village" is not sufficient to establish real unity (of Devadatta) (9).

Having thus examined both, the power of action and that of cognition, he now proceeds to refute the relation, by which they are related to the 'Being' and which alone can establish Him to be omniscient and omnipotent, by showing that there is no reason in support of it.

(10) **"Only this much is perceived that certain things being existent other things come into being. There is no other relation than that of cause and effect."**

The pilloret comes into existence when the clay is already there, and so small Śiva—like form (Śivika) must be preceded by the pilloret and so on till the jar comes into being. In this case we perceive only momentary existences (of the various stages

of clay in making a jar) and nothing more such as relation is directly perceived or inferred. Thus, all that has been said in connection with action, can be repeated in this connection also. The same is the way of refuting all kinds of relations such as that of the container and the contained etc. For, after the separate momentary existences of bowl and jujube fruit, there is the rise of a distinct momentary existence, characterised by absence of intervening space between the bowl and fruit of jujube. And regular precedence and succession of two things is distinctly spoken of as relation of cause and effect in practical life.

But there is no such relation of cause and effect between knowledge or action and the self. For, the latter cannot be spoken of as the effect of the former. Because the knowledge is the effect of the things necessary for its rise and because there is no separate thing called action, there is, therefore, no connection of self with either knowledge or action. Hence it cannot be represented to be doer or knower. (10)

Having thus refuted the arguments in support of relation, the author now advances the argument against it, in general as well as in special terms.

(11) ("There is nothing like relation (Sambandha) apart from momentary existences;) because that which exists in two must have multiplicity of forms. The accomplished (Siddha), however, needs none : nor is it related to another by relation of dependence. Therefore, the relation of the self with action as its agent is a mere supposition."

Relation, as generally defined, is nothing else than the interconnection of two things, which are mutually connected. It is a unity. But how is that possible ? For, what is present in the entirety of its being at one place, cannot also be present at another, because that involves change in form. Thus, conjunction, inherence and other relations, dependent upon them, should be considered to have been refuted.

And the relation of dependence among the sentient and, through transference, among the insentient, of which we talk in our practical life, is also not possible, because what is accomplished (Siddha) cannot be said to be dependent, because of the very fact of its being accomplished. But what is not so, and, therefore, has no individuality, cannot at all be said to have any dependence. The same can be said in regard to the relation, called Apekṣā. Moreover, how can the two forms be united ? For, two cannot

become one; but if they do so, how can then there be any relation; (because they have become one and the relation requires two to unite)? Therefore, just as knower is a mere supposition and not real, so is the doer also. This is the *prima facie* view. The chapter ends. (11) From the beginning 16.

Here ends the Second Chapter, called the exposition of the *prima facie* view, in the "jñānādhikāra", in the Pratyabhijñāsūtra Vimarsinī, written by illustrious teacher Abhinavagupta. (2)

ĀHNIKA III

We bow to that Śiva, without whom no experience is possible and who is essentially ever-shining and unaffected Consciousness.

In the *prima facie* view (stated in the preceding Āhnika) it was held that remembrance is possible from mere residual trace ("Yato hi pūrvānubhava saṃskārāt smṛti saṃbhayaḥ"). To refute this the author puts in the following seven Śiokas beginning with "Satyam" and ending in "jñānasmṛtyapohana-śaktimān". The criticism of action and relation will be answered in the second book, entitled Kriyādhikāra. The refutation of the conception of cognition (Jñāna), as different from self, as admitted by the Kāṇāda and the Sāṅkhya systems, is in full agreement with the view of the author. Therefore, it is a refutation of a different type.

The first two verses prove that though remembrance may be admitted to be due to residual trace, yet it cannot illumine the former direct cognition, because luminosity of every cognition is self-confined. Then in the next two verses having raised the question whether remembrance is illusory knowledge and answered it, in the third verse, by the way, he removes the misapprehension that all determinate cognitions are illusory. Then he states in a verse that, remembrance being impossible even if there be residual trace, the practical life will come to an end. In the next verse he shows how it is possible on the basis of his theory. This is the summary. Now begins the explanation of the text.

(1) "True, but the knowledge, called remembrance, though it arises out of the residual trace of the former experience, yet, being self—confined, it cannot make the former experience known."

By the use of the word 'true' he has indicated:—"there is much in the statement of the *prima facie* view that has to be accepted by me." But what is not acceptable is going to be refuted. This is what he indicates by the use of the word "Kintu" (but), which indicates the difference. Here, in the case of remembrance, the point to be established is not the shining (consciousness) of the sense-object, which is possible from the residual trace; but the point which requires explanation is "How, without the illumination of the (former) experience, we can have that form of remembrance, which is represented by the word 'that', and how without such a remembrance can there be various practical moves, which are dependent upon desire? For, the effort for getting a thing is always consequent upon the ascertainment of the thing as the means of pleasure through the experience."

Here the residual trace of the former experience, explains how remembrance, though not caused by any external object, yet has that (object) as its object. This serves no useful purpose, because this remembrance, as knowledge, being self-manifest and self-confined, cannot illumine another (knowledge), namely, the former experience, as it does the object. (1)

But it may be urged that the remembrance, because of its having originated from residual trace, has the former experience also as its object. To this the author replies.

(2) "Experience is self-luminous. It cannot be the object of any other experience, just as the experience of colour cannot be an object of experience of taste. The fact that remembrance arises from residual trace simply makes it similar to direct experience (in respect of having the same object). But that cannot make the consciousness of similarity possible (in remembrance)."

Here the word "drk" means 'cognition' (experience). It is different from the insentient, inasmuch as it is essentially self-manifest in its nature. Therefore, the insentient has to be spoken of as different from the sentient. Hence cognition is self-manifest i. e. the manifestedness is its never-failing quality; or its essential quality is to make itself alone manifest. Even if there be external objects, still the luminosity (of Jñāna), as falling or reflected on the forms of external objects, cannot be rightly maintained to be the essential nature of cognition (Jñāna). For, self-luminosity of cognition consists in making itself so manifest as to make others also manifest (and not in casting its light on another and shining in another).

But will not the direct experience, being self-manifest in itself, shine in remembrance? "No", he says, because one cognition is not to be made manifest by another. For, if one cognition were to shine in another it would cease to be self-manifest. This is the chief characteristic of the self-manifest (that it shines in itself). If it be accepted that cognition shines in itself, then there being no connection with any other in so far as it does not shine in another, how can the use of the locative which depends upon the relation (of the container and the contained) be justifiable in regard to it?

Because of this (that one cognition does not shine in another) it is that by the cognition of colour the cognition of taste is not made manifest. For, if one cognition were to make another manifest, taste also would be virtually perceived by the eye.

But if the direct experience does not shine in remembrance, what then is the purpose served by residual trace? Of course there is no cognition of colour from the residual trace of taste. How can then this objection stand? Therefore, residual trace itself will remove the objection, raised by you.

No, because the knowledge, called remembrance, has arisen from a later cognition, (the cognition of a similar object) as associated with the residual trace, left by former experience; therefore, it may be similar to it (in point of having the same thing for its object as was that of the first experience) just as the position of a branch, left after having been drawn, becomes similar to what it was before. But it is not right to suppose that whatever is produced by residual trace (of former experience) that is essentially a manifestor of that experience. Moreover, how can there be the consciousness of similarity? For, neither direct experience nor remembrance produces consciousness of similarity. They do not shine in each other. Therefore, the consciousness of points of similarity, present in both, is impossible: and there is nothing else capable of knowing both. Thus, residual trace can make objective reference possible in remembrance, but it cannot make the direct experience an object of remembrance, nor can it arouse the consciousness that the object of remembrance is the object of former experience. This is undeniable. (2).

But your objection will stand only if direct experience be admitted really to shine in remembrance and through it its object also. The fact, however, is that remembrance, being of the nature of determinate knowledge, seems to grasp the experience and its object, though in reality they do not shine. It is, therefore, of the nature of an illusion. Your objection, therefore, can not stand. This is what the author states as the *prima facie* view.

(3) "Well then, although remembrance does not have the direct experience or its object as its own object, yet, because there is determinate consciousness of both, the experience and its object, therefore, it is erroneously thought to be resting on (or related to) them."

Though neither the former direct experience nor its object is the object of remembrance, yet there is the determinate consciousness of both, because remembrance is erroneous in its nature.

This he refutes as follows:—

(The following is the last part of verse no. 3)

"This lacks consistency (or is strange)". (3)

Here he puts forth the argument in support of the above view in the following verse:—

(4) “(If it is an error) how can the essential nature of remembrance be in it? And how can error be the basis of the worldly transactions related to objects? Moreover, why should it be supposed to depend upon residual trace, left by former experience?”

The essential nature of remembrance is the shining of the object in it exactly in the manner in which it shone in direct experience. But if it does not shine in the same manner, distinctive feature of remembrance will be lost. Moreover, in an error it is either the non-existing (asat) (according to the view of Asat-Khyātivādin) or the particular form that self assumes, (because of Vāsanā, according to Atma-Khyātivādin) that shines. The error therefore, does not grasp any object. For, the object does not shine in it. Thus, the object is not made so manifest by error as to become an object of action in practical life. The essence of Vyavasthāpanā (right knowledge?) is such a manifestation of an object as can be useful in practical life. After the remembrance of an object, there arises desire for it, and action towards it follows. This will be impossible (if remembrance be simply an error and, therefore, unable to make the object manifest). Moreover, if the object does not shine, its mere origin from the residual trace cannot serve any purpose. For, its dependence upon residual trace is assumed only to explain its similarity with the direct experience. But there is no similarity whatsoever of the direct experience, whose characteristic feature is the manifestation of objects, with the error, called remembrance, which does not in any way touch i. e. has no relation with, the external object. (4)

But if it be said that there is similarity of remembrance with direct experience, inasmuch as both, the experience and its object, are determinately apprehended by it and, therefore, in order to explain this partial similarity, the assumption of residual trace is necessary. Well. What do you mean by “determinately apprehended”? If you mean ‘manifested’ then it (remembrance) ceases to be of erroneous nature; but if thereby is meant “not manifested” then again, the object not having been made manifest, the use of the word ‘similarity’ is meaningless in this connection. To prove this the author says the following:—

(5) “The remembrance, being erroneous in its nature and, therefore, not self-shining, will not make the objects manifest. Even though it be accepted to be self-luminous, yet, its self-luminosity being confined to illumining itself and what is pictured up there, it would not explain practical attitude towards external objects.”

Remembrance or any other erroneous knowledge, is not erroneous in its self-luminous aspect of illumining itself, because it is never contradicted. Erroneousness is confined to what is pictured up there. For, though the pictured up is nothing but a form of self itself, yet it is not apprehended as such: on the contrary, it is apprehended as object. Hence remembrance is an error in respect of its object. And because remembrance or any other type of error has no true reference to external object and does not say anything about it, it is, therefore, not luminous in relation to that object, just as knowledge of jar is not in relation to cloth. And because that, which is not self-luminous, has nothing to do with external object, therefore, practical life, related to external object (which is based on remembrance) would disappear.

If, however, on the basis of its self-luminous aspect, or its determinate form, it be said to be self-luminous, still because remembrance in its self-luminosity is confined to itself and what is pictured up there, and because it cannot refer to external object even in name, how can it explain the determinate manifestation of and the practical attitude towards the object (which is based upon it)? (5).

Thus, even though there be residual trace, yet the remembrance is in no way possible. And, therefore, all cognitions will be without mutual connection. This is what has been said in the preceding five verses. The author now connects it with the point under discussion:—

(6) "Thus, all human transactions, which originate from unification of various kinds of cognitions, which mutually differ and cannot become one another's object, will come to an end."

Practical life of humanity depends upon unification of cognitions of all types, i.e. upon their (cognitions) figuring in remembrance as related to the same objects as those to which they were originally related. It is as follows:—

All transactions depend upon remembrance. For instance, the very first (the most important kind of cognition) the direct perception (pratyakṣa-jñāna) is not possible without the conscious unification of the former and the latter states of self. And this is made possible by remembrance alone. For, if the object of direct perception be not related to the subject, direct perception would cease to be so. Similar would be the case, (it has to be admitted) with pleasure etc. also. And rejecting, accepting, actuating, promising or admitting and other similar transactions (are all due to remembrance and therefore) are based upon remembrance. Thus, all human transactions, which are due to unification of

cognitions with one another, would come to nought, if the view of the opponent be accepted. But if some one were to ask: "How"? The author gives a reply by means of adjuncts (Anyonyabhinnānām, and Aparasparavedinām). The cognitions are different from one another. The indeterminate knowledge is different from the determinate knowledge, limited by present time, and that also is different from remembrance. Therefore, these cognitions make their objects alone manifest, and, in respect of the objects of other cognitions, are like insentient dumb and deaf or both and cannot make them manifest. (6).

Thus, there cannot be determinate unification either of cognitions as such or their objects. Nor can one cognition shine as an object of another. Nor is there any fourth cause of relation of cognitions, which may bring about their unification. Therefore, all transactions would come to nought. And these transactions cannot get destroyed simply because of your desired curse. "Let them be destroyed." But because they have existence, therefore, it is necessary that an effort should to be made to explain this. But even the Creator cannot do this unless the method, accepted by us, be followed. This, the author clarifies as follows:—

(7) "If there be not one great Lord, who is essentially self-luminous, holds within all the innumerable forms of the universe and possesses the powers of cognition, remembrance and differentiation".

Of course nobody denies that the self (Saṃvid) shines. But if that self be self-confined (be resting within itself), how can it make the objects shine (manifest)? But if the objects also be admitted to be essentially self-shining, then, they also being self-confined, the distinction between the perceiver and the perceived will be lost. Therefore, the Buddhist also, desiring to represent Saṃvid (Vijñāna) to be the illuminator of the object, has to admit that the object also is included within Saṃvid itself. But if that manifest of the object be changing every moment (as the Buddhists hold) the remembrance will not be possible. Therefore, Saṃvid is only one, and as such it includes the whole of the objective world within itself. This also he has to admit much against his will. Still this Saṃvid, because it contains the whole universe within itself, therefore, will shine with the whole universe either manifest or otherwise, because such is its nature. But it is not so. Therefore, it follows that Saṃvid makes some objects manifest as separate from itself out of the mass of objects, which lie merged in it, as identical with it. This is called power of knowledge.

This very Saṃvid, the self-luminous principle, when made as if it were different from itself by what has emerged (out of

universal Saṁvid), is called ever renewing cognition, because of the reflection of the externally manifested external objects on it, due to its being extrovert. But still because these new cognitions rise and disappear, the same impossibility of transactions follows. Therefore, (it is to be admitted that) the self-luminous principle, which became extrovert at the time of grasping an external object, has its introvert (Antarmukha) self-luminosity intact even at a subsequent time. And this (introvert self-luminosity) becomes aware of its having become extrovert in relation to a particular object and, therefore, is called the power of remembrance. And that which directly cognises or remembers a new object is identical with universal self-luminous principle. Hence the universal is ever perfect and in reality there is nothing new, directly cognised or remembered.

And then, as a matter of course this also has to be admitted that whatever is made manifest, is separate from Saṁvid, so is one Saṁvid from another, and so also is one object of knowledge from another; and that this (separation) however, is not really possible. Hence it is called mere appearance, because all that is created is mere appearance (Ābhāsa). And the separation (differentiation) is so called because it cuts the differentiated off on all sides (from the rest). That power, therefore, which is responsible for manifestation of one thing as distinct from the rest, is called the power of differentiation (Apo- hana Śakti).

All the worldly transactions depend upon this triad of powers. It is due to the triad of powers of that Glorious One that there is the manifestation of limited perceivers, Caitra and Maitra etc., who are naturally limited in their direct experience, remembrance and definite knowledge. It is He, who directly experiences, remembers and determinately cognises through the various limited subjects. This is what the teacher has said in the following lines:—

“Although practical approach to the objective world (apparently) depends on the individual subject, limited by vital power (prāṇa) and the constituents of subtle body (Puryaṣṭaka) yet (in reality) it depends upon the universal Self.”

And innumerable is the variety of ways in which these powers of knowledge etc. are manifested. This capacity of manifestation is the power of freedom (Svātantrya). This is called independent and perfect great power, when it is compared with the powers of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra, who are its creations. And this is sentient in its nature “Cidvapuḥ”. Thus, it follows

that He is omnipresent. And because He is different from the insentient, characterised by being of one fixed form, therefore, He is spoken of as Great Lord, characterised by the possession of powers of knowledge etc.

If this be not admitted, nothing will be manifest. This is the unwelcome consequence. But because the objects are manifest, therefore, it has to be admitted. This is the opposite conclusion. "The practical life of humanity will come to an end if it be not so", this is the connection of the present verse with the previous. The word 'Cet' implies the opposite conclusion. (7) The Chapter ends. From the beginning 23.

Here ends the third chapter, called the refutation of the philosophy of the opponent, in the Jñānādhikāra in the Pratyabhi jñāsūtravimarsinī, written by illustrious teacher, Abhinavagupta(3).

ĀHNIKA IV

We bow to that Śiva, who strings in a regular order the multitude of gems, the objects, which lie heaped up in the treasury of His heart, on the string of remembrance.

Thus, it has been shown that remembrance is preceded by direct perception and that both of them depend upon the power of differentiation (Apoḥana Śakti). This has been pointed out to be the only possible way of accounting for the facts of experience. Now, according to the introductory statement, remembrance has to be dealt with in order to support the opposite conclusion, which follows from the unwelcome consequence (of the Critic's position). For, the introductory statement (in the last chapter) was: "True, but the cognition, called remembrance".

There may not be the possibility of the rise of remembrance from mere residual trace, but it has to be explained: how will the power of the Lord, as admitted by you, make it possible? In order to answer this objection the following eight verses, beginning with "Because that experiencer of the former object" and ending in "The objects shine in the experiencer" are given.

It is asserted in the first verse that remembrance is possible on the exponent's assumption. The second verse states that remembrance has the power to illumine the particular object of the former direct experience. In the third it is stated that remembrance enters into the direct experience and its object so as to become one with them. The fourth shows how remembrance does not illumine the former direct experience as an object. The fifth corroborates the statement, made in the fourth, by asserting that in the experience of the other's experience by a Yogin, the other's experience does not figure separately as an object. In the sixth the counter assertion, that remembrance does have the direct experience as its separate object, is shown to be based on an imaginary analysis and, therefore, baseless. In the seventh it is shown by the way that even in the determinate cognition there is unification with the former direct experience. In the eighth it is asserted that remembrance, its object and its subject rest on one Sentient Principle and so, by the way, do perception, its object and its subject. This is the summary. Now the verses will be explained in due order.

(1) "That knower of the object of former experience, being present at the time of subsequent memory and determinately experiencing as 'that', is said to remember, because he is free."

The knower of the formerly experienced object, the introvert sentiency or consciousness, has continuous existence till the time of remembrance also; because he, who is of the nature of pure *Samvid*, is free from the limiting attribute of time. That the object is present within the experience as one with it, is of course self-established fact.

The point to be thought over is this: "Is it that (in remembrance) the Self-luminous principle (*Samvedana*), which is free from the limitation of time, and all the objects, which are within it, are experienced as self-luminous?" If so, there should be the experience of universal "I" as holding the entire objective world within itself. But if there be the experience of the objects as "this" and, therefore, as distinct from the Self-luminous principle, there are two alternatives:—

(1) If the objectivity (*idantā*) rests on "I" then, it being the state, known as *Sadāśiva*, consciousness would be "I am this".
 (2) But if it does not rest on "I", then the consciousness must be 'this'. And because there is the consciousness of novelty, therefore, it would be direct experience and not remembrance. With this objection in mind the author says "free" (*Svairī*). It means one whose nature it is to employ, without fail, his means for the accomplishment of the end; or he, who employs himself in his work without requiring any other prompter. Therefore, because of his freedom he has the consciousness "that". And the essential nature of the experience "that" is that it is not the experience of the pure subject "I", which is entirely free from limitation of time, nor is it that of something which is altogether different from the subject (i.e. pure object), but that of the object, (i) which formerly, at the time of direct experience, was differentiated from the universal Self; because of its association with the individual subject, limited by time and place of the former perception, and, therefore, was not merged in "I", (ii) which in that very condition was separately placed, wrapped up in darkness as if it were, and (iii) which is referred to by the word "residual trace". When, therefore, that cover of darkness is removed from the object, it shines as before, as differentiated from the subject.

But why does it not then shine as "this", as it did before? It does not so shine, because it shines as associated with the body, time and place of the first perception, because of which it was differentiated from the universal subject, "Aham". And for this very reason it is that the consciousness of its shining at the present time of remembrance does not altogether disappear. There is, therefore, consciousness of the time of the past direct

experience, 'associated' with the present time of remembrance. The latter predominates.

Thus, it is said that the experience "that" is the embodiment of two contrary experiences of the former and of the later times. And thus, that highest Lord alone remembers. His remembrance is nothing else than His assuming the form of limited subject, such as is fit to be affected by time and Kalā etc. and is necessary for the consciousness of this kind. Thus, remembrance is unity in multiplicity; because it is due to Māyā and Vidyā. And, therefore, it is that those, who are well versed in the Āgamas, hold that remembrance, when animated by Mantra etc. is like Cintāmaṇi, capable of giving all Siddhis, as follows:—

"Remembrance itself, assuming the form of contemplation, exposes your glory as Cintāmaṇi does the wealth." This will do.

The compound ending in Trn, (Pūrvānubhūtārthopalabdā) specially indicates (i) that the direct experience is related to time through its object; (ii) that it rests on the object; and (iii) that both the experience and its object rest on the subject, both, as one with and separate from it; because the compound is of the type of Ekārthibhāva. We shall explain that such a compound conveys the idea of unity in multiplicity. (1)

The following verses explain this very remembrance. Here if anybody were to say (i) that remembrance is determinate knowledge ("Vikalpa jñānam"); the object, therefore, cannot be made manifest by it; because the determinate knowledge does not touch the object; and (ii) that the direct experience, by which it was made manifest, is now no more: therefore, the direct experience cannot be made manifest by remembrance; firstly, because one knowledge cannot make another manifest; and secondly, because it has no existence at the time of remembrance. Hence, there being no manifestation of the object, it again follows that the consciousness "I remember this" is simply an illusion. The following is the reply to him:—

(2) "Experiencing the object that was made manifest before (at the time of past direct experience), even at a subsequent time, the subject has to be admitted to be capable of manifesting the particular either as jar as such or as possessed of the entire group of attributes."

It has to be admitted that in definite remembrance there is a clear consciousness of the object; otherwise it will be no better than the state of deep sleep or that of unconsciousness. Therefore, in view of the fact that there is a clear consciousness of the

object (in remembrance), it has, as a matter of course, to be admitted that the object shines in it. For, if the object of knowledge be not shining, the mental reaction (Adhyavasāya) will be as good as blind. And this shining of the object is neither altogether associated with or dissociated from the time of the first experience. For, in both the cases there is the danger that the consciousness would assume the form "this". Therefore, the consciousness of time of the past experience, as associated with the object of former direct experience, is necessary in relation to the object of remembrance; because it (time) determines the object and also because (in remembrance) there is emphasis on the object of former direct experience. Similarly the consciousness of time, associated with body and vitality (Prāṇa) of the rememberer is necessary in relation to the subjective aspect; because in remembrance there is equal emphasis on the time of the present experience. The essential nature of the object is mere "Ābhāsa" i.e. the object is nothing but a mere limited manifestation, because the means of right knowledge operate on each limited manifestation. This very limited manifestation (e.g. jar), being connected with other manifestations (e.g. gold or any other metal of which the jar is made), becomes clearly manifest like the co-extending rays of thousand lamps. But even when there is no connection with other limited manifestations, the manifestation is still limited, because of its connection with the manifestation of time. That the power of the time is the only differentiator will be explained later on.

Thus, the manifestation of jar is determined, because it is related to the manifestation of time, associated with the manifestation of the body (of jar) at the time of former perception.

Remembrance often refers to an isolated 'ābhāsa' (in this case it is not very clear). But it becomes perfectly clear, when its object is mixed up with other manifestations (which are its attributes). Even when it is perfectly clear, its association with the former time is not broken; because remembrance is an experience, the object of which is not common to other subjects. But that object of remembrance, which shines in common to many individual subjects, as is the case with the object of remembrance of a Yogin, is a Creation of Yogin. In the case of the talk with Brahman, (the spiritualists admit that through concentration, the object, the deity, appears in a physical form) the manifestation is new. In this case, the chain of remembrance of the essential nature of Brahman etc., as known through other means of right knowledge, such as Āgama etc., is simply a means. The use of the injunctive

Liñ in 'Bhāsayet' indicates infallibility. It is not that it does not make the object shine; on the contrary, it does certainly make it shine. "In its time" (Svakāle) means "at the time of remembrance". By the word "cognising" (Āmrśan) the present time, associated with the subjective aspect of remembrance, is indicated. By "determinate object of former experience" (Pūrvābhāsitam Svalakṣaṇam) the past time, associated with the object of knowledge in isolation, has been indicated as responsible for the delimitation of jar as such. This is the chief characteristic of remembrance. Its clearness depends upon the intensity of desire. This is what the word "Atha" indicates. The same is asserted by the word "in its entirety" (Akhilātmanā) i.e. in a form unified with all attributes.(2).

But if thus the object, limited by the time of its first experience, shines apart from the subject in remembrance, then it should shine as "this". For, shining as "this" is nothing else than shining with limitation. To remove this objection the author says as follows:—

(3) "If the object shines apart from remembrance, it would be improper to say that it shines as the object of remembrance. Therefore, the various cognitions, associated with different times, have to be admitted to be unified. And here is that subject (of remembrance)."

If that object were to shine apart from remembrance as something external, it would not be shining as being remembered i.e. it would cease to be the object of remembrance; rather, it would become the object of perception. But if any body were to ask: how then the particular is said to shine at all? The reply is: it does not shine now, but it shone before, and then it did shine externally.

But if any body were to ask "what happens now" (at the time of remembrance)?, we would say: "determinate cognition". But if the objector were to say that thus it follows that shining of object and its determinate cognition belong to different times, (the one to the time of remembrance and the other to that of perception) (the reply is) "What of that"? (The objector:—) Because they are interdependent, both would, therefore, be as good as nothing (because one will have been destroyed long before the other's coming into existence). (The reply:) Not so. No doubt, the Buddhist, according to whom there is no other reality than different momentary cognitions, cannot satisfactorily reply to this objection. But, according to our system of philosophy, the subject introvertly determines

(Vimṛśati) the various cognitions, which are not dissociated from the times of their rise, by unifying them into one whole. Thus, the former experience shines objectively as associated with past time: and the subjective reaction to it (Vimarśa) shines as associated with the present time, the limiting condition of the introvert subject. The distinction of the cogniser from mere cognition (Vedana) lies in this that he is free in uniting or separating the various cognitions according to his will. It is in this that his power as 'doer' (Kartṛtva) consists. The unification, as expressed in "I experienced" or "that jar", is non-different from the unifier. This is what is indicated by the concord between 'the unification' and 'that knower' (i.e. the unification is the same as the subject). By means of the expressions "it is that" the subject, who was concealed as if it were, has been brought to clear light as "this". Thus, by the statement, smacking of wonder, recognition has been indicated. This is what the author himself has asserted in the following:—

"I have brought to clear light the essential nature of the subject, which was soiled by those who talked all kinds of irrelevant things about it and who denied their own experience, after silencing them by means of clear arguments". (3).

But if the former experience itself is the externally manifested light of the object of remembrance, why not then say simply that the experience is the object of remembrance? What is the use of this strange unification? To remove this doubt the author says as follows:—

(4) "It is not so. For, the former experience does not shine separately in remembrance as 'this', like an object. But it shines as 'I experienced before', because the experience shines only because of its resting on the subject."

The illustrations are of two kinds, positive and negative. Just as 'before' i.e. at the time of direct experience, the former objects, jar etc., shone separately as "this", so, at the time of remembrance, the former experience does not shine apart from remembrance. And just as, at the time of remembrance, the object does not shine separately from remembrance as "this"; because at the time of remembrance there is no external manifestation; so, for that very reason, the former experience also does not shine apart from remembrance. How do both shine then? They shine as "I experienced". If anybody were to ask: "What do you mean by this?" The reply is as follows:—

The self is essentially the "I-consciousness". It is introvert in both the experiences, the former and the latter. As the self-

luminous nature of the former experience, shines only as resting on the self, so the jar also, which is merged in that, shines as if it were self-luminous. Both the object and the perception rest on the self. There is a recognised view "Root and personal termination together tell the meaning of the personal termination", i.e. the meaning of root merges in that of personal termination. The perception, therefore, is merged in the "I", the cogniser, who is implied by the number of personal termination; or who possesses the number of personal termination; and so is the object also through that (perception). It (object) does not shine independently. For this very reason the object is not separately mentioned (in the verse). But jar etc. do not (directly) rest on the subject at the time of perception. And because the former perception does not shine separately as an object (in remembrance) for the reason, stated in the second half of the verse, therefore, the unification of cognitions has to be admitted (in remembrance). This is the connection of the present verse with the preceding. The word 'Prāk' is connected with another word than that with which it comes in the text; because the aorist (luṇ) tense (of Anvabhūvam) indicates the past. Similar is the connection of "Aham", because the first person, (in which Anvabhūvam is used) implies "I". The word 'Ārohaṇam' is to be interpreted as both, having causal affix and without it. (4).

But who says that direct experience does not shine apart from the rememberer? But if it be said that it does not shine separately, exactly in the manner in which the jar does, then we say "what of that"? For, the jar also does not shine separately exactly in the manner of perception. Can it be said, therefore, that it does not shine separately? Both of them, of course, shine separately, according to their individual nature. This is a common point in both cases. Accordingly, it has been admitted that just as the past future and subtle etc. become manifest in the knowledge of a Yogin, so does the Citta also of another person, as in the following:—

"Through concentration on an affected state of mind, one gets the power of knowing the minds of others".

Here the word "Citta" means Sattva (Buddhi), modified by the form of an external object. Otherwise what would be the sense in saying that it is known through concentration and why should there be any question about its relation with object, as in the following:—

"And that is without any relation with object".

Therefore, just as the experience of another becomes the object of Yogin's experience, so let one's own knowledge also be the object.

To this objection he replies by saying that the illustration itself is non-existent (Asiddha). This is what he shows by that portion of the following verse which ends in "Bhānti" (shine). And accepting the illustration to exist, by the rest of the verse, he shows the unsuitability of the illustration to the present case, inasmuch as the point of similarity is lacking here:—

(5) "Even in the particular kind of knowledge of Yogins, the experiences of others do not shine as such. They rather shine as one with their own Samvid. But even if they be supposed to shine as objects, (that also would not affect our position)."

In this different kind of knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of another's knowledge by Yogins through meditation, the knowledge of another person does not shine as an object. That is as follows:—

According to the Buddhists, the knowledge (Vijñāna) is self-luminous in its essential nature. Now if this be the object of another knowledge, then its real nature of shining as self-luminous and not as the object of another knowledge, will be contradicted.

According to the Sāṅkhya system, the 'Upalabdhi' is nothing else than the reflection of Puruṣa: and he belongs to the category of the unknowable. How then can he be the object of knowledge?

According to the Vaiśeṣika system also, the knowledge inheres in the self as identical with it. How then can this knowledge be cognised by the mind (Manas) that is within the body (of the cogniser)? But if one were to say "by entering into another body", then it (mind) will naturally take that body to be its own (for, it, being Aṇu, cannot be connected with both the bodies) and in connection with that then will rise the idea of egoity "Aham". Hence all distinction between one's own self and that of the other will disappear. The Vaiśeṣika view that the self can be known through inference only, lacks all support of reason. It has already been said that the view that one knowledge is the object of another, leads to argumentum ad infinitum.

Therefore, it has to be admitted that a Yogin knows the cognition of another person in so far as he is aware of jar and pleasure etc. as related to the self, limited by another's body. In this cognition (of another's cognition) the internal objects such as pleasure etc. and the external, like jar etc., shines as "this";

but the light of consciousness, being self-luminous, shines as "Aham" ("I") only. Thus, a Yogin, in whom the consciousness of distinction of himself from others persists, because of the continuity of the impression of 'thisness' associated with the body and vital air etc. of another person, which he formerly looked upon as a subject (Pramātā), attributes the objectivity of the body etc. to the pure subjective aspect "Aham" and, therefore, erroneously thinks that knowledge to be the knowledge of another. But a Yogin, who has risen above the idea of duality, seeing all as one with himself, realises that the duality is his own creation. Thus, cognition is not the object of knowledge of a Yogin. (Therefore one knowledge cannot be the object of another).

And even if we admit that the knowledge of another person becomes an object of that of a Yogin, our position will not be affected; because there is no similarity between the perception as it figures in the remembrance and another's knowledge as it figures in that of a Yogin. It is as follows:—

In the case of Yogin's knowledge of another's experience, the latter shines as associated with another, as "he experiences", and not as associated with his own self, as "I experience". But in the case of remembrance, it (the experience) shines as resting on "I", free from all taint of objectivity. Hence it has rightly been said that because experience does not shine apart from the experienter, therefore, there is unification of cognitions of different times and that is the knower (5).

But if it be admitted that perception does not shine as an object in remembrance, because of its resting on the subject (Ahantā), (we would point out that) there is another type of experience, in which we find a cognition cognising a perception as "this" (e.g. "I had that perception"); or which (parāmarśāntaram) clearly shows the perception as resting on the external objects like jar, which are rightly experienced as objects. Why then do not we make use of that analogy? To this objection the author replies as follows:—

(6) "This particular form of remembrance 'I had that experience', in which perception seems to shine apart from remembrance as its object, is simply an analysis of the remembrance 'I saw'."

Such is not the cognition of the people in general. For, they do not think that perception shines apart from remembrance as its object, as "I had that experience". Even if we admit that in the case of certain persons, who claim to be great analysts, the remembrance assumes the form "I had that expe-

rience", our position is not affected. For, all that is simply an elaboration of "I remember". It is an elaboration, based upon analysis, similar to that of a word into imaginary parts, such as root and affix etc., in order to explain its meaning to others.

That analyst also, if he be conscious of the original experience "I remember" as the basis of the analysed form of it, as stated above, then he also does not cognise perception as an object; rather, he simply assumes separate objective existence of the perception, as in case of "the head of Rāhu". Otherwise, just as (remembrance) "that jar" refers to something, which was the object of a former perception, so in the case of (remembrance) "that knowledge" also there would arise the necessity of another former experience. For, by the use of the pronoun 'that' it is intended to be indicated that the jar or the experience is the one that has been the object of former experience; otherwise only "experience" (instead of "that experience") would have been used. But that would mean "I experienced cognition by means of cognition", and there also the case being the same, (there being the necessity of another experience) argumentum ad infinitum would follow.

But what is the original undisputed form of remembrance? I say "was seen by me". But does not this mean that seeing rested on the lotus-like face of the wife and so on and not on the self; because the past passive participial affix, which requires reference of the action to the object, would not otherwise be possible? The person who says so apparently does not himself understand what he says. Here the act of seeing is dependent upon the subject; because the object is to be reached by the action of the subject. And, therefore, in "King is shown the servants" the act of seeing is said to be resting on the subject. Even the Mīmāṃsakas admit that "seeing" the essential nature of which is knowledge, and which is a form of Bhāvanā, depends upon the subject (i.e. Ātman). The only difference between this philosophy and ourselves on this point is that, according to the Mīmāṃsā, becoming manifest is the quality of the object, technically called *dr̥ṣṭatā*, and consciousness (*Saṁvid*) is different from this and it is not free. The use of the word "by me" (*Mayā*) conveys the idea that knowledge is dependent upon the subject. Therefore, the two statements "I experienced" and "it was experienced by me" mean the same thing; the difference lies in words only.

Others put the words in a different prose order as follows: "I had that experience" and "Was seen by me" these forms of

remembrance, are mere analysed forms of the original form of remembrance "I experienced". The word "api" is used in the sense of "and" (6).

But even though a thing may be perceived indeterminately, yet so long as there is no determinate perception, there is no particular remembrance of it possible, as in the case of the straw and leaves etc. seen on the way. Therefore, it has to be thought over whether at the time of determinate knowledge the indeterminate, which shone before, does shine as "this" or not. To clear this doubt he says as follows:—

(7) "Whether the form of determinate knowledge be "I see this" or "this is jar", it implies that the indeterminate cognition rests on the subject as one with it."

Here the indeterminate cognition as it is in itself (at one time) so it must always be. Now this indeterminate cognition, at the time when it arises is self-luminous and, therefore, rightly it should shine as essentially "Aham" or "I". Therefore, discussion on the determinate knowledge, which follows it, is of no help anywhere; or it may be so; but the point to be emphasised is that the determinate knowledge also is so (self-luminous). This is the implication of the word (Api) "also".

Now the thing, which forms the object of determinate knowledge, following close upon the indeterminate one, is cognised in two ways: (i) Through perceptual experience, related to the present time as "I see this". Here the pronoun "this" indicates that the activity of indeterminate perception appears to be the object of determinate perception as it were. (ii) This (determinate cognition) may also assume the form, expressible without the use of the first personal pronoun "I", as in "this is jar". Here the objectivity, as it were, of indeterminate perception is indicated by the word 'this' (Ayam).

Here in the last, "this is jar", there is not even so much as a separate reference to indeterminate cognition. Therefore, the question of its being considered as "this" (i.e. the object of another knowledge) does not arise. Hence it naturally follows that here it (cognition) is apprehended as "I". For, if it be not admitted to be apprehended as "I", determinate cognition being possible even in a person who closes the eyes, (soon after the contact with the object) how could the Mental reaction, which rests on clearly manifest object, which is being directly perceived, be possible. In the case of the former (Aham idam paśyāmi), although there is apprehension of cognition, yet, being merged in and resting on the subject it is conceived as self-luminous.

Thus, the determinate knowledge also does not show that one cognition can be known by another.

Here the word 'Avasā' means determinate knowledge; and 'Samavetam' means not separate. 'Avasātari' means in the free introvert basis of self-consciousness, which is essentially self-luminous. "Darśanam" means indeterminate experience. This implies determinate knowledge and remembrance also; because this is the only right thing that can be said in regard to the view that one knowledge is the object of another. For, in all forms of cognition; "I determinately know" "I remember" "known by me" "remembered by me", the cognition is found invariably dependent upon the self. Therefore, the determinate cognition etc. are the powers of the Self, because they rest in the latter. Thus, it has been proved that Self has the powers of perception, remembrance and differentiation. (7).

The following is the summary statement of the conclusion from what has been said above:—

(8) "Because that experiencer or perceiver has various cognitions: 'I see' 'I saw' 'this' 'that', therefore, it is clear, that both, the knower (body etc.) and the known (jar etc.), in their distinctive nature, shine in the subject."

Here the word "Tat" is used in the sense of "therefore" and indicates that what has been said before has to be taken as the reason (for the following conclusion). It has been said before that perception does not shine as separate from remembrance, (in remembrance) as does the object, and that the power of remembrance belongs to the Lord. The following, therefore, is a settled fact:—

It has been stated that remembrance includes the perception within itself. The perception, however, has two forms, because of the difference in intellectual reaction: (i) Sometimes perception of the object is preceded by self-consciousness. In this case, of course, there is predominance of self-consciousness or will, as in "seen by me". (ii) At other times he primarily perceives the object. In this case there is no will, but the object forcibly presents itself to the consciousness all of a sudden, or the subject is swayed by the idea of the causal efficiency (of the object) as in the case of "this". In this case also there is determinate self-consciousness. For, otherwise object will not shine.

Accordingly the forms of perception are two; so are those of remembrance also. Thus, with one sub-division of each form (according to the two forms of perception) remembrance is of

four kinds. Recognition also, which is the unification of the past and the present experiences, is included in the six forms of knowledge. But because of the different forms of perception and remembrance, the recognition has eight forms. These being subdivided into two each, according as the past or present experience predominates, it has sixteen forms.

Thus, there are twenty-two forms of cognition. In these the object of cognition is not outside the light of subject. For, otherwise it would not be manifest. But this object also is to be admitted as separate from the light. For, otherwise how can it be called the object? But how can one and the same thing, at one and the same time be said to be separated from the 'light' and yet to be in the light? Therefore, naturally there has to be supposed something, the essential characteristic of which is the limited light, as the subject, because of which this mass of (real) objects, being separate from the 'limited light', may be separate from one another also. For, if they be non-different from the 'true light', how can the mutual difference among them be possible? Though this assumed (separate) 'light' is a part of the objective and different from the real subject, yet, even when it is still in the condition of an object, it is conceived as "I", as if it were free from all limitations. It shall be called *Māyā pramātā* in "In body, in mind" (1-6-4). And it is spoken of as experiencer. Thus, this simultaneous manifestation of the pair of perceiver and perceived in His mirror-like Self, as not altogether different from His essential self-luminous nature, constitutes His being as the doer of the act of perception and that of remembrance. This is the essential feature of the lord's power of perception and of remembrance. This is the implied meaning. The following is the literal meaning:—

The Self-luminous subject determinately cognises as "seen by me" and "this". From such determinate cognitions it is evident that phenomena such as 'jar' etc. and "body" etc., when unified as object and subject respectively, shine in pure Self-luminous subject. The same is made evident from the determinate cognitions such as "seen" and "this", which the individual self-luminous subject has. And because of this He is said to remember.

Here the power of perception also is discussed by the way, in order to support the view, which has been already expressed, that remembrance depends upon the perception. The substitution of *personal termination* by present participial affix implies that the word, to which it is added, stands for the charac-

teristic. The word "Api" means "and". The word "artha" stands for what has been objectively manifested as separate from the universal Self-luminous principle. The word "Grāhaka" means "limited subject", who belongs to the sphere of Māyā and, therefore, is of impure self-luminosity. Here the chapter ends. (8). The number of verses explained so far is thirty-one.

Here ends the fourth chapter, called the presentation of the power of remembrance, in the jñānādhikāra in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Sūtra Vimarsīni, written by great teacher Abhinavagupta. (4).

ĀHNIKA V

We bow to that Śiva, who always illumines by his power of knowledge, the lamp, the multiplicity of objects, which lies merged within Himself, the great cave.

Thus, the essential nature of the power of remembrance has been presented. Now the author explains in detail the essential nature of the power of perception, on which remembrance depends, in twenty-one verses, beginning with "which shine as present" and ending in "shines in order". In the first verse he summarily states the essential nature of the power of knowledge. In the next two verses he asserts that 'luminosity' (Prakāśa) is the essential nature of the objects. Then after presenting in the next two verses, as a *prima facie* view that the existence of external objects has been firmly established by refutation of "residual trace", as admitted by the subjectivist Baudha, in the next verse he shows that there is no harm even if it be not admitted. Then in one he explains the essential nature of the object, according to his system, and refutes the view that the existence of the external object is proved by direct perception. In the next two he refutes their inferability also. Then in a verse he shows that the objects surely have their existence as mere ideas in Self-luminous universal Self. Then in the following four verses he asserts, on the basis of experience, scriptural authority, logic and examination of essential nature, that self-consciousness is the very life of self-luminosity, which constitutes the essential nature of the subject. Then in three verses he asserts that "free conscious will" itself manifests that which is purely an object and that which, though an object, yet retains the essential nature of the subject. Hence "free conscious will" has to be logically admitted to be the supreme. Then in one verse he says that the difference of knowledge and knower presupposes that the light of consciousness (Prakāśa) is their essential nature. Then in two verses he says that just as in the case of knower so in that of knowledge also, which is of two types, indeterminate and determinate, "free conscious will" is the very life. Then in conclusion, in one verse, he supports the distinction between the knower and the knowledge, which was adversely criticised in the course of the statement of *prima facie* view. This is the summary of the chapter. Now the meaning of each verse is going to be discussed.

There is no doubt about it that indeterminate knowledge is the very life of remembrance and determinate knowledge etc. Now, if the objects shine separately, i.e. as separate or different

from Saṁvid, in indeterminate experience, then the same should be the case in remembrance and determinate knowledge also. But if otherwise, then in the latter also they should not shine separately. Therefore, the power of perception, which is a form of the power of knowledge, should be discussed. With this idea in mind the author says as follows:—

(1) "The external shining (as separate from the perceiver) of the objects, which are directly perceptible, can be logically possible only on the supposition of their being present within (the Self)."

The shining of objects,—which are directly, clearly, cognised as "this", as separate from the individual subject, because of their having been separated from the individual subjects, beginning with Śūnya and ending with body, which are creations of Māyā, is logically possible only if they be admitted to be within the true subject, who is essentially pure self-luminosity; i.e. if they still retain their essential identity with the universal subject. Hence it follows that the Supreme Lord's power of knowledge consists in manifesting the object, which still retains its identity with the Universal subject, as separate from the created limited subject. (1).

The following are the reasons in support of the above view, which has been asserted to be based on reason :—

(2) "If the object be not one with light (of thought or consciousness) it would remain non-manifest even (at the rise of knowledge) as it was before. And the subjective light is not essentially different from the objective. The light (of thought or consciousness) is the very essence of thing."

If luminosity of an object, such as blue etc., be identical with it and not different from and transcending it, then the object should be manifest to all; this we talk of as a mere possibility: or it should be manifest to none: or, in reality, it should be blue only in itself. For, of the two independent things one cannot be logically spoken of as resting on the other. Or it may not be either blue or not-blue in itself. For, without the help of light (of thought) no positive statement about anything is possible. The same may be said about luminosity also i. e. it should be manifest to all or none; or it may be self-confined; or it may not be even in itself. Thus blindness of all would follow.

[But how can you say, says the Buddhist, that the object would remain the same (devoid of light) even at the rise of knowledge, as it was before; because] at the

time of rise of knowledge, the momentary object,—which has become luminous, because of its association with other momentary existences, namely, those of senses and physical light etc.,—is distinct from the previous one. But in that case also (if we admit the Buddhist theory to be correct) the same difficulty i.e. its becoming manifest to all or to none will follow. The same is the objection against the Prakāṣatā-vāda (of Kumārila, according to which, knowledge is an action, which is to be inferred from its result: and the result is nothing else than that which is known as manifestedness, which is a quality of the objects). For, if the light be said to belong to or rest on the object in every way, then it would be difficult to explain why does it shine only in touch with the (limited) perceiver, (to that perceiver alone who is in touch with it and not to all) on account of which the statement "It shines to me" is made.

It cannot be said that that perceiver, whose senses etc. are responsible for bringing about the manifestedness of jar, is the cause of manifestedness of the object, exactly as seed is that of sprout (and, therefore, it will shine in relation with him alone). For, the being of sprout as such does not depend upon the seed (after it has been caused).

Therefore, if the object be not essentially of the nature of light, it would be as non-manifest at the time of rise of knowledge as it was before.

But how can you say that the object would remain the same both before and after the rise of the knowledge, because the knowledge itself is of the nature of light of the object? This view would have been accepted if it had the support of reason. But how can the knowledge, which is different from the object, be connected with the latter? If the distinctive feature of knowledge be the shining of object (in it), the identity of the object and knowledge would follow, because knowledge (thought) is said to be the essential nature of the object. And if the thought (knowledge) be the essential nature of the object, then, thought being the very life of object, the aforesaid objection will stand. But if the essential nature of knowledge be said to be that it makes the object manifest, then also the meaning being "It makes the object shine", the same objection will arise.

I have discussed the meaning of the root and the causal affix, while refuting dualism. Therefore, for information on this point, that portion should be referred to. Hence it is an impossible statement that the separate light is connected with the object. From the above discussion, therefore, it follows that the

essential nature of the object is light and that it is non-different from the "Light" (prakāśa).

If this light be different in the case of each different object, their unification will not be possible; because both of them would be self-confined. This point has already been discussed in Sloka: "the practical life of humanity will come to an end". Therefore, Light is only one. The same has been shown by repetition: "the light cannot be different (from the object)"(2).

There are other objections even if the knowledge be admitted to be essentially the manifest of the object, as something different from it (the object). The author now states them:—

(3) "If the light (of thought) be different from the object and homogeneous in itself, then confusion of one object with another would follow. Therefore, the object, that is made manifest, is not different from light. For, what is not light cannot be said to exist."

If light of consciousness be something other than the object and, therefore, different from it, then in itself, being pure light of consciousness, it is one (i.e. has no variety). That is as follows:—

If in the statements "the knowledge of Nila" and "the knowledge of Pīta" the aspects, Nīla and Pīta, are to be considered to be the very essential aspects of knowledge, then they cease to be different from knowledge, and consequently it would mean the abandonment of the theory of difference. But if they be represented to be the objects, let us then see how can that be possible. For, the difference between Nīla and Pīta is to be known through the light (of consciousness), but how that very light, through which Nīla is known only as Nīla, Pīta also can be known only as such, (the light of consciousness being the same in both the cases). It cannot be said that the difference is due to the fact that one is caused by blue and the other by yellow or that it forms one whole with blue or yellow. For, this statement can be made only when the difference between one thing and the other has been established; but that is exactly the thing that we are discussing. Nor can it be said that the light (of consciousness) is of the form of Nīla, because the latter is reflected in it. For, the other (i.e. Bimba) is not manifest (in itself simultaneously with and independently of that on which it is supposed to cast its shadow). But if the object be admitted to be non-different (i.e. the object also be admitted to be shining) then that would mean abandonment of the theory of difference (Bhedavāda). Similarly, if we accept the theory that the difference in know-

ledge is due to difference in the means etc., how can the knowledge, caused by multiplicity of objects, such as blue etc., in one, who is at the peak of a mountain, be clear in the case of one and indistinct in case of another object, because the light of consciousness is one and the same. (This is the criticism of the Bauddha view that Vijñāna (saṃvedana) is formless. Nirā kāratveca saṃvedanasya I. P. V. V., Vol. III 79-80). So also in the case of remembrance, the residual trace having been revived by the perception of one thing, (out of many which were perceived together) the consciousness of all should forcibly follow. Thus there will be great confusion.

But if one were to say "Let there be the objects only; what is the use of admitting the existence of light which causes so great confusion?" The author says in reply that what is not light cannot be said to have existence at all. For, if (any one were to say that) 'blue' in itself is yellow or nothing, what would be the flaw in it? This is what the author himself has said elsewhere:—

"Thus these insentient objects are as good as non-existent in themselves. They are manifestations of the light of Self, which alone shines both as the subject and the object".

Therefore, the object can exist only if it be 'light'. And it can be 'light' only if the same 'light', which appears in the form of cloth, be admitted to appear in the form of jar also. Hence the 'light' is established to be of all forms.(3)

"Such is the power of that one 'light' that it can manifest the multifarious objects of the universe, some as cause and others as effect in the fixed order or even in contravention of it." This is what has to be proved to the opponents. And it is proved if other causes, to explain the variety in consciousness, which in itself has none, are rejected. (The following are some of the causes, admitted by opponents, to explain the variety in consciousness):—

(According to the Bāhyārthānumeyavādin) the cause of successive changes in the light, which is really one, is the reflection. The blue etc., which is similar to this reflection, is the external object. Although that is only inferable, yet because there is the direct perception "this is nila" as also because all the worldly transactions, connected with Pramāṇa, are dependent upon determinate cognition, it is spoken of as perceptible.

This theory of the Buddhist, who believes in the existence of the inferable external world, the author puts forth as a *prima facie* view:—

(4-5) “The light (of consciousness) (Bodha), being without diversity in itself, cannot be the cause of variety in manifestation (in determinate cognition). Therefore, this (variety in manifestation), being without any perceptible cause, leads to the inference of the external. The revival of variety in Vāsanā cannot be represented to be the cause. For, there is no answer to the question “what is the cause of revival of variety in the revived Vāsanā ?”

(According to the Vijñānavāda) the light of consciousness (Bodha) has no variety. In reality it is pure light. For, if the ‘blue’ etc. be different from light of consciousness then they, in their essential nature, being different from ‘light’ (i.e. being of the nature of darkness), would not at all shine. But if it be supposed that to shine as blue is its nature, then how Pīta would shine ? (because it is different from Nīla). And even if it be supposed that its nature is to shine in succession as Nīla and Pīta etc., then the consciousness of self as free from affection of external objects, in the state of deep sleep will not be possible. Therefore, light is light only. It has no form that is different from it in any way. “Light has no variety”. This light, which has no variety, cannot be represented to be the cause of different manifestations, such as Nīla at one time and Pīta at another, because there cannot be diversity in the effect, if it be not present in the cause. Therefore, the variety of manifestation of Nīla and Pīta etc., being without any perceptible cause, leads to the inference of the external, which is responsible for the reflection that appears in the light of consciousness (Vijñāna). The inferred is, of course, similar to the reflection it casts. It has diversity corresponding to the reflections, falling on light of consciousness (Vijñāna) in due succession, and is in every way different from it (light of consciousness). This is the possibility according to him who believes in the separate existence of the external objects. This is not a mere possibility but it borders on certainty. That is as follows:—

The reason that has been given to account for difference in perception, namely, the revival of the residual traces, is not sound; because Vāsanā is nothing else than the residual traces of impressions. It is responsible for remembrance. But here we have to look for the cause of difference in direct experiences, (to which difference in Vāsanā may be considered to be due, because of which there is consequent difference in perception, due to the

revival of Vāsanā, according to the Vijñānavādin). Or let us accept (the Vijñānavādin's conceptions of Vāsanā and its Prabodha, namely,) that Vāsanā is nothing else than the power of the light of consciousness (jñāna), capable of making the (supposed) external objects manifest; that Prabodha is its state of preparedness to do its work, and also that diversity in the objective aspects of experiences is due to revival. Our objection to this also is as follows :—

Although in regard to those objects, which are within the light of consciousness (jñāna), it can be said that their shining (existence: Sattvam:) (Sattā) is unreal, yet that which is the cause of these manifestations has to be accepted to be real. For, nothing, the chief characteristic of which is that it is without any capacity, can have, as its essential nature, the capacity to accomplish something.

Under these circumstances, if these vāsanās, which are represented to be the cause of objective manifestation, are admitted to be different from light of consciousness and to have got real existence, then this Vijñānavāda also is but Bāhyārthavāda, but in different words. But if these Vāsanās also are represented to have only imaginary existence, then, as such they cannot be represented to be the causes of different perceptions. But if it be said: they are the causes only in that aspect in which they are real, then their real aspect is only pure knowledge (Vijñāna) and that has no diversity. Therefore, diversity in the effect (diversity in the worldly object) cannot be explained. Thus, there being no essential diversity in Vāsanās what hope can there be of there being any variety in their revival.

Or let there be different Vāsanās. But there being nothing different from the light of consciousness (Bodha) truly existant such as time and space etc., which can be represented to be revivers of different Vāsanās and, therefore, there being no variety and so there being only one revival, all things should shine simultaneously.

The view, that other (objective) cognitions, which are within the chain of self-luminous self-consciousness, are the various causes of revival of different residual traces, is not sound, because all differences, whether in respect of pleasure or pain or Nīla and Pīta or former and later time or place, are essentially of the nature of light of consciousness (Vijñāna) and Vijñāna is in reality nothing else than "Light" itself; therefore, there being no possibility of difference in their essential nature there is no possibility of difference in cognitions.

Even in the case of other lights of consciousness (Bodhas) in the form of the other subjects which are called other chains, the impossibility of difference is common. For, in the case of those other chains of lights of consciousness also, thin or fat body, vital air, breathing in or out, qualities of the intellect, pleasure or pain, which are thought to belong to others, are really one with that light of consciousness, which is looked upon as inferer. We, therefore, fail to understand "what then remains which can be represented to be another."

If it were said that it is the light of consciousness (Bodha) which is present in what is called another chain, we would reply that the existence of that not having been established by any means of right knowledge, it is as good as nought. And even if it be established to exist as object, it would be insentient (jaḍa). And even so it would be nothing more than light of consciousness (jñāna) in its essential nature, like body etc. For, if it be admitted to be nothing more than the light of self-consciousness, it would not be known to another (jñāna or light of consciousness).

(The Vijñānavādin might attempt to prove the existence of another subject as follows :—)

"In ourselves we have experienced that such an activity as that of speaking is invariably preceded by desire to speak, as its necessary cause. Therefore, we infer that in the case of another person, such as Caitra, also such an activity must be preceded by similar desire. (So when we hear another person speak we know by inference that his speech also must have been preceded by desire.) But we know from our own experience that that desire is not in the chain, which we call ours. Thus it is clear that desire is another's and, therefore, that chain, to which that desire belongs, is another's". To this the reply is as follows:—

The experience of speech in the inferer is in two ways : (I) at the time of acquiring the idea of invariable concomitance, the experience is related to the subject as "I speak" : but (II) at the time of inference it is related to the object, as "This (man) speaks". Hence the idea of invariable concomitance is related to something else than that (i.e. to a different type of reason from that) which is directly experienced. How can then the latter be the reason for inference ? The cause of experience "this man speaks" being unknown, how can the inference of another's desire from it be possible ? Further, how can the experience "This man speaks" which is related to the object, the other subject, be admitted by the inferer to be the effect

of another's desire, which is intended to be inferred ? For, the effect of the desire (of which the inferer has the experience) is "I speak"; and that is related to the subject. It is not right to admit that the effect of what is essentially subjective, is objective in its essential nature; because we have no means of knowing such causal relation: for, it is not established by any means of right knowledge that the subjective cause produces objective effect, such as "this man speaks". The experience "this man speaks" depends upon establishing the existence of another subject and the existence of the latter depends upon the former; the argument, therefore, has the fallacy of inter-dependence of the two terms. It is not universally true that the effect of the subjective is the objective ; because there are exceptions. Nor is the rise of another subject necessarily due to the determinate will (anusandhāna) "let another subject also come into being" of the inferer. For, even when one is, the other is not, and vice versa. Further, the determinate will "let another subject come into being" which is supposed to be the cause of another subject, cannot be known to have any causal relation with another subject unless the otherness be established. Hence there can be no idea of invariable concomitance between the two.

And if other subjects are different from one another, the objects also, which shine as resting on them, would be necessarily different, because the recognised view is that the objective aspect of consciousness is not essentially different from the subjective. Hence all the subjects being not related to the same object, the co-operation of many subjects, which is based on their relation to the same object, should be out of question. Thus, people, unattached to one another, should be as if under the influence of spirits. And if the other subject, which is being inferred, be different from that which is taken to be inferer, then, of course, there can be the possibility that the object of cognition is different from the light of consciousness (Bodha). But then the law "the knowledge and its object are one ; because of their invariable concomitance", being not universally valid, what harm have blue etc. done that their separate existence is not tolerated. Therefore, the separate existence of different subjects is to be considered as not established. But if it is to be considered as established, then all the objective ideas (ābhāsas), which are within different subjects, would simultaneously bring about the revival of residual traces, which are responsible for difference in the objects of cognitions. For, there is no reason why only a particular residual trace should be revived. Therefore, even if other sub-

jects be admitted to exist, the difference of objects such as blue etc. from one another cannot be established (for, difference is due to their appearance in consciousness in an order of succession).

Thus, the difference in the residual traces as well as in the causes, responsible for their revival, cannot be shown to be consistent with reason. Therefore, this is established that light of consciousness (Bodha) has no variety in itself. And because it cannot reasonably be supposed to be the cause of the inexplicable diversity that appears in it, therefore, we have to admit the possibility of the inferable external object. "If Bāhyārthavādin were to say this". This is the meaning of these two verses. The word "Cet" indicates that the statement contained in them is simply a *prima facie* view. Thus the supposition of Bāhyārthavādin is presented to be a strong *prima facie* view.(4-5)

Now to weaken the supposition, he says the following :—

(6) "May be, but all transactions being possible on the basis of those various manifestations, what is the use of admitting the external, in support of the existence of which there are no reasons?"

When "Syādetat" is taken to mean admission of possibility of what has been said before, then the word "Kintu" is to be admitted to be understood here. And so the rest of the verse is to be interpreted as putting forth another possibility, which makes the former supposition weak. But if we do not accept the view that "Kintu" is understood here, then 'Syādetat' has to be taken in the sense of absence of conflict between the supposition, referred to above, and another which is being stated in this verse.

What have you got to do with the supposition of existence of external thing, which is difficult to maintain ? For, all the worldly transactions can be well explained by the subjective affections (ābhāsas) which are accepted by you : and no transaction is possible with what is always a matter of inference only. What is, therefore, the use of believing in the existence of the external, which lacks the support of reason ? As for the reason against it, the chief one is that if we believe in the existence of external things as different from light of consciousness, it will be impossible to establish even by inference that they shine (or are manifest). And additional reasons against it are: (I) The existence of Avayavin in Avayava is not possible i.e. the Avayavin cannot be said to be inherently (by relation of Samavāya) connected with Avayava. (II) Samavāya (relation of inherence) cannot be established. (III) There

is this unwelcome consequence also that it (Avayavin) will have opposite attributes such as motion and motionlessness, cover and exposure, redness and the opposite of it and spatial divisions etc. Even according to the view (of the Anusañcaya bāhyavādin Bauddha) that the external object is nothing more than a collection of atoms, the atoms alone exist. For, the collection is not an independent entity. And if they enter into union i.e. get conjoined closely without leaving any space between themselves, then the atoms shall have to be supposed to be having parts, facing each one of the six quarters : for, otherwise, if, for instance, there be placed six atoms on different angles of a hexagon, then (union taking place) if at that very place of the central atom, where one atom has got connected with it, the others also were to be connected, only oneness of atom will be the outcome. If, therefore, it is to be supposed that different atoms get connected with different parts of the central atom, then the conclusion of its having got parts is inevitable. But if it be said that that part only of the atom, with which another gets connected, is real, we would again advance the same argument (to refute it). Therefore, in reality there remains nothing external.

Nor can it be said (by the Naiyāyika) that because those which have definite dimension (Mūrta) (i.e. the atoms, constituting a binary) must necessarily be related to a number of spatial points (cannot be having only one place as is supposed by some) and because relation with different spatial points is to be admitted, when two things are related by Sāmyoga, therefore, there is binary substance (dvyanuka), the being of which involves two atoms but which is the same in size as atom and has grossness in it : when these three unite, there is a perceptible object. For, this is only Avayavivāda, and this has already been refuted.

Further, in the Vaiśeṣika system the conjunction is admitted to be Avyāpyavṛtti i.e. it partly inheres in the thing. But how can this partial inherence be possible in the case of atom which has got no parts? If it be said that conjunction inheres only in that which is its substratum: I would ask, what then remains that it cannot pervade? This is an additional argument against the Vaiśeṣika theory. Therefore, we have not taken pain to state it at length. This point has been very elaborately dealt with in the Prajñālankāra by Ācārya Śāṅkaranandana. (6)

But destructive reason is futile when the reverse of what it seeks to prove is established as certain by another proof. For, that very strong proof proves the invalidity of the des-

tructive reason. And we have already given the reason in support of our theory that external object exists as the cause of the effect (reflection) in the verse: "Those accidental affections".

To this the author replies as follows:—

(7) "That Lord, whose essential nature is sentiency, externally manifests, like a Yogin, all the objects which are within Him, according to His free will, without (requiring) any material cause."

Here although in dream, remembrance, kingdom of mind and imagination etc., variety of 'manifestations', the blue etc. is possible without any external cause, yet the variety of 'manifestation' perceptible in those states or conditions, because of its impermanency, uncommonness to all perceivers and also because of its possibly being due to the residual traces, left by former experience, can be considered to be unreal. But in the case of the various creations of city and army etc. by the simple will of a yogin, there is no possibility of representing them to be due to different material causes, such as clay, wood, semen and blood etc., so well known to us. It cannot be said that the omnipresent atoms, brought together by the will of yogin, bring about the desired thing. For, the reason, why this explanation is given, is only to show that the creation of Yogin also is due to the cause, which, in its essential nature, is non-different from that which we find responsible for ordinary every day creation. But this is not an established fact that the jar is the outcome of atoms alone directly. It is, on the contrary, not without the intervening stages of Kapāla etc. that jar comes into existence; and then also it is dependent upon subsidiary causes; for instance, the movement of hands and feet, connection with certain fixed time, place, possession of religious merit and excellence of training and practice. Thus, there being so many things necessary (in the creation of jar), if a Yogin can produce only by first acquiring all that is necessary for the creation of the desired object, he would be no better than potter himself. Therefore, if the Yogin's Creation has after all to be without well known causes, why then think of atoms etc. as the material cause, which it is impossible to maintain.

Therefore, it may be admitted that such is the spiritual power of a Yogin that it makes the objects, which are nothing else than various manifestations of his spiritual power, manifest. Therefore, it is possible that the universal consciousness (Sāmvid), whose power of freedom is acknowledged,

by virtue of its peculiar will, the chief characteristic of which is freedom from obstruction, manifests these objects of the world, which are present within as one with it, objectively as this i.e. as external to vital air, intellect and body, to which limited power of consciousness is given. Therefore, why not admit freedom of the sentient Self in the manifestation of the multifarious objects of the world, which has the support of experience ? Why feel the weariness, due to search for another cause ?

The significance of the word "eva" is that all opponents have to accept the determinate illumination (Vyavasthāpanā) of the objects as the chief characteristic of consciousness (Saṁvid) because, as has already been said, it is self-established (needs no proof). Its sentiency is its power of freedom, which is here indicated by the word "deva". What is then the use of unnecessary search for another cause ? Because, there is this possibility that the Lord makes all manifest, what is then the use of believing in the independent existence of the external, which lacks the support of reason. This is the connection of this verse with the previous. (7).

There are two ways in which the external phenomenon can be explained by inference. Well, then (I) should we follow the analogy of jar etc. reflected in a mirror, in the case of appearance of variety of reflection in the light of consciousness (Jñāna) and suppose some external objects as the causes of variety, different from the mirror of Vijñāna (II) or follow the illustration of Yogin and represent the power of freedom of Saṁvid to be the only cause. This is doubtful. Therefore, the author refutes the possibility of inference of external objects, in the following two verses :—

(8-9) "According to none, inference is possible of things which have not been directly perceived. As for the senses, they have of course been cognised, because of the cognition of things such as seed etc., which are of the nature of cause."

"The object that is outside the light of consciousness has never shone in any way. Therefore, its existence cannot be established even by inference."

Because of the arguments, stated in the preceding verses, the external objects do not shine as the objects of perceptions (Refer to Sautrāntika view 4—5). For, what is after all perception ? Is it not only this "Nīla shines" ? But it is non-different from self-manifest light of consciousness (Saṁvid). It is nothing more. Not only this ; but this external cannot be established by inference also. This is the force of "Api".

Here the inference cannot apply. And even if it does, it cannot establish the existence of external things. This is what is tried to be proved by these two verses.

What is inference ? Is it not (a kind of) determinate knowledge ? But all determinate cognitions are due to direct experience. This is well known. Therefore, nobody can say that inference can operate in relation to those things, which have never been the objects of direct experience. But if you say that the above statement holds good in the case of inference concerning those things which have been the objects of direct perception ; but it cannot be true in those cases in which inference is applied to the things, of which there has been only generic perception (*Sāmānyatodrste*) as in the case of inference of senses, because of the perception of the objects : our reply is as follows :—

It is admitted that in the case of inference, based on generic perception also, the inferred object is to be of the same type as the one which was object of determinate cognition. The determinate cognition (inference), however, does not come into touch with senses etc. as possessed of any particular form, but simply as some cause of perception. Now this characteristic, namely, the causality, is of course directly perceived. For instance, in "Seed is the cause of sprout" and "thread is the cause of cloth" the relation of cause and effect is to be ascertained with the help of perception and non-perception.

Of the two (means of right knowledge) the perception operates on each limited manifestation separately ; because the mental reaction (*Vimarśa*), which is nothing but determinative cognitive activity, refers to object, for which a single expression stands; and because the means of indeterminate cognition follows the same line as does that of the determinate one. This point will be asserted as follows:—

"The uncontradicted cognition refers to the object, for which a single expression stands".

It shall be proved later that "Ābhāsa" as such is 'universal'. As for *Anupalambha*, that also is essentially nothing more than the perception of another thing and depends upon the *Ābhāsa* as such.

Therefore, in the case of cognition of causal relation between seed and sprout, there has already been generic cognition of causal relation, i.e. that which necessarily presupposes something for its own being is the effect of the presupposed. For, in the case of every jar its having a cause as such in the form of clay etc. shines. (8)

It is contradictory to say that that which is outside the light of consciousness and is in itself different from the light, shines. And in the case of that which does not shine, the inference, which is of the nature of determinate knowledge, does not operate. In the case of the statement, "out of the village" or "out of the house" that which is out, is not meant to be different in nature from village or house : for, in that case the road, garden, tank, ditch and scale etc. shall have to be considered as different in their essential nature from village or house. In all such cases "out" (Bāhya) simply means "near" . Therefore, in "out of the village" and "out of light" there is only similarity of words and not of meanings. Thus, even according to those (Bauddhas) who hold that the thing does not shine in determinate cognition, the use of inference is not justifiable in the case of the external.

As for ourselves, we have already stated our view in the verse "If the determinate cognition be error" that determinative activity of cognition also has its object, that shines. Therefore, if the external objects, blue etc. are not illuminated by the light of inference, which is a determinate cognition, then it cannot be represented to be inferred at all. But if it be admitted to be illuminated, then, according to rule "which is not light cannot be brought to light" it shall have to be admitted to be "light" in its essential nature. It is not external.

Therefore, all the arguments, which are adduced to establish the external, prove, on the contrary, the internality of the so called external. Therefore, the author uses the words "in any way" i.e. whether perceptibly or inferably, the external, which is not light, never shone. It is consequently established that the sentient Lord Himself is the manifestor. (9)

It has been said that He manifests externally what is present within. But how do you establish the presence of all within Him ? To this the author replies as follows :—

(10) "The mass of the so called objects shines only as resting within the Lord. For, if it be not so there will be no possibility of the rise of will, which is a kind of determinate consciousness."

Even when things are manifest externally their internality does not get broken. For, internality is nothing else than "oneness with the (highest) subject". This shall be stated later on. And this oneness of things with the subject is always there, because that which is not one with light, and, therefore, does not shine, is nothing. But externality consists in "this" consciousness where rightly there should be "I" consciousness. Thus, according to this system, resting within is nothing else than con-

sciousness of the objective as "I" and not as "this", a form which befits the sentient (Cit). Such a consciousness of the objects, Nila etc., there is. We cannot say 'it is not'. For, in that case the consciousness "Let me make a jar", which is called desire in relation to the act, about to be done, on the part of potter, for instance, not being restricted or limited by the object of desire, why should it not have reference to cloth ? Thus, confusion in transactions should follow. But if one were to say that in the case of desire also, the jar, having been created (in imagination) at the very time of desire, has become its object, then we would say that that creation (in imagination) in the case of sentient being is not reasonable without a preceding desire. This point shall be explained later on in "Such a desire of one who desires to sit is causality." If, therefore, another desire also were to be assumed, the question will again be "is that associated with object or not" ? and so on *ad-infinitum*. But if it be said that it is associated with an object, then the object is identical with self ; but if not, why then the desire to create on the part of a potter should not refer to cloth ? If there also immediate imaginary creation be supposed, then again *argumentum ad-infinitum* would be the result. Therefore, it has to be admitted that the whole of this mass of external things is ever shining in the sentient Self as "I" ; and that universal consciousness (Sāṃvid), in a certain order or even without it, manifests them externally in multifarious forms, because of its omnipotence, the chief characteristic of which is freedom. The manifestation of subject precedes that of the object.

In this variety of manifestations also, Sāṃvid makes the perceivers one in relation to certain manifestations, i.e. it makes the spectators one in relation to the dance of a heavy hipped dancing woman. For, they become one in relation to that particular manifestation (dance) only. Their identity, however, is not complete because the idea of difference, associated with body, vital air, intellect and pleasure etc. which constitute parts (of universal manifestation) still persists. Therefore, the Highest Lord by uniting the perceivers or separating them manifests the universe in diverse ways such as creation and destruction etc. This is what the perceptor has said:—

"I bow to that lord who always diverts himself in creation, ever rests in pleasure of maintenance and is ever satisfied with the food of three worlds."

And Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa also has similarly said:—

"All praise to the indescribable, tireless, and unborn One, who remains indeterminate even though by His determinate

countless imaginings He is ever creating all the three worlds."

Therefore, it is established that the objects are within the subject. For, otherwise there would be no possibility of desire for them (10). -

But desire implies determinacy and how is that possible in the Lord, who is of the nature of pure consciousness, which is free from all determinacy (avikalpa)? To this the author replies as follows:—

(11) "Freedom is the very nature of the light of consciousness. For, otherwise, though reflection of the external objects be falling upon it, yet it would be no better than insentient crystal etc."

Here if both the light of consciousness or Prakāśa and what is different from it i.e. not-self-manifest, e.g. jar etc., exist in mutual isolation and rest within themselves, it would be impossible to point one out as sentient as distinct from the other, which is insentient, as in the case of jar and cloth (independently of the light of consciousness). But if it were to be said that the light is sentient; because it is connected with object; (the reply is that if mere relation with something be sufficient to call a thing sentient) why then not call clay also sentient because of its connection with jar? But if it is not only connection with the objects but also making them manifest, (that constitutes sentience), then it follows that light of consciousness is manifest as object. For, it is not reasonable to hold that one who is essentially different from the other is the manifestor of it. But if jar, though different in its nature from light of consciousness be supposed to be the cause of light (i.e. its shining as related to jar) then the light also being the cause of (manifestation of) jar (as such) the jar also shall have to be admitted to be sentient. But if the light of consciousness is to be supposed to be sentient because jar, though it is different from light of consciousness, yet it casts its reflection on the light, bearing which light is called light of jar: then crystal, water and mirror also, being similar, shall have to be admitted to be sentient. But if it were said that as crystal etc. are not able to feel consciousness of their being affected with reflection, so they are insentient; then it follows that consciousness of being affected which is the very life of sentience, the essential nature of which is freedom in respect of withdrawing within and spreading out, is natural to Prakāśa. This is what is known as perfect independence, the chief characteristic of which is resting within one's own self. For, when the consciousness "I alone, who am essentially light, am shining" rises then Saṁvid considers itself to be the

knower, the known and the means of knowledge and does not require any other, the so called external thing (for having such consciousness). But so far as crystal etc. are concerned, even when reflection is falling on them, to be known as such they require a subject, different from them and, therefore, because of their being devoid of consciousness, they are insentient.

All things, both before and after their separate manifestation, are in reality sentient, because they rest in self-consciousness; because they are one with self-consciousness, which is the essential nature of the subject.

This is what has been said in the following verses :—

“The fruition (culminating point) of the distinct determinate cognition “this” consists in its resting on what constitutes its essential nature; and that is the determinate consciousness “I am that.”

The middle state only, which is characterised by “this” and in which both the former and the later states are not apprehended, is the sphere of Māyā, the saṃsāra of the ignorant. Therefore, it is established that sentient freedom is the only essential characteristic of the Lord. (11)

It is not that we alone have represented the sentient freedom to be the chief characteristic of Saṃvid ; other Āgamas also have done the same. To show this the author says the following :—

(12) “Because the self is distinct from the insentient; therefore, it is spoken of as sentiency (Caitanya), the implied sense of which is the sentient activity or freedom in respect of conscious activity.”

Because free consciousness (Vimarśa) is the chief characteristic of Self ; therefore, with a view to represent it as such, the Self, though a substance and substratum of attributes, is put in the same case as that of sentiency (caitanya), though the latter stands for an attribute, in the Śivasūtra “Caitanyamātmā” by the glorious one. The word ‘sentiency’ (caitanya) stands for any word, which means the essential characteristic (of self). For, the teacher (Patañjali), in (I) “the power of sentiency is unchanging” (II) “that is the perfect isolation (Kaivalya) of consciousness (Dṛśi) (Y.S.2-25)” and (III) “the subject is nothing more than consciousness” (Y.S.2-20), has put the Self in the same case as that of the word, which stands for the essential nature. The substance is that, resting on which everything shines and is desired for practical purposes. Therefore, if you

do not get angry (I would say that) the entire mass of categories, elements, objects and worlds shines as such only resting on the universal consciousness (Saṁvid): and because this mass, including the categories, such as quality, action etc., essential nature and such other categories as are the substrata, rests on that (Saṁvid) which is the most important of all substances ; therefore, that (Saṁvid) alone is the true substance.

The word "Caitanya" is formed by adding the (Taddhita) affix, expressive of the state of being, (ṣyañ), which indicates relation, to the word "Cetana", formed by adding Kṛdanta affix (Lyuṭ), expressive of the sense of doer.

Therefore, by the word "Caitanya" sentiency has been prominently represented to be the most essential nature of Saṁvid, which is the substratum of the mass of innumerable qualities. As relation is always experienced as resting on the two, which are related, and as one of the related, the substance, is referred to by the original form (Cetana) ; so the affix 'ṣyañ', which indicates that the essential nature (Dharma), namely, the consciousness, as an activity, is related, brings to light the remaining (of the two which are related, namely, consciousness, as an activity). And activity in consciousness is nothing more than the agential activity i.e. freedom in uniting, separating and holding together. It consists in not being self-confined, like the insentient ; in having as its essential nature unlimited light; in perfect independence of others. And this freedom constitutes the point of distinction of the Self from the insentients, which are devoid of power of freedom to conjoin and disjoin. Having that (power of freedom) in his mind as all-surpassing and most prominent, in order to indicate the subordination of other attributes and superiority of free consciousness, the author instead of saying "Self is sentient" says "Self is sentiency". "Citkriyā-citikartrtā-tātparyeṇa" is one compound. For, the rule "Every quarter of a verse should be self-contained" is applicable to poetry only and not to philosophy. Or they may be taken separately as follows :—

The act of consciousness or the characteristic feature of the agent in the act of consciousness is spoken of as self. This is an interpretation which is not found anywhere. (12)

But just as 'light' and 'not-light' are in themselves so; (because they are indeterminate) and, therefore, when the word 'light' is used it does not necessarily indicate that (what is referred to by) it is distinct from insentient: so free-consciousness, sentiency or (Vimarśa) and not-free-consciousness or insentiency also are in themselves so. Therefore, they (the words

representing them) also cannot necessarily mean any distinction between the sentient and the insentient. With this objection in mind, the author says the following:-

(13) "Self-consciousness is the very self of sentiency. It is Parā speech, (vāk) which ever shines 'independently. It is the freedom (Svātantrya). It is the supreme power of the transcendental self."

The root "Citi" in "Cetayati" (which we find when we split up the word 'Cetana' as Cetayati iti cetanaḥ) means the act of consciousness which has self-reference, characterised by self-experience, as its essential nature. This is as follows:—

Jar is not manifest in itself i.e. is not conscious of itself; and because it does not shine in itself i. e. because it does not shine freely or independently, therefore, it is said to be insentient. But Caitra, because he has the power of various kinds of feeling and activity, shines in himself as "I" i. e. he is conscious of himself; he, therefore, shines in himself as different from that limited manifestation, which can be referred to as "this", in so far as he is affected by innumerable manifestations such as Nīla, Pīta, pleasure, pain and their absence. Therefore, it is said that Caitra is sentient. Thus, it is wrong to say that both, free-consciousness and not-free-consciousness, have their mutually exclusive independent existence in themselves. For, Vimarśa, free consciousness, is all powerful, identifies itself with others, denies itself, merges both into one (as in Sadāśīva State) and denies both, which have been merged into one. Such is its essential nature. And self-consciousness or Pratyavamarśa also in its essential nature is no other than the inner speech. This speech is independent of indicatory signs and is essentially unbroken self-experience, free from objective relation: it is like inward shaking of head; it is the very life of the indicatory sounds "a" etc. , which are used as indicatory signs in the sphere of Māyā. It is the background of other determinate cognitions such as "this is jar" and "I am Caitra" etc. This is called "parā" because of its perfection. It is "Vāk" because of its speaking of (referring to) the universe by means of inner sound in determinate apprehension. Therefore, as sentient, resting in itself and perfectly independent, it is always manifest, without an interruption, as "I". This Highest Lord's principal power of freedom, is spoken of as His 'Aiśvarya', independence of others or omnipotence. Higher and lower (parāparā vāk) is in the state of Paśyanti at the Sadāśīva level; because in it, though the consciousness

of the external, which is to be referred to as "this" and which depends upon the obscuration of the real nature of Self, just arises, yet it rests on self-consciousness. And the lower (aparā Vāk) is in those in whom the element of "this" is predominant and who are possessed of power within the pale of Māyā, such as Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Indra etc. But their power is due to the favour of the Highest Lord. Therefore, in reality, the independence of others is nothing else than supreme bliss (ānanda), omnipotence, freedom and sentiency. Therefore, it has rightly been said:—

"He is different from the insentient". (13).

It has been shown even in principal Āgamas (that the most distinguishing characteristic of the light of consciousness is sentiency). This is what the author says:—

(14). "It is the imperceptible eternal stir (sphurattā). It is the absolute being i. e. perfectly free in respect of all acts of being. It is beyond the limitations of time and place. This, being the essence of all, is spoken of as the resting place of the Highest Lord."

A question is often raised, "Why is it that jar exists but not the sky-flower?" In reply to this question people say: "Jar is, because it is manifest to me, but the other is not". Now, if manifestedness be identical with the very being of jar, it should be manifest to all or to none. Therefore, what is the meaning of "jar is manifest to me"? It means jar has entered my self-consciousness or sphuraṇa, (Sanskrit synonym for which is 'Spandana') the seeming vibration. Now Spandana means slight motion, and here slightness lies in its appearing to vibrate while it actually does not: because though the essential nature of the light of consciousness is not to change at all, yet it appears to be changing as it were, having as it were variety of manifestations. This is what the following quotations say:—

"The self (Ātmā) itself, which is essentially restful light of consciousness, appearing to vibrate (Sphuran) in all objects, is Śiva, the operation of whose will is free from obstruction, and whose powers of knowledge and action are ever active".

"The transcendental motion (Spanda) stands clear before a Yogin, who concentrates on the state of freedom from affection, which is attained (without any effort) at the time when he is extremely angry, excessively joyous, at a loss to know what to do or is running for life". (Sp. 22)

“For a clear grasp of the essential nature of the transcendental motion” (Sp. 20). And

“The flow of the (special) transcendental movement, the qualities (Sattva, Rajas and Tamas)” etc. (Sp. 19).

In ordinary life also a person, though changing in many ways, yet, if he does not change his real nature, is spoken of as grave i. e. of little flutter.

The word “Sattā” means the essential nature of the agent in the act of being i. e. freedom in all actions. It is great, because it pervades even the sky-flower. It is not limited by time or space: for, it is their creator. The reason is that only that which shines at the same level can serve as an attribute, as bangles do in the case of Caitra. But time and space do not shine at the same level with free-consciousness (Vimarśa). The former shine as “this” but the latter shines as “I”. Thus, it is above time and space; it is, therefore, all-pervading and eternal. But it is also in touch with all times and places; because it is their creator. For this reason also it is called omnipresent and eternal.

This is what the following quotations say:-

“The transcendental being (Mahāsattā), the great goddess, is called the life of the universe”.

“Sāram” (substance) i. e. that which is the most important aspect of Samvid, is this power of free consciousness. It is also responsible for distinction of subject from object, both of which are essentially light (of consciousness). This is exactly what has been said in Sāraśāstra.

“That which is the essence of this world is the transcendental power, “Mālinī”.

By “that this” (saiśā) recognition of the power is implied. “Hrdaya” means main stay or resting place. And, according to formerly established theory, the insentients rest in the sentient and the latter rests in the light of consciousness, with which it is one; and the place of rest of this also is the power, the free-consciousness. Therefore, in different authoritative texts the same is spoken of as the resting place of the universe, which ultimately rests in Parama Śiva, the highest abode of all. For, the heart, the resting place, (Hrdaya) of all is Mantra, which, in its essence, is nothing but free-consciousness, which also is simply the power of the transcendental

speech (parā vāk). The following statements have been made in the Āgamas just because of this:—

“Without Mantras there will be no sound nor meaning nor the grasp of the light of consciousness” and

“Having attained the state of Māṭṛs (Brāhmī etc.)”

The same has been asserted by glorious Bhartṛhari also :—

“There is no such cognition as is not accompanied by speech. All experiences at the time when we have them, are as it were penetrated by speech.”

“If the eternal identity of thought and speech were to come to an end, cognition would not be cognition, because it is that identity which brings determinacy into cognition.”

“This speech, as presented above, is the consciousness of the transmigrating being. It is both internal and external. In the absence of it a transmigrating being is seen unconscious like wood and wall”. And so on.

Thus (by showing that his theory is supported by others also) the author has justified the use of (plural in) “Viduh”.

The Bauddhas also, who hold that validity of cognition depends upon the intellectual reaction (Adhyavasāya), have almost accepted this theory, because the most essential nature of the intellectual reaction is (inner) speech (14).

To the question : “Why so much prominence is being given to this power of free-consciousness, in spite of the fact that Parama Śiva has got innumerable other powers ?” the author replies :—

(15-16) “Therefore, it is that He manifests Himself as objects of knowledge. The object has no separate existence : for, in that case, because of His having to look up to them for help, His freedom would be lost.”

“As the Self is without a second and is perfectly free, so by means of mere will (Saṅkalpaḥ icchārūpaḥ), He creates Īśa etc. who are full of power of freedom, and makes them objects of meditation etc. in ordinary life.”

The power of action, the essence of which is omnipotence, includes all powers. And this is of the nature of free consciousness (Vimarśa). Therefore, it is rightly given prominence. This is the substance of the reply. The following is the word-meaning :—

The Highest Lord, whose essential nature is light (of consciousness), manifests Himself as the objects of knowledge, though in reality He is subject only and, therefore, not the object of knowledge. This is what is established as the only

possibility; because by means of strong inferential proofs in support of this possibility, it has been shown that there is no other possibility. And this He does, because of His Freedom, the distinctive feature of which is the power of free-consciousness. Because He is Self-conscious, and because the world lies within Him, therefore, He manifests Himself as blue etc. But how can there be this very possibility that He manifests Himself as object? Reply is that the object cannot have its existence apart or separate from the light of consciousness. The particle 'tu' implies emphasis. In support of this some arguments have already been given; more are given below :—

If the object of knowledge be separate or different from the universal subject, the intentness of the Subject on object, of which we know from our own experience, will not be possible; because that intentness on the object, which is different from it, means His (Subject's) dependence upon the latter. And dependence is quite opposite of freedom. Freedom lies in not seeking external help ; and that is the chief characteristic of Self. Therefore, if Self be seeking the help of another, it would cease to be Self. And not-self, being insentient, there can be no possibility of its seeking any help. This is the unwelcome conclusion. Therefore, from this opposite conclusion it follows that Self does not seek external help, and consequently, being free, it manifests its own Self as object of knowledge (15).

He creates not only external objects of perception such as blue etc., but others also, in which the characteristic nature of doer and power of freedom are markedly present, and makes them objects of meditation and worship etc. This also is possible only if what has been stated in the previous verse be accepted as true. This is the connection of this verse with previous one.

But is there no self-contradiction in saying that the object is created and yet it is full of power of freedom ? Reply is that that Self, which is without a second and is pure light of consciousness (Saṁvid), is perfectly free. Therefore, what has been asserted above is reasonable. The word "freedom" (Svāntarya) implies unobstructed freedom in creating that which in the sphere of Māyā seems extremely difficult.

"Because of this alone" (ata eva) refers to the essential nature of the power of free-consciousness. Therefore, there is no repetition. Or there is another construction possible, namely, "because of this freedom alone" (ata eve svāntryāt). The two words, thus, refer to the same thing and are connected

with both the verses. The author illustrates the point as follows :—

Although we do not know any instance of creation of that which is full of power of freedom, as we know that of blue etc., yet, because to meditator or worshipper in his meditation on the Lord, the glorious, the Self, the eternal, the omnipresent or the free etc., the object of worship or meditation or observation appears as distinct ; it is, therefore, created. But it is not other than Īśvara, because in that case there would remain no difference between meditation on Īśvara and on Anīśvara. But that is not the case. For, the effects of two meditations are different. Therefore, both the kinds of objects, one full of power of freedom and the other devoid of it, are non-different from Self and are manifested by the Lord by virtue of His power of free-consciousness. Therefore, that is the chief power. (16)

But the following question may be raised here:—The objects shine as distinct from one another, because of the light of universal consciousness. The essence, however, of that light of universal consciousness (prakāśa) is free-consciousness or Vimarśa. Hence because free-consciousness is non-different (from light of consciousness), therefore, the only thing that we can rightly say is “that is that” only i.e. prakāśa and Vimarśa are identical. But in our determinate subjective reflection, such as that on Īśvara or Self etc., the created is thought as “this” ; but the “freedom” is thought as “I”. The created, therefore, not being of the nature of self-consciousness, how can it be represented to be not devoid of power of freedom? To answer this the author says as follows :—

(17) “The universal Self-consciousness and Īśvara etc. do not become different from one another simply because of difference in the forms of judgment related to them. For, the judgments related to the created ultimately rest on the universal Self-consciousness just as the consciousness of meaning of a noun, derived from a root, rests on the consciousness of the action, represented by personal termination.”

The affix, expressive of state (tal), is used here in the sense of essential nature. The word ‘etc.’, (ādi) implies Self and Īśvara etc. The word ‘personal termination’ (tiñ) implies all affixes which stand for action. The word ‘action’ (karma) is used to imply power (Śakti) which is not of the nature of substance. Hence the meaning of the verse is as follows:—

The universal consciousness assumes the form “I” and also other innumerable forms such as “Lord” “Subject” “Self” or “Śiva” etc. And although these are apparently different from

one another, yet it is wrong to suppose that there is any real difference between that Self which is Creator and is of the nature of self-consciousness, and that which is created and is conceived as "Īśvara" etc. ; because even the consciousness "Īśvara" rests on Him whose nature is to lord, the most essential characteristic of whom is the capacity to do and to know : and because the capacity to know etc. (jñātrtva) consists in freedom i.e. independence of others i.e. possession of unlimited power of knowledge ; and unlimitedness of knowledge lies in its resting on "I" as "I know" "I do" : therefore, the things, created by this Lord, or Self, are to be (ultimately) conceived only as "I". Or the word "Sṛṣteḥ" may be taken as ending in the ablative case, expressive of the causal relation. (It will then mean) because the Lord, in His creation of Īśa etc. by will, creates what is capable of self-consciousness. In the word "mrśya" the affix (ya) is expressive of capability. The Meanings, such as action (kriyā), relation subsisting between a noun and a verb, conjunction, option etc., which in truth are nothing more than thoughts, expressed by the use of personal termination, instrumental case and particles "ca" and "vā" etc. respectively, even though they may be given substantive forms by presenting them in such words as "pāka" "kartā" "samuccaya" and "vikalpa", yet they rest on the original thoughts, presentable in such words as "pacati" "caitrena" "ca" and "vā". For, otherwise they (meanings) will not be grasped. Similar is the case here. The idea, stated above, may be elaborated as follows :—

The word "parāmarśa" means the point of rest (in the thought-process). And it is only the culminating point that is truly so. And that is nothing else than self-consciousness. The point of rest, that comes in the middle, is like the root (shade) of a tree in going to a village. And that (point of rest, which comes in the middle) is spoken of as created in relation to the culminating point. Hence there is no contradiction. The argument, stated above, proves that blue etc., though they constitute the middle points (in the process of thought) yet, because they ultimately rest on the original thought, "the I", the self-consciousness, they, therefore, are identical with self-consciousness. Even the consciousness "I know this blue" is in reality nothing more than "I shine". This is what has been asserted in the following :—

"Of the consciousness "this" etc.

And because a layman finds false satisfaction in the determinate cognition of blue etc., because it serves his practical purpose,

therefore, blue etc. have been spoken of as devoid of "freedom". But in the case of the self, even a layman does not consider the thought-process complete nor the purpose attained, unless he comes to rest on the original thought. Hence the self has been spoken of as not devoid of "freedom" even when it is created. (17)

But if all thoughts in reality rest in one pure "I-consciousness", how can it be said that direct cognition and remembrance etc. are His powers ; that cognition has such varieties as doubt and certainty etc.; and that the material objects such as blue etc. are of various kinds ? To answer this objection the author says:—

(18) "The same free universal self-consciousness, having as its place of rest the objects of sense-perception, which are separated from perceiver by the power of freedom (Māyā) of the Lord, is called by different names such as perception, imagination and ascertainment etc."

The manifestation, which cannot reasonably be explained is called Māyā. Therefore, the entire mass of objective manifestations, separated from light of consciousness, is Māyā. The power of freedom of the universal consciousness in objective manifestations is itself "Māyā Śakti".

That very universal consciousness, whose essential nature is self-consciousness and which is nothing else than the transcendental speech (Parā Vāk), having the objects,—which are separated from the subject and one another by the power of Māyā, and which are to be known through senses, which also are separated from the subject, each other and sense-objects by the same power of Māyā,—as its places of rest, is called perception, imagination and ascertainment. By the use of the word 'Etc'. (Ādi) doubt and remembrance etc. are meant to be added. Thus (I) perception (jñāna) is the same light of consciousness (Saṁvid) when it is limited by senses, which perceive only what is clear, and by clearly manifested external object. The same light of consciousness (Saṁvid), being limited by mind (Manas) and the object, which is not clear, is called (II) imagination. Saṁvid, being limited by intellect (Buddhi) and the object in all its completeness or entirety, is called (III) ascertainment (adhyavasāya.)

The diversity of objects and of internal and external senses, which does not appear to be consistent with reason, because the objects are essentially identical with the universal consciousness is manifested by the universal consciousness, because it rests on

diversity, and because diversity does not rest on unity as in the case of Sadāśiva and Īśvara. And because (in the sphere of Māyā) variety constitutes the culminating point, therefore, perception and imagination etc. are represented to be powers of that unifier, the universal free consciousness (Saṁvid), whose oneness with its essential nature always is intact. Accordingly, variety of cognitions such as doubt etc. and difference of blue and yellow etc. also has been talked of. Thus there remains no objection. (18)

But although determinacy as distinctive nature of the sentient power is not open to any objection in imagination and remembrance etc., which belong to the sphere of determinate knowledge, yet how can it be maintained to be so in relation to the indeterminate experience, the chief feature of which is immediacy. For, determinate consciousness (pratyavamarśa) consists in using certain fixed word for the thing perceived. This depends upon remembrance of indicatory word : that on revival of residual traces and that also on similar (previous) perception. Thus, how can, at the time of first moment of experience, the application of certain fixed word to the thing perceived be possible ? To remove this wrong idea the author says :—

(19)“At the time of indeterminate experience also there is determinate consciousness (the essence of which is application of indicatory sign). For, how otherwise will there be the possibility of running etc. if there be no determinate consciousness (though in a subtle form)”.

In the indeterminate experience also there is the association with the inner speech which is the essential characteristic of the Self and which is similar to indication by figure etc. For, otherwise a child, on seeing a transaction for the first time, would get no knowledge. A child hears the word, spoken by another person, through a regular succession of indeterminate cognitions; he sees that object before (in regard to which the word, he has just heard, has been used) : and then he sees the place without the thing. Now on hearing “bring the jar or “carry it” how can the consciousness arise in the heart of child that the particular thing is the meaning of a particular word, namely, this is the meaning of the word “jar” ; this is the meaning of the word “bring” ; and this is the meaning of the word “carry”. For, the consciousness, that this particular object is the meaning of this particular word, depends upon unification. And unification is determinate cognitive activity.

But if any one were to say that knowledge of the child (on hearing a certain word, used for the first time) is due to remem-

brance of indicatory words, associated with the objects of experience of former birth, we reply as follows:—

That word, (in terms of which the knowledge of a child is tried to be explained) because at the time of acquisition of its conventional meaning in the past birth, it was determinately cognised as an object, as “this”, has to be admitted to have shone as separate from the subject and to have rested on the subject, identified with intellect (Buddhi-pramātā). For, only as such, it could be expressive.

If then intellective subject (Buddhi pramātā) were admitted to shine in its essential nature as that on which the word rests, the word would have to be admitted to be an important aspect of the subject. Let it be granted that colour etc. as objects, are not essentially of the nature of speech (Abhilāpa). But, just as, though the object is not essentially of the nature of pleasure, yet the intellect-subject (Vijñāna) shines as blissful ; so intellect-subject will have to be admitted to shine as identical with the word that rests on it, (at the time of acquisition of convention by the child). According to this system, however, the object also is essentially of the nature of transcendental speech, because it is essentially of the nature of free-consciousness (Vimarśamaya). Even the state of senselessness and so forth, if it be not of the nature of determinate cognition, its possibility would in reality be matter of swearing only ; because there would be no determinate activity of the subject in it, and consequently there will be no subsequent recollection of it.

But if the determinative activity be supposed to arise there as related to some form, what else (would be the consequence than that) there can be no senselessness which is characterised by absence of all mental activity. Hence it follows that even in the case of senselessness there is subtle determinative activity. All words are capable of expressing all meanings. But at the time of acquisition of convention, a particular word is unified with a particular meaning. That is as follows:—

At the sight of an object in front, a child naturally apprehends it determinately, either subjectively as “I” or objectively as “this”. On it either the word “fair complexioned” or “cow” is superimposed. That word also, because of continued use, becomes one with the subject (pramātr). Of the two, one is further superimposed upon as “white” and the other as “bull”. This is the essential nature of convention.

From the above arguments it is clear that in the indeterminate experience there is an element of determinacy. The idea con-

veyed by the word "Api" is that even indeterminate cognition really ends in definite consciousness "I see". That this definite consciousness is an aspect of perception as a function (Pratyakṣa) is the view of even the Naiyāyika. And function can never be different from one to whom it belongs ; because the former is the essential nature of the latter.

Or let the indeterminate cognition be admitted to be momentary in its nature, but there is no doubt about it that therein also there is definite consciousness. For, if it be not there, then a person, going hurriedly with one aim, or uttering letters rapidly, or reading a book of hymns rapidly, should not reach, utter or read the desired. That is as follows:—

How can reaching the desired place be possible unless there be determinate consciousness, the essential aspects of which are unification and separation ; such as knowledge of the place, desire to step, stepping, consciousness of the foot having been placed on the right place, desire to leave, consciousness of another place, and also desire to step on it etc. ? Similar should be considered to be the case with speaking and reading rapidly etc. In the last two cases there is contact of tongue with various places of articulation. Here (in the above cases of reading etc.) hurry consists in the absence of clear determinate knowledge, which follows the indeterminate. Therefore, there must be subtle determinate consciousness, consisting in subtle idea of indicatory sign (word). For, gross determinacy is nothing else than expansion into clear and definite shape of the subtle idea in the form of the indicatory word. For instance, expansion or clarification of "this" is "jar" "white" etc. and of that also is "of the shape of big belly with a bottom" and "with quality of whiteness inherent in it". The root "Dhāvu" according to the text, means to go or to clean. But in the present context it means to run, because of its own expressive power (independently of any prefix). (19)

May be that subtle determinate consciousness is present even in the indeterminate in the cases, cited above. But in other cases the determinacy of consciousness is apparent, because of its grossness. In such cases indicatory word shines separately like other external objects, blue etc. e.g. "this is Nīla". How can this (indicatory word) be represented as one with essential nature of indeterminacy ? For, determinate consciousness is, according to you, non-different from indicatory word, and that, (indicatory word) even in the state of Māyā, wherein difference is clearly manifest, is held by you as not having separate

existence from indeterminacy. How can this be acceptable? With this objection in mind the author says the following:—

(20) "The determinacy, (*Adhyavasā*) which is expressed as "this is jar", is the power of the Highest Lord, beyond name and form. It always shines as (one with Him) "I" and never as "this".

Who said that the gross audible indicatory sound is identical with free-consciousness (*Vimarśa*), which is the very life of light of consciousness? That gross sound also shines separately as other objects. (Our view about this *Vimarśa* is that) Determinacy, which determinately cognises words and objects, characterised by name and form as non-different, as, "that is this" is the power of the Highest Lord, called "*Vimarśa*". It always shines as unlimited "I" and never as limited "this". For, if it were to shine as limited, being dependent upon another, there will arise the necessity of another and that being supposed to shine as limited, there will be required still another. Thus, it will lead to *argumentum-ad-infinitum*. Therefore, the external objects, being without anything to rest upon, would not shine at all. Therefore, no *Vimarśa* is separate from *Prakāśa*. The gender of the word "*adhyavasā*" is feminine. It is formed by adding affix "an" in accordance with the rule "*Ātaścopasarge*" (*Pan.* 3-2-16). (20)

If all cognitions rest on I—consciousness, then it means that they do not touch the objective level. Therefore, as association with time and space is possible of that only which is of the nature of object of knowledge and not of the knower, so, there being no connection with time or space, how can various cognitions, which are experienced as coming in succession one after the other, either in relation to space or certain aspects of the subject etc., be explained? And if there be no order of succession, there will in reality be only one cognition. How then would it be justifiable to say, as you have said, that Lord is full of powers of cognition and remembrance etc.? To this the author replies and concludes the discussion:—

(21) "It is only because of the affection by temporal and spatial limitation of the variety of objects that cognition, remembrance and intellectual reaction (*adhyavasāya*) etc. appear to be successive."

True, the universal consciousness (*Saṁvid*) has no order or succession. But it has, by virtue of its power, manifested separately various objects of knowledge. And these shine in it, casting their reflections as on a mirror. Therefore, because of the spatial limitation, such as distance and proximity and

extendedness and unextendedness, constituted by variety of forms; and temporal limitation, such as slow or quick succession, constituted by variety of forms involved in action of these objects, there appear to be parts of cognition and remembrance and intellectual reaction, though they have no parts. And because of the parts, which shine, there appears to be succession of parts in each of them as well as in their mutual relation. Although temporal succession alone is clearly perceptible in cognitions and not the spatial ; yet, as the cognition of mountain seems to be big and that of jujube fruit small to a layman, so the author has referred to spatial succession also. Therefore, the succession in cognition, which is perceptible, due to the successive reflections of the external objects, is not unreal, because nothing that shines is so. Therefore, it was right to say "cognitions etc. are the powers of the Lord."

By the verse "Because of the power of the Lord, the "Māyā" difference in forms of cognitions was explained. And by this verse the difference in temporal and spatial limitations is explained. This is the difference (between the subject-matter of this verse from that of the earlier). The chapter ends (21).

Here ends the fifth chapter, called the presentation of the power of cognition, in jñānādhikāra in the commentary on the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Sūtra by great teacher Abhinavagupta. (5)

ĀHNIKA VI

We bow to that Śiva, who, because of his free will, creates variety of forms, by separately manifesting the objects, which in the state of identity with His Self are like one solid mass, by means of His power of differentiation, which is like a chisel.

Thus, the powers of knowledge and remembrance have been explained. Now the power of differentiation (Apoḥana-Śakti), which is the helper of both, is going to be discussed at length in eleven verses beginning with "The universal self-consciousness, which is the essential nature of the light of consciousness" and ending in "Are established to belong to all living beings."

The first verse shows that the distinctive feature of the universal self-consciousness is indeterminacy. The next verse asserts that in pure self-consciousness, the activity of differentiation is impossible. The verse after that says that such Self-consciousness has been established on rational basis in this system only. The next two verses admit that the impure self-consciousness is determinacy. In the next verse it is shown that unification also is determinacy. The following verse asserts that the creative activity of the Highest Lord consists in the unification etc., as presented above. Then in one verse the conclusion that all objective manifestations have their being in the universal consciousness, which is under discussion, is stated. Then in the following two verses it is stated that the same objective manifestation appears in a variety of ways in the direct cognition and remembrance. The last verse says that what has been stated above is useful in recognising the identity of the individual self with the Lord. This is the substance of the chapter. Now begins the explanation of the text.

In the preceding chapter it has been said "the essential nature of light of consciousness is free-consciousness (Vimarśa) 1-5-11" And Vimarśa has been related to subtle speech. This logically implies that the pure lord or universal consciousness is of the nature of determinacy (Vikalpa); because it is related to speech. This is not a welcome implication, because determinacy arises only in the world, which is of the nature of Māyā. With this objection in his mind, the author says :—

(1) "The (universal) I-consciousness, though it is the very life of the light of consciousness and is embodied in the transcendental speech, is not determinacy, because determinacy is certainty, which implies two."

The (universal) I-consciousness,—which rests on freedom, the chief characteristic of which is perfect independence of others; which is of the nature of inner consciousness and is without any break,—is the very life, i.e. the most essential characteristic of the light of consciousness, which is of the nature of pure *Samvid* and is not soiled by association with body etc. This cannot be determinacy. He shows reason to justify the supposition that it is determinacy, namely, “Even though it is embodied in speech.”

By the word ‘speech’ (*Vāk*) is meant that sound, which is of the nature of inner speech, is one with *Samvid*, ever shines within and is different from that sound, which is of the nature of an object and as such can be perceived through sense of hearing. Speech (*Vāk*) is so called, because it speaks of the object by superimposing itself on the object through unification, namely “that is this”. But if it is embodied in speech why then is it not determinacy? Reply is; because in it the characteristic of determinacy (*Vikalpa*) is absent. That is as follows :—

Determinacy is the act of constructing many images (in consequence of contact with one object) and then differentiating the object of cognition from all else, which it was at first doubted to be. The variety (involved in determinacy) is due to the fact that on sense-contact with fire there arises the idea of possibility of not-fire; it is superimposed (on fire at first) and then rejected. Thus, it implies both fire and not-fire. Therefore, in determinacy, there is always differentiation of what the object of cognition is from what it is not. (1)

The same point is further elaborated as follows :—

(2) “There is the possibility of appearance (at the same place) of both jar and not-jar, which are essentially different from each other. But there is nothing which has similarity with the light of consciousness and which, though different from it, yet shines.”

There is the possibility of presence at that very place, where we see a jar, of something which is altogether different from jar, say, cloth, which also occupies places admittedly fit for it, gives rise to cognition and has been (may have been) brought there by a fixed set of causes. Therefore, there being the possibility of appearance of both jar and cloth (at the place where jar alone is present) there is room for superimposition. When there is superimposition of a thing of different nature (on jar) then alone there is room for the power of differentiation (*Apohana*) to function in refuting what is superimposed. Therefore, the ascertainment “this is jar” has the distinctive feature of deter-

minacy, which depends upon the operation of the power of differentiation (Apoḥana). Here *Liṅ Lakāra* is used in the sense of possibility.

But that which can possibly be superimposed on the light of consciousness, cannot be not-light. For, superimposition is always of something that belongs to the same category. And the 'not-light' has never been found to have the causal efficiency of the light of consciousness. For, the very fact that it is superimposed or is thought to be possible, would mean that it is not not-light. Therefore, there is nothing like 'not-light', similar to the light of consciousness, which may be on a par with the latter and whereon the power of differentiation (Apoḥana) can function. As there is no 'not-light', so what can be refuted? Even if 'non-light' be supposed to shine or exist (then it is no 'not-light') rather that is also light of consciousness. Nor has light of consciousness any temporal, spatial or formal differences so as to make it possible to differentiate one light of consciousness from the other.

Here the word "Hi" means : because it is so (i.e. because there is nothing similar to the light of consciousness) and consequently because there are not two ; therefore, the differentiation being impossible, it (Ahampratyavamarśa) cannot be represented to be of the nature of Vikalpa. Therefore, in the case of pure Saṁvid, which is free-consciousness itself, the "I—consciousness" is the "self-consciousness (Pratyavamarśa) only and not determinate cognition (Vikalpa). (2)

Here it may be asked : how can the determinate perception of jar, which arises on the basis of the indeterminate perception, negate not-jar ? For, nobody has mentioned even its name. And how can the residual trace of not-jar arise on perception of jar ? (The reply is) True. But this is a question which has to be put to the Buddhist and not to us. The reason is as follows :—

(3) "The certainty about "this" that the subject, in whom both "this" and "not-this" shine, feels, because he rejects not-this, is spoken of as the determinate cognition "this is jar."

According to this system, the subject is different from means of cognition. He is perfectly free in the sphere of cognitions. He is a free agent, because he is responsible for unification and differentiation of cognitions. This has been proved. And all the objects shine within that subject. These objects are essentially of the nature of pure consciousness only, and shine as one with the subject, exactly in the manner in which a city

shines in a mirror. This also has been stated. Thus, both the images, of "this" i.e. 'jar' and of 'not-this' i.e. "not-jar" are present within the subject. Therefore, in the state of indeterminacy, jar is one with pure consciousness and, like the latter, it is omniform and perfect. Hence it can be of no use in practical life. Therefore, the Subject, while manifesting the activity of Māyā, splits this perfect being i.e. manifests it as delimited. Through that (manifestation of activity of Māyā) he differentiates jar from not-jar, self and cloth etc. The differentiation consists in negation. And we speak of certainty about the jar "this is jar and nothing else" on the basis of that very differentiation only, the chief characteristic of which is negation. For, the meaning of the word "eva" is the negation of all other things, which can possibly exist (at that place). This determinacy (Vikalpa) is so called because it cuts a thing off on all sides (from everything else). The implication of the word "hi" is "because it is so", therefore, it is rightly said that determinacy depends upon two. But by means of the statement of two facts in the preceding verses two reasons have been successively stated (in support of the two assertions in verse no. 1). Therefore, as determinacy is such, so I—consciousness is pure free-consciousness and not determinacy (Vikalpa). This is the central meaning in the long sentence, that extends over three verses. By the Bauddhas also the differentiation is represented to be an act of the subject. For, in the verse "Ekaḥ Pratya-vamarśākhyah" etc. they use the words "prapattā" and "svayam". But how can they support this assertion? Let us stop here. (3)

But why cannot I—consciousness be represented to be determinacy inasmuch as in this also jar etc., which are not—I have to be negated? With this objection in his mind the author says:—

(4-5) "The I-consciousness,—which shines as a distinct subject, because the universal consciousness has obscured itself through its power of obscuration (Māyā) and shines distinctly within (the limitations of) body, intellect (Buddhi) vital air or the supposed voidness,—is determinacy (Vikalpa); because of its differentiation from others. Determinacy (Vikalpa) owes its being to the awareness of another thing, which is of opposite nature."

The I—consciousness is of two kinds, one is pure and the other is due to Māyā. Pure is that which rests on pure Saṁvid which is non-different from the universe, or on that pure self, in which the whole universe is reflected. Impure is that which rests on body etc. which are objective. Thus, in relation to

pure self-consciousness there is nothing of opposite nature possible, which has to be negated ; because jar etc. also being essentially of the nature of consciousness and, therefore, of not opposite nature, have not to be negated. Thus, there being nothing to be differentiated from the Self, there is no possibility of determinacy in pure self-consciousness. But the impure self-consciousness, —which rests on body etc., which are of the nature of an object, and exist separately from other bodies and jars etc.,—is undoubtedly a determinacy. This is the substance. The word-meaning is as follows :—

‘Principle of consciousness’ (cittattva) means that which is of the nature of pure light. ‘Giving up’ (Hitvā) means that though it is still there, yet having thrown into the background through the influence of Māyā. ‘In the differentiated’ (bhinne) means ‘in the body etc.’. That determinate consciousness “I who am fat” which is due to the wrong notion that I who am body etc. am the perceiver of the external objects blue etc. is really determinacy (Vikalpa). It is not pure self-consciousness. The reason may be stated as follows :—

“Para” means another i.e. body and jar etc. which are of opposite nature, i.e. of equal status and opposite because they (self and not-self) are mutually exclusive. The limited self-consciousness is determinacy, because the consciousness “I am fat and not thin, nor identical with jar etc.”, arises from cognition, which is characterised by superimposition of what is of opposite nature and depends upon the negation of ‘not-that’. The obscuration of pure Saṁvid is the cause of difference of body etc. And the cause of obscuration of that pure Saṁvid is that power which is called Māyā. It is the power of freedom of the Highest Lord. It is freedom to bring about the obscuration of unity, which is of the nature of illusion. It is simply His will to conceal Himself. And the obscuration of the real nature of Saṁvid consists in wrongly considering body etc., which are still of the nature of object and, therefore, different from the subject, to be the subject, without any reason for it.

Accordingly, the Cārvākas, who represent those who wrongly suppose the body to be the self, hold that body, with consciousness as its attribute, is self. Thus, according to them, body is the chief thing, because such is the idea of women, children and the ignorant.

Some followers of the Vedānta, who are better than the Cārvākas, maintain that body is transient, because certain new qualities (colour etc.) arise in it and change on account

of its subjection to heat. And because they find that without the presence of the vital air (Prāṇa) in the body, hundreds of deformities enter into it, they hold that vital air, which is responsible for feelings of hunger and thirst, is the self. Those who are wiser still, such as the followers of Kaṇāda etc., seeing that vital air also, being transient, cannot possibly remember, hold that Buddhi, which is the substratum of knowledge and pleasure etc., is the self.

Others, holding Buddhi also to be a lower principle inasmuch as it appears as an object at the time of spiritual intuition, represent the subject to be above the entire mass of knowables, essentially of the class of the unknowable and similar to ether (nabha) in respect of voidness and yet different from ether, which is one of the five elements. This is the view of the Sāṅkhya etc., who believe in Śūnya-Brahman.

The implication of the word "imagined" (kalpita) is that as soon as the objective nature of body etc. is realised, another subject which is nothing more than void (Śūnya) is imagined. The same being the case with this also, another Śūnya is supposed and so on; because so long as duality persists the chain of suppositions does not break. This, however, does not mean infinite regress. For, all, body and intellect etc., possess the essential nature of subject, just because of the presence in them of the power of real light of consciousness, but not independently. Thus, the conception of body as the subject is mere egoism (ahaṅkāra). Śūnya (as subject) is nothing more than universal consciousness in a limited form; just as not-being or absence of jar (ghatābhāva) is nothing more than limited piece of (bare) land. Intellect, vital air and body etc. (as subjects) are nothing more than the universal consciousness, affected by the reflections of objects, after it has assumed limitation. These subjects constitute the various levels in the gradual spiritual ascent of Yogins. They are called by different names in different Āgamas, such as jāgrat etc. or Piṇḍastha etc.

The obscuration shall be explained later as follows: —

"The sentiency or consciousness, which is associated with the limited subject such as Śūnya etc., which are in themselves insentient, but in which the element of freedom predominates because it is revived by 'Kalā', is limited and occupies a subordinate position."

Therefore, it is established that impure I-consciousness is determinacy. (5)

Each of the two types of self-consciousness is again subdivisible into two, according as it is of the nature of direct experience or of unification. Pure Self-consciousness (of the nature of direct experience) is "Aham" or "I" in the śiva stage. And it is of the nature of unification 'I am this' in the state of Sadā-śiva.

Impure self-consciousness also is similarly of two types: (I) that which is of the nature of direct experience "I am fat" and (II) that which is of the nature of unification "I who was fat, am now thin": or "I, who was a child, am now young or old" etc.

It has been established that Vikalpa is not possible in the case of pure Self-consciousness. The impure self-consciousness, which is of the nature of direct experience, has already been demonstrated to be of the nature of determinate knowledge. In the case of the impure self-consciousness, which is of the nature of unification, there being consciousness of unity, some one might consider it to be an indeterminate cognition. It is, therefore, to remove his ignorance that the author says as follows:—

(6) "Connecting of the determinate present stage with the previous one, which is due to the revival of impressions, (in the case of the limited subject, who has definite temporal, spātial and formal limitations), is also a determinacy (Vikalpa), because it is related to (body etc.) shining separately as limited."

Body etc. is to be taken over from the previous verse. In the case of the body etc., —the characteristic of which is determinacy and which appear at a certain time, with temporal, spātial and formal limitations, —the unification (of the present) with the previous manifestation (Avabhāsa) such as the body of childhood e.g. "I, who was a child, am today a young man" is determinate knowledge and not pure self-consciousness. Here the use of the word "Ādi" implies unification with the coming stage also i.e. "shall grow old". Here the adjunct of body etc. (Bhinnāvabhāsinī) is given as the reason (in support of the above statement), namely, "because, even at the time of unifying the two stages, the body shines separately". For, if this unifying of the two stages be accompanied with the consciousness of its all round perfection i.e. its freedom from all limitations, then it would be Sadāśiva stage and consciousness would assume the form "I am this". Who can say that determinate consciousness is possible in this case ; because in this unification there is no consciousness of separation.?

But how is this unification possible in the case of separate limited subject ? Reply is, "because of impression" i.e. because

of remembrance, due to the revival of impressions, caused by former experiences. In the case of the subject as vital air, this unification of two stages is based on feelings of strength and weakness. In the case of Buddhi as a subject, it is based on varying degrees of knowledge and pleasure etc. And in the case of void (Sūnya) it depends on the consciousness of its extensiveness and inextensiveness. This also is Vikalpa.

Similarly in the case of unification of two stages of a jar also "this is that very jar" determinacy has to be admitted. But, as in all these unifications the power of knowledge (Vidyāśakti) flashes predominantly, like lightning, therefore, these are admitted by teachers to be the first steps in getting contact with the Supreme. (6)

The body etc. (as subjects), are not the objects of higher and higher subjects so that the shining of a particular object of knowledge will not be possible without shining of the subject of that; and the latter will not be possible without the light of another higher subject, and that too will not shine without the light of another still and so on *ad-infinitum*. Rather the fact is that the statement that the pure light of consciousness illumines the whole universe, implies, as has already been stated, that the Lord is never without the powers of Creation etc. This is what the author proves as follows:—

(7) "Therefore, even in practical life, the Lord, because of His free will, enters into body etc. and manifests externally the mass of objects, which shines within Him."

The assertion, that has been made in the verse "In body and intellect" etc., can be thus justified. How ? If in the practical life, which is the sphere of Māyā, the Lord Himself, who is in reality pure light, be supposed to make the mass of objects, that shines within Him as "I", externally manifest as "this" by entering into body and vital air etc., i.e. manifesting Himself primarily as a limited subject in body and vital air etc., by means of his free will, which is nothing more than the power of Māyā. Otherwise there will be infinite regress. The *Lin Lakāra* (in *Bhāṣayet*) implies "reason". The words "Api" and "Eva" are to be connected with other words than those with which they are found connected in the verse. The word "tat" stands for "reason". Because of the statement, that has just been made, the following is established. What is that ? the Possibility—that even in Practical life i.e. in sale and purchase, in witnessing a performance and in giving an exposition, the Lord Himself, identifying Himself with the bodies and vital airs etc. of Caitra and Maitra etc., manifests

externally, as separate from each other, that which shines within Him, without breaking its internality—is established. The 'Līṅ Lakāra' (in 'Bhāsayet') means possibility. At one particular time He (1) brings about identity (identifies Himself) with particular subject (body etc.); (2) terminates identity with another; (3) produces continuance of the subject as the percipient of jar etc; (4) imposes obscuration by obscuring the perfection, which is the essential nature ; and (5) bestows favour by bestowing perfection in so far as He makes the identity (of subjects) shine in relation to limited manifestation (aesthetic object). Thus, not only in great creations, great continuances, great annihilations, obscurations due to wrath, and favours in the form of initiation and spiritual insight, does the Lord perform five functions, but always, in practical life also. This has been asserted in the following verses:—

"We bow to that Lord, whose diversion is creation, who has repose in the pleasure of continuance and who is ever satisfied with the food of all the three worlds."

"We bow to that one eternal being, who retains his indeterminacy even though He is at every moment ceaselessly creating the three worlds by hundreds of determinate thoughts" etc. and

"When you freely manifest the individuals within yourself." (7)

Now there remains no doubt about this that the objects shine within (the universal Self). What is then the use of thinking about other causes (of the objective world.) This is the point in hand which has to be established. To establish it reason has been given that without it (i.e. the shining of objects within) determinate consciousness in the form of desire would be impossible. And by the way, the real nature of self-consciousness and determinate knowledge (Vikalpa) has been explained. Now in order to set the minds of the pupils at rest, he concludes by explaining the point in hand as follows :—

(8) "Thus, there is no doubt about it that the objects shine within the universal subject in remembrance, determinate knowledge, which depends upon the differentiation, and in indeterminate cognition."

Because the Highest Lord Himself is really the subject even at the time when body etc. are wrongly thought to be subjects, therefore, it is established that in remembrance, in determinate knowledge, the essence of which is differentiation, and in indeterminate experience, the shining (of the object) within i.e. shining as resting in the light of consciousness, is established; there is no doubt about it.

If body etc. were in reality the subjects then the talk that jar etc. are present within body, vital air, intellect or void (Śūnya) would be meaningless ; because the body etc. stand apart from jar etc. But the real light of consciousness is omnipotent. It is, therefore, established, without any effort, that the entire universe is within it. (8)

But if the objects, which shine within, are externally manifested in all cases i.e. in remembrance and in direct experience etc., what difference then there is between manifestation that takes place in perception and that in remembrance ? This difference cannot be denied, because there is clearness in one case and lack thereof in the other. To answer this he says as follows :—

(9) "In perception, in which the objects are externally manifested, the manifestation is due to Svātantrya, but in remembrance etc. it is due to the residual traces of the former experience."

In the direct perception, "this is Nila" which makes what was shining within externally manifest, the external shining of the objects, which are within the Self, is due to freedom (Svātantrya) and not, as in the case of remembrance, due to the impressions, caused by another perception. In remembrance, imagination and determinate cognitions, following on the back of direct perception, the objects blue etc., which lie within the subject and are externally manifested, are not due to freedom, but to the impressions, created by former experiences.

Now residual trace is nothing else than continued existence of the experience, in another time also. As this continually existing experience is associated with the limited manifestation, blue etc., so remembrance etc. also, being one with the limited manifestation, blue etc., shine as such. And for this reason it is that the limited manifestation (the object of remembrance) which is not possible at the time of remembrance, is associated with the time of its former experience (e.g. that jar). Thus it shall be declared that remembrance etc. are in themselves without any object and that their objects are only the objects of perception. It is in this that indistinctness of the object in remembrance etc. lies. Thus it is clear that there is difference in manifestation (Ābhāsa) in perception and in remembrance. External manifestation of the object, which shines within, without intervention of another (the residual trace), is perfect clearness. And manifestation, with the intervention of residual traces, because of its not having taken place at that very time, is indistinctness. (9)

But from this theory it will follow that shining of objects externally, in all forms of knowledge, excepting the direct perception, which is due to the operation of senses, is not without the intervention of residual of traces. With this objection in his mind the author points out how to divide them :—

(10) “In determinate cognition, which is free in its working, because it can manifest anything in any order in the mirror of the Buddhi, the external manifestation is due to freedom.”

The determinate cognition in the form of imagination or volition etc., which is due to mental distraction and is independent of direct perception, is free in its working i.e. does not require any external prompting in its rise and termination. The external manifestation of blue etc. which shine within this, is due to freedom i.e. depends upon nothing else. For instance, the determinate cognition (the imagination) manifests externally on the background of the internal organ, the clear mirror of Buddhi, an elephant, which is present within the subject, and which was never seen before as possessed of white colour, two trunks and hundred tusks, just at that very time. (10)

As a result of this discussion on variety of manifestations, which was entered into, by the way, in the course of arguments to prove that the objects shine within the subject, the principal point, the recognition of the Lord in self, which is here intended to be specially treated, is automatically, without any effort, established.

(11) “For this very reason, i.e. because of the capacity to manifest in imagination all that is desired, the powers of knowledge and action of all living beings are clearly established.”

(1) This very picturing up in imagination, of all that is desired, and (2) this objective grasp of the pictured up, —though it has never been the object of experience, because it has no existence in the objective world, which has been explained, by the way,—establishes this also that to all, who are endowed with life, whether he be a worm or Brahmā, the power of knowledge, consisting in objective grasp and that of action, consisting in picturing up, are natural. In the kingdom, which is a creation of mind, there is no possibility of any dependence upon the already existing separate creation, brought into being by God. Therefore, one's own power of action and that of knowledge, which are characterised by freedom in knowing and doing, have to be clearly recognised. The use of singular in “Sarvasya”

indicates that all are essentially one with the Lord. The chapter ends (11). The number of verses from the beginning up to this point is sixty-three.

Here ends the sixth chapter, called the presentation of the power of differentiation, in jñānādhikāra in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Sūtra Vimarsini, written by illustrious teacher Abhinavagupta. (6)

ĀHNIKA VII

We bow to that Śiva, because of resting on whom, as the only place of rest, the innumerable powers, produce various effects, just as gems do the variegated light.

Thus, the real nature of powers of remembrance etc. has fully been described so far. And the essential nature of the subject also has been described here only to prove that they (remembrance etc.) are powers. As powers cannot exist independently, therefore, it is going to be proved that the substratum (the resting place, the basis) of those powers is one. And that is the Highest Lord, because He is free to bring about the union or separation of those powers. He is not simply an insentient substratum, as the fire is of powers to burn and to cook. Both these points were hinted at in a previous verse: "If there be no Lord, holding the endless universe within". This should now be thoroughly discussed and established.

In order to establish one basis, another chapter, consisting of fourteen verses, beginning with "And that this light" and ending in "Practical life is experienced" is begun.

Of these the first verse states briefly the essential nature of the one basis. The next two verses state reasons, both positive and negative, namely, that the practical life is possible only if there be one basis and not otherwise. Then the essential nature of practical life is presented in terms of causal relation in one verse, of remembrance in another and of differentiation between truth and falsehood in eight verses. The last verse states the conclusion. This is the summary of the chapter. Now the meaning of each verse is going to be explained.

It has been stated in the last verse of the preceding chapter, "it is established that all the living beings have the powers of knowledge and action". But how is that? And what is that which is different from knowledge etc. and can possess them? For, the Kaṇādic conception of their substratum has already been refuted in "Therefore, even when the qualities change" etc. To answer this question the author gives a clear idea of what that One is, according to this system.

(1) "And this consciousness of the object, i. e. the consciousness, which shines affected by a succession of variety of objects, is nothing but the great Lord, the Subject, who is essentially the eternal and unchanging light of consciousness."

Although in the experience "jar shines" the light of consciousness is related to object : yet it (the light of consciousness) does not belong to it (the object) as its own essential nature (Svakam Vapuḥ) : on the contrary, it is the light of consciousness itself which shines as object; because the object always shines on the background of subject e.g. "shines to me".

The same idea is found expressed in the Veda:—"All shine after Him, who is ever shining. All this shines with His light".

Here present participial affix 'ṣatr' indicates His ever shining nature. And the use of accusative case, the peculiar significance of which in this particular case is Lakṣaṇa, indicates the relation of knower and the object of knowledge (between Tam and Sarvam). This relation is a product of His power of creation, which owes its being to His power of freedom. And the succession, which is experienced externally, has been shown to be due to His picturing up of the objects.

The light of consciousness,—which is affected, as mirror is by reflection, by temporal and spatial order, characterised by simultaneity or succession of objects, manifested by the powers of time and space, which are nothing more than the power of freedom of the great Lord, about whom we shall talk soon,—has already been discussed in an earlier verse "Only different objects" etc. And this (light of consciousness) is self-luminous and is, therefore, manifest to all. In reality it is introvert. And because it is ultimately nothing more than pure light and there is no variety in it, therefore, it is without succession. This very light of consciousness is the great Lord, whose essential nature is "consciousness", which is beyond the temporal and spatial limitations. He is called the subject inasmuch as He is pure light of self-consciousness. He is full of power of freedom, which expresses itself in various ways, such as unifying, differentiating and relating to the subject the mass of knowledge, consisting of determinate cognitions in innumerable forms, referring as "this" and "this" to every objective manifestation, which shines within the mass of means of knowledge, which are nothing more than the extrovert light of consciousness. Thus, the correct description of light of consciousness is that it is the "I", the resting place of both, (I) indeterminate cognition of jar as an external object and (II) inner determinate cognition, "this is jar", which

assumes the form of jar, which was the content of former indeterminate cognition. (1)

He states positive reasons to prove what has been asserted above, as follows : —

(2) “The mutual connection of the objects is possible, if they have their being (facing one another) in the subject, through (the channels of) various definite cognitions.”

It is said that the objects shine distinctly only as resting on consciousness (Saṁvid); but this shining is not possible if they were to be supposed to be resting on the varying cognitive (Pramātmaka) consciousness (Saṁvid) (such as the vijñāna of the Bauddhas). If the objects, such as blue and pleasure etc., be resting (facing one another) in the ocean of universal Self-consciousness, which is essentially the subject, having been carried to it through various determinate perceptions, which are comparable to currents of rivers, then alone their mutual relationship can be explained. The meaning of the word “Jñāteya” is the state of relations (jñāti). The reason why the word “Jñāteya” is used for relations is that they know one another. It also means the act of relations, which is nothing else than the mutual assistance. In the present context, however, the word is used in the sense of unification, in order to show that the insentients cannot get unified themselves. (2)

Now he is going to advance negative argument to assert the same.

(3) “How can otherwise mutual connection of the objects, which are related to different temporal and spatial orders and are self-confined, be possible? For, it (connection) depends upon their shining simultaneously.”

What connection can there be amongst insentient objects, their indeterminate experiences, determinate cognitions and ascertainments, which remain confined to their respective temporal and spatial orders and are self-confined i.e. are cut off from one another? This means that no connection is possible. For, this connection can be established only if they shine simultaneously and are unified in one time, place or form. It is possible in no other way. For, straw and grass etc., borne by currents, which lose themselves separately (in sands) at different places, never meet.

There is difference in temporal and spatial relations of the objects because of their diversity. Therefore, the word “Simultaneous” (Sakṛt) is used to indicate the idea of elimination of such difference. (3)

But what is this Samanvaya? To answer this question, he describes the most comprehensive relation of cause and effect, as follows:—

(4) “As perceptions and non-perceptions are confined to their respective spheres, which are exclusively their own and are different from the rest; the establishment of the relation of cause and effect, therefore, depends upon oneness of the subject.”

It has been asserted (by some schools) that the causal relation between fire and smoke is established by means of five i.e. two perceptions and three non-perceptions. When (1) a person perceives fire, (2) he does not see smoke, then (3) he directly perceives smoke. If (4) he does not see fire, (5) he does not find smoke also. But how can this be? For, the perception of fire does not bring into being that of smoke in any way; because the perception of fire brings about the perception of only that which is characterised by brilliance and is different from smoke; and because it rests on that separate part alone which has its special characteristic. It does not touch the object of another perception nor does it enter into what constitutes the essential feature of another perception. Here the word “Pāti” is used in two different senses “to make known” and “to rest”. It stands for two words, (the one derived from the root ‘Pat’ with causal affix and the other without it.)

The same has to be said with regard to the remaining four, non-perception of smoke etc. Therefore, just as “fire” “absence of smoke” “smoke” “absence of fire” and “absence of smoke” these five, when perceived by different persons, cannot give an idea of any relation of cause and effect between fire and smoke so they cannot arouse the idea of relation, when they are perceived by the so called the same perceiver. And the determinate cognition also, which makes known something which is different from the indeterminately cognised, is not valid. (Hence the causal relation cannot be said to be explicable in terms of Vikalpa.)

But, according to our system, when through five channels of perception and non-perception those five things enter into one sea, then coming together they are manifested by the subject through his power of freedom, as unified with and dependent upon each other, but not otherwise, (unrelated) like jar and cloth. The single manifestation of interdependence is the relation of cause and effect. Therefore, according to us, everything is all right. (4)

But cannot the power of remembrance bring together the effects of various perceptions and non-perceptions? Reply

has already been stated, namely, that remembrance also operates only on what has been the object of perception and is of the nature of unification of different perceptions. Therefore, remembrance itself is not possible without one subject. This he shows in the following verse:—

(5) “The same self-consciousness, which makes itself shine in remembrance, is the illuminator of the former perception also and no other.”

In remembrance, the object, which has already been perceived shines. Here the object is simply remembered: it does not shine as new. That which shines in remembrance, is the former perception itself. But because the perception itself is of the nature of knowledge and not an object, it cannot, therefore, be the object of another knowledge, because one knowledge cannot be the object of another: on the contrary, it is self-luminous. Further, if it (being momentary) has no existence at the time of remembrance, how can it shine (so as to become the object of remembrance)? And even if it be supposed to be existing, then also these two cognitions, remembrance and perception, are different from each other. Therefore, remembrance will never be possible. Hence remembrance is possible in the following manner:—

The self-consciousness in remembrance is the same as that in perception. There is nothing else than self-consciousness, whether it be perception or inference, which can make remembrance possible. Therefore, it is established that that self-consciousness, which has continued existence, without any break, between the time of perception and that of remembrance, is the essence of the subject. “What has been experienced by one cannot be remembered by another” was the argument, which was advanced before in connection with remembrance to establish the existence of the subject. But now the same has been done in a different manner; i.e. by showing the identity of self-consciousness in both. (5)

But the opponent may say: “Let us admit the validity of determinate cognitions in the spheres, other than that of direct perception, (Anubhava) also. For, invalidity is due to contradiction. And how can we talk of invalidity of any determinate cognition when there is no contradiction?” With this objection in mind, the author shows at great length how this relation of contraries, which is the very life of all wordly transactions, inasmuch as it enables us to differentiate the real from the unreal, is also not possible without the existence of one subject:—

(6) "The relation of contraries (Bādhyabādhakabhāva) is possible only as a result of resting of all cognitions, which resting in themselves separately cannot be annullers of one another, in one (permanent) subject."

"Rightness of a thing depends upon there being nothing to prove the contrary". (This is the maxim of the Naiyāyikas.) The relation of contraries, therefore, has to be proved. But how will that also be possible (if there be no permanent subject)? This is the significance of the word "Api".

(What does the statement "this is mother-of-pearl and not silver" mean?) It cannot mean annulment of silver by mother-of-pearl: for, we do not see such a thing being done. Nor can it mean refutation of perception of silver by that of mother-of-pearl, because two perceptions, resting on their separate objects, or resting separately in themselves, cannot refute each other. Nor can it be said that their contrariness (Virodha) consists in mutual exclusion: for, then all cognitions being such, it would be impossible to know which annuls and which is annulled: and thus all distinction between right and wrong will be lost. Here the negative 'a' (in 'avirodhinām') has to be used in two different constructions. What has been stated means as follows:—

If cognition (of silver) is itself destroyed what then has another cognition (the knowledge of mother-of-pearl) done to it? For, the other cognition, having no existence at the time of cognition of silver, cannot possibly annul the object of the latter. Nor can the cognition "there is no silver", which refers to the absence of silver, annul the object of cognition of silver. If it be said that one (succeeding) cognition destroys another (preceding): this being true of all cognitions, how can only some cognition be said to be annulable?

This is possible only if cognition of silver as well as that of mother-of-pearl rest on one self-consciousness. The point may be elaborated as follows:—

When these cognitions rest in one subject, all of them do not rest in the same way, but differently; this is a fact of experience. For instance, two cognitions "blue" and "lotus", resting in the subject, rest as mutually connected as adjective and substantive; similarly "jar" and "cloth" (rest in the subject) as exclusive of each other. But in the case of "this is mother-of-pearl" or "this is not silver" the consciousness "this is not silver" rests in the subject as destroying the previous consciousness "this is silver" and consequently stopping any action that follows the right knowledge.

Thus, different relative positions of cognitions to one another in the case of the relation of cause and effect etc. have been fixed by the subject, because of his freedom. This (fixing of relative position) is not possible for the objects of knowledge to do, (because they are insentient). This proves that Pramāṭṛ, subject, is free in the sphere of cognitions.

Thus, because the former cognition (of silver in mother-of-pearl) stands definitely annulled (by the cognition of mother-of-pearl) in one subject, the relation of contraries, therefore, is possible in practical life. As the same Lord manifests those relations also through His freedom as He does other external objects, therefore, they are also real. (6)

Here the author states the view of the opponent with the object of refuting it later on :—

(7) "But if you say that just as the consciousness of the absence of jar on the ground is nothing else than consciousness of bareness of the ground ; so certainty about mother-of-pearl is nothing but the consciousness of invalidity of perception of silver."

The cognition "this is mother-of-pearl", being self-luminous and being related to the subject as an object, is experienced as identical with validity. For, (the Bauddha) maxim is that definite cognition limits itself, (cuts itself off, i.e. it is well defined.) Now definite or determinate cognition of "this" is invariably concomitant with the differentiation from "not this". Thus representing the cognition of "silver" which is essentially nothing more than cognition of not-mother-of-pearl to be incorrect means the same thing as representing the cognition of mother-of-pearl to be identical with valid knowledge. It is not a new theory that the cognition of one thing means consciousness of absence of another. For, it is well known that consciousness of bareness of the ground is the same as the consciousness of absence of jar on it. Thus, annullability of the cognition of silver is the realisation of its invalidity. Therefore, if the opponent were to say that the relation of the contraries can thus be accounted for, and that accordingly oneness of the subject is unnecessary. (7)

In order to explain, by the way, the real basis, on which all transactions, connected with non-existence, are possible, he proves the illustration, given in the system of the opponent, to be faulty.

(8) "What has been stated is not right. For, from mere knowledge of the ground, its (ground's) being a separate entity from jar may be established, but certainly it cannot establish the absence

or non-existence of jar (on the ground) which is capable of being perceived."

The illustration that has been given is not to the point. The reasons are as follows:—

We talk of two types of non-existence in our practical life. The one is 'Tādātmyābhāva' i.e., non-existence of a thing as identical with that wherein it is said to be non-existing e.g. "the ground (Bhūta) is not jar". The other is Vyatirekābhāva i.e. non-existence, which denies separate possible existence of a thing at a particular time and place. "Here on this ground there is no jar."

In the case of the first of these, transaction is based simply on the knowledge of the bare ground. In this case, the optical perception is of no use, (i.e. is not responsible for the idea of non-existence). Therefore, the implication is that there is the non-existence of the relation of identity even with that, the direct perception of which is not possible, for instance that of a Piśāca, because of his peculiar nature, or that of sound, which is not perceptible, because of the absence of the entire set of causes, a fact which is known definitely because of the non-perception of anything that can be object of hearing (e.g. the sound which is audible when we close our ears and which would have been perceptible if the set of causes had been present). Thus, when a person says "the ground is not jar" he means it is neither anything else such as sound or Piśāca. But when direct perception is admittedly responsible for the idea of non-existence, as in the case of "Vyatirekābhāva", there such is not the case. (8)

But if anybody were to ask: why ? Reply is, because in that case its scope would become too wide. This is what he shows in the following lines :—

(9) "The ground is always separate from (i.e. not identical with) other things ; because all objects have their separate and self-confined existence. How then is it that knowledge of the ground is the cause of consciousness of absence or non-existence of other things at one time and not at another ?"

Even when there is a jar (on the ground) the purity of the ground is not marred, because different objects do not get mixed together (i.e. have separate existence). How then is it that even at the time when there is a jar (on the ground) we do not say as we would do if there were really no jar, e.g. "there is no jar here on the ground"? "Its knowledge" (tājñānam) i.e. the knowledge of the bare ground "sometimes" (jātu) i.e. only under

certain conditions, such as that of actual absence of jar, and not always, establishes non-existence of a separate jar. How is that possible? Thus, "Vyatirekābhāva" (according to the opponent's theory) should imply the absence of even Piśāca. (9)

But how is it then that we consistently talk of Vyatirekābhāva in practical life only under certain conditions? How is this to be explained? With this objection in mind the author shows the way of accounting for it, which was unknown to his predecessors.

(10) "But the mass of light (in the case of one who can see), or touch, warm or soft, in the case of a blind man, is perceptible on the ground. That would establish non-identity of his cognition with that of a jar."

According to this system, the existence of one thing means non-existence of another. This is what we know from the experience of ordinary every day life. This way of knowing the non-existence, (as pointed out by experience) has not to be left. The relation of existence (of one thing) with non-existence (of another) is the same as that of two things which stand in relation of container and the contained. Therefore, whatever different from jar is seen on the ground, it may be a piece of stone or mass of light etc., which is perceived by means of eyes, is in ordinary life spoken of as "not-being of jar on the ground" or "there is no jar on the ground". And whenever there is no optical perception, as when the eyes are closed or there is very thick darkness, then also, the subject, who experiences touch, which is different from hard, which belongs to jar, such as soft, hot, or cold or neither, speaks of that (touch) in practical life as non-existence of jar, because touch of air must necessarily always be everywhere. This is the substance of the verse. The word meaning is as follows:—

The word 'but' (Kintu) implies picturing up of the objection in order to state one's own view. What is the correct view in this case? The reply to it is: "there" (tatra) i.e., on 'the ground' 'the mass of light' is undoubtedly the object of cognition. To the blind there is hot touch etc.; "of that" (tasya) i.e. of the mass of light or of touch; 'its own knowledge' (Svajñānam) i.e., the knowledge that refers to it as distinct from another, such as jar etc., that (svajñānam) which is the subject; 'of that' (tasya) i.e. of the light etc.; "identity with not-jar" (Aghaṭarūpatām) i.e. identity with not-being of jar; "there" (tatra) i.e. on the ground: establishes. The implication of Liñ Lakāra is that it is possible. Here Liñ is in accordance with the rule: "Liñ. is also used to imply possibility" (Pa.Su. 3-3-172).

A person, who is aware of the possible existence of the entire set of things, necessary for hearing, such as his sense of hearing

etc., because he hears the feeble sound, caused by working of the vital air within, and who hears that sound only as related to his own auditory cognition, denies another sound as "there is no other sound here". Similarly if his attention be fixed on the most subtle interior sound, he experiences not-being of the feeble sound (of vital air). And not-being of flavour, smell and touch also is experienced by him only who experiences the flavour of saliva, the smell of the interior of organ of smell, called 'Tripuṭikā' or the touch of the body. For, without the perception of one out of many things, which can be the objects of the same kind of perception, there can be no certainty about the means of perception being intact. This is unexceptionable. It is not right to hold that the contact with a thing, which is an object of the same kind of perception (as the one, not-being of which is to be asserted), is unnecessary for certainty about the means of perception being intact; because we cannot say that the means of knowledge is not intact just after the time when we have realised it to be intact through the recent experiences of various objects. For, the person, who desires to find out not-being of a particular object, is found using the sense-organ, through which it can be perceived. (10)

But from this view it will follow that we can talk of non-existence of even the imperceptible Piśāca, as Vyatirekābhāva; because just as the mass of light is different from jar, so it is from Piśāca. With this objection in his mind, the author says the following:—

(11) "Just as Piśāca, though different from light, yet can be within light itself, because he is imperceptible, so his existence within the ground cannot totally be denied."

Although mass of light is different from Piśāca and itself it is negation of Piśāca, yet it cannot be said that there is no Piśāca here. For, the jar cannot have its existence within the mass of light, because in its presence mass of light will break. Therefore, it is established "there is no jar". But Piśāca is of such a nature that even though he may be present within the light or the ground, yet the compactness of neither is disturbed. Therefore, there being the possibility of his existence within the light, his separate existence cannot be denied. Similarly in things possessing colour, there being the possibility of taste etc., the latter cannot be denied. Although Piśāca is not-light, is different from light, yet just as there is the possibility of his being within the ground unseen, so there is the possibility of his being within the mass of light also. Hence, although the identity of Piśāca with the ground is denied, yet his being within the ground is not denied in every way. How can, therefore, that

practical life proceed on earth, which depends upon not-being of Piśāca within it. This is the meaning of the verse. (11)

Thus, having shown by the way the real nature of the idea of not-being in practical life, the author makes use of it in the present context, as follows:—

(12) “Thus the ascertainment ‘this is mother-of-pearl’ may mean not-being (of the cognition) of silver. But it cannot prove the knowledge of silver, got on a former occasion, to be false.”

Just as though the consciousness of light means the consciousness of not-being of jar, yet perception of light does not affect the former perception of jar in any way; so the perception of mother-of-pearl, means not-being of cognition of silver. This is the possibility. Just as perception of jar is the consciousness of validity of the knowledge of jar, so not-being of the perception of cloth is the consciousness of validity of the same; but this does not prove the former knowledge of cloth to be false. All this is a representation of various aspects of perception of jar. This does not affect another former perception in any way.

Similarly the consciousness “This is mother-of-pearl” or “It is not silver” may shine in itself as “I am valid in relation to mother-of-pearl and not-being of silver, but not in relation to silver”. But this does not affect former perception of silver in any way. How then can silver, grasped by a former perception, be proved to be false? (12)

But the word “this” refers to the same object as that which was the basis of valid knowledge of silver and now is that of “mother-of-pearl” or “not silver”. Therefore, from this we infer that the former perception of “silver” was invalid. For, it is not possible that two valid, though contrary, cognitions may refer to the same object. Therefore, this relation of contraries in practical life is due to inference. With this objection in his mind the author says :—

(13) “The relation of contraries cannot be maintained to be based either on perception or on inference; for, the minor term is non-existent. But it can be rightly maintained to be due to one subject, because it is proved to be so by personal experience.”

The relation of contraries cannot be explained either in terms of direct perception or in those of inference, because the minor term itself is non-existent. Here the word “Api” implies the non-existence of reason and invariable concomitance.

The word “Api” is to be connected with both (dharmyasiddheḥ and anumānataḥ). When both the minor term (Dharmin) and the reason, are beyond all doubts and the invariable concomitance of reason with what is tried to be established is remembered,

the inference operates to prove that what is tried to be established is really present in minor term.

In the case in hand, the former cognition of silver being the minor term, the point to be established is its invalidity, and perception of mother-of-pearl or consciousness "It is not silver" or the objectivity to that perception, which belongs to the object, is represented to be the reason. This is not right, because at the time of perception of mother-of-pearl the former cognition of silver has no existence (because cognitions are momentary). Nor is the perception of mother-of-pearl a characteristic feature of cognition of silver (as smoke is of fire): and inferential knowledge is not possible from that which is not the special characteristic of the minor term. Therefore, this is also not right to represent the remembered cognition of silver to be the minor term.

But if some one were to say "We are trying to establish that mother-of-pearl is not the object of cognition of silver; because it is the object of perception of mother-of-pearl." I shall ask him "Are you drawing this inference at the time of perception of mother-of-pearl?" If so, it is nothing more than establishing the already established. But if before the perception of mother-of-pearl, then the inference would be defective inasmuch as its reason would be futile (Bādhita hetvābhāsa); because the reverse of what it seeks to prove is already established by cognition of silver which has just taken place. Moreover (in the absence of permanent subject) who would acquire the idea of invariable concomitance viz. where there is one cognition at present there another cognition cannot be? If the opponent were to say by another inference, then I would repeat the same question and this would lead to argumentum-ad-infinitum.

The above discussion refutes the objection of the opponent; "How could two cognitions be possible in reference to one object?" For, who would have the consciousness of two cognitions having the same object, because it has been asserted that the cognitions rest in themselves and in their objects? Thus the relation of contraries cannot be asserted to be based on inference also. Nor is the inferential process experienced to intervene in the rise of the consciousness of the relation of contraries. For, as our own experience tells us, it rises quickly. Therefore, for the same reason, the relation of contraries cannot also be denied.

Thus, after showing the impossibility of relation of contraries, according to the opponent's theory, he now concludes the discussion on the point in hand by asserting that the relation of contraries arises, according to his system, from the fact that all

cognitions rest in one subject. It is consistent with reason if it be admitted to spring from one subject. We have already explained that it is he (the permanent subject) who organises the cognitions in that manner. This being the real explanation (of the relation of contraries) if some one talks of the impossibility of practical life without it (anyathānupapatti) as the means of proving it, let him do so. Now every aspect of it can be accounted for. (13)

Not only relations of cause and effect, of remembrance and of contraries, which characterise all the general transactions of ordinary every day life, but the particular transactions also such as purchase and sale, which are impure, and relation of teacher and taught etc., which are pure, depend upon one subject, because transactions depend upon some kind of unification. This is what he shows in the concluding lines:—

(14) "Thus, experience shows that all transactions, whether pure or impure, depend upon the omnipresent Lord, in whom all the objective manifestations, so very different from one another, are reflected."

On account of the nature of both, positive and negative, arguments, given in two verses "Those various" etc., as well as of types of illustrations of practical life, given in other verses, this also has to be admitted that the practical life is experienced as resting on the omnipresent Lord, who is beyond temporal and spatial limitations and who is affected, without undergoing a change in his essential nature, by objects, such as blue and pleasure etc., which are extremely different from one another, i.e. whose very life is diversity, because they are the creations of Māyā, and which are very much like shadows and, therefore, have no existence independently of Him (on whom they are reflected). This means that the direct experience is the strongest proof on this point. And such is the experience of those also, who have been initiated and who practise concentration. And it is because of this experience that their level even in practical life, which is recognised to be the worldly state, is identical with the level of Śiva, which is characterised by the realisation of the essential nature of the subject. This is what has been asserted in "Concentration on relation". The practical life of those, who have not recognised the essential nature of the Self, is impure; but of others it is pure. The Chapter ends. (14) From the beginning 77.

Here ends the seventh chapter, called the presentation of one basis, in the Jñānādhikāra in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā, written by the revered great Śaiva teacher, Utpaladeva, with the commentary, called Vimarśinī, written by illustrious teacher, Abhinavagupta. (7)

ĀHNIKA VIII

We bow to that Śiva, who is always self-manifest as great Lord to those who have realised the Ultimate through practical life, which is undisputed, because it is a matter of personal experience.

Thus, after explaining the powers of knowledge, remembrance and differentiation, he has shown how practical life will be impossible unless there be one substratum of all these. By this much (i.e., by means of the preceding Chapter) the use of the word "one" in "If there be not one, holding within" has been justified. This also has been established that all shine within Him and so another statement "holding within the endless forms of the universe" has been substantiated. Now His omnipotence (Māheśvarya), which is nothing more than "Freedom" and which also was referred to there, is to be explained. And that is in the sphere of both, knowledge and action. Accordingly it is of two kinds. Therefore, the lustrous one (Bhagavān) is spoken of as "knower" and "doer". Although in reality there is only one Sāmvid, which is nothing else than pure light of consciousness and free consciousness, yet this difference has been brought about by Himself in order to make others understand (true nature of Śiva). Therefore, although freedom in the act of knowing is identical with power of action, yet "Freedom" should be discussed in the 'book' dealing with knowledge, as it pertains to that. Thus the meaning of the word "knower" (jñātṛ) is fully settled as regards both its root and affix.

Now knowledge is nothing else than I-consciousness, limited by the affection, cast by variety of manifestations, brought about by Himself. And freedom in relation to those manifestations is freedom of power of knowledge. This is what is tried to be established with the following eleven verses, beginning with "Immediate sense-contact" and ending in "Because knowledge and action are pure".

After asserting in one verse that manifestation is of two kinds, (1) dependent upon another manifestation and (2) otherwise i.e., independent; he says in the next verse that 'manifestation' (ābhāsa) is unity only. After stating in two verses that accordingly the 'manifestation' of causal efficiency is also dependent on another 'manifestation', he states, in two verses, the manifestation, in which causal efficiency resides. He then asserts in one verse that internality is the basis of variety in Ābhāsa, which is due to affection of one manifestation by others. Then in two verses he states the essential nature of externality

and its subdivisions. Then in one verse he summarily states the One, who is the substratum of the powers of knowledge etc. In another verse, he states in conclusion the essential nature of the great Lord and refers to the coming Kriyādhikāra. This is the summary of the chapter. The meaning of each verse is now going to be explained.

But if the whole of practical life depends upon the Highest Lord, the well known variety, characterised by distinctness and indistinctness, would not be possible; because that lustrous Lord, on whom all this depends, is one. And we cannot suppose that the practical life has got any reality apart from Him. With this objection in his mind, the author says:—

(1-2) "The 'manifestations' differ only inasmuch as that in some cases they depend upon immediate sense-contact; and in others, as in the case of thick darkness, they do not do so. But there is no difference in the essential nature of the objective 'manifestation' (ābhāsa) (figuring) in determinate cognitions, referring to the past, present or future objects."

Manifestations differ from one another in this much only, (they are dependent on the direct perception in one case and are not so in the other); but there is no difference in the essential nature of the objective manifestation anywhere. This is the substance of both the above verses, if we take them together. An Ābhāsa exists only so long as it shines. In some cases the manifestations are related to, mixed up with, another manifestation, the sense-contact, the external-sense-perception in the form "I see", which takes place just at the time when that manifestation shines. In such cases they are said to be "clear". But in the transaction of a cogniser in the dark, which is indistinct, the manifestations are otherwise (i.e. are not mixed with the then direct perception). That is to say, to the person who is born blind the other manifestation, namely, the external-sense-perception, does not exist at all: and to the person, who has become blind by accident and, therefore, has fallen in the thickest darkness, it has no existence at that time, (time of blindness) but he remembers his former direct perceptions.

There is, therefore, no difference possible in the being, the real nature, of the objective 'manifestations' in any form of determinate cognition, may those cognitions be related to present, past or future objects.

The crux of the whole thing is that in all cognitions: "I see", "determinately apprehend," "imagine," "remember," "do", or "speak of this blue", the manifestation "blue" in its real

nature is the same; and so is the manifestation "I see" which is related to "yellow" etc. also. This idea of clearness or otherwise arises only when the Lord unites the 'manifestations' with or separates them from one another, because of His freedom: i.e. when the manifestation 'blue' is separated from the 'manifestation', 'I imagine' and is joined with the 'manifestation' "I see" it is spoken of as distinct. Thus distinctions in practical life at all times can be accounted for. But when these manifestations are in the Lord Himself, then there is no union with or separation from any other (2).

This explanation may be all right in the case of 'blue' etc., in relation to which external senses operate. But how can the manifestations "pleasure" etc. shine differently, because in relation to them there is no operation of external senses (to explain it)? With this objection in his mind, the author says:—

(3-4) "Although manifestations, such as pleasure etc., or those which are the means thereof, remain always the same; yet they shine differently because they are unified with another manifestation, namely, "past."

"But when the 'manifestations' pleasure etc. are repeatedly and determinately pictured up, they shine as before, because they are unified with the manifestation "clear" or "present."

Although manifestation, "Ābhāsa", (of pleasure etc.) is the same in the case of past or future enjoyment, or its cause, such as garland and sandal etc.; and the same holds good of suffering and its causes, such as serpent or thorn etc. yet, because of its mixing up with the manifestation "it is past" or "it is to come" and separation from the 'manifestation' "I am experiencing", the experiencer does not have the same experience as he had before, namely, "I am happy at present" or "I am unhappy" or "I have acquired the thing necessary for happiness" etc., (though those manifestations, are still there).

But when he constantly and determinately pictures up the objects of pleasure or pain, then, because of association with the cause, namely, the repeated and determinate picturing up of pleasure and its causes, he has the experience "I am happy" in no other way than the one, pointed out by us, namely, union with another manifestation. This is right, because at that time thinker has consciousness of 'pleasure-manifestation' as unified with that of clearness-manifestation (Sphuṭatvābhāsa). Here the word "past" implies "future" also. (4)

But what does all, that has been said to explain the variety of experiences, mean? Does not it mean that external garland

etc. are the causes of pleasure and pain and that pleasure etc., caused by external objects, are the causes of experience "I am happy" etc. It follows from this that in the absence of externality (of garland etc.), pleasure etc., not being caused by the former, will not be the causes of experiences "I am happy" etc. Therefore, if there be no externality (of garland etc.) they cannot at all be represented to exist. How then the statement "there is never any difference in the real nature of manifestations of the objects" be justified? For, (in the latter case) they have no existence. With this objection in his mind, the author says:—

(5) "Externality of manifestations (Ābhāsas) which are of the nature of "being" (Bhāva) or those which are of the nature of "not-being" (Abhāva) is merely an attribute and does not constitute their essential nature, therefore, they ever exist as internal."

Externality is not the essential nature of either the positive or the negative manifestations; e.g. "Here I have pleasure" or "I have no pain"; because the real nature of pleasure does not shine as "externality" but only as "pleasure". Externality is another manifestation. When the Lord, by virtue of His power of freedom, makes it manifest as united with "pleasure", then externality becomes its attribute. Therefore, just as absence of manifestation of "blue" does not affect the real nature of the manifestation "lotus" or the absence of manifestation "king" does not that of "man", so even when manifestation "externality" is absent, manifestation "pleasure", "pain" or "wife" is not affected in any way, because they always exist internally. (5)

The manifestations, such as blue etc., when reflected on the internal organ, the mirror of Buddhi, are internal, inasmuch as they are within internal organ; and they are external; because they shine as separate from the subject as objects of knowledge. And pure externality is simply external perceptibility. In both the conditions (internal as well as external) these manifestations (Ābhāsas) 'blue' etc., exercise their functional power inasmuch as they give rise to knowledge, referring to themselves.

But why do they not exercise their functional capacity in the state of internality, the chief characteristic of which is oneness with the subject? With this objection in his mind, the author says:—

(6) "They do not exercise their functional capacity in the state of internality, which is due to their oneness with the subject. For, the condition of that (exercise of functional power) is the externality, which arises from separateness of manifestations from one another and from the subject."

Because of their internality, due to oneness with the subject, these manifestations do not exercise their functional capacity: because it depends upon their separateness. And because the manifestation 'blue' is separate from the manifestation 'yellow' and because it is also separate from the subject, therefore, it can exercise its functional capacity in relation to that subject. In the state of oneness with the subject, there is no separateness. And exercise of fixed functional capacity depends upon separateness of manifestation. Thus, even when there is the manifestation (Ābhāsa) of externality of the darling, but if there be no manifestation (Ābhāsa) of embrace at the same time, the purpose of being a source of pleasure is not fulfilled. And if there be other manifestations (Ābhāsas) such as "She is far away" then it will, as we know, discharge a function contrary to the previous one i.e. rather than being the cause of pleasure it will be that of pain.

Hence because there is no Ābhāsa of externality at the time of identity with the subject, therefore, there is no functional capacity exercised by the object. The exercise of functional capacity also is a kind of Ābhāsa. And exercising certain functional capacity is not the essential nature of object so that in the absence thereof it may not have its existence also.(6)

But internality of Ābhāsas must get broken at the time of their unification with the manifestation "external"; because it is contradictory. And if so, how can it be said "internals always shine"? To this he replies as follows:—

(7) "As the Ābhāsas are essentially of the nature of consciousness, so they always exist internally. But when they are manifested externally by the Māyā, they exist externally also."

Ābhāsas always have their existence in the light of consciousness of the Universal Subject, whether they be in the state of their internality or externality; because they are essentially of the nature of consciousness. Otherwise they would not shine. This has already been established. But when the power of Māyā, which is nothing but the power of Freedom, operating in manifesting things separately, makes them externally manifest, then, because of the externality (brought about by Māyā) they have both internal and external manifestation. This shining within is not of the opposite nature from shining without (so that when one is there the other cannot be); but it is the background of all manifestations. How then can there be represented to be any contradiction? It has, therefore, rightly been said "Internals always exist".(7)

But it has been said that exercise of functional capacity on the part of an object is possible only when it is external and that externality is perceptibility by means of external senses. But this kind of externality is not possible in the case of what is pictured up by imagination. How can then they exercise any functional capacity? But it is found that Piśāca etc. pictured up by imagination, cause fear. With this objection in mind the author says as follows:—

(8) "This, that is pictured up in the imagination, is also external, because it shines as separate (from the subject as "this" and not as "I"). Internality consists in oneness with the subject. Separateness from that is externality."

The wife or thief etc., pictured up in imagination, which is nothing but a kind of determinate cognition, is also external. For, not only that (is external) which is externally perceived; but that also which shines as separate from the subject as "this". And internality is the shining in the subject as "I". "Antar" means near. And nearness requires something, in relation to which it may be asserted. And in the absence of other requisites (of internality), the subject alone is the unexceptionable requisite in all cases. Therefore, it follows that nearness to the subject is oneness with it. That which is different from it (the subject) is external. Therefore, it is but proper that what is pictured up in imagination should also exercise functional capacity. (8)

Jar etc. may be represented to be external, because of the activity of potter etc. (being responsible for their existence); but how can that, which is an object of internal sense, (pleasure etc.) be spoken of as external? With this objection in mind, he says the following:—

(9) "It is by the will of the Lord that what is pictured up in imagination and pleasure etc. shine externally, exactly as do the objects of sense-perception etc. which are directly perceptible."

It is because of the will of the Lord, who holds all manifestations within and maintains the whole of the external creation, that what is pictured up within through determinate imagination, such as blue etc., shines as external, as cut off from the (limited) subject; exactly as do the blue (Nila) etc., which are the objects of sense-perception. The shining of the latter type is called "direct perception". It means this that even the activity of a potter is in reality Lord's will, externalising itself in the form of activity in the body, made manifest by Him. It is nothing else. Therefore, just as the objects 'blue' (Nila) etc. are perceptible to external senses as externally manifest, as separate

from the limited perceiver, because of the Lord's will, though in reality they are within the light (of universal consciousness); so are those, which are known through internal senses. There is no difference between them in this respect.

Love and indifference etc.—(Rati Nirvedādi), which are of the nature of basic and transient emotions respectively (Sihā-yivyabhicārīrūpāḥ), which are very much like pleasure and pain and the essential nature of which has been stated by Bharata etc.,—though they are objects of internal-sense only, yet they shine externally. Although in determinate imaginings it is the freedom of a limited subject that operates, yet, as its being ultimately non-different from the universal consciousness cannot be denied, so in reality that freedom also is of the Lord. This is what the author himself has said elsewhere:—

“Although practical life in relation to external objects is confined to the individual subject, limited by vital air and the group of eight (puryaṣṭaka), yet, in reality, it has its being in the highest self. For, how can the Prāṇapramātā, who is essentially nothing else than the Highest Self, delimit Him (The highest Self).”

But when the imaginary creation springs from spontaneous activity of the mind and involves no desire on the part of limited subject, there the working of the Lord is clear. Therefore, the externality of even the creation of imagination is due to Lord's will. (9)

Now the author states in conclusion the essential nature of the Lord and of oneness, which have already been discussed above.

(10-11) “Therefore, no worldly transaction can be possible without unification of cognitions (Sāmvids). They are unified because of oneness of the light (of consciousness). And that light is the one Subject, this is established.”

“And that very one Subject is the Highest Lord, because He is ever free, and because this freedom is identical with the independent powers of knowledge and action of the playful Lord.”

From the arguments, which have been stated in the preceding section, it is clear that without the unification of cognitions (Sāmvids) worldly transaction cannot be possible. And because it is possible, therefore, they are unified. And this is not difficult to establish. For, the light that illumines the objects (Viśayaprakāśa) is itself spoken of as light of consciousness (Sāmvid). And it is due to the affection of light of consciousness by the objects, because of its being extrovert,

that the light which illumines Nīla is different and so is that which illumines Pīta. Thus, in reality, light of consciousness, being free from limitations of time, place and form, is only one and, therefore, it rests within (as Aham). And that is spoken of as the subject. This is established with reason. (10)

Neither is this Self, the chief characteristic of which is "Light", without self-consciousness, nor are its affections by "blue" etc. unaffected by determinative activity, as the crystal and its affections are; on the contrary, the Subject is ever-self-conscious. His being great Lord consists in His eternal Self-consciousness, unrestrained freedom, perfect independence of others and in being essentially pure bliss. This very freedom, which is identical with self-consciousness, constitutes the pure and ultimately real powers of knowledge and action of the playful Lord. The power of knowledge is essentially the light of consciousness (Prakāśarūpatā) and the power of action is nothing but "Vimarśa", which is essentially freedom, and which has its being in Prakāśa. And freedom (Vimarśa) is the essence of the light of consciousness (Prakāśa). The powers of knowledge and action, therefore, at the transcendental level, are nothing more than free will. At a lower stage, technically called "parāpara" which is the level of Sadāśiva, these powers are identical with the I-consciousness, which is identical with "this-consciousness". At the lowest stage, at the level of Māyā, they are dominated by "thisness". Thus, in every way, the power of knowledge is essentially free will (Vimarśa). For, without the latter the former would sink to the level of insentiency. This has already been asserted. And that free will itself is the power of action. Thus, the author hints at the Kriyādhikāra, which is coming after this. The chapter ends (11). From beginning 89.

Here ends the eighth chapter, called the presentation of the chief characteristics of the Great Lord, in the Jñānādhikāra of the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā, written by illustrious great Śaiva teacher Utpaladeva, with the commentary, called Vimarśini, by illustrious teacher Abhinavagupta.

The Jñānādhikāra ends.

KRIYĀDHIKĀRA

ĀHNIKA I.

May the glorious husband of Gaurī,—who manifests the full river of the power of action, which is the basis of countless waves (of time etc.), between two banks, the individual subjects and objects, through his Free Will, on the extended and clear mirror of his own self,—reveal to us the highest truth.

We bow to that Śiva, resting on whom the power of action, the darling, is able to show wonderful sportive movements of different kinds.

Now in order to establish fully in all its details, the essential nature of “The power of action” another Adhikāra is begun. In the first Āhnika, consisting of eight verses, beginning with “Therefore” and ending in “which is manifested” the author tries to establish that although in reality the power of action in the Highest Lord has no succession, yet, because of its being responsible for the manifestation of succession (in action) in the limited worldly subjects, it is successive also. That is as follows:—

In the first verse, the *prima facie* view, which has already been stated, is refuted. In the next verse the essential characteristics of the succession and the negation thereof (simultaneity) are differentiated. In the next three verses the essential nature of succession is stated. In the following two verses the spheres of the succession and the absence thereof (simultaneity) are differentiated. In the concluding verse it is shown that in spite of difference in the spheres, both in reality rest in one. This is the summary of the Āhnika. Now the meaning of each verse is going to be explained.

The point, which has already been discussed and which is meant to prove the power of knowledge, having been established, another point, (namely, that He has unlimited power of action) is automatically established. In the following verse the author indicates this as logically settled conclusion of this Adhikāra:—

(1) “By establishing the existence of one Subject, the objection of the opponent, “How can the action, which is successive, be one and belong to one subject?” has been refuted.”

The view of the opponent—that there are only different cognitions, direct experience and ascertainment etc., without any separate substratum thereof, that remembrance is due to residual traces and that if cognition be admitted to be insentient (*jaḍa*) it would not make other external objects manifest: but if it be sentient, then, being free from limitation of time and

place, it would be non-different from Self,—has been refuted: because it has been shown, at some length, how, according to the view of the opponent, various experiences, such as direct cognition etc., will be impossible. This also has been demonstrated how remembrance will not be possible from mere residual traces. And this also has been established that the unlimited light of consciousness is not insentient (jaḍa) and that its appearance as limited is due to the affection of the external objects, manifested by its own power of perfect freedom.

Thus, with the reasons given above, not only all the points, which could be raised against His power of knowledge, have been refuted but also the objections against His power of action have been answered, with these very reasons. This is the implication of the word “Api”. And the objection: “How the action, though one, can yet be represented to consist of a series of successive stages, when the substratum is one?” as well as those, contained in the last two verses of the 2nd Āhnikā of the Jñānādhikāra (1,2,10-11), namely, “Those being there” and “What rests in two is multiform” have been refuted. For, in the whole of the *prima facie* view the only point, on which all the objections are based, is that how one can be of diverse forms. And in reply to this point it has been stated that in the case of that, whose essential nature is sentiency, variety of manifestations is possible without contradicting its oneness, as in the case of the mirror. Hence there is no incoherence. Therefore, though this light of consciousness, the underlying reality of all objects, is one, because of its recognition as such, yet, as it assumes variety of conflicting forms, so, they, being unable to shine simultaneously, shine in succession and thus make it one substratum of action. In this way the relation etc. also can be explained. (1)

But the essential nature of action is successiveness and the succession is not possible in the Lord, who is of the nature of pure consciousness and is unaffected by the limitation of time. How then can action be attributed to Him ? To this he replies as follows:—

(2) “The worldly action can be maintained to be successive, due to the power of time, but not the eternal activity of the Highest Lord, like the Lord Himself.”

“He raises the hand” “He lets it fall” these momentary existences, coming after one another, are successive. Now to those who hold these very momentary existences themselves to be action, as do the followers of Kaṇāda, its successiveness is directly perceptible. But, according to those,—who hold that it is a certain power, present in the hand, which is beyond sense-

perception, is responsible for the awakening of the perceptible activity, is the cause of the perceptible difference of the preceding momentary existence from the following one and is to be known only through inference,—its successiveness is inferable only. But the successiveness of the worldly action is possible because of the particular power of the Highest Lord, the power to manifest the manifestables as cut off from one another, which is known as the "Power of Time". But the power of action, which belongs to the Lord Himself, which is non-different from Him, is eternal and is unaffected by time, cannot possibly be represented to be successive. To represent it as successive is as impossible as to represent the Lord Himself as the same. For, it is said:—

"If the hand be successive, the action in it also would be the same". (2)

It has been said above that time, becoming an attribute, puts the limitation of time upon the object. But what is this so called time? To this he replies as follows:—

(3) "Time in reality is nothing else than the succession, observable in the movement of the sun etc., in birth (janma) of different flowers and in summer and winter."

The manifestations, which are admittedly of fixed limitation, such as those of the sun and the moon, of various flowers of mango, jasmine and Kuṭaja etc., of summer and winter and of intoxication of cuckoo etc., are spoken of as time, with which the manifestations, which are not of fixed limitation, such as reading etc., are put limitations upon (measured); just as gold is with weights. And this particular nature of the sun etc. to appear with certain fixed limitations, is in reality succession, it is nothing else. And this succession itself and nothing else is the time. Here the word "eva" has to be connected in two different ways (i.e. time itself is succession, or succession itself is time). Even the simultaneity of two manifestations is nothing but succession, but only in relation to other manifestations. The consciousness of length and shortness (of time) is also of the nature of succession, because there is difference of manifestations, due to extendedness (vaitatya of succession) or absence thereof. Similarly the ideas of propinquity and remoteness refer to the same, because there is clearness in one case and absence thereof in the other. Thus, variety of manifestations of an individual, such as Devadatta etc., being measured with the movement of the sun etc., as gold is measured with (weighed against) weights, is spoken of as "(Devadatta) goes the whole day." (3)

But let the so called time be the very nature of the thing. What is this power of time? To this he replies:—

(4) "Succession depends upon difference, the latter on the existence of a certain manifestation and non-existence of another, and the existence of some manifestation and non-existence of another are brought about by the Lord Himself; who manifests the variety of manifestations."

Here if the time, which consists of a succession, be simply difference in natural constitution, then the four figures also, being of different natural constitution, would constitute separate points of time. Therefore, the essence of time, is that succession, which is due to such difference as is perceptible in the presence of the red rays and absence of bright mass of light (of the sun) and of which the existence and the non-existence of manifestations are the very life. And the existence and the non-existence of manifestations (Ābhāsas) are not caused by any external cause. This has already been explained in detail. Therefore, that very self, whose essential nature is consciousness and which is known through one's own experience as capable of bringing about various manifestations in dream and in imagination, is the cause of these manifestations also. The Self, manifesting the external objects of the world, such as blue etc., manifests them in innumerable variety: viz. He manifests manifestations such as "Jar" "red" "tall" "hard" as having common basis. And He manifests manifestations such as "Cloth" and "jar" as having different bases, as mutually exclusive, each one as negation of the other. But when He manifests them within Himself they are identical with Him. In such manifestations there is no rise of succession.

But when He manifests one season, Śarat for instance, as totally without the manifestation of another, Hemanta for instance, and vice versa, then there is the rise of succession of time. Thus the power of bringing about the last kind of variety of manifestations is the power of time of the Lord.(4)

Now the author further explains His power of bringing about variety of manifestations :—

(5) "The Lord makes the spatial succession manifest by means of variety of manifestations of bodies (Mūrti vaicitrya) and the temporal succession by means of manifestation of the variety (of forms) in action (Kriyāvaicitrya)."

Here the word 'Mūrti' means the body of the object; and vaicitrya means variety. Thus, by means of

manifestation of the variety of external bodies such as house, courtyard, market, temple, garden and forest, each of which is different from the rest, the spatial successions such as distant and near, wide and narrow etc. are made manifest by the Lord. But when, because of the strong recognition, the experience, "This is essentially the same hand", arises and though there is no essential change in the body, yet formal differences appear; then the variety of forms, which cannot coexist in the same body, because the forms are contrary to one another, is spoken of as action. He makes the temporal succession manifest, through manifestation of variety of forms, involved in action, limited or unlimited in their nature, as related to one, that is freely constructed in imagination, because the fruition etc. of action are related to it.

The objection: "How can what is essentially the same assume variety of forms?," cannot be raised here, because it is not any object which is so imagined: but it is the universal consciousness (Saṁvid) itself, which shines in that manner. For, its omnipotence consists in its shining in that manner. No law of contradiction can be effective in the case of shining itself. For, the contradiction between pleasure and pain etc. owes its being to shining. And the essential nature of contradiction is the shining of one as negation of another. This is what has been indicated by the word "Api" and "īśvara". (5)

But from the above statement it follows that the temporal and spatial successions belong to the sphere of the manifested. But the subject is not the manifested. He is manifest to none; rather all are manifest to him. How is it then that temporal and spatial successions are experienced in him as "I was, am and shall be" and "I am sitting in the house, forest or temple". Moreover, what can be far or near or present, past or future to one who is free from limitations of time and space? Therefore, the temporal and spatial orders, which are recognised to be dependent upon the subject, cannot either be spoken of in reference to external objects. For, distance and priority etc. do not belong to them independently of the subject. To justify this he says as follows:—

(6-7) "The variety of manifestations of forms, which is the basis of (the idea of) temporal succession in all things, shines to the limited subject only, such as "Śūnya". It does not shine to the universal subject, whose light is eternal."

"The spatial succession also in things shines to the limited subject only. To the universal subject the objects shine as

identical with itself and, therefore, as beyond all limitations, like the Self itself."

The variety,—which is due to being and not-being of manifestations and which has been represented to be the basis (of the idea) of temporal succession in all the external objects, which are unity in multiplicity,—can shine only to the limited subject Śūnya etc., which are of limited light only (i.e. are not ever-shining). To shine is not the essential nature of the limited subject, Śūnya; because it is insentient like other objects, blue etc. Its shining as a subject consists in the slight stir in the light of consciousness (Saṁvit sphuraṇa). Therefore, when that is absent, as in the case of body as a subject in the state of deep sleep, or as in that of the vital air or Śūnya, as a subject, in the state of senselessness, then the continuity of its shining is broken. Thus, there is temporal succession in the limited subject due to being and not-being of manifestations (Ābhāsa), as in "I am no longer a child: now I am young". And because the empirical subject is identified with the limited I—consciousness, therefore, the temporal succession is evident in it. It is such a subject which is responsible for the appearance of temporal succession in external objects e.g. "I was a boy and a jar also had simultaneous existence with me as such".

There is no temporal succession in the eternal subject, who is essentially consciousness and, therefore, is ever shining, as has been asserted in "The Self is ever shining"; nor is there such a succession even in the object, related to Him. For, they shine as one with Him.

Similarly spatial succession also shines only in the limited subject, body, vital air or Śūnya, as "Here I am sitting". And it shines in the objects also because of their relation to him e.g. "that which is in close proximity is "near" and that which is contrary to it is "far". To the Subject who is perfect and so free from all limitations the objects shine as His very Self "I" and, therefore, they are perfect i.e. free from all limitations. For, such is His real nature. In this verse there is Samucca-yopamā. The following line says the same:—

"The eternal subject has no succession. All are perfect in form and in action in every way (in Him)."

Thus, in the course of discussion on action, the temporal succession, being relevant to the subject in hand, has been discussed: and by way of illustration, the spatial succession also has been dealt with by the way. The illustration should be stated before. Therefore, at the time of exposition of variety it is proper to deal with spatial succession first. But in conclusion

the temporal succession, has been first stated, as it is relevant to the subject in hand, and then comes the statement about spatial succession, because it has been dealt with only by the way. (6-7)

But it follows from the above discussion that in the Lord, who is the real subject, action is not possible: because there is no temporal succession in Him, on which action depends. With this objection in his mind, the author says the following:—

(8) "But to manifest the variety of subjects and objects with their characteristic limitations, is the creative power of the Lord, who knows them as such."

According to this system, in reality action is nothing else than the very will of the Lord, which is independent of all the rest, is of the nature of unbroken self-consciousness and is the unchecked power of perfect freedom. This is what will be said in conclusion at the end of this Adhikāra: "Thus the will itself is the cause, the agent and the action".

In the case of ordinary individuals, Caitra and Maitra etc. also, the act (of cooking) is nothing else than the inner desire "let me cook" : and because of this desire it is that even when he is connected with various other movements than those of cooking, such as putting the pot on oven, the consciousness "I cook" remains unbroken. It is the very desire, expressed as "I cook", which manifests itself as the various movements. In that desire in reality there is no succession. Similarly in the case of the Lord also the determinate consciousness in the form of will "Let me Lord over" "Let me shine" "Let me move" and "Let me be self-conscious" is in reality nothing else than I-consciousness in its essential nature and there is nothing like succession in it. (For, the object is one with the Self and has its being in it as its power). This is what is said by the following sentence:—"Let the succession in the form of variety of the subjects and the objects shine". Therefore, there is no succession in this case also.

But when the desire in the form "let me cook", assuming the form of movements, associated with the body, shines as affected by succession, then 'the will of the Lord' as associated with variety of subjects and objects appears as affected with the succession, like a mirror with the current of a flowing river reflected in it. The only difference between the two is that the mirror has no such will, while the Lord has it. Thus, His power of action is represented in two ways: (I) It is the capacity to create action, characterised by succession. (II) It is the capacity to be affected by the action, characterised by succession.

The same has to be said with regard to spatial succession. In the case of spatial succession, some hold that it is His power of consciousness that operates: but in this School, only power of action has been accepted. This is the connected idea of the verse. The word-meaning is as follows:—

The word “tathā” means characterised by difference of the bodies, which is responsible for the rise of spatial succession and by difference (of forms of the same body, involved) in action, which gives rise to temporal succession.

The act of manifesting mutual difference of the limited subjects such as Sūnya etc., characterised by spatial and temporal succession, from one another as well as from the objects of perception; and of the external objects from one another as also from the limited subjects; is the power of Creation, i.e. action, of the Lord. Action is not confined to the limited subject only. And because He, the omniscient, knows all varieties of subjects, objects and actions, as brought about by the power of action: and also because all move and ever have their being in Him, therefore, He is represented to have the power of action.

Although there is no break in His continuous shining and therefore, there is the absence of succession in Him and hence there can be doubt about the possibility of action in Him, yet it can be proved in the aforesaid manner. This is the connection. The chapter ends. (8) From the beginning 97.

Here ends the first chapter, called the presentation of the power of action, in Kriyādhikāra in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā, written by illustrious teacher, Utpaladevapāda, with the commentary, called Vimarśinī, by illustrious teacher, Abhinavagupta pāda. (1)

ĀHNIKA II

We bow to that Śiva, who, through His own free will, creates contradiction and harmony and unity and diversity and who experiences self-consciousness in its true nature.

It has been stated in the previous chapter that the creative power of the Lord is without any limitation or check in its operation. To prove the same, by justifying the existence of such categories as action, relation and universal etc., which cannot be proved, according to the systems, which admit the independent existence of external objective world, the next Āhnika, of seven verses, beginning with "Action, relation and universal" and ending in "therefore, there is no such illusion" is begun.

In the first verse, which is like an aphorism, it is shown that though action etc., which are unity in multiplicity, cannot be accounted for in terms of the school of thought, which maintains that the objective world has independent being; because there is this defect in them that they involve the assumption of possession of opposite qualities by one and the same thing; yet they have to be surely justified. The next verse states the reason in support of them. The third verse states that though they are the objects of indeterminate cognition, yet it is only in the determinate cognition that their characteristics become clear. Fourth and fifth verses discuss the different spheres of unity and multiplicity. In the sixth verse the essential nature of the relation of predicate and subject etc., admitted to be among the relations, hinted at in the introductory verse, is stated. The seventh states their utility in practical life. This is the summary.

From the preceding discussion it follows that creation of every thing by the power of creation of the Lord, whose chief characteristic is to manifest, is nothing else than manifestation, but such manifestation is common to two moons, to the external objects such as blue etc., and also to action, universal and relation etc., which are associated with the external objects. The question, therefore arises that if all are the products of the same creative power, how can we justify their differentiation, in practical life, as real, unreal and real only because of determinate cognition (saṁvṛtisatya) ?

To answer this objection, in order to establish that the assumption of unreality of action etc. is not justifiable and that

two moons etc. are unreal even though they also may be mere manifestations, he says the following : —

(1) "The ideas of action, relation, universal, substance, place and time are not erroneous, because they persist (i. e. because they are not proved to be false at any later stage, as is the case with two moons) as also because they have functional capacity i. e. serve our purpose in every day life. They are based upon unity in multiplicity."

The idea of action as associated with what is different from the principle of sentiency (*cittatva*), as in the case of agent, object and means of action: e.g. "Caitra is going" "Rice is boiling" and "Fuel is burning", depends upon a limited being such as Caitra etc. which is unity in multiplicity. That is as follows : —

The body of Caitra, though a multiplicity, because of difference in its temporal and spatial relations and forms; yet it still shines as unity, because it is recognised as the same. And action is nothing else than the shining of a thing as the same in the midst of variety of changes. It is real, because the consciousness of it is not proved to be false by future perceptions. But so far as two moons and other similar appearances are concerned; although they appear as such, yet later on their persistency, consisting in continuing to be the objects of operations of external or internal senses for the correct perception, is destroyed by another perception e.g. "there are not two moons." But the persistency of the consciousness "Caitra is going", is not experienced as having been destroyed by any subsequent cognition.

Moreover, although two moons exercise the functional capacity inasmuch as they give rise to pleasure and agitation; yet the perceiver of the couple of moons does not have the experience that the couple of moons has functional capacity of dispelling darkness twice as much as single moon has. On the contrary, he experiences that the functional capacity of even two moons is the same as that of a single. Therefore, the couple does not serve double purpose. But in the case of the act of going, the definite aim is to reach the village. And the utility of the act of going fully accords with the aim, the arrival at the village. Therefore, the idea that is based on action, which is unity in multiplicity, is not erroneous; because it has persistency and utility. The same thing has to be said in regard to others, from relation to time. This will be made clear in the following verses. (1)

But unity and multiformity are contrary to each other. How can then they exist in one and the same thing? This method of demolishing persistency is based on the disproving reason. With this objection in his mind the author says the following :—

(2) "The introvert reality is a unity. The same, being unified with the manifestations of time, space and essential nature, appears as multiplicity, when it becomes the object of sense-perception."

When we see Caitra moving, never there arises the idea that he is not moving, as it does in the case of misapprehension of silver in a piece of mother-of-pearl: "This is not silver". And in the case of (false) perception of two moons also, there arises later consciousness, contrary in its nature to the former perception of two moons: "there are not two moons; my perception was caused by some defect in my vision due to darkness".

As regards the objection, "how can one be many (at the same time?)" our reply is (a counter question) "how (what is) cause (at one place; seed in fertile soil for instance) ceases to be so (at another place i. e. in barren ground) ?" But if you say "It is because of difference of the field". We will ask: —who has given this boon that contrariety is no contrariety if there be difference of the field ? But if you say in reply "by our experience." Why then do you not accept the evidence of direct knowledge, which has been given by us in the case of action, "He goes" etc. ?

In the case of unity in multiplicity of action it is not that the difference of sphere of manifestation cannot be put forth (to justify contrariety in its nature). That is as follows :—

Being unmixed with other manifestations it (Caitra as Ābhāsa) shines as one, and accordingly, being perfectly independent of others, it is internal. It shines always as such. (It is that internal aspect of a thing because of the persistence of which the thing is recognised to be the same in spite of all changes.) It is also internal because of its being known through internal sense, which is capable of knowing all that is such (i. e. internal). It is called Tattva, because its real nature never changes. It is also so called because it is capable of expanding itself when connected with other manifestations. And, therefore, it is grasped as one and the same.

The same internal reality, because of its connection with place "here" and "there"; time "now" and "then" and forms "fat" and "lean" etc., and consequently its becoming the object of the external senses, is perceived as many.

(Another interpretation)

It has been stated in 1,5,10 that the objects shine only as resting within the Lord, and, therefore, the universe being within the Lord is one. According to the view that is to be stated in the course of presentation of the essential nature of causal relation; "Causality is nothing but making that, which revolves within, the object of both the internal and external senses"; the same universe, (which shines resting within the Lord as one with Him), because of its connection with different times and places etc. and therefore, its objectivity to senses, is perceived as many. It is one, when it is unmixed with other manifestations, and then it is pure consciousness (cit) and as such is object of only internal sense. But it is many when it is associated with other manifestations and, therefore, shines as something different from Cit and as such becomes the object of both internal and external senses. Thus, the difference of sphere is clear. The unity itself shines as multiplicity, because we recognise it in multiplicity; just as the same thing (seed) shines as both cause and not-cause, or as material and contributory cause. But if you say that the representation of a thing as of contrary natures, as of seed both as cause and not-cause, is only practical and not real; then I would say "In this case also the same thing is spoken of as both, unity and multiplicity, for practical purposes only". As a matter of fact all duality, such as blue and yellow and indeterminate and determinate in the sphere of Māyā, is only practical and not real. Therefore, the contrariety in unity and multiplicity cannot make the reason, advanced to prove the existence of action, faulty. This is the significance of the word "Eva".

"Tatra" means in action etc. The inner reality in action is only unity. The same being the object of perception, because of its association with different places etc., appears as multiplicity. This is the prose order. Or the word 'Tatra' may mean the reality of action having been established. Or it may mean 'out of the two, unity and multiplicity'. The prose order then would be; unity is justifiable in this manner and multiplicity in this. (2)

Even though difference in the spheres of unity and multiplicity be admitted, yet appearance of unity not being possible at the time when multiplicity shines and *vice versa*; how can a thing be represented to be unity in multiplicity? That is as follows:—

Caitra is perceived in diverse spatial relations by the external senses only. But it has to be noted here that the indetermi-

nate experience, caused by the external senses, does not mix various manifestations (so as to arouse the consciousness of unity in multiplicity). For, it arises from the object, that is directly present before the external senses, and therefore, it does not unify experiences. This is the accepted view. Nor does the determinate, which is the product of mind (Manas), has for its object a thing which is unity in multiplicity. By which cognition can then the grasp of what is both unity and multiplicity be possible? To remove this doubt from the mind of the opponent the author says as follows:—

(3) “The mind, (Manas) reacting (on what has been received through external senses) produces the mental constructs such as action etc., which rest on unity and multiplicity and are primarily due to the activity of the subject.”

According to this system, the subject, who is of the nature of self-consciousness and is like the thread, on which the beads of cognition are strung, is the very life of cognitions. This is what has been explained (in the previous Adhikāra in the 8th Āhnika). He has been proved to be free. As Śiva, He is perfectly free from all impurities. But when He is associated with Māyā and is, therefore, limited, He is called Paśu. He, as Paśu, is clearly manifest at the time of determinate cognition, in which mind is at work; because in the indeterminate experience, which is due to external senses, there is the rise of the states of Sadāśiva and Īśvara.

The subject determines even when he is still in the sphere of indeterminacy. But the internal sense makes the constructs, such as action and relation etc., manifest by means of its activity which follows close upon indeterminate experience (as just described) and is outside the latter, is of the nature of ascertainment and is called reaction (anuvyavasāya). These constructs rest on unity and multiplicity. (It should not be supposed that because they merely appear in Vikalpa, therefore, they are of the same nature as the appearance of two moons). For, it has been already asserted that all that shines in determinate cognition cannot be represented to be unreal, because essential nature of reality is nothing else than luminousness and if the determinate cognition were not luminous, it would not be right to say that such functions (of Manas, Buddhi and Ahāṅkāra) as those of superimposition, ascertainment and relating (referring) to self, are performed in relation to what figures in it. And therefore, such statement (of the Bauddha) as “They superimpose externality on what is not external” would be meaningless. This has been asserted in “If the determinate cognition were erroneous”. But

if the opponent were to say "How can determinate cognition (Vikalpa) touch (have for its object) that which is illumined by sense-perception and is indeterminate?". We reply that it would be so if Vikalpa be independent in its function, but it is not so. It is the work of the subject. And the subject is the same self-consciousness as was present in the former indeterminate experience; and his having the impression of former experiences consists in his retaining the former experiences even at the time of determinative activity. Therefore, as the former indeterminate experience illumines its object, the characteristics of which are self-confined, so Vikalpa, which is merely an action of the subject, who is one with the former experience, has the same object as that of former indeterminate experience. This is what the teacher has said in the following verse:—

"The subject is said to have the impression of the former indeterminate cognition in so far as that former indeterminate cognition persists (in him) even at the time of differentiation."

Therefore, the mind is responsible for various constructs, such as action etc., indicated in the introductory verse of this chapter. They refer to what is unity in multiplicity and in their production the subjective activity of unifying unity and multiplicity predominates.

Although even in indeterminate cognition i.e. in the consciousness of jar etc. as such, universals etc. do shine; yet they do not clearly shine there. The universal, relation, action, substance and space etc., shine clearly when there is the realisation of a characteristic as present in all things, which have similarity; when the two related clearly figure in consciousness; when the chain of successive momentary existences is not allowed to go out of consciousness; when we grasp together all the parts; when we hold together the limited and the limiting, respectively. Therefore, it is established that the universal etc. are grasped through the determinative function of mind. Thus "Saṃvṛti" is determinate cognition. Therefore, let the Bauddha talk of action etc. as real in determinate cognition only (Saṃvṛtisatya). But (let it be remembered) this (Saṃvṛtisatyatva) is also a kind of reality. Therefore, they (action etc.) have not to be supposed to be unreal like two moons. (3)

The universal consciousness as the power of action, descending to the empirical level, manifests action etc. Among these the relation is the principal. That is as follows:—

- (1) Universal is that one (characteristic) which shines in all those which are similar.

- (2) Action is 'extendedness' (vaitatya) of an individual, Devadatta, over time, space and forms.
- (3) Whole (avayavin) is union of parts and their extendedness over space.
- (4) Relative position (Dik) consists in fixing upon the limit of a thing and then determining the position of another thing in relation to it as "this is in front of that" etc.
- (5) Present time is coincidence of a certain action of an individual with his own being. And past and future are absence of such coincidence.

Whatever shines on the back of what figures in consciousness as the meaning of a bare word, i.e. a word without any case termination, is relation. Therefore, all Kāraṅkas are nothing but relations. Only in some cases this relation admits of being called by a different name, e.g. to indicate the particular type of relation of those who have dew-lap etc. which can be presented by one word, (used in plural number) as "cows", the word 'relation' is substituted by 'universal' etc. for practical purpose. But when another word cannot be used, the word 'relation' is retained. Accordingly all measures of land, grain and gold etc. and all that is included in them, such as small and big etc., and number and separateness etc., are forms of relation only. Even those, who hold the universal to be something different from relation, admit the 'inherence' (Samavāya) to be the very life of it. And Samavāya is nothing but relation, according to some, or something that depends upon relation, according to others. For, they say :—

"Relation supports that power which is called "Samavāya."

As for the "Kāraṅka", it always depends upon predicate (Kriyā) and the latter entirely rests on time. And time, the essence of everything through action, itself depends upon relation. Therefore, the practical life in all its various aspects entirely depends upon relation. This is what the teacher himself has said:—

"We bow to that Śiva, who by means of His free will creates the practical worldly life, which depends on all the objects, which are subjected to relation, which is essentially unity in multiplicity."

Therefore, the author says the following to explain the exact nature of relation :—

- (4). "When the objects, which shine separately and as such are self-confined (are independent of one another's existence),

are unified in so far as they are mutually connected in one subject, they constitute the basis of the idea of relation."

Both "king" and "man" externally are independent of each other and are self-confined. But when they are unified in the subject, not perfectly or entirely; for, then the difference will altogether disappear; but only inasmuch as they are mutually connected in respect of their forms, i. e. have invariable concomitance and (to put it figuratively) ride the swing of oneness, which has two ends or extremes (1) unity and (2) diversity, which rise and fall simultaneously, then they constitute the basis of the idea of relation "king's man." That is as follows : —

"King", when grasped by intellect (Buddhi), as not 'satisfied' with his self-centredness and as fulfilling his purpose only when connected with another form, namely, that of "man"; and similar is the case with the latter also; this relation between the two is called "formal relation" (Rūpaśleṣa). It is one in itself, and consists in standing of two things in the aforesaid connection in consciousness (Cit). It rests on the "king", the consciousness of whom arises first and, therefore, the additional consciousness of "man" is merged into it and does not shine separately. It depends upon freedom and, therefore, it shines in consciousness only. The most important idea in it is that of the subordination of "man". Accordingly, the essential nature of relation is that its multiplicity is outside the subject, but its unity is within the subject, because the forms of the terms of relation mutually 'embrace' each other. (4)

(5) "The determinate cognitions, which grasp the concepts "universal" and "whole", rest on unity, that is also outside the subject and similar multiplicity, which is due to diversity of individuals (subsumed under the universal) and the parts (of which the thing is made) respectively."

The determinate cognitions, which grasp the manifestation "universal" i. e. the universal which shines, rest, not in unity, which is within the subject and multiplicity, which is outside, just as does 'relation'; but they rest on multiplicity, characterised by diversity of individuals (subsumed under it) which is outside the subject and on unity (of the universal) which penetrates through all individuals and as such is outside the subject. For instance, when we perceive a number of cows and say "cows"; we have the consciousness of individual cows, separate from one another. It is this consciousness which is responsible for the use of plural number. And at the same time we are also cons-

cious of a characteristic that shines in each individual cow. And it is because of this consciousness of the characteristic that we recognise the meaning of one noun in all individuals. Both of them shine outside the subject. For, we point them out by means of figure, saying "these". The only thing that is to be kept in mind is that their externality also presupposes their being within the true light of consciousness. Therefore, the admission of both unity and multiplicity (in the case of universal etc.) does not admit of any adverse criticism, just as in the case of consciousness of variegated colour (Citra-saṁvedana). This explains the contrariety also between red and not-red in a thing. But the internal unity of the universal is due to relation. The same holds good of all similar cases. Similarly the determinate cognitions, grasping the "whole" such as 'jar' that shines objectively, do not refer to internal unity and external multiplicity but to the external unity, due to joining (of part) without any gap, and multiplicity, due to parts, taken separately. For, "jar" shines as a unity because of its parts being closely joined together, and also as extended. (5)

(6) "The relation of 'Kāraṅkas' is due to determinate consciousness of a predicate (kriyā) : and the concepts, such as relative position (Dik) etc., depend upon the relation between the limited and the limiting."

The mutual relation of 'Kāraṅkas', whereon rest the powers of agent (Kartṛśakti) etc. and of the things, which we perceive, such as the subject, the object and the means of knowledge, is due to the internal right-consciousness of predicate of a particular type. For, without internal right-consciousness (of predicate) a thing is not directly perceived as related to another. The meaning of the word "Viśaya" is efficient causality such as implies impossibility (of mutual relation of things) elsewhere (i. e. without the consciousness of predicate). The relation of the powers of kāraṅkas with the things, whereon they rest, is also due to determinate consciousness of predicate. And the things and the powers are directly related to predicate. Thus, it is the glorious (Bhagavatī) universal power of action, which manifests relation of so many types. The form of two objects,—which are determinately cognised as external to the subject and separate from each other e. g. this is before, behind or far away from that, if it be at first conceived as a unity in the mind, then be visualised as diversity and lastly be cognised to rest on unity,—is Dik. In this case, the keenness to discern particular parts such as face etc., certainty about one facing or having one's back towards the other; awareness of direct or indirect contact of one

with the other; and consequently their nearness etc. to each other, are useful.

In the awareness of one thing as older or newer etc. than the other, knowledge of shortness etc. of continuity of existence since birth, is useful. The same is the case with knowledge of length or shortness of time.

In the consciousness of future, present and past times e. g. "He shall cook", "He is cooking", "He cooked", determinate cognition of some other activity,—which is manifest, was manifest before, or is possibly to become manifest, which depends upon the cognitive tendency of the subject,—such as that of the sun, or that of the particular fruition of action such as cooked rice, is necessary. Similarly number, magnitude, severality, conjunction and disjunction etc. are to be represented as mere forms of relation. The theory may briefly be stated as follows :—

When an object, that shines, in such a manner as does not bring satisfaction to the percipient so long as it rests within itself and has its form fully determined only when it rests on the determinate cognition of another object, then we have a relation, which is nothing but a manifestation of the universal power of action. There may be a relation within relation in reference to another object, just as some maintain that in the number etc. inherence (*Samavāya*) is involved. In this case the infinite regress, though it may be there, is not a fault, just as in the case of creations in the preceding and the succeeding 'Kalpas'. For, even if we do not grasp the creation, connected with the future, the grasp of the creation, connected with the past is not adversely affected. Therefore, there is no fear of basic relation being disproved.(6)

Thus, after asserting the importance of relation, which is as if it were the very life of the entire practical life of the world and which is a manifestation of the universal power of action; the author now, in order to establish its validity and utility, referred to in an earlier verse, says the following:—

(7) "Attainment of purpose by means of an object that has both unity and multiplicity, is possible for a subject, who seeks causal efficiency, only according to the view that has been stated above. Therefore, ideas of relation etc. are not erroneous."

According to this system, the being of objects does not consist in relation with the extensive universal (*Sattā*), because such a conception is too narrow and involves the flaws of infinite regress and uselessness. Nor is it constituted by causal efficiency, because the latter is totally different from the former.

Nor is it the discharge of causal function; because the objects are not always found to do that. For, it is asserted :

“The causal efficiency is not natural to objects.”

And the discharge of causal function, which is known through invariable concomitance or invariable non-concomitance, which are essentially of the nature of direct cognition and non-cognition respectively, is not always perceptible. Therefore, in the case of its imperceptibility, the thing would have to remain imperceptible, though it may exist. Nor is it capacity to discharge causal function : for, it is difficult to ascertain at the time of ascertaining whether the thing does or does not exist in reality. (The main objection against all the three Bauddha views, given just above, is that) all the three, (the causal efficiency, showing it and its potential existence) do not shine and, therefore, they are as good as horns of man, (i. e. they are not existent). And if we look for another causal efficiency, we shall be involved in infinite regress. Therefore, being of a thing (Sattā) is nothing but shining (Prakāśamānatā), provided that the determinate cognition, which refers to it, is not subsequently contradicted. Such a being the relation etc., which are unity in multiplicity, surely have. Therefore, they are undoubtedly real. Still if the opponent were to assert emphatically that ordinary people mostly seek causal efficiency and they treat that as real which discharges causal function; and ask “Have the relation etc. got that ?” We, therefore, console his heart. If you do not get angry, we would say that in the entire field of practical life, even in those cases, in which there is no clear consciousness of relation, it is exactly so. We assert that purpose is served by that object only which, being essentially of the nature of relation etc., has both unity and multiplicity : and that the object, which is self-confined, nowhere at any time serves any purpose. That is as follows :—

When we remember a past pleasure, we desire for the object that gave it. Accordingly our desire refers to the whole of the practical life and the pleasure, which were once experienced and not to those which were not experienced. When, what was experienced before, is got again we experience satisfaction, because we get the desired. Now if what is got is nothing more than what had been got, then there is no room for desire; because the desired is already got. But if it be different from that, how could it be desired : because it is unknown. Therefore, desire is possible only if “that only” is “not that” also : and “not that only” is “that” also. The same may be said about

the means of pleasure also. This is what the teacher has said :—

“When a person desires the wished for, he is determinately conscious of the desired or the means to it. That which has not been the object of experience, cannot be the object of desire. For, even the heaven is an object of desire, simply because it is the place of experienced joys. If the object of experience be destroyed just at the time when it is experienced, how can any desire for it be possible? Therefore, it is determinately grasped as one with the subject (in the form of residual trace).”

Thus, in the object, which is essentially a manifestation, another manifestation, such as the universal or relation etc., is present though it is not directly perceived; otherwise no practical life in any way or form would be possible. Therefore, if the practical life, which is useful to all persons at all times, places and conditions, be not real, then we have nothing left which may be represented to be real. Therefore, we should not commit the error of looking upon the ideas of relation etc. to be erroneous. The chapter ends (7). From beginning 104.

Here ends the second chapter, called the discussion of unity in multiplicity, in the Kriyādhikāra in the Īśvara Pratyabhiññā, written by illustrious teacher, Utpaladevapāda, with the commentary, called Vimarśinī, written by illustrious teacher Abhinavaguptapāda. (2)

ĀHNIKA III.

We bow to that Śiva, on whom the means of right knowledge depend, through dependence on the power of self, in producing the knowledge of the object.

While dealing with the particular manifestations of the power of action, the essential nature of the universal etc., among which the relation is predominant, has been explained by the way.

Now the real nature of relation has to be explained to the exclusion of every other thing. This, in reality, is of two kinds, namely, that which exists between the knower and the known, and that between cause and effect. On the former of these, which is the basis of discussion on the objects and means of right knowledge etc., depends all that so far has been dealt with or is going to be dealt with. Because it is a well known principle of the various systems that the existence of a thing can be established only by means of right knowledge. Therefore, as it is helpful in proving the existence of the thing in hand and it is itself of the nature of relation, so to bring out the distinctive nature of means of right knowledge etc., the discussion of which is very necessary, the following chapter, consisting of seventeen verses, beginning with "This is such" and ending in "Make the recognition of the Lord etc., possible in practical life", is begun.

In the first two verses he discusses the essential nature of the means of right knowledge and its effect. Then, in order to discuss the essential nature of the object of knowledge he states in ten verses that the manifestations are determined by intellectual reaction, with a view to prove that the means of right knowledge operate on each isolated manifestation and not necessarily always on the thing the characteristics of which are well defined. Then by the way he discusses the essential nature of erroneous knowledge in one verse. In another verse he shows that the establishment of the essential nature of the object of knowledge is possible even on the basis of the theory of God that is in hand. In the next three verses he shows that the differentiation of means of right knowledge, their effects and their objects etc., is possible only on the presupposition of the subject, the essential nature of which has already been stated, and, therefore, the subject cannot be the object of knowledge. Hence there is no possibility of operation of the means of right knowledge on the subject. The means of knowledge have only one effect, namely, that they make practical life possible. This is the substance.

In order to justify that the ideas of action etc., are not erroneous in their nature, as has been said before, the real nature of the well known means of right knowledge and their effect (Pramiti) is restated in the following verses:—

(1-2) "The means of right knowledge (Pramāṇa) is that because of whose power the object shines determinately as "this" and "of such and such nature". That is also self-luminous and rises afresh every moment. That (Pramāṇa) as determinately cognising within itself an object, for which a single expression stands and which is free from temporal and spatial limitations, is the cognition (Miti), provided that it is uncontradicted."

Because of which i.e. because of whose power, the external objects, blue and pleasure etc., shine within the bound of their limitations without transgressing them, i. e. are positively ascertained as "this" in respect of their form and as "of this nature" in respect of their association with other qualities, such as eternality and transitoriness: that is called the means of right knowledge in the world. This is what has to be discussed by the discriminating mind, as follows:—

According to this system, a thing, with its essential characteristics, does not shine as separate from the rest independently: firstly because it is insentient and secondly because in that case (it would not shine as associated with others and therefore,) such consciousness as "It is manifest to me" "It is manifest to Caitra" will be impossible. Therefore, it has to be admitted that it shines determinately as dependent upon another. Now if that other also be supposed to be insentient, that would be "blind leading the blind". Therefore, the other has necessarily to be of the nature of Saṁvid. But if that be supposed to be of the nature of pure Saṁvid, then it would not be the cause of determinate shining of blue alone, because it is the same in regard to yellow etc. also. Therefore, it has to be assumed as its essential nature that it faces the blue, is tinged by it and shines as so affected, when it makes an external object shine determinately. And its capacity to make them shine determinately consists in its capacity to shine as affected by them.

Now if it be held that it makes 'blue' shine which is not separate (from Cit) then it should equally make 'yellow' also shine (at the same time), because the latter also is as much one with Cit, whose essence is light (of knowledge) as the former. Therefore, it follows that it makes 'blue' shine which is separated (from Saṁvid). But 'blue' can thus shine as a separate object (ābhāsa), if that Ābhāsa (subjective light) also, which makes 'blue' shine, be separate from the great Light.

For, if it be not separate from that Mahāprakāśa, it would be impossible for it to shine as separate from blue etc. (as its illuminator). But the fact is that nothing in the objective world can bear separation from the Great Light. Therefore, the Great Light has to manifest itself as limited. This limited manifestation (of the Great Light) is spoken of as Śūnya (Pramātā) because it is of the nature of not-being as it were (Nañarth-arūpaḥ) (because it is contentless in so far as it is free from objective affections). Its being depends upon limited subjective and objective manifestations as cut off from one another. The rise of limited subject is nothing else than the appearance of the light as limited. Thus, in reality manifestation of the subject, the means of knowledge and the object, is due to only one power of Creation.

And (I) because the light, which is admitted to be the means of right knowledge, emanates from the limited subject, who is limited, because of the limitations of Śūnya, Buddhi, Vital air and body etc., assumed by Him, and who in its introversion, is ever of the nature of Samvid, and is ever naturally inclined (unmukha) towards the objects, and (II) because the objects are affected (at every successive moment) by the new limiting conditions of time, place and form: (and appear as new every moment) therefore, at every successive moment the extrovert subjective Ābhāsa, (Pramāṇa) has to be manifested afresh as different from that of the preceding moment (to be able to receive the affection of new objects). This is the idea conveyed by "of fresh rise (abhinavodaya)" Fresh means 'not soiled' because of fading as a result of even a moment's (continued) existence.

Now if this (Pramāṇa) be not related to the limited subject, the consciousness "I, who had consciousness of Nīla, am now having that of Pīta" will not be possible. But such personal experience is undeniable and it is never contradicted. Thus the Ābhāsa (the extrovert light) which shines as related to the limited subject and appears every moment in a new form, because of its facing object, is called Pramāṇa, because it operates to bring about cognition.

What is this so called Pramā ? If you say it is of the nature of effect (of Pramāṇa); we assert that that very Ābhāsa, which is essentially the light of cognition (Bodharūpa) is Miti, the fruit of Pramāṇa. This is the construction (of the principal sentence in the second Śloka). But if any one were to say that thus (if you say "the same is Miti") the two would be considered to have been spoken of as synonymous rather than as being related with each other as cause and effect; the reply is that that Ābhāsa

is Pramāṇa inasmuch as it is extrovert light. But when in its aspect of determinate self-consciousness, which, as has been said before, is characterised by introvertness, it is limited by the affections of the objective world, the same light of consciousness (Bodha) is the effect. Just as in "that I, who am brave, am victorious" though bravery and victoriousness, are represented to belong to one and the same person, yet they are discriminated as cause and effect by a person of critical judgement, as "because I am brave, therefore, I am victorious", so in the present case there is relation of cause and effect "because there is light or manifestation of Nila, therefore, there is determinate knowledge "this is Nila", though 'Pramāṇa' and 'Pramiti' are essentially the same. This is what has been asserted in "Because the determinate knowledge is because of that". Moreover, the effect in the present case is no other than action (of the subject) (Vyāpārarūpameva) : and action has no separate entity from both the agent and means, therefore, also there is non-difference of Pramāṇa and its effect.

The chief characteristic of Pramāṇa (the means of right knowledge) is its power to produce the determinate knowledge. And the word (śabda) is the very life of this determinate knowledge (because the only difference between the determinate and the indeterminate knowledge is that while in the case of one we cannot use any word; in that of the other we can). Now word is used for one manifestation (ābhāsa) only, which is free from all associations with other Ābhāsas, such as place and time etc. e. g. "jar" or "red" (each word standing separately does not convey the idea of time or place etc. of the thing signified by it). Hence the means of right knowledge operates only on an isolated Ābhāsa, which is very much like a universal and admits of no specification, because it is not mixed up with the other Ābhāsas of time and place etc. which are apt to impart their limitations. Even the word "this" refers to the manifestation in front, merely as such, and not to one that is mixed up with other Ābhāsas. This is what the venerable teacher himself has said in the following lines : —

"The determinate consciousness "this" even when it refers to a definite object, which lies in front, implies "universal thisness" which is present in all objects."

Therefore, (as the means of right knowledge operate on an isolated manifestation (ābhāsa) only) 'ābhāsa' alone is real. And the particular (Svalakṣaṇa) is a different kind of 'Ābhāsa', which is characterised by shining of time and space etc. as united with one and the same manifestation. On that the means of right knowledge operate separately. Therefore, when a

means of knowledge operates on the unified whole (made up of what has been separately cognised) it is not valid, because it refers to what is already cognised. We shall discuss this in a subsequent section.

Determinate cognition, according to our view, entirely depends on the use of words. Hence it refers to each Ābhāsa separately. Therefore, even those who hold that the determinate cognition of the whole also is valid, because it is based on determinate cognition of each part separately, have to admit the validity to rest on the cognition of each manifestation. This will do. It is no use discussing the irrelevant. But if the determinate knowledge be simply an activity of Pramāṇa, that is present in (the case of erroneous perception of the existence of) two moons also; (that also should, therefore, be called determinate knowledge). No, because determinate knowledge is so called because, on account of its residual trace, it has continuous existence till it serves its well-known desired purpose. It is not destroyed before that. But if it be destroyed in the middle, it is not determinate knowledge. Nor was the knowledge of two moons determinate knowledge even before (i. e. before it was contradicted by a subsequent experience); because even before it was contradicted by the unexceptionable knowledge of oneness of the moon that we have within. This is supported by the evidence of our own experience, because our personal experience "at that very time" "this" was not "silver" recognises that the determinate knowledge, which arose before, has been proved to be no determinate knowledge at all. This is what the teacher has said in the course of discussion on *Bādha* and shall deal further with this point in the verse "*Rajataikavi-marśe*". This being so, no sooner does the person, who determinately cognises two moons, want to arouse the curiosity of others, which is the admitted purpose of showing a new thing, then, being overwhelmed by contempt and ridicule on hearing the words of the other people, considers his former so called determinate knowledge "this is the couple of moons" as having been uprooted by his own experience.

But the question is "if the person (who has erroneous determinate cognition) does not seek any causal efficiency from what he determinately cognises, how can there be then talk of its contradiction or non-contradiction?" Answer to this is "Let it not be : we do not lose anything thereby". For, activity is not always due to determinate right knowledge only. It is caused at times even by uncertainty as in the case of cultivation of land or intensity of desire as in the case of taking poisonous food, or as in the case of theft, in which impediments, as experience

tells us, are sure or possible. Thus, the intensity of desire is, in the case of ordinary men, the cause of activity. And people when active, discover some of their cognitions to be right, when they are not uprooted by the later ones; and others to be wrong, when they find them proved false by later experience. And thus, because the perceiver has had enough practice to differentiate between correct and incorrect or right and wrong means of knowledge, and also because he has been doing so through out his hundreds of former births, therefore, he can find out distinction between *Pramāṇa* and *Apramāṇa* at the very first sight, as he does between jewel and silver. And in reality there is distinct difference between them due to difference in the cause etc. Therefore, when he considers his distress to be bearable and so is not goaded to various activities by his desire, which influences human activities as much as does the great planet *Rāhu*, then being afraid of being contradicted (or falling into error), he is guided in his activities by knowledge which he fully knows to be correct and so he is never deceived. Such a person is said to be very considerate in his action.

Thus, the general conception the *Pramāṇa* is explained in order to remove the doubt about the validity of determinate cognitions such as those of the universal and relation etc. (which the *Bauddha* raised) on account of his own ignorance. And because the conception of the means of right knowledge, as has been presented above, is a mere repetition of what is well known, the reader has not been troubled with details such as its classification and criticism of the definition etc.

Pramāṇa is that means of knowledge, which is not proved to be false at a later stage by an experience of the opposite nature, and is the cause of the effect in the shape of determinate knowledge, the continuity of which is not broken till the accomplishment of the fixed purpose. It is essentially the light of consciousness. It is related to an object and springs from the essential nature of the subject. There is no difference of opinion about it in reference to the sense-perception or experience of pleasure etc. or mental apprehension or the cognition of a *Yogin*, because it directly refers to the *Ābhāsa* in the form of the object of knowledge.

Anumāna defined

The knowledge derived from inference is the knowledge of an object (*Ābhāsa*) from that of which it (the inferred,) is an effect; or of which it forms the essential nature. The relation of one thing with the other as cause and effect and the relation of identity (*Tādātmya*) of two things have to be acknowledged to

be dependent upon the Niyati śakti of the Lord. Therefore, the inference operates within the limit of that time or place within which the invariable concomitance is well known.

Āgama

But Āgama is the inner (Antaraṅga i.e. the essential or natural—Svabhāvatayā sthita) activity (Vyāpāra) of the Lord, who is essentially nothing else than pure consciousness (Cit). For, it is nothing but the inner voice or speech (Parā) (i.e. it is spontaneous thought of one who rises to the transcendental level of complete de-individualisation, which he expresses when he descends to the empirical level. It springs from never changing pure "I" Bh. II, 84-5). It is the very life of other means of knowledge, such as direct perception. Therefore, whatever is said in the Āgama, that is undoubtedly so. For instance, the following Mantra : — "This poison cannot kill me. I am myself Garuḍa".

(This Mantra frees a person from the effect of snake-bite; but only if the person, using it, rises above the empirical personality and exclusively contemplates its meaning. For, according to this system, a person becomes what he contemplates in the aforesaid manner (Ātmānam Yādṛśam Yotra bhāvayet tādrśo hyasau). Hence Āgama, in reality, is nothing more than the strongest determinate thought of the completely de-individualised self. And the collection of such thoughts in language is secondarily called so, because it is a means of arousing such thoughts. (Tataḥ sa eva vimarśa Āgama ityucyate mukhyatayā, tadupayogitayā tu upacāreṇa tajjanakopi śabdarāśiḥ I. P. V. V. Vol. III P. 84).

And whichever other collection of such thoughts in language (Śabdarāśiḥ) is helpful in arousing such strong determinate thought (in the believer in that Āgama) that also is valid (Pramāṇam) as for instance, the Vedas and the Siddhānta (Āgamas) etc. or other Āgamas such as those of the Bauddhas and the Jainas; because the assertions, which have been made by them (Veda etc.) such as "I, who have performed joytiṣṭoma shall go to heaven" "I am initiated (Dīkṣita), I shall not be reborn" "I am compassionate, I shall attain Buddhahood" "I endure great pains, I shall reach the stage of Arhan" etc., are not proved to be invalid, because only those who believe in them, are entitled to follow them. To those, who do not believe in them, they are not valid: because to them they are not articles of unshakable faith; because they do not arouse strongest determinate thought in them. But will it not follow from this that the same scripture is Pramāṇa to some and not so to others? And this is not proper,

because it is said "Pramāṇa knows no partiality". Reply to this question is as follows : —

The objector does not know the real nature of 'belief' (Partīti). However, I am not going to ignore him. Now, what is the meaning of "Pramāṇa knows no partiality". Does the perception of Nīla on the part of one man, make the object (Nīla) known to all; or does the perception of smoke similarly make all infer fire from it; or is Āgama in the form of the prediction of a Siddha "In the morning you will get treasure in this way" Pramāṇa to all persons equally? But if you say that it is so to a certain person at a certain time only, then I say:—"so is the case with this particular kind of the strongest determinate thought, Āgama, which is so called because it makes the object known in every way." The fact that eyes and the light etc., which help wrong knowledge, being helpers of wrong knowledge, are not the means of right knowledge, (in a particular case), does not mean that the means of direct perception, which produces right knowledge (in some cases only) is partial in any way. (For, the wrong knowledge is due to the defect in the eyes).

In the same way, though the same Āgama (Veda),—while asserting the non-validity of such portions as those regarding Jyotiṣṭoma etc. in the case of unqualified Sūdras, because they are not the articles of unshakable faith to them, because they do not arouse the strongest determinate thoughts in them and, therefore, are not of the nature of true Āgama,—asserts also the validity of the same in the case of the qualified Brāhmaṇas, because they are the articles of faith to them, because they arouse the strongest determinate thoughts in them and therefore, are of the nature of true Āgama. But they (Āgamas regarding Jyotiṣṭoma) cannot be attacked on the ground of partiality (to some) and impartiality (to others).

For, all Āgamas, whether of the nature of injunction or of prohibition, are productive of strong determinate thought (Vimarśa) only within the limitation, i. e. in certain persons only who are qualified to follow them and that too at a certain time and place, as co-operating causes. It is just for this reason that in the verse "Tradition" etc. the words "where" and "when" are used. Accordingly it has been asserted by great teachers such as Bhartrhari and the commentator on the Nyāya Sūtra, that the direct perception and the Āgama invalidate the inference. When the general definition of the means of right knowledge is known, its essential nature is completely grasped. The special definitions, therefore, are useless.

The Bauddha defines the means of right knowledge as that which is not subsequently contradicted. This amounts to saying that it is a helper in reaching the object or that it is prompter towards the object; or that it shows the thing, which can be reached and which is fit for directing one's activity towards. But this definition does not state any characteristic of Pramāṇa, which rests on the light of consciousness, which is primarily admitted to be Pramāṇa. And such a characteristic, if at all it can be established, is established by the definition given in the Kārikā. Otherwise the definition would be no better than (mockery, such as) twisting of the face, shaking of the head and bending or pressing the fingers. It is no use going into details. (2)

It has been stated in the preceding verse that Miti has as its object only that which is signified by a single expression, but a single expression is used for the external object, which is a configuration of various Ābhāṣas. How then can it be said that the means of right knowledge operates on each Ābhāṣa? For, the 'Svalakṣaṇa' is a configuration of Ābhāṣas. In order to answer this objection the author says the following to give a very correct idea of what the object of means of knowledge really is:—

(3) "Even in the case of one object, which is a product of unification, there is cognition of different kinds of Ābhāṣas, according to the taste, or the purpose or the intellectual capacity i.e. the traditional knowledge that one has of the object."

Although jar is externally perceived as one object yet it is not one only (as it is perceived). It can also be differently analysed. That is as follows :—

An object can be analysed in three ways ; according to the taste, the purpose , or the established tradition, which the discriminator follows. But the constituent Ābhāṣas differ in each case. But if you ask how then Svalakṣaṇa can be spoken of as one ? The reply is that sometimes determinate knowledge of these Ābhāṣas, which shine separately, rests upon each Ābhāṣa separately. In such a case we grasp higher and lower universals. But sometimes it rests on unification of them by holding them as principal and subordinate ; as "Here this is so". In such a case the object is one Svalakṣaṇa.

Here the word "Api" has to be joined with a different word from that with which it is connected in the text i.e. it has to be used with "Artha" and not "Ābhāṣa". Thus even in the case of that object also, which has been constructed as one particular

object by determinative activity which consists in determinate unification, the Ābhāsas differ, according to the taste, the purpose or established tradition that the cogniser follows. (3)

The following lines illustrate the point, dealt with in the preceding verse:—

(4-5) "Just as the Ābhāsas, 'long', 'round', 'tall' and 'man'; or 'smoke' and 'of sandal-wood'; though limited by time and space, shine in isolation from one another (to different individuals facing the same object) : so do the Ābhāsas, 'is' 'jar', 'substance', 'gold' and 'bright'. Each of them, shows its respective causal efficiency, is the object of a separate determinate cognition (and, accordingly,) is referred to by one word."

Here in one particular well-known Ābhāsa, 'man' who is known to be sentient, at times, only length, which is characterised by occupying a large space, is definitely perceived. It (length) is common to trees also. At another time only circularity, which is characterised by imperceptibility of joints, and is possible in the case of a rock also, is perceived : or only tallness, which consists in being spread upward and is common to a post. Or only the quality of a man i.e. the freedom in his movements, such as going or coming, which is common to other men also, is perceived at still another time. That is as follows :—

The perceiver may do so because of his free will, unrestrained by any purpose, i.e. Ruci. This is what has been asserted in the following :—

"Ruci, which arises independently of any purpose, because the mind is essentially restless."

He might analytically perceive the objects as covering large space only, when he is prompted by desire for concealing : or when he desires to understand or tries to explain the conception of his elders of what is called long.

Thus, in determinate knowledge, Ābhāsas differ (according to the taste or purpose etc. of the perceiver). But it is one particular Ābhāsa, because it rests on the Ābhāsa of either time or place. The Ābhāsas of time and space impart particularity and exercise the function of as if it were destroying eternality and omnipresence, which are responsible for the rise of the idea of universality. Just in the same manner as that in which the Ābhāsa "Man" has been explained, other Ābhāsas, such as Brāhmaṇa etc. have to be explained. Among the different Ābhāsas mentioned above, the Ābhāsa, "man" is the best known, because in man are found many Ābhāsas, which are common to both the sentient and the insentient. Following this example

various well known Ābhāsas can be differentiated from one another in smoke also, e.g. 'smoke' 'of Sandal', "rising from white sandal wood". And with the help of this above well known illustration, we can ascertain variety of Ābhāsas in jar, which is not ordinarily known to have it, in the following manner :—

When a person, who is getting broken-hearted, finding that there is nothing, sees a jar, he simply perceives the Ābhāsa "existence" only, as "It is". He has no consciousness of other Ābhāsas even in name. Similarly one who desires to fetch water, perceives Ābhāsa "jar". The man, desirous of simply a thing, which can be taken to some place and then brought back, perceives the Ābhāsa "thing". The man, desirous of price, perceives Ābhāsa "gold"; the man, desirous of pleasantness, perceives Ābhāsa "brightness"; the man, desirous of extremely hard substance, sees Ābhāsa "hardness". The same may be said about the taste and the intellectual capacity.

Thus, a thing is nothing else than these various Ābhāsas, because every thing is essentially Ābhāsa. And Vimarśa also, which is the very life of Ābhāsa, is separate for each Ābhāsa, because the indicatory sign, the word, which is known to be the very life of determinate knowledge, rests on (i.e. is separate for) each Ābhāsa e.g., "is" "red" and "jar" etc. Similarly the capacity of serving certain fixed purpose also rests separately on each Ābhāsa, as we know it through positive and negative concomitance. For instance, by the Ābhāsa of mere existence, only the breaking of the heart is avoided. The need of another Ābhāsa (the capacity to fetch water) in the Ābhāsa "being" is related to a different Ābhāsa. For, just as in the case of desire to accomplish the purpose (of fetching fire) the Ābhāsa "vessel" is needed ; so in the case of desire to fetch water, another Ābhāsa of definite nature (i.e. jar) which is invariably concomitant with the Ābhāsa "being" is needed. Thus, from whatever point of view we reflect on the object, we discover it to be essentially nothing more than an Ābhāsa ; because only as such it shines objectively, is determinately cognised, and serves the required purpose. This is established. Thus, the author, in order to establish one point, has given three illustrations (I) "Long and round" (II) "smoke" and (III) "is" and "jar", because they differ from one another in so far as the first is best known ; the second is simply known and the third is unknown. (5).

But if thus every Ābhāsa is a thing by itself, how then jar can be spoken of as one thing ? To this objection he replies as follows :—

(6) "The causal efficiency of the "ābhāsas", which shine objectively as resting on a common ābhāsa, is collective. But that of those which shine separately is individually fixed."

In the configuration of Ābhāsas, there has to be admitted some Ābhāsa as the chief among them, which may be considered to be the substratum of all others. This would be their common abode. Now the so called "Sāmānādhikaranyā" is nothing else than the connection of these Ābhāsas with this common substratum. The meaning of the instrumental case (in Sāmānādhikaranyena) is "Characterised by". "Pratibhāsa" means the light of consciousness inclined towards a configuration of Ābhāsas, which rest on a common substratum, and the determinative activity, which finds expression, not in a word (but in a sentence); because all these Ābhāsas necessarily rest on one. Therefore, the Ābhāsas, which constitute one particular configuration—because of the determinate cognition in the form of a sentence, "here now this jar is" which is the very life of shining of various Ābhāsas on a common substratum,—discharge a different collective function, though even so they retain their individual differences. But when there is determinate knowledge of each Ābhāsa separately, then each one of them has its separate fixed function.

Here in this śloka by the words "Ābhāsa" and "Pratibhāsa" determinate knowledge also is to be supposed to be implied. The word "Punaḥ", which indicates distinction, has to be connected with both, just as the eye of a crow is connected with both the sockets. By the use of plural in "abhedinām" the author has conveyed the idea that the Ābhāsas do not lose their separate entity (Svarūpabheda) even when they rest on one substratum.

Thus, when the separateness or diversity (Pṛthaktva) of Ābhāsas occupies a subordinate position to that of identity (e.g. "this place" "this place") then there is true universality (Sāmānyarūpatva) in so far as the identity tinges or qualifies various similar individual (external) objects. But when the Ābhāsa "jar" is determinately cognised in total isolation, (i.e. when "jar" shines as a substantive) then its universality is not real but simply possible, because of its fitness (to tinge a number of similar individual external objects). For, all the categories (of the Nyāya) excepting the substance, are essentially dependent. Thus the idea that "jar" also as such is one thing is right, because it is established as such by its shining in indeterminate and determinate knowledge and its function. (6).

Here the following objection may be raised :—

It is not one Ābhāsa that serves an end ; rather, a collection of a number of them serves a collection of a number of ends. Moreover, if different Ābhāsas mix together to discharge one function, what is it that limits their mixing up ? i.e. Why is it that some Ābhāsas are mixed together and not others ? The author answers this objection in the following Śloka :—

(7) “Just as the idea of oneness of different rays of a lamp or of oneness of different currents in the ocean, depends upon their discharging one function ; so does that of the Ābhāsas, which do not contradict one another.”

Though the scattered rays of a lamp, do not discharge the function of bringing about ocular perception of the minute, yet they perform the same function when they are focused. In this case there is no collection of functions discharged by them. And the various currents also, when they fall into the sea, discharge the function of giving rise to innumerable waves. Similarly various “Ābhāsas” “jar”, ‘of gold’ ‘red’ and then ‘it is fit to be used for bringing water to pour on the head of Śiva,’ discharge one function of causing great pleasure. Thus the capacity of discharging one function is established (in the case of Svalakṣaṇa.) To the question : “what is it that limits mixing up of these Ābhāsas?” the following is the reply :—

Those, which are not of opposite nature, alone get mixed up together. The Ābhāsa of form does not mix up with that of air, because they are of opposite nature. And this contrariety is due to the power of Niyati.

Thus, just as the one thing that is constituted by separate rays focused, or that one, which is constituted by various currents meeting in the sea, gives rise to the idea of oneness ; so that one, called Svalakṣaṇa, which is a configuration of the various Ābhāsas, ‘jar’, ‘red’ and ‘gold’ etc., which are not of contrary nature, gives rise to the idea of oneness. This is the construction. Thus, it is accepted that shining in indeterminate and determinate cognitions and discharging of function are due to the idea of unity. (7)

But if the means of right knowledge operates on each Ābhāsa separately, it follows that the validity of manifestation “fire” depends upon the cognition of fire ; validity of manifestation “smoke” rests on the cognition of smoke ; and in the same manner the validity of the relation of cause and effect rests on the cognition of their relation only. Such being the case, there is the possibility of perception of fire without that of smoke.

And, therefore, many difficulties would arise. To remove this objection the author says the following :—

(8)“Even in the case of unqualified fire etc., the causal relation, heat and its being the meaning of a conventional expression etc. are known through one means of knowledge.”

Here i. e. even in the theory that the means of right knowledge operates on each Ābhāsa separately, no flaw can be pointed out. That is as follows :—

Although the manifestation “fire” may be of generic nature, because of its not being unified with other manifestations, time and place etc. yet this very manifestation is known with certainty only when it is unified with as many manifestations as are made invariably concomitant with it by the power of Niyati. Thus, the manifestation “fire” is naturally invariably concomitant with the manifestation of its being the effect of fuel and cause of smoke as also with that of its being hot in its nature. And it is so perceived at all times and in all places, because they are mixed up together into one:

And even that characteristic which does not naturally belong to it and, therefore, depends upon the convention established by men, such as being signified by the word ‘fire’ or the capacity to bring about the ocular perception of jar etc., is ascertained by means of a single perception itself. For, to the perceiver, the Ābhāsa of fire, at all times and places, is known, as invariably concomitant with other Ābhāsas, with which either the nature or the humanity has mixed it up. What is then the use of another means of right knowledge in regard to them ?

By the statement “this object, which is of bright and luminous form, is the meaning of the conventional expression, freely fixed by man”, the author indicates that in all cases the Lord’s power of Niyati is the only refuge. The crux of the whole thing is that the invariable concomitance of one Ābhāsa with others, whether natural or otherwise, that we find, is due to the working of His power of Niyati. The power of Niyati operates differently in relation to different objects. It manifests fuel (as the cause of fire) as associated with the past time. It manifests smoke (as the effect of fire) as associated with future time. It manifests heat as associated with fire at all times; and expressibility by such words as fire etc. for a short time only.

Therefore, because of the dependence on the working of the power of Niyati, there is invariable concomitance of the Ābhāsa of smoke with that of fire. Hence there does not arise any difficulty in regard to inference. All the characteristics

of fire, namely, its being both an effect and a cause; its being hot and its being signified by the various words which stand for it no less than its being without any odour, going upward, and being of the opposite nature from water, as implied by the word "etc." (Ādi), are known through only one means of right knowledge.

The practice, that there should be a break when half the śloka is finished, obtains only in literary works and not in the philosophical ones. Therefore, it is no fault that the compound runs on from the second to the third foot (pāda) of the śloka.

The use of the affix 'Tal' at the end of each component part of the compound is meant to indicate that the things signified by them belong to different classes, according as they are natural or artificial because of their dependence on or independence of another thing (such as human convention). (8)

Thus, the essential nature of the object is made manifest by one means of right knowledge, which rests on each Ābhāsa separately. And their proper invariable concomitance with one another, is ascertained by the introvert aspect of the same Samvid, on which depend all the preceding various experiences, which had various limited Ābhāsas as their objects. And this introvert light of consciousness is the valid means only in regard to manifestation "oneness" because unification is its essential characteristic. But in the case of the manifestations which are unified, it is not the valid means of knowledge. For, they come to it second hand. In regard to them the former means only, which operates upon each manifestation separately, is the valid means.

Now the author is going to show the manner, in which Pramāṇa is useful in bringing about the physical activity in addition to the mental activity, the essential characteristic of which is to make manifest the essential nature of the objects.

(9) "The activity of the person, with purposive attitude, is possible in reference to a particular object at the time of its perception, when it is determined by other cognitions such as those of time etc."

The external causal efficiency of an object is due to its determination. And in this determination, the connection of an Ābhāsa with the Ābhāsa of time or place is of great importance. Here there is one point which deserves special attention, namely, that this determination of Ābhāsa will serve no purpose (is nothing) unless it be definitely cognised as such. But even when it is grasped determinately, if it be resting on the subject, who is pure consciousness and, therefore, free from limitation of

time etc., it will entirely give up its particularity. Thus, in reality all is one. But the particularity shines. The cause of that is the power of freedom of the Lord. This is called *Māyā Śakti*.

The activity of the organ of speech, body, and mind, which takes place at the time of perception of a definite object, which is a combination of various *Ābhāsas*, in the person, who is actuated by the desire for realising a definite purpose, which can be realised only with the help of a definite object, is possible only if that *Svalakṣaṇa* be determined by many other perceptions, such as those of place and time, implied by the word "ādi", and that of any other characteristic that we unify. It is not possible otherwise. For, such an activity is not possible from one *Pramāṇa* but from a collection thereof.

This collectivity is not possible if the theory of the opponent be accepted. But, according to us, it is possible, as resting in one subject, whose essential nature is sentiency. This is what has already been said in "Na cedantaḥkṛta" etc. (2-3-7). This very unification of means of knowledge is called 'yojikā' or 'Yukti' on the analogy of unification of sweet-smelling things etc.

Thus the point that has been established is that activity is due to a collection of perceptions. The verse may be construed in other ways also as follows:—

Even when there are perceptions of time etc. i.e. there is unification with *Ābhāsa* of time etc., the activity of mind etc. is possible in regard to *Svalakṣaṇa*, that shines within the subject as a unity. Or, activity is possible only when there is its cause in the shape of *Svalakṣaṇa*, which is determined by other perceptions such as those of space etc., i.e. other *Ābhāsas*, which are directly perceptible. In this case also the collection of means of knowledge, which is referred to, through reference to plurality of the objects of knowledge, as that which follows it - is spoken of as the cause of activity.

But is this collection of *Pramāṇas* the cause of activity that coincides with direct perception only? No, says the author:—

"Even that which is due to inference"

Not only the activity of mind and body etc. that coincides with the direct perception is caused by a collection of *Pramāṇas*, each of which is different from the rest, because of its relation to a different *Ābhāsa*, such as that of time, but also that activity which coincides with inference. The various perceptions of *Ābhāsas* of smoke, fire, their invariable concomitance, and that of mountain separately, as well as the inference "there is fire"

which relates to what is not known through perception and asserts its presence, form one collection. And the activity of the inferer, possessed of purposive attitude, that coincides with inference, is based on that collection. This is the connection of this part of the verse with the rest. (9).

Thus unity and diversity are due to *vimarśa* or determinate knowledge. And that is the manifestation of the power of freedom of the great Lord, who is essentially consciousness (*Saṁvedana*). This will explain the view of the opponent, who holds "thing is the same whether it be far or near". This can be explained in no other way. This is what the author establishes in the following two verses:—

(10-11) "Sameness of the objects, which appear to be different because of their nearness or remoteness, their direct relation to senses or its absence, their externality or internality or defects in the accessories of knowledge, remains intact, because they primarily shine as such, a fact which is made manifest by subsequent intellectual reaction, which recognises them to be the same."

How can those who try to explain every thing in terms of indeterminate cognition only, establish that the thing, whether far or near, is the same ? Because there is sure to be a difference in two cases, according as the reflection of the object on the mirror of extrovert "*Saṁvid*" falls partly or wholly, distinctly or indistinctly. But if you say that in the case of *Vimarśa* also there will be the same difference, (because *Vimarśa* is almost entirely dependent upon indeterminate knowledge), I say "quite so". But there is the determinate knowledge that follows this in the form of recognition "this is the same object," which is nothing more than determinate consciousness of identity (of the objects of past and present cognitions). And this recognition is as it were the very life of indeterminate cognition. It makes the chief objective manifestation (*Avabhāsa*), the objective manifestation of 'the Sameness', shine. Thus, because in recognition there is consciousness of the sameness, that fits in with it; for, *Ābhāsa* and *Vimarśa* always go together; therefore, from the point of view of chief or principal consciousness (i.e. recognition as the same) sameness of the object, whether it be far or near, is unaffected. Similarly in the judgement "the same as was inferred has been perceived", sameness of the objects, which are objects of two kinds of knowledge, perception and inference, and, therefore, are conceived in two different ways in respect of their subsidiary *Ābhāsa*s, is unaffected; because identity of them is made to shine predominantly by subsequent intellectual reaction, which recognises them to be the same. This is the construc-

tion. Similar is the case with those which are objects of internal and external cognitions: for, they are also recognised as the same; "the same that I saw then am now imagining within".

The same is the case with those which appear differently because of the defective light of the lamp etc. They are also recognised as the same: "the same red lotus that appeared to be blue in the lamp-light is now seen to be red in the sun-light". Similarly whatever other objects have different appearances either because of difference in the perceptive organs or of meeting one side thereof, they also are the same because the essential nature of the objects (i.e. their identity) shines in consequence of the principal determinate cognition (i.e. the recognition). (10-11)

The object may be considered to be the same in both the cases i.e. when it is far or near, because of its being equally capable of exercising the functional capacity, as conceived or ascertained by the perceiver in both the cases; but how can the thing be similarly called the same whether it be externally perceived or internally conceived; because in the later case it cannot discharge the function, that it was thought to be capable of doing by the perceiver. To remove this wrong notion the author says as follows:—

(12) "The functional efficacy (Arthakriyā) of the objects is not naturally their own. It is fixed by the will of the Lord. Therefore, the object cannot be considered to be different simply because of its not exercising functional power."

In the verse "Kāryakāraṇatā" (2-3-8), like distinctive nature of the thing, its functional capacity also is referred. But this functional capacity is not natural to the object. It is not the essential nature of the object. It is fixed by the will of the Lord in its being as well as not-being. Therefore, as the functional capacity is not the essential nature of the object, so the object should not be considered to be different because of its not discharging its function. For, the difference can be possible only if there be difference in essential quality; but exercising the functional power is not the essential quality. This is what has already been stated and shall also be stated on many occasions. And the essential nature is the same in the state of internality as well as that of externality, because the determinate cognition is the same in both cases. (12)

But if difference and non-difference of the things from one another is to be decided with the sole help of the determinate knowledge, then there should be no talk of error in all the three worlds. From this it will follow that even the mother-of-pearl

is in reality silver; because there is determinate knowledge of it "this is silver". Therefore, there being nothing like erroneous knowledge there can be no possibility of any contradiction thereof. What is then the use of the statement "Determinate knowledge is that which is not proved to be false at a later stage" (2-3-2.) For, in the absence of error there remains nothing to be excluded by the adjunct "uncontradicted" (Abādhitā). This objection he answers as follows:—

(13) "Even when there is consciousness of silver at the sight of mother-of-pearl, there is no silver in the mother-of-pearl; because there is no agreement (between the two cognitions) in respect of their spatial limitation. In the case of 'two moons' also it is particular point in the heavenly vault that shines differently."

In the erroneous knowledge "this is silver, hard, common object to all perceivers and capable of accomplishing its purpose" there is no error about the various Ābhāsas "this" "silver" and the connection thereof, because there is the determinate knowledge. But erroneousness of it arises later on when there is determinate knowledge "this is not the thing, called silver, hard, capable of being perceived as such by other perceivers and of serving its purpose"; because in this later determinate knowledge, the essential nature of earlier determinate knowledge, which is to be ascertained through this later one, does not shine as it did before, i.e. at the time of former determinate knowledge, but it should; and because in reference to that very time, at which arose the consciousness "this is silver", there is determinate knowledge later on "this was not silver". In the case of the erroneous cognition, the form of the cognition is not "It is not just at this very time" as in the case of lightning which disappears as soon as it appears. Therefore, as it does not continue to shine in as perfect a form as it should up to the time of ascertainment, so it is error. This type of error is technically called "Apūṇakhyāti". This not-shining of the object in a perfect form as it should, (up to the time of ascertainment) is the essential nature of error. On the basis of it we may talk of (1) Asatkhyāti (2) Viparītakhyāti and (3) Anirvacaniyakhyāti. But (the opponent may point out that) the consciousness of the real silver is also Apūṇakhyāti. What of that? From this it will follow that all the cognitions are erroneous in their nature. (The exponent replies). It is fortunate that your eyes are now opening. All that shines in the condition of Māyā is illusory. And the erroneous knowledge in the sphere of Māyā is an error on error. It is like a dream in dream or a boil on the cheek; because there is a break in the continuity of that determinate knowledge, the continuity of which should

not be broken. Therefore, there is no error so far as the separate consciousness of "this" etc. is concerned. But the contrary cognition (Bādhaka) destroys the continuity of definite cognition in respect of unification right from the time of rise of determinate cognition. The error lies in the unification, this is established.

Although silver (wrongly perceived) in a shell shines as identical with real silver in the definite knowledge, yet there is no existence of silver in the shell as has been made manifest by that erroneous knowledge "this is silver". The reason is that the place, which forms the limiting condition of that knowledge "here is silver" i.e. the place in the form of shell, which (falsely) shows in itself the brilliance of silver, does not show itself as such in the correct determinate knowledge. Here the root "vad" means to shine.

Well, let it be so in the case of erroneous perception of silver in a shell, but in the case of erroneous knowledge of two moons as expressed in the judgement "there are two moons", there is no consciousness of mixing up of this with any other, as it is in the case of silver with shell, in connection with which contradiction may be possible. For, you yourself have said that in the case of one unconnected Ābhāsa there can be no contradiction. Reply:—But who has said this that the Ābhāsa of two moons is not mixed up with any other Ābhāsa? For, if it be so, then, being without any characteristic, how could it appear with distinctive characteristics of being limited by certain time and place. Therefore, in the case of the two moons also there is Ābhāsa of mixing up with time and place. For, if it be not there, how could there be checking (Nirodha) of the determinate knowledge, which appears to be inclined to continue? (because Vimarśa does not operate on a single Ābhāsa, unmixed with those of time and place).

And (leaving aside the idea of its being mixed up with the Ābhāsa of time) there has to be pointed out the reason why correct determinate knowledge does not follow the unification of the Ābhāsa of duality and that of moon. Therefore, the author says "not only in the case of the Ābhāsa of silver, but also in that of the two moons, there is unification with the Ābhāsa of place, namely, "sky". Explanation of "Anyathā" is "the sky, which was seen as occupied by two moons, is not so". By this contrary determinate knowledge the former (erroneous one) is uprooted.

Thus, the point that has to be proved is that Ābhāsas and their union are controlled by the power of Niyati. They (Ābhāsas) shall be dealt with as Tattvas in Āgamādhikāra. Thus

'vastu' 'Tattva' and 'Prameya' are synonymous terms. Thus, earth (Prthvi) is the Ābhāsa of hardness. Fire and (red) colour are the Ābhāsa of "red". Rajas is the Ābhāsa of union. Arrangement (sanniveśa) is essentially "Niyati". "Niyati" is nothing but order. The order has the not-being (Abhāva) as its very life. For, the shape (of a jar) like that of a big belly with a base, is nothing but the strange shining of not-being of Ābhāsa of the earth. The Ābhāsa of difference is the Māyā. The Ābhāsa of the true light of consciousness, which is beyond the Māyā, is the category "Śiva". This will do. We shall deal with it in the sequel. The Lord alone has free power to unite or disunite the objects of knowledge. The means to be followed to realise the Ultimate real unity is seeing non-difference in the difference of Ābhāsa of jar (i.e. seeing it as one with the self). Thus, it is established that the practical life is not a positive obstruction on the way to union with the Highest Lord. (13).

Trying to make this very point clear, the author proves that the being of all the prameyas depends upon the Lord alone.

(14) "Thus difference of objects (from one another) in respect of qualities, such as sound etc., and their identity in respect of the universal etc. can be explained on the basis of one subject."

An object shines as separate (on account of its element of particularity) and also as commingled with others, (Anuvṛttam) (on account of its element of universality). Both of these two aspects should be considered to be real. For, there is no contrary reason to prove the falsity of either. In reality if there be reason to contradict either of these, then, once having risen and thereafter becoming incapable of rising again (because of having been contradicted) the contradicted would disappear like the flash of lightning. But it is not so. Therefore, the Vedāntin, considering this contrariety between diversity and unity as difficult to maintain, calls it Māyā, and as such indefinable. And others (Bauddhas) say that because it shines in the determinate cognition only, therefore, it has no external existence. Both of them have deceived themselves and the common people.

But, according to us, shining of both is possible as resting on Saṁvid; because the Saṁvid is free. Even the birds know this through their own experience that resting within Saṁvid (consciousness) and, therefore, becoming one with it, even the blazing fire and water are non-contradictory. Hence the following assertion has been made:—

"Therefore, because of picturing up, according to free will" (1-6-11)

Therefore, diversity, which is due to the qualities, which serve as limiting condition and are used as restrictive attributes, or to words etc. or even to rod etc. (as in Daṇḍin); as also the unity, which is due to universal, similarity, or non-perception of difference, which have been discussed from "Kriyā sambandha" onwards, can be explained only if we admit that every thing rests within the Lord, called by the name 'Śiva' who rests in our hearts and is free to do innumerable things of diverse nature such as uniting and separating the right knowledge and the means thereof. What is the use of admitting other innumerable Viśeṣas, when the adjuncts can distinguish one from the other. For instance, in the case of Paramāṇu we may say, "it is one that got mixed with another at the time of formation of Dvyanuka, which comes into being later than atom and which precedes the time of making the jar, associated with this place". Similarly in the case of Ātmā, we may say "It is that which in the past was in heaven and embraced this heavenly damsel in this manner". In this way in the case of Yogins and all-knowing persons distinction between atom and self etc. is established. It is no use going into details. Thus the Prameya is established to be characterised by diversity and unity. The unity in diversity of the object, is beyond all doubt, because it rests on one subject. (14)

If the subject be the resting place of all the objects of knowledge, the attempt should be made to support his existence, and not that of the object, by adducing proofs; as the writer of the Mahābhāṣya says "the effort for (proving) the primary thing is fruitful". With this objection in mind, the teacher reminds us of what he said before "Who, holding the self to be essentially sentient, can disprove or prove the existence of the self" (1-1-2).

Now that the correct nature of the means of right knowledge as well as that of the Highest Lord is known; the statement, "how can such means of right knowledge operate on such a Lord?" can be presented as the conclusion. To show this clearly he says the following:—

(15-16) "What room is there for the operation of the means of right knowledge in the case of the Lord, who is like a smooth surface of wall, whereon the picture of the diversity of the universe is painted, who is essentially such as cannot be touched by not-being, who is ultimately real, who is the eternal subject, who is ever self-shining and wherein rest all forms of cognition."

The light (of consciousness),- which is associated with the limited perceiver, has a new rise every moment, and faces the object,-is called Pramāṇa. Now how can this means of right

knowledge be of any use or possibly apply to the Lord, who is pure consciousness and eternal? Moreover this Pramāṇa establishes the existence of a thing, which has not already been established, through determinate knowledge, "it is this", which rests in the introvert light of the subject, connected with the universal Light. It presupposes the universal light. But on what can the establishment of the self-established universal Light depend? The variety of this world can shine only if there be the Highest Lord, who is essentially pure light, just as a picture can, only if there be a wall. If the external objects be cognised in isolation from one another, then,—because Nīla and Pīta etc. rest in themselves and their cognitions are like insentient, mute or dumb with regard to one another, because they refer to their objects only, and because the determinate cognitions thereof, which follow the indeterminate, are similarly cut off from one another,—how can there be such consciousness as "this is variegated". But just as when depths and elevations are represented by various lines on a smooth wall, there is the possibility of consciousness "she is of deep navel and elevated breasts"; so there can be consciousness of difference in relation to 'the variegated' only when all the different cognitions are connected with one wall of universal light (of consciousness). Thus, the author speaks of ever lasting self-luminousness of the wall of light of consciousness for receiving the impress of all the various objects.

Thus what can the means of right knowledge do in regard to one who is self-luminous? But if you say that He does not shine before (the working of the means of right knowledge); that would mean that He has no existence, because He is nothing else than pure light. Further, we can have no negative cognition of Him as "He is not"; because He alone has real existence. For, light of consciousness alone exists and what exists cannot be non-existent.

But if you say that His unlimited power, which is unknown, shall be made known by Pramāṇa; that also is not possible. For, if He did not shine as subject, whose work is the use of the Pramāṇas? But if He shines then He is the Lord, because the Lord is non-different from the subject. This is the idea, conveyed by three adjuncts in the text "Īśvare, Pramātari and sarvadābhā-tavigrahe". "Vigraha" here means special characteristic, which is particularly grasped. Because free self-luminousness is His characteristic nature, therefore, non-existence cannot touch Him at any time. He is free from limitation of time; because temporal limitation cannot be attributed to what is not touched by not-being. Therefore, He is said to be eternal (Purāṇa). "Kimpramāṇam" means: what is Pramāṇa in regard to Him;

why is this Pramāṇa to be used with regard to Him; or what useful purpose can the use of Pramāṇas serve? The Pramāṇa cannot rightly be represented to operate in His case; because Pramāṇa is so called because of its appearing ever anew and bringing about the rest of the object in the subject, which is technically called Pramiti. And the subject, being of unbroken light, has all the Pramitis in his introvert aspect. How then can Paramāṇa, which appears ever anew, can operate in His case; and where will rest Pramiti which owes its existence to the former?

Therefore, Pramāṇa is possible only in the case of the subject, limited by body, vital air, the group of eight (Puraṣṭaka) and Śūnya. And there too it operates on the objective aspect only and not on the subjective (Sāmvedanāṁśe). And in regard to the subjective aspect, we may say that one's own experience is the means of knowing it in its limited aspect, i.e. when it is limited, because it faces the object and so appears anew, because of its contact with the real subject who is free from all limitations. Even the Bauddha has to admit that the consciousness "this is my Jñāna" is associated with limited subject. Pramāṇa has nothing to do with the true subject. This is what I have said myself:—

"All feel ashamed at having been reduced to the level of an object by the great Lord. How can that Lord, therefore, be himself reduced to the level of object of knowledge?" (16)

But if the means of right knowledge are of no avail and cannot possibly function on the Lord, what is then the use of the Śāstra about Him? For, the Śāstra is only a means of knowledge. Reply is that the fact that the direct means of knowledge do not apply to Him, does not affect the utility of the Śāstra as a means of knowledge, because the Śāstra is a collection of inferences (inferential means for the realisation of the highest reality) for the sake of others. The highest object of a Śāstra is to present the subject in terms of the sixteen Padārthās, Pramāṇa etc. (as enumerated by Gautama). Although the Bauddhas find fault with Pañcāvayava etc., yet that is simply their obstinacy. It is made clear in that part of the book, which contains the quotation "Hitāhitapṛāptiparihārayoḥ". And it is a fact that after the subject has been presented in terms of sixteen Padārthas, the other person can well understand what is explained to him.

But if any one were to ask what is the object of another person (that is served) through Parārthānumāna; reply is "it is for convincing others". That is possible through 'Parārthānumāna'.

Five parts of syllogism are used in it. Thus the founder of the Nyāya system, Akṣapāda by name, has established that all the Sāstras, excepting the Āgamas, are in reality collections of inferential proofs, such as bring full conviction to others.

Therefore, in this connection also, in order to remind us of what he stated in "But because of ignorance" (1-1-3) the author says as follows:—

(17) "Because of the ignorance, the "I" in the limited subject has never before been looked upon as the Lord etc. This Śāstra, through bringing the powers to light, prompts people to do so."

The power of freedom of the Highest Lord consists in His accomplishing that which is very difficult and seems impossible in that particular prior state, which is known as Paśu, and in which we are. What more difficult of accomplishment can there be than this that in Him who is essentially light there is manifest what is the negation of light, right at the time when His essential nature, the light of consciousness, is shining in full? Therefore, it is all due to the power of freedom that He does not shine as perfectly free, i.e. makes or gives rise to that part (of the universe), which is known as the subjective, by manifesting limited individual subject, and through him manifests the perceptible. This is called the power of Māyā of the Lord. This is asserted in "Māyā is the principle of ignorance". Ignorance is due to the power of freedom, called Māyāśakti, as described above. Ignorance consists in the loss of perfection in knowledge i.e. in considering perfection, freedom and eternality, which are shining within himself, as not shining. Perfection consists in being full of the objects of the universe, clearly manifested because of the rise of the stir, the power of Will. Freedom consists in the powers of remembrance etc. And eternality and omnipresence of the Universal light are automatically established because it is free from limitations of time and place.

The idea,—that what shines as "I" is perfect, omnipresent, omnipotent and eternal being i.e. the idea that the "I" is identical with the Lord, the Subject, the Lustrous, as presented in the preceding two verses,—was not in practice before, because of ignorance. This Śāstra makes people fit to live this idea in practice by bringing to light His powers of knowledge, will and action by means of treatise on Pratyabhijñā, which is a collection of inferential proofs to justify the idea in practice.

In "Pravartyate" there is double causative. The significance of the word "Kevalam" is that nothing new is done, nor what was really non-manifest is made manifest. Only wrong idea about that, which is shining, as not shining, is removed. And

Mukti is nothing but the attainment of godhead at the removal of this wrong idea. Accordingly Saṃsāra is non-removal of the same. For, both of them depend upon the unshakable ideas and both are manifestations of the glorious one.

The crux of the whole discussion is this:— The wrong notion of a person, who is under the influence of a spirit and considers himself as having been taken away (through wrong notion) even though he is there, is removed (by interrogating) in the following manner:—What are you? If you say "one whose face and clothes are such", then see, you have got them. The person who says this repeatedly does not produce anything new. In the same manner the wrong notion, "I am not the Lord" which is due to ignorance in the worldly people, in regard to the Self, that is always shining as "I", is removed by the Śāstra as follows:—

- (1) He, who is possessed of power of freedom in respect of knowledge and action, is "Iśvara", as is the one whom we know through Purāṇas and Āgamas. You are such.
- (2) He, on whom something depends is the Lord of that as a king is of his kingdom. So does the world depend on you. Thus, looking upon yourself as the Lord does not depend on any external ground. This is the invariable concomitance.
- (3) Whatever shines in something else, that something is full of what shines in it e.g. treasure is full of gems. And the world shines in you.
- (4) Whatever shines within something else, that something pervades what is within it e.g. casket pervades the gems. The whole of the universe, beginning with the earth and ending in Sadāśiva, as stated in the Śāstras, is within you, who are essentially of the nature of consciousness (Saṃvid).
- (5) If a certain thing presupposes something else as the condition of its coming into being and dissolution, that something must exist before and after that, by which it is presupposed, e.g. sprout presupposes the earth in such a manner. The whole universe presupposes you, who are essentially the light of consciousness. Similarly thousands of other attributes, such as are well established by the Āgamas, may be attributed.

Thus, when the ignorance is removed, but because of persistence of the residual trace of ignorance, though there may still

be the idea of identity of the self with body etc., (in practical life) and that of non-identity (in the state of Samādhi) and there may also be the consciousness of jar etc., as not identical with the self; yet, just as the person who knows the secret of magic, is not deluded even when he sees its creations, so the person, who has recognised the self, is not (deluded). Therefore, when the body has been brought to end by death, he attains the state of the great Lord (Parameśvaratā). But the person, who through continuous practice of concentration, as enjoined in the Śaiva Śāstra, realises the identity of jar and body etc. with the highest Lord, acquires the attributes of the highest Lord in his very life time. He, however, does not attain perfection. For, true identity with the universe, is realised only after the body, which is essentially a limitation, has been dissolved. But if there be a person, who thinks that the mass of reasons, which establish that the individual is identical with Universal in practical life, is unsound, his ignorance has to be removed by means of Smṛti etc. which are prompters to practical life. But the person, whose ignorance is not dispelled by the Smṛtis etc., should be considered to be doomed to remain ignorant, because of the will of the Lord. Such a person also, if the injunctions of the Śāstra fall into his ears, and impressions thus created attain maturity, will sometime surely realise the Self. Thus, what was asserted in the two verses "Kartari" etc. (I, I, 1-2) has been re-asserted in a polished form, in three verses beginning with 'Viśvavaicitrya' etc., by saying: "How can the means of right knowledge, which are of such a nature, can justly apply to the Lord, who is of such a nature". Thus, what was rightly stated in the beginning of this Śāstra, has been established now in another way. The chapter ends. (17) From the beginning 120.

Here ends the third chapter, called the discussion on the means of knowledge, its fruit and its object, in the Kriyādhikāra in the Pratyabhijñānāsūtravimarsinī, written by illustrious teacher, Abhinavagupta (3).

ĀHNIKA IV.

We bow to that Śiva, who, manifesting the objects and different types of causal relation on His clear mirror-like self, shines as the creator.

In the course of discussion on relation, which is simply a manifestation of His power of action, by the way, the real nature of relation between the knower and the known has been explained. Now, in order to explain the essential nature of the relation existing between cause and effect, the following chapter consisting of 21 Slokas is begun. It begins with "And this" and ends in "Thus the will itself is the cause, the creator and the action". In the first verse it is summarily stated that, according to the author, the relation between cause and effect is non-different from that which holds between the creator and the object of creation (Kartṛkarmabhāva). Then in the next three verses the causality of the insentient is refuted. In the following six verses it is established that causality, which is identical with creativeness really belongs to the sentient. The next three verses show, by the way, that (possibility of) inference depends upon the power of Niyati. The next three verses show that causality, as conceived by the Bauddhas, ultimately follows our view on the subject. If it does not, it is nothing. The next three verses show that conception of causality, as presented in the Sāṅkhya system also, does not stand to reason, if it does not accept the creativeness of the sentient, as stated by us. The following two verses show that the creativeness of the sentient also does not stand to reason if the sentient be not the Lord. (Aniśvaratāyām). This is the summary. Now begins the explanation of the text.

Having shown, in the course of discussion on the power of action, that from the practical point of view the Lord is essentially the subject, the author now, attempting to show that His being the creator also follows automatically from the same (power of action), says the following:—

(1) "And the Lord, being of unlimited power, makes the objects manifest through His power of will. It is this power of action in which His creativeness consists."

The word 'ca' implies emphasis. This very eternal Subject makes manifest, without any break in continuity, these objects which were manifested even before. How? By virtue of His will, which has no definiteness or succession and is identical with the Lord. Where do these objects have existence? Reply

is "because of His being of unlimited power or His powers being innumerable" i.e. all the objects exist as His very self i.e. as one with His self. They are essentially Sakti or power. This is what has been stated in "Which exist within the Lord" (1-5-10). Action is nothing more than this manifestation and this will. The same is the creativeness of this Lord. (1).

But the sprout is seen coming out of the seed, and no sentient being is seen present in the seed. How can it then be said that the sentient alone is the manifestor of all? To this objection he replies as follows:—

(2) "It is not due to the power of the insentient seed that the sprout, whether (it be considered to be) existing or not (in the seed), has its apparent existence. The relation, therefore, between cause and effect, is essentially the relation between the creator and the object of creation."

The insentient seed has got no such power as to be able to make the sprout, existing or non-existing in itself, manifest. The birth of the sprout from the seed is not due to any capacity belonging to sprout, because it has no existence. And coming into being of the sprout cannot be due to the power of seed: for, the latter is different from the former. Therefore, effect is nothing else than the object (of action), made manifest by the power of action. This is what is indicated by the Kṛadanta affix "nyat". Similarly Kāraṇa is that by which the agent is made to do an act by being made fit for it. Thus, cause also rests on the sentient doer. (Various interpretations of "Asataḥ sataḥ")

- I. Of the existent which appears to be non-existent.
- II. If the meaning of "or" (Vā) be considered to be implied, it would then mean, "of the sprout, that is non-existing, and the seed, which is existing".
- III. Whether the sprout be considered to be existing or non-existing (in the seed). (2).

But why can the insentient not have this power (of bringing about the manifestation or existence)? Reply is as follows:—

(3) "Whatever is non-existing will ever remain so, because non-existent cannot become existent. And what is existing has nothing to gain by again coming into being."

The effect may be postulated to be existing or non-existing. But the assertion that it is of the nature of both or of neither or that it is indefinable, is self-contradictory. Therefore, it is to be left out of consideration.

If jar has no existence, then in reality it is of non-existing nature. How can it then come into existence against its nature? For, black does not become yellow, though one may prostrate at its feet hundred times. But if jar is existing then what is expected from wheel, rod and thread? The same question as to whether it is existent or non-existent in its essential nature, can be raised even in regard to the view that it is made manifest or clear.

But you may say then "be silent". I say that also is not proper.

"For, the relation of cause and effect is talked of in this world".

And, therefore, it has to be necessarily proved.(3).

Therefore, he shows the way to explain it as follows:—

(4) "This relation of cause and effect (causality) is nothing but the attainment of objectivity to both, the internal and the external senses, by what was already revolving within, through the power of that some one (Sāmvid)."

The manifested, (a jar for instance,) even before it is an object of internal perception, has its being, lives, throbs (sphurataḥ) strangely (vicitratvena), both as identical and as different, within the "heart" of the potter, because it is essentially one with his self-consciousness. The relation of cause and effect is nothing more than such a manifestation of what is within (as has been stated above) as makes the manifested an object of both, the internal and external senses. The word "both" implies the idea that the manifested is such as fully serves the purpose. Thus, creation of pleasure etc. consists in making them the objects of internal perception. But in the potter, who is nothing but Prāṇa and Puryaṣṭaka etc., this object cannot be supposed to have its existence, because he also is insentient. Therefore it follows that Sāmvid makes the universe manifest, because of manifoldness of its power. "Of that some" (Tasya kasyāpi) means: because of Him, who has been described above and whose glory is beyond the reach of thought and cannot be questioned.

You cannot raise the question here as to whether its being the object of both the internal and the external senses, is existing or non-existing, (as was raised before in connection with sprout). For, the only truth in this is that just as in the case of the reflection of jar etc., which is being made by potter, in a mirror, the power of making them so manifest belongs to the mirror; so in the case of the objects

which shine in dream, the power of making them manifest belongs to the Saṁvid. There is, however, the rise of false consciousness "potter is making the jar externally manifest" (in regard to the manifestation in dream). But this also is due to the glory of Saṁvid. Thus, potter, wheel, rod and jar etc. being existent, through His glory alone there is the rise of various egoistic consciousnesses also, such as "I did it". "He did it". "It arose in my heart". "It arose in his heart" etc. But as this egoistic consciousness cannot be attributed to the insentient clay etc., creativeness is, therefore, established to belong to one who is essentially of the nature of Saṁvid. But one may say: "Assert that the objects become externally manifest. What is the use of saying "as objects of both the internal and the external senses?" Reply to it is that this implies the idea of their such manifestation as makes them fit to serve completely their purpose. Therefore, there is no contradiction. (4)

This discussion establishes the essential nature of action (Kriyā), which is the primary subject for discussion here. This is what the author shows in the following lines:—

(5) "Thus, action is one. It involves succession and exists both within and without. [It is the embodiment of the whole process (series of changes) from the beginning, i.e. the stage of its appearance within as one with Saṁvid, to the end i.e. the stage when it is the object of both the internal and external perceptions]. This definitely belongs to one who is capable of assuming both internality and externality. this has been established."

"That this" (Saiṣā) implies that action, which was refuted (in 1,2,9) in respect of its essential nature as well as of its substratum. That is now rationally established. It is of the nature of Ābhāsa, which has continued existence (through various stages) from the time of that form of it, in which it is one with Saṁvid within, to the time of its form in which it is externally manifest when it becomes the object of sense-perception. (But if anybody were to say that pleasure is never externally manifest, how can then the experience of pleasure be represented to be successive? (Reply is:) It is so (i.e. characterised by succession), because of its association with the object in the form of the perceptible (i.e. the pleasure, when it is simply desired, is not of the same nature as when it is actually experienced. Therefore, there is succession in the experience of pleasure on account of its association with an object). And it (kriyā) is one, because of its oneness with the one common substratum of both the subjective and the objective aspects of the universe. This one substratum is Saṁvid. And because it is pure and free, it is, therefore, capable of assuming both externality and internality. (5)

But this (Antarviparivartinaḥ ubhayendriyavedyatvam) may be so in the case of a jar etc. (where the agent is sentient e.g. potter) but why in the case of seed and sprout etc., which we know through direct perception to be insentient, we do not acknowledge the seed itself to be the cause of the sprout? To this he replies:—

(6-7) "That which is admitted to be within a thing at one time, is spoken of as its effect when it is out of it at another time. The internality and externality of existence are admitted to be in relation to the subject. Therefore, the subject alone is the cause. And he remains the same in both the kinds of manifestations of the object (internal and external). Therefore, action is said to belong to one."

Creation is to make that, which shines within, externally manifest, while it still preserves its original nature of being internal. Therefore, it is to be externally manifested by that with reference to which it is spoken of as internal and which manifests the internal as external. And as the objects are admitted to shine within the Subject, who is essentially sentient, so they have to be made manifest as external by Him. Thus, He alone can reasonably be represented to be responsible for their external manifestation. Therefore, the Subject Himself is the cause and not the insentient one.

Here the particle "Ca" is used in the sense of reason (hi). Because the Subject is the cause of internal and external manifestations: for, without Him, both the manifestations, which depend on Him, are not possible, therefore, the act of creation, the nature of which has already been well defined, definitely belongs to one subject and not to the insentient. (7).

This very point he further strengthens as follows :—

(8) "Therefore, in the case of sprout also the Highest Lord is admitted to be the cause, because no other, even the seed etc., can reasonably be represented to be the cause."

As the sentient one alone is the creator, so the Naiyāyikas and others have accepted the sentient Highest Lord alone to be the cause even of sprout etc. But if any one were to say that they admit (I) that the Lord is only an instrumental cause (of sprout): for, they admit the causality of atoms also, in which action is generated (by His Will), in consequence of which there take place the separation and conjunction (of atoms) in a fixed order; and (II) that there are other causes also which are different from the God, e.g. seed, land and water etc.; because they are responsible for the commencement of (formation of)

the series of such constituents of the sprout as are related to it by the relation of inherence, but are in reality the parts of these contributory causes. (Our reply is) "Right". Of course they say so, but their statement lacks the support of reason. Because in view of the reason, given above, the insentient cannot be represented to be the cause. Thus, the crux of the whole thing is that the Lord Himself, in union with (Sāhityena) the Ābhāsas of seed, water, and earth, appears as sprout. (8).

But what will be the difficulty if we were not to admit a sentient cause, separate from the seed etc., which we see? To answer this question the author says the following:—

(9) "Therefore, it is that potter, in accordance with the laws, fixed by the Lord, produces jar through regular successive operations on clay etc."

The use of "Tathāhi" strengthens the previous position by implying that the illustration shows that such is the invariable concomitance.

The insentient causes work only when they are prompted by the sentient. For, if clay etc. could bring about their effect simply by being near one another, then what is the use of potter? They produce the effect through a regular succession of various forms such as that of a small Śivaliṅga and of a pilloret (which are given to the clay in the course of making of a jar,) and that is dependent upon potter. If that be the case, my point is established that even in making a śivika, they (clay etc.) need a sentient cause as prompter. From this it follows that insentient causes, without being prompted by a sentient, can never bring about an effect. For, if that had been so, it would equally have been so in the case of clay etc. This reason is without an exception (Ekānta). Therefore, naturally it follows that whatever insentient is seen producing an effect it depends upon the sentient e. g. clay: and such are seed etc. This is "Svabhāva hetu." The production of an effect by an insentient is not without any prompting cause, because it is only occasional. And no other prompting cause than the Lord can reasonably be represented to be responsible for it, because we do not find any (anupalambha) If the sentient be not admitted to the prompting cause, it would involve the flaw of assuming the absence of a prompting cause, in violation of the generally accepted law of invariable concomitance. That is not reasonable, because then there would be no reason why similar absence of the instrumental cause should not be assumed in the case of clay etc. also. Thus the invariable concomitance is proved. Therefore, in the case of a jar the potter himself is the Lord. This is what is stated in the following

lines:—(Thus potter through) the various fixed operations on clay rod, and wheel etc, in accordance with the fixed law, which is only a manifestation of the Lord, for instance, kneeding of clay, use of rod, revolving of wheel, brings about the existence of jar through a regular succession of forms, śivika and pilloret etc.

Here the use of potential mood (Liñ) in “janayet” conveys the idea of accordance with the fixed law.

And if you do not get angry (I would say) that in reality potter also brings jar into existence in accordance with the law, which is essentially the free will of the Lord of the universe, which has manifested its power, called Niyati, which necessitates the operations of wheel etc. (in the creation of a jar). Otherwise how could the insentient clay etc. follow the will of the potter, and why should not the threads also respect the desire (follow the potter's will) to make a jar? This also has been conveyed by this Sūtra, “Tathā hi” etc.

But if the Lord Himself is the creator in all cases, the potter ceases to be the creator of jar etc. The line of demarcation, therefore, between merit and demerit (Dharmādharmā) will disappear. Quite so: if you believe in reason and authority of the scripture, it is exactly as you say. But there is another thing to be noted in this connection, that the Lord, while creating other things, has created this also that individual soul such as that of a potter, erroneously considers itself to be an agent, exactly as a surety considers himself to be the debtor. And if it be the Lord's will “Let not false egoism arise in him” then he is not a doer. This also has been indicated by this verse “Tathā hi” etc.

And even the thought, the essential nature of which is the question that one puts to one's own self, “shall I create a jar by working on clay or not”, in order to decide one way, is due to the Lord's variety of manifestations which either conceal or reveal the essential nature. Here potential mood conveys the idea of question.

Therefore, one has to realise that in all cases in reality the Lord Himself is the doer; I am that; and, therefore, I am not a limited but the universal creator. (9).

And we see the freedom of the sentient manifesting itself everywhere. For, it makes even the insentients one with itself. (i.e. makes the objects shine). But the insentients have no capacity of making others manifest. This has been asserted before. The same he supports by means of an illustration, known to all the schools:—

(10) "By sheer power of will of the Yogins, even without clay or seed, jars etc., which have permanency and serve their respective purposes, come into being."

If the causes, which are known to be dependent on the prompting of the sentient, (in the production of their effects) such as clay etc.; and those which are known to be independent of it, such as seed etc., were the ultimate causes, how, without them, the things could be created by sheer power of the will of a Yogin. For, in such a case, the conclusion will be either that clay etc. are not causes or that the creation of a Yogin is without any cause.

But if you say that the sprouts etc., which are creations of the will of a Yogin, are different from those which owe their being to clay and seed etc., then also I have to tell you that, there being no difference in cognition, they have to be taken to be non-different. This has already been asserted. And Yogin is of unobstructed free will, and his will is "Let the jar be such as may be capable of serving various purposes which that jar, which is made up of clay, can possibly serve". This is the idea conveyed by "Tattat sthiraśvārthakriyākaram". Here the word "Sthira" means that which lasts till its purpose is served. "Svasya" means "its own". "Karam" means that which possesses the form which fits in with its essential nature and its cause. Thus the second half of the verse means "jar etc., which last till their respective purposes are served; which possess such forms as fit in with their respective essential natures and causes and which are capable of serving their respective purposes, come into being."

Some hold that jar etc. cannot come into being without material cause. A Yogin, therefore, they assert, sees the necessary atoms and brings them together, because of his will. To them I have to say; "If your heart approves that the relation of cause and effect, known from authoritative sources as well as negative and positive invariable concomitances, does not get broken in the case of a Yogin, then what is the use of saying that a Yogin brings atoms together. If the causal law is not violated even in the creation of a Yogin, the reasonable position to maintain would be that the causes of jar are Kapālas etc.; and those of the body are the parts of the body itself and that cause of each of them (Kapāla etc.) also is the same as that which is well known in the world and which does not brook the least change. Thus, in the case of a jar, clay, wheel and rod etc. and in that of the body, co-habitation of man and woman and laps of so long time as we find necessary for the production of effect, will be necessary.

Thus the creation of jar and body etc. by a Yogin's will-power will become difficult to establish."

But there is no flaw, to be pointed out, in the view that the sentient Lord of great glory, Mahādeva, who is perfectly free to follow or transgress the law of Niyati, Himself assumes the various forms. Thus, there is no contradiction between the views; (I) that the person, who belongs to the domain of Niyati, has freedom (to follow) the well known worldly causal law and (II) that one (Yogin) who likes to transgress the law of Niyati, has freedom to follow the supernatural causal law, which is most known to yogins. This much is said from the worldly point of view. In reality, however, He alone, who is essentially nothing more than the five powers of creation etc. and manifests the universe which has both succession and simultaneity, shines. For, the established view is that the sentient Lord manifests the objective world like reflection in the mirror of His Self. This is what the older teacher has said:—

"I bow to that Śiva, who is praise-worthy because of Kālā and who paints the picture of world on 'no-wall' (abhittau) without the multitude of material causes." (10)

But if the things, which are produced even without the well known causes, be similar in all respects to the effects, brought about by their accepted causes, all talk of inference would cease. For, the possibility of inference is explained as follows:—

How can one thing be invariably concomitant with another? (Because every thing is self-confined). With this question in their minds, those, who look upon themselves as the greatest authority (the Bauddhas), hold that the primary cause of invariable concomitance is either the relation of identity or that of cause and effect (between two things). For, a thing cannot be without its peculiar characteristic nature, nor can one thing be of diverse natures, because with the diversity of natures, the unity of the thing cannot stand. It cannot be said that the two different characteristics are abandoned in turn; because in that case also it would follow that the thing is without any characteristic. (For, the characteristic cannot be abandoned).

The same thing, (that has been said in regard to a thing which is represented to be without any essential characteristic or to have various characteristics,) has to be said in regard to an effect which is spoken of as having no cause or having diverse causes. (The latter is the view of the Naiyāyika). In both the cases (tādātmya and tadutpatti) the invariable concomitance depends upon the cause. For, if śimśapā can never be without the essential

nature of a tree, it is because of the cause (seed): similarly, it is because of its own cause (fuel) that the essential nature of fire is to produce smoke. But now if the relation of cause and effect be transgressing the law of Niyati, all the inferences would be impossible. For, because of power of will of a Yogin even Śimśapā can be without the essential nature of a tree. As for the smoke we have got to say two things about it, namely, (I) things which are capable of producing smoke such as fire etc., will not, because of the will of a Yogin, produce smoke: (II) and the will of Yogin will produce smoke even without fire. Thus, inference will be out of the question. But we do draw inferences. How is then this to be explained? To this the author replies as follows:—

(11) “When it is known through other means of knowledge that the object, that we perceive, whether it be an effect or an essential nature, is not a creation of a Yogin, then alone it can serve as reason for drawing an inference. But in both the cases the reason has causal law as its source.”

It is generally accepted that a product of the will-power of a Yogin is in every way, i.e. in respect of semen and other constituent fluids of the body, similar (to natural product) and not dissimilar, as a scorpion of natural birth is from that which is an outcome of cowdung. Therefore, (i.e. for this very reason, namely, because Yogic production is in every way similar to the natural) an effect, such as smoke in inferring fire, or an essential characteristic, such as the universal nature of Śimśapā (a kind of tree) in inferring the treeness, (Vṛkṣatva) serves as reason for inference, only if the object is ascertained to be not a Yogic creation, either through the words of an authoritative person or some other means. In inference, the practice of former birth and the well established popular tradition have to be depended upon. This view is supported by Patañjali, who maintains that the objective facts, grasped by the intellect (of a Yogin), in which truth alone shines, are the bases of both popular tradition and inference. And the followers of other schools of thought, who are staunch rationalists, have postulated that, for grasping a thing in its entirety, there is a kind of direct perception, which is very much like the direct cognition of a Yogin. But we are not primarily concerned with the means of right knowledge which is used in practical life. For, the matter in hand is the real nature of the Lord, and that is ever manifest, even though other objects of knowledge may not shine. This is what we have said many times before.

But what is the use of such a discussion (i.e. discussion of the inference which is based upon causal law) in the case of such inferences as are based upon the very essential nature, as the reason (e. g. *Vṛkṣoyam śimśapātvāt*)? The reply is as follows:—

It is because of the cause (the seed) of the origin of *Śimśapā*, which is invariably concomitant with the essential nature of a tree, that the essential nature, namely, “treeness”, is invariably concomitant with *Śimśapā* and the like alone, (and not with man or any other thing). Accordingly there is the following rule about the inference from essential nature as a reason:—

We know taste from colour, which is invariably concomitant with it in a particular configuration (though the two are not causally related) through “*Hetudharmānumāna*”: i.e. through inference of a quality (which is invariably present in the effect of a particular cause) from the cause: just as we infer a particular quality in smoke (e.g. sweet smell) from its being the effect of fuel of a particular kind (e.g. Sandal wood).

The following is another interpretation of *Utpattimūlajaḥ*:—

It is a fact of experience that scorpions can be produced by different causes, such as parent-scorpions or cowdung (preserved under certain conditions). That there is difference between the two scorpions (produced by two different causes) in respect of powers and fluids (*Rasa*) is a different matter. (i.e. It is not important, because the difference in the powers of the two scorpions (*Vīryabheda*) does not mean difference in the essential nature (*Svabhāvabheda*). Therefore, there is no harm in admitting that the smoke, which is a creation of a Yogin may be even such as has no relation with fire. But how can there be change of essential nature? No logician would believe that *Nīla*, while existing as such, would become different from itself (in its essential nature), because of the will of a Yogin. To this we reply as follows:—

The essential nature as a reason, (*Svabhāvaheṭu*) is of two kinds; (I) that in which the causal relation is latent, and (II) the opposite of it. The illustration of the former is “This mountain has fire, because it has smoke”: and that of the latter is “This is transitory because it is a product of action”. We have nothing to say about the former; because it is based upon the causal relation. Let us, therefore, consider the latter. If it be the essential nature of the product of action that it owes its being to cause, how can the transitoriness, which in its essential nature is “being”, as delimited by “not-being”, be the essential nature of the product of action? For, the two “*Ābhāsa*” (I) dependence upon cause (*Kāraṇāyattatva*) and (II) “having

'being' limited by 'not-being' as the essential nature" (Abhavanaparicchinna-bhavanavabhāvatva) are essentially different. (And one thing cannot have two essential natures). But, if you admit the identity of the two 'Ābhāsas' (mentioned above) you fall into the logical error of proving the apparent. But if you say that you are trying to establish the convention e.g. the word "taru" is to be used for the object, because it is a tree, (i.e. if you are trying to establish the usage only) the usage is essentially of the nature of 'learning' or of 'expounding' and, therefore, it is an effect. And you also have admitted the power of "Niyati" in the 'usage' (vyavahāra). Therefore, in all cases of "essential nature as reason" (svabhāvahetu), if there be no diversity of "Ābhāsas", (i.e. if the Ābhāsa, which is put forward as a reason be not different from that which is proved;) nothing more than the usage is established. For, this reason is fallacious, because the major term is non-different from 'reason'. The same may be asserted about the 'particulars' (viśeṣas). The same is the way of the universal: (i.e. the argument, that has been advanced against Svabhāvahetu, applies to them also when they are put forward as reason). Hence, according to the law, that has already been mentioned, the shining of Śimśapā and Vrkṣa, as distinct Ābhāsas on a common substratum, depends upon the power of Niyati and, therefore, is due to the cause (the seed). Thus, the so called Svabhāvahetu is based upon causal law. Therefore, the assertion made in the Kārikā has to be interpreted in general terms: "All Svabhāvahetus are based upon the cause of the origin".

(Now the author tries to show that, according to the Ābhāsa-vāda, the defect of identity of the reason with what is to be proved (Sādhyaābhedadoṣa) does not arise even if we were to discard the view that the Svabhāvahetu merely establishes the usage, as follows: —)

And we have established it earlier that the object is nothing but 'manifestation' (Ābhāsa). And (because Svabhāvahetu depends upon causal law) therefore, at the time of creation (manifestation) of a particular Śimśapā, the other objects, which possess branches, (trees) are not yet created (manifested): therefore, the universal Vrkṣa as an Ābhāsa, which is the major term, does not exist even in name. This is not an impossible position. And the particular tree, which is identical with Śimśapā, is nothing more than Śimśapā as such. And that is directly perceived (Siddha) and, therefore, there is no necessity of inferring it. (i. e. it cannot be accepted to be the major term). (Hence in the case of the inference "Vrksoyam Śimśapātvāt", there is no fallacy

of Sādhya-bheda; because from the particular, which is Siddha the universal, which is Sādhya, is proved).

(He now tries to show that Anityatva and kṛtakatva also are not identical, as follows : —)

The Ābhāsa 'transitoriness' (anityatā) may not be there even when there is the Ābhāsa "it depends upon a cause". Similarly there may be Ābhāsa of momentariness even when there is the not-being of the Ābhāsa of causal efficiency. The irresistible conclusion, therefore, is that all 'svabhāvahetus' depend upon the power of Niyati. (11).

But, according to the theory that things of the world are nothing else than Ābhāsas or manifestations, the fire (on the mountain), which is not shining to the inferer, is nothing. How then that which is not shining can be the cause of smoke and how then can fire, which is supposed to be the cause, be inferred from smoke? With this objection in mind and with a view to support the Ābhāsavāda the author says as follows : —

(12) "The fresh smoke etc. again (i. e. after the acquisition of invariable concomitance of fire and smoke etc.) is possible only on account of the cause that is not perceived, such as the Ābhāsa of fire etc. because it was manifested as a common Ābhāsa to all the subjects, made identical (by His Will)."

The causal relation between the Ābhāsa of fire and that of smoke was known by means of direct perception and anupalabdhi once in the kitchen. Now, according to the view of the Vijñānavādin, the Ābhāsas are different in each chain of cognition. Therefore, according to them, the causal relation between fire and smoke has been known only in the case of such Ābhāsas (of smoke and fire), as belong to the individual subject. But the causal relation between smoke and fire, which belongs to other individual subjective chains of consciousness, is altogether unknown. Therefore, inference of the Ābhāsa of fire, belonging to other chains of cognitions of other perceivers, from a worm up to the all-knowing, by means of Ābhāsa of smoke, belonging to his chain, will be impossible. This is certain.

But, according to this system, at the time of forming the idea of invariable concomitance, the Ābhāsas of smoke and fire are common to all perceivers, who can possibly have their existence at that place, as according to those who admit the existence of external objective world. For, in relation to them the Lord has made the subjects one. This has already been stated. Therefore, the idea of invariable concomitance of fire in general with smoke also in general is formed without any reference to chains of cognitions either one's own or those belon-

ging to others : consequently when invariable concomitance, namely, the smoke that is on the mountain is from nothing else than the Ābhāsa of fire, is remembered at a subsequent time, the inference is drawn "There is fire on this mountain" (at the sight of smoke).

This means that the particular subject, that infers, at first gets identified with other subjects, (who stand there) in relation to the particular Ābhāsa of smoke (i. e. the one that is perceived at the top of a mountain) : and then he attains identity with other subjects in relation to the Ābhāsa of fire in its universal aspect, which is associated with the idea of imperceptibility and which is distinct from other particular Ābhāsas (of fire). 'Bhūyah' means the perception of smoke that arises after the knowledge of invariable concomitance has been acquired. The word "Ādi" indicates that Ābhāsa of sprout etc. also is implied. "Nūtaṇa" (new) means fresh and not old, like smoke arising from smoke.

This appearance of new smoke or sprout is due to the cause, the Ābhāsa of fire or that of seed, which is not perceptible to the perceiver but is the cause ("Adhipati"); (Bhavet means) it can originate from that alone and nothing else. Here Liṅ is used in the sense of possibility. And that Ābhāsa is the same to all perceivers. For, if it be considered to be different in the case of different perceivers (as according to Buddhists) then it will be impossible to infer anything. This is the implication (of "Tattatpramātreka"). And because that Ābhāsa of fire as a cause (Adhipati) which is common to other subjects is the cause of smoke, therefore, Ābhāsa of smoke, being an effect of that of the fire, is sure indicative sign of the latter, when, of course, there is certainty that the Ābhāsa of smoke is not the creation of a Yogin. Thus from that effect (the smoke) the fire is inferred, because it is not perceived but is the cause (Adhipati) of smoke. (12).

But then there should be inference of fire from the smoke, which is coming out of the jar of a cowherd, wherein it has been long kept confined (even after fire had been extinguished). To this the author replies as follows:—

(13) "The effect, that is invariably concomitant with the cause, is the reason (Liṅga). But the other Ābhāsa of smoke, which is not fresh, is due to another Ābhāsa "the smoke," which is the cause and which is the object of perception to other perceivers but not to the inferer."

That Ābhāsa of smoke, which is not new, (i.e. is not immediately coming out of fire), is from (originates from) Ābhāsa of smoke itself which is its cause, which is imperceptible to the inferer and which is perceived by other perceivers. Therefore, there is no causal relation between this old smoke and fire: (its cause is rather smoke itself, from which it directly originates). Hence the fire, which is not the cause, cannot be inferred from such smoke. This is the underlying idea. The experienced people, of course, see the difference between two kinds of Ābhāsas. But because the inference is used for various practical purposes, based upon inference, therefore, it had to be specially well defined. With this object in view, the idea, that the author had conveyed by means of the word "new" has been made clear by pointing out what is to be excluded. (13).

But if thus you accept the view that Ābhāsa of smoke is due to that of fire, then what about your view that the sentient alone is doer (Kartā). That is, how can the capacity of the insentient to bring about certain effects, as we have seen in the case of sprout, coming out of seed, be refuted in view of the analogy of causal relation between fire and smoke (which has been accepted in the preceding verses)? With this objection in his mind the author says the following:—

(14) "The causal relation, which (according to the Buddhist) is nothing more than 'this being there that is there' (asmin sati idam asti) cannot hold good in the case of the insentient objects, which feel no need or desire (apekṣā)."

We cannot talk of causal relation in reference to one and the same thing. Nor can two things, which have simultaneous existence be represented to be cause and effect, like jar and cloth: nor can those which come into existence in succession one after the other, but not regularly, like Nīla and Pita. And of things which come into being in a fixed succession, that which comes before cannot be the effect, nor can that which comes afterwards, be the cause. Thus, according to the Bauddhas, the cause is that which invariably comes before and so the effect is that which always comes after. Now if the priority or posteriority be nothing additional to the two things then there would be only two things 'that and that': or rather, there would not be even conjunctive sense, because that also implies relation. Therefore, it would be simply "that that". But if priority means that state which is the cause of another, and similarly posteriority means that state which is to be brought about by another, then it shall have to be assumed that that aspect of the seed, which is res-

possible for its causing the sprout, rests on the sprout i.e. involves the existence of sprout within itself. For, if it be not so then it would be simply impeller or not even that: for, that also depends upon another. The same has to be said with regard to that, the existence of which is to be brought about by another.

Thus not only the theories that the causal relation is nothing apart from things, pure and simple etc., are not supported by reason; but also that theory of causal relation,—which is expressed by “this being there”, which implies the existence of causal agent through locative case, which conveys the sense of the past tense; and “this is” which implies the existence of the object of the activity of the causal agent, through the personal termination, which means that something is to be effected,—cannot be established with reasons on the basis of the insentients. For, mutual need (apekṣā) is the very life of it; and that is not possible in the case of the insentients (14).

If any one were to ask “how”? the reply is as follows:—

(15) “For, the meaning of the locative case (Apekṣā) cannot be attributed to the insentients, which are self-confined and possess no power of unification, whether they are admitted to be of the nature of ‘being’ or that of non-being.”

The insentients are not capable of unifying the form of one with that of another: for, unification of one form with another is invariably concomitant with sentiency, which is quite opposite of insentiency. And this unification implies ‘need’ (Anusandhānamapekṣā) and that is a characteristic of sentiency alone. The use of the word ‘apekṣā’ in relation to the insentient is only a transference of epithet. Therefore, the insentient object is self-centered or self-confined, because it is contented with resting within itself. How can it then move towards another? (i.e. How can the need for another arise in it to bring about the desired effect?)

Therefore, whether you consider the seed to be existing and sprout to be non-existing, or the reverse, or both to be existing or both to be non-existing; or hold one of these to be directly perceptible and, therefore, fit for the use of the language about it, and the other to be quite the opposite: or both to be presentable in language, or both to be unrepresentable in language: in all these cases, it (seed) will be simply an object indicated by a word, but will have no attribute (Dharma) even such as the conjunctive connection: because all kinds of relations are of the nature of (conscious) dependence of one upon another and, therefore, rest on the sentient. (15).

(Thus, having shown how, according to the Bauddha theory, the relation of cause and effect is not possible, the author now shows its possibility according to his own system).

Because, the 'need' (apekṣā) is not possible in the insentients;

(16) "Therefore, the mutual relation of the objects, which is indicated by case terminations, is rationally possible, if they be resting on one subject. It can be no other than that which is known as Kriyākārahāva i.e. the relation, subsisting between nouns and a verb."

There is no other relation existing between two objects, excepting that which is defined as the relation that subsists between nouns and a verb and which is expressed by the locative or any other case termination. That is possible only if both the objects rest in the free sentient Being. It is not possible in any other way. To explain this point it may be added that the 'idea' of this mutual relation of two things cannot be held to rest on the external (vastu) even though it may be admitted that it is grasped in determinate cognition somehow. For, the essential characteristic of the determinate cognition is that it follows an external object through following the indeterminate cognition. But in the case of determinate cognition of relation that (following of the indeterminate cognition) is absent, because it does not arise from an external object. For, indeterminate cognition follows an external thing: but the thing itself is admitted (by the Bauddhas) to be self-centred. (Hence relation has no external objective being to which the indeterminate cognition of relation may refer.)

Therefore, relations such as "there being seed sprout comes into existence" can be explained only if all be supposed to rest in free sentient Self, but in no other way. (16).

On the assumption that the seed and the sprout etc. are perfectly self-centred, the need (apekṣā), which is characterised by (presupposes) the existence of causal agent and of the object of his action, may not be possible. But it is certainly not impossible, according to the system of the Sāṅkhyas, who believe in oneness of cause and effect. What is then the use of propounding the theory of causal agent, (Kartṛvāda) who is mere manifestation of the principle of sentience? To this objection the author replies as follows:—

(17) "If cause and effect also are identical with each other in their essential nature, then there would be unity only. For, if difference be admitted, there would not be mutual identity."

If the sprout be the very essential nature (i.e. the very self) of the seed, then there is sprout alone and there is nothing like seed: or the case may be represented to be the reverse. Thus, what can be represented to be the cause as distinct from the effect? But if you say that seed is one thing and the sprout is a different thing, then they are not mutually identical, because unity and diversity are of opposite nature and, therefore, cannot co-exist simultaneously in one and the same object.(17).

But still the seed, appearing in multifarious forms such as sprout etc., is clearly seen by far-seeing persons as of one undivided form like a stream. And this experience is not subsequently contradicted. Accordingly, when the question is put "Where is the seed gone"? They say "It has not gone anywhere; it is existing in the form of sprout;" "it has assumed the form of sprout: the sprout is the seed". Similarly Pradhāna, evolving and assuming the forms, beginning with Mahat and ending with earth, appears in the form of a chain of innumerable creations and destructions. This is the comprehensive conception. But things are imagined or represented to be cause and effect, when only a part of the whole is taken into consideration (so that what precedes is cause and that which comes after (in this chain) is called effect). Thus the conception of causality is based on the analysis of what is essentially a unity. With this objection in his mind the author says the following:—

(18) "Action is nothing more than the assumption of multiplicity (of forms) by what is essentially a unity, provided that it follows the temporal order. Thus, because Pradhāna etc. evolve in such a manner, therefore, it automatically follows that they are causal agents."

The wise sage (Kapila) in his system, depending upon recognition, supported by any one of the three means of right knowledge, direct perception, inference, and verbal authority, justifies the view that the same equilibrium of pleasure, pain and ignorance, assuming inequilibrium in innumerable ways, becomes the universe. Now this assuming of variety of forms by one, that is essentially a unity, because it is known as such through recognition, is action, because it is marked by succession of time. For, action is nothing but a fixed series of forms, (in which a thing appears), which, (forms) being different from one another, do not shine simultaneously. And because such is the essential nature of action, therefore, as Pradhāna, being characterised by a particular kind of action, cannot be simply represented to be the cause, so it has to be spoken of as "causal agent".

(The explanation of "Tathāpariṇamattayā") Because Pradhāna is always intent on (Āviś) the act of evolving, which is characterised by successively appearing in the forms of Mahat etc. i.e. because Pradhāna, having abandoned certain form and having put separately i. e. having definitely distinguished (Vyavasthāpya) the two forms (I) the one to which evolutive activity is to be directed and (II) the other, from which it is to be withdrawn, inclines towards the third form, which is in the process of making. (18).

But by these arguments Pradhāna has been established to be an agent (Kartṛrūpam) in relation to the act of evolving. Well. There is no harm; because we do not hold Pradhāna to be as dissociated from action as the Puruṣa is. With this objection in his mind the author says:—

(19) "And it is not consistent with reason to hold that evolutive activity belongs to the insentient. For, the insentient is an isolated unity and therefore, is the opposite of the unity in multiplicity (which characterises action). It is, therefore, reasonable to admit it (evolutive activity) to belong to the sentient."

Thus, it is not reasonable to represent Pradhāna, which is an isolated unity, as doer of the act of evolution, which is characterised by the power of freedom to assume multifarious changes which are constantly taking place; because it is insentient. For, the insentient is essentially self-confined; it is the object of knowledge. But (if Pradhāna be admitted to evolve) it is to be represented as a multiplicity, because of the different forms (such as Mahān etc.) which differ like Nīla and Pīta; it is also to be represented as a unity because of oneness of its essential nature. But the same essential characteristic cannot be represented to be both multiplicity and unity, because it is contradictory to make opposite assertions simultaneously in regard to one and the same thing. Nor can it be said that one essential characteristic is unity and the other is multiplicity. For, that would mean that two essential characteristics belong to one thing. But that is not reasonable, because of the following authority:—

"Thus nothing that is objective, can have both the unity and the multiplicity, (which are essentially opposed to each other) as its essential characteristics."

Thus multiplicity as an essential characteristic is not possible in the case of the insentient, which is to be spoken of as "this" and is an essentially limited 'Ābhāsa' which is cut off from all, and, therefore, has fallen to the state of being the object of knowledge,—if it is to be admitted as one. But both the characteristics,

unity and difference, are found in that which does not fall to the state of being the object of knowledge, but which, because it is of the nature of light of consciousness, is ultimately real light, which has only one essential characteristic, namely, 'Cit' and which is pure. This is what our experience tells us. For instance, we find that a mirror, which is clear, mixes up with (assumes) thousands of forms such as those of mountain and elephant etc. (which are reflected in it) without its peculiar essential constitution being affected in any way. Now the appearance of mountain etc. in the mirror (reflection) does not conceal the mirror as the appearance of silver conceals the shell, or that of two moons does the real moon. For, even when mirror appears in those multifarious forms, its 'being as a mirror' is not concealed, because even then there is the consciousness "this mirror is excellent and clear". Now the mountain, which is external; does not enter into mirror: for, that would involve leaving of the place: nor does it shine on it; for in that case mirror would be concealed; nor does it shine within: for, there is no possibility of entering into it; because the mirror is solid hard, and capable of resistance; nor does it shine behind: for, it is not seen there, rather it is always seen in the front: nor is it right to say that the rays of the eyes, having turned back from the mirror, because of their being reflected back as they fall on the mirror, perceive the mountain itself; because we see both the reflection and the reflected when we see the mirror which is placed near mountain (i.e. we see two objects which will be impossible if the rays were simply turned back by the mirror and the object of perception had been the real mountain.) Therefore, it has to be admitted to be the glory of the purity that there is mixing up with various Ābhāsas and still there is oneness. And the person, who is on the peak of a mountain, perceives thousands of objects present in a city in one perception. Thus, only Cit can be represented to be Kartā, because it is capable of assuming different forms, without its oneness being affected in any way thereby, and as such it is capable of exercising power of action. (19).

But let us assume then that the consciousness (Vijñāna) which is called Brahman (in the Vedānta philosophy) assumes the various forms which constitute the universe. What is the use of postulating the Lord? To this objection he replies as follows:—

(20) "Even if we admit the unity of consciousness (Cit) to be truly real, there can be no act of creation of different 'Ābhāsas' unless there be determinate consciousness of identity (of the objects with the self) which is the characteristic of the desire to create."

If you say that the "sentient" (Cidrūpa) is really one and that this duality is all due to the trouble of Māyā or Avidyā; then you cannot explain "To whom does this Avidyā belong?" It cannot be the characteristic of the Brahman, because He is simply pure consciousness: and in reality there is no other limited soul etc. to whom this may belong. But if you say "this Avidyā is inexplicable"; we cannot understand as to whom it is so. Moreover, you say that it shines with its characteristic nature and that it is indescribable. What is this? If you say that the idea present in your mind, when you say that it is indefinable, is that it cannot be explained with reasons; I would say "what is that reason which disregards our experience? (it is no reason at all, if what it tries to establish is not in consonance with our experience). And what strange improbability (of existence) can there be of one that is shining? (i.e. what better reason is required to establish the existence of a thing than this that it is an object of experience?)

But you say that the Brahman is Sat and shines indeterminately as a unity and that duality is due to the act of determination. The question, therefore, arises "to whom does this act of determination belong?" But if you say "to the Brahman" then it follows that the Brahman is associated with Avidyā (and as such ceases to be omniscient). For, there is in reality no other (to whom Avidyā may be represented to belong). But if you say "indeterminate knowledge is true knowledge, while determinate one is false". I would question "why this distinction (why one is right and the other is wrong); because both of them are equally shining?" But if you again say that duality, though shining, is proved to be false, I would rebut by saying that non-duality is proved to be false by the appearance of duality, because consciousness of falsity of a thing is due to rise of a different consciousness. And Bādha also exists because it shines. Duality also shines: how can it, therefore, be called Avidyā?

But if you say, that, leaving the idea of shining, the conception of our non-duality is based upon the authority of Āgama, then I would say that Āgama also, because it involves the idea of duality, is nothing, and so is the division of perceiver, perceived, and means of perception. Therefore, all this is nothing.

Therefore, even though Cit may be admitted to be really one, yet the act of assuming or entering into different forms, which is the essential characteristic of a doer, is not possible. But all this becomes possible if there be freedom, whose essential feature is Parāmarśa i.e. will in the form of desire to do. In

that will exists all that is to be created as if one with it. This has been asserted in "Living within the Lord". Therefore, the Highest Lord manifests the universe in diverse forms, the ultimate reality of which consists in shining. This universe is essentially identical with Self. It is real in its nature. Its highest reality lies in its being one with the light of consciousness, and its oneness with the light of consciousness never gets broken. This freedom constitutes His Aśvarya; it consists in His capacity of doing what is extremely difficult.

The genitive case in "Ābhāsa-bhinnayoḥ" is indicative of general relation with action (Kriyā). After this (general statement) the various constructions, in which this word fits, are being separately given as follows:—

(I) The two, namely, the sentient and the insentient, differ from each other in respect of "shining" (Ābhāsa). The insentient, the jar, is an object of action; and the sentient Ābhāsa, the Cit, is doer. Their relation with action, namely, one's being the object and the other's being the subject of action is not possible. For, without consciousness of oneness with the whole of the mass of objects, to be created, in the form of desire to do so, how this action, being one, could be the characteristic of two, which are essentially different.

Here, only the relations of subject and object with action have been stated, for the simple reason that all this discussion proceeded from consideration of the correct nature of the relation of cause and effect. Other relations also, for which other case terminations stand, in reality follow in the wake of the power of action, which rests in one doer (eka kartṛtvānupraveśini). For, otherwise, how can action be called one, in spite of its multiplicity of relations, such as that with instrument etc. Or it may be interpreted as follows:—

(II) Without the determinate grasp of oneness, which is the chief characteristic of the desire to create, of the two, the insentient and the sentient, which are distinct from each other in so far as one is the subject and the other is the object of desire.

(III) Without the determinate cognition of the two distinct Ābhāsas as "I and this", the essential characteristic of which is that it rests on one (subject) and which itself is the characteristic of desire, (no action is possible).

(IV) Or unless the two distinct Ābhāsas be grasped in one determinate cognition, how could there be action, which is characterised by the will to do.

Hence the genitive case in (Ābhāsabhinnaḥ) refers to action or to desire to do or to determinate consciousness. And the compound (ending in Parāmarśam) is due to the fact that the components are ever interdependent. (20).

Now he concludes the discussion by saying:—

(21) “Thus the Will itself of the Lord, who wills to appear as jar and cloth etc. which constitute the world, which is nothing but an Ābhāsa, is the cause, the agent and the action.”

Because neither the insentient nor the Cit, which is without the power of freedom, can reasonably be represented to be either the cause or the doer, therefore, it follows that it is the will of Him who desires to create, which, being externally manifest, is called action. The essential nature of the doer as also that of the cause consists in that and nothing else. Therefore, when the statement “the jar stands” is made, the meaning is that the Lord, desiring to manifest Himself as “jar” and assuming the form of jar, because of His “freedom” and not without such an assumption, stands shining.

Thus the construction of the śloka is: “Action is the strange will of the Lord, who is free and wills to appear in the form of the universe, constituted by Ābhāsas of jar etc., in the various stages of their becoming, such as creation, existence etc. and thousands of their sub-varieties. Therefore, the glorious Highest Lord alone is the creator of the universe. The chapter ends.(21).

Here ends the fourth chapter, called the presentation of the essential nature of causal relation, in the Kriyādhikāra in the Iśvara Pratyabhijñā, written by illustrious teacher, Utpaladeva, with the commentary, called Vimarśinī, written by illustrious teacher, Abhinavagupta. (4)

Here ends the Kriyādhikāra, the Second of the Adhikāras,

ĀGAMĀDHIKĀRA

ĀHNIKA I.

I bow to that all-surpassing ocean of the Āgama, the most important thing in which is the mass of jewels in the form of ideas about the supreme category of the Śaiva system, and after reaching which the group of all the rivers of the other Āgamas attains perfection and realises its end.

We bow to that Śiva, within whom shines the group of the categories, beginning well with the glorious Sadāśiva and ending with the earth.

Thus, in the preceding two Adhikāras, the exact nature of the power of knowledge and that of action have fully been explained. It has been stated that the power of action is capable of bringing about the manifestation of all the objects, contained in the universe. Now it has to be explained "what are all these Padārthas?" In this connection it has to be noted that the objects of the world, characterised by sentiency or insentiency, are simply manifestations. The question, therefore, is what are the categories under which they are subsumed. The direct perception of the limited individual soul does not work everywhere, and similar is the case with the inference; because we cannot have the knowledge of distinguishing characteristics and invariable concomitances of all things. But Āgama in its essence is simply the 'determinate thought' (Vimarśa) of the Highest Lord, who is unlimited pure light (of knowledge). Nothing is, therefore, beyond its view, (or range). Therefore, the teacher, in order to explain the exact nature of the objective world with a view to bringing home to the people that state of the subject, which is transcendental and is attained by making the universe an object of knowledge (i.e. knowing what it really is); begins the third, the Āgama Adhikāra. Here, in eleven verses, beginning with "Thus, having internal and external existence" and ending in "Because of difference in grossness and subtleness", the author separately discusses the group of categories, which is based on the authority of the Śaivāgamas and is also supported by reason. This group of categories, begins with the Śiva and ends with the earth: every one of these is a single Ābhāsa, which is spoken of as 'universal' in other systems. And the entire domain of bodies and worlds etc. which is consequent upon the peculiar combinations of these

Ābhāṣas, which give rise to the innumerable definite objects, is due to the fact that all Ābhāṣas rest on one common basis. This is the gist of the chapter.

Now with a view to showing the mutual connection of Adhikāras, and concluding the refutation of *prima facie* view, the author says the following to explain the exact nature of the category, technically called 'Śiva' :—

(1) "Thus, because action is nothing more than the free consciousness, manifesting itself both internally and externally, in accordance with the temporal order; therefore, action really belongs to the Subject. Hence the powers of knowledge and action are mutually inseparable."

The sense conveyed by "evam" is:— "Because the relation of cause and effect, which has been represented by other systems to be dependent upon the insentient, is not possible in any way." On the contrary, the sentient, the Cit, manifesting itself both internally and externally in the form of different Ābhāṣas, (such as those of cause and effect) which are essentially nothing but the light of consciousness (Prakāśa), in temporal order, is called action. This (action) is the characteristic of the subject, who is essentially the power of knowledge. Therefore, the powers of knowledge and action are not separate. For, knowledge is enlivened by Vimarśa and action is nothing else than Vimarśa.

And as no association with action is possible for one that is without the power of knowledge, so that category is called 'Śiva', which is characterised by powers of knowledge and action in union, which, through the power of action, is capable of bearing the reflection of the innumerable creations and destructions of the entire mass of Tattvas, and which, though it appears in meditation and instruction as mere appearance or Ābhāṣa, is not of the nature of Ābhāṣa. (1)

But if such be the category, called 'Śiva', and the universe be non-different from it, what other categories then can there be? And if all the categories rest on one principle of pure consciousness, how can there be any succession thereof; because there is no temporal or spatial difference among them? (Reply is:) It is exactly as you say.

(2) "But at first there comes into being the category called Sadāśiva, because of the rise of the internal aspect, i.e. the power

of knowledge, to prominence : and then there comes into existence Parameśvara Tattva when the external aspect comes into predominance."

Although there is only one Śiva-Tattva, yet its own power of freedom shows in itself multifarious forms, like reflections. And succession of time and place is nothing else than variety of forms, because spatial succession is simply variety of forms : and temporal succession is the variety of forms involved in action. Therefore, because of the rise of internal aspect, i. e. the power of knowledge to prominence there arises that Tattva which is known as Sādākhyā, because of its having its being in Sadākhyā. And Sādākhyā is so called because here the consciousness of "being" arises for the first time. Or here the word Sādākhyā means that this category is the meaning of the word Sadākhyā, which is synonymous with the Sadāśiva. This has to be first dealt with in teaching the order of creation etc. Similarly at the rise of the external aspect, which consists in the power of action, there comes into being the category, which is the meaning of the word 'Parameśvara'. It is called Īśvara Tattva. Therefore, its manifestation after the Sādākhyā is reasonable.

From this it follows that here "Tattva" (the essential nature of that) means one that shines undivided in the various groups of things, with distinctive features, and so serves as the cause to justify their being represented as belonging to one class. For example, mountain, tree and city, all are, in their essential characteristic, earth; and so are river, lake and sea, water.

Sadāśiva-Category is the concretisation of "Cit"(consciousness). It consists in the "this-consciousness" of the mass of objects on the part of sentient beings, who are pure consciousness and who are technically called Mantramaheśvara. This mass of objects shines like a reflection on them. It is very dim like that which shines as the object of inner sense only in the new creation, (the first descent from the state of "free-consciousness" or Savimarśa-Caitanya). It is like an extremely dim outline of a picture. It may also be compared to the mass of objects, when it is on the verge of complete annihilation at the time of dissolution of the universe, and, therefore, is extremely dim (vague). But to the sentient beings, who are technically called 'Mantresvara', the universe, which has attained a stage of clarity, similar to that of the objects of our external cognition, shines almost as a reflection. The category, technically called Īśvara, is nothing but the shining of it in the aforesaid manner. But Sadāśive, as a god, and also Īśvara, as a god, who are the objects of

contemplation and worship, are admitted to be different from the categories, called by the same names. They are like Brahmā and Viṣṇu. The former have not to be confused with the latter, because of similarity in names, as some, who questioned, "why have not Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra been counted amongst the categories?" have done. (2).

Now the author shows that there are other names also of these two categories:—

(3) "Unmeṣa (opening up), which consists in the external manifestation, is Īśvara Tattva, while Nimeṣa (closing up), which consists in the internal manifestation, is Sadāśiva."

"Because of the opening up of which there is the rise of the universe" in this quotation, by the word "opening" (unmeṣa) Īśvara Tattva is meant, because what is called clearness (of manifestation) of the universe is its externality, and the same is opening. But closing up (nimeṣa) consists in making it obscure i.e. in the predominance of "I-consciousness". Thus Nimeṣa is Sadāśiva-category, because of which there is the annihilation of the universe. Therefore, it is pure Spanda i.e. the Sadāśiva-category is nothing but the pure activity of the Lord. It is nothing but the assumption of another obscure form by the Lord, who is motionless; because He manifests Himself in a form, marked by slight motion.

In reality all these so called categories are the powers of the Highest Lord. Certain power, -because of its including many other powers and, therefore, of its being nearer (more closely connected with) the Lord, as is genus jar with the individual jar, -is to be meditated upon. Some other power is dependent upon another and is self-centred, and, therefore, its connection with the Lord is not so close, as for instance, that of jar with its "being" (Sattā).

Thus the powers of opening up and closing up are called Sadāśiva and Īśvara, and deities, which preside over them, are also called by the same names.

Now he speaks of the means (karaṇa) of the two presiding deities, namely Vidyā Tattva.

(The following is the second half of the verse No. 3.)

"The state of resting of both the I-consciousness and the this-consciousness on one substratum is called Sadvidyā."

Resting of the light of consciousness on itself alone, i.e. consciousness, as activity (Vimarśa) characterised by resting on self-luminousness, perfectly independent of all others, is represented as "Aham." And the consciousness, which is dependent upon another, is represented as "Idam". The latter in reality rests on that which is simply self-luminous and is perfectly independent of others. Of these the first consciousness "Aham" is Śiva Tattva and the second is Vidyeśa. In the state, which comes in between the above two (Śiva and Vidyā) there arises the consciousness "I—this". At this state the "I" and the "this" are at the same level, like the pans of an evenly held beam of a balance. Such is the form of consciousness at the level of the categories, called Sadāśiva and Īśvara. The distinction lies in the fact that in the former case "thisness" is obscure, while it is clear in the latter.

These two forms of consciousness, 'I' and 'this', in the case of the limited subject rest separately on the subject and the object respectively. Therefore, Sadvidyā (or pure knowledge) is characterised by the elimination of separateness of the bases and the union of these i.e. the consciousness of the subjective aspect as "I" and that of the objective as "this", in one resting place (the Cit). This is different from Āśuddha Vidyā, associated with the limited subject.

Now in Śuddhavidyā, (there are two states). When in the pure Cit, where the I-consciousness rests, the objective aspect is made manifest (by Vidyā), (i.e. grasped as emerging from the "I") then, because of the obscurity of the "this", it is called the state of Sadāśiva, which can be represented as "I-this". But when in the clear consciousness of the "this" aspect the I-consciousness merges, the former being substratum, it is called the state of Īśvara and the consciousness can be expressed as "this-I". This is the distinction (between the two). (3).

But why is this called Śuddha Vidyā? In reply to this the author says as follows:—

(4) "(This is called Śuddha Vidyā) because in it the things, which have descended to the level of objectivity to knowledge and, therefore, are conceived as "this", are essentially of the nature of I-consciousness; and because they are conceived as they really are."

"Avalokana" means "knowing", "conceiving". These words are synonymous with Vidyā. The purity, i.e. correctness,

of knowledge consists in its following the true nature of the thing. The purity of Vidyā lies in the fact that it remains uncontradicted. 'Bodha',—the light of consciousness, the essence of which is the Self-consciousness, free from dependence on any other,—is the essence of all the objects, which are correctly conceived as "this"; because they have assumed the state of being the objects of knowledge. The consciousness "I-this" is pure knowledge, because it rests on ultimately true nature of the objects. (4).

The two Tattvas are different from the deities, presiding over them, (though they have the same names). This is what the author is trying to establish in a round about way through (reference to) Āgamic practice, as follows:—

(5) "In the two categories (Sadāśiva and Iśvara) the objects are not only in the state of imperfection (aparatvam), because they shine as not-self: but they are also in the state of perfection (paratā) because they are covered (ācchādāt) by I-consciousness, (i.e. because they shine as identical with the self). For, the Sadvidyā (which is common to the categories of the Sadāśiva and the Iśvara) is the "perfect—imperfect state" (Parāparaśā)."

'Paratā' here means perfection i.e. independence of others, the 'I-consciousness'. 'Aparatva' similarly means imperfection i.e. dependence on others, "this-consciousness". In the two categories (Sadāśiva and Iśvara) the objects, which are obscure in one case and clear in the other, are in "perfect-imperfect state", because they touch both the "I" and the "this". The State, which is related to the object of knowledge, (i.e. the state of the object) is the category. It is essentially the object of knowledge of the pure subjects, Mantreśvara etc., who manifest it. And Śuddha Vidyā is the state of their consciousness. The gods Sadāśiva and Iśvara are the deities presiding over these subjects. This is the summary-view.(5).

According to some, Śuddha Vidyā is that in which consciousness of the subjective aspect "I", which is represented to grasp all as identical with itself, is predominant. While others hold that it is the consciousness of the objective aspect, which is to be covered (comprehended as identical with "I") that is predominant in Śuddha Vidyā: otherwise how will the objective aspect shine at all, as there is no Māyā? But if it be supposed to be there its growth will follow. And because it manifests objective aspect such as is not capable of growth, therefore, it is pure. And because it shines, therefore, it is called 'Vidyā'. For this

very reason i.e. because of its being almost undeveloped Māyā, it is called Mahāmāyā by such preceptors as Raurava. This is what the author says in the following verse:—

(6) “Others maintain that Vidyā is nothing but the distinct consciousness of the objects in the subject, who is still essentially of the nature of pure consciousness; the distinct consciousness which is similar to that which is brought about by the power of Māyā. Such a consciousness is found in the subjects, which are called Vidyēśvaras.”

That power of freedom, which is characterised by manifestation of difference (i.e. as not identical with Cit) of the objects, which are really one with Cit, even at the time when pure Cit itself is both perceiver and doer i.e. before even the rise of limited perceiver Śūnya etc., is called Śuddha Vidyā. It is like the power of Māyā, because of its manifesting difference in respect of the objective aspect (and not the subjective aspect also). It is not Māyā itself, because difference is not manifested in respect of the subjective aspect i.e. pure Cit. In this way glorious Vidyēśvaras, Ananta etc. have their being. Though they are one with pure Cit, yet they perceive the objective world as different from themselves, just like Īśvara of those who believe in duality.

Thus, Śuddha Vidyā is that power of Vidyēśvaras, which consists in manifesting the objective aspect as different from the Cit, to the subjective, which is pure Cit and ultimate reality.(6).

Others say as follows:—

Sadāśiva and Īśvara Tattvas are those manifestations of Parama Śiva, in which the difference (between the subject and the object) has not yet grown or much developed. Thus, when the difference is not clear, the Lord's power of will operates; but when it is clear it is the power of knowledge that works.

When difference is sufficiently developed, then, though there is mistake in respect of the objective aspect, yet there is none in regard to the subjective. Therefore, the subject being of the nature of pure consciousness, the power of action operates, as in the case of Vidyēśvaras.

But when there is the growth of misapprehension in respect of both the subjective and the objective aspects, Māyā śakti works. This is so in the case of the limited subjects i.e. those who are still in the bondage of Māyā.

But in the case of the subjects who are free from the bondage, such as Yogins and Jñānins, it is Vidyā śakti which is responsible

for their consciousness of the ultimate nature of the objects, when, though the misapprehension of the true nature of both, the subjective and the objective aspects, has disappeared, yet the residual trace thereof is still there. This is what he shows in the following verse:—

(7) “In the state of Paśu, it is Vidyā śakti, which reveals the real nature of the Lord.”

The state of limited subject is that, which is characterised by the erroneous knowledge, is fit for bondage and is devoid of freedom, and in which there is at least the residual trace of the idea of difference among the perception and the subject and the object thereof (though there may be no idea of it). The power of the Lord, which makes the essential nature of the Highest subject (Aiśvarya) manifest in this state, as has been established by means of reasons, stated before, because of which only some people, who accept those reasons as sound and, therefore, whose hearts are satisfied, become successful in their undertaking,—is Vidyāśakti. This view, which is found in Śaṅkaraśāstra etc. appeals to the heart of the teacher also because here he has not used the word “Anye”, and also because of his dealing with Māyā immediately after this, as it comes in due order.

Māyā is defined as follows:—

(This is the last part of the verse No. 7)

“And that power, which is responsible for the obscuration, is called Māyā.”

But the power of obscuration, the Māyā, causes the wrong notion of being a subject to develop fully in śūnya etc., which are insentient : it also causes the wrong notion of the objects, which are in reality non-different from Cit, as different from it (Cit). Thus, it obscures the essential nature of subject and object in every way; because its nature is to delude. Here by the word “obscuration” (tirodhāna) one has not to understand Vilaya i.e. scoffing at both, the preceptor and the Mantra, on the part of the initiated, which is counted among five Kṛtyas in Āgamas, but simply obscuration. (7)

In the following śloka he clearly explains Tirodhāna which is essentially obscuration:—

(8) “The power of Māyā shows itself in manifesting undiluted diversity and in bringing about the identification of the not-self such as śūnya, Buddhi and Prāṇa, with the self.”

In the state of deep sleep, fainting and meditation on non-existence "No", the vacuum (Śūnya), which is very much like ether (Ākāśa) and which is in reality objective in its nature and, therefore, is not-self, is conceived as the very self "I". Similarly in exhaling and inhaling, Prāṇa, which is nothing but air, is conceived as self: e.g. "I am breathing". In the case of rise of anger or desire for food in the beings moving or motionless, it is Prāṇa, invigorated by fire, (that is thought to be the self). Buddhi also, which is simply like a reservoir of clear water (tank), whereon the objects are reflected, is mistaken to be self: e.g. "I know within" "I am unhappy" etc., at the time of introspection. And even body, which is mostly earthy, appears as self within one who realises one's physical state as "I am lean".

In reality, all these Śūnya etc. are essentially non-different from Cit. They have been manifested as different from Cit by Māyā. Further, Śūnya etc., in that very state (of their assumed difference from Cit), while their state of insentiency (jaḍabhāva) still persists, have been made to be erroneously assumed as identical with Saṁvid (Aham) (the principle of self-consciousness). Thus, the power of Māyā of the Lord is characterised by freedom to accomplish the most difficult things. This is the idea conveyed by the word "Vijṛmbhate". By the use of the word "Vā" the author indicates the inclusion of son, wealth and wife etc., which are really objective in their nature, amongst the objects which are erroneously assumed to be identical with self, though they are not enumerated or mentioned here (8).

But, if Śūnya etc., though they be different from the self, because they are devoid of sentiency, yet, because they are assumed to be sentient, and therefore, be identical with Cit, they would naturally have the attributes of the pure divine omniscience and omnipotence etc. To this objection he replies as follows:—

(9) "The limited subject, Śūnya etc., who knows the limited objects, which are separate from it, is really an object and as such is limited by the five limiting conditions of time etc."

There will be the possibility of possession of divine attributes by Śūnya etc., if they were to abandon their limited nature even when they are assumed to be identical with self, the "I-consciousness". For, if they were to abandon their limited nature, their so called object of knowledge, such as Nīla etc. would cease to shine as separate from them. For, Śūnya etc., which are represented to be limited subjects, are limited only in so far as they cognise the limited external objects as separate

from themselves. And at the time when they cognise limited objects, they themselves fall to the level of object. The reason is that Meyatva (objectivity) consists in being limited. And it is because of the limitedness of the subject that there is the possibility of its being separate from other similar limited objects. But such is not the case with Cit, because it is unlimited.

That which constitutes limiting condition of Śūnya etc., identified with the self, is the group of five, time etc. That is as follows:—

Kāla (time) is that which is at first responsible for the idea of successive stages in the limited subject, where it manifests itself, and then arouses a corresponding idea in relation to the object also, e.g. "I, who was thin, am now fat and shall be fatter still." Thus, the subjective limitation of time (Kāla) is responsible for the idea of successiveness of body, which is assumed to be identical with self: and through that it arouses a similar idea of succession, such as that of past time, in relation to the object of knowledge of the limited subject.

Vidyā is that limiting condition of the insentient subject, such as Śūnya, etc. which is responsible for the rise of limited cognitive power. It distinguishes between Nīla and pleasure etc. in the mass of objects which are reflected on the mirror of Buddhi.

Kalā is that which is responsible for the rise of limited power of action. It gives rise to the idea of "Kārya" (what ought to be done). "I know something" and "I do something" are the forms of judgement, aroused by Vidyā and Kalā respectively.

Rāga is that subjective limiting condition which is responsible for the choice of something to the exclusion of other things, though every one of them is equally something that ought to be done. It is also responsible for superimposition of qualities (beauty etc.) on the limited subject, body etc., and on the objects. This Rāga is not simply want of indifference (avairāgya), a quality, which, according to the Sāṅkhyas, is associated with Buddhi. For, that is something gross, that may not be in an old man in relation to a handsome young lady. But Rāga is certainly there. Attachment (Rāga) is also accepted in this system, as one of the eight attributes of Buddhi. (But that is gross).

(But the question is) "Why is the attachment to a certain fixed object only?" (The reply is) the object of attachment is

fixed by Niyati, i.e. Niyati is that limiting condition which is responsible for the attachment to a certain fixed object.

Thus, the subject, being limited by or intertwined with Kāla, Vidyā, Kalā, Rāga and Niyati and being deprived of divine glory by Māyā, shines as limited, with a part of the whole glory that is restored, as "that which knows something now, does this, and is attached to this, am I". These limiting conditions (or limited powers) do not necessarily always function in relation to the same object. Occasionally they function in relation to different objects. For instance, a person, who is attached to one object of action, is made by Niyati to do something else.

These Kāla etc. shine only as associated with the subject and, therefore, they are like his powers. They differ in the case of each subject. But sometimes, because of His will, for instance, when acting of an excellent actor or fight of two wrestlers is being witnessed, they lose their difference, (which they have in relation to each individual spectator.) For, they have no independent life: they are absolutely dependent upon the Lord's will. This is what has been said many times and shall also be repeated in future. (9).

It has been stated that the limited subject has for his object of perception what is separate from himself and can be spoken of as "this". This 'Prameya' is now being explained:—

(10) "Meya (the object) is of twenty—three kinds, consisting of objects and means. There is one category, called Pradhāna, which is nothing but the state of identity of all Meyas. It is the Primary cause of all."

The objects and means which are of twentythree kinds; and their primary cause, which is nothing but the state of identity of objects and means and which is called "Pradhāna"; all these are the objects. This is the connection.

To Yogin and Mantramahesvara etc., because of their capacity to have all the Bhūtas, Tanmātras and Pradhāna under their control, all these constitute the objects of direct knowledge; and to the transmigratory souls also they are known through inference and verbal authority (Āgama). Therefore, they are called Prameyas.

Time etc., though they are of the nature of Prameya, yet, because they are primarily related to and constitute the powers of the limited subject, therefore, they are not counted here, when

only those Prameyas, which are separate from the subject who is a creation of Māyā, are being counted. In reality the so called Pramātā himself, of which we are talking here, is Prameya. Here his nature as Prameya is kept concealed and he is represented as Pramātā. (10)

But of these twenty-three, which are the objects and which are the means? To this he replies:—

(11) "The internal and external means are of thirteen kinds: and the objects are of ten kinds, because of their division into gross and subtle."

The subject uses the means first of all. Therefore, here the thirteen means are stated first. To know determinately when it confronts an object, is the general function of the Buddhi. The egoistic feeling (grāhakābhimāna) in relation to an object is the Ahaṅkāra. Manas is the cause of desire (Sāṅkalpa) etc. Thus the internal sense is of three kinds. The five perceptive senses, the senses of hearing, touch, sight, taste and smell, are useful in (acquiring) the determinate knowledge of sound etc. The five organs of action are useful in acting. Action is of two types (I) giving up and (II) reception. In the action that is related to external object, hand, anus and foot are the means. That means of action, which is instrumental in performing the two kinds of action in relation to vital air, that is within, is the organ of speech. The organ of generation is that which is useful in the act of resting, consequent upon the cessation of agitation of vital air.

The organs of action (Karmendriyas) pervade the whole body and are particular forms of Ahaṅkāra. Hence the person, whose hands have been cut off and who receives by means of arms, really receives by means of hand. The same may be said about others also. But simply because a particular Indriya can perfectly perform its function in a particular part of body, therefore, the hand, consisting of five fingers, is spoken of as its abode. Thus, there are thirteen means. Though they are the effects, yet, instrumentality being their peculiarity they are spoken of as the means.

Gross objects are earth, water, air, fire and ether. The subtle forms of these are smell, taste, colour, touch, and sound. On this point systems differ. Some hold that ether etc. have only one quality each. But others maintain that each preceding (in the order, given above) has one quality more than the succeeding. This point is not very important. Hence it has not been

discussed here. The gross, which presents the state of differentiation, is the means of inferring the undifferentiated state. Hence the gross categories are stated here first. According to this system, the 'Ābhāsas' such as earth etc. mixing up with one another, assume the form of a definite object, such as jar etc. They rest in (Viśrāmyanti) the subject, when they are approached by organs of action, perceived by perceptive senses, desired by 'Manas', taken as "this" by Ahankāra, ascertained by Buddhi, differentiated by Vidyā and affected by Kāla etc. This is the implication. This has been discussed by me in detail in the Tantrāloka and the Tantrasāra etc., which primarily deal with matters of this kind. Hence, here this has not been elaborated, because elaboration is not necessary. The Chapter ends. (11).

Here ends the first Chapter, called the presentation of the categories, in Āgamādhikāra in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā, written by illustrious teacher, Utpaladeva, with the commentary, called Vimarśinī, written by illustrious teacher, Abhinavagupta. (1).

ĀHNIKA II.

We bow to that Śiva, who, in the circle of his heart (mind), determinately manifests variety of limited subjects, though still He retains His essential nature intact.

Thus, in the preceding chapter Tattvas have been discussed. And although the essential nature of the subject has been dealt with in so far as the subject is included in the categories, yet the essential nature of the subject is the main topic in this book, it has, therefore, to be better defined and its exact nature is to be well settled. Therefore, the following Āhnika consisting of 20 Ślokas, beginning with "There the pure subject" and ending in "Vyāna" etc. is begun. That is as follows :—

In this system the recognition of the real nature of the subject is taught. For, the limited subject,—knowing what to shun and what to seek after as also what is his own real nature; and entering into, realising oneness with, his True Self, which is of the nature of Śiva and is the highest object of achievement,—gets liberation right in his life time.

The first verse states the essential nature of the trinity, Brahmā etc. Then in two verses the essential nature of the subjects, which are to be abandoned as well as of those which are to be sought after, are stated. Then in seven verses the essential nature of impurities (Mala) which is useful in that, (i. e. in pointing out the essential nature of each type of subject) and the difference of subjects from one another, which is due to them, are stated. In two verses the essential nature of the state of union with the Ultimate is stated. In five verses the states of deep sleep etc., which belong to the subject, are discussed. In the last three verses these states are divided so as to point out, which is to be abandoned and which is to be acquired. This is the summary of the chapter. Now the meaning of each verse is going to be discussed separately.

(1) "Such being the real nature of Tattva, Rudra is the presiding deity in that state, which is characterised by the fact that the subject stands alone in it. And Brahmā and Viṣṇu are the presiding deities in the creation and the unbroken continuity respectively of different Prameyas."

The idea, implied by the word "Tatra", is:—"Such being the real nature of Tattva, as is well established by verbal authority (Āgama) and is supported by reason". In that state, which is

known as that of dissolution, wherein the subject only, limited by five limiting attributes of time etc., exists in all his purity, with the whole mass of Prameyas withdrawn, the presiding deity is Rudra, who is meditated upon, because of his effecting or bringing about that condition, as also because of making those devotees of his incline towards himself, who exclusively meditate on that state. Rudra is nothing but Īśvara. He, because of the predominance of that essential characteristic of the subject, which is nothing more than the middle light (Suṣumṇā), which is free from merit and demerit, sun and moon, and day and night etc., which are nothing more than 'Prāṇa' and 'apāna' (idā and piṅgalā), (i. e. because of his being at the objectless level of the subjective experience) has his third eye open even in the condition of Māyā.

Brahmā is the presiding deity in the creation of different Prameyas and so Viṣṇu is in unbroken continuity of the created. Therefore, it is that, because of the predominance of the continuous chain of Prameyas, which shines as "this is blue" etc; and because of absence of pure subjectivity "I"; there is no opening of the third eye in their cases. Here "Daivata" means the same thing as Devatā. 'Prasara' is used in the sense of creation and chain. (1).

The state of pure subject (Pramāṭṛ) has been referred to above. Now the various types of the subject, according to Āgama and also their various names are given below:—

(2) "The subject, who is limited by time etc., because he is blinded by Māyā and, therefore, thinks that Karma binds him, is transmigratory. But when he is made to recognise his powers by true knowledge, then, being pure Cit, he is spoken of as liberated."

(3) "The subject is called Pati, (Lord) when he looks upon the objects as non-different from himself. But he is called limited subject (Paśu), when they are manifested as separate from him by Māyā and he is defiled by troubles (Kleśa) and Karmans etc."

'This', the subject, called śūnya-pramātā etc.—who is blinded, rendered ignorant, by Māyā and, therefore, considers himself to be tied by Karmans, and who is limited by time etc.—transmigrates. He is, therefore, called 'transmigratory being'. Body also, continuing to have some similarity in different states of youth etc., transmigrates as if it were. So far as Buddhi etc. are concerned, they transmigrate to other births also. But he,—who is made to recognise his power by Vidyā, which is a power that reveals the essential nature of the self; and, there-

fore, who considers body and also the rest of the world as non-different from Saṁvid and consequently who is one with Cit, unmixed with anything different from it,—is called liberated, because he is free from the bondage of rebirth, even when his body still exists. But when the body is destroyed, he is pure Śiva; and, therefore, then there can be no talk of liberation, because there is absence of both bondage and liberation. But in consideration of the previous stage or in comparison with other subjects he is, for practical purposes, spoken of as liberated, Śiva.

And he, who is liberated, apprehends the objects as constituents of himself, and therefore, because he imparts to them the reality, which is his own chief characteristic, and so maintains them, he is called protector (Pati) in scriptural books. But when he perceives them as separate from himself, as they have been separated by the power of māyā, then, being bound by those very bondages, the objects, he is called Paśu. And it is because of the mass of the external objects that there are troubles in the shape of ignorance, egoity, attachment, aversion and devotion etc., and also Karmas meritorious or others. By means of the word 'ādi' the author has implied the inclusion of residual trace, left by actions, good or bad, which is nothing more than 'Āśaya' as also the fruition thereof, the Vipāka. Thus impurity is of innumerable kinds. He is called Paśu because of his being bound down by them. (3).

That which constitutes the essential aspect of the limited subject, is called Mala or impurity. It is represented to be of three kinds in Āgamas, as follows:—

(4-5) "The impurity, called Ānava, is due to loss to Consciousness (Bodha) of its essential nature. It is of two kinds, it consists (i) in the loss (to consciousness, Cit) of its freedom (Svāntaryahāni) or (ii) in the loss of power of knowledge. The impurity, called "Māyīya" is nothing but the consciousness of the object as distinct from the subject. Birth and subjection to the effects of actions are due to it. And the impurity "Kārma", belongs to the subject which is insentient, (body etc.). All the three are due to Māyā."

According to this system, the essential characteristics of 'Cit Tattva' are omniscience and omnipotence. The impurity, called Ānava, consists in the loss of these, so that the Self becomes limited. Here limitedness consists in the obscuration of the real nature. Thus, even when omniscience is there but simply there is obscuration of omnipotence, which consists in perfect freedom and forms another characteristic feature

(of real self) or *vice versa*, there is the same impurity, called Āṇavamala, which consists in the obscuration of real essential nature.

‘Atraīya’ means when there is the impurity, called Āṇavamala i. e. when the self has been limited in two ways. The consciousness of what is separate, constitutes Māyīyamala. It is merely a name. For, really all the three impurities, being due to Māyā, are Māyīya.

There arises Kārmamala in the form of merit or demerit, when there is the consciousness of the external world as separate from self, in the doer, body etc., which are really insentient. To this are due transmigration and varied experiences. This lasts for limited time only. This means that definite caste, life and varied experiences are fruits of Karma. (4-5).

Now in order to show clearly the essential nature of these impurities by fully explaining their respective spheres, the author speaks of the sphere of “Loss of freedom to ‘consciousness’ (Bodha)”.

(6) “Those, who are pure consciousness, but at the same time are without the power of perfect freedom of action, are made separate from Himself by the Highest Lord, because of the absence of freedom of action in them.”

Those, who are essentially of the nature of pure consciousness, but are without the supreme freedom,—which consists in pure self-consciousness, “I”, which is essentially of the nature of “Bliss”, which consists in resting on the Self,—have been made so by the Highest Lord, i. e. separate from Himself. The reason for this is that there is the absence of Kartṛtā, which is characterised by perfect freedom. The underlying idea is to point out the difference from the Lord, who is pure knowledge, coupled with (Aviyukta) perfect freedom. (6).

Well, there may be the possibility of their separation from the Highest Lord, because of the reason, stated above. But how can they (who, though essentially of the nature of pure consciousness, are yet devoid of power of freedom) be separate from one another. For, in the case of him who is essentially pure consciousness there is no possibility of temporal and spatial limitations, because of his omnipresence and eternity. And in the absence of mutual difference, how can the use of plural in “Nīrmitāḥ” in the preceding śloka be justifiable? He removes this objection in the following śloka : —

(7) “Although there is no difference in respect of such characteristics as omniscience etc., yet they are different from one another,

because of the will of the Lord to shine differently. Such subjects are called *Vijñāna-kevalas*."

This has been stated many a time before that, according to this system, the Lord Himself, who is of unchecked power, desiring to become "that", becomes "that". In reality nothing different from Him exists. Therefore, because of the Lord's will "I, though essentially of the nature of consciousness, eternal and omnipresent, may yet shine separately" there is the mutual difference of the subjects (*Pramāṭṛs*), who are beyond the limited subjects, beginning with body and ending with *Śūnya*, though there is non-difference in respect of omniscience, eternality and omnipresence. They are called "*Vijñānakevalāḥ*" in the *Śāstras*. Therefore, in "*Vijñānakevala* has only one impurity" the meaning of "*Vijñānakevala*" is those who have *Vijñāna* i. e. consciousness, without freedom, as essential characteristic.(7).

Thus, having stated that the statement "*Svāntantriahānirbodhasya*" applies to *Vijñānākala*, he now makes clear the other part of the previous *śloka* "*Svāntantrasyāpyabodhatā*" by showing its sphere :—

(8) "The subjects, *Śūnya* etc. who are essentially insentient, are *Pralayākala*s. They have the impurity of *Karma* also. But the impurity of *Māyā* they may or may not have."

*Pralayākala*s are those subjects, whose "I-consciousness" shines in relation to (identified with) *Śūnya*,—which is devoid of all power of knowledge, because of its insentiency, —or vital air or *Buddhi*. They are called *Pralayākala*s, because they have been made *Akala* (i. e. without *Kalā Tattva*) by *Pralaya* (i. e. one of the acts of the Universal Mind). They are without bodies and senses, which are implied by *Kalā Tattva*. They are subjects, but are devoid of knowledge. They remain without bodies and senses so long as the time of dissolution of the world lasts, but after that they get connected with bodies and senses. Therefore, they are associated not only with *Ānava Mala* but *Kāma* also, in the form of residual traces, left by the pious or impious deeds.

But if so, then they should have consciousness of separate object also. Quite so, they do have that consciousness in the state of deep sleep, when there is the object of knowledge. (In the deep-sleep-experience "I had pleasant sleep", the pleasure is the object of knowledge.) But there is none in that state in which there is no object of knowledge (in the *Apavedya suṣupta*). Hence in the case of the *Pralayākala*s the impurity of *Māyā* is

not necessarily always there; because this impurity depends upon the consciousness of separate external object. That is as follows:—

Some, resting on (identified with) śūnya etc. and made inactive (i. e. insentient as it were) by extremely deep sleep, are said to be in Apavedya susupta i. e. in which there is no consciousness of object. Others, identifying themselves with Buddhi etc., have consciousness of separate objects in the form of pleasure and pain only, which lack distinctive features. These subjects are merged in Savedyasusupta, i. e. deep sleep which has objective reference. The characteristic of being without gross body and senses is common to all Pralayākālas. (8).

Thus, the part “Svātantryasyāpyabodhatā” has been made clear. And by the way the sphere of Kārmamala also has been shown. But Māyāmala is said to be present only alternatively (Pāṅśika). Now the author points out that there is the sphere of Māyīya mala where both the other Malas, Āṇava and Kārma are absent :—

(9) “The subjects, who identify themselves with pure consciousness and are omniscient and omnipotent in consequence of destruction of the impurity of Karma, possess the impurity of Māyā because they are conscious of separate objects. They are called Vidyēśvaras.”

There are some subjects, who are one with pure consciousness and who have self-consciousness (which refers to nothing else than Cit). They are, therefore, subjects (Kartārah) (i. e. possess unchecked powers of knowledge and action), and as such are omniscient and omnipotent. But body, senses and Bhuvana etc. shine as separate from them, as the objects of knowledge and action, as does cloth from a weaver. Therefore, these subjects, called Vidyēśvaras, are associated with Māyīya impurity. (9)

Now he is going to show the cases in which all the three impurities are present, as follows :—

(10) “Although all the gods and transmigratory souls have all the three impurities, yet the chief among them is kārma, and that is the cause of repeated re-birth.”

According to this system, Vidyēśvara and Vijñānākala, being beyond the sphere of Māyā, do not have transmigratory existence. And Pralayākālas also do not transmigrate so long as the time of dissolution of the universe lasts. But those, who have their being in the Tattva, called Māyā, and are counted in the śāstra to be of fourteen kinds, are all transmigratory and have all the three impurities. But which is that impurity which

is responsible for their transmigration ? Reply is : "though all the three impurities are there, yet it is Kārmamala which is responsible for repeated re-birth". The following quotation supports this view :—

"The bodies, the objects and the senses are all due to Karma".

And transmigration is nothing else than uninterrupted continuity of connection with the chain of present and future bodies, senses and objects.

The Āṇava and Māyīya impurities are not directly responsible for transmigration, because without Karma they are not capable of bringing into existence the various kinds of limited objects such as body etc. as in the case of Vijñānākala etc. Therefore, in different Śāstras, Kārma mala alone is held to be primarily responsible for transmigration. Hence, stepping on the ladder to freedom from rebirth begins only at the destruction of Kārma mala. Therefore, it is that in scriptural texts of Sāṅkhya, Purāṇa and Bhārata, giving up of the wrong notion (Abhimāna) of bondage of karma is specially preached.

Thus, because of each of the three Malas in isolation from the rest, three groups, consisting of two Malas each, and one group consisting of all the three Malas, there arise seven kinds of subjects. (Three Malas separately are responsible for three, Śiva, Mantramahēśvara and Mantreśvara). These very Malas, in groups of two each, are responsible for three more; i. e. Vidyēśa, Vijñānākala and Pralayākala. And all the three together give rise to the seventh (Sakala). Accordingly the Scripture asserts :—

"There are seven subjects, from Śiva to Sakala. They all possess power".

In fact Malas are of endless variety, because of their subdivisions; because of their being related to one another as principal and subordinate in a variety of ways; and because of difference due to the fact that some are alternant (Vikalpa) and others are aggregative (Samuccaya). (10).

Because of the difference in these impurities, due to their rise and disappearance, the transmigratory beings are of two kinds. This is what he shows in the following:—

(11-12) "And this "Free-consciousness" (Cittattva),-in which the power of action predominates (Kartṛtāmayaṃ) and which is revived by the power of kalā and constitutes the subjective aspect of Śūnya etc., which are in reality devoid of sentiency,-is limited, i. e. is of the nature of an object, because it occupies a

subordinate position (i.e. "I" element is subordinate to "this" element)."

"Now Jñāna (true knowledge,) which is the most essential characteristic of liberation, (entering into the Reality) consists in the equal predominance of both "consciousness" (Bodha) and "freedom." (Kartṛtā) and consequent subordinate position of Śūnya etc. to that which is sentient in its nature (Cit)."

Here the word "Etacca" stands for that "free-consciousness" (Caitanya) which belongs to the transmigratory beings, gods etc. This consists primarily in 'freedom', because the other aspect, namely, pure consciousness (Saṁvid), after having been deadened as it were by impurity, is revived (udbodhita) by the Lord's power, called Kalā; i. e. because of its having been given rise to, though this also was obscured by Mala. This "free-consciousness" is the essential characteristic of the sentient. As associated with limited subjects, beginning with body and ending with Śūnya, it is limited; because it occupies a subordinate position, i. e. it is objective in its nature, because of its being merged in the objective aspect of subject i. e. body and Śūnya etc., which have assumed "thisness" e. g. "He who is fair in complexion, he who is happy, he who is thirsty, he who is without any form, I am that".

In all these instances it is the "thisness", the objectivity of the transmigratory beings, in which the subjectivity (Ahantā) is merged, that shines. The transmigratory state, consisting of the states of waking, sleep and deep sleep, is nothing but this (objectivity in which the subjectivity is merged).

But that state, in which the same principle of free-consciousness or self-consciousness, because of the instruction of a teacher or any other similar reason, shines, in its full freedom, emerging as it were out of the objective Śūnya etc., and there is full consciousness of the presence of qualities of omnipresence and eternity etc. within,—is called 'beyond the fourth' Turiyātīta.

But that state,—in which all, from Śūnya to body etc., are converted (into self) by self-consciousness, which has the consciousness of possession of the above described glory of omnipotence and externality etc., as a metal is (converted into gold) by the alchemical process,—is called the "fourth" (Turiya) state. In this body etc. give up as if it were their objective nature. Both these states of liberation in the very life time, are known as "Samāveśa" in the Śāstras. In all these, well entering (into reality) is the only important thing. And other instructions are only to bring that about. For instance, the Gītā says:—

“Those who by making their minds (Manas) enter into me”
and

“But if you are not able to make your mind enter into me”
etc.

And entering into Him (Samāveśa) is the only fruition of all the well known five reverential acts, such as offering of prayer, bowing to, worship of and concentration and Samādhi on the Highest Lord, the essential part of which is the identification of such aspects of the limited subject as body etc. (with the Lord). This is what is said in the Gītā also : —

“If you cannot practise (concentration), devote yourself to a work that relates to me”.

But after the fall of the body, the Highest Lord alone remains, and, therefore, there can be no talk of “Samāveśa”. For, who can enter where and how ? This is what the next śloka says:—(Commentary on Kārikā 12 begins here).

The merging (Samāveśa) is characterised not only by the predominance of free-consciousness (Kartṛtā) and consequent reduction of śūnya etc. to subordinate position; but also by the equal prominence of another aspect of Cit, the “pure consciousness” (Bodha), which was before obscured by Mala. For, the Mala, “the loss of power of knowledge to freedom” has now ceased to function. And such predominance of free-consciousness is called ‘knowledge’ (jñāna), because of its being the opposite of the impurity, called ignorance. This is the chief characteristic feature of Samāveśa; because, on account of this, a subject, though associated with body, is yet Lord. Accordingly in the śāstras such a subject is called liberated (Mukta). (12).

There may thus be ‘fourth’ (Turya) and “beyond the fourth” (Turyātīta) states of the ‘Pati’ but how can there be three different states, waking, sleep and deep sleep states, of the Paśu, of which the Āgamas talk ? With this objection in mind he describes the exact nature of deep sleep in the following three ślokas:—

(13—15) “The absence of object of knowledge characterises the Śūnya Pramātā, who is nothing more than not-being of Buddhi etc. and who experiences subjectivity as “I”, which is related only to the vague and absolutely formless residual trace.

In the Śūnya resides the power, which sets vital air etc. in motion and is the internal activity of the senses (Indriyas). This power is called life (Jīvana). Another view of ‘life’ is that it is

nothing but self-consciousness, identified with vital air (Prāṇa) which is identical with the group of eight (Puryaṣṭaka).

Thus, deep sleep consists in the rest of self-consciousness in Śūnya or Prāṇa. It is like the state of dissolution. It is of two kinds (I) that in which the objective consciousness persists and (II) that in which there is no objective consciousness. In the former the subject has the impurity of Māyā; but in the latter he is free from it."

According to this system, the principle of sentiency, concealing its real nature, manifests itself as the objects of knowledge, beginning with Buddhi and ending with body or Jar etc. All this is one manifestation of the power of freedom. In this there is neither succession nor difference in reality. But still, because of that very power of freedom there appear both succession and difference. This being so, there arises a state when that aspect of the principle of sentiency,—which obscures the essential nature of Cit and is not associated with the later part of the manifestation i. e. Jar etc., either because of its (objective world's) not having risen; or its destruction, as at the time of dissolution of the world; or its not being attended to, as at the time of deep sleep, Samādhi and fainting fit,—rests in itself, and Kartṛtā (free-consciousness), the chief characteristic of which is self-consciousness, also rests on i. e. refers to the same and gets associated with residual trace, which is formless because it is not clear and is pure i. e. has not come down to the objective state. In this state, there is no other consciousness left excepting that of nothingness. And though it does not require clear consciousness of the objects, Buddhi etc., which have simply to be negated, yet, because the relation with the negatable is necessarily there, as in the case of the experience "I have nothing", therefore, it has negatable in general as one with itself. Hence its object is nothing more than the residual trace. The Śūnya is so called because it is essentially nothing else than not-being of all, beginning with Buddhi and ending with body etc. and Nīla, because there is the Śūnyatā i. e. the not-being of the objects. And the essential nature of not-being consists in existing nowhere than in the residual trace. This is the only way in which the objects can be said to be non-existing, in any context. For, they are never totally destroyed.

In that very Śūnya-subject there is a power, which is responsible for the working of the group of airs, called Prāṇa, Apāna Udāna, Samāna and Vyāna. And this (power) is nothing but inner working (Āntarivṛtti) of the groups of senses (Indriyas) of perception and those of action, which are mere expansions

of Vidyā and Kalā respectively. But their external working consists in perception of sound etc. as also in striking the places of the articulation etc. This has been asserted in:—

“The five airs, Prāṇa etc. are the general activity of the senses” (San. Ka. 29).

Thus, I—Consciousness, resting on Śūnya, associated with (power of) group of senses, is life. Therefore, Śūnya is jīva and the same transmigrates.

Or if the self-consciousness be resting on that inner power of the powers of senses, which, functioning as principle of life in general, is responsible for working of Prāṇa etc. and is called Prāṇa, then Prāṇa itself is jīva. It transmigrates and the same is Śūnya. And Prāṇa is signified by the word “Puryaṣṭaka”.

Five vital airs, group of senses of perception, group of Indriyas of action, and that which is responsible for the rise of certain knowledge, all these constitute Puryaṣṭaka. According to others five Tanmātras and Manas, Buddhi and Ahaṅkāra constitute Puryaṣṭaka. They say:—

“It is essentially the rise of Tanmātras and (has its being in) Manas, Buddhi and Ahaṅkāra” (Spa. Ka. 3—17) and

“Earth, water and fire” (Gi., VII, 4.)

Thus, self-consciousness, resting on Puryaṣṭaka, two different conceptions of which have been given above, is spoken of as “Suṣupta”. Now ‘Sausupta’ is the state of Ahantā at that time of rest (on Puryaṣṭaka), which is characterised by Bhāva (being) which is essentially nothing but pure consciousness (bodha) and Kārma which is of the nature of action. (Another explanation of Sausupta). The subject is asleep, because of impurity; but he is not asleep as it were because of kalā. But when the latter (kalā) gets merged in sleep he is in deep sleep (Suṣupta). The state and act of that is Sausupta.

Now in the case of Sausupta of Śūnya there is no separate object of knowledge; therefore, because of the absence of Mala of Māyā, it is called Apavedya (without object). But in the case of Sausupta of Prāṇa, there being experience of pleasure or pain, due to touch (Sparsakṛta), there is Māyīya Mala. Hence it is called Savedya.

Pralaya also has to be assumed to be like two kinds of Suṣupta, deep and not-deep. But Pralaya is of long duration, because it is due to destruction and non-rise of body etc. But Suṣupta is of a short duration and it is due to absence of attention to

body etc. This is the distinction. In the latter case also, sleep is due to fatigue, fainting is due to there being something wrong with the constituent fluids of the body, and intoxication and madness are due to a certain thing (taken). Samādhī is due to free will of the man. These are minor differences. Some hold that Samādhī is Savēdya Sauṣṭpa and other Sauṣṭpas are Apavedya. (15).

Thus, it is clear that deep sleep state is without consciousness of clear separate object of knowledge. But what is the difference between dreaming and waking in both of which there is clear consciousness of objects? With this question in mind, he draws distinction between the two in the following two verses:—

(16-17) “The state of dreaming is that in which the objects, though they are the objects to mind (manas) only, yet they are so created that they shine as clearly as they do when they are related to external senses. It is an illusion.

And the wakeful state of the subjects is that in which the creation (the object) is common to all subjects, has stability and is external inasmuch as it is the object of all senses.”

The eyeballs etc., which are the abodes of external senses, of a person who is sleeping, are found closed. And when they are closed there is no external sense-activity of perceiving the external objects. Therefore, the objects of sight and touch etc. such as are capable of shining like objects of various kinds of perceptions, are created by the Lord in the range of mind. This is not the creation of the limited subject, because we see the undesired; and even when the desired is seen, it is found connected with different times and places. And because it is simply a creation in the sphere of mind i. e. it, has existence in mind alone, therefore, it is not the object of common perception of other subjects. And no doubt there are certain objects which appear as objects of common perception of other subjects, yet they are not so, after the dreamer rises from sleep, and there is then the consciousness that these appearances were baseless. Hence it is illusion. And the other perceivers as well as one's own perceptive and other senses, which appear in dream, seem to be certainly non-different from those of the wakeful state, (so long as dream lasts); yet they do not appear to be so in the state of waking. Thus continuity of certainty is broken. Therefore, the perception of both (the types of objects) is spoken of as erroneous. For, the lack of persistency is nothing more than erroneousness. Thus uncommonness has been clearly implied by

representing them as not the objects of sense-perception. This is directly asserted in the following:—

“The break in the continuity of (the idea of) certainty is due to illusion”.

This was not referred to even at the time of stating the qualities, which are opposed to those which belong to the objects of wakeful state. Such a creation shines at the time of dream to limited subject. Hence it is object of cognition in dream.

And this state of limited subject, in which such an object is cognised, is called the state of dreaming. Here the word “akṣa” implies all the ten external senses (Indriya).

But wherein the objects are perceived by external senses in common with others, and there is the uncontradicted continuity of consciousness of their having true existence; and, therefore, there is persistency in the objects; such a creation in relation to the limited subject is technically called jāgara. And a subject, perceiving such a creation, is said to be in the wakeful state. This jāgara lasts only so long as there is continuity of certainty in regard to reality of existence of external objects. But when continuity of the consciousness of certainty is broken in the middle then that is dream-state. For, things are mere manifestations.

In a long dream, the shorter dream that comes within, is jāgara as compared to the long dream. And similarly what is considered to be jāgara, there being break in the continuity of consciousness of its certainty at another time, is simply a dream as compared to another Jāgara. (17).

In the following śloka the author indicates that the conditions or states from Turīya onward have to be coveted by showing that these three are to be shunned:—

(18) “These three states have to be given up, because of the predominance of Prāṇa and subordinate position of power of ‘freedom’ (Kartṛtā) in them. For, there is pleasure or pain in them, according as the predominance of this power of freedom increases or decreases.”

The subject considers those things to be the objects of aversion, in which he sees trouble in the form of hard labour that he feels, he shall have to do, because of desire either to shun or to gain them. The aversion etc. are due to variety of mixture of pleasure and pain (which those various things are capable of giving). And this is possible in the case of all these three states. For, when that aspect of the principle of pure sentience,

which consists in the power of freedom and is characterised by resting in one's own perfect independence of others and pure bliss, is reduced to a subordinate position, in the condition of (identity of self with) the working of Prāṇa etc., or Śūnya, or Puryaṣṭaka or body etc., then the predominance of Prāṇa etc., becomes manifest. Consequently the greater the obscurity of the principle of pure sentiency the greater also is pain; and similarly the more it rises to prominence the greater is also pleasure. For instance, at the time when keen appetite is felt, there is pain, because of the rise of Prāṇa to prominence. Therefore, when a person has had his fill, Prāṇa goes into obscurity and Ahantā comes into prominence; consequently there is pleasure. The same holds good in the case of shampooing and not-shampooing the body of one who is tired, according as there is the predominance or subordination of the body. But there is no rise of pain at that time in the case of the person, who knows the real nature of Samāveśa. The following quotation says the same thing :—

“For, even a weak person, having identified himself with that (Spanda), succeeds in his work: and similarly one who is extremely hungry, is able to quell his hunger.”

Thus at the time of predominance of Prāṇa and comparative subordination of the “power of freedom” (kartṛtā) there are experienced hundreds of varieties of pain and joy. This is the level of toil and suffering. Thus, in these three states there is predominance of Prāṇa etc., and Kartṛtā is reduced to subordinate position. Therefore, all these are to be shunned.

And the states of Turiya, in which there is predominance of Kartṛtā and Turiyātīta, in which there is its continuity, therefore, are to be coveted. For, after the realisation of one's own essential nature, which is nothing but ‘pure unmixed bliss’ there is an end to one's toils, which one has helplessly to do in one's attempt at gaining or averting certain things. This is the substance. (18)

But if the reason for giving up the first three states is the predominance of Prāṇa etc. in them, and if this predominance is in these three states only, and there is absence thereof in Turiya etc., how then after entering into Turiya there is rise again (Vyutthāna). This doubt he removes with the following two Ślokas :—

(19-20) “In the states of both, waking and dream, the principle of life (Prāṇa) manifests itself primarily in inhaling and exhaling. In the state of deep sleep it (Prāṇa) is called Samāna, the most

essential feature of which is the rest (of Prāṇa for a while in the cavity of the heart i.e. the non-manifestation of Prāṇa in the forms of inhaling and exhaling). As such Samāna is comparable to the time, technically called Viṣuvat (equinoctial time)."

Another translation

(Samāna is like the time, technically called Viṣuvat. For, Samāna is characterised by the equality of (the movement of) Prāṇa and Apāna and the rest of the principle of life in the cavity of heart (i.e. not moving to the right or to the left) for a while ; exactly as the time 'Viṣuvat' is characterised by the equality of (the duration of) the day and of the night and stoppage for a very short time of the movement of the sun (logically) towards either the south or the north (i.e. its being at the equator).

"In the state of Turiya, it moves up through mid-passage (Suṣumnā). As such it is called Udāna. Here the dissolution of the objective world starts. From Vijñānakāla to Sadāśiva are in this state. And the Turiyātīta state is the state of Parama Śiva. It is characterised by the working of Vyāna."

Prāṇa means the 'being' (Sthiti) of the sentient principle (Cidrūpa) as Prāṇa and Apāna, the characteristic of life. It is essentially nothing more than the universal motion ('Sāmānyaparispanda' as admitted by the Spanda system). It brings sentiency to the insentient body etc. When because of "freedom" (Svātantrya) self is superimposed on it, it is determinately apprehended as "I". This very 'being' of Cit, manifesting itself in the particular forms of movement such as those of vital air (Prāṇa) etc., assumes five different forms. It shows (in itself) the particularity of 'Prāṇa' and that of 'apāna' in succession, according as it shows itself in the form of inhaling and that of exhaling, when it leaves something (the heart) or falls on something. These two particularities are clear in the state of waking: because here it (Prāṇa) proceeds from the body and rests on the external object and from there comes back to the body; and also in remembrance etc., because of its (Prāṇa's) resting on the internal object, Prāṇa and Apāna are very distinctly cognised. In dreams also both are there, because an observer clearly sees Prāṇa and Apāna in the form of inhaling and exhaling of a person who is asleep. And the sleeping person also himself realises their existence in the form of leaving (the heart) and coming back (to it), because he has the consciousness of object. Thus the principle of life (Prāṇa) has two particularities inhaling and exhaling in the wakeful state. The same is the

case in the state of dream. The state of sleep is called Svapna. When this state grows very strong then we have a subject in deep sleep (Sūsupta). Sausupta is nothing but the state of subject in deep sleep. The Sūsupta state is of two types. Both the types are characterised by the possession of the particularity of the principle of life, called Samāna. Although in the Savedya Sūsupta the movement of Prāna and Apāna is perceptible, yet in reality deep sleep consists primarily in the rest of the principle of life (Prāna) in between the two movements in the Hrdayasadana, the place in the heart, the spatial point which is beyond the reach of senses. Thus, the suspension of activity of Prāna and Apāna, the rest for a while, is the characteristic of Samāna. Its primary function is to produce equality in the vital fluids in the higher as well as in the lower animals. It is responsible for the digestion of drink and food, because it brings about the opening of the lotus of the heart. It is like the time, technically called 'Viṣuvat', because it is nothing but the equality (Sāmya) of Prāna and Apāna, which are like day and night, and the 'rest' (in the cavity of the heart), for a while.

Another Interpretation

The word "Viṣuvat" is formed by adding affix "vat", which means "to deserve", according to Pāṇini's rule "Tadarham" (Pā, Sū 5-1-117), to the word "Viṣu" which means 'pervasion'. It (secondarily, Lakṣaṇayā) means that which deserves (is characterised by) equality. The affix 'Vat' is indeclinable only when it is used in the sense of comparison. For, we find in use such forms as "udvataḥ" and 'nivataḥ'. The statement (that 'Vat' is indeclinable, only when it is used in the sense of comparison) is not a mere assertion; it is based upon the authority (Taddhitaścāsarvavibhaktiḥ Pā. 1-1-38). Or the word may mean 'that which removes the difference in the length and shortness of day and night'. In this case the word is to be derived from the root 'Su' with the prefix 'Vi' and with affix 'ṣatṛ'. In the Viṣuvat, (i.e. Samāna.) Prāna and Apāna, which are in suspension, have their being in the form of residual trace. Their suspension (Viccheda) is their being in the form of residual trace only and not their total destruction. This has been repeatedly asserted. Thus, in the state of deep sleep, leaving (hāna) and receiving (i.e. coming to) (Ādāna) are in the rudimentary stage. All the limited subjects up to Pralayākāla are in these states.

But when the activity of the principle of life abandons the left and right passages, follows the upward central path, then that movement brings about melting away of all duality like

that of congealed Ghee and produces a state that is characterised by unity. This is the function of Udāna, which is found in all the subjects from Vijñānākala to Sadāśiva. This state is technically called 'Turya'. Vijñānākalas are beyond Māyā. Therefore, melting away of duality starts with them. But when the duality completely disappears, the activity of the principle of life (Prāṇavartti) assumes the form of Vyāna inasmuch as it operates in the body, consisting of the entire mass of the categories, elements and worlds, which constitute the entire sphere of objectivity. This is the 'Turyātita' state. This befits the Paramaśiva, who is essentially the whole universe. Thus, the subject, who is nothing more than the principle of life (Prāṇarūpa), assumes the forms of Prāṇa, Apāna, Udāna, Samāna and Vyāna. Therefore, Udāna is put in the same case as that of Vijñānākala, Mantra and Īśa, i.e. Sadāśiva and Īśvara, according to classification. It means this: although in the states of Turiya and Turiyātita the principle of life is there, because otherwise there would be no rise from them, yet, because there is destruction of duality in these states and they are characterised by rest on unity, therefore, there is no variety of pleasure and pain in them and they are nothing more than the highest bliss, which is characterised by perfect rest on the Self. Hence these states ought to be acquired. But in the states of deep sleep etc., because there is either vague consciousness of object, because it is in the form of residual trace only, or very clear cognition of it, therefore, there is variety of pleasure and pain etc. Hence they have to be shunned. Hence it has been rightly said:—

“The three are to be shunned”. The highest Lord, whose body is the whole universe, appears as the powers of exhaling and inhaling in the Sakalas. He is also all classes of subject such as Pralayākala and Vijñānākala. He is all this because He is Prāṇa Apāna, Udāna, Samāna and Vyāna. He is Sadāśiva also. This also has been indicated by what has been stated above. The following says the same:—

“The universe, consisting of the thirty-six Tattvas is nothing more than the Lord's powers of Prāṇa etc.” (20). From the beginning 171.

Here ends the second chapter, called the presentation of the essential nature of the subject, in the Āgamādhikāra in the Īśvara Pratyabhiññā, written by illustrious teacher, Utpaladeva, with the Commentary, called Vimarśinī, written by illustrious teacher, Abhinavagupta. (2).

Here ends the Āgamādhikāra, the third of the Adhikāras.

TATTVA SANGRAHĀDHIKĀRA

ĀHNIKA I.

We bow to that Śiva, who manifests the self of devotees as one with innumerable variety of the means and the objects of knowledge.

Thus the self in its essential nature is identical with the Highest Lord. This has been established fully in the preceding three Adhikāras. This is proved by self-experience, reason and Āgama. For a clear understanding of it by the pupils, the same is now being stated through a summary view of the contents of the Āgamas, in one Āhnika, consisting of 18 verses beginning with "The self itself of all living beings" and ending in "Utpala has established." In one verse the Ultimately Real Nature of the Self is stated. The following nine verses state what is bondage, in order to show what the subject and the object are in reality. The seven verses show the essential nature of liberation, which is nothing more than Recognition. In one verse the conclusion is stated. This is the summary. Now the meaning of verses is to be given as follows:—

(1) "The one Highest Lord alone is the very self of all the living beings. He is full of unbroken consciousness "I am this entire universe."

According to this system, the insentients shine only as merged in the sentient. The consciousness of the insentient "this" rests on the self-consciousness "I". From this it follows that the insentients are without self. The sentient beings alone have self. Their self is nothing else than the Highest Lord. Therefore, the self and none else is the Maheśvara. And because He is of the nature of Saṁvid and Saṁvid has no limiting attributes of time, place or form; though there may be difference in body and vital air etc. : for, they belong to that part of the creation, which is called insentient, and as such are merged in the sentient principle. There is, therefore, one sentient principle which manifests in himself (itself?) all the forms of the universe because of his freedom. Hence the Highest Lord, holding all that is objective in its nature within Himself, is perfect, because He is self-consciousness, which is characterised by resting within His own self and independence of all others. Therefore, no effort is required to establish His omnipotence and omniscience (i.e. they are self-evident). Just as the cognitions and actions of Buddhi and the organs of action and perception,

in relation to the respective diverse objects, in reality belong to the self, so the cognitions and actions of Rudra and Kṣetrajña, who are thousands in number and who are like the senses (Indriya-sthāniya) of the Highest Lord, in relation to the mass of objects, belong to the principle of sentiency (Cidātman). (1).

But if the one Highest Lord alone is the self, what is then the bondage, for freedom from which attempt has to be made? With this objection in mind the author says:—

(2) **“In the objective world, which has been created by Himself, the Lord makes Buddhi etc. the substratum of false self-consciousness, because they are (fit to be) the limited subjects.”**

The Highest Lord, resting within His own self, in the very luminous mirror of His self, creates (manifests) within Himself by means of power of perfect freedom, the objective (aspect of the) world, which is limited in its nature. The creation of objective world is preceded by self-concretisation (Sāṅkocapurāṣara). In the midst of this creation there are the objects, such as Prāṇa, Buddhi and body etc. They are objects and are to be referred to as “this”. But they are fit to be subjects in relation to objects, which are separate from them. Therefore, as they cannot completely cast off the objectivity, so they shine as illumined with unreal and imperfect self-consciousness, as “I am Devadāta” or “I am Caitra”. (2).

Let it be as you say. But still who can be in bondage? Who is there different from the Lord? To this objection he replies as follows:—

(3) **“The individuality of the limited individual subject is due to ignorance of the real nature of his true self. Such souls are admitted to be many. They have Bhoga, which is made up of pleasure and suffering, which are nothing but limited action and bliss (Kriyānandau); i.e. Rajas and Sattva.”**

Quite so. In reality there is no bondage. But only when He, because of His all-transcending power of freedom, manifests Himself as limited, then He is not conscious of His perfection, though it is there even in that state. This is the reason why He is called Puruṣa. ‘Puruṣa’ is essentially nothing more than the ignorance of being perfect in reality. It is because of the limitedness through association with different bodies, vital airs and Buddhis, that Puruṣas are many. And the limited individual soul is enjoyer of fruits of his action and, therefore, he is in bondage. Bhoga is nothing else than the (limited) action and bliss. Limited action is suffering, because Rajaguna,

which is nothing but a mixture of knowledge and ignorance and is characterised by motion, is pain. Sattva, which is essentially light of knowledge, is pleasure. Tamas is complete ignorance. It is the rest between the two. It is like Pralaya. (3).

But what is to be excluded and what is to be included by the word "Sṛṣṭau"? To this he replies:—

(4) "What are spoken of as knowledge and action of the Lord in relation to the objects, which are identical with Him; the same, together with the third, the Māyā, are the three Guṇas of the limited subject, namely, Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas."

All consciousness and freedom, that is in the universe is identical with the Lord, who Himself is the universe. And the consciousness (Prakāśa) and freedom (Vimarśa) are the powers of knowledge and action respectively. Māyā is the Lord's power, which is responsible for the consciousness "I this" which is the ultimate reality of Sadāśiva and Īśvara, which are characterised by the consciousness of separate objectivity as resting on the self-consciousness. In these two states the consciousness of Prakāśa and Vimarśa, as the essential nature of the self, still persists. These three powers are recognised to be natural i.e. not-created, in the Lord. But when there is the ignorance of the essential nature of the self and cognition and action refer to objects, which are (recognised to be) separate (from the self) and there is consciousness of the separate objects as devoid of both Prakāśa and Vimarśa, then arise Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, which are characterised by pleasure, pain and absence of both (Moha) and the functions of which are knowledge, action and restriction (Niyama) respectively (4).

But the powers of knowledge, action and Māyā are thus spoken of as non-different from the Lord. Therefore, it follows that similarly Sattva, Rajas and Tamas are non-different from the limited subject. But they are counted as separate from Puruṣa. How is this? This doubt he sets at rest in the following śloka:—

(5) "In the course of the discussion on the practical life, which is based on diversity, Guṇas, which change into various means and objects, should not be mentioned as the powers of the possessor of them (Śaktimatah)."

Right. It would be so, i.e., there would be identity of Guṇas with the limited subject, if there be no talk of the state of diversity. But here we are discussing difference between one thing and another in practical life. Now Puruṣa, in his essential nature, is nothing more than the limited sentiency; and it is not

his essential nature to make the objects shine. For, then they would shine always. The fact is that it (shining of objects) is due to connection of Puruṣa with others (the means). Therefore, as these Sattva etc. have separate existence from Paśu, who is supposed to possess them, so they are not represented to be non-different from him, but, as they are helpful (in bringing about the manifestation of external objects) so they are represented to be his qualities. But why are they talked of as separate from Puruṣa? Reply is that these thirteen means and ten objects are the effects of pleasure pain and ignorance, because they are experienced as essentially of the nature of pleasure etc. Therefore, if pleasure etc., which have their existence as one with the group of objects and means were to be identical with Puruṣa also, then it would follow that Puruṣa is identical with the whole creation, inclusive of both the means and objects. We have already refuted the theory of evolution. And this (identity of Puruṣa with objects etc.) is of course an unwelcome conclusion. For, it would mean that Puruṣa, with Svātantrya śakti (in the form of all the qualities) is omniform (Viśvarūpa). It would mean that there is no Puruṣa and that the Lord alone exists. Therefore, in discussing the essential nature of Puruṣa, whose existence is due to lack of self-recognition, Sattva etc., have to be presented as separate. This is the correct position. (5).

But how do the powers of knowledge etc., become Sattva etc., in the case of the limited subject? To this he replies as follows:—

(6) “The powers of being, (Sattā) self-consciousness (Ānanda) and action (Kriyā) belong to the Lord. But the limited subject has both Sattva and its not-being. That which is of dual nature (of being and not-being) is Rajas, which is pain. It is mixture Sattva and Tamas.”

According to this system, the Lord is naturally self-luminous and preserves the world by bringing about its existence etc. This world is characterised by apparent glaring variety. His (Lord of the world's) being i.e. freedom in respect of being (Bhavanakartṛtā),—as has already been shown in 1-5-14 “That is transcendental motion, that is transcendental being”,—is characterised by slight flutter, quiver or motion. The same, because the light of consciousness is inseparable from self-consciousness, shining in the form of self-consciousness, which is essentially Vimarśa, is called power of action. The same, because of its perfect independence of others and entirely resting on itself is called ānanda. Thus the Lord, because of His being Cit (sentiency), is characterised by all these powers.

But the limited subject has both being and its negation, and bliss and its negation, because he is limited in his nature. That aspect (of the Lord's power), which is called being and bliss (Sattānanda), appearing as light of knowledge and pleasure (in the case of limited subject) is called Sattva. That, which is the negation of Sattva or Prakāśa and Ānanda, and, therefore, is essentially the veil of ignorance, is called Tamas. Although these Sattva and Tamas mutually exclude each other, like Nila and negation thereof, yet, like 'genera' of cause and effect, they shine also as mixed up with each other, inasmuch as they are grasped together in one determinate knowledge of an object, exactly in the manner of two different colours, black and the opposite thereof, harmoniously mixed up in a bird of variegated plumage. Therefore, that which consists of two, Sattva and Tamas, and is of mixed nature, is called Rajoguṇa. It is (essentially of the nature of) pain, because in it Sattva and Tamas, which are respectively of the nature of light and darkness, are mixed together. For instance, the consciousness of a son as "dear" (i.e., unmixed with any other consciousness), is Sattva and therefore, pleasure. Total absence of the consciousness (of son etc.) is Moha. But the consciousness of certain aspects, for instance, his body being subjected to a disease and lack of consciousness of others, for instance, his being free from all diseases and full of good qualities, that is so much desired, is pain. This very continuity from a former to a later stage is the true nature of action. There is no such state of the limited subject, as is free from both Sattva and Rajas. For, such a state does not fit in with any form of cognition, determinate or indeterminate. That is as follows :—

The object (Nīla) shines in indeterminate cognition. Not-being of Nīla, though it is nothing, (materially) yet it is a product of determinative activity, and as such has its reality in practical life only, because it shines. "The blue and not-blue" (Nīlānīla) may shine because of the mixture of blue and not-blue. But not-being of both (Anubhayarūpatva), if it is not grasped in the indeterminate cognition of object, it would run after (i.e. become the object of) the determinate cognition, (to get itself grasped). But if it does not enter into determinate cognition, it would be indeterminately grasped object and nothing else. Hence the limited subject does not possess any fourth quality. Here the word "Api" is used in the sense of "Ca". In the case of the limited subject the "Being" (Sattā) is the quality, called Sattva. Not-being of that is Tamas. Rajas is the mixture of the two, that is the connection of words. (6).

Thus the essential nature of the subject, both, limited and perfect, has been settled in brief. Now, in order to ascer-

tain the exact nature of the object of perception, the following śloka shows clearly how is this objectivity (Prameyatattva) connected with the Lord:—

(7) “The Ābhāsas, which shine differently, as mixed up with one another, or as separate from each other, are (in their totality, without any internal distinction) the object of Lord’s consciousness (apprehension) of objectivity, which is expressed as “this”, which does not stand for any conventional meaning.”

It has already been stated that, according to this system, the objects are mere manifestations (Ābhāsas). At times these Ābhāsas are mixed up, united together, by the determinative activity which combines a number of Ābhāsas into a unity, which is the distinctive characteristic of the particular. At times they are conceived separately. Then they are universals. Now both the kinds of objects (the universal and the particular) form the object of consciousness of objectivity, expressed as “this”; which does not stand for any conventional meaning, not only in the case of just born children etc., but also in that of the Lord. This consciousness is very much like that which is expressed by pointing the thing out with a figure. “Tathā” means “in that manner i.e. as particular or as universal”. They shine variously. The variety of forms of objects is due to the fact that their particularity and universality both appear simultaneously resting on Ahantā (principle of self-consciousness). Therefore, (it is admitted that Maheśvara) manifests the unconventional objectivity (Asāmayikīm idantām) which is merely negation of subjectivity and may, therefore, be represented as mere not-being (śūnya), the meaning of the negative particle (Nañartha) without reference to the negatable; which is nothing but Saṁvid itself, but limited; and which shines with the light of Saṁvid (i.e. as identical and not different from Saṁvid) in the state of Īśvara, because it is invariably concomitant with the manifestation of the object.(7)

Thus, it has been shown how does the objective world shine to Pati, who is identical with Īśvara. But there can possibly be no talk of object in relation to the Highest Lord, Paramaśiva, because all such talk is due to Sadāśiva and Īśvara, who are His first manifestations. Therefore, now the author explains how these Prameyas shine to Paśu, in the following three ślokas:—

(8-9-10) “But the objects, which shine differently, are determinately grasped (Prakalpya) by the limited subject in terms of various indicatory signs (words) in the sphere of remembrance and imagination etc.

The uncommon creation (the world of imagination) of the limited subject depends upon the creation of the Lord. It is not common to all limited subjects, because the limited subject is ignorant of his identity with the Lord. But the creation of the limited subject, who has realised his oneness with the Lord, is real i. e. common to all. It is due to his determinative activity, which is of changing nature, because of its being permeated by variety of letters, which is essentially nothing more than the (activity-of) Prāṇa and which is impermanent. This (determinative activity) itself is due to the power of the Lord, the chief purpose of which is to obstruct rest on one's own self."

Here the word "Tu" indicates difference. To the inner or limited self the objects shine as described below; and not in the manner in which they shine to Īśvara, as stated above. In remembrance, imagination, ideation and other definite cognitions, the objects, which appear differently, i.e. in indefinite or definite form, according as they shine separately or mixed with other Ābhāsas, are determinately grasped, according to the residual traces of each individual, as associated with different indicatory words such as "This is dear" "This is enemy" which stand for different kinds of pains and pleasures, according to the previous experience of each individual limited subject, who is of the nature of limited individual self-consciousness, and is distinct from other similar self-consciousnesses. In brief it means that to Īśvara the Prameyas are the objects of pure consciousness, unmixed with the element of determinacy. But to the limited subject they shine as related to different determinate cognitions, each of which is naturally different from and exclusive of all others, because they are used for practical purposes such as accepting or rejecting. (8).

But if the object, even when it is an object of pure consciousness, is exactly the same as it is when it is determinately cognised, what then is the difference in the object in its two states, namely, (I) when it is the object of consciousness of Īśvara and (II) when it is determinately grasped by limited subject? Reply is as is given in the following Śloka beginning with "Tasya".

The creation, for which a limited subject is responsible, is based upon that of the Lord and, therefore, being dependent on the creation of the Lord, it is not common and is related to that particular subject alone i.e. is not common to other subjects: for instance the creation, "This is pleasant", shines only to its creator and to none else.

But if the limited subject also be capable of creating then is he Lord himself? Quite so. He is Lord himself. But if so,

why then his creation is not common to other times and subjects? Well, it would be, if he knew his power. And because he does not know his power (therefore, his creation is not similar to that of the Lord). The determinative activity i.e., the power to grasp determinately, arises in him only who is dependent upon another.

But who is responsible for the rise of that power to grasp determinately? Reply is as follows:—

The Lord is the embodiment of all ideas and, therefore, is characterised by the mass of words. He possesses the power, the chief function of which is to obscure the state of being the Highest Lord, which is characterised by perfect rest in His essential nature. It (this power) is nothing more than the eight "Vargas" (groups of letters), which are essentially different powers (deities), called Brāhmī etc. It has variety, because of the variety of letters, "K" etc. This power is responsible for the rise of the determinative activity of the limited subject, which is changing, because the limited subject does not rest on one determinate cognition. Therefore, through the determinative activity, which is permeated by such varied arrangement of letters as "this is friend" and "this is enemy", springs up the uncommon creation of the limited subject, who is essentially identical with the Highest Lord. (The creation of imagination) "The elephant with five mouths and four tusks runs in the sky" is also a creation of determinative cognitive power, because it is also a peculiar unification of Ābhāsas. This also depends upon the Ābhāsas, manifested by the Lord. This means that all that is created by limited subject in the field of determinate cognition, depends upon the creation of the Lord. (9-10).

But if the creation of the limited subject is nothing but phenomenal world, what will the creation of Lord do to him (Paśu)? This is what he explains in the following Śloka:—

(11) "The creation is of two kinds: one is common (Sādhāraṇa) and the other is uncommon. Both are clearly manifest. By giving up the determinative activity and concentrating (on "I am this") gradually the state of Īśvara is reached."

The creation of Īśvara is of two kinds; common, such as jar etc., and uncommon such as is indicated by the word "Anyathā": e.g., two moons etc. Both of these have the common characteristic of being clearly manifest. When, through a slow and gradual process of giving up determinacy through concentration on the clearly manifest object, which is only indeterminately grasped; this creation is referred to as "I am this", as in the experience at the level of Īśvara; then it slowly destroys the limited nature

of Paśu and makes the divine nature manifest, according as the practice of concentration develops, as a result of following the instruction:—

“The eyes, which are directed to the external, should be free from winking and opening and the true object of meditation should be within.”

Further, if the world, a creation of determinative activity of the limited subject, as has been stated above, be otherwise, i.e., be the creation of the determinative activity of one who has realised his identity with the well recognised power of the Lord, then it is also common: just as is the creation of the determinative mental activity of one who has realised the Supreme, has his mind thoroughly absorbed (in the idea, for which the mantra stands) and has applied his Mantra determinately for promoting health, or bringing about death or for pacification.(11)

Thus, it has been shown how Mokṣa is nothing but self-realisation, which is nothing but the realisation of Paramaśiva, which follows from one's identifying one's self with what is free from all determinacy, through giving up of all Vikalpas. Now he is going to show that there can be Mokṣa even when there are Vikalpas.

(12) “He, who has realised his identity with the universe and knows that all that is manifest is simply his glory, is the Highest Lord even when the determinate cognitions are still arising.”

“The inner self, which is called Paśu and is referred to as ‘I’ is nothing different from the Supreme Self, who is essentially the light of consciousness, grasping both, the subject and the object: on the contrary, that transcendental being I am and He is I. There is no difference between the two. Therefore, even this determinate creation is nothing but my own glory, known as the power of freedom.” This consciousness having grown firm, he becomes liberated in his very life time, though his Vikalpas may not have been destroyed. The following line says the same:—

“That is surely a state of freedom from doubt, in which even doubt is not definitely doubted.” (12).

But if the case be such, as has been stated above, what then is the difference between the liberated and the one who is still in bondage, in relation to the object? The reply is:—

(13) “The liberated, looks upon the common object of perception as one with himself, as does the Great Lord; but the bound sees it as altogether different from himself.”

The liberated considers himself identical with the self-consciousness "I", which is the prompter (Adhiṣṭhātr) of all subjects right from Sadāśiva and Īśvara down to worm. Accordingly he thinks "all that can be the object of cognition of any being in the universe is also of mine, and similarly my object of cognition is that of all beings in the universe." And he also thinks "that object is only a part of my self and so are others also". And slowly he begins to think that Prameyas are non-different both from one another and from the subject. Thus, all figure in his consciousness as ultimately merged in the undiluted unity. But quite opposite is the case with the bound. He rests on pure diversity. (13).

It has been discussed how the objects appear at the states of Sadāśive and Īśvara and in relation to the liberated and the bound. But it remains to be stated how does the object stand in relation to Parama Śiva? To this he replies:—

(14) "Śiva is ever full of the mass of the endless Tattvas, which rest in or have their being in Him. He is pure consciousness and bliss (cidānandaghana). He is perfectly changeless."

In relation to the glorious Highest Lord there can be no talk of the object of knowledge. For, the whole mass of Tattvas is completely merged in Him; because it rests on pure Cit. Therefore, that state is pure unity, characterised by rest on the Self, the Ānanda, which is nothing more than spontaneous natural self-consciousness (Samvitsvabhāva). It is eternal self-consciousness. It is absolutely changeless. It is called the transcendental state of the glorious Lord, who is the whole universe, whose all-transcending glory is without any break and who is eternally pure. In it all talk of the object ceases. It is represented to be all-transcending. (14).

He now gives the conclusion of what has been discussed in the preceding four Adhikāras.

(15) "Thus, fully knowing the Self and its powers of knowledge and action, and realising the powers to be non-different from the self, he knows and does all that he desires."

Thus, knowing the Self to be essentially Īśvara, and His powers of knowledge and action to be identical with the power of freedom and to be non-different from Him; and determinately apprehending "such is the self and not as conceived by Kaṇāda etc."; and realising that powers of knowledge and action are non-different from Him; a subject, who practises Samāveśa, becomes capable of knowing and doing all that he desires, while he is still associa-

ted with the body. But one, who does not practise that, is liberated in his life time and after the fall of body becomes the Highest Lord. (15)

This matter, though it is based on personal experience, yet the tradition, that has been handed down from teacher to teacher, has to be referred to as a corroborator. For, it has already been shown in the Āgamādhikāra that it is based on the Śāstra. Thus, it can be shown to be fully supported by preceptorial teaching, scripture and personal experience. With this object he states the preceptorial line as follows:—

(16) “Thus, this new easy path has been shown by me, exactly as it was given in the Śiva Dṛṣṭi Śāstra, written by the teacher. Therefore, a person, putting his feet on this, after realising himself to be the Creator of the Universe, becomes Siddha, when he enters into unbroken identity with the state of Śiva.”

This path, which is new, because it was not well known, on account of its being hidden in all the sacred scriptures, and which is easy, because it is free from all troubles in so far as it needs no such efforts as are involved in practising the internal and external discipline and Prāṇāyāma etc,—was talked of by the great grand-teacher Śrī Somānandapāda in his Śiva Dṛṣṭi Śāstra. The same has been clarified here by removing the blemish in the form of objections from the point of view of other systems of thought. And because the matter, discussed here, has the support of the preceptors, scripture and personal experience; therefore, when a person concentrates his mind on what is given here and, after realising (Vibhāvya) that he has the omnipotence, the chief characteristic of which is the creation of the universe, he is unshakably convinced; then because of this conviction itself he attains liberation in this very life and is identical with Śiva. This is what the great grand-teacher himself has stated as follows:—

“When the presence of the true nature of Śiva in all is recognised through indisputable experience, the means of knowledge and concentration of mind lose all their value. When the gold is once known as such, does contemplation play any part as a means of its knowledge? That knowledge is true and firm like the one that we have of our parents etc.”

After realising one's identity with Śiva, if one remains continuously merged in it and merges any one, two or all of the triad of body, intellect and Śūnya in it, one attains all powers, including the highest. (16).

But if the essential nature of the Self is ever the same, there would be no difference in it (i.e. in its causal efficiency) in the

case of either its recognition or non-recognition. For, a seed, though it may not be recognised, yet, if all the contributory causes are present, it does produce the sprout. Why then is there so much insistence on Self-recognition? Reply is as follows:—

The causal efficiency is of two types: (I) external, such as the production of sprout, and (II) internal, such as causing pleasure etc., which is essentially nothing else than the self-consciousness, the rest of the subject on itself. The former undoubtedly does not depend upon recognition; but the latter does. In the present case the causal efficiency lies in the arousal of the consciousness "I am the Highest Lord", which is characterised by the possession (by the realiser) of both, higher and lower, "Siddhis" and the glories of the liberated in life. Therefore, in this case recognition is surely necessary.

But it may be asked "where do you find that the causal efficiency, which is essentially the rest on the subject, is not seen without recognition and is co-incidental with recognition? In reply to this the author says the following:—

(17) "Just as an object of love, who has been brought to the presence of a slim lady by her various entreaties, cannot give her any pleasure, though he may stand before her, so long as he is not recognised and, therefore, not distinguished from common man; so the Self of all, which is the Lord of the world, cannot manifest its true glory so long as its essential nature is not recognised. Hence the means of its recognition has been dealt with."

Suppose that the passion of love is aroused in a young lady by mere hearing of the excellences of a hero and that she, intensely desiring day and night to see him and with her heart completely out of control—sends messengers, writes love-letters, presenting her condition, and has her already slim body made slimmer still by pangs of separation. Now the hero unexpectedly turns up in response to her entreaties and stands before her. But she is not able to apprehend clearly his distinctive great qualities and consequently to her he is nothing more than an ordinary man. Under such circumstances, the perception of the object, though it actually takes place, does not give any satisfaction to the heart. Similarly, though the Lord of the Universe is ever shining within as the very self, yet His shining does not make the heart full (of Ānanda); because the self is not realised to be transcendental, and possessing the supreme Lordliness, characterised by unchecked freedom of thought and action. The Self, therefore, shines as do other ordinary objects, such as jar etc.

But when she distinctly cognises those excellences in him, either in consequence of a word from the messenger, or of recognition of a characteristic or something else, her heart immediately blooms fully like a wonderful bud. And in consequence of repeated enjoyment of union, she experiences the rest of the heart in other forms also. Similarly when transcendental Lordliness is fully recognised in the self, either as a result of preceptorial instruction or recognition of the powers of knowledge and action, then immediately in the very life time there is final emancipation, characterised by perfection. But if a person makes repeated efforts at merging himself in the Supreme, he attains mystic powers. Thus, it is the recognition of the Self which gives both the higher and the lower spiritual powers. (17).

This system is beneficial to all. It gives final emancipation. In order to induce common man to follow it by arousing in him the urge,—which is characterised by the belief in the possibility of the promised and which is aroused by the remembrance of its (system's) greatness, because of its connection with great family and famous name,—the author concludes by referring to his as well as his father's name as follows:—

(18) “In order that common man may have the transcendental power (Siddhi) without much effort, Utpala, the son of Udayākara, has written this *Īśvara Pratyabhijñā*.”

The word ‘jana’ means simply ‘man’. In following this system, therefore, the qualification of belonging to a particular caste etc. is unnecessary. Hence it is asserted that it is for the benefit of all. Its aim is great, because its purpose is to enable common man to realise the higher and lower Siddhis without much effort. My illustrious grand-teacher, Utpaladeva, the son of Udayākara, wrote this system. Common man, therefore, follows it, because of the fame of its founder. The author has benefitted common man by inducing him to follow it by referring to both the names. The meaning of ‘Iyam’ is ‘this’ which has been made so appealing to the heart by hundreds of reasons. The Chapter ends. (18). From the beginning 190.

Abhinavagupta has written this small commentary on the (*Īśvara*) *Pratyabhijñā*. It cannot be adversely criticised. It clearly explains the meaning of the verses.

Through this system, which is based upon personal experience, the subject matter of *Mīmāṃsā*, *Nyāya*, *Vyākaraṇa* and *Śaivāgama* becomes helpful in the realisation of the Self. For, no other than the sun is capable of uniting the juices (*Rasa*) of earth and water for the development of grains.

What reply can be given to the question "What are you.?" by one, who wants to discuss the śāstras, before realising the self, and who is, therefore, under the influence of an evil spirit (as it were)?

Here ends the Tattvasaṅgrahādhikāra in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā, written by Utpaladeva, with the commentary, called "Vimarśinī" written by Abhinavagupta.

The Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī ends.

THE END:

INDEX

A

- Abādhitā, 157.
 Ābhāsa, 20, 38, 43, 62, 63, 67, 95,
 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 124, 140,
 141, 142, 143, 144, 147, 148, 149,
 152, 153, 155, 157, 158, 176, 177,
 178, 180, 184, 185, 189, 190, 201,
 224, 225.
 Ābhāsavāda, 177, 178.
 Abhāva, 114.
 Abhilāpa, 82.
 Abhimāna, 208.
 Abhinavagupta, 1, 18, 31, 39, 53,
 85, 97, 110, 118, 126, 138, 165,
 188, 201, 218, 231.
 Abhinavodaya, 141.
 Abhitti, 174.
 Absolute, 1, 13.
 Ācchādāt, 194.
 Action, 2, 6, 11, 13, 14, 17, 28, 29,
 30, 32, 35, 49, 56, 78, 79, 103,
 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127,
 128, 131, 132, 133, 166, 167, 176,
 183, 188, 189, 190, 191, 212, 219,
 220, 221, 222, 228, 231.
 Activity, 121, 131, 143, 145, 154, 225.
 Ādāna, 217.
 Adhipati, 179.
 Adhyavasāya, 43, 80, 84.
 Ādi, 80, 153.
 Ad-infinitum, 69, 93.
 Aesthetic object, 94.
 Affection, 142.
 Affix, 49, 78, 111, 153.
 Āgama, 7, 42, 43, 71, 74, 75, 91,
 145, 146, 164, 186, 189, 196, 199,
 202, 203, 204, 210, 219.
 Āgamādhikāra, 158, 189, 201.
 Agamic practice, 194.
 Agent, 12, 29, 125.
 Agential activity, 72.
 Agitation, 128, 200.
 Aham, 47, 48, 50, 92, 118, 197.
 Ahambhāva, 6.
 Ahampratyavamarśa, 88.
 Ahaṅkāra, 91, 131, 200, 212.
 Ahantā, 48, 209, 215, 224.
 Aiśvarya, 15, 73, 187, 196.
 Ajaḍātmavādin, 12.
 Akala, 208.
 Ākāśa, 23, 197.
 Akṣapāda, 163.
 All-inclusive, 2.
 All-pervading, 75.
 All-transcending, 228.
 All-transcending power, 3, 220.
 Āmalaka, LV.
 Analogy, 48, 66, 154, 180.
 Analysis, 48.
 Ānanda, 4, 11, 74, 202, 223, 228, 230.
 Ananta, 194.
 Āṇava, 204, 208.
 Āṇavamala, 205, 206.
 Anirvacanīya Khyāti, 157.
 Anityatva, 178.

Annihilation, 94, 191.
 Annuler, 103.
 Annulment, 103.
 Antaraṅga, 145.
 Āntari vṛtti, 211.
 Antarmukha, 38.
 Anubhava, 102.
 Anubhayarūpatva, 223.
 Anumāna, 144.
 Anupalabdhi, 178.
 Anupalambha, 67, 171.
 Aṇusañcayabāhyavādin, 64.
 Anusandhāna, 62.
 Anuvṛtti, 159.
 Anuvyavasāya, 131.
 Anyonyāśraya, 15.
 Apāna, 203, 211, 216, 217, 218.
 Aparatva, 194.
 Aparā Vāk, 74.
 Apavedya, 212, 213.
 Apavedya Suṣupta, 206, 207.
 Apekṣā, 30, 181, 182.
 Apohana, 87, 88.
 Apohana Śakti, 38, 40, 86.
 Appearance, 38.
 Apprehension, 73.
 Apramāṇa, 144.
 Apūrṇakhyāti, 157.
 Argumentum-ad-infinitum, 47, 49, 109.
 Arhan, 145.
 Artha, 53, 147.
 Arthakriyā, 156.
 Articulation, 212.
 Artificial, 153.
 Asat, 35.
 Asatkhyāti, 157.
 Asatkhyātivādin, 35.

Āśaya, 204.
 Ascertainment, 80, 87, 100, 119, 131, 157.
 Asiddha, 47.
 Assertion, 167.
 Association, 130, 140, 142, 169.
 Astitva, 14.
 Āśuddha Vidyā, 193.
 Ātmakhyātivādin, 35.
 Ātman, 24, 49, 74, 160.
 Atom, 64, 65, 160, 170, 173.
 Attachment, 198, 204.
 Attribute, 44, 75, 219.
 Avabhāsa, 92, 155.
 Avalokana, 193.
 Avasā, 51.
 Avayava, 63.
 Avayavin, 63, 64, 133.
 Avayavivāda, 64.
 Aversion, 204, 214.
 Avidyā, 186.
 Āviś, 184.
 Aviyukta, 205.
 Avyāpyavṛtti, 64.
 Awareness, 136.

B

Bādha, 143, 186.
 Bādhaka, 158.
 Bāhya, 68.
 Bāhyārthanumeyavādin, 58, 63.
 Bāhyārthavāda, 60.
 Basic relation, 136.
 Bauddha, 28, 54, 58, 89, 100, 104, 131, 137, 145, 147, 159, 162, 174, 180, 182.

Being, 14, 15, 112, 124, 136, 137,
149, 177, 223.

Belief, 5.

Bhagavatī, 135.

Bhārata, 208.

Bhartṛhari, 76, 146.

Bhāskara, 5.

Bhaṭṭa Divākaravatsa, 3.

Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa, 19.

Bhāva, 114, 212.

Bhāvanā, 49.

Bhavanakartṛtā, 222.

Bhedavāda, 57.

Bhoga, 220.

Bhūta, 199.

Bhūyaḥ, 179.

Bimba, 57.

Binary, 64.

Bliss, 215, 223.

Blue, 116, 140, 203.

Bodha, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 142, 194,
204, 209, 210.

Bodharūpa, 141.

Bondage, 196, 220, 227.

Bound, 228.

Brahmā, 38, 74, 96, 192, 202, 203.

Brahman, 43, 185, 186.

Brāhmaṇa, 146, 148.

Brāhmī, 76, 226.

Buddhahood, 145.

Buddhi, 12, 25, 26, 27, 46, 80, 89,
91, 93, 96, 131, 141, 196, 197,
198, 200, 203, 206, 207, 210, 211,
212, 219, 220.

Buddhi Pramātā, 82.

Buddhist, 37, 44, 55, 56, 59, 88,
179, 180.

Buddhistic, 19.

C

Caitanya, 71, 72, 209.

Caitra, 128.

Cārvāka, 90.

Caste, 231.

Category, 47, 72, 150, 189, 190,
191, 192, 194, 199, 202.

Causal, 25.

Causal affix, 46.

Causal agency, 6, 7.

Causal agent, 12, 13, 183.

Causal efficiency, 13, 51, 88, 111,
136, 137, 143, 148, 150, 153, 178,
229, 230.

Causal function, 137.

Causal law, 174, 177.

Causal relation, 3, 4, 62, 67, 98,
101, 130, 152, 176, 178, 180, 181.

Causality, 67, 69, 130, 166, 168, 170.

Causation, 27.

Causative, 163.

Cause, 3, 6, 11, 23, 30, 58, 59, 63,
65, 66, 101, 104, 113, 125, 139,
142, 151, 153, 154, 166, 168, 170,
175, 176, 177, 178, 182, 223.

Central path, 217.

Certainty, 80, 86, 88, 89.

Characteristic, 71, 125, 127, 132,
135, 142, 147, 152, 158, 174, 185,
204, 205.

Cidānandaghana, 228.

Cidrūpa, 186, 216.

Cidvapuḥ, 38.

Cinmayatva, 14.

Cinmayī, 27.

Cintāmaṇi, 42.

Cit, 130, 140, 145, 185, 186, 191,

- 193, 195, 196, 197, 198, 203, 204,
210, 211, 216, 222, 228.
- Citi, 73.
- Citra saṁvedana, 135.
- Citsvarūpa, 25.
- Citta 46.
- Cittattva, 90, 128, 204, 208.
- Cogniser, 21, 45, 46, 47, 148.
- Cognition, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
25, 26, 27, 28, 32, 33, 36, 38, 40,
44, 45, 52, 60, 62, 66, 68, 76, 84,
85, 86, 87, 90, 100, 102, 103, 104,
109, 110, 119, 131, 140, 143, 144,
147, 155, 158, 160, 178, 214, 219,
220, 223, 228.
- Cognitive activity, 81.
- Cognitive power, 27.
- Cognitive tendency, 136.
- Concentration, 46, 110, 165, 210,
226, 229.
- Conception, 136, 183.
- Conclusion, 178.
- Configuration, 147, 150, 151, 176.
- Consciousness, 14, 20, 21, 32, 34, 41,
55, 58, 63, 66, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75,
76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 86, 90, 91,
92, 99, 100, 104, 109, 121, 124,
125, 128, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135,
136, 142, 149, 158, 161, 165, 178,
187, 193, 206, 207, 209, 213, 214,
216, 224.
- Construct, 132.
- Contemplation, 18, 42, 192, 229.
- Contrary, 102, 103, 104, 108, 109,
110, 129.
- Contrariety, 129, 130, 135, 159.
- Convention, 82, 152.
- Conventional expression, 22, 152.
- Conventional meaning, 82, 224.
- Conviction, 13, 229.
- Creation, 1, 43, 69, 78, 79, 94, 126,
136, 141, 165, 167, 170, 172, 174,
177, 188, 191, 203, 219, 220, 222,
225, 226, 227.
- Creation of Yogin, 175.
- Creative power, 125.
- Creative stir, 10.
- Creativeness, 166.
- Creator, 37, 75, 166, 167, 170, 188,
229.
- ## D
- Daivata, 203.
- Dance, 69.
- Daṇḍin, 160.
- Dāśya, 4.
- Deep sleep, 10, 11, 59, 218.
- Deindividualisation, 145.
- Demerit, 24, 172, 205.
- Desire, 137.
- Determinacy, 70, 76, 81, 82, 83, 84,
86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 225,
226, 227.
- Determinate, 54, 130, 131.
- Determinate cognition, 14, 19, 21,
32, 40, 44, 52, 58, 67, 68, 71, 79,
82, 88, 95, 96, 100, 101, 102, 112,
131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 143, 148,
151, 156, 182, 187, 223, 225, 226,
227.
- Determinate consciousness, 34, 68,
81, 83, 135, 155, 185, 188.
- Determinate creation, 227.
- Determinate experience, 132.
- Determinate knowledge, 20, 21, 22,
28, 34, 37, 42, 50, 51, 55, 67, 68,
92, 94, 142, 144, 148, 150, 155,
157, 158, 223.

Determinate perception, 50, 88, 100.

Determinate will, 62.

Determination, 153.

Determinative activity, 68, 82,
132, 148, 150, 223, 225, 226, 227.

Determinative function, 132.

Deva, 66.

Devatā, 203.

Devotee, 4.

Devotion, 2, 6, 204.

Dharma, 72, 181.

Dharmin, 108.

Dialectic, 18.

Defferentiation, 10, 37, 38, 40, 51,
87, 88, 89, 94, 98, 111, 127, 132,
201.

Dīkṣita, 145.

Direct apprehension, 21.

Direct cognition, 32, 80, 120, 137.

Direct experience 23, 33, 34, 35, 38,
40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 67, 92, 110.

Direct perception, 22, 28, 29, 36, 40,
54, 58, 96, 102, 105, 112, 145,
146, 154, 189.

Dissolution, 1, 164, 211.

Diversity, 11, 19, 59, 60, 63, 110,
127, 134, 150, 159, 160, 183, 221.

Doer, 24, 30, 31, 45, 52, 111.

Doubt, 80.

Dream, 65, 169, 214, 217.

Dream in dream, 157.

Dr̥k, 33.

Dr̥ṣṭatā, 49.

Dualism, 5.

Dualistic, 11.

Duality, 48, 186, 217, 218.

Dvyaṇuka, 64, 160.

E

Earth, 212.

Effect, 23, 30, 58, 59, 62, 65, 101,
104, 139, 142, 151, 153, 168, 182,
223.

Efficiency, 230.

Efficient causality, 135.

Egoism, 91, 172.

Egoistic, 169, 200.

Egoity, 47, 204.

Ekānta, 171.

Ekārthibhāva, 42.

Elimination, 193.

Emancipation, 231.

Emotion, 117.

Empirical level, 132, 145.

Empirical multiplicity,

Empirical personality, 145.

Empirical subject, 124.

Entity, 104, 142.

Equator, 216.

Equilibrium, 183.

Equinoctial time, 216.

Erroneous, 35, 128, 131, 136,
138, 140.

Erroneous knowledge, 36, 139,
157, 158, 196.

Erroneousness, 36, 157, 213.

Error, 35, 36, 68, 157, 158.

Essence, 74.

Essential characteristic, 71, 81, 87,
184, 191, 203.

Essential feature, 216.

Essential nature, 57, 59, 60, 65, 71,
72, 73, 75, 77, 78, 98, 110, 112,
114, 117, 119, 120, 122, 124, 129,
131, 134, 139, 144, 146, 153, 156,

157, 166, 168, 172, 173, 175, 176,
177, 182, 188, 202, 203, 219, 222,
226, 230.

Essential quality, 156.
Eternal, 10, 78, 161.
Eternal activity, 120.
Eternal being, 163.
Eternal subject, 124, 160.
Eternality, 205, 206, 209.
Ether, 23, 24, 91.
Evolutive activity, 184.
Existence, 58, 60, 61, 63, 106, 124,
139, 149, 160, 168, 191.
Experiencer, 20, 22, 23, 26, 40,
48, 51, 52.
Expression, 21.
Expressive power, 83.
Extendedness, 85, 121, 133.
Extensive universal, 136.
External, 59, 63, 64, 66, 68, 115,
116, 161, 168, 185.
External aspect, 191.
External cognition, 156.
External discipline, 229.
External existence, 159.
External manifestation, 96, 170, 192.
External means, 200.
External multiplicity, 135.
External object, 63, 68, 85, 119,
123, 124, 127, 140, 197.
External senses, 80, 113, 116, 129,
130, 131, 168, 169, 213, 214.
External sense-perception, 112.
External unity, 135.
External world, 59.
Externality, 115, 117, 131, 135,
155, 156, 169, 170, 192.
Extrovert, 38, 99, 141, 155.
Extrovert light of consciousness, 20.

F

Fainting, 213.
Fallacy, 177.
Fallacy of inter-dependence, 62.
False perception, 129.
Form, 100, 133.
Forms of cognition, 51.
Free, 40, 41, 45, 49, 78, 88, 188.
Free consciousness, 72, 75, 76, 77,
78, 82, 84, 86, 88, 89, 111, 190,
191, 208, 209, 210, 211.
Free conscious will, 54.
Freedom, 11, 14, 15, 41, 69, 70, 73,
74, 76, 77, 78, 80, 87, 90, 91, 95,
96, 104, 111, 113, 117, 163, 164,
186, 196, 209, 214, 215, 216, 219,
220, 221, 227.
Freedom of action, 16, 205.
Freedom of knowledge, 16.
Free power, 159.
Free Will, 65, 86, 93, 118, 119, 127,
148, 159, 172.
Function 150, 151.
Functional capacity, 114, 115, 128,
156.
Functional efficacy, 156.
Functional power, 156.

G

Gaurī, 119.
Genera, 223.
General activity, 212.
Generic cognition, 67.
Generic perception, 67.
Gītā, 209.

Glorious Lord, 228.
 Goal, 8.
 God, 5, 19, 96, 170, 209.
 Goddess, 75.
 Gold, 5, 148, 149, 209.
 Grace, 2; 4.
 Grāhaka, 53.
 Great Light, 140, 141.
 Great Lord, 13, 39, 118, 227.
 Gross, 200.

H

Hāna, 217.
 Harmony, 127.
 Heart, 137, 168, 169, 202, 217, 230.
 Hemanta, 122.
 Hetu, 6.
 Highest bliss, 218.
 Highest Lord, 5, 42, 74, 76, 84, 86,
 94, 98, 112, 119, 120, 121, 159,
 160, 161, 170, 192, 205, 210, 219,
 220, 224, 228, 229, 230.
 Highest Reality, 1, 6, 7.
 Highest Self, 117.
 Highest Subject, 196.
 Highest truth, 119.
 Hṛdaya, 75.
 Hṛdayasadana, 217.
 Human convention, 153.
 Human goal, 1.
 Hunger, 91, 215.

I

'I', 92, 99, 163.
 I-consciousness, 20, 21, 45, 80, 84,

86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 111, 118, 125,
 192, 193, 194, 206.
 I-this, 193, 194.
 Idā, 203.
 Idam, 193.
 Idantā, 41.
 Idea, 62, 138.
 Idea of relation, 134, 136.
 Ideation, 225.
 Identification, 1, 8, 196, 210.
 Identity, 76, 94, 106, 144, 155,
 159, 165, 174, 177, 199, 215, 222,
 225, 227.
 Ignorance, 13, 18, 26, 92, 163, 164,
 165, 183, 204, 220, 221.
 Illuminator, 102, 141.
 Illusion, 19, 34, 42, 127, 213, 214.
 Illusory, 4, 32, 157.
 Image, 87.
 Imagination, 20, 65, 80, 81, 95,
 96, 116, 122, 224, 225, 226.
 Implication, 105, 179.
 Impure, 110.
 Impure self-consciousness, 86.
 Impure self-luminosity, 53.
 Impurity, 4, 204, 205, 207, 208,
 210, 212.
 Independent, 133, 173.
 Indeterminacy, 21, 83, 84, 86, 89,
 94, 131.
 Indeterminate, 50, 54, 72, 130,
 132, 150, 161, 223.
 Indeterminate cognition, 19, 20, 21,
 50, 59, 67, 81, 83, 92, 94, 99, 100,
 127, 182, 223.
 Indeterminate experience, 51, 55,
 81, 82, 94, 100, 131, 132.
 Indeterminate knowledge, 37, 54,
 155, 186.
 Indeterminate perception, 88.
 Individual, 94, 134, 225.

- Individual self, 18, 86.
 Individual self-luminous subject, 52.
 Individual subject, 16, 41, 43, 55, 119.
 Individuality, 30, 220.
 Indra, 74.
 Indriya, 200, 210, 211, 212, 214.
 Indriya-sthāniya, 220.
 Indus Valley, 1.
 Inequilibrium, 183.
 Inference, 7, 19, 24, 28, 29, 47, 61, 63, 66, 67, 68, 102, 108, 109, 144, 146, 152, 154, 155, 174, 175, 176, 178, 179, 180, 183.
 Inferential process, 109.
 Inferential proof, 77, 163.
 Inferer, 155.
 Infinite regress, 93, 136, 137.
 Inhaling, 215, 216.
 Inherence, 30, 63, 64, 133, 171.
 Inner speech, 20, 87.
 Inner visualisation, 2.
 Inner voice, 145.
 Insentient, 118, 189.
 Insentient, 14, 15, 16, 17, 25, 26, 27, 30, 33, 37, 39, 58, 61, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 91, 98, 100, 119, 120, 124, 140, 148, 161, 166, 167, 168, 170, 171, 172, 180, 181, 184, 187, 188, 190, 204, 206, 207, 219.
 Insentient self, 12.
 Insentient subject, 198.
 Instrumental case, 79.
 Instrumental cause, 171.
 Instrumentality, 200.
 Intellect, 61, 66, 82, 91, 93, 95.
 Intellect-subject, 82.
 Intellectual reaction, 51, 76, 84, 85, 155.
 Internal, 115, 129, 168, 190, 191, 200, 224, 229, 230.
 Internal activity, 210.
 Internal manifestation, 192.
 Internal perception, 168.
 Internal power, 17.
 Internal reality, 129.
 Internal senses, 117, 128, 129, 131.
 Internal unification, 11.
 Internal unity, 135.
 Introduction, 18.
 Introspection, 197.
 Introvert, 38, 41, 45, 99, 153.
 Introvert light, 153, 161.
 Introvert reality, 129.
 Introvert subject, 45.
 Introvertness, 142.
 Intuition, 91.
 Invalidity, 102, 104, 109.
 Invariable concomitance, 15, 61, 62, 109, 134, 137, 145, 153, 164, 171, 173, 178, 189.
 Invariable non-concomitance, 137.
 Invariably concomitant, 104, 152, 174, 181, 224.
 Īśa, 76, 218.
 Īśvara, 10, 16, 78, 79, 131, 192, 193, 194, 218, 224, 225, 226, 228.
 Īśvara Tattva, 195.
 Itihāsa, 15.

J

- Jaḍa, 13, 61, 120.
 Jaḍabhāva, 197.
 Jāgara, 214.
 Jain, 145.
 Jiva, 13, 212.
 Jñāna, 17, 20, 26, 27, 28, 32, 33, 60, 61, 66, 80, 162, 209, 210.

Jñānin, 195.
 Jñātā, 111.
 Jñāteya, 100.
 Jñāti, 100.
 Jñātṛtva, 79.
 Judgement, 78, 158.
 Jyotiṣtoma, 145, 146.

K

Kaivalya, 71.
 Kalā, 16, 42, 91, 174, 198, 199, 208, 209, 212.
 Kāla, 91, 174, 198, 199, 201.
 Kalā tattva, 206.
 Kalpa, 136.
 Kaṇāda, 32, 91, 228.
 Kaṇādic, 98.
 Kapāla, 65, 173.
 Kapila, 183.
 Kāraka, 133, 135.
 Kāraṇa, 167, 192.
 Kāraṇāyattatva, 176.
 Kārikā, 147, 177, 210.
 Karma, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 212.
 Kārma, 206, 207.
 Kārma mala, 205, 207, 208.
 Karmendriya, 200.
 Kartā, 79, 180, 185, 207.
 Kartṛkarmabhāva, 166.
 Kartṛrūpa, 184.
 Kartṛśakti, 135.
 Kartṛtā, 209, 211, 214, 215.
 Kartṛtāmaya, 208.
 Kartṛvāda, 182.
 Kārya, 198.

Kāryakāraṇatā, 156.
 Kha, 24.
 Kleśa, 203.
 Knowledge, 11, 19, 30, 32, 38, 54, 56, 93, 104, 105, 106, 120, 175, 189, 194, 212, 213, 221, 228, 231.
 Knowledge of Yogin, 47.
 Knower, 16, 17, 30, 31, 40, 45, 51, 54, 111, 139.
 Kṛdanta, 72.
 Kriyā, 29, 79, 135, 160, 169, 187, 220, 222.
 Kriyākāraṇabhāva, 182.
 Kriyā vaicitrya, 122.
 Kṛtakatva, 178.
 Kṛtya, 196.
 Kṣetrajña, 220.
 Kuṭaja, 121.

L

Lakṣaṇa, 20, 99.
 Lakṣaṇā, 217.
 Lakṣmaṇagupta, 1.
 Law of contradiction, 123.
 Liberation, 4, 204, 209.
 Life, 15, 210.
 Light, 11, 12, 22, 52, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 72, 99, 223.
 Light of consciousness, 14, 15, 17, 48, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 66, 68, 70, 80, 84, 86, 87, 88, 91, 94, 95, 99, 111, 115, 144, 227.
 Light of self, 3.
 Limitation, 9, 20, 123, 162.
 Limited individual, 189, 220.
 Limited light, 52.
 Limited manifestation, 73.

Limited sentieny, 221.
 Limited subject, 42, 53, 123, 124,
 141, 202, 213, 214, 223, 225, 227.
 Limiting condition, 158, 160.
 Liṅga, 179.
 Locative, 33, 181.
 Logical error, 177.
 Lord, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
 37, 40, 51, 52, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71,
 78, 85, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 104,
 111, 112, 116, 117, 120, 125, 126,
 127, 130, 139, 152, 154, 155, 156,
 159, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166,
 167, 171, 174, 175, 178, 187, 188,
 192, 196, 197, 199, 205, 206, 209,
 210, 213, 218, 220, 222, 225, 226,
 227, 230.
 Lordliness, 230.
 Loss of freedom, 205.
 Luminosity, 25, 26, 27, 32, 33, 54, 55.

M

Magnitude, 136.
 Mahābhāṣya, 160.
 Mahādeva, 174.
 Mahāmāyā, 4.
 Mahāprakāśa, 141.
 Mahāsattā, 75.
 Mahat, 183, 184.
 Maheśvara, 4, 6, 11, 12, 14.
 Māheśvarya, 111.
 Major term, 177.
 Mala, 202, 204, 205, 208, 209, 210,
 212.
 Mālinī, 75.
 Manas, 80, 131, 200, 201, 210, 212,
 213.
 Manifest, 63, 158.

Manifestation, 1, 3, 10, 11, 13, 35,
 36, 38, 42, 43, 45, 52, 56, 58, 59,
 60, 63, 65, 66, 71, 74, 92, 94, 95,
 111, 112, 113, 121, 123, 124, 127,
 129, 131, 138, 142, 152, 155, 164,
 166, 168, 170, 172, 177, 178.
 Manifestedness, 25, 33.
 Manifester, 34, 37, 57, 167.
 Mantra, 4, 42, 75, 76, 145, 218.
 Mantra Maheśa, 4, 13.
 Mantra Maheśvara, 191, 199, 208.
 Material cause, 65, 173.
 Mātṛa, 76.
 Māyā, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17,
 42, 53, 55, 71, 74, 77, 80, 81, 85,
 86, 89, 90, 93, 115, 118, 130, 131,
 157, 159, 163, 186, 194, 195, 196,
 197, 199, 200, 203, 204, 206, 207,
 211, 218, 221.
 Māyāmala, 207.
 Māyā Pramātā 52.
 Māyā Śakti, 80, 154, 195.
 Māyīya, 204, 205, 207, 208.
 Māyīyamala, 205, 212.
 Meaning, 81.
 Means, 58, 138.
 Means of cognition, 88.
 Means of knowledge, 2, 3, 16, 99,
 139, 143, 152, 165.
 Means of right knowledge, 10, 11,
 12, 13, 17, 29, 43, 62, 67.
 Meditation, 47, 76, 77, 78, 197, 227.
 Memory, 22, 23, 24, 40.
 Mental activity, 153.
 Mental apprehension, 144.
 Mental construct, 131.
 Mental distraction, 96.
 Mental reaction, 43, 50, 67.
 Merit, 24, 172, 203, 205.
 Meya, 199.

- Meyatva, 198.
 Mid-passage, 216.
 Mīmāṃsā, 49, 231.
 Mīmāṃsaka, 49.
 Mind, 46, 131, 154, 174, 213, 229.
 Minor term, 108, 109.
 Misapprehension, 129, 195, 196.
 Miti, 140, 141, 147.
 Moha, CVI, 221, 223.
 Mokṣa, 227.
 Momentariness, 178.
 Momentary, 44, 56, 83, 102, 109, 121, 132.
 Mother of pearl, 103, 104, 109, 129, 156, 157.
 Motive, 5.
 Mr̥śya, 79.
 Mukta, 210.
 Mukti, 164.
 Multiplicity, 58, 127, 128, 129, 130, 134, 135, 137, 183, 184.
 Mūrta, 64.
 Mūrti, 122.
 Mūrti vaicitrya, 122.
 Mutual relation, 135, 182.
- N
- Nabha, 91.
 Naiyāyika, 9, 83, 103, 174.
 Namana, 2.
 Namaskāra, 2.
 Nañārtha, 224.
 Nañārtharūpaḥ, 141.
 Negation, 90.
 Nihilism, 15.
 Nīla, 57, 58, 59, 66, 73, 95, 116, 118, 141, 161, 176, 180, 184, 197, 198, 211, 223.
 Nimeṣa, 192.
 Nimeṣaṇa, 192.
 Nirmitāḥ, 205.
 Nirodha, 158.
 Nivataḥ, 217.
 Niyama, 221.
 Niyati, 151, 152, 158, 159, 166, 172, 174, 175, 177, 178, 199.
 Niyati Śakti, 145.
 Non-cognition, 137.
 Non-contradiction, 143.
 Non-contradictory, 159.
 Non-difference, 142, 146.
 Non-different, 78, 84, 120, 121, 159, 161, 173, 203, 213, 228.
 Non-duality, 186.
 Non-existence, 104, 105, 106, 107, 122.
 Non-identity, 106, 165.
 Non-manifest, 56, 163.
 Non-manifestation, 216.
 Non-perception, 67, 101, 160.
 Non-recognition, 230.
 Non-validity, 146.
 Not-being, 14, 15, 18, 91, 106, 107, 108, 124, 141, 156, 159, 161, 176, 177, 178, 181, 210, 211, 222, 224.
 Not-cause, 130.
 Not-light, 88.
 Not-self, 15, 90, 194, 196, 197.
 Not-self-manifest, 70.
 Not-this, 88.
 Nūtana, 179.
 Nyāya, 5, 150, 231.
 Nyāya Sūtra, 146.

O

Object, 34, 46, 56, 61, 76, 126, 135, 137, 139, 140, 147, 153, 156, 159, 166, 168, 175, 196, 198, 206, 208, 213, 214, 219, 220, 224, 227.
 Object of desire, 138.
 Object of experience 138.
 Object of knowledge, 139, 206.
 Objective 21, 62.
 Objective consciousness, 211.
 Objective effect, 62.
 Objective level, 84.
 Objective manifestation, 60, 141.
 Objective world, 127, 142.
 Objectivity, 41, 48, 50, 109, 130, 198, 209.
 Obscuration, 7, 13, 90, 94, 204.
 Omniform, 89.
 Omnipotence, 69, 73, 74, 76, 123, 197, 204, 219, 229.
 Omnipotent, 10, 11, 12, 13, 19, 95, 163, 207.
 Omnipresence, 5, 163, 205, 206, 209.
 Omnipresent, 39, 65, 75, 78, 206.
 Omniscience, 25, 197, 205, 206, 219.
 Omniscient, 10, 11, 12, 19, 126, 207.
 One, 4, 17, 98.
 Oneness, 120, 151, 153, 169, 185, 187, 202, 225.
 Optical perception, 105, 106.
 Organs of action, 16, 200.
 Organ of speech, 154.
 Original form, 72.
 Original nature, 170.

P

Pacification, 227.

Pāda, 153.
 Padārtha, 189.
 Pain, 60, 61, 114, 183, 207, 212, 218, 221, 222, 223, 225.
 Pāka, 79.
 Pākṣika, 207.
 Pañcāvayava, 162.
 Para, 90.
 Parā, 73, 145.
 Paramāṇu, 160.
 Parāmarśa, 79, 186, 188.
 Parama Śiva, 1, 13, 18, 75, 76, 195, 216, 218, 224, 227, 228.
 Parameśvara, 191.
 Parameśvaratā, 165.
 Parameśvara tattva, 191.
 Parāparadaśā, 194.
 Parāparā vāk, 73.
 Parārthānumāna, 162.
 Paratā, 194.
 Parā Vāk, 75, 80.
 Particular, 35, 42, 133, 136, 177, 216, 224.
 Particularity, 154, 159, 177, 224.
 Paśu, 131, 196, 203, 204, 210, 222, 224, 226, 227.
 Patañjali, 71, 175.
 Pati, 203, 204, 210, 224.
 Perceiver, 37, 38, 51, 55, 65, 90, 128, 152, 156, 178, 180, 213.
 Perception, 24, 44, 46, 48, 49, 51, 52, 58, 59, 60, 66, 67, 80, 83, 95, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 108, 109, 121, 128, 129, 130, 146, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 169, 170, 178, 179, 185, 196, 211, 212, 213.
 Percipient, 94, 136.
 Perfect being, 89.
 Perfect freedom, 4, 6, 125, 205.
 Perfect-imperfect, 194.

- Perfect independence, 215.
 Perfect Will, 3.
 Permanent subject, 103, 109, 110.
 Pervasion, 217.
 Phenomenal world, 226.
 Philosophy, 72.
 Physical action, 17.
 Piṇḍastha, 91.
 Piṅgalā, 203.
 Piśāca, 105, 106, 107, 116.
 Pīta, 57, 59, 73, 118, 141, 161, 180, 184.
 Place, 74, 83, 100, 128, 145, 152, 154, 158, 213.
 Playful Lord, 118.
 Pleasure, 60, 61, 93, 100, 113, 114, 128, 137, 140, 169, 183, 207, 212, 215, 218, 220, 221, 225, 230.
 Possibility, 88, 93, 94.
 Potential existence, 137.
 Power, 1, 4, 13, 14, 25, 51, 78, 222, 231.
 Power of action, 13, 17, 96, 98, 119, 139.
 Power of cognition 25, 37, 85.
 Power of creation, 93, 99.
 Power of differentiation, 38, 86, 87, 97.
 Power of Freedom, 38, 65, 66, 72, 78, 90, 99, 101, 115.
 Power of knowledge, 2, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 25, 37, 38, 39, 54, 55, 74, 86, 93, 96, 98, 111, 195.
 Power of obscuraton, 89.
 Power of perception, 52, 54, 55.
 Power of remembrance, 38, 52, 54, 98, 101.
 Power of sentiency, 71.
 Power of time, 43, 99.
 Power of will, 5, 172.
 Prabodha, 60.
 Practical life, 39, 93, 98, 104, 105, 108, 110, 111, 112, 127, 133, 136, 137, 138, 139, 159, 165, 221.
 Practical purpose, 71, 79, 130, 133, 204, 225.
 Pradhāna, 183, 184, 199.
 Pradhyaṇa, 2.
 Prajñālaṅkāra, 64.
 Prakalpya, 224.
 Prakāśa, 11, 14, 54, 57, 70, 78, 84, 118, 190, 221, 223.
 Prakāśamānatā, 137.
 Prakāśarūpatā, 118.
 Prakaṭatāvāda, 56.
 Prakṛti, 26.
 Pralaya, 206, 212, 221.
 Pralayākala, 206, 207, 208, 217, 218.
 Pramā, 141.
 Pramāṇa, 58, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 153, 154, 160, 161.
 Pramātā, 48, 82, 104, 161, 200, 203, 206.
 Pramātmaka, 100.
 Prameya, 159, 160, 199, 200, 202, 203, 204.
 Prameyatattva, 224.
 Pramiti, 140, 142, 162.
 Prāṇa, 38, 43, 91, 168, 197, 203, 211, 212, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 220.
 Prāṇa pramātā, 117.
 Prāṇarūpa, 218.
 Prāṇavṛtti, 218.
 Prāṇāyāma, 229.
 Prapattā, 89.
 Prasara, 203.
 Pratibhā, 3.

Pratibhāsa, 150.
 Pratipam, 6.
 Pratiti, 146.
 Pratyabhijñā, 163, 231.
 Pratyakṣajñāna, 36.
 Pratyavamarśa, 81, 88.
 Prayojana, 5.
 Prima facie, 119, 190.
 Primary cause, 174, 199.
 Primary function, 217.
 Principal Consciousness, 155.
 Principle of life, 215, 216, 217, 218.
 Principle of sentiency, 128, 211.
 Priority, 180.
 Prompter 147, 165, 171, 228.
 Propinquity, 121.
 Prthaktva, 150.
 Prthivī, 159.
 Purāṇa, 7, 15, 161, 164, 208.
 Pure consciousness, 10, 88, 89, 145, 205, 207.
 Pure diversity, 228.
 Pure-Ego, 1.
 Pure knowledge, 60.
 Pure-Light, 2, 90, 93.
 Pure Self, 3.
 Pure Self-luminosity, 55.
 Pure Self-luminous subject, 52.
 Pure Sentiency, 214.
 Pure subject, 41.
 Purity, 105, 205.
 Purpose 134, 136, 147, 162, 173, 231.
 Purposive attitude, 153, 155.
 Puruṣa, 27, 47, 220, 221, 222.
 Puryaṣṭaka, 15, 117, 162, 168, 212, 215.

Q

Quality, 214.
 Quiver, 222.

R

Rāga, 198, 199.
 Rāhu, 49, 144.
 Rajas, 26, 159, 220, 221, 222, 223.
 Rajataikavimarśa, 143.
 Rājoguṇa, 220, 223.
 Rasa, 176, 231.
 Rationalist, 175.
 Reaction, 131.
 Real, 52, 60, 102, 127, 128, 220.
 Reality, 19, 44, 59, 71, 120, 132, 139, 144, 174, 209, 211, 214, 220.
 Reason, 63, 65, 66, 93, 108, 118, 120, 158, 171, 175, 176, 196, 202, 207, 219.
 Recognition, 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16, 18, 20, 28, 45, 52, 96, 120, 123, 155, 183, 219, 230, 231.
 Recollection, 22, 82.
 Reflection, 26, 27, 38, 47, 58, 59, 65, 66, 84, 85, 91, 99, 155, 168, 185, 190, 191.
 Relation, 3, 14, 19, 24, 25, 30, 32, 33, 35, 37, 46, 81, 84, 85, 127, 128, 131, 132, 133, 135, 136, 138, 139, 151, 166, 167, 170, 227.
 Relation of cause and effect, 101, 175.
 Relation of contraries, 103, 104, 109, 110.
 Relation of dependence, 30.
 Relative position, 133, 135.

- Rememberer, 24, 43.
 Remembrance, 11, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 28, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 58, 59, 65, 86, 93, 94, 95, 98, 101, 102, 110, 111, 119.
 Residual traces, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40, 41, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 81, 88, 95, 96, 119, 120, 138, 164, 196, 204, 206, 210, 211.
 Reverential act, 210.
 Right, 103.
 Right consciousness, 135.
 Right knowledge, 61, 62, 103, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 151, 152, 153, 160, 161, 183, 222.
 Rightness, 103.
 Rohaṇa, 6.
 Ruci, 148.
 Rudra, 38, 192, 202, 203, 220.
 Rūpaśleṣa, 134.
- S**
- Śabda, 142.
 Śabdarāśi, 145.
 Sādākhya, 191.
 Śaḍardhaśāstra, 196.
 Sadāśiva, 4, 16, 17, 41, 73, 81, 92, 118, 131, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 216, 218, 221, 224, 228.
 Sadāśiva category, 191, 192.
 Sādhāraṇa, 226.
 Sādhya, 178.
 Sādhyaḥbheda, 178.
 Sādhyaḥbhedadoṣa, 177.
 Sadvidyā, 192, 193, 194.
 Śaiva, 165.
 Śaivāgama, 189, 231.
 Śaiva systems, 189.
 Sakala, 208, 218.
 Śakti, 1, 78, 167.
 Śaktimataḥ, 221.
 Salutation, 2, 3.
 Samādhi, 165, 210, 211, 213.
 Samāna, 211, 215, 216, 217, 218.
 Sāmānādhikarāṇya, 150.
 Samanvaya, 101.
 Sāmānyarūpatva, 150.
 Samanyatodṛṣṭa, 67.
 Samavāya, 63, 101, 133, 136.
 Sāmāveśa, 209, 210, 215.
 Samavetam, 51.
 Sambandha, 30, 160.
 Saṁsāra, 71, 164.
 Saṁskāra, 23.
 Samuccaya, 79, 208.
 Samuccayopamā, 124.
 Saṁvedana, 41, 155.
 Saṁvid, 11, 16, 37, 38, 41, 47, 49, 55, 65, 66, 69, 71, 72, 75, 77, 80, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90, 100, 111, 117, 140, 153, 159, 164, 168, 169, 197, 204, 209, 219, 224.
 Saṁvit sphuraṇa, 124.
 Saṁvitsvabhāva, 228.
 Saṁvṛti, 132.
 Saṁvṛtisatya, 127, 132.
 Sāmya, 217.
 Sāmya mokṣa, 158.
 Saṁyoga, 64.
 Saṅkalpa, 76, 200.
 Śaṅkaranandana, 64.
 Śaṅkha, 12, 19, 25, 28, 32, 47, 91, 182, 198, 208.

- Saṅkocapurāṣara, 220.
 Sanniveśa, 159.
 Sāra, 75.
 Sāra Śāstra, 75.
 Śarat, 122.
 Sat, 186.
 Sattā, 60, 136, 137, 192, 222, 223.
 Sattānanda, 223.
 Sattva, 26, 46, 60, 220, 221, 222, 223.
 Sauśupta, 212, 217.
 Sauśupta of Prāṇa, 212.
 Sautrāntika view, 66.
 Savedya, 212.
 Savedya suśupta, 207, 213, 217.
 Scorpion, 175, 176.
 Self, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 30, 32, 35, 36, 37, 45, 46, 47, 49, 51, 52, 55, 59, 78, 79, 81, 86, 90, 91, 95, 96, 110, 120, 164, 166, 187, 196, 198, 212, 218, 219, 220, 224, 228, 230, 231, 232.
 Self-centered, 181, 182.
 Self-centeredness, 134.
 Self-confined, 20, 32, 33, 37, 55, 57, 72, 100, 132, 133, 134, 174, 181, 184.
 Self-conscious, 77.
 Self-consciousness, 4, 19, 21, 51, 60, 71, 73, 74, 78, 79, 80, 86, 88, 90, 92, 102, 103, 118, 125, 127, 131, 132, 168, 194, 205, 207, 209, 211, 219, 220, 221, 222, 224, 225, 228, 230.
 Self-contained, 1.
 Self-contradiction, 77.
 Self-contradictory, 167.
 Self-established, 66, 161.
 Self-experience, 73, 219.
 Self-luminosity, 4, 25, 26, 36, 54.
 Self-luminous, 60, 102.
 Self-luminous principle, 37.
 Self-manifest, 25, 33, 66, 111.
 Self-realisation, 5, 227.
 Self-recognition, 1, 230.
 Self-shining, 10, 11, 12, 17, 21, 25, 35, 37, 160.
 Sense, 96, 169, 208, 213.
 Sense-contact, 87, 111.
 Sense-organs, 16, 107.
 Sense-perception, 80, 116, 129, 132, 144, 169, 214.
 Senselessness, 82, 124.
 Sentiency, 25, 41, 65, 66, 70, 71, 74, 91, 120, 154, 181, 189, 197, 208, 211, 216, 222.
 Sentient, 14, 15, 16, 24, 27, 28, 30, 38, 70, 71, 73, 75, 119, 160, 170, 171, 180, 181, 186, 187, 190, 209, 219.
 Sentient activity, 71.
 Sentient being, 182, 191.
 Sentient cause, 171.
 Sentient freedom, 71.
 Sentient Lord, 174.
 Sentient power, 81.
 Sentient principle, 40.
 Sentient self, 66, 182.
 Sentient Subject, 16.
 Siddha, 30, 146, 178, 229.
 Siddhānta, 7, 145.
 Siddhi, 10, 11, 42, 230, 231.
 Silver, 103, 104, 109, 144, 157, 185.
 Similarity, 160.
 Śimśapā, 174, 175, 176, 177.
 Śiśnadevāḥ, 1.
 Śiva, 5, 17, 19, 32, 40, 54, 78, 86, 92, 98, 111, 119, 127, 131, 139, 159, 160, 166, 174, 189, 190, 202, 204, 208, 219, 228, 229.

- Śiva Drṣṭi, 5, 8, 17.
 Śivādvaita, 177.
 Śiva tattva, 191.
 Śivika, 171, 172.
 Smaraṇa, 2.
 Smṛti, 165.
 Somānanda, 1, 17, 229.
 Space, 20, 60, 84, 99, 123, 129, 132, 133, 142, 148.
 Spanda, 16, 192, 215.
 Spandana, 74.
 Spatial, 14, 85, 88, 92, 99, 100, 110.
 Spatial limitation, 84, 85, 140, 157, 205.
 Spatial order, 100.
 Spatial relation, 100, 128, 130.
 Spatial succession, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126.
 Speech, 73, 76, 82, 87, 145.
 Sphuraṇa, 74.
 Sphurattā, 74.
 Spirit, 62, 164.
 Spiritual ascent, 91.
 Spiritual insight, 94.
 Spiritual intuition, 91.
 Spiritual path, 8.
 Spiritual power, 65, 231.
 Spiritualist, 43.
 Sthiti, 216.
 Stir, 16, 74.
 Subject, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 20, 23, 27, 36, 38, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 61, 62, 76, 78, 80, 82, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 110, 114, 117, 119, 123, 124, 131, 132, 135, 138, 139, 144, 153, 159, 163, 170, 178, 190, 196, 202, 203, 227.
 Subjective, 43, 44, 48, 62, 162, 195.
 Subjective Ābhāsa, 141.
 Subjective cause, 62.
 Subjective light, 55, 140.
 Subjective luminosity, 27.
 Subjective reaction, 45.
 Subjectivist, 54.
 Subjectivity, 203, 209, 210, 224.
 Substance, 14, 71, 72, 75, 76, 78, 128, 132, 139, 148, 149, 215.
 Substantive, 79, 103.
 Substratum, 24, 71, 72, 91, 98, 111, 112, 119, 120, 150, 169, 177, 192, 193, 220.
 Subtle, 200.
 Subtle idea, 83.
 Succession, 30, 63, 84, 85, 99, 119, 121, 123, 124, 125, 166, 169, 171, 172, 174, 183, 211.
 Śuddhavidyā, 193, 194.
 Śūdra, 146.
 Suffering, 220.
 Śūnya, 15, 55, 91, 93, 95, 124, 126, 162, 196, 197, 198, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 215, 224, 229.
 Śūnya-Brahman, 91.
 Śūnya pramātā, 141, 203, 210.
 Śūnya-subject, 211.
 Śūnyatā, 211.
 Superimposition, 87, 88, 90, 131, 198.
 Supreme, 1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 93, 227.
 Supreme bliss, 74.
 Supreme creative power, 3, 4, 12.
 Supreme Diety, 2.
 Supreme freedom, 205.
 Supreme greatness, 2.
 Supreme Power, 4, 7, 73.
 Supreme self, 277.
 Surrender, 2, 3.
 Suṣumṇā, 203, 216.

Suṣupta, 212, 217.
 Svabhāvabheda, 176.
 Svabhāvahetu, 176, 177, 178.
 Sairī, 41.
 Svajñānam, 106.
 Svalakṣaṇa, 20, 44, 142, 151, 154.
 Svapna, 217.
 Svarūpabheda, 150.
 Svātantrya, 38, 73, 77, 95, 216.
 Svātantryahāni, 204.
 Svātantrya Śakti, 222.
 Śyañ, 72.
 Syllogism, 163.

T

Tādātmya, 105, 144, 174.
 Taddhita, 72.
 Tadutpatti, 174.
 Tamas, 26, 221, 222, 223.
 Tanmātras, 212.
 Tantrāloka, 201.
 Tantrasāra, 201.
 Taru, 177.
 Taste, 147.
 Tattva, 26, 129, 158, 159, 190, 191, 194, 202, 207, 228.
 Teacher, 110, 138.
 Temple, 123.
 Temporal, 14, 84, 85, 88, 92, 99, 110, 205.
 Temporal limitations, 85, 161.
 Temporal order, 183.
 Temporal succession, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 191.

Theory of difference, 57.
 Theory of God, 139.
 Third eye, 203.
 Thirty-six tattvas, 218.
 This-consciousness, 68, 118, 191, 192, 194.
 Thisness, 118, 209.
 Thought process, 80.
 Tika, 1.
 Time, 9, 20, 25, 28, 42, 60, 74, 84, 99, 121, 123, 133, 145, 148, 152, 154, 158, 213.
 Tirodhāna, 196.
 Touch, 132, 213.
 Transcendental, 189, 230.
 Transcendental being, 75, 222, 227.
 Transcendental categories, 16.
 Transcendental level, 118, 145.
 Transcendental Lordliness, 231.
 Transcendental motion, 75, 222.
 Transcendental movement, 75.
 Transcendental power, 75, 231.
 Transcendental self, 73.
 Transcendental speech, 75, 80, 82, 86.
 Transcendental state, 228.
 Transitoriness, 140, 176, 178.
 Transitory, 21, 176.
 Transmigration, 205, 208.
 Transmigratory beings, 208, 209.
 Transmigratory souls, 199.
 Trinity, 202.
 True light, 52.
 True self, 202.
 True subject, 55.
 Turiya, 209, 214, 215, 216.
 Turiyatīta, 210, 215, 216, 218.
 Turya, 210, 218.

U

- Udāna, 211, 216, 218.
 Udayākara, 231.
 Udvataḥ, 217.
 Ultimate, 6, 9, 19, 111, 159, 202.
 Ultimate cause, 173.
 Ultimate Reality, 3, 11, 19, 195, 221.
 Ultimate State, 1.
 Uncommon creation, 225.
 Unconventional objectivity, 224.
 Undifferentiated state, 201.
 Unification, 29, 36, 37, 40, 45, 46, 48, 52, 57, 81, 83, 86, 87, 88, 92, 93, 100, 102, 110, 117, 147, 148, 153, 154, 158, 181, 226.
 Union, 7, 98, 159.
 Unity, 1, 19, 30, 127, 129, 130, 134, 135, 137, 160, 183, 185, 186, 218.
 Unity in diversity, 1.
 Unity in multiplicity, 42, 128, 130, 131, 133, 137, 138.
 Universal, 14, 18, 20, 67, 127, 128, 132, 134, 138, 142, 147, 159, 160, 165, 178, 189, 224.
 Universal Consciousness, 65, 72, 78, 80, 86, 89, 91, 117, 123, 132.
 Universal Creator, 172.
 Universal light, 161, 163.
 Universal Mind, 206.
 Universal power, 136.
 Universal Self, 38, 41, 54, 94.
 Universal self-consciousness, 86, 100.
 Universal self-luminous principle, 53.
 Universal subject, 41, 55, 77, 94, 115, 123.
 Universal thisness, 142.
 Unmeṣa, 192.

- Unreal, 102.
 Unrestrained freedom, 118.
 Upacāra, 14.
 Upalabdhi, 47.
 Upodghāta, 18.
 Utkarṣa, 18.
 Utpala, 1, 231.
 Utpaladeva, 18, 110, 118, 201, 232.
 Utpaladevapāda, 126, 138.
 Utpattimūlaja, 176.

V

- Vacuum, 197.
 Vad, 158.
 Vaiśeṣika, 12, 19, 24, 47, 64.
 Vaitatya, 121, 133.
 Vāk, 73, 87.
 Valid knowledge, 104.
 Valid means, 153.
 Validity, 76, 102, 104, 108, 136, 143, 144, 151.
 Vandana, 2.
 Vāsanā, 27, 35, 59, 60.
 Vastu, 159.
 Vat, 217.
 Veda, 99, 145, 146.
 Vedānta, 90.
 Vedānta Philosophy, 185.
 Vedāntin, 159.
 Veil of ignorance, 223.
 Verbal authority, 183, 199, 202.
 Viccheda, 217.
 Vidyā, 16, 42, 193, 194, 198, 199, 201, 203, 212.
 Vidyāpati, 2.
 Vidyāśakti, 93, 195, 196.

Vidyā Tattva, 192.
 Vidyēśa, 193, 208.
 Vidyēśvara, 13, 195, 207.
 Vighraha, 161.
 Vijñāna, 37, 47, 58, 59, 60, 66, 82, 100, 185.
 Vijñānākala, 13, 207, 208, 216, 218.
 Vijñānakevala, 206.
 Vijñānavāda, 59, 60.
 Vijñānavādin, 27, 60, 61, 178.
 Vikalpa, 79, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 101, 131, 132, 208, 227.
 Vilaya, 196.
 Vimarśa, 17, 45, 67, 71, 75, 76, 78, 84, 86, 118, 146, 149, 155, 158, 189, 190, 193, 221, 222.
 Vimarśamaya, 82.
 Vimarśinī, 201.
 Vipāka, 204.
 Viparitakhyāti, 157.
 Viriñca, 4.
 Virodha, 103.
 Vīryabheda, 176.
 Viśaya, 135.
 Viśayaprakāśa, 117.
 Viśeṣa, 24, 160.
 Viṣṇu, 4, 38, 74, 192, 202, 203.
 Viśrānti, 6.
 Viṣu, 217.
 Viṣuvat, 216, 217.
 Viśvarūpa, 222.
 Viśvottīrṇa, CCI.


Vital air, 66, 69, 91, 93, 107, 124, 141, 200, 210, 211, 216.
 Vivekāñjana, 3.
 Volition, 96.
 Vṛtti, 1, 7, 8.
 Vyākaraṇa, 231.
 Vyāna, 202, 211, 216, 218.
 Vyāpāra, 145.
 Vyāpārārūpa, 142.
 Vyatirekābhāva, 105, 107.
 Vyavahāra, 177.
 Vyavasthāpanā, 35, 66.
 Vyutthāna, 215.

W

Wakeful, 214, 216.
 Will, 1, 2, 51, 66, 188, 199, 206.
 Will of yogin, 65.
 Will-power, 6, 174, 175.
 Wrong, 103.

Y

Yogin, 40, 43, 46, 47, 48, 65, 66, 74, 91, 144, 160, 173, 174, 175, 176, 179, 195, 199.
 Yojikā, 154.
 Yukti, 154.




OUR IMPORTANT BOOKS ON TANTRA AND ŚAIVISM

- Avalon, Arthur, Ed.**—Mahanirvana
Tantra (Text) (Paper) 75; (Cloth) 100
—Prapancasara Tantra (Text) (Cloth) 100
(Paper) 75
—Sharada Tilaka Tantra (Text) (Cloth) 175
(Paper) 120
- Chakravarti, Mahadev**—The Concept of
Rudra-Siva Through the Ages 150
- Chattopadhyaya, S.**—Reflections on the Tantras 55
- Dwivedi, R.C. and Rastogi, Navjivan, Ed.**
—Tantraloka of Abhinavagupta
(Text in Devanagari with Exhaustive Eng.
Introduction & Indices) in 8 Vols. (Cloth) 800
(Paper) 600
- Goudriaan, Teun, Ed.**—The Vinasikha Tantra
(A Saiva Tantra of the Left Current) 75
- *Guenther, Herbert V.**—Tantric View of Life \$ 8.50
- Hinze, O.M.**—Tantra Vidya 30
(Eng. Tr. by V.M. Bedekar)
- Jaideva Singh**,—Pratyabhijnahridayam of
Ksemaraja (Text, Eng. Tr.) (Cloth) 40
(Paper) 30
—Sivasutra (The Yoga of the Supreme
Identity) (Text, Eng. Tr.) (Cloth) 60
(Paper) 45
—Spanda-Karika (Text, Eng. Tr.) (Cloth) 50
(Paper) 35
—Vijnana-Bhairava (Text, Eng. Tr.) (Cloth) 50
(Paper) 35
- Lessing, F.D. and Wayman, Alex**—Introduction
to Buddhist Tantric System 75
- Pandey, K.C.**—An Outline of History of Saiva
Philosophy 80
- Rastogi, Navjivan**,—Krama Tantricism of
Kashmir, Vol. I 55
- Shastri, Lakshman, Ed.**—Tantraraja Tantra
(Text) (Introduction by Arthur
Avalon) (Paper) 100; (Cloth) 120
- Sivaraman, K**—Saivism in Philosophical
Perspective 150
- Skorupski, Tadeusz**—Sarvadurgati Parishod-
dhana Tantra (Tibetan and Sanskrit text
Romanised with Eng. Translation and
Intro., Notes etc.) 200
- Wayman, Alex**—Yoga of the Guhyasamaja
Tantra 100
- Woodroffe, John and Pandit, M.P.**—
Kularnava Tantra (Skt. Text with
Eng. Intro.) (Paper) 70; (Cloth) 100

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS

Delhi Varanasi Patna Madras



ŚAIVA SIDDHĀNTA THEOLOGY

Rohan A. Dunuwila

In this book the author surveys for the first time the whole tradition of the Siddhānta in its historical, literary and theological contexts. He then focuses on Aghoraśiva (A.D. 1100), the theologian who bridged the two traditions, Sanskrit and Tamil.

The book is based on Aghoraśiva's commentary on Bhoja's (A.D. 1058) *Tattvaparakāśikā*, a systematic work of seventy-five verses. After translating the main verses (1-24) with their commentary, the author identifies the Siddhānta's main metaphysical problem: how to harmonize Emanationism with the theology of Difference (*bheda*)—a problem ignored by Bhoja and his predecessors. He then points to Aghoraśiva's solution as significant in the context of Hindu theology: an *inner* plurality of the Godhead untainted by the phenomenal. This—the divine plurality in unity—is the Siddhānta's fundamental insight.

Rs. 100

SIVASTOTRĀVALI

N.K. Kotru

Sivastotrāvali is a collection of stray verses composed by Utpaladeva. The importance of this text lies in the fact that it contains spontaneous outpourings of a master mind given to the discovery of the truth of existence. The verses come out direct from the heart, and retain all the purity of the spirit that speaks through them. As such they constitute an authentic saga of one of the greatest spiritual adventures in the world. In fact, we can feel through them not only the author's consummate wisdom, but also his very temper and heartbeat during various stages of his *sādhana* till he attained the acme of spiritual insight. The book throws valuable light on the author's struggle with forces of nature that impeded his progress all the way till he gained entrance into the closely guarded audience chamber of the Lord. It contains the text in Devanāgarī, an English rendering, a very useful introduction, a glossary of technical terms and an Index of verses.

(Paper) Rs. 50; (Cloth) Rs. 80

TRIADIC MYSTICISM

Paul E. Murphy

This book is the first consistent theological treatment of the subject of Hindu thought known to itself as *Trika* or Triadism, and popularly as Kashmir Śaivism.

The author has endeavoured to make the thought of this complex system intelligible to educated readers innocent of Sanskrit, through a consistent use of English equivalents of Triadic terminology, listed in the Appendix. He has also attempted to sound the depths of the Triadic system through the use of the comparative method, by instituting parallels with the theologies of two religions, Islam and Catholicism. The latter religion, Murphy believes, offers the greatest number of such parallels with Triadism, and so is compared with it in greater detail. Murphy's book is truly a model of inter-theological comparison.

Rs. 120

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS

Delhi Varanasi Patna Madras

SV
S.N
Sub
P
Sub