An Introduction to Tantric Philosophy

The Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta with the Commentary of Yogarāja

Translated by Lyne Bansat-Boudon and Kamaleshadatta Tripathi

Introduction, notes, critically revised Sanskrit text, appendix, indices by Lyne Bansat-Boudon

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The Paramārthasāra, or ‘Essence of Ultimate Reality’, is a work of the Kashmirian polymath Abhinavagupta (tenth–eleventh centuries). It is a brief treatise in which the author outlines the doctrine of which he is a notable exponent, namely non-dualistic Śaivism, which he designates in his works as the Trika, or 'Triad' of three principles: Śiva, Śakti and the embodied soul (nara).

The main interest of the Paramārthasāra is not only that it serves as an introduction to the established doctrine of a tradition, but also advances the notion of jīvanmukti, 'liberation in this life', as its core theme. Further, it does not confine itself to an exposition of the doctrine as such but at times hints at a second sense lying beneath the evident sense, namely esoteric techniques and practices that are at the heart of the philosophical discourse. Its commentator, Yogarāja (eleventh century), excels in detecting and clarifying those various levels of meaning.

An Introduction to Tantric Philosophy presents, along with a critically revised Sanskrit text, the first annotated English translation of both Abhinavagupta’s Paramārthasāra and Yogarāja’s commentary.

This book will be of interest to Indologists, as well as to specialists and students of Religion, Tantric studies and Philosophy.

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IDENTITY, RITUAL AND STATE IN TIBETAN BUDDHISM

Martin A. Mills

THE KHECARĪVIDYĀ OF ĀDINĀTHA
A critical edition and annotated translation of an early text of haṭhayoga

James Mallinson

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Preface

In the text, kārikās and pratīkas are set in boldface.

In general, an effort has been made to limit citation of Sanskrit terms in parentheses. However, it has been judged desirable to make the basic vocabulary of the doctrine visible to the reader. Thus, the Sanskrit term is instanced

— when it designates a key notion of the Trika, or one of its favorite metaphors, and at its first occurrence,

— when it is required in order to grasp the sense of a gloss (e.g., ad 33, where kṛḍā is glossed by khela),

— in order to take note of the more or less uniform translation of diverse, but essentially synonymous, Sanskrit terms, e.g., X Y Z, all of which have been translated by ‘consciousness’ (note, especially, the variety of terms for ‘liberation’),

— mutatis mutandis, in order to take note of the polysemy of certain crucial Sanskrit terms, parāmarśā, paramārtha, smṛti, etc.

Certain Sanskrit terms of wider, but often technical usage, whose meaning is not easily grasped, or which are expanded upon, have been treated in the notes. Literal translations are likewise to be found there.

Sanskrit terms that have become, or are used as, English words are left in Roman, and may accept a plural suffix: kārikā, śloka, mantra, avatāra-ṇikā, guru, karman, etc.

Likewise, marks of suppletions have been limited as much as possible to those necessary to make sense of an often laconic Sanskrit, especially as concerns the many technical explanations of concepts and terms. The frequently occurring āha, referring always to Abhinavagupta, has been rendered by ‘the master says’.

Glosses or terms to be understood as such are enclosed in single quotation marks. Double quotation marks indicate that the author ‘wishes to single out a word or phrase, not quoting it from a specific document ... but referring it to a general background that will be recognized by the reader’ (Chicago Manual of Style, 13th ed.).
Certain elaborations of notions treated in the notes have been grouped together in an ‘Appendix’.

In addition to the key terms of the doctrine, certain recurring segments of its phraseology have been indexed, each with a translation, forming a glossary of the essential points of the system.

To this has been added an Index locorum and an ‘Anthology of spiritual experience’ (see Intr., n. 99).

The Sanskrit text reproduced here is based on the KSTS edition. It has been revised and corrected at places after collation of nine manuscripts; see ‘On the Sanskrit Text’.

For the history of the work here presented, it may be useful to note that Prof. K. D. Tripathi is a disciple of Rāmeśvara Jhā, the author of the Pūrṇatāpratyabhijñā, cited frequently in the notes (see, especially, n. 314).

A work by D. B. SenSharma has appeared in 2007, to which I have had access only tardily, but have nevertheless consulted: Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta. The Essence of the Supreme Truth, with the commentary of Yogarāja. Translation & introduction. New Delhi, Muktabodha, and Emeryville, Calif. The work is however more a free gloss than a translation.
Acknowledgments

The work on the annotated translation of the Paramārthasāra and its gloss began in June 2000 in collaboration with Prof. Kamaleśhadatta Tripathi, thus following the rigorous tradition of Indian scholarship. Since then, a number of versions have seen the light and have resulted in the present text, which has benefited from comments and advice offered by several learned scholars.

Special thanks go to Charles Malamoud, André Padoux, Raffaele Torella, Alexis Sanderson, Dominic Goodall, Marion Rastelli, David Seyfort Ruegg, Eli Franco, Karin Preisendanz, Ernst Steinkellner, Nalini Delvoye, Michel Hulin, Victoria Lissenko, Birgit Kellner, Seishi Karashima, who were generous enough to provide their expertise in response to my queries.

One of the pleasures attendant upon scholarly research is certainly this: the constant attestation of that simple and discreet fraternity to which the scientific community pays tacit homage.

I am particularly indebted towards three colleagues and friends. Not only did Yves Codet contribute to elucidating several difficulties raised by the text, but he also immensely helped by formatting my manuscript using the XeTex software. This was a long and somewhat laborious task, during which his patience never abided.

With Judit Törzsök, I had long discussions concerning passages that required her grasp and knowledge of tantric Śivaism, particularly its rituals. Her unfailing support was central to the establishment of the Sanskrit text.

Finally, the bibliography is the result of a dedicated collaboration with Silvia D'Intino who generously shared her cataloguing skills and her sharp understanding of the "bibliographic object".

I also wish to express my deep gratitude to my friend and highly esteemed colleague Edwin Gerow, whose careful reading of my text ensured proper English wording. During our discussions, with talent and just the necessary touch of mischievousness, he fulfilled the role of an objector, commenting and challenging many terms and passages of earlier drafts of
this work. The present version has been materially improved by responding to, and indeed incorporating some of, his comments. Needless to say, any remaining infelicities should be attributed to me.

LBB
Śiva (?), with the khaṭvāṅga. Sirpur, Chhattisgarh. 7th century. Photo by Nicole Ménant-Di Dio
Introduction

As soon as the expanse of ignorance affecting the mind is dispelled by correct insight, then ‘liberation while living’ is present on the palm of the hand.

— Abhinavagupta, Tantrāloka

1. The two Paramārthasāra

The Paramārthasāra, or ‘Essence of Ultimate Reality’, is a work of the Kashmirian polymath Abhinavagupta (end of the tenth, beginning of the eleventh century). It is a brief treatise, a compendium in which the author outlines the doctrine of which he is a notable exponent (indeed, the most fecund), namely nondualistic Śaivism, which he designates in his works as the ‘Trika’, or ‘Triad’ of three principles: Śiva, Śakti and the embodied soul (nāra).

According to Yogarāja (second half of the eleventh century), the author of its commentary, Vivṛti, the Paramārthasāra is of the nature of a prakarana, a ‘manual’ or ‘précis’ serving as introduction to the established doctrine of a tradition. The work, appropriately, begins by

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1The commentary ad 104 uses the term śāstra.
2samkṣepa or samgraha. See 2nd maṅgalācarana of the commentary (paramārthasārasamkṣepa), Paramārthasāra [PS] 104 (idam...samkṣepam), 105 (tad idam samkṣiptam śāstrasāram) and the colophon of the commentary (paramārthasārasamgrahavivṛti).
3See, for instance, Tantrāloka [TĀ] X 1, XIII 348 and (as the periphrastic expression ‘ṣaḍardha’, ‘half of six’) TĀ XIII 301 (where is established the supremacy of the Trika over all Śaiva currents), XVI 158, XXXVII 26, 68, etc. I use the term ‘Trika’ here in this sense. On the historical development of the Trika and other symbolic meanings of the term itself, see Sanderson 1995: 672; 2007. The preeminent concern of this essay, ‘nondualistic’ or ‘nondual’ (advaita) Śaivism of Kashmir, will be, when the context does not tend to confusion, referred to simply as Kashmir Śaivism or even as Śaivism. On this ‘Triad’, see avataranikā [avat.] ad PS 41 (n. 875) and 46.
4See avat. ad PS 2–3 and 105, and n. 276 on prakarana.
5As YR puts it in his commentary ad 104, the theme underlying the entire text is ‘[that brahman], in reference to which a concise summary (samkṣepa) containing the essential purport (tàtparya) [of our doctrine] has been stated, and explained, by Abhinavagupta, whose name is to be mentioned with reverence [i.e., celebrated]’. In his gloss of PS 105, YR underlines as well the esoteric dimension of such a tradition, thus “revealed”, at least in part, to the
featuring a *mumukšu*, one who ‘aspires to liberation’, a student desirous of learning from a master the means whereby he may put an end to his dolorous wanderings through the cycles of rebirth.  

The *Paramārthasāra* shares with the vast majority of Indian philosophical texts this propaedeutic purpose that is encoded as well in the title of the work, which may equally be understood as signifying ‘The Core of the Teachings on Ultimate Reality’, as Yogarāja explains in his gloss of the second and third verses.  

### 1.1. The Paramārthasāra of Ādiśeṣa

What makes the *Paramārthasāra* of Abhinavagupta unique is the nature of its exposition of the doctrine. It does not in all respects correspond to the ordinary model of a *prakaraṇa*.  

In its second and third verses, which recount its “myth of origin”, this *Paramārthasāra* is presented as a śaivite reworking of another *Paramārthasāra*, attributed to Ādiśeṣa, also called Ādhāra (sixth or seventh cen-

sincere adept: ‘This core of the teaching (*śāstrasāra*), that is, that essence (*satattva*) spread throughout numerous texts, has been condensed by me; that is, has been stated [by Abhinavagupta] after having mastered it himself, within the small span of hundred verses, though it can hardly be explained in a thousand texts. By this is stated [as well] the resourcefulness [of the author’s] luminous consciousness [(*pratibha*)].

6See YR ad 101, where the gods say, apropos the ‘failed’ aspirant (*yogabhṛṣṭa*): [...] *yasya svātmanī jijnāstrtham prāgjanmanī udvam “bhūt, ‘It is he [after all] whose striving in a previous life was motivated by a desire to know regarding his own Self*.  

7The polysemy of the term *artha* makes other interpretations possible: ‘The Essence of Ultimate Meaning’ (see PS 59 and YR ad loc.), or, more pregnantly, ‘Principles essential in attaining the Supreme Goal of life’, namely *mokṣa* — see PS 103 and YR ad 104, quoted p. 33. The term ‘sāra’ (lit., ‘sap’, ‘vivifying juice’) itself participates in the pun, expressing on the one hand the ‘kernel’ or ‘core’ of the Real, from which the inessential has been stripped away, and on the other, the heart of the teaching, from which superfluous or ancillary discussion has been abstracted.

8See p. 19.

9Also Ananta — all these being synonymous with Śeṣa, Viṣṇu’s serpent. Hence the alternative titles of the work: Adhārakārikā, or Anantakārikā, to which is sometimes added a descriptive title: Āryāpāṭeṣāṭi, ‘The [work composed of] eighty-five āryās’. The tradition also makes this identification, referring on the author a quasi-divine status (cf. the epithet *jagadādhaṇa*, ‘support of the world’, v. 87). And so, Rāghavānanda [R], a late Advaitin (probably 16th cent.), author of the *Paramārthasārasāvivarana* [APSv], the only commentary on the first PS to have come down to us, observes, in his gloss on v. 87: *śeṣaḥ anantas tu na yah ko ‘pi vipaṣeṣit, ‘Śeṣa, namely Ananta, not some sage or other*. But, in his gloss on v. 3, he qualifies this same Ananta as *jīvanmuktam guruvaram (papraccha)*, ‘[he asks] the most excellent teacher, liberated while alive ...’ The same ambiguity is seen in YR’s commentary, which sometimes presents Ādhāra as a sage (*muni*), a mortal, but also associates Ādhāra or Śeṣa directly with a divine figure, Anantanātha — ‘Lord Ananta’— sometimes termed also the ‘presiding deity of Māyā’ (TĀ VIII 323a, with the commentary of Jayaratha [JR] (fl. ca. 1250; see Sanderson 2007: 418–419), the *Tantrālokaviveka* [TĀV]; references to TĀV will be made to Dwivedi and Rastogi’s ed. 1987). Abhinavagupta [AG] seems generally to opt for a supra-mundane status; he cites, in his commentary to *Bhagavadgītā* [BH] VIII 6, v. 81 of
tury), of which the commentator, Yogarāja, has retained only the Śāmkhya features. This is perhaps in function of that text’s verse seven, in which the mumukṣu, who now knows his catechism, presses the master to reveal the secrets implied in the distinction between puruṣa and prakṛti and just why knowledge of that distinction is salvific. To this extent, Yogarāja only takes partial account of the doctrine of the older Paramārthasāra, which conflates Śāmkhya dualism and the nondualism of the Vedānta—a kind of pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta halfway between the dvaitādvaitāda of Bhartṛprapañca and the advaitāda of Gaudapāda, but one which, impressed with devotion to Viṣṇu, remains profoundly theist, in the manner of epic Śāmkhya.

Ādiśeṣa’s work, which he there terms a śruti; in his TĀ (XXVIII 309b), he attributes this same verse, without naming the text, to the ‘Lord of the serpents, who bears the burden of the universe by supporting it’ (ahūnā viśvādhāradhurāndharah). Another thread of the tradition (in fact, the edition of the text, published in the Pandit, 1871) identifies Śeṣa with Patañjali: śrimadbhagavaccheṣakṛtyaṇapaṇ Śaṁpatā (colophon) vs. śrimadbhagavatpatanjaliviraktyāryā (incipit). The Western mentality will of course attempt to resolve the ambiguity: the author is one Ādiśeṣa, so named, who is a devotee of Viṣṇu. The line between divinity and honored predecessor being always difficult to draw in India, such identifications serve as well as ways of claiming greater authority for the text in question. In these notes, the Paramārthasāra of Ādiśeṣa will be designated by the abbreviation ĀPS (Ādiśeṣaparamārthasāra), the Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta, by PS.

The Yuktidipikā ad Śāmkhyakārikā [SK] 2 cites v. 83 of ĀPS. This anonymous commentary is situated ca. 550 AD by Frauwallner (1973, vol. I: 226), ca. 680–720, or even later, by Wezler and Motegi, Yuktidipikā: 50.

See YR ad 2–3.

2 ĀPS 7: γναपुरुṣαβιβαγαγινε dharmādharmau na bandhakau bhavatah/ iti gaddita-pūrabhavāyaith prakṛtrim puruṣam ca me brūhi/, ’Merit and Demerit do not bind him who knows the distinction between the Qualities and the Soul. In accordance with [these] sentences, as pronounced in the foregoing, explain to me Primordial Nature and Soul!’ (tr. Danielson—as are all translations from ĀPS cited here, unless otherwise specified).

3See, notably, Bouy Āgamaśāstra [ĀS]: 23–28; Mahadevan 1975: 16–22; Bhattacharya ĀŚ: LXXIXff.

4See APS 27. Ādiśeṣa shares notably with Bhartṛprapañca the conception of a saprapañcabrahman, in virtue of which brahman, in the course of evolution, passes through different states (avastha), eight in number, according to Bhartṛprapañca (see Hiriyanna 1924), five, according to Ādiśeṣa (v. 27).

5See APS 31.

6Thus, by some authors, the PS of Ādiśeṣa has been identified as essentially vedāntic, in reference, particularly, to v. 31, whose terminology is indubitably vedāntic, and to the last verse (which may nevertheless be a late interpolation): vedāntāsāstram akhilam vilokya ṣeṣas tu [...] (Gaṇapati Śāstri APS: preface; Suryanarayana Sastri APS: VII; Bhattacharya ĀŚ: LXXX; Bouy ĀŚ: 18, 27; note that the śabdakalpadruma identifies the text of the Paramārthasāra as the ‘work of Śeṣaṇāga’, in 79 āryās, s.v. vedānta); note also that the later vedāntic tradition, represented notably by the Jivanmuktiviveka (14th cent.) appropriates the first Paramārthasāra for its demonstration of jivanmukti, presuming to ignore Śaiva arguments entirely on that notion. Consider it as more akin to Śāmkhya (Pandey 1963: 63; Silburn PS: 19: ‘un Śāmkhya teinté de Viṣṇouisme (sic), par conséquent théiste’), or vaishnavite (Barnett PS: 708). P. Hacker (1965: 154) treats the APS as one of the texts ‘that profess Vaishnavism and teach radical advaitism at the same time’. For Danielson (APS: 4, 6, 10),
The doctrine that emerges from the earlier Paramārthasāra reflects at least a part of the conceptual apparatus of Śaṃkhyā evolutionism, placing it within the general framework of a vedāntic metaphysics that posits from the start the unreality of the phenomenal world,¹⁷ itself the result of the all-powerful māyā of Viṣṇu—a deity who, however, seems little but the personification of a principle that the text terms equally brahman, ātman, or paramātman. This doctrine, evidently eclectic, is none the less sufficiently coherent to be qualified as “synthetic”. The text attempts, in effect, to integrate both the perspectives (dārsanā) of Śaṃkhyā and of Vedānta, rather than considering them as alternatives, unifying them within the rubric of a Vaiṣṇavism whose “divinity”, whatever his name, serves as unique principle—thus, in effect, privileging the nondual aspect of the doctrine and placing it squarely within the currents of early devotionalism.¹⁸

A programmatic verse at the beginning of Ādhāra’s response to the disciple sketches the basic outlines of such a doctrine: ‘I shall propound this “Essence of Supreme Truth” (paramārthasāra) after making obeisance to that Upendra [= Viṣṇu], by whom this unreal world was made from Primordial Matter as something seemingly real’.¹⁹

Moreover, one has the feeling that the questions put by the disciple are principally framed in terms of Śaṃkhyā,²⁰ whereas the responses of the teacher are usually couched in advaitic terms, even though the latter continues to utilize (in order to make himself better understood?) several Śaṃkhyā concepts—always careful, however, to establish equivalences, where possible, with key notions of the other system—for instance prakṛti, persistently identified with the māyā of Viṣṇu.²¹ As a matter of fact, the disciple poses two questions: how liberation is achieved (vv. 4 and 6),²² and how he is to grasp what is at issue in distinguishing puruṣa and prakṛti (v. 7). It is the master who, in the course of his response, unifies the two despite numerous Śaṃkhyā traits, ‘the work as a whole belongs to a tradition of Vedānta, and one we may call Bhedābhедādvaita’.

¹⁷APS 2: atmambrusau nikhilo ‘pi loko magno ‘pi nacamat ca/ aścaryam etan mṛgatśnikābhe bhavāmbūrbāsau ramate mṛṣaiva//, ‘The whole world, though submerged in the ocean of the Self (ātman), neither drinks from nor looks at it. It is a mystery that [the world] just blindly lusts for the ocean of existences, which is like a mirage’; also APS 9, cited infra.

¹⁸It might be said that the same tactic is employed in all the manifestos of devotionalism, including the Gītā, which may well have served as model for those that followed.

¹⁹APS 9: satyam iva jagad asayatam mūlaprakṛtir idam kṛtām yena/ tam pranipatyopendram vakṣye paramārthasāram idam//.

²⁰Even if he addresses (APS 4) a master whom he celebrates as ‘one who has mastered Veda and Vedāṅga’, as him ‘who speaks the truth’ (ṝavakṛt)—that is, comments R, who knows ‘the complete meaning of Vedānta [viz., of the upaniṣads], formed by the words of the Lord, Brahmā, etc.’.

²¹APS 10b: māyāyāt pravṛttih samhiyata īyam punah kramaśaḥ//, ‘[Then] this Manifestation, which consists of Magic (māyā), is absorbed again in [reverse] order’.

²²APS 4: saṃsārāraṇavataraṇapraṇaśaṁ purchāmy aham bhagavan.
requests by introducing a third term, *brahman* (or *ātman*), an upaniṣadic notion, hence vedāntic, qualified as *advaita* in verse 57. Thus, doubtless, the liminary caution of the master, who warns the student that the response will be difficult, and who exhorts him to make the necessary effort to understand it: ‘Although that which is to be said [about this] in the following is very hard to penetrate into even for those who have knowledge, do you hear it nevertheless!’

One may wonder whether Ādiśeṣa’s preamble offers the occasion for apprehending the manner in which the transition between the two systems may have taken place. The transition is conceptual, if not chronological, which may have been the work of a thinker or group of thinkers — though we must not infer from this any anteriority of one system vis-à-vis the other, be it Śāmkhya dualism or the nondualism of the Vedānta. Thus the analogy of the chrysalis, which the student employs to illustrate the problematic of liberation from bondage, may also apply to the manner in which one doctrine emerges from the other — the same doctrine, to be sure, yet different, indeed perfected.

Nevertheless, as he arrives at the end of the exposition, the reader notices that the doctrine — despite its apparently composite character — takes great care to designate and to present itself as a *sarvātmavāda*, a ‘doctrine of the Universal Self’ or a ‘doctrine holding that all is the Self’ — a term that proclaims the doctrine’s coherence by allying it with a long-established tradition that sees the Ultimate as both immanent and transcendent, but which in effect amounts to asserting another type of nondualism. The *sarvātmavāda* of Ādiśeṣa, in effect, finds its place within the lineages of Advaita and the traditions of Kashmir Śaivism — monisms that proclaim, in consonance with many upaniṣads, that ‘the Self is All’: ‘[There is] not a single doubt as to this, [viz., the fact that] this all is only the Self. Only when one realizes [this Self] as both having and not having parts, does one become free from the impenetrable darkness of Delusion,

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23 In particular, ÆPS 13 (*ātman*), 16-18, 19 (*brahman*), etc.
24 An *advaitabrahman* further described as *sakataniskala*, an oxymoron that R interprets as referring both to the *saprapaṇcabrahman* of pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta and to *brahman* as *sat*, *cit*, *ānanda*.
25 ÆPS 8: *ity ādhāro bhagavān prṣṭah śisyena tāt sa hovāca/ vidusām apy atigahanām vak-tavyam idam śīnu tathāpi tvam/.*
26 See Shastri PS: IX. Bhartṛprapaṇica (5th or 6th cent.), cited by Śaṅkara in his commentary to *Bṛhadāranyakopanishad* [BĀU], is there presented as an *aupaniṣada* whose doctrine is influenced by Vaiśeṣika and Śāmkhya (see Bouy ĀŚ: 27).
27 ÆPS 6: *karmagunājālabaddho jīvāh sāmsarati kośakāra iva/ mohāndhāragahanāt tasya katham bandhanān mokṣah/*, ‘The soul, bound by the net of Acts and Qualities, is in Trans-migration like a chrysalis [in its cocoon]. How is it to be delivered (mokṣa) from bondage, which is hard to penetrate because of the darkness [consisting] of Delusion?’
28 Verse 29c-d sketches already the outlines of the doctrine: *na vidantā vāsudevam sarvātmanān narā mūdhāḥ/*, ‘Deluded by this error, people do not recognize Vāsudeva as the Self of everything’.
and become Supreme Lord at the same time’. Another aspect of the strategy of identification elaborated by the first Paramārthasāra is its claim of doctrinal uniqueness, which takes the usual form of asserting its universality with respect to rival doctrines, but such that they find a place within it as subsidiary moments: ‘We consent to whatever [others], who are blind with greed, proclaim in their Siddhāntas, Āgamas, and Tarkas, since all that [testifies to the orientation of] their thought toward [our] doctrine, according to which everything is the Self. Moreover, it is evident that vedāntic notions and the monistic argumentation that supports them take precedence over the exposé of Śāmkhya categories: the theory of the tattvas appears only occasionally, and there remains of Śāmkhya ontology only the notion of the three ‘qualities’ (guna), and of Śāmkhya eschatology only the insistence on discriminating purusa from prakṛti, with a view thereby to gaining liberation — a teaching, for that matter, found already in the upaniṣads, as recognized already by Vācaspati in his Tattvakaumudī [TK] (citing specifically BĀU II 4, 5 and Chāndogyopaniṣad [ChU] VIII 15): ‘Says the Śruti: “The Spirit should be known and discriminated from Primordial Matter”; (by so doing) “the agent does not return, he does not return (into this world),’ In effect, more even than an exposition of doctrine — a doctrine moreover that did not give rise to a discrete tradition — the Paramārthasāra of Ādiśeṣa presents itself as a treatise on liberation, to the extent that it constitutes the response of a master to his acolyte desirous of liberation. Such is indeed the point of articulation between Śāmkhya-type and Advaita-type reasonings in the first Paramārthasāra — the soteriological perspective. And this is also, without a doubt — I will return to this point below — one of the justifications that might have prompted the second Paramārthasāra to undertake a rereading of the first.

29 ÂPS 63d–64: na kaścid apy atra samdehah// atmavedaḥ sarvam niśkalasaśakalam yadaiva bhāvayati/ mohagahanād viyuktas tadaiva paramēśvarībhūtah//. Here, the most evident divergence with respect to éaiva monism or that of Śaṅkara is the maintenance of a brahman/ätman conceived as both provided with and devoid of parts. The final phrase, however, reads as Śaiva: ‘... and become the Supreme Lord at the same time’ (tadaiva paramēśvarībhūtaḥ).

30 ÂPS 65: yad yat siddhāntāgamatarkesu prabravanti rāgāndhāḥ/ anumodāmas tat teśāṁ sarvātmavādadihitāḥ//. Similar strategy in PS 50 (see p. 9).

31 See ÂPS 20.

32 See ÂPS 7, 35, 44–45, 70, 75, 83.

33 TK 2: ātmā vā ’re jñātavyah prakṛtito vivektavyah (BĀU II 4, 5); na sa punar āvartate na sa punar āvartate (ChU VIII 15); tr. G. Jha.

34 It has been suggested (Danielson ÂPS: 4) that the famous preamble to the second section of the received text of the Upadesasāhasrī may have been based on the model furnished by the first PS: a mumukṣu asking a master to instruct him regarding means of acceding to liberation.
1. THE TWO PARAMĀRTHASĀRA

1.2. Rewriting

1.2.1. Appropriation

However that may be, the claim made by the Śaiva Paramārthasāra to have rewritten the older Paramārthasāra is quite unheard of in the history of Indian literature — where neither borrowing nor unattributed copying are much frowned upon for in this case it is not merely a matter of reproducing a text of well-known reputation, making here and there a few adjustments or innovations, but rather of appropriating, transforming, even investing another text, to make it better able to express an improved doctrine. This appropriation is justified on the assumption that the improved doctrine (in effect, Trika Śaivism) is already present in seed form in the older doctrine (of Ādiśeṣa), and that it is nothing but the accomplishment of that older doctrine, from which it has erased all trace of dualism.

The second Paramārthasāra is thus a work that sees itself as the quintessential distillation of another — though, to be fair, in formal terms, it is also an expansion, having added twenty or so verses — which process Yogarāja illustrates by the analogy of butter extracted from clotted milk, an analogy that cuts two ways. For, in effect, while the clotted milk represents a transformation that is spontaneous, given the right circumstances, the production of butter requires will and effort. On the other hand, according to the Sāṁkhya doctrine of causality, satkāryavāda, the effect is pre-existent in the cause, and so may the Trika itself, which adopts the same satkāryavāda, be understood by its advocates as already present in the ‘clotted milk’ of Ādiśeṣa’s “Sāṁkhya”. What remains is that the transformation implies a supplementary effort, as well as a perfectioning — a threefold effort composed of reasoning (yukti), acquisition of experience (anubhava), and scriptural exegesis (āgama), as Yogarāja is fond of repeating.

Thus the process of rewriting at work in the second Paramārthasāra

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35See Kāvyamāṁśa, chapters XI-XII — or Dhvanyāloka, chapter IV.
36See, for instance, the different versions of the Madanaparājaya, The Defeat of Love (Balbir, Osier 2004: 21ff.).
37“[Knowledge of] brahman, the ultimate, may be attained through the text entitled Paramārthasāra, also called the Verses of Ādhāra, via the discrimination of purusa from prakṛti, according to the principles of the Sāṁkhya system”. The teacher (guru, viz., Abhinavagupta), motivated by the need to show favor to others, expounds the essence of it, just as one extracts butter from curds; that is, he expounds the essence of teachings on ultimate reality (paramārthopadesa) in keeping with the Śaiva principle of ultimate (or transcendent) nonduality, in order to show favor to all creatures’ (translations of AG’s PS and its commentary are the author’s).
38With, sometimes, a fourth term: meditative practice (pariśīlana); see YR ad 8, 10-11, 79-80.
makes it appear that the debate with Sāmkhya has really never taken place, which justifies nondual Śaivism of Kashmir in borrowing the theory of the tattvas, all the while adapting it to the needs of a monistic system. Even though it is true that the doctrine set forth in the Śaiva Paramārthasāra is framed polemically, as the commentary frequently attempts to demonstrate, it is essentially directed against the Buddhists, particularly Dhammadīrīti, and against Vedānta, referred to by Yogarāja as Brahmavāda at large, or as Śāntabrahmavāda. I will return to this point later.

In support of this interpretation of the exercise of rewriting — in addition to the clotted milk analogy — I might point to the passage of the commentary where the term guruh of the third verse is understood to refer both to Ādhāra and to Abhinavagupta. Yogarāja’s exegesis is supported by several liminary considerations: — the attribution of the first Paramārthasāra to an author designated not only as Śeṣa but as Patañjali; — the traditional identification of Patañjali (whether he be the author of the Mahābhāṣya, or of the Yogasūtra [YS], or of both) with Śeṣa, in virtue of the epithetical designation bhujangi gavīn, implying that Patañjali is a devotee of Śiva.

39See p. 54. On the Saiddhāntika treatment of the tattvas, see Tāntrikābhidhānakosa [TAK], s.v. tattva.

40See, esp., PS 32 and the commentary ad loc., which, in the course of discussing rival conceptions of the Self, refers explicitly to the Mimāṃsā (see n. 738, 740).

41See, for example, YR ad 10–11, 15, 27, 32 (where the ‘Brahmavāda’ is referred to for its version of the śūnyavāda: neti neti), and 35. YR’s gloss permits us to complete Sanderson’s observation: ‘When Vedānta is expounded by its opponents in Kashmirian sources of our period it is the doctrine of Maṇḍanamiśra which is generally in mind [...]. To my knowledge no source betray familiarity with the doctrines of Śaṅkara’ (1985: 210, n. 41 — Sanderson refers here, notably, to the commentary of Ramakanta on the Paramokshanirāsakārikā of Sadyojyotis). It is in fact quite difficult to decide whether Śaiva authors discuss or are aware of the niceties involved in distinguishing Maṇḍana’s from Śaṅkara’s doctrines. They nowhere deal with the issues dividing later vedāntic schools; how then is it possible to know definitely which particular version of Vedānta they have in mind? All one can reasonably say, at least as regards the PS and its commentary, is that YR assigns to the ‘Brahmavāda’ category both the Vedānta stricto sensu — which he also refers to as the Śāntabrahmavāda (ad 10–11) — and the Śabdabrahmavāda of Bhartṛhari and his followers. Accordingly, YR ad 27 refutes the conception of Self of the ‘Brahmavadins’ and that of the ‘Prānabrahmavadins’, viz., of Bhartṛhari. And YR ad 35 applies the word ‘Brahmavādin’ to Bhartṛhari. Bhartṛhari (ca. 650 Ad), of course, is substantially prior both to Maṇḍana and Śaṅkara, who are more or less contemporaneous with each other. The distinction between these two sorts of ‘Brahmavāda’ seems much clearer in YR’s text than any putative distinction between the doctrines of Maṇḍana and Śaṅkara. One may wonder whether the Śaivas of the 10th–11th cent. were aware of or interested in doctrinal differences among later vedāntic “schools”, which may not have come into vogue in any case much before the time of Vācaspatī and his great commentary, the Bhāmātī. It may be added that one of the main points of contention between Śaivas and Advaitins, according to YR, concerns their respective interpretations of the epithet śaṅta as applied to brahman: śaṅta, for YR, does not mean ‘inert’, in the manner of a stone, but ‘serene’, reposing [ever] in its absolute nature, in unison with its Śakti, for there is no disturbance arising from the dichotomy between the knower and the known’ (YR ad 10–11). On the above discussion, see also n. 791; on Maṇḍana, see Biardeau 1969.
of the Serpent, and thus, in some degree, its incarnation; — the evidence of a south Indian tradition, which holds Abhinavagupta also to be an incarnation of Śeṣa, on the basis of a pun on his name when suffixed with the honorific -pāda: abhinavā-guptapāda, ‘he, utterly novel, whose feet are hidden’. Though the attribution may appear fanciful, this line of argument does suggest, if ‘guru’ is to be understood as referring to more than one teacher in this passage, that Abhinavagupta and Ādhāra were also sometimes understood as the same teacher. The passage in question might then be translated: ‘The Teacher [Ādhāra] replied to him by [reciting] the Ādhāra-kārikā of which [as] Abhinavagupta, [he now] expounds the essence from the point of view of the Śaiva teachings’.

It should be noted also that verse 50 of Abhinavagupta’s Paramārtha-sāra: ‘Though not an agent, it is I who compose the wonderfully varied Siddhāntas, Āgamas and Tarkas’, besides echoing APS 65, amounts to an implicit proclamation of the superiority of the Trika doctrine. Thus is disclosed one of the main purposes served, from the Trika point of view, by rewriting the Ādiśeṣa’s text: to put an end once and for all to the disputes of precedence among the schools, by affirming the uncontested supremacy of the Trika. At the same time, PS 50 provides another, as it were “metaphysical”, clue as to that rewriting: the true author of the Paramārthasāra, whether he be called Ādiśeṣa or Abhinavagupta, is none other than Śiva himself, the sole Agent, who is one’s own Self in the form of the absolute ‘I’. ‘Thus, says Śiva, in Yogarāja’s commentary, though not myself their creator, it is I who cause the multitudinous wonders that are the Siddhāntas, etc., [to come into being], having entered into the intentions of gods, sages and men, being [already] in essence their inner intuition (antahpratibhā) and desirous of expounding [these doctrines] either in abridgement or in more elaborate form’. 44

1.2.2. Reasons for a choice

1.2.2.1. DESTINY OF THE FIRST PARAMĀRTHASĀRA Why has the Paramārthasāra of Ādiśeṣa been chosen as a text to be recomposed? It was, evidently, a text that enjoyed some celebrity in the Indian tradition — and may already have acquired by Abhinavagupta’s time the status of a śruti. Might one suppose that Abhinavagupta, in “rewriting” it, expected some transfer of its authority in his favor?

42 Note that TĀ XXVIII 285b, in quoting the pratika of YS IV 27, refers to the author of the YS as ‘Bhujagāḍhiṣa’, ‘Lord of the serpents’. Similarly, TĀ XXVIII 309b refers to Ādiśeṣa, author of the first PS, as Ahiśāna, v. 81 of whose work TĀ XXVIII 312 quotes.


44 See n. 946. On the question of Trika’s supremacy, see also PS 27 and n. 661.

The text’s authority was not limited in time or by tendency. Abhinavagupta himself refers to Ādiśeṣa’s work elsewhere, citing twice its verse 81 in his Gītārthasamgraha [GAS] ad VIII 6 (where it is termed a śruti) and ad VIII 14, as well as in TĀ XXVIII 312.46 The same verse will be repeated verbatim by Abhinavagupta in his Paramārthasāra, as its verse 83. And when Vāmadeva, probably a disciple of Yogarāja,47 quotes it (p. 21), he attributes it to ‘bhagavān bhogipatih’,48 the ‘Lord of the serpents’, that is, presumably, Ādiśeṣa.

Similarly, the older Paramārthasāra was well known in circles that practiced a syncretistic version of Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism. Thus, the Spandapradīpikā [SpP], a commentary on the Spandakārikā [SpK], the foundational text of the Spanda school, cites verse 66 (which has no direct correspondent in the Śaiva Paramārthasāra).49 The Spandapradīpikā, a work of Utpalavaiṣṇava (also known as Utpalācārya, Bhāgavata Utpala,50 ninth –tenth century), testifies to the same spirit of syncretism as does the Cicchaktiṣaṃstuti of Yoginātha (probably same period),51 a Śākta who was familiar with the Spanda, and who as well cites Ādiśeṣa’s verse 33 for its evocation of the māyā of Viṣṇu.52

Before this, the Paramārthasāra of Ādiśeṣa was authoritative for Sāmkhya, as evidenced by the citation of its verse 83 in the Yuktidīpikā, a work composed sometime between the sixth and ninth centuries, of unknown authorship, but probably of Sāmkhya affiliation. This verse, which the Yuktidīpikā attributes to the ‘tradition’ (āmnāya), is cited in support of its interpretation of SK 2, according to which interpretation ‘liberation is obtained by knowledge’ (jñānān mokṣāḥ) — the knowledge, that is, whereby puruṣa is discriminated from prakṛti: ‘Just as a man falls to the ground from the top of a tree involuntarily, once he has lost his foothold, similarly, someone who knows the Qualities and the Soul (puruṣa) becomes “separate” (kevala), even involuntarily’.53

Even Advaitins make use of the first Paramārthasāra. The fourteenth-

46The entire passage (vv. 309–320ab) constitutes a meticulous exegesis of the cited verse, whose source, according to JR, is the Anantakārikā.
47See p. 22.
48With emendation: bhogipatināpi for bhegipatināpi.
49Cited n. 80.
50See Sanderson 2001: 35.
51By the testimony of the SpP which, in its long avat. (Dyczkowski SpP: 5–6), cites at length the Cicchaktiṣaṃstuti, one may infer that Yoginātha is prior to Utpalavaīṣṇava, or his contemporary. On Yoginātha, see Dyczkowski SpK: 290.
52APS 33: jvalanād dhūmodgatibhir vividhākātī ambare yathā bhūtā/ tadād viṣṇau sṛṣṭhī svamāyā dvaitavistārā bhūtā//, ‘As a variety of forms appear in the sky because of smoke rising from fire, so creation, expanded into multiplicity, appears in Viṣṇu by his own Magic’. By this citation, Yoginātha explains the fact that phenomenal diversity itself presupposes a unique divinity in which it must inhere, thus justifying an idealistic monism.
53APS 83: vyākṣāgrāc cyutapādo yadvad anicchan naraḥ kṣītau patati/ tadād guṇapurūṣajñō nīchann api kevalībhavati//.
century Jīvanmuktiviveka of Vidyāraṇya cites verses 77 and 81, which present two types of jīvanmukta. In the sixteenth, Rāghavānanda comments upon the entire text. And numerous are the Indianists who take the Paramārthasāra of Ādiśeṣa to be a possible source for the Agamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda, the chef-d’œuvre of pre-Śāṅkara Advaita.

In addition, the Candrikā (sixteenth century) on the Prabodhacandrodaya (ad V, v. 33) cites APS 18, ascribing the verse to Śeṣa (yathoktam bhagavatā śeṣena). Finally, in the eighteenth, the famous grammarian Nāgāshabhaṭṭa cites it several times in his Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntalaghumāṇ-jūṣā, while discussing the status of error.

The first Paramārthasāra has thus enjoyed a long and significant destiny, of which the most striking indication is no doubt its having been rewritten by a philosopher of another persuasion.

1.2.2. DIVERGENCES/CONVERGENCES

The identification of Abhinavagupta, the ‘new Śeṣa’, with the author of the first Paramārthasāra is just the emblem, the mythical clothing, of a more profound affinity.

After all, nondual Śaivism of Kashmir, which Abhinavagupta has brought to its finished state, aims, just as did the work of Ādiśeṣa, at the integration of two points of view seemingly incompatible: realistic dualism — that of the Sāṃkhya, from which it borrows the hierarchy of ‘principles’ (tattva) — and idealistic nondualism, of which it retains the core notion of the ‘world as appearance’. Even if the modalities of realization are different, the principle of integration is the same in both projects.

But, just as evidently, the fact that the two doctrines are analogous does not make them strictly commensurable. For the version of Kashmir Śaivism that eventuates in the Trika is a system of thought of considerable scope and coherence, lacking common measure with the relatively impoverished system of the older Paramārthasāra — which, as we said before, has not given rise to a discrete tradition.

Above all, the Trika, to which the Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta is intended to serve as introduction, is a Śaiva doctrine, whose greater purpose is that of synthesizing the older currents of Śaivism itself. From

54 Respectively, pp. 74 and 49, ascribing them to Śeṣa (qualified as bhagavat, in citing v. 81; as the author of the Āryāpañciśīti, in citing v. 77). APS 77: hayamedhasahasrṇy apy atha kurute brahmagāñcālaksāni/ paramārthavin na punyair na ca pāpaiḥ spr̥yaṁ vimalah//; v. 77 repeated almost verbatim by v. 70 of the second PS, as APS 81 is repeated as such by PS 83.

55 In particular, APS 78 (jadavat vicared agādhamaṁ) is paralleled by ĀŚ II 36d: jadaval lokam ćcātare. See, esp., Sastri ĀŚ: VIII; Bhattacharya ĀŚ: LXXIXff.


57 Nāgāshabhaṭṭa cites APS 49–50 (p. 232), 33 (p. 236), 9 and 30 (p. 246), 25 (p. 247), 28 (p. 268, 287), 29 (p. 268), 56–57 (p. 269), 47 (p. 283), 23 (p. 284), 27 (p. 287), 46 (p. 291), 65 (p. 295). He shows that Ādiśeṣa conceives error as sadasaṁkhyāti, not as anirvacanīyakhyāti; see Sastri ĀŚ: XX.
them it borrows not only the notion of śakti, but many elements of ritual and yogic practice (mantras, mudrās, kundalini, etc.) that serve to place it in a tantric context, deploying both a metaphysics and a praxis of considerable complexity within a system of thought situated under the aegis of esoterism.58

Still, the points of convergence of the two Paramārthaśāras are not infrequent. Let me mention only a few most worthy of note. For the text of Ādiśeṣa has already forged a number of concepts that will become integral to the Trika.

sarvātman

In the first place, the notion of sarvātman, the universal Self, inherited from the upaniṣads, is fundamental to the doctrine of Ādiśeṣa. And though the Trika describes itself using terms other than sarvātmavāda, the idea of sarvātman is nevertheless at the heart of its doctrine — as the principle explaining the double status of the Self, serving also as divinity: both immanent and transcendent. And so Kṣemarāja teaches, in his auto-commentary to Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya [PH] (v. 8), that the notion of the double status of the Self is the criterion of excellence that places the Trika above all the other systems, even those of the Tāntrikas and Kaulas.59

Numerous are the occurrences of the notion of sarvātman in the Śaiva Paramārthasāra. Here are just two examples: verse 73, which serves to define the jīvanmukta, and whose first hemistich implies the notion of sarvātman: ‘There is nothing at all separate from the [knower of the Self] to be honored with an oblation or to be praised; would then he, who is liberated, who has no use for homages or ritual formulae, be satisfied with hymns of praise, etc.?';60 and verse 82, which repeats almost verbatim verse 80 of the first Paramārthasāra: ‘He who knows the Self of all, thus described — [source of] supreme and incomparable bliss, omnipresent, utterly devoid of diversity — becomes one with that Self.’61

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58Note the recurrent reference in these texts to the notion of rahasya, ‘secret’.

59Kṣemarāja cites from an Āgama: viśvottirṇam ātmaatvam iti tāntrikāḥ/ viśvamayam iti kulādāmaṇāniyaniṣṭāḥ/ viśvottirṇam viśvamayam ca iti trikādidarśānavidah/, ‘The Tāntrikas maintain that the ātman principle transcends the universe. Those who are followers of the Kula tradition, etc., consider the ātman principle as immanent in [or ‘constitutive of’] the universe. The Knowers of the Trika system, etc., consider it as both transcendent and immanent’ (Pratyabhijñāhṛdayavṛtti [PHvf] 8). Similarly, YR ad 82 explains: ‘He is the “Self of all” (sarvātman), the Self of all that cognizes and is cognized; and [taking the compound as a bahuvrihi] he is that whose Self is [composed of] the entirety of knowers and things known; in other words, he is both the transcendent and the immanent’.

60PS 73: stutyaṃ và hotavyaṃ nāsti vyātriktam asya kimcana ca/ stotṛdīnā sa tasyen muktas tannirnāmaskṛtviveṣaṃ/.

61PS 82: vyāpinam abhihitam itiham sarvātmānāṃ vidhūtanātāvam/ nirupamaparamānandam yo vetti sa tanmayo bhavati//; cf. APS 80: vyāpinam abhinnaṃ itiham sarvātmānāṃ vidhūtanātāvam/ nirupamaparamānandam yo veda sa tanmayo bhavati//. See also YR ad 69, which discusses the double meaning of sarvabhūtātman.
1. THE TWO PARAMĀRTHASĀRA

Another point of convergence is supplied by the notion of 'play' (kṛīḍā), which serves to explain, in the first Paramārthasāra, the double movement of phenomenal manifestation — away from, and return to, the One that is both immanent and transcendent, both extroverted and introverted: 'Having displayed himself, like a mirage, employing the infinite varieties of breath [and the other principles], Vāsudeva withdraws again [all into himself] through his own power, as if playing'. Here the idea of 'play' is associated with the notion of svavibhūti, which anticipates the śaivite notion of svātantrya, 'freedom' or 'independence'. Note also that Rāghavānanda glosses svavibhūtyā, 'by one's own sovereignty', as svātantrasya saktyā māyāyā, 'by virtue of māyā, the energy of freedom' — śaivite terminology indeed, and which does take the reader aback coming from an Advaitin! Nevertheless, though the theme of 'divine play' is common to Śaivism and to Advaita (even pre-Śaṅkarāṇa), it should be noted that Advaitins privilege the term līlā, whereas Śaivas prefer kṛīḍā, as does Ādiśeṣa.63

Equally remarkable is the presence of a phrase in Ādiśeṣa’s text destined to find its place in the treasury of śaivite maxims: sakṛd vibhāto tāh, ‘having appeared once [and for all]’: ‘The Self is devoid of all concepts, pure, [always and forever] waked, unageing, immortal, calm, spotless, having appeared once [and forever], spiritual, [and] pervasive, like space’.64

This very verse finds a parallel in the second Paramārthasāra, in reference to its verses 10 and 11, which attempt as well a definition of the Self. Yogarāja, after explaining that the compound ‘devoid of dissolution and creation’ (layodayavīhinam) means ‘eternal’ (sanātananam), goes on to cite the formula sakṛd vibhāto yam ātmā, ‘The Self appears once and for all’.

62APS 30: prāṇādyanantah bhedair ātmānām samvitayā jālam iva/ saṃhārati vāsudevāḥ svavibhūtyā kṛīḍāmāna iva// (translation is mine; cf. Danielson: ‘After having extended himself through infinite varieties, viz., breath, etc., like [a feat of] magic, Vāśuveda [= Viṣṇu], by his own sovereignty, reabsorbs [everything] as if playing’). R reads akṛīḍāmāna iva.

63In the Brahmasūtra [BS] (II 1, 33), creation itself is free play (līlā): lokavat tu līlākaivalyam, ‘But [Brahman’s creative activity] is mere sport, such as we see in ordinary life’ (tr. Thibaut). One should distinguish this theory from the teleological theory according to which the Lord creates in order to play; Śaṅkara in his Bhāṣya [BSBh] II 1, 33 observes: ‘Analogously, the activity of the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own nature, without reference to any purpose’ (tr. Thibaut, who adds in note: ‘The nature (svabhāva) of the Lord is, the commentators say, Māyā joined with time and karmāṇa’). This is equally the view of AS I 9. R ad APS 30, while commenting on the word he reads as ākṛīḍāmāna, cites as well BS II 1, 33. And he adds: svāḍīṣaṃvrīḍhīmanto narendrā yathā svavibhūtyā kṛīḍanti tadvad ātmanātmany eva vhartukāma iva, ‘Just as princes whose dominion is complete [continue to] play [at being kings] by exercising their majesty, so also [does Viṣṇu], for he loves to sport, in and by himself’.

64APS 25: sarvavikalpanahinah suddho buddho jāramaraḥ sāṁtah/ amalāḥ sakṛd vibhāto cetana ātmā khavad vyāpi// (tr. Danielson, modified).
Saivite texts that take up this formula in more or less developed versions are numerous. Its origin is perhaps to be found also in the upanisads, as for instance, in ChU VIII 4, 1–2, where the ‘world of brahman’ is qualified as sakṛdvibhātah. As far as the ontological implication of the formula is concerned, namely that this Self ‘once and for all appearing’ is the source of the appearance of all other things, is the ‘unique Real’, Rāghavānanda, while commenting on Ādiśeṣa’s verse 25, recalls that the formula is already alluded to in Mundakopanisad [MuU] II 2, 11: ‘Every thing shines only after that shining light. His shining illumines all this world’. Such an idea is also present in one of the leitmotifs of the Trika, the formula nāprakāśah prakāśate, ‘That which is not luminous cannot manifest itself’, with its complex network of implications.

In a śaivite perspective, the epithet sakṛdvibhātah in effect establishes not only the eternity of the Self, but the contemporaneity of the Self’s revelation and the advent of liberation — and as well that the experience itself is perennial. This is the truth, when apprehended, that “astounds” like a flash of lightning (the root sphur) — the sudden and simultaneous realization both of the Self and of one’s liberation; on it is grounded the otherwise paradoxical idea of liberation in this life (jīvanmukti). For if the experience of the Self takes place in this life, the same must be said of liberation, whose realization is thereupon dependent. Such is the Traika usage of the old epithet applying to the Self, sakṛdvibhātah — a usage that the second Paramārthasāra illustrates: ‘Similarly, the [knower’s] own essential Self remains in the condition it was in when it became manifest once and for all at the moment knowledge was acquired; it does not become otherwise when the body falls away’.

Liberation through gnosis

The principle of ‘liberation through gnosis’ appears as the first correlative of the doctrine of sarvātmavāda: to know that all is the Self is to be instantaneously liberated. Several verses of the two Paramārthasāra propound this principle. Two are particularly worthy of attention — if only for the way in which the second Paramārthasāra borrows from the first. Ādiśeṣa’s verse 73 reads: ‘There is neither any place for Release, nor [does Release consist in] going elsewhere. Breaking the fetter which consists of ignorance: that is what one knows as Release’.

65 ChU VIII 4, 1–2 is quoted n. 455. MuU II 2, 11: tam eva bhāntam anubhātī sarvam tasya bhāsā sarvam idam vibhātī (tr. Radhakrishnan — as are all translations from upaniṣads cited here, unless otherwise specified).

66 See YR ad 30.

67 PS 93: evaṁ jñānāvasare svātmā sakṛd asya yāḍṛg avabhātah/ tāḍṛśa eva tadāsau na deha-pāte 'nyathā bhavati//.

68 Notably, ĀPS 39–40, 67–68, 72, 73, 81; PS 60 [= ĀPS 73], 83 [= ĀPS 81].

69 ĀPS 73: mokṣasya naiva kimcīd dhāmāsti na cāpi gamanam anyatra/ ajñānamaya-granthēr bhedo yas tāṁ vidur mokṣāḥ// (the words common to the two PS are in roman).
by verse 60 of Abhinavagupta’s *Paramārthasāra*, whose first hemistich is identical, but which shows śaivite modifications in the second: ‘Neither has liberation any abode, nor does it involve a going elsewhere. Liberation is the manifestation of one’s own energies realized by cutting the knot of ignorance’.  

Similarly, Ādiśeṣa’s verse 81 is repeated *verbatim* as verse 83 of Abhinavagupta’s work — constituting one of the rare cases of word-for-word citation in the second *Paramārthasāra*: ‘Whether he gives up his body in a place of pilgrimage or in the hut of an outcaste, be he conscious or not, he goes [thence] to a condition of transcendent Isolation, his grieving at an end, for he was liberated at the very moment he acquired knowledge.’

There is no better example of the affinity of the two texts, inasmuch as, prompted, almost fortuitously, by the epithet *nastasmṛṭih*, the later *Para- mārthasāra* introduces another point of convergence: once acquired in this life, the fact of liberation cannot be abolished, even by the mindlessness and disorder of the final agony. Verse 81 of the initial *Paramārthasāra* just alludes to that question, which, as is well known, is much debated in Indian speculation. But the Śaiva *Paramārthasāra*, in the person of Abhinavagupta, develops the issue at length, over several verses, followed by Yogarāja who proceeds even to reinterpret in a śaivite sense several parallel passages of the *Bhagavadgītā*.

*Meditative realization (bhāvanā)*

The means whereby one accedes to that final knowledge of the Self (or of brahman), according to the first *Paramārthasāra*, is ‘meditation’ (bhāvanā), or rather, as we have translated the term as it occurs in the second *Paramārthasāra*, ‘meditative realization’. This is also the means privileged by the Śaiva *Paramārthasāra*, to the extent that it is this means that prevails in the *śāktopāya*, the ‘way of energy’ — of the four ‘ways’ the one whose perspective is chiefly adopted by Abhinavagupta in his *Paramārthasāra*. Indeed, the notion is found as well in other doctrines (though sometimes in another context, or with different implication or significance), but its understanding is here directly inherited from the older text.

The first *Paramārthasāra* devotes, in effect, three verses to bhāvanā: ‘After one has discarded Illusion, which, being delusive, has the nature of fallacy [in that it produces] the idea of plurality, let him realize Brahman, which is without plurality, being both with and without parts. As water

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70 PS 60: mokṣasya naiva kīm cid dhāmāsti na cāpi gamanam anyatra/ ajñānagranthibhidā svāsaktabhivyaktād mokṣaḥ/.  
71 Arguably the verse most frequently cited in later literature, particularly by AG; see p. 9.  
72 PS 83: tīrthe svapacaghe vā naṣṭasmṛṭīr api pariyajyan deham/ jñānasamakālamuktaḥ kaivalyam yāti hataśokah/.  
73 See PS 90–91, 94–95, with notes.  
74 See p. 49, and n. 858; also n. 1227.  
75 See n. 1054, the usage the MTmamsa makes of it.
becomes one with water, milk with milk, wind with wind, so, by medita-
tion (bhávaná) on the spotless Brahman, [man] becomes one with it. If in
that way, the sum total of plurality has receded into the state of Brahman
by meditation (bhávaná), no delusion, no sorrow [remains] for him, as he
looks on everything as Brahman'.

After an encomium of bhávaná (v. 41), the second Paramárthasára con-
denses in a single verse (v. 51) the teaching of its predecessor’s verses
57–58: ‘Thus, once the postulation of duality has ceased, [the adept] after
overcoming the bewildering power of illusion, should merge in brahman
as milk merges in milk, and water in water’,77 and in concatenation repro-
duces verse 59 of the first Paramárthasára, verbally modified to suit šaivite
metaphysics: ‘Thus, once the host of principles has been reintegrated into
Śiva through meditative realization, what sorrow is there, what delusion
for him who views everything as brahman?’78

For its part, the first Paramárthasára returns (v. 64) to the notion of
bhávaná, in the guise of the causative verb bhávayati, which it associates
with the idea of liberation (paramesvaribhútaḥ, ‘he becomes the Supreme
Lord’).79 And, in verse 66, the term itself, though not mentioned as such,
is ably etymologized as follows: ‘By whichever appearance the Lord, who
has all forms, is meditated upon, that appearance he adopts, as he is like
a jewel [fulfilling all] wishes’.80

Similarly, at verse 68, the second Paramárthasára associates again this
notion with that of liberation: ‘Thus awakened by the winds of his med-
itative realization, as he pours an oblation of all his thought constructs
into the blazing Fire of the Self, he becomes Fire itself’.81 And we note
that the metaphor ‘winds of meditative realization’, which serves as ma-

76APS 57–59: evam dvaitavikalpaṁ brahmasvarūpāṁ vimohaninm māyāṁ/ utsṛṣya sa-
kalaniskalaman advaitam bhāvayed brahma// yadvat salile salilam kṣire kṣiraṁ samiṁraṁ vāyuḥ/ tadvad brahmani vimale bhāvanayā tanmayatvam upāyat// itthāṁ dvitaśasūne bhāvanayā mohah kah śokaṁ sarvaṁ brahmāvalokayatā//.
77PS 51: itthāṁ dvaitavikalpe galīte pravīlaṅghya mohaninm māyāṁ/ salile salilam kṣire kṣiraṁ iva brahmāṁ layī syāt//.
78PS 52: itthāṁ tattvasamūhe bhāvanayā śivamayatvam abhiyāte/ kah śokaḥ ko mohah sarvaṁ brahmāvalokayatā//. Note especially the substitutions Šiva for brahman, tattva* for dvaita*. The second hemistich, in both texts, recalls Isopanisad 6–7, the first PS being somewhat closer to its source, since it respects the upaniṣadic order of the words (ko mohah kah śokaḥ): yaś tu sarvāni bhūtān ātmany evānapaśyati// sarvabhūteṣu cātmāṁ caṁnaṁ tato na vi-jugupate// yasmīṁ sarvāni bhūtān ātmaivābhūd vijāṇatā// tatra ko mohah kah śoka ekatvam anupaśyataḥ//, ‘And he who sees all beings in his own self and his own self in all beings, he
does not feel any revulsion by reason of such a view. When, to one who knows, all beings have, verily, become one with his own self, then what delusion and what sorrow can be to
him who has seen oneness?’
79See APS 64, quoted n. 29.
80APS 66: sarvākāro bhagavān upāsyate yena yena bhāvena/ tāṁ tāṁ bhāvāṁ bhūtā cintā-
manīvat samabhiyeti//. This verse lacks a correspondent in the later PS.
81PS 68: itthāṁ sakalavikalpāṁ pratibuddho bhāvanāsamiranataḥ/ ātma-jotiśī dīptā juhvajjyo-
turmayo bhavati//.
trix to the extended metaphor of the verse, may well be a reemployment of a segment of Adiśeṣa’s verse 58, not otherwise utilized, [...] samūrane vāyuḥ, ‘As [...] wind becomes one with wind’ — verse 51 of the Śaiva Paramārthasāra having retained, in its exercise of transposition, only the two initial images: water and milk.

The Śaiva Paramārthasāra thus puts equal emphasis on the idea of bhāvanā, but with the difference that the notion is there placed among practices of an āgamic yoga, in which the Trika sets great store. Associated with mantric practice, with kūndalinī yoga and with the practice of the muḍrās, bhāvanā is the spiritual exercise par excellence, thanks to which the mumukuṣu accedes simultaneously to knowledge and to liberation, while he yet lives. 82

*jīvanmukti*

‘Liberation in this life’ is indeed the common project of the two Paramārthasāra, even though the second reserves to it a more explicit treatment. It provides also, doubtless, the first among the motives for rewriting the text itself. The Śaiva Paramārthasāra transposes the Paramārthasāra of Adiśeṣa precisely because it has apprehended there the foundation for the doctrine of jīvanmukti. It is a jīvanmukti that does not speak its name clearly in the first Paramārthasāra, but which is there recognized by many indications, when viewed in the light of later developments, once the debate provoked by the oxymoron of the term itself (‘jīvan’ while living / ‘mukti’ liberation [from this life]) finally subsided, conferring on the notion its general legitimacy. Rāghavānanda, the Advaitin exegete mentioned earlier, makes no mistake when, in his commentary on verse 3, he presents Adiśeṣa as a jīvanmukta. 83

The entire labor of Abhinavagupta and Yogarāja is aimed at bringing to light that very truth: the ‘liberation’ that is at issue in the older Paramārthasāra is already the ‘liberation in this life’ that Abhinavagupta makes into the issue of the second. In this sense, the śaivite transposition is also an exegetical project. Underscoring the soteriological vocation of the first Paramārthasāra, the transposition reveals in addition that the soteriology, based doubly on Sāṃkhya and Advaita, establishes the notion of jīvanmukti.

Thus the Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta makes the text of Adiśeṣa into a treatise on liberation in this life. The best proof that may be given of this is that the stanzas of Adiśeṣa’s work cited in later literature — with

82See YR ad 9, 61, 62, 64–66, 83, 86, 96.
83APS 3: [...] ātmatattvasāksad bodhavantam jīvanmuktam guruvaram yathāvidhy upagamyā baddhānjalāḥ papraccheti, ‘[...] having approached in a proper way and with a gesture of salutation the most excellent teacher [Adiśeṣa], who is liberated while still living and who possesses an intuitive grasp of the reality of the Self [or ‘and who possesses an evident mastery of the reality of the Self’], he asks …'
the possible exception of Nāgeśa’s grammatical reference — concern more or less the idea of jīvanmukti. Two among them (especially 81, the most famously cited in any case) are part of the demonstration of jīvanmukti propounded by the Jīvanmuktiviveka; moreover, the quasi-totality of the second Paramārthasāra’s borrowings from the first concern liberation — and that means, as the commentary incessantly attempts to show, ‘liberation in this life’.

Even if the term ‘jīvanmukti’ appears no more often in the second Paramārthasāra than it does in the first, it is possible to read it there in outline, twice, by the bias of periphrases where the concessive ‘api’ points to and resolves in one gesture the oxymoron that the notion represents. Thus, at verse 61: ‘He who has cut the knot of ignorance, whose doubts have vanished, who has put aside error, whose merits and demerits have been destroyed, is liberated, though still joined with his body’, 84 and at verse 86: ‘In the same manner, consciousness, once it has been separated from the complex of sheaths [that is the body, etc.], is [forever] completely alien to their touch, even though, as a liberated Self, it remains there [for a time] due to root impressions [previously accumulated]’. 85

Moreover, in comparing the strategies of composition of the two Paramārthasāra, one notes that, beginning with verse 76 of the first (= verse 69 of the second), the textual parallelism grows more obvious, the correspondences are more patent, and succeed one another in a rhythm that cannot be ignored. Whole sequences of verses are repeated verbatim or almost so, in many cases. 86 One observes also that verse 75 of the first Paramārthasāra, strongly colored with Śaṅkhya and not as such taken up by Abhinavagupta, itself clearly postulates the notion of jīvanmukti, via a periphrasis, and as such introduces the long concatenation of symmetrical verses in the two texts: ‘As soon as the Soul has understood Matter as different [from itself], it becomes, [even though it still] exists in the midst of Transmigration, free from all acts, as a lotus leaf [is free] from the water [in which grows the lotus plant]’. 87

The first Paramārthasāra even takes up the matter of obstacles to liberation as represented by the notion of the yogabhrāsta, the acolyte ‘fallen from discipline’ (vv. 84–85). Thus going out of its way, the text promises even to such as he access to the liberation that had been to him for so long a time denied (v. 86).

This is, in its way, also a manner of establishing the legitimacy of the

84 PS 61: bhinnajñāna-granthir gata-saṁdehaḥ parākṛtabhrāntiḥ/ prakṛta-apaññya-panāpo vigrahayoge 'py asau muktaḥ// (the words at issue are in roman).

85 PS 86: tadvat kaśicukapālapālitrakṛtāh saṁvid atra saṁskārāt/ tiṣṭhāt api muktaṁ cātasya satyasāravivarjita bhavati//.

86 Compare APS 76–78 and PS 69–71; APS 79–82 and PS 81–84.

87 APS 75: buddhavā vibhāktām prakṛtīm puruṣāḥ saṁsāramadhyago bhavati/ nirmuktaḥ sarvakarmabhīb amujapatronām yathā salilaiḥ//.
notion — that of envisaging equally all the obstacles that might be alleged to interfere between the *mumukṣu* and his liberation. And so a “rhetoric of solicitude” is put in place that Abhinavagupta also makes use of — his verses 100–101 repeating almost *verbatim* Ādiśeṣa’s verses 84–85, while his verse 102 transposes Ādiśeṣa’s 86, the principal difference being eschewal of any reference to Viṣṇu. And finally, this last point of convergence: the theistic dimension of the two doctrines, so evident that it often suffices, in the exercise of transposition, to replace references to Viṣṇu with those corresponding to Śiva.⁸⁸

1.2.2.3. DESTINY OF THE SECOND PARAMĀRTHASĀRA

In the same way most modern accounts take little note of the contribution of Śaivism to the issue of liberation — liberation in this life or not — likewise later Indian tradition, notably inspired by Vedānta, is careful to avoid Śaiva reasonings. Perhaps, for the orthodox, it is due to the reticence aroused by suspicion of tantric leanings.⁸⁹

When the *Jīvanmuktiveka* invokes, in the fourteenth century, the authority of the *Paramārthasāra*, it is the first *Paramārthasāra* that its author has in mind, though the *Paramārthasāra* of Abhinavagupta contains the same verse, hardly modified: later tradition, it is true — Abhinavagupta included — accords to the first *Paramārthasāra* the status of śruti.

I have found references to the *Paramārthasāra* of Abhinavagupta only in works of śaivite tendency: the TĀV ad I 37, I 39–40, and IX 50, as well as the *Parimala* (PM) ad Mahārthamaṇjarī (MM) 25 (probably thirteenth century),⁹⁰ which cite, respectively, vv. 15–16a, vv. 16b–17, v. 14 and v. 26. Note as well that, when Abhinavagupta cites APS 81 in his TĀ XXVIII 312, and explains it in the following verses, it is as though he were using his treatment of Ādiśeṣa’s work in order to comment, though allusively, on his own PS 83.

And so the destiny of Abhinavagupta’s *Paramārthasāra* has been limited to Śaiva circles.

2. The *Paramārthasāra* of Abhinavagupta

2.1. The text and its commentator

Yogarāja describes as a *prakaraṇa* the text he is commenting on. Though the text of Abhinavagupta does conform to the strictures of the genre in

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⁸⁸ This is not the place to pursue the discussion of the elder *Pāramārthasāra* and its relationship to the younger. A separate monograph will be devoted to the subject, to be published in due course.

⁸⁹ See p. 35.

⁹⁰ On the date of the MM, see Cox 2006; Sanderson 2007: 379, n. 479.
that it is indeed an epitome, a concise treatment of doctrine (see vv. 104 and 105), it does nevertheless diverge from the type in two principal ways: one is inherent in the need to reconcile the imperative of doctrinal coherence with the project of rewriting an older text of somewhat different persuasion; the other is that the Paramárthasāra of Abhinavagupta does not confine itself to an exposition of the doctrine as such but at times hints at a second sense lying beneath the evident sense, namely esoteric techniques and practices that are at the heart of the philosophical discourse, as strikingly exemplified by verses 41–46.

Moreover it can be said that the doctrine itself is esoteric by nature, which does not prevent it however from being formulated in precise philosophical terms. At least, it is how the system perceives itself: ‘Thus, the supremely recondite core of the teaching (śāstrasāram atigūḍham) has now been condensed in one hundred āryā-verses by me, Abhinavagupta, illumined [viz., inspired] by remembrance of Śiva’s feet’ (v. 105). Yogarāja never fails to expand upon that ‘supremely recondite core of the teaching’, the spiritual realization of nondualism — which is the ultimate truth of the system — and the means or ways to attain it. He refers frequently to the ‘secret’ (rahasya) that consists in the ‘knowledge of one’s own Self’ (svātmajñānarahasya, vv. 87–88), in other words, in recognizing that one’s own Self is not different from Maheśvara (v. 81).91

Even though he has not the breadth of Abhinavagupta, who commented on many of the key texts of the tradition, or of Jayaratha, who felt able to confront the monumental Tantrāloka, Yogarāja is nevertheless a profound exegete, sometimes even audacious — despite what Lilian Silburn says.92 Not only is he sensitive to the subtle and ever reciprocal transitions in the text between the cosmic Self and the individual self, between Śiva and the ‘knower’ (jñānin), both of which appear in our text under the guise of the pronoun ‘I’ that verses 47–50 are at pains to represent, but he shows himself capable of decoding the double entendres. Thus he deciphers references to the articulation of the mantra SAUH throughout verses 41–46, and to the symbolic signification of its elements. As well, in his commentary on verse 104: idam abhinavaguptoditasamkṣepam dhya-yataḥ param brahma/ acirād eva śivatvam nijāhṛdayāvesam abhyeti, ‘To him who meditates on this transcendental brahman, as concisely expounded by Abhinavagupta, Śivahood comes without delay, once it has pervaded his own heart’ — the apparently straightforward authorial signature is

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91 See YR ad 14 (rahasyanaya), 75 (rahasyavid), 81 (rahasyaṃ paramārthamaheśvarākhyam ... upalabhya), 87–88 (svātmajñānarahasya), 96 (svātmasambodhamukhāmnāyarahasya) and 104 (parabrahmarahasyātisaya).

92 Contrairement aux grands commentateurs de cette école philosophique, Yogarāja n’est qu’un simple exégète qui ne possède aucune originalité; c’est la raison pour laquelle nous ne donnons qu’un résumé de sa glose’ (Silburn PS: 20).
reinterpreted metonymically, as a copulative compound (dvandva) of adjectives that qualify the term 'brahman': 'To him who meditates on this transcendental brahman in reference to which a concise summary has now been stated, [such that brahman is now understood as both] quite novel (abhinava), and [heretofore] hidden (gupta), Śivahood comes without delay [...].' Moreover, Yogarāja proves himself very accurate when he finds in the discussion of liberation of verse 60 a reference to the Trika denunciation of the practice of yogic suicide (utkrānti), which is also condemned at greater length in the Tantrāloka — though with some misgivings, as the practice was taught in the Mālinīvijayottaratantra [MVT], the text that is otherwise considered authoritative in the Trika.

It is equally obvious that Yogarāja is familiar with the immense literature of nondualist Śaiva tradition, which he cites abundantly, and without much regard to tendency — which in effect establishes his authority to comment on the Paramārthasāra. Nevertheless, a predilection for a Krama-oriented exegesis is felt in his commentary, in the manner of his guru, Kṣemarāja (1000–1050), who repeatedly concerns himself with the Krama doctrine, celebrated as the highest of all systems. Yogarāja himself was probably initiated into Krama, as may be inferred from another text ascribed to him, the recently discovered Śivāstaka. This hymn to Caitanyaśiva, 'Śiva as consciousness', is of Krama affiliation and justifies our recognizing, at various places in the Paramārthasāra, Yogarāja’s references as having a Krama coloration. For example, after referring to the Kālikākrama in his gloss on PS 41, Yogarāja, ad 42, quotes the text of Kallaṭa that Kṣemarāja himself quotes in his vṛtti ad PH 18 — a verse that is instrumental in defining śaktivikāsa, the ‘blossoming of energy’, also called bhairavimudrā, which, as the context shows, implies a reference to Krama practice. It is one example among many of Yogarāja’s hinting at esoteric aspects of the doctrine (‘esoteric’ being understood in its narrow, technical sense), expanding on the diversity of yogic practices where the base text merely alludes to them.

Thus, within the apparent linearity of the Paramārthasāra’s philosophical discourse, Yogarāja finds many occasions to bring out more or less

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93Trika literature abounds in such reinterpretations of the name ‘Abhinavagupta’.
94See n. 1031. Note that AG also finds a veiled reference to that practice while commenting on BhG VIII 13–14.
95See his Spandanirnaya [SpN] ad I 1 (Kaul Śāstrī SpK: 6, l. 5); his quotations of the Kālikākrama in the Śivasūtramāratiṃśi [ŚSV]; his auto-commentary ad PH 15, where he reverently cites ‘the Kramasūtras composed by ancient teachers in their own characteristic language’ (tad uktam pūrvavargurthih svabhāsamayesu kramasūtresu), and ad 19, in which he refers again to the Kramasūtras, which he not only quotes, but explains at length, in dealing with the notion of kramamudrā, or mudrākrama; see also Sanderson 2007: 398ff.
97See also, inter alia, the reference to the notion of ‘great Void beyond the Void’ (ma-hāsūnyātīśūnyā), in YR ad 14 (n. 495).
cryptic references to the notion of supreme Speech, to the doctrine of phonemic emanation and the role of the māṭrkās (vv. 10–11), to mudrās (v. 42), to mantric practice (vv. 41–46), to the placing of the thirty-six tattvas on the body of the guru and of the initiand (v. 74), and to the kundalini,\(^9\) understood notably in its association with the articulation of the mantra HAMSAH (v. 78).

However, the major contribution of Yogāraja to the understanding of the text is his emphasis, beginning with the commentary on verse 9, on what he considers its core issue, jīvanmukti. He does adopt a style that is his own — conscious doubtless of the reticences and the disagreements surrounding the notion, he makes constant reference to the interior experience of the yogin, of the jīvanmukta so incomprehensible to ordinary men. Of course, the framework is well known, both in the literature of Kashmir Śaivism (and in the Paramārthasāra itself; see v. 59), and in pan-Indian tradition, beginning with the upaniṣads — but Yogāraja gives its exposition a particular twist. For instance, he accents his account with a series of phrases in the first-person singular, presumably to be attributed to the yogin himself, wherein the yogin formulates the content of his “incommunicable” realization.\(^9\)

Such are the originality and the lucidity of this commentary that it truly merits its appellation as a vivṛti, an ‘elaborate explanation’.\(^1\)

It might be noted also that Yogāraja could have figured in roles other than that of Kṣemarāja’s disciple, exegete of the Paramārthasāra, and author of the Śivāñēka, if he is the Yogeśvara or Yogeśvarācārya that Vāmadeva, the author of the Janmamaṇḍañévacāra, salutes as his master — thus furthering a preceptorial lineage or paramparā.\(^1\)

Thus read in the light of its commentary, the text of Abhinavagupta presents a remarkably exhaustive exposition of Trika doctrine, which Yogāraja attempts to position, as much within the vast śaivite tradition as in the perspective of other Indian systems — sometimes in order to appropriate the others, as in the case of the Bhagavadgītā and the Mahābhārata, sometimes in order to achieve distance from them, as in the case of idealistic monisms of the Advaita or the Buddhist Vijnānavāda sort, and

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\(^9\)Covertly ad PS 78, more explicitly ad PS 97, again ad PS 98–99, through one allusion.

\(^9\)Phrases that I have thought interesting enough to collect in an ‘Anthology of spiritual experience’ (see p. 461), to which should be added the “ahamstuti” that constitute verses 47–50 of the PS itself; see p. 25, and p. 55.

\(^1\)Thanks to this commentary, we have been able to make sense out of such puzzling passages as kārikās 27, 63, 78 or 84–85, to cite only a few; see, for instance, the way YR discloses the ‘implication’ (tātparya) of kā 63 (n. 1065).

\(^1\)Such is the hypothesis of Shāstri, in the preface to his edition of the Janmamaraṇaṇavicāra — an hypothesis that might be corroborated by a few additional indices: 1) the occurrence of the image of the water-wheel (arhaṇṭaḥkatḥaṇḍyantra), in a similar context in both YR’s commentary ad 47 and in the Janmamaraṇaṇavicāra: 18–19; 2) Vāmadeva’s citation (pp. 20–21) of the same two verses that YR had quoted in his commentary ad 83.
sometimes to "complete" their argumentation, particularly in reference to the Sāṃkhya. Note especially the way in which Abhinavagupta condenses the polemical demonstration of the Trika's supremacy into one verse, v. 27 — a verse that summarizes, sometimes idiosyncratically, several rival doctrines, and which is based, with significant alterations, on verse 27 of the first Paramārthasāra. It becomes, in the second, a doxography in miniature.

Thus the Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta achieves a double goal: it rewrites an older text without compromising its own point of view, and it makes of itself both a doctrinal synthesis and a defense of jīvanmukti. And it does this within the confines of a tight argument, the articulations of which Yogarāja is at pains to emphasize, taking particular note of the various implicit objections to which such or such a verse may be said to be a response.

2.2. Structure of the text

The structure of the text is governed by a dialectic between bondage and liberation — a dialectic that is articulated in terms of instruction as to the means of abolishing bondage.

V. 1: programmatic verse, in which Yogarāja, following a well-known procedure, alludes not only to the essential principles of the system, but also, if covertly, to what constitutes its major theme, and that of the Paramārthasāra itself: the notion of jīvanmukti.

Vv. 2–3: the myth of origin of the Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta, structured in terms of the myth of origin of the Paramārthasāra of Ādīśeṣa.

Vv. 4–13: condensed exposé of the system's nondualism: phenomenal diversity understood as the manifestation of the Lord's energies; successive and concentric manifestation of the four envelopes, or cosmic spheres (anda, v. 4), which comprehend the multiplicity of worlds and finite creatures; reaffirmation of nondualism: the paśu is none other than Śiva incarnate, who assumes as actor the infinity of roles in terms of which the theater of the world is characterized (5); series of examples (6–9, 12–13); doctrine of 'reflection' (pratibimba; 12–13) and the related doctrine of 'difference-and-non-difference' (bhedābheda). Yogarāja introduces (ad 9) for the first time the figure of the jīvanmukta, which he reads allusively in the notion of grace there set forth. Vv. 10–11, proposing to define the Self (or supreme principle), anticipate the later definitions of the jīvanmukta.

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\[102\] See p. 52.

\[103\] In supposing that the interpretation of YR reflects the views of AG.
Vv. 14–22: exposé of the thirty-six ‘principles’ (tattva), ontological categories or principles constitutive of the ‘pure path’ and the ‘impure path’, that are graduated manifestation of the Self, itself designated in what follows as brahman, or as ‘supreme principle’ (paratattva), or as ‘Śiva beyond [the principles]’ (paramaśīva — Śiva seen as the thirty-seventh principle). These principles, arranged progressively, explain the genesis of finitude — as they do in the prototypical Sāmkhya, which serves as basis for this and other Indian theories of “objectivity”. Allusions to the theme of error appear from v. 15 onward, where is introduced the notion of ‘fallacious creative power’ (māyā vimohinī).

Vv. 23–27: characterization of finitude as a ‘sheath’, ‘constriction’, or ‘impurity’ — all realizations of error, and consequences of māyā; allusive reference to three of the four ‘envelopes/spheres’ (anda, 23), the three ‘impurities’ (mala, 24); the fundamental misapprehension of taking the Self for the non-Self, expression of ‘nescience’ (avidyā), termed as well ‘ignorance’ (ajñāna) — in other words, Self-forgetfulness and the advent of subject-object dualism in the form of ‘dualizing thought’ (vikalpa, 25); nondualism reaffirmed (26); refutation of competing theories of the Self, all of which partake of error, though in different degrees (27, reprised in 32).

Vv. 28–32: introduction of the theme of ‘all-powerful error’, described as the obfuscation of the truth (‘the darkness of error’, 30), the constriction of the immemorial and eternal freedom of the Self (32); a theme that is omnipresent, inasmuch as on the dissolution of that error depends liberation in this life — the major issue here treated. Traika innovation: notion of the sequentiality of the two errors, that of taking the Self for the non-Self being prior to and more fundamental than that of taking the non-Self for the Self (31). The two errors constitute the mithyājñāna of PS 53, ‘false/apparent knowledge’. Similarly, ‘dualizing thought’ (vikalpa), which includes all the false constructions of the relation of Self and non-Self espoused by rival systems, is condemned as ‘false’ (mithyā, 32).

Vv. 33–38: reversibility of finitude and liberation, of which the freedom of the Lord is the explicative principle: Abhinavagupta’s introduction of the theme of ‘divine play’ (krīdā), expression of the Lord’s sovereign freedom; beginning of the treatment of liberation, which is obtained by reversing the process that is instrumental in generating bondage; liberation prescribed in v. 33: ‘One should unveil his proper Self ...’, to which one accedes, symmetrically, by unveiling, by purification, by reconquest or recognition of ‘Self-knowledge’ (svajñāna); correspondence established between macrocosmic (creation, etc.) and microcosmic (the four states, waking, etc.) modes of the Self (34); justification of the apparent para-

104See n. 848, ad PS 39.
2. THE PARAMĀRTHASĀRA OF ABHINAVAGUPTA

dox of a Self (or a *brahman*) both one and many (35); refutation of the objection that the Self is polluted by its particular realizations (36) and that the Self is compromised by the variety of its states of consciousness; refutation of the objection that the Self is subject to affectations: the “psychologization” of the Self being a mere matter of metaphor (38). Verse 38, which describes the Self ‘as it is in reality’ (*paramārthahataḥ*), anticipates the descriptions of *jīvanmukta* that follow.

Vv. 39–40: eradication of the twofold error (*bhrāntidvaya*, avat. ad 40) and the simultaneous advent of knowledge and liberation. The same freedom of the Supreme Lord — that is, one's own Self (*svātmamaheśvara*) — which has the power to subjugate has also the power to liberate (ad 39). The liberation that was prescribed in v. 33 is acquired in v. 40, with the necessary implication that it is a liberation acquired in this life: ‘In this way, when these twin delusions have been cut off, along with their roots, there is no penchant at all on the part of the supreme adept who has attained his goal to accomplish anything else’. Here we find, in Abhinavagupta’s text, the first reference, even though veiled, to the *jīvanmukta*, described as the ‘supreme adept’ (*parayogin*). Yogarāja interprets v. 40 as implying a denunciation of external rites, preparing thus the way for an esoteric account of mantric practice (vv. 41–46) exemplifying the ‘interiorized rite’ (*antaryāga*).

Vv. 41–46: change of tone in the commentary that focuses on an esoteric and mystical interpretation of the philosophical concepts treated above (*bhedabheda*, etc.). The stress is put upon the means of simultaneous access to both knowledge and liberation, by presenting, in terms that are ambiguous, a ‘discipline’ (*yoga*) based on scriptural sources (*āgama*) that is proper to the ‘way of energy’ (*śāktopāya*), this latter also called the ‘way of knowledge’ (*jñānopāya*) — the way of interiorizing ritual that is characterized by ‘meditative realization’ (*bhāvanā*) and mantric practice, notably that based on the mantra SAUH; description of the *jīvanmukta* as a yogin embarked on the way of energy. Vv. 41–46 constitute thus an esoteric parenthesis (or the beginning of such a parenthesis) in a discourse that is primarily philosophical — whose esoterism is recognized by its partial presentation and by the dissemination of occult teachings (YR ad 43, notably); symbolic correspondence between this section of the treatise — which describes the heart (*ḥṛdaya*), that is, ‘energy’, as well as the ‘seed of the heart’ (*ḥṛdayabija*), that is, the mantra SAUH — and its place in the center of the treatise.

Vv. 47–50: self-proclamation of the ‘I’ as ultimate principle, on the model of the vedic ‘self-praise’ (*ātmastuti*). The realization of the ab-

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105 See n. 865.

106 I call it *ahamstuti*, ‘[self-]praise of the “I”’. Note that the first appearances of the key notion of the absolute ‘I’ are to be found in YR’s commentary ad 6 (see n. 369), with the con-
solute ‘I’ (aham), equally that of the yogin and that of the Lord, is characteristic of the ‘way of Śambhu’ (śambhavopāya), defined, as well, as the ‘direct way’ (sāksādūpāya). In consequence, the first-person pronoun expresses the ‘undeniable’ (anapahavanīya, YR ad 47, 50) faculty of experience (or consciousness) present in all beings. This ‘I’, the mode of affirmation of the ‘Great Lord that is the Self of each person’ (svātmamah-esvara), reduces all the other modes of valid knowing (including revealed texts, Āgamas), to a position of externality and relativity (YR ad 50). This self-praise of the ‘I’ ‘stamps the yogin in the way of Śambhu’, as is said in Tantrāloka. On another level of interpretation, it is not the metaphysical principle of the ‘I’ that is solely at issue here, but the mantra AHAM as well, which represents that principle symbolically. Vv. 47–50 would in that case constitute a follow-up to the esoteric parenthesis of vv. 41–46, devoted to mantric practice and articulated in terms of the mantra SAUH. The mantra AHAM, defined elsewhere as the ‘supreme great mantra’ (paramahāmantra), source of all the other mantras’ efficiency (vīrya), is thus in effect the counterpart, in the way of Śambhu, of the mantra SAUH that pertains to the way of energy.

Vv. 51–59: the esoteric parenthesis is brief. From v. 51 onwards, we return to a properly philosophical account. At the very moment that knowledge is acquired (v. 51, ‘after overcoming the bewildering māyā ’), the yogin is liberated. He is henceforth a ‘knower’ (jñānin, YR ad 51 [first occurrence]). After this sketch of the yogin in majesty as the ‘master of the Wheel of energies’ (v. 47), that is, of the yogin following the sambhavopāya, we return to the depiction of the yogin in majesty according to the śāktopāya: the avataranikā ad 51 places in the mouth of the yogin, at the moment of his awakening, the proclamation of ĪPK IV 12: ‘This might is all mine’. The portrait of the jīvanmukta presented in vv. 51–59 answers the implicit objection that the notion of ‘liberation while living’ is incompatible with the karmic destiny that must be attributed to the yogin in virtue of his incarnate state. The response is that subjection to the concept of ahantacamatkara, and ad 8, with the concept of ahampatrīti, the cognitive experience of the ‘first person’ (see n. 397). See TĀ I 142.

Cf. TĀ III 265b–272a, IV 212–218.

Cf. TĀ III 269: ‘[...] sa evāsau śambhavopāyaamudritah. The three principal traits of the śambhavopāya are found in this PS’s ahamstuti, as they are set forth in Tantrāloka, along with the same stylistic usage of the first person; see TĀ III 280–281: matta evoditam idam mayyeva pratibimbitam/ madabhinnam idam ceti tridhopāyaḥ sa śambhavah/ [...] srṣṭeḥ sthitēḥ sambhyeś ca tad etat sūranam kṛtam/, ‘All this proceeds from me, is reflected in me, is inseparable from me’. The way of Śambhu is a triple one [...]. In this way follow one another emanation, maintenance, and reabsorption’. Cf. PS 48a: mayyeva bhāti viśvam darpana iva nirnaye; 48b: mattaḥ prasaratī sarvam [...]; 49b: sarvasmiḥ aham eva sphurāmi [...].', and YR ad 47–50: ‘[... the master] explains, using terms expressive of the pronoun “I”, that Śiva is the very self of everything [that exists], that, being in evidence everywhere in virtue of being established first [as condition for everything else], he enjoins the creation and all that follows from it’. See TĀ I 125b–127a, IV 212–218.
law of karman is the product of 'faulty knowledge'. In consequence, the advent of 'true knowledge' suffices to free one from that law (53), without it being necessary to distinguish between acts dating from before the awakening and those posterior to it: in both cases, it is a question of detaching the consequence from the act, seen not as a momentary event, but as the setting in motion of a long process eventuating in its proper fruit (in Mīmāṃsaka terms, it is thus the *apūrva*, generated by the act and linking it with its fruit, that "disappears"). For him who has been consecrated 'liberated while living' by his awakening, those fruits in process of maturation (*prārabdhakarman*) are consumed by the fire of awakening itself (v. 55), while those set in motion after the awakening eventuate in no consequence, inasmuch as 'awakening' signifies the abolition of the desire for fruition (v. 56). The *jñānin* frees himself thus from all the modes of karmic realization (v. 58), the principal indicator and effect of which is his emancipation from all sorrow.

V. 60: this initial portrait of the 'knower' culminates in the Traika definition of liberation as 'the manifestation of one's own energies realized by cutting the knot of nescience', in other words, as liberation while living — against a backdrop of "dualistic" definitions of liberation, rejected because they account only for liberation at death.

Vv. 61–67: less allusive mention, in the kārikās, of *jīvanmukti* — albeit via a periphrasis: '[...] he is liberated though still joined with his body' (v. 61); sketch, in the commentary to 61, of a distinction between liberation in this life, *jīvanmukti*, and liberation at death, which later traditions, among them post-Śaṅkara Vedānta, will term *videhamukti*; reiteration of the principle underlying the notion of *jīvanmukti*: it is access to knowledge, that is, the recognition of one's own self as the universal Self (or the Lord, or Pure Consciousness), that sets aside the negative effects of the law of karman, together with the fatality of transmigration (61–62). Vv. 63–66 respond to this apparent paradox by contesting the necessity of any convergence between a mechanistic application of the law of karman and the so-called fatality of reincarnation. Such "fatality" applies only to the embodied soul laboring under the control of nescience, which obliges him to act in view of a fruit or result. As soon as his nescience dissipates and his identity with the universal Self is recognized, the 'knower' — incarnate, as he is (at least in the eyes of others) — accedes to a state of 'disincarnation' (*āsarūratva*), synonym of liberation — responses that are hardly more than common places used by the commentator to further his demonstration. As proof that the benefit of an act may not pertain to the agent, v. 67, borrowing from ordinary experience, proposes the grammatical example of the verb *yaj*— 'to sacrifice', which, when inflected in

110 Cf. BS Bh I 1, 4: *āsarūratvam mokṣākhyam*; See YR ad 63, 70, 72 (and n. 1062), 79–80 (and n. 1212).
the middle voice (yajate), implies that the yajamāna, the patron of the sacrifice, is its beneficiary, but, when inflected in the active voice (yajati), implies that the yājaka, the officiating priest, acts without acquiring that particular benefit which belongs to his patron. The yājaka thus becomes a metaphor for the man ‘liberated while living’.

Vv. 68–73: exonerated henceforth from the corruption of his acts, the jīvanmukta can now be described in the light of the very acts that compose his daily life — indifferent to the injunctions and prohibitions that are the meat of the ordinary man, appearing to others not unlike a madman, wandering hither and yon, so deviant is he from the usual standard (71). His rituals of consecration are interior, metaphorical (68): the ‘knower’ makes oblation of his dualizing thoughts in the fire of his consciousness, fanned by the wind of meditative realization (bhāvanā) — the mention here of bhāvanā signals that the path taken by the ‘knower’, in this section of the Paramārthasāra, is that of ‘energy’. Regardless of the accidents that may affect his life and acts henceforth, the characteristic of the ‘knower’ is his purity (70), unalterable because innate.

Vv. 74–80: description of the mystic practice of the ‘knower’ devoted to the way of energy; metaphorical extensions of the inner-outer parallelism noted above: construction of the body as temple (devagrha, 74); one’s own self as the divinity (devatā, 75); thought as oblation (havāna, 76); unshakable awareness of the Ultimate as his own meditation (dhyāna, 77); contemplation of supreme ipseity as his silent (or whispered) recitation (japa, 78); surpassing of all duality as his vow (vrata, 79–80). The description of practice culminates with a characterization of the jīvanmukta as a Kāpālika (79–80) — although his vow, qualified as ‘otherworldly’ (alaukika) by Yogarāja, goes well beyond that of the ordinary kāpālika, whose practices are soiled by duality despite their terrifying rigor; pursuit of these images: the transmigratory world where abides the jīvanmukta is quite as terrifying as the burning-ground of the kāpālika; the symbolic khatvāṅga of the latter, a staff surmounted by a skull, becomes, literally, the body of the former, the kāpālika’s begging-bowl, in the form of a shard of skull, becomes the ‘shred’ of the knowable that sustains equally the jīvanmukta; the kāpālika’s liquor is the other’s ‘essence of the universe’. In sum, the jīvanmukta is ‘liberated’ because he is exempt from duality. Yogarāja concludes: ‘Such is the vow of him who has cultivated the lotus feet of a true teacher. Beyond that is nothing but the desiccation of the body’ — a comment that serves also to introduce a new motif (extensively developed in vv. 89–102), that death does not interrupt or modify the fact of liberation.

Vv. 81–88: new portrait of the jīvanmukta, again in quasi-philosophical terms (81): the commentary borrowing from the Sāṃkhya-kārikā the famous image of the potter’s wheel (without however acknowledging the
source [SK 67], which it cites almost verbatim), the living body of the 'knower' is said there, like the potter’s wheel, to “spin” for some time after the last impulsion given to it by the potter. Here, the impulsion is the inertia provided by acts previously undertaken (prārabdhakarman), whose motion continues unrestrained: it explains why and how liberation occurs within this world; introduction of two new elements defining jīvan-mukti (82): that the experience is blissful (that is, positively felicitous, not merely absent of sorrow), and that it is open to all, without ritual prerequisites — and therefore does not require the social ‘perfectioning’ (samskāra) implied in the caste system. In his commentary to v. 83, Yogarāja sketches the distinction between liberation in this life and liberation at death, and alludes to a theme that will be later developed (vv. 90–95): the significance of the yogin’s final moments for his already acquired liberation. The vanity of injunctions and prohibitions is again noted (83–84). A new objection is raised (avat. ad 85–86), which, while admitting the simultaneity of ‘knowledge’ and liberation, denies the possibility of continuing to ‘live in a body’, for this is necessarily polluting — liberation being possible, in other words, only at the moment of death. In response, it is pointed out (85–86) that ‘enlightenment’ implies the disappearance of the three impurities that are responsible for the soul’s finitude and transmigration. The persistence of a body does not compromise in any way the liberated status of the jīvanmukta — and his liberation is irreversible, established once and for all, according to the Śaiva maxim: sakṛd vibhāto 'yam. A concession is made nevertheless to the adversary (YR ad 85–86): a gradation, or perhaps a sequencing, of two orders of liberation: liberation in this life, corresponding to the ‘Fourth state’ (turya), and liberation at death, corresponding to the ‘state beyond the Fourth’ (turyātīta). Vv. 89–95: theme of the irreversibility of liberation developed in detail. A paradoxical argument justifies this irreversibility by appealing to the law of karman — the same law that, for the ordinary man, condemns him to the fatality of transmigration. One becomes, in effect, that which

111 The notion of jīvanmukti itself represents in all likelihood an effort to resolve the dilemma thus posed: how can “fruits” of action be abolished at the moment of awakening, and yet the motion imposed on the body during the period before awakening continue until the death of the body? To affirm both is in a sense to claim that certain acts or manners of acting have no result, nor do they propose any goal (see PS 67). The figure of the potter and his wheel seems to exclude another possible resolution of this dilemma — that seemingly adopted by the Gītā and by Mahāyāna Buddhism — that the fruits of such acts can be conveyed to others, more worthy or capable of receiving them, Kṛṣṇa, in the former case, a bodhisattva in the latter. A ‘god’ is indeed a convenient adjunction to any such system of thought.

112... in other words, after the destruction of his body, he attains a condition of Isolation (kevalatā) that is beyond the Fourth state [of consciousness], composed solely of blissful consciousness [...]’.

113 ‘This being the case, the [mind of the] knower of the Self (jñānti), while living (jīvann eva), is formed by the Fourth; and he transcends even that Fourth, once his body no longer exists’. 
one has always been — whether he be a bound soul (paśu) or a ‘knower’ (jñānīn). No intervening accident, no unexpected shock is sufficient to deflect one from the destiny he has sought. Such is the teaching of v. 89, which on its face seems to concern only the bound soul; it is the commentary that supplies the missing link with this śaivite interpretation of the law of karman. In virtue of this principle, the final agony of the ‘knower’, whatever disorder of mind or body may accompany it, does not bring into question his status as ‘liberated’ (90–95). One reading of v. 91 suggests the possibility of comparing the opacity of the ‘knower’s’ final moments to the condition of certain animals as they confront death (cf. the episode of gajendramokṣa, for example, taken up by YR): the animal condition itself does not obstruct the state of liberation to which the animal may have been entitled.

Vv. 96–97: jīvanmukti is now philosophically established. One question remains: why are some aspirants, though genuinely desirous of liberation, not accorded their release in this life? In other words, how does one account for “gradation” or “degrees” of liberation — and sometimes even failures? The response, even though it may appear not entirely satisfactory, makes appeal to ‘divine grace’ in the form of a ‘descent of energy’ (śaktipāta): it is that ‘descent of energy’ of the Supreme Lord, unconditioned, unrestricted, and yet varied, that liberates. This apparent gradation of “descents” is of course correlated with the abilities of the aspirant, which notion would be difficult to see as anything but a restating of the question, rather than an “answer”. In fact, a shift in point of view is in course: at the end of the treatise, it is solely Śiva’s perspective that is at issue — paramārthataḥ — in terms of which the perspective provided by the law of karman is merely instrumental, and ultimately to be cast aside, as mere vyavahāra, inasmuch as it is valid for the embodied agent, who acts only by proxy; the sole real agent is Śiva. The ‘descent of energy’ thus amounts to the acquisition (or ‘recognition’) of a ‘freedom’ that is one’s already — inasmuch as Śiva is here conceived as ‘freedom’ itself. Given the degrees of grace, one cannot escape the idea that different degrees of effort are also called for — on the part of different aspirants — and so the text, in these final sections, shifts from an emphasis on the jñānīn to one on the yogin, he who is engaged in a ‘discipline’ (yoga) leading to

114*On the other hand, comments YR ad 89, when his body falls away, nothing at all befalls the man [viz., the jñānīn] who has rehearsed no [acts engendering] latent dispositions; indeed, with whatever intention the cognizer rehearses (abhyasyāt) [his actions], he becomes one with that [intention], and at the moment of death the object that he desires with clarity comes into evidence for the cognizer. In this way, there can be no reversal [or setting at naught] (viparyaya) of the matters that have been rehearsed [throughout life], nor can anything not of the nature of previously rehearsed activity come into play in some unprecedented fashion (apurvatvena). Thus, previous rehearsal (pūrvābhyaṣa) is alone the cause [of] whatever [effect ensues]. This is the purport'.

115viṣṇukhala, as it is said in the avat. ad 9.
emancipation. If the echo of the Gitā is clear, the term ‘yogin’ implies as well a reference to the Śaiva system of upāyas. A reading of vv. 96–97 — without any reference to the commentary — finds there easily a description of jīvanmukti and the three ‘ways’ capable of leading to it. In 96 is described an aspirant who, benefiting from a grace that is ‘very intense’ (atītīvra), follows the ‘way of Śambhu’, the immediate or direct path to liberation, characterized through the analogy of copper changed alchemically into gold by contact with mercury; such an aspirant accedes to final enlightenment, as it were, ‘effortlessly’ and in this life — the only mediation required being that of the teacher. V. 97 envisages an aspirant who has devoted himself to the sequential practices of the ‘way of energy’ (śāktopāya) — and probably, to the ‘way of the finite soul’ (ānavopāya). The element that is common to vv. 96–97 is their reference to a yogin who has or will have succeeded in his quest, who has acquired liberation in this life or will in the next.

Vv. 98–102 are devoted to a lengthy exposition of the unsuccessful aspirant, the aspirant who has ‘fallen from discipline’ (yogabhrasta), typically, by an unexpected death that has interrupted his practice — and who thus sees his liberation deferred. Vv. 98–99 promise to such a one a residence in ‘divine worlds’ and a rebirth that is guaranteed to produce a salutary result. Not only is no effort wasted, but his practice is taken up at just the point it was interrupted. Vv. 100–102 describe an aspirant even more imperfect, whose practice has utterly failed, who has, for instance, failed to grasp what has been clearly explained to him. After a sojourn lasting even longer in the divine worlds, he too is promised an ultimate liberation, but only after a subsequent death. The source of the notion of the yogabhrasta is doubtless the Gitā (VI 37–49), as Yogarāja notes ad 102. The notion, strangely enough, is largely absent in other texts of nondual Śaivism of Kashmir — with the single exception of TĀ XXXVII 65 (which uses the synonym yogacyuta while referring to Kṛṣṇa’s teaching apropos the yogabhrasta) and Tantrālokaviveka ad loc., where the term yogabhrasta figures in a citation of those very verses (viz., BhG VI 41b–43, in vol. VIII: 3713). Why this Paramārthasāra’s remarkable and quite detailed exception? In part, the answer must lie in the fact that Abhinavagupta’s Paramārthasāra is the rewriting of an extra-Śaiva text, the Ādiśeṣa’s Paramārthasāra, of which the last verses (vv. 84–86) have been reproduced quasi verbatim in Abhinavagupta’s verses 100–102 — preceding which, however, comes a preamble that refers, even though covertly, to the Traika notion of the three ‘ways’ (vv. 96–97) and supplies a philosophical foundation for the notion of the yogabhrasta (vv. 98–99). This brings into focus, perhaps, the strategy of rewriting at issue here, where sometimes fidelity and coherence must be reconciled somewhat loosely. This borrowing from the older text does serve Abhinavagupta, however, in
facilitating his claim that liberation is universally accessible — witness the vibrant plea of Yogarāja in favor of the effort to obtain liberation (103).

V. 103: This verse contains the "moral" to be derived from vv. 96–102, which is that of the entire treatise: every effort bears fruit, provided that it be sincere; liberation is certain, be it now or later. Neither must the aspirant fear presumption: not only is his effort promised success, but it is legitimate.

Vv. 104–105: As expected at the end of a treatise like the Paramārthasāra, v. 104 returns to the text itself and its author, and finds an additional reason to believe in the inevitability of liberation: it is even more certain now that it has been explained in the best of all possible treatises, namely, the Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta. V. 105 goes even further, celebrating the work for its concision, and the author for his authority, conferred by the unequalled splendor of his mystical realization, in which he is likened to none other than Maheśvara himself.

2.3. Sketch of the doctrine

On the model of a doctrine that places in tandem servitude and emancipation, the text of the Paramārthasāra is constructed dialectically: to verse 24, which describes the installation of impurities, corresponds verse 57, which contemplates their abolition;\(^{116}\) to verses 4–5, which introduce the motif of the 'sheaths' or 'envelopes' (anda), whose unfurling causes finitude, correspond verses 41–46, which describe the manner in which mantric practice proceeds to their being stowed away; to verses 30–31, which set forth the notion of twofold error, correspond verses 39–40, which consecrate its eradication; verse 15, which defines māyā, is reflected in verse 51, which makes māyā's dissipation the precondition of liberation.

In effect, finitude and liberation are nothing but appearances, have no "reality" apart from worldly convention and linguistic usage.\(^{117}\) To the extent that Śiva's game brings them into play, they assume alternating roles, endlessly, in a world that has no other destiny than transmigration, subject only to Śiva's will: 'Thus does the Supreme Śiva extend [within

\(^{116}\) Theme taken up again at vv. 85–88.

\(^{117}\) See YR ad 60: "In just this way, consciousness, [when] constricted by the limitations deriving from the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc., is said to be “as if bound” (baddham iva); and similarly, once the bondage that consists of the conceit attributing to the body, etc., the capacity to cognize has come to an end through the manifestation of the knowledge of one's own nature, that same [consciousness] is said to be “as if liberated” (muktam iva), [since now it is] fully deployed through the discrimination of its own energies [of independence, etc.] [...] Hence bondage as well as liberation are both essentially [functions of] conceit of self affecting the limited cognizer; it is not that any events of this sort [really] take place in the reality that is consciousness — the ultimate truth [of this system]; see n. 1039.
our sphere] his play [made] wonderful by [the alternation of] bondage and liberation'.\textsuperscript{118}

On the level of ultimate reality (paramārtha), in contrast, there exist neither servitude nor emancipation — just sovereign freedom, which is manifest in the play of the god, who is pleased sometimes to conceal himself, sometimes to reveal himself, rhythmically, in accordance with his two ‘energies’ (śakti), that of obscurcation (tirodhānaśakti) and that of his grace or favor (anugrahaśakti).\textsuperscript{119}

Everything, in this system of thought, extending even to notions and entities of little value, is a product of an ‘energy’ of the god. The doctrine is well suited then to the needs of the mumuksu, the acolyte aspiring to emancipation, for it accords him assurance that he will reach his goal: even in the sphere of finite interests, there is nothing set in stone, nothing irremediable — even finitude itself is finite.

In this sense, emancipation is defined not so much as a motivated effort to undo bondage, as it is a positive recognition (pratyabhijña) that one is already free — if anything, the paradoxical acquisition of a freedom that one has never lost. Although this paradox is, in some way, common to most Indian radical monisms, this school affirms in particular that the recognition at issue takes the form of the ‘full deployment of one’s own energies’ (svātmaśakti, YR ad v. 60). With the introduction of the notion of śakti, the Trika affirms both its doctrinal coherence (the other systems do not have recourse to such a notion in order to describe liberation) and its taste for paradox — a way to shore up a counterfactual view of the human condition. Liberation is freedom: in other words, there exists no liberation, but a freedom that plays at hiding itself.

At the heart of the doctrine, as we have seen, is the notion of jīvanmukti, ‘liberation [from life] while one yet lives’, the oxymoron par excellence — and scandalous as well for ordinary reasonable men, concerned, as all men should be, with executing their religious and ethical duties. The numerous objections to the notion point to that scandal, objections for the most part implicit in the texts themselves, but which the commentators delight in bringing out.

The challenge that jīvanmukti represents as well for the Paramārthasāra itself can be ascertained subliminally in the polysemy of the work’s title, where paramārtha signifies not only ‘ultimate (parama) reality (or truth, artha)’, but (as the commentary to v. 104 at the end of the treatise somewhat belatedly reveals) ‘the highest (parama) of the four goals (artha, scil., puruṣārtha) of human life’, namely emancipation (mokṣa): ‘Now the author [Abhinavagupta] proceeds to sum up the purpose of the text, saying that “it alone is the teaching that serves as a means for realizing the

\textsuperscript{118}PS 33.

\textsuperscript{119}See YR ad 60 and 69.
INTRODUCTION

Likewise, in his commentary on the first verse, Yogarāja appears to descry a reference, albeit concealed, to jīvanmuktī in the name ‘Śambhu’, which he interprets etymologically as signifying ‘whose nature is unsurpassed felicity’\(^{120}\) — a not uncommon ploy, witness the similar readings of the name ‘Śaṅkara’ (cf. SpP 1, quoted below). He continues: ‘With this summary sentence, which teaches that the supreme state to be attained is absorption in [what is already] one’s own essence, the teacher has stated in abbreviated form the purport of the text in its entirety’.

In this system, the only freedom to which one should aspire, is emancipation in this life\(^ {121}\) — a notion that appears to follow from nondualism itself, if one understands by ‘emancipation’ going beyond the contraries and reintegration within the One: there is no reason why a person, in this world, should not be as free as is Śiva, for he is not-different from him, provided that he undertakes the real labor of recognizing that truth.\(^ {122}\) The existential difficulty of becoming Śiva may be read, in effect, between the lines of the doctrine of the four upāyas — which doctrine includes, nevertheless, at least for a handful of individuals, either the possibility of the ‘non-means’ (anupāya), that is, the absence of all existential difficulty in realizing one’s own identity with Śiva; or that of the quasi-instantaneous ‘way of Śambhu’.

Indeed, one has the sense that Kashmir Śaivism is one of the first systems to seek to justify doctrinally the notion of jīvanmuktī. As such, the treatment of the notion and its representation as a philosophical issue constitute in their own way major contributions to the development of Indian thought.

The theme of abandoning karmic life is nearly as old as Indian civilization itself, and has given rise to a debate that is a persistent leitmotif of Indian intellectual history. The asperity of that debate might be due as much to a lingering suspicion that Brahmanism had already surrendered too much to Buddhist influence, as to the newly popular devotionalism and its reinvigorated sense of ritual, menaced by any abandoning of worldly life.

The menace represented by the abandonment of karmic life had been first manifest in the late-vedic critique of the efficacy of the sacrifice itself (see, for instance, MuU I 2, 10–11). That critique was at least partially disarmed by the notion of the four stages of life (āśramadharma), relegating saṃnyāsa to the end of life, well after the householder had fulfilled his

\(^{120}\) anuttaraśreyahsvabhāva — or ‘[appropriation of] whose nature becomes [for the aspirant] the ultimate goal’.

\(^{121}\) See SpP I [ = ad I 1, in the textual organization of SpN]: iba hi jīvanmuktataiva mokṣah.

\(^{122}\) Concerning the conception of jīvanmuktī in the Siddhānta, which is dualist at the time of the Kashmirian exegetes, see, especially, Brunner, Somaśaṁbhupaddhati [SŠP], vol. III: XIII, and TAK, s.v. jīvanmuktā (vol. II: 275ff.).
ritual destiny (including the procreation of sons). In the same way, the ideal of liberation (*mokṣa*) was superadded to the three "normal" goals of human life, corresponding to this new "extra-human" condition.

From a strictly philosophical point of view, the debates that are echoed in the Śaiva texts on the degrees of liberation relate to a narrower issue, rather more technical in nature: can liberation — accepted by nearly everyone at the time — be reconciled with karmic life, or must one wait for the end of life in order to accede thereto? That is, is the notion of *jīvanmukti* defensible?

Many scholars, Renou among them, have remarked on the Indian genius for synthesis, reconciliation — a spirit that refuses to regard any contradiction as final. In this sense, the tension between the life of the hermit and worldly life is not a recent phenomenon, nor a fatality — and the notion of *jīvanmukti* offers once again the opportunity to palliate it. The dynamism of Indian intellectual history depends in large part on that dialectic, where compromises have been numerous (and not all congenial to Western fashions of thought), such as the interiorization of complex external rites, the Brahmanico-Buddhist amalgam, the notion of the 'guru', both "free" and socially engaged.

The quarrel reflected in these Śaiva texts is thus far from original, but is nevertheless felt as irremediably crucial.

As far as the terms *jīvanmukti/*mukta are concerned, most modern interpreters consider them as relatively recent. To date, they have been noticed in several Advaita or Advaita-like texts of the epoch, such as the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* (also it seems from Kashmir, and presenting several Śaiva traits), that some (including Dasgupta 1975, vol. II: 231) would attribute to the ninth century; and the *Ātmabodha*, traditionally assigned to Śaṅkara himself — though erroneously, according to the same authorities.¹²³

The terms figure as well in Śaiva texts of the same period, as I will attempt to show, but their more certain dating should not hide the fact that the idea of *jīvanmukti* had long ago found its way into the conceptual apparatus of monists (of whatever stripe) — it is there in the *Gītā*,¹²⁴ as well as in some older upaniṣads,¹²⁵ and recognized as such by Śaṅkara.¹²⁶

¹²³ On the notion of *jīvanmukti* in the *dvaitavedānta* of Madhva (13th or 14th cent.), see R. Mesquita 2007.


¹²⁵ See n. 1405.

¹²⁶ See Dasgupta 1975, vol. II: 246; Oberhammer 1994: 15. Prof. Raffaele Torella has kindly referred me to the epic usage of *jīvanmukta*, or rather *jīvan... muktaḥ*, to which Prof. Minoru Hara has devoted an article (1996). It is to be noted, however, that in the Epic the term does not occur as such, but rather as variations on a stock phrase, usually (in the MBh) in the negative: *na me jīvan vimokṣyase*, 'You will not escape from me alive', a phrase which expresses only the hero's determination not (na) to let his foe escape (*muktaḥ*) alive (*jīvan*) from the battle. The locution is found in the affirmative in the *Harivamsa*: *jitah... jīvan muktaḥ ca viṣṇunāda*, 'vanquished, he was released alive by Viṣṇu'. The context here is clearly not "mukti"
Even its technical interpretation is there: are ‘free while alive’ those that “act” no more, but are obliged to live out their prārabdhakarman, because (as indicated by Śaṅkara and others) a karman once set in motion is not easily annulled.

Yet, the contribution of the vast śivaite literature to the debate on jīvan-mukti cannot be ignored, as has been mainly the case, not only by modern scholarship (at least beyond the field of Śaiva studies), but also by later Indian tradition. In effect, one can say without exaggeration that the Śaiva authors give us one of the first more or less complete accounts of an idea that had taken root for some time in Indian absolutist thought — although they do not deviate from the commonly received opinion as concerns the general character and importance of liberation itself, as shown by their constant references to prior discussions of this issue, and most notably to the Gitā.

There is no doubt as to the soteriological orientation of the quasi-totality of developed Indian philosophical systems — be they monist or dualist, as the Sāmkhya — but the novelty of the Trika’s approach lies in its viewing, indeed reevaluating, mukti in the light of its metaphysics, showing that, for instance, on the level of the absolute, there is no liberation, inasmuch as bondage exists only on the empirical level. A view with Mādhyamika overtones, it is true, but freed from the eristic and negative character of the latter — bondage itself being resolved in the absolute freedom of the Self, a state of dynamic plenitude (among other names, Trika confers upon itself that of pūrnatāvāda) that suffices to define liberation as freedom itself. Thus, the Trika organizes under the heading of a ‘doctrine of freedom’ (svātantryavāda) the elements of the immemorial dialog on the liberated man.

Another important emphasis of the Trika, perhaps even an innovation, is, as I have already indicated, its privileging the acquisition of jīvanmukti, even to the point of denigrating the older notion of ‘liberation at death’.  

Jayaratha, in his commentary on TĀ I 21— the concluding verse of the text’s introit — observes, in effect, that ‘the objective [of this treatise] is to confer emancipation in this life by recognizing the Self as such, by employing progressively such means as will be described in what follows’, and that this goal ‘although developed through the long sequence of verses that follow, is directly declared by the present verse (21), which begins

127See Oberhammer 1994: 15, with reference to BhGBh VI 27: ‘Selon toute apparence, ce texte est la plus ancienne référence à la jīvanmuktiḥ et peut-être le seul passage où Śāṅkara emploie le terme technique de jīvanmukta’.

128See Utpalavaishnava’s exegesis, p. 41.
with "Śrīśambhunātha". 129

At the other extreme of the treatise, verses 32–33a of chapter XXXVII confirm: 'This treatise [concerning the] Real, [wherein is declared] the essence of the Trika itself, is evidently to be taken up [and studied], providing as it does without great effort the supreme benefit that is emancipation in this life, and arranged in such a way as to convey the highest satisfactions just as desired'. 130

Jayaratha (ad TĀ XXXVII 32–33a) does not fail to stress the coherence of the treatise on which he comments, by relating these verses to those of the first chapter: 'Thus, [with the articulation of vv. 32–33a of ch. XXXVII] the main purpose of the work is accomplished, which had been set forth in [vv. 284b–286a of ch. I]: “The sage who continually occupies himself with [this work] of thirty-seven chapters will become an incarnate Bhairava; since he whose knowledge has been completed in [study of] these thirty-seven will become Bhairava, why should one be surprised when even finite creatures, by contemplation of him, attain to the state of Bhairava?” 131 Recalling thus, in his commentary on verses 32–33 of the final chapter, the passage in the initial chapter where the jīvanmukta is described, along with his vocation of helping others on the same path, Jayaratha reaffirms that the theme of emancipation in this life is the thread of Ariadne stringing together the entire text — and I might add, the entire doctrine.

In effect, the key notions of the system — 'grace' (śaktipāta), the 'means' or 'ways' of liberation (upāya), the triad of 'impurities' (mala), to cite only a few — enter into its soteriological project. We learn, for instance, from the Tantrālokā's treatment, and to a lesser extent, that of the Paramārthasāra, that jīvanmukti is accessible in the three inferior 'ways'. Supporting this notion is the alchemical metaphor, which is one of the Trika's favorite topos. 132 According to Yogarāja (ad 96) the process at work in attaining jīvanmukti by the quasi-instantaneous 'way of Šaṁbhu' is similar to that involved in transmuting copper into gold by means of mercury — viz., the pāṣu into Śiva by the 'verbal transmission' (āmnāya) of Śaiva doctrine. By āmnāya is here meant, somewhat atypically, the direct audition of the doctrine, arguably once only, from the mouth of the teacher. In TĀ V 151,

129TĀV I 21: vakṣyamānōpāyakramena svātmatayā prayabhijñānāj jīvanmukti-pradatvān prayaojanam ślokāntarāśūritam api śrīśambhunātha ityādiślokena sāksād uktam.

130TĀ XXXVII 32–33a: ittham dadad anāyāśāj jīvanmuktimahāphalam/ yathepsitamahābhoga-dāṛtvena vyavasthitam// śodorādhasāraṁ sacchāstram upādeyam idam sphūtam//.

131TĀ XXXVII 32–33a: anena ca asya granthasya — iti saptādhikānām triṁśatam yath sādā budhah/ āṁnikānāṁ samabhyaset sa sāksād bhairavo bhavet// saptātṛimsatā samāṁnabodho yad bhairavo bhavet/ kim cīram anāvo 'py asya drśā bhairavatām iyuḥ — ityādīnā upakrāntam eva mahāprayaojanatvam nirvāhitam//.

132... which serves also to describe the two final 'states' (avasthā), turya and turyātīta (see YR ad 96 and n. 1365).
that same analogy applies to jīvanmukti obtained by the ‘way of the finite soul’.

Still, the imperative of emancipation in this life is not limited to the Tantrāloka, nor to the phase of development of nondual Kashmiri Śaivism of which Abhinavagupta’s treatise is the summation. At the very beginning of his treatment, Abhinavagupta relies on the authority of various Āgamas on the question of emancipation, and particularly on that of emancipation in this life — notably, the Raurava, Svāyambhūva, Maitreya, etc. (I 46). The Nīśātana is cited in TĀ I 50–51 as positing in unambiguous terms the distinction between liberation at death and liberation in this life. In these same verses one can also detect a sketch of the notions of pauruṣajñāna and bauddhajñāna, to which TĀ I 36ff. has just devoted a novel treatment: ‘He whose mind remains subject to dualizing thoughts becomes Śiva after the dissolution of the body; but the other [who is not so subject] becomes [Śiva] in this very life — such is the main teaching of the śāstra [viz., the Nīśātana].’ In TĀ XIV 44b–45, Abhinavagupta alludes again to this passage of the Nīśātana, which Jayaratha cites more elaborately, concluding: ‘Thus it has been demonstrated that liberation is only for the living whose mode of being lacks dualizing thought constructs; but, as for the rest, it will be when the body falls away’. Similarly, the passages TĀ IV 213–221a and 259–270 rely on the Mālinīvijayottaratantra, a supreme authority for the Trika, in order to develop their notion of jīvanmukti as obtained via the ‘way of energy’ — a ‘way’ that implies the interiorization of ritual (MVT XVIII 74–82, TĀ IV 212).

Again, reference is made, in the texts of this school, to other Tantras or Āgamas, notably the Svachchandatantra [SvT], the Mṛtyuṇjit (or Netratrantra) [NT], the Kularatnamālā and the Kālikākrama, profusely cited by the Śiva-sūtravimarśini (see n. 881) and the Spandanirnaya [SpN], works of Ksemaraja, who as well commented on the Svachchandatantra and the Netratrantra. In some of these citations, the notion of jīvanmukti is explicitly formulated, notably: SvT VII 259a (in SpN II 6–7): [...] jivann eva vimukto

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133In the context of treating pauruṣajñāna and bauddhajñāna. On the dating of those texts, see below.

134Even though the terms jīvanmukti or jīvanmukta are not there found, JR ad I 50–51 is explicit: evam vikalpo 'ra sambhavan muktau vyavadhāyakah iti na tadaiva muktiḥ, tasya punar asambhava satyapi dehe muktiḥ, ‘Since dualizing thoughts, still possible, interpose themselves at the point of liberation, there is then no liberation; when they are no longer possible, there is liberation, even though the body exist’.

135TĀ I 50–51: vikalpayuktacittas tu pīṇḍapātāc chivam vrajet/ itarās tu tadaiveṣ āśāstrāyātra pradhānātah//. See also TAV ad loc., which completes the citation: [...] vikalpayuktacittas tu hy ātmānām śivam avyayam/ pāsyate bhāvāsvadhyā yo jīvanmukto na saṁśayāḥ, ‘He who sees himself as the unchanging Śiva, his mind free of dualities, because his being is cleansed, is “freed while living”; of this there is no doubt’.

136TAV XIV 44b–45: evam nirvikalpavṛttinanāṃ jīvatām eva muktiḥ itareṣām tu dehāpātānan- taram iti siddham (vol. V: 2438).
2. THE PARAMĀRTHASĀRA OF ABHINAVAGUPTA

'sau yasyeyam bhāvanā sadā//' (see also Appendix 20, p. 345); SvT IV 398b (in ŚSV III 28): [...] dehapaprāṇasthito 'py ātmā tadvallīyeta tatpade//; SvT X 372b (in ŚSV III 45): tatrastho 'pi na badhīyeta yato 'tīva sunirmalāh//; and Kālikākrama (in ŚSV III 31): sarvāṇi śuddham nirālambham jñānam svapratyayātmakam/ yaḥ pāsyati sa muktātmā jivan eva na samśayah//, 'He who sees all knowledge as pure, free of [external] support [viz., object], and having the nature of his own understanding, [is now such that] his self is liberated [or “has a liberated self”] while yet he lives. Of this there is no doubt'.

Here, a few remarks as to the dating of scriptural sources referred to by Abhinavagupta and his commentators in the context of jīvanmukti might be of some use.137 Sadyojyotis, who was active between 675 and 725 according to Sanderson 2006: 76, certainly knew the Rauravasūtrasaṃgraha, the Śvāyambhuvasūtrasaṃgraha and the Mataṅgapārameśvara, belonging to the Siddhānta canon. The last work is later than the fifth century AD, as Sanderson 2006: 78 also shows. We can also affirm with a fair amount of certainty that all these texts, as well as all other known scriptural sources, postdate the early layers of the Nīśāṣa, which is probably the earliest of all known Tantras. Goodall and Isaacson (2007) have established 450–550 for the early Nīśāṣa, thus 550 is a very likely terminus post quem for most of our sources (675 being the terminus ante quem).

The case of the Mālinivijayottara is less straightforward, for Sadyojyotis’s references or allusions to it are not established beyond doubt.138 However, it is more likely than not that he indeed knew the Mālinivijayottara, whose date can be tentatively established before 675 (and after 550). The Svacchanda, which is often considered relatively late,139 may also come from this period (sixth–seventh century). For the Mālinivijayottara knows and claims to be based on the Siddhayogēsvarimata, whose short recension declares itself to be an abridged Svacchanda.140 Since the dating of the Mālinivijayottara is itself problematic and the Siddhayogēsvarimata survives only in its short recension, we are not on firm ground here. Nevertheless, both the Siddhayogēsvarimata and its near contemporary, the Brahmayāmala, of the Vidyāpītha canon, are likely to have been composed in or around the seventh century for various other reasons.141 The Brahmayāmala also includes transformations of the cult of Svacchandabhairava,142

137 I am grateful to Dr Judit Törzsök for detailed discussions on the subject.
138 See Törzsök Siddhayogēsvarimata [SYM]: 14 citing Sanderson.
139 See Goodall: 'Tentative sketch of a possible relative chronology of some early Tantric works and authors, principally of the Śaivasiddhānta', 14th World Sanskrit Conference, Kyoto, September 1–5, 2009.
140 Törzsök SYM: 16 and 262.
141 See especially Hatley 2007: 200ff., establishing the period of composition of the Brahmayāmala from the 6th to the 8th cent.
142 Hatley 2007: 223.
which suggests again that the Svachchandatantra, the scripture of that cult, predates the Vidyāpīṭha. As to the Netratantra, also referred to in the context of jīvanmukti by Kashmirian exegetes, Sanderson has concluded from iconographical evidence that it was composed between AD 700 and 850, probably toward the end of that period.\(^{143}\)

Concerning the Nisāṭana, the Kularatnamālā and the Kālikākrama,\(^{144}\) the dating of these texts has been discussed much less extensively than the above mentioned titles. Given their Kaula and Krama affiliations, they are likely to be later than the above listed works of the Siddhānta and the Vidyāpīṭha,\(^{145}\) possibly going back only to the eighth century or later. In any case, they must predate the Kashmirian exegetes of the tenth.

This tentative dating of the relevant scriptural sources indicates that not only the idea, but also the very terms jīvanmukti, jīvanmuktay, etc., were present at an early date in the Śaiva tradition.

The figure of the jīvanmukta is also present in the more easily datable texts of the Spanda and the Pratyabhijñā, all of which were composed within the span of one century, between 875 and 975.\(^{146}\)

It is only hinted at in the Śivasūtra, particularly in the third section devoted (according to Kṣemarāja’s exegesis) to the ānavopāya (III 9ff., III 18–45), and it is the text’s Vimarsinī that develops the idea, either through citations (notably Kālikākrama, in ŚSV III 31; see supra), or directly, as in III 42, which describes the state of the jīvanmukta.\(^{147}\)

But the term itself is employed in the Spandakārikā (II 5).\(^{148}\) Even better, jīvanmukti is the real subject of the treatise, as both the SpP and the SpN emphasize, and the jīvanmukta is described in the manner of the śāktacakreśvara, ‘Lord of the Wheel of energies’. The term, in its Kaula accep-

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\(^{143}\)Sanderson 2004: 273–293.

\(^{144}\)On the Kālikākrama, see Sanderson 2007: 369–370.


\(^{146}\)See Sanderson 2007: 411, 418.

\(^{147}\)ŚSV III 42: \textit{sārīrvāyśīr vratam ītyuktasūtrārthanityā dalakalpe dehādau sthitāḥ pi na tatprāmāṇṭāsambhāvenāpi sṛṣṭāḥ/ tad uktaṁ śrīkularatnamālāyām yadā guruvarah samyak kathayet tan na samśayaḥ/ muktas tenaiva kālena yantras (perhaps an aśa form for yantram, which appears in other citations of the same verse: TĀ XIII 231b, XXXVI 29) tīṣhati kevalam/ , ‘In accordance with the sūtra “sārīrvāyśīr vratam” (Śivasūtra [ŚŚ] III 26) though he still exists in the body which is to him like a mere sheath, he is not touched even by a trace of [the conceit that this body is] the subject. It has been said in the Kularatnamālā: “When the excellent teacher teaches him correctly, he is undoubtedly liberated at that very moment; the ‘machine’ [viz., the body — the implicit image being that of the potter’s wheel] alone persists [viz., thereafter he inhabits a body merely moving like the revolving wheel of the potter].” Cf. the readings of the second hemistich in YR ad 83: muktas taraiva kāle ‘sau yantravat kevalam vaset, and PM ad MM 66: tadaiva kila mukto ‘sau yatra tiṣṭhātī kevalam, and n. 1239.

\(^{148}\)SpK II 5: \textit{iti vā yasya samvītiḥ kriḍātvenākhillam jagat/ sa paśyant satataḥ yukto jīvanmukto na samśayah/ }, ‘Or he, who has this awareness, viewing the entire world as the play of the Self, and constantly united [with it], is liberated while living; there is no doubt about it.’
Utpalavaisnava observes that, in the first verse, jīvanmukti is be-tokenized in the very name of the divinity ‘Śaṅkara’, ‘maker’ (kara-) of ‘felicity’ (śam-), this last understood as the equivalent of śreyas, ‘[ultimate] goal’, itself defined as enjoyment (bhoga) and release (apavarga). Utpalavaisnava continues by pointing out the major components of the exposé of jīvanmukti: SpK 30 [= II 5, in the textual organization of SpN], 10 [= I 10] et 51 [= III 19]. To be precise, SpP 30 attacks dualistic conceptions of emancipation, which recognize only emancipation at death, as well as practices such as utkṛṇti that aim at achieving such a death.

As well, Kṣemarāja, in his explanation of the first and last verses, states that jīvanmukti is the goal of the Spandakārikā: ‘What is to be taught in this treatise is that absorption in the [Lord] has for its fruit liberation while living’ (ad I 1); and commenting on the cakreśvara of III 19, he observes: ‘Thus he becomes the Lord, that is, the Master, of the Wheel of energies described in the first sūtra. In other words, he attains the supreme sovereignty in this very body’. Finally, the notion of jīvanmukti is at play in ĪPK IV 12–16, and particularly in IV 12: ‘All this might is mine’, and in the treatise’s conclusion (IV 16), which Utpaladeva’sṛttiglosses: ‘He who by applying himself intensely to this enters into the nature of Śiva, becomes in this very life a liberated soul’.

Utpalavaisnava’s sarcastic dismissal of the yogic notion of utkṛṇti (re-lined by YR ad 60) testifies also to the sharp debates that must have taken place on the question of jīvanmukti, not only in Śaiva precincts, but also

According to the Kaula, the saktis are not yoginis, as is the case in the Vidyāpītha and in the Bhairava-tantras, but internal energies. See Sanderson 2007: 402–403; 1988: 679ff. SpP 1 [ad I 1, in the textual organization of SpN]: bhogāpavargākhyām śam śreyah sukham vā karoti śāṅkara/ amalāh svasvabhāvo yah prāgbadhīheyatayopāttaḥ/ īha hi jīvanmukta-tāvā mokṣah.

SpP 30 [= ad II 5]: ye tv āduḥ vinotkṛṇtiṁ kuto mokṣah/ tannirāsāyāha — vinā svabhāvāvabhāvane punaḥ kaivalyam utkṛṇṭibalād yadi syāt/ atara 'pi paksē nanu mokṣabhāg udbandhanām yaḥ kurute pramūḍhaḥ/., ‘In order to refute those who maintain that liberation cannot be achieved without committing ritual suicide, it is said “If one could achieve liberation by virtue of ritual suicide without experiencing one’s own true nature, then, from this point of view, would not the deluded one who hangs himself achieve liberation?” ’ On the notion, see YR ad 60 and n. 1031. SpN I 1: tatamāvēsa eva hi jīvanmuktāphalā īha prakaraṇa upadeśyāḥ. SpN III 19: tataś ca prāthamastānirnītasya śāktikākramaṣya [...] tīvra 'dhipa'īr bhavet/ anena ca dehena mahēṣvaratvam avāpnoty eveti yāvat. Sarvo mammāyām vibhava iti, quoted by YR ad 33 and 51 (avat.). Īśvara-praprajñā-viśeśiḥ Śīvarāyanī Śīvarājā, Šīvarājā Śīvarājā Śīvarājā Śīvarājā Śīvarājā Śīvarājā Śīvarūtāśeṣā eva mukto bhavai (tr. Torella ĪPK).
among the Advaitins, as, for example, Śaṅkara ad BĀU IV 4, 6 makes clear. These debates proceed, in the first place, from the incredulity and skepticism that the notion arouses: given the iron law of karman, jīvanmukti offends common sense. The jīvanmukta is a walking paradox. And thus does the Paramārthasāra describe him as mad, a vagabond living a life of randomness — at least as the ordinary man sees him (vv. 69, 71). Both text and commentary are keen to stress that essential misunderstanding. 156

Perhaps, as I have already indicated, resistance to the idea of jīvanmukti is related as well to its implied evicting of dharma from the system of values, or at least to paying it only an optional respect: ‘Whether he performs a hundred thousand horse sacrifices, or kills a hundred thousand brahmins, he who knows ultimate reality is not affected by merits or demerits. He is stainless’ (PS 70). 157 The scandal would be greater had the Śaivas not found a way to defuse it by relativizing their rejection of conduct universally admitted. Such could be one of the implications of the famous maxim describing the Śaiva brahmin: ‘Kaula within, Śaiva without, Vedic for worldly affairs — like the coconut, the essential is kept within’, 158 which is also a way of recalling the esoteric dimension of the doctrine. In the same spirit of reconciliation, Yogarāja (ad PS 40) refers to the pan-brahmanical authority of the Yājñavalkyasūtra in order to distinguish between ordinary and supreme dharma. Whereas ordinary dharma consists of sacrifice, good conduct, and the like, ‘the supreme dharma is to see the Self through discipline’ (Yājñavalkyasūtra I 8). Thus is the jīvanmukta justified in neglecting the lower dharma in pursuit of the higher one, that of his inner realization.

Alone among the texts of the system, it seems, the Tantrāloka develops, in the context of emancipation, the original doctrine of double-ignorance (I 36ff.): 'spiritual' (pauruṣājñāna) and ‘intellectual’ (bauddhājñāna) — and along with it its positive counterpart, the doctrine of double-awakening: ‘spiritual’ (pauruṣajñāna) and ‘intellectual’ (bauddhajñāna). If the rationale for these concepts is present in the Śaiva Āgamas, the terminology, which presents overtones of the Sāṃkhya, seems to be a creation of the Tantrāloka. It is in this doctrinal context that appears the definition of jīvanmukti that figures as an epigraph to this introduction. 159

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156 See YR ad 83: ‘Moreover, by whom [else] can the last moment of the knower of the Self be directly experienced, apart from the witness (śaksīn) that is his own experience? — On the strength of which [witness] one might posit the existence in him of consciousness or its opposite, inasmuch as “those who see horizontally” [viz., fettered subjects] are not privy to any such realm of experience? Therefore, in this matter, let the omniscient ones be asked [their opinion], as well as TĀ XXVII 319–320a and TĀV ad loc.

157 See also TĀ IV 248–253.

158 Quoted without attribution in TĀV IV 250: antah kaulo bahiḥ śaivo lokācāre tu vaidikaḥ/ sāram ādāya tiṣṭheta nārikelaphalam yathā/; see also Sanderson 2007: 232.

159 Tantrāloka I 44: bauddhajñānena tu yadā bauddham ajñānajmbhitam/ vilīyate tadā jīvanmuktiḥ karatale sthitā//.
The Paramārthasāra refers not to these symmetric pairings. One may infer, however, from the citations that Jayaratha makes of vv. 16b–17 of the Paramārthasāra, in his commentary on the passages of the Tantrāloka (ad I 39–40) that concern pauruṣājñāna and bauddhājñāna, that these pairs correspond in the Paramārthasāra to the conjoined placement of finitude and double error. The pauruṣājñāna corresponds to the ānava-mala, the impurity of deeming oneself finite, that is, the wholly deceitful ‘atomization’ of universal consciousness — itself the product of māya (PS 15) — and to the constitution of the puruṣa, finite (or mundane) man (PS 16a); the bauddhājñāna to the quintuple constriction of the kaṇcukas (PS 16b–17).

Still, the articulation of these notions in the Tantrāloka, and the rigor with which they are argued, constitute a singular contribution to their understanding. When spiritual ignorance, the metaphysical ignorance proper to incarnate man consisting in mistaking the Self for the non-Self, is dissolved by initiation (dikṣā), that is, by ritual, there subsists still an intellectual ignorance, marked by the unleashing of ‘dichotomous thinking’ (vikalpa). In consequence, spiritual ignorance by itself can be an instrument of liberation only at death, when the body (and so the buddhi, locus of vikalpa) is no more. On the other hand, when intellectual ignorance, consisting in mistaking the non-Self for the Self, is abolished by the study of the treatises and practices that they teach, this does not suffice for attaining emancipation in this life, nor in the following. It is intellectual knowledge, accompanied by (or preceded by) intellectual knowledge, that is the instrument of liberation in this life. In any case, it is intellectual knowledge that is decisive for determining whether or not one reaches enlightenment in this life.160 By pauruṣājñāna, in effect, the paśu-puruṣa is delivered in essence, but, existentially, continues under the domination of his ‘dualizing thoughts’.

Apart from the fact that these arguments seal the alliance of ritual and gnosis, they confirm that jīvan-mukti is nothing else than the reconciliation of the plans of essence and existence.

For its part, the Paramārthasāra — at least as YR ad 85–86 reads it — introduces a correspondence unknown to the Tantrāloka, which is established between the two kinds of liberation — seemingly “consecutive”: that obtained while living and that secured at death — and the two final ‘states of consciousness’ (avasthā), the ‘Fourth’ (turya) and ‘Trans-Fourth’

160See TĀ I 45: dikṣāpi bauddhavijñānapūrva satyaṁ vimocikā/ tena tatāpi bauddhasya jñānasyastā pradhānataḥ// and TĀV, avat. ad I 44: nanu yady evaṁ dikṣayā dehānta eva muktir bhavet, tat kathāṁ “jīvan eva vimukto 'sau' ityādy uktam ity āśāṅkyāha/.
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(turyātīta)\textsuperscript{161} — the latter appearing as a Śaiva innovation.\textsuperscript{162} From the moment the ‘state of liberation’ (mokṣa) found a home in life existential (jīvanmukti), the insertion of the latter in the pan-Indian schema of the four states, and its designation there as the ‘fourth’ obliged the promotion of the old ‘fourth’ — ‘liberation’ universally understood as ‘liberation at death’ — to a ‘fifth’, or rather to a ‘Trans-Fourth’, position in the hierarchy of states having no name of its own, yet retaining something of its previous status.\textsuperscript{163}

As mentioned above, the term itself (jīvanmukti, or jīvanmukta) makes some of its first appearances in tantric texts, whose aim was, among other things, to supersede the orthodox ritual system. As Sanderson (1995: 25ff. and 1988: 660ff.) shows, tantric doctrine and ritual attempted to demonstrate their superiority compared to orthopraxy in several ways, which included that tantrism presented itself as a more efficient means to the same end: on the whole, it proposed to liberate one through tantric initiation (even if liberation was not immediately fully effective). This meant that the average initiate could be considered liberated already in this life and did not need to make any particular effort for the attainment of mokṣa subsequently. Therefore it is not surprising that the term and the concept of jīvanmukti were not unknown to the early tantric tradition.

However, when nondualist Kashmirian exegetes make use of this notion, they tend to do so from the Kaula point of view, which is anti-ritualist.\textsuperscript{164} Consequently, one is liberated in this world through internal realization, and ultimately through knowledge, rather than through ritual action. The jīvanmukta is a jñānin. This kind of liberation in life was in turn seen by proponents of the orthodox brahmanical religion as a paradox, and it is on their behalf that avat. ad PS 85-86 asks the following question: ‘How can one continue to act after enlightenment, without accumulating further consequences of those acts? In effect, liberation is possible only at the moment of death’.

The fact that tantrism proposed more efficient means of liberation did

\\textsuperscript{161}A correspondence already sketched in ŠSV III 25 and ŠS III 41. See also YR ad 61: ‘And he whose [ignorance] is destroyed, even while remains a rapport with the body, is at that very moment liberated (muktah), though he still lives (jīvan eva). It is not that bondage involves necessarily a connection with a body. The removal of that ignorance is liberation. However [it may be added that], with the perishing of the body, complete (pūrṇa) liberation is attained’, and ad 83: ‘He goes to a condition of transcendent Isolation’ (kaivalya) [viz., reaches ‘separation’ from the limited world of bondage] through knowledge of the Self alone; that is, in other words, after the destruction of his body, he attains a condition of Isolation that is beyond the Fourth state [of consciousness] (turyātītarūpāṁ kevalatāṁ yātā), composed solely of blissful consciousness’.

\textsuperscript{162}The term appears in some late upaniṣads of tantric coloration.

\textsuperscript{163}See also YR ad 35.

\textsuperscript{164}See p. 51. On the Kaula developments in general and their importance in the exegetical tradition, see Sanderson 1988: 692ff.
not imply that arguments of the brahmanical orthodoxy were refused by Kashmirian exegetes. The Trika, as set forth by the Paramârthasâra and its commentary, employs a rather virtuoso strategy that uses the law of karman in order to subvert that same law. And so the last portion of our text, from v. 89 onwards, multiplies references to the properly Mîmâmsaka notion of *apûrva* in arguments intended to establish not only the possibility of *jîvanmukti*, but its very legitimacy.

In parallel, the Trika is not loath to invoke authorities (pramâna) outside its own tradition, though, to be fair, its readings are usually favorable to its own theses. In the first place, the Bhagavadgîrâ, whose omnipresence in Yogarâja’s commentary and in other texts of the system is perhaps intended chiefly to affirm how the this-worldly ascesis recommended by the Gîtâ is, in fact, this-worldly liberation.

Similarly, several indices furnished by the Paramârthasâra and its commentary permit apprehension of the relation of inheritance that Trika sustains with Sâmkhya on the question of liberation: the commentary to PS 81 (which paraphrases without attribution SK 67) and 83, where we find mention of the potter’s wheel; the reutilization of Sâmkhya notions of *kaivalya* (at v. 83, itself the reprise of APS 81) and of *apavarga* (YR ad 33); the important role assigned to the *antahkarana* in the process of liberation (YR ad 90–91, 92–93); the citation of SK 44 by YR ad 92–93.

It is true that Sâmkhya and Trika start from the same postulate: liberation is not accessible by ritual (SK 1), but rather by discriminating knowledge (vijñâna, SK 2). There comes to the surface, in the usage that the Paramârthasâra makes of these Sâmkhya notions, a Traika rereading of Sâmkhya doctrine according to which the notion of *jîvanmukti*, or at least a type of this-worldly release that has not yet received that name, is already germinating in the *Sâmkhyakârikâ*, in re vv. 67–68. As such, the Trika proposes an interpretation of SK 67 that is not all that distant from that of Gauḍapâda. The Gauḍapâdiyabhâsya [GBh] on the *Sâmkhyakârikâ*, in effect, brings out the dynamic organization of the ensemble constituted by

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165See p. 29. Compare the transformation of the Mîmâmsaka notion of *bhàvanà*, ‘efficient force’ (PS 63) into the Traika notion of *bhàvanà*, ‘meditative realization’ (PS 41, 52, 68).

166For instance, the Śaiva Āgamas, such as the Triśîrohbhairava (cited TÀ XXVIII 320b–324a), and the Gîtâ (cited TÀ XXVIII 324b, and 325–326a) are put on the same level.

167This is an attempt to translate into English the formula: ‘ascèse intra-mondaine’, coined by Hulin (2001: 268) apropos the BhG.

168A rereading implicit in YR’s borrowing from SK 67, while commenting on the paradoxical condition of the *jîvanmukta*, as described by PS 81. This Trika rereading of liberation according to Sâmkhya appears equally in the TÀ, notably in IV 212, which associates explicitly the notion of *kaivalya* with that of *jîvanmukti*, and in XXVIII 307–320 and TÀV ad loc. (in particular, ad 317, which cites also SK 67). Hiriyanna (1995: 116, and 1993: 297) finds as well allusion to the notion of *jîvanmukti* in SK 67–68.

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vv. 67–68: contrasting the ‘incarnate’ state of v. 67 with the ‘disincarnate’ state of v. 68 (prâpte śarīrabhede) — life and death in effect. Moreover, the liberation that occurs ‘when the body falls away’ (GBh 67: śarīrapâte) is the liberation that v. 68 terms kaivalya, described as ‘total’ (aikântika), that is, according to the Gauḍapâdiyabhâsya, ‘necessary’ (avaśya), and ‘definitive’ (ātyantika), or ‘which encounters no obstacle’ (anantarhiita) — the principal obstacle being the body, which no longer, in any way shape or form, afflicts the spirit, now liberated, of the departed. In sum, v. 67 refers to jîvanmukti, v. 68 to kaivalya, ‘absolute’ liberation, in the etymological sense of ‘ab-solvo’, ‘loosen from’.

The Trika pretends however to ignore the appropriation of this gradation by the Advaita inspired by Śaṅkara. At the very most, one notices, especially in Yogarâja’s commentary, the vedântic idea of aśarīratva, the ‘disincarnation’ that characterizes the jîvanmukta in that he ceases to confuse his body with the Self.\(^\text{170}\)

Another element of the definition of ‘liberation’ that Trika shares with Advaita, and which dissociates it from Śaṅkhyâ, is the notion of ‘felicity’ (ānanda) that accompanies the experience of liberation. That Śaṅkhyâ has ignored this ‘felicity’ is a reproach made by Śaṅkara ad BĀU III 9, 28, 7: ‘Some, like the partisans of Śaṅkhyâ or Vaiśeṣika, opine that in liberation, one tastes no kind of joy’. The Trika does not confront Śaṅkhyâ directly on this point, but never ceases to stress the aspect of ‘felicity’, associating with it an aspect of experience that is absent from advaitic arguments: the ‘marvelous’ (camatkâra), a notion that Śaiva metaphysics shares with Śaiva aesthetics.\(^\text{171}\)

Whatever may be the case with these similarities and differences, the Trika develops an original doctrine regarding liberation, of which a singular trait is the postulate that liberation in this life is inconceivable in the absence of the Lord’s grace, described here as a ‘descent of energy’ (śaktipâta). It is this subordination of liberation to ‘grace’ that, according to TĀ XIII 276b–279a, constitutes the superiority of the Śaiva path in relation to other systems. As André Padoux observes, ‘[... la grâce] détermine la voie parcourue, le maître rencontré, l’initiation reçue et jusqu’au système religieux auquel on accorde sa foi’.\(^\text{172}\)

\(^{170}\)See p. 27, as well as YR ad 63, 70, 79–80 (and n. 1212), and 85–86: ‘The corporeal sheath is effective only so long as a relation with the sheaths of the [three] impurities [...] that arise from ignorance exists. But since the sheath created by ignorance has already been destroyed by [the guru’s] instruction regarding knowledge of one’s own [true] Self, how can any such corporeal sheath, [even] moribund, effect any control over the knower of the true Self at the end?’ The idea of aśarīratva culminates in the idea (which is as well an experience) that the universe becomes, as it were, the permanent body (svângakalpa) of the yogin now freed from his transitory body; see, esp., YR ad 87–88.

\(^{171}\)See p. 55.

\(^{172}\)Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 47. Others have seen, in other contexts, systems setting forth the dispensation of grace on the part of a merciful god; for instance, Hiriyanna (1995: 412–413),
From this point of view, Trika may be considered as a "mystique of grace". In this vein, the Paramārthasāra proposes at the very beginning (v. 9) that the key to the system is Śiva's grace (śivaśaktipāta).\textsuperscript{173} Even if that mystique resonates perfectly with the emotional effusion proper to bhakti — an experience that is omnipresent in Trika literature\textsuperscript{174} — it is still subject to reasoning and to argumentation. We observe in effect an attempt to theorize that mystique of grace, which not only adduces a complex hierarchization of its "degrees", set forth in ch. XIII of Tantrāloka,\textsuperscript{175} but also establishes correspondences with the doctrine of the 'means' or 'ways' (upāya) of liberation. The progressive extenuation of grace is reflected, in effect, in the descending hierarchy of the 'means' — distinctions, of course, as we have seen, that apply only at the mundane level.\textsuperscript{176} As the first five chapters of the Tantrāloka affirm, the 'ways' of liberation are themselves subordinated to the degree of grace accorded to the adept — in other words, to his relative capacity of receiving that grace.\textsuperscript{177}

Such a conception of grace implies for the Trika the abandonment of social and ritual requisites, measured in terms of the acquisition of merit and demerit. No particular 'qualification' (adhikāra) is postulated: access to jīvanmukti is thus open to everyone, if only he make a sustained effort in that direction.\textsuperscript{178}

It is thus clear that the Paramārthasāra articulates the quasi-totality of the doctrine it seeks to abridge around its defense and characterization of liberation. But this project is not without its costs, as certain accents are displaced that are required in order to establish the coherence of the work. On the one hand, an emphasis is put on the notion of the āndas apropos the doctrine of Rāmānuja: 'The word (viz., prapatti) points to a belief that salvation is obtained through free grace. It is described as śaranāgati, flinging oneself on God's compassion [...]. In one of its forms described as 'resignation in extreme distress' (ārta-prapatti), it is believed to bring liberation immediately. A single moment of seriousness and sincerity is considered enough [...].'

\textsuperscript{173}Which motif is taken up again by YR, notably ad 18: 'When the bound soul becomes of purified heart, due to the Supreme Lord's grace, then the veil of sheaths that afflict us with finitude spontaneously disappears, on account of the coming into being of the knowledge of one's own Self (svātmajñāna) [consisting in the insight:] "I am myself the Great Lord." ' 

\textsuperscript{174}See, for instance, YR ad 94–95, 100–101, as well as the rich stotra literature.

\textsuperscript{175}See Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 44–47.

\textsuperscript{176}On the doctrine of the upāyas, see n. 858. For the manner in which a practice engenders a practice associated with the immediately inferior path, or another practice of the same path, see TĀ V 155b–157. The process is comparable to the unfolding of the tattvas, and like it, is reversible. The yogin who is not accorded a 'very intense' grace (alone associated with the anupāya), may raise himself from one path to the next, seen as levels — from meditation to bhāvanā, for instance, and, as TĀ III 174 says, from bhāvanā to the experience of the 'I', characteristic of the āmbhavopāya. See also the general avat. ad PS 41–46.

\textsuperscript{177}See YR ad 96; also TĀ V 158a.

\textsuperscript{178}YR ad 103: 'Therefore, it is shown by the words "whosoever engages in this very beautiful path" — that is, in the path leading to the most excellent [form of] liberation — that there is no restriction of qualification [on such practice]'.
(vv. 4–5, 23, 41, 46); on the other, reference to the theory of the 'word' remains mostly implicit (vv. 10–11), as is the treatment of the upāyas — a notion that became so important in Abhinavagupta's syncretistic exegesis, that Kṣemarāja divides the text of the Śivasūtra into three parts organized in terms of the three inferior upāyas.

As I have attempted to show in examining the arrangement of the Paramārthasāra text, these three 'ways' are there alluded to, though not explicitly designated, with the exception of the avat. ad 41–46, which mentions the 'way of Śambhu' (or the 'condition of Śambhu', sāṁbhavapada) and that 'of energy' (sāktabhūmikā). This confusion of boundaries between the 'ways' perhaps signifies by indirection their porosity — a porosity of practices proper to each of the ways, and especially, their porosity of essence. For, as the Tantraloka insists, in the last analysis, little matters the way; it is the end that counts — namely, absorption in Śiva (or in the Self), that is, liberation itself. Indeed, it is to liberation in this life that lead the three inferior ways, for, in the 'non-way' (anupāya), there is neither servitude nor liberation (TĀ III 273).

For this reason, all the ways have a degree of legitimacy. Whether one enters without delay into one of the two superior ways (anupāya, sāṁbhavopāya), thanks to a spectacular 'descent' of grace that makes any further mediation unnecessary or useless, or whether one raises himself progressively from one way to the next (excluding, of course, the 'non-way'), each way is instrumental either as such or as transitional, in virtue of a functional hierarchy that is, however, not a hierarchy of value. In effect, even the lowest way, that of the finite soul (ānavopāya) is not without value. Apart from the fact that Abhinavagupta says that he was himself initiated into that way by his master Śambhunātha, it emerges from the organization of the Tantraloka itself that the treatment of the ānavopāya is not confined to the fifth chapter, but is prolonged well beyond that, even to

179It is YR who makes it explicit.

180As A. Sanderson (1983: 160) observes: 'The upāyas [...] out of their humble origin in the Malinīvijayottaratantra (2.21–23) [...] had become in his [AG's] exegesis the defining core of his entire system, more than a thousand verses being devoted to their definition in his Tantraloka'; see n. 858.

181See n. 865. Note that, according to YR's commentary, PS 96 alludes to the sāṁbhavopāya: 'The acquisition of the knowledge of one's own Self has for its unique means (upāya) the favor of the Supreme Lord. Here, such [acts] as silent recitation, meditation, offering sacrifice, etc., which arise thanks to the [Lord's] power of causal constraint, are ineffectual as means', whereas PS 97 implies a reference to the two other ways: the sāktopāya and the ānavopāya (see n. 1376).


183See TĀ V 151: [...] tadātmayāṁ yātī ananyadhīḥ/ śivena hematām yadvat tātmram sūtena vedhitam//.

184See TĀ I 58a as well as PS 96 and YR ad loc.

185At least into two practices typical of that path, namely, reflection on the Wheel of energies, and raising the energy of breath (TĀ V 41, 50b–52).
the final chapter. In the last analysis, the differentiation of the various ways is not very significant, in the sense that 'everything is Śiva'. That is why the motif of jīvanmukti is associated with the three inferior ways in the chapters of the Tantrāloka devoted to them, whereas it is absent from the chapter devoted to the anupāya.

Another indication of the porosity of the ways and their partial overlapping is the reciprocity of yogic and mystic practices. In effect, the same practices postulate different modes of realization according to the way in which they are put into effect. Thus are present in the three ways mantric practice, kundalini (also utilized considerably in the āṇavopāya), and meditation on the Wheel of energies, whereas mudrās are shared by the sāktopāya (TĀ IV 194–211) and the āṇavopāya (TĀ V 79–85). In this sense, the 'ways' are so many 'approaches' to or specific points of view on the same content of experience. Texts like the Vijñānabhairava [VBh] show how, within the confines of the same practice, the yogin raises himself from one means to another. So does the commentary on PS 41–46 (avat.).

Still, though perhaps covertly, the Paramārthasāra privileges, it would seem, the point of view of the sāktopāya (or jñānopāya, 'way of knowledge'), which allows in principle a certain plurality of practice, though one practice suffices. This is one of the matters in which the sāktopāya is distinguished from the āṇavopāya, in which a plurality of practices

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186 See TĀ I 231 and Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 31.
187 TĀ IV 273–375a.
188 See, respectively, TĀ III 200b–208a, 223b–225 (which cites Siddhayogeśvarimata), on the mantra AHAM; IV 181b–193 (SAUH and KHPHREM); V 54–100 (SAUH); V 131b–155a (SAUH and others).
189 In the context of a complex practice associated with raising the energy of breath (V 43–53), with the uccāra of SAUH (V 54–70 and 141–145), with the fusion proper to sexual union (V 70–74), and with mudrās (V 79–85); vv. 86–95, a citation from Trīśirobhārava, again evoke it, as well as V 100b–128a, where it is again associated with sexual practice. For the kundalini in the śambhavopāya, see TĀ III 137b–141a (which cites Trīśirobhārava), and III 220–223a (which cites Siddhayogeśvarimata), where it is described as phonemic energy, and identical with the totality of word (vāc). In the śāktopāya, the kundalini is merely alluded to, in a citation from Yogasamcaraṇatra (TĀ IV 136–144) which evokes the kutilā, the 'coiled (serpent)' (IV 142), in its association with sexual practice (see Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 230), and with the practice of hamsoccāra (IV 135–136). Similarly JR apprehends, sub IV 153–157, a reference to the sarpharakundalini, and, sub IV 200, a reference to the moment where the kundalini arrives at the form of mystic drunkenness which is its culmination.
190 See TĀ III 248a–267, IV122b–147, TĀ V 26b–42.
191 See VBh 28–31, for instance, and TĀ XXXIV 2, quoted n. 868.
192 Similarly, according to ŚŚV III 4, the sāktopāya is the principal focus of the SpK: iti śrīpurvaśāstre dhyanādī eva ānavatvena uktaṃ/ etac ca sthūlavāt śāktopāyaprabhāśāmani spandaśāstre na samghītam, 'In the Śrīpurvaśāstra [viz., the MVT] meditation, etc., are spoken of only in relation to the finite soul [viz., to the way of the finite soul]; they, because of their gross character, are not referenced in this Spandaśāstra, which is devoted to the exposition of the way of energy'.

is of the essence, associated with an intense sensory activity. Among the indications corroborating that interpretation: the emphasis placed on ‘knowledge’ (jñāna) and on the ‘knower’ (jñānīn), as well as the importance attributed to the notion of bhāvanā (not present in the two superior ways).  

On the other hand, the mantric practice that Yogarāja discerns in vv. 41–46 is that prescribed by the sāktopāya: not only does he apprehend, in the adjectives sāntam and amṛtam of v. 43, an occult reference to the mantra SAUH, which evokes Parā, the divinity proper to the sāktopāya, but he emphasizes the effectiveness (vīrya) of mantras in general (avat. ad 41) — one of the main themes of the sāktopāya. An effectiveness that is not merely a function of correct enunciation, but presupposes the interiorization of a mystic realization. The yogin engaged on the ‘way of energy’ identifies, not with the divinity that the mantra expresses, as is the case with the Siddhānta, but with ‘the universal sense of the mantra’ (mantrarthasārvatmya, TĀ IV 258b–259a). In other words, for this yogin, the mantra is not a simple formula for ritual usage, but represents ultimate reality itself.

Mantric practice and bhāvanā have as their consequence conversion of a discursive mode of thought into an intuitive and non-discursive awareness focused (if that is the word) on ultimate reality, an awareness of ‘difference-and-non-difference’ (bhedabheda). Mantric practice and bhāvanā concern the interiorized sacrifice (antaryāga), drawn from the Kaula tradition, which itself involves the promise of liberation in this life. This ‘interiorized sacrifice’ — touted by the sāktopāya — defies description and is never better portrayed than by analogy. Thus, as I have already shown, vv. 74–80 of the Paramārthasāra transform the procedures of the “mundane” ritual metaphorically into their interiorized counterparts — in other words, transform practices proper to the āṇavopāya into those suitable to the sāktopāya. Vv. 79–80 are particularly exemplary of this, to the extent that Yogarāja evokes the figure of the Kāpālika ascetic in order to oppose to him the figure of the jivanmukta Traika. This also shows how the Trika of the exegetes has been able to integrate, while domesticating and purifying, the older tradition of the Kāpālikas, which reserved the most extreme practices to its virtuosi (vīra). The gloss of Yogarāja illus-

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193 See PS 41 and n. 858. On bhāvanā, see also Appendix 20, p. 345.
194 In fact, mantric practice is the principal characteristic of the sāktopāya.
195 SAUH is, in effect, that mantra whose initial is SA- (or S-), and it is designated as the amṛtabija; see YR ad loc.
196 As taught also in ŚŚ II 1 (cītman mantrah) and SpK II 1–2 (quoted in ŚSV II 1 and II 3).
197 On this notion, see PS 12–13 (and its commentary), as well as avat. ad PS 41 and 46.
198 See TĀ IV 211 (antaryāga) and 212 (description of the jivanmukta).
200 Same rhetoric in TĀ IV 194–203.
trates this clearly: the ascetic who follows the Trika path is as worthy, or perhaps even more worthy, of the title of *vīra*, for he observes an other-worldly vow, whereas the Kāpālika's is merely mundane.

The privileged place accorded to the *sāktopāya* in the *Paramārthasāra* derives as well from the fact that it is presented there as 'easier'. Such is the teaching of TĀ IV 257b–258a: '[The Siddhānta recommends], in order to identify [with Śiva], giving oneself up to restrictive practices such as wearing the topknot. The Kula prescribes their abandonment, for it teaches an easy way', or of PS 76: 'For him who is engaged in offering into the blazing fire of consciousness all the great seeds of difference [that blossom forth] on the presupposition of inner versus outer, the oblation is made without effort'.

Similarly, when PS 80 describes the vow of the yogin engaged on the 'way of energy' as 'both easy and very difficult', it signifies that the *sāktopāya* is both easier and more difficult than the *āṇavopāya*: easier in that the practitioner need no longer concern himself with the panoply of rites prescribed in the *āṇava* nor acquire their requisite ingredients and votive objects; more difficult in that all rites must be interiorized successfully. The *sāktopāya* is thus the way that occupies the middle ground between the *sāṃbhavopāya* and the *āṇavopāya*, just as the *bhedābheda*, the experience to which it gives access, occupies the middle ground between the *abheda* of the *iddbhavopāya* and the *bheda* of the *āṇavopāya*.

The two other ways are not for all that absent in the presentation of the *Paramārthasāra*, and the exhortation in the commentary to verse 103 to 'use all means' in order to accede to the supreme human goal is perhaps to be understood in that sense.

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201 See also PS 77: 'And unceasing is his meditation [...]’ and YR ad loc.: 'Therefore, the meditation of such a yogin arises naturally (svarasodita)', as well as PS 78 and YR ad loc.: 'emerging naturally, [the energy of the middle breath] is said to be an innate [kind of] rosary, as it comprehends all the senses'.

202 References to Bhairava (TĀ III 1, and passim), to Bhairava as śabdārāśi, 'mass of sounds' (TĀ III 198–200a), and to the 'condition/nature of Bhairava' (bhairavibhāva, III 271, 277) — a term for jivanmukti realized in the manner of the *sāṃbhavopāya* (see JR ad 271) — are characteristic of the *sāṃbhavopāya*. As well, are the analogy of the mirror (TĀ III 1–66; 268–293), the mantra AHAM (TĀ III 20b–206), the celebration of the absolute 'I' (TĀ III 207–208a, 280–281), and the motif of the Wheel of energies (TĀ III 248a–267). The same themes may be read sub PS 9–13, 43, 47–50, 96. The avat. ad 41 refers to the manner in which the yogin raises himself from the *sāktopāya* to the *sāṃbhavopāya*. The point of view of the *āṇavopāya*, with its profusion of practices, is relatively rarely adopted in the PS. This point of view appears only by implication in the description of the *sāktopāya* (vv. 74–80) — the practices of concern to the *āṇava* are those that the *sāktopāya* transforms — and in that of the *sāṃbhavopāya* — the enlightenment that v. 96 describes has as its 'means' (upāya) the grace of Śiva alone, not the collection of means that characterizes the *āṇavopāya*: 'Now the purport of this is as follows: the acquisition of the knowledge of one's own Self has for its unique means (upāya) the favor of the Supreme Lord. Here, such [acts] as reciting the rosary, meditation, offering sacrifice, etc., which arise thanks to the [Lord's] power of [causal] constraint, are ineffectual as means (upāya)' (YR ad 96). The only positive reference
The manner in which the Paramārthasāra positions itself in relation to other systems deserves also to be noted in brief. With the signal exception of verse 27, which is a doxography in miniature, the only evident criticism of other systems is aimed at the rival idealisms of Advaita and Vijñānavāda — as though the dualism of the Sāmkhya were nothing but a venial sin, destined to dissolve itself in the “complete” soteriology of the Trika. Once Sāmkhya dualism is refuted in the commentary to verses 2–3, Yogarāja makes no further reference to that system, apart from some veiled borrowings of elements in its theory of liberation, such as the analogy of the potter and his wheel, and the very terms of SK 47, of which he offers (ad PS 83) a Traika interpretation.

It is interesting that the Paramārthasāra prefers to efface such differences in order better to bring out the relationship of one tradition to the other. The Sāmkhya is not only a system that the Trika considers to have stopped short in working out the aspiration toward enlightenment and liberation; it is also a system with which the Trika sustains an affinity, indicated by its having adopted the doctrine of the tattvas, together with the notion of their evolution.

For the Sāmkhya doctrine of the tattvas implies two corollaries: on the one hand, that the empirical world is given a value — by the ‘enumeration’ (saṃkhyā) that is made of its forms; on the other hand, that the world thus evaluated is also instrumentalized in the quest for liberation.

According to the Sāmkhyakārikā (and the commentary of Gaudapāda particularly) the same attractions of the world that subject the purusa to incarnate existence — understood as both intellectual and sensible experience — and to the cycle of rebirths have also the vocation of conducting the purusa to its liberation — which amounts to establishing the final cause as a fundamental principle of the system. That is even their raison d’être: prakṛti deploys the creation (understood as the twenty-three remaining tattvas) only for the sake of the purusa’s separation from herself. She works to the ‘way of the finite soul’ is perhaps found in the following verse. YR ad 97 describes, in effect, the stages of the elevation of the kundalini, a practice present in the three ways, but whose discursivity seems to attach, here, to the ‘way of the finite soul’.

203 SK 67 seems to be the origin of this image, which soon becomes a topos; see BSBh IV 1, 15.

204 In the same way, TĀV XXVIII 312 cites SK 67.

205 The Trika’s affinity with Sāmkhya is again manifested by its adoption of the satkāryavāda. In contrast with its devaluation, presented by the Advaita as necessary, to the extent that on that devaluation depends the status of brahman itself (see Hulin 2001: 83). The advaitic devaluation of the phenomenal world extends even to acosmism — the ajātivāda, ‘view that [the world] never came into existence’ — which serves the view that brahman only “truly” exists (Hulin 2001: 56; 102–103; Bouy ÅŚ: 48–49, 249–254, 266–272). Dasgupta (1975, vol. I: 423), however, finds an ajātivāda in Gaudapāda’s Kārikās, and considers this an indication of Gaudapāda’s putative Buddhism — a point of view much debated (on this debate, see Bouy ÅŚ: 42–43).
indefatigably (vv. 56–58) to that end, or better, she displays the creation before the *puruṣa*, as an actress before an audience (v. 59). Such would be the meaning of the arresting and sustained analogy of the *prakṛti*-actress playing before the *puruṣa*-spectator (vv. 59, 61, 65–66). The same “theater of the world” in which the *puruṣa* is imbricated so long as he is deprived of discernment is also the locale of his liberation, for that liberation is subordinated to the acquisition of ‘discriminating knowledge’ (*vijñāna*): once Creation is grasped as a complex of organized constituents, which must therefore be ‘for another’, the *puruṣa* is *ipso facto* ‘differentiated’ from it and from the complex; it is ‘free’, it recognizes itself as the independent term, ‘that for which’. 207

The *puruṣa*, in its essence freed of any taint of objectivity — objectivity as summed up in the twenty-four remaining *tattvas* — is that difference. And that discriminating principle is made the fundamental index of the Sāmkhyakārikā’s soteriology, from its second kārikā onwards, which enjoins the fundamental distinction between the ‘manifest’ (*vyakta*), the ‘unmanifest’ (*avyakta*) and the ‘knower’ (*jīna* — lit., ‘knowing’) — that is, between the twenty-three ‘produced’ *tattvas*, beginning with the *buddhi*, and the two ‘unproduced’ or original *tattvas* — primal “matter” (*prakṛti*), designated as the unmanifest (*avyakta*), and primal “spirit” (*puruṣa*), the former also frequently referred to as *pradhāna*, the ‘base’, ‘placed-before’.

This is taken up by Gaudāpāda in his *Bhāṣya*, who cites the following verse: ‘He who knows the twenty-five principles, whatever his style of life, whether his hair be plaited or in a topknot, or his head shaven, is liberated — no doubt about it!’ 208

Thus, in the Sāmkhyakārikā’s manner of setting forth the *tattvas* can be seen *in ovo* the principle of reversibility of servitude and liberation. One has the feeling that Saivism (nondualist and dualist) takes up this principle and puts it into practice sequentially, introducing two symmetrical movements of installation and ‘dis’installation of the *tattvas*, now thirty-six in number. The Śaiva innovation consists in the reversal of these *tattvas*, from gross to subtle, in the ascending movement of the self’s recognition of its Self. 209 Of course, the idea is similar to the strategy of the combined Sāmkhya-Yoga, according to which the process of awakening, for

207 GBh 55: [...] *pañcāvīṃśatattvajñānānānāṃ syāt sattvapuruṣāntyākhyātōkānāṃ idām pradhānam īyam buddhir ayam ahaṅkāra īmānāṃ pañca mahābhubānī yebhyo *nyāḥ puruṣo visādṛśa iti/, ‘The knowledge of the twenty-five principles is marked by the otherness of spirit and existence: “this is matter”, “this is mind”, “this is ego”, “these are the great elements” — from all of which alien spirit is dissimilar’; see also GBh 60 and 64.

208 GBh 1: *pañcāvīṃśatattvavijñāno yatra tattāśrame vaset/ jāti mundi vāpi mucyate nātra samāyah/*, repeated ad 2.

209 See SpN III 19: [...] *dharādīśīvāntasamaṃgrahoyakāvalanena paromapramārttām satīṃ eva pratyabhiṣījñānakramenaṃvalambate/, ’By gulping down the entire range of things to enjoy, from earth to Śiva, he reaches gradually through the process of recognition the state of supreme subject, which exists unconditionally’; see also PTLvr 21–24, quoted n. 621.
the yogin, is in some manner the reverse (pratisarga, or pratiprasava, YS IV 34) of the process described in Sāmkhya, resulting in the world of our experience. Still, Yoga has not developed the notion of a "reversion" of the tattvas, one after another, as a means of access, or rather, of ascent to liberation. Therefore one can speak of a Śaiva "innovation", at least in a technical sense. Besides, such a reversal of the tattvas is implied in the doctrine's logic of the system to the extent that it can be considered as conditioned on the introduction of the notion of śakti, which is itself dependent on the introduction of eleven supplementary tattvas whereby a dualism is converted into a monism. In effect, the idea of a "reversion" of the tattvas can only be conceived of dynamically, at the cost of a considerable effort capable of establishing the notion the Śaivas call adhvaśuddhi, 'purification of the paths'. It is a reversal that is implicit in the term adhvan, 'path', given to the differentiated manifestation of the Supreme Lord. Apart from the fact that the 'world as path' lends itself to directionality, it seems destined to point to a "return path". In effect, in virtue of a folk etymology that derives adhvan from the root ad, 'eat', the path is not just a process, a moving toward something, it is also that which 'should be consumed', that is, the expected result of that movement: the 'path' (analogy of the empirical manifestation), which the act of returning itself abolishes.

With the insertion of māyā and the 'sheaths' (kañcuka) associated with it, not only is the dualism of Sāmkhya made to mesh with Śaiva nondualism, but, inversely, Śaiva nondualism attempts to fortify itself against logical defect to the extent that it is careful, in its philosophical discourse, to present māyā as one of the modes of realization of the Śakti. With the addition of the eleven superior tattvas, of which the first five represent the 'pure path' (suddhādhvan), Śaivism reconciles the level of essence (suddhādhvan) with that of existence (asuddhādhvan).

Moreover, the Śaiva setting forth of the eleven superior tattvas permits the resolution of another problem that is raised by the borrowing from Sāmkhya of the notion of the tattvas: the idea of evolution itself, in effect, is in principle incompatible with most Indian idealistic systems, which, establishing an equivalence between "change" and the "unreal", consider the very idea of evolution in and of itself faulty, erroneous.

The Trika's reconciliation of idealism with the "realistic" approach implied by the idea of evolution goes even to the extent of revising the notion of bhedābheda, 'difference-and-non-difference'. Evolutionism in effect can-

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210 One that could be old; see, for instance, the notion of tattvajaya, 'conquest of the tattvas', in MVT (Vasudeva MVT: 149).
211 Not only the śuddhādhvan and the asuddhādhvan, but the notion of sadadhvan, the 'six paths'.
212 See TĀ VI 30 and TĀV ad loc. cited n. 1387.
not be maintained apart from the notion of bhedaabheda, for such an idea is implied in any theory of causation linking a cause with its effect, different from that cause, but in some sense also the same, for it is not the case that any cause can produce any effect. Thus the quadripartite distinction of the tattvas proposed by classical Sāṃkhya reposes implicitly on the notion of bhedaabheda: that which, not produced, produces (prakṛti); those which are produced but produce nothing (the mahabhūtas); those that both produce and are produced (from mahat to the tanmātras); and that which neither produces nor is produced (purusa).

In the last analysis, the Śaiva treatment of bhedaabheda, illustrated, somewhat atypically, by the metaphor of the mirror and its reflection (PS 12–13), would derive as much from a doctrinal constraint — that of an idealistic system — as it does from the external constraint imposed by integrating a “realistic” evolutionism within an “idealistic” evolutionism. For that, the notion of evolution itself had to be reconsidered. While Sāṃkhya makes it dependent on prakṛti alone, active but unconscious, presented to a purusa conscious but inactive, Śaivism subordinates evolution (where the purusa is relegated to the ‘impure path’) to the agent par excellence, the unique ultimate principle, Śiva animated by his Sakti — in other terms, consciousness indissociable from self-consciousness. This agency expresses itself as the absolute ‘I’ (aham), which is given a central place in the Paramārthasāra itself, via the “ahamstuti” of verses 47–50, the self-proclamation of the ‘I’ as the ultimate Real. Thus the idea of the ultimate principle as itself agent seals the difference, on the ontological plane, between Sāṃkhya and Trika, or rather consecrates the integration of the first in the second.

The Trika distinguishes itself also from Sāṃkhya in that the reevaluation of the sensible world culminates in a sense of marvel (camatkāra), a ‘marveling’ that borders always on joy (ānanda), and which characterizes both the regard the yogin casts upon this marvelously variegated world and the open-eyed delight with which he contemplates his identity with that world and with the Lord.

We find here perhaps the source of one of the characteristic features of the nondual Śaivism of Kashmir, which has developed, alongside a religious philosophy and a mysticism, an aesthetics that has become one of the leitmotifs of Indian speculation, and compelling enough as an aesthetics to overshadow all its rivals. A series of writers, preeminently Śaivite, among

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213 In Advaita, the same analogy illustrates the notion of ‘appearance’, bhedaabheda being rejected by Śaṅkara as a logical contradiction; see p. 57.

214 See, esp., Tantrasāra [TS] VIII (p. 86) quoted n. 594, and TS VIII (p. 87), quoted n. 605, which speaks of the ‘agentive part’ (kartramśa) of the ahankāra, itself nothing else than the devaluated form of the absolute ‘aham’.

215 See also PS 10–11, PS 14, PS 45, and YR ad loc.; also ĪPvj* III 2, 5, quoted n. 515.

216 See YR ad 75 and 79–80.
whom Abhinavagupta was probably the most influential, developed a "theory of beauty", or rather, of "aesthetic experience", that remains one of the jewels of Kashmir to this day.

Not only is aesthetic emotion described in the very terms that Kashmirian Śaivas apply to spiritual experience — rasa, 'savor', ānanda, 'bliss', camatkāra, 'wonder', ātmaviśrānti, 'repose in the Self' — but the 'amazement' (vismaya) of ordinary experience is transmuted into the 'sentiment' (rasa), as aesthetical as it is spiritual, of the ‘Marvelous’ (adbhuta). The yogin and the spectator of drama have in common the ‘recognition’ of the Self, or, what amounts to the same thing, their identification with the universe — a transitory experience for the spectator but established once and for all for the yogin, who is thus nothing but an ‘emancipated spectator’.

What about the relation of Trika with Advaita? It is obvious that the former shares with the latter the notion of māyā (already present in the first Paramārthasāra) and its faculty of 'veiling' (āvaraṇa), inherited from the tradition; after all, even in its vedic occurrences, and in conformity with its etymology, māyā is a ‘power of fabrication’, and as such can be seen as to represent the advaitic version of the Śiva's sakti. Yet, whatever may be its fundamental affinity in this regard, it is still the case that the two systems differ considerably in their manner of treating māyā.

In the Paramārthasāra, we find, in effect, a polemical attack on Vedānta's views regarding sakti and māyā. Yogarāja (ad 15) reproaches the 'Brahmavadins' for having considered māyā distinct from brahman, whereas, from the Śiva point of view, māyā is nothing but a realization of Śiva's sakti, understood initially as 'energy of freedom' (śvātantryaḥsakti). It is because of this failure to recognize the essential freedom of the supreme

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218 See Īśvarapratyabhijñāvīmarśini [ĪPV] 1 1, 1, vol. I: 38, in the context of a debate on the function of memory in accounting for the experience of the yogin: nūnāṃ sa eva īśvaro 'ham iti, 'Yes, I am the Lord'; in the same context, see also ĪPV 1 4, 3, vol. I: 165: eṣa sa iti āchādītasyeva pramāṇatattvasya sphurāvdbhāsānaṃ kṛtam, idam iti, vismaya āgarbhāyāṇyā uktyā pratyabhijñā eva sūcitā, 'When one says “this is he” there is clear revelation of a cognizer, hidden as it were; [even in cases when one says only] “Aha!” (idam), a recognition is indicated by this utterance, whose central meaning is amazement'. As for the experience of the spectator, see Abhinavaśabara [Abh] ad Nātyaśāstra [NS] 1 107, vol. I: 36: pāthyakārāṇapātrāntaraprāvesavāsāt samutpanne deśakālaviśeṣāvesānālingīte ... rāmarāvandivijayādyadvapāveṣāye ... bhavat pāñcaśaīr divasaīh sacamatkaratidyastracitamādhyapriṣṭasvāmāśyaṃpamāth śvāmādvarena viśvam tathā tāpāyān pratyaṃkam sāmājīkāh ..., 'Once the conviction has developed that Rāma and Rāvana, and so on, are before him, ... thanks to the entrances of other characters and the hearing of lines spoken — [a conviction] unmarked by the irruptions of particular times and places — ... the spectator thus view[es] every particular through the lens of his own self, (though the spectacle) continue (bhavat) for five or six days, for his attention is now one with his own self, which has entered into the midst of that action with a sense of wonder'. N.b.: This characterization is excerpted from a much longer passage describing the spectator's experience in response to the play. See Bansat-Boudon 1992: 151–152.

principle that Yogarāja (ad 27) finds fault with these Brahmavādins, even though such an account of the vedāntic system (especially that of Śaṅkara) must be taken as a serious abridgement, which fails to take note of the important cosmological role played therein by Īśvara, or of the complex interplay of māyā and the jīva in its account of the “perceptible” world.

As a consequence, one observes that the Traika view of the “real world” differs somewhat from that of Śaṅkara’s Advaita, where notions of the “real” are based exclusively on the single unchanging Real, brahman (sat, tṝṇātv), which can never be other than it is (in later Advaita usage, termed pāramārthikam sat). By contrast, the “absolutely unreal” (prātitbhāsika) can appear only verbally, is always other than it is (asat) — the ‘son of a barren woman’ (a contradiction in terms) or the ‘horn of a hare’ (an imaginary association). Between these two extremes is the “real world” (vyāvahārika) — or what we like to call the “real world” — which is ‘inexplicable’ (anirvā- canīya) in the sense that it is neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal (sadasadvilaksana) — the world, in other words, of change, where rules of cause and effect apply. Śaṅkara prefers the formula sadasadvilaksana to the older bhedābhedā (different-and-not-different) for he considers this last a contradiction in terms.

While the Śaivas and the Advaitins agree in not denying a provisional reality to the world of normal experience, they seem to part company in their view of the “absolutely unreal”, which notion has disappeared from the Śaiva lexicon, leaving us with a “bi-polar” universe consisting of the God on one side and his “creation” on the other. Such “entities” as sky-flowers and square circles are accorded no special status, for as ideas they “exist” in the same created universe.220 In a sense, we have returned to a more Sāmkhya-oriented view of the Real, where the created world is legitimated as a function of the absolute, no doubt motivated by the Śaivas’ view that action is part and parcel of that absolute, conceived as inseparable from its Śakti.

Thus, in the schema of the Trika, Śakti appears twice, as the consort of Śiva, that is, as self-consciousness still indistinct from pure consciousness, and as the subtly “degraded” form of māyā — which, it will be remembered, figures as the sixth in the procession of the tattvas. In this sense, one can say that the Trika substitutes for the pair brahman/māyā of Advaita the couple Śiva/Śakti, once māyā, or more precisely, the goddess Māyā, is taken as a hypostasis of Śakti. It being understood that, in a Traika perspective, the dissociation Śakti/māyā is valid only in a worldly perspective,

220See PS 44 and n. 915. Trika theory holds that consciousness contains everything within its fold. Only that which is known exists; whatever is not an object of knowledge does not exist. It is curious that the same formulation of the relation of the idea and its object may be found also in the most extreme realistic doctrines — notably Prābhākaramīmāṃsā — where it cannot be admitted that an idea (even an erroneous one) has “nothing” for its object; see also n. 265.
vertically; it has no reality from the ultimate point of view, when envisaged horizontally. In some ways, it could be said that the Trika conception of māyā is closer to that of the Gītā — or in any case, to the version of the Gītā as commented upon by Abhinavagupta. Besides, it should be noted that the philosophical discourse of Advaita, though founded on the pair brahman-māyā, does not assign to the tattvas the soteriological role which is their due in Sāmkhya and in Trika — although in varying ways.

As regards the integration of Sāmkhya into the Trika, certain displacements are in evidence: the māyā of the Trika represents functionally the prakṛti of Sāmkhya with the major difference that the former now embodies a goddess and is not an 'unconscious' principle; in contrast, the prakṛti of the Trika is a devalued form of the Sāmkhya prakṛti, reduced to its tri-guṇātmaka function. Likewise, the puruṣa of the Sāmkhya becomes, in the Trika hierarchy, little more than the archetype of the finite, bound soul.

It is true that Indian soteriologies have as their principle the abrogation of a condition deemed unhappy, and one can argue that they are all organized around a dialectic of servitude and liberation. Still, the way proposed by Śaivism is distinguished from other systems by the dynamism and discursivity of that dialectic. A quality that relates evidently to its notion of the Absolute (called Śiva), which the throbbing essence of its energy predisposes to a series (limited in number) of manifestations. The geneses of finitude and of liberation operate, dynamically, by a progressive installation and disinstallation of the tattvas, by the emanation of diversity and its reabsorption. Thus does Śaivism interpret both Sāmkhya and Advaita.

The thought-universe of the Trika is indeed that of an idealism based on the notion of universal consciousness, of which many variants exist, in the West as well. Still, the wide range and the complexity of the system make it unique, inasmuch as it develops, as a coherent tradition, over several centuries, and is graced by the works of some of the most acute thinkers of the Indian past.

Lyne Bansat-Boudon
Saint-Aubin-sur-mer, June 3, 2009
Translation

Salutation to the one having the form of ultimate reality, which is the Self, which is consciousness.

Now begins
the *Paramārthasāra*, the 'Essence of Ultimate Reality', composed by the revered master, Abhinavagupta, most eminent among the great Śaiva teachers together with the commentary of the revered master Yogarāja

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221 The compound *paramārtha* is equivocal as is the final term *artha*, which may be understood according to anyone of its various meanings, such as 'goal', 'object', 'truth', 'reality'; see Intr., n. 7.

222 *māheśvarācārya* — lit., 'preceptor in the lineage of [teachers] devoted to Maheśvara'.
1. To the One who, although nothing but a mass of consciousness, is yet solidified in the form of the world, to the unborn One who is proficient in the play of concealing.

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223 cidghana: the image, much exploited in the Śaivism of Kashmir, of consciousness as 'solid' or 'compact' (ghana) is translated here more or less literally, though it probably seems quite paradoxical to the Western reader, as 'solidity' is normally associated with physical objects, especially weighty ones, not with events of the mind. But it also appears to be the case that Śaiva authors were quite aware of the paradox as well, and had good reason to stress it. Even in modern Sanskrit, the term ghana continues to be associated with the gross, rather than the subtle, as for instance 'ice' is commonly referred to as 'ghanibhūtaṃ jalam'. Several rationales can be adduced for this strange metaphorical usage, among them the fact of paradox itself, which may serve (as it often does in Advaita and Mādhyamika explanations) to shock the mind out of its usual habits and to prepare it for supra-mundane insights. It may also be the case, especially for Kashmirian Śaivas — who do not dismiss the 'solid' world as a purely illusory phenomenon (as is usually done by Advaitins), but see it as an activity of the Lord himself — that, by this paradox, attributes normally associated with the effect are transferred to the cause, emphasizing thus the cause's truly substantial reality. Which suggests a third rationale for the usage, which is simply that it is the overtones suggested by the literal 'solidity' that are at issue — thus consciousness is 'compact', 'uniform', 'pervasive', etc. And finally, in stressing what amounts to the materiality of consciousness, our authors may be making a point that is often associated with the 'material cause' (in Aristotelian terms), namely, that, quā matter, all form is superadded and ipso facto extrinsic. As Chāndogya says, what is 'real' is the clay, not the pot or the dish or the toy formed of it. Mutatis mutandis, the clay (as matter) is 'inexpressible' except as or through form — one cannot encounter clay as such, and yet all clay objects are nothing but clay. Taken together, these interpretive possibilities present a strong justification for this apparently anomalous metaphor. However that may be, the formula has upanisadic antecedents: cf. BĀU IV 5, 13: evam vā are 'yam ātmā [...] kṛṣṇah praṇānāgaghaṇa eva, and BĀU II 4, 12: idaṃ mahād bhūtām [...] viṣyānāgaghaṇa eva; also MĀU 5, referred to n. 792; see also n. 234 on cidānandaikaghana.

224 jagnamūrti: in spite of the solidity implied by the term ghana, the same cit is seen as rasa, fluidity (cf. the expression 'cidrasa in PH 4, quoted below), which, when oriented toward objectivity in the process of bhedayakti, 'manifestation as difference', is again described in terms of gradual solidification, or crystallization, which process ends in prthivītattva. Solidification is also emphasized through terms such as śāyana (or aśyana, or praśyāna) and mūrti. In the sense of 'image', mūrti (derived from the root mūrch, 'to solidify', 'to coagulate') signifies the coagulation of the essential fluidity of the divinity. In this maṅgala, YR seems to echo the words of his direct guru Kṣemarāja's auto-commentary on PH 4, pp. 55–56: śrīparaṃśivah [...] cidrasaśyānatārūpāisesatattvabhuvanabhāvavattatattpramātryātmatatyāpī prathate/, 'Paramaśiva [...] manifests [lit., 'displays'] himself both as the totality of principles, worlds and entities and as their respective experiencers, that are only a solidified form of the essential fluidity of consciousness'. See also Kṣemarāja's SpN I 2 quoted n. 226; also YR ad 46. Quoted in Utpalavaiṣṇava's SpP (Śaṭrī Islām purkar 6): the Cichaktaṃsūti, which develops the image, uses the same terminology: prāṣyānaç cidrasasyoghoḥ sākāratvatam upagatah/ avasāyaḥ prabhodhāre tūdiye svavasvabhāvabhākh/, 'The stream of the essential fluidity of consciousness solidifies, assuming [concrete] forms. However, it recovers its own essential nature [i.e., its fluidity], as does the morning dew, when the Sun of consciousness rises'.

225 kriḍā — a key term of the doctrine.

226 prachāddana points here to a central concept of the Śaivism of Kashmir: the tirodhana-śakti, power (or energy) of concealment of the Lord, itself a realization of his svātantra-śakti, his energy of absolute freedom. Cf. Kṣemarāja in SpN I 2: tato 'yam cidātmā bhagavān ni-jarasāśyānatārūpam jagad unmajjhayatiti jyujyate, 'Therefore, it is perfectly valid to say that the Lord who is consciousness brings about the emergence of the world by solidifying his own essence', and Śivasūtravimarśinī [ŚSV] I 2: yāh paramesvareṇa svavātantraśaktyā-
his own Self, glory to this Supreme Lord!

2. On the compendium Paramārthasāra, artfully composed by the master, I, Yogarāja, make this brief commentary, at the request of the learned.

Kārikā 1

[The master] being of the opinion that the completion of this treatise — in keeping with the system of nondualistic Śaivism (śivādvayaśāsana) — requires first the removal of the unceasing flow of obstacles, such as apprehension, fear, idleness and doubt, which arise when one imagines oneself as primarily determined by that condition wherein the body and the like is taken to be the cognizer (dehādipramāṇa), now first

bhāṣītasvarūpāropapanārūpayā mahāmāyāśaktyā svātmānād akāśakalpe 'nāśritāt prabhṛtī māyāpramāṇānāṁ samkocco 'vabhāsitaḥ sa eva [...] bandhah, 'A limitation is made to appear by Paramāśiva in his own being which is pure like the sky. Taking the form of [experiences, beginning with those of] Anāśritaśiva and ending with [those of] the māyāpramāṇa, this limitation is the effect of [Paramāśiva's] energy of mahāmāya, which itself consists [for the Lord] in the veiling of his own nature brought about by his energy of freedom. That limitation alone [...] is bondage'.

227 samksepā — cf. YR’s symmetric statement in the colophon and n. 1445.

228 yuktā could be understood more literally as 'by means of, by having recourse to, reasoning', inasmuch as the exponents of the Śaivism of Kashmir claim a rational justification for the doctrine; see n. 427. However, taking into consideration the context, we have opted for the translation: 'artfully', 'skillfully', as pertaining more directly to the composition of a text; this is all the more justified, inasmuch as YR can thus be seen as alluding to AG’s Paramarthasāra as a (skillful) rewriting of the Paramarthasāra of Adīśa.

229 In this context, where the dehādipramāṇa is referred to, sāṅkā is probably to be taken in the sense of vicīkṣitas, 'uncertainty' ('incertezza', in Gnoli’s translation [TA: 309]), 'apprehension'; see YR ad 58 (avat.) and YR ad 83, which gives this definition: '[...] doubts occasioned by [the presence of] choice (vikalpa);' cf. Tantrāloka (TĀ) XIII 198b, for a general description of sāṅkā: sāṅkā vikalpamālā hi śāmyet svapratyayāt iīt, 'Doubt originates from mental constructs. It may be pacified by one’s own [firm] conviction [viz., ‘when possessed of intense or average grace’ (tīvramadhyāsaktipātatvatah)].' In his commentary, JR quotes from the Nīśatana (referred to in TĀ XIII 197–198) a definition of doubt as bondage par excellence: vikalpaj jayate sāṅkā sā sāṅkā bandharūpīṁ/ bandho 'nā na hi vidyate tē sāṅkām vikalpajāmā/ vikalpāyāyaktasya na hi syāc chreyasi gatī/, 'The doubt that arises from mental constructs takes the form of bondage. There is no other bondage than the doubt arising from mental constructs. The one who is concerned with exertions resulting from mental constructs cannot attain to the highest goal; also TĀ XII 24: sāṅkāj jāyate glāṁhī sāṅkāyā vighnabhājānam, and 25, which quotes Utpaladeva’s Śivastotravāli [ŚŚA] II 28: savāsāṅkāsāpaṁ mārgam numo māheśvaram tv itī. Note Sanderson’s usual translation of sāṅkā as ‘inhibition’ (1985: 199, and n. 69; 1986: 181). See also Parātrīśikālāghuṣṭti [PTLVr] ad 18: kevalam parikṣīnaśāṅkāsāpaṁ tv avatī yāyogī śāṅkāyāḥ [...] ekarasaadvishadāksamāśvāsāvīnishhītavatvād, ‘The destruction of the doubt that is perplexity is alone useful, for this doubt is an obstacle to the absorption that consists in constant awareness of him only’. Sanderson (2007: 379) casts doubt on the attribution to AG of the PTLvr, but observes that this attribution is attested at an early date in the PM, probably 12th or 13th cent.

230 Sanderson 2005: 91, n. 7, translates: ‘the multitude of hinderers, namely, such [states of mind] as hesitation, uneasiness, laziness, and uncertainty’.

231 pramāṇa — lit., ‘agent of [presumably valid] cognition (pramāṇa).’ The two families of terms based on the roots jñā (jñāna, etc.) and mā (māna, esp. pramāṇa, etc.) present particular
considers his reverence to the Supreme Lord (parameśvara).

The essential meaning of the entire treatise is inherently present in this reverence, and it is through this reverence that is enabled absorption (samáveśa) in the divinity who is but one's own Self (svāmadevata), a uniform mass of blissful consciousness (cidānandaikaghana), once the difficulties to the translator. We have tended to prefer 'know' and its derivatives for the former, and 'cognize', etc., for the latter — although both translations are etymologically closer to Skt. jñā than either is to the original sense of mā, 'to measure, determine'. Rather than become embroiled in the Germanic / Latinate constrast, some have preferred the Greek-based 'gnosis' for jñāna, for obvious reasons (Skt. jñāti would be an exact transposition of this term), but of course this too is, etymologically, just another variant of the IE root *gnó. To the extent, however, that the terms based on the root mā retain an associative nuance with their origins in the Naiyāyika-Bauddha debates on 'valid means of cognition', it was thought at least permissible to employ here the rather more 'academic' associations of 'cognize', reserving the solid Germanic 'know' for jñā and its derivatives — whose applications are both mundane and esoteric, but less often "technical" — in the sense of serving to disambiguate the concrete problems of the "knower" enmeshed in the trammels of mundane awareness. Along with pramārtha 'cognizer' must be accounted an entire family of terms that serve to characterize the problematic of the concrete knower — prameya, 'object of cognition' (for the Nyāya, there is no 'knowledge' without a corresponding object — a position common to most "realisms"); pramāṇa, 'means' of establishing a correct relation between the prior two; and pramā, the 'valid' cognition thus derived. If these associations are to be thus retained, the distinction in translation may to that extent be justified. In some contexts, however, stylistic and other constraints may operate to suggest a less rigid adherence to this strict distinction. See PS 30–31, 39–40, 60–61 concerning the two levels of error, as sources of bondage. 232

pravanatā — lit., 'his [constant] submission'. Cf. ÍPV I 1 (vol. I: 18ff.), in which prahvatā is synonymous with the pravanatā found here. Commenting upon Utpaladeva's first words: kimcid āsādya maheśvarasya dāsyām [...], 'Having somehow realised my condition as being Maheśvara's servant [...]' ÍPV 11, 1 (vol. I: 18) elaborates the meaning and the connotations of this salutation: iha paramesvaram prati yeyam kāyavānīnamas tadākāsvayatātīyajanālaksanā prahvatā sā namaskārāyāthāḥ, 'In this system, salutation means the reverence consisting in the dedication of body, speech and mind exclusively to Him' (tr. Pandey); see Sanderson 2005: 89ff.

232 cidānandaikaghana — lit., 'mass consisting solely of consciousness and bliss' (if the compound cidānanda be understood as a dvandva, as is generally the case); or 'mass consisting solely of the bliss that is consciousness' or 'mass consisting solely of the bliss of consciousness' (if the compound be understood as a karmadhāraya or tatpurusā). For an inventory of more-or-less equivalent expressions gleaned from the commentary (cidekaghana, cidekavapus, cidekamūrti, cinmūrti, cinmūrtatva, cinrūpa, citsvarūpa, cidghana, abhinnicidghana) suggests, beneath the diversity of style, an insistence on (1) the sole reality of cid — by appropriating qualifications normally associated with its "objects", viz., vapus, mūrti, rūpa, etc.; (2) the materiality of cid, as the sole basis of the visible world. The mention ānanda in the longer versions of the compound seems destined to add a "sensible" dimension to that uniqueness. All of which might be alleged to favor the interpretation of the compound itself, not as a dvandva, but as a karmadhāraya or tatpurusā — for, precisely, cid and ānanda are not two; therefore our translation: 'a uniform mass of blissful consciousness'.
condition of finite cognizer (parimitapramātā) has been overcome: 235

1. To You, the transcendent, situated beyond the abyss, beginningless, unique, yet who dwell in manifold ways in the caverns of the heart, the foundation of all this universe, 236 and who abide in all that moves and all that moves not, to You alone, O Śambhu, I come for refuge. 237

To You, whose form is the god that is my own Self, who are the essence of what is present (sphurattā) 238 in every cognizer, 239

235 The avataranikā — lit., ‘descent’, is the preamble to the commentary proper, serving to introduce the verse, and clarifying the sequence of the text from one kārikā to the next.

236 Silburn translates: ‘qui repose en toute chose’.

237 The verse (a triṣṭubh) is nearly identical to APS 1 (on the title and authorship of the first Paramārthasāra, see Intr., p. 2), substituting parastham gahanāt for parasyah praṅtṛt, and śambhum for viṣṇum. The editions of the APS add to this maṅgala a verse (APS 2: āmāmbrāsañī nikīhilo ‘pi loko magno ‘pi nācamaṇi nekṣate ca/ āścaryam etan mṛgyaṛṇikābhē bhavāṃburaṅśau ramate mṛṣaiva), to which nothing in AG’s PS corresponds. The Pandit edition of the APS omits those first two stanzas, beginning directly with the long narrative frame (garbhagṛha ‘...’) that precedes the exposition proper. Thus is the title Āryāpancaliti justified: if the concluding verse is excepted, the text does consist of 85 āryas; see Intr., n. 16.

238 The term sphurattā is one of the key words of the Trika. Mayrhofer, Monier-Williams (Sanskrit-English dictionary [MW]), and other authorities consider the roots sphur, spar, and sphāy more or less related; the various senses that may attach individually to each root are often confounded in the usage of all, extending from ‘be enormous’ to ‘explode’. By reason of the frequency of their occurrences alone, and given the preponderance of the notion of light in this doctrine, the roots [pra-]kāda, [pra-, vi-, ava-]bhā, bhās, sphur, etc., appear to be employed without major differentiation of meaning. Thus, we have preferred to translate them in a more or less anodyne fashion and indifferently with terms such as ‘appear’, ‘become evident’, ‘become patent’, ‘manifest’, etc. A passage from TĀV V 123 supports this interpretation: commenting on bhaṣāte durghatā saktir of the verse, JR says: bhaṣāte svāmaikāmyena prathate, ‘[and so, that energy] “manifests itself”, [that is] it extends itself [as everything visible] inasmuch as it is [ever] identical with itself [viz., incapable of abolishing its own nature]’ (see the entire passage, n. 872); also TĀV IV 14, where sphuṭayet is glossed as sākṣākuryāt. However, to fully understand the connotations of these usages will require a complete exposition of the Śaiva doctrine, which is rather the business of PS itself. The term sphurattā appears in ĪPK I 5, 13-14, in the context of defining citi — ‘consciousness’, or, as translated by Pandey, ‘sentiency’, or ‘principle of consciousness’ (ĪPK, vol. III: 73), a term that is glossed by the Vimarsini as yā citiḥ citiśriya tasyaḥ pratyavamarṣah, ‘the act of consciousness which has self-reference’ (tr. Pandey, vol. III: 73). Being essentially reflective awareness (pratyavamarṣa), consciousness (citi) is represented also as ‘supreme Speech’ (parādvāc), ‘freedom’ (svātantra) and ‘sovereignty’ (aīśvarya) of the supreme Self (paramātman) (ĪPK I 5 13); as the ‘manifestation’ (sphurattā), ‘absolute being’ (mahāsattā), and ‘heart’ (hṛdaya) of the Supreme Lord (ĪPK I 5 14). ĪVP I 5, 14 glosses again mahāsattā as mahādevī, through the citation (vol. I: 261): mahāsattā mahādevī viṣvajīvanam ucyate. On the Vaiśeṣika and Vaiyākaraṇa concept of mahāsattā, see Appendix 15, p. 339. Here, the use of the root sphur in the sense of ‘to manifest’ is significant, for the Trika phenomenal world is neither an illusory appearance (vivarta), as Advaitins hold, nor a real transform (parināma), as stated by followers of Śāmkhya and Pāñcarātra, but the luminous manifestation of the Lord (or spanda principle) that is implicit in every act of consciousness and which “surges forth” periodically as the insight determining even the possibility of awareness. See SpN I 3.

239 See PS 49 and YR ad loc.
Śambhu, [appropriation of] whose nature becomes [for the aspirant] the ultimate goal (śreyas), who are as well [absolute] Being (sattā),

I come for refuge to You as my protector in order to attain absorption in You;

By the word ‘eva’ the author means: ‘I take [refuge] in Śambhu, not in some other god operating within the realm of Illusion (māyā), who is [therefore] different from me — Śambhu, the divinity who has taken the form of my own Self’. Thus the master excludes any connection with another divinity.

Moreover, what sort of Śambhu?

240 Or ‘whose nature is unsurpassed (anuttara) felicity’. One might suspect here a play on the word śreyas — a term commonly used by the Mīmāṃsakas in the sense ‘the goal par excellence’; that is to say, the reward, in the largest sense, deriving from strict performance of the sacrifice: the maintenance of the good order of things (dharma) and, ultimately, the personal reward thereto pertinent, long life and, at its conclusion, residence among the gods. Where the text declares no explicit purpose deriving from the ritual, the Mīmāṃsakas posit this “general” end, for every act should be undertaken in view of some result, whatever it may be. So, in later loose usage, śreyas becomes a term for the ‘purpose of purposes’, something akin to the Platonic ‘Good’, human felicity in its most abstract form, or (even better) ‘heaven’ — but generally to be distinguished from the ‘other-worldly’ purpose (which is not an “end”), mukti, liberation. In our text, however, some occurrences of śreyas appear to refer to mukti; see also n. 150 and 1421.

241 śambhūṃ svāmādevatākārāṃ eva prapadye na ca punar māyānātācārināṃ kimcid bhinnām devam. See ĪPV I 1, 1 (vol. I: 29): sambhavantī hi māyāgarbhābhikārīno viṣṇuvirinācādyāḥ, ‘There do exist [deities] powerful within the pale of māyā, such as Viṣṇu, Viśnac (= Brahmā), etc.’; and ĪPV I 5, 13 (vol. I: 254–255): ‘Those operating within the pale of māyā are Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Indra, etc.’; cf. BĀU I 4, 10 (quoted by R ad APS 80), characterizing the paśu: atha yo ‘nyām devatām upāste anyo ‘saun anyo ‘ham asmiti, na sa veda/ yathā paśur evam sa devvānām, ‘So whoever worships another divinity (than his self) thinking that he is one and (brahman) another, he knows not. He is like an animal to the gods’.

242 anyayogam vyavacchinatī: the indeclinable eva is used in two different senses: avadhatāraṇa, ‘determination’, ‘ascertainment’ (viz., ‘that very X’); and that of anyayogavavyavaccheda, ‘exclusion’ (viz., ‘X only’), as is the case here. Cf. ĪPV I 1, 1 quoted n. 241.

243 The syntax of commentaries on versified texts is relatively free; two exegetical procedures are followed: the dandāñvaya, ‘rod-like syntactic construction’, and the khandāñvaya, ‘syntactic construction [made clear] by [having recourse to its] elements (khanda)’. Beginning with the subject (if expressed), ending with the verbal form, the dandāñvaya method places the intermediary words in their respective cases in keeping with the normal prose order. Such is the style of Mallinātha’s commentaries on Kālidāsa’s works. Here, and throughout his commentary, YR follows the khandāñvaya style: the long sentence constituting the entire kārikā is first reduced to its core sentence: tvām eva Śambhūṃ śaraṇam [prapadye =] samśraye, which is then explained in the order of its words. Then, the exegete explains the other words of the sentence — all here adjectives qualifying ‘Śambhūṃ’ — by asking questions that elicit the qualifications as responses: ‘what sort [of Śambhū]?’ One will find excellent illustrative examples of this style in YR’s commentary ad 98–99. Note that the question: ‘what sort [of Śambhū]?’ (kim bhūtam) will be again answered in kārikās 10–11, 43, and, even more elaborately, in kārikās 64–66. At the same time, YR’s commentary adheres to the general principles of Indian hermeneutics in stressing the inner coherence (sangati) of the text, and in raising possible objections and offering solutions (ākṣepasya samādhānam); cf. Grimal 2000: 765–785.
Transcendent (para)\(^{244}\) means ‘full’ (pûrṇa), namely, ‘replete with all five energies’: Consciousness (cit), Bliss (ānanda), Will (icchā), Knowledge (jñāna), and Action (kriyā),\(^{245}\) and who has thus the nature of the Unsurpassed.

Thus is he ‘situated beyond the abyss’.

Now, beyond the abyss\(^{246}\) means ‘beyond the principle of mâyā’ (mā-yātattva) [viz., beyond the category of apparently objective existence],\(^{247}\) ever remaining in his transcendent (para), or all-encompassing (pûrna) nature, that is, remaining on the pure path (śuddhādhyāna)\(^{248}\) [composed of the five principles] beginning with Śiva and ending with vidyā.

And although he manifests himself (sphurat) as marvelously different-
tiated, when manifesting various states of consciousness, he does not deviate from his transcendent nature, which is all-encompassing.

As it has been said in the Spandaśāstra:

Even though different [states of consciousness, such as] waking, etc., that are not [truly] different from him, proceed from him, he never departs from his own nature, which is that of pure agent of experience (upalabdhy).}

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249 Reflecting on the states of consciousness (avasthā) — waking (jāgrat), dream (svapna), deep sleep (susupti) — has, from the time of the earliest upaniṣads, the BĀU and ChU, been a way of discovering the inner ātman, for susupti is taken to be the stage (avasthā or sthāna) where objectivity resolves into its source, as it were. See BĀU II 1, 15–19 (svapna and susupti), IV 3, 9–34 (jāgrat, svapna and susupti), with the famous image (IV 3, 18) of the ātman/puruṣa continuously wandering through the two states of waking and sleep, as a great fish swims from one bank of the river to the other; see also BĀU (II 1, 15–19, IV 3, 9–20); ChU IV 3, 3; VIII 6, 1–3; VIII 10–11; KauBU III 13; SŚ X 3, 3, 6 and 5 2, 11–15; BSBh I 1, 4 and I 1, 23. In accordance with a recurring pattern where + 1 completes a series of three in an enumeration (see Malamoud 1989: 140ff.), some texts, like MuU III 2 8 (quoted by R ad ĀPS 70), postulate a state (not yet designated as the ‘Fourth’, turiya or turya) transcending all three: vidvān nāmarūpād vimuktaḥ paraḥ param puruṣaṁ upaṁtī divyaṁ, ‘He who knows, delivered from name and form, attains the divine Being, higher than the highest’; see also ChU VII 24, 1: yatra nānyat paśyatī [. . .] sa bhūmaḥ. It is MĀU 7 and 12 that, for the first time, explicitly adduces a caturtha, ‘fourth’ state (on the MĀU and its exposition by Gaudapāda, who lived before Śaṅkara, see PS 35 and YR’s gloss). The Śaivism of Kashmir adds a fifth, turyātīta, ‘beyond the Fourth’, the ‘trans-fourth’ state. Thus is developed the logic of transcendence, in consequence of which the Śaivism of Kashmir postulates above Śiva himself, Paramāśiva; see YR ad 14 (and n. 513), which establishes the correspondence of turya with the ‘pure path’ (śuddhādhyāna), i.e., the totality of the first five tattvas; also YR ad 15 and 85–86.

250 According to the SpN (Singh: 34), ‘etc.’ includes not only dream (svapna) and deep sleep (susupti), states of consciousness common to all (lokaprasiddha), but also concentration (dhāranā), meditation (dhyāna) and intense absorption (samādhi) that are proper to yogins. SpN I 3 seems to establish a term-by-term correspondence between waking / dhāranā, dream / dhyāna, and deep sleep / samādhi. On this point, see ŚŚV I 8–10 (Singh: 43).

251 According to SpN I 3, tadabhinne may be understood as a hetugarbhaśeṣana, an ‘adjective containing an implicit reason’. Thus one could understand: ‘Even though different [states of consciousness such as] waking, etc., proceed [from him], he never departs from his own nature, which is that of a [pure] agent of experience (upalabdhy), for those [states of consciousness] are not [truly] different from him’.

252 Or else (according to the gloss prasarpāti = pravahati satī) ‘flow on’, i.e., ‘go on appearing’. However, our translation of prasarpāti as ‘proceed from’ is also supported by the SpN which emphasizes the process of manifestation, expression of the Lord’s absolute freedom: anena cātiṣdurghatakārītvam eva bhagavato dhvanitam/ yasmāy jāgarādivimśhetam ca prakāśayati tatraiva ca svābhavedam iti bhedām manānā tadbhedātmanohbhāyātmāna ca rūpenārāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparāparावरिष्णभूतानि। 'This [adjective ‘tadabhinne’] suggests that the Lord accomplishes [what is otherwise] difficult to construe. Inasmuch as he [is the one who] manifests (prakāśayati) the different states, waking, etc., [he manifests] his own lack of difference vis-à-vis that [manifestation of difference]. Thus, he manifests himself as differentiated, as non-differentiated and as both differentiated and non-differentiated when he assumes the form of the triad of his energies, viz., non-supreme, supreme, supreme-non-supreme’.

253 SpK I 3. Ancient commentators, as well as modern scholars, have variously interpreted this verse (see Silbum, Singh, Dyczkowski ad SpK), largely for the reason that the syntactic construction of the first hemistich may be analyzed in two ways, as shown by Kṣemarāja in
Beginningless means ‘ancient’ due to the presumption of priority (ādisiddhatva) [that necessarily devolves] from his status as the absolute in which the principle flows on (prasarpati = prasarat) [i.e., ‘assumes diversity’ (vaicitryam grhnati)] in different [states of consciousness such as] waking, etc., which are not [truly] different from the same as consciousness. See SpN I 3: such as waking, etc., may differ phenomenally, but Íva, as Experiencer, remains one and the same as consciousness. See SpN I 3: and the [pure] agent of experience is that of pure agent of experience (upalabdhy), and this persists even when one dreams, or is in deep sleep. In other words, states of experience such as waking, etc., may differ phenomenally, but Íva, as Experiencer, remains one and the same as consciousness. See SpN I 3:  

Thus, this verse teaches that, although himself the pure subject of experience, the Lord, being logically prior, is the condition permitting such states of consciousness; the essential nature of Íva is that of pure agent of experience (upalabdhy), and this persists even when one dreams, or is in deep sleep. In other words, states of experience such as waking, etc., may differ phenomenally, but Íva, as Experiencer, remains one and the same as consciousness. See SpN I 3: such as waking, etc., may differ phenomenally, but Íva, as Experiencer, remains one and the same as consciousness. See SpN I 3:  

Beginningless means ‘ancient’ due to the presumption of priority (ādisiddhatva) [that necessarily devolves] from his status as the absolute in which the ōtapuraśa compound tadabhinne is an adjective qualifying jñārādādivibhede ‘pi, and prasarpati is the locative of the present participle. We have preferred to retain this interpretation in our translation inasmuch as Kṣemarāja also seems to prefer it (see the beginning of the gloss: lokaprasiddhe [...] bhede yogaprasiddhe ‘pi vā [...] prasarpacy anyān-yarūpe pravahati sati arthāt tat tattvam [...] naiva nivartate). In the second interpretation, tad becomes an autonomous pronoun, and the subject of the present indicative prasarpati. tat would then refer to the spanda principle, and the meaning would be: ‘Although that [spanda principle] flows on (prasarpati = prasarat) [i.e., ‘assumes diversity’ (vaicitryam grhnati)] in different [states of consciousness such as] waking, etc., which are not [truly] different from it, it never departs from its own nature which is that of a [pure] agent of experience’ (see Silburn SpK: 71); or else, if one retains the alternative understanding of jñārādādivibhede ‘pi as jñārādādivibhede ‘pi sati, offered by SpN: ‘Although that [spanda principle] flows on [i.e., ‘assumes diversity’], when different [states of consciousness such as] waking, etc., take place [...]’. The two interpretations — equally supported by SpN — are not fundamentally different, except for the emphasis that the first puts on the absolute freedom of the Lord. The kārikā means that Íva, or the spanda principle, is the condition permitting such states of consciousness; the essential nature of Íva is that of pure agent of experience (upalabdhy), and this persists even when one dreams, or is in deep sleep. In other words, states of experience such as waking, etc., may differ phenomenally, but Íva, as Experiencer, remains one and the same as consciousness. See SpN I 3: such as waking, etc., may differ phenomenally, but Íva, as Experiencer, remains one and the same as consciousness. See SpN I 3:  

Beginningless means ‘ancient’. It means that the cognizer is prior to the cognition, that he is its condition sine qua non. The subject precedes the object, which is but the object of his cognition, and as such is established (śiddha) first. This question of the Lord’s ādisiddhatva is discussed at length in SpN I 2, while answering the Buddhist objection that there is no Self, no ultimately real Knower; that which we consider real is, for want of a better word (cf. SpN I 4) a continuum, a series, of cognitions (jñānasatā). Kṣemarāja demonstrates that a denying subject is needed for denying the Self; in other words, that without a denying Self, there cannot be denial of the Self, for this denial would be then a painting without a canvas (abhittikam etac citram). The proof of the reality of the Lord is precisely his manifestation as denying subject. Therefore the text can conclude: bhagavān ādisiddhavaprakāśasamūrti astiī, ‘The Lord, being logically prior (ādisiddha), and in the form of self-luminosity, does exist’. Such arguments as to the logical priority of the Self or consciousness are found in all the Indian idealisms: cf. Śaṅkara’s Upadeśasāhasrī 97: siddhā tarhy ātmanah pramāṇaḥ svatatasiddhit pramāṇanirapekṣasatyāya. In ḠPVV 11, 2 (vol. I: 51), AG, while answering the objection that in the case of fire inferred from smoke, it is smoke that is established first, contrasts that sort of priority with the priority of the Self, which is qualified as purāṇa, since there cannot be any objectification of the Self, the pure subject. See also SpP avat., p. 6, which deals with the concept of ādisiddhatva
cognizer present in all possible perceptions as the principle of experience itself (anubhaviṣṭa);

unique means 'unaccompanied', for the attribution to him of difference makes no sense, inasmuch as he is universally present (sphurāṇāt) as the unity of consciousness (cidaikya).

The master goes on: 'who dwell, etc.'.

Even if he is of this sort, yet, out of his own freedom (svātantrya), he has penetrated in manifold ways, that is, in many different ways, into the caverns (guhā), that is, into the caverns that are the hearts (ḥṛḍ) [of all limited cognizers], whether they be Rudras or ordinary souls (kṣetrajña).

In other words, even though his nature is [unitary] consciousness, he situates himself as the variety of cognizers, manifesting (abhāṣya) himself freely (svayam) as insentient or sentient, just as an actor [assumes various roles].

Therefore he is the foundation of all this universe'.

while demonstrating the irrefutability of the Spanda doctrine. Thus ĪPK (I 1, 2) affirms the logical priority of the Self, i.e., the spanda: ata evesvarapravahbhijñāyām ādisiddhir ity uktaṁ (correcting a misprint [adisidd/iarj in Dyczkowski's edition). In ĪPV I 1, 2 (vol. I: 55), AG glosses the term ādisid̐ha with avicchinnaprakāśa, 'of uninterrupted light', and relates it to the next word of the kārikā, maheśvara, the 'sovereign Lord' — who is such on account of his being uninterrupted light, manifesting himself thereby as omniscient (jñā) and omnipotent (kartr). AG attributes the meaning 'eternal' (see Pandey's transl., p. 10), or 'eternally present', to ādisid̐ha — a meaning that can be retained in YR's commentary, where ādisid̐ha glosses anādi, 'beginningless'. On purāṇa, see YR ad 7; also the avat. ad 47–50, which refers to the concept of ādisid̐hahatā.

The expression addresses the problem common to all monisms: how can one reconcile the oneness of the Lord, the only Real, with phenomenal diversity? The Lord's immanence consists in his being the consciousness of each and every finite being, from the Rudras to the kṣetrajñas. guhā, 'cavern', is a designation of mayā, 'power of differentiation', or 'delusion'. It is not to be taken as a mere metaphor, rather, it is a technical term that designates one aspect or level of mayā, seen as threefold; see n. 246.

The phrase associating rudras and kṣetrajñas recurs as a motif in Trika texts; cf. YR ad 5, 6, 14, 23 and ŚSV, maṅgalacarana: rudrakṣetrajñavargah samudayaḥ yato yatra visrāntim rched [...] caitanyam śāṅkaraṁ taj jayati, 'Victory to this consciousness of Śāṅkara from which proceeds the host of Rudras and kṣetrajñas, and in which they come to rest'. It is a way of classifying the multitude of cognizers (pramāṇa) — or, as stated by PS 5, of 'enjoyers' (bhokta) — endowed with bodies (or, more generally, 'forms'), faculties (karana) and the corresponding attributes (guna), into a hierarchy of categories, according to the degrees of excellence of their faculties: gods (Rudra, etc., viz., Brahmā and Viṣṇu), men (among which the yogins enjoy extraordinary faculties and powers), and 'animals', this latter category including stationary beings (stāvara) such as plants; see Appendix 1, p. 317.

The analogy of the actor is recurrent in Indian speculation, one of the better-known examples being the danseuse (or actress) of the Śāṅkhya-kārikā. The theory of the seven subjects (saptapramāṇa) is implicitly referred to here. See YR ad 14, and SpN I 1 quoted in Appendix 10, p. 330. For the same analogy of Śiva as an actor, see YR ad 5 and 26.

The juxtaposition of the two epithets sarvālaya and sarvacaracarastha points once again to the simultaneous transcendence and immanence of the Lord. The epithet sarvālaya is another formulation of SpK I 2: yatra shtitam idaṁ sarvam kāryam [...], 'The One, i.e.,
The foundation, the place of repose (viṣrāntisthāna) of all this universe (sarva) [viz., 'the place whereon reposes', that is, 'on which depends', all this universe] — namely, this [manifest] world (jagat), consisting of all cognizers, whether they be Rudras or ordinary souls, and, as well, of all objects of cognition (prameya). For is it not well known that this universe, which indeed is grounded in the universal knower (pūrnapramāṇa) [viz., the Lord, or consciousness], is nevertheless referred to in various ways, manifesting (prakāśamāna) itself through difference, as though emerging [from the placid sea of unity], urged on by a pressing need to articulate everything into pairs of knowers and knowns (grāhyagrāhaka)? If this were not the case, this universe would not exist at all — for it would be on such hypothesis other than Light (prakāśa).  

Consciousness] in whom is situated all this product, i.e., all this world [produced by that Agent who is the Lord, or Consciousness ...'].

On jagat, see, esp., n. 465.

 Cf. ĪPK I 4, 8: tan mayā dṛṣyate dṛṣṭo 'yam sa ity āṁśasy api/ grāhyagrāhakatābhinnāv arthau bhātāḥ pramāṭāri, 'Therefore, when there is the reflective awareness "that is seen by me", "this", "that", the two elements though divided into perceiving subject and perceived object are manifested within the [true] cognizer (pramāṭāri)' (tr. Torella ĪPK: 110).

In SpK I 2, the term corresponding to unnagna is nirgata: yatra shhitam idaṁ sarvam kāryam yasmāc ca nirgatam.

 Cf. the apekṣā of the grammarians — the 'expectation' or 'need' aroused by one word for another in a tight syntactical relationship, as the apekṣā of an active transitive verb for an accusative direct object.

This is the first statement, in YR's commentary, of a major thesis of the Śaivism of Kashmiri: only that exists which shines, i.e., that alone exists which is known. This fundamental principle will come up again in the discussion of kā. 5, 7 and 8, as well as in kā. 30 and its commentary, where it will be given as a formula, unfortunately truncated, quoted by YR: [...] nāprakāśah prakāśate, [...] That which is not luminous cannot manifest itself [lit., 'illumine']! — or 'the absence of appearance does not appear'. Cf. SpN I 2: iha yat kiṁcit [...] tad yadi na prakāśate na kiṁcit, 'Whatever is here, in this world, [...] if it does not shine forth [viz., appear], it is nothing [i.e., it does not exist]; again in PS 49; also ĪP 1 5, 3b (quoted in SpN 1 5): prakāśatmā prakāśyo 'rtho nāprakāśaḥ ca Siddhyati/', 'The object that is made manifest [lit., 'that is illumined'] has Light/consciousness for its essence. That which is not Light does not exist [lit., 'cannot be established']; also Ajādapramāṭāsiddhi [APS] 13, quoted in SpN 1 5 and ĪPV I 1, 5 (part of the second hemistich) and I 5, 3 (entire verse): evam ātmayāsa asatkalpaḥ prakāśasyaiva santy ami/ jādāḥ prakāśa evāsti svātmānaḥ svaparātmaṁbhir//, 'Those objects, insentient, are treated as (or "seem to be") inexist ent vis-à-vis the Self; nevertheless, they do exist as belonging to Light; the Light of one's own Self alone exists, [whether it comes] from the selves of others or one's own'. The context in which ĪPV I 1, 5 quotes this verse (second hemistich) may aid in its understanding: paraṁ kavalam upāder dehāde sa cāpi vicārito yāvan nānya iti visāva pramāṇārthatah ekaḥ pramātā sa eva cāsti/ tad uktam prakāśa evāsti svātmānaḥ svaparātmaṁbhir iti/ tataś ca bhāgavān sādāśavo jñāti y atiḥprabhṛṇi krimi api jñātīyantam eka eva pramātā, 'Othersness only derives from limiting conditions such as the body, and these [limiting conditions themselves], as soon as they are investigated, [turn out] not [to be] different [from the universal Self]; therefore the
Reflection\(^{266}\) on the pronoun ['all' (sarva)]\(^{267}\) gives rise to the question: 'whence emerges this all (viśva)?'\(^{268}\)

Yet, for all that, the nature of the Lord is not merely transcendent (samuttirṇa); therefore the master says: '[You] who abide in all that moves and all that moves not', for he is ever present also in the form of this sentient and insentient universe, as has been said:

Since You are indeed the creator of All, O You, who permeate all, therefore, You alone are this All.\(^{269}\)

In accordance with this rule, it makes no sense to posit as an effect some other unmanifest (aprakāśamāna) entity that is not part of that [manifesting cause].\(^{270}\)

According to the Spandakārikā:

It is the [Lord] himself as the enjoyer who is, always and everywhere, established in and through the objects of enjoyment,\(^{271}\) it is the Lord himself who appears (cakāsti), now one way, now another.

entire crowd of knowers is, in truth, one knower, and this [knower] alone exists. This has been said [by Utpaladeva]: “The Light of one’s own Self alone exists, [whether it comes] from the selves of others or one’s own”. So there is just one knower, whether expressed as “Lord Sadāśiva knows” or even as “the worm knows.”’ An echo of that verse may be found in YR’s gloss ad 58. The Trika notion according to which there is no other reality than Light/consciousness, and the correlated concept of ‘reflection’ (pratibimbā) are anticipated in Kāṭhakopanīṣad [KĀU] II 2, 14-15: *tad etad iti manyante ’nirdeśyām paramām sukhām/ katham nu tad vijāṇīyām kim u bhāti vibhāti vā// na tatra sūryo bhāti na candratārakaṁ nema vidyuto bhāti kuto ’yam aṁghī/ tam eva bhāntam anubhāti sarvam tasya bhāsā sarvam idam vibhāti//,* ‘This is that and thus they recognise the ineffable, Supreme Bliss. How then may I come to know this? Does it shine (of itself) or does it shine (in reflection)? The sun shines not there, nor the moon and the stars, these lightnings shine not, where then could this fire be? Everything shines only after that shining light. His shining illumines all this world’; note that KĀU II 2, 15 = MuU II 2, 10, Śvetāsvatāropanīṣad [ŚvU] VI 14.

\(^{265}\)pratyavamarsa.

\(^{266}\)Such reflections are ancient; see Appendix 2, p. 318. Cf. YR ad 17.

\(^{267}\)The question is likely inspired by the grammatical notion of the pronoun (sarvanāma) — a (single) noun capable of representing a multiplicity of other nouns: ‘whence comes this multiplicity to which we refer by a single word, the Lord?’ In a sense, the Lord is the prototype of the pronoun.

\(^{268}\)The source of the quotation has not been discovered. For the reasoning, see SpN I 2, quoted n. 265. See also the lost commentary of Somānanda on the Parārāḍikā [PT], quoted in Parārāḍikāvivaraṇa [PTV] 4 (Singh PTV: 32, Skt. text): *kim bahunā sarvam evaṁnuttaram anuttaravatā, ‘Why say more? All [this universe] is unsurpassed, because he [the Lord] is unsurpassed’.

\(^{269}\)For if it were an effect, it would ipso facto be manifest. YR presumes here a “world” that would not be part of the Lord, which would be nothing but an “effect” separated from him and therefore devoid of “luminosity”. But such a supposition contradicts itself, for how would such a “world” make itself known? Similar phraseology and reasoning in YR ad 27: *anyakṣayatvātiriktaṁ aprakāśarūpasya prakāśamānataḥbhāvāt;* also in YR ad 5 and 10-11.

\(^{270}\)SpK II 4b. ŚSV I 14 observes that this verse hints at the bhedābheda state of experience. YR quotes again SpK II 4b in his gloss ad 74.
In other words, to You, who are such, that is, who are unsurpassed, who take the form of that god who is the Self of everything, and who, though in essence the marvel of supreme ipseity (parāhantācamatkāra),272 have yet assumed diversity; and, even more, to You who are supreme Light, free from duality (advaya); to You who are, as well, extreme, infrangible freedom; to You, O Lord Śaṁbhu, I come [for refuge]. I absorb myself (samāvīśāmī) in You alone who are such, that is, who are my own Self in the marvelous form of supreme ipseity to be experienced by making use of the adventitious ego (kṣtrimāhankāra)273 [that limits the Self] to the body, etc.

With this summary sentence,274 which teaches that the supreme state to be attained is absorption in [what is already] one’s own essence (sva-svabhāva), the teacher has stated in abbreviated form the purport of the text in its entirety, via notions of what must be done and what must not be done that will be explained in detail later.275

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272 First occurrence in this text of a key concept of this school: camatkāra is one of the notions common to Kashmiri aesthetics and speculation. The term characterizes both an aesthetics (rasāsvāda) and a mystical experience (brahmāsvāda) — which are ‘analogically related, but differentiable’ (Gerow 1994: 188) — via a shared aspect: that of ‘wonder’, ‘wonderment’. In the attempt to understand or describe and name this experience, other concepts have been forged that emphasize its other dimensions, involving two main semantic fields: nirvṛtti, ‘serenity’, ānanda, ‘bliss’, ātmaviśrāntī, ‘repose in the Self’, on the one hand, and rasa, ‘flavor’, carvanā, ‘delection’ (lit., ‘mastication’), on the other. All these terms are common to both fields of experience, even if they appear to have greater scope in aesthetics; see ABh ad NS VI 31, vol. I: 279, which justifies such technical terms on the basis of their common use: tatha hi loke sakalavighnavinirmuktā samvittir eva camatkāranirveśarasanāsvādanabhogasamāpattilayaviśrāntyādīśabdair abhidhiyate, ‘For, in ordinary life, by the various words “wonderment” (camatkāra), “immersion” (nirvṛtti), “relishing” (rasanā), “tasting” (āsvādana), “perfect realization of enjoyment” (bhogasamāpatti), “absorption” (laya) [lit., ‘dissolution’], “resting” (vīśrāntī), etc., is expressed that [form of] consciousness which is free from any obstacle’; see Appendix 3, p. 320.

273 That is, by instrumentalizing the adventitious, ‘manifest’, ego in the quest for transcendence. The concrete ego is, as Śaṅkara observes, the existential form of the transcendental absolute.

274 grahanakavākya.

275 What is to be attained is identification with the anuttara, that is, with one’s own Self; what is to be abandoned is the kṣtrimāhankāra, the ‘adventitious ego’, that considers the Self limited to the body, and identifies with worldly experience. Similar statement in Rāmakantha’s commentary on SpK, commonly known as the Vivṛti, “Extensive Explanation” [SpV], although entitled Spandasūrārthāvati, the Necklace of Meanings [Strung Upon] the Thread of the Spanda [a pun on ‘sūtra’]; see SpV I 1: vyākhyātaś ca ayam ādiślokāḥ samastaprakaranāsthopakṣepagarbhaḥ, ‘Thus we have shown that this first verse contains, in a nutshell, the meaning of the entire work (or manual)’. 
Kārikās 2–3

Thus, through the intermediary of this verse of praise, the author has stated the essential purport of the manual, namely, nonduality. Now, making explicit [as is required at the beginning of a treatise of this sort] the ‘descent of the śāstra’, he explains, in the following two āryás, its subject matter, its relation [to that subject matter, that is, the relevance thereto of this work and of the entire Śaiva doctrine there expounded], etc.: 

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276 prakarana — AG’s verses are also referred to as a prakarana in the avat. ad PS 105. See Vācaspataya s.v.: śāstrasiddhāntapratipādake granthabhede, ‘[prakarana] means a category of text expounding the established doctrine of a system’, and, quoting Vedāntasāra 3, refers to it as an example of the textual genre: asya vedāntapraKaranaatvāt [...], ‘[It is thus called] because it has for its topic the Vedānta [...].’ In fact, the primary sense of prakarana is ‘topic’ (asmin prakarāna, etc.), but the term is employed, by synecdoche, to designate a text that introduces a topic, which therefore constitutes an ‘introduction’ to it that is considered elementary; the term also designates one of the ten types of rūpaka, which has for its subject “topical” matters, that is, does not deal with otherworldly gods or heroes. See also the Vidvanmanoraṇjanī ad Vedāntasāra 3, which quotes Parāśaropapurāṇa XVIII 21–22: śastraikābeśasambandham śastrakāryāntare sthitam/ āhuh prakaranam nāma granthabhodo vipaścitah/, ‘The learned call prakarana that particular category of texts which deals with one part of a system or is established in [service of some] other purpose of the system [e.g., as a manual]’. Note that the Spandakārīkā is defined by Rāmakanṭha (see n. 275) as belonging to the same class of texts, that of prakarana.

277 śāstrāvatāra — a śāstra involves transmission through a tradition, which transmission may be of five sorts, which SpP, avat., p. 2 expounds in detail: tatrāmiśām śāstrāvatāram sambandhas tāvat pañcavidhah/ paro mahān divyo divyetara itaretaraś ceti, ‘The relationship [between those who reveal] these śāstras [and their disciples] can be of five kinds, namely, “supreme”, “great”, “divine”, “human”, or “mutual”.’ For further details on this classification, see Dyczkowski SpK: 360.

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278 The ‘etc.’ covers the two remaining aspects of the ‘descent’, namely, the aptitude of the pupil (‘is he qualified?’) and the goal presupposed by the teaching (‘is it possible of realization?’). Here is an example of the methodology of Indian hermeneutics, whose objective is to establish, at the threshold of the text to be commented upon, the anubandhas, that is the ‘preliminary considerations’ or ‘requisites’ as Hiriyanna translates the term in his edition of the Vedāntasāra (pp. 20 and 45), without which no study of śāstra should be undertaken. The main anubandhas are four: the determination of the disciple’s aptitude (adhikāra) to study the matter at issue (it concerns as well his ritual and social qualifications), the subject (viśaya), the mutual relation (sambandha), the end to be attained (prayojana). As the Vedāntasāra explains, sambandha means ‘the relation of what has to be made known — that is, in the vedantic system, the identity between brahman and the individual self — to the means of making it known, namely, in this case, the upaniṣads, which are the [right] proponent’ (sambandhas tu tadaikyaprameyasya tatapratipādakopanisatpramānasya ca). Here, PS 2–3 present the same four anubandhas, namely, the description of the adhikārīn (‘Wandering at a loss in the cycle of suffering that starts with our residence in the womb and ends with dying, a disciple inquired of the revered Ādhāra concerning ultimate reality’); the subject-matter (viśaya, or abhidheya), namely, ‘ultimate reality’; the relationship (sambandha) the treatise bears to its subject, namely, that of expounder (pratipādaka) to expounded (pratipādyā), in keeping with the Śaiva nondualistic doctrine; the objective (prayojana) of the treatise, namely, attaining the realization of the identity of Śiva and paśu, culminating in liberation from the ‘cycle of sufferings’. As observed by YR, PS 2–3 has recourse to a fifth
2. Wandering at a loss in the cycle of suffering that starts with our residence in the womb and ends with dying, a disciple inquired of the revered Ādhāra concerning ultimate reality.

3. The Teacher replied to him by [reciting] the Ādhārakārikā.²⁷⁹ [Now] Abhinavagupta expounds the essence of that [instruction], from the point of view of the Śaiva teachings.²⁸⁰

A certain [student], having cultivated dispassion²⁸¹ through the grace (prāsaḍa) of the Lord, and having withdrawn his mind from the world of transmigration,²⁸² came to realize that he needed to be instructed by a teacher. Having propitiated properly²⁸³ the revered Ādhāra, who was for him the true teacher (sadguru), namely, the sage called also Śeṣa, he inquired of him concerning the nature of ultimate reality [and whether it was attainable] through instruction.

Thereupon, considering, in order, [the disciple's] entitlement, his maturity, and his determination,²⁸⁴ and having thus judged him, the disciple, to be endowed with a receptive heart,²⁸⁵ that very Anantanātha, anubandha: the abhidhāna or title, namely, Paramārthasāra — hinted at in the two āryās by paramārtham (kā. 2) and tattvāram (kā. 3). Rāmakāṇṭha’s commentary on SpK I 1 is a remarkable example of the application of these hermeneutical rules; such is the case with the SpP, avat., p. 2–3, respectively: vācyo ‘ṛṭhau/ vācakam śāstram/ spandābhidhō ‘ṛthro ‘ṛc vāc- cyah/ tadvācakatvād upācārāc chāṭrasyāpy etatsamjñāḥ/, ‘The denoted [subject] is [supreme] reality; the denotator is the śāstra. The reality denoted here is called spanda, and, by extension (upacārā), insofar as it denotes it, spanda is also the name of the śāstra’; and (p. 6): upāyopayapratipādam eva śāstrasāya pratyojanam/ yā tadavabodhāḥ upayasyavārūpāpattih sthirā tad eva pratyojana-pratyojanam iti, ‘The purpose (pratyojana) of the treatise is to explain the means and goal [of spiritual realization]. The purpose of the purpose is to achieve a permanent realization of one’s own nature, which is the [supreme] goal attained by an enlightened insight [into the means and goal]’ (tr. Dyczkowski 1994: 142).

²⁷⁹ On the authorship of the first Paramārthasāra and its different titles, as well as on the relationship between the two Paramārthasāra, see Intr., p. 2 ff.

²⁸⁰ Kārikās 2 and 3 are in the āryā meter, as is the rest of the text, with the exception of the first verse, which is a tristubh. AG’s PS 2–3 correspond to a longer narrative in APS 3–9 (omitted in the edition of the Śabdakalpadruma, probably because it does not directly rely on the canonical exposition of the Vedānta that is expected). Besides, it should be noted that PS 2a (garbhādhivāsavāpāṇamāpanirāntinakaduḥkhačakracaviḥbhrāntah) echoes both ĀPS 3a (garbhagṛhaśasambhavajanaṁjāramāraṇaṁpravṛtyogāḥdhu) and 54b (janmajaṁraṇaṁcakra iva bhṛmāyate jantuḥ).

²⁸¹ vairāgya. Cf. TĀ XIII 98: vairāgyam bhogavairāsyaṁ, ‘vairāgya is disgust with [respect to] objects of enjoyment’ and TĀV XIII 100: vairāgyam nāma bhogeḥbhyo vaimukhyam ucayati iti, ‘Repugnance [felt] toward objects of enjoyment is called vairāgya’.

²⁸² Cf. ĀPS 4b: samsārāṇavataraṇapraṇāśnam pṛcchām aham bhagavan, ‘Thee, O Lord, I ask the question of how to cross the ocean of transmigration’.

²⁸³ ĀPS 3 shows the pupil ‘making obeisance with his hands’ (prāṇjali) and eulogizing the guru (kā. 4).

²⁸⁴ parśīlana.

²⁸⁵ vīgālitāntaḥkaraṇa. Or ‘whose heart has been emptied [of its cares]’. A probable explanation of this expression is given further in YR ad 2–3: ‘whose heart is pierced with (viddhaḥprāya) the energy of the Supreme Lord’s favor (anugrahaśakti)’; see also YR ad 103:
wise in teaching all the doctrines without exception,\textsuperscript{286} imparted instruction, saying: `[Knowledge of] the transcendental brahman (parabrahman),\textsuperscript{287} may be attained through the text entitled Paramārthasāra, also called the “Verses of Ādhāra” (Ādhārakārikā), via the discrimination of puruṣa from prakṛti, according to the principles of the Sāmkhya system'.\textsuperscript{288}

The teacher [viz., Abhinavagupta], motivated by the need to show favor (anugraha) to others, [now] expounds the essence of it, just as one extracts butter from curds;\textsuperscript{289} that is, he expounds the essence of teachings on ultimate reality in keeping with the Śaiva principle of ultimate [or transcendent] nonduality (paramādvaya), in order to show favor to all creatures. It is he who realized that the teachings concerning brahman are supplied with irrefutable arguments when expounded from the point of view of [the notion of] one's own freedom, in the form of ultimate nonduality. [By his very name,] which, even as a sequence of syllables, is auspicious, that teacher may be said to be hidden (gupta); and is himself a

\begin{quote}
vivekārdhārydayaih, ‘by those whose hearts are softened by discrimination [that is, whose minds have been rendered susceptible to this doctrine by their powers of insight]’.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{286}Note the pun: the one who is “ṣeṣa (‘remainder’) knows all (niḥṣeṣa, ‘without any remainder’) the doctrines.

\textsuperscript{287}This ‘qualification’, in constant usage, should be taken more or less hyperbolically: it is not thereby suggested that ‘other’ brahman(s) of lower quality are to be noticed. Rather the compound is understood more or less as an appositional karmadhāraya — the brahman that is the ultimate, or the transcendental brahman. It is for this reason that we have generally avoided the translation ‘supreme’ — suggesting quasi-political dominance — in preference to ‘ultimate’, or ‘transcendental’, which looks only to the limit beyond which there is nothing. The same principle has been applied to the translation of parapramāṭ.

\textsuperscript{288}YR offers here a summary of what is at stake in the disciple’s query, after the manner of AG, who gives in two kārikās (2–3) the essential meaning of the introductory passage of Ādi-ṣeṣa’s PS: (kā. 3–7: ‘[...] explain to me prakṛti and puruṣa’), to which the guru responds (kā. 8–9): ‘I shall propound this “Essence of Ultimate Reality”, after making obeisance to that Upendra [Viṣṇu], by whom this unreal world was made from prakṛti as something seemingly real (sayam īva).’ Cf. also APS 70a: evam prakṛtim puruṣam vijnaya [...], ‘Thus having recognized prakṛti and puruṣa as distinct [...]’; and APS 75: buddhavā vibhatām prakṛtim puruṣah [...], ‘When the puruṣa has understood prakṛti as different [from himself ...]’.

\textsuperscript{289}The analogy is a variant of the topos according to which the goose (hamsa) is said to be capable of separating the milk from a mixture of milk and water; cf. TĀ IV 134–136, especially TĀ IV 136b: tat punah pibati priyā hamso ‘haṃṣa sa iti spṛḥan//, ‘The resplendent goose drinks all that again [viz., reabsorbs the universe] with pleasure [JR: priṭih ānandaḥ svātantriyāṃ], saying to himself: "haṃṣ saḥ, viz., I am that." ’ The subject, once aware of his identity with the universe, becomes the supreme subject — the haṃsa serving as an image of the jīvānukta. TĀV ad loc. glosses aham saḥ as: aham parapramāṭapi ‘pi saviṣvaphārah savīṣvaphārah ‘pi vā aham eva/ iti akṛtimena sīṣṭasamhārakārīnā svabhāvabhūtena vimarsenā sātatyena pravṛtiśravād avicchinnatayā prasphuran, ‘The “I”, though the transcendental cognizer, bursts forth in the form of the universe, or, though bursting forth in the form of the universe, is the “I” alone; resplendent, undivided [lit., “in its lack of internal differentiation’], due to its constant activation through [viz., realized in the form of] reflective awareness, its very essence — reflective awareness [that is, the corresponding activation] that is the non-adoptive cause of creation and reabsorption; also TĀV ad loc.: haṃṣaḥ [...] parapramāṭaḥ, punah sṛṣyādyuttarakālam.
secret (guhyā), that is, he is possessed of secret [wisdom] (sarahasya), due
to [his experiencing] the ever new (abhinava), supramundane, sudden
burst (spāra) of the state of wonder (camatkāra) that is consciousness.

Thus have been expounded the objective of the text, its title, subject
matter, and the mutual relation [of the subject matter to the means of
making it known], etc., but they are not elaborated here for fear of
making the text overly prolix.

Now how is the disciple described?

The master replies: '[Wandering at a loss in the cycle of suffering
that starts with our] residence in the womb'.

Wandering, that is, at a loss, in the cycle (cakra) that consists of
suffering and ends with dying — a 'cycle' so-called because it is like a
wheel (cakram iva), whose [revolutions are the] existences shaped
by successive appearances and disappearances [of the disciple, viz., his
births and deaths].

One may see as its felly the six 'modifications of becoming' [which
any limited soul undergoes when passing] through the variety of states
consequent upon residence in the womb, namely, birth, existence, growth,
change, decay and death.

By this description is suggested that the disciple's awakening is becom­ing
evident, which implies remembrance of his previous births. Otherwise,
how can the curiosity that prompts him to pursue acquisition of the
supreme benefit be explained?

\[\text{290} \] \text{alaukika.}

\[\text{291} \] Numerous are the esoteric etymologies of the name Abhinavagupta, some given in his
own works, some in their commentaries. See PS 104 and its gloss.

\[\text{292} \] See n. 278.

\[\text{293} \] Cf. ṚŚ 54b: janmājāraṃarāṇaṃayē cakra iva bhṛāmyate jantuḥ.

\[\text{294} \] \text{samśaraṇa.}

\[\text{295} \] bhāvavikāra — Renou (BSBh: 12) translates bhāvavikāra as 'modifications du devenir'
('modifications of becoming', Sarup Nirukta), whereas Thibaut (Vedāntasārā: 16) renders it
as 'forms of existence' or 'stages of existence'. Renou (BSBh: 12, n. 7) adds that, according
to Ṭrśyāyāni (on Nirukta I 2), the theory of the six bhāvavikāras is given in order to defend
the thesis that the verb has as its fundamental idea 'to become', whereas the noun has for its
fundamental idea 'to be (such and such)' ['Le verbe a pour notion fondamentale le devenir
(le nom ayant pour notion fondamentale l'être)']. Moreover, as does YR here, the
Nirukta expresses those 'modifications' as verbal forms, with a slight alteration in the order of
enumeration. See also Vākyapadīya [VP] I 3 and III 33ff.; Ś ad BhG [BhGBh] II 20 (verse quoted
in YR ad 7); see Ruegg 1959: 24–25, on the difficulty raised by the inclusion of asti, 'to be',
in the list of modifications of action.

\[\text{296} \] ṚŚ 3a enumerates four of these bhāvavikāras as consequent upon dwelling in the womb
(garbhagṛhaṇa): saṃbhava, janman, jara, marana; ṚŚ 54, three: janman, jarā, marana.

\[\text{297} \] Had he not remembered his previous births, he would not have been aware of this un­
ending cycle, which he can no longer bear. It is this awareness that serves as his awakening,
and prompts the enquiry addressed to his guru.

\[\text{298} \] Lit., 'how can the curiosity [that prompts him] to pose questions as to acquisition of the
supreme benefit [...]'.
And [it is also here suggested that] he is a worthy receptacle for the teacher's instruction in whom dispassion has developed, whose heart is pierced by the energy of the Supreme Lord’s favor (anugrahaśakti), and by whom correct knowledge (samyagijnāna) has been acquired; thus, it is such a one alone who desires knowledge of ultimate nonduality, having approached a suitable teacher, an incarnation of the Supreme Lord.

And this has already been said elsewhere:

O Goddess, he is led toward the true teacher by the Lord's grace.\textsuperscript{299}

This will be stated later in this treatise.

\textbf{Kārikā 4}

The master has thus established a basis [for the text] by [expounding] the process of its origin. Now, he starts the text [proper] by stating, as regards this world, marvelous with the diversity of everything in it, that it is the supreme freedom of the Supreme Lord alone that constitutes the source of agency (kartṛtva),\textsuperscript{300} [made manifest in] conjoining or disjoining [the host of his energies, bringing about, on the one hand, the dissolution, on the other, the creation of the universe]\textsuperscript{301} — thus making known that

\textsuperscript{299}The exact source of this quotation has not been found. Compare, however, TĀ XIII 249b: \textit{rudraśaktisamāviśto niyate sadgurum prati}, and TĀV XIII 248b–249a, which quotes: \textit{rudraśaktisamāviśtah sa śivecchayā/ bhuktikuptiuprasiddhyartham niyate sadgurum prati}///, a text very similar to TĀ IV 35: \textit{śripūrvasāstre tenoktam sa yiyāsuh śivecchayā/ bhuktikuptiuprasiddhyartham niyate sadgurum prati}, 'It is said in the Ancient Treatise [viz., the Mālinivijayotaratantra]: "He who, thanks to Śiva's will, wishes to go to the true teacher, is led to him so that he may obtain enjoyment and liberation."' The question of the intensity of śaktipāta will be taken up in kā. 9 (and YR ad loc.), YR ad 18, kā. 96–97 (and YR ad loc.). The KSTS includes a second line of quotation which we have chosen to omit: see our 'List of variants' in 'On the Sanskrit text'.

\textsuperscript{300}Note the difference between \textit{kartṛ} and \textit{hetu} — doubtless based on the usage of the grammarians (cf. P. I 4, 54–55), who, among other things, thus distinguish the 'agent' of the causative verb from the 'agent' of its embedded base verb.

\textsuperscript{301}We have interpreted samyojana and viyojana as the conjunction and the disjunction of the Lord's saktis, taking into consideration the lines of the avat. as well as the kārikā itself. Moreover, this interpretation is supported by Kṣemārāja's commentary on SpK I 1 (p. 6): \textit{yasyonmesanimesābhhyām jagataḥ pralayodayayau/ tam śakticakravibhavaprabhavam śaṅkaram stumah/}, 'We laud that Śaṅkara by the opening and shutting of whose eye-lids the world appears and dissolves, and who is the source of the glorious display of the Wheel of energies (śakticakravibhava)’. As does here the avat., SpN I 1 explains śakticakravibhava in terms of the samyojanā and viyojanā of the Lord's saktis: \textit{tasya śakticakrasābhāsparaṁārthasya viśvasya yo vibhavah parasparasyamoyojanāviyojanāvaiśvacitryam anantaprakāram tasya prabhavam kāram/ sa eva hi bhagavān vijñānadeśātmakaṁ svātmakāmyena sthitāṁ viśvān abhāsāṁ anyonyam nānāvaiśvacitryaṁ samyojayam viyojayam ca viśvdayapralayayahetū/; ‘Glorious display’ (vibhava) means the infinite variety of the conjunction and disjunction of the Lord’s energies vis-à-vis each other, which thus appear as a wheel [lit., 'the conjunction and...
this universe is nothing but the blossoming of his energies (śaktivikāsa) through the intermediary of the four [concentric] spheres (anda): 302

4. Displaying the glorious superabundance 303 of his own energies, the Lord has brought forth this tetrad of spheres. 304 As divided one from another, they are named Energy, Illusion, Nature and Earth. 305

By the Lord — Lord Maheśvara, who is free [from any constraint], a uniform mass of blissful consciousness —
this tetrad of spheres, consisting of the aggregate of [all] entities
disjunction with each other of the Wheel of energies’); a Wheel of energies whose ultimate meaning is the manifestation, viz., the universe. [The Lord] is the source (prabhava) [of this glorious display], its cause. Thus, the Lord mutually joins and disjoins, in an infinity of ways, all objective phenomena (ābhāsa) [lit., ‘appearances’, ‘manifestations’], which are [in reality] of the nature of consciousness and exist within him as identical with him [for they are nothing but his saktis]. He is [in that way] the cause of the manifestation and dissolution of the universe’. According to this interpretation, the conjunction, or fusion, of the Lord’s energies — of phenomena — amounts to the dissolution of the world, whereas their disjunction, or diffusion, amounts to the creation of the world in all its wonderful diversity. Such is also the explanation of Rāmakanṭha: according to the SpV (p. 3) on the same SpK 1 1, the manifestation (udaya) and the reabsorption (pralaya) of the world take place, respectively, through the extension (prasara) and the reabsorption (pralaya) of the Lord’s energies. In keeping with one of the traditional exegeses of SpK 1 1, Rāmakanṭha demonstrates that the members of the two compounds unmesanimesābhāyām and pralayodayau are organized as a chiasmus, with unmesa related to udaya and nimesa to pralaya: yasyonmesanimesābhāyām śaktiprasarapralayābhāyām jagato viśvasya pralayodayau vināśaprādurbhāvau/ atra yathāsaṃkhyam na vivakṣitam iti vakṣyamah, ‘The reabsorption and the manifestation, that is, the end and the generation, of the world take place through the opening and shutting of his eye-lids, i.e., by the expansion and reabsorption (prasara/pralaya) of his energies. The meaning intended here involves a reversal in the order of words’. Note that the term yathāsaṃkhyam designates a principle of ordering two parallel lists in such a way that the terms of the second list mimic in order those in the first: ABCD abcd (see P. I 3, 10). Rāmakanṭha, here, observes that this principle is not observed in the present case. Moreover, YR commenting upon nijasāktivaibhavabharat uses the same terminology, vaibhava explained as vicitra prarārah. On the Wheel of energies whose circumference is the universe and the hub the divine Heart, see Kṣemarāja (Spandasamdoha [SpS] ad SpK 1 1), and AG’s Dehausthedevatācakrastotra, along with its extensive commentary by Silburn (pp. 89-97). See also PS 65 and YR ad loc.

302 The multiplicity of spheres poses the problem of their relashionship. Śaiva doctrine assumes them to be concentric, that is to say, the inner contained within the outer.

303 Lit., ‘By the superabundance of the glorious display [...]’. Our translation of ‘vaibhava is borrowed from Silburn’s ‘glorious déploiement’ in her translation of SpK 1 1 (Silburn SpK: 61).

304 Cf. ŠŚ III 30 [in the textual organisation of the ŠŚ]: svāśaktipracayo ‘ṣya viśvam.

305 As regards AG’s rewriting or adaptation of ĀPS, it may be observed that the term anda is found in ĀPS 10, although in its usual sense of cosmic ‘egg’, and not as a notion specific to the Śāivism of Kashmir. Creation, viewed as a tetrad of spheres, is a novel idea proper to Āgamas such as MVT. Although this concept of andacaturasaya may be seen as implicit in Śāmkhya, insofar as it is related to the doctrine of the tattvas that Śāmkhya does develop, it occurs here in an altogether different context, with an altogether different import: the tetrad of spheres is an ontological requirement of the system (see Appendix 5, p. 323).
TRANSLATION

(vastupinda), is so called inasmuch as it covers the universe as does a sheath (kośa). As has been said:

[...] the aggregate of entities is called an ‘egg’ (anda). 307

[This tetrad] has been brought forth, that is, has been made manifest, or rather made effective, by [his own free] agency of becoming (bhavanakartṛtā). 308

306 ācchādaka.

307 Segment of TĀ VIII 169b, which is a quote from the Rauravāgama. TĀV ad loc. (vol. IV: 1474, in Dwivedi, Rastogi TĀ; all references to TĀ and TĀV will be made to this ed.) explains vastupinda as a samudāya, ‘aggregate’, of ‘entities’, namely, ‘bodies, faculties, etc.’ (anda hi nāma vastūnām tanvaksādānām pindaḥ samudāya ucyate, tad asya lakṣaṇam ity arthaḥ). The term vastu is further explained in TĀ itself (VIII 176b–177a): [...] vastusabdēna tanvaksabhuvanāmakam// rūpam uktam yatas tena tatsamūho ‘nda ucyate/, ‘The word “entity” (vastu) refers to a form (rūpa) of bodies, faculties, or worlds. Thus, by this term, their assemblage is referred to, called anda, “envelope” [lit., “egg”]. Thus, here, YR quotes a part of the much longer definition that TĀ VIII 169–170 borrows from the Raurava[āgama]. This cryptic quote is further glossed by TĀ XI 171–172, which provides the key for understanding the concept: vastupinda iti proktāṃ śivaśaktisamūhabhāk/ andaḥ syād iti tadvyaktā samūhabhāva ucyate// tathāpi śivamagnānāṃ saktināṃ andaḥ bhavet/ tadartham vākym aparam tā hi na cyutaśaktitah/, ‘Since this anda, which is [essentially] an assemblage of Śiva’s energies, has been described as “aggregate of entities”, it is spoken of as their [energies’] objectification, in the process of manifestation. Even so [one may object], the condition of being anda could be predicated of the energies that are immersed in [i.e., that are one with] Śiva. For that reason [i.e., in order to avoid the fault of a too wide definition], another syntagm [qualifying anda, has been given, namely, pracyutah śaktirūpatah, from which it may be inferred that] those [energies] have not deviated from their nature as energies [viz., being one with Śiva]. It results from such a definition that the anda, assuming the form of an ‘aggregate of entities’, namely, bodies, faculties, and worlds, is the first externalization, or objectification, of the host of Śiva’s śaktis. Furthermore, as the concretization of the Lord’s śaktis, the anda is seen as a form given to the formless, hence as a cover, veiling the pure Light of the Self/consciousness, and further covering the world that it encompasses. Thus, the other aspect of the definition of anda consists in its being a cover (ācchādaka), a sheath (kośa), as explained here by YR. Therefore, the definition given by YR synthesizes the two main features of anda: it represents a constriction permitting concretization of the Lord’s śaktis; see Appendix 5, p. 323.

308 bhavanakartṛtā, [the Lord’s free] agency of becoming [lit., ‘faculty of exerting his power of becoming’], is the key word here, expressing the paradox of an Absolute (Paramaśiva, pure Being, perfect plenitude) who coexists with his own creation, necessarily external to him. The concept of an active being is thus adumbrated, suitable for an Absolute that is both consciousness (prakāśa) and self-consciousness (vimarsa), self-consciousness seen as spanda, ‘vibration, pulsation’. The term occurs in ÍPvj I 5, 14 defining citi, ‘consciousness’, or ‘principle of consciousness’: sattā bhavattā bhavanakartṛtā [...], ‘It [viz., consciousness, citi] is being, becoming, and agency of becoming’ (compare Torella ÍPK: 122: ‘It is existing, being, the subject of the action of being’). We prefer to translate bhavanakartṛtā as ‘[the Lord’s free] agency of becoming’, in the light of ÍPV I 5, 14 (vol. I: 258–259): sattā ca bhavanakartṛtā sarvakriyādyā svātantryam, ‘sattā, “Being” [or rather, “state of being”], means bhavanakartṛtā, “agency of becoming”, [which is but] freedom in all actions”; on citi, see n. 238 and n. 1049. bhavanakartṛtā designates the Lord’s faculty of exerting his power of becoming — that is, of manifesting himself as the universe, eternally and permanently present in him. Being free, Parameśvara decides to embody reality, in other words, to become “real”. See again ÍPV
How? The master says: ‘By display of the glorious superabundance of his own energies’.

[That is, the Lord has brought forth this all] by and through the abundance, of the glorious displays, the wonderfully variegated outflows, of his innate, inherent, unique host of energies, such as Will, etc.

Thus the confection of the world is indeed but the sudden bursting into bloom of the Lord’s own energies.

As it has been said in the Sarvamārīgalāśāstra:

Energy (śakti) and the Possessor of energy[ies] (śaktimat) are said to be the [only] two entities. His energies constitute the entire world, but the Possessor of energies is the Great Lord.

Of what does this tetrad of spheres consist?


IV 1, 6 (vol. II: 289): sattā bhavanakarṇā sphurattārūpā, ‘His state of being, i.e., his [own free] agency of becoming (bhavanakarṇā), is but [lit., ‘takes the form of’] his manifestation [lit., ‘flashing forth’]. From both passages (IPv 1 5, 14 and IPv 1 4, 6), it appears that bhavanakarṇā stands as a synonym for sattā and sphurattā, the latter very closely related to spanda. As such it designates the highest śakti of the Lord, for spanda and spanda consist of nearly imperceptible, or extremely subtle, movement: kimciccalana. The ‘kimci’ tells us rather that the ‘movement’ at issue is not otherwise distinguished, which implies that it would be ascertainable only with difficulty, for to perceive it would be to impute to it some characteristics, a direction, an intensity, etc. — thus justifying the translation generally adopted, ‘imperceptible’ or ‘subtle’ (movement). On the notion of spanda, see Appendix 6, p. 327.

bhara — lit., ‘burden’.

prasara.

bhagavatah kila svaśaktivikāśasphāra eva jagannirmānānam. Nearly the same formulation in IPv 5: vastutāḥ saktivikāśo viśvam, ‘In reality, the universe is the blossoming of the [Lord’s] energies’, a statement which, according to IPv (vol. III: 363), finds its source in ‘an Āgama such as the Śrīmarīgalāśāstra’ (thus certainly referring to the famous verse: śaktayo ‘hya jagat sarvam which YR quotes here). Nevertheless, as emphasized by Śivadṛṣṭi (ŚDV) III 20b, such statements are valid only from a vyāvahārika point of view. Note YR’s usage of śaktivikāsvaratā (and its synonyms) in the context of liberation (ad PS 56, 60 and 61).

śaktis ca śaktimāṁś caiva padārthadhyayam ucyate/ śaktayo ‘hya jagat sarvam śaktimāṁś tu maheśvarah/. See Appendix 4, p. 322.

As underlined by Pūrṇatāpratyabhijñā [PP] (prakṛiti-vimarsa [= II], 169, p. 21), which reformulates TĀ XI 12b–13a, the concept of anda is meant to emphasize diversity: andaḥ ca bhuvanām hi vibhāgasthitādhamkim/ ad evāvaranān prāhuḥ śākyantam tāc ca sambhaḥvai//, ‘It is said that anda is responsible for the differentiation of the bhuvanas, that it is an envelope [sequestering all the principles (tattva)] up to [but not including] śakti’. From śaktyanda to prthvyanda, the four andas may be seen as concentric spheres encompassing the entire creation, itself understood as the triad of experiencer, experience and object of experience. When, at the outset, the text has recourse to the concept of the four andas, diversity is not yet apprehended dynamically, in the course of its progressive manifestation via the thirty-six tattvas, which will be expounded at length in kā. 14–22, but statically, as a fixed object or entity composed of those thirty-six principles, grouped into four spheres according to increasing constrictions put upon the Lord’s absolute freedom. For a detailed exposition of the notion of anda and an attempt at their interpretation, see Appendix 5, p. 323.
This energy, which pertains to the Supreme Lord, belongs to the universe formed of cognizers and objects of cognition (pramaṇaprameya), even though it is in essence nothing but the marvel of supreme ipseity. It takes the form of an activity of negation (niṣedhayāpāra) based on the failure to discern the Self (ātmākhyāti), and is effected by denying (apohana) one's own nature.\(^{314}\)

This energy is called śaktyāṇḍa, the 'sphere of Energy', in virtue of its veiling function, and its role in effecting bondage (bandha).\(^{315}\)

[This sphere] consisting of that part [of the thirty-six principles] beginning with Sadasiva and Īśvara and ending with śuddhavidya, fully holds in itself the trial of the [remaining] spheres, which have yet to be explained.

Thus it is that the [supreme] energy [of the Lord] has been so designated [i.e., śaktyāṇḍa], inasmuch as it takes the form of a cover. In this sphere,\(^{316}\) Sadasiva and Īśvara are the presiding deities.

And another sphere is called māyā[anḍa], the 'sphere of Illusion', whose essence is the triad of impurities (malatraya).\(^{317}\) It is composed of

\(^{314}\)By denying, negating the plenitude of the Self, apohanaśakti gives rise to difference, but this difference exists only on the level of pure subjectivity. This is why śaktyāṇḍa is related to the three tatvas — Sadasiva, Īśvara and śuddhavidya — ordered below Śiva/Śakti, and above māyā. śaktyāṇḍa represents the state of consciousness in which difference appears as a very dim presence, a first outline of what will actually take place in māyā. On apohanaśakti, see the exposition of PP II 155b-157, which sounds like a gloss on this very passage of YR's commentary: māryeyātmavīśvasya svāmarūpasya sarvadā// parāhantacāmatakasāraśārabhūtatayā sataḥ/ svarūpāpohānāmeyam akhyātār yāstī tannayā// naṁarthabhāvarūpātmāniṣedhayāpṛtiś ca yā/ sā śaktih paramesāmya śaktyāṇḍam iti procyate//, 'The Supreme Lord is that absolute reality, eternally remaining as the essence of the marvel of supreme ipseity, whose form as the universe of cognizers and objects of cognition is [ultimately] that of the [unitary] Self. This energy (śakti) called "śaktyāṇḍa" — assuming a form of non-existence [lit., 'absence'] as denoted by the particle "na" — operates to negate the Self, for it consists in the failure to discriminate, the setting aside (apohana), of the nature of that Self [now seen as "I" and "this"]'). While explaining this notion to K. D. Tripathi orally, Rameśvara Jha used to add that this negation (niṣedha) was a 'pure negation' (śuddhanārtha), for, at this stage, negation does not require any opposing reference (pratīyogin): there is nothing else than the Self to be negated. See also YR ad 10-11.

\(^{315}\)The form of experience that takes place at the junction of the śaktitattva and the sadāśīvatattva is named Anāśristaśiva, 'Śiva unrelated [to the universe]'; see Appendix 7, p. 327.

\(^{316}\)anda is not merely the 'envelope', which, limiting the ultimate reality, determines different levels of experience; it is also seen as a fullyfledged loka, a 'sphere', as it is often translated (Silburn PS), inhabited by a multitude of beings and things, under the control of presiding deities, and related to the hierarchy of the tatvas. This will be even more obvious with the three other āṇḍas.

\(^{317}\)The first occurrence, in our commentary, of this key concept. The three impurities (malatraya) are the ānavamala, the impurity of [deeming oneself] finite, the māyāyamala, the impurity of [regarding the world as] objective, and the kārmamala, the impurity of [supposing oneself the agent of] actions; on those notions, see YR ad 17-18, 24, 37, 57. Once māyāśakti, the power of differentiation, begins to operate, engendering the samsāric world, the five kartukas constitute the subjectivity of an individual soul (ānu) and affect it with the three impurities. Might it be possible to see in these three terms, displaced to a more concrete level, references to the three forms of being noticed above (viz., sattā, bhavatā,
delusion (moha); its form is the bondage that affects all varieties of cognizers in virtue solely of its propensity to occasion difference. It consists of that part [of the thirty-six principles beginning with māyā and] ending with puruṣa.

That [sphere] incorporates within itself the two spheres yet to be explained.

Here the presiding deity is the Rudra named Gahana — the ‘Abyss’. 318

Similarly, Nature (prakṛti), whose constituents are sattva, rajas and tamas [originally in equilibrium], once it is transformed [viz., once this equilibrium is lost] into [internal and external] faculties, and as well into effects [namely, the objects of those faculties] — which become objects of enjoyment (bhoga) for fettered subjects, binding those subjects in their guises of pleasure, pain and delusion — is called prakṛtyaṇḍa — the ‘sphere of Nature’. 319

In this [sphere] also, there is a presiding deity, Lord Viṣṇu, who is endowed with great glory 320 and who emphasizes difference [or, who presumes difference (in order to function)].

Similarly, earth (pṛthvī) is termed pṛthvyaṇḍa, the ‘Terrestrial sphere’ — the Terrestrial sphere, consisting of the gross [corporeal] sheath (kaṇčuka), for it provides an outer enclosure 321 to all the subjects, from man to stationary beings, and is [hence also a] binding factor.

This sphere also has its presiding deity, Lord Brahmā, who occupies the pre-eminent place in the fourteenfold creation of beings. 322

bhavanakartta (see n. 308)? The ānava “defect” relates, in effect, to the individual subject; the māyiya to the objective universe; and the kārma to the cycle of existences, which, by the intermediary of the notion of the act, explains the fashion in which the two other modes of being enter into contact, entwine.

Or ‘the Impenetrable’. On gahana and the threefold māyā, see n. 246. On Gahana, as the adhipati, the intendant deity, of the māyāṇḍa, see Appendix 8, p. 328

Cf. ÍPK IV 4–6, which states that the Lord’s energies — jñāna, kriyā and māyā — correspond, in the fettered subject (paśu), to sattva, rajas and tamas, respectively, and explains how those gunas, transformed into karanas and kāryas, can no longer be termed ‘energies’ or ‘powers’ (śakti).

mahāvībhūti.

pratiprākāra — the term is attested, according to Böhtlingk, Roth Sanskrit Wörterbuch [BB&R] (confirmed by Edgerton’s BHSD), only in the Tibetan canon, viz., in the Mahāvyutpatti, in the sense of ‘outer wall’. Same term in YR ad 12–13 (prākāra) and ad 23 (pratiprākāra).

See MVT V 7–9, where the fourteen categories of beings inhabiting the fourteen worlds (loka or bhuvana) in brahmāṇḍa are given in the context of the ‘purification of the paths’ (adhvaśuddhi), itself a part of the dikaś: caturdaśavidya yatra bhūtāgrāmāh pravartate/ sthāvarah sarpajātiś ca paśijātiś taḥpāparā// mṛgasamjñaś ca paśvākhaḥ paśiṣṭo ‘nasya ca manusah/ paśiṣṭo rākṣaso yākṣo gāndharvaḥ ca indra eva ca// saumyaś ca prajāpatyaś ca brahmaś cātṛa catuṛdaśa/ sarvasyaivasya samśuddhir brāhme samśodhite sati//, ‘[Such are the fourteen lokas] where dwells the fourteenfold host of beings: stationary beings and reptiles, birds being another variety, and those termed wild animals; those termed domestic constituting a fifth variety, another being man. And Piśācas, Rakṣas, Yakṣas, Gandharvas, Indra, Soma, Prajāpati, Brahmā. Thus they are fourteen. Once this brahmaṇḍa ha has been purified, the
Thus does this tetrad of spheres, which is but the expansion\textsuperscript{323} [i.e., the emanation] of the Supreme Lord, become apparent\textsuperscript{324} [to us] (parisphurati) — made manifest (prakāśita) in this way by the Sovereign [who remains immanent in it].\textsuperscript{324}

\textbf{Kārikā 5}

Having thus explained the tetrad of spheres, the master utters the [following] verse in order to portray the nature of the universe, with a view to explaining it in terms of the relation of enjoyer to object of enjoyment:

5. There, within those spheres lies this universe, as an uninterrupted continuum of wonderfully varied bodies, faculties, and worlds. And, therein, the enjoyer, endowed with a body, is Śiva himself, who assumes the condition of a fettered soul.\textsuperscript{325}

There, in those four spheres well known to the Āgamas,\textsuperscript{326} purification of all this [fourteenfold host of beings] is achieved*. First seen as triple (see SK 53: \textit{ayam tridhā sargah}) — viz., man, 'animals', gods — creation is further seen as fourteenfold, distributed into one variety of man, eight varieties of gods and five varieties of 'animals', including 'stationary' beings: \textit{aṣṭavikālo daivas tairagyonaś ca pañcadhā bhavati māṇuṣaś ca ikaviśvaḥ}. Yuktidipikā ad loc. gives a list of the eight kinds of divine beings that is slightly different from that of MVT: Brahmn, Prajñāpati, Indra, Pitṛs, Gandharvas, Nāgas, Raśas, Piśācas. The five kinds of 'animals' are the domestic (paśu), the wild (sṛṅga), birds, or winged animals in general (pakṣin), reptiles (ṣarṣarpa) and stationary beings (sthdvara), such as plants, etc., that are considered to be living beings, but at the lowest level, the tairagyona (see PS 6, where 'pādapa' of the kārikā is glossed by sthdvara); Rād ÁPS 27a names jāti, 'genus', those categories of beings. As for man, it is stated that 'human creation is of one sort, for no other category (jāti) [lit., 'birth', or 'class'] can be suitably alleged' (\textit{manuṣyaś ca ikaviśvaḥ jātyantardnupapatteh). Note that the acceptance of the term bhuvana as a metonym for the number 'fourteen' testifies to the regular association of that notion with that number — compare, for instance, the terms \textit{aśīn} or \textit{nayane}, 'eyes' [dual], which sometimes are taken to mean 'two', by a similar metonymy.

\textsuperscript{323}vijñāmbhita.

\textsuperscript{324}Paramēśvara is the transcendent form of the Lord as creator, on the cosmic level, whereas Bhagavat is the form he assumes on the level of immanence; when no longer the creator, he is seen as the knower of creation. In the Āgamaaprāmānya of Yāmunācārya, bhagavat is defined as follows (1976: 26): \textit{jīnān apratihāṃ tasya vairāgyan ca jagatpateh/ aśīvrayam caiva dharmas ca sahasidhām catusṭayam/}, ‘There is a tetrad [of innate attributes] belonging to the Lord of the world [that is, the tetrad ‘appears along (with him)’ (sahasidhā), as soon as he manifests himself] [or, less probably, the members of the tetrad ‘appear together’ (sahasidhā), not in sequence]: invincible knowledge, dispassion, sovereignty, and righteousness’. This is further commented upon: \textit{jagatkartur bhagavato niraśāyaśaṅkumaravādinirūpam, ‘It is described how the Lord, creator of the world, is endowed with unsurpassed energy, etc.’}

\textsuperscript{325}Cf. SpK II 3–4, quoted n. 452.

\textsuperscript{326}The doctrine of the \textit{anda} is expounded in MVT II 49 (quoted in TĀV XI 8) and MVT IV 24–25 and in the Rauravāgama, as clearly stated by TĀ (VIII 168b) itself: \textit{andaśvarūpam gurubhiś coktaṁ šrīrauvādīṣu, ‘The nature of the \textit{anda} has been said by the gurus in the Raurava [āgama].’ The two following ślokas (TĀ VIII 169–170), defining \textit{anda}, are a quotation
within those spheres lies this universe; that is, it dwells in the midst of them.

What sort of universe? The master answers: ‘[a continuum of] wonderfully varied [bodies, faculties, and worlds]’.

By bodies, he means shapes characterized by various arrangements of face, hands, feet, etc., and differing [from each other] according to the [infinite] varieties of [beings, from] Rudras to ordinary souls, all of which are made wonderful by the manner of their differentiated conditions.

Similarly, faculties, such as eyes, have [degrees of] excellence due to the difference from one to another [being].

For instance, endowed as they are with a host of attributes, such as omniscience, the faculties of cognizers on the order of Rudras (rudrapramāt) are unsurpassed. This universe is indeed instantly and simultaneously known and created by such faculties.

On the contrary, this universe is neither known nor made by the [corresponding] faculties of ordinary souls which are capable only of knowing and making objects such as jars, for they are restricted [in their function] by the power of [causal] constraint [that is, the constraint imposed by causal consecution, the sequence of cause and effect] (niyatiṣakti) belonging to the Supreme Lord.

And even there [viz., among ordinary souls], ascetics (yogin) are seen from the Rauravāgama (or from its commentary by Sadyojyotis, as proposed by Gnoli TĀ: 183, n. 4), as is made clear by the commentary. Then comes AG’s own explanation, in TĀ VIII 171-174.  

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327See Appendix 1, p. 317. Both categories are ‘embodied’ (dehin) subjects, yet the difference between them is established on the basis of the hierarchy of the faculties and knowledge. Being omniscient (sarvajñā), Rudras will not be reborn after dissolution, unlike kṣetrajñas, whose limited Knowledge (they take the body to be the Self) destines them to be reborn. Rudra [or the Rudras], as a type of being, signifies those who have reached, after the model of Rudra, a level of experience where one is able to reabsorb within himself all cognizable reality. Hence they will be described in the following lines of the commentary as possessed of unsurpassed knowledge and powers (see, n. 324, the definition of bhagavat), whereas the knowledge and the faculties of the kṣetrajña are limited. Nevertheless, the yogin possesses relatively more powers. The same may be said, to some extent, of beasts, for they may be more powerful physically than men, even if their knowledge is not superior. PS 49 develops the theme of the variety of bodies.

328Samsthāna.

329guna.

330The Self, within the realm of māyā, is enclosed by five kaṇcukas, among which is niyati, the restriction of the freedom of the Lord: the One beyond causal relationship is now limited by the law of causality, which is ‘at the root of the law of karman’ (niyatir yatah karmano mūlabhūmiḥ) (ĪPVV III 2, 3, vol. III: 312). Cf. ĪPV III 2, 2: māyiyah [...] pramātā niyatyā karmābhāvah saṁsārī, ‘The māytic cognizer […] depending on the karma because of the law of necessity is in the power of the saṁsāra […]’ (tr. Torella ĪPK: 197). Hence the translations of niyati as ‘determinism’ (Miśra 1993: 175), ‘causal restriction’ (Silburn PS: index), ‘necessity’ (Torella IPK: 197). Yet, one can see, even so, a difference between niyati and niyatiṣakti: inasmuch as everything arises from the Lord, niyati as a category is called ‘tattva’, whereas niyatiṣakti is a potentiality of the Lord. See also YR ad 9 and 17.
to possess faculties above the norm: even that which is distant [yet still visible], or is screened from view, or is entirely out of sight may be discerned by them, and even the pleasure and pain experienced by other cognizers, for such ascetics have transcended the power of causal constraint.

And likewise, there are animals who have faculties excelling even those of men, although [in general] they are restricted (saṃkucita) by niyati-sakti.

For instance, cows are able to see their homes even if they are screened from view; horses discern their way even at night; vultures descry meat even if it lies hundreds of yojanas away; [winged creatures, from] birds to flies and mosquitoes, are capable of flying in the sky; reptiles move on paths on their chest and hear sounds by the power of sight, and camels pull a serpent out of its hole, even at distance, merely by breathing. Thus one may infer that there is everywhere a wonderful variety of faculties.

Similarly, there are worlds (bhuvana), well known to the Agamas, that are distinguished [from the norm] by their circular, triangular, quadrangular, semilunar and parasol-like shapes.

Thus the universe is such that within it is contained an uninterrupted continuum, an unobstructed flowing stream, of bodies, faculties and worlds — [bodies, faculties and worlds that are] wonderfully varied, or of a marvelous nature, due to their varied extraordinary qualities.

Here, in such a universe, whose nature it is to be enjoyed, an enjoyer must be presumed. Therefore, the master says: 'And, therein, the enjoyer, endowed with a body [is Śiva himself].

Being the abode wherein are enjoyed [the results of past actions], the body belonging to the finite soul (anu) is affected by the three impu-

331 Cf. SK 7, which enumerates eight causes making perception impossible, among which are atidūratva, 'excessive distance', and vyavadhāna, 'interposition [of an object between an organ and the object to be perceived]'. This question will be taken up again by YR ad 17, in the course of explaining vidyātatvā. viprakṛṣṭa is opposed to saṃnīkṛṣṭa, whose philosophical implication is the proximity of an organ of sense to its object.

332 For an elaborate discussion of this point, see SpP 39 [= ad III 7, in the textual organization of SpN).

333 See SvT X 99a: chatrākārāni sarvāni teśāṁ vai bhuvanāṁ tu. On the various descriptions of and ways of counting bhuvanas in the Agamas, see Appendix 5, p. 323, and YR ad 78.

334 However, the four spheres themselves, within which the entirety of the various worlds, along with their specific bodies and organs, is created and dissolved, remain immovable.

335 First occurrence of this concept in the commentary. The use of 'anu' here recalls the term's usage in Vaiśeṣika, where it designates the ultimate and indivisible constituents of all "things" — ipso facto therefrom composed. By extension, it designates also the 'atomic' soul (or rather "souls"), indivisible and reproducible infinitely, the constituents of the psychic universe. If our present authors are using the term in cognizance of its Vaiśeṣika origins, it would indicate then consciousness that is not omniscient, which functions in the inadequacy of always partial awareness — not only limited but also incompetent. According to Gonda (1960–1964, vol. II: 235ff.), the notion of the 'anu' — which is common to all the versions of
rities. That [finite soul is thus said to be] embodied (dehin), that is, is endowed with a body (śārīrin), whose nature consists in the experience of pleasure and pain, etc.

In this universe consisting of pleasure and pain, etc., that [embodied soul] is also called the ‘enjoyer’ (bhokṭṛ), that is, who experiences (anubhavī) pleasure and pain, etc. — the fettered subject (paśupramāṭṛ).

Now, one may object: — inasmuch as there is [according to you] no difference attaching even to that which appears infinitesimal — as far as the transcendental cognizer (parapramāṭṛ) is concerned) — how indeed can this worthless thing we call ‘embodied’ be different from him? For, as has been said:

Even a part represents the universality of brahman [viz., its capacity to assume all forms]. Neither has it been exceeded, nor can it be diminished.

Śaivism — is not so much understood as a concrete existent, as it may well have been in the Vaiśeṣika, as a designation of a principle in terms of which is explained an aspect — in any case illegitimate — of the soul’s existence: the soul, which is in reality unlimited, identical with brahman, sees itself as detached therefrom, enclosed in a body. It is that very soul, seen in this way as ‘ānu’, ‘atomic’, that constitutes the ānava-māla.

336 A traditional etymology derives śarīra, ‘body’, from śa: śryata iti śarīraḥ, ‘That which decays, is the body’.

337 Derived from bhuj, ‘to enjoy, possess, eat, consume’, the term bhokṭṛ designates the ‘enjoyer’ of an object, its possessor, whether it be internal (as pleasure and pain) or external (as the color blue). Thus he is the subject of sense experiences, bound to experience those objects, whether agreeable or not. In general usage, anubhava is also conceived of as an empirical experience, even though, when contrasted with bhoga, it signifies an experience more receptive than acquisitive, in which the ego does not assume the dominant role, or, at least, in which personal interest is not primary. Nevertheless, such an experience is considered “mine”, that is, does not exceed the ambit of the finite subject. The Trika system appears to invest the notion with a meaning different from ordinary usage, to the extent that it associates anubhava with the ultimate principle, which has the result of dissociating this type of experience from corporeal enjoyments, in principle at least. Hence the recurring contrast between bhoga and anubhava, between bhokṭṛ and anubhaviṭṛ: the anubhaviṭṛ is also an experiencer, but of ideal objects only — his “use” of them is ideational, rather than corporeal. This is confirmed by SpN I 3 (quoted n. 253), where anubhaviṭṛ glosses upalabdhr, whose meaning, in the context of SpK I 3, is that of ‘pure agent of experience’; cf. SpV I 5, p. 30: grāhako ‘pi māyiyah pramāṭāatra vivakṣito na tattvika upalabdhrasvarūpah, ‘By “subject” (grāhaka), what is meant here is the empirical subject (māyiyah pramāṭā), not the real one, who is the pure agent of experience’.

338 That is, given that the Lord is [according to you] absolutely undifferentiated, how would [in that case] one be able to conceive even the atom as differing from him? By the same token as applying to “Paramaśiva” or “parabrahman”, the term parapramāṭṛ is also hyperbolic, for, at this ultimate level, there is no other “pramāṭ” possible. However, given the origins of the term and its cognates in discussions elsewhere of concrete and therefore limited experience, the term parapramāṭṛ does have the flavor here of an oxymoron, plainly accepted in the Kashmiri schools in order to distinguish Śiva’s unlimited cognition from that of ordinary knowers — in reference to whom the term “pramāṭ” may be understood literally — albeit that the limitations on their “knowledge”, being self-imposed, are on no wise inherent.

339 avikalpya — lit., ‘dichotomized, subject to alterativity’. This is a topos: if brahman is
Likewise, according to [your own] maxim:

Even each and every principle has got the form of the thirty-six principles,\(^{340}\)

the same supreme sovereign cognizer, who, endowed with his own energies and formed of great Light (mahāprakāśavapus) is one only, radiates [within everything] (avabhāsate), utterly undifferentiated in every respect.

Now, even if one postulates the existence of an embodied soul [viz., an individual consciousness] lacking illumination (aprakāśamāna) and who is different from him [viz., the supreme cognizer], that existence cannot even be ascertained, since it [viz., the embodied soul] has been denied [or, has been postulated as lacking] the quality of 'illumination' (prakāśamānatva) [— and asserting this would involve you in a contradiction, for you have
elsewhere maintained that nothing exists that is bereft of illumination — or, that is not manifest. If, on the other hand, [you assert the existence of an embodied soul that] is possessed of illumination (prakāśate), then in that entity, which [according to you] has for its essence the transcendental brahman, there is just one cognizer, [for such a cognizer can] not be distinguished from ‘illumination’ (prakāśa) itself, [or from brahman, for that matter, which has been defined as prakāśa ‘illumination’ — and this is plainly contradicted by the plethora of subjects attested in sense-experience itself].

Then, on what basis do you affirm the existence of difference [viz., this universe] characterized as it is by [the opposition between] object of enjoyment and enjoyer?

In answer to all this the master says: ‘Śiva himself assumes the condition of a fettered soul’.

Thus, that Lord who has been described above as a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, and whose nature is freedom, Śiva himself, whose essence is now the veiling of his own true nature, takes on the role (bhūmikā) of a cognizer endowed with a body (dehapramāṇa), according to his own will, as though he were an actor (nāta), and, since he is [henceforth] to be maintained and treated as a domestic animal [that is, as a tethered beast], he is now distinguished by his existence as a fettered subject (paśu). In reference to the objects of his enjoyment which he has himself created, pleasure and pain, etc., he, now the embodied soul, is called their enjoyer. There is, in consequence, nothing to which language can refer that is other than Śiva.

Moreover, it is the Lord himself, it is Śiva, who makes manifest the pair of cognizer and object of cognition [again] characterized as enjoyer and object of enjoyment, in his freedom, as if they were toys for playing (krīḍanaka).

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341 Example of reductio ad absurdum.
342 kimparatvena.
343 satattva. The Bālabodhinī of Vamanacharya Ramabhatta Jhalakikar, a modern commentary on Kāvyaprakāśa, states (sub IV 23 [1965: 91]) that the satattva of Mammaṭa’s text may be understood as synonymous with tattva in the sense of svarūpa, ‘nature’, as is the case with the terms gotra and sagotra: satattva tatsvarūpa/ tattvasatattvaśabdau paryāyau/ gotrasagotraśabdavat. Note that Mammaṭa is a Kashmirian author of the late 11th cent., contemporary, more or less, with YR. Cf. MW s.v. (sa-tattva): ‘natural property, nature (-tas, ind. “really, in reality”’), attested in BhP, Vedāntasāra); also YR ad 105, who glosses ‘sāra, in śāstrasāra, ‘the core of the teaching’, with satattva. Same analogy of Śiva compared with an actor in YR ad 1 and 26. See also SpN I 1, quoted in Appendix 10, p. 330.
344 According to Mayrhofer EWA, s.v., paśu is related to Lat. pecus, ‘(domesticated) animal’; the word has nothing to do, historically, with pāśa ‘snare’ (cf. Gk. πήσω ‘assemble’) — contrary to etymologies in vogue in India (as here). paśu in the sense of ‘bound soul’, ‘fettered subject’, is, in any case, a metaphoric usage. Similar explanation of paśu in YR ad 16.
345 padārtha.
346 Cf. SpK II 4, quoted n. 452.
It is in relation to this pair that all these worldly pursuits based on difference take place.

Therefore, the very freedom of the Supreme Lord is unsurpassed: even though he abandons his own nature of plenitude (pūrnasvarūpa) and assumes the condition of a fettered soul which consists of the dichotomy of enjoyer and object of enjoyment, he remains Śiva himself, a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, who ever manifests himself (prasphuran) as the pure agent of experience present in the Self of all cognizers.

Kārikā 6

[Let us admit that] the cognizer, whose nature is consciousness, is one. Even so, if he is designated as ‘many’ because of the diversity implied by the marvelous variegation of knowers and things known, created by māyā, etc., how can he be referred to any longer in terms of a oneness already contradicted [by diversity]? If he is one, how can he be many? Inasmuch as this is a case of contradiction (virodha), like that of sunlight and shadow, it entails the attribution (adhyāsa) of contradictory properties (viruddhadharma) [to one and the same thing]; and it is not the case that a thing can be at the same time one and many, as has been stated:

The attribution of contradictory properties [to one and the same thing], [or] difference in the causes, this [pair] only constitutes difference, or the cause of difference between things [respectively].

[Alleging this,] the author resolves the objection by proposing an example taken from ordinary life, in regard to the matter to be illustrated

\[\text{347 Cf. ÍPV II 1, 1: } yata iyati pūrvapakṣe iyad eva jīvitam ekam anekasvabhāvam katham syād iti.\]

\[\text{348 Cf. ÍPK II 2, 1 (Torella ÍPK: 157, n. 3), ÍPK II 4, 19, and ÍPV ad loc.: na tu sa eva svabhāvo bhinnas cābhinnas ca bhavītam arhati vidhinisedhayor ekatraikadā virodhāt.}\]

\[\text{349 The usual response of the Bhedābhedavādins to such an objection is situated in the realm of experience — whatever pure logic may tell us, ordinary experience offers us countless examples of the essential coexistence of the ‘one’ and the ‘many’ (in Plato’s terms) — for example, any set of “parts” that make a “whole”, an “organic” whole — as opposed to an unrelated assemblage of disparate entities. The Trika’s answer involves the doctrine of the two truths — for, on the cosmic level, the “one” and the “many” indeed coexist, but on different levels of being: }\]

\[\text{samvīrtisātya, variously translated as ‘vérité d’enveloppement’, ‘surface-level truth’, ‘relative truth’, or ‘truth of empirical order’, and }\]

\[\text{paramārtha-sātvat, ‘deep-level truth’ (see kā. 27) — or, in Plato’s terms, the ‘merely apparent’ and the ‘truly real’.}\]

\[\text{350 Pramāṇavārttikasvavyaṭi [PVsvavyaṭti] ad Svārthānumānapariccheda 33a. We are indebted to Prof. E. Steinkellner for the identification of the quote. In the view of the MSS evidence and the citation in TĀ, the KSTS’s reading has been kept; see our ‘List of variants’ in ‘On the Sanskrit text’. The sentence is to be construed yathāśaṁkhyam. Also quoted in TĀV XI, avat. to 98, also in the context of a controversy as to the ability of an undivided consciousness to assume entirely the form of diversity, i.e., to manifest itself as many.}\]
[viz., his own position]:

6. As the clear crystal assumes the shades\textsuperscript{351} of varied colors, so the Lord himself\textsuperscript{352} contains the kaleidoscope\textsuperscript{353} of forms of gods, men, animals\textsuperscript{354} and plants.

[The comparison may be formulated as follows:]\textsuperscript{355}

Although uniform, the [clear] crystal\textsuperscript{356} sustains within itself a marvelous diversity by virtue of [its association with] innumerable and varied contingent attributes (upādhi)\textsuperscript{357} such as red or blue, and thus itself becomes wonderfully diverse. Yet, for all that, it [the crystal] is never devoid of crystal-ness.\textsuperscript{358} What alone [determines] the crystal-ness\textsuperscript{359} of the crystal is this: although the [crystal] is permeated\textsuperscript{360} by various characteristics, the understanding [viz., 'this is a crystal'] remains ever unobstructed to all [who perceive it].

\textsuperscript{351} Lit., 'aspect'. Silburn (p. 64) translates rūpa by 'apparence' ('appearance'). Barnett translates rūpa and rūpatva by 'semblance'.

\textsuperscript{352} [...] although being fundamentally one.

\textsuperscript{353} Lit., 'the fact of being forms', 'formness'. The idiom 'the kaleidoscope of forms' is an attempt to render the abstract noun rūpatva, in the sense that a kaleidoscope represents a capacity holding within it an infinity of discrete forms.

\textsuperscript{354} paśu, 'domestic animal', stands in the kārikā, by synecdoche, for four of the five varieties of 'animals' enumerated in MVT V 7–9 and SK 53, namely, paśu, paksin, sarpa, mṛga, whereas pādana, 'plant', usually termed sthāvara, 'stationary', is given a fifth and separate entry. See n. 322.

\textsuperscript{355} In fact the commentary starts with yathā, 'just as', citing the yathā of the kārikā. The correlative adverb, taṭhaiva, 'likewise', equivalent to the tadvat of the kārikā, comes later in the commentary. In order to make the translation lighter, we have separated the two clauses.

\textsuperscript{356} sphaṭikamani — lit., 'crystal-jewel'.

\textsuperscript{357} upādhi is generally translated as 'contingent condition' or 'contingent attribute', according to context. The bird is an upādhi of the branch — that is, a 'contingent attribute' of the branch — insofar as it serves to distinguish that branch from others, just as 'wet fuel' is an upādhi of the fire — that is, a 'contingent condition' of the fire — insofar as it serves to correct the overextension of the proposition 'where there's fire there's smoke' ('fuel' may be a necessary condition of fire, but its "wetness" is an upādhi). YR's usage seems consistent with this general principle inasmuch as, here, the very multiplicity of the attested world (including all substances, attributes, and actions) is viewed as freely (but not necessarily) 'conditioned' on the Lord's will. In the case of the color 'red', which at first sight appears to belong to the crystal, but of which it is nothing but an upādhi — discovered at that moment when one realizes that the color belongs in fact to the flower — the term 'upādhi' finally acquires the valence of 'false attribute'. From this standpoint it is but a short step to the cosmic usages we see in texts of monistic persuasion, like the Paramārthasūtra; on upādhi, see also n. 1278.

\textsuperscript{358} sphaṭikatā.

\textsuperscript{359} manitva — lit., 'jewel-ness'.

\textsuperscript{360} accharita — same term in ÍPvī I 7, 1; Torella (ÍPK: 136) translates áccharita by 'variegated by'. Cf. also avat. ad 85–86, p. 167, and ŚSV III 1, defining citta, 'empirical experience, or consciousness', as vīṣayāvāsanáccharita, 'colored by [or saturated by] the dispositions deposited by the objects of senses'.
In ordinary parlance [or, in everyday practice],\(^{361}\) we say only that these colors, red, etc., appear (sphuranti) here [viz., in the crystal], not that the contingent attribute ‘red[ness]’, etc., qualifies the crystal, as it does a cloth, such that an alteration\(^{362}\) of its true nature ensues [if the color is modified].\(^{363}\)

Therefore the purity of the gem consists precisely in assuming various hues,\(^{364}\) which have the form of contingent attributes, while at the same time persevering (prathate) in its very essence [viz., as crystal].

Likewise, as the crystal-gem may contain a variety of colors, so the Lord, free, solely formed of consciousness (cidekaghana),\(^{365}\) contains, though uniform, in the clear mirror of his Self,\(^{366}\) the kaleidoscope of forms of those particular [entities] he has himself created, which are not different from him — though they now have the form of entities such as Rudras or ordinary souls, who [may be classified as] gods, men, and others, from domestic animals and winged creatures to stationary beings [viz., plants].\(^{367}\)

Nevertheless, transcending all of them, he is ever aware of his non-dual Self — although it has assumed innumerable forms — invigorated\(^{368}\) by the state of unfragmented wonder that is [pure] ‘I’[-ness] (aham).\(^{369}\) Although [the Lord] is as he has been described [i.e., one, yet assuming innumerable forms], neither ‘space’ nor ‘time’ may be [posited as] different from him, in such manner as to negate\(^{370}\) his oneness, and in reference to which one might raise the objection that [in asserting that he is both one and many] contradictory properties, etc., have been attributed to [one

\(^{361}\)vyavahyate.

\(^{362}\)vipralopa — lit., ‘loss’.

\(^{363}\)If the red color were really present in the crystal, it would no longer be crystal, for its nature, which is to be transparent to any color, would have changed.


\(^{365}\)Lit., ‘a mass solely consisting of consciousness’, which we have translated somewhat more freely to avoid burdening the reader with too many "massive" constructions.

\(^{366}\)First occurrence of the mirror metaphor.

\(^{367}\)Creation taking place in prthvyaṇḍa is referred to here.

\(^{368}\)upabṛśṇita.

\(^{369}\)First occurrence of the ‘I’ notion, in reference to the specific concept of ahantācamatkāra. YR will take it up again, with the notion of ahampratīta, while commenting on PS 8. ‘aham’ as a full-fledged notion is to be found in YR ad 30 and in kā. 47–50. Cf. IPK I 5, 11, according to which the difference between consciousness and the crystal is that the latter, unlike the former, being lifeless (jāda), cannot be aware of the reflections of which it is the substratum. Same reasoning in the Saṃvīprakāśa quoted in SpP 4 [= ad I 4] (Dyczkowski SpP: 18): [... ] naitāvata 'sau sphaṭikah prthiḥ nāsti eva raṇjakāt/ bhavārūpaparītyaktaḥ tava vā nirmālā tanuh/; [... ] the crystal can never be free of the color [imparted to it by other objects] whereas Your pure form [O Lord] is always free of phenomena' (tr. Dyczkowski Saṃvīprakāśa: 149). As observed by Dyczkowski (SpK: 369, n. 95), the verse is not found in the available MSS of the Saṃvīprakāśa, but is also quoted in the Lāksmīmitra [LT] (XIV 8a) in the same form, and as a paraphrase in TĀ V 154b–155a.

\(^{370}\)Time and space are deemed upādhis. Note the pun on khaṇḍanā, ‘dividing’ and ‘refuting’.
and] the [same] Great Lord that is one’s own Self (svātmamaheśvara).

And even others [viz., Buddhists] acknowledge that a cognition [whose content is] variable, although it is [thus] modified by a variety of distinct [factors], is, quâ immediacy [of perception — sāksāt], one only. 371

For instance, as in the Pramāṇavārttika:

The color blue, etc., is a contingent attribute of cognition as regards the cognition (vijñāna) [whose content is always] variable (citra); [as such,] it does not partake of anything else [viz., it is itself, and not the color yellow, for instance]; it cannot be perceived [differently, viz., as the color yellow]. For [even] when [conceptually] separating this [blue from yellow], [the cognizer] refers [only] to the thing [i.e., to the concrete unit that underlies what he sees in his perception, namely, the color blue]. 372

371 Buddhist logical theory is invoked here, once again represented by Dharmakīrti (Pramāṇavārttika [PV], Pratyākṣapariccheda 220), this time explicitly. Similar reasoning is at work in TĀ I 197 and TĀV ad loc. (tr. Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 115): ‘De même que pour un objet donné, une cruche ou autre chose, la perception globale de l’objet lui-même, avec toutes ses caractéristiques, résulter de l’ensemble, de la réunion de toutes les perceptions séparées de chacune de ses qualités — une couleur rouge, par exemple, etc. — de même, ici, c’est à partir de la manifestation partielle des éléments grossiers, etc., [formant la manifestation] qu’apparaît dans sa totalité l’énergie de Rudra’ [— ‘In the same way as, for a given object, a jar, etc., the global perception of the object itself along with all its characteristics, results from the whole, from the combination of all the perceptions parted from each of their qualities — the red color for instance — similarly, here, it is from the partial perception of the gross elements, etc., [constitutive of the manifestation] that appears the energy of Rudra in its totality’].

372 Pramāṇavārttika, Pratyākṣapariccheda 220. Again, we are indebted to Prof. E. Steinkellner for the identification of the quote. The verse here cited is to be taken with the following verse (PV III 221): yad yathā bhāsate jñānam tat tathāivānubhyate/ iti nāmaikabhāvah syāc citrākārasya cetasaḥ/ //. This pair of verses has been variously interpreted by Buddhist commentators themselves: among them, Manorathanandin (whom we have followed in our translation) and Prajñākaragupta, followed by Masahiro Inami, in an article entitled ‘Nondual Cognition’ to appear in Proceedings of the Fourth International Dharmakīrti Conference (Vienna, forthcoming), which has been brought to our attention by Prof. Eli Franco, one of the editors. Inami translates the verses as follows (cited with the author’s permission): ‘In a variegated cognition, a color such as blue, which is a qualifier of the cognition, cannot be known to be unaccompanied by other [colors]. One who distinguishes it [from other colors] is focusing on the [external] objects [not on the cognition] [III 220]. The cognition is experienced exactly in the manner in which it appears. Therefore, the variegated image in cognition should be singular [or, as suggested by Eli Franco: ‘the cognition which has a variegated form is singular (viz., it is the cognition which is said to be singular, not the form)’] [III 221].’ The major difference of interpretation relates to the term ananyabhāk, which Inami subordinates in idea to the following compound, asākyadarsānah, understanding it (as it were) as expressing the content of that ‘cognition’ that is impossible — ‘cannot be known [dpś- here understood as jītā-] to be unaccompanied by other [colors]’ — whereas we have related it to the verse’s subject, jñānopādhīh, as, apparently, does Manoratha also. However that may be, the understandings of verse 220 are not that different as to the point that YR wants to make: even the most notorious partisans of multiplicity — the Buddhists —
Moreover, space and time are postulated by the objector as diversifying the free, all-encompassing Knower \( (jñātṛ) \), whose nature is only consciousness \( (cidekavapus) \). How could they serve to delimit [viz., serve as a qualification of] such a Lord, persisting as they do [within him] only as aspects of his playful effulgence \( (samullāsaka) \) that results in the variety of his forms and actions?\(^{373}\)

Here it should be kept in mind that, had space and time ever existed as different from [i.e., independent of] consciousness, only then, would [your objection] have been valid: [viz., that our assertion, namely, that the Lord is one and many, entails] the attribution of contradictory properties [to one and the same object] — an attribution which is itself a creation of that consciousness.

[Rather,] since their own existence [viz., the existence of space and time] is established only by the Light of consciousness \( (samvitprakāśa) \), it is thereby established that the [Lord], although having a multiple nature, is the same unique Great Lord, whose form is consciousness \( (cinmūrti) \).\(^{375}\)

Had difference [viz., manifoldness] been a [real] property,\(^{376}\) it would have been difficult to refute [the objection of] the attribution of contradictory properties [to one and the same object].

\[ \text{Kārikā 7} \]

But, [objects the pūrvapakṣin,] the notion has been admitted [by you] that there is but one cognizer, whose essence is consciousness, and also that [such a subject], having now assumed [the shape of] bodies, faculties and worlds, becomes multiple. If that is indeed the case, then, that one cognizer should perish once his body, etc., is destroyed, and he should originate once his body, etc., comes into being.

Similarly, that [universal subject] is variously delimited with respect to each and every cognizer in accordance with the six ‘modifications of becoming’ — birth, existence, etc. And it is that [universal subject, in the form of the] Lord who enjoys heaven and hell, according to the variety of his actions, whether meritorious or unmeritorious. All this being so, how accept that what appears to the mind, inevitably, as multiple must be cognized, insofar as it is cognized, in a cognition that is in some sense one, momentary though it may be. Whether that ‘unity’ be predicated of the cognition itself (as per Prajñākaragupta), or of the ‘object’ of cognition — viz., the color blue, that cannot be anything but itself, insofar as it is understood as a component of that object — (as per Manorathanandin), the principle is established that the ‘one’ and the ‘many’ may, or do, coexist. On the context of such a statement in this work of Buddhist logic, see also Vetter 1964: 66–71.

\(^{373}\) vyavacchedaka.

\(^{374}\) Cf. again IPK II 1, 4–5.

\(^{375}\) Silburn translates \( cinmūrti \) as ‘pure spiritualité’ (‘pure spirituality’).

\(^{376}\) bhedadharme, scil. sati.
can it be said that Śiva has an absolute nature (svasvarūpa)? The master responds to these objections by means of an example:

7. As when the water moves, the moon [reflected there] seems to move, and when the water is still, seems to be still, so it is with this Self, the Great Lord, [when reflected] in the host of bodies, faculties and worlds.\(^{377}\)

Just as, where a course of water is moving, the ‘cool-rayed orb’, that is, the physical moon, which, in reality, is situated in the sky and of itself does not move, but has even so descended [in appearance] onto the flowing water, moves, goes forth, as it were, so too, at the same moment, elsewhere, where the pond of water is motionless, that very ‘cool-rayed orb’ becomes still, as it were [i.e., there reflected, appears to be still].

Thus the moon is imagined in both ways [as both moving and still] by all cognizers, though it cannot in fact be so [that is, the moon neither moves nor is still: such predicates belong to the water only].

Nor is it the case that time and space, which pertain properly to the water, affect (paramṛṣ) the nature of the moon, that is, its remaining in the sky, as differentiating factors; only water as such is so [affected by the differentiation brought about by time and space].

Moreover, since difference — as exemplified by the mobility or immobility that affect the orb of the moon but properly belong to the water in which the moon is reflected (pratibimbita) — is merely phenomenal,\(^{378}\) to that extent, the moon suffers no harm at all in its essential nature, whether it be reflected in the water of the Ganges or whether it descends onto [viz., is reflected on the surface of] slime.

So it is with this Self that has the nature of consciousness, [though it appears] to be born or to perish when are born or perish the host of bodies, faculties and worlds it has itself created. But this is only the

\(^{377}\)Cf. ĀPS 17, evidently followed here by our author — although its first hemistich is slightly different, as the sun is there mentioned rather than the moon. As the moon does not depend for its existence upon the water in which it is reflected, so the Lord does not depend upon the play of differentiation. It is diversity that fluctuates, not the Lord. Silbum translates bimba by ‘reflet’ (‘reflection’), and omits iva. Our translation is based on the commentary, which develops the meaning of iva, and clearly distinguishes bimba from pratibimba ‘reflection’. In fact, the logic of the complete simile requires to understand himakarabimbam as the ‘orb of the moon’, instead of the ‘reflection of the moon’, as does Silbum, for what has to be demonstrated is the absolute, eternal, nature of the Lord, or Self. Thus the complete simile is to be understood as follows: the moon stands for the Lord, or the Absolute, its reflection for the limited Self, water for the phenomenal world. Cf. SpP 3 (p. 13), in the context of the discussion on avasthās: vellatsu pratibimbesu jalaspandanuvartisu/ yathendor na kriyāeṣas tathā 'tra paramātmah//, ‘Although its moving reflections dance in consonance with the vibrations of water, the moon does not indulge in any action. Likewise, here, the supreme Self [remains constant in the midst of change].\(^{378}\) vyavahṛtyate — or ‘is merely a convention of language’ — i.e., we say ‘the moon shimmers [on the water]’, but this is just a way of talking.
practice [i.e., the understanding] of those who are deluded (vyāmohita) by māyā in this phenomenal world, just as happens when the moon [is reflected] in water. For it is not possible that the Self be born or that it die.

As it has been said in the revered Gītā:

He is not born, nor does he ever die; nor, having come to be, will he ever more come not to be. Unborn, eternal, everlasting, this ancient one! Is not slain when the body is slain.

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379 vyavahāra — see n. 659. Note that BhGBh II 20 (BhG II 20 being quoted subsequently in YR’s commentary) refers to this conventional but erroneous understanding of things: ity ucyate loke (see note below).

380 The phrase nāyaṃ bhūtvā bhavitā vā na bhūyah has been variously interpreted. See, among others, Lévi, Stickney BhG (borrowed by Silbum PS: 65): ‘n’ayant jamais été et n’allant être encore’ [— ‘neither having ever been, nor being about to be again’], and Edgerton BhG: ‘Nor, having come to be, will he ever more come not to be’, who translate the sentence as it is, in a linear way. Š’s commentary reads (with the ambiguity on bhavitā/abhavitā allowed by sandhi): nāyaṃ bhūtvā bhavitā [and ‘bhavitā] vā na bhūyah, glossed as follows, in terms of a complex analysis of the syntax: na ayam bhūtvā abhavitā bhūyāḥ, na vā na bhūtvā bhavitā bhūyāḥ, ‘It is not that, having been, [the Self] will cease to be thereafter [viz., the ordinary definition of death], nor that, not having been, will it be thereafter [viz., the ordinary definition of birth]’. Thus nāyaṃ bhūtvā bhavitā vā na bhūyah is a way of emphasizing and unpacking the first statement — na jāyate mriyate vā kadācit — by making it clear that this Self is beyond temporality, i.e., beyond the sequentiality hinted at here by the double use of the absolutive and of the periphrastic future — although one has to be suspicious of this interpretation, for abhavitā cannot be a periphrastic future, according to Pāninese grammar.

The negative form of such a future would be na bhavitā (see Renou 1968: §134, for some exceptions). For this reason, Edgerton finds Š’s explanation implausible. Š’s commentary is the following: yasmād ayam ātmā bhūtvā bhavakriyām anubhūyā pasćād abhavitā ‘bhāvam gantā na bhūyah punas tasmān na mriyate/ yo hi bhūtvā na bhavitā sa mriyate ity ucyate loke, ‘Since it is not that this Self, after having come into being, i.e., after having experienced the process of existence, will thereafter cease to be, i.e., will thereafter (bhūyah = punah) become non-existent, therefore it does not die. [For] in common parlance, the one who ceases to be after coming into being is said to die’. vāsabān naśabād cāyam ātmābhūtvā vā bhavitā dehavan na bhūyah punas tasmān na jāyate/ yo hy abhūtvā bhavitā sa jāyata ity ucyate/ naivam ātmā/ ato na jāyate, ‘Or, from the use of the words vā and na, [it is to be understood that] unlike the body, this Self does not again come into existence after having been non-existent [thus, on this second level of the meaning, the second na negates bhūtvā with the sense of abhūtvā]. Therefore it is not born. [For] the one who comes into existence, after having been non-existent, is said to be born. The Self is not like this; therefore it is not born’. Cf. AG’s commentary on the same passage, where the exegete proves to be a more scrupulous grammarian than Š, although he offers essentially the same explanation: na jāyate mriyate vā kadācit/ etad eva sputayati — nāyaṃ bhūtveti/ ayam ātmā na na bhūtvā bhavitāpi tu bhūtvai/ ato na jāyate na ca mriyate/ yato bhūtvā na na bhavitāpi tu bhavitai/; ‘Neither is this [Self] ever born nor does it ever die’. He explains this by the words “nāyaṃ bhūtvā [etc.]”. This Self, not having not become, will exist — in other words, it has ever been; thus it neither is born nor does it die; (mutatis mutandis) since it has become, it will not not be — in other words, it will ever be’.

381 BhG II 20 (tr. Edgerton — as are all translations from BhG cited here, unless otherwise specified). Š comments upon these attributes: since birth is denied, the Self is unborn (aja); since perishability, i.e., death, is denied, it is eternal (nitya); since change in the form of
Therefore this Self, the Great Lord, free [ever autonomous], whose nature is the awareness (pratyavamarśa) that all the universe is his own Self, ever persistent\(^{382}\) as the principle of experience itself [at the heart] of all cognizers is in fact nothing but his own absolute nature, whatever [limiting] condition\(^{383}\) may appear or disappear.

It is precisely the universal mastery (maheśānatva) of the conscious principle (samvittattva) that enables accomplishment of [what is otherwise] difficult to construe (durghatakārin); for, although [in conformity with this principle, the Lord] enjoys in innumerable ways all the goods of heaven and all the evils of hell, having accepted [freely] the condition of fettered subject, at the same time, he remains identical with his essence\(^{384}\) which is consciousness, because he is the principle of experience itself in each and every [percpient subject] (sarvānubhavītā) [that is, that makes possible the experience of anything at all].

Or rather, if the state of being fettered — determined by its condition of bondage, and exemplified when we experience merit and demerit, heaven and hell, hunger and thirst, etc. — is illumined (prakāśita) by the self-illuminating (svātmaprakāśa) Lord and recognized (parāmyṛta) [by him], only then does it attain its being [viz., exist] in [the Lord's] own Self, as stated above.\(^{385}\) Otherwise this state of being fettered simply doesn't exist.\(^{386}\)

How then can it be said that the Great Lord that is one's own Self suffers loss of his true nature?\(^{387}\)

Decay is denied, it is everlasting (śāvata); since change in the form of growth (opposed to decay) is denied, it is said to be 'ancient' (pūrāṇa), and as such evernew, everfresh, free from any accretion. Let us recall the traditional etymology of pūrāṇa: purā navam bhavati iti purāṇam, 'what formerly was new, is ancient' and: purā adhunā ca navam eva, 'pūrāṇa is that which formerly was new and is new to-day' (see YR ad 1, who comments upon anādi by pūrāṇa). Finally, in the last statement: 'this Self is not destroyed (or 'killed' (hanyate), 'slain', as Edgerton translates, when the body is destroyed', hanyate is to be understood as 'transformed', in order to avoid a tautology with mriyate in the first line. Thus this last statement works as a conclusion: in this verse, all six kinds of transformation seen in the world are denied with respect to the Self.

\(^{382}\)prathamāṇa — lit., 'expanding'.

\(^{383}\)avastha — those states and processes which differentiate him as a limited soul: birth, existence, etc., and being gods, men, animals, etc.

\(^{384}\)Lit., 'is not other than his essence'.

\(^{385}\)Cf. YR ad 1, 5 and 6.

\(^{386}\)nīhsvabhāva eva — lit., 'is simply devoid of any proper nature'. The rationale here is that of the ābhāsavāda, and is characteristic of the Śaiva system: only that exists which shines, i.e., only that exists which is known to us (see n. 265). Likewise, the condition of fettered subject does not exist independently of consciousness: it exists only when apprehended as such.

\(^{387}\)svātmaprakāśa — same term in YR ad 6. The same rationale again is developed as in YR ad 6: how can that which is itself dependent alter the nature of that on which it depends? Hence bondage itself does not provide a valid argument for the pūrvarakśin whose position is that Śiva, as paśu in bondage, cannot be of an absolute nature. Whatever is bondage is known to be bondage, its existence depends upon the Self as knower. Therefore, whatever
In every wise, only the thing, such as the body, that has been created [by the Lord] can be subject to destruction or generation; never can creation or destruction be attributed to the eternal Lord who is consciousness. Thus, the unitary Self, being at the heart of the multiplicity of forms thanks to the distinction [freely projected by the Self] between what is to be known and him who knows, is at the same time what there persists, as the principle of unity [that obligatorily subtends that very multiplicity], inasmuch as it is the principle of experience itself that is at the heart of every percipient subject [that is, that makes possible the experience of anything at all].

Therefore, the nondualistic doctrine (advayavāda) remains intact.\(^38\)

Kārikā 8

Even so, [the following objection has been raised:] — if indeed, as you have proclaimed — in keeping with both reasoning and traditional scripture — this Self of all things, on whose nature depends the phenomenal display of the universe, is ultimately nothing but universal consciousness (saṃvīt) and if it manifests (avabhāsa) all things in consequence of the fact that consciousness is everywhere,\(^38\) why then is [that universal consciousness] not observed even in the lump of clay, for [, according to you, the lump] is not therefrom to be differentiated, as far as its essence is concerned?

And if you accept [even the nonsensical view that it is present even in a lump of clay], then the [conventional] repartition [of entities]\(^39\) according to sentiency and insentience, which is so evident, cannot be explained, inasmuch as worldly practice is based on the distinction between sentient and insentient. How can that [difficulty] be [overcome]?

Answering that objection, the master says:

8. Just as Rāhu, although invisible, becomes manifest when interposed upon the orb of the moon,\(^39\) so too this Self, although [invisibly] present in all things, becomes manifest in the mirror of

\(^38\)The absoluteness of the universal Self cannot be denied. The infinite variety of limited selves is but its reflection in the water — flowing or still — of the phenomenal world.

\(^39\)See PS 44 and 49, and YR ad 58.
the intellect,\textsuperscript{392} by securing [similarly] a basis in external objects.\textsuperscript{393}

Although wandering everywhere in the sky,\textsuperscript{394} [the demon of the eclipse] Rāhu is not perceived. Nevertheless, at the time of a [lunar] eclipse, he is clearly visible, appearing to us as if situated upon the form [viz., the orb] of the moon, [such that people say:] 'This is Rāhu'.

Otherwise, although present [in the sky], it is as if [Rāhu] were not present among the host of planets.

Likewise [i.e., as in the example], here also [i.e., in the thesis to be exemplified], this Self, although intrinsically persisting as the inmost core of all beings, is not observed as such by anyone, for what is apprehended is apprehended only in immediate perception, where it takes a form indistinguishable from one's own experience.\textsuperscript{395}

Moreover, when [this Self] becomes a matter of awareness\textsuperscript{396} in the [cognitive] experience of the 'first person' (ahāṃpratīti), namely, [in the 'I' that subtends the predicate in expressions] such as 'I hear [sounds]',\textsuperscript{397} — an experience that occurs to every cognizer endowed with a subtle
body (puryaṣṭakapramaṭ) whenever objects of sense such as sound, viewed as objects to be known are apprehended in the mirror of intellect (buddhidarpana), or, in the mirror of intuition (pratibhāmukura) — then, that same Self, its form now fully manifest, is apprehended also in [the object before us] the lump of clay, etc., as that whose nature it is to apprehend [that lump]: there also the inherent Self becomes manifest (prakāśate), that is, is perceived by all as one and the same as their own particular experience.

[Nevertheless,] even though [consciousness] is there in the lump of clay, etc., it is widely taken (prathate) as not being there, in virtue of [the clay’s] abounding in tamas, just like Rāhu in the sky.

Thus, among the host of entities that are nothing but semblances of himself [viz., aspects of universal consciousness], the Lord, by his power of differentiation (māyāsakti), turns some into cognizers, who, anointed with the unction of conditional [or temporary] ipseity (ahan-tā), take on the form of subtle bodies though they are [to him] but

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398This is a definition of the paśupramāṭ, since it is the puryaṣṭaka, or 'subtle body', that carries the Self or the Soul from one birth to another, that is, from one body to another. As such it is also called ātivāhika; see n. 738.

399In Śaivism as well as in the Śaivism of Kashmir, the five tanmātras (defined in PS 21) — sound, etc. — are the subtle objects (vīṣaya) of the five jñānendriyas respectively — hearing, etc. — (PS 20). Both the jñānendriyas and the tanmātras proceed from the antahkaraṇa, and especially from the ahankāra, for the jñānendriyas, realized in the form 'I hear', necessarily refer to an 'I' (YR ad 20). The tanmātras do the same 'due to the inevitable interrelation of the object with the subject' (YR ad 21).

400vyavasthā — see n. 406.

401Starting with the conjunction of objects and sense-organs, this process of cognition aims at establishing a determinate cognition (niścaya) — which is the function of buddhi (PS 19) — which leads one to become aware of one's self as the subject of the experience: objectivity becomes the pretext for an awareness of one's own subjectivity, although it is yet but limited, deserving to be termed egotistical 'conceit' (abhimana), an adulteration of essential I-ness, or ipseity (ahan-tā). On speculations about this process, and the functions which it implies, see PS 19; also YR ad 94-95, which, through a striking description of the dysfunction of antahkaraṇa and bāhyakaraṇas at the moment of death, is very useful for understanding their role in the cognitive process.

402sthūla san sphutarūpah.

403tamas is darkness, lethargy, as well as metaphorical darkness, ignorance. Clay is not a cognizer, in the absence of a subtle body. Consciousness may be there, but is not experienced, and therefore not experienced by others, except by a jñānī, one enlightened.

404svātmakalpa.

405First occurrence of this notion, as such (and not as tattva, or as ānada), that is, as the power of the Lord to manifest himself as the entirety of diversity.

406āhantāvyavasthārasābhiṣikta. For vyavasthā as a technical term in traditional usage, see Renou 1942, s.v. The term is used in relation to certain rules whose "optionality" is not general, but is rather determined by accompanying circumstance (cf. P. I 1, 34). For instance, the difference between 'one may substitute saccharine for sugar at any time' and 'when taking coffee, you may use sugar; otherwise, saccharine'. In our present usage, the term perhaps signifies that what is at issue is conditioned — by "facts", by ordinary usage — and is in no wise predetermined; as such, it is subject to the complex of spatio-temporal con-
elements to be known.

And [mutatis mutandis] he turns some into objects fit to be cognized — in reference to which, the well-established practice of differentiation whereby, on the one hand, sentient entities are stipulated and, on the other, insentient, is quite well founded.

Thus, because it is a mere object of cognition, the lump of clay, etc., is insentient, whereas the cognizer endowed with a subtle body, because he is a cognizer, is sentient.

But, ultimately, from the point of view of the Supreme Lord, no usage distinguishes the sentient from the insentient.

Kārikā 9

Now, one may object: — if in the intellect (buddhi) of all cognizers there exists this vibration (prasphurāṇa) of their proper Self without any distinction, then why may not all of them become knowers of their proper Selves (svātmavid)? Or let us suppose them not endowed with such knowledge [viz., that of the Self], there being no basis for any distinction [among knowers].

Yet, even at the level of phenomenal existence, there are some who, having attained the knowledge of their proper Self (svātmajñāna) are liberated while still living [in a physical body] (jīvanmukta), and are endowed with omniscience and omnipotence; and there are some who are worthy of attaining the knowledge of their proper Self and are desirous of making the ascent, whereas others, lacking the knowledge of their own

[...]

ditions. The same image of royal consecration — lit., an ‘aspersion’, a ‘sprinkling’ (abhiseka) of water mixed with a few ingredients — occurs in YR ad 31. Consecration (abhiseka), thus used analogically, is a topos; cf. SpN I 8, in the context of a discussion on the sense-organs: ahantārasavipruñabhiṣekād acetano 'pi cetanatām āsādayatyeva, ‘The insentient [group of the senses] itself may acquire sentiency provided it is consecrated by the drops of the unction of ipseity’. And ŚSV II 8: sarvair yat pramārtvenābhiṣiktaṃ sthālasūkṣmādvisvarūpaṃ śarīram tat [... ] havīth, ‘The body, whether gross or subtle, etc., that all beings consecrate (abhiṣikta) “Subject”, is the oblation [...]’.

407 bhedavyavahāra.

408 The passage concerns two issues: it justifies ordinary usage (vyavahāra), which goes against that of the doctrine, and sets it aside, for, as it is the case with the other Advaitas, ordinary usage cannot apply to the Absolute.

409 The two branches of the dilemma are: since the Self/consciousness is all-pervasive, either every pramārta must immediately know that Self, or no pramārta can possibly exist, for no distinction can be imagined that would distinguish that pramārta from any other. All are jñānins, or none are. How then can one justify a hierarchy of pramārtas?

410 See PS 96.

411 druuruṣu — see PS 97-102.
Self, are tightly fettered by the chains of actions good and evil that occasion merit and demerit, and are bound to transmigrate. How can this be consistent?

So, keeping all these objections in mind, the master explains in response that the grace of the Supreme Lord is without restriction [that is, is not bestowed in virtue of any qualification, moral or immoral, on the part of the donee]:

9. As a face is reflected clearly in a mirror free of dirt, so does this [Self] become manifest, being nothing but radiance, in the ‘intellect-principle’, made pure by Śiva’s grace.

[The comparison may be developed through the following example:]

In a mirror free of dirt, a face appears clearly, is endowed with its various qualities of form, etc., that are not different [from those of the face itself], for there is no area [of the face] that the mirror free of dirt doesn’t capture. On the contrary, in a dirty mirror, the face, even though it may have an extraordinary excellence, appears (prakāśate) altered due to the tarnishing force [of the mirror].

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412 The term nigada refers to the heel chains of an elephant or to a noose that snares the feet of an animal, throwing him down. The paśu, or fettered soul, is, analogically, such an animal.

413 Lit., “the “fall”, that is, the conveyance [from above] of energy, its descent'; first occurrence of the notion in the kārikās; see YR ad 18, PS 64–66, and 96. Śiva is seen as paścakṛtyavidhāyin (cf. PH maṅgalācaraṇa), endowed with five cosmic functions (kṛtya): creation (stṛiti), sustenance (sthiti), dissolution (samḥṛti, or dhvamsa) — three functions accepted by all Indian philosophical systems that postulate the world as created — as well as obscurcation (tirodhāna, or nigrāha), and grace (anugraha, or saktipāta) — two additional functions that are postulated by Advaita systems in general. These two functions, or energies/powers (spoken of as tirodhānasakti and anugrahasakti) respectively explain bondage — the manifestation of Śiva as the host of the sentient limited souls and the insentient objects of the world — and liberation. Cf. TĀ XIV 24, where the paścakṛtyas are enumerated.

414 viśrīkhala — see YR ad 96. Note the play on the words: nigada/viśrīkhala. viśrīkhala, whose literal meaning is ‘lacking a chain’, viz., ‘unfettered’, ‘unbound’, ‘unrestrained’, has here the derived meaning of ‘unconditioned’ (see, infra, the second quotation in YR ad loc.). The question will be taken up again in kā. 82, where the notion of ritual adhikāra is questioned, as well as in kārikās 96–102. Analogous formulation in TĀ I 185: nairmalyam samvīdāś cedam pūrvābhāsāsavād aham/ aniyantośvarecchāha ity etac carcayisate/, ‘Consciousness’ absence of defect is due either to prior practice [in former lives, adds JR], or to the unrestrained will of the Lord; this will be examined [in the thirteenth chapter, adds JR].

Whereas the jīvanmukta is described in kā. 96, kā. 97 evokes the videhamukta who is liberated immediately after the existence in which he has striven for liberation. The different types of the yogabhṛṣṭa, those ‘fallen from the path of yoga’ (or ‘from discipline’) are also described: one who will strive for liberation within the span of two births, separated by a stay in ‘worlds of enjoyment’ (kā. 98–99); and one whose liberation will take place also after two births, but after a much longer stay in divine worlds (kā. 100–102).

415 cakraśi glosses vibhāti in the kārikā; cf. KAU II 2, 14–15, quoted n. 265, which contrasts vibhāti and bhāti, vibhāti meaning ‘to shine in reflection’.

416 svīky — lit., ‘make its own’, ‘appropriate’.
Moreover, the dirty mirror is not able to capture those qualities, such as they are. Rather, the man whose face is reflected there feels ashamed of himself while contemplating his altered face, affected as it is by the tarnishing force [of the mirror], etc., and he thinks: 'my face is deformed'.

In the same way, the Self of some few cognizers whose present birth is the last is reflected (avabhāsate, lit., 'is resplendent') in the mirror of intuition, in proportion to the sum of attributes, such as omniscience, with which it is endowed — for that mirror has been cleansed by Śiva's grace — [Śiva being none other than] one's own Self, for that [Self] is radiance (bhārūpaḥ) — whose very form is radiance, namely, Light itself.

['Cleansed' means] made clear by the complete removal of the latent dispositions (vāsanā) left by the impurities of deeming oneself finite (āṇavamala), of regarding the world as objective (māyīyaṃala), of supposing oneself the agent of actions (kārmamala).417

By the term descent ('pāta) is here evoked the effulgence of the rays of the energy (śakti'), [also] termed ‘favor’ (anugraha), that emanate from Śiva himself.418

These few alone, though descended into the world of transmigration, are, for all intents and purposes, liberated (muktakalpa), for their own nature has become co-extensive with their proper [or 'universal'] Self.419 They are thus possessed of excellence.

The Self of some others, though endowed with radiance, that is, though [in reality] illumined (bhāta), remains, for all intents and purposes, as if unillumined (abhāta), due to its impurity, inasmuch as the intellect-principle (buddhitattva) has been veiled by the impurities of deeming oneself finite, of regarding the world as objective, of supposing oneself the agent of actions deriving from the Supreme Lord’s energy of obscuration (tirodhānaśakti). On this account, these [others] are called 'tethered' [animals, paśu] and 'bound to transmigrate' (sāmsārika).

And still others are cognizers desirous of ascending, because of the conjunction of both energies [that of obscuration and that of grace, bestowed on them by the Lord].

Thus, in all such cases, the variation in [the Lord's] grace may be pre-

417The translation reflects, for these three notions, the same point of view, which is that of the fettered subject; the three ‘stains’ are certainly erroneous but at the same time are voluntary, imposed on ourselves by ourselves, and by no other, of whatever sort; see n. 317, an hypothesis on the correspondence of the three mālas with three forms of being: satā, bhavattā, bhavanakarṣṭā. See PS 24 for a complete exposition of the mālas.

418Cf. another definition of saktipāta in YR ad 96.

419Lit., 'due to the extension of their own nature into their proper Self' (svātmasvarūpaprathānāt). These are the jīvanmuktas further described in PS 96 and YR ad loc. Same statement, but in negative form, at the end of the passage, which deals with the opposite figure of the paśu: ‘on account of this [power], they wander (sāmsarantī) through this [cycle] again and again, engaged in good and bad actions, enjoying pleasure and pain, etc., for their own nature has not become co-extensive with their [universal] Self (svasvarūpaprathānāt)'.

sumed as one of the following types: sometimes intense (ūra), sometimes feeble (manda), sometimes even more feeble (mandamandatara), etc. 420

Accordingly, there is no action — whether it be meditation (dhyāna), silent (or whispered) recitation (japa), etc., or sacrifices such as horse sacrifice, or anything else, all of which arise from the power of causal constraint [of the Lord] that is included in his power of differentiation — which may cause the liberation (mocana) of the Self. For nothing that is based on difference is suited to serve as means to that [liberation, viz., identity with the Self], since the Self has passed beyond māyā. 421

As it has been sung:

Not by the Vedas, nor by austerity,/ Nor by gifts or acts of worship,/ Can I [be seen in such a guise,/ As thou hast seen Me]. 422

Therefore, accordingly, the favor of the Supreme Lord is the only genuine (akṛtṛima) cause [of liberation for] those whose intellects are worthy

420-Variation in [the Lord’s) grace’ here refers, not to to differing intensities of the Lord’s grace, but to the levels of receptivity of the adept. Similarly, the same fire will have quite different effects on dry and wet paper. We have here, admittedly, an explanation of the inexplicable: on one hand, divine grace is the same for all, unconditioned (viśrīkhala); on the other, nevertheless, is observed in the “real” world a hierarchy of subjects, which is a function of each subject’s degree of aptitude in receiving that grace. Thus YR distinguishes three large categories: on one extreme, the jīvanmukta, on the other, the paśu or samsārin, whose submission to worldly concerns makes him insensitive to the actions of grace, and between these two extremes, the āruрукṣu (or mumukṣu), whose efforts toward deliverance open him up to the Lord’s grace, but whom diverse factors — his native intelligence, or chance interruptions in his practice (see kā. 98-102) — deter from an efficacious and immediate reception of grace. We have here another version of the “two truths”: the paramārthasatya and the samvpisatya, transcendent truth, and empirical truth. The distinction between the subject destined to liberation and the subject condemned to be reborn is not a function of the intention of the god — so says the text cited below by YR himself: ‘As far as the Lord’s grace is concerned, his intention (d/i) requires nothing [as a precondition], for it proclaims his independence (svatantrata) [...]’. There remains the question of the distinction between anugrahašakti and tirodhánašakti. The former is manifested in the form of the ‘descent of energy’ (śaktipāta). The second is instrumental in effectuating māyā, which is responsible for the finitude of the samsārin. But the principle underlying the exercise of either śakti is the sovereign liberty of the Lord. Similarly, the term viśrīkhala, applied to śaktipāta in the avat., may also be understood in this sense: the grace dispensed by the Lord is ‘free’, not merely in that it is unconditioned, but also in that it has no other cause than the sovereign liberty of the divinity. An explanation that may well be opened to the objection that it explains nothing, but to which one might respond that the dogma of the Lord’s liberty is at the very heart of Trika doctrine. The same debate, expressed in almost the same terms, occurs in the commentary on kā. 96-102; see, esp., the avat. to 96 and 97.

421 Cf. YR ad 18 and 96: ‘the acquisition of the knowledge of one’s own Self has for its unique means the favor of the Supreme Lord’.

422 BhG XI 53. Devotion (bhakti) is the unique means, as taught in the following verse: bhaktīyā tv ananyayā śakya aham evanvidho 'rjuna/ jñātum draṣṭum ca tatvena praveṣṭum ca paramātapa//, ‘But by unswerving devotion can/ I in such a guise, Arjuna,/ Be known and seen in very truth,/ And entered into, scorcher of the foe’ (BhG XI 54). There is no direct commentary of AG on this verse of the Gitā.
of it.

As has been said:

As far as the Lord's grace is concerned, his intention requires nothing [as a precondition], for it proclaims his independence; it is not affected by a trace of cause [associated with it — that is, it cannot be construed as the effect of any cause, such as the behavior of the worshiper].

On the other hand, the Supreme Lord's energy of obscuration is the very cause of fettered subjects' wandering from birth to birth: on account of this energy, they wander through this [cycle] again and again, engaged in good and bad actions, enjoying pleasure and pain, etc., for their own nature has not become co-extensive with their [universal] Self.

Therefore, although the [absolute] Self is common to all cognizers, there are nevertheless two energies, that of favor and that of obscuration, of the nature of Light and of non-Light (aprakāśa) [respectively], that are causes of the dichotomy between liberation (mokṣa) and bondage.

As has been said [by Avadhūtasiddha]:

The unobstructed energy [of obscuration] of the one endowed with infinite energies binds the ordinary being with the net of fetters that is this empirical world. And his other [energy, that of grace], after it has severed all [three] strands with the sword of knowledge, leads man face to face [with Śiva] so that he reaches the state of liberation (vimukti).

423 Read kāraṇakālā-aegrātā.

424 The source of the quotation has not been found. The doctrine of the Lord's 'unconditioned' will suits very well other ideas concerning the dispensing of grace in the Śaivism of Kashmir.

425 The 'sword of knowledge' is a common image. Cf. MBh X 47, 12-15, quoted in BhGBh XV 1: etac chittvā ca bhītvā ca jñānena paramāsīnā/ tataḥ cātmaratim prāpya tamān nāvartate punah/; 'Having felled and split this [Tree of material existence] with the great sword of knowledge, and thus attaining the bliss of the Self, one does not return from that [bliss]'. 'Axe of knowledge' (jñānakuṭhāra) is a variant; cf. YR ad 87–88.

426 Bhagavadbhaktistotra 17. The verse is also quoted in Śrīkumāra's commentary on the Tattvapraakāśa (1 15) of Bhoja. As observed by Gnoli (ibid.: 215), 'this stotra, as is shown by the relatively numerous quotations, must have enjoyed at other times a certain reputation', especially in Kashmirian Śaiva circles. In effect Abhinavagupta quotes it (v. 29) in the Brhadvināśū and the Laghuvināśū, and YR, once more, cites it (v. 21) when commenting on PS 27 (see Gnoli, ibid.). According to Gnoli, Avadhūtasiddha might have been a native of Kashmir, and, having become an authority among Śaivas as early as AG's time, might have lived there in the 10th or even in the 9th cent.
Kārikās 10–11

Having thus accounted for this entirety (idam sarvam) [viz., the universe in general], in accordance with scripture, experience and reasoning, the master next takes up the world (jagat) that is internal to the tetrad of the spheres of Energy, etc., earlier propounded, which has as its basis the thirty-six principles [that will be explained] in the order of their arising. But, in anticipation of that, in two kārikās, he propounds the cause of the cause, namely, the Supreme Śiva (Paramaśiva), suspended from whom that world appears.

10–11. This world of thirty-six principles is reflected within the ultimate principle, which, formed of light, is complete, and is supremely blissful on account of reposing in itself; it is suffused with the energies of Will, Knowledge and Action, and replete with an infinity of [other] energies; it is devoid of all mental constructs, de-
void of dissolution and creation, is pure and is at peace. 432

The universe, which will be described as starting from Śiva [the first among the thirty-six principles] and ending with earth [the last], appears (prakāśate) as reposing in him — that is, in him whose nature is such as has been described — the ultimate, all-encompassing, Śiva-principle (śivatattva). That is to say, though manifesting itself (cakāsat), it is shown by reasoning not to be different from that [principle]. Now, as to this view, [the following objection may be raised:]

— [The word tattva is thus derived:] ‘that where the whole (sarva) consisting of bodies, etc. [scil., faculties and worlds], is spread out (tanyate) [is called “tattva”]; 433 alternatively, because of its ‘extension’ (tananā), it is what ‘extends’ (tat) up until [the world’s] dissolution; “tat-tva” is then ‘the state or condition of that [extended thing, viz., the ultimate principle]’. 434

In either case, the word tattva conveys something insentient. 435

432Compare PS 11 with APS 25: sarvavikalpanahīnāḥ sūddho buddho 'jārāmarah śāntah/ amalaḥ sakṛd vibhātaḥ cetana ātāḥ khavad vyāpī/.

433Both derivations of the word tattva referred to here by the pūrva-pākṣin are from the root tan, ‘to spread, extend, expand’. The first, in passive voice, makes tattva an object, an effect of the Lord’s activity. However, the word does not designate concrete diversity per se, but rather ‘where the entire manifestation is extended’ — the categories whereby the infinite varieties of phenomena are ordered; tattva is thus a factor of classification (vargajātānaniścita), an element unifying a collection of distinct entities, as stated in IPV III 1, 2, vol. II: 219: yathā girīṛksapuraprabhātiṇām nadyāraḥsāgarārādiniṁ ca pṛthivirūpavitvam abruṅvatvam ceti, ‘For instance, mountain, tree, city, etc., are earth by essence, whereas river, lake, ocean, etc., are water by essence’.

434Kṣemarāja’s definition of tattva in his Svachchandatantradhyota [SvTU] ad SvTU IV 241–242 (vol. II: 74) — the terminology is almost the same — makes YR’s commentary more intelligible by adopting the exegetic method associated with nirukti: tasya bhāvas tananāt tattvam iti vyupatpyā niruktyā ca, ‘tattva is so called for it is “extension” (tanana), according to etymology (niruktyā); and from the point of view of morphological derivation (vyupatpyā), it means the state or condition of that [which “extends” (tat)] — that is, tattva is derived from the root tan. It is (barely) possible that this tat could have been understood as the root noun of the root tan (tanoti), in weak grade (and so shorn of its nasal, cf. ga-ta), with tugāgama (that is — the stem-extension t[uk]), as would be normal after a short vowel (cf. viśva-ky-t). See also TAV IX 1, vol. IV: 1637: tanoti sarvam iti tat param rūpaṁ tasya bhāvas tattvam ity arthah, ‘[The term] tattva is thus explained: [the element] tat means ‘that which extends to everything’, [namely] the ultimate form [of the universe]; [by affixing thereto the abstract suffix -tva, one obtains the sense:] ‘the state (or condition) of that [extended entity (or supreme form)] — that is, the principle of expansion itself’. Thus, tattva refers either to classified objectivity, or to transcendental subjectivity, although, ultimately, all tattvas are absorbed into that wherefrom they proceed, the Supreme Lord, or ultimate principle (paratattva), defined as ‘that which expands’. See also n. 506. Historical linguistics of the modern sort of course does not approve such etymologies, preferring the straightforward derivation tat-tva ‘this-ness’.

435Whether phenomenal category or ultimate principle, tattva is always understood as existing in space and time (as paratattva, it ‘expands till dissolution’). As demonstrated elsewhere (YR ad 6 and 10–11), spatiality and temporality are insentient, unless taken as the very powers of the Lord. So grounded is the objection of the pūrva-pākṣin. This ‘extending’ mani-
therefore, can it be applied to the Lord, to the Supreme Śiva, whose form is consciousness (cidṛūpa)?

To this objection it may be said in response: — The word tattva, ‘principle’, is employed [by us] only to the extent that a verbal exposition is required, for those who need instruction, but truly this word does not apply to [the Supreme Śiva].

Of what sort is this ultimate principle (paratattva) then? It is that whose form, whose proper nature, is radiance, is Light: of it the form is that of great Light: that is the meaning.

And, it is complete [or all-encompassing] (paripūrna), that is, it wants nothing [to complete itself, is free of dependency] (nirākāṅkṣa). [In this respect, it might be alleged:] — but also are free of dependency such things as crystal-gems, mirrors, etc., which are insentient.

Therefore, the master says: ‘supremely blissful (mahānanda) on account of reposing in itself’, that is, it is endowed with great bliss, with supreme felicity, due to the fact that it reposes in its own true nature, [informed by] the delight (rasa) that arises from the state of unfragmented wonder that is [supreme] ipseity (akhaṇḍāhantācamatkāra).

Thus, because its essence is supreme, beatific splendor (sphuratta), [which needs no other source of light], its difference is [sufficiently] stated in respect of inanimate entities such as crystal, which must be illuminated [from without].

Therefore the master says further: ‘suffused with the [energies of] Will, Knowledge and Action’. The energies of Will, Knowledge, and Action constitute its nature; festation, being nothing but phenomenal plurality, implies that the Lord has abandoned his own essential nature, pure consciousness. In this way, plurality implies insentience.  

436 Same term and discussion in YR ad 14.  

437 Barnett and Silburn translate paripūrna as ‘perfect’. But ‘complete’ appears more appropriate here, in the light of the commentary which explains it as nirākāṅkṣa, ‘desireless, wanting nothing [to fill it up, viz., complete]’. The term ākāṅkṣā, ‘expectation’, borrowed from grammar, designates that which — like a transitive verb — “expects” a complement — its “direct object” — and is therefore in itself incomplete. Commenting upon both icchāsaṁvitkaranaṁ nirbhartam and anantaśaktiparipūnam, YR again understands the term to mean ‘completely filled with innumerable energies’. Same sequence in YR ad 65.  

438 His freedom from dependency is not just a negative condition. He is also characterized as supreme bliss itself; see Intr., p. 29, and p. 46.  

439 Similarly IPK I 5, 11 makes reflective awareness (vimāraṇa/pratyavamarṣa), experienced as wonder (camatkāra), the factor distinguishing the Lord or universal consciousness from insentient objects such as crystal. Although the latter are colored by objects just as consciousness is, they are not aware of it.  

440 Paramaśiva is inseparable from his supreme energy (parāśakti), which is also named svātantrasākti, energy of absolute freedom. Since this svātantrasākti transforms itself into icchāsākti, jñānasākti and kriyāsākti, in succession, Paramaśiva may be said to be ‘of the nature of the energies of Will (icchā), Knowledge (jñāna), and Action (kriyā)’. SpN III 13 and ŚŚV III 19, both quoting MVT III 5–13, describe in detail the entire process (see Appendix 9, p. 329).
it is not the case that it is devoid of energy, and is, as it were, insentient, as is maintained by the Śāntabrahmavādins. Moreover, it is replete with an infinity of [other] energies (anantaśakti);441

replete with (paripūrna) — entirely, completely, filled with (pūrna), or permeated by (vyāpta) — infinite, uncountable, energies, as manifested in [the infinity of] forms that have names, such as ‘jar’, ‘cloth’, etc. And these energies take the form of Brāhmī, etc.,442 as offshoots of the energies of Will, Knowledge and Action,443 and [as denotation] arise from the mass [or totality] of sounds (śabdaraśi).444 These energies beam forth (ullasat)

441 Note that anantaśakti was the term used by Avadhūtasiddha in the passage quoted at the end of the commentary on PS 9. Cf. also SpK I 1, quoted n. 301, in which Śiva is celebrated as the master of the Wheel of energies. These ‘innumerable (ananta or aśeṣa) energies’ are also termed the ‘Wheel of energies’ (śakticakra), which SpN III 13, while defining parāvāc, describes as “composed of enlargements of the “six paths” — [enlarged] by means of innumerable words and objects to which they refer [appearing and disappearing to the rhythm] of uninterrupted series of manifestation and dissolution [...]’ ( [...] svikrtānantavācavacakahūpadhvasphāramayāśeṣaśakticakrarodikārāntahkṛtāniśeṣasargapralayādiparamparā [...]). See also PS 47 (and YR ad loc.) and the image of the water-wheel.

442 MVT III 14 mentions eight goddesses, or divinized energies (śakti), presiding over the eight groups of phonemes (varga): Māheṣī ( = Māheśvari), Brāhmaṇī ( = Brāhmī), Kaumārī, Vaiśnavī, Aindrī, Yāmyā, Cāmundā and Yogiṣī; on the mātrakā, see also SpP I (pp. 11–12).

But the lists differ according to different texts (see Padoux 1992: 155). SpK III 13 emphasizes, as explained by the Nirmaya, the deluding power of those verbal śaktis, responsible for the servitude of the pāsu, ‘deprived of his might by limited words and ideas’ (samkucitān śabdāir jñānaś ca viluptavibhavah). Cf. ŚSV III 19: [...] práptatattvā ‘pi pramādyān māheśdibhiḥ pāsujanāhīśhāgghubhābhīr api śabdānvadhadvarena mohyate, ‘Even he who has attained [supreme] reality, if inattentive, is confounded (mohyate) by Māheśi and all the other presiding deities of fettered subjects, through the medium of words that confound [lit., ‘pierce’ (scil. ‘destroy’), anuvyadh’].

443 YR’s exposition refers here to the doctrine of phonemic emanation, as developed by ŚSV III 19. The Lord’s svātantryaśakti, seen as parāvāc, supreme Speech, having divided itself into the three energies of Will, Knowledge and Action, assumes the forms of vowels and consonants. Thus it becomes Mātrakā, the ‘Mother’ of phonemes, whether uttered or not, and presides over the deities, such as Māheśvarī, etc., who reign over the eight groups of phonemes, also called mātrakā. The name mātrakā, whether applied to a single entity or to many, connotes not only the ‘mother’ of the words, but also of the worlds, inasmuch as the multitude of words entails the multitude of objects by them denoted. As shown by MVT III 5–13 (see Appendix 9, p. 329), Brāhmī, etc., seen as energies, spring forth from the triad of icchā, jñāna and kriyā. Similar development in YR ad 64–66; also ŚSV III 19, TĀ III 198–200a.

444 ŚSV II 13 defines the Lord as ‘śabdaraśi, mass [lit., ‘heap’, implying an undifferentiated totality] of sounds, whose essence consists of a pulsating radiance, the nature of which is the reflective awareness of the fullness of the [absolute] “I”, inseparable from the totality of the universe’ (bhagavān śabdaraśiḥ tasya yā sattā aśeṣavisvabhādanyāpyātanāhāhmvarṣanātāmā sphuratā); tr. Padoux 1992: 307. See also YR ad 64–66, using a similar phraseology. SpV IV 21 [= ad III 19, in the textual organization of SpN] (p. 160) makes explicit the relationship between the Wheel of energies and śabdaraśi: satyātmavarṣaprayaparābhyājñālakṣaṇāṁ hetōḥ cakreśvara bhavet cakrasya prākṛtpūtaśaṭhitīyā carācarabhāvaparyantena praçaśeṇa praṣṭasya śabdaraśīsamutthasya svasaṁkṣiṣāmāhasya śivaro ‘dhīṣṭhād. ‘By recognising his true essential nature, “He becomes the Lord of the Wheel”, this is, the Lord who presides over the
from it [the ultimate principle], and also achieve rest in it.  

And, thus, it might also be said that, in the Lord, [his energy of absolute] freedom takes the form of supreme Speech (parāvāc).  

Here, someone may object: — If the ultimate principle [or entity] is of the nature of Speech (vāc), then, it is constructed mentally inasmuch as it is differentiated by means of sounds [or phonemes] [which are voluntary]. How can a mental construct (kalpanā) be attributed to him who is pure Light?

With the intention of answering this objection, the master says: ‘devoid of all mental constructs’.

[That is,] although of the nature of Speech, the wondrous experience, in the supreme cognizer, of supreme ipseity is free from mental constructs (nirvikalpa).

For a mental construct (vikalpa) is characterized by the differentiation (apoha) [of a ‘this’] from an ‘other’ [viz., a ‘non-this’] — that is, by the postulation of a duality — the jar and the non-jar — which determines the jar as distinguished from all that is non-jar.  

But nothing other than Light, which would [necessarily] have the form of non-Light, is attested that could serve as a counter-reality to that Light — whose very essence is the marvel of supreme ipseity — such that, by distinguishing [Light] from that [other entity], its status as a mental construct [— as having an alternative] would be established.

Wheel or group of His own powers born of the “Mass of sounds” (śabdāraśi) and which, in the manner previously described, unfolds through the extending sequence of manifestation (prapaṇca) all the way down to the level of animate and inanimate beings' (tr. Dyczkowski ÍPK: 134); also Spk III 13, which again establishes the śabdāraśi as the source of the group (or Wheel) of energies: śabdāraśisamutthasya śaktivargasya bhogyatām/ [...] gatah san [...], but from the viewpoint of the paśu and not that of the pati, as does SpV IV 21 (= III 19) quoted above.

445Cf. SpN III 13 quoted n. 441.

446parāvāc, supreme Speech, is the first flutter of consciousness: I am, and I know that I am. On the levels of Speech, or of the Word (vāc), see Padoux 1992: 166–222.

447pratipakṣatayā.

449vikalpa, here, is used almost punningly: not only ‘mental construct’, but also ‘alternative’ (as employed by grammarians and some others).

450Had there been something like non-Light (aprakāśa), Light (prakāśa) would have been a mental construct. But aprakāśa becomes prakāśa as soon as one supposes it to be aprakāśa. All is Light, and this Light is ultimately pure ipseity, as such free of all mental constructs. This discussion echoes, in nearly the same terms, that of ÍPK I 6 and its vṛtti concerning vikalpa, while examining ahampratyavamarśa, the reflective awareness ‘I’. See particularly ÍPK I 6, 2: bhinnayor avabhāso hi syād ghatāghatayor dvayoh/ prakāśasyeva nānyasya bhedinas tv avabhāsanam/,' In fact, the manifestation of two things as different would [be limited to, for example,] the case of the “jar” (ghaṭa) and the “non-jar” (aghaṭa). There is, however, no manifestation, as if it were light, of something other [than light]; and its vṛtti: prakāśād dvitiyasya
If [you, the pūrṣapaksīn, further allege that] there is an object to be distinguished [from Light] that is of the essence of non-Light, and which does appear before him whose form is Light itself [— namely, the content or object of that Light/consciousness —], then, we reply: how could that object serve to delimit\textsuperscript{451} that Light, which is [also] that object's own essential nature, inasmuch as that object must have [by your hypothesis] the nature of Light [in order that it may be 'seen']? Only in terms of such [alternativity] could the status [of Light] as a 'mental construct' be brought out!

For there is the maxim:


delimit.\textsuperscript{451}

And, since nothing appears as contrary [to Light], how then might it

\textit{bhinnasya pratiyogino 'prakāśasamjñāsayā anavabhāsane prakāśetaravām na syā/ tasya anavā-

bhāse vyapohanēyogād vikalpatāhānīh/}, 'Otherness with respect to light (prakāśetarava) is not possible, since an opposite reality (pratiyogin), second to and distinct from light, called non-light, is not manifested. There being no possibility of exclusion (vyapohanâyogâ), since such an opposite reality does not exist, one cannot, therefore, speak of mental construct (vikalpatā) [with reference to \textit{ahampratyavamarśa}]' (tr. Torella ÏPK: 129-131). Note that the notion of \textit{pratiyogin} is based on a technical usage of the Nyāya — where it signifies the term to be presumed as the other pole in defining a given relation. For instance, 'father' is the \textit{pratiyogin} of 'son', in the relation \textit{pitpputrabhava}, as the meaning of this latter term (already implicitly relational) presumes reference to a parent, in this case, his 'father'.

\textit{vyavacchedaka} — lit., 'serve as a qualification of'. The meaning of the term \textit{vyavacchedaka} is best grasped in the context of the notion of the \textit{pratiyogin} — for it too is a relational term, whose \textit{pratiyogin} is the \textit{vyavacchedya}. The relation is that of 'qualification to thing qualified', understood in a way such that the existence of the one is somehow determined or limited by the existence of the other — for example, the 'Indian cow' and the 'dewlap' (whose relationship appears to be without exception, and therefore may serve in a definition), or the 'bird' and the 'branch' (on which it perches, which relationship is merely occasional, and therefore serves only to distinguish the bird from other birds). The relation is thus (as are all relations) shared by the two relata, and belongs to neither one exclusively, whatever be the manner of their coexistence. In the present context, this language is used to emphasize that "light" (prakāśa) can have no \textit{pratiyogin}, and is therefore "unqualified" absolute. Cf. Vāmana, quoted in SpN II 3–4 (see n. 902).

\textit{SpK II 3b}. The entire text is as follows: \textit{yasmāt sarvamayo jīvāh sarvabhāvasamudbhavāt/ tatsamvedanātāpena tādāmyapratipattitah/} (II 3) \textit{tasmāc chadbārthacintāsu na sāvasthā na yā śivaḥ/ bhoktaiva bhogyabhāvēna sadā sarvatra sanshistah/} (II 4), 'The limited individual Self/embodied soul (jīva) is identical with the whole universe, inasmuch as all entities arise from him, and he perceives his identity (tādāmya) [with all entities] insofar as he is aware (\textit{sammveda}) of them. Therefore, there is no state, as regards words, meanings or thoughts, that is not Śiva. It is the [Lord] himself as the enjoyer (bhokta) who is, always and everywhere, established in and through the objects of enjoyment (bhoga). Thus the experienced object has an identity of essence with the experiencer. From the PM 60, it may be inferred that the famous hemistich (SpK II 4a): \textit{tasmāc chadbārthacintāsu na sāvasthā na yā śivaḥ}, is borrowed from some older texts (\textit{anekāmnāya}); see n. 1028. Cf. TĀ IV 275a: \textit{sarvām śivamayam}, and avat. ad PS 46.
be possible even to ascertain\[^{453}\] that there is an object here which, not subject to illumination (\textit{aprakāśamāna}), has the form of its opposite [that is, which is different from Light] — whatever that object might be?

Therefore, the ultimate principle is of an undelimited nature (\textit{aparicchinnasvabhāva}), inasmuch as it is free of all mental constructs, which are themselves delimiting factors.

Therefore, the master says: ‘it is pure’, free of stain, due to the absence of the soot-like impurity found in thought-construct.

Similarly, [the master says: that the ultimate principle is] serene (\textit{sānta}), reposing [ever] in its absolute nature, in unison (\textit{sāmarasya})\[^{454}\] with its Śakti, for there is no disturbance (\textit{ksobha}) arising from the dichotomy between the knower and the known. Yet, it does not at all resemble a piece of stone [as does the \textit{sāntabrahman} of the Advaitins].

Moreover, it [the ultimate principle] is devoid of dissolution and creation. According to the maxim:

\begin{quote}
Once this Self has appeared [, its possibility of not appearing is nowhere (— is not possible —), for it is complete],\[^{455}\]
\end{quote}

\[^{453}\] Cf. \textit{IPV} I 3, 7 (vol. I: 143): \textit{yata esa eva purīṣaś chedanāt pariçecheda ucyate, tad avabhāsanāsāmarthyaṃ apohanaśaktiḥ}, ‘Differentiation (\textit{pariçecheda}) is so called because it cuts [the differentiated] off on all sides [from the rest]. Hence, what is responsible for the manifestation [of one object as distinct from the rest] is \textit{apohanaśakti} [the power of differentiating “I” from “this”, i.e., the power of eliminating the Lord’s essential plenitude]’ (our translation borrows from Pandey IPK: 38). On \textit{apohanaśakti}, see n. 314; also \textit{GAS} XV 15: \textit{ayam ghata eva iti sarvamakabhavahakhandanāmānîm vikalpajñānātmakam apohanaṃ pāsavaṣṭirūpaṃmayāmayapramārūcitaṃ}, ‘Distinctive apprehension (\textit{apohana}), such as “this is nothing but a jar” (or “this is a jar [and nothing else]”) is essentially that knowledge consisting of mental constructs, the source of [\textit{sāra} — “from which flows” …] the disintegration of the notion that all things have the same essence, which is suitable to the [limited] knower who is himself a consequence of those illusory powers (\textit{māyā}) that have shaped themselves into a creation affected to souls in bondage’.

\[^{454}\] \textit{sāmarasya} — lit., ‘the condition of [those things] that have one and the same savor or essence’, ‘sameness of savor’; first occurrence of this key notion. Same term in ŚDVṛ I 48, glossing \textit{svaṃ padarthaṃ sāmāvīvata śīvata śītād: paraṃśivāprabhṛtī gañādyantaṃ api padarthaṃ sāmāvīvata […] śīvata… niyata saraṃsān tathā sāmarasyāśadānāt kāpi śhītiḥ syād ity arthah/ evaṃ ca sarvasvī sāvarvāpasāmarasyāt tado dhātāyamāyasuddhyāsuddhiḥpaparoparopādi bheda bhāvānāṃ uktaḥ, ‘[“Śivahood is the same for all entities” — This means:] from Parmaśiva [on high, down] to jars, and so forth, Śivahood […] is established … as the same for all entities. So, since they have acquired such unity of essence, their status would be a matter of indifference. Since everything has identity of essence (\textit{sāmarasya}) with Śiva, the difference between pure and impure, between the transcendent and the immanent (\textit{parāpara}), and so forth, can be attributed to entities only insofar as that [identity] is misconstrued/not recognized (\textit{akhyāti}), for this is the source [of such difference] (“\textit{māya}”).’ In the Kashmirian tradition, the word \textit{rasa} lies at the heart of another unity, that of poetics and metaphysics. In an aesthetic context, the \textit{rasa} expresses also a unity of sentiment in which private distinctions and emotional involvements are cast off. It is the cornerstone of the doctrine. On the notion, see Rastogi 1987: 35–36; Bansat-Boudon 1992; Pollock 2006.

\[^{455}\] The complete text of the quotation is given by \textit{AG} in \textit{IPVV} II 1, 6–7 (vol. III: 23), while commenting on \textit{na kvāpy aprakāśah} of the \textit{vivṛtti} ad II 1, 7, attributing it to the Śāiva
Kārikās 12-13

[the Self] is eternal. Therefore time, past, future, and present, makes no alteration in it, for from it time itself emerges (samullāsa).

Thus, once it is admitted that the ultimate principle is free of generation and decay, the entirety of the whole may be logically established. And this is what has been propounded here.

Kārikās 12-13

But, interrupts an objector, if the ultimate principle is such as you say [and you also] affirm that the world appears [within it], then how can this be — inasmuch as nothing, in respect of that ultimate principle, would dare to ‘appear’ therefrom different?

[You are caught in the following dilemma:] If you say that the universe is different from it [viz., the ultimate principle] and so appears [within it], this would be tantamount to denying the nondualistic doctrine. But if you

Sārasvatāsāṃghraha: sakṛd vibhāto 'yam āṭmā pūrṇasyasya na kvāpy aprakāśanasamdbhavah; it is found also in the SpS [p. 25], where it is attributed to the Śivasūtra (probably a part of the ŚS which is lost; see Silburn ŚS: 2); note that the SpS reading differs slightly: pūrṇo 'sya, aprakāśasamdbhavah. The statement can also be reminiscent of Chu VIII 4, 1-2: aha ya āṭmā sa setur [...] tasmād va etam setum tīrṇvāpi naktam ahar evāvhinispadaye/ sakṛdviṃbhāto hy evaisa brahma-lokaḥ. It may be worth noting that APS 25 also defines the āṭmā as sakṛdviṃbhāto, a point of convergence with AG’s PS 93; R ad loc. quotes MuU II 2, 11 (see p. 14). The compound sakṛdviṃbhāta appears twice in Gaudapāda’s ĀŚ III 36 and IV 81, in the context of defining brahman as āṭman (or citta). The term is glossed by Ś ad loc.: sadaiva vibhāta ity etat, and, as he notes, is further explained in ĀŚ IV 81b itself: sakṛdviṃbhāto hy evaisa dharmo dhātuḥ svabhāvataḥ (as Bouy reads); the same term qualifies brahman in Upadeśasāhasrī X 1: dpīśvarīpaṃ gaganopam param sakṛdviṃbhātam [...]. In its abridged form (viz., sakṛdviṃbhāto ‘yam āṭmā, or even sakṛdviṃbāthā), this passage is quoted in a number of Śaiva texts, among which we are able to cite, besides ĪPV and SpS, ĪP 1, 6-7 (vol II: 22), TĀV I 125-126, IV 179, VIII 169a, 174 and XXIX 80, and, here, YR ad 10-11. It is also found, in the context of aesthetics, in Ābh ad NŚ VI, śāntarasaprakarana, after kā. 82 (vol I: 335). In all probability, this list is not exhaustive and many other occurrences might be discovered. In any case, it should be emphasized that its frequent occurrence makes sakṛdviṃbhāto ‘yam āṭmā a key formula of nondual Śaivism of Kashmir. Note that YR quotes it here in the same context as does ĪPK II 1, 6-7, that of the eternity of the supreme Subject, or consciousness, whose background is the debate on Light and its contrary. In fact, YR seems here to refer, indirectly, to the literal form of ĪPK II 1, 6, whose final sakṛt is given a special treatment: sarvatrābhāsabhedo ‘pi bhavet kālakramākaraḥ/ viĉhinnabhāsah śunyāder mātur bhātasya no sakṛt/, ‘In all things the diversity of the manifestations is the source of temporal succession for the knowing subjects, such as [those who are conscious of] the void (śunya) [viz., the śunyāparāmbār], etc., whose light is discontinuous, but not for the knowing subject who shines once and for ever’ (tr. Torella ĪPK: 155, modified). See also PS 93 and notes thereon. It is noteworthy that SpS quotes sakṛdviṃbhāto ‘yam āṭmā, etc., immediately after referring to SpK II 4a: sabdārthacintāsa nā savasthā na yā śivah/, ‘There is no state, as regards words, meanings or thoughts, that is not Śiva’. The same textual organization is observed, here, in YR’s commentary, where the previous quotation is from SpK II 3b. Such echoes from text to text show the persistent interreferentiality of the Trika system.

456na kramate — see YR ad 6.
say that it is not different, what sense then can be attributed to this verbal construction of yours, \[14\] which appears to say that the universe appears [within it] [as something else again]?

In response to this, illustrating through an example the principle at issue, viz., [the relation termed] ‘difference-and-non-difference’ (bheda-bheda), the master says, in order to substantiate [the aforesaid principle]:

12–13. As, in the orb of a mirror, objects such as cities or villages, themselves various though not different [from the mirror],\[458] appear both as different from each other and from the mirror itself, so appears this world [in the mirror of the Lord’s consciousness], differentiated both internally\[459] and vis-à-vis that consciousness, although it is not different from consciousness most pure, the supreme Bhairava.\[460]

[The comparison may be developed through the following example:] In the depths of a clear mirror, the world \[461\] appears (bhāsate) as reflec-

\[457\] vācaryukti.
\[458\] That is, as reflections, having no substratum apart from the mirror itself.
\[459\] Lit., ‘mutually’.
\[460\] The translation differs somewhat from that of Silburn: ‘Tout comme des villes et des villages variés qui se reflètent dans le disque d’un miroir sont dépourvus de distinctions, bien qu’ils semblent doués de distinctions mutuelles et séparés du miroir également, de même, procédant de l’Intelligence absoluement immaculée du suprême Bhairava, cet univers tout en étant lui aussi dénué de toute distinction, apparaît comme fait de parties mutuellement distinctes et distinct également de cette (Intelligence)’ — ‘In the same way as varied cities and villages reflecting in the orb of a mirror are devoid of distinctions, although they appear as endowed with mutual distinctions and separated also from the mirror, so, originating from the altogether immaculate Intelligence of the supreme Bhairava, this universe, although also devoid of any distinction, appears as made of parts mutually distinct as well as distinct from that [Intelligence]’. Here, vimalatamaparamabhairavabodhāt is not taken as a complement of vibhāgalūnyam, as does the commentary, but rather as a causal complement of the principal verb ābhāti (which creates a difficulty, for, then, vibhāgatūnyam is left without complement), and bhairavabodha is understood as ‘the Intelligence of Bhairava’. Note that these kārikās seem to echo TĀ III 1–4 and TĀV ad loc.: ata eva căṇena viśvasya citpratibimbatvam/ [...] yathā hi darpanādau parasparavyāvṛttātmānah pratibimbitā ākāraviśeṣāḥ tato ‘nairiktāte ‘pi aitiriktā iva bhāsante tadvad ihāpiṇī, ‘Le monde, ainsi, est un reflet dans la conscience [...] Il en est du cosmos comme des formes reflétées dans un miroir ou autre [surface réfléchissante], formes distinctes les unes des autres et qui, quoique nullement séparées [du miroir qui les reflète], apparaissent cependant comme différentes de lui’ (tr. Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 141); the pratibimbavāda is developed at length in TĀ III 1–65, whose commentary ends with the same verse as that which is quoted at the end of YR’s commentary ad 12–13. Since the exposition of the pratibimbavāda is dealt with in the TĀ in the context of the exposition of the sāmbhāvopāya, and is placed there under the aegis of Bhairava, it may be inferred that PS 12–13 amounts to a cryptic exposition of the sāmbhāvopāya — in order to be liberated in the ‘way of Śambhu’, one must realize mystically that the universe has no nature apart from being a reflection in the divine consciousness. He who acquires in this way an experience, in his own consciousness, of the appearance and disappearance of the universe, and can affirm: ‘I am Śiva’ [śiva ‘ham], is liberated (TĀ III 268–293). See also, AG’s stotra, Paramārthacaracā, vv. 4–5.

\[461\] sarva — in order to appreciate the force of the analogy, it seems important to understand
tion (*pratibimba*) variously — whether a city, village, fortress, enclosure, market-place, river, stream, fire, a tree, mountain, animal, bird, a man or a woman — that is, as having various forms, each differentiated by means of its own characteristics (*svālakṣaṇyena*), but also that [differentiated world] appears (*bhāti*) as undifferentiated, that is, as not different from the mirror itself, assuming a form within the mirror that is in no way different from that mirror.

And although it appears there [in the mirror] as undifferentiated from the mirror itself, [that world] appears (*bhāti*), or presents itself [to the senses] (*sphurati*) in relations of mutual disjunction,\(^{462}\) that is, appears as differentiable\(^{463}\) [internally], in the sense that the cloth is different from the jar and the jar from the cloth inasmuch as each presents characteristics of its own.

Only as reflected in that mirror are objects perceived (*parāṁsṛyante*) as distinct from each other; and once they quit the mirror, nothing of them [remains behind to be] apprehended separately [that is, only the mirror remains]. Rather, though remaining consubstantial with the mirror\(^{464}\) [i.e., although being one with it, as reflection], the world\(^{465}\) is perceived as different in every respect.\(^{466}\)

Now, if it be objected that, in that case, the mirror would itself be hidden by the reflection of the jar, etc., the master replies, saying: 'no, [the reflections are different] from the mirror itself as well'.

It is not merely in and of themselves\(^{467}\) that the objects, even though

\[^{462}\]vibhāgenaiva ca parasparam.

\[^{463}\]vibhaktatayā — cf. PS 48 and YR ad loc.

\[^{464}\]darpanāsamarendraṣyaḥ sthitam api — the term *samarasya*, 'unison', is intended to evoke the nature of the relation between the image and the mirror: fundamental identity, superficial (or apparent) difference.

\[^{465}\]jagat — although there are still differences of opinion, the word *jagat* is commonly derived from the root *gā* (*jīgāti*), understood as a present participle with "corrected" reduplication. The Indian tradition more or less agrees, beginning from the root *gam*- (*kvip, dvitvam, tuk ca* — *Vācaspataya*), which explanation Renou also favors (1952a: §248). On the other hand, one of the glosses of the word given the same dictionaries is *jangama*, which suggests that a sentiment of intensification has also been associated with *jagat*. Thus the word suggests, even more strongly than *sarva*, that the "world" is here to be understood distributively, as the 'incessant going and coming' of differentiated being; see its frequent occurrence in the phrase: *saṛtṛimsāsatattvātmakam jagat*, for instance in avat. ad 14, YR ad 1 and 46 (avat.).

\[^{466}\]It is only in the mirror that the appearance of multiplicity is possible; without the mirror, there would be no presentation of multiplicity. In order for the comparison to support the thesis here propounded, and in order to understand the verse above, one must forget that a "real" mirror implies objects beyond or outside it. In this mirror reflections alone are at issue, and, quâ reflections, their sole support is the mirror itself; see TĀ III 21b: [...] *vastu bhavati tato 'py anyatra nāpy alam?*, '[the reflected image] is a [real] thing, which does not exist apart from that [mirror]'.

\[^{467}\]svayam.
reflected in the mirror, appear as different [from each other], inasmuch as they are also different from the mirror.  

For, although the mirror is composed of those various reflections, it appears (cakāsti) as [different] from those reflections, for its own nature transcends them. And it is not understood as composed of them in such a way as to convey the idea that no mirror exists.

Everyone has an unsublated perception that 'this is a mirror', even as he apprehends the various objects therein reflected. Nor is it the case that the [image of the] jar, etc., qualifies the mirror in such fashion that the essential nature [of the mirror] would be abrogated [— as it would if one were to say]: 'this mirror is suitable for [reflecting] a jar' [scil., '... and not a cloth'], and 'this mirror is suitable for [reflecting] a cloth' ['... and not a jar']. The difference consequent upon time and space ['causes' of the variability of the reflections] does not thus eventuate in the loss of the [mirror’s] essential nature. Therefore, being tolerant of those reflections, the mirror remains nothing but a mirror, as regards itself. There is thus no defect attaching to the doctrine of reflection [viz., of the reflected image] (pratibimbavāda).

Now, it might be said that this reflection is nothing but an error (bhrānti). Indeed, when an elephant is perceived in the mirror, it is not that an elephant is found in the mirror [rather, there is something like an elephant, in the form of its reflection], for, since no consequence which is fruitful [can be attributed to the elephant in the mirror] such as would in fact [pertain to an actual elephant], the conclusion (niścaya) [that 'this is an elephant'] would be simply an error.

[Let it be said here only that] the example is valid to the extent that the doctrine of reflection is valid. As far as error is concerned, its nature will be propounded later in the text.

Likewise, in exactly the same way, namely, in complete accordance with the example of the reflection of a city, etc., in a mirror,473

[we assert that] the world (jagat), this universe (viśva), although not different from consciousness most pure, the supreme Bhairava, that is, although not separated from Light itself, which abounds in unfrag-

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468 The differences between objects do not suffice to explain all difference. The issue is important for Abhinavagupta for it entails that the world be understood also in its relation to the Absolute, rather than merely in and of itself, independently. Thus the illustration is complete — the reflections of objects, however numerous they are, also need the mirror.

469 Were it necessary to employ a special mirror to reflect each different object, then, of course, it would have been legitimate to say that its 'nature' had indeed been affected by the nature of the object.

470 svātmani — or '... its nature'.

471 arthakriyā.

472 It will be explained later what is an error, and how reflection is not an error.

473 The example (dṛṣṭānta) has been explained. The author now takes up to the dāṛṣṭāntika, the term to be explained through the example.
mented bliss and is utterly free of impurity,

[... that the world] is displayed as differentiated [internally], like the image in the mirror — that is, as having various forms, each [determined as different] from the other, in virtue of the dichotomy of knower and known ...

... and [differentiated] from that as well, that is, from that consciousness as well, appears (abhāti) [the world] as if emerging from it, whereby consciousness, though displaying itself in the form of that [world], displays itself also as transcending it, in the way the mirror transcends the reflections.

And so, Light/consciousness, tolerant of the reflections of all the objects of the universe and yet transcending all those objects, displays itself according to its own inherent nature as the principle of experience itself in each and every [perciipient subject].

And even the difference of time, of place, or of kind, which pertains to the [external] object, just appears there [but not really], as if in a mirror. Yet, it is not the case that they serve to differentiate the very nature [of consciousness]. Therefore, consciousness, although appearing both one and multiple, is one only, just as variegated cognitions are grasped by [one] consciousness. 474

Nevertheless, between the Light of consciousness (citprakāśa) — endowed as it is with the state of wonder [that is supreme ipseity] 475 — and the light of the mirror, there is the following difference — viz., the city, etc., that is judged to be different [from the mirror] as a reflection, appears in the perfectly pure mirror only as external to it, but is in no way created by the mirror. Thus the conclusion that ‘this is an elephant’ [as applying to what is seen] in the mirror would be erroneous. 476

On the other hand, Light [viz., consciousness], whose essence is the marvelous experience of itself, makes manifest (abhāsyati) on its own surface (svatmabhṛti), and out of its own free will, the universe, whose material cause is that same consciousness, by considering (paramāṣṭāt) that...

474 All variety — the city itself — is comprehended in and by consciousness, single and unique, which serves as the basis of that variety. Compare the elegant argument on this issue developed by Śaṅkara in his Upadeśasāhasrī.

475 i.e., endowed with vimarṣa, or spanda. Consciousness, or Light, vibrates, realizing itself as consciousness, whereas the insentient mirror is neither aware of itself nor of the reflections it receives from outside.

476 This remark follows from the discussion of arthakriyā, above. The “image” (usually designated by the term ākāra) of the elephant, whether that of the mirror or a picture, represents only its exterior form (and to that extent is shared with the “real” elephant), but lacks all other qualities (which we may call “real”) of the animal: one cannot travel on the back of a picture (for example). Here, this difference is exploited in order to emphasize that the “reality” of the elephant is elsewhere, and does not derive from the mirror, which is not true of “objects” created by Śiva. The metaphor can, in other words, only be carried so far.
TRANSLATION

[the universe] is not different [from that consciousness].\textsuperscript{477} The Lord’s creativity (nirmāṭṭva) is nothing but that manifestation (ābhāṣana) of the universe. Therefore, self-awareness (parāmarśa) is the main aspect of that Light, making it possible to distinguish it from the light of the insentient mirror, etc.\textsuperscript{478} This is what the author has stated in his Vivṛtivimarśīni:

As the variegated construction [of the universe] appears within the mirror, so does the entire universe, here, within the Self [consciousness]. Nevertheless, consciousness knows the universe by means of its own essential power of awareness (vi-marśa), whereas the mirror doesn’t know it in that way.\textsuperscript{479}

Thus, from the point of view of the Supreme Lord, since the host of objects\textsuperscript{480} has been created within his own body, there is no illusion of difference (bhedabhṛānti) at all [that is, we cannot logically consider the Lord as different from the universe]. However, from the point of view of the cognizer under the dominion of māyā (māyāpramāṭṭ), the appearance of difference [or, difference which itself is but an appearance] (bhedāvabhāṣa) is nothing but a confusion on his part that consists in his failing to recognize his plenitude (pūrṇatvākhyāti).\textsuperscript{481}

\textsuperscript{477}In the example (dṛṣṭānta), the substratum is the mirror. In the dāṛṣṭāntika, the substratum is consciousness. There is a unique difference between the dṛṣṭānta and the dāṛṣṭāntika. In the dṛṣṭānta, there is something present as an archetype that is reflected in the substratum, whereas, in the dāṛṣṭāntika, it is consciousness that appears both as substratum and archetype (as the manifold world), for the archetype is but the creation of the substratum. The world thus created is consciousness, he who manifests it is consciousness, and the surface, or screen (bhīti), on which it is manifested, or projected, is also consciousness. This is the source of wonder. For a similar formulation, see TĀV III 1–4 (vol. II: 354): svabhāṣa eva svechchā sarvam prakāṣayati, and vol. II: 355–56: paramēśvaro hy anargalatvalaṅgasvāvantaryamāṁkhyāti svāmabhāṣitāv eva anatiriktam ayātābhāṣitāyam yad viśva-vāciṁ cingāyam pradarśayati iti, “The Supreme Lord, by the power of his own freedom which cannot be hindered, makes manifest on his own surface the wonderful diversity of the universe as different from him, although it is non-different from him”.

\textsuperscript{478}Etc.’ means insentient matter, in general.

\textsuperscript{479}TS III (p. 19), quoted by AG in ĪPVV I 5, 14 (vol. II: 203): ‘I have said this in the Tantrasāra, etc.’. Note that TĀV III 65 quotes the same verse, with a variant: nijavi-mārṣanasāraytīya, instead of nijavimarṣanasārayuktīyā.

\textsuperscript{480}bhāvārāśi.

\textsuperscript{481}akhyāti, avidyā: these two terms, which often seem to be used interchangeably, may nevertheless be distinguished in terms of their origins. In principle, akhyāti is employed more or less at the psychological or individual level, to designate one type of misapprehension or misunderstanding, and to characterize a certain theory of validity formulated in terms of that notion. The term is particularly associated with the Mīmāṁsā of Prabhākara, who denies any positive participation of the apprehending subject in the formulation of the error to which he is subject. avidyā, in contrast, is a term particularly associated with Advaita in its various forms, which designates a form of error at the cosmological level. For Śaṅkara, avidyā is the product of māyā, creative power par excellence, to which all men are subject at every moment. Our authors, it seems, utilize these terms in full cognizance of their
Failure to discern (akhyāna) means here ‘absence of display’ [or ‘non-persistence’ (in our consciousness)] (aprathā) of the all-encompassing, that is, the nondual nature [of the Lord].

To say it in another way: plenitude does not appear [to the limited cognizer], but rather non-plenitude alone, which has duality as its form [viz., the duality of knower and known]; thus it is that only difference is by him perceived.

Therefore, this doctrine of reflection is free from flaw.

Kārikā 14

Thus, the master having stipulated\(^ {482}\) that the world consisting of thirty-six principles [is to be understood] as undifferentiated from Light [viz., consciousness] (kārikās 12-13) — this in consequence of his having stated the true nature of the ultimate principle (kārikās 10-11) — he goes on now, in the [following] kārikās [viz., kārikās 14-22], to explain, in the order of their arising, the proper form of each principle:\(^ {483}\)

14. He [the Supreme Śiva] makes manifest the [conditional] state of the [unique] principle\(^ {484}\) [just mentioned] by realizing differences among the five energies — which realizations are Śiva, Śakti, Sadāśiva, and Īśvara and āvidyā.\(^ {485}\)

original acceptations, although, case by case, their domains may very well overlap. This is unsurprising, in a monism of this sort — it is āvidyā that is responsible for the fact that we confuse what is not our body with our body, which confusion in turn is fundamental in the various particular errors that govern our daily lives as enchained beings. We have generally translated akhyāti, when otherwise undetermined, as ‘failure to recognize [one’s own Self]’ or, with contextual variants, ‘failure to recognize [one’s identity with the Self]’ or ‘failure to recognize [the Self as such]’ — or, in those cases where akhyāti impinges on the domain of āvidyā, quite simply, by ‘nescience’, keeping in mind, of course, the complex of ideas out of which it emerges.

\(^ {482}\)sthitirji vidhāya.

\(^ {483}\) Cf. the condensed exposition of the thirty-six tattvas in ŚD I 29b-33.

\(^ {484}\)tattvadaśā.

\(^ {485}\) The uniform energy (of the unique Lord) is contextualized (or hypostatized; hence the term daśā) by dividing itself into five energies. Silbum translates: ‘Il manifeste les catégories: Śiva, Énergie, éternel Śiva, et celle du Seigneur et du pur Savoir, en se servant des caractères propres aux cinq énergies’ — ‘He manifests the categories: Śiva, Energy, Eternal Śiva, as well as those of the Lord and of pure Knowledge, by making use of qualities specific to the five energies’. TĀV IX 50 (vol. IV: 1683) quotes this kārikā. PS 46 will deal again with the manifestation of the five śaktis as the first five tattvas. Emphasizing the ontological question of the division into five tattvas of the Supreme Lord who is one, YR follows the argument of TĀ IX 49b-52a: śivaḥ svatantradgrūpah pañciṣaktisunīrśharah// svātantryabhāśitaḥbhādā pañciṣaktiśadvibhayate/ cidāndesāparajñānakriyānāṁ susphusvatvātah// śivaḥsaktisadesānvādyākhyāmottvapañcakam/ ekaikatāpi tattvē 'smin sarvaṣaktisunīrśhare// tattprādhānayogeno sa sa bheda nirūpyate/, Śiva, who is by essence free vision and is endowed with five śaktis, first divides himself into five [tattvas], by differentiation born of freedom itself — [and this is done] for clarification of [the pentad of śaktis] Consciousness, Bliss, Will, and Action. [Thus] comes to be the pentad of tattvas — termed Śiva, Śakti, Sadā[śiva], Īśāna and [śuddha]āvidyā. [And] although each one of the tattvas is filled with all the śaktis, yet every distinct entity [i.e.,
[The verse is to be construed as follows:]

He, that is, the Supreme Śiva, whose essential nature has just been propounded by describing [him as] the ultimate principle [kārikās 10–11], makes manifest (bhasayati) the [conditional] state of the [unique] principle [now] as qualified in five ways, by realizing differences among the five energies,486 that is to say, by discriminating each from what it is not — the energies that are five in number, Consciousness, Bliss,488 Will, Knowledge and Action, [each of them] the cause of innumerable [subsidiary] energies, and that [together] constitute the [Lord’s] own real nature; that is to say, he makes evident each in and through its proper characteristics. This is the purport.

How described is that [conditional state of the unique principle]?

The master says: ‘Śiva, etc.’ — i.e., he speaks the verse in an effort to explain that condition.

[In this verse, the term tattvadaśā, ‘conditional state of the (unique) principle’, is qualified as śivasaktisadāśivatām in which the abstract suffix -tā evokes that general condition of which the three terms ‘Śiva’, ‘Śakti’ and ‘Sadāśiva’ [appear as instances].

Similarly, [‘conditional state of the (unique) principle’ is qualified as īsvaravidyamayun in which the suffix -mayi evokes that state whose [dual] form consists of Īśvara and vidyā [i.e., evokes that state which is made of Īśvara and vidyā as a pair].489

Now, the nature of each principle is explained.

To explain in detail, śivatattva — that is, ‘the principle that is termed Śiva’ — is nothing other than consciousness, whose material form is great Light, which transcends all the [other] principles, and consists of the state of wonder that is perfect ipseity (pūrnāhantācamatkāra) within all cognizers. Here, the exposition [of the Lord] as principle is done with reference to people who require instruction.490
Universal consciousness consists in the Lord’s becoming potentially all things, as when he knows (parâmôśat): ‘I become all’. 491 It takes the form of the Bliss that is proper to the Lord who is pure consciousness; it is slightly swollen (kimciducchûnatârûpa), being at this stage the seed of all things. 492 This [condition of consciousness] is called the ‘state of Sakti’ (śaktyavasthâ).

It is she [viz., Śakti] who is celebrated in all the esoteric doctrines (rahasyanaya) as one only, 493 although sometimes in complete and some-

491 viśvam bhâvâmi.

492 The reasoning, terminology and image appear to be borrowed from ŚD 16-17 defining aunmukhya (lit., ‘direction toward’, ‘orientation’), the desire of creating which begins to deploy within blissful consciousness itself: kimciducchûnatâ saiva mahâdbhih kaiścid ucyate, ‘Some philosophers name this desire [of creation] kimciducchûnata, i.e., “slight swelling”’. According to Utpaladeva (p. 16), it is Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna who has recourse, in his Tatvagarbhastotra, to this image of the slightly swollen seed, which is about to eject the shoot it contains as a germ, in attempting to explain the moment when, as stated in MM 14, the Lord is ‘ready to desire, know and create the universe’; the PM ad loc. makes use of the same image: tasyaiva kimciducchûnâvasthâyâm saktiśabdavyapadeça ity arthâh. As Silburn puts it (MM: 100), before quoting ŚŚA XIII 15: ‘L’énergie constitue la prise de conscience que Śiva a de soi en tant que Béatitude quand il tend à s’enfler ou à se dilater au sortir de la plénitude indivise et qu’il se met à vibrer spontanément en vue de s’exprimer’ [— ‘The energy constitutes Śiva’s awareness of himself as Bliss, when he intends to swell or dilate at the moment he comes out of undivided plenitude and starts to spontaneously vibrate so as he expresses himself’]. It is worth noting that Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna, who forged the image of the slightly swollen seed that is used here in order to define the state of Śakti, was a Śaivite Śakti (on Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna, see Dyczkowski SpK: 291).

493 Cf. PHVg 8 [Singh: 70]: [...] iyam turyâ saṃvidbhaṭṭârîkâ tatatatsṛṣṭyādibhedbhedād avamantâ samharantâ ca sadâ pûr̐nā ca kṛ̐ṣâ ca ubhâyarûpa ca anubhâyatā ca akramam eva sphurantâ shrih/ uktam ca śr̐īprāyabhijñānākāyām āvad arthâvâlechena uttiṣṭhātī pari ca bhavatī iti, ‘This venerable turyā consciousness flashes forth ceaselessly, now creating multifarious emulations, etc., now withdrawing them, [thus] always full (pûr̐na) [since it is able to project things out of itself] and yet always emaciated (kṛ̐ṣā) [and therefore bound to reabsorb what departed from it in order to make up its loss], of both forms, and assuming none of them. It has been stated in the Pratyaikhjâtikā: “When licking [i.e., reabsorbing] (avaleha) the objects, she [Śakti] rises [in her own nature], and so she is full”’; also ŚSV I 6, which deals with the incomprehensible nature of supreme energy in the context of the śakticakra: [...] atirikta tadadhyâyatâyāpy abhidhyâmayanâpy anetadîrûpā anuttarâ parâ svâtantraśaktiṣâ parâ ñiṣṭhâ aham parâ svâtantraśaktiṣâ. "There exists an energy of freedom (svâtantraśaktiṣ), unexcelled (anuttarâ), transcendent (parâ), not having any form [lit., ‘not having the form of that’, anetadîrûpā], although it has been described as “being in excess” (atirikta) or “in no wise deficient” (arikta), or as manifesting both [viz., “excess” and “deficiency”]’ Singh and Silburn, supported also by Apte’s dictionary, understand atirikta as ‘beyond empty’, that is ‘extremely empty, quite empty’ [cf. Singh ŚŚ: “greatly empty”; Silburn: “elle a beau être pleine, vide, à la fois pleine et vide, ou ni vide ni pleine”], thus apprehending here a cauśâkoti of the Madhyamaka sort. YR in his commentary appears to follow this line as well. However, neither B&R nor MW list such a meaning for atirikta, which they take in the usual sense of ‘excessive’, ‘de trop’, and so on — which meaning, if retained here, would vitiate the cauśâkoti. The Vâcaspatya has perhaps the key to this puzzle: ‘atirikta: “attśaitye, śresashe, bhinnē, śûne ca” — and, to justify this last meaning, ‘empty’: ‘yasya yâvatpramânam yuktam tato ñihatve: “hînâṅgim atiriktāngim iti smṛṭhī’, namely, ‘she who is “missing a limb” has gone beyond the norm established as
times in emaciated form, the two serving as metaphors of world creation and world dissolution.

Further, at this [stage, viz., that of Śakti, which is] the seminal level of the universe's generation and which is termed [therefore] the 'great Void beyond the Void' (mahāsūnyātīśīnya), the condition of Sadāśiva is reached, namely, the state of wonder that is perfect ipseity, a state proper to the Great Lord (Maheśa), who realizes: 'I am this', without differentiating [one from the other], for [at this level] the segment of [the energy of] Action [implied by the 'this', viz., the Lord's creation] still resides in ipseity (ahantāviśrānti) [i.e., is still latent in the 'I'], because [the energy of] Knowledge is yet predominant.

A bijabhūmi.  

Probably a Krama technical term, which implicitly refers to the Goddess Vyomavāmeśvarī ('She who Vomits the [Five] Voids'), worshiped in the first phase of the pentadic cycle of the Five Voids, who represents 'the initial and eternal vibration of thoughtless consciousness' (Sanderson 1988: 696–697). Thus is Vyomavāmeśvari at the level of Śakti. See the Krama text, the Mahānayaparakāśa (39b–40a) of Arṇasimha, which describes Vyomavāmeśvari: mahāsūnyātīśīnya ratva samyakāntatāraṇī yā// sarvavyomāni vāmanti vyomavāmeśvari tu sā// 'She who, though at peace for she is "great Void beyond the Void" (mahāsūnyātīśīnya), vomits all Voids is Vyomavāmeśvari' (manuscript transcribed by Marc Dyczkowski, made available by the Muktabodha Indological Research Institute). The term mahāsūnya appears in SvTV II 154 (which cites Vbh 149 and Kubjikāmatatantra [KMT] VI 23), SvTV IV 209, and IV 369; since SvTV IV 209 relates mahāsūnya with the śāntiśīla, which corresponds to the level of Śiva/Śakti, the notion might be equated with that of mahāsūnyātīśīnya. It is to be distinguished from the notion of sūnyātīśīnya, the 'Void beyond the Void', which, according to SvṬ X 707, corresponds to the śakti named mahāmāya (see SvTV VII 6 [two times], X 707, X 1213, X 1278, XI 16; TĀV VI 10, XI 20, NT VII 21, XXI 61 [two times], XXII 43, XXII 44; nevertheless PHv 4 [Singh: 55] offers a different correspondence, which makes sūnyātīśīnya a synonym for Anāśritaśiva — a level of experience at the junction of Śakti and Sadāśiva, i.e., at the junction of the one and the many ('anāśritaśiva paryāśānyātīśīnya') — inasmuch as such 'experience' (if it can be called that) precedes all concrete or material creation (on these notions, see Appendix 7, p. 327).

Pūrnāhantāmayo yaḥ camatkāraḥ.

Ahām idam.

Trika texts develop a sort of norm which correlates icchāśakti with Sadāśiva, jñānaśakti with Īśvara and kriyāśakti with suddhavidya (see PS 14, TĀ IX 50b–51a, ĪPV III 1, 7 (avat.) and Torella IPK: 193, n. 13). Nevertheless, as emphasized by TĀ IX 51b–52a (quoted n. 485), it is more a question of the predomination of one specific śakti in a specific tattva than a regular correspondence, the other śaktis being also present in every tattva, even though in a subordinated way. This principle suffices to explain the relative discrepancies between the texts. In effect, according to some, it is jñānaśakti that operates in Sadāśiva, and kriyāśakti in Īśvara, whereas a residual trace of kriyāśakti is in action in suddhavidya, icchāśakti being correlated with Śakti; see ŚD I 29b–31, TĀ VI 43–44, and the rather enigmatic statement of the IPK III 1, 2, thus explained by the Vīmasīntī: antarī jñānarāpa yā daśā tasya udrekaḥdāsane sādākhyam [...] bahirbhāvasya kriyāsāktyamayasya [...] udrekaḥdāse sati [...] īśvaratattvam,
Here reside the class of cognizers called the Mantramahēsavas, the ‘Great Lords of Mantras’.  

Likewise, it is at this very stage [i.e., on the level of the tattva Sadāśīva], thanks to the absence of difference expressed in the judgment ‘I am this’, that the condition termed ‘Īśvara’ is reached, consisting in the marvelous experience of one’s own Self, for now the two moments of ip-

‘When the preponderance (udreka) of the internal condition characterized as “knowledge” (jñāna) becomes evident, there arises the tattva Sadākhyā. [...]. And when the preponderance of the external state, which consists of the energy of Action (kriyāsakti), becomes evident, there comes into being the īṣvaratattva’ (on the etymology of Sādākhyā and Sadāśīva, see n. 906); see also ŚD II 1, and PTV 1 (p. 3 [Skt. text]): tatra ubhayatra jñānakriyāsakitimayo rūpe sadāśīvesvarasāre [...]. Here, YR’s commentary appears to accord with such conceptions.

On the hierarchy of the seven types of subject (saptapramāṇa) — Śiva, Mantramahēsavas, Mantrēsavas, Mantras (including Vidyeśvaras), Vijnānakalas, Pralayākalas and Sakalas — see Appendix 10, p. 330. Those categories, to whom YR will refer in commenting on this kārikā and kārikā 23, represent different levels, or modes, of consciousness.

Here, YR does not relate the īṣvaratattva to a specific sakti, be it jñānasakti, as is generally the case, or kriyāsakti (see n. 498). Moreover his exposition of the īṣvaratattva differs from what appears to be the norm. Most Trika texts establish symmetry between the Sadāśīva and the Īśvara states, to the extent that they even explain them through the contrastive metaphor of shutting and opening the eyes (nimeśa/unimeśa), as in ĪP 1, 3. In both tattvas, it is the experience of aham idam, ‘I am this’, with a difference of emphasis: on ‘I’ (or internality), in Sadāśīva; on ‘this’ (or externality), in Īśvara. In Sadāśīva, ‘I’ overcomes ‘this’, since consciousness equates the universe with itself, in the movement of nimeśa, while closing, as it were, its eyes. According to ĪPVV, vol. III: 264, the word itself — Sadāśīva, ‘Eternal Śiva’ — means that Śiva remains Śiva, i.e., consciousness, even if the object begins to emerge within him. Symmetrically, in Īśvara, ‘this’ overcomes ‘I’, since now consciousness equates itself with the universe, thus making differentiation more evident, as the universe is, in effect, its own negation. On these reasons, see ĪPV 1, 2-3: [...] yadā aham ity asya yaddhārikanām cimātārāpam tattvavedām samullāsayati tāde tasyaśphuṣṭāt sadāśīvat āham idam iti/ āham iti tu idamīyamāṃ sphuṣṭihūte ‘dhikaraṇe yadāhāmaṃśavāmaśaṃ niśācata tadēśvarat — iti vibhagaḥ. ‘When the substratum of the “I”, namely, pure consciousness, makes appear in that (“I”) a “that”, then such [conscious] state is called “Sadāśīva”, because the “that” [though appearing] is not there manifested clearly [i.e., as other than the “I”], viz., “I am this”; on the other hand, when, as [captioned in the phrase] “this is I”, the “that”-aspect has achieved clarification as the substratum, then such [conscious] state is called “Īśvara”, for in such [awareness] the “that” is anointed with an awareness of the “I”-aspect [that is, the “object” is endowed with the grace of consciousness] — such is the difference [between the two stages].’ See ĪPV 1, 3-3; also ĪPK 1, 5 and vṛtti ad loc., wherein is coined the concept of ‘perfect-imperfect state’ (parāparadāśa; parāparāvasthā) in order to account for these two ambiguous tattvas, whose perfection of consciousness (that of the ‘I’) is slightly altered by the mere presence of a ‘this’: atredantāmater aparātast samhārayaḥ sarvasya vedyasyaścādhā- danāt parateti parāparāvasthaḥ, ‘Here there is imperfection because there is the notion of “this”, perfection because all the cognizable is veiled by the T; this is therefore the perfect-imperfect condition’ (tr. Torella); cf. PHV 3, where the concept of a parāpara condition is applied to the sadāśīventavat. On the other hand, YR, though admitting the simultaneous presence of ipseity and objectivity at the level of Īśvara, chooses to emphasize the perfection of the experience in which there is no sense of alterity. Kṣemarāja’s exposition, in PHV 3, accords with that interpretation: īṣvaratattve sphuṭatdantatāntasāmānāntikaranyāṁ yādṛś viś- vam grāhyam, tādṛś [...] Ṭhe universe, in the īṣvaratattva, grasped as that kind [of entity] in which the co-referentiality of the “I” and the “that” has become manifest, is such [...].’ Note
seity and eceity (idantā) are held in perfect equilibrium, according to the “rule of the balance”\textsuperscript{502} — which does not allow ‘this’, viz., the ‘other’, to present itself as differentiated.

Here reside the class of cognizers called the Mantreśvaras, the ‘Lords of Mantras’.

At this point, thanks to the subordination of ipseity and the predominance of eceity [that thereupon ensues], the state of wonderment consisting in the realization: ‘I am I’, [and] ‘this is this’,\textsuperscript{503} is attained; [the predicates in these judgments] may be indicated [only] with a finger [for their content is as yet indistinguishable from their subject], just as is the head of the new-born child.\textsuperscript{504} This is indeed the [condition] of the Lord [and is called] the principle of pure Knowledge (śuddhavidyā),\textsuperscript{505} because [this realization is] the very essence of knowledge (bodhasāra).\textsuperscript{506}

\textsuperscript{502}samadhyatatalpūtanyayena — same phrase in ĪPV III 1, 3, which is there applied to īśvaratattva alone, even though the Vinarśini seems to understand the image in relation both to Sadāśiva and to Īśvara: [...] aham idam iti samadhyatatalpūtanyayena yo vimarośa sa sādāśivanātha īśvarabhūtaraṇe ca. Yet, as the Bhaśkari explains, it is so formulated for fear of prolixity (vistarabhiyā), but in reality apart from this passage, the pre-eminence of the ‘I-principle’ is associated only with the sādāśivatattva (nanu tarhi sādāśivatattve samadhyatatalpūtanyayo na yuktah, satyam, vistarabhiyā atraivam eva varatate ity alam).

\textsuperscript{503}aham aham/idam idam — some texts formulate the experience as ‘aham ca idam ca’ or ‘aham idam ca’.

\textsuperscript{504}The illustration is most likely intended to reflect the infant’s “point of view” — which, mutatis mutandis, is that of the Lord: the infant confounds the external world with himself (or his own body), and is unable to designate it other than by pointing to his own head.

\textsuperscript{505}In śuddhavidyā, the ‘this’, although now clearly apparent, still remains within the fold of the ‘I’, inasmuch as it is but the projection of the ‘I’ within itself. Thus, although at this stage some duality appears, that duality does not present itself in the form of alterity, to be subject to which is the destiny of the finite beings (Pralayākālas and Sakalas) living in the world of mutually exclusive subjects and objects. In the śuddhavidyā, even though the subject regards now the object as other, he does not deviate for all that from his perfect mergence with pure consciousness. Though apprehended, objects are known as they are in essence: as nothing but consciousness (cinmātrasāra, in ĪPr III 1, 4 = bodhasāra in YR ad 14). This is where the ‘purity’ of ‘pure’ Knowledge resides, as explained in ĪPr III 1, 4. At this stage, the ‘this’ appears as “distinct” from the ‘I’, but not “different” from it, inasmuch as it is just an aspect of the ‘I’. It is noteworthy that YR uses the same term camatkara, ‘wonder’, in describing each of the three levels of experience corresponding, respectively, to Sadāśiva, Īśvara and śuddhavidyā. On śuddhavidyā and its relation to the concept of śakticakramaḥeśvaratva, see n. 942.

\textsuperscript{506}The sequentiality implied in the ordering of the śuddhataṭvas is intended to clarify the process of creation, first as an immaterial extroversion of vibrating consciousness, then, from māyā onwards, as a material one. In this ‘pure path’ (śuddhādhvan), consciousness is the only reality; creation takes place within consciousness: it is in fact a projection of consciousness. In this sense, it is right to apply the term tattva to the five stages of consciousness, which are ‘principles’ or ‘reality-levels’, rather than ‘facts’ — and this usage is equally justified even if the term be understood in the etymological sense of ‘extension’, ‘projection’, as Indian commentators are wont to do (see YR ad 10–11, n. 433 and 434). They are states of consciousness in which the multiplicity of the world is at first submerged, then gradually revealed, though
Here, out of inherent benevolence, seventy million Mantras, replete with signification (vācakatā), attend, along with the Vidyeśvaras, upon the Mantramahēśvaras, the 'Great Lords of Mantras' and upon the Mantreśvaras, the 'Lords of Mantras', in order to free (uddhartum) the bound souls that are thereby signified (vācyā). ⁵⁰⁷

Here, although the category of [śuddha]vidyā is not distinguishable from the state of [pure] consciousness belonging to those cognizers called Vidyeśvaras, the display of difference (bhedaprathā) [that is here observed in the opposition vācaka/vācyā] is brought about by the energy of māyā. ⁵⁰⁸

Therefore, it has been sung in the Āgamas:

There is mahāmāyā above māyā [...] ⁵⁰⁹

still in immaterial form.

⁵⁰⁷ The Mantras, all varieties included, are vācakas, 'expressors', and the bound souls are vācyas, what is 'expressed' through them. So formulated is the distinction between signifier and signified: 'to what object do those mantras pertain, etc.?'

⁵⁰⁸ This is a paraphrase of ĪP K III 1, 6: bhedādhīr eva bhāveṣu kartur bodhāmano 'pi yā/ māyāsātkyteva sā vidyety anye vidyeśvarā yathā/, ‘According to others, [śuddha]vidyā is nothing but the notion of “difference” — similar to that which results from māyāsakti — that affects an agent endowed with consciousness in regard to entities [that he perceives] — such as is exemplified by the Vidyeśvaras; a view that is not shared by Utpaladeva, who presents it as that of 'others', and which the ĪPV ad loc. attributes to the Rauravāgama, introducing in the same passage the additional tatva of mahāmāyā. At the level of śuddhavidyā, comments AG in his avat. ad ĪP K III 1, 6, the manifestation of difference cannot be explained without the intervention of māyā. Yet, difference is still 'known' — an aspect of 'knowledge' (vidyā). Therefore the māyā that operates there is, however, 'not fully developed' (aprarūdhā) māyā, feeble ('śīthilā', so glossed by the Bhāskari) — an attenuated form of māyā, called mahāmāyā in the Raurava: tata eva aprūdhā mahāmāyākalpatvān mahāmāyeyan śrīrauravādigurubhir upadīṣṭa. YR's manner of exposition implies that the incomplete quote that follows (māyopari mahāmāyā) is likely borrowed from the Raurava; see n. below. Anyhow, it is in this sense, because the Mantras and the Vidyeśvaras are 'permeated' (as stated here by YR) by the mahāmāyā, that is, are contaminated by its vicinity, that they are affected by the māyīyamala; but it does not mean that they are located in the mahāmāyā; rather, it is the next level of subjectivity, that of the Vijnānākālas, which resides in the mahāmāyā. Moreover, it should be noted that YR's differs here from Utpaladeva's view, as formulated in ĪP K III 1, 3, that 'I' and 'this' are, in the śuddhavidyā, in a relation of co-referentiality (sāmānādhikaranya).

⁵⁰⁹ māyopari mahāmāyā [...]. Cf. Rauravāgama, Vidyāpāda, IV 28b: māyopari mahāmāyā sarv-vakāranākāranam. It must be noted that the Vidyāpāda part of the printed Rauravāgama (RĀ) is in fact part of the Rauravastīrasamgraha [RSS], which probably dates from a much earlier period than the printed Kriyāpāda of the Rauravāgama. The printed Kriyāpāda belongs to a different stratum of composition and was transmitted exclusively in South India (moreover, there is no Vidyāpāda at all in the South Indian RĀ). In the RSS, citations from the old Raurava are found, among them: māyopari mahāmāyā. For more information and a discussion of the dating and the relation of the two texts, see Goodall (Kīrāṇāyati: xl, n. 92, and xlviii-xlxi). A similar line is cited by AG in his PTV 5–8 with attribution to the Kubjikāmata, but the verse is not found in the transmission of the Kubjikāmata (see Sanderson 2002: 2): māyopari mahāmāyā trikoṇānandarūpini, ‘Above māyā is mahāmāyā, the embodiment of the bliss of the triangle’ (Singh PTV [Skt. text: 64; transl.: 176]; Gnoli PTV: 249); compare YR’s quote with that of PTV 5–9 (PTV [Skt. text: 40; transl.: 101]) and TĀV IX 91a: māyoradhve śuddhavidyādhaḥ saṁti vijñānakevalāḥ, ‘Above māyā and below śuddhavidyā are the Vijnānakevalas’ (see
Hence [it is only in that limited sense that] the Mantras residing there are said to be finite souls, for they are penetrated by mahāmāyā.\(^{510}\)

Above the māyā-principle and below the suddhavidyā are the cognizers termed Vijnānākālas,\(^{511}\) who retain the impurity of deeming oneself finite (n. 511). Also TĀ VIII 337b: mahāmāyordhvataḥ suddhā mahāvidyādāra mātrkāḥ vāgūṣvārī [...], ‘Above mahāmāyā, there is the pure great Knowledge (= suddhavidyā), the Mātrkā, the goddess of Speech [...]’, and TĀV ad loc. according to which suddhavidyā is termed mahāvidyā, on account of its purity (suddhavidvā deva cāṣyā mahattvam ity uktam mahāvidyā iti); the term appears (as mahāmāyāsakti) in ŚŚV I 2, quoted n. 226. At this stage, YR’s exegesis introduces the concept of mahāmāyā. The issue is that of explaining the paradox of a subjectivity unmodified by objectivity; such “objectivity” as there is remains under the dominion of the “subject”; it cannot be the product of māyā, but rather of this quasi-māyā. The paradox is brought out in the characterization of the Mantras and the Vidyēśvaras, who, though belonging to the suddhādhvaṇ, are nonetheless subject to the māyīyamala (see Appendix 10, p. 332). On mahāmāyā, see also n. 495 and Vasudeva MVT: 170.

\(^{510}\)The implication being that they are considered as finite souls (anu) inasmuch as they are subject to the māyīyamala. YR refers here implicitly to IPV III 2, 9, which states, as regards the Vidyēśvaras: [...] esān anutvam api syāt. Another characteristic of the Mantras and Vidyēśvaras (which distinguishes them from the Vijnānākālas) is that they are endowed with agency (kārtya; IPK III 2, 9) — a feature which is only alluded to in YR’s exegesis, when he presents that category of subjects as ‘signifiers’ (vācaka), that is, ‘agents of signification’, who are able ‘to free the bound souls’. As for the Vidyēśvaras, they are also agents, inasmuch as several Āgamas present them as instigators of the cosmic functions, later termed pariçakrya, the ‘five functions’, but here restricted to four. Scriptures differ as to the act they are exempted from; see Vimalavati I 1a, Parākhyataantra II 96b, RSS I 15b, and MVT I 20b–21: etān aṣṭau sthitihvamsarasakṣanugrahakaritāḥ// mantramāntratvāvedā suddhe samniyojya tatah punah// mantrād eva samindrathā saṁdalāḥ//, ‘Having accorded [the status of] pure Mantramāntratvāvedā to these eight [Vidyēśvaras] in charge of preservation/creation (sthitih), destruction (dhvamsa), obscuration/protection (rakṣa) and grace (anugraha), he created in the same way seventy million Mantras with their respective spheres of influence/manḍalas’ (tr. Vasudeva, modified; see Vasudeva MVT: 158–161, for an interpretation of the passage). Thus, as observes IPV III 1, 9, the Vidyēśvaras are endowed with a partial agency, such that they are ‘different from the Lord and from one another’, and as such ‘they too must be considered as “anu”’ — which is just another way of formulating the reason justifying the anutva of this category of subjects, the māyīyamala being the cause of their partial agency. One observes here YR’s emphasis on the level of subjectivity represented by the Mantras and the Vidyēśvaras, who reside in suddhavidyā. By underlining the Mantras’ role as vācakas and the liberating vocation of both the Mantras and the Vidyēśvaras, YR anticipates the account of mantric practice he will give in kā. 41–46, where those pramāṇas named Mantras are also the personifications of the mantras of the tantric practice.

\(^{511}\)This sentence is to be read as a paraphrase of the quote (probably an Āgama, although given without explicit attribution): māyordhvā suddhavidyādāh santi vijnānakevalāḥ, which completes the argument of PTV 5–9 (and in TĀV IX 90b–92a; see below). The entire passage (Singh [Skt. text: 40; transl.: 101]) is as follows: māyātattvasopari viḍyātattvādāḥ cāvaśaṁ tatvāntareṇa bhavityayo yatra vijnānākālaṁ sthitih/ yathoktam māyordhvā suddhavidyādāh santi vijnānakevalāḥ iti tatā hi mahāmāyābhave māyāpade pralayakevalānam avasthitih vidyāpade ca viḍyāśvarāndinām iti kim iva tad vijnānakevalāpadaṁ syāt/, ‘There must exist necessarily another principle above the māyā-principle and below the [suddhavidyā]-principle where abide the Vijnānākālas. As has been said: “Above māyā and below suddhavidyā, are the Vijnānakevalas”. Therefore, if mahāmāyā is not [accepted as a category], then, since the abode of the Pralayaekavalas is in the domain of māyā, and that of the Vidyēśvaras, etc., is in the domain of [suddha]vidyā, in which domain would abide the Vijnānakevalas?’ By allud-
[after shaking off the two other impurities].

This form of Śiva, who is [in essence] one only, is yet spoken of in terms of a pentad of principles, i.e., as the Fourth state (turya), although he transcends the Fourth state (turātita).

Hence this independent agent (karta) manifests himself as one only. Therefore, this [Śiva], unique and autonomous, appears (prakṣaṇa) as the agent [of creation], the Light [viz., consciousness] of whom, at the level of Sādāśiva and Īśvara, consists in the thought: ‘I am this’.

ing here to the PTV, YR refers implicitly to the notion of mahāmāyā he has just dealt with, thus completing its definition. This additional level, which has no name of its own in the quoted text, is to be identified as mahāmāyā and interpreted, spatially, as a full-fledged tattva. This is another argument in favor of the introduction of mahāmāyā in the general scheme of tattvas and pramatās: an additional tattva has to be postulated in order to make room for the Vijnānakalas. TĀ IX 90b–92a confirms that line of reasoning, providing it with an ontological foundation: the Vijnānakāla is stationed mid-way between the pure and impure paths, for, being affected by ānavamala, he cannot ascend, while, being free both from kārmamala, inasmuch as he is exempt from action (niṣkarma, v. 90b), and from māyiyamala, inasmuch as he ‘resides only in pure consciousness’ (śuddhācintāmarasamshīta, v. 92a), he cannot descend. As TĀV ad loc. says: [...] asau ‘māyordhve śuddhaviidyādhaḥ santi vijnānakalevalah’ ityādyuktayuktyā śuddhāśuddhādhanadhyavrati śuddhabodhaikāsvabhāvo ‘pi svātantryāhāneḥ — ānavamalāmāyākṛtaṣya svarūpasamkocasya sambhavāt [...]’, ‘[...]’ that one, according to the reasoning at work in the statement: “Above māyā and below śuddhaviyā, are the Vijnānakalas”, abides between the pure and impure paths, although he is essentially pure knowledge — [a paradox] due to the loss of freedom, that is, due to the presence of the contraction of his own essential nature brought about by a trace of the ānavamala’. On such grounds, the apparently contradictory statements of Vasudeva (MVT: 170), namely, ‘Abhinavagupta locates the Vijnānakalas in Mahāmāyātattva [...]’ but he is unable or unwilling to cite an authoritative scriptural passage substantiating this’, and ‘an unidentified Śaiva scripture quoted by Abhinavagupta and Jayaratha also places the Vijnānakalas in the interstice between the pure and impure universes’, may be reconciled. For further details on the Vijnānakalas, see Appendix 10, p. 330.

512Here YR briefly evokes the Vijnānakalas, who do not belong to the śuddhādhaṇava, the subject of the kārikā. Yet, he must refer to them at this point of his exposition, because of their intermediate status and location between śuddhādhaṇava and aśuddhādhaṇava. Thus, YR, following AG, reorganizes the various arrangements observed in previous texts of the Śaiva tradition. He locates here three categories of subjects unambiguously on the scale of the tattvas: the Mantras (along with the Vidyevaras), the Vijnānakalas and the Pralayakalas being respectively assigned to śuddhaviyā, mahāmāyā and māyā. He will take up the description of the last two categories of subjects, the Pralayakalas and the Sakalas, in his gloss on PS 23.

513The ‘Fourth state’ (turya) is Śiva’s experience of perfect, blissful, consciousness, transcending waking (jāgrat), dream (svapna) and deep sleep (susupti); cf. PS 35 and YR ad loc.; turyātīta, the ‘one transcending the Fourth’, is a still higher state, for turya is not completely free from contingent conditions (upādhi) such as the body or breath. Here the question of the existence of a thirty-seventh tattva is implicitly referred to by YR in agreement with IPK III and Bhāskara’s commentary. According to Bhāskara, though Śiva and Paramāśīva are not different in essence, Śiva is meant to refer to his specific nature (svārūpanīrdeśa) while Paramāśīva is the all-inclusive form, which implies his pervading (vyāpakā) the whole scale of the tattvas. However, Paramāśīva is not to be considered a thirty-seventh tattva: he who pervades (vyāpakā) cannot be located in the same series as those pervaded (vyāpya). See Torella IPK: 189–190, n. 2.

514aham idam.
is this thought that, composed of pure knowing, is the instrument [of creation]. The effect [thus produced] is the ensemble of [concrete] principles beginning with māyā and ending with earth that are yet to be explained.

Thus that unique transcendental cognizer (paramapramātya) named Maheśvara, the Great Lord who is the Self, expands himself as agent, instrument and action.

Kārikā 15

The master next explains what the proper form of the māyātattva is:

15. The supreme freedom of the Great Lord, which accomplishes what is difficult to construe, is indeed nothing but the covering of

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515 This celebration of Śiva's supreme agency echoes ŚDV 3, 5: ahetūnām api karmanām janmādihetubhāvavisayaviparyāsād abodhāmakakartaṣṭaṁ kārmam, 'The impurity of [supposing oneself the agent of] actions, which pertains to the agent devoid of the Light of consciousness, arises from erroneously considering actions to be the cause of births, etc., whereas they are not causes [for the sole, real, cause is the supreme agent, the Lord himself]. Actions, being insentient, cannot be the cause of anything. The only cause is the sole agent, the Lord.'

516 Cf. ŚDV (p. 27), according to which the Lord 'assumes the form of the thirty-six tattvas, all understood as "effects" (kārya) of that sole cause that is the supreme agent ([...] tattvarūpaṁ sātramśatsaṁkhyam kāryam rūpena bhārati).

517 viṣṇubhāte — see the conclusion of YR's commentary ad kā. 35. With this verb YR anticipates the next definition (kā. 15), for ŚV 3, 1, 8 (pp. 234–235) states: atiduskaravastusampādanāpratigṛhāṛātūpā paramesvarasya māyāśaktiḥ/ ity etad viṣṇubhate ityanena darśitam, 'Thus, the power of the Supreme Lord that is māyā (māyāśakti) is characterized by freedom to accomplish the most difficult things. This is the idea conveyed by the word viṣṇubhate' (tr. Pandey 1986: 197, slightly modified).

518 By this statement YR defines 'the absolute autonomy of a non-individual consciousness which alone exists containing the whole of reality within the bliss of a dynamic 'I'-nature, projecting space, time and the interrelating fluxes of subjective and objective phenomena as its content and form, manifesting itself in this spontaneous extroversion through precognitive impulse (icchā), cognition (jñānam) and action (kriyā) as the three radical modes of an infinite power' (Sanderson 1986: 170).

519 svārūpa — viz., 'nature', 'essence'.

520 durghatasampādana — that is, the internal division of the single principle into innumerable subjects and objects. The compound can be understood as a karmanāya [KD], a tatpurusa [TP] or a bahuvrīhi [BV]. It amounts to five possible interpretations, among which the main difference is whether durghaṇṭa qualifies as an adjective the process of manifesting objectivity, or designates objectivity itself ('that which is difficult to construe'); 1) as a KD — 'which is a difficult accomplishing', as an apposition to svātantrayam; 2) as a TP — 'which is the accomplishing of what is difficult to construe'; 3) as a TP understanding sampādana in the sense of sampādaka (see YR: prāptiprapakkam, and Renou 1968: §§ 168, 180) — 'which accomplishes what is difficult to construe'; 4) as a BV based on a KD (see 1) — 'whose accomplishing [as the dichotomy of subjects and objects] is difficult'; 5) as a BV, based on a TP (see 2) — 'which accomplishes what is difficult to construe'. The translation follows YR's interpretation.
Siva's own Self, [in which phase he appears as] the Goddess Māyā-śakti — the energy of delusive construction.  

By supreme is meant 'requiring nothing else'; by freedom of the Supreme Lord (paramesīṭ) is meant 'the fact that he creates everything'; such freedom is realized in the energy, termed māyā, of him [the Lord] who possesses it.  

māyā is so called because by it is distributed (māyate), that is, delimited (paricchidyate), the phenomenal display of knowers and knowns, culminating in earth; or māyā is so called in terms of its capacity to delude everyone [and everything].  

Keeping in mind that she is associated with the god of playful nature (kṛiḍāsīla), [māyā] is [also] called the 'goddess' (devī), and it is not

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521 Cf. TĀ VIII 332: atah param sthitā māyā devī jantuvaśhioninī/ devadevasya sā saktir atidurghatakārītā/. PS 15 and 16a are quoted in TĀ I 37; PS 16b and 17 in TĀ I 39–40.  

522 ananyapekṣa.  

523 It is noteworthy that, in defining māyā, which is responsible for empirical bondage, the emphasis is laid on freedom. The theme of the divine play (liṅgā in Advaita and Vaiśnava traditions, kṛiḍā in Trika) culminates in the somewhat paradoxical notion that the freedom of the Lord is not complete unless he is able to obscure and delimit himself (cf. Hulin 1978: 306). In ŚSV I 2, the Lord's freedom is defined as jñānakriyāśvatantra, freedom to know and to do everything. Here, the kriyā aspect of the Lord's freedom is referred to, since the exposition now takes up the asuddhahāvan, the 'impure path', namely, actual (as opposed to virtual) creation.  

524 YR gives here two traditional etymological explanations of the term māyā, both of which seem to presume the root mā (passive māyate) 'measure out': māyā is, on the one hand, the capacity to 'produce' forms, images, objects, and on the other, to 'deceive' thereby. For a summary of recent discussions of the problem, see Mayrhofer (EWA II: 349–350), who takes it as 'wahrscheinlich' that the term derives from the root mā 'construct', contra, inter alia, Thieme (ZDMG 95: 112ff., Anm. 1), who would derive it from the root mī 'alter'. As Mayrhofer points out (see also KEWA II:625; III: 777), recourse to the root mī does not appear at all necessary, inasmuch as the sense 'capacity to deceive' (mohakata) can easily be deduced as an extension of 'the capacity to measure', that is, to construct forms that are in the last analysis illusory. Such acceptations are in evidence in the earliest period, as ēndro māyābhīḥ pururāpa īyate, 'Indra assumes many forms through his powers [of representation] (māyābhiḥ)' (ṛŚ VI 47, 18; ŚB XIV 5, 5, 19; BĀU II 5, 19; JUB I 44, 1, 4), quoted by R ad APS 1 (while commenting on nīvīṣan bahudhā guhāsū), by Bhāskara in his gloss ad IPV, maṅgalacarana 2, p. 13, and by ĀŚ III 24a (through its pratīkā), in order to demonstrate that creation takes place in an illusory fashion; see also n. 528, the quotation in IPV II 3, 17 (vol. II: 141): māyā vimohinī nāma, and TĀ VIII 332, quoted n. 521: jantuvaśhioninī. See also the phrase mohanīṁ māyāṁ [...], in kārikā 51 and n. 969.  

525 Similar passage in TĀ VIII 333: devīṁ devabhinnatvāt. Cf. PTV (Skt. text: p. 3), which enumerates the meanings of the root div: divu kriḍāvijīgāvyavahāradyutistutigatūs. 'The root div is used in the senses "play", "desire to conquer", "worldly pursuits", "splendor", "adoration", "movement"'. Dhātupātha IV 1 gives some more meanings: divu kṛiḍā-vijīgāvyavahāra-dyuti-stuti-modā-māda-svapna-kānti-gātāsū. Here, māyā is devī in a limited sense, as playful (kṛiḍāśīla), and she is playful because, as one of God's energies/powers, she belongs to him, who is himself playful, according to one etymology of the name deva. See also TĀ I 101–103 (where the list of the divine qualities is slightly different): heyopādeyakathāvīrahe svāṇandagahanatayocchalanam kṛiḍā, '[Il est dieu, deva, parce qu'il joue] sans se soucier de ce qui est à rechercher et à rejeter. [Son] jeu est jaïlissement en tant que masse indivise de sa
appropriate to state, as do the Brahmavadins, that there is a mâyā who is distinct.

What sort of freedom is it? The master answers: ‘which accomplishes what is difficult to construe’.

[By ‘difficult to construe’] he means ‘able to be effected [only] with difficulty’; [through this freedom takes place] the accomplishing (sāmpādana) of that difficult (durghata) result, consisting in [the totality of relations between] cognizers and objects of cognition — that is, such freedom effects the attestation of [such a universe]
This *māyā* is the covering of Śiva's own Self — when, out of his free will, he assumes the state of a bound soul. ['Covering'] here refers to the triad of impurities — impurity of deeming oneself finite, etc. — and is termed 'concealment of his proper form'.

**Kārikā 16**

Inasmuch as the various objects of experience, which are derived from primordial matter and appear to us in the form of the pleasurable, etc., are about to be explained, the master [first] speaks of the principle of

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529Cf. YR ad 9. Such is the *tirodhānasakti*. On the 'concealment of his proper form' (*svāra-pagopana*), see PP II 9, p. 3: *guru-sakti jayatā ekā madrūpapradhikā/ svāra-pagopanayagra śiva-sakti jitā yāyā/, 'Hail to this unique power of the guru which enables the blossoming of my own nature. Thanks to it, the energy of Śiva which is intent on concealing his own nature is overcome'. See also ÍPv' II 2, 5: *tannalatrayānīmānī prabhoh icchā māyāsaktī ucyate, māyāsaktī is the Lord's will to create the three impurities*. Although *māyāsakti* is a *sakti*, its status is different from that of the triad of Will, Knowledge and Action, since *māyāsakti* is connected with differentiation.
individuation (*pumṣṭattva*) as such, which is manifested in the form of the enjoyer of experiences:

16. Under the influence of all-encompassing *māyā*, consciousness is defiled, becoming the individual soul, the fettered being, and is bound, thanks to [the limiting factors of] Time, Agency, Necessity, Passion and Ignorance.

Consciousness, although omniscient and omnipotent, assumes the impurity of deeming itself finite on account of its loss of freedom (*pāratan-trya*), brought about by *māyā*’s taking control [or possession]. This impurity is nothing but the failure to recognize [the Self as such] (*akhyāti*), as when one sets aside those qualities of omniscience, etc.

Wherefore, that [consciousness], [now] limited, having cut itself off from the infinite space of consciousness, just as the space confined in the jar (*ghaṭākāśa*) [is cut off from infinite space], is called *pumṣṭattva*, the ‘person’.

Therefore, both maintained (pālya) and bound (pāśya) by *māyā*, it is called *paśu*, [the ‘domesticated animal’ or, figuratively, the ‘fettered subject’], being the locus of those very fetters (pāsa) which are the impurities of deeming oneself finite, of regarding the world as objective, of

*Pumṣṭattva* here stands for *pumān*, ‘person’, and is thus synonymous with *puruṣatattva*. As shown by YR at the end of his commentary, *pumṣṭattva* is the condition of the fettered individual subject, delimited by *māyā* and the five *kaṇcukas*. *Pumṣṭattva* thus represents the infusion of supreme ipseity into individual souls (now ‘atomic’, *ānu*), who are themselves further affected by the three *malas*. Cf. *Iūv* III 2, 3, where the term *pumṣṭa* is found in the same sense. The term ‘individuation’ should not be understood in any sociological (or even psychological) sense, implying what has come to be designated as the “individual” of modern societies — it has rather to do here with the idea of the *ānu*, or the *ānaṃsāla*, the wholly deceitful ‘atomization’ of universal consciousness. Among the many discussions of the Indian “individual” — or whether such a term is at all appropriate in characterizing the pre-modern “person” — is Louis Dumont’s *Homo Hierarchicus*, q.v.

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531 Lit., ‘in its proper form’.

532 The usual denomination of this *tattva* is *vidyā*, meaning ‘[limited] Knowledge’. The first hemistich is quoted, along with kā. 15, in TĀV I 37–38. The second is quoted immediately thereafter, along with PS 17, in TĀV I 39–40. The term *kaḷa*, here translated ‘[limited] Agency’, expresses more literally this sense of limitation, its primary meaning being ‘segment, phase (of the moon), etc.’.

533 *Bodha* is the universal divine consciousness, whose characteristics, according to *PṬV* (p. 2), are *avikalpatvam*, ‘not subject to thought-constructs’, and *pūrṇatvam*, ‘completeness’, ‘lack of internal division or external condition’. By contrast, *abodha* is empirical consciousness, characterized by *vikalpa* and *apūrṇatva*.

534 Cf. *Iūv* II 3, 17 (vol. II: 141): yā mūḍhatā [...] *pūrṇavasya* [...] *svātantryasya* [...] nityātādharmasya ca prakśamānasyāpi yad aprakśamānātayā abhimānātam, ‘That confusion consists in wrongly considering perfection, freedom and eternality as not shining, although they are shining [within one’s self]’.


536 For a similar definition of *paśu*, see YR ad 5.
supposing oneself the agent of actions.\textsuperscript{537}

Moreover [by saying: ‘bound (saṃbaddha)] by Time, Agency, etc.’, the master indicates that [consciousness] is bound (baddha) completely (samyak), that is to say, is tied down, due to its being permeated\textsuperscript{538} by Time, etc., whose proper form will be expounded next.

Thus the \textit{punustattva} consists in being enveloped by the hexad of principles [namely, \textit{māyā} and the five \textit{kañcukas}].\textsuperscript{539}

\textbf{Kārikā 17}

The master now propounds the proper nature of these principles, Time, etc., in the order of their enveloping that [embodied consciousness]:

17. I know\textsuperscript{540} just this thing, at this very moment only, to some extent only, by focusing my entire self on it.\textsuperscript{541} In this way, the hexad of sheaths, \textit{māyā} being the sixth,\textsuperscript{542} is said to be [existentially] included\textsuperscript{543} in the finite soul ...\textsuperscript{544}

Thus, just as consciousness, though free, assumes the condition of a finite soul through its own \textit{māyā}, so also its energies of Knowledge and

\textsuperscript{537}See YR ad 9.

\textsuperscript{538}\textit{otaprotā} — lit., ‘interwoven with’. Cf. YR ad 18, where \textit{ūta} is mentioned, and IPV III 1, 9 (vol. II: 238, quoted n. 546), where we find \textit{otaprotā} mentioned in a context similar to this one, viz., while being defined the five kañcukas.

\textsuperscript{539}\textit{For māyā} is a veil (āvarana, lit., a ‘covering’), and the \textit{kañcukas} are ‘sheaths’. The literal meaning of the latter, ‘armor’, ‘cloak’, is found in the name of a traditional character in the Indian drama: the \textit{kañcukin}, or chamberlain, so termed because of his close-fitting garment.

\textsuperscript{540}The grammatical remark in the commentary indicates that YR is privileging, among the various ‘powers’, that indicated by the verb \textit{jñā}, ‘know’; even though the other ‘powers’ are implied, they are easily supplied, and it is not necessary to cite them each time their ‘leader’ is mentioned; cf. the symmetric statement in IPV III 1, 9, vol. II: 238 (see n. 546).

\textsuperscript{541}Note that the Sanskrit order of the sentence — \textit{adhunā, kimcit, idam, sarvātmanā, jānāmi}, viz., \textit{kāla, kalā, niyati, rāga, vidyā} — corresponds to the order of kārikā 16, which in turn reproduces the order according to which these \textit{kañcukas} envelop the \textit{paśu}, as taught by YR’s avat. ad 17. Thus there is logic in the ‘genesis of bondage’. Yet, one may find other orders of enunciation in other texts, for instance: \textit{kāla, niyati, rāga, vidyā, kalā} in IPV III 1, 9.

The VIIIth chapter of TS (p. 84) solves the difficulty, giving the order of enumeration as a convention differing from one text to another: \textit{atra caisām vāstavena pathā kramaṇaṁdyāvaiva śṛṣṭir ity uktam kramāvabhāso ‘pi cāstity api uktam eva/ kramaṁ ca vidyārāgadānām vicīto ‘pi dṛṣṭaḥ kaścid rajyan vetti ko ‘pi vidan rajyate ityādi/ tena bhānakaśravāparāṇaṁ api rauravādīṣu śāstreṣu aviruddham mantavyam, ‘In this regard, as a matter of fact, of those [sheaths] it has been stated that the origination is free of sequence; but it has also been said that an appearance of sequence is there. [In ordinary life] one can see that \textit{vidyā}, \textit{rāga}, etc., appear in a different order. For instance, one knows when he loves, whereas another loves when he knows, etc. Therefore, one should know that there is no contradiction in expounding a different order [of the \textit{kañcukas}] as happens in śāstras as the \textit{Raurava}’.

\textsuperscript{542}Lit., ‘associated with \textit{māyā}’.

\textsuperscript{543}\textit{antarārāga} — see n. 549.

\textsuperscript{544}The two kārikās 17 and 18 are to be read as a syntactic unit.
Action, when restricted, are said to become respectively the [limited] Knowledge (vidyā) and [limited] Agency (kalā) of the bound soul.545

Just as by the king a small quantity of money is given, out of compassion, to him whose wealth has just been appropriated, so that he may survive, likewise, to consciousness which has assumed the condition of a finite soul, its omniscience, etc., having been put aside, the ability to know [something] is conferred [by the Supreme Lord], with the ultimate aim of permitting limited Agency [and result].546

Because the power of knowing is thus predominant, the syntax of the sentence shows [the other sheaths, kāla, etc. (of kārikā 16)] as subordinated to the verb jñā.

This heax of sheaths, associated with māyā as described above, veils547 the proper form of the finite soul (anu), that is, of the particular soul (pums), whose omniscience, etc., has been removed due to the impurity of seeming itself finite.548

545And he exercises his limited powers of Knowledge and Agency through cognitive organs (jñānendriya, or buddhindriya), and organs of action (karmendriya) as stated by the Tantrasadbhāva, quoted in ŚSV III 3: kalodvalitacaitanyo vidyādarītagecarah/ rāgena raṇjitāt-māsau buddhyādikersanair yutah//, 'Consciousness [of the finite subject] is reduced to [limited activity] by kalā, the objects of sense (gocara) are shown to him by vidyā, he is emotionally affected by rāga, endowed as he is with organs of cognition, etc.'. See also ÍPV III 1, 10-11, vol. II: 242, quoted in Appendix 13, p. 337, and PHvr 9 (pp. 71-72), quoted n. 561, which develops this process in the course of explaining how the three saktis of the Lord, icchā, jñāna and kriyā, transform themselves respectively into ānava, māyīya and kārma malas. On jñānendriya and karmendriya, see PS 20.

546Doing and Knowing are associated with Willing (icchā), and Willing is rooted in Bliss (ānanda). This is a positive way of seeing the kañcukas. They are not only corsets constraining free, infinite subjectivity, transforming it into a fettered individuality; they are also gifts conferred by the Lord as compensation for this ontological damage, as a partial return of its former powers. ÍPV III 1, 9, vol. II: 238, synthesizes the entire process: evam kalāvidyādikālarājanatyantāh otaprotā māyāpārthāt-vyayāsavasvāh san punar api prativitātaratsavasvarāśimadhagatabhāgamātā evambhātō 'yaṁ mitah pramāṇā bhātī/ idāṁ idāṁ kimci jānānah idāṁ kurvāno 'tra raktō 'traiva ca yāh so 'ham iti, 'Thus, the subject, being permeated (otaprotā) with limited Agency, limited Knowledge, Time, Passion and Necessity, and being deprived of all sovereignty by māyā, manifests himself as limited, with a part of the whole sovereignty that is given back to him (prativitām), [when considering]: "The one who knows and now does something, this much, and is attached to this, and to this only, that one is me." ' Hence, concludes ÍPV, 'these [kāla, etc.] manifest themselves only as associated with the [limited] subject and, therefore, constitute his [limited] powers' (ete ca pratīpamārāyagataya bhātī, itī tasyāiva śaktirūpāḥ). Therefore, in this world of difference inhabited by individuals, 'they differ in the case of each subject' (pratīpramārābhīnā eva). This is how the formulations: 'his Time', 'his Necessity', etc., which are seen frequently in YR's gloss, are also to be understood — in which the genitive refers to the aforementioned 'anu'. On the kañcukas considered as the degradation of the attributes of the Lord — omnipotence, etc. — see MM 18.

547Icchādāka.

548The function common to the five kañcukas is that of delimiting, particularizing, the universal experience characteristic of the śuddhādhvān. And this delimitation cannot arise without replacing the free vision (svatantradṛṣṭ) characteristic of completeness with the clouded vision brought about by māyā, the power of differentiation; cf. TĀ IX 49b-52a (quoted n. 485)
In this sense, the hexad of sheaths is said to be ‘[existentially] included’, that is, is innate [in the finite soul], just as the flaw is innate in the gold.\textsuperscript{549}

What does the hexad consist of? The master replies: ‘[just] now, etc.’.

I know at this very moment only\textsuperscript{550} signifies that this finite soul delimits itself in terms of present time [i.e., qualifies itself as present only, as expressed through the verbal endings of the present tense — as such excluding past and future]; [and \textit{mutatis mutandis}, in terms of past or future time, as when it says:] ‘I knew it previously, I know, I will know’; similarly [for the verb ‘do’:] ‘I did, I do, I will do’.\textsuperscript{551}

In so doing,\textsuperscript{552} [the finite soul] delimits even its modes of being in accordance with the proper nature of knowledge and action. Thus does Time (\textit{kāla}), so [delimited], [become a fetter] of the finite soul.

And [I know] to some extent only,\textsuperscript{553} that is, [one knows and] one accomplishes delimited things only,\textsuperscript{554} for one is not capable of accomplishing everything. [The potter] undertakes to make a jar only, not a piece of cloth, etc.

Such is the limited Agency of the finite soul.\textsuperscript{555}

[I know] just this,\textsuperscript{556} i.e., that one expects a determinate effect to

where Śiva is said to be \textit{svatantradgrūpah}. Therefore, in order to give a full account of the process, \textit{mâyā} is to be added to the pentad of the \textit{kāicukas}.

\textsuperscript{549}Gold, like the soul, is in essence free from flaw. In the world of nature, however, gold, like the soul, is associated with flaws that, however, can be removed — the gold by fire (the technique consisted in melting the gold so that any impurities, always lighter than gold, might float to the surface), the soul by the realization that I am Śiva. Such flaws are ‘\textit{antarāga}’ — a term used here with overtones of its grammatical meaning — in the sense that they find their ‘existential’ occasions before another ‘rule’ is applied or whose causes are found within the domain of another rule — for instance, the rule here promulgated, thanks to which we may be liberated from such flaws. The grammatical \textit{antarāgatva} has to do with priority of application founded on the principle that rules whose domain is included take precedence over those of the including domain — which is consistent with the present non-grammatical application, inasmuch as the inherent “part” of the rice grain is \textit{antarāga} with respect to the grain as a natural whole, or the flaw with respect to the nugget. Note that the literal sense of \textit{antarāga} is ‘inner element’ or ‘element within’. Same image of the flaw within the gold in \textit{YR} ad 24 and 87–88. In \textit{kārikā} 18, we will meet another image: that of the \textit{kambuka}, the ‘bran’.

\textsuperscript{550}Lit., ‘I know now only’ (\textit{adhunaiva jānāmi}).

\textsuperscript{551}The action expressed by the finite verb is always delimited by a temporal suffix, so that the tenses appear as exclusive alternatives; one cannot express the three tenses simultaneously. Thus is the soul ‘qualified’ by the verbal cum temporal context.

\textsuperscript{552}\textit{iathā kalayan} — on root \textit{kal}, see n. 623.

\textsuperscript{553}Lit., ‘just something’ (\textit{kimcid eva}).

\textsuperscript{554}\textit{Cf. IPV} III 1, 9, vol. II: 238 quoted n. 546: \textit{idam kimcij jānāna idam kurvānah [...].}

\textsuperscript{555}Implied here is not so much that our talents are limited to one or another métier, but that, at any given time, we are restricted as to what we do, by what we do. And the same goes for ‘knowing’. Only the Lord is ‘\textit{sarvakartṛ}’, that is, can do or know everything at once — the universe that we experience only in limited ways.

\textsuperscript{556}Lit., ‘this alone’ (\textit{idam eva}).
follow from a determinate cause — such as smoke from fire, or enjoyment of heaven, etc., from performance of sacrifices like the horse sacrifice, etc.; one does not expect [the result] to arise from any [cause] whatsoever.557

Thus the niyatattva of the [limited self] is that [tattva] according to which the self [during the course of its life] is necessarily determined558 by the merits and demerits arising from the host of actions done by reason of its own resolution.559

And [finally, I know] by focusing my entire self on it560 means that the bound soul is grounded in rāgatattva, the principle of passion, which is a deeming of oneself as incomplete, as when one thinks: 'all such things are of use to me', or 'I would be [such and such; for instance: rich]', or 'may I never cease to be'.561

557 For the Śaivas, the yogin and the poet represent, in this world, the omnipotence of the free Lord, who creates whatever he desires without reference to any material cause; cf. IPK I 5, 7 (quoted n. 666) and IPvj as well as SpN I 2, quoted n. 265. Similarly, Mamma says in the maṅgalācarana of his Kāvyaprakāśa: niyatikṛtaniyaratītihatīm hlādāikamayīm ananyaparatantram/ navārasarūcīrīn nirmittām ādādhati bhārati kaver jayatii/, ‘Victory to the poet’s Speech, which projects a creation, free from the laws of Necessity (niyati), constituted by pure delight, independent of anything else, and charming on account of nine (or novel) sentiments (or flavours: rasa)’ (tr. Dwivedi Kāvyaprakāśa: 3, modified). The commentary Sampradāyaprakāśini by Śrīvidyācakravartin contrasts this creation of the poet with that of the Creator (brahman), attributing to the former an eminence comparable to the latter’s: niyatśaṅkṣya nīyataraṅgād sukhadhukhāsahasvabhāvād paramānñayāpāda-karmādisehaḥ kārānaparatantraḥ śādhasa na ca ṣa ṣāyaiva taiḥ tādṛṣī brahmaṇa nirmir nirmāṇam, ‘Formed into a definite shape by the power of niyati, characterized by pleasure, pain and delusion, dependent on material causes such as atoms and auxiliary causes such as action (karman), possessed of [only] six flavours and not invariably pleasant by these — such is the creation or production of the Creator’ (tr. Dwivedi Kāvyaprakāśa: 3). According to AG’s maṅgalācarana to the Locana, the poet — the metaphor of the Supreme Lord — can create anything he wishes, such as a celestial flower, without abiding by the ordinary law of causality, i.e., without requiring any other cause than his own genius (pratibha), which may be seen as the totality of the causes: apūrvaṃ yad vastu prathayati vinā kāraṇākālam [...], ‘[The poet] manifests entirely new objects without requiring the least cause [...].’ Which affords yet another example in Kashmirian Śaiva thought of the close parallel between the Lord’s powers and the poet’s — and indeed between mokṣaśāstra and kāvyasāstra. Note that, in the Trika, pratibhā, often translated as ‘genius’ in a poetic context, is both self-luminous consciousness (svapraṇāśa) and self-consciousness (vimāraśa).

558 nīyamena [...] nīyamāte — for a similar usage, also in a context of physical determinism, namely, the successive rising and setting of the moon and sun, suggestive of human destinies, see Šakuntala, IV, st. 2.

559 samkalpa — the law of karman is one aspect of this general law of causation. Sanderson (1986: 179) translates nīyati as ‘causality of karma’.

560 sarvātmanā.

561 i.e., ‘let me not lose the capacity of being an enjoyer’. The feeling that my possessions are not yet complete and a desire for continued existence constitute the principle of desire [or Passion]. The finite subject, forgetting his universal nature, identifies himself with something or someone else. In this sense, rāga is the degradation of plenitude (pūrṇatva). This regular correspondence between the Lord’s śaktis — omnipotence, omniscience, plenitude, eternity, and inclusivity [lit., ‘pervasion’] — and the five kaṇicas is laid down in PHvj 9, pp. 72-73: tathā sarvakāriṇīsarvarajñatvāpūrṇatvanitvātavayāpakaraṇasaktayaḥ samkocam grh-
[Contextualized] passion (rāga) is an attribute of the intellect. It is nothing but ['corporeal'] attachment as when one thinks: 'here is my passion', [now located] in one place, wherever it may be — and it is not the case that the [word rāga is] coextensive with the [general] principle of passion (rāgatattva) which governs any expectation at all [for instance, the hope of final release, which illustrates rather the kañcuka itself].

nānā yathākramam kalāvidyā rāgādāniyātīrīputatāy bhānti, 'Thus, by accepting limitation, the [Lord's] energies — omnipotence, omniscience, plenitude, eternity, and inclusivity — appear respectively as kalā, vidyā, rāga, kāla and niyayati'. The logical cum causal nuance of these terms should be kept in mind: the fifth fetter to which the subject is prone is here termed niyayati; the unfettered Lord vis-à-vis the subject so fettered is described as vyāpaka. The term niyayati here intends specifically the type of connection that is called "causal": from "smoke" we are obliged to conclude "fire", and the reason for this is that the domain of "smoky things" is without exception included (yāpyā) in the domain of "fiery things" (vyāpaka); such relation of inclusion is termed vyāpī, often translated as 'pervasion'. Here the Lord is the ultimate vyāpaka, for he includes everything possible, and therefore everything can indifferently be termed a vyāpya. The relation of vyāpī is therefore "truistical" for the Lord, and no niyayati can be said to characterize his relation to any effect — which relation does most definitely apply to his "fettered" subjects. Cf. also Kṣemarāja's Pārāprāveśikā (p. 8): asya sarvakartātva sarvajñatvatvam pūrnatvatvam niyāvatvam vyāpakatvam ca śaktayo 'sāmkucitā api sāmkocagrahanena kalāvidyā rāgādāniyātīrīputatāy bhavanti, ‘Omnipotence, omniscience, plenitude, eternity, and inclusivity: those powers of him, although not contracted, become kalā, vidyā, rāga, kāla and niyayati respectively, when they assume contraction*.

562 There are eight buddhidharmas: righteousness (dharma), gnosis/knowledge (jñāna), detachment/dispassion (vairāgya), sovereignty (aisvarya) and their opposites (cf. SK 23, and GBh). Cf. ÍPV III 1, 9 (vol. II: 238): ca na tad buddhigatam avairāgyam eva, taddhi [avairāgyam] sthūlam vṛddhasya pramādyām na haved api, rāgas tu bhavaty eva, 'That [rāgatattva] is not the [specific] attachment [or passion] (avairāgya) that is associated with the intellect/volition (buddhi) [that is, it is not to be understood as the Sāmkhya notion of avairāgya, that belongs to the category of buddhidharma], [for] [that specific attachment], in its gross form, is not observed in an old man in regards to a young woman, whereas the [principle of] passion (rāga = rāgatattva) [itself, or 'in its general form'] very much is!' Cf. Rāmakaṇṭha ad Kīrāṇatātra I 16c–17 (Goodall Kīrāṇavṛtti: 201–208).

563 Samāna — that is, 'expressive of'.

564 At issue are two forms of 'attachment', one (rāga or avairāgya, as it is referred to in ÍPV III 1, 9, quoted n. 562) specific, exclusive, contextualized; the other (rāgatattva) general, inherent in the human condition, which diffusely establishes any object as 'not mine'. Note also that the term avairāgya involves a double negation: 'absence of dis-passion': our author may be profiting here from that resonance as well, for a 'contextualized' passion is nothing more than the lack of a certain kind of discipline, itself associated with those objects of sense one wishes to abjure. The lyrical cry of Cherubino [Chérubin], in The Marriage of Figaro [Le Mariage de Figaro] by Beaumarchais (I, 7), may illustrate this concept of rāgatattva, craving for all objects of enjoyment: ‘[...] le besoin de dire à quelqu'un je vous aime, est devenu pour moi si pressant, que je le dis tout seul, en courant dans le parc, à ta maîtresse, à toi, aux arbres, aux nuages, au vent qui les emporte avec mes paroles perdues. – Hier, je rencontrai Marceline ...’ ['[...] the need to say to someone "I love you" has become so compelling that I say it to myself when I run across the park, I say it to our lady and to you, to the clouds and the wind that carries them away along with my useless words. Yesterday, I ran into Marceline ...']. The same distinction is made in Sanskrit aesthetics between the aesthetic feeling that is the rasa, śṛigāra for example, and the empirical affect (sthāyibhāva) that is its corresponding kāma; the former experienced by the audience at large, as a disembodied
Moreover, I know means that I know something that is before my eyes, such as this jar, etc., but not that distant object screened from view: \(^{565}\) such is the principle of vidyā (vidyātattva), or limited Knowledge.

In [the previous] kārikā [16], the term avidyā, ‘absence of knowledge’, ‘nescience’, has been used with a view to [distinguishing this limited vidyā from] perfect Knowledge (śuddhavidyā), and not because [it implies a complete] absence of knowledge; \(^{566}\)

associated with māyā [that is, māyā being the sixth] means that the hexad of sheaths is, for the bound soul, conjoined with the display of difference [brought about by māyā].

Kārikā 18

How is this hexad of sheaths existentially included in the finite soul? The master says:

18. ... Just as the bran \(^{567}\) is tightly attached to the grain of rice, in a relation of non-separability, although it is different from it. \(^{568}\) Nevertheless, it is open to purification through the discipline of ardent engagement in the path of Śiva. \(^{569}\)

[The comparison may be formulated as follows:] In practical terms, \(^{570}\) the bran, though different, is attached to the rice-grain in a relation of non-separability, to the point of appearing (bhāsate) interwoven with the grain of rice, with no difference [in evidence between them], such that it is removed \(^{571}\) even by the skilled [only] with much effort; being exist-

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\(^{565}\) For the same terminology and issue, see YR ad 5.

\(^{566}\) In spite of the etymology, avidyā should not be taken as complete absence of knowledge (vedanābhāva), but rather as imperfect knowledge, whether taken in the general sense of ‘nescience’, or as referring to a specific kaṇcuka. Indeed, the usual name of the kaṇcuka is vidyā, for although imperfect, it is yet knowledge.

\(^{567}\) kambuka — first occurrence of the term, usually attested as kambūka. Kārikā 23 contrasts the term with tusa, ‘husk’. According to Mayrhofer, kambūka is Dravidian in origin, whereas tusa is Indo-aryan [or Indic].

\(^{568}\) The stress is laid on the inseparability of the bran/sheaths and the rice-grain/finite soul, which inseparability is apparent only, as YR emphasizes, while commenting on ‘tu’. Relying on the commentary, we differ from L. Silburn, who understands kambuka as synonymous with tusa, ‘husk’ (Fr. ‘balle’): ‘La balle fixée au grain de riz (semble) inséparable de lui, bien (qu'en réalité) elle en soit distincte. Mais cela est parfaitement purifié lorsqu'on se tourne ardemment vers la voie de Śiva’. As well, the full sense of ‘yoga’ is not hinted at.

\(^{569}\) Thus a soteriological parenthesis is formulated in the exposition of the tattvas, factors of finitude.

\(^{570}\) vāstavena vṛttena.

\(^{571}\) prakṣipyamāna — lit., 'thrown away'.
tentially included in the grain of rice, it does not present itself separately [to the person polishing].

In similar fashion, the [sixfold] sheath of māyā, etc. [i.e., of māyā together with the five kaṇcukas], which is figuratively represented by the bran [in the illustration above], though [really] separate from the finite soul, which is figuratively represented by the rice-grain, appears as if inseparable from that soul, due to its being existentially included in it, thus concealing the unfragmented essence of consciousness. This much is to be supplied. 572

If this be so, how does that sheath, so difficult to detach, disappear? The master says: ‘it is open to [purification], etc.’ 573

The particle ‘tu’, ‘nevertheless’, is here used in the sense of specifica-
tion [i.e., restriction] 574 for no other means is available in this case.

[There now follows a word-by-word exegesis of the second half of the verse:] of Śiva, that is, of the Great Lord that is one’s own Self;
the path, that is, the method whereby one arrives at 575 the awareness that one’s own essence is resplendence (vibhūti), which takes the form: ‘I am a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, supreme and nondual’, 576 or ‘this entire universe is mine alone — is nothing but the expansion of my own energy’; 577

... ardent engagement in that [path] (aunmukhya), that is, directing oneself with perseverance toward meditation on that [method]; such [meditation] is discipline (yoga), that is, a grounding 578 of the finite soul in its own Self seen as constituting its essential nature, that is, seen as plenitude.

In this way, it, that is, the [sixfold] sheath, whose essence has been explained, is open to purification, and this in an exemplary fashion, 579 that is, attends spontaneously upon its own dissolution without remainder.

And this should be said as well: when the bound soul becomes of purified heart, due to the Supreme Lord’s grace, then the veil (āvāraṇa) of sheaths that afflict us with finitude spontaneously disappears, on account of the coming into being of the knowledge of one’s own Self consisting in the insight: ‘I am myself the Great Lord’. 580

And, apart from such knowledge of the Self [won through this arduous

572Same reasoning in YR ad 24.
573bhajate — lit., ‘shares, partakes of’.
574vīśeṣa — see n. 487.
575Lit., ‘whose form is’.
576paramādvayacidāndanaikaghano ’smi.
577mamaiva idam viśvam svasaaktivijmbhaṇamātram.
578sambandha — lit., ‘connection with’.
579viśeṣena = vi in the ‘viśuddhi’ of the kārikā.
580aham eva mahēśvaraḥ.
method], no mere act grounded on worldly causalities\(^{581}\) and belonging to the realm of \(mâyā\) would have the slightest chance of succeeding.\(^{582}\)

### Kārikā 19

For such a finite soul, which is, as well, an enjoyer, an object of enjoyment must be posited.\(^{583}\) This being the case, the master next expounds the principles that have originated from primal matter \(-\) that is, from \(pradhāna\), or \(prakṛti\).\(^{584}\)

19. Pleasure, pain and delusion: these alone constitute primal matter. Next comes the inner organ differentiating itself, in order, into volition, mind and ego, in accordance with \(\) [the functions of] decision, ratiocination and conceit of self \(\) [that each, respectively, assumes].\(^{585}\)

That state of indifferentiation\(^{586}\) \(-\) referred to here as consisting of pleasure, pain and delusion \(-\) of \(\) [the three ‘qualities’] \(sattva\), \(rajas\) and

\(^{581}\) Lit., ‘arising through the power of causal constraint (\(niyatīakti\)).’

\(^{582}\) Lit., ‘would dare present itself \(\) \{so as to effect such a reversal, that is, the dissolution of the \(kāṇcukas\)\}.’ Cf. a parallel statement in the commentary ad 9. Not only are rituals hinted at here, but also any action presuming to effect a result.

\(^{583}\) \(\text{evamvidhasyānora bhoktuṣ ca bhogyena bhāvyam}\) \(-\) the statement is symmetrical with YR ad 5: \(\text{evamvidhe cāṭra bhogyasvabhāve viśvasmin bhoktrā bhāvyam}\).

\(^{584}\) After the exposition of \(pradhāna\), or \(prakṛti\), begins that of \(meya\), cognizable reality, which is defined as follows (\(\text{IPK III 1, 10-11}\)): \(\text{trayoviṃsātīdhā meyam yat kāryakaranātmaṃ/ tasyāvibhāgarūpy ekam pradhānam mūlakāraṇam// trayaḍaśāvidhā cāṭra bāhyāntaḥkaraṇāvalī/ kāryavargaṁ ca daśadāḥ sthūlasūksmatvabhedah//, ‘Made of twenty-three categories, cognizable reality consists of effects and instruments. As an undivided \{category\} \(\) (eka), \(pradhāna\) is that state in which \[all cognizable reality\] is unified (\(avibhāgarūpin\)). It is the primal cause \[i.e., the material cause\] \(\) \([mūlakāraṇa]\). The series of external and internal instruments has thirteen aspects and the effects are of ten kinds, being divided into gross and subtle\} (on \(avibhāgarūpin\), cf. Pandey, \(\text{IPK, vol. III: 199}\)). The exposition of the \(meya\) ends with kā. 22.

\(^{585}\) Cf. SK 33. ‘\(\text{antāḥkaraṇa}\)’ is a term found also in Advaita, where it represents the ‘subjective’ side of the provisionally real, corresponding to the ‘objective’ \(māyā\). Under its aegis are grouped together, as in \(\text{Śāmkhya}\), the intellective functions of \(\text{buddhi, āhāṅkāra, and manas}\). The sequence found in the \(\text{Kārikā}\) does not imply that the \(\text{Trikā}\) presumes for the “organs” an order of evolution different from that of the \(\text{Śāmkhya}\). By it is merely signified that the three “organs” correspond to and are explained by the three functions: \(\text{nīscaya, saṃkāla, abhimaṇā}\). The translation differs somewhat from L. Silburn’s interpretation: ‘Ainsi la nature consistant uniquement en plaisir, en souffrance et en égarement constitue l’organe interne fait de décision, de volition et de présomption qui appartiennent dans l’ordre à l’intellect, au sens interne et à l’agent d’individuation’.

\(^{586}\) \(\text{sāmānyam rūpaṃ}\) \(-\) the same notion is conveyed by \(\text{sāmyāvasthā}\) in GBh 16: \(\text{tat kim uktam bhavati sattvarajastamasāṁ sāmyāvasthā pradhānam, and GBh 23: iyaṁ prakṛṭiḥ sattvarajas- tamāsāṁ sāmyāvasthā}\.\) According to the \(\text{Śāmkhya}\), when the equilibrium of the \(\text{gunaṣ}\) \(-\) by which equilibrium \(\text{prakṛti}\) as such is defined \(-\) is disturbed by the mere proximity of \(\text{puruṣa}\), the process of creation takes place. However, the \(\text{Trikā}\) develops its own notions on the sequence of \(\text{tattvas}\) that starts from \(\text{prakṛti}\), postulating, notably, an additional principle, the \(\text{gunaatattva}\); see Appendix 11, p. 334.
tamas where no dominance or dependence\(^587\) [of any of the three] is apprehended, is termed *prakṛti*, the primal cause (*mūlakāraṇa*).\(^588\)

The master says, beginning with the words ‘decision, etc.’,\(^589\) that from *prakṛti* proceeds the inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) — which has the form of its [viz., of *prakṛti*] effect.

By decision (*niścaya*)\(^590\) the master means the notion that ‘this is such and such’.\(^591\)

By ratiocination (*saṃkalpana*)\(^592\) he means ‘organizational thinking’ (*manana*).\(^593\)

\(^587\) *aṅgāṅgibhāva*.

\(^588\) This notion of *mūlakāraṇa* is common to both Sāṃkhya (SK 3) and Trika (see n. 584). However, in the Trika, *prakṛti* is *mūlakāraṇa* in a secondary sense, for *prakṛti* is not the supreme principle, as it is in the Sāṃkhya, but a manifestation of the Lord’s supreme energy.

\(^589\) Here begins the definition of the several ‘functions’ (*vyṛti*) of *buddhi*, *manas* and *ahāṅkāra*.

\(^590\) Cf. GBh 27: *tatra manasah kā vṛttir iti/ saṃkalpo vṛttih. ŚSV III 1 uses also the term *vyāpāra*, ‘activity’: [...] *adhyavāśyādyivāpārabuddhyahankṛymanorūpam citdam*, ‘citta consists of *buddhi*, *manas* and *ahāṅkāra*; its activity consists in ascertaining, etc.’.

\(^591\) Cf. the Sāṃkhya definition (SK 23), where *adhyavāśa* is a synonym of *niścaya* (see also ŚSV III 1, quoted n. 589). On *adhyavāśa*/*niścaya* as the function of the *buddhi*, see n. 401, n. 591, and p. 294; also, TĀ I 38b–40 and TĀV ad loc. (p. 76): *adhyavāśyā buddhiḥ*; TĀ I 215, IX 238. However, there is a definition of *buddhi* specific to the Trika, which is expounded in TS VIII, pp. 85–86: *tato guṇatattvād buddhiḥitavām yatara pumprakāśo viśayaḥ ca pratibimbam arpayataḥ*, ‘Thereafter, from guṇatattva, buddhiḥitavām emerges, in which the light of *puruṣa* [i.e., consciousness] reflects itself, as well as objects’. On *niścaya*, see also YR ad 32 and 63.

\(^592\) That is, it is ‘just this’ and not ‘something else’. It is the faculty of distinguishing between objects and ascertaining their specific nature. The *buddhi* evaluates as well as discerns; it reacts in relation to the ‘I’: why indeed discriminate objects? The *buddhi* comes into play when a response of the subject is called for. Note that the *buddhi* is the initial evolute of *prakṛti*, where the notion of ‘activity’ is lodged. Thus the *buddhi* is not solely an intellective function, but also a volition, a desire to act, be it simply the ‘act’ of preferring one object to another. GBh 23 gives an example similar to that of YR: *ayam ghaṭo ‘yam pata ity evam sati yā sā buddhīr iti laksyate*, ‘When one says: “This is a jar, this is a piece of cloth”’, this is what is defined as volition (*buddhi*). In the Sāṃkhya, it is to the *manas* that is given the task of representing to us the world of the senses, which appears both as external and internal, providing thus the groundwork for involving the individual (the ‘*a/ham*’) in actions. Thus is explained the characteristic function of the *buddhi*, *adhyavāśa*, that is, choosing, even willing (cf. the notion of *aśvarya*, ‘sovereignty, power’, as a property of *buddhi* — *buddhiddharma* — in SK 23 and Vācaspāti’s TK thereon, even though the word has acquired a supra-human reference), on the basis of the data that are given to it by the *manas*. The *buddhi* makes its own the content delivered to it by the *manas*, thus anticipating the individualizations represented by the *ahāṅkāra* and the host of the sense-organs, and to which the latter are instrumental; cf. TK 23: *sarvo vyākhāntatālocyā maṇḍala ‘ham arūdhhiṣṭa ity abhimaya kartavyam etan mayety adhyavasyati atāś ca pravartata iti lokasiddham*, ‘It is well known that a man who is to act, considers [the situation], ponders over it, agrees that he is entitled to do it, determines that he should do it and then does it’.

\(^593\) Or ‘projection’ — of an entity where there exist only the disjointed data of the five senses. Cf. SK 27, where *manas* is defined as *saṃkalpa*. As is obvious, AG follows here *verbatim* the “evolution” of the categories as expounded in Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s Sāṃkhya; there, the function of *manas* is clearly that of collecting the senses’ data — scattered as such under the five domains of the individual organs — so that unique
By conceit of self [or self-referentiality] (abhimāna) the master means 'possessive behavior' (mamatā). 594

"objects" appear clearly before us, each of them endowed with the properties of the five senses — length, odor, color, etc. Thus is manas the common "theater" where all the five gather — much akin to the "common sense" of the English philosophers, which itself has antecedents in Aristotle's κοινή αἴσθησις. Advaitins, on the other hand, use the term manana in another sense. Here, as well, it belongs to a triad, śravaṇa, manana, nīdidyāsana, which evoke the way one appropriates the truths of the system — first, they are 'heard' under the guidance of an enlightened teacher; then, one strives to convince oneself of their validity by efficient 'arguments', thus setting aside opposing theses as well as doubts originating in the "real" world; finally, they are incorporated in a new apprehension of the "real", which is now intuitive. Note that manana plays here as well the part of an intermediary between "external" and "internal" thought. TS VIII (p. 87) explains how manas proceeds from the sāttvikāhankāra, along with the buddhindriyas and karmendriyas: tatra sāttviko yasmād manaś ca buddhindriyapañcakam ca, 'From the sāttvika [ahankāra] manas and the pentad of the buddhindriyas proceed', and (p. 88): sāttvikā eva ahaṅkārāt karmendriyapañcakam. Nevertheless, TS VIII (p. 89) mentions other views: according to some, manas proceeds from the rājasāhankāra (anye tu rājasān mana ity āduh); according to others, manas proceeds from the sāttvikāhankāra, whereas indriyas proceed from the rājasāhankāra (anye tu sāttvikā mano rājasāc ca indriyāṇīṇī); see n. 605 and 613. In a similar fashion, Vācaspati considers the buddhi to be polyvalent — in some, it is sāttvikapradhāna, in others, tāmasapradhāna (TK 23).

594Lit., 'the idea that "all this is mine, or for me." ' Similar definition in YR ad 70. Cf. TK 24: abhimāno 'hāṅkārāh/ yat khalv ālocitām maṭaṁ ca tatra 'ahām adhiṛktaḥ', 'saktāḥ khalv aham atra', 'madārtā evam āmi viṣayāḥ', 'matto nānā 'traḥdiṛktaḥ kaścid asti', 'ato 'ham asmi' iti yo 'bhimaṇāḥ so 'saḍhāraṇavyāpāravād ahaṅkāraḥ/ tam upajīva hi buddhir adhyavasyati 'kartaṁyam etayān iti niścayaṁ karoti, ' "The I-principle (ahankāra) is egotism (abhimāna)" and this "I-principle" is perceptible in such ideas as — "To what I have observed and thought of I am entitled" — "I am able to do this" — "all these things are for my use" — "there is no one else entitled to it" — "hence I am" — the egotism involved in all such notions forms the characteristic function of the "I-principle" — it is through this principle that the Will (= buddhi) performs its determinative function appearing in such decisions as "this is to be done by me." ' (tr. G. Jha). The notion of abhimāna implies 'conceit of self', 'pride', 'egotism' (see G. Jha), in sum, 'presumption' — bearing in mind that it is the 'I' itself that is chiefly 'presumed' (as well as the entirety of the ego's relations to its surroundings) — or, in some contexts as TK 30, quoted next note, 'self-referentiality'. TS VIII (p. 86) gives a definition of ahaṅkāra and emphasizes the way in which the Trika distinguishes itself from the Sāṁkhya: buddhitattvād ahaṅkāra yena buddhipratibimbite vedyasamparke kaluṣe pumprakāśe 'nātmayā atmabhāmānāḥ śuktau rajatābhimānavat/ ata eva kāra ity anena kṛtaṅkavam asya uktam sāṁkhyaasya tu tad na yujyate sa hi nātmamo 'hamvimārasamayaṁ iti chchati vayaṁ tu kartvam api tasyecchānaṁ/ tāc ca sūdham vimarṣa evāpratīyoṣvātmacamatkārārūpo 'ham iti, 'From buddhitattvva emerges the ego (ahankāra). It is responsible for mistakenly presuming the non-Self [i.e., the body, the intellect, the faculties, etc.] to be the Self, as happens when silver is mistakenly seen in the conch shell [in lieu of mother-of-pearl]. This [experience] takes place when the light of the purūsa [viz., consciousness] is tarnished by its connexion with the object reflected in the intellect/volition (buddhi). Therefore, 'kāra [ahankāra] denotes the factitious character (kṛtaṅkava) [of the ego]. This position is not that of the follower of the Sāṁkhya, who does not admit that the Self is endowed with the awareness of itself as an 'I' — inasmuch as, according to him, the conscious principle (the purūsa) is inactive, and cannot therefore refer to itself; such self-reference will not obtain until the ahaṅkāra makes its appearance, vis-à-vis the buddhi, 'pure or active consciousness'), whereas we admit also the agency [of this "I"]. And that [agency] is pure, for [according to us] the "I" (aham) — being nothing but self-awareness — has the form of the marvellous experience of one's own Self (svāmacamatkāra), in reference to which there is no possible alternative (apratiyogin). Note, however,
In the order thus described, [have been enumerated] the triad of volition, mind and ego (buddhi mano 'ahankāraḥ), termed [collectively] the inner organ,595 which appears as an effect of the qualities, [inasmuch as their equilibrium has been disturbed by notions of] dominance and dependence.596 And it appears also as a cause, with regard to the gross elements (bhūta), the [external] organs (indriya), etc.597

Karikā 20

The master now speaks of the external organs:598

20. The ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose599 are the cognitive organs600 in respect of sound, etc.601 And voice, hand, foot, anus and

that this -kāra is often explained today by equating it with the -kāra of the grammarians: as in śākāra, the ‘vocalise’ śa. Thus, 'ahankāra, viz., the ‘vocalise’ ahām, would represent the interruption of reflexivity within consciousness, in the form of ‘aham’ (see van Buitenen 1957: 17ff.). Cf. also Kṣemarāja’s Parāprāvesikā (p. 10): 'ahānakāro nāma mamedam na mamedam ity abhimānasādhanam, ‘By ahankāra we mean that [locus] wherein is realized the conceit [of egoism] (abhimāna), as instanced by the assertions, “this is mine”, “this is not mine.” ’

595 On the functioning of those three tattvas, see the example given in TK 30: yadā mandāloke prathaman āpramudhām ālocayati atha pranṛhitamanāḥ kāraṇāntakṛṣṭasārasaśiṁjīnimaṇidākṣ阐明jodandah pracaṇḍataraḥ pājaccaro 'yam iti niścino' atha ca mām pratīyeta abhimanyate, athādhyāvasya āparāśāmītaḥ sthānād iti, ‘In dim-light, a person has at first only a vague perception of a certain object; then, fixing his mind intently, he observes that it is a robber with his drawn bow and arrow leveled at him; then follows the self-consciousness that “the robber is advancing against me”; and lastly follows the determination to run away from the place’ (tr. G. Jha).

596 According to TS VIII, one should understand that the inner organ (antahkarana) is an effect of the prakṛtātva, the additional attvā postulated by the Trika between prakṛti and buddhi in order to explain why actual creation takes place, i.e., in what manner the equilibrium of the three gunas has been disrupted. See, in Appendix 11, p. 334, the development on ksobha.

597 The Sāmkhya and the Trika differ regarding the manner in which the evolution of the phenomenal world is to be conceived; see Appendix 12, p. 335.

598 The jñānendriyas and the karmendriyas are collectively termed bāhyakaraṇas. See IPV III 1, 11 (vol. II: 241), which emphasizes the instrumental character of the threefold antahkarana and the ten bāhyakaraṇas: esām ca kāryate 'py asādāhārena karaṇātvena vyapadeśāḥ, ‘Though they are the effects [buddhi proceeding from gunatītva, 'ahānakāra from buddhi, the ten indriyas and manas from 'ahānakāra], yet, instrumentality being their peculiarity, they are spoken of as such [i.e., as instruments]’ (see also YR ad 94–95).

599 Note that the SK distinguishes clearly between the organ (indriya, e.g., the ear) and the ‘faculty’ (ṛṣṭṛti), which is nothing but the organ’s manner of functioning; see Vācaspati ad loc.: tatra rūpayagahanalāngam caksuḥ, etc., ‘The eye is the organ for perceiving color’ (tr. G. Jha), etc. In truth, the ‘function’ or ‘faculty’ enters into consideration only as a secondary phenomenon, but it is already implied by the strict relation that exists between the organ — the ear — and its ‘subtle’ object, that is, the tanmātra that is proper to it — in this case, sound. See also IPV III 1, 11, quoted note below.

600 buddhendriya or jñānendriya; G. Jha (TK 26) translates: ‘organs of sensation’, ‘sensory organs’. IPV III 1, 11 (vol. II: 241) defines them as ‘useful in acquiring the determinate cognition of sound, etc., within buddhi” (buddhanu śabdādyadvayavasāyārūpāyām upayogī). 601 Here the five tanmāras are referred to; see kā. 21.
TRANSLATION

genitals are the organs of action.602

In respect of sound, etc., that is, in respect of the domain [wherein each operates] that is to be described [in kārikā 21], there are five organs (indriya), the ear, etc., which are predominantly cognitive [hence they are termed buddhīndriyas, or jñānendriyas]. And the five organs that are predominantly active [hence they are termed karmendriyas] are the voice, etc. The domains603 [wherein operate] the organs of action (karmendriya) are speaking, grasping, moving, excreting and bliss.604

And in both cases, since both are accompanied by the ego in expressions such as ‘I hear ...’ [viz., buddhīndriya] or ‘I tell ...’ [viz., karmendriya], both are taken to be effects of the ego.605

Kārikā 21

Now, the master describes the proper form of the domains of those organs: sound, etc.:  

602 Cf. GBh 26: karma kurvannti karmendriyāṇi/ tatra vāg vadati [...], ‘They are called organs of action because they perform actions. Thus, the voice speaks [...].’ Cf. IPV III 1, 11 (vol. II: 241): tyāgo grahanam iti dvayam — bahirviṣayaṁ yat tatra pāṇīḥ pāyuḥ pādaḥ — iti karaṇāni/ etad evāntah práne yena kriyate tad vāg indriyam/ tat praksobhapraśāntyā viśrāntikriyopayo γ upasthah, ‘[Action] is of two types: giving up and grasping. In [actions related to] external objects, hand, anus and foot are the instruments (karana). Being in relation to vital air, which is internal, voice is the organ (indriya) that is able to perform the two kinds of action [viz., giving up and grasping, in the sense of exhaling and inhaling]. Hence [according to this logic], the genitals are that which is useful in the act of resting (viśrānti) which follows the cessation of the agitation [of vital breath]’ (tr. Pandey, modified) — an assertion that functions as an explanation for the viṣaya assigned to upastha, that is, ānanda, ‘bliss’, ānanda being nothing but ‘the act of resting (viśrānti) which follows the cessation of the agitation of vital breath’. And the text concludes: sarvadehavyopakāni ca karmendriyāṇy ahańkāriaviśeṣāsāmakāni/ tena cchinnahasto bāhubhyāṁ ādadanah pāninaividatta evaṁ anayai/ kevalaṁ tattatśptahpūrnavyrti- tilābhasthāntvāt pāncāṅgulirupam adhiśthānam asyocyate, ‘The organs of action pervade the whole body and are particular forms of the ego. Therefore, the person whose hands have been cut off and who receives [alms, etc.] by means of his arms really receives by means of his hands. The same may be said of other [organs] also. [The hand,] with its five fingers, is spoken of as the ‘abode’ [of the function] only because it is the seat wherein is manifested most clearly the full and complete function (vyātti), viewed in relation to various [uses]’ (tr. Pandey, modified).

603 What is termed here ‘object’ [or ‘field’, or ‘domain’] (viṣaya) of the karmendriya is termed its ‘function’ (vyātti) in Śāṅkha. Cf. SK 28 and GBh ad loc.

604 ānanda — G. Jha translates: ‘gratification’. On ānanda, object of the upastha, see n. 616; cf. BĀU II 4, 11: [...] evam sarvēṣāṁ ānandāṁ upastha ekāyaṇaṁ [...], ‘[...] as the organ of generation is the one goal of all kinds of enjoyment [...]’.

605 Cf. TS VIII (p. 87), with correction of bhautikam in bhautikavam: bhautikavam api na yuktam ahaṁ śrṇomy ityady anugāmā ca sāptah āhārākāraṇam, karaṇatvena cāvaṣyam kar- tramāsarpāśītvam, ‘It is not proper to consider them [viz., the organs] as material. Rather, since they are accompanied [by the ego] in [such statements as] “I hear”, it is obvious that they proceed from the ahaṅkāra. Since they are organs (karana), they are necessarily “touched” by the agentive part [of the ahaṅkāra].’
21. The subtle domain, devoid of [internal] differentiation, which the [cognitive organs] are [severally] to apprehend consists of the pentad of abstract entities (*tanmātra*): 606 sound, touch, [form as] light, 607 savor and odor.

As regards the domain, that is, the field, to be grasped by [each of] these organs as something to be known or done, 608 the master asks: — ‘What kind of thing is it?’ [First of all,] it is devoid of [internal] differentiation: its essence is the universal from which the particular has been expelled; 609 it is therefore subtle. Such an entity is the *tanmātra* — sound [as such], etc., [grasped in its] universal form. Sound in its universal [form] (*sabdāsamānya*) is thus called *śabdatanmātra*, ‘sound as such’ [that is, devoid of reference to the other *tanmātras*, and therefore, as well, to particular sounds]. And as for the others [namely, the karmendriyas], their domains have been already dealt with (ad 20). 610

Due to the reciprocal implication 611 of [cognitive] field and [cogni-
tive] witness, the pentad of abstract entities derives, as do the organs [of cognition and action], from the [principle of] ego.

Kārikā 22

Earth, etc., are the result arrived at by a mutual commingling of those [sensible] domains [viz., the tanmātras]. This the master says:

22. The domain [thus described], now gross due to the mingling of the [subtle tanmātras], manifests itself as the pentad of gross elements (bhūta): ether, air, fire, water and earth.

It is the particular, that is, the [now] gross domain that acquires the form of a concrete element, due to the mingling of those [subtle ‘fields as such’ (tanmātra)], that is, due to their ability to come into contact with each other.

For instance, from ‘sound as such’ (śabdatanmātra) proceeds ‘particular sound’ (śabdaviśeṣa), namely, [the gross element] ether [in the sense that ether is the locus of tonal variety, as well as of ‘sound’ as distinguished from other ‘objects’]. From sound and touch proceeds air; from those two combined with form proceeds fire; from those [three] combined with savor proceeds water; and from those [four] to which odor has been added

viṣayavisayin.

Cf. SK 25, which distinguishes the indriyas that presume (along with the manas) a sāttvika, or ‘luminous’, form of the ego from the tanmātras, that presume a tāmasa, or ‘dark’, form of the ego, with the result that manas and the indriyas are ‘apt to fulfil their specific function’ (svaśayasyamartha). Moreover, according to GBh 25, the ego ‘is said to be tāmasa to the extent that it is the origin also of the bhūtas, which abound in tamaś' (bhūtānām avidhītas tamobhahulas tenoktaḥ sa tāmasa iti). In fact the ego is the ‘origin of the bhūtas abounding in tamaś only in an indirect way: in the Sāmkhya doctrine of evolution, the bhūtas proceed from the tanmātras, which are the evolutes of the tāmasa ego. Cf. TS VIII (pp. 89-90): śabdaviśeṣāṁ hi kṣobhātmanāṁ yad ekam akṣobhātmaṁ prāgbhāvi sāmānyaṁ aviśeṣātmakaṁ tat śabdatanmātraṁ/ evam gandhānte ‘pi vācyam, ‘That which is the undisturbed, unique, [principle] of specific sounds whose nature has been disturbed, such a universal (sāmānya) of a non-specific nature, which is prior to them, is called śabdatanmātra, “sound as such”. This may be said also of the other tanmātras down to odor’.

Cf. SK 38 quoted n. 609.

bhūtas, or mahābhūtas — lit., ‘great (or gross) entities/beings’.

According to GBh 38, one bhūta proceeds from one tanmātra: ether from sound, air from touch, water from savor, fire from form, earth from odor. However, this does not contradict the definition of PS 22, which agrees, as does the theoretical section (vidyāpāda) of the Āgamas (e.g. Kālottara, Pauśkara, etc.), with the classical Sāmkhya thesis (see Yuktidīpikā ad SK 38) of the tanmātras’ progressive accumulation, that is, that the physical elements are categorized by the adjunction one-by-one of sensible qualities, for it remains the case that each bhūta has one tanmātra as its primary quality (see Torella IPK: 196); see Appendix 13, p. 337.
proceeds earth.617 Such are the five 'great' [that is, gross, physical] elements (mahābhūta).618

In consideration of the maxim, 'the effect has the qualities of the cause',619 [it follows that the mahābhūtas] have qualities that increase [in complexity] one-by-one [— each more complex element, in other words, has one more quality than the preceding simpler element].

Thus is prakṛti, whose nature is that of cause and effect,620 transformed into something that can be enjoyed by the mundane man (puruṣa), through the Will of the Supreme Lord. And so has this world of thirty-six principles been described, tattva by tattva, by distinguishing [each principle from the rest].621

Kārikiṇ 23

As the master explained previously how māyā functioned as sheath (māyākaṇcuka) [kārikiṇas 15–18], so [now] he explains how prakṛti serves as sheath with respect to the mundane man:

23. As the husk envelops the rice-grain, so does this creation, beginning with prakṛti and ending with earth, envelop consciousness in the manner of a body.

As the husk, the skin of the grain, envelops, or veils, the rice-grain, so does this creation too, starting with pradhāna and ending with earth,

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617 From clay to man, all earthly elements are fragrant.
618 On the relationship of the tanmātras and the bhūtas, see Frauwallner 1973: 279ff.
619 The statement quoted here is an adaptation of SK 14, expounding the theory of sakāryavāda: kāraṇaṃ kāraṇaṃ tadātmaṃ kāryaṃ api/ tathā kṛṣṇe bhavyāntantubhyah kṛṣṇa eva paśa bhavati, 'In mundane matters, of whatever nature is the cause, of the same nature is the effect. For instance, from black threads only a black piece of cloth comes into being'. The same logic underlies the theory of the progressive accumulation of tanmāras within the bhūtas as they increase in grossness (see IPV III 1, 10–11, in Appendix 13, p. 337).
620 See Frauwallner 1973: 304ff. From the Trika point of view, prakṛti is also an effect, inasmuch as its proceeds from māyā, which is, in turn, nothing but the Lord's energy of freedom.
621 Here ends the description of the thirty-six tattvas. On the last twenty-three, which, from buddhi onward, constitute cognizable reality (meya), see ĪPK I 1, 10–11, and Vṛtti (Torella ĪPK: 195–196). This portrayal of the process of manifestation is ultimately meant to show the way the process may be reversed progressively and the world "reabsorbed", as one strives for liberation; see PTLvṛ 21–24 (which echoes CHU VI 1, 4ff.): yathā ghaṭasārdvapraḥpraṇaḥcavarp vṛttyāntraṃ eva satyaṃ nyātātman eva satyaṃ vyātātman eva satyaṃ gandharupatāvāṣā paramarṣe 'ham ity eva satyaṃ tathā, 'As, when the phenomena that are the jar, the dish, etc., are set aside, what remains truly is clay itself, and as, when the phenomenon of clay is set aside, what remains truly is odor itself, and as, when one is no longer aware of any specific odor, what remains truly is the [absolute] 'I' (aham) itself, likewise [...]" (our translation).
envelop once again consciousness — [already] enveloped by the sheath of máyā, figuratively represented by the bran — in the manner of a body, figuratively represented by the husk, that is, it veils [consciousness] as its outer enclosure.

Here [, at this level], are called Sakalas 622 those cognizers who are of a bodily nature because of the factors of fragmentation (kalā), 623 beginning with the organs in their “pure” state [that is, without adjunction of an object] 624 and ending with particular [objects] [i.e., with the mahābhūtas].

And those who are freed from the particular [that is, from gross materiality] and from the body are Pralayākalas [as happens, for instance, in deep sleep]. 625

Such is this world: governed by the Rudras and by ordinary souls, 626 in the company of the seven categories of subjects (pramāṭṣaptaka), from Śiva to the Sakalas.

622The Sakalas, lit., ‘those endowed with kalā’, are affected by the three impurities, and their condition is that of life in this world. They are therefore also called māyāpramāṭṣ, inasmuch as they are deceived by máyā from which the dichotomy of subject and object begins. On Sakalas, see Appendix 10, p. 330.

623Commenting on kalāviluptavibhavah […] sa paśuh, ‘the fettered subject, deprived of his might by kalā’, SpN III 13 sets forth the meanings of kalā: kalayati bahih kṣipatī pārīṁityena parichinattiti kalā māyāśaktih […] aha ca kalāyā kiścitkartrtvopodbalānāmanā śaktyā taudapalakṣitenā kalāvidyākalaniyatātmanā kaṇicukena viluptavibhavah sthagitaparvakaṅṭrāvādiddharmah/ […] kalāyā akhyāyātmanāṁśena viluptavibhavah saṁkucita iva, ‘The term kalā [lit., ‘(the verb) kalayati’] designates that which, projecting outside, cuts off and delimits, namely, the energy of delusion (māyāśakti) […]. According to another interpretation, kalā means the energy/power (śakti) giving strength to limited agency (kiścitkartrtvā). [This power named kalā] implies the [quintuple] sheath (kaṇcuka) of kalā, vidyā, kāla, niyati and rāgā. Therefore, “the fettered subject deprived of his might by kalā” designates the one whose attributes of perfection, [unrestrained] agency, etc., are veiled by that [quintuple sheath]. […] [And kalā may be taken in the sense of a part (amāśa). Therefore,] being deprived of his glory by a part, i.e., by the part[ial knowledge] that is akhyāti [the metaphysical ignorance of his own plenary nature], he is contracted [i.e., limited] as it were’. Cf. ÍPV III 2, 13 (vol. II: 263), defining buddhāndriyas and karmendriyas as the expansion (prapañca) of vidyā and kalā, viz., of limited Knowledge and limited Agency (vidyākalayoh prapañcabhūtau yau kramena buddhāndriyakarmendriyavargau). Also ÍPV III 2, 8 (vol. II: 252), quoted n. 625.

624indriyāmātra — implied here is the Indian notion according to which the organs, far from being mere receptors, play an active part in the act of perception. In this vein, the term grāha is to be taken literally.

625ÍPV III 2, 8 (vol. II: 252) defines the Pralayākalas as follows: […] kṛtā akalāh kalā-tattvopalaksita karaṇanakāryahah, ‘They have been made “without activity (kalā)” (akala), i.e., devoid of the karaṇas [the internal and external organs] and kāryas [the objects of those organs] which are implied by kalātattva [Limited Agency]’. This is why the term Pralayākala has to be understood as ‘Inert in Dissolution’ [lit., ‘those devoid of limited Agency (akala), because of dissolution (pralaya)’] — a condition experienced, for instance, in deep sleep, when one reaches that state of total absorption (signified by the word ‘dissolution’) where neither sense-organs, nor objects of sense appear to be in play. It is thus a degree of consciousness higher than that of the Sakalas. Rudra is the model for such subjects. See Appendix 1, p. 317 and Appendix 10, p. 330.

626YR thus intends to place the Rudras and the ‘fettered souls’ on the same level of responsibility (or of deficiency).
24. In this world, the supreme covering is the impurity [also termed āṇavamala]; the subtle one consists of the [sixfold] sheath, beginning with māyā [thus constituting the māyīyamala]; the gross covering is external, and has the form of the body [thus constituting the kārmamala]. Indeed the Self is enwrapped in a triad of coverings.

Inmost impurity, the āṇava[mala] [viz., the impurity of deeming oneself finite], means here the [paśu's] failure to recognize that he is consciousness — which failure, in turn, consists essentially in casting aside one’s own real nature.

By supreme is meant ‘existentially included [in the finite soul]’ for it remains as coexistent [with consciousness] in the manner of the flaw within the gold. By covering (āvarana) is meant ‘veil’ (chādana).

The sixfold sheath beginning with māyā, and ending with limited Knowledge, constitutes the subtle covering of the Self.

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627... and ending with vidyā.
628The āṇavamala is the fundamental, ontological impurity, that ‘concerning the anu’ (cf. the ‘atom’ of the Vaiśeṣika — the smallest particle found in “nature”). It represents the reduction of infinite free consciousness to a minimal, ‘atomic’, state. In the realm of experience, as stated in ŚSV I 4, the āṇavamala is the ‘presumption (or intuition) of limitedness’ (apūrṇamanyatā), which makes the limited soul think: apūrṇa ‘smi, ‘I am not full [viz., ‘I am imperfect’]’ (ibid.). Same definition in PHvṛ 9 (p. 72). Note that mala often signifies, by synecdoche, āṇavamala, particularly in Siddhānta.
629The term tādāmya is used by Advaitins as a way of rationalizing their inability to describe in conventional terms the relationship between brahman and māyā — neither identity, nor difference, nor both (viz., the notion of bhedābheda, dear to the parināmavāda, but abjured by Advaita). It might be said that the Advaitin speaks of tādāmya in a way resembling Nāgārjuna’s use of the catuṣkoṭi — viz., in order to assert that the Absolute is ineffable. In the same fashion, here, even though it cannot be said why the flaw is within the gold, its presence therein is both irrefutable and “given” (nija). Here, tādāmyena glosses the epithet antaraṅga, glossed previously as nija, ‘innate’ (YR ad 17).
630One might allege here a certain inconsistency in YR’s use of metaphors. In AG’s text, in effect, the analogy of the inedible bran (kambuka) of the grain is affected to the māyīyamala (kā. 17–18). Yet, commenting (ad kā. 17) on the ‘antarāṅga’ of the hexad of sheaths that constitutes the māyīyamala, YR introduces the analogy of the flaw within the gold (kālikā) — an analogy which, in his commentary ad 24, is affected to the āṇavamala, whereas that of the bran is affected to the māyīyamala. The following interpretation may solve the difficulty: in YR ad 17, the analogy of the flaw within the gold is affected to the māyīyamala only secondarily, inasmuch as the māyīyamala presupposes the āṇavamala, which is indeed implied by the term ‘anu’, in the genitive: māyāsahitam kaṇḍukaśaṅkham anor antarāṅgam idam uktam (17b); see YR ad loc. In YR ad 87–88, the analogy of the flaw within the gold is again affected to the āṇavamala.
Such a cover pertains to [the soul/consciousness] in such a way that it leans back against it,\(^{631}\) as does the bran with respect to the rice-grain — thanks to which the display of the [limited] ability to know, act, etc., constitutive of difference,\(^{632}\) displays itself [before us — in reference to the “world” extending before us in apparent multiplicity]. It constitutes the impurity of regarding the world as objective.\(^{633}\)

**External**, with respect to it, is the covering — figuratively represented by the husk — which is characterized as embodied existence (śarirasattā) derived from pradhāna, and which is gross, for it consists of skin, flesh, etc.

This is the third impurity [namely, the impurity of supposing oneself the agent] of actions, due to which the subject becomes a receptacle for the accumulation of good and bad [results of] actions.\(^{634}\)

Thus the Self, although fully open (vikasvara) becomes contracted (ṣaṃkucitikṛta) [i.e., is reduced to finitude],\(^{635}\) like space by the jar, and is enwrapped in this triad of coverings — the supreme, the subtle and the gross.\(^{636}\) In this condition, it is deemed ‘atomic’ (aṇu, viz., finite soul), and it is termed the fettered soul (paśu).

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\(^{631}\)Viz., that it is tightly attached to it.

\(^{632}\)Here, the five kañcukas are referred to, as defined in kā. 17.

\(^{633}\)ŚSV I 4 defines the māyāyamala as the ‘display of differentiated objectivity’ (bhinnavedayapraṇaḥ), which makes the limited soul consider his body as if it were his Self, such that he thinks: ksāmaḥ sthūlo vāsmi, ‘I am slim or fat’ (ibid.). Same definition in PHṣ 9. See also YR ad 31.

\(^{634}\)ŚSV I 4 defines the kārmamala as the ‘impregnating [of consciousness] with the dispositions that result from one’s good and bad [actions]’ (śubhāśubhavāsanā), which makes the limited soul think: agniṣṭomayājī asmi, ‘I am a performer of the agniṣṭoma sacrifice’ (ibid.). Similar definition in PHṣ 9.

\(^{635}\)The contrast samkocavikāsa is specific to Trika, evoking the closing and opening of a flower. samkoca is a metaphor of finitude, vikāsa of liberation. The image will be taken up again in YR ad 56, 60, 61, in the course of discussing mokṣa.

\(^{636}\)Kṣemarāja, commenting on his PH 9 (pp. 71–72), goes even further, presenting the three malas as limitations (samkoca, or parimitatā) of the icchā, jñāna and kriyā śaktis, respectively: icchāśaktiḥ samkucitā satī apārnammanvayatārūpam ānavam malam; jñānaśaktiḥ [...] antahkaranabuddhīyatāpattīpavam āvantam samkocagrahanena bhinnavedyapratātārūpam māyāyam malam; kriyāśaktiḥ [...] karmendriyārūpasamkocagrahanapavam āvantam parimitatām prāptā subhāśubhānusūṣṭhānāmayam kārnam malam/, ‘icchāsakti, once contracted, becomes ānavamala, which consists in considering oneself imperfect; jñānaśakti, assuming the extreme contraction that begins with the acquisition of the inner organ and cognitive organs, becomes māyāyamala, which consists of the apprehension of objects as different [from one another and from the Self]; kriyāsakti, once contracted in the form of organs of action, becomes extremely limited, assuming the form of kārmamala, which consists in doing good and evil’. 
Due to its relationship with those [three coverings, or impurities], [the Self] is harmed, as it were. The master says:

25. Due to the darkness of ignorance [which is akin to the disease of double-vision], the [Self] conceives its own essential nature as a multifarious diversity of objects and subjects, whereas it is one and nondual.

The [aforementioned] Self, bound up with the triad of coverings, because it has been brought into contact with the darkness that is the failure to discern the Self, knows its own — that is, its inherent, viz., not borrowed from another — essential nature ($\text{अत्मस्वभवम्} = \text{svabhāvam ātmānām}$) — namely, consciousness, that essence whose distinguishing mark is the [pure] presence of the Self —

$\text{637 upahata} = \text{‘harmed’ means here ‘forgotten’. Same image in YR ad 31: yad [anātmany api] ... ātmamāṇitvam ... etad aitivasasam.}$

$\text{638 ajñānatimira} — \text{the term timira is here used both in its general sense (‘darkness’) and in a specialized medical sense, designating a certain disease of the eye (see also the gloss, here, of ajñānatimira by ‘ātmākhātyāyandhakāra’ as well as kā. 31 and YR ad loc.). What is at stake here is the specific ocular disorder that causes double-vision, which may be translated by the technical term ‘diplopia’. This diplopia, and its effect, the apprehension of a double moon, serves as a classic example of erroneous perception (bhrānti) and of metaphysical ignorance, or nescience (akhyāti), since by this defect of vision one perceives duality where there is only unity. The motif of diplopia is recurrent in Trika literature; see, for instance, TĀ I 331, IPv 3 II 2, 17 (dvicandrajndnadav apy angulyaṇajñānaśadāh, ‘timira, which is an imperfection [of vision] due to which one sees [real objects as] double, is [to be understood] as what obstructs the vision of the supreme consciousness (pratibhā)’. Rāmānuja’s Śrībhāṣya I 1, 1 (pp. 99–100) explains the apprehension of a double moon by the split of the visual rays that is produced either through pressure of the finger upon the eye, or owing to timira, understood in the technical sense of an ‘ocular disorder’: dvicandrajñānādav apy angulyavaśāmbhanātimirādibhir nāyanatejogatibhedena sāmagraībhedāt sāmagraīdvayam anyonyanirāpeksam candragrahanadvayahetur bhavati, ‘Similar is the case of the double moon. Here, either through pressure of the finger upon the eye, or owing to some abnormal affection of the eye, the visual rays are divided (split), and the double, mutually independent apparatus of vision thus originating, becomes the cause of a double apprehension of the moon’ (tr. Thibaut, Vedāntasūtra: 123). The term rekhātimira is in itself a technical description of the trouble, since it means the ‘timira consisting in [confusing the lines (rekhā)’. See YR ad 31.}$

$\text{639 Despite the separate avat. ad 25, kārikās 24 and 25 make one grammatical unit, whose subject is the āman (occurring at the very end of kā. 24) and whose predicate is the verb avabudhyeta.}$

$\text{640 svam svabhāvam ātmānām — agreeing with Barnett, Silburn translates: ‘alors qu’il est [...] identique à soi’ — ‘whereas it is self-identical’], which appears to render svam svabhāvam. See YR’s commentary on svam svabhāvam ātmānām, rephrased as svam ātmasvabhāvam.}$

$\text{641 ātmākhātyāyandhakāra — cf. the definition of the ānāvamala as caitanyasya ... akhyāti, in YR ad 24.}$
although one — that is, although of a nondual nature — [only] in terms of the phenomenal display — a display that consists of multifarious constructs [or (artificial) arrangements, dispositions], such as knower, means of knowledge and known;

or, in other words, it thinks of itself in terms of difference, the obverse of [original] non-difference.

For instance, the person afflicted with the [ocular disorder called] rekhātimira, though he is looking at just one moon, asserts that there are two moons in the sky and even points them out to people, saying: ‘Look at the two moons!’ Inasmuch as the moon is really single, it is due to his diplopia (timira) that it so appears. And thus, the person afflicted with diplopia experiences a practical result, be it anxiety or delight.\(^{642}\)

Similarly, he takes as his goal the fruits of actions, as different [from himself], treating everything as different though it is not different from his own self — he by whom the display of difference has been taken for granted thanks to the darkness of ignorance [viz., of non-recognition of the Self].\(^{643}\)

And thus he becomes again and again the enjoyer of heaven and hell [as a result of his actions].

In this way, diplopia is to be taken here as a metaphor\(^ {644}\) for ignorance (ajñāna),\(^ {645}\) for thereby things appear contrary [to reality].

Kārikā 26

The master shows the nonduality of the Self through an illustration:\(^{646}\)

26. Just as juice, skimmed froth, granular sugar, brown sugar, candy, etc., are in essence nothing but sugar cane,\(^ {647}\) so are all forms

\(^{642}\)arthakriyāṁ prāṇoto — lit., ‘He acquires [viz., reaps the benefit of] its causal efficiency which produces either anxiety or delight’. Seeing those two moons, he watches them or shows them to others, deriving either anxiety or delight from this experience, or wishing others to experience the same feelings.

\(^{643}\)Thus are referred to, respectively, the ānavamala (the darkness of ignorance), the madhyamala (the display of difference), and the kārmamala (the acting in the world of differentiation).

\(^{644}\)rupanā.

\(^{645}\)Same phraseology in YR ad 30, which reformulates PS 25.

\(^{646}\)It should be noted that AG’s PS 26–28 agrees here as to content and sequence with APS 26–28.

\(^{647}\)Cf. MM 25, which uses the same analogy in a different context. The PM ad loc. explains: yadvad iksurasasya svapākayuktikramāt styānibhūtasya mādhuryam gulaṇīndair na pariṣajyate, ‘[...] as sweetness is not alien to [viz., is still retained by] the lumps of gūr (solidified molasses), [that result] from the process of cooking the juice of the sugar cane until it becomes solidified’. Cf. ChU VI 1, 4: yathā saumya ekena mṛtpiṇḍena sarvam mṛtyumayam vijñātaṁ syāt vācārambhāṇam vikāro nāmadheyaṁ mṛtyikety eva satyam, ‘Just as, my dear, by one clot of clay all that is made of clay becomes known, the modification being only a name arising
only different states of the supreme Self, Śaṃbhu.648

As one and the same essence of sugar cane (iksurasā) is [revealed in] the different forms taken on by the sugar cane, such as juice (rasa), etc., on account of the [same] ultimate sweetness found in all of them, so, likewise, all particulars that appear within phenomenal display through the relation of object to subject are — [like] waking, etc. — merely different states of the supreme Self (paramātman), one’s own essential nature, [which we term] Śaṃbhu, the Great Lord, consciousness itself.

For it is that very Lord, the inner self (svātmabhūta) of each and every one, who assumes those different roles649 out of his own freedom, and thus displays himself as characterized by the states of object and subject, etc., in the same way as does the juice of the sugar cane [assume various forms].650 Moreover, it is not that there is anything different from that Self. Therefore, it is one and nondual, for consciousness pervades all the states.

Thus, visualizing everywhere the unity [of the Self], the cognizer becomes the knower of all.651

As the revered Śaṃbhu[nātha] has stated:652

One object has the nature of all objects. All objects have the nature of one object. Therefore, he who has seen one object in its essence has seen all objects in their essence.

And in Bhagavadgītā:

Whereby in all beings one/ Unchanging653 condition men

from speech while the truth is that it is just clay'.

648Verse quoted in PM 25.
649bhumikā — same image in YR ad 1 and 5. Compare YR ad 5: na punah śivavyatiriktam kīmciit padārthajātam asti, 'There is, in consequence, nothing to which language can refer that is other than Śiva'. and what is formulated here: na punah svātmamanah tasmād bhinnam kīmciid asti, 'Moreover, it is not that there is anything different from that Self'. On bhūmikā in the sense of ‘level [of subjectivity]’, see YR ad 41–46 (general avat.) and 45.
650The use of the word rasa here in its two senses (lit., ‘juice’ and fig. ‘essence’) confirms the word’s etymology. The connection of the two is so close that it may be doubted whether even a pun is intended.
651sarvadṛśvan.
652One of the teachers of AG who deserves specific mention in TĀ (I 12–13, I 16), Śaṃbhu-nātha (celebrated as Bhaṭṭanātha, ‘revered teacher’, in sl. 16) probably initiated AG in Kaula tantric practices.
653Our text agrees with the KSTS in reading āksaya ‘imperishable’ here. However, the received text of this line of the Gītā reads avyaya ‘changeless’, which is followed by Śaṅkara (who glosses it with kūṭastha) as well as by other commentators (when this can be ascertained); and this reading was also adopted in the critical edition of the Mahābhārata (VI 40, 20) and in Edgerton’s translation. For the reasons why we have retained the KSTS’s variant, see our ‘List of variants’ in ‘On the Sanskrit text’.
TRANSLATION

perceive, / Unmanifold in the manifold, / Know that that knowl-
edge is of goodness. 654

Kārikā 27

Though the variety [of reasonings] 655 formulated by the other schools is accepted by us for purposes of provisional discussion, 656 that variety is not becomingly employed 657 in the arena of [those reasonings that have to do with] the truth.

The master now says:

27. [The many differing conceptions of the Ultimate — that it is] Consciousness, or the Inner Controller, or Breath, or the Sovereign Body, 658 or the Genus, or, finally, that it is the Particular — all these are for purposes of disputation only; 659 in ultimate terms, none of

654 BhG XVIII 20. This verse contrasts the knowledge proceeding from sattva with that based on rajas (śl. 21) and tamas (śl. 22). This sāttvika knowledge consists in realizing the Self (here bhāva, 'Entity/Reality') as nondual, however multifarious empirical diversity may be. BhGBh XVIII, 20 concludes: tadātmavastu vyomavan nirantaram ity arthah, 'That Reality which is the Self remains, like space, undivided — this is the purport'. And Ś adds in his avat. to 21: yāṁ dvaitadarśanāṁ tāṁ asamyooghātūṁ rājasāṁ tāmasāṁ cet na sākṣāt samāroccihataye bhavanti, 'Being based on rajas and tamas, those doctrines that are dualistic are incomplete; therefore, they are not by themselves adequate for the eradication of [the pains of] worldly existence'.

655 Note that bhedaḥ is rephrased as ete bhedaḥ (plural) at the end of the same commentary.

656 samvyāratham — 'for purposes of provisional [discussion]' is a contextually determined "translation" of samvyāratham, here apparently understood by YR as a synonym of the kārikā's vyavahāramātram. In any case samvṛti appears to be used here in a way consistent with its Buddhist sense; YR himself, while commenting on this very kārikā, uses the term samvṛti-sātya, variously translated as 'vérité d' enveloppement', 'surface-level truth', 'relative truth', or 'truth of empirical order', and contrasted with paramārthasatya, 'deep-level truth'. On this opposition, see, inter alia, Edgerton BSHD, s.v., who translates 'common-sense truth'; Sprung 1973: 40–53; Bareau 1966, vol. III: 179, 184, 196. Cf. Bhāmatī on satyāṁ mithunūqtya (BSBh 1, 1, Adhyāsapракarana: 17): na ca samvyātiparamārthasatoḥ paramārthikam mithunam astity abhūtataddbhāvārthasya cveḥ prayogah.

657 avakalpate.

658 virāḍeha — the cosmic Man whose body is the entire cosmos. Silburn distinguishes between virāj, translated as 'corps cosmique' ['cosmic body'], and deha, translated as 'corps ordinaire' ['ordinary body']. So does Pandit PS: 37. We have followed YR's gloss, which takes virāḍdeha as a unit. Note that R ad ĀPS 27 interprets also virāḍdeha as a single syntagm, and understands it as 'the Brahmade Egg, stretching for 500 million yojanas' (pañcāātkotiyojana-vistārnambrahmāṇām). Cf. BĀUBh I 4, 1, who identifies the ātman with Virāj or Hiranyagarbha.

659 Whatever translation we adopt, vyavahāra (in vyavahāramātram etat) should be taken as referring to this world of practical and provisional truths. Cf. also YR ad 37: 'Moreover, in none of the other schools of philosophy do the terms jīva, puruṣa, ātman, aṇu, apply (vyavahriyate) to the Supreme Lord, a uniform and unqualified mass of blissful consciousness'. Cf. also Māũ7 and 12, in which 'the ineffable final fourth part of the human self and the soundless fourth part of om [...] are described as ayyavahāra, "not susceptible of being dealt with, in language or otherwise." ' (Hacker 1972: 120). According to ĀŚ II 17–19 and Ś
them exist [as characterizations of the Ultimate].

ad loc. (on the authorship of the Gaudapádiyabhasya, or Ágamaśāstravivarana [ĀŚV], and its traditional ascription to Ś, see notably Bouy ĀŚ: 31–33, and n. 140), prāna, etc., are among the innumerable objects (bhāva) imagined (vikalpita) as the ātman. And those objects are endowed with samsāradharmas, ‘phenomenal attributes’ (ĀŚV II 17–18), or samsāralakṣanas, ‘phenomenal characteristics’ (ĀŚV II 19), such as cause and effect, exteriority, interiority, decay, death, etc., from which, as established by scripture (sarvopaniṣad, in ĀŚV I 17; śāstra, in ĀŚV II 18) through the via negationis, the ātman is altogether distinct (ĀŚV II 17 is quoted n. 667).

And, ipso facto, the doctrines that expound them.

This enumeration of different conceptions of the Real is rather unusual in Trika literature. The canonical scheme appears to be that of PS 32, which enumerates deha, body, prāna, breath, buddhi, intellect or volition, and nabhas (or śunya), the Void. A list that matches that of ĪPK I 6, 4, and of ŚSV I 1, which, commenting on caitanyam ātman, explicitly attributes these different conceptions of the Real to their respective exponents or schools of thought: aha cātma ka iti jijnāsūn upadesyān prati bodhayitum na āarīraprāṇabuddhiñāṇyāni laukikacārvāka vaidikyogācāramādhyamikādyabhupagatāni ātmāpi tu yathoktam caitanyam eva, ‘And so, in order to explain to inquisitive disciples what the Self is, the author says: “It is not the body, as maintained by the Materialists (laukikacārvāka), not Breath (prāna), as maintained by the followers of the Vedas, not the intellect (buddhi), as maintained by the Yogācāras, nor the Void (śunya), as maintained by the Mādhyamikas, but, as already said, it is pure consciousness (caitanya)” (tr. Singh, modified). For parallel passages, see Appendix 14, p. 338.

The enumeration of kā. 27a may have been occasioned by APS 27a, first hemistich, of which it is an exact borrowing. However, the perspectives of the two texts are altogether different. On the basis of their common terminology and approach, it appears that, as a Vedāntin, Ādiśeṣa agrees with Bhartṛprapañca’s conception of brahman, or paramātman, passing through different states, or stages (avasthā), in the process of evolution, the ultimate reality becoming differentiated into the manifold objects of experience that are both identical to and different from it. These stages, or modes, of the saprapañcabrahman, to which the infinite variety of the universe is reduced, are eight in number, according to Bhartṛprapañca. In descending order, the hypostases, or ‘transformations’ (parināma) of brahman, or are (see Hiriyanna 1924: 79–80): 1) antaryāmin; 2) sākṣīn; 3) avyākta; 4) sūtra; 5) virāj; 6) daiva; 7) jāti; 8) piṇḍa.

Thus, as Hiriyanna concludes (p. 80): ‘the whole brahman may be said to evolve in two distinct lines — one (1–2) the spiritual, and the other (3–8) the material, which constitutes either the adjunct or the environment of the spiritual’. In APS 27a, those avasthās are said to be five, if one relies on R, who takes jātipinda as a unit, glossing it “vyāśtidēhaḥ”, doubtless to be taken in its Śāmkhya acceptance, which designates the particular ‘body’ only insofar as it constitutes a part of a larger whole. Thus Ādiśeṣa enumerates vijñāna, antaryāmin, prāna, virāddheha, and jātipinda, even though those states imputed to the Self are in truth unreal, for it is only one, as established by ChU VI 2, 1 quoted by R ad APS 27. Despite the similarity of their first hemistichs, verses 26 and 27 differ as to their purport in the two Paramārtarāsāra. In APS, kā. 26 and 27 form a pair expounding the view common to Bhartṛprapañca and Ādiśeṣa of the evolutionary relationship between paramātman (or saprapañcabrahman) and the modes in which the universe appears: rasaphāṇītaśarāṣṭarkārayogādhanādā vikṛtayu yathāvivekoṣah/ tadbhavād udbhādāh paramātmanam eva bahurūpāh/ vijñānāntaryāmiprāṇavrāddhehajātipindāntāh/ vyavahārās tasyādānāmy ete vasthāvisēsāh sūyāh/... On the contrary, AG’s PS distinguishes 26 from 27, which contrast is signaled also by the supplementary -ādyāh. Verse 26 is indeed an adaptation of APS 26 (besides the adjunction of -ādi, note the suppression of vikti in a; the greater alteration of b). Verse 27 then becomes the doctrinal exposition of different conceptions of the Self, at the cost of making a few alterations in the half verse: vijñānāntaryāmiprāṇavrāddhehajātipindāntāh/ vyavahārānātram etat paramārtthena tu na santy eva/... According to YR’s interpretation, the names given to the Self or Ultimate do not denote the different states through which it passes, but the different conceptions of the Ultimate that...
By consciousness (vijñāna)\textsuperscript{662} is meant ‘nothing but consciousness’ (bodhamātra), in isolation (kevala), devoid of limiting attributes.\textsuperscript{663} Although devoid of name and form,\textsuperscript{664} [consciousness] appears variously, adopting the mode of externality, in shapes such as “blue” and “pleasure”, etc.,\textsuperscript{665} — thanks to the power of beginningless latent dispositions [constantly] reawakened (vāsanāprabodha)\textsuperscript{666} and infinitely various. Thus say the different schools of philosophy attempt to establish. Thus, verse 27 aims to refute such doctrines in order to establish the Trika as the highest and only true view. From the Trika perspective, if there is an evolution, it is not of the Self, which is beyond evolution, but of speculations about the Self. And Trika represents the accomplishment of this long speculative process (see n. 689 and 946). Cf. ĀŚ II 19–28, which enumerates thirty-five conceptions of the Self or Ultimate, falsely represented as so many phenomena. ĀŚ II 30 concludes that the ātman, which assumes the form of the innumerable phenomena it itself creates, is in reality absolute and free from all ideation. Such phenomena do not exist independently of the ātman, which is their substratum, as shown by Ś ad loc., who quotes BĀU I 4, 6 [= IV 5, 7]: \textit{idam sarvam yad ayam ātmā.} Also, BSBh I 1. A separate monograph will be devoted to a detailed interpretation of this kārikā and its commentary.

The question of how to translate the term is taken up in May 1971: 305. The term (one of whose synonyms is citta) is understood contextually as ‘cognition*, ‘pensée* (‘thought’), or ‘conscience* (‘consciousness’); May translates \textit{cinamātravāda}, one of the appellations given to the Vijnānavāda, as ‘doctrine du rien-que-pensée*, ‘doctrine de la pensée sans plus’ (EPU II, s.v. citta). Cf. ĀŚ II 25b and BSBh II 2, 28.

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\textsuperscript{663}anupādhi.

\textsuperscript{664}From BĀU I 6, 3, the syntagm ‘name and form’ signifies phenomenal reality as veiling the immortal ātman, equated with prāṇa. Therefore, it designates the objective aspect of consciousness. “Name** refers to the “designating** subject, “form** to the “signified** object; in their opposition, they refer to a world conceived of as a totality half-objective and half-subjective.

\textsuperscript{665}nīla, ‘blue’ [or yellow (pīta), etc.], is the standard example of the external form grasped by the sense-organs, whereas sukha, ‘pleasure’, is that of the internal, grasped by the antahkarana (see YR ad 30). Therefore, the syntagm nīlasukhādi represents the ‘knowable’ (vedya), or ‘objectivity’ insofar as it is an object of consciousness, whether external or internal. Such reasonings are common to Buddhist idealists and to the Trika, even though the latter (see SpK I 4) reaches the opposite conclusion: the existence of a permanent Subject, a substratum for the impermanent, incidental experiences of pleasure and pain, etc. On the Vijnānavāda, see Bouy ĀŚ: 229–235, 261–263 (who refers to Lévi 1911, Béreau 1966, Bugault 1968, Yamada 1977, Dāsgupta 1969, Mahadevan 1975); see also May 1971: 265–323.

\textsuperscript{666}YR reproduces here the very terms of ĪPK I 5, 5, which formulates the Vijnānavāda doctrine through its refutation — to which Trika adheres — by the Bāhyārthānumeyavādins: \textit{na vāsanāprabodho 'tra vicitro hetutām iyāt/ āsāpyā taprabodhayā vaicīrye kim nibandhanam//}, ‘Not [even] a varied reawakening of the dispositions can be taken to be the cause here [viz., of the multiformal world of phenomena], for in such case, what would be the cause of the variety of their reawakening [if not the existence of material entities outside the plane of thought]?’ (tr. Torella, modified); ĪPV I 5, 5 (vol. I: 212ff.), refutes the Vijnānavāda with two arguments: 1) vāsanās are able to cause remembrance only: vijñānavādinā yo hetu vaicīrye vāsanāprabodhalakṣaṇa uktāḥ sa na upadhyate/ ‘ṣmṛtyajanaḥ saṃskāraḥ vāsanā’ iti tāvat prasiddham, ‘What the Vijnānavādin holds, namely, that the cause of phenomenal diversity consists in the [re]awakening of the vāsanās (vāsanāprabodha), cannot be accepted, for it is well known that “the vāsanā is the residual trace (saṃskāra) responsible for remembrance (ṣmṛti) [and nothing else]”’; 2) ultimately, the Vijnānavādin’s position is but ‘a kind of bāhyārthavāda under the guise of different words’ (tad ayam śabdāntarapracchānno bāhyārthavādapraṇakāra eva); ĪPK I 5, 6–7 give the Trika position, which agrees with the Vijnānavāda in denying
the Vijñānavādins.\textsuperscript{667} The Brahmavādins,\textsuperscript{668} citing the texts:

All this [universe] is verily Puruṣa,\textsuperscript{669}

the independent existence of the material world, but disagrees with it inasmuch as it replaces inert thought (citta) by free, divine and omnipotent consciousness, as the source of the phenomenal world: cidāṁmaiva hi devo 'ntahsthitam icchāvaśād bahiḥ/ yogīva nirupādānām arthajātam prakāśayet/; ‘Indeed, the Lord, who is consciousness, manifests externally the multitude of the objects that reside within him, without having recourse to material causes, through his sole will, as does a yogin’ (IPK I 5, 7); see also BS Bh II 2, 28, p. 395, which reproduces the debate between a Buddhist Bāhyārthavādin, who holds that the external object is the cause of perceptive cognition (prajñāpāti), and the Vijñānavādin, for whom it is thought or consciousness that transforms itself into objects. To the objection of the Bāhyārthavādin: katham punar asati bāhyārthe pratayavaciṣṭāyam upadayate, ‘How does one explain the variety of sense experience if the external object does not exist?’ the Vijñānavādin thus answers: vāsanāvaicitryād iti, ‘due to the variety of the [inherited, immemorial] dispositions’. See also YR’s commentary ad 91, which uses the same terms: vāsanāprabodha.

\textsuperscript{667} Cf. ĀPS 26–27, which expounds an early vedāntic doctrine that agrees essentially with the teachings of the upaniṣads, on the states or modalities of the saprapārabrahman in the course of its transformation, namely, according to Ādiśeṣa: vijñāna, antaryāmin, prāṇa, vi-rādeha and jātipinda. Hence, R ad ĀPS 26–27 quotes, in order to explain vijñāna, BĀU III 9, 28: vijñānam ānandam brahma, ‘brahman is knowledge and bliss’. Cf. also ĀSV II 17, where the ātman is defined as pure consciousness and nothing else (viśuddhaviṇājñānam: tadhetuphalādisamsāra dharmān paramārthaḥ, ‘That exists in an ultimate sense where there is no insentience’, SpN explains: mūḍhābhava aśvāyāmyakavravāsājñānaprakāśātmakartato vijñānam bhūtaḥ, ‘although pure consciousness (prakāśa), said to be devoid of reflection (vimārya), such as have held the partisans of Vedānta — who say “brahman is consciousness” (vijñānam brahma iti) — even to that brahman insensibility [may be secondarily attributed], because [in addition to being devoid of reflection which is] the source of its sovereignty (aśvāyā), it lacks the power of vibration (spanda) which is the essence of its freedom (svātantrya)’. In the same way, YR (ad vijñāna and antaryāmin) treats as equivalent the Vijñānavāda and the Sāntabrahmavāda, glossing over their many similarities and differences, insofar as he emphasizes that both have erred equally in not recognizing the absolute freedom of the Lord as cause of creation. Thus perhaps YR echoes the criticism of the Vijñānavādins as formulated by the Mādhyamikas. In effect, according to the Mādhyamikas, the Vijñānavāda theory of cognition, involving the concept of ālayavijñāna, ‘consciousness-receptacle’, has surreptitiously reintroduced the germ of a substantiality which they [viz., the Mādhyamikas] denounced as a resurrection of the brahmanical ātman (see Bareau 1966: 196 and Bouy AŚ: 320) into Buddhist speculations that had been characterized by the doctrine of anātman (Pāli anattā) (viz., the non-existence of an imperishable ātman); see ĪPK I 5, 5, quoted n. 666.

\textsuperscript{668} By the term ‘Brahmavādin’ YR may refer here to Śaṅkara’s Advaita or to preśaṅkarite Vedānta, and most probably, to the Vaiṣṇava stream of presaṅkarite Vedānta, as represented by Bhartṛprapañca and Ādiśeṣa — the reference made here to the pursaśūkta (ĪŚ X 90) would corroborate such a hypothesis; on the identification of that Brahmavāda, see n. 41.

\textsuperscript{669} RS X 90, 2. Same text in ŚU III 15, quoted in SpN II 6–7, which reveals what is really
There is not the least diversity here [in brahman],\(^{670}\) hold that it is the transcendental brahman itself, which they call the 'Inner Controller (antaryāmin) of all',\(^{671}\) that appears as difference through the force of beginningless nescience.

[We, however, reply:] — In both these [doctrines, though the

at stake when confronting the upaniṣadic doctrine with the Śaiva: ātmā jñātavya iti tatreṣā eva sarvaśarvakartṛśvatantrāśvaravārūpatayā prayābhiṣijātām ātmano jñātām na tu puṣaṇa evaśam sarvām iti śrutyaṇtaviduktam, 'In the statement: “The Self should be known”, what is meant is the recognition (prayābhiṣijāna) of the Self as Śiva, who is omniscient, omnipotent and free. Such is the knowledge of the Self. That [knowledge] is not referred to by the Vedāntins' (śrutyaṇtavid) dictum, “All this [universe] is verily Puruṣa.”  Then Kṣemarāja concludes with a quotation from SvT IV 392a: \(\text{ta ātmopāsakäh sarve na gacchanti param padam ity āmnāyoktekhe,} \) "[It is not so] for, as stated by tradition [viz., SvT IV 392a]: “All those worshipers of the Self do not reach the highest state.”  As explained by Singh (SpK: 125), according to the Trika, the realization of [lit., “mergence into”] the Self (ātmavijñāpīt) is not the highest ideal, rather it is śivavyāpī, the realization of both the Self and the universe as Śiva. Cf. also BĀU I 4, 1: ātmaivedam agrāsit puṣravādīyah, 'In the beginning, this [world] was the ātmā alone, in the form of the puṣrava' (cf. Radhakrishnan: 'In the beginning this [world] was only the self in the shape of a person'), and the ‘Śaiva Āgama’ text quoted in PHvj* 8: sthītā vedavidah puṇṣi, 'The knowers of the Vedas rest [content] with the Puruṣa'.

\(^{670}\)BĀU IV 4, 19. It is evidently a quotation from some older text (tad ete ślokā bhavantī: BĀU IV 4, 8), which is followed by this conclusion: mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyum āpnoti/ ya iha nāneva paśyati, 'He goes from death to death, who sees in it, as it were, diversity'. Cf. also KĀU IV 10b and 11b; text quoted, by means of its pratika, along with the pratika of BĀU II 5, 19 (= ĒŚ VI 47, 18: indo māyābhīhi) in ĀŚ III 24a (neha nāneti cāmnāyād [ ...]), and in ĀŚV II 31. Cf. also ChU VI 2, 1 quoted n. 893. The two citations given by YR, representing Brahmadvāda-Vedānta, establish the thesis that duality is unreal: the Lord whose manifestation is the differentiated universe is inwardly free from differentiation. SpP 28–9 [= ad II 3–4, p. 37] quotes the Śrutī: śrutī ca ātmavedām jagat sarvām neha nānātī kuścanā, ‘Śruti declares: “All this universe is the Self alone, there is not the least diversity here.” ’

\(^{671}\)R ad APS 27 quotes BĀU III 7, 3: yah prthivyām tiṣṭhan prthivyā antararah, yaḥ prthivi na veda, yasya prthivi śāriram, yaḥ prthivim antaro yamayati, esah ta ātmāntaryāmy anmāt. ‘He who dwells in the earth, yet is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who controls the earth from within, he is your self, the inner controller, the immortal’. BĀU III 7 (1–23) consists, in its entirety, of the definition, in the form of a litany, of the ātmā as antaryāmin, ‘the inner controller from within who controls this world and the next and all things’ (ya imām ca lokam param ca lokam sarvāh ca bhūtān antaro yamayati), who is ‘that thread by which this world, the other world and all beings are held together’ (tatt sūrāṃ yasmin ayam ca lokah paraś ca lokah sarvāh ca bhūtān samycomingsah bhavantii) [BĀU III 7, 1]. The litany concludes (v. 23): nānāya to ‘sti draṣṭā, nānāya to ‘sti śrotā, nānāya to ‘sti māntā, nānāya to ‘sti vijñātā/ esah ta ātmāntaryāmy anmāt. ‘There is no other seer but he, there is no other hearer but he, there is no other perceiver but he, there is no other thinker but he. He is your self [ātmā], the inner controller, the immortal’. Cf. also MĀU 6, in which antaryāmin defines the prājñā (on this notion, see kā. 35 and YR ad loc.). Thus, the earliest references to the notion of antaryāmin are to be found in the Śatapathabṛahmana and the upaniṣads, especially in the ChU and BĀU, from which is quoted ‘There is not the least diversity here [in brahman]’. In Vaiṣṇava Vedānta, the antaryāmin, which occurs first in the enumeration of the states or modes of the paramātmā, appears as a tattva. Different is the later vedāntic conception of the antaryāmin; see, for instance, Pāiocādāśī VI 236; also BS Bh 1 2, 5, 18 (which discusses BĀU III 7), in which Śaṅkara holds that the antaryāmin is effectively the ātman, and is distinguished, at least provisionally, from the jīva (this being wholly determined by māyā), whereas what one has called the antaryāmin represents the core of what is real in the heart
conscious principle has been formulated as supreme], what has not been recognized is the freedom of that conscious principle (vedāna), which, endowed with life,\textsuperscript{672} becomes the efficient cause\textsuperscript{673} of the construction of the universe.\textsuperscript{674}

However, others, the Prāṇabrahmavādins [viz., the Brahmavādins who hold that brahman is cosmic Breath], maintain that the entire universe has come into being in accordance with the act of breathing (prāṇa), once the resolve [of creating the universe] has been formed (āgūrya) [or, once [the brahman-prāṇa] has proclaimed it].\textsuperscript{675} And since, according to

of the living being — impossible to slough off. Evidently, the antaryāmin is ‘considered from the vyāvahārika point of view’, but, at the same time, transcends that point of view — it is not the jīva, and to it is not attributed any ‘creative’ role. Similarly, Rāmānuja identifies the antaryāmin with Nārāyaṇa, arguing against a pūrvapakṣa which would have it the same as the jīva.

\textsuperscript{672}jīvitabhūta — such terminology implicitly contests the vedāntic’s view that brahman is śānta.

\textsuperscript{673}hetu — efficient or ‘impelling’ cause (according to the grammatical acceptation of the term — specifically, the causative ‘agent’ as contrasted with the embedded ‘agent’: P. 14, 55).

Cf. Kallaṭa’s Tattvavicāra quoted in SpP 1, p. 9: śāktiprasarasāṅkocanibaddhāv udayavyayau/ yasyātma sa śivo jñeyah sarvabhāvapravartakah//, ‘[All things] arise and fall away in consonance with the extension and withdrawal of [Śiva’s] power. Know that their essential nature is Śiva, Who impels all things’ (tr. Dyczkowski SpK: 145).

\textsuperscript{674}According to the Trika, the inadequacy of the Śaṅtabrahmavāda consists in its considering brahman as pure prakāśa, inherently luminous consciousness, devoid of self-awareness (vimāraṇa), or dynamic freedom (svātantra); see SpN ad I 5. Same argument in YR ad 15.

In the Tāvīryāvatā, develops his criticisms of the Vijñānavāda.

\textsuperscript{675}The entire passage is quite puzzling. A number of texts refer to those named Prāṇavīds, or Prāṇātmavādins. For instance, according to ŚŚV I 1 (quoted n. 661), they are Vaiḍikas. Cf. ĀŚ II 20, dealing with the different conceptions of the ātman: ‘Comme étant l’Énergie pneumatique [le] conçoivent ceux qui connaissent l’énergie pneumatique’ (tr. Bouy — ‘It is conceived as pneumatic energy (prāṇa) by those who know pneumatic energy’). According to Anubhūtisvarupa, Ānandagiri and Svayaipprakāśānanda ad loc., the Prāṇavīds are the Hairanyagarbhas, worshipers of the Hiranyagarbha eulogized in ČS X 121, who take the prāṇa to be the ‘creator of the world’ (jagatkarti), or, if prāṇa is taken to be Īśvara, the Lord, those who, like the Vaiśeṣikas, consider the Lord as the efficient cause (see Bouy ĀŚ: 127). Nevertheless, such an identification creates a problem: can these Hairanyagarbhas, whoever they may be, be understood as the savimarśaśabdabrahmavādins of YR’s commentary? There remains the possibility that these Brahmavādins are to be identified with Bhartṛhari and his followers — the key to the puzzle being the reference here to the word āgūrya, although the word is itself as puzzling as the entire passage. However that may be, the different usages of the term agree with the sense, well attested in the older language, of the root gur/gūr (related to the root gu or gū by the majority of philologists): at issue is the articulation of a formula with ritual function in the course of a rite of some sort. Later lexicographers add the nuance of ‘proposition’, inasmuch as the majority of such formulae amount to invitations or to requests for actions. It should not then be surprising that the term figures here in the dissection of theses attributed to the Prāṇabrahmavādins, who would derive the cosmos from a similar ‘proposition’ articulated quasi-verbally by “(Śabda)brahman”. It is perhaps due to that ambiguity that our text does not specify the agent of the act of elocution, but the doctrinal context allows one to suppose that it is either brahman or the force of “breath” that brahman represents. Thus, it seems that YR expounds here the view (shared by Bhartṛhari and others) that words precede the things they name in the order of creation. Such speculations echo the śaṅkarite exegesis of ChU I 11, 4–5, whose conclusion is that ‘prāṇa is brahman’
them, brahman has no form other than Breath, brahman is Word [itself] (śabdabrahman) endowed with self-awareness (savimarśa).

Others are agreed that the true form of brahman is the Sovereign Body (virāddeha) [that is, the cosmic body (deha), or creation] that has assumed the shape of Virāj (vairāja) — in accordance with such texts as:

The One, of whom fire is the mouth, heaven the head, sky [space] the navel, earth the feet, the sun the eye, directions the ears, homage to him who is in the form of the universe.

(BSBh I 1, 9, 23). Though Bhartṛhari’s philosophy does not give as much emphasis to the notion as it receives here, the view espoused is in conformity with his theory of four stages of enunciation — paśyanti, etc. (see, nevertheless, VP I 117: tasya prāne ca yā śaktir yā ca buddhau vyavasñhitā). According to Bhartṛhari, whom YR is probably following here, prāna plays a prominent role at the fourth and third levels of linguistic activity: vaikhart — where takes place articulation into phonemes, as prāna, in its gross or physical form, strikes against the various organs of articulation (cf. VP I 122) — and madhyamā — in which intentions are formulated mentally. Consequently, prāna represents as much the differentiated world as the cosmic principle from which it proceeds (on this question, see lyer 1992: 123ff., 143–146, 106ff.). It seems, therefore, that the views attributed by YR to the Prāṇabrahmavādins agree with Bhartṛhari’s theory according to which things are produced by word: chandobhya eva prathamam etad viśvaṃ vyavarata (VP I 120); see also Ruegg 1959: 61 (n. 2c), 76–79. Moreover, such speculations may also imply a tradition of exegesis in which vedic speech, represented by the syllable om, is considered to be at the core of the cosmic process — a tradition going back perhaps to RS X 121 (Max Müller’s hymn to ‘Deo ignoto’), in which Hiranyagarbha, identified with Breath (asu), is said to be the effective source of creation, therefore associated (though later) with Prajāpati. In the same way, Breath is extolled as the cosmic principle in Atharvaveda XI 4, whose last stanza (possibly a later addition) compares it to Hiranyagarba. Thus, the Prāṇabrahmavādins, in YR’s commentary, are less likely to be Hairanyagarbhas (commonly referred to as Prāṇavids, or Prānātmavādins) than followers of Bhartṛhari, described in our text as identifying prāna as the source of the entire cosmos.

On the notion of śabdabrahman, see also Sāmbaparīcāśīkā 21 (along with Kṣemarāja ad loc., in Padoux Sāmbaparīcāśīkā: 569): yat tad vedyam kim api paramam śabadattvam tvam [...] tat sod vyakṭim jīgisu [...] avyaktena pranavavapuṣu [...] sacchabdabrahmaoccarati karanavyañjitam vācakām re//, ‘Quant à Ta nature ineffable, qu’il faut connaître, c’est que Tu es la réalité intérieure suprême de la Parole [...

667The Sovereign Body (virāddeha) is the cosmic body, seen as the creation (deha) of Virāj, the cosmic ‘Souvereign’. The virāj is, according to the traditional etymology, the ‘all resplendent’, or the ‘Sovereign (per se)’: viśesena rājate iti virāj. On virāj, considered both as a meter of ten syllables and as a demigurge, see ChU IV 3, 7–8. Senart observes (ChU: 49) that ‘Virāj’, the cosmic ‘Sovereign’ seems to correspond to the totality of the sensible world (n. 2), whereas the meter ‘virāj’ is to be considered as the expression of this world (n. 4). For a diachronic account of the notion, see Renou 1952: 141–154.

676On the notion of śabdabrahman, see also Sāmbaparīcāśīkā 21 (along with Kṣemarāja ad loc., in Padoux Sāmbaparīcāśīkā: 569): yat tad vedyam kim api paramam śabadattvam tvam [...] tat sod vyakṭim jīgisu [...] avyaktena pranavavapuṣu [...] sacchabdabrahmaoccarati karanavyañjitam vācakām te//, ‘Quant à Ta nature ineffable, qu’il faut connaître, c’est que Tu es la réalité intérieure suprême de la Parole (paramam śabadattvam) [...] voulang devenir manifeste à partir de l’essence immanifeste du pranava. [...] Les organes de la parole étant [intérieurement] manifestés, le véritable Brahman-son (śabdabrahman), qui est ce qui t’exprime, s’énonce’ [— ‘As for Your ineffable nature, which is to be known, it is that You are the ultimate reality of Speech [...], desirous of becoming manifest [...] from the unmanifest essence of the pranava. [...] Once the organs of Speech are [internally] manifested, the true śabdabrahman, which is what expresses You, enunciates itself’].
What the Vaiśeṣikas and others⁶⁷⁹ call ‘genus’ (jāti) is [for them] the ultimately real (paramārthasat)⁶⁸⁰ entity, being the substratum of all qualities (guna). It is characterized [in this doctrine] by using terms such as ‘universal’ (sāmānyā) and ‘being as such’ [or the ‘universal per se’] (mahāsattā).⁶⁸¹

Others maintain⁶⁸² that particulars (piṇḍa = vyakti)⁶⁸³ are ultimately of consciousness coincide with the four elements or instants of the syllable om. According to ĀŚV 3 — which establishes the correspondence between the divine Viraj and the lowest level of the ātman, the vaisvānara — to take brahman to be Viraj signifies, even in a vedāntic context, that one’s course has been interrupted on the way to liberation.⁶⁷⁹

The opposition vyakti/ākṛti, ‘particular [thing]/common [form]’ has been subjected to much scrutiny by Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas and Vaiyākaranas, as have been the related notions of jāti, sāmānyā, piṇḍa and dravya. For the Mīmāṃsā, cf. Śābarabhāṣya 13, 30: kā punar ākṛtiḥ kā vyaktīr iti/ dravyagunakarmanānām sāmānyamādram ākṛtiḥ/ asadhāraṇaviśēgā vyaktiḥ, ‘Qu’est-ce que l’ākṛti? Qu’est-ce que la vyakti? L’ākṛti, ce n’est rien d’autre que le trait commun — sāmānyā — aux substances, aux qualités et aux actions. Quant à la vyakti, c’est la particularité individuelle — asadhāraṇaviśēga’ (tr. Biardeau 1964: 167) [— ‘What is ākṛti? What is vyakti? The ākṛti is nothing else than the feature common (sāmānyā) to substances, qualities and actions. The vyakti is the uncommon particular — asadhāraṇaviśēga’]; cf. also Mahābhāṣya 1 2 6, opposing vyaktivādin and ākṛtvādin. Biardeau observes [1964: 292ff.] that Bhartṛhari, in dealing with the same notions, transforms the views of Patañjali and of the Mīmāṃsā. On these questions, see Biardeau 1964: 68–100; 155–203; 229–247; 292ff.⁶⁸⁰

paramārthasat is a term not well suited to a Vaiśeṣika context, implying as it does, degrees of “reality”. ‘Ultimately real’ may serve as a translation if one understands ‘what is real in and of itself, without qualification’. The problem of translation is essentially unresolvable because one cannot set aside the fact that here a partisan of monism is speaking of systems that are in no wise monist.

⁶⁷⁹ YR’s account partly agrees with Vaiśeṣika doctrine according to which ‘being’ (sattā), as the ultimate form of commonness (parasāmānyā), represents the category of commonness (sāmānyā) as such (cf. Frauwallner 1973, vol. II: 104 and 175–177). See Appendix 15, p. 339.

⁶⁸⁰ See Appendix 15, p. 339.

⁶⁸² The passage seems, in quarrels with the other schools on the ‘meaning of the sentence’ (śabdabodha), to echo the position of the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which has insisted that the word refers literally only to the vyakti, and secondarily to the jāti. In this sense, a Śaiva such as YR may have understood that the Vyaktivādins considered the vyakti an ultimate principle. See Nyāyabhāṣya [NBh] II 2, 58–69, in which the Vyaktivādin is perhaps a follower of Yādī, an early grammarian, many of whose notions have been refuted by later Pāṇiniyas; Yādī teaches that the word refers to dravya, the ‘particular’, understood as a concrete thing (see Frauwallner 1973, vol. II: 101–102); on Yādī, see Ruegg 1959: 32–34; Renou 1940: intr., p. 19. As well, the point of view expressed here is consonant with that of the Cārvākas, according to the few authentic records of that school — a single authentic text of that “school” is thought to survive, the Tattvopaplavasimha; other references are found in always hostile compendia, such as the Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha — where an attempt is made to demonstrate (ironically?) that ‘perception (pratyakṣa) alone, which is always restricted to particulars, guarantees any semblance of validity, and that no ‘inference’ can be deemed certain, inasmuch as the universal (vyāpti) on which it depends can never extend, given our limited purview, to all possible instances. May also be intended here (so Ruegg, private communication) the Buddhist Pramāṇavāda (Dignāga, Dharmakirti, etc.), where the universal (sāmānyā, jāti), as opposed to svakāsa (the term vyakti not being employed in this school) is not real. Favoring this interpretation is YR’s usage of language akin to that of the Buddhists, such as paramārtha(satya)/samvit(satya), vyavahāramātra, sāmānyā/vyakti.

⁶⁸³ vyakti is a Mīmāṃsaka notion, which is taken up again, with some alterations, by the Naiyāyikas (cf. Biardeau 1964: 234–235). The notion is discussed in Śābarabhāṣya 1 3, 10, 30–35 (cf. Biardeau 1964: 168ff.) For the discussion of piṇḍa — lit., ‘lump,’ ‘compact mass,’ or ‘corporeal frame’, therefore ‘individu concret’ (‘concrete individual’), as translated by
real, and that no universal that would be one and [at the same time] the substratum of numerous qualities ever appears (prakāśate) [to the senses]; nor may it be established by argument that such is the case. Therefore, ordinary usage, which deals exclusively with particulars (vyakti), is sufficient [and we need not resort to fictions such as the ‘universal’].

What then is the use of positing a universal?

They dispute [the need to posit] such a universal by advancing speculations of various sorts. They say, among other things, that ‘particulars do not depend [on that universal for their existence], and that nothing else appears [in our ordinary experience] that is dependent on it’. Thus, they are agreed that ‘genus (jāti) is not ultimately real’.

The categories [here set forth] — viz., ‘[from] consciousness to particulars’ — are such as have been described. [In conclusion] we hold that ‘all these are for purposes of disputation only’. Since, in this doctrine of Śiva’s absolute freedom (svātantryavāda), the self-manifesting (prakāśa-māna) reality cannot be concealed, those different categories do appear [also] as relative truths (saṃvṛtisatya), but, in ultimate terms, none of them exist [as characterizations of the Ultimate], that is, they do not exist in essence [i.e., in truth]; they do exist as categories postulated in other systems of thought.

Therefore, it is the one Great Lord — namely, [one’s own] consciousness, the supremely real, the ultimate Light, the utterly free — who appears (cakāste) variously [i.e., who appears as manifold], for there is nothing other than he that is different from him, and hence lacking in illumination, that can manifest itself.
And it has been stated:

After speculating, those who are fond of building systems of thought out of their own wisdom go on saying that the essence (tattva) is such and such. That essence is nothing different from you, O Lord; it is but a dispute of scholars about the names [to be given to you].

Kārikā 28

Now the master offers an illustration of error in terms of its capacity to present unreal objects:

28. There is no serpent at the place occupied by a rope, and yet that serpent causes dread that may end in death. Truly, the power of error is great and cannot be pinned down.

The great power of error cannot by anyone be pinned down: in other words, [its true nature lies] beyond anyone’s capacity of investigation — so great is its ability to make the real appear (pratibhāsana) other than it is, which [in the present case] means failing to recognize one’s own plenitude.

To demonstrate not only that the Trika is a synthesis of all the Indian schools of thought, but also that it surpasses them. These systems are classified into ten types according to the level of reality they have been able to reach, a level again roughly related to the Śaiva scale of the āraṇvas. These levels (sthiti), which other systems have failed to go beyond, are to be understood as different modes of identification with the inner, ultimate reality. Moreover, in accordance with the recurrent metaphor of the Lord-actor, they are taken to be the different roles through which the divine Actor manifests his essence. As the seven categories of subjects are seen as roles (bhūmikā) assumed by the Lord in SpN I 1 (see Appendix 10, p. 330), so it is with the forms of the Self presumed by the different schools of thought, as stated by PHvr 8: evam ekasyaiva cidātmano bhagavatah svātantryāvabhāsitāh sarvā imā bhūmikāh svātantryaprachchādanātmānānaññāvatamyabhēditāh/ ata eka eva etāvad vyāptika ātmā, ‘Thus, the divine one, whose essence is consciousness, in his absolute freedom displays all these roles. And it is this freedom that, by opting for relative degrees of concealment or unveiling, makes these roles differ from one another [choosing in varying degrees to unveil or conceal itself]. Therefore, there is only one Self pervading all these roles’. Therefore, one has to go beyond appearances, or roles, to reach the ultimate reality, the divine Actor. Such is the eleventh and highest sthiti, that of the Trika philosophers who maintain that the Self is both immanent in the universe and transcendent (see n. 59). Cf. ÎRvr I 6, 4–5, for which the erroneous identification of the Self with various entities such as the body, etc., constitutes a vikalpa, a mental construct.

690 utpreksya.

691 Bhagavadbhaktisutra 21. On Avadhūtasiddha’s Bhagavadbhaktisutra, see YR ad 9 and n. 426.

692 Same theme as APS 28. The sequence of ideas is this: since the aforesaid doctrines are erroneous to some degree, being only relatively true, it is now appropriate to explain how error is possible.

693 atādrūpya.
For instance, although it is a rope that in reality is seen, yet, due to the confusion \( (bhrama) \) caused by its long and coiled form, the witnesses \( (adhyavasāṭr) \) conclude: 'this is a snake' — for they apprehend \( (adhyavasāya) \) in the [real] object, the rope, a snake — itself an unreal object that merely appears \( (pratibhāsa) \) to them.

And it is precisely because [the snake] appears [to them] as a real object that [their mistake] causes a fear that death will terminate [the encounter].

This [sort of thing] is even well attested in experience: who has not undergone [a semblance of] heart-failure, thinking that a post is a living being, or having become confused, after conjuring up on his own some [supposedly] terrifying form? Thus it is delusion \( (vibhrama) \) itself [defined, in this system, as the ignorance of one's own plenitude] that is the cause of the display of finitude.

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694 We take 'iti' as referring to 'bhūtam' alone, not to 'sthanum bhūtam' as in the KSTS ed. Moreover, all the MSS show a pause after etat — some have a single danda, some a double, others a noticeable space; in all cases, the final -r of etat is signaled with a virama, indicating a complete phrase. Note also that one MS gives iva in the place of iti.

695 samullikhya — a sense suggested by certain figurative usages of the root ul-likh, among them the late figure of speech ullekha, signifying a rapid series of images evoking a single subject (upameya); see Gerow 1971, s.v.

696 Here, sthanu and the ākāra are envisaged as alternatives (indicated by the vā). The post seen in the distance at dusk serves, particularly in vedāntic literature, as a familiar illustration of 'bhṛnti' — for example, Upadeśasāhasri: avidyā nāma anyasmin anyadharmādhāropanā, yathā prasiddham rajatam prasiddhayām śuktikāyām, yathā prasiddham puruṣam sthanāv adhyāropayati, prasiddham vā sthanum puruse... (51–55, etc.); also BSBh I 1, 4: yathā mandāndhakāre sthanar ayam ity aghyamānaviśeṣe puruṣasābdapratyayau sthanunivāsayau, 'As in light darkness, the word and the idea of man is applied to a post when it is not distinctly cognized as "This is a post." ' As well, B&R cite a passage drawn from Śaṅkara's commentary on BĀU: kimsva naro vā sthanur vā: 'Might this be a man or a post?' Elsewhere, the implication is simply that, in its indistinction, the dimly seen post occasions doubt and therefore fear; see also TĀ I 250a: sthanur vā puruṣo vēti na mukhyo 'sty eṣa saṁśayah/.

697 apūrṇatva — lit., 'incompleteness', 'absence or loss of plenitude'. In Advaita Vedānta, error is understood as a twofold process whose first stage is the veiling \( (āvarana) \) of the real nature of the rope, and the second, the projection \( (viksepa) \), or superimposition \( (adhyāsa) \), of a snake on the rope itself. Thus, the delusive power of māyā, understood as an external force, is behind error. The epistemological viewpoint of Trika is different: if error is the product of māyā (which is not external, inasmuch as it is a sakti), and implies a superimposition of an unreal object on the real one (see YR ad 30), yet, in ultimate terms, error is to be defined as the ignorance of one's own plenitude, as imperfect knowledge, which the Lord's freedom has made possible, by means of his māyāsakti.
Kārikā 29

Now, the master shows the relevance [of this example] to the matter under discussion: 698

29. Likewise, merit and demerit, heaven and hell, birth and death, pleasure and pain, as well as social class and the stage of life, etc., although [in reality] not existing in the Self, come into being through the force of delusion.

Just as a rope, really existing, but erroneously apprehended (vimṛṣṭa) as a snake, brings about the same [dreadful] effect as that created by a [real] snake, 699 so likewise, do merit, etc., although unreal, that is, not existing really, take place, that is, come into existence, in the minds of those who take the body to be the Self (dehātmamānin), because of the confusion: ‘this [viz., the body] alone is real’, which confusion comes into being through the force of delusion, that is, the illusory (vyāmoha) influence of māyā.

By merit is intended ‘[a sacrifice such as the] aśvamedha’;
by demerit is intended the ‘slaying of brahmins’, etc.;
by heaven is intended ‘supreme happiness’;
by hell is intended ‘torments’;
by coming into existence is intended ‘birth’;
by death is intended ‘cessation of existence [lit., ‘of birth’]’;
by pleasure is intended ‘delight’;
by pain is intended the ‘agitation arising from rajas’;
and by social class is intended the ‘belief: “I am a brahmin”’, etc.;
by stage of life is intended: ‘I am a celibate’, etc.;
the mention of the word ‘etc.’ here intends penance, worship, vows, etc.

All that, whose essence is nothing but mental constructs, which emerges from the gaping [mouth of] delusion is deemed to be such on account of the power of differentiation, by which the Self is taken to be the body, etc. (dehādyāmatā).

All this proceeds from error [viz., from taking the body, etc., to be the Self], due to which fettered souls experience incessantly the bondage of heaven, hell, birth and death [viz., the inevitable results of dharma and adharma].

However, merit and demerit, etc., do not exist ultimately for the Self, 698 prakṛta — lit., ‘he applies this example to the matter under discussion’.
699 Lit., ‘brings about the causal efficiency (arthakriyā) belonging properly to the snake [viz., terror]’.
700 vijṛmbhita.
which is a uniform and unqualified mass of blissful consciousness (anavachinnacidānandaikaghana).\textsuperscript{701}

Kārikā 30

Thus, having examined the capacity of error to make unreal objects appear, the master now explains its origin:

30. That darkness [of error]\textsuperscript{702} is such that this wellknown conceit develops, in regard to entities, that they are other than the Self, though [in truth] they are not separate from the Self, owing to the fact that they appear to it.

In saying ‘That darkness (andhakāra) is such ...’, the master refers to the all-deluding (vīśvamohini) error that consists in our failing to recognize our own plenitude, as previously explained;

in saying ‘that ... in regard to entities’, he refers to those ubiquitous objects, whose form presumes the opposition of cognizer and object of cognition, which are the very substance of Light, owing to the fact that they appear to it (prakāśamānātayā), that is, they cannot be accounted for except in terms of their having appeared, in accordance with the maxim:

That which is not luminous cannot manifest itself,\textsuperscript{703} [... and they appear such] even though not separate from the Self, that is, from consciousness, the Great Lord.

\textsuperscript{701}anavacchinna is here taken in its scholastic sense of ‘not discriminated, unqualified’ — the avacchedaka designating the quality or particularity that serves to distinguish one thing (or type) from another (as its dewlap distinguishes the Indian cow from other beasts). The usage of the term here indicates that the terms cit and ānanda are in this sense unqualified, inasmuch as they are universal and cannot be limited by anything whatsoever (which, if it were supposed, would contradict their comprehensiveness); see the use of the positive avacchinna in YR ad 58.

\textsuperscript{702}That is, the first level of error consisting in taking the Self as non-Self; in other words, not recognizing one’s own essential plenitude, giving therefore rise to the belief in otherness. Thus, kārikā 30 echoes, or reformulates, kārikā 25 — which describes ajñānātīmira, the ‘darkness of ignorance [which is akin to the disease of double-vision]’, again commented upon as ātmākhyātyandhakāra, ‘the darkness that is Self-ignorance’ — as well as kārikā 28.

\textsuperscript{703}nāprakāśaḥ prakāśate — lit., ‘That which is not luminous cannot illumine’. Perhaps the fourth pada from Vāmanadatta’s Śaṁvitprakāśa I 12: tvadātmakatvam bhāvānām vivadante na kecana/ yat prakāśyadaśayāto [v.l. prakāśyadaśām yāto] nāprakāśaḥ prakāśate//, ‘No one disagrees that entities have as their essence you, in terms of their condition of needing illumination. Therefore, that which is not luminous is not manifest’. The verse is quoted in SpP 28–29 [= ad II 3–4]; cf. Dyczkowski’s transl. (SpK: 162): ‘None dispute that You (O Lord) are the essential nature of (all) things; it is not darkness (apprakāśa) that shines when (the light of consciousness) becomes the object of illumination’, and his edition of the Śaṁvitprakāśa, for variants.
Furthermore, this conceit that [these entities] are other than the Self (ayam anātmābhimānah) [obliges me to think:] ‘those entities are to be grasped [by me] (grāhya), are external to and different from me, [exist] independently [of me, as their grāhaka].’ All this being the case (yat), [such conceit is nothing but] the unreal imposition⁷⁰⁴ of insentience on them,⁷⁰⁵ by denying their real form, which is consciousness.

Here is the purport of what has been said:⁷⁰⁶ as regards the appearance (prakāśana) of entities [viz., their manifestation as such to the subject], it is the Light of the Self that alone is independent, or, in other words,⁷⁰⁷ that manifests itself as “blue” or “pleasure”, etc. [i.e., as objects apparently external or internal]⁷⁰⁸ — for it would be unintelligible to allege as the cause [of their appearance] something other [than consciousness], such as, for example, latent dispositions, etc., considered as external [to consciousness], and having the form of non-Light.⁷⁰⁹

⁷⁰⁴āpādana — Śaṅkara speaks here of adhyāśa.
⁷⁰⁵Cf. TĀ I 332, which formulates lyrically this imposition of untrue insentience on objects; see also YR ad 31.
⁷⁰⁶The syntagm ayam āśayaḥ often flags a contrasting portion of the commentary in which emphasis is placed on argumentation, rather than on syntax or vocabulary — by introducing parallel considerations, offering analogies, etc. Hence, it may be translated as: ‘Now [let us turn to] the argument [of the verse]*, or ‘Here is the purport [of what has been said]’.
⁷⁰⁷arthāt.
⁷⁰⁸Cf. TĀ II 16, according to which everything is Light, Light is the sole reality: nīlāṃ pīṭham sukham iti prakāśah kevalah śivah/ amuṣmin paramādvaite prakāśatmanī ko ‘parah’/, ‘Śiva is the only Light [shining] as blue, yellow and joy. In this absolute, nondual state, whose nature is that of Light, who is there other [than he]?’
⁷⁰⁹This extremely condensed statement includes an objection, which is not explicitly indicated as such, and its answer. The position of the Trika siddhāntin is that no entity can exist, absent its cognition, and that there can be no cognition without a persisting factor, which is consciousness: whatever exists, i.e., whatever is known, is nothing but Light/consciousness, or, to put it differently, Light/consciousness is the unique cause of the appearance of an entity. The siddhāntin answers here the objection of a purvapakṣin according to whom some other cause independent of Light/consciousness, such as the latent dispositions (vāsanā), may explain this shining, or cognition, whether true or erroneous. For, if we try to reconstruct the objector’s argument, why does one see a snake, and not a garland, in a rope? In other words, why are things known in a particular way, sometimes differing from one individual to another? The objector would answer that one’s own vāsanās produce the erroneous cognition as well as the fear it involves: the latent impression of a snake lies in us, along with the disposition of fear; when conditions are brought together, this latent impression makes the snake appear in our consciousness, instead of the rope, and this implies the correlated terror. The siddhāntin’s refutation follows the same fundamental assumption: the cognition (hence the existence) of an object necessarily depends on consciousness. In other words, consciousness is both luminous in and of itself (svapraekāśa) and object-illuminating (arthaprakāśa) (cf. ĪPV I 3, 6–7). The opponent who would have recourse to vāsanās (presumably removed from present sentience) as the cause of this cognition would have to admit that vāsanās themselves are ultimately not different from consciousness. The reference is probably to Buddhists (particularly the Vijñānavādins; see n. 666) and Vedāntins, who take beginningless avidyā, or, what is the same thing, beginningless dispositions, to be the cause of the illusory phenomenal world. As emphasized, here, in YR’s commentary, the Trika viewpoint reflects its main postulate: the absolute freedom of the Lord. It is this divine freedom that makes all entities
Thus, it is only ‘I’ (aham) — who am essentially consciousness (cit-svarupa) — who appear [in fact] through the opposition of cognizer and object of cognition;\(^{710}\) but this real form [viz., the absolute ‘I’] does not appear [to the bound soul]; it is merely unreal difference that displays itself.

Since [Light as] the true essence (tattvika) [of things] is not thus displayed, error has here been represented through the metaphor of darkness.\(^{711}\)

### Kārikā 31

Once the conceit that locates the non-Self in the Self\(^{712}\) has arisen, there arises the conceit that locates the Self (ātmābhimāna) in the non-Self.\(^{713}\) In explaining this, the author affirms the doubly delusive form of error:\(^{714}\)  

31. **It is darkness upon darkness,\(^{715}\) it is a great ‘pustule upon a boil’,\(^{716}\) to think that the Self is located in the non-Self — the body, breath, etc.\(^{717}\)**

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\(^{710}\) This is the first occurrence of the pronoun aham itself — a notion that is at the core of Trika speculation.

\(^{711}\) Same phraseology in YR ad PS 25.

\(^{712}\) That is, in terms of Śaṅkara’s Advaita, the superimposition (adhyāsa/adhyāropana) of the non-Self on the Self.

\(^{713}\) Cf. YR ad 60, who develops the notion of the superimposition of the Self on the non-Self, whereas, in YR ad 61, *apūrṇatvakhyāti*, ‘the [mistaken] cognition (khyāti) that [the Self] is incomplete’ stands for ādmany anātmabhimānāḥ.

\(^{714}\) The reasoning resembles greatly that of Śaṅkara on the notion of adhyāsa/adhyāropana (abhimāna = adhyāropana); cf. Upadeśasāhasri 51: *avidyā nāma anyasmīnī anyadharmadhyāropanā, ‘Nescience is [defined as] the superimposition of the qualities of [one] thing upon another’. The adhyāsa involves always two aspects — *tasmān atad/atasmīn tad*, ‘not that in that/that in not that’ — and PS 31 deals with the second aspect, which is the contrary of the first, as clearly stated by YR ad loc.: *atādrūpye tādrūpyatraśiṣṭāḥ*, ‘The apprehension of a thing as having such and such a form in [reference to an object] not having such and such a form’.

\(^{715}\) Silburn translates *timira* as ‘troubles de la vision’. Better to reflect the coherence of the text, we take *timira* here as a synonym of andhakāra of the previous kārikā; see also kā. 25. It is the commentary that plays on the double entendre of *timira*.

\(^{716}\) We borrow the idiom from Barnett.

\(^{717}\) ātmamāṇitva — i.e., when that which is the non-Self (anātman), the body or vital breath, is taken to be the Self. Cf. YR ad PS 53 and 60. Cf. ŚSV I 2: *evam ādmany anātmabhimānārūpākhyātilaṣaṇānātmātmaṃ jñaṇam na kevalo bandho yāvad anātmani sarūrāv ātmat-bhimānātmaṃ ajñānāmālāṃ jñaṇam api bandha eva, ‘Thus, that [limited] knowledge, which is really ignorance in the sense that one is not aware that the non-Self [has been] erroneously superimposed on the Self, is not alone bondage; [as well] that [limited] knowledge, which is rooted in the ignorance whereby the Self is superimposed erroneously on the non-Self, viz., the body, etc., is also bondage’. At this point in his demonstration, Kṣemarāja quotes
In the first place, the darkness that is nescience (akhyātitimira) has resulted in the imposition of insentience, appearing as difference, onto entities that are in reality but one consciousness, such that those entities, which are not different from one's essential Self (svātman), are yet displayed as different from it. Hence nescience, which is like darkness, is called 'darkness' (timira) [metaphorically].

As the one and only moon appears double due to [the disease called] 'line-darkness' (rekhātimira) [viz., diplopia], situated in the eye, such that one concludes: 'There are here two moons', so likewise does the double-vision that is nescience (akhyātitimira) make each and every object appear as if it had the form of non-Self, through [the principle of] difference, though [in truth the objective world is] one only and shares the nature of one's essential Self.

In this situation, another darkness ensues — a delusion engendered by a delusion — [it is as though] 'a pustule grew upon a boil'.

Now, as regards (yat) ... the Self [which is] thought [to be located in the non-Self] (ātmamāṇītvam) [we say]: once the ubiquitous objects [of our normal experience] have fallen victim to insentience — their nature as consciousness (citsvarūpa) having been abrogated by not recognizing [their identity with the Self] — from among them, on one or another insentient [object] occupying the field of the knowable, such as the body, or breath, etc., now seen as other than the Self, is [superimposed], according to the principles of ordinary cognition, the belief that this is the Self (ātmamāṇītva) — or, [in general,] the apprehension of a thing as having such and such a form in reference to an object not having such and such a form — as, for example, when one asserts 'I am thin', 'I am stout', 'I am hungry', 'I am happy', 'I am nothing' — so many assertions that [according to us] are outrageous [that is, fly in the face of common SpK III 14 (symmetrically, in his commentary to SpK III 14, Kṣemarāja quotes ŚŚ I 2), which defines the condition of the paṣu, the fettered subject, thus explaining how the non-Self, the body, etc., is taken to be the Self: by metonymy, the body represents the innumerable ideas (pratyaya) of which it is the substratum, and by 'ideas' one has to understand words, as well as their corresponding objects, exclusively apprehended in their relation to the ego, as shown by the Mārkaṇḍeypurāṇa XXV 15 (quoted by SpN III 14): tāteī kińcit tanayeti kińcid ambeī kińcid dayieti kińcit/mameī kińcin na mamei kińcid bhautam saṁdham bahudhā mā lapethāḥ/, 'Do not indulge ceaselessly in material associations, saying sometimes “O father”, sometimes “O my child”, sometimes “O mother”, sometimes “O beloved”, sometimes “This is mine”, sometimes “This is not mine.”' As stated by the kārikā itself, it is precisely the 'rise of ideas' (pratyayodbhavah) that makes one who is essentially pure and autonomous consciousness lose his independence (asvatantaratām eti). Similarly ŚŚ II 8: saṁrām haviḥ, 'Oblation is the body', refers to the error that consists in taking the body to be the Self, and which has to be reduced to nothing in the fire of knowledge, in the way the oblation is consumed in fire; see ŚSV ad loc. Cf. BSbh I 1 and AS I 13 and 15.

718See kā. 25 (ajñānatīmira) and YR ad PS 30.
719See PS 25 and n. 638.
720A reference to the Buddhist śūnya?
Now, if it is objected that such an [experience, which is an] outrage to common sense exists [even] without postulating the conceit that locates the Self [in the non-Self], let it be so as regards such phenomena as “blue” and “pleasure”.  

Or even if we could avoid referring to it [viz., the notion of abhidharma] in all cases, still there is, through the notion of [being associated with] a Self, the unct of ipseity sprinkled on this or that insentient object, such as the body, etc., itself nothing but a lump of clay. On the other hand, in the case of phenomena such as “blue”, “pleasure”, and so on, the attribution to them of a lack of relation to the Self [can be understood only] through the notion that they are related to nothing but themselves.

The situation [that we have just described] is nothing but the round of existences in its full and lamentable form, for what drags the fettered souls [into the round of existences] is that very injury inflicted [on the Self] by the dualities [of pleasure and pain, etc.], brought into play through such conceits [as have been displayed in the preceding analysis].

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721 ativaśasa. The syntax is: yat... āmamānītvam... etad ativaśasam.
722Viz., ‘such an objection should also apply to the internal and external objects of experience’ — an objection which we answer by saying that, on the contrary, it is difficult to do without the notion of superimposition as regards “blue” and “pleasure”, because, according to you (might the objector be a Naiyāyika?), such qualities as “blue” and “pleasure” cannot exist in the absence of a substratum, which, in this case, is a Self. Perhaps implied is the Nyāya position that most cases of error such as that of the ‘red crystal’ may be accounted for without referring to āmābhimaña, ‘superimposition of the Self on the non-Self’, but even the Nyāya, says YR, adopts this notion in the case of the internal and external qualities of the Self.
723We understand this continuation of the argument as again directed to the Naiyāyikas, whose doctrine has been reformulated in terms more congenial to the Trika (ahantā/idadantā, ahantrārāsaḥśēka). But, another possibility might be that the former clause is addressed to a proponent of the Sāmkhya, whose notion of buddhi and ahaṅkāra does indeed appear to conflate the conscious principle with the inert principle; the latter half might conceivably be addressed to a Buddhist, possibly a Vaibhāṣīka, whose notion of svalaksana appears to attribute an untoward ‘thatness’ to fleeting and self-referential experiences.
724Lit., ‘Or even, [let it be admitted that] there is no [such notion] in any case’. Note that, probably, the comma and the semi-colon introduced by the KSTS ed. should be interchanged: the semi-colon after astu, the comma after bhūt. Anyhow, in the corrected text presented in this volume, we have not maintained punctuation marks other than dandas.
725Same image of the unct of ipseity temporarily sprinkled on an insentient object (ahantrvavashāraśāhuṣṭikta) in YR ad 8.
726idadantayā — lit., ‘through the notion that they are nothing but “this”’. That is to say, according to the Vaibhāṣīkas, although there is no “Self” to serve as substratum to the unending series of cognitions, each cognition is momentarily distinguished from the next, and at that moment is endowed with idantā, ‘thatness’. Thus the Trika answers both the Sāmkhyas (‘you do nothing but reformulate our notion of ahantā “I-ness”’) and the Vaibhāṣīkas (‘you do nothing but reformulate our notion of idantā “thatness”’) — and the result in both cases is the same: ‘this world is lamentable’ (eṣa eva samsārah socaniyāh).
727abhīghātaḥ.
As has been said by the yoginī Madālasā in the Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa:

The chariot is situated on the ground, and the body is situated on the chariot, and in the body is situated yet another spirit (puruṣa) [i.e., the Self]. Yet no one thinks of the earth as ‘mine’, as one does with his own body. Such extraordinary delusion!\(^{728}\)

**Kārikā 32**

Having established that, in this way, one binds one’s [true] Self with false mental constructs by failing to recognize that Self,\(^{729}\) the master now says:

32. How strange it is that one envelops one’s Self with notions such as the body, or the vital breaths, or with concepts belonging rather to the intellect, or with the expanse of the Void\(^{730}\) — just as does the silkworm with its cocoon!\(^{731}\)

\(^{728}\)Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa XXV 18. This is a development of the ancient parable of the Self riding in the chariot being the chariot-driver, the mind (manas) the reins, the senses (indriya) the horses, the objects of sense (viśaya) they range over; see ĪŚU I 3, 5. Once the first level of error has taken place, that is, once the entities constitutive of phenomenal reality have been taken to be different from the Self, earth, chariot and body are but mere substrata for the Self, i.e., they are objects equally insentient. Nevertheless, in a second phase, the limited subject identifies himself with the body alone, whereas he should identify himself with all the objects of the universe, thus recognizing that there is no object of the world that is different from the supreme Self, which is both transcendent and immanent. It is noteworthy that, in the same context — the definition of the paśu as he who takes the body to be the Self — SpN III 14 quotes a verse borrowed from the same chapter of the Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa (see n. 717). See also PS 39, which explains the reverse process, in which the two errors are successively dispelled.

\(^{729}\) okhyātivaśa — cf. ĪŚ 1 2: jñānam bandhaḥ, ‘[Limited] knowledge is bondage’.

\(^{730}\) ‘Sky’ (nabhas) here metaphorically for the usual ‘Void’ (śūnya) — see below. prapañca may also be somewhat ironically intended — the marvellous extent of different speculations on emptiness. This enumeration of the four main modes of conceiving the Self agrees with that of Ī_PK I 6, 4, ŚSV I 1, and PHvṛ 8 (see n. 661 and Appendix 14, p. 338). As made clear by the Virūpākṣapañcāśīkā 3, quoted in PM 19 (p. 54), those four main modes of conceiving the Self (namely, body, breath, buddhi, the Void) are nothing but realizations of ‘egoity’ (asmitā), as opposed to ‘ipseity’ (ahanad), which is the experience of the true Self; note that the Virūpākṣapañcāśīkā adds to these four, objects of sense and the senses themselves: sampanno 'smi kṛṣo 'smi sānyatatāro 'smi modamāno 'smi/ prāṇiṃi śūnyo 'smīti hi ṣatsu padaśev asmitā dṛṣṭā/.

\(^{731}\) An echo of this discussion is to be found in PS 51, as shown by YR ad loc. Relying on the commentary, and thus agreeing with B. N. Pandit (PS: 39), we propose translating jālakāra, lit., ‘net-maker’, as ‘silkworm’, rather than as ‘spider’, as do Barnett and Silburn. For, not only does YR gloss jālakāra as kṛmi, whose primary meaning is ‘worm’, but the detailed description of the entire process better suits the silkworm. Although not suggested here by YR, the metaphoric meaning of jāla, ‘deception’, ‘illusion’, ‘magic’, could also be implicitly intended here (cf. ĀPS 30).
Once [the unity of] consciousness has been cast aside in failing to recognize the Self, each and every cognizer envelops his Self, though [it is in truth] pervasive, with the bindings\textsuperscript{732} of mental constructs which arise from himself. How? The master explains this by saying: ‘the body, etc.’.

[These mental constructs are:] notions (vimarśana) of body and vital breath [as the one and only Self]; concepts (jñāna) proper to the intellect, that is, the determinate cognition [or ascertainment] [of pleasure and pain, etc.]; and the expanse (prapañca), that is, the proliferation of [speculations on the] Void (nabhas).

with [notions] such as ... (yogena) means ‘by relating [his Self] to mental constructs such as the body, etc.’ — for instance, saying: ‘I am slim, fat, beautiful, wise’.\textsuperscript{733} — Thus do feeble-minded persons, children, and women, and, indeed, cultivators [who are absorbed only in their physical labour] take their body to be the Self, on the strength of their own understanding,\textsuperscript{734} and, in so doing, deem themselves discerning,\textsuperscript{735} at least to some extent. [But, we say,] the body perishes here and now; how can it be the Self?

On the other hand, those who take the vital breath to be the Self,\textsuperscript{736} thinking: ‘It is I who am hungry and thirsty’, may deem themselves a bit [but not much] more discerning!

[To which we reply:] now, both the body and the vital breaths are as insentient as is a lump of clay, etc.; how could either of them be the Self?

So, Mīmāṃsakas and others,\textsuperscript{737} [who think that the assertions:] ‘I am

\textsuperscript{732}nīgaḍa.

\textsuperscript{733}Those who say: ‘I am wise’ are those who take the buddhi to be the Self.

\textsuperscript{734}sāvikalpena.

\textsuperscript{735}vivecaṅgamanya — Philosophically, this unsurprising position is just that adopted by the Čārvāka school of thought. Cf. ŚŚv I 1, quoted n. 661, and PHvr 8: caitanyakaviśiṣṭam sāriram ātma iti ātī cārvākāh, ‘The Čārvākas say: “The Self is identical with the body endowed with consciousness.” ’ On the Čārvāka doctrine, see Mahadevan 1974: 79–86: ‘The Čārvāka does not deny consciousness, but only that it is real independent of the body. When the elements come together in a particular mode to form an organism, consciousness (mind or soul) appears in it. Consciousness, thus, is an epiphenomenon, an after-glow of matter; it is a function of the body. [...] when the elements combine to form an organismic pattern, consciousness emerges, even as the intoxicating quality appears in a mixture of certain ingredients, none of which, taken separately, possesses it, or as the red color is produced from the combination of betel leaf, areca nut, and lime, none of which is red. That there is no soul apart from the body is evidenced by the fact, says the Čārvāka, that consciousness perishes with the body’. Note how the objector [?] reverses the argument in YR’s commentary.

\textsuperscript{736}That is, inasmuch as vital breath is the prerequisite of all sense experience. Here YR’s exposition differs from that of kā. 27: there, he was referring to a philosophical school, the Prāṇabrahmaṇavādins, here he alludes to the ordinary, almost trivial, experience of breathing.

\textsuperscript{737}Here, YR comments upon dhījñāna, lit., ‘cognition of the intellect’, of the kārikā. ŚŚv I 1 (quoted n. 661) and SpI I 4 identify those who take the buddhi, or the act of cognition proper to the buddhi, to be the Self, respectively, as the Yogācāras, and as both the Yogācāras and the Mīmāṃsakas. According to PHvr 8 (quoted in Appendix 14, p. 338), which gives a more complete account of this position, they are Yogācāras, Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas,
happy', or 'I am sad', mean that it is the Self who feels pleasure and pain, show even greater discernment, for they take the subtle body to be the Self.  

[But, we reply,] how can affectations of the intellect, such as pleasure and pain, be said to be the Self?  

Hence the partisans of the Void assert that the Self [is rather to be found] where there is an [utter] absence (abhāva) of mental construct — whether it be that of body, vital breath, or intellect. Thinking that 'whatsoever appears, I am not that', they maintain that the Self is but that Void, defined as the absence of any [cognizable] content whatsoever, whose essence is the negation of all [definite cognition]. [This Void] is expressed here by the term 'sky' (nabhas).

But there is another 'Void' (śūnya) — that of the Brahmavāda — each school developing its own views on the way buddhi stands for the Self. It seems likely, therefore, that here, the 'etc.' refers to Yogācāras and Naiyāyikas.

738The Mīmāṃsakas' purpose is to disclose the rationality inherent in the law of karman: the doer and the experiencer are one and the same person, even if the fruits of his acts are experienced after some delay, in another birth even. Therefore, they postulate a 'soul', purvaśākha, which transmigrates from one birth to another. Thus the purvaśākha, composed of eight elements, among which the subtler is buddhi, both acts and experiences the fruits of its actions, in the form of pleasure and pain. SpN I 4 presents a similar exposition of the Mīmāṃsaka view of the Self (see n. 740). In addition, it shows that such a view, although not fully satisfactory, implies its own completion. In effect, to consider the Self as the experiencer, or the 'I', of 'I am happy', 'I am sad', is undoubtedly a progress with regard to those, Carvākas and the untutored, who take the body to be the Self, and thus know only 'I am thin', 'I am fat'.

739buddhidharma — here, buddhidharma appears to be understood in the sense of buddhyu-pādhī, 'extrinsic affectation of the intellect' (and not in the sense of the eight buddhidharmas: dharma, jñāna, vairāgya, aśvarya, and their opposites), since pleasure and pain are so characterized in Trika texts — cf. PHv 8, SpN I 4, or YR ad PS 27. SpK I 4 and SpV ad loc. speak of [buddhyu]avasthā.

740 It may be interesting to compare this passage with Kṣemarāja's refutation — from the Trika point of view — of Mīmāṃsaka doctrine, ad SpK I 4: aham sukhī ca dukhī ca raktaś ca iyyādisamvīdah/ sukhādyavasthānusyīte vartante 'nyatra tāḥ sputām//', 'I am happy, I am sad, I am devoted' — these and other cognitions have evidently their basis in some other [substratum] (anyatra) threaded through the states of happiness, etc., [like jewels on a necklace, or flowers on the string of a garland]; note that SpN I 4 glosses sukhādyavasthānusyīte of the kā. as: antahsraksūrikalpatayā sthīte, 'which is like the cord within [and binding together] the garland of flowers'; cf. YR ad 34 and 35; on the Mīmāṃsaka position on the Self, see Appendix 16, p. 340.

741śūnyābhimānī — the same examination of the śūnyavāda is at issue in SpK I 12–13 and SpN ad loc., which treats the matter thoroughly. See Appendix 17, p. 341.

742Lit., 'as the absence of any display'.

743It is a second version of the śūnyavāda that is at issue here, namely, that of the Advaita, interpreted according to the Traikās. The difference appears to be but a question of method — Buddhists say that the Void is the Void, namely, that it is apprehended only as such, whereas Advaitins want to particularize it, as it were, by distributing it over several acts of negation, in keeping with the formula 'neti neti'. Thus it seems that YR wants to associate the Advaitins to the śūnyavāda while distinguishing them from the Mādhyanikas, by taking recourse to a literal reading of 'neti neti', which seems to pluralize the notion of Void.
whose partisans maintain that, in the process of meditation (samādhāna), when it is realized that ‘here is another absence (śūnya) [that] is not myself’, they then posit that other absence as the Self, \(^{744}\) in accordance with the formula ‘not this, not this’; \(^{745}\) this amounts to giving up one particular Void and grasping [in its place] another, in series, as the essence of the Void.

These [latter speculations] have been characterized as ‘the expanse of the Void’ \(^{746}\) in the kārikā.

Furthermore, because they have not determined the nature [of the Self] to be consciousness, those ascetics (yogin) who take the Void to be the Self — themselves insentient \(^{747}\) and confused, immersed as they are in the cave of deep sleep — fetter the Self with insentience, the Self that is essentially consciousness. \(^{748}\)

\(^{744}\) When, at the moment [or in the process] of meditation (samādhāna) [...]: here, the concept of abhāvasamādhi, ‘absorption in the Void’, that the Śaivas ascribe to such ‘nihilists’ as the Vedāntins and the Mādhyaṃkikas, is referred to and refuted, as is also done in SpK 112–13, SpN and SpP ad loc. Same argument in SpN 112–13: \(\text{tvadjiam avijneya [avastha] avijneyatvād vaktum āsakety ucyatam i unyeti tu kuthā, śunyatāpi ca yāvad bhāvyate tāvad vikalpikhitavād asau vijjeyavaiva [emending vijjāiva to vijjeyava], ‘If this state [named vacuity] is unknown to people like you, it should be said that, on account of its unknowability, it is impossible to express it. Then why call it Void? Even vacuity, as long as it is conceived, is indeed knowable, inasmuch as it is conceptually delineated’.}

\(^{745}\) neti neti. See Appendix 18, p. 342.

\(^{746}\) SpN 112–13 (Kaul Shāstrī: 28) denounces it as an ‘unfathomable abyss of supreme delusion’ (agādhe mahāmohoe) into which the Śunyavādins throw themselves and others.

\(^{747}\) Cf. SpK I 13a: \(\text{atas tat kṛtrimam jīneyam sausuptapadavat [...]/, ‘Hence, that [viz., non-being (abhāva)] should be considered a factitious [state] similar to deep sleep’; in other words, the abhāvasamādhi is taken to be a state of naught and insentience only in a hyperbolic or transitory sense, as is the case with deep sleep. For when one awakes from deep sleep, one knows that he has experienced, adventitiously, that state of naught and insentience; cf. SpN 113a: \(\text{ato mohavasthaiva sā kalpitā tathā smaryamāṇatvatvāt sā cānubhūyamāṇavād anubhavitvāt praṃātur avasthātpṛyaspa pratyuta sattām āvedyate na tv abhāvam iti, ‘Hence, that state of insentience is but a presumption (kalpita), since thus it is recollected (smaryamaṇa). On the contrary, the fact that such a state is experienced attests to the existence (sattā) of the experiencer (anubhavī), of the cognizer (pramātṛ), who is the substratum (avasthā) of that experience, and not of any non-being (abhāva) [or Void]’.}

\(^{748}\) The experience of the Void remains an intelligible experience (pratipatti), which the yogin thus construes, after he has emerged from samādhi: ‘I was profoundly unconscious’ (gāḍhamudho ‘ham āsam). Therefore the experience is not possible without an experiencer, that is to say, without consciousness itself. Insentience cannot as a consequence characterize such an experience. Thus the Tīrika has formulated three objections against the śunyavāda:

1) Taking the Self as a Void, defining it negatively, amounts to a regressus ad infinitum, for this involves the aporia that the object negated has by that fact been admitted. 2) Taking the Self as a Void implies its insentience. 3) From the Tīrka perspective, it is impossible to conceive the all-vibrating and fulgurating Self or consciousness as inert and insentient. On this argument as to the intrinsic dynamism of the Self or consciousness and the correlative principle of its sovereign freedom, see YR ad 27: ‘In both these [doctrines, though the conscious principle has been formulated as supreme], what has not been recognized is the freedom (svātantra) of that conscious principle which, endowed with life, becomes the [efficient] cause of the construction of the universe’; see also Kṣemarāja’s discussion on the
How strange! — that is, how astonishing this all is! Moreover, how absurd! This would never happen of its own accord!749

And here the master gives an example: ' [...] with its cocoon, etc.'. Just as the silkworm, that is, a certain kind of worm, after making its cocoon, namely, an envelope formed of its own saliva, envelops itself on all sides, that is, binds itself with a view to its own death — for, later on, it there dies — so likewise does one who considers the body, etc., to be the Self, bind his own Self with his own thought-constructs, that is, with thought-constructs such as ‘I’ or ‘mine’ that he himself has made.

As Buddhists say:

Where there is Self, there is thought of an other. Attachment and hatred arise from distinguishing the Self and the other. Compounded of these two [opposed ideas], all vices arise.750

Kārikā 33

How is this great delusion (mahāmoha) then dissolved, in itself difficult to fend off,751 which arises when the body, etc., is taken to be the cognizer? To this question, we answer: it is the freedom of the Lord only that is the cause [of such a dissolution]. The master says:

33. One should unveil752 his proper Self by a discipline that aims at manifesting the might of Self-knowledge. Thus does the Supreme Śiva extend [within our sphere] his play made wonderful by [the alternation of] bondage and liberation.753

[The compound svajñānavibhavabhāsānayogena is analyzed as follows:]

Self-knowledge (sva-jñāna) here means the ‘awareness (avagama) of Self’s own freedom’ — that Self whose distinctive feature is consciousness; the might (vibhava) of that Self-knowledge means the ‘flourishing (spī-tatva) of [the acolyte’s] own freedom’, in the marvelous form of supreme ipseity, as his conscious form (cidrūpa) [becomes evident] as he sloughs same questions in SpN I 12–13.

749Namely, it can be explained only in terms of delusion, that is, in terms of our notion of abhimāna.

750Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇasiddhi 219, according to Vetter’s edition (= 221 in Pandeya’s edition). Note the inversion of the first two words in YR, who reads saty ātmāni instead of ātmāni sati. The identification is due to Birgit Kellner and Seishi Karashima, whom I thank. Prof. Raffaele Torella has drawn my attention to the fact that the verse is quoted anonymously in the Abhisamayālaṃkāraloka by Haribhadra (ed. Vaidya: 303, 545).

751dumivāra — cf. YR ad 18, where the hexad constituted of māyā and the five kañcukas is also said to be dumivāra; see also, at the end of the passage, the absolutive: ... nivārya.

752These two kārikās are symmetrical: veṣṭayate, in kā. 32; udveṣṭayet, in kā. 33. The second hemistich of 33 is intended as a conclusion to both 32 and 33.

753See PS 60, n. 1039.
off the conceit that takes the body, etc., to be the Self (dehādyabhimāna). Then he knows: ‘I am a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, [hence] I am free’.\(^{754}\)

The manifestation (bhāsana) of that might that is nothing but the freedom of consciousness means illumination [namely, of the acolyte who] has located in his own Self everything that had been heretofore wrongly considered as external to it, saying [as it were]: ‘This might is all mine’.\(^{755}\)

The discipline (yoga) aiming at this manifestation means the fixation of reflection on the Self that results from such a program of such determined practices.\(^{756}\)

Thus, by a discipline that aims at manifesting the might of Self-knowledge, one unveils\(^{757}\) his proper Self — that Self, whose nature is consciousness and is not subservient to anything else.\(^{758}\)

[By ‘one unveils’ is meant that] the Lord himself unfastens him who had been made fast in the chains that consist in considering (paramarśanā) the body, vital breaths, subtle body or the Void [as the Self], that is, now removes what had covered him, by making him aware of the truth: ‘I am consciousness, I am free’.\(^{759}\)

Thus, the veiling of the Self that is the body, etc., which had come about through failing to recognize the Self as such, perishes now due to the power of recognition (khyāti),\(^{760}\) inasmuch as the fault [viz., the wrong identification with the body, etc.] is such insofar as it is made up from one’s own thought-constructs, as has been stated by the revered author of the Tantrasāra:

One becomes the Lord (pati) instantly — his self nothing but consciousness and his body nothing but the universe — through reasoning, whereby is obtained a firm conviction wholly other

\(^{754}\)cidānandaikaghanah svatantro 'smi.

\(^{755}\)Quote from IPK IV 12: sarvo mamāyaṁ vibhavaḥ, which occurs again in YR ad 51 (avat.).

\(^{756}\)evamparidUanakramena.

\(^{757}\)udveśtayate — udveśtayet, in the kā.

\(^{758}\)This statement expands upon the preceding nija, ‘own, proper’. Consciousness is autonomous, in the sense that it is self-caused; it is not an effect, rather, it is the only cause of whatever exists. Or, as say the Advaitins, the language of cause and effect, being vyāvahārika, cannot be used to describe the ultimate principle, which is ‘without beginning’.

\(^{759}\)caitanyasvarupah svatantro 'smi.

\(^{760}\)Here we note the only occurrence in YR’s commentary of the positive term khyāti, plainly and perhaps even playfully contrasted with akhyāti. The contrast suggests that khyāti is to be taken in the sense of pratyabhijñā, whose antonym a-pratyabhijñā is not attested. Cf. PHvṛ 4, where the following verse, of unknown provenance, is cited: akhyātir yadi na khyāti khyātir evāvaśiṣyate/ khyātir cet khyātirupatvāt khyātir evāvaśiṣyate, ‘If non-manifestation does not manifest [itself], then “manifestation” alone remains; if it does manifest [itself], then manifestation alone remains, because [the non-manifest] has the shape of the manifest’. The rhetorical model here is perhaps the upaniṣadic ‘pūrṇam adāh pūrṇam idam/ pūrṇat pūrṇam udacyate/ pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya/ pūrṇam evāvaśiṣyate (BĀU V 1, 1)’ or the ubiquitous Śaiva ‘nāprakāsah prakāsate'.

than the [false] conviction of the bound soul, [in the habit of] asserting [confidently:] ‘I am inert’, ‘I am bound by my acts’, ‘I am impure’, ‘I am governed by another’.\textsuperscript{761}

But why does the Lord both bind and liberate? The master says: ‘Thus [does the Supreme Śiva extend his play made wonderful by (the alternation of)] bondage, etc.’.

Thus (\textit{iti}), i.e., through the process expounded earlier, the free Lord, the Supreme Śiva, whose distinguishing feature is that the uniform mass of blissful consciousness of which he is composed cannot be perfected,\textsuperscript{762} creates bondage, establishing himself in the capacity of cognizer by means of the body, etc. — whereupon failure to recognize [one’s own identity with the Self] is made to appear through his playful habit that essentially consists in concealing his own real nature, thus covering over his own nature.

Similarly, \textit{mutatis mutandis} (\textit{punah}), having suppressed the bondage of cognizing by means of the body, etc., through the process of revealing the knowledge he has of his own Self, he liberates (\textit{mocayati}) himself of his own free will.

Thus, in two ways, he extends, or he spreads [before us], his \textit{play} (\textit{krīḍā}), his sporting (\textit{khelā}), \textit{made wonderful by [the alternation of] bondage and liberation}, that is, \textit{made marvelous by bringing out the essential nature of the transmigrating world and of liberation (\textit{apavarga}) — [all the while] thinking to himself: ‘ Alone, I do not rejoice’}.\textsuperscript{763} For this is the very essence of the deity that, while remaining fixed in his own nature (\textit{svarūparūpaḥ san}), he displays himself everywhere as the principle of experience itself, whatever state [or condition] he may assume. And this is precisely his freedom.

\textbf{Kārikā 34}

And it is not just that [freedom or play that is the issue], inasmuch as any other particular state, to the extent that (\textit{eva}) it reposes in its own form [i.e., appears as such], is [also] made to appear (\textit{avabhāsyate}) by the Lord. The master says:

\textit{34. Creation, maintenance and dissolution, as well as waking, dream and deep sleep, appear against [the backdrop of] the Fourth}

\textsuperscript{761}\textit{Tantrasāra} IV (p. 32).

\textsuperscript{762}\textit{pūrnacidānandaikaghana} — lit., ‘whose uniform mass of blissful consciousness is already perfect/complete’.

\textsuperscript{763}\textit{ekākī na ramāmy aham} — cf. BĀU I 4, 3: \textit{sa vai naiva reme, tasmād ekākī na ramage, sa dvitiyam aicchat}. 
Nevertheless, the Fourth abode does not appear as covered over by them.

Now, whether it concern creation and the rest from the cosmic point of view, or particular states, such as waking and the rest, that apply to the cognizer under the dominion of mâyā, in either case, these states appear against the [backdrop of the] Lord, a mass of bliss (änandaghana), that is, against the Fourth abode (turīye dhāmani), namely, the Fourth (caturtha) state consisting of nothing but perfect ipseity (pūrṇāhantā).

Reposing there as they do, such states nevertheless acquire a formal[ly independent] existence, [i.e., appear to exist] as external to it, when regarded from the perspective of the [limited] cognizer, himself constructed [by the Lord’s power of mâyā].

That which does not appear (na prakāśate) against the backdrop of the Supreme Lord does not appear externally either. Thus [the Śivasūtra states]:

Like sesame oil, the Fourth state is to be sprinkled over the three others.
Thus, the Fourth mode is threaded\textsuperscript{768} through all states — this is the supreme purport of the verse.

But ‘can for all that his essential nature be veiled there [in that Fourth state] by those [phenomenal states], or not?’ The master answers: ‘Nevertheless, it [the Fourth state] does not appear to be covered over by them’.

And so, though covered over for the sake of [revealing] the formal independence [of entities in this world], [that essential nature] is still manifest (avabhāsate) everywhere, for, being the principle of experience itself at the heart of each and every percipient subject, he [the Lord] transcends all those states. And it is not the case that, there [viz., in the Fourth state], he hides his own nature of plenitude (pūrṇasvarūpa) by concealing that [essential nature].

Thus is the abode that is Śiva ever replete, in all conditions whatsoever.

\textit{Kārikā 35}

With language taken from vedāntic statements,\textsuperscript{769} the master treats of the nature of the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep; and [in so doing] he makes known the Fourth [state], which is beyond them, though infused in them:\textsuperscript{770}

35. The waking state is this All, because difference is there. Dream is Splendor, because of the glorification there of Light. The state of [deep] sleep is that of the [pure] Knower, because it is a mass of consciousness; beyond there is the Fourth.\textsuperscript{771}

\textsuperscript{768}\textit{anusyūta} — YR’s commentary on the next kārikā presents the same image. The same term is found in SpK I 4; see also TĀ X 296 (also quoted in PM 61): trayasyāsyānusamādhis tu yadvaśād upajāyate/ sraksūtrakalpaṁ tat turyāṁ sarvabhedaṁ ghyatāṁ, ‘The Fourth is to be understood, within all the [three] different [states], as the string [holding together] the garland, through whose power comes into being the interconnection of [the elements of] the triad’. Note that MM 61 presents a somewhat different image: the string is \textit{vimārśa}, and the Fourth is one of the pearls that are there strung.

\textsuperscript{769}The themes developed in kā. 35 are based on MaṉU 2-12, and have been elaborated by preśāṅkarite vedāntic works, such as ĀPS 31 (quoted n. 764) and ĀŚ I 1–29 ad MaṉU 2-12. Note that, in the same context, Kṣemarāja also refers to vedāntic reasonings. In order to substantiate his gloss on SS I 11: \textit{tritayabhoktā vīrēśah}, ‘The enjoyer of the three [states] is the Lord of the heroes [i.e., of his sensorial energies] (vīrēśa)’, he quotes (without giving the source) ĀŚ I 5: \textit{trīṣu dhāmasya yad bhogyam bhoktiḥ yaṁ ca prakiritiḥ/ vedaitad ubhayam yas tu sa bhūjāno na lipyate/}, ‘He who knows both what is said to be the object of experience and the subject of experience in the three states is not affected by them [i.e., by those two conditions], even while he experiences them’. On the reasoning, see SpK II 4b, quoted by YR ad 1.

\textsuperscript{770}\textit{anusyūta} — lit., ‘threaded through them’.

\textsuperscript{771}As to content, kārikās 34 and 35 correspond to ĀPS 31.
The waking state is this All (viśva), i.e., the cosmic (vairāja) form of brahman. Why? Because of difference, that is, because the sense-organs — the eye, etc. — of all cognizers operate within the fivefold domain [of sense objects] — sound, etc., which the Supreme Lord has created as external to himself.

Hence, it is one and the same brahman, [diversified] as to object and subject, that subtends the marvelous display of varied sensory cognition. Hence, it has been stated in the Śivasūtra:

The waking state is [ordinary] cognition (jiñāna).

This has been proclaimed as the cosmic state (vīraḍavasthā) of brahman. As has been said in the Śrutī:

He who has eyes on every side, and a face on every side, who has hands on every side, and feet on every side, he forges together with hands, with [wings] that are worthy of sacrifice, creating the heaven and the earth, sole god.

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772 viśva, here, corresponds to the vaiśvānara of MāU 3, as developed by ĀŚ I 1–5 (which employs viśva, instead of vaiśvānara). Senart (ChU: 69) translates vaiśvānara, in ChU V 11, 2, as: ‘l’âme qui est dans tous les hommes’, Minard 1949 (p. 156, § 432) as: ‘Pananthrope’ (observing in the note: ‘Ou Pamphyle ou Pandème, si l’on entend “appartenant à tous les clans en commun”, comme le fait Ren. Anth. 15 n. 1’), Bouy (ĀŚ: 84) as: le ‘Panhumain’.

773 Cf. ChU V 18, 2, to be compared with MBh XII 47, 44, quoted by YR ad 27, as well as by BSīb I 2, 25.

774 Viz., the buddhindriyas (see PS 20).

775 Viz., the tanmātras (see PS 21).

776 Thus, as stated by MāU 3 and ĀŚ I 3, the waking subject is sthūlabhuj, ‘experiences the gross aspect (of objectivity)’. ĀŚ I 4 adds that not only does the waking subject, or viśva, ‘experience the gross’, but ‘the gross also satisfies him’: sthūlaṁ tarpayate viśvam. It is the state of external cognition: bahisprajñā (MāU 3; ĀŚ I 1).

777 ĀŚ I 8.

778 And it has been said profusely in the Śrutī. This text (ṚŚ X 81, 3) is one of the hymns to Viśvakarman. It is also found (with variants) in Kāṭhakasamhitā [KS] XVIII 2, Vājasyaṁśahityā [VS] XVII 19, Maitreyaśaṁśahityā [MS] II 10, 2, Atharvasaṁśahityā [AthS] XIII 2, 26, Taṭṭīrīyasasamhitā IV 6, 2, 4, Taṭṭīrīyāranyaka X, ŚvU III 3. Here, the reading (namate, samyajatrair) that of KS XVIII 2. namate is also supported by Taṭṭīrīyasasamhitā and Taṭṭīrīyāranyaka, which read namati. Main variants: dhamati (ṚŚ X 81, 3; VS, MS, ŚvU), in the sense of ‘to weld’, ‘to forge’, is supported by ṚŚ X 72, 2, where Brahmanaspati ‘forged together’ (samadhmat) all things in this world; bharati in AthS. samyajatrair is found only in KS; elsewhere: sampatrair, which is supported by ṚŚ IX 112, 2, describing the blacksmith who uses the feathers of great birds (parnebhīḥ ṣakunānām) for fanning fire; therefore, in order to make sense with samyajatrair, ‘worthy of sacrifice’, we supply ‘wings’ as the implicit noun to be thus qualified. Note that R ad ĀPS 6 quotes the last pada of ṚŚ X 81, 3. For other texts evoking Viśāj, see YR ad 27, and n. 678.

779 ṚŚ X 81, 3.
[As waking is the cosmic form of brahman,] likewise dream is the state of brahman that is tejas, ‘Splendor’ (tejovasthā).780

Why? The master says: ‘because of the glorification of Light’. 781

In dreams, neither do the external sense-organs make so bold as to operate on their corresponding sensory domains, sound, etc.,782 nor is anything there attested that is external and ultimately real, such as sound, etc., nor is any other cause of the determinate cognition [experienced in dreaming] to be apprehended as something external [to dream itself], whether slightly different [from dream], such as nescience, etc.,783 or as identical to it [viz., dream itself] nor can [such a cause] be established by argument [when the dream is over].784 Still, everything [that one can possibly imagine] does appear in dreams.785

780 I.e., the taijasa form of ātman/brahman, as defined by MĀU 4 (and ĀŚ I 1-5). Not only does the dreaming subject ‘experience the subtle’: praviviktabhuj (ĀŚ I 3), but also ‘the subtle satisfies him’: tarpayate [...] viviktam tu taijasam (ĀŚ I 4). This is the state of internal cognition: antahprajñā (MĀU 4; ĀŚ I 1). Compare the following upaniṣadic passages, which predate the formulation of the notion of tejas/taijasa and its incorporation into the doctrine of the ātman’s quadripartition: BĀU IV 3, 9: sa [puruṣaḥ] yatra prasvapiti asya lokasya sarvāvato mātrām apādāya svayam vihayata svayaṁ nirmāya svena bhāsā svena jyotiśa prasvapiti/ atrayaṁ puruṣaṁ svayaṁ jyotir bhavati, ‘When he goes to sleep, he takes along the material (mātrā) of this all-embracing world, himself tears it apart, himself builds it up; he sleeps (dreams) by his own brightness, by his own light. In that state the person becomes self-illuminated’; and BĀU IV 3, 14: atro kalvä āhuḥ jāgaraṁadēva evāśyasyaḥ/ yānī hy eva jāgrat paśyati tānī supta iti/ atrayaṁ puruṣaṁ svayaṁ jyotir bhavati, ‘Others, however, say that (the state of sleep) is just his waking state for whatever objects he sees when awake, those too, he sees, when asleep; (not so) for in the dream-state the person is self-illuminated’.

781 This Light is the manifesting power of brahman.

782 Cf. BĀU IV 3, 11: svapnena śārīram abhiprathaya/ asuptaḥ suptāṁ abhicākaśīti, ‘Having struck down in sleep what belongs to the body, he himself sleepless looks down, on the sleeping (senses)’. For avidyā operates in the “objective” world, whereas the cause of whatever is experienced within a dream is to be found in dreaming itself or in the dreamer. The discussion will be taken up again in YR ad 48. Cf. BĀUBh IV 3, 9: the dream is circumscribed by the body of the dreamer, a ‘dream body’ (svapnadeha), ‘constituted of latent dispositions’ (vāsanāmaya), ‘like a māyic (or magic) body’ (māyāmayam iva) — ‘svayam nirmāya nirmāṇam kṛtvā vāsanāmaya svapnadeham māyāmayam iva. According to Hiriyanna, Śaṅkara’s māyā and avidyā are to be understood as more or less referring to the same thing. If a distinction is to be forced, one may be taken to represent the “objective” side of the phenomenal world, the other its “subjective” side — but the distinction itself illustrates the force of māyā, and a fortiori, of avidyā. In other words, bound souls are the substratum of avidyā; whereas the substratum of māyā is Īśvara, who casts illusions on the bound souls as does a magician who is not trapped by it. And such is the deeply rooted effect of māyā that each bound soul clings to his ignorance; māyā is meant for elseone, not for Īśvara.

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784 The passage explains in what manner the dreaming subject experiences phenomena in their subtle form. See ĀŚ II 1-5, which discusses the unreality of dream-phenomena from a logical perspective.

785 Cf. BĀU IV 3, 9-10: [...] atrayaṁ puruṣaḥ svayaṁjyotir bhavati/ na tatra ratāḥ na rathayo-gā na paṁhāno bhavanty atha ratān rathayogāga na tatra bhavanty atha rathāṁ bhavanty athānandān mūḍhaḥ pramudāḥ bhavanty athānandān mūḍhaḥ pramudāḥ sṛjate na tatra veśānāṁ puṣkarināṁ svayantyo bhavanty atha veśānāṁ puṣkarināṁ sṛvānāṁ sṛjate sa hi kartā, ‘In that state the person becomes self-
What is implied by all this is that it is he, the Lord, the luminous god endowed with his own essential nature [of consciousness], who has assumed the condition of diverse cognizers, and as if dreaming, after dividing (pravibhajya) his own Self into the marvelous diversity of numerous subjects, houses, cities, palaces, etc., through his illuminative [i.e., manifesting] power of freedom.

Hence, the Brahmavādins accept that the freedom of brahman is nothing else than dream [i.e., manifests itself as dream]. For it is stated in the Vedānta texts:

Dividing (pravibhajya) himself by himself and creating entities of various kinds, the Lord of all, being all forms, appears (prakāśate) as the enjoyer in a dream.

Iluminated. There are no chariots there, nor animals to be yoked to them, no roads, but he creates (projects from himself) chariots, animals to be yoked to them and roads. There are no joys there, no pleasures, no delights, but he creates joys, pleasures and delights. There are no tanks there, no lotus-pools, no rivers, but he creates tanks, lotus-pools and rivers. He, indeed, is the agent (maker or creator). Note that ĀŚ II 3, in dealing with the unreality of dream-phenomena, alludes precisely to this text: abhāva ca rathādīndm śrūyate nyāyapūrvakam/, 'The non-existence of [dream-]chariots and the like is taught by the Sruti, accompanied by reasonings'.

Or 'whose essential nature is [to be] himself [viz., being pure consciousness, he cannot be other than himself'].

svapnânta uccdvacam iyamàno rûpàni devah kurute bahûni/ uteva stmtbhíh saha modamdno jaksad utevdpi bhayáni pásyan//, 'In the state of dream going up and down, the god makes many forms for himself, now as it were enjoying himself in the company of women or laughing or even beholding fearful sights'.

Dividing himself and creating objects of all kinds, the subject deviomes, now as it were enjoying himself in the company of women or laughing or even beholding fearful sights'.

asādhārana — here, Barnett seems to understand a contrario: 'The Lord [...] reveals to each dreamer a common universe' — whereas the privacy of dream is attested by one's own experience: my dreams are mine alone. To the sovereign freedom of the Lord corresponds the equal freedom of the finite dreamer.

Quoted in Vākyapadīyārtti [VPṛ] I 119. The reading is vedāntesu, in KSTS and in all our manuscripts, except for the Wilson MS, which reads vedanátsu. We have opted for the reading vedāntesu — in any case more satisfactory grammatically. This verse is found as a quote in VPṛ I 119 [119 Iyer = 127 Biaudeau], with one variant: pravartate instead of prakāśate. Iyer translates (p. 115): 'The Lord of All, the All-embracing, the Enjoyer, after dividing Himself and after having created many different things, proceeds to sleep'. Biaudeau has (p. 163): 'Se divissant lui-même et créant des objets de toutes sortes, le sujet devient, dans le rêve, souverain de toutes choses et fait de toutes choses' — 'Dividing himself and creating objects of all kinds, the subject becomes, in dreaming, the sovereign of all things and is made of all things'. The verse seems to have been famous in the Śaiva circles, for Rāmakānta quotes it — although with two variants: sarvaśaktih, 'endowed with all powers' (for sarvamayah) and propadyate (for pravartate) — in his Viṛti to SpK III 1-2 (p. 102), in
Thus, the cause here [viz., of what is experienced in dream] is the glorification (māhātmya) of his Light alone [that is, the glorification implicit in his power of manifestation].

Therefore, the dream of brahman is the condition termed ‘Splendor’ (tejas) [namely, ‘dream’ (in the kārikā) refers to the luminous state of brahman].

Likewise, the state of sleep is [that of] the [pure] Knower.

The state of sleep (suptāvasthā), that is the deep sleep (suṣupta) of all cognizers is called the ‘Knower’ (prājñā), meaning that it is the knowing state (prājñāvasthā) of brahman.

That is to say, in deep sleep, only the Wisdom (prajñā) of brahman the context of the Lord’s revealing himself in dream to the yogin. Now, what is the source of this verse? Rāmakanṭha attributes it to Bhaartrhari, from which statement we may infer that Rāmakanṭha, and probably other Kashmirian Śāivites, considered Bhaartrhari to be the author of the Vṛtti. The question that remains is whether Bhaartrhari too cites the verse, or whether it is his own (see Biardeau [VP: 162], who observes that the northern manuscripts attribute the verse to Bhaartrhari himself). Although, as observed by Biardeau (p. 163), the text sounds rather upaniṣadic (‘La résonance en est plutôt upaniṣadique’), the verse has not been traced in the upaniṣadic corpus. Taking into account three indices, it may be inferred that this passage of YR’s commentary on the dream state reflects the views of the Grammarians, whose affinity with the Trika is so marked that YR believes himself able to reformulate in Trika terms Bhaartrhari’s positions: the three are 1) the source of the quote (VPṛṛ I 119 [= 127]); 2) the presence of the same key-term, pravibhaṭya, both in YR’s gloss and in the quote supporting it; and 3) the frequency of the dream metaphor in the VP and in its Vṛtti — see, besides VP 119 and its Vṛtti quoted here, VPṛṛ I 1: [...] vivartah / svapnaviṣayapratibhāsavat, ‘Phenomenal manifestation is like the appearances in a dream’; VPṛṛ I 4: ekasya hi brahmānās [...] svapnavijñānapuruṣavad abhisatvatvāḥ [...] bhoktābhoktavyabhogagranthayā vividantante, ‘In this One brahman [...] “knots” of the nature of subject, object and experience manifest, having no external reality, like the beings perceived in dream’. It seems indubitable, then, that in introducing a citation that is to be found ‘vedāntesu’, YR is referring to a commentary on Bhaartrhari (and, perhaps, of Bhaartrhari); it follows that the ‘Brahmāvādin’ whose doctrine is supported by the quote is a Śābabelāvādin, that is, a grammarian of the school of Bhaartrhari. Moreover, it is noteworthy that early (preAshavkarite) Vedānta, the VP with its Vṛtti, and the Trika, all have a similar conception of diversity: they hold that phenomenal multiplicity is not illusory, that, in its subtle form, it is the Lord’s ‘manifestation’ (pratibhāsa, in VP; abhāsa, in Trika), wherein the Lord as consciousness — as in a dream — appears as the triad of subject, object and experience itself.

So generally Conze 1974; Bugault 1968 translates ‘la sapience’.

792 prajñā — the term is variously translated: ‘Understanding’ (Barnett PS: 731); the ‘Cognitive’ (Hume BĀU: 392); ‘wise’ and ‘intelligent’ (Bhattacharya ĀŚ); ‘serenely’ aware* (Fort 1990: 151); the ‘enlightened’, the ‘knower’ (Gupta ĀŚ: 180, 181); ‘le Percipient’ (Bouy ĀŚ: 86). The first occurrence of the term is probably found at BĀU IV 3, 21, which describes deep sleep through the metaphor of the man who “knows nothing without or within” while in the arms of his beloved. Defining prajñā, MāU 5 borrows from BĀU IV 3, 19: [...] evam evvyām puruṣa etasmā antiyā dhāvaiti yatra supto na kam cana kāmam kāmayate na kam cana svapnam pāṣyati [...], ‘[...] even so this person hastens to that state (of self) where he desires no desires and sees no dream’; on the dissolution of all desires, characteristic of this state, see also BĀU IV 3, 21. It is the state of ‘massive cognition’, variously termed prajñānaghana (MāU 5) (‘masse de pure conscience objectale’, so Bouy, p. 86), ghanaprajñā (ĀŚ I 1), and jñānaghana, as here, in PS 35.

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remains, who has become thus the seed of the universe.  

[Deep sleep] is the great Void (mahāsūnya), where objects, etc., are dissolved, where root impressions only remain, inasmuch as phenomenal display has vanished for all knowers, [along with] the dichotomy of knower and known. There, brahman remains at the very center [of all beings] as the principle of Knowing (prajñātātayā).

This [condition of ‘Knower’, viz., brahman] is the substratum of the root impressions implicit in the display of the world’s marvelous diversity — as blue, pleasure, etc. — that belong to every [individual] cognizer — as in [many] examples drawn from ordinary experience, such as that of the awakened one who [remembers what he] has experienced previously.

Otherwise, had the stable brahman not shone forth as the nature of the Knower (prajñāt) in this condition [of deep sleep], by encompassing everything [that is knowable], wherefrom could have arisen, in the reawakened cognizer, the memory (smṛti) of things previously experienced — via the recall of such experience [through judgments like]: ‘just so this happened?’ Nor could have arisen the experiences: ‘I slept well, I slept badly’, or ‘I [slept as though] completely senseless’.

So says Bhattadivākaravatsa:

[O Lord, who is the Self,] if all experienced objects were not preserved within you by appropriating them fully, no memory, whereby [we are] not robbed of the things that we have [once] known, could possibly arise.

794 Cf. MāU 6: esa sarveśvara esa sarvajña esa ‘ntaryāmy esa yonih sarvasya prabhavāpyayau hi bhutānām, ‘This is the Lord of all, this is the knower of all, this is the inner controller; this is the source of all; this is the beginning and the end of beings’. From the viewpoint of the divine, the vaiśvānara corresponds to Viraj, and prājña to the universal Lord; cf. BĀU IV 4, 22: sarvasya vaśi sarvasyesānāḥ sarvasvyādhipātīḥ [...] esa sarveśvara esa bhūtādhipātir esa bhūtapālāḥ [...].

795 Cf. Bhāskarī ad ÍPV III 2, 12, according to which deep sleep, in which the experiencer is predominant, is the state of both the prāṇapramāna and the sūnyapramāna (pramānapradhānānāṃ prāṇaśūnyapramātavasthāyāṃ susuptāvasthā) — the sūnyapramāña, who belongs to the category of the Pralayakalas on the scale of the seven saptapramāṇas.

796 We borrow this rendering of sāmskāra from Dasgupta 1975: 263 and passim.

797 Lit., ‘such as [the memory of] what has been previously experienced by the awakened one’.

798 sthira — cf. BĀU IV 4, 20, where ātman/brahman is said to be dhruva, ‘stable’.

799 Or ‘to the extent that experiences move in us [namely, that we are conscious of them], expressed in judgements like [...]’.

800 Probably another name of Bhāskara, the author of a commentary (the Śivasūtravārttika) on the Śivasūtra and of the Kaksyāstotra, a hymn to the goddess frequently quoted in Kashmirian Śaiva literature. Divākaravatsa, the ‘dear son [lit., ‘calf’] of Divākara’, so styles himself in the colophons to his Vārttika. The verse quoted here is also quoted (and attributed to Bhatṭadivākara) in ÍPVV, vol. II: 3; it is quoted without its source in TĀV V 137, vol. III: 1067, in a passage dealing with memory. YR quotes another verse, borrowed from the Kaksyāstotra, in his gloss to PS 51; also ÍPVV, vol. II: 13, 14 and 14S; for other quotes, see Dyczkowski SpK: 29–30 and notes.
It has thus been proclaimed [by the kārikā] that deep sleep, consisting of consciousness [although still under māyā], [corresponds to] the state of brahman called 'Knower' (prājña). Why? Because it [the deep sleep] is a mass of consciousness (jñānaghanatvāt). ⁸⁰¹

[Moreover,] since this is to be taken as a cause in relation both to deep sleep and to the Fourth state, it [viz., jñānaghanatvāt] should be supplied in both places. ⁸⁰²

This state of deep sleep is a mass of consciousness, inasmuch as it takes the form of Light. ⁸⁰³

Nevertheless, tarnished by the root impressions left there by the dissolution of the universe [viz., in the condition of deep sleep of brahman], it is not [absolutely] pure consciousness (śuddhacit). ⁸⁰⁴

As it has been stated in Spandaśāstra:

The all-pervading Lord reveals himself, in the two states [of waking and dream], as possessed of the supreme Power (para-mā śaktiḥ) of [diversifying himself into] knowledge and the knowable, but, elsewhere, he reveals himself as consciousness. ⁸⁰⁵

And, beyond it, there is the Fourth; ⁸⁰⁶ beyond that — namely, deep sleep — different from it, there is the Fourth form of brahman, consisting entirely of unalloyed bliss, for the root impressions [that produce] the latent dispositions proper to the limited soul have there entirely vanished, as is suitable to the status [of the Fourth, understood as other than the third]. ⁸⁰⁷

⁸⁰¹ In deep sleep, absence of duality is experienced. The notion cidghana, 'mass of consciousness', implies that the subject no longer apprehends duality, recovers his basic unity (he is ekbhūta, as stated by MĀU 4), with the result that he experiences bliss: ānandaśrī (MĀU 5; ĀŚ I 9), that he himself is bliss: ānandamaya (MĀU 5). Cf. ĀŚ I 12 on prājña: nātmānām na parāmś caiva na satyam nāpi cāṅśtam/ prājñāh kim ca na samvetti [...] 'Prājña knows nothing — neither himself nor others, neither truth nor falsehood' (tr. Bhattacharya); and, on the subject in deep sleep, BĀU IV 3, 21 (quoted supra); BĀU IV 3, 23: na tu tad dviyān asiti tato 'nyad vibhaktam yat paśyeta, 'There is not, however, a second, nothing else separate, from him that he could see'. On the term jñānaghaṇa, see n. 792.

⁸⁰² ĀŚ I 13a formulates the same truth: dvaitasyāgraṇam tulyam ubhayam prājñāturyayoḥ, 'Non-apprehension of duality is similar in both prājñā and turya'.

⁸⁰³ See, infra, the quotation by YR of SpK I 18.

⁸⁰⁴ ĀŚ I 13b also distinguishes between prājñā and turya, but differently, by recourse to the concept of bijanidrā, 'germinal' or 'causal sleep', present in the former, and absent in the latter. In the former, diversity emerges again and again from the state of pure potentiality. Compare YR, here: 'In deep sleep, only the sapience (prajña) of brahman remains, who has become thus the seed (bijā) of the universe'.

⁸⁰⁵ SpK I 18. As pointed out by SpN I 18, according to some exegetes, 'elsewhere' refers to both deep sleep and the Fourth state; according to others, to deep sleep alone.

⁸⁰⁶ MĀU 7 gives the first explicit definition of the Fourth state, called caturtha. ĀŚ I 10–18 develops this definition.

⁸⁰⁷ For speculations on turiyā (or its variant turya), see Malamoud 1989: 140ff. As he
Since no name suitable to the meaning [of that Fourth state] can be given, it has simply been called here the ‘Fourth’, thus designating it numerically by means of an ordinal suffix — namely, the ordinal of the cardinal ‘four’; for it is the repository of the triad of states previously expounded — the [string] threaded through all of them together.

[To the question — ‘How then, if it is threaded through the three states, can it be beyond them?’ the master responds: ‘Because it is a mass of consciousness’.

Since all those states — waking, etc. — are pervaded by the ignorance of cognizers, these being necessarily prone to difference, the Fourth has the shape of unalloyed consciousness (jnānaghana), Light and bliss, for all root impressions have there vanished, consequent upon the cessation of the perturbance (ksobha) bringing about differentiation into subject and object. Therefore, though situated within them, it is beyond, that is, is different from them, for it has transcended those [three limited] states, being nothing but consciousness itself.

Thus, does the free and all-encompassing brahman expand its nature ultimately nondual, yet diversified into various states. Kārikā 36

If so, then it would follow that the failure to recognize the Self would of necessity soil all classes of cognizing subject, inasmuch as the pure supreme Self still finds itself threaded through each and every cognizer. The master demonstrates that it is not so with an example:

36. As no cloud, smoke or dust can soil the surface of the sky, so the supreme Person is untouched by the alterations brought about

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observes (n. 10): 'L'analyse étymologique comparative permet d'établir que turiya est construit sur une forme contractée du radical catur, “quatre”. [...] Mais la spéculación philosophique [...] fait de turiya un dérivé de la racine verbale Tṛ, TUR, “franchir”, et interprète cet adjectif comme “ce qui est au-delà”. Cf. Renou 1978: 86' ['Comparative etymological analysis shows that turiya is constructed from a contracted form of the root catur, “four”. [...] But philosophical speculation [...] made turiya derive from the verbal root ṭṛ, tur, ‘to cross’, and interpreted this adjective as “that which is beyond”. Cf. Renou 1978: 86'].

Viz., the place where the three previous states merge (see YR ad 34). This hints at the transcendent aspect of brahman.

That is, the string accounts for the unity of the ensemble, the necklace, and, at the same time, is found within all the parts, the pearls; see YR ad 34.

YR's concluding remarks on the vedāntic ātman/brahman are made in Trika terms. It is the supreme Śakti of the Lord, in the form of his power of absolute freedom (svātantryaśakti), that opts either for transcendence or for immanence.

akhyātimālaya — lit., 'dirt of non-recognition'.
through mâyā. 814

[The comparison may be formulated as follows:] the naturally clear surface of the sky remains unsoiled by clouds, smoke or quantities of dust, although these appear against [the backdrop of] that sky — nor are thereby its eternity and infinite extension negated; rather, the sky remains just sky, whatever [transitory] state embellishes it, as happens with reflections in the mirror, for the sky [like the mirror] is invariably recognized (pratyabhijñāna) as such.

Likewise, i.e., similarly, the Lord is not touched by the alterations brought about through mâyā, although these alterations are situated in the Lord himself; these modifications arise out of [immemorial] nescience and consist of the numerous and diverse states occurring in innumerable cognizers: birth, death, etc. His own nature has not been abrogated by those modifications, for he is the supreme Person (parah puruṣah): he represents the first glimmering (ullāsa), and the [final] place of repose of all mundane men (puruṣa). 820

For this reason, he ever manifests himself (sphurati) as the principle of experience itself at the heart of each and every percipient subject. This has been indicated by the word ‘supreme’. Therefore, as happens with the magician [whose magical tricks, which he himself creates, delude

814 Verse similar to ÁPS 35, apart from one important difference: prakṛtivikārair aparamṛṣṭah parah puruṣah// (APS 35cd) /mâyāvikāraḥ aparamṛṣṭah parah puruṣah (PS 36). ÁŚ III 8 formulates the matter positively, denouncing those who are not enlightened: yathā bhavati bālānām gaganāṃ malināṃ malaiḥ/ tathā bhavaty abuddhānām ātmāpi malino malaiḥ/, ‘Just as, in the eyes of simple people, the sky is soiled with impurities, so, for those lacking in wisdom, the ātman itself is soiled with impurities (mala)’. 815Cf. the traditional derivation of ākāśa: a samantāt kāsata ity ākāśaṃ, ‘That which shines on all sides is ākāśa’. See ÁPS 35, BhG XIII 32 (yathā sarvagatam saukṣmyād ākāśam nopalipyate/sarvatvāvasthito dehe tathāmā nopalipyate//), ÁŚ III 8 quoted n. 814, Ś ad loc., BSBh I 2, 8; I 3, 19, II 3, 17. Cf. YR ad 72 and ad 83–84 (n. 1255).

816 Lit., ‘by whatever [transitory] state it is variegated’.

817 Cf. kā. 12–13 and YR ad loc.

818 These are the ‘modifications of becoming’ (bhāvanikāra); see n. 295. Thus, by an analogy with space, it is shown that the ātman is the same in all finite souls, and that this ātman is neither soiled nor subject to transmigration in any real sense. Defilements and ‘modifications’ are but effects of mâyā. Cf. ÁPS 51: janmavināsana-gamana-gamana-malam-pairavartyatito nityam/ ākāśa iva ghaṭādiṣu sarvātmā nopalipyate//, ‘The Self of all, which is permanently free of connection to birth and destruction, to coming and going, and to impurities, is ever [seemingly] connected [to birth, destruction, etc.], like the ether in jars, etc., [in that the ether seems to be connected with the jar’s origination, destruction, etc., although it is not really connected to these]’. (tr. Danielson, revised), and the similar statement of ÁŚ III 9: marane samrah caiva gatyagamanaiyor api/ sthitau sarvasatireresv ākāśenāvilaksanaḥ/, ‘Whether death, birth, departing and coming, or staying [in this world] is concerned, [the ātman] present in all bodies is not different from space’. See also, PS 29, and the corresponding statement in ÁPS 21.

819 Cf. YR ad 50.

820 Cf. YR ad 1, where sarvālaya of the kārikā is glossed by sarvaviśrāntiṣṭhāna.

821 aintradālika.
others without deluding him], the modifications associated with māya that proceed from him, consisting of non-Light, do not abrogate the Lord himself. As had been said by my teacher’s teacher’s teacher, in the Nareśvaraviveka:

822 On the illusory power of the ātman (or Lord, here), see ĀŚ III 10a: saṃghātāh svapnavat surve ātmamāyāvīsarjītāh, ‘The corporal aggregates, as happens in a dream, are created by the illusory power (māya) of the ātman’. Also ĀŚ II 12; 19; ŚvU IV 10a: māyāṁ tu prakṛtim vidyāṁ māyināṁ tu mahēśvarāṁ, ‘Know then that prakṛti is māya, and wielder of māya (māyin) is the Great Lord’.

823 Nareśvaraviveka = Ajadapramāṭsiddhi [APS] 20–21a. The editors of this volume in the KSTS (Jagadisha Chandra Chatterji and the “Pandits” of the “Research Department of the Kashmir State”) have “corrected” the reference of the quote, attributing it to the Ajadapramāṭsiddhi, though their manuscripts all have: paramesṭhinā nareśvaraviveke; all eight manuscripts at our disposal confirm this: all read “nareśvaraviveke”. Indeed, the quote figures in the Ajadapramāṭsiddhi 20–21a, whereas the Nareśvaraviveka, although frequently quoted in the Śaiva literature, is not available. No such title as Nareśvaraviveka [NV] figures in the India Office Library Catalogue (ed. 1938–1957). The Catalogus Catalogorum of Aufrecht, based probably on a MS of our Paramāṭhasāra, notes it as the work of Paramaṇeśthin, cited by ‘Vitastapuri’ (sic) — no doubt an error of interpretation of our passage of YR’s commentary ad 36, inasmuch as Vitastapuri is the city designated by YR as his place of residence in the final strophe of his commentary. Yet, the NV is given an important place in the works of Śaivism (see, esp., its numerous quotations in the IPVV, and that in the PM, p. 57). Therefore, the question is: does the verse belongs to the NV or to the APS, and if belonging to the NV, what is this work and who is its author? The verse cited here is apparently wellknown. It is found in TĀV V 8a (citing the first verse: yady apy arthasthitih ...), IPVV I 3, 7 (vol. I: 143; first verse), IPVV I 8, 9 (vol. I: 420; citing the same verse and a half as in YR), IPVV I 3, 7 (vol. I: 287; citing the pratika: yady apy arthasthitih), IPVV I 8, 10 (vol. II: 433; citing the pratika), and PM 19. There is no explicit attribution (whether title or author) in TĀV V 8a, nor in IPVV I 3, 7. Nevertheless, IPVV I 8, 10 attributes it explicitly to the APS, as does the PM. On the other hand, IPVV I 3, 7 cites it as that of ‘the ācārya’ (yad uktaṁ ācāreṇaiva — which is glossed by Bhāskara: ‘atśācyasammatim āha’), and IPVV I 8, 10 as that of ‘the grhaṇakṛt’ (yathoktam grhaṇakṛtaiva — glossed by Bhāskara: ‘atśād utpaladevasya sammatim āha’ and: ‘grhaṇakṛtā — śrīmad uplaladevena’) — glossed by Bhāskara: ‘atra śrīmad utpaladevasya sammatim āha’ and: ‘grhaṇakṛtā — śrīmad upaladevena’). From these occurrences, it can be inferred that the author of the verse is Utpala, and that the text from which it is borrowed is the APS, rather than the NV — inasmuch as AG almost always refers explicitly to the NV when he cites it: ‘yan Nareśvaravivekah’ or ‘tathā Nareśvaravivekah’, as observed by A. Sanderson (private correspondence). Despite the manuscripts of the Paramāṭhasāraviviṣṭi [PSV], there is little chance that the verse here cited by YR belongs to the NV, unless we admit that the verse is present in the two texts. Still, YR attributes this verse to his parameśthin, the guru of the guru of his guru, that is, to Utpala (if the paramparā is as follows: Kṣemarāja, Abhinavagupta, Utpaladeva) — unless it is to Laksmanagupta that the verse is to be attributed, as proposed by A. Sanderson. On this basis, it might be supposed that YR could have been mistaken in the matter of the text’s name, and that the source of that confusion might be that the two texts had the same author, Utpaladeva — a mistake that could easily have happened, inasmuch as the two passages in the Vimarśini where the verse here cited by YR appears refer only to the author, and that only generically, as ācārya or grhaṇakṛt, and not to the work’s title. The hypothesis that the NV be attributed to Utpala would explain as well the evident doctrinal relationship of the NV and the IPK, and the many times the IPK cites the NV. It remains surprising, however, that AG cites the NV without ever mentioning that it is the work of Utpala (or of another of his teachers). R. Torella (private correspondence), recognizing an ‘Utpala-like’ character in the NV, may be mentioned as providing further support for this thesis.
Although common experience, is conditioned by reference to embodied souls limited by breath and the subtle body, yet it is anchored also in the supreme Self. How could there be limitation of it [the supreme Self] by breath [etc.], when breath has the Self for its very essence? 

Kārikā 37

But how is it possible that mundane men, though in reality nothing but uniform consciousness (ekacit), are affected by a medley of various states, such as pleasure, pain, delusion, birth, death, etc., each of which is distinctive? 

37. Though the space within one jar is infused with dust, other [spaces within other jars] are not thereby defiled. So it is with those embodied souls that experience differences of pleasure and pain.

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824 arthasthiti — lit., ‘state of things’, ‘course of ordinary events’. Bhāskara ad IPV I 3, 7 glosses: arthasthirit arthaviṣayo vyavahāraḥ, ad 1 8, 9: arthasthirit arthaviṣayo jñānāvidvyavahāraḥ and concludes: na hi prāṇapuryaṣṭakarabhūt ghaṭāder arthasthirit dṛṣyaṭe, ‘for such common experience (arthasthiti = vyavahāra) is not to be had from pots, etc., which are devoid of breath and the subtle body’.

825 Bhāskara glosses niruddha as ‘sthitim gatā’ (ad IPV I 3, 7), and as ‘niyatā’ (ad IPV I 8, 9).

826 Bhāskara glosses yantrād as ‘pariccheda’.

827 The context in which this verse is quoted in IPV I 3, 7 is particularly illuminating inasmuch as it implies a reference to BhG XV 15 (mattaḥ sāmrāṭ jñānām apohanaṁ ca, ‘From Me derive memory, knowledge and exclusion’ — our transl.): anena saktitraṇya viśve vyavahārāḥ/ tac ca bhagavata eva saktitraṇyaḥ yat tathābhūtānuḥvivitrśaktipiyāvāhavāvairaṇa- maitrāṇyavabhāṣānam/ sa eva hi tena tena vapaṇā jānāti smarati vikalpayati ca/ yathoktam a- cāryenaiva ... , ‘All worldly behaviors depend upon this triad of powers (saktitraṇa) [namely, knowledge (jñānā), in the sense of direct experience, memory (sāmrāt), and exclusion (apohana), in the sense of differentiating, that is, limited, knowledge. It is this triad of the Lord’s powers that Caitra, Maitra, and all others, manifest, as so many experiencing, remembering and cognizing subjects. [In reality] it is he who knows [viz., directly experiences], remembers and cognizes through the variety of limited subjects. Thus said our teacher […]’. Utpala’s own vṛtti ad IPK I 3, 7 cites BhG XV 15, in support of the view according to which the energies of knowledge, etc. (jñānādikāḥ saktayaḥ), pertain to the principle of consciousness (citattva) alone. The supreme Self (paramātman) of APS 20–21a is none other than the principle of consciousness (citattva) of Utpala’s vṛtti ad IPK I 3, 7; see AG’s Traika interpretation of BhG XV 15, quoted n. 453.

828 The argument here is slightly different from the preceding — its inverse, so to speak; compare the analogous dialectic of the Advaita, where, once the existence of a unique and omnipresent brahman is admitted, the problem becomes that of explaining the existence of phenomenal diversity. It is the diversity of finitude itself that is the index of the non-reality of finitude. Infinitude alone is real.

829 Verse exactly repeating APS 36. Cf. also ĀŚ III 5 (echoing APS 36?): yathaikasmin ghaṭākāśe rajodhūmādībhūtī yute/ na sarve samprayūjyante tadvay jīvāḥ sukhādībhīḥ//, ‘Just as, if one space within a jar is filled with dust, smoke, etc., not all [spaces in all jars] are so filled, so is the case with the individual souls regarding joy, etc. [i.e., similarly, if one individual soul is filled with joy, etc., not all souls are filled with joy, etc.]’. ĀŚ III 6 (quoted n. 833)
[The comparison may be formulated as follows:]

Though one space within a [specific] jar is infused\(^{830}\) with quantities of dust, other such spaces within [other] jars do not thereby become defiled, that is, infused, with dust; these spaces remain [essentially] spotless, because what is common to all of them is the quality of space [and not any adventitious quality, such as being dusty].

The space, itself spotless, pervasive and unvarying, that has come to be limited by the restriction (\(\text{sa}nkoca\)) of the jar, belongs as such to that jar only, nor are those [analogous] spaces [confined within other] jars or [behind] curtains to be confused with one another, whether they be fumigated with black aloe or made odorous with musk, or simply be bad-smelling\(^{831}\) — because it is of the nature of space to be one,\(^{832}\) and because the distinctions [if such there be] are made in reference to jars themselves and the like [and not to space as such].

Moreover, though real space is situated [everywhere] uniformly, jars and the like, delimited as they are by restrictions — such as [enclosing] sides — that refer only to the jar itself [and not to space], make display of a great variety of [apparently] different spaces.\(^{833}\)

Thus, it is the restriction alone made by the jar that is thus qualified by a spatial predicate\(^{834}\) [and not the reverse], because in such terms alone are practical affairs conducted\(^{835}\) [namely, it is useful to speak of the 'space' as belonging to the 'jar'; it is not useful to speak of the 'jar' as belonging to or delimiting 'space'].\(^{836}\)

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\(^{830}\) *samācchādita* — lit., ‘covered’.

\(^{831}\) The meaning of *vithira* (a *kāśmiṭra* word?) is doubtful. A jar intended for pickles may be meant, for these are prepared with *asā foetida*. The fumigation or perfuming of the space in the jar, which makes the space unique, corresponds, as *upameya* in the analogy, to the *vāsanās*, the dispositions responsible for the seeming individuations of the universal ātman. YR is playing here, at the end, on the etymological ambiguity of the terms *vāsanā* and *adhivāsita*, which may be derived either from the root *vas*, ‘to dwell’ (a more probable etymology, according to Renou 1997, vol. II: 778, who translates ‘residence’), or *vās*, ‘to perfume’.

\(^{832}\) Note the unique character of space (ākāśa) among the elements enumerated by the Vaiśeṣikas; it is said not to be a *sāmānya*, ‘universal’, precisely because, unlike all the other elements, it has no instances.

\(^{833}\) AS III 6 formulates the same truth: *rūpakāryasaṃākhyaś ca bhidyante tatra tatra vai/ākāśasya na bheda 'sti tadvaj jīveṣu nimayah//∗, ‘The form, the function and the denomination (of the spaces contained in jars, etc.) differ indeed from one to another, although difference cannot be predicated of space itself. So it is with the limited selves’. Śaṅkara, ad AS III 5, mentioning containers such as jars (*ghaṭa*), water-pots (*karaka*) and bedrooms (*apavaraka*), explains that they differ from each other by form (they are small, large, etc.), function (drawing water, keeping it, going to sleep), or denomination (*ghaṭa*, *karaka*, *apavaraka*). The differences proceed from the containers, not from the space, which is not qualified by the containers.

\(^{834}\) We have emended *tathā avaśisyate* to *tathā viśisyate*; see our ‘List of variants’ in ‘On the Sanskrit text’.

\(^{835}\) *arthakriyākāritvāt* — lit., ‘[and this is justified] by the use to which the jar is put’.

\(^{836}\) The affairs of men are conducted with particular ends in view, ends that are supplied by
Nor is it the case that this putative corruption, etc., of the space within a [specific] jar conceals the [undivided] nature [of space], nor that the different spaces thus delimited by the jar, etc., are confused\(^{837}\) with one another.

Like that — that is, in the same way — those embodied souls (jīva) — that is, mundane men (puruṣa) — though essentially nothing but uniform consciousness, have been made finite by rejecting their own essence, which is full, pervasive, a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, enclosing themselves in the triad of coverings (kośātraya) that are [the impurities] of deeming oneself finite, of regarding the world as objective, of supposing oneself the agent of actions\(^{838}\) — in virtue of the Supreme Lord’s power of differentiation [or, power of delusive construction].

For which reason, although they are essentially uniform consciousness, they differ from one another, due to the evil disposition\(^{839}\) of the delimitation imposed on them by the three coverings [viz., by the triad of impurities],\(^{840}\) a delimitation that is specific to each [of the three], just as differ from one another spaces delimited by jars, curtains, etc.

For example, the delimitation brought about by the covering of māyā (māyāyakośa) is commonly referred to as the embodied soul.

Moreover, in none of the other schools of philosophy do the terms jīva, puruṣa, ātman, anu,\(^{841}\) apply to the Supreme Lord, a uniform and unqualified mass of blissful consciousness.

Thus, these embodied souls, delimited by the sheaths [of impurities] — the impurity of deeming oneself finite, etc. — are not confused with one another, acquiring diverse bodies perfumed by beginningless and wonderfully varied latent dispositions\(^{842}\) imposed on them by the impurity of

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\(^{837}\) vyāmiśraṇā — examples of nouns in -anā (fem.) are attested — see Whitney 1983: § 1150.2.h, etc.

\(^{838}\) ānapāvādīyaprākṛta — see kārikā 32. Note that, here, prākṛta [mala] stands for kārma [mala].

\(^{839}\) daurāmya.

\(^{840}\) Not all subjects are equally affected by the three impurities (mala). In effect, in the process of liberation, the mumukṣu ascends the hierarchy of the seven “cognizers” (saptapramātṛ) according to his ability to free himself progressively from the impurities (see Appendix 10, p. 330).

\(^{841}\) These terms, of course, have many acceptations in the different systems of Indian thought. Possible references are to the Lokāyatas, which takes the jīva, ‘principle of life’, as the sole reality; to the Sāmkhya, which understands the puruṣa as one of two fundamental principles; and possibly to the Vaiśeṣika, where ātman designates the category of “spiritual” substance and anu the ‘atom’ or fundamental unit of “nature”.

\(^{842}\) Same terminology in YR ad 53.
supposing oneself the agent of actions, having diverse intentions, and partaking of the differences expressed by the pairs of opposites — merit and demerit, heaven and hell, pleasure and pain, birth and death — just as are not confused the spaces within different jars etc., which, delimited by a particular jar, etc., are variously perfumed by diverse substances.

Thus, it is quite justified to conclude that, though essentially nothing but uniform consciousness, '[embodied souls] experience difference from one another because of their own delimitation'.

Kārikā 38

Thus, the particular states that refer to the host of embodied souls are said to belong to the Lord only in a secondary sense [i.e., are only metaphorically ascribed to him], for none exist really there [viz., in the Lord]. The master says:

38. When the host of principles [namely, the sense-organs] is tranquil, the Lord is, as it were, tranquil; when delighted, he is delighted; when deluded, he is deluded; but, in truth, he is not so.  

When the host of principles, that is, the host of sense-organs, is tranquil, that is, when they have ceased to function, the supreme Self thereto pertinent is [also] deemed to have become tranquil, that is, to have perished, as it were.  

Similarly, when that [host of sense-organs] is delighted (hṛṣṭa), that is, disposed to exult (sāhlāda), he is said metaphorically to be so [i.e., to be delighted].  

Moreover, when [that host is] deluded (mūḍhe = vimohavati), enveloped in tamas, he is [deemed to be] deluded (mohavāṇ = mūḍha), as for instance when he is seen as the origin of stationary beings.  

843 maṇḍala.  
844 In kā. 37, consciousness was considered from the perspective of the finite jīva, as involving an ever-recurring variety of states, such as pleasure and pain. Now, from the perspective of the Lord (bhagavat), these various states appear as aspects of his own Being here captioned in language suggestive of the three guṇas of the Sāmkhya. Same content, but slightly different formulation, in ĀPS 34 (note a misprint in Silburn, who compares this kārikā with ĀPS 37), the main variant being that, here, tattvagana replaces manas of ĀPS: śānte i va manasi śānte hṛṣte hṛṣta i va mūḍha i va mūḍhe/ vyavahārasaṅga na punah paramārthata śvaro bhavati, 'In the usual conception, yet not according to ultimate reality, the Lord is, as it were, calm, if mind (manas) is calm; he is, as it were, joyed, if mind is joyed; he is, as it were, deluded, if mind is deluded' (tr. Danielson, modified); on the interpretation of ĀPS 34, see Danielson ĀPS, n. 136–137, pp. 56–57.  
845 sthāvarayoni — B&R cite, s.v. sthāvara, in re 'fixed' plants, the apparently parallel formation 'sthāvarotpatti' from a medical text (but do not offer a gloss) and the Bhāgavatapurāṇa (III 10, 18ff.) avers that the seventh, among the nine 'creations' of Brahmā, is that of 'fixed' (taṣṭhuṣām) entities — plants and trees — suggesting the possibility that Brahmā himself
But in truth (paramārthataḥ), that is, in point of view of fact (vastuvṛttena), he, the Supreme Lord, is not so, that is, [does not exist] in the same way as do [those phenomena]. For everything that partakes of insentience must either be born or be destroyed [or both]; but neither destruction nor origination apply to the unchanging Lord, whose nature is consciousness and whom we refer to [as enclosed] within the sheaths of māyā, etc. 846 Hence, the Lord is ever the same.

Kārikā 39

The error that has come to pass in the process of elaborating [the world of our experience] (samuttattikramena) is moreover completely uprooted in the process of achieving enlightenment (jñāptikramena). 847 And [therein consists] one's own freedom. The master says:

39. After initially setting aside the error that consists in the Self appearing in the form of the non-Self, the supreme Self sloughs off then the erroneous view whereby the non-Self is projected onto the Self. 848
[The Self,] having firstly, that is, in the beginning, set aside its appearance in the form of the non-Self, that is, in such insentient things as the body, etc., as signaled by judgments such as: 'I am slim', 'I am stout', which is nothing but predicating the Self of the non-Self \(849\) —

[— that is,] having abandoned the notion that the adventitious body and the like is to be seen as the cognizer, \(850\) thanks to the irruption (sphurānā) [into consciousness] of non-adventitious ipseity (akṛtrimāhantā), such that one now judges: 'I am a uniform mass of blissful consciousness; my nature is unconditioned; I am free'; \(851\)

[having first done this,] the Self, its bondage to the body dissolved, and having thus approached the status of supreme Self, then sloughs off the erroneous view (bhrānti) that consists in the display of difference — that display which is generated by the conceit attributing to the body and the like the capacity to cognize (dehādipramāṭābhīmāna).

This erroneous view [consists in the projection of the non-Self] onto that Self — the universal category \(852\) whose form is manifestation (spuradrūpa), whose embodiment is Light (prakāśavapus), even though it appears as its own components \(853\) [that is, as multiple].

[This may be further explained as follows:] [the Self] grinds utterly to dust [such illusion], in the realization: 'I alone manifest myself as the Self of the universe'. \(854\)

Of this the purport is: as long as the conceit that locates the Self in the non-Self — the body, etc. — does not dissipate, so long does the delusion not dissolve \(855\) that consists in valorizing difference \(856\) in this world, [the things of] which are even so but the display of one's own Self (svātmaprathā).

Hence, it is the Lord alone, the supreme Self alone — that is, the Great Lord that is one's own Self \(857\) — who causes the destruction of the error consisting in the conceit that locates the non-Self in the Self, by destroying the erroneous view consisting in the conceit that locates the Self in the non-Self — and in this matter none other has such capacity.

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\(849\) Lit., '[... nothing but] consideration (pardmariana) [of objects] having reference to the non-Self, in terms of the Self'.

\(850\) A synonym of kṛtrimapramāṭ is kalpitapramāṭ; see IPVI 5,1 (vol. I: 197).

\(851\) aham cidānandaikaghano 'navacchinnavabhāvaḥ svatantraś ca.

\(852\) viśvapadārtha.

\(853\) svāṅgakalpa.

\(854\) aham eva eko viśvātmanā sphurāmi.

\(855\) Same terminology in YR ad 53.

\(856\) bhedaprathā — lit., 'display of difference'.

\(857\) Cf. TĀV V 151: svātmiva hi paramēśvarah śivah.
Thus, because this pair of errors has been let go, there is left nothing at all for the adept of this discipline to accomplish, for he has become [identical with] the Supreme Lord. The master says:

40. In this way, when these twin delusions have been cut off, along with their roots, there is no penchant at all on the part of the supreme adept who has attained his goal to accomplish anything else.\footnote{In addition to accounting for the two levels of error and the resulting conception of mokșa, karika 39–40 deal implicitly with the notion of śākti-pāya, 'way of energy', which will again be taken up in those following (41 to 46). The doctrine of the upāyas has been considerably developed in the Trika at the instigation of AG who dedicates to their exposition, partly or entirely, the first five chapters of his TĀ. In TĀ 167–170, AG presents the doctrine as derived from the MVT, the authoritative Scripture in this system, of which he quotes three verses (MVT II 23, 22 and 21), and says (TĀ I 213) that he received this system of classification from his teacher Śāmbhunātha. To the original threefold classification, AG adds a fourth category, the anupāya, or 'non-means', 'non-way'. TĀ I 171–232 expounds in detail the four upāyas, anāvopāya, śāktopāya, śāmbhavopāya and anupāya, beginning with the lowest (on the four, see TĀ I-V, Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 52–60). That the śāktopāya is alluded to within the span of karikas 39–46 is shown by the avat. ad 39, which states that 'the error is completely uprooted in the process of achieving enlightenment (jnaptikramena)'. For what distinguishes the śāktopāya from the higher śāmbhavopāya is precisely its discursive and sequential character, inseparable from recourse to 'enlightenment' and the practice of yoga. The śāktopāya is also called jñāna-sāktipāya, 'means (or way) of knowledge', thus named, for Śiva, as 'possessor of the sakti' (saktimāt), is known through his sakti, who further divides herself into Will (ichā), Knowledge (jñāna) and Action (kriyā). It is also called jñāna-sāktipāya, 'means of cognitive energy', for it consists in the yogin's transforming his jñāna-sakti, his cognitive energy, into an intuition, a mystical realization — bhāvanā in this system. śāmbhavopāya is characterized by non-discursivity and immediacy; śāktopāya by discursivity and mediacy. śāmbhavopāya and śāktopāya are respectively the effects of an 'extremely intense grace' (tīvrativraṣaktipāta) and of a 'moderately intense grace' (tīvramadhyadaktipāta). Thus, TĀV (ad III 292, vol. II: 693) adduces the absence of 'extremely intense grace' as reason for the inability to follow the 'way of Śambhu', and later observes (TĀV IV 276b) that 'the one purified by the most intense grace' is purified (pavitrita) with the śāmbhavopāya: kaścid eva tīvratamadaktipāta. The repeated definition of the śāmbhavopāya is "akimciccatana", the ‘thought of nothing’, that is, the experience of non-discursive consciousness (see TĀ I 168a = MVT II 23, which defines him who attains the śāmbhavopāya as “akimciccataka”; I 171; V 156b), whereas the meditative or mystical realization (bhāvanā), discursive by nature, characterizes the śāktopāya; cf. TĀV V 156b: akimciccatanam śāmbhavah/ bhāvanā sāktah; also TĀ I 178b–179a: tenavikalpa samvittir bhāvanādyanapekṣi// śivatādātmyam āpannā samāveśo 'tra śāmbhavah; ‘Therefore, the absorption proper to Śambhu is non-discursive consciousness, independent of all bhāvanā, etc., in which one attains identity with Śiva; see also Intr., p. 51. On bhāvanā, see Appendix 20, p. 345.}

Once in this way, that is, in the manner expounded in the [previous] karika, the budding shoots of this pair of errors have been crushed, of him who has attained his goal (kṛtārtha), that is, by whom the goal (artha) — the realization of [ultimate] human purpose (puruṣārtha) — has been effected (kṛta), that is to say, reached, by sloughing off the entirety

\footnote{In addition to accounting for the two levels of error and the resulting conception of mokșa, karika 39–40 deal implicitly with the notion of śākti-pāya, 'way of energy', which will again be taken up in those following (41 to 46). The doctrine of the upāyas has been considerably developed in the Trika at the instigation of AG who dedicates to their exposition, partly or entirely, the first five chapters of his TĀ. In TĀ I 167–170, AG presents the doctrine as derived from the MVT, the authoritative Scripture in this system, of which he quotes three verses (MVT II 23, 22 and 21), and says (TĀ I 213) that he received this system of classification from his teacher Śāmbhunātha. To the original threefold classification, AG adds a fourth category, the anupāya, or 'non-means', 'non-way'. TĀ I 171–232 expounds in detail the four upāyas, anāvopāya, śāktopāya, śāmbhavopāya and anupāya, beginning with the lowest (on the four, see TĀ I-V, Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 52–60). That the śāktopāya is alluded to within the span of karikas 39–46 is shown by the avat. ad 39, which states that 'the error is completely uprooted in the process of achieving enlightenment (jnaptikramena)'. For what distinguishes the śāktopāya from the higher śāmbhavopāya is precisely its discursive and sequential character, inseparable from recourse to 'enlightenment' and the practice of yoga. The śāktopāya is also called jñāna-sāktipāya, 'means (or way) of knowledge', thus named, for Śiva, as 'possessor of the sakti' (saktimāt), is known through his sakti, who further divides herself into Will (ichā), Knowledge (jñāna) and Action (kriyā). It is also called jñāna-sāktipāya, 'means of cognitive energy', for it consists in the yogin's transforming his jñāna-sakti, his cognitive energy, into an intuition, a mystical realization — bhāvanā in this system. śāmbhavopāya is characterized by non-discursivity and immediacy; śāktopāya by discursivity and mediacy. śāmbhavopāya and śāktopāya are respectively the effects of an 'extremely intense grace' (tīvrativraṣaktipāta) and of a 'moderately intense grace' (tīvramadhyadaktipāta). Thus, TĀV (ad III 292, vol. II: 693) adduces the absence of 'extremely intense grace' as reason for the inability to follow the 'way of Śambhu', and later observes (TĀV IV 276b) that 'the one purified by the most intense grace' is purified (pavitrita) with the śāmbhavopāya: kaścid eva tīvratamadaktipāta. The repeated definition of the śāmbhavopāya is "akimciccatana", the ‘thought of nothing’, that is, the experience of non-discursive consciousness (see TĀ I 168a = MVT II 23, which defines him who attains the śāmbhavopāya as “akimciccataka”; I 171; V 156b), whereas the meditative or mystical realization (bhāvanā), discursive by nature, characterizes the śāktopāya; cf. TĀV V 156b: akimciccatanam śāmbhavah/ bhāvanā sāktah; also TĀ I 178b–179a: tenavikalpa samvittir bhāvanādyanapekṣi// śivatādātmyam āpannā samāveśo 'tra śāmbhavah; ‘Therefore, the absorption proper to Śambhu is non-discursive consciousness, independent of all bhāvanā, etc., in which one attains identity with Śiva; see also Intr., p. 51. On bhāvanā, see Appendix 20, p. 345.}
of restrictions limiting the recognition (parijñapti) of his own freedom, and who is thus disciplined in accord with most excellent yoga,

[of such a one] no penchant, that is, no activity of the mind, is ever directed to the accomplishment of anything else, that is, to any remaining acts such as pilgrimage, confining oneself to a certain region, initiation, silent (or whispered) recitation, meditation, listening to the exposition [of the canons], etc., for,

This is the supreme dharma, namely, to see the Self through discipline.861

Thus has been asserted the preeminence of the discipline tending to the realization of one’s own Self (svātmayoga).862 There is no [need of] effort elsewhere on the part of the consummate adept (pūrṇayogin), since he has realized that discipline.

As has been stated in the revered Gītā:

When the jungle of delusion/ Thy mentality shall get across,/ Then thou shalt come to aversion/ Towards what is to be heard and has been heard (in the Veda).864

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859 Confining oneself to a certain region is a vow, an observance (vrata); cf. TĀ IV 258b–263a. PS 79–80 will dilate upon the vow of the jñānin.
860 Same development in PS 69 and YR ad loc. One observes the same logic of exposition in the fourth chapter of TĀ, entirely dedicated to the śāktopāya. In the course of expounding the procedures at work in the śāktopāya — vikalpasamāskāra (or vikalpaśuddhi), ‘purification of the vikalpas’ (1–12), mantric practices (181b–193) and other truly mystical practices, such as japa, etc. (194–211) — TĀ IV deals with the uselessness of external rituals (109b–122a), and proclaims (212–277), citing as authority the MVT (quoting MVT XVIII 213–221a), the vanity of prescriptions and prohibitions, especially those relating to purity and impurity; see also TS IV, pp. 31–32 (tr. Silburn 1981: 194), which concludes: na hi sūddhir vastuno rūpam nīlatvavat, anyatra tasyaiva aśūddhicodonāt, ‘Purity indeed does not constitute the essence of the thing, as does the blue color, for, elsewhere [viz., in other schools], the same thing would be declared as impure and as such the object of an injunction’.
861 Yājñavalkyasmṛti [YājS] 1 8. The complete verse is: ijjācāraṇadāhīnāsādānāvādhīyāyakarmanam/ ayam tu paramo dharmo yad yogenātmarāṇam//, ‘There are [dharmaic] actions such as sacrifice, good conduct, restraint of the senses, non-violence, liberality, study of the Vedas, but above all, there is a supreme dharma, which is the witnessing of the Self through discipline’. YR’s version of the third pāda differs in a few particulars.
862 The yoga referred to in the śāktopāya should not be mistaken for the type of practice proper to the ānavopāya; cf. TĀ IV 88–109a, particularly 106–109a, which quotes MVT XVIII 74 (partly) and 78–79. TS IV, p. 27, defines the yoga proper to the śāktopāya: yad anapekṣita vikalpaṃ svabhāvikam paramārthatattvam prakāṣate tasyaiva saṅnantathātathāvidhapraśamātratādhyāvatar ātmanānandhānya vikalpavīrāseṣo yogah, ‘Yoga [here] means a particular [mental discipline, the mind exercising itself] vis-à-vis alternatives (vikalpaviśeṣa), whose essence is concentration (anuśandhāna) on the nature of the supreme truth that shines [in us] naturally and without alternative (anapekṣita vikalpa), and is intended for confirming [or ‘making commonplace’: rūḍhi] that [truth] as nothing but that sempiternal shining (prakāśa) as such’.
863 The reference to yoga and buddhi is an additional sign that the śāktopāya is at stake here; see TĀ I 214–215.
864 BhG II 52. The perfect yogin no longer requires the teachings of the Śruti, i.e., of the
Having explained in [the kārikās] immediately following (samprati) [kā. 41–43] that [the supreme yogin] reaches a condition of identity with the universe, itself replete with apparent differences, from Earth to Illusion [— first,] by merging himself in (āveśa) the condition of Śakti, which represents [the essential simultaneity of] difference-and-

Vedas, whether they are those he has already heard and followed, or those that are yet to be heard. Such a yogin — on whom acts cannot possibly be enjoined or forbidden (cf. TĀ IV 212–221a — quotation from the MVT XVIII 74–82 — and IV 271–278a) is thus a jīvanmukta. Through one of the numerous etymological plays on the name Abhinavagupta, celebrated as the jīvanmukta par excellence, TĀV IV 278a further defines the jīvanmukta as 'the one protected (gupta = pariraksita) everywhere (abhi = abhitah), i.e., from all differentiation, by the praise (nava = stava) [of his own Self]', who is therefore an 'extraordinary' (kpi, glossed as alaukkikah) sage, 'qualified [for that sacrifice (asmin... yāgavidhau) that is the practice of the śāktopāya]'.

From here, the style changes, now imbued with a mystical lyricism, equally evident in the kārikās (notably 47–50, with the striking entrance into the discourse of the first person) and in the commentary (in 41–46, metaphor follows upon metaphor and alliterations are frequent). As well, it is noteworthy that vv. 39–49 have no corresponding verses in the APS, thus constituting a long parenthesis devoted to the esoteric teachings of the Trika. The correspondences resume with PS 50, which corresponds to APS 50 and APS 62. The syntax of this passage is complex. Grammatically, the entire avat. is one sentence, of which the main clause is our final paragraph ('In sum...'); what precedes is structured as three dependent clauses organized in three times around a gerund (abhiddhyā, implying relative past time), a present participle (abhidadhat, implying correlation with the main verb, here simply aha), and a future participle (unmilayiṣyat, implying intention), which we have separated also by paragraph indications. The avat. makes reference implicitly to the doctrine of the upāyas, and particularly to two among them: the vādbhava* and the śaktabhumika. It is in this context, implicitly established by kā. 38–40, that kā. 41–46 deal, sometimes allusively, with tantric practice, including mantras and mudrās, with special emphasis on the significance and potency of the mantra SAUH, which is also, according to AG, the esoteric purport of the entire PT, the text referred to by YR ad 43. According to the separate avat. to 43 and 46, what is at stake here, in these five kārikās, is the esoteric mantric tradition (mantrasampradaya), especially that related to the mantra SAUH. Kārikās 43–46 disclose (with the help of the commentary) the potency (virya) proper to the mantra SAUH, which itself depends on the higher potency of the supreme and primordial mantra, AHAM, which encloses in itself 'the full power of all the phonemes, from A to HA, of which mantras consist' and draws them together 'in a single point of concentrated energy, the bindu, its final letter' (Padoux 1992: 386); see n. 876.

The reference is to the three andas: prthvyanda, prakṛtyanda, māyānda.

śāktabhumikā — similar terminology in TĀ XXXIV 2 (śaktīṃ bhūmin upāśrayet) which describes a progressive ascent to the nature of Bhairava through anāva*, sākta* and śambhava* upāya: tato 'py ānāvasamāyād gād chāktīṃ bhūmin upāśrayet/ tato pi śambhavim eva tāratamya-kramāt śphūtam/, 'Then, abandoning the level of the ānāva(upāya), one attains the level of energy [viz., of the śāktopāya], and, afterwards, in turn, clearly that of Śambhu [viz., the śambhavopāya].' As stated by TĀ IV 187b–188a: tac chaktiiryāryohād bhairavīye cidāmnī/ viṣṭjīye hi tat [...] , 'It is through ascending the triad of the saktis (saktiiryā) that [the world] is emitted (or projected: viṣṭjīye = visarga: H) into the consciousness of Bhairava [where it rests]'. The process of reabsorption into pure consciousness is described here.
non-difference;\textsuperscript{869} [— then,] by dissolving all difference as he realizes within himself (samāpatti)\textsuperscript{870} the condition of Śambhu, which is a mass of perfect Light and bliss,

— the master proceeds then [kā. 44] to explain that [this universe] is like a series of waves\textsuperscript{871} which arise before our eyes as splendors surging ever forth from Śakti [as their sole source], [splendors] themselves likened to a great current flowing from the abode of Śambhu, a veritable ocean of nectar,\textsuperscript{872}

\textsuperscript{869}Cf. the very similar avat. to kā. 46, which describes the symmetric process of emanation (śrṣṭi), q.v. The śāktotpāya corresponds to the state of experience termed bheda-bheda, ‘difference-and-non-difference’ or ‘unity-in-difference’, since the Lord/sādhaka conceives of the phenomenal universe as both distinct and not distinct from himself; see Intr., p. 25.

\textsuperscript{870}samāpatti — the term, derived from the root pad, means literally, ‘attain completly’ or ‘reach utterly’, therefore, in this context: ‘realization in oneself’, ‘union’, ‘coincidence’, ‘identity’, ‘fusión’, ‘union’; cf. SpN II 7 on tadaṁmatāsamāpattih: tadaṁmatāsamāpattih śīvākyāvēśo na tu paścavaktrōdṛer vyatiriktyākārasya dārsanam, na tu niścayamātēna tadaṁmatāsamāpattīr api tu icchato vikalpavishvāhatamaksaśvaiyakaropacchāparāmarṣādhirādhasyas, ‘tadaṁmatāsamāpattī [means] “absorption (āvesa) in Śiva in the form of one’s identity (aikya) with him”, and not the visual identification (dāiīna) with a particular form of him, such as the five-headed Śiva. This identification is not the result of a mere determinate cognition (niścaya), rather it is that of an “aspirant” (icchat) who is firmly fixed (paramārtha) on his desire to identify himself with Śiva (śīvākya) as the universal “I” (viśvāhantā) not [given in] discursive awareness (avikalpa). Also TĀ I 171: jītyemasamāpatti, ‘union with what is to be known’, and JR ad loc.: avikalpamakasamvātādātmyam abhyeti, ‘One attains identity (tādātmya) with non-discursive consciousness’; similarly TĀV V 121 (vol. III: 1046), which glosses bijayoni-samāpattaya (121b) as bijayonyamaśvāsakṣātyākārīnyena, thus establishing the equivalence: samāpatti = aikāmya, ‘identity’; also TĀ III 79, where, in a different context, samāpatti is glossed as aprthahbhāvenavabhāsanam, ‘manifestation [qualified] by non-separation’ [viz., ‘coincidence’, ‘fusion’] (see also TĀV ad loc.). See also SSV I 14, and SSV I 22, where samāpatti glosses anusandhāna, ‘mental union’, in the sūtra: tatasvātantrāvyāhāśiitatadākātyātmaya sarvam eva bandhām yathoktodyaḥtādātmyam abhyeti, ‘One attains identity (tādātmya) with non-discursive consciousness’;

\textsuperscript{871}tattatarangabhāṅgirūpātām — cf. VBh 110: jalasvērvāravah bhāṅgaḥ prabhā rāveḥ/ mamaiva bhāravasyaśīt viśvabhaṅgaḥ vibhēdītāḥ.

\textsuperscript{872}mahāpravāhadesāyāśaṅkatasariṣāprasāraṃsāprasāraṃkumah — lit., ‘which arise before our eyes (pra-mukham) as splendors surging ever forth (prasārola)’ from Śakti (śāktā), [splendors] themselves likened to a great current (mahāpravāhadeśaḥ)’ [...]. Cf. TĀV V 123 and its commentary which may help to elucidate this passage: atra bhairavanātthasya samaskrocakāśikā/ bhāsate durghatā śaktik samācakāśikārasya/ tātātmyaṃ sarvam eva bandhām yathoktaḥtādātmyam abhyeti, ‘Identity/fusion with Bhairava, the sudden emergence (udyama) [of supreme I-consciousness], as has been already stated (SS I 5), sets at naught all bondage that is of the nature of the ignorance brought about by the absolute freedom [of the Lord/consciousness]’. PHVg (avat. ad 19) equates samādhi, samāveśa and samāpatti, and defines them as the ‘attainment of consciousness and bliss’ (cidānandalābhā): [...] cidānandalābhā, sa eva ca paramayoginah samāveśasamāpatyādiparyāyāḥ samādhiḥ.

\textsuperscript{873}tattatarangabhāṅgirūpātām — cf. VBh 110: jalasvērvāravah bhāṅgaḥ prabhā rāveḥ/ mamaiva bhāravasyaśīt viśvabhaṅgaḥ vibhēdītāḥ.
— and he does this in order to reveal,\textsuperscript{873} next [kā. 45–46], the ‘Heart of supreme consciousness’ (parasamviddhrdaya),\textsuperscript{874} which consists in the unison (sāmarasya)\textsuperscript{875} of Śiva, Śakti and the finite self, and whose source is the absolute identity (paramādēyaya) wherein all differences are dissolved;

[iisaid to] “accomplish the impossible”, in virtue of which it may also be termed freedom; — [and so, that energy] “manifests itself”, [that is] it extends itself [as everything visible] inasmuch as it is [ever] identical with itself [viz., incapable of abolishing its own nature’]. And JR continues: ‘— because of whose grandiose work (yan mdhatmydt), the emergence of the universe (is attested] in such a form (iyan — viz., “takes on the limited form that we apprehend”), eternally tending toward being governed by conditions of creation and destruction’. See also TĀ IV 184b: āurmir e$a vibodhabdheh na samvid anayd vina, ‘[The spanda] is a wave in the ocean of consciousness, and consciousness [like the ocean] cannot be without a wave’, where the wave (āurmi) serves as a metaphor for spanda/vimaria, and the ocean symbolizes pure consciousness, or Light (prakaia); also, the following verse (in SpN I 1), quoted from an ‘Agama’: āurmir e$a vibodhabdheh śaktir icchāṁāka prabhoh, ‘[The Goddess, as Śakti] is the wave of the ocean of consciousness, the volitional power of the Lord’ (tr. Singh SpK: 11). Cf. the hymns of the Krama-Mahārtha that celebrate the Kālīs, emanations of the supreme Kālī, who are also worshiped in the Wheel of energies: Śrikālīkāstotra 11; Kramastotra 1; AG’s Kramastotra 10 (Silburn Anuttarāstikā).

\textsuperscript{873}Unnīlayisyat.

\textsuperscript{874}I.e., the pulsating Absolute, as invoked in the mangalācarana of Kṣemarāja’s Parāpraveśikā: vīmānakām tauduttirnam hṛdayam paramesituh/ parādīṣakātirāṇaṃ sphuranti samvidam numah//, ‘Adoration to the Heart (ḥṛdaya) of the Supreme Lord, the absolute consciousness immanent in the universe and [as well] transcendent that manifests (spuruṇti) in the form of the Supreme Śakti (parāṣakti) and [in lesser powers], as well’. Thus, ḥṛdaya is the Anuttara, the ‘unsurpassable’ in which Śiva and Śakti unite, that is, the luminous consciousness (prakāśa) and the Light of Light, the ‘self-referential consciousness’ (to borrow the term of Muller-Ortega 1997), named vimaria, of which spanda is one of the numerous synonyms. See also SpN IV 2: prakṣāvimāratiṣāmakaṃ hṛdayam eva. Definitions of the divine Heart emphasize sometimes its Śakti dimension, sometimes its prakāśa aspect, and sometimes they combine both. Nevertheless, the Heart, or Absolute, is to be seen as a triangle, for, as will be stressed by YR in his commentary on 41, this Heart-Absolute is the place in which merge not only Śiva and Śakti, but also nara, the finite soul, that is, the entire phenomenal world (jagat). It is also what is taught by the gloss on the Parāpraveśikā quoted above, but from the point of view of emanation: iha khalu parameśvarah prakāśātmā prakāśā ca vimārṣavabhāvaḥ [...] svayamprakāśārūpāḥ paramesvārāḥ pārameśvarāḥ śakyāḥ śivādhi-ranyantajagadāmaṃ spuruṇā prakāśate ca, ‘The Supreme Lord who is luminous in and of himself (svayamprakaśa) appears and shines forth thanks to Śakti, his consort, as the world, starting from Śiva and ending in earth — viz., the sublest and the grossest forms of existence’. On the Heart in Śaiva texts, see particularly Muller-Ortega 1997, Padoux PTLvj: 65–66; 1992: 387, 417–419. The mantra SAUH — whose essence is AHAM, the paramantra, ‘supreme mantra’ — is the phonic form of this pulsating Absolute. Symbolizing the pulsating Absolute, this mantra is also a means to attain that Absolute, through the mystical realization (bhāvanā) proper to the śāktopāya. Cf. YR ad 43, which quotes PT 9–10, where the mantra SAUH is said to be the ‘Heart’ (ḥṛdaya) ‘of the nature of Bhairava/supreme consciousness’ (bhairavātman).

\textsuperscript{875}Here is one of the symbolic justifications of the term ‘Trikā’, the ‘Triad’: nara, Śakti and Śiva stand respectively for the knowable (vedya, or the ‘object to be known’), knowledge (vedana), and the knower (vedaka), again symbolically equated with the phonemes S, AU and H; see PTLvj 21–24: tad ead vedyavedanavedakavīśāntyritrayam ayaṃ varṇatrayasvarūpam tat trayam, ‘Such is the nature of the three phonemes [S-AU-H]. It is a triad for it consists of a threefold repose in the knowable, knowledge and the knower’.
further, the essential potency (vīrya) [of that revelation] is contained in the Great formula (mahāmantra), as may be confirmed in one's own experience.

In sum, he declares [kā. 41–46] that the universe is made one [and is absorbed in the pure Being], through the procedure of synthesizing (saṃkalana) the natures of the three spheres, as [stated] in the Āgamas:876

41. For877 the triad of Earth, Nature and Illusion,878 erroneously consigned879 to the status of 'that which is to be known', becomes, by the force of the realization of nonduality,880 a residue of pure Being.

As to the threefold [reality] in the form of the gross, the subtle and the supreme, which constitutes the essence of the spheres of Earth, Nature, and Illusion respectively, [that was at first] erroneously consigned to the status of what is to be known, that is, did attain the status of field of knowledge, [it is that very reality which now] becomes a residue of pure Being (sanmātra), that is, whose essence is nothing but Being, which, in turn, is nothing but Light, by the force, that is, the excellence, of what is [termed] the realization of nonduality, in accordance with the rule taught in the revered Kālikākrama:881

876 After this preamble, YR's commentary on each kā. makes clear that the progression of the text (kā. 41–46) is modeled on that of the enunciation of SAUH. It also indicates how the symbolic meaning of the mantra is to be construed, constituent by constituent. Kā. 41–42 allude thus to S(a), the first phoneme of SAUH; kā. 43 associates AU with S; kā. 44 deals then with AU specifically; kā. 45 alludes to H, which completes the mantra, whose enunciation reflects the movement whereby the world is internalized within consciousness; kā. 46 represents the enunciation of SAUH in the reverse movement of externalizing the world by the same consciousness.

877 Glossing hi of 41b with yasmāt, YR's commentary emphasizes the logical link between kārikās 40 and 41: 'There is no penchant at all on the part of the supreme adept who has attained his goal to accomplish anything else' (40), 'for', by the power of bhāvanā, he sees phenomenal diversity as 'a residue of pure Being' (41).

878* āpatita.

880 advaitabhāvana — note the usage here of the neuter (bhāvana), in the verse and commentary, for metrical reasons, instead of the more common feminine form (on bhāvanā as meditative realization, see YR ad PS 52 and 68). Kārikā 41 deals with the meditative realization in which the śāktopāya culminates. The last sentence of the general avat. ad 41–46 amounts to a description of that experience: 'In sum, he declares that the universe is made one through the procedure of synthesizing the natures of the three spheres'. It is YR's commentary that develops the esoteric meaning of the kārikā. It will take up the question again while explaining kā. 43, revealing more explicitly that mystical realization is obtained through meditation on the mantra SAUH. Therefore, by implication, it appears that kārikā 41 aims at giving a cryptically symbolic interpretation of S [= sat, 'pure Being'], the first phoneme of SAUH. Note that Silbum does not translate advaita* in the compound advaitabhāvanabalāt: 'Car cette trinité: terre, nature, illusion, qui accède à l'objectivité se réduit, grâce à l'efficacité de la réalisation mystique, à l'être pur'.

881 The same passage is quoted in PM 2, a Krama text, and attributed to the Devikākrama,
Cognition/consciousness (jñāna)\(^{882}\) manifests itself externally and internally as a variety of forms.\(^{883}\) In the absence of cognition/consciousness, no object exists. Hence, the world has the form of cognition/consciousness. In the absence of cognition/consciousness, no entities can be made into objects by anyone. From this it is concluded that cognition/consciousness constitutes the essence of those entities.

\(\text{hi}\) is used here in the sense of ‘for’ (yaśmaṭ).

**Kārikā 42**

[The master] confirms this thesis [by means of an example], with the intention of [further] establishing the non-reality of difference:

42. Just as girdles, earrings, and bracelets, by setting aside their differences, are seen to be gold,\(^{884}\) so likewise, the universe appears which thus appears to be another name of the Kālikākrama. This text has not come down to us, except through quotations. Kṣemarāja, in ŚŚV III 30 (ad svasaktīpracayo 'syā viśvam, 'The universe is the unfolding of his own energy'), quotes a longer version of the same passage, ascribed to the Kālikākrama, whose conclusion is: yugapadvedanāj jñānajnāyayor ekārūpata, 'The conclusion' that knowledge and the known have one and the same nature [derives] from their being simultaneously apprehended' (cf. Silburn's transl. [ŚŚ: 99] and Torella's transl. [ĪPK: XXVIII, n. 42]) — an argument also made by the Vījñānavādins: the invariable correspondence between symbol and signified object establishes that the latter is not independent of the former; see Sanderson's interpretation of the verse as quoted in ŚŚV III 30 (2007: 369–370). The pratīka of the verse that follows those quoted here by YR (asti nāstivibhāgena ...) is again quoted in ŚŚV III 31. The same two verses quoted by YR are cited in TĀV III 57 (vol. II: 418) and V 80 (vol. III: 2006), and ŚŚV quotes other verses, ad III 31, 32, 40, 41, 44. It is interesting to note that YR quotes here a text of a Krama background; see Intr., p. 21.

\(^{882}\)We translate jñāna as ‘cognition/consciousness’ in the light of Kṣemarāja’s commentary on the parallel passage of the NT (also quoted in ŚŚV III 30). jñānamaya, epithet of the Lord, is there glossed as cīna-traparamārthaḥ, ‘whose ultimate meaning is that it is “nothing but cognition/consciousness.”’

\(^{883}\)Consciousness appears externally as objective experience: of the jar, or the color blue, etc., and internally as subjective experience: of pleasure, pain, etc.

\(^{884}\)At issue is the thesis that phenomenal diversity is not ontologically different from pure Being. Cf. SpP 2 [ = ad I 2], pp. 12–13: yato bodhyasya svayaṁ sattvaṁ nāsty ato bodhṛpaṁ anāvṛtam evāvasthādvaye ‘pi, ‘No object of consciousness can exist independently [of the subject], thus the conscious subject [who is, on the contrary, perfectly autonomous] is completely unobscured in both the states [of cosmic manifestation and withdrawal]’ (tr. Dyczkowski SpK: 147). Thereafter, SpP 2 quotes two parallel stanzas, which explain the metaphor of gold and its ornaments as alluding to the double movement of creation and dissolution: yathā hemno rūpakeṣu vaicīryaṁ svāparīcyuteḥ/ atha nityasvarūpasya tathā te viśvarūpatat/A yathā galitārūpasya hemnah piṇḍāmanā sthitih/ tathā galitravedasya tava śud-dhacīdāmatat/", ‘Just as gold fashioned into jewelry is, without undergoing any change, wonderfully varied, so is Your form as all things [which You assume even as] You persist just as You are. Just as gold, losing its form, persists as a gold ingot (piṇḍa), in the same way
as pure Being, when difference is set aside. 885

As, indeed, golden ornaments — girdles, etc. — are gold and nothing else for him who is interested only in gold, by abstracting the particular form [imposed on the gold], namely, the girdle; and as gold, silver, bronze, copper, lead, etc., appear as metal only [and not as the particular metals the names suggest] to him who is interested in metal as such, so likewise, this universe, when difference is set aside, is pure Being (sannātra) — that whose essence is Being alone (sattāmātra) — for the yogin [whose mind is] grounded in non-discursive awareness (prati-bhāsa) alone, by whom has been jettisoned the stain of thought-constructs, such as those enjoining abandonment [of whatever is prohibited or not agreeable] or acceptance [of whatever is prescribed or agreeable] — in accordance with the rule laid down by the revered Kallaṭa:

That [viz., the mudrā śaktivikāsa, ‘blossoming of energy’] is accomplished by means of the transformation [of consciousness, even] in the presence of forms, etc. 886

Kārikā 43

Now, alluding to the tradition of the mystic formula, 888 the master describes the ascent of the universe, limited as it is in the form of finite beings, 889 to the state of Śakti [i.e., self-consciousness], according to the

Your pure conscious nature persists when objectivity falls away [from You]' (tr. Dyczkowski SpK: 147, modified). See also, in a Vaiṣṇava context, Samvitprakāśa I 104b–106a, quoted in SpP (p. 4). It establishes that, whether the world is an illusory change in the Absolute, or is considered a product of real change in the Absolute, such as is the case with the numerous ornaments made of gold, the Absolute, the ultimate reality and ground of phenomenal diversity, remains substantially the same: [...] parināme sa eva tvam suvarṇam iva kundale, ‘[...] In case of [the world considered as real] change [in the Absolute], it is You who persist, as the gold [remains gold] in the very form of the earring'. Also Samvitprakāśa I 56–57 quoted in SpP 5 [= ad 1 5] and LT XIV 38–39. Such speculations (and YR's here in particular) go back ultimately to ChU VI 1, 4ff., Uddālaka's discourse on the unity of Being: ... sarvam mṛnahayam vijnātam syād vācāraṃbhānam vikāro nāmadheyaṃ nṛtiketey eva sotam, etc.; the examples of gold (loha), and iron (ksṇāyasa) follow.

885 Through other analogies (limbs and body, clay objects and clay itself), APS 46 presents the same argument, whereas APS 58–59 describe how the yogin merges plurality (lit., ‘duality’, dvaita) into the state of brahman by meditative realization (bhāvanā).

886 We have derived the meaning of this rather enigmatic statement from the context of PHvr 18, which quotes the same hemistich and similarly ascribes it to Kallaṭa without giving the title of the work from which it is borrowed. On Kallaṭa, see Appendix 19, p. 343.

887 karākaśayan — lit., 'casting a sidelong glance at'.

888 mantrasampradāya — YR reveals here, although cryptically (for he quotes two esoteric verses of the PT), that this portion of the text can be seen, on a second level of interpretation, as dealing with the mystical meaning of the mantra SAUH, which is the phonic form of the Anuttara, the vibrating absolute in which the triad of nara (jagat), Śakti and Śiva (= brahman) merges.

889 See the avat. ad 41 and 46.
KĀRIKĀ 43

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wellknown [path taught in the] Āgamas which depends upon abandoning
the appearance of limitation:

43. That [universe so qualified], which is brahman, supreme, pure, tranquil, undifferentiated, even, whole, immortal, real, 890 repose in Śakti, 891 whose form is luminosity.

[YR takes up these epithets, one after another, and comments on them, apprehending, if not a causal, at least a rhetorical sequence:]

This, namely, this universe, whose essence is pure Being is called brahman, because it extends. 892 As say those Expert in the upaniṣads:

In the beginning, my dear, this was Being alone [...]. 893

Having said this (or 'therefore' — iti), it is supreme (para), because it is full (pūrṇa), 894 and it is pure (śuddha), 895 due to the absence of [thought-constructs such as] injunctions and prohibitions; 896 [furthermore,] it is tranquil (santa), due to the repression of particularity; and for that very reason, it is undifferentiated (abhedātmaka); it is even (sama) [i.e., ever identical to itself], due to the absence of increase or decrease — [It is said:]

Even a part represents the universality of brahman [viz., its capacity to assume all forms]. Neither has it been exceeded, nor can it be diminished. 897

Such being the case, it is whole (sakala), and for that reason, immortal (amṛta), that is, imperishable; 898 and it is real (satya), in keeping with the theses set forth by the revered Bhārtṛhari:

890The same pattern of enumeration is evident in kā. 10–11.
891That is, YR explains, ‘it becomes composed of that’ (tanmayibhavati), in effect, ‘becomes identical with [supreme energy].’
892bhavat — on the etymology of brahman, see YR ad 51 (and n. 975) and 104.
893ChU VI 2, 1. The complete text is: sad eva saunya idam agra āśid ekam evādvitiyaṃ, ‘In the beginning, my dear, this was Being alone, one only without a second’. Note that the Laghuśruti ad PT (whose subject is the mantra SAUH) quotes the same passage while commenting on verses 4–5.
894See YR ad PS 1 for a similar definition of para.
895As shown by PS 10–11, which enumerates śuddha among the epithets of the ultimate principle (paratattva), and YR ad loc., ‘pure’ means ‘free of stain (vīmāla), due to the absence of the soot-like impurity (aśuddhiṃasi) found in thought constructs’. Symmetrically, impurity derives from those very thought constructs — hence, in māyā, from differentiation.
896See YR ad 42 who gives tyaktahānādāna as an example of vikalpa; also YR ad 10–11.
897Verse already quoted by YR ad 5, but, there, put in the mouth of an objector stressing the paradoxical character of a doctrine that maintains both that the Lord is all and that the finite soul is different from him. Here, PS 43 answers the objection with the epithet ‘real’ (satya).
898YR ad 10–11 glosses ‘free of dissolution and creation’ (layodayavihīna) with ‘eternal’ (sanātana).
Of the real and unreal elements that are found in every object, the real element is the genus, whereas the unreal one is the particular.\footnote{899} And:

That which exists in the beginning, in the end and also in the middle, alone has reality.\footnote{900}

And so indeed this universe [viz., brahman], which has as its essence pure Being, reposes in that supreme energy (parā śaktiḥ) whose form is luminosity (bhāṣvarūpa), which consists in the unison of the energies of willing, knowing and acting.\footnote{901}

\footnote{899}VP III 1, 32 (tr. Iyer). For the discussion of a variant, see ‘On the Sanskrit Text’.\footnote{900}Lit., ‘(is) its [viz., brahman's] truth/reality’. The element that perdures is equivalent to the Being of the object. In this way, it is signified that the gold, not the ring, is the Real. SpN I 5 quotes the entire verse (whose source has not been identified), of which the second hemistich is: na yad ābhāsate tasya satyatvam tāvad eva hi//, ‘That which simply appears has no reality; it is real only as long as it appears’ (tr. Singh SpK: 48). Kṣemarāja offers a clue for understanding the verse, explaining that eva has to be added three times in the first hemistich (sāvadhāranatvāt sarvavākyānāṃ evakāro 'tra trīr yojyāḥ), so as to read: yad ādau ca tasya eva satyatā, yad ante ca tasya eva satyatā, yan madhye ca tasya eva satyatā. The citation occurs in the midst of Kṣemarāja’s discussion of the supreme Subject which, defined as spanda-sākiti, is taken to be sole reality and is to be distinguished from the empirical, finite, psychosomatic subject (māyāpramādī). Other conceptions of ultimate reality that amount to taking as real what is but transitory (such as the Buddhist view of a continuum of instantaneous cognitions) are therefore unreal from the viewpoint of the Absolute (see Appendix 14, p. 338, the discussion in its entirety). The Lord’s eternity proves his reality; all other ‘realities’ being but transitory and mere appearance (ābhāsa). Whatever has a beginning and an end, whatever appears and disappears, does not really exist. Is real only that which is without origin and without end, in other words that which exists in the ‘beginning, in the middle and in the end’ — the eternal, the supreme principle, the ātman/brahman. Cf. BhG II 16a: nāsato vidyate bāhavo nābhāvo vidyate sahayā, ‘Of the unreal [according to Śaṅkara, heat, cold, etc., i.e., pairs of opposites, and the body, subject to change] there is no existence; the real [ātman/brahman, according to Śaṅkara] does not cease to exist [lit., ‘has no non-existence’]’ (our transl.); VP I 1: anādiridhanam brahma [...], ‘this brahman which is without beginning or end [...]’ Also ĀŚ II 6a [= ĀŚ IV 31a]: ādav ante ca yan nāsti vargamāne ‘pi tat tathā/, ‘That which is not at the beginning, nor at the end, is not also in the present [meaning: that which is not in the beginning, nor in the middle, nor in the end, therefore, that which is but transitory, is not real’; cf. Ś ad loc.: yad ādav ante ca nāsti vastu mṛgaṭṛnikādi tan madhye ‘pi nāstīti niścitam loke, ‘That which is not in the beginning, nor in the end, such as the mirage, etc., is not in the middle also. This is an established truth in this world’. This statement of ĀŚ II 6a is famous: not only it is taken up again in ĀŚ IV 31a, but also, in the same terms, in Pañcadasī XIII 68b; and, with variants, in YV IV 45, 46 (very near to the text ascribed to Bhartṛhari quoted here by YR: ādav ante ca yan nāsti kidrśī tasya satyatā/ ādav ante ca yan nityam tat satyam nāma netarat); V 5, 9; III 4, 62; III 11, 13. Although both YR and SpN I 5 attribute this verse to the ‘revered Bhartṛhari’ (tarabhavadhāṛṛhārī), it is not found in the present VP. Might it be inferred that it belongs to the lost Śabḍadhārusamikṣā quoted in ŚDvr, p. 84, as well as in SpP, p. 4 (as Dhārusamikṣā) and pp. 16 and 21 (as Śabdadhārusamikṣā)?

\footnote{901}Thus forming the Trident (trīśūla) of energies, itself equated with AU in the spelling of S-AU-H, so that the first two constituents of S-AU-H are alluded to in kā. 43; on the Trident, see also n. 909 and PS 45 (n. 922).
[It reposes in, i.e.,] it becomes one with that (notanmayībhavati) supreme energy, in consequence of what has been stated:

The disposition of objects is founded on consciousness.902

Now903 [the term] śāntam, ‘tranquil’, [could be re-parsed as a compound of śa and anta]: ‘that which is at the end of [viz., follows] ś’ (śakārasaṃyante) [in the usual “alphabetic” order of the Sanskrit syllabary], namely, the cerebral [sibilant ś, or sa]. [Hence] the brahman, whose essence is Being (sat) alone, is [sa, the dental sibilant that is] ‘tataḥ param’, next to [viz., that follows] that [śa, alluded to by śāntam in the kārika].904 It is [therefore termed] immortal (āmṛta), [in the sense that it is a] ‘seed of immortality’ [or an ‘ambrosial seed’] (āmṛtabija),905 [as well...

902 The source of the verse has not been traced. We have derived this interpretation of vyavasthitī from its grammatical usage, ‘conditioned alternative’. The assertion thus means that the things of the world do not dispose themselves according to their own rules or by some unknown fate; their disposition is founded on consciousness. Same quotation (with the variant: *vyavasthitayah, plural), and in the same context, namely, that of the exposition of the mantra SAUH, in TĀV IV 185b (vol. III: 832), and — in the reading: samvinnīśthā hi viṣayavavasthitāḥ — in the context of defining bhāvanā, in TĀV XXVIII 358b–359a; commenting upon the two verses: yataḥ sarvānmanānāṁ svasamvedanānāthau// pramāṇāntarasaṃbhāvah samvinnīśtho na tadgataḥ/, JR observes that the existence of other cognizers is founded in that [consciousness] and not in [the object to be known and which is not visible], whose essence [viz., whose existence] can be known [only] through inference (... pramāṇaḥ ... atra tattva eva, na tv anumeyasvarūpaḥ ādīta); TĀV XXVIII 359b–360a confirms: ḍhātādeśi tattva samvinnīśṭā na tu tadgataḥ// tadva mātrantare ‘py evaḥ samvinnīśthā na tadgataḥ/, ‘[Just as] the existence (astītā) of the jar, etc., is founded on consciousness, and not in reference to that [jar]/., so likewise, as regards another cognizer (mātṛ), his existence is founded on consciousness, not in reference to that [other subject]’.

903 Now, YR begins again the interpretation of some of these epithets, in the esoteric context of phonemic emanation, and particularly, the realization of the mantra SAUH.

904 ‘Param’ here may well be the reutilization in another sense of the param of the kārika. Let us summarize: 1. śāntam = śa; 2. what ‘follows that [śa]’ (tataḥ param) is sa; 3. sa, in S-AU-H, represents brahman as sat, ‘Being’, ‘existing’ — which, as such, is also termed the ‘third brahman’, as stated by PT 9, quoted further in YR’s commentary ad 43. In a passage dealing with phonemic emanation, TĀ III 167 defines the phoneme SA as ‘the undivided supreme brahman’ (tad eva brahma paramam avibhaktam). TĀV ad loc., after quoting ChU III 14, 1: sarvam khalv idam brahma, has recourse to BhG XVII 23, which establishes the traditional nomenclature of brahman: aum tat sad id nirdeśo brahmanās trividhāh smṛtaḥ/ (verse again quoted by TĀV ad V 142–144, a passage which deals again with the mantra SAUH, from the point of view of the ānapo’ya). Thus, sat is the third brahman (coming after om and tat in the enumeration). Therefore, SA [or S], the initial of sat, or the third brahman, is also symbolically designated as such.

905 amṛtabija, ‘ambrosial seed’, stands here for SA, and is not to be taken here in its strictly technical sense, namely, as the name given to the four cerebral vowels — f i j I — (see TĀ III 91–92a). The clue to interpreting this very passage of YR’s gloss is perhaps found in TĀ III...
as] pure (सूर्ध), on account of its contiguity to the abode of Sādākhyā [viz., Sadāśiva].

And for this reason, it [viz., brahman, or the universe] is even (sama) and whole (sakala), because everything has now an equal essence (sarasamārasīkaraṇa), consequent upon the experience: ‘I am this All’.

And, finally, it is true (satya), due the dissolution [characteristic of the condition of Sadāśiva] of nescience [which is the source of error].

As has been taught by the Lord himself in the revered Trīṃśikā:

The third brahman, O fair hipped one, ...

[the complete text is: ‘United with the fourteenth (phoneme, viz., AU), O blessed one, the third brahman (defined as sat, therefore represented as SA, or S, the initial of sat), O fair

165b–166a: tata eva sakāre 'śmin spuṭaṁ viśvaṁ prakāśate// amṛtam ca param dhāma yoginas tat pracaksate, ‘Therefore, it is in the phoneme SA that the universe clearly appears// And the yogins call it [viz., SA] the immortal and supreme abode (dhāman); TĀV ad loc. introduces the notion of amṛtābijā: [...] amṛtābijayakotes ca guravas tat parāṃtram dhāma pracaksate — sarvasāstresu kathayantīty arthah, ‘ [...] Because of the mention [of it, viz., SA] as being the seed of ambrosia (amṛtābijayāt), the teachers call it [viz., SA] the immortal and supreme abode, that is, they state [it as such] in all the śastras'. In a different context, namely, while dealing with the four amṛtābijās, or amṛtāvarṇas, TĀ III 91–92a defines ambrosia (amṛta) as the supreme wonderment (paracamatkāra) of consciousness at rest within itself: [...] āmani eva ca viśrāntyā tat proktam amṛtāmakam, ‘This tetrad of cerebral vowels is said to have ambrosia for its nature for it reposes in itself'; see also TĀV III 91: asya varṇacatustayasya [...] śvāmadrāviśrāntyā paracamatkārāya tattvam, ‘Since these four phonemes repose in their own Self, and nowhere else, they consist in supreme wonderment (paracamatkāra)'.

906 By pervading as sat the third three andas, the third brahman (or SA) represents the manifest world (though still in potentia, as it appears in the sūddhādhvan), and thus corresponds to the level of Sadāśiva; see PTLvṛ 9: yad idam ītyayam brahma sadāśivavattvātmaḥ [...]. Typically in the sūddhādhvan the phoneme [SA] stands for the name of Sādākhyā. For, in the state of Sadāśiva, when one experiences: *aham idam sarvam.

907 The third brahman or brahma (or S) the initial of sat), O fair

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hipped one, well-joined with (the letter $H$) that comes at the end of the “Lords of the phonemes” (viz., at the end of the vowels),$^{910}$ is the heart of Bhaïrava’s Self.$^{911}$

This [universe] is that very brahma — experienced (avamrṣṭa) in the process of becoming immortal,$^{912}$ at the heart of everything, and extending to the plane of Sādāśiva — which reposes in Energy, as previously described [viz., ‘whose form is luminosity’].

eemanation. Referring to the MVT IV 25, TĀ III 104b–105a calls it triśūla, ‘Trident’: asmiṃś caturdaśe dhārmi sphaṛtibhūtatriśaktike/ triśūlātavam atah práha śāstā śrīpūrvaśāsane/, ‘As, in this fourteenth stage [= AU], the three energies [namely, icchā, jñāna, kriyā] are manifested, the [divine] Teacher has named it [i.e., this fourteenth stage] “Trident”, in the First Teaching [= the MVT] (śrīpūrvaśāsana).’ See ŚSV II 7, where AU is designated as sūlabija, the ‘germ of the Trident’, inasmuch as it proceeds from the fusion of the three śaktis — icchā, jñāna, kriyā — with a predominance of kriyāsakti: [...] sūlabijām ca icchājñānāsaktivyāptapūrṇakriyāsaktipradāhāvatā śaktītrayarasaṃghaṭanamayam pradāryā [...].

$^{910}$PTLVglosses tītiśāntasamanvitam with [...] visargah tasmin samyag aviyogenānītām viśrāntam. There are fifteen ‘Lords of the tithis’, that is, fifteen vowels from a to the bindu am; and tītiśānta, ‘that which comes at the end of the Lords of the tithis, viz., of the vowels’, designates the visarga, the sixteenth phoneme. On tītī, see Padoux PTLv: 80, n. 57; on the visarga as the sixteenth tītī, see PTLv 9: tītiśāntām paṇicadāśanām svarāṇām yo ’ntaḥ paryantasthitītitbhūto visargah, ‘The one that is at the end of the ‘Lords of the tītis’ (tītīsānta), i.e., of the fifteen vowels, is the visarga, the ultimate abode [of manifestation]’, and Padoux PTLv: 80, n. 59; also PTV 9 (Singh: 84 [Skt. text]): caturdaśā okārāṃkāramadhyagah/ tītiśānto visargah īrtiyam brahma śahamadhyagah/ etad bijam vastuto viśvasa/ tāthā hi yatkimcet sat pārthivapārtamāyāyāpyām bhāsate tad icheyām jīnē vā kriyāyām vā pātītam api sarvātīmatvām trikārūpyam patrātra śivapade viśjyate sarvam ca śivapaddādviśjyate, ‘The “fourteenth” is [au, the vowel] that comes between o and am. tītiśāntaḥ is visarga, i.e., h. īrtiyam brahma is the sa that comes between sa and ha. [S + AU + H], such is the [mantra that is the] generating seed (bijā) of the universe. Whatever appears as existing (sat) [symbolized by S] — whether it pertain to the sphere of the Earth, or Nature, or Illusion — it, falling within [the specific realm of] either icchā or jñāna or kriyā, takes still the form of the triad [of the energies symbolized by AU], for it is of the form of all. And this all that is emitted within the abode of Śiva is also emitted out of it [in the form of the visarga’]. Moreover, the PTV gives even more interpretations for each term of the śloka 9, including the sixteen interpretations given in reference to each of the six phonemes, from a to h. Sometimes, tītiśa (sg.), the ‘Lord of the vowels’, refers to the fifteenth phoneme only, the anusvāra, or bindu, m, ‘whose essence is the cognizer (vedakāmakabindu)’, as stated by PTLv 5–9. However that may be, tītiśāntaḥ, the ‘phoneme following the anusvāra, m’, designates as well the visarga h, which is not counted among the tītis, because, as ‘emission’, it is at once the source of the entire process of the phonemic emanation. Therefore SAUH is the mantra that symbolizes the Anuttara, the transcendental reality.

$^{911}$With such formulation (ḥdayam bhairavātmanah), the verse alludes again to the mantra SAUH, also named ḥdayabija. On a PTV (p. 266, l. 4–267, l. 7) forced interpretation of the verse as referring to alcoholic liquor and the five ‘jewels’ or ‘ambrosias’ of the Kaulas (namely, semen, menstrual blood, urine, excrement, and phlegm), see Sanderson 2005: 111–114, n. 63.

$^{912}$anṛṭibhāva and anṛṭikaraṇa are two terms occuring in sādhanā: it is the transformation of him who is perishable into imperishable, eternal.
Whatever does not repose in the supreme energy under the headings of [i.e., as manifesting itself through the energies of] acting, knowing or willing, does not exist. The master says:

44. By contrast, whatever is not touched by that [source] whose essence is to illumine and [which will then manifest one of the three aspects of the Śakti, whereby] one may say: ‘it is desired’, ‘it is known’, or ‘it is done’, has the status of a flower in the sky.

Whatever entity, even if present externally in the guise of an object, if it not be touched by consciousness and made radiant under the headings of Will, Knowledge and Action — if it not be endowed with that bursting forth of the Energy named Parā (parāśaktisphāra) [or parā for para, ‘supreme energy’], whose single essence informs universally the triad of its several energies — such an entity, devoid of any power [to appear] (vikala), inasmuch as it is indicated by a name alone, is like a

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914 YR glosses bhāsvarūpaṇa with icchājñānakriyāmukhena bhāsvarena [...] bodhena; see also TĀ VIII 3, n. below.
915 Same reasoning and image in TĀ VIII 3 (quoted in TĀV VII 62, vol. III: 1342), in the context of describing the adhvams, which stand for the phenomenal universe: adhvā samasta eviṃam cinmātre sampratisṭhitah/ yat tatra na hi viśrāntaṃ tan nabhaḥkumārayate//, ‘A path (adhvā), in general, is grounded in pure consciousness (cinmāra). That which does not repose there [in pure consciousness] is like a flower in the sky [i.e., does not exist]’; JR comments: nabhaḥkumārayate iti na kīmciī syād ity arthaḥ. Cf. TĀ IV 186b-188a, quoted n. 922, which, apropos the triadic śakti, argues similarly (the allusion being to the mantra SAUH). However, the Trika speculation goes even further, for even this flower in the sky, although it is indeed a thing materially non-existent, does exist really, inasmuch as, being imagined, it exists in consciousness itself. The phrase as such is thus equivocal and points perhaps to the same coincidencia oppositorum that often affects extremes. Thus conceived, existence is called mahāsattā, ‘great’ or ‘transcendental existence’: on these speculations, see ḠP I 5, 3 (quoted n. 265); ḠPV I 5, 14 (vol. I: 259-260): sā ca khapuspādikam api vyāptotī mahātī, ‘This [existence (sattā)] is “great” (mahātī) for it pervades everything including the sky-flower’; and MM 32: kāḥ sadbhāvaviśeṣaḥ kusumāḥ bhavati gaganakumāsaya/ yat sphaṇānuprāṇo lokāḥ sphaṇānca sarvasāṃśānām//, ‘From the viewpoint of real existence, what is the difference between the sky-flower and the [real] flower, since the world exists only as manifestation [of the Lord-consciousness], and that this manifestation-consciousness is the same in all?’ (the PM quotes ḠPV I 5, 14). On mahāsattā, see also PM 66; Sanderson 2005: 130, n. 100.
916 Yad vastu vastuvṛttena — The two occurrences of the word vastu are to be taken here as suggestive of the poetic figure paunaruktya: the second, in effect, qualifies the first.
917 Sāmarasya — the meaning here would then be: it is the same Śakti who animates the three emanations, and it is that undifferentiated energy alone that is capable of explaining the energies that each, in its apparent difference, embodies.
918 Possible allusion here to the taṇḍraḥya(nyāya) of the Mīmāṃsā, an interpretive device that aids in the identification of names of rites in consequence of substances or divinities that have therein been mentioned — the idea being that neither of the latter need be mentioned twice, and consequently any second mention of same (such as the word ‘agnihotra’
flower in the sky.

By this argument has been pointed out the potency of the [three] modes [namely, Will, Knowledge, Action] constitutive of the Trident that [hover] over and above the modes of existence [— that is, that are presumed by everything that can be said to “exist”].

Kārikā 45

By restating\textsuperscript{919} that the universe merges with the abode of energy, the master makes evident that it is identical [with supreme consciousness] as a complete realization of the abode of Śaṁbhū:\textsuperscript{920}

45. This entirety is emitted by the god of gods into himself, the Supreme Lord, the ultimate reality to which has been given the name Śiva, who adopts the discipline of embracing the Trident of energies.

Thus, this entirety — by which is ultimately meant the brahman previously expounded,\textsuperscript{921} on account of its form as pure Being — is emitted\textsuperscript{922} by the god, that is, by the Lord who is none other than

\textsuperscript{919}See kā. 41-43.
\textsuperscript{920}śāmbhavapadasamāpattyā — similar statement found in the general avat. ad 41-46.
\textsuperscript{921}In PS 43. Lit., ‘this entirety (samastam api), whose highest reality [or whose ultimate meaning] (paramārtha) is that brahman previously spoken of […]’.
\textsuperscript{922}The verb visfjyate has also an esoteric meaning referring to the visarga [= H] at the end of the mantra SAUH. See TĀ IV 186-189a: tathā hi sad idam brahmamālaṃ māyāndasamajñi- tam/ icchājñānakriyāroham vinā naiva sad ucye//, tac chaktitritayārohād bhairaviye cidāt-mani/ visfjyate hi tat tasmād bahīr vātha visfjyate/ evam sadrāpataivasām satām śaktirayātmatām// visargam parabodhena samākṣipyaiва vartate/, ‘Indeed, this Being (sat = S) [that is, at once, the real (sat) universe composed of the three andas described in PS 43, and the pure Being (samātāra) that is its true essence], which, rooted in brahman [viz., in brahmāndā = prthvyaanda], is [ultimately] termed māyāndā [viz., the anda inclusive of prakṛty and prthvya (or brahma) anda — as the four andas fit within one another, as emphasized by YR ad PS 4 —], is not called ‘existent’ (sat) unless it rises to (āroha) [the level of the energies of] Will, Knowledge and Action [viz., to AU, or śaktiyanda]. For it is only by ascending (āroha) to that triad of energies (saktiriti) that it [viz., that Being, or real world, in the form of the three andas] is emitted (visfjyate = visarga: H) into Bhairava’s Self, which is pure consciousness [where it goes on resounding]; or that it is [again] emitted out from that [pure consciousness]. Thus, the reality (sadrūpatā) [sat, in the form of S] of those andas, [which are] real [‘only inasmuch as they appear in the form of the universe’, explains JR], takes place only [viz., does exist only, or is realized only] through supreme consciousness (para-bodha) [or supreme consciousness (as supreme Agent)], when its [that of sat, or S] coalescence with (samākṣiya) [AU as] the essence of the triad of energies and the visarga [= H] is accomplished [that is, according to JR, “[this reality] manifests itself by virtue of its identity with the supreme Cognizer thanks to the progressive ascent to the visarga’”] (cf. Padoux’s [1992: 418], Sanderson’s [1990: 57] and Gnoli’s [TĀ: 103] translations); TĀV ad loc. explains: evam yathoktyuktya, eṣām brahmāndadānāṃ satāṁ visvarūpatayā pra-tibhāsamānānām eva, sadrūpata parabodhena saha śaktirayāvatām visargam ca samākṣipyaiwa
Supreme Śiva ...

... of gods — deities, from Brahmā to Sadāśiva, but also, the sense-faculties, which illuminate all things —

— into the ultimate reality to which has been given the name Śiva, that Supreme Lord, who is a uniform and unqualified mass of blissful consciousness, [or, in other words,] into the [adept's] own essential nature,

— by adopting the discipline of embracing the Trident of energies (śaktitriśūla), that is by the progressive realization of the Energy named Parā [or parā for para, supreme energy] [symbolized by AU] according to the method already expounded; [— in other words, the entirety that is in effect Śiva] attains identity with him [namely, himself], through complete absorption therein, due to the excellence of inner-directed awareness (vimarsana).

And it makes no sense to attribute agency to any other [being or principle] whatsoever, nor is there any other cognizer other than this Cognizer. And it is that Lord alone, ascending through the different levels [of subjectivity], who appears (sphurana) as the different [categories of] cognizers, from ordinary souls to Rudras. Hence, it is most appropriate to state [that this 'entirety' is emitted into himself] by the god of gods.

Thus has been demonstrated the mode of existence of the [inward] emission [of the universe].

vartate, visargopārahakramena parapramātraikāmyena prasphuratity arthah. Thus it appears that, somehow, the exposition of the PS together with its commentary helps in understanding that puzzling passage of TĀ. And it is shown that the visarga at the end of SAUH symbolizes both the inward, referred to in PS 45, and outward projection of the universe (in PS 46). As Padoux (1992: 419) explains this synthesis: 'The span of creation, from the Earth to māyā, is, in the mantra, taken in its essence as pure being (sat = S). It is then absorbed in the three energies of Śiva (AU), thanks to which it is imbued with consciousness (more specifically with the self-revelatory and free awareness called vimarsa), to be afterwards (but eternally, out of time) emitted (= H) in consciousness [...] both internally and externally'.

923 In accordance with its etymological meaning of 'luminous', deva can be taken by extension to refer to the sense-faculties; see the notion of karaṇadevis, or karaṇadevatās, goddesses that are the organs of sense, in YR ad 47 and 80.

924parigama — cf. Abhijñānāsaṅkuntalā's final stanza (bharatavākya), where Śiva as Nīlalohita is given the epithet of parigataśaktiḥ, thus glossed by Rāghavabhaṭṭa: parito gata vyāptā saktih śāmartyham asyety anena tatācchaktitvam vyajyate, “śakti”, “energy”, [means] “capacity”, “gatā”, “gone around”, [means] “suffused by” (vyāptā), [parigataśakti means] “he whose energy has been encompassed all around”; by this expression he [the poet] suggests the possession of multiple energies'.

925Namely, by means of SAUH.

926visargavṛtti, as symbolized by the final visarga of SAUH.
Thus, having shown so far, from the perspective of reabsorption, that the differentiated world, the world of finite being, attains unison with Śiva, formed of undifferentiated consciousness, by ascending to the abode of energy [i.e., by attaining the śāktopāya], that which is based on difference-and-non-difference, the master next says that it is Śiva himself, solely formed of consciousness, who, surging forth (ullāsya) as Energy, appears (sphursti) as the universe, [the universe] of finite being. Nor, he says, is there any form of Energy or of finite being separate from Śiva. It is Śiva himself who thus appears as the [universe, now seen as the] solidification of his own essence; — in other words (iti), [the master now] explains [in the following kārikā] the process of emergence which consists in the bursting forth of the Great formula (mahāmantrasphāra) [viz., SAUḤ]:

46. Conversely, through the orderly emergence of the five energies, that wondrous triad of spheres is created also externally, by acquiring an outward Self.

It is the Supreme Śiva, whose Self is the unison of the pentad of energies, viz., Consciousness, Bliss, Will, Knowledge and Action, by whom is created the triad of spheres, made wonderful by a variety of worlds, etc., and he does this by disclosing in turn the [five] levels [of pure subjectivity], viz., Śiva, Śakti, Sadāśiva, Īśvara and śuddhavidyā, whereby [each one of the pentad of energies, viz.,] Consciousness, Bliss, Will, Knowledge and Action, is severally displayed as predominant; — in other words by acquiring an outward Self, that is, by showing himself as external manifestation [that is, as the universe].

By the term conversely (punar api), the master shows that the Supreme Śiva himself, ever free, remains ever thus, projecting on the surface the play of the emerging and disappearing display of the universe, [a playful display,] which, although not different from his
own Self, appears yet as different. And there is nothing that is different from him.

Kārikās 47–50

And so, in response to questions such as 'who is he, whom we call “Śiva”?' — the Lord whose habitus is the play of the emerging and dissolving universe — and 'where does he reside?' and 'by what means of knowledge do we know him?' the master explains, using terms expressive of the pronoun 'I', that Śiva is the very self of everything that exists, that, being in evidence (sphuran) everywhere in virtue of being established first [as condition for everything else], he enjoins the creation and all that follows from it:

47. In this way, setting in motion, thanks to the discipline of his play, the machine that is the Wheel of energies, the god [now the yogin, says:] 'It is I, whose form has been purified, who am situated in the role of the hero [setting in motion] the great Wheel of energies.

935 Cf. YR ad 34: ‘That which does not appear against the backdrop (bhitti) of the Supreme Lord does not appear externally either’.
936 asmacchabdavacaka — on the “ahamstutu” that represent kārikās 47–50, see Intr., p. 25.
937 adisiddhatā — see YR ad 1, n. 255.
938 That is, the play, in which he engages by making appear and disappear the universe, as encoded in the mantra SAUH.
939 See below: the image is that of the water-wheel (araghaṭa).
940 Certain indications suggest here a transition from a cosmological and doctrinal perspective to one in which the practicing adept, or yogin, is central. Such are the term yoga, ‘discipline’, the term deva, applied often to men of a certain stature, the compound iṣuddhādharuṇa, suggesting a transformation, and the term nāyaka, with overtones of the dramatic ‘protagonist’ — the principal character in the eternal play of Śiva.
941 Silburn translates differently: ‘Et ainsi le dieu [...] est le Je [...]’.
942 Cf. TĀ I 109–112 (Dyczkowski 1989: 117). AG’s Dehasthadevatācakrastotra, which celebrates the great Wheel of energies. Also MM 26. As emphasized by Kṣemarāja and Upalavaiśāva in their commentaries, the first and last verse of the SpK are celebrations of the Lord of the Wheel of energies, the cakreśvara, defined in SpK III 19 as the bhokṛ, the ‘universal enjoyer’, that is, the ‘ultimate (or transcendental) cognizer’ (paramapramārg, SpN ad loc.). The commentary continues: paramapramārgtāṁ satīṁ eva pratyabhiṣijñānakramenavālabhatē/ tataḥ ca prathamasūtranirṇītasya śakticakrasya svamaricinicaṃvayeṣyavaro 'dhipatir bhavet/ anenaiva ca dehena maheṣvaratvam avāpnoty eveti jñāvat/, ‘He [viz., the yogin] attains the status of ultimate cognizer, which [he is] already, by means of the method of recognition (pratyabhiṣijñāna). Hence, one becomes Lord of the Wheel of energies, referred to in the first verse, i.e., of the collective whole of one’s own “rays” [emanating from the Self]. In other words, one attains to universal mastery (maheṣvaratva) with this very body’, whereas SpP 51 explains: evam satī svatāranyāpates tataḥ cakreśvaraḥ śakticakrasvāmi sarvajñātādiyutaḥ, ‘Being thus [i.e., in this state of absorption], [the yogin] is the Lord of the Wheel (cakreśvara), for he has attained freedom. He is the Master of the Wheel of energies (śakticakrasvāmin), who is endowed with omniscience and other [divine attributes]’. Also ŚŚ I 121: śuddhavidyodayaḥ
48. It is in Me that the universe appears, as in a spotless mirror jars and the like. From Me comes forth the All, as does the wonderful diversity of dreams from one asleep.

49. It is I who have taken on the form of all things, thus resembling the body, whose nature it is to have hands, feet, and the like. It is I who appear in each and every thing, just as the nature of light appears in all existent things.

50. Though devoid of corporeal sense-organs, it is I who am the one who sees, the one who hears, the one who smells. Though not an agent, it is I who compose the wonderfully varied Siddhântas, Âgamas and Tarkas.

Thus (itî) means here 'in the manner just explained'; the machine (yantra) means 'the infinite collection of energies implied by the pentad of energies' — Consciousness, etc.;

thanks to the discipline of his play means 'by his playful intervals of creation, etc.', arising out of and sinking back into [his formless state],

cakrâsatvasiddhîh, 'When perfect Knowledge (śuddhâvidyā) appears, one obtains full mastery over the Wheel [of energies] (cakrâsatva), and ŚŚV ad loc.: vaisvâmyapraîhavâîchâyâ yadâ śaktiî samdhatte tadâ aham eva sarvam iti śuddhâvidyodayât viśvâmakasvaâsatîcakrâsatvârîpaṁ mâheśvaryaṁ asya siddhyati, 'When he joins [himself] to Śakti with the desire of extending [himself] as the soul of all things, then, thanks to the dawning [in him] of that Perfect knowledge (śuddhâvidyā): “I am all”, his universal mastery (mâheśvarya) is established, whereby he takes the form of Master of the Wheel of his own energies (svaśâsatâcakrâsatva), which are the essence of all things'. Thus the Lord of the Wheel of energies, Śiva, and the jîvanmukta are identical.

943That is, 'thus resembling the body, which is the same for all beings, consisting essentially of hands, feet, and the like, and yet assumes different forms'. According to YR (see the commentary ad 5 and ad 49), bodies are infinitely diverse, though consisting essentially of hands and feet, etc.

944Cf. APS 46–47 (see Mahadevan 1975: 20). Here, PS 49 carries the argument to its conclusion: all entities, that is to say, all cognitions, are to be traced back to the Cognizer, who is the 'I'. Therefore, ultimately, there is no reality other than the supreme 'I', whose very nature is to manifest itself, to 'shine forth', taking advantage of entities/cognitions, which have no other role than to facilitate that 'shining forth', hence they too are 'bhaśvarūpa'.

945Cf. BÂU IV 3, 23–30, BÂU IV 4, 22: sa vâ esa mahâh aja ātma yo 'yam viśñânamaaya prâneśu, 'Verily, he is the great unborn Self who is this (person) consisting of knowledge among the senses'.

946PS 50a rewrites and condenses APS 62, itself inspired by ŚvU III 19, which quote YR ad PS 50 and R ad APS 62. PS 50b borrows from APS 65a the single word: siddhântâgamatarkâh, and finesses the scholastic debate that is featured in APS 62 by making Śiva, the god who is none other than one's own Self, the supreme 'I', proclaim his absolute sovereignty. For an interpretation of PS 50, see Intr., pp. 6 and 9. Cf. BhG XV 15: vedântakrâd vedavid eva cåham, 'And I am the author of the Upaniśads and the Vedas' knower', and AG ad loc.

947On the pentad of energies, emblematic of innumerable other energies, see PS 10–11 and YR ad loc.

948helâkrama.
in the manner of a device consisting of jars forming a water-wheel [that descend into and emerge from a well].

I, myself (aham eva), here signifies the ‘god’ who is the ‘I’ of all living beings; such awareness of one’s own Self, the essence of which is the marvel of supreme ipseity, the sound that is never sounded (anāhato nādāmā), is the god who is nothing but the incontrovertable Self of every being, and who thus appears (sphurati) as engaged in play.

It is thus established that Śiva is he who is founded in his own nature.

Similarly, he ‘whose form has been purified’ means ‘he, the context [of whose thoughts] has transcended the realm of mental constructions’.

Furthermore, he is situated, namely, he remains ever in the role of the hero [setting in motion] the great Wheel of energies — in the role that conveys to the presiding deities of the sense-organs (karaṇadevatā) the freedom [to indulge ad libitum] in worldly pursuits, such as taking or rejecting objects. For, unless the capacities of the sense-organs [i.e., one’s own faculties] repose in consciousness, their existence as having such and such a nature is not evident [i.e., they do not really exist, being without function].

Therefore, in order to acquire even their own nature, they continuously rely on him alone who is possessed of energy[ies] [as their substratum].

This being the case, because the Lord presides over the hearts of all cognizers, the notion that he presides over a limited range of existence (niyatābhuvana) [i.e., over a finite expanse of being only] is ruled out.

949 Implicit here is a demonstration of God’s reality: for if God is none other than my own Self, to deny his existence is to deny my own Self — which to the Śaivas appears impossible and self-contradictory. Theme taken up again, now explicitly, in YR ad 50.

950 YR’s commentary on this passage can be understood in several ways, depending on how one construes the various iti which are there found in rather confusing imbrication. The translation reflects what we have taken to be the most direct and, indeed, logical, reading — which seeks to link the two key terms of verse 47, aham ‘I’ and deva ‘god’, in such a way as to establish their identity. And this is done through the “middle term”, ‘consciousness’, which is the essence of both. YR begins by citing the aham of the verse — aham iti — then notes that this reference to the first person singular implies reference to god himself, deva, as the ‘I’ of all conscious beings — devah sarvpārāṇinām aham iti. But such an ‘I’ is of course nothing but reflective awareness, freed of all personal attributes — pārāmaśa — which YR goes on to describe in such a way as to make evident the equation of ‘consciousness’ and ‘I’ — anāhato ... pārāmaśah, sa eva ... sarvasyaiva svāmaiva — at which level we encounter again deva ‘god’, as that very auto-referential all-encompassing consciousness, which by definition has no “purpose” other than that of manifesting itself — devah kridanāśilā sphurati iti.

951 Svavārpanānśtha — the yogin is referred to here.

952 For alienation from one’s own nature, in the form of the ānavamala, is the supreme impurity (see PS 24).

953 Nāyaka — a term borrowed from dramaturgy: derived from the root nī ‘to lead’, the nāyaka of the drama is its ‘hero’ who ‘guides’ the plot.

954 Cf. the Sarvamaṅgalāsāstra, quoted by YR ad PS 4 and Appendix 4, p. 322.
And so the All — whatever is thought to compose a whole — appears only in Me, after the manner of the reflection in the mirror, that is, it appears, its significance fully realized only in the experience of the 'I' as previously explained; in other words, the All appears (sphurati) as the [absolute] ipseity that is its very essence.

And from Me, from that form that is complete, namely, my own Self, designated as 'I', the all-inclusive (sakala) universe comes forth, leaving no remainder, that is, it appears before the cognizer, as something removed from him.956

If one asks: — 'How [is this possible]?' the master replies: 'as does the wonderful diversity of dreams from one asleep'.

Just as the diversely wonderful variety of objects appearing in dream — cities, enclosures, temples, etc. — expands from the sleeping cognizer in the dream-state, even though there is no external object — such objects being grounded in nothing but his own consciousness, as no other cause such as nescience, etc., can be said to exist957 — so, likewise, does the universe come forth from that form designated as 'I', a uniform and unqualified mass of blissful consciousness, for no other cause specified in the [other] schools of thought can be suitably alleged.

It is I who have taken on the form of all things.

By 'I' (aham iti) he means [the 'I' that affirms itself in saying:] 'I am' (asmi),958 which is the complete self-reflection of consciousness in itself (caitanyaparāmarṣa); [this is the 'I'] who have taken on the form of all [things], because it has acceded to the status of cognizer in various bodies, etc. — in other words, all forms are mine, because [this same reflective consciousness] is evident, internally undifferentiated, even in cowherds, children, women, etc.

Is there a parallel [for this unprecedented plasticity]? [Yes, he answers:] '[thus] resembling the body, whose nature it is to have hands, feet, and the like'.

Just as, generally, the body, which is the same for all beings, consisting essentially of hands, feet, and the like, assumes different forms, in accordance with the particularity of each cognizer,959 just in the same way, the

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955 asmadarthaśrāntam — lit., 'having come to repose in the meaning of [the word/experience] "I"'.

956 'As something removed [from him]' (apahṛtataya) — intended to explain mattah: the "whole" is now divided into subject and object, percipient subject and objectified universe, which latter "appears" before me, as something "else".

957 Cf. PS 12-13 and YR ad 35.

958 aham and asmi are often treated as synonyms, such that one is often glossed by the other — as here. By this stratagem, the author elegantly reconciles the two aspects of cognition here concerned: aham, internal (contemplative, nominal) awareness; asmi external (active, verbal) awareness.

959 Cf. YR ad 5.
single entity, which we have characterized as consciousness, assumes all forms, for taking up residence everywhere.

Similarly, it is I who appear (aham eva sphurāmi) in each and every thing, that is, in this [phenomenal universe] that takes the form of knower, knowledge and the known, for [it is I who] appear (prakāśanāt) as the principle of experience that is at the heart of every [existent thing/percipient subject] as its own Self.

How does this take place? The master replies: ‘just as the nature of light [appears] in [all] existent things’.

that is, just as, in diverse things, the nature of light (bhāsvarūpa), that is to say, something that has the inexhaustible capacity of illuminating (dyotanaśīla), blazes intensely, in the same way, in this soulless (jaḍa) world, a single entity having the form of consciousness blazes intensely as ‘I’.

Moreover, [the master says:] ‘the one who sees, etc.’.

‘Though devoid of corporeal sense-organs [it is I who am the one who sees, etc.]’ means that [the yogin finds his] purposes accomplished, inasmuch as he reposes everywhere in perfect ipseity (pūrṇāhantāviśrānti), while saying to himself: ‘It is I who see, hear, smell, taste, touch, for my body is consciousness (cinmūrtatva) itself’.

Indeed, the host of corporeal sense-organs thinks: ‘I see, etc.’ — but such cannot be the case in, for example, the state of deep sleep, for there is no one there who sees, etc.

Therefore, it is the supreme Person himself who is the enjoyer of our enjoyments of objects, who remains ever in the heart of all beings, who is a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, and who gives rise (samullāsaka) to the host of corporeal sense-organs, though he be devoid of them; it is he who is signified by the word ‘I’.

So says the Śruti:

> Without foot or hand, (yet) swift and grasping, he sees without eye, he hears without ear. He knows whatever is to be known; of him there is none who knows. They call him the Primeval, the Supreme Person.

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960 YR here is not claiming that the jīvanmukta is devoid of sense-organs, but that his perceptions no longer function on the corporeal level, subjecting him to the body. And this, of course, is a sign of jīvanmukti.

961 Same notion of kṛtakṛtvād in PS 81 (adaptation of ĀPS 79); PS 40 presents a similar notion: kṛtārthaḥ. Cf. BS Bh 1 1, 4; thus is kṛtakṛtvād another sign of jīvanmukti.

962 cinmūrtatvād aham eva paśyāmi śrṇomi jighrāmi rasayāmi spyāmi.

963 The position alluded to here, perhaps ironically, may be that of the Buddhists, for whom the skandhas are functionally independent.

964 parah puruṣah — cf. PS 36.

965 ŚvU III 19. Same quotation in Rad ĀPS 62.
Thus, though not an agent, [it is I who compose] Siddhāntas, Āgamas, etc.

That is, though not myself their creator, I cause the multitudinous wonders that are the Siddhāntas, etc., [to come into being], having entered into the intentions of gods, sages and men, being [already] in essence their inner intuition (antahpratibhā) and desirous of expounding [these doctrines] either in abridgement or in more elaborate form.

Nor is it possible that corporeal sense-organs be the instrument of that process, being in themselves insentient and little better than clods of earth.

Thus, through all such intermediaries, it is I who am the creator of all valid means of knowledge.

For this reason, it might also be said that, in [support of] the existence of the Great Lord that is one's own Self and is of the nature of supreme ipseity, no [otherwise suitable] valid means of knowledge can ever be adduced, nor is such ever employed. Thus is Śiva everywhere established — the very Self of all beings — in terms of their faculty of experiencing, as demonstrated in the 'I' that can never be denied. It is this Śiva who is established first as prior condition in [regards to the operation of] every valid means of knowledge [that is, the means of knowing cannot function unless Śiva be admitted as their basis].

Kārikā 51

Thus, through the process expounded above, the yogin becomes one with the nature of the transcendental brahman, reflecting (pratyavamṛṣan) with determination on his own Self: 'This might is all mine':

51. Thus, once the postulation of duality has ceased, [the adept,] after overcoming the bewildering power of illusion, should merge in brahman as milk merges in milk, and water in water.

In this way, by the device of sustained concentration [on the truth that] the 'I' [of the meditator] is one with all things (sarvāhaṁbhāva),

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966 vyavadhāna.
967 dārdhyena.
968 śri K IV 12: sarvo mamāyam vibhavah: 2nd occurrence of the quote (see YR ad 33).
969 moharum mdydm. The association of māya with the adjective mohanī, 'bewildering', illustrates the difficulty inherent in translating māya as 'Illusion'. For, if māya were nothing but an illusion, it would ipso facto be 'bewildering'. In an Indian perspective, such 'bewildering' is not fully illusory — for māya represents all the 'reality' of the actual world, thus agreeing with its derivation from the root mā, 'to fashion'. The translation of māya as 'Illusion' amounts to missing the active, productive aspect of the notion, which is precisely its force or power. It is this force, or power, on which all our notions of the Real are grounded, that is bewildering.
970 PS 51 borrows from ĀPS 58 and 59 (PS 51a = ĀPS 59a; PS 51b = ĀPS 58a).
once the postulation of duality has ceased, that is, once the display of difference has vanished,

after overcoming the bewildering power of illusion, that is, after jettisoning the nescience implicit in the conceit of affirming the Self in place of the non-Self, that is the cause of the display of difference — having thus dismissed all constriction by virtue of the formula: ‘I, myself, am the Self of the universe’,

he who has knowledge (jñānin) should [now] merge in brahman, that is, should, after dissolving all limitation, attain identity with brahman, which is a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, is complete and is suited to expanding, and which is his own nature.

And to him who asks: — ‘What [might illustrate this mergence]?’ the master responds, saying: ‘in water, etc.’.

Just as water — the water drawn up [from wells] by means of different jars, etc. — or just as milk — differentiated as coming from thousands of cows, whether emaciated or corpulent — just as this water or this milk is nevertheless taken as one undifferentiated thing when it enters [as water] into [other] water or [as milk] into [other] milk, due to the disappearance of that limitation which is the [consequence of] differences among jars or among [cows] emaciated [or corpulent] — such that no difference is there evident,

so, likewise, by setting at naught the notions [of brahman] as variously body, vital breath, subtle body or the Void, brahman verily is realized.

As Bhaṭṭaṇāvākaravatsa says in the Kākṣyāstotra:

Once the island consisting of the idea of the body has been washed away, once singleness of thought has been attained in the pure river of consciousness, and when, on the other hand, you have retained the host of senses in your inner being, [only then, O Lord,] do you appear, one, eternal, the essence of everything.
Kārikā 52

Thus, for the yogin who has ascended to the state of *brahman* (*brahmasat-tā*), even the overwhelming presence of dichotomies has its source in *brahman*, and does not suffice to interrupt [the continuity of] his own nature. The master says:

52. Thus, once the host of principles has been reintegrated into Śiva through meditative realization, what sorrow is there, what delusion for him who views everything as *brahman*?  

Thus, in the way previously demonstrated, when — for the yogin whose bonds, the sheaths, have fallen off — the host of principles, namely, the group of sense-organs [as instruments of subjectivity] and their domains, the elements (*bhūta*), has been reintegrated into Śiva, through meditative realization (*bhāvanā*) — that is, through the firm understanding that this universe is [identical with] his own unfragmented (ekā) consciousness — [when, in other words, the yogin] has attained the state of ultimate nonduality, then, for him who thus sees everything — that is, the group of principles — as *brahman*, the overwhelming dichotomies indicated by [the persistence of] sorrow and delusion are indeed as nothing, and hence, do not occasion any distress, for they all have their source in *brahman*, and have assumed the form of the yogin's own nature [viz., of his consciousness].

Kārikā 53

But, says an objector, inasmuch as the body of him who knows necessarily persists, even if he has acceded to ultimate nondual [consciousness], why...
would not, in that case, the accumulation of the fruits of his actions, be they auspicious or inauspicious, which are occasioned by that body, make itself evident? The master refutes this objection:

53. The auspicious and inauspicious fruits of actions arise only from association with faulty knowledge. Not easy to overcome indeed are faults arising from association, just as company kept with a thief [is dangerous] for one who is not a thief.983

The accumulation of the many fruits of meritorious and non-meritorious actions — performing the horse sacrifice or killing a brahmin, etc.984 — arises only from association with faulty knowledge (mithyājñāna). ‘I am possessed of a body’, ‘let this horse sacrifice, etc., be for me a means [of obtaining a desired result]’985 — such is perverse knowledge,986 consisting in the conceit that locates the Self in the non-Self.987

From embracing988 such faulty knowledge only [comes], for the fettered soul, the accumulation of the auspicious and inauspicious fruits of actions. Being constantly pervaded by such accumulation [— in the form of the latent dispositions989 — the fettered soul] becomes a receptacle for the sufferings of this world of transmigration.

But, says an objector, how is it, for all that, that such bondage (paśutva) continues to afflict the cognizer, though his nature be [identical with] brahman? In response, the master alludes990 to a parallel case, saying: ‘Not easy, etc.’.991

983Verse partially similar to ÁPS 52, notably to 52b, which offers the same analogy of the thief. The reasoning and the image seem to be Sāṃkhya in origin — see SK 20, and GBh ad loc.: yathācauraś cauraśi saha gṛhitā caura ii, ‘As one who is not a thief, caught in the company of thieves, is taken to be a thief […]’. We differ from L. Silburn who, taking samgama and saīga in their first meaning of ‘attachment’, translates: ‘[...] fâcheux est le vice de l’attachement comme l’union d’un voleur à un homme qui ne serait pourtant pas un voleur’ [— ‘[...] regrettable is the vice of attachment as is the company of a thief’].

984Cf. PS 70, and the very similar ÁPS 77.

985The favourable results would be svarga or cakravartita, universal sovereignty.

986vaiparitīyena jñānam — lit., ‘knowledge by inversion’, ‘knowledge that is not knowledge’. On these notions, see YS I 8: viparyayo mithyājñānam atāttipratītiśam; ÁŚ XIII 2 and the three commentators ad loc. — namely, Ānandajñāna, Bodhanidhi, Rāmatīrtha — who take avidyā as the cause of mithyājñāna; Upadeśasāhasrī I 10, 8 and III 3, 116 (see Mayeda 1979: 45, 78, 95, 125, n. 9).

987Our text differs here from the KSTS edition. For a discussion of the variants and the textual problem, see ‘On the Sanskrit Text’.

988Thus is glossed samgama of the kārikā. SK 20 has samyoga.

989The term adhivāsa, ‘pervaded’, suggests the notion of vāsanā; see n. 831.

990upaksipati.

991The kārikā, it seems, addresses to the question of “human condition”. Is man, by nature, bound to the karmic condition, or is the karmic condition, in some sense, occasional or accidental? AG responds here that the question is one of association rather than of nature and that liberation is therefore possible; cf. kā. 67–68, and YR ad 67, who emphasizes the fact that the law of karman depends, in ultimate terms, on vikalpa; cf. Upadeśasāhasrī II 2, 45–48.
Bondage comes to afflict the cognizer, though his nature be identical with brahman, because the faults arising from association are in all cases difficult to endure — that is, just as contact with a wicked person serves to convey a fault that pertains to that person alone even to him who is most righteous, likewise, association with delusion born of nescience brings the cognizer, though pure, into contact with auspicious and inauspicious actions, so that he assumes the state of a bound soul.

Kārikā 54

Birth, death, and similar [insupportable experiences] do not belong to the yogin who has assumed the form of brahman (brahmārūpa); rather, they belong only to cognizers under the dominion of māyā. Thus the master says:

54. Those fools who here cultivate the nescience that results from devoting themselves to worldly transactions go to birth and death, bound by the restraints of merits and demerits.

Those cognizers who, defiled by the desire for fruits, and thinking the body to be the Self, serve the nescience that consists of attributing merit and demerit to worldly transactions, by adopting means intended for the acquisition of fruits such as heaven, hell, etc., in this world — furthermore, [a nescience that is identical with] māyā that consists in the display of difference —

... are fools, that is to say, are ignorant, bound by the chains of merit and demerit; they are born and die again and again in order to experience the fruit of those [actions], and thus become receptacles for the unceasing sufferings of existence.

On the other hand, it is not the case that the yogin, whose veil of delusion (mohāvaraṇa) has been destroyed, who has cast off the bondage of merit and demerit, and who is now of the nature of brahman (brahma-svabhāva), is born or dies.

Kārikā 55

Thus, actions, even those effected during the period of nescience, are destroyed by the emergence of knowledge only, and not otherwise. The master says:

55. For even those actions, whose nature is merit or demerit that have been stored up during the period of ignorance, vanish thanks

992 Same term in YR ad 56; see also kā. 15.
to the radiance of knowledge, just as is consumed [in a moment] goose-down which has accumulated for a long time.\footnote{That is, when touched by fire. YR glosses tūla as haṃsaroma, ‘down of the goose’, of which haṃsatūla, lit., ‘goose-cotton’, is a synonym. Barnett translates ‘down’, Silburn ‘cotton’ and Pandit ‘heaps of cotton’. Cf. Mataṅgapārameśvarāgama (vidyāpāda II 6–7), quoted in TĀV I 46: tataḥ sa bhagavān īṣat ... pradādāha munēḥ sarvam ajñānaṃ ṭṛṇārāviva.}

During the period of ignorance, that is, during the contingent state\footnote{avaśara.} in which the conceit of self posits an adventitious cognizer (kṛtrimapramāṇa),

action, which has been stored up, that is, made one’s own, in the form of [its resulting] merit or demerit, because of our striving after fruits corresponding to it,

thanks to the radiance of knowledge, that is, thanks to the radiance of a discriminating knowledge (viṣiṣṭajñāna),

vanishes.

[In other words] the realization (vijñāna) that ‘I am indeed the supreme brahman’\footnote{aham eva param brahma.} is capable of consuming [as would a fire] the adventitious [condition of] cognizer; and thanks to the power of its effulgence (prabhā), the [actions accumulated] come to nothing, through repeated reflection [on one’s identity with brahman].

This process may be compared to what? The master replies: ‘It is like goose-down which has accumulated for a long time’.

Just as [avian] ‘cotton’ — that is to say, goose-down — which has accumulated for a long time is turned into ashes in a moment, when ignited by fire,

just so disintegrates the entire accumulation of the fruits of action in the lapse of an instant, when ignited by the fire of discriminating knowledge (vijñānavāhni).

As has been stated in the revered Gītā:

As firewood a kindled fire/ Reduces to ashes, Arjuna,/ The fire of knowledge all actions/ Reduces to ashes even so.\footnote{BhG IV 37.}

Kārikā 56

Not only are the [consequences of] actions previously accomplished dissolved by the grace of knowledge; neither does present action eventuate in enjoyment of results, thanks to the [yogin’s] vision fueled by knowledge [and thus burning up ignorance]. Hence the master says:
56. Once knowledge has been attained, action, though performed, tends to no fruit. Therefore, how could [the yogin’s] birth be effected? Once the connection with the bondage of birth is severed, the sun of Śiva shines with its rays unhindered.

Once reflection on the Great Lord that is oneself has grown [viz., into a fixed practice], action, whether auspicious or inauspicious, is not so bold as to offer up its corresponding fruit, for the conceit of self [that leads to the notion] of an adventitious cognizer is now absent.

This being the case, because the fruits of action are lacking, in what way can [re]birth be said to exist — dependent as it is on the enjoyment of [the fruits of] action? Of the yogin there would be no rebirth. Such is the purport of the verse.

Now, one may ask: — ‘If he be not born again after the perishing of this body, then, of what sort is he? [viz., how is he to be described?]’

The master answers: ‘Once [the connection with the bondage of] birth is severed, etc.’.

That is, [the yogin] is such that his connection (yoga), his relation, to bondage in the shape of birth has departed.

He whose veil of delusion has been destroyed now shines as the sun in the guise of Śiva, that is, comes into evidence (sphurati) with [his] rays unhindered, with the host of rays of his consciousness (cinmarīci); and there is for him no such thing as the liberation postulated by other schools of thought, if that means going somewhere else [viz., such as svarga, heaven, as say the Mīmāṃsakas]. For him, there ensues only that state wherein his own energies are fully deployed (svāśaktivikasvaratā), for the constriction imposed by the sheaths of māyā, etc., has vanished.

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997 The nominative karma, of kā. 55, is the common grammatical subject of 55 and 56, as made clear by YR.

998 Lit., ‘with its very own rays’.

999 pindapātā — lit., ‘after the perishing of this lump [of flesh]’.


1001 kramacit prāpṭah — Here, YR anticipates PS 60: mokṣasya naiva kimcid dhāmāsti na cāpi gamanam anyatara/. Mīmāṃsakas, Vaiṣṇavas and others are of the opinion that, from this world, the soul moves on to another abode — whether it be called svarga, ‘heaven’ — or simply the Lord’s presence. The path is that of samnyāsa, ‘renunciation’, or parivrāja, ‘going about’, as a mendicant. On the idea of mokṣa in both Mīmāṃsaka schools, see Hiriyanna 1993: 332ff.

1002 Same term in YR ad 60: svāśaktivikasvaratā; also YR ad 61: vikavasvaraśaktih.

1003 By contrast, in the nondual Śivaism of Kashmir, mokṣa is defined — as it is here — as the ‘state wherein one’s own energies are fully deployed’ (svāśaktivikasvaratā), which results from the vanishing of the constriction imposed by the hexad of kaṅcikas; the metaphor is completed by its association with the “floral” image implied in the pair samkoca/vikāsa: just as bondage is the “closing up” of the innate śaktis, liberation is their “blossoming”. Again, YR anticipates PS 60, where he glosses svāśaktivahīyaktā of the kārikā with svāmāśaktivikas-
Kārikā 57

The master now describes [more fully] this process:1004

57. As the seed, freed from the husk, the bran and the beard, no longer generates the sprout, so likewise, the Self, freed from the impurities of deeming itself finite, of considering the world as objective, of supposing itself the agent of actions, no longer generates the sprout of existence.

Just as, separated from the beard, the husk and the bran,1005 the rice-seed, though still embraced by soil, water and the sun's heat,1006 no longer functions as a cause in respect of that effect indicated by the genesis of the sprout,1007 because of the absence of the ensemble of [factors such as] the beard, etc., which are [essential to] the very nature of the seed, so likewise, freed, that is, separated, from the impurity of deeming itself finite (ānava), metaphorically represented by the bran, from the impurity of considering the world as objective (māya), represented by the husk, and from the impurity of supposing itself the agent of actions (karman), represented by the beard, the Self, that is, consciousness, because of the absence of the ensemble of factors constituting the triad of impurities, no longer enjoins the sprout of existence, that is, [no longer supports] germination of phenomenal existence.

None but the Great Lord himself there persists, contemplating (parā-myāśan) within himself the marvel of the host of objects that [constantly] varatā. Cf. YR ad 24: 'Thus the Self, although fully open (vikasvara) becomes contracted [i.e., is reduced to finitude] (sañkucitikṛta), and YR ad 60 and 61, in the course of his exposition of mokṣa. That same notion of liberation is conveyed by praṇā (prathana); cf. TĀ I 156: mokṣo hi nāma navāṇyāḥ svarūpa-prathanaṁ hi saḥ, 'Liberation is indeed none else than the display of one's own essence', and TĀ I 161-162: [...] amapraṇā mokṣas [...] , 'Liberation is the display of the Self'. See also TĀV I 24, p. 57: saiva ca prakāśānandagahānasyātmanas tattvikaṁ svarūpam taprathānām eva mokṣam, 'That [perfect knowledge (pūrṇā khyātih)] is the true essence of the Self, which is a mass of Light and bliss. The display of that [true essence] is liberation'. From among Śiva's innumerable energies, five principal ones stand out. They, which were limited when Śiva chose to become a paśu, now blossom.

1004 yukti.

1005 Thus is mokṣa defined as separation from the sheaths that are the three impurities.

1006 Cf. the second conclusive stanza of ĪPV: [...] bhauṁan rasāṁ jalamāyāṁ ca na sasyapūṣtatva muktvārkaṁ ekam iha yo jayaṁ kṣamā ko 'nyah//, 'No other than the sun is capable of uniting the juices (rasa) of earth and water for the development of grains' (tr. Pandey); and Bhāskarī ad loc.: bhauṁan bhūmigatān rasāṁ jalamāyāṁ ca griśmād eva kṣīnān svamaricakrantr nivesā varṣiṇyadimaricbhāh sasyapūṣtya yo jayaṁ arkaṁ vinā ko 'nyah kṣamāḥ, 'What else than the sun, once it is installed within the circle of its own rays, is capable of uniting, by means of its rays, again accompanied by rain, the juices of earth (bhauṁan = bhūmigatān) and water, exhausted by summer heat, so that seeds develop?'

1007 The grain that is separated from its envelope loses its power of generation. Another possibility is to heat it, as exemplified in kārikā 58 and 62.
appear and disappear, multifarious and ubiquitous.\textsuperscript{1008}

\textbf{Kārikā 58}

Thus, for him who has knowledge, whose seeds [of action] within those sheaths have been burnt up by the fire of knowledge (jiñānāgni), there is no occasion at all for apprehension, nor is anything to be attained or avoided. Thus, the master says:

58. He who knows the Self fears nothing, for everything has his own form. And he is never aggrieved for, as regards the ultimate reality, the quality of the perishable does not exist.

He who knows the Self (ātmajñā), that is, who knows the freedom of the Great Lord as his own, fears nothing, that is, he has no fear of anyone — king, enemy or any other living creature.

Why is this so? The master says: ‘for everything has his own form’.

Since everything (sarva), that is to say, this world (viśva), the aggregate of objects,\textsuperscript{1009} assumes, for him who knows the non-difference of the Great Lord and his own Self, the form, the shape, of his own Self, a body solely formed of great Light, in consequence of the fact that Light/consciousness is everywhere,\textsuperscript{1010}

... [since this is so] it is Light alone that is evident (prakāśate), both as the [cognizing] Self [viz., the subject] and as the other [viz., the knowable, the object], because of its independence.\textsuperscript{1011}

Therefore, whatever occasion for fear there may appear in this world, how can that occasion generate fear for him who is so, for it is, as it were, a part of himself? — Even more so, since only an entity different from oneself can become a cause of fear.

What Yama [the presiding deity of death]\textsuperscript{1012} or other deity, indeed, is there who, different from it, could set a limit to that Self, which is in all respects complete? Of whom would he who has knowledge be afraid? — he who has rejected the conceit that locates the Self in the body?

Therefore, once he comprehends his own form in all things, [the jiñānīn,] though abiding in this world of transmigration, remains one and unfragmented, and acts without apprehension, inasmuch as he has shaken off the dichotomy between himself and the [supposed] other.

\textsuperscript{1008}Same notion (viśvavartin) in YR ad 30 and 31.
\textsuperscript{1009}Cf. the famous verse of TĀ I 332, which addresses the padārthajāta.
\textsuperscript{1010}That is to say, ‘... for [the definition of reality as] Light is applicable everywhere [to whatever is real]’. Cf. YR ad 5 and 8: sarvatrasamvidanugamāt.
\textsuperscript{1011}That is, because it can know no obstacle, is entirely self-referent. Let the reflections come and go in this mirror which I am — I, that unity, remain ever there. These are the very terms of APS 13 (see n. 265), quoted in IPV ad 1 1, 5 and 1 5, 3, as well as in SpN I 5.
\textsuperscript{1012}YR now takes up the question of the greatest fear, that of death.
As had been said by my teacher’s teacher’s teacher:

For him who is eternally joyful in this world [understood as] completely filled with himself alone, what is there to fear? —
He who sees, O Lord, this entire realm of objects as your body, lacking any alternative? 1013

And also the author of the present work:

One man says: ‘I am alone’ in this world of transmigration; he is distraught with the [bitter] taste of violent fears. There is another who says: ‘I am alone; who is other than I? Thus, my fear is gone, I am secure!’ 1014

Furthermore, he is never aggrieved, etc., that is, he who knows the Self is not aggrieved by such thoughts as, for instance: ‘my wealth is lost’, or ‘my wife ..., etc.’, ‘I am devoid [of food, strength, etc.],’ ‘I am afflicted with disease’, or ‘I am dying’ ...

... and this is because, in the manner previously explained, the quality of the perishable does not exist, that is to say, the quality of the destructible is not to be found, as regards the ultimate reality — that primordial (tattvika) entity whose form is consciousness, that is ever turned within and is [in the last analysis] nothing but the cognizer.

For everything that appears as something to be effected or is determined 1015 as ‘this’ or ‘that’ [viz., as ecceity] — [everything] whose essence is conceit of self — originates and perishes.

But this is not so in the case of the Self, which consists of consciousness, whose essence is [absolute] ipseity, which is never adventitious and is [forever] free, for it makes no sense to posit of it an effort aiming at producing an effect [in any way other than itself].

Nor is it the case — for all that — that [for him, the contemplating ascetic] there is any interruption of his own form [viz., here involving continued existence in his body], [it is simply that, for him,] the contemplating ascetic, though he remains in his body, sorrow and the like, which

1013 SŚ XIII 16. avikalpa — that is: ‘lacking any alternative [to yourself; hence to himself, who is not different from you]’. The term avikalpa is translated according to the grammatical meaning of vikalpa, ‘alternative’.

1014 The source of the citation has not been traced, although it is probably quoted from a stotra of AG, the ‘granthakhāra’. Šivopādhyāya’s commentary (18th cent.) ad VBh 104 quotes the verse (VBh: 90) which it attributes to a ‘pūrvaguru’. Cf. BĀU I 4, 2: so ‘bibhet/ tasmād ekākī bibheti sa háyam ikṣām ca cakre yan mad anyan nāsti kasmān nu bibhemitī tata evāṣya bhayaṁ víyāya kasmād dhy abhesyad dviyāyād vai bhayaṁ bhavati//, ‘He was afraid. Therefore one who is alone is afraid. This one then thought to himself: “since there is nothing else than myself, of what am I afraid?” Thereupon his fear, verily, passed away, for, of what should he have been afraid? Assuredly it is from a second that far arises’.

1015 avacchinna — see n. 701.
are born of the body, make no appearance as things covering over his essential form.  

Kārikā 59

And no defect of incompleteness could possibly attach to the mind of him who has this knowledge, because his sustained concentration on the nature of the Great Lord as nothing other than his own Self has become unshakable.

This the master now explains:

59. What misfortune is there, and whose would it be, when he becomes the Great Lord at the very moment he realizes: ‘It is I [who am the Lord]?’ There can be none on account of the collection that has been made of jewels of ultimate meaning, heaped up in the most secret treasure-room of the heart.

Most secret (atigūḍha) here means ‘extremely well guarded’ (gupta); such is the treasure-room that is the heart, namely, the store-room whose nature it is to serve as repository for the inmost essence of all ultimate meanings (paramārtha).

Thus, ultimate meaning — the essence of which is the knowledge of one’s own Self taught by a true teacher and engrained thanks to an extraordinarily acute trust in the teacher — is said to be a collection of jewels, that is, it is like a collection of jewels, inasmuch as it is the source of all splendors (vibhūti). Thanks to this ultimate meaning,

1016Here, the commentary answers a possible objection: ‘Had such a yogin really identified with Śiva, as you maintain, how could he gone on living in his own form (svaṅpo), that is, as still remaining in his body?’ Here, it is the notion of jivanmukta that is discussed, a notion rejected by most of the “Realists”, logicians and others. The Trika’s answer is that his form cannot be affected by his body, inasmuch as his body does not have any longer an influence on his mind, whereas sorrow is born from the association with the body alone.

1017Viz., of Śaiva doctrine. We might recall the equivocation that underlies the word paramārtha throughout this text: the ‘ultimate meaning’ (paramārtha) that is here taught is the ‘ultimate reality’ (paramārtha); see Intr., n. 7.

1018Same analogy in the maṅgalaśaraṇa ad IPV I 4: padārtharatananikaram niyajṛgāṅjaḷaṇi-tam/ grathnantaṁ smṛtisūtrāntah saṁtatyaiva stumāḥ śivam//, ‘We praise Śiva in continuous fashion, who strings together the multitude of objects, like jewels, that are gathered up in the treasure-room of his heart (ṛgjaḷaṇa), [spacing them] along the thread of memory (smṛ-tisūtra)’.  

1019gaṇja is attested in the Rājatarangini and in the Kathāsaritasāgara (10th-11th cent.), both also from Kashmir. Either the Sanskrit term is a sanskritization of the Persian ganj, or it is a borrowing from Old-Persian *ganja — a term, which, if it happens not to be attested in Achaemenid inscriptions, has been borrowed by Gk. γαντα; see Mayrhofer KEWA I: 315.

1020The similitude extends to aspects of the things compared — such as vibhūti, prarūḍha, gaṇja, which are understood as double entendres (śleṣa) — as well as to the things themselves.
even the soul yet embodied becomes the Great Lord, that is, may expe-
rience the freedom of the Light that is his own Self, whose characteristic
feature is repose in supreme ipseity (parāhantāviśrānti), a freedom that is
complete and made manifest in the awareness: ‘It is I [who am the
Lord]’,\textsuperscript{1021} that is, ‘I am all this [universe]’.\textsuperscript{1022}

This being the case, what miserable misfortune, that is, sense of im-
poverishment, could for him obtain? Or, what meretricious excess of [spirit-
ual] power (vibhūti), etc., might also be implied [if it were supposed that
he were not already complete]?\textsuperscript{1023}

For all objects are essentially of the nature of appearance and when
they do appear, for the yogin they appear as though they were himself
[viz., parts of himself].\textsuperscript{1024} Hence, how can the objects pretend [to fur-
ther] either his perfection or corruption? Thus, for him there can be no
misfortune, etc.

Furthermore, whose [misfortune would it be]? That is, ‘what possible
substratum might there be for such misfortune?’ Well, let us admit [since
misfortune is indeed experienced] that it is they who think the body, etc.,
to be the Self who are the substrata of this misfortune, inasmuch as they
may either, by attaining it, become master (īśvara) of the desired object
different from them, or, by losing it, be made void of that object.

He, on the other hand, who has knowledge, for whom the ultimate
meaning [obtains] thanks to his reflection on non-adventitious ipseity —
he who [thus] becomes the Great Lord, reflecting: ‘I am all’,\textsuperscript{1025} inasmuch
as the object to be desired is now inseparable from him\textsuperscript{1026} — how can
he be the receptacle of misfortune, etc., in the absence of either acquiring
or losing that which is different from him?

Thus have been explained [suitably], as expressing (vācaka) non-fortu-
itous meanings, the qualifications ‘hrdaya’ (‘heart’), ‘prārūdhaparamārtha’
(‘heaped up [jewels of] ultimate meaning [viz., of Śaiva doctrine]’), and
‘mahān’ (‘great’), [as applying, respectively, to] ‘gaṇja’ (‘treasure-room’),
‘ratnasamcaya’ (‘collection of jewels’) and ‘īśvara’ (‘Lord’) [in the kāri-
kā].\textsuperscript{1027}

\textsuperscript{1021}aham eva.
\textsuperscript{1022}sarvam idam asmi.
\textsuperscript{1023}Powers (vibhūti) employed for purely personal, that is, ‘magic’, aims, such as levitation,
etc., are referred to here. According to YR, recourse to such ‘powers’ has its occasion in a
sense of impoverishment, itself incompatible with the sense of plenitude characteristic of the
true yogin.
\textsuperscript{1024}svātmakalpa.
\textsuperscript{1025}sarvam asmi.
\textsuperscript{1026}Note the parallelism between ‘vyatiriktasyaisānyāsyapr̥tyā īśvarāḥ’ and ‘avyatiriktena
esāniyena maheśvarāḥ’.
\textsuperscript{1027}YR here anticipates the objection that the figurative language of the kārikā does not
suitably apply to ultimate reality, and that such comparisons are capricious or fortuitous.
The analogy may be conventional as indicated by its use elsewhere in Śaiva texts, such as
Kārikā 60

The master now says what is the nature of liberation:

60. Neither has liberation any abode, nor does it involve a going elsewhere. Liberation is the manifestation of one’s own energies realized by cutting the knot of ignorance. 1028

Of liberation (mokṣa), that is, of that state of isolation (kaivalya) the essence of which is the marvel of supreme ipseity, no abode is evident, no place apart, for [in such a state] the delimitations of space, time and particular embodiment are absent. 1029

For the same reason, neither is liberation a going elsewhere, into some place apart, 1030 a dissolution [of the self] — as it is in the view of the dualists, where it is said to dissolve above (ūrdhvam) [the cranial ‘aperture of brahman’ (brahmarandhra)], at a ‘point twelve finger spaces (ca. 20 to 25 cm.) directly above’ (dvādaśānta, viz., the uppermost cakra), by leaving (utkrāntyā) [the body], after piercing through the cakras, starting from the one at the base [of the spine] (ādhāracakra). 1031

the māṅgālācāraṇa ad ĪP V I 4 (quoted n. 1018).

1028 ajñānamagrānthi — cf. ĀPS 73, whose second hemistich differs slightly: ajñānamayagranther bheda yas tam vidur mokṣam//, ’Breaking the fetter which consists of ignorance: that is what one knows as Release’. Not only does the Śaiva PS introduce the concept of sakti, but emphasizes it, as shown by the commentary, which includes a syntactical ślea on svāsakti; see n. 1036. Cf. also Sarvajñābhairava quoted by SpP 1, p. 7: nāyatra gamanam sthānam mokṣo ‘stitasurasundari/ ajñānamgrāntihhbedo yaḥ sa mokṣa iti kathya//, ’O fair Goddess, neither does liberation involve a going elsewhere, nor is it a place [to be discovered]. It is said that liberation is but breaking the knot of ignorance’. Cf. further the maxim quoted thrice by PM 53, 60, 64: calitvā yāsyaṃ kurva sarvam śīvamayaṃ yataḥ, ’If he sets out, where shall he go, since everything is made of Śiva?'; note that this hemistich is part of a longer text quoted in PM 60, which, Silburn tells us (MM: 171), is recited daily, at the end of meals, by Kashmiri pandīts.

1029 Similar phraseology in ŠR ad 64–66, which takes up again the definition of mokṣa.

1030 Cf. BĀU IV 4, 7 quoted n. 1062 and Š ad loc.: atra asmin eva śārire vartamānāḥ brahma sāmasnute, brahmabhāvam mokṣam pratipadyata ity arthah/ atah mokṣaḥ na deśāntaragamanādi āpeksate, ‘[..] And attains Brahman, the identity with Brahman, i.e., liberation, living in this very body. Hence liberation does not require such things as going to some other place’ (tr. Svāmī Mādhavānanda).

1031 The term utkrānti, nominally ‘ascent’, is here to be understood in the technical sense of ‘terminal Egress’, or, as it is sometimes rendered, ‘yogic suicide’ (see Vasudeva MVT: 437ff.). As such, it refers to the practice of elevating the breath (that is, the vital principle) along the dorsal nervous cord from the generative nucleus at its base to the cranium, then ‘cutting it off’ with the mantra named kālarātri, the ‘Night which is Death’ (MVT XVII 30), as it emerges from the top of the head. The notion is mentioned in ĪV (XVII 25–34), Kirāntantra, ch. 59, 1cd, and 28ab, SvT VII 314ab, Matāṅgāpārameśvarāgama, Yogapāda VII 41–48, and in the Úrmikālānava (available in MS only), quoted by TĀ XIV 31–32a and 33–35a as well as (in a more elaborate way) by TĀV ad loc. YR’s rejection here of the notion, attributing it to “dualists” inasmuch as it involves a “displacement” of the vital airs as a precondition of ‘liberation’, echoes TĀ XIV 31–37, where the notion is discussed in the context of jīvanmukti. Placing himself under the authority of the Úrmikālānava, which denies to the ‘dualistic'
Such is liberation. As has been stated:

If the existence of Śiva [as consciousness] is all-pervasive, what purpose is there in terminal Egress (utkrānti)? If the ultimate principle [— scil., ‘of reality’] is not all-pervasive, what pur­pose is there in terminal Egress?\footnote{1032}

There are, as well, many other varieties of liberation of such sort, post­ulated by other schools. Were they to be dilated upon here, they would bring with them the danger of an overly prolix text. Hence, they will not be dilated upon. [In summary, however, we may say that] in all such cases [viz., other types of liberation], because they are open to the im­purity of dualism (ādāvaitamala), the desire for liberation (mokṣālipsā) [has been redirected] to what is not liberation (amokṣa), resulting in the mere appearance of liberation (mokṣābhāsa).\footnote{1033}

What then is the definition of liberation? The master says in reply: ...

‘[by cutting the knot of] ignorance, etc.’.

Ignorance is that delusion generated by the nescience implicit in the con­ceit that locates the Self in the non-Self — the body, etc. — whose antecedent is the con­ceit that locates the non-Self in the Self.\footnote{1034}

practice of utkrānti any salutary virtue, AG tries to resolve the paradox represented by the fact that utkrānti is nevertheless taught in the MVT, a text that is authoritative for the nondualistic doctrine of the Trika. The disapprobation here of “yogic suicide” is one with the view that becoming Śiva does not require the destruction of a body that is in any case not different from Śiva. Moreover, the idea that suicide is a means to liberation clashes with the notion of jīvanmukti, the core teaching of the PS. Dissociating itself from older notions of liberation, involving a ‘going elsewhere’ at the moment of death, Trika adopts a view more in line with its doctrine of ṣakti — ‘Liberation is the manifestation of one’s own energies [realized] by cutting the knot of ignorance’, as says PS 60. At the same time, Trika thereby clarifies the sense in which jīvanmukti itself is a necessary consequence of this “cutting”: at the very instant the yogin severs the knot of nescience, he accedes to liberation, once and for all. A similar refutation of utkrānti is found in SpP 30, quoted in Intr., n. 151. Note also the generalized euphemistic sense of utkrānti, ‘the flight or passage of the soul (out of the body), death’ (Apte, citing BS II 3, 19), of which this “yogic” application is little but a specialization.\footnote{1035}

The reference has not been found, although the text is very close to the passage from the Úrmikaula[arnava] (or Úrmimahākula), quoted by TĀV XIV 33b–35a (vol. V: 2432): [...] asti ced bhagavān vyāpi kathayotkramanena kim/ nasti ced bhagavān vyāpi kathayotkramanena kim. On the Úrmikaulānava, a work of Krama Kaulism, which is available only in MS (NAK MS 5–5207 (incomplete) Paper. Newari script), see Sanderson 2005: 133–134. The Úrmikaula is quoted in TĀ XIV 31b–32a, 33b–35a.\footnote{1036}

\begin{itemize}
\item Cf. IPV I 1, 1 (vol. I: 26): anyatratyo hi apavargah kutaścin muktir na sarvata iti niśhreyasaḥbhāsa iti vaksyāmah, ‘The release [expounded] elsewhere, which [inevitably] has the form “liberation is contingent and not universal” [lit., “liberation is somewhere and not everywhere”], we will say is nothing but the appearance of the ultimate’. According to the Bhāskari, the adjective ‘“anyatratya”’, “existing elsewhere”, points here to the doctrines of the Buddhists, etc.’ (anyatra — buddhasiddhāntādīsu bhavah anyatratyah), and the Bhāskari concludes: māyādes tattvāt na tu sūddhāvidyāder api, ‘By this [he means that this so-called “liberation”] derives from the principle of māyā rather than from pure knowledge (sūddhāvidyā), etc.’.
\end{itemize}

\footnote{1037}The order of the two errors is that adopted by YR ad PS 31 and 61; cf. YR ad 53.
That very [delusion] is a knot, that is, is like a knot, for it engenders a constriction of the all-encompassing nature [of the Self]; that is to say, it is a fettering of one's inherent pervasiveness,\textsuperscript{1035} etc., which we have characterized as one's own freedom — a fettering that stems from the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc.;

[whereas] the cutting of that knot, its cleaving, means the splitting asunder of the knot we have characterized as the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc., once the [adept's] sustained concentration on the inherent freedom of his own all-encompassing Self has become unshakable. Because of this tearing asunder, there is the manifestation (\textit{abhivyak-tatā}) [of one's own energies] — or [what is the same thing,] the full deployment of the energies of one's Self, \textit{through one's own energies}\textsuperscript{1036} — properties whose specific characteristic is the freedom of the Self. And it is this [full expansion] that is liberation unexcelled.

Here is the purport of what has been said. [Consider the following illustration:] Although it is space, and endowed with innate and eternal attributes such as pervasiveness, etc., such space, when constricted by its relation to the [inner] sides of the jar, etc., is spoken of as 'jar-space' [viz., a 'space belonging to or within the jar'] and is endowed with attributes such as non-pervasiveness, etc. — and so displays itself as different from [endless] space.

Similarly, once the constriction attributable to the sides of the jar, etc., is removed, that same 'jar-space', etc., [again] becomes instantly endowed with attributes such as pervasiveness, etc. — and there is no concurrent manifestation (\textit{āvirbhāva}) of any novel attribute\textsuperscript{1037} deriving from the breaking of the jar, etc.\textsuperscript{1038}

In just this way, consciousness, when constricted by the limitations deriving from the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc., is said to be 'as if bound';

and similarly, once the bondage that consists of [the conceit] attributing to the body, etc., the capacity to cognize, has come to an end through the manifestation of the knowledge of one's own nature, that same consciousness is said to be 'as if liberated',\textsuperscript{1039} [since now it is] fully deployed

\textsuperscript{1035}Pervasiveness implies omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence; see n. 561.

\textsuperscript{1036}Same terminology (\textit{svaśaktivikasvaratā}) in YR ad 56, defining \textit{mokṣa}; see also YR ad 61: \textit{mukto vikasvaraśaktir bhavet}, 'liberated, that is, endowed with [fully] deployed energies'. The commentary involves a syntactical \textit{śleṣa}, the \textit{svaśakti} of the compound is to be taken both as an objective genitive ('manifestation of one's own energy') and as an instrumental ('manifestation through one's own energies').

\textsuperscript{1037}In Vedānta, the 'sides of the jar' provide a standard example of \textit{upādhi} — the 'limiting extrinsic condition' which, when present, falsely divides and multiplies a reality intrinsically one and indivisible.

\textsuperscript{1038}Cf. ĀPS 51; ĀŚ III 4–5; BSBh II 1, 22 and II 2, 24. For speculations on \textit{ghatākāśa}, see also YR ad PS 16, 24 and 37.

\textsuperscript{1039}Bondage and liberation are equally illusory, a point often associated with Mādhyamikas.
through the discrimination of its own energies [of independence, etc.].

Hence bondage as well as liberation are both essentially [functions of] conceit of self affecting the limited cognizer; it is not that any events of this sort really take place in the reality that is consciousness (samvitattva) — the ultimate truth (paramārtha) [of this system].

Therefore, nothing at all novel is realized in liberation: there is displayed nothing but one's own innate nature. The same truth is stated also in the Viṣṇudharma: 1040

As the well is not the cause of the production of rain water, but only serves to manifest water which already exist — for whence should that originate which is not? 1041 As, when the bellows-

See also SK 62: tasmān na badhyate nāpi mucyate nāpi saṁsaratī kācit/saṁsaratī badhyate mucyate ca nānāśrayaḥ prakṛtih; also SpP 1, which quotes Vāmanadatta's Saṁviprakāśa (referred to as the Āmasapati, the 'Seventy Verses on the Self') II 58: vastuṣṭhitāḥ na bandho 'sti tadbhāvān na muktaā/t vikalpaghaṭṭāv etāv ubhāv api na kīcicana/; 'In truth, there is nothing at all; in its absence there is no bondage. Both are concocted from thought constructs, neither is anything at all'; as well as AG's Anuttarāstikā 2: saṁsāro 'sti na tatvatas tanubhūtām bandhāsya vā rātvā kā bandho yasya na jātā tasya vaitāḥ muktasya muktikriyā/ mithyāmokārdesa rajjhibhagacchāyāpiśācābrahmo mā kīcicīt tayaja mā grāhāṇā vihāra [v.l. in TĀV 1331, vol. I: 305: viśera] svastha yathāvasthitah/; 'Transmigration does not truly exist. Why then talk of the bondage of the embodied soul? Pointless is activity aimed at freedom when one is already free, bondage never having been; all such confusion is produced by erroneous delusion, as when one mistakes a rope for a serpent or a shadow for a demon. So give up nothing, acquire nothing; just take it easy! You are [already] healthy and well-situated'; also ŚD III 72: tathā tathā śivavasthā śvechātāḥ sa tādatmākāha/ tādatmāte nāsti bandhas tadabhāvān na mokṣanānām/; '(Even when duality prevails) thus, Śiva's state is like that in accord with His own (free) will and that (duality) is of His nature. Thus as it is such, there is no bondage and liberation is not due to its absence' (tr. Dyczkowski SpK: 364); cf. ĀŚ II 32, ĀPS 69, YV III 100, 40.

1040 Viṣṇudharmāḥ, 'Precepts for the Worship of Viṣṇu', of which the Viṣṇudharmottara professes to be the latter part, is ascribed to Saṇanaka, the chief narrator of the text, by the Śārirakamīṁamsābhāṣya (IV 4, 3). It is a compilation, in the form of embedded dialogues and narratives, belonging to 'the liturgical literature of early Viṣṇism' as stated by Grünendahl (Viṣṇudharma: IX). Its date is uncertain: between the 3rd and 11th cent. AD, as proposed by Grünendahl (pp. 72–73), which is corroborated by Rāmānuja's Śārirakamīṁamsābhāṣya (11th–12th cent.), which quotes the text, as well as by the present citation, from the same period. Rāmānuja's reference to the Viṣṇudharma mitigates somewhat Grünendahl's skepticism regarding the text's 'alleged authority among the Śrivaśnavas' (Viṣṇudharma, pt 3: 61–63).

1041 The first stanza of the puzzling verse, cited verbatim by Rāmānuja, is so translated by Thibaut (Śribhāṣya, pt. 3: 758), who takes the apparent hapax jalāmbara ('water-garment') as "rain water" — perhaps understanding the 'sheet of water' that makes an Indian downpour sometimes seem as substantial as a veil. Many variants occur, however, in the manuscripts (see note below), indicating that the image (whatever it was) was not universally grasped. Thibaut does not explain his translation further. Several other infelicities mar the Sanskrit of these lines, making the overall sense less than certain. In any case, if the citation is relevant to the present argument, YR probably understands the 'expanse of water' and the 'well' (that is, a 'water-enclosure') to function here much in the same way as he does the 'expanse of space' and the 'jar' (that is, a 'space-enclosure') of the following illustration. Note that, just before the verse (100, 51) quoted here by YR ('As, when the bellows-hide is
hide is ripped, the wind [that escapes] is not other than wind [itself]; just so, the soul is [not other] than brahman, once the bondage of merit and demerit has been destroyed. 1042

Kārikā 61

Now the master makes it known that he who has knowledge — whose bonds of ignorance have been destroyed — is liberated, though he continues to occupy his body out of benevolence for others:

61. He who has cut the knot of ignorance, whose doubts have vanished, who has put aside error, whose merits and demerits have been destroyed, is liberated, though still joined with his body.

Even though conjoined with a body, he who has found the knowledge of his own Self, though he yet lives (jīvann api), is liberated (muktāh), that is, he is endowed with fully deployed energies (vikasvaraśakti), for there no more exists the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc.

ripped [...]'), the Viṣṇudharma (100, 50) offers the analogy of the ghaṭākāśa occurring earlier in YR’s commentary ad 60: ghaṭaḍhvaṃsa ghaṭākāśam na bhinnaṃ nabhaśa yaḥ/ brahmaṇaḥ heyaśvādhaṃsa viṣṇākhyena pumāṃs tathā/. In Thibaut’s translation, the following verse of the original text (VD 100, 50–51, see note below) reads as follows: ‘— thus knowledge and the other attributes of the Self are only manifested through the putting off of evil qualities; they are not produced, for they are eternal’.

1042 Viṣṇudharma 100, 56; 100, 51. In Grünendahl’s edition, the two ślokas quoted here by YR are not consecutive; the former being 100, 56, the latter, 100, 51. It is noteworthy that the first śloka appears to have been popular, for it is often quoted, as, for instance, in the Āmasiddhi and in Rāmacandra’s Śārirakamimāṃsābhaṣya IV 4, 3, two texts that have the same reading of the verse (in Narasimhācārya’s edition (1910) of the Śārirakamimāṃsābhaṣya, this verse is identified as Viṣṇudharma 104, 56). In the light of the edition of the Viṣṇudharma and the passage quoted by Rāmacandra, it would seem that YR has altered the text, omitting the correlative phrase of the first śloka, and joining to it an anterior verse. The original text, as quoted in Narasimhācārya’s and Abhyankar’s editions of the Śārirakamimāṃsābhaṣya, reads as follows: yathā na kriyate jyotisā malaprakāśānān maneḥ/ ṃsamyogasāvah kutaḥ// yathā [tathā, in Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar ed., Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, LXVIII, pt I, 1914] heyaśvādhaṃsād avabhādādayo gunāḥ/ prakāśyante na janyante nityā evātmano hi te//, ‘As the luster of the gem is not created by the act of polishing, so the essential intelligence of the Self is not created by the putting off of imperfections. As the well is not the cause of the production of rain water, but only serves to manifest water which already exist — for whence should that originate which is not? — thus knowledge and the other attributes of the Self are only manifested through the putting off of evil qualities; they are not produced, for they are eternal’ (tr. Thibaut). Cf. the text critically edited by Grünendahl, which reads differently (and apparently less satisfactorily) verses 55–56: yathā na kriyate jyotisā malaprakāśānānādā/ ṃsamyogasāvah kutaḥ// yathā [tathā, in Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar ed., Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, LXVIII, pt I, 1914] heyaśvādhaṃsād avabhādādayo gunāḥ/ prakāśyante na janyante nityā evātmano hīte// (Grünendahl observes that all MSS. have hybrid ‘-ōdupāṇa-’, except N1: ‘-ōda-’, and B: yathōpadānakaranāt kriyate jalasacmcayam; D-mss.: -lāntaram).
But, says an opponent, if bondage is [as you say] association with the body, how then could such a one be liberated, since an association with the [body is supposed]? 

In response, the master says: 'He who has cut, etc.'

He by whom the knot formed of ignorance has been cut, that is, split asunder, is so [liberated] — the bond formed by the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc., which has arisen thanks to the [mistaken] cognition that [the Self] is incomplete (apūrṇatvakhyāti).

Similarly, [is liberated] he whose doubts have vanished, that is, whose doubts have been destroyed;

and again, he by whom error, that is, illusion formed of duality, has been put aside, that is, abolished, thanks to the acquisition of the knowledge of ultimate nonduality;

and finally (evam), it is he who is such [as has been described, namely, he who is liberated and yet lives], the auspicious or inauspicious [consequences of] whose [deeds] have been destroyed by sustained concentration — whether [those consequences] be conducive to dharma [viz., enjoined] or to its opposite [viz., prohibited], inasmuch as the root impressions [produced by them] have been dissolved, for there no longer exists any notion [associating the] body with the Self.

By this, it has been explained that 'bondage is ignorance itself' 1043 [rather than the body as such, or a connection with the body, as implied by the objection].

And he whose [ignorance] is destroyed, even while remains a rapport with the body, is at that very moment liberated (muktah), though he still lives (jivann eva). It is not that bondage involves necessarily a connection with a body.

The removal of that ignorance is liberation. However, [it may be added that,] with the perishing of the body, complete (pūrna) liberation is attained. 1044

Kārikā 62

Though his body remains as the effect of actions [previously done], the acts of him who is thus liberated while living, while he continues to act, are ignited by knowledge [and are performed] merely for the sake of the body's [previously enjoined] journey, 1045 and not for the sake of any fruit.

1043 In fact, one of the meanings of the second sūtra of the Śivasūtra: jñānam bandhah.

1044 First sketch, here, of a distinction between liberation in this life, jīvanmukti, and liberation at death, which later traditions will term videhamukti. The question will be taken up again in YR ad 83, and more explicitly at the end of the commentary on 85–86; see Intr., p. 43.

1045 sarīrayātrā.
The master now explains this:

62. Just as the seed parched by fire loses its power of sprouting, so is the act no longer conducive to rebirth that has been burnt in the fire of knowledge.\(^{1046}\)

Just as the rice-seed parched by fire, though conjoined with soil, water and heat, is no longer capable of generating sprouts, etc., due to a defect in the [required] aggregate [of conditions], so, in the same way, the act that has been burnt in the fire of knowledge, that is, scorched by the radiance of ultimate nondual consciousness — whose power [of accruing results] has thus been burnt up — is no longer conducive to generating the fruit that is rebirth, when the body of him who has knowledge finally perishes;\(^{1047}\) that is, such an act does not cause the creation of a further body, like the burnt-up seed in respect of the sprout, ...

... and this is the case whatever be the action, whether auspicious or inauspicious, so long as it be performed by abandoning the thought of what is to be avoided and what is enjoined, this itself conditioned on one's having ceased to confound the body, etc., with the Self — which occurs when one realizes: 'It is I who appear (spurāmi) as the Self of everything'.\(^{1048}\)

Therefore, the act done in such a way as to focus (abhisamdhāna) energy of consciousness (citiśakti)\(^{1049}\) on the absence of consequence (aphala) is not able again to give rise to birth, inasmuch as that energy is formed of the notion that the 'I' [of the meditator] is one with all things [— viz., 'I am this all'], or 'this all is indistinguishable from me'].\(^{1050}\)

\(^{1046}\)Cf. kārikā 57 where is described another way of rendering a seed unproductive.

\(^{1047}\)This is the doctrine, expounded at length in the Bhagavadgītā, and proclaimed in the Buddha's first sermon: it is not the act as such that binds, but the intention that motivates it; as long as its fruit is not desired, the act retains its constitutive and obligatory character, whether ritual (Gītā) or compassionate (Buddha); argument taken up again in PS 67.

\(^{1048}\)aham eva itham viśvātmanā spurāmi.

\(^{1049}\)First occurrence of the notion. See ÍPK I 5, 13: citiḥ pratyamarśātmā parā vāk svarasoditā, 'Consciousness (citi) has as its essential nature reflective awareness; it is the supreme Speech that arises freely', and the Vimārśini, where citi is commented upon by citikriyā, the 'activity of consciousness'. Cf. ŚŚV I 1: citkriyā sarvasāmānyarūpā, 'The activity of consciousness is universal throughout'; also PH 1 (quoted in PM 26): citih svatantrā viśvasiddhihetuh, 'Free consciousness is the cause bringing about the universe', and the auto-commentary ad loc. The principal concern of PH is the manner in which citi chooses to limit itself and become citta, empirical consciousness (v. 5), thereafter ultimately regaining its absolute being (v. 13). The term citiśakti is found in YS IV 34; qualified as 'svātipratīṣṭhā', 'established in its own nature', it serves as a synonym to kaivalya, 'autonomy'.

\(^{1050}\)Similar statement in YR ad 51.
If, then, this is so, how\textsuperscript{1051} has this energy of consciousness\textsuperscript{1052} come to be possessed of a body — since it is already fully developed (\textit{vikasvara}) [as supreme ipseity]? The master says:

63. Indeed, energy of consciousness,\textsuperscript{1053} delimited by the efficient force\textsuperscript{1054} [unleashed by ritual acts undertaken in this life, whose result] is a future body suitable to [the fulfillment of] those acts — acts themselves that are made possible by limiting the intellect [to egocentric purposes]\textsuperscript{1055} — comes into possession of a new

\textsuperscript{1051}The rare form \textit{kathamkāram} is worthy of a grammatical note: such instances of the relatively infrequent gerund suffix 'namu\textit{V} (-am), authorized by P. \textsc{iii} 4, 27 are themselves exceptional (see another instance of \textit{namul} in \textsc{kā.} 104). Monier-Williams cites \textit{Śīśupālavadha} (2.52) for this form, where, according to Mallinātha's commentary, the suffix has no proper sense, that is, does not alter the sense of the term to which it attaches — here the adverb \textit{katham}. The \textsc{kāśikā} specifies that in such usages, the 'gerund' must be understood as pertaining to the main predicate, which rules out its use in cases such as \textit{anyathākārtvā śiro bhunke}, 'having nodded [lit., 'having disposed his head otherwise'], he eats' (\textit{anyathākāram bhunke}, 'he eats differently', would be legitimate). Same term in the avat. ad 85–86.

\textsuperscript{1052}Or 'that form of energy that is called "consciousness."'

\textsuperscript{1053}\textit{citi} — we translate as 'energy of consciousness', as YR glosses \textit{citi} with \textit{citišakti}.

\textsuperscript{1054}\textit{bhāvanā}, here, in the light of YR's gloss and the examples there given, seems to be used in its \textsc{Mīmāṃsaka} sense of 'efficient force' (so Edgerton, \textsc{Mīmāṃsāyāprakāśa}, q.v.) attaching to the act, specifically to the ritual act (cf. its derivation from the causative, \textit{bhāvayati}). Our interpretation thus differs from those of previous translators (we underline the renderings of \textit{bhāvanā}). Cf. Barnett: 'Owing to the \textit{conception} of a future body corresponding to [present] works, [a conception] arising from limitation of intelligence, the Thought becomes accordingly contracted on the dissolution of the present body'; Silburn (echoing Barnett): 'En effet, grâce à la faculté qu'elle possède d'imaginer un corps futur conforme à l'acte (qu'elle accomplit) en mettant en œuvre un intellect limité, la conscience se contracte proportionnellement à la dissolution du corps actuel'; B. N. Pandit: 'An individual finite I-consciousness, having a deep rooted conception of finitude with regard to itself, is lead (sic) by the impression of its future body, formed in accordance with its deeds, to the consequent position after the end of its current form'. These three interpretations appear to be based on a specifically \textsc{Śaiva} sense of \textit{bhāvanā}, the spiritual realization preceding \textit{mokṣa} itself — which in any case is not that far removed from the original \textsc{Mīmāṃsaka} meaning. According to the \textsc{Mīmāṃsā}, the act does not end with its material result (which may be nothing but the ashes of the sacrifice), but is prolonged, through its 'efficient force' up to the moment of its "real" fruition: the fulfilled wish of the performer. Even this "real" result depends on the 'efficient force' generated by the previous ritual act. Those questioning this sacrificial model (cf. BĀU VI 2, 15–16; MuU I 2, 5–11) noted that since the previous (ritual) act is occasional, impermanent, its 'efficient force' (needed to maintain the sacrificer 'in heaven', for example) cannot be thought itself to be permanent, and must itself be destined to exhaustion in its turn, becoming then but another element in an endless series of impermanent causes and effects. Later on, YR will emphasize that this 'efficient force' is articulated through the \textit{vāsanās} produced in the mind by ritual acts; see n. 1060. Cf. BhG n 66, where Edgerton's interpretation of \textit{bhāvanā}, 'efficient-force', should no doubt be understood in a more spiritual sense; cf. Śaṅkara: \textit{na cāṣṭy ayuktasya bhāvanā ātmajñānāḥ bhāvīvēśaḥ}.

\textsuperscript{1055}Egocentric purposes such as attainment of sovereignty or possession of much wealth.
body, \textsuperscript{1056} once this present body has fallen away.

[Yogarāja now undertakes an explanation of various problematic elements of the kārikā while composing them into a coherent statement of the kārikā's purport:]

From what follows (yasmāt) [we will, in good time, draw a suitable conclusion, introduced by tasmāt, 'therefore', but in the meantime, it behooves us to clarify the various terms composing the kārikā and to state their syntactic interrelation more clearly:]

by limiting the intellect means 'on account of the determination [to act in a certain way], originating in the failure to recognize [the Self as such], and [tainted] by the dirt of desire, which is itself conditioned on latent dispositions deriving from the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc.;

the act performed [in accordance with such limitation] means 'an act suitable to an agent who is qualified by such latent dispositions' — as for instance when he says: 'I will perform a horse sacrifice', 'may I be happy in this world and in the world beyond', 'may I never be sorrowful', 'let me attain the abode of Indra through this rite';

the future body [of that agent] means 'the body that will come into being later', once has been extinguished one's entitlement to a body needed to enjoy the results of those actions whose fruition has already begun (prārabdhakarman) \textsuperscript{1057} — which body will be suitable to perform those actions that are assured further development thanks to the latent dispositions (vāsanāprarūḍhi) [preserved] in the mind, and thus is fit to serve as enjoyer of fruits acquired in conformity which such acts;

the efficient force attaching to that [future body] means 'the further development of those latent dispositions' [formed in the mind in consequence of the act], in which [are latent] the results of the action \textsuperscript{1058} wished for — as for instance, when one says: 'Let me obtain universal sovereignty, etc., by performing a rite such as the horse sacrifice, etc.'.

It is through this [efficient force (unleashed by ritual acts undertaken in this life, whose result) is a future body suitable to (the fulfillment of) those acts] that the energy of consciousness, although replete in all respects, is affected by the impurity of supposing oneself the agent of actions, which itself originates in the impurities of deeming oneself finite, and of regarding the world as objective; this energy, though all-pervasive, becomes thus

\textsuperscript{1056}Lit., 'becomes [again] thus'.

\textsuperscript{1057}The act (karman) is often distinguished into three sub-varieties: kriyamānakarman, the act now being performed, whose results are yet to be enjoyed; sañcītakarman, act already performed, whose results have not yet begun to be enjoyed, and remain stored up, latent; and prārabdhakarman, the act whose results have begun to be experienced, but not yet exhausted.

\textsuperscript{1058}See n. 1054 and 1060.
delimited,\textsuperscript{1059} just as does the space within the jar;
— and so, this energy [of consciousness], once the [present] body
has fallen away, still affected by limiting factors such as the latent dispo-
sitions belonging [properly] to the body that enjoys the results following
from its actions,\textsuperscript{1060} becomes again thus [that is, comes into possession
of a new body].
[Here] the body is [said to be] the enjoyer of this, namely, the results
of those actions whose fruition has begun;
— by its destruction is meant death, so-called because of the disap-
pearance of those enjoyments;
— and once the [present] body has fallen away, consciousness, where-
in the latent dispositions provoked by actions [yet unfulfilled] have been
roused, becomes [again] thus, that is, becomes endowed with that body,
through whose agency the fruits of one's previous actions are acquired,
and which thus becomes the enjoyer of the results of those actions —
on account of which even consciousness becomes a receptacle for the en-
joyment of heaven and hell, etc. [as consequences of one's good or bad
actions].
[All this being the case,] it follows (tasmät) that, once [consciousness]
has taken on a body (śarīröbhūtva) [as described above], whatever action be
performed in temptation of a finite fruit is more than capable of providing
a new birth wherein one will enjoy the result [suitable to that action].\textsuperscript{1061}
But, on the other hand, since the further development of latent dispo-
sitions (vāsanāpraroha) is no longer an issue, how can an action, having
freed itself from the [thrall of the] body (āsärīröbhūtva),\textsuperscript{1062} and done un-
der the guise of consciousness itself by one who thinks: 'I am brahman, the

\textsuperscript{1059}samkucitā.

\textsuperscript{1060}This is the notion of karmavipāka, the ripening of the act, whose ultimate source may
be found in the philosophy of ritual. Between the actual performance of the act and the
experience of its fruit, the efficient force of the act lies dormant in the form of a vāsanā,
which, according to one of its etymologies, is a fragrance permeating the body. But the
fruits of some acts require a different type of body — that of a man, woman, king, ant,
elephant, nymph, etc.

\textsuperscript{1061}Such is the answer to the objection raised in the avat.: 'how can consciousness become
embodied?'

\textsuperscript{1062}On the notion of aśarīrövatva, see Intr., pp. 27 and 46, and n. 1212 ad 79–80. Cf. BĀU
IV 4, 7 (quoted in Jivanmuktiviveka IV; the verse occurs also at KaU II 3, 14): yadā sarve
pramuceyante kāma ye 'syā hyḍā śrītāḥ/ atra martyo 'mṛto bhavati, atra brahma samaśnute// iti
tad yathāhinirlayanī valmike mṛtā pratayastā śayita, evam evedam śarīrām śete, athāyam aśarīro
mṛtāḥ prāno, brahmaiva, teja eva [...] ‘When all the desires that dwell in the heart are
cast away, then does the mortal become immortal, then he attains Brahman here (in this
very body).’ Just as the slough of a snake lies on an anthill, dead, cast off, even so lies this
body. But this disembodied, immortal life is Brahman only, is light indeed [...]; see Ś ad
loc. (quoted n. 1030): considering his body, which formerly was nothing but an obstacle to
his consciousness, as a mere tatter, of no more importance to him than is the skin that the
serpent sloughs off, the 'knower' acts henceforth disinterestedly, indifferently, focusing only
on his status as 'liberated while living'.

\textsuperscript{1059}tasmät. \textsuperscript{1060}karmavipaka. \textsuperscript{1061}śarīröbhūtva. \textsuperscript{1062}āsärīröbhūtva.
All, be [thought] capable of facilitating the rebirth of all-pervading energy of consciousness? This is the master's intended meaning.

Kārikās 64–66

Now, if it is the case that action done in conformity with the principle of non-Self (anātmatayā) [that is, done while mistaking the Self for the non-Self] eventuates in the cognizing subject's continuing transmigration, then surely the nature of the Self should be described, in virtue of which one does not become [again] enmeshed in transmigration. Although this has already been explained, he speaks of it again in order that his disciples may take it to heart [and interiorize it]:

64–66. Once one has become aware that his Self is formed of Śiva — the Lord that is unblemished consciousness, who has transcended all that involves knowers and agents, who is extended [to the entire universe], is formed of the Light that neither sets nor rises, whose intentions are ever true, who is beyond all mere inclination conditioned by [the particularities of] time or space, who is stable, immutable, ever replete, the unique cause of the processes of dissolution and origination that involve countless hosts of energies, the excellent instigator of injunctions of creation and so on — is it possible that such a one be subject to transmigration? Of one who is extended [to the entire universe], whence or whither is motion possible?

Once the cognizer, whose heart has been transfixed by [the Lord's] grace, and who has overcome the conceit attributing to the body and

1063 sarvam brahmaśmi.
1064 Or, might vyāpinyāḥ āitiṣāktaḥ be taken to be an ablative: 'on account of that all-pervading conscious energy'?
1065 īti tāparyārthah — with this term the entire commentary concludes. Whereas the previous statements expounded a point of view in some sense negative, inasmuch as they sought to explain the idea of reincarnation, the final statement represents their 'implication' (tàtparya), which is their positive counterpart, and serves also to relativize the previous exposition.
1066 The same reasoning is at issue in kā. 9.
1067 ḫṛdayaṅgamikartum — recurrent idiom; see, for instance, ḫṛdayaṅgāmbhāva in PTLvṛ 2a.
1068 sarvasamutāṅraboddhārtayamayam — the compound, which YR does not fully parse, appears to be susceptible of several analyses; as a BV, it could mean 'who has transcended all that involves knowers and agents'; as a TP, it could mean either 'made of all-transcending knowers and agents [referring to the jīvanmuktas, of whom there may be more than one]', or 'made of [viz., who has made himself into] an all-transcending knower and agent'.
1069 In the sense that 'whatever he desires, it happens thus', as explains YR.
1070 Cf. Barnett: 'cunning creator of the laws of creation and other conditions', and Silburn: 'ordonnateur très expert des œuvres de création et autres'.
1071 paraśaktipāta — lit., 'descent of [the Lord's] supreme energy'; see YR ad 9.
the like the capacity to cognize,\textsuperscript{1072} has become aware that his own Self is formed of Śiva [see kārikā 66], that is, once he recognizes that he is a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, how indeed could he — now knowing himself to be identical with the Great Lord — be subject to transmigration, that is, in what way could he become enmeshed [again] in the cycle of existence?

He could not. And as well, because he [alone] transmigrates whose nature is the subtle body which is composed of consciousness and non-consciousness on account of its connection with the impurity of supposing himself to be the agent of actions. How, moreover, could he who is formed solely of consciousness (cidekamūrti), who is, in substance, Śiva (śivamaya) be subject to transmigration — for his sheaths of impurity have been destroyed, notably that of deeming himself finite, etc.? Such is the author’s intended meaning.

An interlocutor may ask: — ‘What harm is there [viz., to your thesis] if one who is solely formed of consciousness were said to be subject to transmigration?’

Suspecting such an objection, the master utters the words starting with ‘extended’:

of an extended [to the entire universe] cognizer, that is one not qualified by time, space or their particular embodiment,\textsuperscript{1073} how is motion ‘to’ or motion ‘from’ possible? Such a cognizer has already pervaded all things! He is [therefore] complete, inasmuch as the latent dispositions have terminated [that were occasioned] by what he had done while under the influence of the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc.

Is there any place beyond him\textsuperscript{1074} from which he might differentiate himself [and thereto] effect a transmigration, a going elsewhere, [such other place] being different?

Indeed, the cases of ablative, locative, and so on, have opportunity only in regard to one who is qualified by the conceit attributing to the body, etc., the capacity to cognize. It makes no sense even to apply the word ‘transmigration’ to the cognizer who, being solely formed of consciousness, is himself nothing but brahman (brahmabhūta), unqualified by [the limitations] of space and time.

What kind of Self is it — formed of Śiva [you say] — that he would become aware of? The master says in reply: ‘unblemished consciousness, etc.’.

[YR proceeds to a grammatical analysis of the components of the description given in the three kārikās:]

\textsuperscript{1072}Same phraseology in YR ad 39 as well as YR ad 1: parimitapramātṛtādhaspadikāreṇa.

\textsuperscript{1073}Similar phraseology in YR ad 60, which deals with the definition of mokṣa.

\textsuperscript{1074}tadatārikta.
By [unblemished] consciousness is meant [that Śiva is] pure consciousness (śuddhacaitanya), as being free from impurity — that from which the accumulation of impurities, the impurity of deeming oneself finite, etc., has departed.

Similarly, [he] has transcended everything, or is unexcelled, for his independence of knowledge and action, already mentioned, is so described [viz., as sarvasamuttiṇaboddhīkartṛmayam].

By extended is meant ‘all-pervasive’, due to the absence of delimitation brought about by space, etc.

Similarly, his form, that is, his body, is Light itself, namely, the blazing torch of consciousness, of which the setting or the rising, that is, the dissolution and the creation, are never seen.

And also, [that Śiva] is such that his intentions (saṃkalpa), that is, his unimpeded caprices (vihāra), are true (satya), that is, are ultimately meaningful (paramārtha), in the sense that ‘whatever he desires, it happens thus’.

And [that Śiva] is [kārikā 65] free from [the need to] investigate, whose motivation is [conditioned by] time, space, or their particular embodiment, for he is endowed with the attributes of omnipresence and permanence.

He is therefore stable, that is, immovable; he is immutable, and imperishable; he is thus Lord (īśvara), and independent.

Moreover, he is ever replete, that is, he wants nothing [to complete himself, is free of dependency].

He is [the agent,] free as regards any injunction to arouse or suppress those very many, that is, exceedingly numerous, hosts of energies [manifesting themselves] in objects such as jars, cloths, etc. — energies that are presided over by the [deified] energies Brāhmī, etc. [viz., the mātrkās], [and whose countless names] arise from the mass [or totality] of sounds.

swātantra may have been suggested to YR here by the mention of two of the three energies (icchā is not mentioned) said to be the first concretization of Śiva's svātantraṃakti.

In this way, YR avoids glossing grammatically the problematic second half of the compound.

bharupa in kā. 9; bhāsvarupa in kā. 43-44.

Being never devoid of meaning, they are necessarily real, or necessarily exist.

Same definition in YR ad 10–11.

The image of the Wheel of energies (śakticakra) is implicit in this description; see PS 4 and SpK 11, quoted n. 301. Moreover, the passage here is parallel with that of YR ad 10–11. The underlying perspective is this: all objects, whether insentient or sentient, whether past, present, or future, may be seen as expressing the energies of Śiva's consciousness. Such objects have for their presiding deities the eight mātrkās (or mātrkās) who are forms assumed by Śiva, and were sent by Brahmā to earth to destroy demons. In effect, since there is no thought without corresponding words, the entire sphere of plurality may be seen as the work of Speech, which is itself, ultimately, that same potentality, or dynamism, of consciousness that has received the name of vimarśa in nondual Śivaism of Kashmir. The vācaka exists
Also, he is the excellent instigator of the injunctions of creation and so on, that is, he is an extremely skilled instigator, or establisher [of such activities].

Thus, he who knows that the Great Lord is his own Self, replete in every respect, in accordance with the qualifications that have been detailed above, will no longer — whatever he does — participate in the cycle of transmigration, since the seeds of [further] action have been burnt up. In sum, he becomes liberated (vimuktaḥ) while still living (jīvann eva).

Kārikā 67

In order to teach [once again] that an act does not eventuate in any fruit — provided it is done by him who knows, who no longer thirsts after the fruits of action thanks to the success of his reflection (pratyavamarṣa) on himself — the master now offers a mundane illustration confirmed by everyone’s experience:

67. It has thus been established by all possible arguments¹⁰⁸¹ that the act done by him who knows bears no fruit. For, in worldly affairs, no fruit attaches to him who, persistently, affirms: ‘It is not mine, it is his’.

‘I am indeed formed [entirely] of consciousness, free, the accomplisher of all actions inasmuch as I exist as the innermost Being¹⁰⁸² of all cognizers’,¹⁰⁸³ or [mutatis mutandis], ‘I am not their accomplisher, it is the divine (pārameśvarī) energy of freedom that does this’.¹⁰⁸⁴ One or the other being the case,¹⁰⁸⁵ what follows for me, who am essentially pure consciousness?’¹⁰⁸⁶

It is due to such arguments, that is, due to reasonings whose nature has been previously set forth, that the action which is accomplished, namely, done and fully realized, by the cognizer who knows the nature of

on three levels: varṇa, letter; pāda, word; and mantra, sentence, utterance; in the same way, the vācya is triple: tattva, principle; bhuvana, universe; and kalā, fragment, or thought. varṇas are also called matākas, for they are the source of words; and, as such, they represent innumerable energies or powers. This bahutarāṣaktivrāṭa, the ‘countless hosts of energies’, echoes here the sākticakra of SpK 11. Here, one of the purposes of the triad of kārikās (64–66) is to teach the essential complementarity of the two aspects termed prakāśa and vimāra, or Śiva and Śakti.

¹⁰⁸¹‘api’ in its totalizing sense, viz., yuktiḥbir sarvair api.
¹⁰⁸²antaratamavā.
¹⁰⁸³aham eva cidghanah svaṇantaraḥ sarvapramārṇantararatanamatraṇevai sarvakarmakārī.
¹⁰⁸⁴naham kartā pārāmeśvarī svātantrayāsaktī itham karoti.
¹⁰⁸⁵etavatā — lit., ‘from this much’.
¹⁰⁸⁶Here, Yogarāja synthetizes the content of the three previous kārikās, making the jñānīn speak in the first person. The conclusion, so far implicit, is: ‘it follows from the above that you can act without being burdened with fruits’.
his own Self as previously set forth in both cases, \(^{1087}\) bears no fruit, that is, is unconnected with any fruit, inasmuch as there is nothing left for him to avoid or to acquire, because of the absence of any notion relating the body, etc., and the ‘I’. \(^{1088}\)

Since all adventitious constructions [such as taking the body as Self] have been dissolved for the knower of the Self (ātmajñānin) in both ways as previously explained, where would the action, even though accomplished, make connection with a result?

The answer is: nowhere [that is, no connection is possible], for, in other words, no basis exists for enabling (svabhāva) the conceit attributing to the body, etc., the capacity to cognize.

Indeed, the basis [of attributing a result to an agent] is the arbitrary convention of presuming, on the part of the cognizer, that the fruit pertains to the act done. \(^{1089}\)

But the act of him who knows, which exhausts itself in its very form [without any reference to a result], due to the absence of any such presumption [that the fruit is that of the action done], is not connected with any result.

Now, where might we find a similar case, where an act is related to a result only through a presumption [on the part of the mind]? The master replies, saying: ‘It is not mine, [it is his], etc.’

That is, [such a case] is [readily] seen, and is not unprecedented. For instance, the sacrificial act, etc. [is done by the officiating priest, saying]: ‘It is not mine, it is his’, \(^{1090}\) [that is, it belongs] to a certain sacrificial patron who is desirous [of the result].

Thus (iti), in accordance with that idea, namely, that, though a sacrificial act has been accomplished [by me, the yājaka], that act is not [mine], given the lack of any intention [on my part] having to do with its fruit, for in the world [of affairs, loke], I am [seen as sufficiently] motivated by the salary [that I retain], and because the act itself is deemed to be associated with a supramundane\(^{1091}\) fruit [viz., ‘heaven’, etc.]. And so, in accordance with the maxim: ‘Officiating priests (yājaka) execute the

\(^{1087}\)The two cases referred to are the jñānin as agent, and the Lord as agent.

\(^{1088}\)Here we understand dehādyahambhāva on the model of viśayavisayībhāva.

\(^{1089}\)rūḍhi — in its linguistic application, rūḍhi designates the direct and unmediated connection between the word (or its pronunciation) and its sense (or its apprehension) — what we would call the “conventional” sense of the word, as opposed to the “derived” meaning (yoga), in which etymological derivation plays a part. In the Indian view of things, the word may be seen as “growing” (root rūḥ) into its natural or inherent apprehension, as “flowering” according to a natural law. Here, it is the rūḍhi of ‘act’ and ‘fruit’ that serves as basis for assigning the act to an agent — a linkage that philosophical reasonings (as well as those of the Gita) attempt to break, by dissociating the agent from the fruit. On rūḍhi, see also n. 1101 and 1371.

\(^{1090}\)na mamedam api tu tasya.

\(^{1091}\)pāralaukika.
sacrifice [for another, *yajanti*, active voice]; the patron of the sacrifice (*yajamāna*) sacrifices [for himself, *yajate*, middle voice], although the officiating priests (*ṛtvij*) accomplish by themselves the sacrificial act [it is with this in mind that they do so]: 'This sacrificial act, this horse sacrifice, etc., does not belong to us at all; but rather to the meritorious [patron] who has taken the vow [to perform it] (*diksita*); we, in truth, here at this sacrifice, are desirous only of the stipulated remuneration.\(^{1092}\) [Actually] there are none of us here;\(^{1093}\) rather it is the patron of the sacrifice who enjoys the fruits, heaven, etc., brought about by this act'.\(^{1094}\)

Thus, because for them there exists no presumption linking the act and the fruit, the act, though done by them, is not linked to any fruit such as heaven, etc.

But, here, the patron of the sacrifice, though doing by himself no sacrificial act, and expecting [i.e., requiring] the acts to be performed by the priests, thinks: 'these sacrificial acts, this horse sacrifice, etc., are mine, and these priests are engaged in this act thanks to my wealth'. Thus 'mine alone will be the results, heaven, etc., certain to ensue after my body perishes'.

Hence, though he does nothing [in fact], the act is for him connected with its result, since he insists on the presumption that the result of the act be desired.

It is for this reason that [the Pāṇiniyas enjoin] the middle voice (*ātmanepada*) after [the term expressing] the agent dedicated [to perform the sacrifice] (*diksita*), in accordance with the rule *kartrabhiprāye kriyāpha-le*,\(^{1095}\) [thus giving the correct forms] *yajate* [3rd sg. pres.], *yajamānaḥ* [nom. sg. masc., present participle]; but when the agent is not intended [as the beneficiary], it is the active voice (*parasmaipada*) [that is enjoined — according to Renou, by I 3, 78], hence: *yajanti* (3rd pl., pres.), *yâjakâh* (nomen agentis in -aka, by II 2, 15).

Such is the insurmountable power\(^{1096}\) of independent thought-constructs\(^{1097}\) that an act, though done by oneself, is not connected with

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\(^{1092}\)Without which the ritual would be invalid.

\(^{1093}\)This rather forceful expression is meant to emphasize the gap between the agent of the act and its result. The officiating priests are aware that they are at the sacrifice as agents, but not as enjoyers. They are formally present, but, in truth, only the *yajamāna* is there, inasmuch as the ritual act exists only in view of its result.

\(^{1094}\)The question here is whether the *adhikāra* of the fruit is always attached to the *kartṛ* (by virtue of its karman — which is necessarily that of the *kartṛ*) or whether it can be transferred to someone else, in keeping with his expectation. Compare the Buddhists' view that only desire creates bondage.

\(^{1095}\)P. 1 3, 72 (cited here without its initial portion, *svaritānītaḥ [...]*): '(Les désinences du moyen valent) après (une racine munie dans le *Dhātupātha* d'un exposant consistant en un ton) modulé [...] ou un ŉ, quand le fruit de l'action se dirige vers l'agent [...]’ (tr. Renou P.: 55).

\(^{1096}\)mahīman.

\(^{1097}\)Note that here the brahmanical sacrifice is part and parcel of "wordly affairs". And the
its result [for that person], in the absence of any presumption [associating
the agent with] the result; while an act, though done by others, may be
connected [for oneself] with its result, if one insists on the conceit: 'this
[act] is mine'.

Therefore, just as priestly actions [are not fruitful], so the act per-
formed by the yogin is not fruitful, in the absence of any such presumption
as to the fruit.

Kāriṇa 68

Thus, in all his actions [viz., in whatever action he undertakes], he who
knows would be illuminated [as such], for his thoughts are bereft of the
stains of supposition as to what he must or must not do. Thus the master
says:

68. Thus awakened by the winds of his meditative realization,\textsuperscript{1098} as he pours an oblation\textsuperscript{1099} of all his thought-constructs into the blaz-
ing fire of the Self, he becomes fire itself.\textsuperscript{1100}

[The term] meditative realization (bhāvanā) is used [here by us, Śai-
vās] as conventionally synonymous\textsuperscript{1101} with ‘awareness’ (vimarsa), in the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{See Appendix 20, p. 345.}
\footnote{Same speculation and metaphor in PS 76, describing the symbolic oblation (homa) of du-
ality into the fire of consciousness. The parallelism of PS 68 and 76 is emphasized by the use of
the present participle juhvat in the former and the noun homa in the latter, both terms being
derived from the root hu, ‘to pour an oblation’. The śāktrapāya is alluded to here, as shown
by the word bhāvanā, and the metaphor of homa, which implies the wider metaphor of yajñā
or yāga, 'sacrifice', a Trika technical term, which stands for the practice of the śāktrapāya;
cf. TĀ IV 277–278a, and TS IV, p. 25: [...] tatra bhāvanāṁ sarvesāṁ paramēśvara eva sāhit
nāyad vyatiriktaṁ astiṁ vikalparūdhisiddhayā paramēśvara eva sarvabhāvārpaṇāṁ yāgaṁ, ‘The
“sacrifice” is the offering of all things to the Supreme Lord in order to strengthen the con-
viction that everything abides in the Supreme Lord and that nothing is distinct from him’. Cf.
Bhaṭṭa Śrī Virāvāmanaka’s verse (quoted in YR ad loc.), which spins out the metaphor of the
internal yajña. The image is as old as ChU V 19, 1ff., VIII 5, 1, inter alia. It is implicit
even in BĀU 1 1, 1.}
\footnote{Cf. ŚŚ II 8: śārīraṁ havih and ŚSV ad loc.: sarvair yat pramāṇenābhisiṣktam sthūlasā-
ksāmiṣṣavāraṁ śārīram tad mahāyoginah parasmin cidagnau hūyamānam havih, ‘This body,
gross, subtle, etc., that all beings consecrate (abhisikta) as “cognizer”, is the oblation poured
by the great yogin in the supreme fire of consciousness’; also ŚŚ I 6: viśvasya samhāro dehāt-
matayā bāhyatayā cāvasthitasyāpi sataṁ parasamvidādibhāvo bhavatity arthāḥ, ‘Then occurs
the dissolution of the universe, that is to say, though existence may continue as body and
external objects, it is now identified with the fire of the highest consciousness (parasamvīd)
viz., it appears only as consciousness’].
\end{footnotes}
context of the Self [as justified by the insight]: ‘It is I who am the Great Lord in the form of consciousness, who manifest (sphurāmi) ever thus, intensely’. 1102

Thus, that is, in the way elaborated earlier, awakened by [the winds of] 1103 his meditative realization, he who knows, while pouring an oblation of all his thought-constructs ... — [by this, the master means that] all such suppositions as ‘I am a bound soul, tied up in the bondage of actions’, ‘I am my body, these are my sons, my wife, etc.’, or ‘this act will lead to heaven or hell, etc.’ are set aside 1104 in the awareness that ‘It is I who am all this’ 1105 —

[... pouring thus an oblation] into the fire of the Self (ātmajyotis), that is, into the blazing fire of consciousness, whose essence is the marvel of supreme ipseity;

that is, offering them by merging them into the essence of non-discursive consciousness, 1106

he becomes Fire [itself], that is, once the fuel consisting of thought-constructs ready to be consumed has been exhausted, the fire of consciousness (cidagni), being that which consumes, is itself perfected. In other words, it is what remains [when the combustion is over], having no form other than that of the transcendental cognizer. 1107

Inasmuch as this [meditative realization] proceeds steadily, it is called wind, that is, it is compared to wind; for, in a similar way, fire covered by ashes is awakened by the wind.

somewhat freely as a kind of paryāya, 'synonym', in accordance with Renou's insight (1942: s.v. 'paryāya') regarding technical terms. The synonymy may obtain only within a school, as, for example, within grammar, where terms such as vrddhi,guna, etc., signify classes of sounds (P. I 1, 1: vrddhir ādaic), whereas outside the school they have other, more etymologically predictable, meanings, 'growth', 'quality' — or, in other schools, equally conventional but different meanings, as in dharmaśāstra, where vrddhi may mean 'interest' (on a loan). The notation of a context here (atmani) serves to distinguish this usage of bhāvanā from the more general usage.

1102 aham eva caitanyamaheśvarah sarvatmanā sarvadā evam sphurāmi.
1103 The full explanation of the simile has been placed at the end of the commentary in order not to interrupt the syntactical analysis of the verse.
1104 sesibhūta — sesibhu means literally: 'become a remainder' or 'become ancillary'.
1105 aham eva idaṁ sarvam.
1106 Same idea, and same formulation in YR ad 71.
1107 The allusion here to vedic rituals is obvious. Mīmāṃsakas have discussed at length the question of the ritual fire's "efficacy", for its consequences were deemed to extend far beyond the cinders that were its only visible result. Here, the "fire" is interiorized, it is transformed into pure consciousness, and becomes itself the "remains" of the combustion of "transitory" states of mind; it occupies thus the place of the Mīmāṃsaka's 'apūrva' or 'adṛśa', which had been thought to be the mechanism through which the 'karman' of the sacrifice (viz., the sacrifice itself) worked itself out. But this 'adṛśa' has one quality that the Mīmāṃsaka's reasoned 'adṛśa' most significantly lacked: it is the self-evidence of consciousness itself.
Kārikā 69

How [concretely] does one who delights in practicing the discipline of supreme knowledge [or 'that leads to supreme knowledge'] (jñānayoga), in the way expounded above, spend his time, by [what means] sustaining himself for the rest [of his life]?  

69. Eating whatever he finds, clad in whatever is available, tranquil, inhabiting anywhere at all, he is liberated who is the Self of all beings.  

Eating whatever edible object is put before him, marveling at it [that is, delighting in it], accepting whatever comes to him without effort on his part, and paying no heed to the [usual] restriction: 'this is pure, this is impure; this is bad food, this is dainty' — for he has abandoned the suppositions as to what he must or must not do.

Likewise, clad in whatever is available, that is, covered up with a tattered garment, or the hide [of an animal], or tree bark, or a cotton cloth, or even with those garments whose essence is the divine [sky] (divyātman, viz., naked); being thus desirous of simply covering his body, neither does he despise one or praise another, for in neither mode is there any question of distinction or discredit.

Why is this? Because he is tranquil, having transcended thought-constructs, such as pleasure and pain.

1108 śeṣavartanayā.  
1109 sarvabhūtātman — or, according to the commentary: 'he whose being is [composed of] all beings'; cf. sarvātman in PS 82, and Y R ad loc. Cf. ĀPS 76, a similar verse, but with yatra kvacana ca śāyī, in the place of yatra kvacana nivāsi. Cf. ĀŚ II 37b quoted n. 1129; on another interpretation of calācalaniketa, see n. 1112); also PS 81, which similarly emphasizes the yogin’s sovereign freedom: [...] tiṣṭhati yathestam, ‘He remains [viz., lives on] [acting] as he wishes’. Here begins a long description of the yogin, which ends in kā. 84. For similar speculations on yoga as contemplative union, free from any consideration of caste, or pollution, see BĀU IV 4, 23 (sarvam āmānām paśyaiti, nāmaṁ pāmā tarati, sarvam pāmānaṁ tarati, ‘[...] He sees all in the Self. Evil does not overcome him, he overcomes all evil’), and BhG V 18, which holds that ‘In a knowledge-and-cultivation-perfected/ Brahman, a cow, an elephant,/ And in a mere dog, and an outcaste,/ The wise see the same thing’ (vidyāvinayasampanne brāhmaṇe gavi hastini/ suni caiva śvapāke ca paṇḍitāh samadarśinah/); also ĀPS 77 (almost identical to our PS 70), and ĀŚ III 39, which defines yoga as asparśa, ‘free from contact’, i.e., free from all ‘relation’ or ‘connection’ (sambandha) [Ś ad loc.] with [Anubhūtisvarūpa and Ānandagiri ad loc.] either the varṇāśramadharma, the laws of caste and stage of life, or pollution (mala); cf. Bouy ĀŚ: 182. The yogin described here, in PS 69 [= ĀPS 76], is, according to the Śaiva doctrine, the jīvannukta, a state that ĀŚ II 38 describes without naming such an ascetic jīvannukta: there tattvibhūta, ‘having become Reality’, is a synonym of BhG VI 27 brahmabhūta, ‘having become [one with] brahman’, which Ś ad loc. glosses as ‘who is liberated while living, i.e., who is sure that, indeed, the brahman is all’ (jīvannuktaṃ brahmaiva sarvam ity evam niścayavantam brahmabhūtam). ĀSV II 38 quotes BhG V 18c and BhG XIII 27: samaṃ sarveṣu bhūteṣu tiṣṭhantam paramesvaram/ [...] yath paśyaiti sa paśyaiti/ ‘Alike in all beings/ Abiding, the Supreme Lord,/ [...] Who sees him, he (truly) sees’.  
1110 Lit., ‘falls’, scil., 'in his begging-bowl'.
Likewise, inhabiting anywhere at all; anywhere, in a place of whatever sort, being merely desirous of shelter for himself; nor should [holy] sites, shrines, or places of pilgrimage, etc., be adopted by him [as residences], just because they are pure, nor should cremation grounds or the dwellings of outcaste be avoided, etc., [merely] because they are impure.  

He dwells at whatever place falls to his lot without any effort on his part, for [his thoughts are] bereft of the stains of weighing what is pure and what is not.  

Such a one is liberated (vimucyate); he is liberated, for he spends his time acting [solely] for the benefit of others, thus sustaining himself for the rest [of his life]; that is, he becomes one with the Supreme Lord (paramasavibhavati).

As it has been stated:

Covered by this or that [garment], fed with this or that [food], reposing here or there, such a man the gods know to be a [true] brahmin.

And in Mokṣadharma[prakaraṇa]:

I, the pure one, observe the ‘vow of the python’, by which eating fruits, taking meals, or drinking are unregulated, in which space and time are ‘modified’ in accordance with the evolutions of fate [alone], which offers happiness to the heart [of him who observes it], and which is not observed by the wicked.

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1.111 TĀ IV 213–275, which quotes (IV 213–221a) the older text of the MVT XVIII 74–81, deals lengthily with the vanity involved in considerations of purity and impurity — the subject-matter of PS 69–71 and 73. See also PS 83 = ĀPS 81, and ŚDvṛ I 48, quoted n. 454.

1.112 Cf. BhG XII 19b, which defines him who is dear to the Lord as aniketa, ‘homeless’. Parallel statement in MBh XIV 43, 40b: acalaś caniketaś ca kṣetrajñah sa paro vibhuh, and ĀŚ II 37b (quoted n. 1129), in which the ascetic (yati) is described as calācalaniketas, ‘n’ayant pas de demeure fixe’ [— ‘having an unstable residence’] (Bouy); ‘with an unfixed home’ (Bhattacharya); ‘having no residence whatever’ (Karmarkar). Š ad loc. analyzes differently: ‘having as his residence the “moving” (cala) and the “unmoving” (acala)’, i.e., the body and the true nature of the Self (atmatattva); accordingly, Gupta ĀŚ translates: ‘with the self alone for home or his body’.

1.113 šesavartanayā.  

1.114 brāhmaṇa — that is, ‘one who is instilled with knowledge of the brahman’; MBh XII 237, 12 (Crit. Ed.), from the Mokṣadharma, as is the citation following. The yas of the third pāda is, in the Crit. Ed., replaced by ca, itself considered problematic. The verse appears also several times in the addenda of the Crit. Ed.

1.115 vibhakta — lit., ‘declined’.

1.116 MBh XII 172, 27, vratam ājagaram. See Nilakantha ad ‘vratam ājagaram’: ajagaro hy ayatmenaiva jivati, tasyedam [vratam]. The entirety of chapter 27th deals with the exposition of this vṛata by an ascetic who develops the same themes as does YR here. In this passage of MBh, the metaphor of the python may illustrate yādṛcchika of ĀŚ II 37b. What is celebrated here is a life of randomness. It is exemplified by the ‘vow of the python’ to which a Hindi
But how, by acting thus [— by living in this way], can the knower of the Self himself be liberated?

The master replies, saying: ‘the Self of all beings’.

Because the knower of the Self knows himself as the Self of all beings — the compound sarvabhūtātman meaning [both] that he is the Self of all beings, and that all beings are his own Self — nothing exists for him as bondage; everything is conducive to his liberation.

Kārikā 70

Nor does one so described, who is devoid of conceit of self, suffer the slightest risk of acquiring merit or demerit, whatever he does. The master says:

70. Whether he performs a hundred thousand horse sacrifices, or kills a hundred thousand brahmins, he who knows ultimate reality is not affected by merits or demerits. He is stainless.

If sometimes he who knows ultimate reality (paramārthavid), that is, knows that the essence of his nature is the Great Lord’s identity with his own Self, performs prescribed acts such as the countless sacrifices — the horse sacrifice, rājasūya, aptoryāma, etc. — he takes them merely as duties to be performed in a spirit of play only (kriḍārtham), for he is free from the conceit that consists in desiring a result (phalakāmanābhīmāna); — or, considering himself as non-identical with his body (āsarīrata), [if he commits] great sins all of which are prohibited, such as killing brahmins, partaking of liquor, committing theft, etc., which are the results of thoughtlessness;

poet, Malukadasa (Malukdās), in the 16th cent., refers: ajagara karai na cākari, pañchi karai na kām/ dāsa malūkā kahi gāye saba ke dātā rāma, 'The python does not attend and the bird does not work, [yet they receive their daily food]. Malukdās says that Rāma is the supreme bestower'. Moreover such a life may be also defined as a life freed from any social duty, as formulated by PS 40 and YR ad loc.

1117 Cf. BĀU 1 4, 16: atho ’yam vā ātmā sarvesāṁ bhūtānāṁ lokāh, 'Now this self, verily, is the world of all beings'; ŚvU III 21a: vedāham etam ajaram purānam sarvāmānam sarvagatam vibhūtvā, ‘I know this undecaying, ancient (primeval) Self of all, present in everything on account of infinity’.

1118 Cf. Samvitprakāśa II 58, quoted n. 1039.

1119 On abhimāna, see PS 19 and YR thereon, as well as YR ad 68.

1120 Verse similar to APS 77, with the difference that APS, in contrasting a thousand horse sacrifices with a hundred thousand brahmanicides, lays stress on the seriousness of the sin. The verse is quoted in the Jīvanmuktiviveka (p. 74/p. 285), which attributes it to Sēṣa’s Āryāpañcāṭī. Cf., for the content of kā. 69–70, the verses from the Niśāțana quoted in TĀ XXVIII 72–75a, in n. 1240.

1121 The aptoryāma is a particular way of offering the soma sacrifice.

1122 pramāda.
— in either cases, he who knows [the true Self] is touched, or polluted, neither by the merits, that is, by the auspicious results, nor by the demerits, that is, by the inauspicious [results — be they heaven or hell — pertaining to these acts, for the acts are done] with the thought: ‘It is just the Will of the Supreme Lord that manifests itself (vijñāmbhate) in this way; what matters it to me?’ for gone is the conceit of thinking that ‘this is mine’.

Why is this? The master replies: ‘he is stainless’, for the impurities of deeming himself finite, of regarding the world as objective, of supposing himself the agent of actions, which are the causes of transmigration, have vanished, have perished [utterly].

Thus, it is the polluted cognizer who is subject to the [egotistical] conceit that ‘this belongs to me’, for his faculty of cognition is [lodged in] a body, etc., so qualified; [he alone is thus] subjected to the accumulation of merits and demerits, because of the waywardness of the conceit that ‘this is my auspicious act, this is my inauspicious act’.

But how can he be touched by merit or demerit whose store of the consequences of action has been exhausted — those accumulated impurities that are themselves the causes of possessiveness — once conceit of self has vanished?

As it has been stated in the revered Bhagavadgītā:

Whose state (of mind) is not egoized,/ Whose intelligence is
not stained,/ He, even tho he slays these folk,/ Does not slay, and is not bound (by his actions).125

Kārikā 71

Pondering the manner of living fixed for one who knows the Self, the master says:

71. Living without self-deception, excitement, anger, infatuation, dejection, fear, greed, or delusion; uttering neither praises [of the gods] nor ritual formulae, and having no opinions whatever, he should behave as one insensible.129

1123 parameśvarecchaiva iithāṁ vijñāmbhate mama kim āyātam.
1124 daurātmya.
1125 BhG XVIII 17.
1126 niyatācaryā.
1127 Cf. ĀŚ II 35a: vitarāgabhayakrodhāhair munibhir vedapāragaih/[…].
1128 Cf. ĀŚ II 37a, quoted in the following note.
1129 jāda — among the many possible (and misleading) translations of jāda, ‘insensible’ seems to capture best the several equivocations of the term; see Webster’s: “1) incapable or bereft of feeling; 2) insentient; 3) unconscious; 4) not apparent to the senses, hence indifferent;
Self-deception (*mada*) means the ‘conceit of attributing to the body, etc., the capacity to cognize’;

excitement (*harsa*) means the ‘satisfaction’ that results from acquiring something not heretofore acquired;

anger means ‘wrath’;

infatuation (*manmatha*) means ‘thirsting for enjoyment’;

dejecction (*visāda*) means the ‘state of confusion’ (*mūdhatva*) caused by separation from what one desires;

fear means the ‘interruption [of composure]’ caused by an enemy or by lions, tigers, etc. ;

greed means ‘small-mindedness’ [i.e., considering only my own advantage];

delusion (*moha*) means ‘[considering things only] in terms of the relationship they have to “one’s own self” ’.1130

Though such [forms of limited] awareness arise from time to time as transitory affectations of the body, he [the jñānin] sets them aside, saying: ‘I am brahman, the All’. 1131 He realizes that they are residues [left behind in the process] of becoming aware of his own Self, after merging them into his own non-discursive consciousness, as forms thereof.

Similarly, it is he who has gone beyond [the need of] praises and ritual formulae.1132 Inasmuch as there is nothing different from himself to be praised, he needs use no hymn of praise, etc.; nor has he to rely on ritual
formulae (mantra) such as vaṣat, etc., for there exists no specific divinity different from him [to be invoked thereby].

[What then does he do?] **He should just behave as one insensible,** having no opinions whatever. Since he is himself replete, due to the absence of all expectations, he is like one at a loss (unmatta); his mind has banished considerations having to do with actions taught in the injunctive treatises, such as those that specify the manner of accomplishing [rituals, etc.], or [those that involve] the existence of something to be apprehended in conformity with some mode of correct apprehension (pramāṇa) and requiring an accompanying apprehender (pramatr), such as 'this [conclusion] is proven, this [one] is not'.

Neither does he require instruction regarding himself, nor does he posit anything to be apprehended in order to instruct others.

Thus, having effectively conquered himself, considering that all is brahman, he should disport himself for purposes of play. For this reason, he has been described here as insensible.

**Kārikā 72**

If this is the case, then how is it that, while the body perdures, he who knows is not touched, as we are, by the group of [thought-constructs:] self-deception, etc., though they may be surrendered [unto the Self]? Here, the master gives the reason:

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1133 Compare ĀPS 78: jadavad vicaret and ĀŚ II 36b: jadaval lokam ācaret. Bouy ĀŚ: 141 translates ‘comme un sot’ [— 'as a fool'], i.e., according to Ś ad loc., without showing one's own powers and qualities.

1135 Two types of argument (vāda) are mentioned: that dealt with by the Mīmāṃsā concerning the correct mode of accomplishing a ritual act, always in the future, and that which pertains to perception, itself always actual — the sphere of logic (Nyāya), implying prameya, pramāṇa and pramatṛ.

1136 YR refers here to the wellknown Naiyāyika distinction between reasoning employed for one's own instruction, and reasoning aimed at communicating with others (svārtha/prārtha) — the former, for instance, not being confined within the syllogism of five members.

1137 sarvam brahma.

1138 parivarjyamāṇendpi — lit., 'although they have been removed [from any influence over the liberated self]'.

1139 AG has just explained that although such states perdure after our enlightenment, they subtend a different relationship with the body. The question then arises: if, as the argument implies, these corruptions — 'self-deception', etc. — persist, even removed from such influence, they cannot continue to manifest themselves apart from the complicity of the body, as their substratum, and inasmuch as the liberated self continues to exist in some relationship with the body — by definition, the state of jīvanmukti — then, how is it that the self is not further sullied by them, however unusual be the final relation between Self and body?
endowed with the highest awareness of the nondual Self be touched by such delusion?

The group made up of self-deception, etc., which has been explained in the previous kārikā, [arises] from delusion caused by difference.

Now, delusion caused by difference, having [always] the form of ‘myself’ and ‘what is mine’, is nothing but the view [that one’s own Self] is not complete [i.e., is fragmented].

From this [delusion caused by difference], [the group, self-deception, etc.] arises, that is, comes into being, through the error that imposes duality (dvaitabhrāñti) on fettered cognizers, via the notion that such and such is to be avoided, such and such adopted.

But he who is the most excellent of knowers, and is possessed of awareness (bodha) of the supreme nondual Self, as [expressed in the dictum:] ‘I am brahman, the All’, who thus becomes like space itself — how, in what way, is he to be touched, that is, polluted, by this group, self-deception, and the rest?

Indeed, one thing may sometimes convey the nature of another thing different from it; [as in the present case:] how can the group, made up of self-deception, etc., once it is understood as composed of brahman, lend itself to the obstruction of the knower of the Self, who is composed of brahman, and is therefore of the same genus?

Kārikā 73

And as well, the whole lot of hymns of praise and ritual oblations addressed to external [deities], all of which depend on duality, is not sufficient to satisfy him [the jñānī]. This, the master says:

73. There is nothing at all separate from the [knower of the Self] to be honored with an oblation or to be praised; would then he, who is liberated, who has no use for homages or ritual formulae, be satisfied with hymns of praise, etc.?  

For the knower of the Self, whose form is that of nondual [viz., undifferentiated] consciousness, nothing exists that is separate from him —

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1140 sarvam brahmāsmi.
1141 Due to its lack of internal differentiation.
1142 The logic of the argument, here, rests on the traditional understanding of ākāśa; see YR ad 36.
1143 Inasmuch as the object and the subject have the same nature — namely, brahman — one, the object, which had been considered as “different” may be taken to reveal the nature of the other, the subject, also “different” — and vice versa.
1144 When all is brahman, the jñānī is included in brahman, and so must be self-deception, etc.
1145 Note that the entire passage (PS 69–73) echoes ĀŚ II 35–37.
that presents itself to him as different; [there is nothing] to be praised, such as a deity, [nothing] to be honored with an oblation — such that it is [in fact] praised or presented with an oblation.

Nor does he who knows the Self (ātmajña) attain satisfaction by means of hymns of praise, etc., inasmuch as their execution is seen to be conditioned on an obligation.\(^{1146}\)

Since he is composed of unfailing bliss, delighting ever in awareness of non-difference, he pays no heed to any adventitious [viz., non-spontaneous] [sort of] bliss.

Thus, it is he who has gone beyond [the need for] homages and ritual formulae that is celebrated in the Vedānta texts [viz., the upaniṣads] as the one liberated (mukta).

**Kārikā 74**

Nor has he any use for a divine abode different from himself — his own body is the locus of the divinity that is his Self (ātmadevata); nor is there any other support for his consciousness. There is thus for him no other divine abode.\(^{1147}\) The master says:

74. The divine abode for him is his own body — endowed with the thirty-six principles, and replete with œils de bœuf [viz., the sense-organs], constructions inset in the body\(^ {1148}\) — or [if not his own,

\(^{1146}\)For merits arise from the act that has been enjoined, and demerit from the act that has been prohibited.

\(^{1147}\)Compare kā. 74–80 with TĀ IV 194–211, which also deals with the mystical practices that are those of the jñānin in the śaktopāya.

\(^{1148}\)The image is quite appropriate here, the sense-organs being analogous to the symbolic "windows" (gavākṣa) of the outward temple that allow "light" to pass, in retrograde fashion, from inside (that is from the deity itself) to outside, inasmuch as such "windows", being closed and as solid as a part of the wall, do not admit the rays of the sun into the temple; see Kramrisch 1946: 318–321, on gavākṣa; and the term tamori (see below), 'enemies of darkness', that glosses gavākṣa. The projection, in the process of Tantrika meditation, of the thirty-six tattvas upon the body transforms it into a microcosm; it is therefore a ritual notion, present in the oldest Tantras. The body as shrine appears to be a notion proper to the Kula branch, wherein the lineages (kula) of yoginis are viewed as (extensions of) the sense-organs. We might observe here that the body-shrine of the Kārikā, along with its architectural details, is possibly a late metaphor, inasmuch as the older Tantras do not generally mention statues, nor temples for public worship; see, nevertheless, the fourth chapter of the Brahmayāmala for references to images of wood or other substances used for worship. Hidden from the larger society bien-pensant, tantric rituals were originally celebrated in disused places, and were probably not housed in any permanent structure — although there was a 'sanctum' (yāgagraha), a retinue of deities surrounding the site (bāhyaparivāra), and deities guarding its entrance; see Sanderson 1986: 173–174. Whenever AG speaks of daily external worship, its substratum is mainly a smooth mirror-like surface — for instance, a mirror or a sword-blade; it may also be 'a līlā (provided it is private, moveable, not of fashioned stone, nor of any metal but gold), a rosary (aṇḍasyūtram), a skull-cup (mahāpātram), a skull-staff
then] the body of another, or even an object, such as a jar.\textsuperscript{1149}

For that knower of the Self, his own body or that of another [external to him],\textsuperscript{1150} is the abode of the deity, for it is the substratum of everything that is to be enjoyed [viz., external objects] by the deity that is his own Self.

However, external locales, such as [temples of the] Meru [type],\textsuperscript{1151} etc., become abodes of a deity, whenever they are so determined by a teacher through the adjunction (\textit{kalana}) of the thirty-six principles, making them coextensive with a body.\textsuperscript{1152}

Once the [image of the] deity dwelling there, though external [to one’s own Self], is comprehended as formed of consciousness (\textit{cidghana}) through being pervaded by one’s own Self, then even that [image] becomes the deity there.

Otherwise, how could either one or the other [viz., the temple or the image], both inert, mere bits of rock, save [viz., free] (\textit{uddharet}) devotees [from transmigratory experience], or conduct the dead into [the deity’s] proximity, etc.?\textsuperscript{1153}

Thus, the body itself is, in a direct sense,\textsuperscript{1154} the abode of the deity, for it is the dwelling place of consciousness. And, dwelling in that body, the Self of all beings is the deity. Therefore the body alone is the abode of the deity for those who are enlightened.

\textit{(khātvāṅga)}, an image of painted clay (\textit{citrapustam}), deodar wood or gold, [...] a copy of an esoteric scripture, an image traced on a human skull (\textit{tūram})’ (Sanderson 1986: 170); on those questions, see also Törzsök 2003: 179–224, and Takashima 2005: 115–142.

\textsuperscript{1149}We differ from Silburn, who translates: ‘Son temple c’est son propre corps [...]. C’est aussi ce qui diffère de ce corps, à savoir vases et objets semblables’.

\textsuperscript{1150}Probably a reference to the tantric partner; in the phraseology of the Gauḍīya Vaiśṇavas, the term \textit{parakiyā} denotes the devotee and female partner par excellence, inasmuch as her love for the deity is unconditioned — unlike that of the \textit{svakīyā}, who is linked to her husband by dharmic obligations.

\textsuperscript{1151}Meru is probably intended here as an architectural term, designating a large temple; see Acharya 1979, s.v. (esp., \textit{Bṛhatśamhitā} LVI/LV 20). On mount Meru seen as \textit{axis mundi}, see SvT X 122ff. and TÀ VIII 43ff. (TÀ VIII 45b, which describes it as a ‘\textit{bhairavaliṅga}’, is quoted by Kṣemarāja ad SvT X 124).

\textsuperscript{1152}\textit{sārīrayāpti} — lit., ‘... through [their] pervasion by the body — pervasion characterized by the adjunction of the thirty-six principles’. I interpret \textit{kalana} in its general meaning, ‘effecting’, ‘putting on’, here as a synonym of \textit{nyāsa}; on the technical meaning of \textit{kalana}, see n. 1177. Note that the guru’s body as well as an external locale such as a temple, both involve imposition of the thirty-six principles, for the guru places them, one after another, on his own body, and then transfers them to an external object, such as a \textit{liṅga}, a temple, or the body of an initiand; on this process, see \textit{Somasambhupaddhati}, vol. III; also, for an example of the process at work in interiorizing the thirty-six \textit{tattvas}, see Sanderson 1986: 178–180, and fig. 2: 187.

\textsuperscript{1153}Probably a reference to different conceptions of \textit{mokṣa} (understood as proximity to, or identity with, the deity), or to different degrees in its attainment (see PS 96–102).

\textsuperscript{1154}That is, not metaphorically. Here \textit{mukhyā vṛtti} means \textit{abhidhā}, the primary or denotative power of the word.
What sort [of body]? The master says: ‘endowed with the thirty-six principles’.

The external [object] is determined [to be the abode of the deity] when pervaded (vyāpti) by the thirty-six principles. Even more obviously is the body, in which the deity resides, endowed with [lit., ‘sustained by’ bhṛtam], that is, nourished,¹¹⁵⁵ by the same thirty-six principles.

In the external abode of the deity, there is an arrangement [of windows in the form] of œils de bœuf; so too this [internal shrine, which is the body, may be said to be:] replete with œils de bœuf — [viz., the sense-organs], constructions [that are inset] in the body;

[The foregoing compound is to be understood as follows:]
— replete with means ‘not deficient in’,
— construction means the ‘disposition of “enemies of darkness” (tamori) in the corporeal body (vigrahe = šarīre) — viz., the series of entryways that are the sensorial faculties.

Hence, [the body] is similar to the external abode of the deity.

Not only is the body [for the jnānī or jnānīri] the abode of the deity inasmuch as it is the dwelling place of consciousness, but as well, whatever [other] objects there are that are governed by consciousness, all of them are abodes of the deity for him [the jnānī or jnānīri].

With this in mind, the master says [in the verse]: ‘or even the jar, etc.’, for the pentad of sensory domains that constitute the objects of our enjoyment — here suggested metonymically by reference to jars, etc. — are indeed governed by consciousness through entryways consisting of organs such as the eye, etc. Furthermore, according to the teaching of the Spandaśāstra, they are themselves composed of consciousness:

It is the [Lord] himself as the enjoyer who is, always and everywhere, established in and through the objects of enjoyment.¹¹⁵⁶

¹¹⁵⁵YR seems to understand the term bhṛta as alluding to one of the etymologies of the name ‘Bhairava’, according to which the first element derives from the root bhṛ, ‘to carry, maintain, sustain’; see his commentary ad 75, where this etymology is given explicitly. For an analysis of various etymologies of Bhairava, see Kahrs 1998: 57–97.

¹¹⁵⁶SpK II 4b. Verse already quoted in YR ad 1. Cf. Bhaṭṭa Śrī Vāmana, quoted in SpN II 4: ālambya samvidām yasmāt samvedyām na svabhāvātah/ tasmāt samvidām sarvam iti samvinmayo bhavet/, ‘Since all [objects] are known insofar as they rest on consciousness, and not by themselves, they [exist only] as known. Hence, one should identify himself with consciousness’ (is this Bhaṭṭa Śrī Vāmana the same author as the Bhaṭṭa Śrī Viravāmanaka from whom YR ad 76 quotes a verse?). The same notions of a body endowed with thirty-six principles, and of external objects such as jars, etc., seen as not different from consciousness, that is, from Śiva, is found in the Pratyabhijñāṭikā, quoted in SpN II 4: शारिरम अपि ये शृङ्खितसत्तात्त्वमायमी स्वार्थपावयध पश्यानि आर्यानं कर्यायं की तस्मिनं ग्यात्किलम अपि ताहाभिनीविष्या पश्यानि आर्यानं की ते 'पितृ नास्ति अत्रा विविधं, ‘Even those who perceive the body of thirty-six principles in the form of Śiva, and treat it with respect, acquire spiritual perfection. So do those who, investing even a jar, etc., with the form of Śiva, perceive it in the same
The entire universe of objects, such as jars, etc., is the potential body of him who knows, just like his already existing [actual] body. This being the case, it [the universe of objects] is not different from himself, no more than his own body; it is the abode of the deity; that is, the abode of the god, wherein the objects of enjoyment are governed — [the god who is] playful and free, the Great Lord that is one’s own Self.

Kārikā 75

Now, in external abode of the deity [viz., the temple], the devotee is, as a rule, seen to be engaged in worshipping the deity, having [previously] offered flowers, etc. But in respect of the abode of the deity that is the body itself, how does the knower of the Self behave, and what does he do? The master says:

75. And there [in that body so consecrated], he occupies himself in worshipping the great deity that is the supreme Self — Bhairava, also known as Śiva — ever accompanied by his own [consort of] energies, by offering thereunto articles of worship that are purified by awareness of the Self.

In the abode of the deity that is his own body, the accomplished yogin occupies himself in worshipping the deity who has assumed the form of the highest goal (śreyas) [viz., who has assumed the form of a goal more excellent than ‘heaven’ itself], namely, Śiva, the auspicious deity, who is none other than Bhairava, [the three syllables of whose name stand for] maintenance (bharana), withdrawal (ravana) and ejection (vamana) [of the world], inasmuch as [within him alone] all the sensory domains — sound, etc. — are enjoyed, dissolved, and made resplendent, who is, in turn, none other than the supreme Self that is termed [by us] consciousness, transcending everything ...

... [he goes on worshiping that deity,] that is, he should become

way, and treat it with respect. There is no controversy about it’.

1157 Here, YR develops one of the traditional etymologies of deva, derived from the root div, ‘to play’. See YR ad 15.
1158 prakṛṣṭaśreyorūpo devaḥ — or ‘the deity of an extremely propitious nature’; on śreyas, see n. 240.
1159 ‘Bhairava’ is, as here, traditionally explained as an acrostic — though its etymological meaning is also apparent: ‘terrifying’, a quasi-causative from bhūru, ‘timid’.
1160 Here, sense-objects such as sound, etc., are treated experientially — as enjoyed, dissolved and made resplendent — rather than as elements in the process of creation — maintenance, withdrawal, ejection.
resplendent (parisphuret)\textsuperscript{1161} by propitiating that deity unceasingly, according to the process about to be expounded.

— Now is it not the case that the external deity is always accompanied by [consort and] attendants? Accompanied, then, by what entourage, should this [inner deity] be worshiped?

The master replies: '[... the inner deity is] accompanied by his own [consort of] energies'.

Here, by his own [energies, or powers], the master refers to the capacities of the sense-organs, the eye, etc., which function as the [outward-extending] rays of consciousness, and through which [the five inner] energies — Consciousness, Bliss, Will, Knowledge and Action — find their culmination;

by 'accompanied by', he means 'surrounded on all sides' by those [energies].

Now, responding to the question: 'Employing what [articles of worship] does he go on worshiping?', the master replies: '[employing articles purified by] awareness of the Self'.

Here, the awareness (āmarśana) meant is: 'My own Self is this All';\textsuperscript{1162} that is, the reflection (parāmarśa) on oneself characterized by repose in perfect ipseity, achieved when all objects are experienced as formed of consciousness; further, the articles meant for worship, namely, the pentad of sensory domains, sound, etc., which are pure on account of the removal of insentience, have become spotless on account of that [reflection] whereby the imperfections resulting from the stain of duality have disappeared. It is with such articles that he worships, purified by the awareness of the Self.

Here is the purport of what has been said: the knower of the Self, having gathered up, effortlessly, the pentad of sensory domains, sound, etc., by means of the divinities that are the sensory organs, the ear, etc., and marveling at them in his heart, then effects their identity with his own Self, by abandoning [all thought of] the deleterious\textsuperscript{1163} distinction between what is to be sought out and what is to be avoided.

Thus, the state of internally undifferentiated wonder — which is nothing but the manifestation (sphurāṇa)\textsuperscript{1164} of perfect ipseity — that accompanies each and every moment of apprehending the sensory domains,\textsuperscript{1165} is alone the worship appropriate to the god that is one's own Self.\textsuperscript{1166}

\textsuperscript{1161}This is intended as a gloss on paripūjayaṇa āste, which we have been obliged, for reasons of syntax, to place at the head of the foregoing sentence.

\textsuperscript{1162}svatmaiva idam sarvam.

\textsuperscript{1163}kalahka.

\textsuperscript{1164}On this association of camatkāra and sphurāṇa, see the definition of camatkāra offered in the vṛttī ad DhĀl, in Appendix 3, p. 320.

\textsuperscript{1165}Lit., '... that accompanies unceasingly each moment ...'.

\textsuperscript{1166}Implicit reference, here, to aesthetic theory, as Śaiva thinkers developed it in Kashmir,
It is in this sense that sensory domains, sound, etc., are the instruments of worship. Knowing this (iti), the worshiper of the deity who is one's own Self must at each moment be attentive when appropriating those domains.\(^{1167}\) This is what the knowers of the secret (rahasyavid) maintain. Indeed, this has been confirmed by Rājānaka Rāma\(^ {1168}\) in one of his verses of praise:

Show me, [O Lord], that Bhairava form of yours that is propitiated [only] by those energies — fiery (taijasī), etc.\(^ {1169}\) — that are engaged in conveying to you as offerings the things of this world collected through constant and unrestrained [i.e., spontaneous] exertion.\(^ {1170}\) Show it to me, who am a hero (vīra) moving in this [dark] night of existence (bhavaniśā), in a body that is nothing but a cremation ground replete with abundance of flesh, blood, serum, and bones.\(^ {1171}\)

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\(^{1167}\) It is the simple act of appropriating the fields of experience, which everyone does without effort and incessantly, that is transformed into the means of realizing their identity with the Self.

\(^{1168}\) Rājānaka Rāma is one of the names by which Rāmakantha (ca. AD 950–1000; see Sanderson 2007: 411), the author of the SpV (and possibly of the Sarvatobhadra, a commentary on the Bṛh), is referred to in different sources. He presents himself, in the second conclusive stanza of his SpV, as the direct disciple of Utpaladeva (ca. 925–975; see Sanderson 2007: 352). Rājānaka Rāma is to be distinguished from two Bhaṭṭa Rāmakanṭha: Rāmakanṭha I, the author of a now lost Sadyṛttī, who was the guru of Rāmakanṭha II’s grandfather, and Rāmakanṭha II (fl. ca. AD 950–1000), the commentator on the Kiranatantra (see Goodall, Kiranāvṛttī: IX). In his SpV (p. 164), Rājānaka Rāmakanṭha quotes a verse from a stotra that he says he composed himself; similarly, PHṛ 11 quotes a verse found in SpV, p. 135, ascribing it to Śrīrāma. Rājānaka Rāmakanṭha may also be identified as the ‘Śrī Rāmabhaṭṭāraka’ referred to in Vāmadeva’s Janmamaranavivṛttā (p. 21). From such indices, it may be concluded that he was also a poet, author of devotional hymns. If he may be identified with the author of the Sarvatobhadra, a commentary on the Bṛh (see Goodall Kiranāvṛttī: IX), he has also laid claim to some poetical skill, referring to himself (p. 404) as the ‘king of the poets’ (kavindra). ‘Rājānaka’ occurs frequently in titles of Kashmirian Śaiva teachers; see, for instance, colophons of Kṣemarāja or Jayaratha, respectively to PH and TĀ. See Stein (ad Rājatarangini [RT] VI 108) RT: 244 (n. 117): ‘The title Rājānaka, meaning literally “almost a king”, used to be given for services rendered to the king. […] The title has survived in the form of Rāzdān as a family name of very frequent occurrence among the Brahmins of Kāśmīr’. The services were probably those of a minister, as may be inferred from an oblique reference to such a function in RT VI 117: sa pārthivatvamanitravamiśrayā čeuṣṭyā spūrṇa/ rājā rājānakāṣ ceti mīṃśāṃ eva dhīyaṃ vyadhāt.

\(^{1169}\) The term taijāsī, here, is probably the name of a śakti (or a kālā), who operates at the level of māyā, inasmuch as the verse of Rāmakanṭha, quoted here, describes Bhairava as propitiated by means of the phenomenal multiplicity that śaktis unceasingly reveal. For the expression taijāsī kālā, see TĀV IX 40 citing the Rauravāgama: tato dhīṣṭhāya māyāṃ sa paramesvarah/ kṣobhayitvā svakiranair āṣajat taijasīm kalām/.

\(^{1170}\) See ŚŚ 1.5: udvamo bhairavah, ‘Spontaneous emergence [of supreme consciousness], such is Bhairava’.

\(^{1171}\) Meter: śārdūlavikṛādita. Bhairava, the terrible Lord, inhabits the cremation ground. Hence, the body, which is, on the one hand, the abode of the deity, may also be seen, on
At the conclusion of [the ritual of] worship, an oblation should be made into the fire. So, how does that [injunction apply] to the knower of the Self? The master replies:

76. For him who is engaged in offering into the blazing fire of consciousness all the great seeds of difference [that blossom forth] on the presupposition of inner versus outer, the oblation is made without effort.\textsuperscript{1172}

For him — the worshiper, in the way just described, of the deity that is his own Self —

the oblation — the [pouring of substances] that refreshes the fire —

into the blazing — radiating with the marvel of supreme ipseity —

fire of consciousness, is accomplished,

without effort — without the bother [associated with collecting and] owning sesame, clarified butter, fuel, etc.

[And] what does [he in fact] do? The master replies with [the phrase beginning with] 'inner [versus] outer'. — Here,

outer refers to the postulation, by a cognizer, of [something] beyond himself,\textsuperscript{1173} in respect of what is to be cognized, such as [the color] blue, etc. —

[inner refers to the corresponding] postulation in respect of what is to be grasped within, such as pleasure, etc. — It is
difference of this sort, namely, the diversity native to the functioning [of the antahkarana] that is the great seed (mahābhija) [of bondage], for out of it emerge the cognizer and cognizable objects — [functioning that consists in] definitive knowledge (niścaya — i.e., ‘this is not that’), postulation [of ecceity] (saṃkalpana — i.e., ‘these things are not me’) and conceit of self (abhimāna — i.e., ‘this is mine’);\textsuperscript{1174} [all such differences

the other, as a cremation ground. The implication is that the body of the yogin is subject to dissolution in the ‘fires’ of his austerities, as is the dead man’s corpse on the funeral pyre.

\textsuperscript{1172} Cf. PS 68; also SpN II 5: mahāyogī jivan eva prāṇādīmān api vijñānāgniṁirdagdhāśesa-bandhano dehāpi te siva eva jīvanś cedṛn mukta eva na tu kathā cir api baddhāh, ‘The great ascetic, even while he lives and is possessed of breath and the [other faculties], is [not bound by] any fetters, which [lit., ‘is such that all his fetters...’] have been burnt up in the fire of his knowledge; when his body falls away, he is Śiva himself; and while living is, as such, already liberated, [for] he is not bound in any way at all’. Cf. TĀ IV 201–2; TS IV, p. 26 (tr. Silburn 1981: 193).

\textsuperscript{1173} svapara.

\textsuperscript{1174} The translation of the terms niścaya and saṃkalpana differs slightly from that of PS 19, for the point of view here is that of the yogin. For him, perception itself, which reveals difference, must be overcome; previously, the perspective was that of the ultimate, Śiva, engaged in elaborating the phenomenal world. Compare the “twin” perspectives of Sāmkhya and Yoga — the one elaborating a theoretical construct and the other promoting its abolition. In this world of diversity, every mental operation has three aspects: discrimination (or identi-
belong to or depend on the distinctions between] 'cognizer' and 'thing to be cognized', between the 'inner' and the 'outer' — Now, it is
the collection [of such seeds] that he offers [into the fire of consciousness] — seeds that are themselves nothing but postulates of the mind (kalpanā) and being themselves the source of all [other] difference.

[This collection] is indeed a [shapeless] heap,1175 because difference is infinite.

[And he] offers, makes oblation of, this [collection] into the fire of his own Self, by merging it into non-discursive consciousness, achieved through the vision of ultimate [or transcendent] nonduality.1176

This is the purport of the verse: for the yogin whose being is identified with the transcendental brahman, the essential (akṛtrima) oblation consists in annulling the determination (kalana)1177 that there be a subject who cognizes and an object to be cognized that are beyond himself;

[and annulling that, for him] comes about naturally (svarasasiddha), for there is no longer any conceit attributing to his body, etc., the capacity to cognize.

As has been stated by Bhaṭṭa Śrī Vīrāvāmanaka:1178

1175rośī.

1176 Cf. YR ad 83: paramādvayayadṛś.

1177 kalana has a specialized meaning in the Trika. Padoux translates: 'dynamisme limitateur', 'limiting dynamism'. Most traditional etymologies presume a link with kāla, 'time', which, according to Mayrhofer (s.v.) is illusory (he cites Lat. celer, Gk. κέλλω 'impel', which agrees nicely with the sense proposed here). Compare the term's often attested (but also contested) medical meaning, 'the “thrust” of the embryo in the womb'. The meaning should be something like 'determine', 'compel to be precise'; it is the annihilation of that "thrust" toward determination, that "need" to distinguish, that "distinguishes" the mental oblation of the yogin. The notion of kalana would then be related to the 'sheath' (kaṇḍuka) termed here kalā, 'tendency to act in respect of a determinate agent'; cf. kalā vāyurūpā kim-cicikartṛtvena prerikā (PTLvṛ 5ff.). Finally, 'determination' appears to capture the different meanings implied by Padoux's excellent 'dynamisme limitateur'. Also to be rejected is the false doublet sometimes proposed, kalana/karaṇa.

1178 Verse also quoted, without explicit attribution, by PM 42. In his introduction to Vāmanadatta's Samvitprakāśa (pp. 7–8) M. Dyczkowski observes that it is not at all certain whether the Vīrāvāmanaka said here by YR to be the author of the quoted text is the same person as the Vāmanadatta, author of the Samvitprakāśa. Dyczkowski gives several arguments 1) Vāmanadatta, author of the Samvitprakāśa, presents himself as a Pāṇcarātrin, whereas the epithet 'vīra' generally applies to Śaivas; 2) the sacrifice there described is more of a Śaiva than of a Vaiṣṇava model; 3) the verse quoted by YR cannot be traced in the manuscripts of the Samvitprakāśa (although it might be supposed that those MSS are incomplete, or that the verse is quoted from another work of the same Vāmanadatta). In all probability, there is room to believe that we are dealing with two different authors, inasmuch as SpN II 4 cites a verse attributed to 'Bhaṭṭa Śrī Vāmana' (see n. 1156) — a verse that is not attested in the available manuscripts of the Samvitprakāśa. Might it not be then the case that the Bhaṭṭa Śrī Vāmana of the SpN is the same author as the Bhaṭṭa Śrī Vīrāvāmanaka(ka) to which YR attributes the present verse?
We perform obligatorily that supra-mundane sacrifice\textsuperscript{1179} in which the forest of duality provides the [required] firewood, and death itself is the great animal [to be sacrificed].

\textbf{Kārikā 77}

The master now describes the [way of] meditation (\textit{dhyāna}) of such a sacrificer:

77. And unceasing is his meditation; moreover, the Lord [who is his Self] creates manifold forms. That alone constitutes his meditation — [the realization] that the true form of things is nothing but that which is drawn [on the wall of consciousness] by his imagination.

Every form, thought to be a fixed form, is subject to disappearance, owing to the unsteadiness of the mind.\textsuperscript{1180}

Moreover, that meditation is unceasing, since the Lord, the Great Master who, although infinite, has the form of one's own Self, creates manifold forms, in virtue of his freedom [to compose] thought-constructs, whereby the essence of his energy of action [is manifested], — that is, he ceaselessly inscribes the numerous objects that are nothing but constructions of his imagination, as forms upon the mirror of his intellect.\textsuperscript{1181} It is these [constructions] — that alone constitute the [\textit{jñānī}'s] meditation, namely, his contemplation (\textit{cintana}), itself exempt from coming into being and passing away, for there is nothing that is different from it.

But elsewhere, [when one meditates upon] a particular deity, there is a determination [of that stream of consciousness]\textsuperscript{1182} inasmuch as one predicates various faces and limbs [of the deity].

All acts of the mind are but sprouts emerging (\textit{sphāra}) from this Energy named Parā [or supreme energy]; for him who knows this, the All [i.e., universe] has become without qualification, identical with the Supreme Lord.

And that alone constitutes his meditation — [the realization] that the true form [of things], namely, ultimate reality, is that which has

\textsuperscript{1179}\textit{See PS 68.}

\textsuperscript{1180}Lit., 'due to the [constant] movement elsewhere of the operation of the mind'. The forms subsist as long as they find a substratum in the mind, but the latter is not thereby constrained.

\textsuperscript{1181}The same term is found in \textit{YR ad 8}, glossed by \textit{pratibhāmukura}. Further, in the commentary \textit{ad 77}, \textit{samvidbhītī}, the 'wall of consciousness', appears as a gloss of \textit{buddhidarpana}.

\textsuperscript{1182}Such a statement implies that particular forms of the deity, if paid too much attention, may distract the yogin from contemplating the ceaseless stream of divine activity they manifest.
been drawn, that is, painted, on the wall of consciousness (saṃvidbhatta) by the imagination (saṃkalpa), that is, by the [active] mind.

Thus, since all this that appears [viz., everything] has been delineated [for us] in the form of mental constructs, [it follows that] whatever has the form of an act of mind, never going beyond the realm of that which appears, is true [viz., real], for in every circumstance it is accompanied by consciousness.

This has been stated in the revered Svachchandaśāstra:

Wherever the mind goes, there one should fix the mind. Having moved it [i.e., let go that fixation], where will you go, since all is composed of Śiva? 1183

And similarly, in the Śaivopanisad:

Wherever goes the mind, O beloved one, whether [its object be] external or internal, there is the condition of Śiva, for Śiva pervades everything. Where indeed will [the mind] go, [if not to him]? 1184

Therefore, the meditation of such a yogin arises naturally. 1185

Kārikā 78

And his would be what sort of silent (or whispered) recitations [viz., of what rosary would he 'speak' or 'tell' the beads]? The master says:

78. When he rotates in his inner awareness the entire sequence of universes, the [thirty-six] principles arranged sequentially, as well as the group of sense-organs, then this is termed his ‘silent recitation'. 1186

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1183SvT IV 313. Same text quoted in ŚSV III 24, although with variants: yatra yatra mano yāti jñeyaṃ tatraiva cintayet/ calitvā yāsyate kutra sarvam śivamayaṃ yataḥ//.
1184Śaivopanisad [ = VBh 115]. Śaivopanisad is another name of the VBh to which AG refers also as the Śivavijñānapanisad in IPV, vol. II: 405.
1185śvarasodita — lit., ‘emerging from its own essence’.
1186The kārikā has been translated in accordance with our understanding of the commentary. Another interpretation is possible — aksaganan understood in explanatory apposition to bhuvanāvalim, and tattvakramakalanāṃ, as an adjective also qualifying bhuvanāvalim (although YR does not gloss it as a BV): ‘And, when he rotates in his inner awareness (bodha) the entire sequence of universes, thought of as a [triadic] sequence of tattvas, [in the manner of] a collection of beads [viz., as his rosary (aksagana = metaphorically the aksamālā)], then this is termed his “silent recitation” (japa).’ Cf. the definition of the japa in TĀ IV 194 and TS IV, p. 26; also ŚŚ III 27: kathā japaḥ, ‘The conversation [of the jivanmukta] is the recitation [of the mantra]’, quoted here by YR ad 78, and by Kṣemarāja ad Sāmbapañcāśikā 10 (see Padoux Sāmbapañcāśikā: 570). Note the play on the words: aksagana of the kārikā being glossed as aksasūtra and aksamālā, with a ślesa on aksa (m.), ‘bead' and aksa (n.), ‘sense-organ'.
The constantly recurring reflection on supreme ipseity as not different from the universe itself, [which is pursued] in the manner about to be described, is termed his 'silent recitation' [viz., the mental 'speaking' or 'telling' of a rosary], and this is said to be not adventitious [— that is, is not a passing state, but is rather, seemingly, inherent, or natural].

— What is that ['recitation']? The master says:

'[He rotates] the entire sequence of universes (bhuvana)'. That is, [he rotates] the entire series of mansions (prâkâra, viz., 'worlds') numbering 224 that are encompassed within the host of thirty-six principles; similarly, [he rotates] the arrangement in sequence of principles — that is, the arrangement, the accurate determination, of the sequence of principles, termed 'Self' (âtman), 'knowledge' (vidyā) and 'Śiva'.

As well [he rotates] the group of sense-organs, that is, [he rotates] also the collection of sense-organs, both internal and external.

All this [he does] in his inner awareness (antarbodha), that is, in his own consciousness, which has become [viz., which has been identified with] the rosary, formed of the energy of the middle breath (madhyamaprânašakti).

1187 According to MW, bhuvana may be a varia lectio for bhavana, 'house'; thus might be explained the use here of prâkâra, 'mansion', as a gloss for 'bhuvana'.

1188 Our text differs here from the KSTS edition concerning the number of bhuvanas. For a discussion of the problem, see 'On the Sanskrit Text'. On the number of the bhuvanas, see Appendix 5, p. 323.

1189 This refers to a manner of grouping the realities of the universe under three headings only — the three 'principles' (tattva) of âtman, vidyā, and Śiva — instead of the usual thirty-six of the Trika system: a 'trinity', named triatattva (SSP, vol. III: 428ff.) or tatvavatraya (YH III 85, Dviveda: 271), that is the object of a rapid form of nirvānadikśā, 'liberating initiation', designated as the triatattvadikśā (SSP, vol. III: 428ff.). On the correspondence between the three all-encompassing principles and the thirty-six recognized by the system, on the one hand, and the five kalās and the bhuvanast, on the other, see SSP, vol. III: 428ff. On the correspondences between the three principles and the parts of the body of the adept, see SSP, vol. III, pl. XIV. According to Hélène Brunner, op. cit.: 436–437, who follows the explanation of Somaśambhu, the âtmatastva, which comprises the thirty-two inferior principles, up to śuddhidivyā (thirty-one, viz., up to mayā, according to some authors), represents the domain of individuality and finitude; the vidyāyatstva, which brings together Īśvara and Sadāśiva (as well as śuddhidivyā, according to all texts except that of Somaśambhu) is the domain of knowledge (vidyā), wherein the âtman enjoys both omniscience and omnipotence; the śivatattva, which coincides with the tatva Śiva, is the domain where the âtman is recognized as not different from Śiva, and since Śiva is indissociable from Śakti, the three tattvas enumerated to here comprehend the thirty-six tattvas of the usual list. See also Dipikā ad YH III 85 (p. 272–273), and Padoux YH: 307–308.

1190 Probable reference to the gross form of the thirteen organs as well as to their inner powers, or presiding deities (karaṇēśvarī, karaṇādevī), who appear to the adept at the climax of his practice.

1191 akṣasūtra.

1192 Breathing, with its exhalations and inhalations, mimics the creator god who 'emits' and 'swallows' the universe periodically. The yogin strives to regulate his breath, sup-
When he rotates [all this] according to the sequence of the flows [of the breath — which is none other than śakti itself, seen as vāc, or phonic energy, and symbolized by the kuṇḍalinī — passing] through bindu and nāda — that is, when he revolves all this in his own consciousness in the manner of a water-wheel, in accordance with the sequence: creation, sustenance, resorption, that defines each exhalation of his breath; in other words, when each and every moment he considers [all this] to be composed of [nothing but] subtle phonic vibration (nāda) — then this natural repose in perfect ipseity is indeed his 'recitation'.

Here is the purport of what has been said: ‘recitation’ is but the uttering [accompanied by yogic practice] (uccāra) of a mantra designating a deity fit to be denoted by it. And those recitations may be counted by means of the rosary accompanied by the [practitioner’s] permutation with the energy of breath (prāṇaśakti), by [the simple device of] sequencing the turning of its “beads” [i.e., turning them one after the other].

However, for the yogin [experiencing] ultimate [or transcendent] nonduality, his own energy of breathing has become the thread [of the rosary], reverberating (nadantī) with the flow [of respirations] in the posing that its moments are the ‘beads’ of a rosary, of which breathing itself constitutes the thread. The madhyama-prāṇa is that prāṇa which rises without deviating through the susumnā canal, in the form of kuṇḍalinī; as such, it is called udāna, the ‘rising breath’. According to Kṣemarāja ad SvT VII 10, the madhyama-prāṇa is that prāṇa which rises in the ‘middle’ nādi: madhyanāḍyāśrayamadhyama-prāṇa. On madhyama-prāṇa, see NT VII 7: tāṃ vahen madhyama-prāṇe prāṇāpānāntare dhruve, and Kṣemarāja ad loc., vol. I: 153: madhyama-prāṇe susumnāsthodānākhya-prāṇa-brahmanī vahed nīma jīta-prāṇāpānāvavyutyanamagnatayā vimṛṣṭa, ‘The madhyama-prāṇa is the breath, termed udāna, that passes through [the nādi termed] susumnā; in addition, it is termed “middle”, because it issues from the fusion of prāṇa [the “ascending” breath (viz., exhalation)], and of apāṇa [the “descending” breath (viz., inhalation)]; for a complete description of the process, see Sanderson 1986: 177ff. See also TĀ XXIX 236, where the term madhyama-prāṇa appears in the context of the vedhadikfā (a dikṣā made by piercing the different cakras by means of the madhyama-prāṇa). On the five prāṇas, see Padoux 1992: 136, n. 140, and Olivelle BĀU: L-LI. On japa and its association with prāṇa, see SvT II 140a: japaḥ prāṇasamaḥ kāryaḥ; also Padoux 1987, and TAK II, s.v. japa.

bindu and nāda are different levels of the articulation (uccāra) of a mantra (see n. 1375). The commentary thus establishes that the kārikā refers to mantric practice, and associates that practice with kuṇḍalinī breathing techniques; see Padoux 1992: 83, according to whom phonic energy ‘gradually condenses, and passing through an initial “resonance” (nāda), becomes a drop (bindu) of phonic energy, divides, and subsequently gives birth to the matrix of the phonemes (mātrkā), then to the phonemes themselves (varṇa), and to words. This sound process is “that which expresses” (vācaka), and induces thereby the emergence of “that which is expressed” (vācya), namely, the world of objects (artha) or of the meanings that it expresses. The phonic energy is symbolized by the kuṇḍalinī, in her twin aspect, human and cosmic, connected with “breath” (prāṇa). Padoux (YH: 375) translates nāda as ‘vibration phonique subtile’ [— ’subtle phonic vibration’], or (1992): ‘phonic resonance’, ‘subtle sound’. aksamālā. Note that the word tantu is often used to describe the middle śakti, which is compared to a fibre of the lotus stalk (mpnālatantu); see Kubjikāmatatantra [KMT] XXIV 120–121, where the Goddess, in the form of śakti, the mother of the three worlds, situated in [the middle
middle breath; emerging naturally, [this energy] is said to be an innate [kind of] rosary, as it comprehends all the senses.\footnote{1196}

Since all this world is [composed of] objects to be expressed, [and] given that the universe consisting of thirty-six principles\footnote{1197} is established in this very same energy of breath, the Goddess (bhāgavatī), who is supreme [awareness] (parāsvabhāvā — viz., parāvāc as parāśakti), assumes the form of vital breath via the sequence of arousal and release [that follow] at each exhalation of [the yogin’s] breath. [Ever] aware (vimśañtī) [of the absolute, i.e., the Supreme Śiva], she causes the attentive yogin to execute naturally [a suitable] recitation in each vibration (spanda) of his breath.\footnote{1198}

Here, in the Śaivopaniṣad, [we find] the number of recitations [given]:

The ‘recitation of the [mantra-]goddess’ [viz., the mantra ‘HAMSĀH’] is taught as easy to accomplish; [one may repeat it] 21600 times in the span of one day and one night. It is difficult [only] for those who are dull.\footnote{1199}
And, in Śivasūtra, it has been stated:

His conversation is the recitation [of the mantra].

This recitation alone is the focus of those [adepts] whose feet are to be honored, possessed as they are of [perfect] concentration.

Kārikās 79–80

And this is his vow. The master says:

79–80. When he regards everything with the same glance, when he deems his awareness fully satisfied with the world seen as a cremation ground, and apprehends his body as nothing more than a staff surmounted by a skull, and when he is able to hold in his

(or compiled) by Upaniṣad Brahmayogin (Adyar, 1920) gives the two letters in the reversed order: ha for exhalation, sa for inhalation, but the principle remains the same'. The mantra 'hamsa' is the mantra of the absolute 'I', inasmuch as it symbolizes the supreme identification 'so 'ham', 'I am this'. See ŚV T VII 56: prānahamsa sattā lināḥ sādhakah paratatvavive/ tasyāyaṁ japa uddīṣaḥ siddhimuktīphalapradah/, 'The adept reposes always in the prānahamsa and knows ultimate reality/. This is what is termed his recitation (japa). Thus does he obtain such fruits as liberation (mukti) and supernatural powers (siddhi)/'. Kṣemarāja comments: iha prāno nirñitaviśvamantravīryabhūtaḥamsāsrayatvāddhamsa iti/, 'Here, the breath is termed hamsa, because it is based on the hamsa, wherein the efficiencies of all the [other] mantras have been brought out', and quotes VBh 156. The mantra 'HAMSĀH' is also known, although in texts later than the 12th cent. (e.g., in Śivopādhyāya's 18th cent. commentary ad VBh), as ajapājapa [lit., as translates Padoux, 'la récitation de la non-récitée'] [— the 'recitation of the non-recited'], i.e., natural, or automatic, or spontaneous, japa. See Padoux 1987: 144–147; and TĀ I, s.v. ajapa, ajapājapa; II, s.v. japa: 'la pratique de l'ajapājapa identifie le mantra récité et le souffle, ce mantra étant hamsa, lequel est à la fois ces deux syllabes, le souffle central ascendant et l'énergie divine ou l'absolu, voir ŚV T 4. 262; BVU [ = Brahmacidyopanisad] 57–80'. The identification of the japa referred to in PS 78 with the mantra HAMSĀH offers a clue for understanding the passage of YR's commentary ad loc.: 'when he rotates (yat pari-vartayati) [all this] according to the sequence of the flows [of the breath passing] through bindu and nāda [...]', for, according to Jñānaprakāśa's Śivayogaratna (sū. 4–5; 16th cent. AD), the breath is suspended thanks to the bindu which, being the anusvāra of the syllable haṁ of hamsa, is in the center of the ajapāmantra (ajapāmantramadhyathobindunā); see Padoux, 1987: 146; the Śivayogaratna has been edited and translated by T. Michaël.

1200Ś Ś III 27. See also VBh 145, quoted in ŚŚV III 27, and in SVTU I 139a: bhūyo bhūyah pare bhāve bhāvanā bhāvyate hi yā/ japah so 'tra svayam nādo mantrātma japya īḍṣaḥ/, 'Indeed, the realization (bhāvanā) that is realized again and again within ultimate reality is the [true] recitation (japa); there [viz., within that japa] of itself the sonic resonance (nāda) of this sort is to be recited, being of the nature of mantra'. Same notion of the natural japa in TĀ IV 194: akṣtrimaitaiddhyādayārdhṛ yat kimcid ācāret/ prāṇyād vā mṛṣate vāpi sa sarvo 'syā japa mahā/ , 'Whatever he does, firmly established in this non-adventitious Heart (ḥṛdaya), whether breathing or pondering, all this is considered to be his japa'. TĀV ad loc. quotes the same ŚŚ III 27 that YR refers to here, as well as (from some unknown source?): bhāyair api yo jalpaḥ sa japah [...]/ ityādy uktam.

1201Lit., 'an awareness' accompanied by the imagistic notion (kalpana) that his body is nothing but a "staff surmounted by a skull" (khātvānga). In other words, his body is treated
own hand [as his begging-bowl] any fragment of the knowable, [instead of] a skull,\textsuperscript{1202} filling it with the liquor of delighting in all the essences,\textsuperscript{1203} then that is his vow, both easy and very difficult.\textsuperscript{1204}

When [he composes his mind] in the way that will be explained, then that is his, the knower of the Self’s, vow — a [self-imposed] restriction intended to propitiate the deity that is his own Self.

What sort of vow? The master says: ‘[a vow] both easy and very difficult’.

Very difficult, that is, obtained by suffering made acceptable through the favor of the Supreme Lord, putting aside all other means [of liberation metonymically as a *khatvāṅga*, the staff that accompanies the ascetic on his journeys and which is one of his “characteristic marks” — a staff whose superior part is provided with or imagined as a skull. The literal meaning of ‘khatvāṅga’ is ‘leg or member (“aṅga”) of a bed (khaṭvā)’. In effect, the upper portion, or “head”, of a bed’s leg, in the shape of a parallelepiped, is pierced with three holes, through which the cords are threaded that constitute the supports of the traditional Indian bed. The two upper holes, parallel to the floor and slightly apart, can be seen as the orbital cavities of a cranium, while the third, below and between them, resembles a mouth. The term khatvāṅga appears (in the guise of the adjective khatvāṅgin) once only in the Māññanavadharmanāśastra [MDhŚ] XI 105, doubtless in its literal sense ‘bed-post’; perhaps MDhŚ XI 72 (kṛtvā śavaśīro dhvajam, ‘having made the head of a corpse his emblem’) refers to our khatvāṅga, as an attribute of the ascetic (see, infra, Baudhāyanadharmanāśastra [BĀDhŚ] I 1, 3); see also YajŚ III 243, which describes the mendiant ascetic ‘carrying a bowl which is a skull’ (śirahkapālin ‘with his emblem’ (dhvajavant); cf. Āpastambadharmāsūtra [= ĀpDhŚ] I 10, 29, 1, khatvāṅgandaṃdārthe ‘...’), ‘[...], taking a khatvāṅga as his walking stick’; the commentator Haradatta (14th–15th cent.) mentions the two interpretations of the term: either khatvāṅga is a ‘part of a bed’ or ‘it is to be taken in the sense well known in the Tantra of the Kāpālikas’ (khatvāṅga aṅgasaḥ khatvāṅgasaḥ ‘...’) kāpālikakatantraprāśadesaḥ khatvāṅgasya vā grahaṇam; also: Gautamadharmāsūtra III 4, 4, 4, where the penitent is described as having two attributes: the khatvāṅga and the begging-bowl made of a skull (khatvāṅgakapālaṇīr), and BĀDhŚ I 1, 3: kāpāli khatvāṅgi ‘...’ dhvajam śavaśīrāḥ kṛtvā, ‘carrying a skull and a khatvāṅga, [...] having made the head of a corpse his emblem’. Iconographically, the khatvāṅga is sometimes a stick surmounted by a skull (or by many skulls, as in Buddhist representations), sometimes a kind of stick or mace whose superior portion is sculpted in the form of a skull (see illustration).

On kapāla, see MDhŚ VIII 93 (kapālena ca bhūksārthī ‘...’), where the term signifies simply ‘begging-bowl’, as it does in vedic texts (see, for instance, ĀpDhŚ II 9, 23–10, BĀDhŚ II 10, 17, 23 — in the context of the agnihotra); cf. YajŚ III 243, quoted n. 1201, and ĀpDhŚ I 10, 28, 21: [...] puruṣāśīrāḥ pratīpāṇātham ādāya, ‘[...], Having taken the head/skull of a man in order to drink’. J. Törzsök pointed out the aforementionned textual references on kapāla and khatvāṅga in a lecture delivered at the EPHE, Vth Section (February 2008).

\textsuperscript{1202}Visvarasaśāsavaparrām ... rasayati — lit., ‘he delights in [a begging-bowl that, rather than] a skull, [is nothing but] a piece of the knowable, which he holds in his own hand, filled with a liquor [composed of] all essences [or, of essences of all (things)]’. The term viṣvarasa, interpreted as ‘all essences’ may imply a reference to the Tantric worship, in which the adept partakes of a mixture of sexual fluids, blood, alcohol, etc.; viṣvarasa may, as well, be understood as ‘the essences [of all the things] of the world’.

\textsuperscript{1204}Cf. TĀ IV 258b–263a, on the futility of ordinary vows, which are, by no means, required ‘for understanding the plenitude of one’s Own Self in its omnipresence’ (svātmanas tathā vāsvarāpyeṇa pūrṇatvam jñātum); also TS IV, p. 27, which gives the Trika definition of vṛata, quoting the Nandaśīkā: sarvasāmyaṃ paramaṃ vṛataṃ, ‘The highest vow is [to take] everything as identical’.
tion], for nescience itself has vanished. And it is easy, for it is obtained without the bother of adopting external ornamentation, such as bones, ashes, etc., or [of observing] restrictions as to food, etc. 1205

What is that vow? The master replies [with the phrases beginning with] 'all'; that is, [this vow is observed] when he contemplates all this, which is presented to his mind 1206 as formed of apparent difference with an eye to its lack of difference — [which sense of unity is inculcated] by reasoning, by traditional scripture, by experience and by meditative exercise (abhisīlanā) [and is confirmed in the insight]: 'It is I alone who myself manifest as all this'. 1207

Thus says the revered Bhagavadgītā:

Himself as in all beings,/ And all beings in himself,/ Sees he whose self is disciplined in discipline,/ Who sees the same in all things. 1208

Thus the vow consists in the idea of non-difference become unshakable. Moreover, when he deems his awareness fully satisfied with the world seen as a cremation ground, then this also is his vow.

[This is thus explained:] just as this world consisting both of objects to be known and of knowers may be deemed to be overwhelmed by [a great many] hundreds of corpses, namely, objects characterized by insentience — jars, bodies, etc. — so, verily, it may indeed be termed a cremation ground, that is, a garden where dwell the Fathers. 1209

As well, since consciousness, [assuming the form of] the Goddess, alone is sentient, and whatever appears different from it — namely, the entire universe, which is illumined (ullāsita) by that awareness — is insentient and may be compared to a corpse, so is the universe [here quite properly compared to] a cremation ground.

Furthermore, he deems his awareness satisfied utterly with that world seen as a cremation ground. That is, he understands [his awareness] to be situated in the midst [of a cremation ground], made extremely frightful in virtue of the fact that whatever has come into being is subject to destruction. 1210

He who takes a [mundane] vow (vratin) dwells, does he not, in a cremation ground; but he who lives by an other-worldly (alaukika) vow takes up residence in this world of transmigration — itself [a veritable] cremation ground made frightening by the fact that all cognizers and objects

1206prātiṣṭhā.
1207sarvam idam ekah sphurāmi.
1208BhG VI 29.
1209pitṛvāna.
1210Or, taking the compound as a dvandva: 'by virtue of [scenes of] creation and destruction'.
of cognition are found to be perishable; like one insane, he plays games (kṛḍā) with those fettered cognizers, who are [effectively] insentient, and with objects that are cognizable, such as jars, etc., which take the place of the dead [in the outward cremation ground]. [This he does,] considering: 'I alone am the ultimate reality, [embodying] the unique principle of consciousness, [which extends] everywhere'.

Moreover he deems his awareness [fully satisfied with the world seen as a cremation ground] accompanied with the imagistic notion that his body is [nothing more than] a staff surmounted by a skull.

Here, the body is imagined as a staff surmounted by a skull — which is the prescribed way of [viewing the body, metaphorically or in principle, as a] skeleton.

For the body of the yogin after all amounts to nothing but a corpse, is nothing but the remainder of root impressions [left by his previous experience], for he deems his [true] self to have gone beyond the body, owing to the extermination of his foul seizure by the conceit that his body is the locus of the cognizer.

For him who thinks thus, his body is imagined as stamped (‘mudrā) with the form of a skeleton. [Therefore, his awareness] is furnished (kalitām), impressed (mudritām), with that [image], inasmuch as [his awareness is now presumed to be the] substratum for whatever is to be enjoyed.

Indeed, the heroic ascetic (vīravratin) situated in a cremation ground should be [viewed as if] marked [with the sign, or imprint] of the staff surmounted by a skull; for he, whose [true] form is his awareness, considers his own body as different from that awareness insofar as it is something to be known — hence the ‘stamp of the staff surmounted by a skull’ [is justly said to be upon it]. And that also constitutes his vow.

Similarly, he delights in (rasayati) [a begging-bowl that, rather than] a skull, [is nothing but] a piece of the knowable — that is, he takes pleasure (carvayati) in it — for, the knowable is anything having the form of the enjoyable, characterized by the pentad of objects, sound, etc.; it is delimited both by what there is to know and what there is to do.

\[\text{Ullsaratāram eva ekacittattvaparamārthaḥ}.\]

This analogy of the khaṭvāṅga represents a tantric metaphorization of the notion of aṣṭarūṭa, which, in BĀU IV 4, 7, quoted n. 1062, is rendered by the slough of a snake. Cf. YR ad 83: ‘free of the modes (bhāva) [determined] by the [hexad of] sheaths (kaṅcuka) whose first is māyā, he requires nothing else, merely supporting his body as [basis for exhausting] the [unexpended] remainder (śeṣa) of [previous] impressions (samskāra), in the way the [potter's] wheel [goes on] rotating (cakrabhrama) [after the potter has ceased impelling it]’; and: ‘In any case, how could there be awareness (smṛti) at the end without there being affirmation of root impressions (samskāra) left by his previous experience (pūrvānuḥbhava)?

Lit., (taking durgraha in the sense of āgraha) ‘owing to the extermination of [those wise men’s] [stubborn] insistence that the body [etc.] is the cognizer'.

Lit., ‘he who has taken the heroic vow'.

See YR ad 21.
Thus the [knowable] is said here to be a piece, equivalent to the piece of skull [used as a begging-bowl by Śaiva ascetics], which is nothing but a [fragment of] skull, that is, a shard of the cranial bone — in which he delights, that is, at which he marvels, by reposing in perfect ipseity, periodically sipping the essence [of the knowable] — then that also is his vow.

That the drink of heroes (vīrapāna) placed in a skull is indeed savored by him who takes a vow is expressed by the words: ['filled with a liquor composed of] all the essences [of the entities of the universe]. 1216

Moreover, the portion of the essence [present] in all [entities, or in the universe], that is contained in the fragment of skull having the form of the knowable pentad of objects, sound, etc., namely, the part made of the ambrosia that is delight (carvanā) itself, is nothing other than what is called here the liquor [composed] of [all] the essences [of the entities of the universe], for it offers supreme bliss (paramānanda); it is the best of drinks, and [that "skull"] is filled with it.

And this might [also] be said: by skull is [here intended] 'something serving as a receptacle', namely, the resistant part of the 'all' that may be analogized to a 'shard'; the 'drink' is the essential portion1217 contained in that [scil., 'cup'], capable of creating wonder, for it offers exultation.

Now, a skull is held in the hand of one who has taken a vow; hence, the master says: 'It is [that] held in his own hands'. Here, his own means 'those belonging to him'; the term 'kara', 'hand' [signifies also] the 'rays of consciousness', essentially, the goddesses that are the organs of sense such as the eye, etc.; in them [scil., the 'hands', i.e., the 'rays' of consciousness, i.e., the goddesses, i.e., the organs of sense] is received the fragment of the knowable that [momentarily] assumes the character of an object, insofar as it is something to be enjoyed; hence the [metaphorical bowl] is said to be 'held in his own hands'.

As a drink is drunk with the aid of a [begging-bowl made of a] skull held in the hand, so by the [true] yogin is savored the liquor [composed] of all the essences, gathered unto him by means of the sense-organs, the eye, etc., which are the 'rays' of his consciousness (samvitkara), with the aid of that "skull" which is any piece of the knowable.

Here is the purport of what has been said: the yogin, gathering up, by means of the goddesses that are the organs of sense, the pentad of objects constantly offered to him in this way, partakes of constant repose in Bhairava, who is his own consciousness, by the act of reasoning itself.1218

1216 There may be here a veiled reference to Kaula rites; see Masson, Patwardhan 1969: 38ff., esp., 42; also TĀ XXIX, 6 and passim.
1217 sārabhāga.
1218 A reference to the 'view that there is no second' (advayadṛṣṭ), as stated in the next sentence?
Until the very last moment, he leads [his life], as taught here, in conformity with the view that there is no second (advayadṛṣṭ). Such is the vow of him who has cultivated the lotus feet of a true teacher. Beyond that is nothing but the desiccation of the body.

Kārikā 81

Now, summing up what has been previously expounded, the master explains that this doctrine is preeminent [among doctrines]:

81. So, having attained [that condition which is] called by the name Maheśvara, namely, ultimate reality, wherein he is shorn of birth and death, [the yogin] remains [in this world], [acting] as he wishes, because all that he manifests [henceforth] is the [pure] state of the agent of experience; he has accomplished whatever he had to do.1219

So, that is, in the manner just now expounded,1221 having apprehended the secret that is called by the name Maheśvara, namely, ultimate reality — that is, having correctly experienced the Great Lord as he is in reality, in virtue of the unshakable realization1222 [of that reality] in his own heart ...

[Answering the question] 'what sort [of entity] is this [ultimate reality]?', the master explains: it is 'free from birth and death', or, in other words, is that by which, when understood, there can be no more birth or death;

Having realized this [state], the yogin remains [in this world], [acting] as he wishes, having accomplished whatever he had to do.1223 [This means:] the yogin, the final goal of whose existence (parapuruṣārtha) has been fulfilled, owing to the absence of anything further to be done, remains [in this world], that is, continues [to live], passing his time as he wishes, without ever exceeding [the boundaries of] his own desire, his body kept ['in motion'] like the freely revolving wheel [which once set in motion by the potter goes on rotating without further effort on his part].1224

1219 That is, unentangled with the perishable objects of this world.
1220 Adaptation of ĀPS 79. On the notion of kṛtaṁśrtyatā, see YR ad 50.
1221 This interpretation of samanantara is required by the context (see the avat., and the iti of the kārikā).
1222 pratipatti.
1223 Cf. PS 40.
1224 Cf. SK 67: samyagjñāṇādhigamād dharmādinām akāraṇapṛaptau tiṣṭhāti saṃskāravaśāc cakrabhramavād dhṛtyāśarīrah, ‘By the attainment of perfect wisdom, virtue and the rest become devoid of causal energy; yet the spirit remains a while invested with the body, just
How is this possible? The master replies: ‘because [all that] he manifests [henceforth] is the [pure] state of the agent of experience’ [untangled with the perishable objects of this world] — that is, because, in all conditions [viz., in whatever circumstances he finds himself], he is manifest as the [pure] agent of experience [and not as an enjoyer], his is the effulgence (parisphurana) attained through sustained concentration on that very secret. In other words, though remaining in his body, [the yogin] experiences bliss unsullied [by bodily contact].

Kārikā 82

Among living beings, anyone at all who thus knows his own Self [to be identical with the universal Self], would become one with that Self — with this in mind, the master now teaches the absence of any restriction as to whether [the student] is entitled [ritually to pursue such knowledge]:

82. He who knows the Self of all, thus described — [source of] supreme and incomparable bliss, omnipresent, utterly devoid of diversity — becomes one with that Self.

He who knows — whatsoever animate being knows — the omnipresent Śiva, who has been thus — in the way mentioned — described, that is, made known as a uniform and unqualified mass of blissful consciousness by the methods of argument, scripture, experience and sustained concentration — that is, anyone at all who has abandoned [all mundane] limitation becomes one with that [Self] — would be none other than Śiva himself. So is the verse to be construed.

In this case, there is no restriction as to whether the [student is ritually] entitled to [pursue] the knowledge of the Self, for all those, whoever they may be, who are afflicted by the faults of birth, death, etc. — even if they be animals — become one with him by recognizing (pratyabhijnānāt) that the Great Lord is one’s own Self. Such is the reference of the word ‘yat’: ‘he who ...’.

Further, [this omnipresent Śiva] is how [to be described]?

[He is] the Self of all, the Self of all that cognizes and is cognized; or [taking the compound as a BV] he is that whose Self is [composed of] a potter’s wheel continues to revolve through the momentum of the impulse previously imparted to it’ (tr. G. Jha) — of which the present passage ( [...] cakrabhramavad dhṛtaśarirah tīṣṭhati [...] ) seems merely an emprunt. TĀ XXVIII 312-320a quotes APS 81 (v. 312) and comments upon it (vv. 313-320a). It is noteworthy that TĀV ad loc. (avat. ad XXVIII 317) — that is, in the same context, inasmuch as PS 83 reproduces APS 81 — puts the quote of the same v. 67 of the SK in the mouth of an objector. Cf. PS 69 and ĀŚ II 37b (quoted n. 1109): [...] yatir yādṛcchiko bhavet, ‘[...] one should become an ascetic and live spontaneously, without willing anything’. Same image and phraseology in YR ad 83.

parārtha.
the entirety of knowers and things known; in other words, he is both the transcendent (sarvottirṇa) and the immanent (sarvamaya).

Hence [this omnipresent Śiva] is [described as] having shaken off, or having set aside, diversity, the infinity of [phenomenal] difference, on account of his appearance (sphurana) in the form of consciousness always and everywhere; he is further described as that whose bliss is incomparable, devoid of qualification and most excellent, because expectation [of any thing at all, for him] is lacking.

Anyone who knows thus his own Self would become Śiva (śivarūpin).

Kārikā 83

Such being the case, where should he who has understood that the Great Lord is his own Self give up his body, when his entitlement to that body has been extinguished, and to what [place] does he then go? The master now removes such doubts:

83. Whether he gives up his body in a place of pilgrimage or in the hut of an outcaste, be he conscious or not, he goes [thence] to a condition of transcendent Isolation, his grieving at an end, for he was liberated at the very moment he acquired knowledge.

The knower of the Self who has thus concentrated with determination upon (pariśīlita) his nature and whose heart has truly gained confidence

1226 Lit., ‘even if he be no longer conscious’.
1227 This verse is borrowed from APS 81 without alteration. AG quotes it in two other places: GAS ad VIII 5–7, referring to it as an ‘authoritative Śruti’ and TĀ XXVIII 312, where it is referred to by JR as an āgama — with a variant: pariṣyajet for pariṣyajan; note that TĀ XXVIII 315a comments upon the use of the optative, expressive of the possibility (sambhāvana). The verse is quoted also (see S. Sastri APS: 38, and Gnoli TĀ: 536, n. 5) in a late 14th cent. Vedānta text (2nd half of), Vidyāranya’s Viśvantītiveka (see Inr., n. 54). Cf. the similar verse from the Rānamālāśāstra, quoted by the immediately preceding passage of TĀ XXVIII (v. 310): rathyanātre mūrapurāṇamahyey caṇḍālagehe niraye śmasāne/sacintako vā gacintako vā jītani vimokṣam labhate ‘pi cānte, ‘Even if at his final hour he finds himself in a roadway, or surrounded by urine and feces, or in the hut of an outcaste, or some other vile place, or in a cremation ground — whether he be conscious or unconscious — he nonetheless attains liberation [viz., he is freed from the fetters of the body] [for these pollutions, which are of the body, do not modify his already perfected state’; and the (anonymous?) quote that follows that of APS 81, in the same passage of GAS VIII 5–7: tanum tyajatu vā kāfyām labhate ‘pi cānte, ‘He may give up his body in Kāli or in the house of an outcaste. He, whose [samsāric] fever is over, was liberated at the time of the attainment of jītāna’ (tr. Sharma GAS: 160) — a verse also quoted ‘from the Śmṛti’ (śmṛteḥ), in the Tattvabodha attributed to Śaṅkara. Compare PS 83 (kaivalyam yādi) and TĀ IV 212 (atra yāto gato rājaḥiḥ kaivalyam adhigacchati/ lokāir ālokyamāno hi dehabhandhāvidhau sthitāḥ), which reinforces our hypothesis that the śāktopāya is the point of view of choice for the PS when evoking the figure of the jivanmukta — chapter IV of the TĀ being devoted to that path.
through the vision of ultimate nonduality, saying to himself: ‘All this universe is nothing but the freedom that is manifest in my own Self’,\textsuperscript{1228} — whether abandoning his body in a place of pilgrimage, that is, in a most sacred place such as Prayāga, Puṣkara, Kurukṣetra, etc., or in the most defiled [of places], the residence of an outcaste, by which reference is meant a dwelling of the lowliest of men;

— thus, in either case, free from the vexation of seeking or avoiding [such places],

— he goes to a condition of transcendent Isolation (\textit{kaivalya}) [viz., reaches ‘separation’ from the limited world of bondage] through knowledge of the Self alone; that is, in other words, after the destruction of his body, he attains a condition of Isolation (\textit{kevalatā}) that is beyond the Fourth state [of consciousness], composed solely of blissful consciousness, a condition quite apart from the host of causes and effects, such as the primal matter, etc.\textsuperscript{1229}

From which it follows that for him there is no longer any discrimination of [licit] object [scil., ‘of consciousness’] from illicit object,\textsuperscript{1230} for he sees with an indifferent eye that all this universe is permeated with his Self and is presided over by the Supreme Lord; therefore, the grief that arises from doubts occasioned by [the presence of] choice has been destroyed, i.e., rejected. His grief is thus said to be at an end.

As it has been said in the revered \textit{Nirvāṇayogottara}:

> It is a matter of indifference for them who know Śiva as ultimate principle whether death takes place in the Himalayas, or at Gaṅgādvāra [= Haridvāra], or in Vārāṇasī, or Kurukṣetra, or Prayāga, or [even] in the house of an outcaste, etc.\textsuperscript{1231}

> Nor there is any need for awareness (\textit{smṛti})\textsuperscript{1232} at the time when body falls away. It is with this in mind that the master says: ‘even if he be no longer conscious’. Here, the meaning of the word even is: ‘Let consciousness (\textit{samsmr̥ti}) cease [, what does it matter]!’

Even if the knower of the Self is no longer conscious at the moment he abandons his body, being overpowered by the humors of wind, bile or

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1228} \textit{sarvam idam svātmaprakāśasvātanantryam}.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1229} Cf. the way TĀ XXVIII 316–320a and JR ad loc. comment on \textit{kaivalyam yāti}, whose ambiguity is underlined. On \textit{turya} and \textit{turyātīta}, see PS 85–86 and Intr., p. 29.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1230} \textit{kṣetra}/\textit{akṣetra}.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1231} On the \textit{Nirvāṇayogottara}, a manuscript of which is deposited in the Central Library in BHU (no./n° C 4246), see Dyczkowski \textit{Samvitprakāśa}: 7, n. 1. On the vanity of prescriptions and prohibitions, see YR ad 69.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1232} \textit{smṛti} means ‘memory’ \textit{stricto sensu}, but here, the word is employed more or less by synecdoche to signify ‘consciousness’ (of something) in general. The entire following discussion seems to imply the question: ‘Can one arrive at \textit{kaivalya} without being conscious at the moment of death?’}
phlegm arising at that moment\(^{1233}\) — that is, if consciousness of his own Self has departed — even if he thus, helpless, leaves his body, now comparable to wood or stone, even so, having already attained the knowledge of his own Self, he undoubtedly reaches [absolute] Isolation (kaivalya). Therefore, there is no particular significance\(^{1234}\) attaching, at the time of death, either to awareness (smarana) or to its absence, provided that one has [already] attained knowledge of his own Self.

Now, if one were to object: — Let there, then, be no distinction made, for him who is [fully] cognizant of the knowledge concerning his own Self, between a place of pilgrimage and its contrary — but, when you say: ‘even if he be no longer conscious at the final moment’, then, as far as the self-knowledge is concerned that had been understood as providing a means (upāyātā) [to liberation], if, at the moment of the body’s falling away, he has [also] become unaware (vismarāṇa) of that very knowledge, how could he then be [said to be] liberated (mukta)? As has been stated in the revered Gītā:

And at the hour of death, on Me alone/ Meditating, leaving the body/ Whoso dies, to My estate he/ Goes; there is no doubt of that.\(^{1235}\)

And so, in such cases [as indicated in the Gītā], meditation (smarāṇa) is indeed [shown to be] useful; and even if one could [somehow] attain identity with him [the Lord] at the final moment, in the absence of any meditation on the Supreme Lord, then all fettered souls, even the stupid, would at the time of death, realize within themselves the Supreme Lord, for no distinction [between them and the knowers of the Self has been posited]; furthermore, all such statements [claiming some final benefit for the true knower, such as those you have been regaling us with in this work] would be unauthoritative.

But this is not the case. [Anticipating such arguments] the master says in reply: ‘[he who became] liberated at the very moment of his acquiring knowledge’. True, there may be no utilization of [conscious] meditation on his part [at the time of death]; however, it was at the very moment when the true teacher, [whispering] into the depth of his ear, conveyed to him the knowledge that the Great Lord is his own Self, that he acquired\(^{1236}\) the ultimate meaning of the knowledge of his own Self: ‘I myself am all this’.\(^{1237}\)

Free of the modes determined by the [hexad of] sheaths whose first is māyā, he requires nothing else, merely supporting his body as [basis for

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\(^{1233}\)Same development in YR ad 94–95.

\(^{1234}\)viṣeṣa — lit., ‘difference’.

\(^{1235}\)BhG VIII 5.

\(^{1236}\)adhirūḍha — lit., ‘mounted upon’.

\(^{1237}\)aham eva sarvam idam. Cf. TĀ XXVIII 72–73a, which quotes the Niśātana (see n. 1240).
exhausting] the [unexpended] remainder of [previous] root impressions, in the way the [potter's] wheel [goes on] rotating [after the potter has ceased impelling it]. Thus, [once he has acquired true knowledge,] there is no reason, at the final moment, for him to bother about awareness or its opposite, inasmuch as the corporeal sheath is effective only so long as a relation with the sheaths of the impurities of deeming oneself finite, and of regarding the world as objective that arise from ignorance exists.

But since the sheath created by ignorance has already been destroyed by [the guru's] instruction regarding knowledge of one's own [true] Self, how can any such corporeal sheath, [even] moribund, effect any control over the knower of the true Self at the end?

Thus, he would have been liberated (muktah) at the moment the knowledge of the Self was explained to him, and he will go on living (jivann eva) [till his prārabdha actions are exhausted].

As has been stated in the Kularatnamālikā which has a thousand verses:

When the most excellent teacher teaches him correctly, he is undoubtedly liberated at that very moment; thereafter he inhabits [a body] merely [moving] like the revolving wheel [of the potter].

And also in the revered Nīśātana: The mechanism continues to function. Or 'liberated at that very moment, he would merely dwell in time like a potter's wheel [revolves for a time]' yantra, meaning 'device' or 'mechanism' (in general), has been understood as referring to the potter's wheel, an image frequently attested; cf. TĀV XIII 231a: yantram iti akīmeściravatā, 'A mechanism [scil., the potter's wheel] is referred to here, for [the body, so understood] no longer does anything'. This is a wellknown verse cited also in PM 66 (with the variant: yatra in the context of initiation by 'the teacher's sidelong-glance' (gurukatāksapāta). SSV III 43 quotes it as belonging to the Kularatnamālā and gives the verse immediately following — verse that might refer to the jīvanamuktah acquired through the 'non-means' (anupāya): kim punaś caikatādānas tu pare brahmani yah sudhind/ kṣanamārāsthito yogī sa mukto moccayet prajāh/, 'How much more then the yogin of supreme understanding! If he is established in the highest Brahman with one-pointedness even for a moment, he is liberated himself and he liberates other people' (tr. Singh). TĀ XIII 230b–231a (with variant: tadaiva kila mukto 'sau for muktas teneiva kālena) and XXXVII 27 both cite the same verse from the [Kularatnamālā: yasmin kāle gurunā nirvikalpam prakūśitam/ muktas teneiva kālena yantraṃ uśthi kevalam/, of which the 2nd hemistich has the same form as the 2nd hemistich of the Rātanālā cited by YR ad 83 and SSV III 43. The Kularatnamālā is abundantly mentioned in the TĀ as Śrīkularatnamālā, Śrīrattnamālā, Śrīmālā (TĀ and TĀV I 274, XI 28, XIII 229b–231a, XV 594 (... śrīmanmāloditam), XXVIII 112, 128 (śrīrattnamālākulaṃga), 145, 256, 309, 310, 415–417a, XXIX 55, 192b–195a, 201–202a, 236b–239a, 282–283, XXXI 60b (alluded to by devyāyamalālayoh?), XXXVII 25b–29 (variant of the text quoted in XIII 230–231). The Nīśātana (Nīśasamcāra, Nīśācāra, Nīśācāra, Nājaśamcāra, Atana) is a pre-10th cent. Kaula text, which has survived in a manuscript in Kathmandu: NAK 1–1606 (palm-leaf, Newari script); see Sanderson 2005: 110–112, 133; 2007: 375. It is abundantly mentioned in TĀ and TĀV: I 51, IV 78b, IV 177–178a, VI 31b, XII 23b–24a, XIII 197, 241b–242a, XIV 43b–45, XV 83–97a, 105b–107a, 596, XVI 200a (according to JR, śāstre is implicitly
[In the time it takes] to milk a cow or an arrow to fall, which may be encompassed in the blink of an eye, he who has once identified himself [lit., ‘united himself’] with the ultimate principle, is liberated and he may liberate others. How can there be then, for him whose Self has merged previously, for a moment, into the transcendental brahman, [any question of] awareness at the end of life?

Moreover, by whom else can the last moment of the knowing of the Self (ātmavid) be directly experienced, apart from the witness that is his own experience? — On the strength of which witness one might posit the existence in him of awareness or its opposite, inasmuch as ‘those who see horizontally’ [viz., fettered subjects]\(^{1241}\) are not privy to any such realm of experience? Therefore, in this matter, let the omniscient ones be asked their opinion.\(^{1242}\)

Moreover, from the mere movement of the body at the time of death, one cannot infer that the moment of abandoning the body is to be taken as either auspicious or inauspicious [that is, that it would lead or not to liberation] for him who has realized the ultimate truth.\(^{1243}\)

referring to the Niśātana), XXVIII 72-75a, which quotes from the Niśātana: śrīmānnaśātane 'py uktam kathānīvesāṉād api/ śrotabhyanantarasanapraṇāte guruvaṅkṛād vinirgata// muktas tadaiva kāle tu yantram tiṣṭhāti kevalām/ surāpāḥ steyahārt ca brahmāhā gurutāṅpāgaḥ/ anyajō vā dvijā vātā bālo yṛddha yuvāpi vā/ paryantavāśi yo jñāṇī deśasyāpi pavitrakaḥ// tatra saṃnitihi deval sadeviṅkāḥ sakīṅkāraḥ//, ‘In the Niśātana — as soon as it leaves the mouth of the teacher, as soon as it is received in the space of the ear [of the student], even if [the latter] must still inquire as to the sense of the teaching — it is said that [the hearer] is liberated at that very moment; the “machine” [viz., the body; the implicit image being that of the potter’s wheel] alone persists — whether he be a drunkard or a thief or a killer of brahmans or a visitor in the bed of his teacher, whether he be born a brahmin or born elsewhere, whether he be a child, an old man, or a youth; an enlightened man in the neighborhood purifies the very place, for the god is there present, along with his consort and retinue’.

\(^{1241}\)Is the term intended in the sense of ‘those who see only what is in front of their faces’?

\(^{1242}\)Is there a shade of irony here — ‘Therefore, in this matter, let the [so-called] omniscient ones (sarvaññā) be asked [their opinion]’?

\(^{1243}\)This passage refers to the practice, well attested in India, of inferring the future moral state of the dying person from his condition at the last moment — which is indeed decisive in that respect; see Edgerton 1927, pt III: 219-249. Likewise, AG, commenting upon BhG VIII 7, distinguishes between the external state of the dying man, which is purely ‘circumstantial’ (vastuvṛttopanata), and his internal state (antardāśā), which consists in being steeped in the thought of the Lord, i.e., in the awareness of one’s own Self. Of this condition people in attendance on the dying man are but deluded witnesses, and cannot presume anything as to his journey beyond, whereas the only true witness of that experience is the experience itself. GAS VIII 7 emphasizes, somewhat sarcastically, that there is no question of becoming that object the thought of which accidentally crosses the mind at the final moment: kim vastu vṛttopanatam eva tad bhavati tasminn antye kṣane/ nanu purokalatrabandhusmṛteḥ śiśirodakā- pāṇāder vāntye kṣane dṛṣṭam smarāṇam iti tadbhāvapattitaḥ svāt/ maivām, ‘Can it be the case that he [the dying man] becomes only the object brought in fact [to his awareness] at the final moment? Can he possibly become what he sees or remembers at the final moment — a friend, wife, or child that he has recollected or the cool drink [that he has then been
Therefore, necessarily, the Supreme Lord, abiding ever in his own Self, causes him who has acquired knowledge of the Self and who has been made over into the condition of that [viz., into the condition of the cosmos, or of the Supreme Lord] to be aware (smarati) of his own nature, though at the time of death he resembles wood or stone.

As has been stated by the Lord in the Lakṣmīsāṁhitā:

O Nārada, these mortals who are aware of me as they carry on their activities in perfect health, I take note of them, who resemble wood or stone at the time of their end.

And:

His mind firm and his body healthy, he who is ever conscious of my universal form, so long as perdures the equilibrium of earthly elements — I am aware of him, my devotee, as he dies, resembling stone or wood; I lead him on the supreme pathway.

Thus, here, the cause [of salvation mentioned] is the fact that he has once and for all become [identical with] the being of the [universe, or the Supreme Lord]. In any case, how could there be awareness at the end without there being affirmation of root impressions left by his previous experience? Therefore he who knows has no need of anything at all at the moment of dying.
Kārikā 84

If then having recourse to places of pilgrimage, etc., is, as stated above, not subsidiary [to the way of life of the renunciate, viz., not necessary to it] in any context whatever, then why are [such practices] adopted by the wise? In answer to this objection the master describes the specific sphere [in which actions such as pilgrimage, etc., are licit]:

84. Visiting places of pilgrimage is meant for acquisition of merit; going to one's death in an outcaste's dwelling eventuates in hell. But what does this matter to him who is unaffected by the stains of merit and demerit?

There are those, even though wise, who have not yet freed themselves completely from the notion that the body and the like is the locus of the cognizer, and who have [developed as yet] no confidence in the inquiry into the knowledge of their own Self. It is they who, [in an effort to] accumulate merit, perform sacrifices or effect acts of pious liberality [such as building wells, temples], etc., or who acquire demerit [by performing impious actions]. It is for them that visiting places of pilgrimage, such as Prayāga, etc., is ordained; or resorting to a holy region at the time of death in an effort to acquire merit, that is, in an effort to attain a higher world [viz., a better birth].

Similarly, why would not going to one's death in an outcaste's dwelling — going to one's death, that is, reaching destruction [of the body], in an impious place, referred to metonymically by the term 'outcaste's dwelling' — eventuate [for them] in hell? [Why would they not then] fall into a hell such as Avīci, etc.? For it is evident that they persist in considering the body as the locus of the cognizing subject.

Those such as are here described would for all intents and purposes be bound by unceasing birth and death, beset as they are by the confusion of the body, etc., and the Self, in accordance with the view that, after experiencing as well the pleasures [of heaven or hell] consistent with the place of their death, they are reborn in auspicious or inauspicious bodies, and die again.

For him, on the contrary, whose conceit that the body, etc., is the locus of the cognizer has entirely vanished due to the firm awareness [of

1248 vidvas.
1249 tirthasevā includes tirthayātrā, the pilgrimage itself, and tirthāvāsa, residence at the tīrtha.
1250 Same verse as APS 82.
1251 Lit., 'whose seizure by the notion that ... has not yet completely vanished'.
1252 On this notion, see RS X 14, 8, MuU I 2, 10; also Malamoud 1976: 165-166.
1253 uttamaloka.
1254 Lit., 'For it is evident that [in their case] seizure by the notion that the body is the locus of the cognizer [yet persists]'.
the Self] arising from the knowledge of that Self — what signifies all this for him, whose consciousness is as [immaculate as] the firmament (cīna-
bhas), once interruption of contact with the latent dispositions com-
posed essentially of merit and demerit has been effected [viz., who is no
longer affected by such dispositions]?

Thus, since resorting to places of pilgrimage, etc., is meant for those
partaking of auspicious and inauspicious actions, there is no utility, for
the pure knower of the Self, in visiting such places, etc.

As it has been stated in the Mānavadharmāstātra:

If you have no dispute with King Yama Vaivasvata — the
very one who dwells in your heart — then go not to the Ganges
or to Gayā.

Here, Yama is nothing but the conceit that the body is the Self, which
lies in the heart. Since this [idea] has been consumed [i.e., transcended]
by those who have understood their own complete nature as [identical
with] the Great Lord that is one's own Self, how can they resort to places
of pilgrimage, etc.? This is the established truth.

Karikās 85–86

Now, one may object: — It has been explained above [karikās 57 and 62],
has it not, that the Self, whose nature [is revealed] once the impurities of
deeming oneself finite, of regarding the world as objective, of supposing
oneself the agent of actions have been burnt up in [the fire of] knowledge,
remains in its essential nature, when the body falls away, and does not
engender any further sprouting of existence, just as a roasted seed does
not engender any [further] budding.

Had the destruction of the body's sheath been contemporaneous with
the appearance of the knowledge of the Self [that is, had one died at the
moment of revelation], let it be so that [the Self] not engender any fur-
ther [rebirth]. [That is, we accept your thesis on that stipulation.] On the
other hand, since the fetters represented by the body's sheaths, etc., re-
main in evidence [in the case of the so-called jīvanmukta], how in heaven's
name can he not be permeated by the attributes pertaining to the body

1255 This image is widely present in Indian speculation. If anything may be compared with
consciousness, the comparans is often sky (nabhas), or ether (ākāśa), for both are in prin-
ciple clear, omnipresent, without beginning or end, abstract yet sensible. The metaphor is
repeated in respect of the heart: hrdayākāśa.

1256 'The son of the Sun'.

1257 MDhŚ VIII 92. Gayā is a favorite place for offering śrāddha to the Ancestors (piṇḍa).

1258 kathāṅkāram — same adjective in the avat. ad 63 (see note thereon). It is used here for
rhetorical reasons.
[that is, with merits and demerits]? And once he is permeated by them, how can he not become [again] a transmigrating self at death? The master now refutes this objection:

85. Placing the rice-kernel, once it has been completely separated from husk and bran, again within the piece of husk, does not restore to the whole grain its identity associated with that form [that is, does not restore to it its capacity of generation].

86. In the same manner, consciousness, once it has been separated from the complex of sheaths [that is the body, etc.], is [forever] completely alien to their touch, even though, as a liberated Self, it remains there [for a time] due to root impressions [previously accumulated].

[The compound tusa\textsuperscript{kambukasup\textsuperscript{thakk\textsuperscript{ratan\textsuperscript{dulakanatu\textsuperscript{sadal\textsuperscript{ntarak\textsuperscript{xpa}}}} is to be understood as follows:] Placing ... the rice-kernel [that has been] completely separated from husk and bran ... [again] within the piece of husk — that is,]

placing within the piece of husk the rice-kernel, that is, putting it again where it was previously, [but now] well separated, that is, completely detached, from husk and bran —

does not restore the identity of [the husk and] the rice-kernel, that is, [does not restore] the tight coalescence [of the husk and the rice-kernel] — even though [that placement] was [previously] present in terms of a form such that a sprout would be enabled [that is, would germinate].

[In other words] the husk and the rice-kernel remain distinct just like two iron rods, and are not focused on enabling a single action [that is, whatever action ensues derives from the parts separately and not from the whole, in this case the seed].

\textsuperscript{1259} According to Apte’s dictionary, taṇḍula is the ‘grain after threshing, unhusking and winnowing; especially rice’.

\textsuperscript{1260} tāḍāmya — we take the term tāḍāmya in a technical sense (cf. its use in Vedānta and in aesthetics): ‘relatable only to itself’, that is, an ‘identity’, understood as the ‘otherwise indescribable’ unity of its constituents, which, in this case, is alone able to produce the effect, viz., the sprouting. In the metaphor, tusa appears two times, as tusa and as tusaḍala. As tusa, it stands for a congenital impurity, as does kambuka; as tusaḍala, it stands for the body that the jīnānī occupies, much as cast-off clothes, after realizing the knowledge of the Self.

\textsuperscript{1261} Silburn takes samskāra as ‘purification’ (as does Barnett), and translates: ‘De même que la Conscience qui par des purifications est ici séparée des cuirasses qui la recouvrent [...]’ [— ‘Just as consciousness which, by purifications, is here separated from the armors covering it [...]’]. These two verses correspond to ĀPS 44, although the metaphor is different: ‘Just as clarified butter, drawn from milk, is not in that [milk] as before, if it is cast [back into it], so the spiritual Self, if it has [once] been separated from the Qualities (guna) of prakṛti, is not [together with these any longer]’. \textsuperscript{1262} tadrûpatayā = tadrūpa in the compound.
In the same manner, namely, in the same way, consciousness (saṃ-vit), i.e., the intelligence (cetanā) of the knower of the Self, separated from the complex of sheaths, that is, from the accumulation of sheaths such as the impurity of deeming oneself finite, etc. — that is, restored [to his pure state] by affirming through sustained concentration the knowledge of his Self, saying: ‘It is I alone who am manifest, always, everywhere, as the universal Self, whose nature is the Great Lord that is my own Self’ —

[that consciousness] even though remaining there for some time, that is, even though established [temporarily] in this complex of sheaths as a part [of a whole, composed of consciousness and body], thanks to the continuing existence of the body, is [now] a liberated Self (muktātman), its bondage destroyed, and is completely alien to the touch of those [sheaths].

[To explain further:] it [viz., consciousness] is completely alien to, that is, is devoid of, the touch of that complex of sheaths, the body, etc. — [‘touch’ meaning here] the affliction that is born of the impurity of supposing oneself the agent of actions appearing in the shape of merit and demerit and as such is capable of engendering the sprout of transmigration (samsārāṅkura).

In the same way, the rice-kernel, put back in the [separated] piece of husk, is devoid of that contact [with the husk and the bran] that leads to the generation of the sprout. This can be said: transmigration is generally caused by ignorance; however, the consciousness of the yogin is not a cause of transmigration, owing to the deficiency of required conditions [viz., the absence of the three impurities], themselves generated by ignorance, for his sheaths have been sundered by the knowledge of his own Self arisen in him. Nor is it the case that this bondage of the corporeal sheaths, remaining [for a time] as a remnant thanks to the power of root impressions, is capable of giving rise to the sprout of transmigration through the manifestation of [bondage’s] own properties, for its root, ignorance, has been burnt up in the fire of knowledge.

1263aham eva svātmamaḥeṣvaravasahvāhovisvātmamaḥ sarvadā sarvatra sphurāmi.

1264śeṣavartanayaḥ — from the point of view of the body, consciousness is not the ‘whole’ (śeṣin), and their relationship, though necessary from a logical point of view, makes of consciousness the ‘part’ (śeṣa) that, upon death, vanishes, thus putting an end to that ‘whole’.

1265upārāga.

1266Consciousness remains free from contact with merits and demerits, which, a function of the kārmamala, are the very cause of transmigration.

1267Lit., ‘assemblage, collection’; namely, a functional assemblage, therefore a set of means or conditions in view of something.

1268śeṣavartanayaḥ.

1269Transmigration is the result of impurities, which are themselves the result of nescience, which consists in taking the body as the Self. The idea is that the body is not the sole cause
This being the case, the [mind of the] knower of the Self (jñānī), while living (jīvann eva), is formed by the Fourth; and he transcends even that Fourth, once his body no longer exists.

Thus, in either case, [the yogin] need have no fear of transmigration.

Kārikās 87–88

Now, one may object: — Even though its own nature has been apprehended, the consciousness of the yogin is nevertheless impure inasmuch as it remains in a body that persists as a remnant, this consciousness — owing to the presence there, to a limited extent, of impurity deriving from its contingent association with the body (dehopādhī). This objection the master refutes by example:

87. A gem, made flawless by the most skilled artisan, though appearing flawed by its contingent association with the jewel-box, is revealed as limpid by nature, as soon as this contingency is removed.

88. Likewise, consciousness, whose [true] condition — thanks to the instruction of a true teacher — is flawless, freed as it is from its contingent association with a body, is freed as well from all other contingencies, and appears as Śiva.

[The comparison may be formulated as follows:]

A gem, its flawlessness verified by an extremely skilled lapidary, though [appearing] flawed, that is, though it becomes, in effect, clouded, thanks to the close contact of the jewel-box, reveals itself nevertheless as limpid by nature, that is, becomes flawless, just as it was previously, once it is separated from the contingent qualification of the jewel-box — such particular cause of obscuration (āvaraṇa) being no longer present.

Likewise, in this very same manner,

that consciousness, whose [true] condition — thanks to the instruction of a true teacher — is flawless (evam sadguruśāsanavimalasthiti vedanam) ...

of rebirth — ignorance is also required, which is a function of the spirit (not the body); and since ignorance has been consumed in the fire of knowledge, it no longer exists.

1270 On turiya and turyātīta, see YR ad 1; on the “degrees” of liberation, see YR ad 61 and ad 83: ‘[...] after the destruction of his body, he attains a condition of Isolation (kevalatā) that is beyond the Fourth state [of consciousness], composed solely of blissful consciousness’.

1271 The translation of punah would be superfluous in this context.

1272 svacchāparamārthah — lit., ‘such that its ultimate truth is limpidity’.

1273 On the conjunction of particles, api, iva, see B&R, ss.vv.: §§ 2 (p. 303), 4 (p. 819).

1274 udyotita — or ‘assured’ (lit., ‘clarified’).
[which sentence is thus explained:]
true teacher means a most excellent instructor, who has completely realized the knowledge of the all-encompassing Self;\textsuperscript{1275}

his teachings means repetition [under his guidance, wherein is revealed] orally (mukhāmnāya) the [great] secret of the knowledge of the Self;\textsuperscript{1276}

consciousness] whose [true] condition [is flawless] means that the impurity of deeming oneself finite, which is the screen [on which are projected] the impurities of regarding the world as objective, and of supposing oneself the agent of actions, has vanished, like the flaw in the gold,\textsuperscript{1277} owing to sustained concentration on that instruction.

And consciousness [purified] in this way is also like the sky above, owing to the disappearance of the original stains; it,

freed, i.e., separated, from its contingent association with a body,\textsuperscript{1278} that is, from the qualification whose defining feature is the body, appears indeed as Śiva, owing to the absence of any further contingency ...

... or, what amounts to the same thing, [consciousness] manifests itself, when the body comes to an end, in virtue of the quality of Supreme Śiva [that it has acquired].

Just as the gem is manifest in and of its own nature, when its contingent association with the jewel-box is removed, so does consciousness, though immaculate already\textsuperscript{1279} in the awareness (avabodha) of its own nature, manifest itself as indeed purified, owing to the termination of its contingent association with the body, judged to be impure.

Now, one may object: — But, just as the gem, though freed from its contingent association with the jewel-box, may again become tarnished by

\textsuperscript{1275}We take paripūrna as qualifying both svatmajñāna\textsuperscript{a} and \textit{vid}. On other definitions of the sadguru, see TĀ IV 33–85.
\textsuperscript{1276}Same expression in YR ad 96.
\textsuperscript{1277}Cf. YR ad 17 and 24.
\textsuperscript{1278}In the terminology of Indian logic, where in all probability the word found its original technical meaning, an upādhi is a rectifying addendum that transforms an otherwise invalid argument or proposition into a valid statement, notably by restricting its over-extended range. 'Where there's fire, there's smoke' is an example. The proposition is false as it stands, for the phenomenon of "smokeless" fire is well-attested. To correct the proposition, it suffices to add the upādhi 'provided that the fuel is moist'. Properly speaking, the upādhi in this sense belongs to the argument, not to the object, but because anything that serves to differentiate one entity from another may be considered an upādhi (as the branch that serves to distinguish one bird from another), the upādhi is often more or less loosely attached to the object, as in the present case. The upādhi, or 'contingent qualification', concerns then any circumstantial condition that cannot be said to belong to the object in terms of its very being, such as the weight of the lead, etc. The yogin's consciousness is devoid of such contingencies (that is, is deficient in upādhi) — nothing limits it, nothing circumscribes it.
\textsuperscript{1279}While referring to the lapidary phrasing of the kārikā, YR reformulates the line in more normal syntax.
the adjunction of any number of other contingencies [such as dust, etc.],
so likewise, consciousness, though freed from the contingency of the body,
will still be impure, if it should receive, like the gem, another contingent
qualification, inasmuch as it is affected by that contingency.

The master anticipates this objection by saying: 'consciousness is
freed as well from all other contingencies'.

The parallelism between the example and that which has been ex­
emplified by it is not complete in all respects. After the falling away
of the [yogin's] body — his only shape now the great Light formed of ul­
timate nonduality — all this [universe] becomes [for the yogin] his own
body, as it were (svāngakalpa) — [which] had been thought to be a mere
contingency.

And, further, he [the yogin] cannot be qualified by any other con­
tingency, for there is no contingency whatever standing apart from this
[plenitude].

Thus, there is no [absolute] parallelism between [consciousness and] the
gem as to the manner in which they accept contingent qualification. The
acceptance of the contingency of a body is rooted, is it not, in ig­
norance, but once that ignorance has been cut off by the axe of Self-
knowledge, how can there again be contact with any [further] contingency?

As it is said in the revered Gîtā:

Knowledge is obscured by ignorance;/ By that creatures are de­
luded.// But if by knowledge that ignorance/ Of men's souls is
destroyed,// Their knowledge like the sun/ Illumines that High­
est.

Therefore, the yogin's own consciousness is ever pure, and pure only,
for he knows his own true nature [as being the Self of all things].

\[1280\] The universe becomes the permanent body of the yogin now freed from his transitory
body. There, all contingent qualifications are impossible, for nothing can be added to or
taken away from the by definition universal body.

\[1281\] Cf. YR ad 12-13._

\[1282\] Same image in TÀ IV 13: durbhedapādadasya mūlam kṛntanti kovidāḥ/ dhārārūdhena
sattarkaküthāreneti niscayā//, 'Ceux qui savent tranchent à la racine l'arbre funeste de la
division avec la hache de la raison intuitive aiguisée au plus haut degré' (tr. Padoux — 'Those
who know cut the root of the ill-fated tree of difference with the axe of intuitive reason highly
sharpened').

\[1284\] BhG V 15b–16.

\[1285\] This is another way of describing the experience of mokṣa, which has already been de­
defined, from the viewpoint of nondual Śivaism of Kashmir, in kā. 60. See also MBh X 47,
12-15, quoted n. 425.
Kārikā 89

The accumulation of root impressions in the mind of him whose conduct has with determination been so fashioned accordingly [viz., fashioned to such ends as have been described in kā. 84 and its commentary] is the very cause in regard to which arise all contingent conditions. And indeed nothing else intervenes that is novel [i.e., no other cause of transmigratory experience need be suspected].

This is what the master says:

89. Having first, on the basis of normative teachings, or like authority, identified himself [with the objects and purposes therein enjoined], and with a faith therein that is unwavering, one attains rebirth in heaven, hell or the human condition.

The cognizer, who has made a repeated effort (abhyāsa), either in the domain of sacrificial action — whether for his own merit or for the

1286 yathāvatpariśālitavyaṁpāra
1287 nūtanavena
1288 Cf. SB X 5 2, 20: tām yathā yathopāsate tād eva bhavati, 'In whatsoever form they serve him that he becomes' (tr. Eggeling); the reference being to Prajāpati, who assumes for the worshiper whatever form the worshiper meditates upon. This passage is frequently quoted by Śaṅkara in his commentaries; cf. MuU III 2, 9: sa yo ha vai tat paramam brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati, 'He, verily, who knows the Supreme Brahman, becomes Brahman himself'; BĀU IV 4, 6: brahmaiva san brahmāpy eti, 'Being Brahman he goes to Brahman'; also BhG IV 11 (quoted by R ad ĀPS 66), BhG VIII 6 (quoted in YR ad 90–91), BhG XII 2 (quoted in SpN II 5); ĀPS 58 (quoted supra) and 66: sarvakāro bhagavān upaśyate yena yena bhāvena/ tām tām bhāvan bhūtvā cintāmanīvat samabhīyeti/, 'By whichever appearance (bhāva) the Lord, who has all forms, is meditated upon, that appearance He adopts, as He is like a jewel fulfilling all wishes', and ĀŚ II 29. Among Trika texts, see SpK II 4 ([...]) na sāvasthā na yā śivah, '[...] there is no state which is not Śiva', and SpK II 6–7; SpN II 6–7 which quotes: śivo bhūtvā śivam yajet, 'One should worship Śiva by becoming Śiva' (again quoted in ŚŚA I 14, which corrects it in the same verse as 'bhakto bhūtvā', 'One should worship Śiva after becoming his devotee'); ŚŚ II 2 (ŚSV ad loc. quoting SpK II 6); TĀ IV 207–8; YR ad PS 104. See also the concept of tadbhāvabhāvita in YR ad 83, ad 90–91 (n. 1308).
1289 First occurrence of the term śraddhā.
1290 This is a specific way of formulating the law of karman; see p. 29. In our translation, we differ from Silburn on two points: the understanding of pūrva and that of the syntactical link of āstrādiprāmāṇyād and avicālatāsraddhyāpi. She translates: 'Par une foi inébranlable aussi en l’ autorité des Traités, etc., on devient identique à l’ objet (de sa foi) et on accède juste avant (la mort) au ciel, à l’enfer (ou) à la condition humaine' [— ‘By an unshakable faith also in the authority of the Treatises, etc., one becomes identical with the object [of one’s faith] and reaches just before [death] heaven, hell, [or] the human condition’]. We follow the commentary, which stresses the stages of the process: ‘having at that moment (tadāiva) attained ... the identity with that ... he attains later (uttaratra), after death (dehapāta), either heaven, or hell, or the human condition’.
1291 On the notion of abhyāsa, see BhG VI 33–36 and Śaṅkara’s definition in his commentary ad BhG VIII (abhyāsayoga) 8: mayi cittasamarpanaviṣayabhūta ekasmin tulyapratyayāvṛttišaṁ vilakṣanaapratyayāyanantarita 'bhīyāsaḥ sa cābhīyāṣo yogāḥ [...], ‘“abhyāsa” consists in the repetition of the same kind of thought, uninterrupted by any contrary idea, with regard to Me alone who am the object of concentration of the mind; that repetition itself is “yoga” ’.
benefit of others —

or in the domain of Self-knowledge — whether that effort is based on the authority of traditional scriptures, or on declarations resuming the traditional teaching of a preceptor, \textsuperscript{1292} or on his own sustained concentration [aided by] reasoning, or even on the faith that arises from previously implanted latent dispositions — \textsuperscript{1293}

[that cognizer,] having attained identity (\textit{tanmayatā}) therewith, at that moment, thanks to the accumulation of root impressions based on such [activity] — an identity that is of the nature of the matters [therein] rehearsed time and time again —

when later on his body passes away, he reaches either heaven, that is, unexcelled felicity, or hell, that is, the sufferings consequent upon [residence in] the Avīci hell, etc., or [again] the human condition, that is, that state wherein both pleasures and pains [are native], in accordance with the latent dispositions [so engendered].

On the other hand, when his body perishes, nothing at all befalls the man (\textit{puruṣa}, viz., the knower of the Self) who has rehearsed no [acts engendering] latent dispositions.

Indeed, with whatever intention the cognizer rehearses [his actions], he becomes one with that intention, and at the moment of death the object that he desires with clarity (\textit{sphuṭatayā}) comes into evidence for the cognizer.

In this way, there can be no reversal [or setting at nought] of the matters that have been rehearsed [throughout life], nor can anything not of the nature of previously rehearsed activity come into play in some unprecedented fashion.\textsuperscript{1294}

Thus, previous rehearsal (\textit{purvāḥyāsa}) is alone the cause of whatever [effect ensues]. This is the purport.

\textsuperscript{1292}Lit., 'the declaration of the teaching-sequence of the teacher's teachings'. The implication is that such a teaching has authority.

\textsuperscript{1293}These addenda develop the 'etc.' (\textit{ādi}) of the kā. Cf. TS IV, p. 23: \textit{kim tu guror āgama-nirūpane vyāpāra āgamsya ca niḥśaṅkasajātīyataprabhandhaprasavanibandhanasamucitavikal-podaye vyāpārah}, 'Moreover, the function of the teacher [lies] in laying out the Āgama texts; whereas the Āgama texts find their function in arousing a thought that is suitable to that text and founded on its development, [a thought] both devoid of doubt and commensurate [with the text]' (cf. Silburn 1981: 191).

\textsuperscript{1294}apūrvatvena — the term is borrowed from Mīmāṃsā, where it signifies that which is "unprecedented" in the prescription of a sacrificial act, and is therefore the source of that act's "validity" or obligatory character (\textit{dharma}). For example, an injunction to "cook" rice for presentation to the Ancestors has no such force, for we know already that rice must be cooked to be eaten, whereas the injunction to dehusk the rice "by hand" is dharmic, for of the many ways to thresh rice, that one alone is made known by the vedic text. The notion acquires ontological status in the developed doctrine of the ritualists — since the "authority" of the rite is consequentially certain, the \textit{apūrva} in fact "exists" as the link between rite and result (if not immediate).
Therefore, for him who knows the Self, the cause of his coincidence with plenitude (pūrṇaprathā),\textsuperscript{1295} at the time of abandoning his body, is the fact that he has once and for all become identical with the being of the [universe];\textsuperscript{1296} nor should the moment of death, whether auspicious or inauspicious, be imagined a cause of heaven or hell for him, as is so often the case among ordinary people. To express this idea, the master says:

90. The final moment, as promoting an ulterior condition either auspicious or inauspicious, acquires the status of a contingent causal factor [only] for the deluded; for him [who knows], on the other hand, it is not a cause in regard to going onward [that is, in regard to his supposed acquisition of another body].\textsuperscript{1297}

91. Even those [low-born —] domestic animals, birds, reptiles, and the like — who, perfected by previously acquired right knowledge, understand their [true] mode of being as that of the universal Self, attain that true mode of being [at the last moment].\textsuperscript{1298}

Since [the notion of] the jñānin has been thoroughly expounded, [in the previous kārikās, it is now possible to state that] the last moment, that is, the final point of time coinciding with the loss of the body, [which is deemed to] promote,\textsuperscript{1299} or serve, the auspicious or inauspicious condition [of the dying man], presumed by the witnesses (pramātr) in attendance on the basis of alterations in the body’s humors, or by the [painful or peaceful] way the malignant disease is experienced ...

... [that final moment] becomes a contingent factor, that is, becomes a cause [of transmigration], for those who are deluded, that is, for those [limited] cognizers only who mistakenly take the body to be the Self.

Let that miserable [last moment] pass [in such a way for them]. But not for all that would it follow, as far as the adept (yogin) is concerned

\textsuperscript{1295}Lit., 'of his extension into or over that which is full'.
\textsuperscript{1296}See YR ad 83 and n. 1244.
\textsuperscript{1297}See the commentary.
\textsuperscript{1298}Silburn translates: 'Mais ce dernier instant qui, renforçant un état de vertu ou de péché, devient pour les ignorants un facteur de l’existence (future), n’est pas (pour ceux qui savent) cause déterminante de leur destinée. Alors même qu’ils seraient bête de somme, oiseau, reptile, etc., ceux qui reconnaissent leur propre destinée comme étant celle du Soi sont néanmoins purifiés par la parfaite compréhension qu’ils eurent jadis et ils vont (maintenant) à cette destinée’ (— ‘But that last moment which, strengthening a pious or sinful state, becomes a cause of the (future) existence for the ignorant ones, is not a cause determining (their) destiny (for those who know). Even if they are beasts of burden, birds, reptiles, etc., those who recognize their own destiny as that of the Self, are nevertheless purified by the perfect understanding that they formely had, and they go (now) to this destiny’). Our interpretation differs from hers; esp., ‘gati’ we take as ‘going’ onward (v. 90); as ‘manner of going, behaving, mode of being’ (v. 91); Silburn translates samskṛta (as does Barnett) by ‘purified’.
\textsuperscript{1299}Lit., 'nourish'.
— he who has abolished the conceit that the body is the Self, and who is ever expert in perceiving the Great Lord as his own Self — that the last moment is an incitement, that is, is a cause in regard to going [onward], [supposing that thereby he would] attain another body after this body.

In order to illustrate\textsuperscript{1300} the question: ‘How does that follow?’ the master says: ‘Even those who [...]’.

Even those of evil birth, namely, those who have acquired the status of an animal (\textit{paśu}) due to the power of some intention or other [as revealed by the accumulation of their demerits], or because of a curse or the like, who come to realize, at the moment of death, their \textit{proper} mode of being, that is, the state of their own self, as \textit{that of the universal Self} ... \textsuperscript{1301}

... even they, deluded though they may be [in their present condition], attain to the condition of their own [true] Self, if favored by the awakening of latent dispositions left by an awareness of their own Self gained previously [i.e., in previous births].

Such was the manner of the Lord of the elephants’ liberation [from his curse], \textsuperscript{1302} who, though for a time an animal nature, was awakened through deeply ingrained memories of devotions (\textit{bhakti}) to the Supreme Lord that had been practiced previously with determination — whereupon, having praised Lord Viṣṇu he attained [again] his own nature, completely shaking off all the sheaths [of corporeal existence]. And what cause operated in respect of such recollection [of Viṣṇu, if not the deeply ingrained memories of his previous devotion]?

This is the meaning of the verse: the knower of the Self does sometimes abandon a body made motionless as wood or rock\textsuperscript{1303} from the alteration of humors, etc., arisen in it; he [sometimes even] mouths random [nonsense], auspicious or inauspicious, such as ‘monkey’ or ‘cat’ [as seen in delirium]; but from these [states, it should not be inferred that] the knowledge and other [attainments]\textsuperscript{1305} are lost\textsuperscript{1306} that he had perfected.

\textsuperscript{1300}The poetical figure \textit{nidarśana} is defined as an illustration or a parallel case that confirms the general thesis or principle at issue — the ‘setting sun’, for example, which illustrates (and confirms) the thesis that ‘greatness is followed inevitably by decline’.

\textsuperscript{1301}\textit{ātmavenu}, viz. ‘... their own self as being the universal Self [...].’ In the kārikā, the term is \textit{tadātmavena}, corresponding to YR’s \textit{ātmavena}: the meaning appears to be the same. Similarly, Śaṅkara, commenting on BhG X 10, uses \textit{ātmavena}; see n. 1310.

\textsuperscript{1302}It is the episode of the \textit{gajendramokṣa} (\textit{Bhāgavatapurāṇa} VIII 2–4).

\textsuperscript{1303}Lit., ‘the \textit{jñānin}, whose movements are those of [a piece of] wood or rock [...]’.

\textsuperscript{1304}Etc.’ here intends all the \textit{karanas}, especially \textit{buddhi}.

\textsuperscript{1305}This ‘etc.’ might refer to \textit{bhakti}, as is suggested by a parallel passage in YR ad 94–95: [...] \textit{abhyaśtabhagavadbhakeha}.

\textsuperscript{1306}Same exposition in AG ad BhG VIII 6, which verse (VIII 6) is also quoted here by YR. AG there contrasts \textit{svasthāvasthāyām} with \textit{asvasthāvasthāyām}, in the obvious senses of ‘when healthy’ (lit., ‘in the condition of a man situated in himself’) and its contrary, ‘when unhealthy’; cf. the two verses from the \textit{Laksṇīsāṁhitā} quoted by YR ad 83. Probably to be understood as an argument \textit{a fortiori}: if the last moment is not decisive in the case of the average man, how could it be so in the case of the \textit{jñānin}?
in practice, while carrying on his activities in perfect health.\textsuperscript{1307}

The various properties of the body, etc., pertain only to the body, etc.; they are not at all capable of occulting an object that is ever realized (bhāvita) [viz., the Great Lord as one’s own Self].

Thus, in all such cases [whether it be a yogin or an ordinary person who dies], it is the ingrown [habit cultivated] up until the moment of death that is the supreme consideration (paramārtha) [that is, the deciding factor].

As it has been said in the revered Gītā:

Whatsoever state (of being) meditating upon/ He leaves the body at death,/ To just that he goes, son of Kuntī,/ Always, being made to be in the condition of that.\textsuperscript{1308}

And:

To them, constantly disciplined,/ Revering Me with love,/ I give that discipline of mind, Whereby they go unto Me.\textsuperscript{1310}

\textsuperscript{1307}svasthaceṣṭatayā — lit., ‘in the manner of acting as a healthy [man] (svastha) [acts]’; svastha means ‘situated in one’s self’, and, in most cases, the one who is thus ‘situated in himself’ is considered to be ‘healthy’, after the manner it is said of gems that they are svastha, when they are not affected by any condition extraneous to their nature (see B&R, s.v.); see also M. Hara 1995.

\textsuperscript{1308}BhG VIII 6. In the same way, BhG VIII 6 (and 7a) is quoted by TĀ XXVIII 325–326a, while discussing the status of the jīvanmukta at the final hour. Cf. YR ad PS 83 and 89. Note that PS 83 (= APS 81) is quoted verbatim by AG — under the general category of śruti — in his interpretation of BhG VIII 6. BhG Bh VIII 6 explains tadbhāvabhāvita as: tasmin bhāvah tadbhāvah sa bhāvitaṃ smaryatānabhāvyasto yena sa tadbhāvabhāvitaḥ san, ‘tadbhāvah means “existence in that [other]”; now, by whom (yena) that [existence] has been caused to exist — that is, exercised by repeatedly remembering it, it is he [of whom it may be said that he] “has been caused to be in the condition of that [other]”: tadbhāvabhāvitaḥ. According to GAS VIII 6, the meaning of the verse is this: na tu yad evānte smaryate tattvam evāvāpyate iti […] sadā yena bhāvitam antahkaranam tad evānte prayānānantaram prayāyate/ tac ca smaryate na veti nātra nirbandhah, ‘It is not that whatever is remembered at the time of death [i.e., whatever thought crosses the mind] that forsooth is obtained […]; That with which the heart has been all along informed, that indeed is attained, in the end, after death. This is not conditional on whether it is presented to the memory or not [at the exact moment of death]’ (tr. Sharma, slightly modified). And, AG adds: sarvāvāsthasu vyāvahārikīś api yasya bhagavatvatvam na ṛṣayād apayāti tasya bhagavya eva sakalakarmanāyakā insāna sattrabhagav antimāyāśasyaṃ svayam eva bhagavatvatvam svayam eva bhagavatvatvam smṛtiśāyaśād yāttī sadā tadbhāvabhāvitaṃ cāra hetuḥ, ‘He [the jñānīn], from whose heart the divine truth is never lost even in the course of all worldly pursuits, who has cast off all actions on the Lord and who is ever suffused with God, he definitely (avaśyām) automatically (svayam) remembers the divine essence (at the time of death) — and the reason for this is that he is always steeped in it’ (tr. Sharma). See n. 1288. The issue of the dying man’s last thought and its effective force is dealt with seriatim until PS 94.

\textsuperscript{1309}Śāṅkara glosses satatayuktānām with nivṛttasaṁvābhāyaśaṁ, ‘to those who are free from all desire for exterior [objects of enjoyment]’.

\textsuperscript{1310}BhG X 10. In his commentary on this verse, Śāṅkara explains: buddhīḥ samyagdarṣanāṁ mattattvavasaṁ tena yogo buddhiyogah tam buddhiyogam/ yena buddhiyogena samyagdarṣanālakṣāṇena mām paramesvaram ātmabhūtam ātmatvena upayānti pratipadyante,
TRANSLATION

It is the transformation of one's inner organ [into the Lord, or not, as the case may be] that constitutes the cause granting immediate direction [to the soul at death].

Kārikās 92–93

Thus, in accordance with the point of view set forth above, there is nothing unprecedented that can affect the knower of the Self once his body has perished — that would set aside, as something completely novel, his having become forever identical with the being of the [universe]. Thus it follows that the body only is perishable; it alone perishes [and not the identity of the liberated soul with the Lord acquired long ago]. There is no further growth of the dispositions [ensuant upon the moment of death]. So as to demonstrate this, the master says:

92. Thus, the conscious principle that survives in the interstices between bodies is in effect composed of heaven or of hell. When the body perishes, it proceeds to associate with another body, in accordance [with the dispositions it has accumulated].

93. Similarly, the [knower's] own essential Self remains in the condition it was in when it became manifest once and for all the

'buddhi [here] means correct perception (samyagdarśana) having Me for an object; linkage (yoga) with that [correct perception] is buddhiyoga, or "yoga [viz., "discipline"] of correct perception". By this buddhiyoga which is distinguished by correct perception, they go unto Me, the Supreme Lord, having become [for them] the Self, [taking me] as their own Self (ādamatvena)'. The first mention of the notion of buddhiyoga in BhG is in II 49, where 'action' (karman) — which is, according to Śaṅkara's commentary, 'undertaken by one longing for results' (karma phalārthinā kriyāmānam) — is said to be 'far inferior to buddhiyoga "discipline of wisdom" (or, as translated here by Edgerton, "discipline of mental attitude"), that is, far inferior to action undertaken with equanimity (samatva), because [action undertaken with desire for a result] is the cause of birth, death, etc.' (dūrena [...] hy avaram [...] buddhiyogā samatvabuddhiyuktā karmano jannamamaraṇādīhetuvaś). Hence Kṛṣṇa's exhortation (II 49c): buddhau ārānam anviccha, 'In the mental attitude seek thy (religious) refuge', on which Śaṅkara: paramārtha-jñāna-janastro bhavya arthaḥ, 'Seek thy refuge in the knowledge of the ultimate reality [or supreme goal]; this is the purport'. Thus buddhiyoga is synonymous with jñānayoga.

1311 dēhānārādāla — Silburn understands this differently (analyzing the compound, it would seem, as dēhānārā-dāla): 'L'homme emprisonné à l'intérieur du corps est à lui-même son propre ciel et son propre enfer' (idem Barnett: 'Man imprisoned within the body is its own heaven and hell', and Pelissero, 'tale è quel principio cosciente individuale imprigionato all'interno di un corpo').

1312 No doubt a synecdoche: the result (heaven or hell) replaces the process of getting there (the permanence of the vāsanās).

1313 Lit., 'due to what is suitable to itself', glossed as yathāhitavāsanānugunyāt. This usage recalls the poetical notion of aucitya — which principle asserts that no element of the drama should violate the constraints of the main rasa.
moment knowledge was acquired;\textsuperscript{1314} it does not become otherwise when the body falls away.

Thus, therefore, the \textbf{conscious principle} (\textit{puruṣa}) which has entered into bodies, jars, etc., that is, the self (\textit{ātman}) of each and every man, permeated as it is by the impurity of supposing itself the agent of actions, is \textbf{formed of heaven}, in the sense that its inner organ is permeated by latent dispositions\textsuperscript{1315} [tending to the realization of] fruits of actions previously performed with the intention of attaining heaven, etc.; in other words, that very Self is the enjoyer of the fruit that is [called] heaven, inasmuch as the Self is then qualified by latent dispositions that have come to fruition in results such as heaven.\textsuperscript{1316}

Likewise, the \textit{Self, in which have} developed latent dispositions [induced by] previous evil actions, is the experiencer of the fruit called hell. Thus it is the body alone that is the abode wherein are enjoyed the fruits of both categories of actions [— good and bad].

\textbf{When that [body] perishes},\textsuperscript{1317} \textbf{the conscious principle proceeds to associate with another body} in accordance with \textbf{the dispospositions it has accumulated}.

[The master means by this:] When the body perishes, \textbf{the conscious principle}, in conformity with its own latent dispositions thus accumulated, associates itself without delay with another body, that is, with another abode whereby it may enjoy [fruits yet unexperienced] — through which association \textbf{the conscious principle} becomes the enjoyer at a later time of the fruits implied by the latent dispositions that were \textbf{strengthened} by specific actions \textbf{undertaken during a past life].

Likewise, \textbf{at the moment of [acquiring] knowledge}, that is, at the moment the student \textbf{in the course of his instruction} becomes aware of (\textit{prakāśana}) his own Self as taught by his teacher, \textbf{one’s own essential Self (svātman), or consciousness (caitanya), remains forever in the same condition it was in when it once (sakṝ) became manifest}, that is, \textbf{it remains} in the condition in which \textbf{it became manifest}, once and for all (\textit{ekavāram}), in consequence of this course of study\textsuperscript{1318} — or \textbf{in other words} \textbf{that very Self} has acceded to the

\textsuperscript{1314}This statement echoes the famous verse \textit{sakṝ̄d vibhāto ‘yam ātmā}, already quoted in YR ad 10–11.

\textsuperscript{1315}Note the etymological figure: \textit{vāsita/vāsanā}.

\textsuperscript{1316}In all this exposition, as well as in kā. 92 itself, the notion of the \textit{pūryaṣṭaka}, or subtle body, is implicit, in the context of the \textit{pāsū}, for it is the \textit{pūryaṣṭaka} which, being the abode of the \textit{vāsanās}, is responsible for transmigration (see n. 393 and 738). It vanishes only after \textit{mokṣa} has taken place.

\textsuperscript{1317}Lit., ‘at the time of decomposition of that [body]’.

\textsuperscript{1318}\textit{krama} may be taken in two ways: either the particular tradition of instruction (e.g., \textit{advaitakrama}) or the process, the procedure, followed by a particular \textit{guru} in his teaching.
condition of self-reflection (parāmarśa) which is limited [only] by its characteristic quality of perfect freedom.

That essential Self is displayed to the jñānin by whom it is constantly in such form contemplated (parāmrśa),\(^{1319}\) in accordance with that very form [in which it is contemplated],\(^{1320}\) because of the development of latent dispositions [in previous lives tending thereto].\(^{1321}\)

Nor is it the case, when the body falls away, that the essential Self of the knower which is already manifest, becomes other than this, that is, becomes hidden [from itself], nor could what has thus become apparent ever not be apparent,\(^{1322}\) for otherwise no one would devote himself to any discipline (abhyaset), and collapse of traditional practice\(^{1323}\) of every sort would ensue, and all [distinctions such as those stated in Sāmkhyakārikā] would become null and void:

By virtue is obtained ascent to higher planes, by vice, descent to the lower; from wisdom results the Highest Good; and bondage from the reverse.\(^{1324}\)

Therefore, at the moment of death, let the body be what it will; it is only the development of latent dispositions relating to the essential Self that constitutes the cause of every one’s bondage or liberation.

Kārikās 94–95

If, moreover, in the body, due to a disorder of its humors, the ravages of dying are experienced, not for all that would the development of his practice [previously undertaken] be in any way impaired.

\(^{1319}\)As he sees the Self, so he becomes the Self.

\(^{1320}\)tādṛṣṭyena.

\(^{1321}\)Or, if one were to read ‘vāsanā-apraroha’, ‘... because of the non-development of dispositions [that would contrary such permanence]’. In either case, it is a matter of vāsanās that were accumulated during a previous life of the ascetic, and which either favor (or do not contrary) the acquisition of final beatitude, or act contrary to that acquisition, but which may be annulled. The reference here (as will be explained in the following verses) is to ascetic practices previously interrupted, but which have created “good karman” on which to draw in the lives to come.

\(^{1322}\)na hi bhātam abhātam syāt. For variants of this key-maxim of nondual Śaivism of Kashmir, see YR ad 30: nāprakāśah prakāśate and YR ad 10–11: sakṛd vibhāto ‘yam ātmā.

\(^{1323}\)vyavahāra.

\(^{1324}\)SK 44 (tr. G. Jha). These references (abhyāsa, vyavahāra), in YR’s commentary, are to ascetic practices — the commentator says in conclusion that if such contradictions be admitted, the ascetic tradition itself, as it is conducted, would be rendered inoperative, for the end of the practice (final beatitude or illumination) would become inexplicable.
In order better to understand the condition [of the dying āvanmukta] described above, the master develops the theme further:

94. Utter theft of the group of faculties, loss of memory, choking, rupture in vital points, particular diseases: such experiences are born of modifications affecting the body.

95. How could such experiences not belong to him, inasmuch as he is still associated with a body? Therefore, even if he be afflicted with delusion at the hour of death, the knower of the Self does

\[\text{parighata} \text{ayate} \] — the sense to attribute here to the verb \text{parigha}- invites reflection: the only instance cited in B&R (from \text{Mṛcchakaṭākā}) and by MW of this combination of verb and preverb involves a musical context — “strumming” a lute. May we then suspect here a metaphorical “playing” on a theme, in the manner of an Indian rāga? Without preverb, the root \text{ghat} often expresses the idea that the elements of an exposition “fit together” well, are “coherent” — and this usage is especially common in the negative: \text{etan na ghaṭate}.

Or ‘death rattle’?

Silburn translates \text{śarīrasamśkāra} as ‘prédispositions corporelles’ [— ‘corporeal predispositions’]. Since the context is that of a ‘disorder of the humours’ (\text{dhātuvaśayana}), we understand the compound in the sense ‘modifications of the body’.

It is possible to understand \text{mohayoge} as a BV qualifying \text{maranāvasare}, and to translate: ‘at the hour of death, even if it [this hour] is associated with delusion’. But we follow YR’s interpretation in translating the kārikā (\text{maranakṣanajanitaśārūrajñānasambandhe ‘pi}). With this kārikā the question of the last moment is definitely resolved. This should be compared with AG’s commentary ad BhG VIII 7, summarizing his position, which he presents at the end as that of his guru in this field, Bhaṭṭendūraja: na hi so ‘nityah ksanaḥ sputadēhavāsthāntē/ na hy aśāv antyah ksana ‘smadvivakṣito bhavāḍśair lakṣyate/ tatra tva antye ksane yenaiva rūpena bhavitavyam tatsamśkārasya dūravartino ‘pi desākālavayaḥ hitāntēm apy ānantaryam iti nyāyena prabodhena bhāvyam/ tadvāśat tatrmaranam tatsmṛtyā tadbhāvaprāptih, ‘That [moment] is not the [true] last moment, because it concerns clearly the body [only]; on the other hand, the last moment that we are concerned with is not the last moment that these gentlemen [who speak in this way] intend. Whatever be the form [of an experience] that was once present [to the mind], one must, at the final moment, apprehend [the presence of] root impressions (\text{samśkāra}) [left] by that [experience], however distant [it might have been] — in accordance with the dictum (YS IV 9, not quoted in its entirety by AG) “even [things, viz., in the YS’s context, vāsandās] separated in space or time may exist in proximity”. Thanks to these [root impressions], there is recollection of them; and in virtue of that recollection, one takes on the existence [indicated] by them’. Note that YS IV 9 reads: \text{jātideśakālavayahitāntēm apy ānantaryam smṛtisamśkārayor ekātipatvāt}. In translating the passage, we differ from Sharma, who does not recognize the quote from YS, and translates: ‘By last moment is not meant the moment of obvious physical demise. The last moment we wish to talk of is not of the kind seen by you all (on the outside). At that last moment, whatever (mental) form ought to be will come to be by the logic that even a remote impression (\text{samśkāra}), even in the case of those obscured by time and space, will be regained on account of belonging to the innermost nature. Under its influence memory (will arise) and through that memory that (appropriate) condition will be attained’. AG completes his exposition by saying that these ‘traces’ (\text{samśkāra}) — hidden — may cancel the ‘traces’ more in evidence left by the behavior of the dying man at his final moment — because they enjoy a status that is more irrevocable, having in virtue of their very acquisition put an end to the temporality and particularity on which the chance behaviors listed above depend. It is for this reason that Kṛṣṇa recommends that one remember him always — there exist \text{samśkāras} (\text{tajjōh}: those born of that — the identification with the divinity) that are able to cancel other \text{samśkāras}
not lapse from ultimate reality [experienced] as his own Self. 1329

The purloining 1330 of the group of organs, viz., the thirteen external and internal sense-organs, means the complete disappearance of their essential function. As, for example, [when] the sense-organs, beginning with the eye, make no pretense as to apprehending [external] objects, such as colors, etc.; or when the organs of action, beginning with the voice, cease, insofar as their functions of speaking, grasping, etc., are concerned. Neither can the intelligence (buddhi) [in such cases] determine 1331 the object as it is, nor the mind (manas) find a basis 1332 [in the data offered by the senses], and even the ego (ahaṅkāra) remains then in the condition of a latency (sāṃskāra) [emerging only] from time to time. 1333

Similarly, loss of memory means the spiriting away of the content of an experience: [as when] one who is about to die is unable to recognize an object placed before him, though apprehended hundreds of times [previously], even when urged to do so by his relatives.

For this reason, the fact that he has once and for all become identical with the being of the [universe, or the Supreme Lord] [— hence, his ultimate salvation] is beyond [viz., is not dependent on] vedic recitations [made at the time of death]; 1334 nor do acts of liberality or anything else [done by relatives] in the final hours, like drawings on the sky, have any effect on his mind when it is in that condition [of identity] — but [if the relatives want to do them], there is no obstacle to doing so, inasmuch as hostile to them (anyasāṃskārapratibandhin, YS I 50), even if one is unconscious of them at the end; see also n. 1243 and 1244.

1329 Or, be the ablative understood as an ablative of cause (according to an alternative interpretation of the corresponding passage in the commentary): ‘Therefore, even if he be afflicted with delusion at the hour of death, the knower of the Self does not cease [to be such], because his own Self is now known as ultimate reality (or, be svātmāparamārthāt understood as a TP, ‘because of the ultimacy of his own Self’)’. In the commentary, be the compound prarūḍhacaitanyapravātāparītavit analyzed as a TP, the translation would be: ‘[...] because his own Self is now known as ultimate reality, that is, because his essential nature is the developed awareness of his consciousness’.

1330 pramōṣa.

1331 On adhyāvasāya, ’determination’ (or niścaya), as the function of the buddhi, see n. 401 and 591.

1332 anavasthitī — the term anavasthitī suggests the regressus ad infinitum of the logicians; its use here, in a Sāṃkhya-like context, suggests a ‘mind’ (manas) that ‘goes in circles’, not finding its normal basis in sense-perception.

1333 The sāṃskāras are not normally said to function in the absence of the sense-organs, of which they are the “root traces”. What YR means here, probably, is that, deprived of the function of the sense-organs, nothing remains of the ahaṅkāra apart from traces previously accumulated, which, as traces, never rise to the level of consciousness of the dying person. On the respective functions of buddhi, manas and ahaṅkāra in the process of cognition, see PS 19.

1334 brahmavidyākathāna — lit., ‘recitation of the knowledge of brahman’. We have opted for the (otherwise unusual) syntactical linkage of vinā with the following term.
they have been enjoined in the ritual texts.\textsuperscript{1335}

[As for the compound, \textit{svāsakalilatā}, ‘choking’, lit., ‘confinement of breath’:] — by ‘breath’ (\textit{svāsa}) [is meant] ‘vital air (\textit{vāyu}) [that remains] in the throat’; its ‘restriction’ (\textit{kalilatā}) in the area of the throat [is exemplified by] such things as stammering and hiccuping.\textsuperscript{1336}

Similarly, \textit{rupture in vital points} means ‘disruption of the ligatures that bind the bones, etc.’.

And by \textit{particular diseases} is meant ‘fever, dysentery, and the like’.

Now, because of a disordering of the humors — wind, bile, phlegm — of that body, which is nothing but a material sheath (\textit{bhūtakaṅcuka}), the experiences\textsuperscript{1337} born of such modifications affecting the body are the experiences of suffering belonging to that body.

How, then, in what manner, could that [experience] not belong to the knower of the Self as well \textit{inasmuch as he is} [still] associated with a body? It would indeed be [experienced]!

Therefore, because of [such objections], [the master has affirmed that] the \textit{knower of the Self} — who [after all] has overcome the conceit that takes the body, etc., to be the Self and who has mastered the relationship between the Great Lord and his own Self\textsuperscript{1338} — \textit{does not lapse}, that is, does not go to a condition different, \textit{from ultimate reality} [experienced as] \textit{his own Self}\textsuperscript{1339} — experience whose essential nature is the developed awareness that [he is nothing but] consciousness, even though there remains [at that moment] a connection with an ignorance born of the body that is itself generated by dying.

Since the knower of the Self, by whom the connection with the body has been cast aside, is not able to identify with experiences born of that body, he does not apprehend the moment immediately adjacent to the casting off of the body\textsuperscript{1340} [such as would be the case] if he were merely an ordinary man. This being so, no unprecedented consequence ensues for him, whose heart is located in the Self\textsuperscript{1341} and who has practiced devotion to the Lord as he carried on his activities in perfect health, via intentions

\textsuperscript{1335}Lit., ‘such may be done merely for its ritual effectiveness (\textit{itikartavyatā}), and has been so enjoined (\textit{iti niyogah}).’ The passage suggests that the recitations and the gifts at issue are those of relatives or others in attendance on the dying \textit{jivanmukta}, made in the hopes of easing his agony or of assuring him an easier passage.

\textsuperscript{1336}The same symptoms are described in GAS VIII 7: \textit{svāsāyāsa}, \textit{hikkā}, \textit{gadgada}; cf. TĀ XXVIII 327b. See also YR ad PS 83.

\textsuperscript{1337}\textit{bhoga} — lit., ‘delights’.

\textsuperscript{1338}Or ‘who has taken upon himself [a state of identity] with the Great Lord’. That is, leaving no room for any suspicion of difference.

\textsuperscript{1339}Beyond the Self recognized as such, there is no further or more ultimate Real to be sought.

\textsuperscript{1340}The meaning is perhaps that the dying \textit{jivanmukta} is no longer, in any case, in contact with the body at the moment when it gives signs of ceasing to function.

\textsuperscript{1341}\textit{svastahāṛdaya}. 
TRANSLATION

that are self-formulated. 1342

Therefore [we say that] the knower of the Self is liberated (mukta) at the very moment that his Self encompasses [the universe — svātmaprathā]; the modifications affecting the body no longer constitute for him any restraint — as has been already explained hundreds of times.

As for him who[se life] is composed of [choices between] piety or sin, and who ever confuses the body with the Self, how can he not come to identify with that body — for such identification arises from the experience of pleasure and pain and the like brought about by modifications affecting the body?

As it has been stated:

But when under dominance of goodness/1343 The body-bearing (soul) goes to dissolution,/1344 Then to the worlds of them that know the highest,/ The spotless (worlds), he attains. 1345

The [three] qualities — sattva and so on — which are attributes of Nature, constitute a constraint only for him who has identified himself with them [viz., with the qualities].

From which it follows moreover that, concentrating with determination [on them] as separate from that [Self], the qualities [constitute] no [constraint] for him. Therefore, the path of the knower of the Self is

1342svasamkalpitābhiprāyena — the acts, whether involuntary or not, of the dying jīvanmukta have no effect on him (that is, they do not produce any apūrva), for his thought is self-dependent: it is not open to any external influences.

1343See GAS XIV 14: yadā samagrenaiva janmanānavaratasāttvika-vyāpārābhāyāsāt sattvam virṛddham bhavati tadā prāṭipraplayasya subhalokāvāpithā, 'When sattva becomes predominant as a result of carrying on sāttvika practices ceaselessly throughout one's entire life, then follows the attainment by the deceased of benign worlds' (tr. Sharma). Note that at the end of his commentary on XIV 14, AG takes advantage of the verse to reassert his own interpretation of the moment of death: ye tu vyācāṣate maranakāla eva sattvādau virṛddhe etāni phalāṇiti tena sanyak sārire 'nubhave praviṣṭāḥ/ yataḥ sarvasyaiva sarvāhantye kṣaṇe moha evopajāyate/ asmadyākhyāyām ca saṃvādīnīmānī slokāntarāṇi. According to the fact that the text would read better with te instead of tena (tena being superfluous here), we modify Sharma's translation: 'Those who say that these results follow upon the predominance of sāttvika or other qualities only at the moment of death are (pre-)occupied with physical experience [i.e., they take a grossly physical view of the situation]. For in case of everyone always at the last moment delusion (moha) alone appears. In this commentary of ours there are other verses consistent with these ideas'. YR here, by quoting BhG XIV 14 in the same context, seems to agree with AG.

1344He goes to dissolution', i.e., 'he dies' (pralayam maraṇam yāti) — so Śaṅkara.

1345BhG XIV 14. The BhG deals elaborately with the gunas in this chapter. This statement of the BhG assumes as its context jñāna: what is the siddhi attained through knowledge? According to Śaṅkara, the 'knowers of the highest' are the 'knowers of such tattvas as mahat — i.e., brahman, etc.' (mahādāditattvavidām); the 'immaculate worlds of the knowers of the highest' may be understood as referring to intellection (buddhi) — immaculate because sattva is properly the guna of buddhi. Note that, in the same context, TĀ XXVIII 326b gives a paraphrase of BhG XIV 14–15, which TĀV ad loc. quotes in its entirety.
altogether different [from the path of those who have identified themselves with the qualities].

On the other hand, fettered cognizers who have not seen the feet of a preceptor [viz., who have not approached him for instruction], misconstrue the qualities that are proper to the [knower of the Self]. For instance, they might say: 'If he is a jñānin, why does he experience [such sufferings], his body stricken with disease, etc.? Why does he [still] support [them]?' Or, if he becomes inert at the time of death, they might say: 'He doesn't remember anything'.

Who is there who will question them, quarreling amongst themselves, since they are afflicted with such many-sided nescience? [Who is there who will say:] 'Even if this fellow is a jñānin and now gives evidence of traces [produced] by properties of the body, how for all that would he be defiled?'

The self-illumination of him who knows the Self remains ever the illumination of the Self, though that illumination be variegated by this or that [external] condition.

There is further no interruption in the pure experience of his own Self through which his knowledge might [in that interruption be said to] perish.

Though in him the power of the six qualities was complete, did not even Lord Vāsudeva, in his incarnation as Kṛṣṇa, experience the pain born of a hunter's arrow's wound, and did he not then abandon his material body? In this case, was there any cessation of the essential nature of the

\[anyatrasāpyādayanti — \text{lit., 'transfer elsewhere'. The normal meaning of the verb suggests an inopportune transfer that augments the delusion of those already deluded paśus.}\]

\[\text{Lit., 'why does he wear, viz., put up with such suffering?'}\]

\[\text{The implication is that no one but the jñānin is able to ask such a question, and he is not in a position to do so.}\]

\[\text{Cf. YR ad 93: nahi bhātam abhātām syāt.}\]

\[\text{sadgunya — lit., 'the state of being endowed with six qualities'. LT II 24–36 enumerates the six along with their definitions: 1) jñāna, 'knowledge', 'omniscience'; 2) aśvārya (II 28), 'lordship'; 3) śakti (II 29), 'ability', 'potency' ['to become the material cause of the world': jagatprakṛtiḥbhavā]; 4) bala (II 30), 'strength', i.e., 'absence of fatigue (śramābhāva) in connection with the production of the world'; 5) vīrya (II 31–33), 'virility', i.e., 'unaffectedness (vikāravihara) in spite of being the material cause' [this is a condition, says LT II 31, not found within the world where 'milk quickly loses its nature when curd comes into existence']; 6) tejas (II 34), 'splendor', 'might', which is said to be 'power to defeat others' (parābhībhavanasāmarthya). For a detailed exposition of the concept of sadgunya, see Schrader (1973: 37–39). According to Ahirbudhnyasamhitā VI 25: sadgungavyāgrāham devam and LT II 6: jñānādāyah sadgungā ete sadgungyam mama tadvaphuḥ, Schrader concludes: 'In their totality the gunas make up the body of Vāsudeva [...] as well as of his consort Lakṣmī. [...] It is mainly in this form, to wit as a person qualified by the six gunas and distinct from his Śakti, that God is called Vāsudeva'. As Schrader observes (p. 36): 'The old dogma that God is necessarily "free from [the three] gunas" (nirgunga) does not exclude His possessing the six ideal gunas which, on the contrary, must be ascribed to Him, because without them there could be no "pure creation", and, all further evolution depending ad loc., no creation at all'.]
Modifications affecting the body, from that of the insect to Sadásiva, are all of this sort; however, the latter [Sadásiva] has a body composed solely of awareness of his own Self, whereas the former [the insect] has for its essence the conceit that the body, and so on, is the Self. So much is the difference [between gnat and God].

Thus the corporeal properties of the knower and of him who is not a knower (ajñánin) are perforce similar; but not for all that, is there any similarity of consequence.

Such a truth has been stated in the revered Gítá:

One acts in conformity with his own/ Material nature, — even the wise man;/ Beings follow (their own) nature;/ What will restraint accomplish?  

1351The episode is narrated in MBh XVI 5, 19-20.
1352Such is the explanation of Śaṅkara: prakṛtir náma púrvakṛtadharmādharmādisamskārāh vartamānajannādaabhihivyaktāh sā prakṛti [according to the text published in the POS, p. 59], 'prakṛti means the modifications [or perfectionings] (samskāra), such as piety and impiety, etc., acquired during past [lives] that become manifest in this present life'.
1353The explanation of Śaṅkara is as follows: jñānavān api kim punar mūrkhaḥ, 'Even a wise man [so acts] — what indeed will a fool [do]?'
1354BhG III 33. Commenting nigraha kim karisyati, 'What will restraint do here?', Śaṅkara adds, putting these words in the mouth of Kṛṣṇa, mama vá anyasya, 'What will restraint do here] from Me or anyone else'? The impressions of merit and demerit shape the nature (prakṛti) of every being, therefore they are also prakṛti, and the individual self behaves in keeping with this. It is common to both, jñānin and ajñānin, even if the result is not the same: the jñānin is able to move against prakṛti and, determining his own course, to attain liberation, whereas the non-jñānin falls prey to his own prakṛti determined by his own samskāras. The quotation from the Gítá substantiates the first part of the statement: when there is a body, the logic of the body will be there, whether it is the body of the jñānin, or of the one who is not a jñānin; this body will have to undergo all its attributes, or conditions, and no intervention, from any side, will be able to do anything. As far as the body is concerned, no control is possible: one cannot make one's body eternal. However, the situation is a different thing when it comes to consciousness, the perennial substratum of the transitory body. Trying to overcome both hatred and attachment, i.e., all kinds of samskāras, the jñānin is able to restrain, to control himself (it is the nigraha referred to in BhG), thus to transgress prakṛti — if not in the realm of differentiation, at least at the level of unity, when he strives for it — and to attain liberation. GAS ad III 33 explains this verse in a very clear way: yo 'pi ca jñāni na tasya vyavahāre bhajanādaa viparyāyāsa kaścit/ api tu so 'pi sattvādyucitam eva caṣṭate evam eva jānan/ ato bhūtānām pṛthivyādīnām prakṛtāu vilayah ātām cākārtā niyamukta iti kasya janmādinigrahaḥ, 'He also who is a knower of the Self will be in no way averse to such worldly activities as eating, etc. Rather he acts properly in accordance with the sattra, etc., (that predominates in him) and he knows that "after this the elements such as earth, etc., will dissolve in prakṛti, but the ātman, which is a non-agent [a 'non-actor', as translated by Sharma] (akartā), is eternally free". [Therefore] to whom applies the restraint from birth, etc.? [I.e., to whom apply the measures intended to check the process of rebirth, etc.? Not to the jñānin]; Sharma understands differently kasya janmādinigrahaḥ: 'Who is imprisoned in birth, etc.? [Not the man of knowledge.]'.

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Kārikā 96

Now the master, explaining that the cause [of insight] is nothing but the marvelous descent of [the Lord's] supreme energy (parāṣaktipāta), posits a difference of result in the process of perfectioning that attends upon the discipline of [acquiring] knowledge — which process may be instantaneous or progressive: 1356

96. When [the yogin] accedes to this way of ultimate reality immediately, [upon instruction] from the mouth of the preceptor [himself], then he becomes Śiva without further obstacle, in virtue of a grace that is extremely forceful.

At the moment in which a person — [he can be] anyone at all for whom this birth is the last — accedes, that is to say, engages upon, this way of ultimate reality which has been explained [to him] hundreds of times already, [after hearing the teaching directly] from the mouth of the preceptor, that is, of a most excellent instructor — namely, the method consisting of the secret transmission by word-of-mouth [that leads to] perfect knowledge of one's own self (svātmasambodha), and whose chief characteristic is complete autonomy ...

... [that person] then, that is, at that very moment — immediately upon [receiving] the teaching of the preceptor, [becomes] Śiva himself, without further obstacle. 1361 As it has been stated in the Śrīkula:

1355 Or 'marvelously variegated', 'variable'.
1356 The question of variable grace has been taken up in kā. 9. From here, through kā. 102, YR develops kā. 9 elaborately, emphasizing its esoteric dimension.
1357 Viz., merely on the strength of the preceptor's teachings.
1358 ... eva sīva = sīva eva.
1359 Same terms — paramārthamārgam enam — and same gloss in PS 100 and YR ad loc.
1360 Same phraseology in YR ad PS 87.
1361 According to YR, eva is to be taken with sīvaḥ rather than with nirvighnam, as in the kārikā.
1362 Perhaps, the text referred to here is the Kularatnamālikā, that YR quotes ad 83, especially because immediate liberation is the issue in both passages (note that Wilson MS ad 83 reads śrīkularatnamālikāsāhasrikā). Nevertheless Śrīkula can be the short form of a number of texts, for instance: the Kulāsāra, which ŚSV III 43 quotes after the Kularatnamālā, the Kulapaścājakā, the Śrīkulaughvāra ['gahvāra] quoted or referred to in TĀV III 170, 174, XXV 13-16, XXXII 49-50b, the Śrīkulakrīḍāvatāra (TĀV XXIX 36-39), the Śrīkulakramodaya (TĀV XXIX 63), etc. Reference is made here to the kulācārya and to the way his sidelong-glances (kaṭākṣapāta) constitute an "initiation", which gives the disciple access to jīvanmukti; according to the PM, MM 66 alludes to the instantaneity of realization (and therefore of liberation) which the sidelong-glance of the guru brings forth. In effect, the PM quotes a verse from the Ramamālā (which is also quoted in two places in TĀ XIII 230b-231a and XXXVII 29, although with variants: yantram for yatra, prakāśitam for prabhāsitam): yasin kāle tu guṇaṃ nirvikālaṃ prabhāsitam/ tadaiva kila mukto 'sa tu yatra tiṣṭhati kevalam', and comments: ' [...] guruṇaṃ śaṃkṣatpatalakṣaṇat [...] kṣaṇād eva'. Similarly, MM 67, whose subject-matter is
He, O dear one, is instantly liberated, on whom the [guru who] knows the essence [of things, who knows the real] casts his glances, whether inadvertently, or playfully, or even respectfully.

Now, one may ask: — ‘How might [the guru] initiate [his disciple] into a secret [teaching that involves a] verbal transmission of this sort?’

The master replies: ‘in virtue of a grace that is extremely forceful (atitīvra)’. In other words, extremely forceful, that is, harsh, is the descent (pāta) of the energy (śakti) of the Supreme Lord, its transfer (avatarana) to the lotus heart of the fettered soul, which is [also] termed [the Lord’s] ‘favour’ (anugraha) — by which descent even the fettered soul becomes Śiva, that is, is liberated while he yet lives (jīvann eva muktah), after hearing the teacher’s communication of that verbal tradition.

As copper is turned into gold by pouring mercury upon it [so is the fettered soul transformed into Śiva].

jīvanmukti, refers explicitly to the ‘deśikakataśkapāta’, that is, as explained in the PM, to the ‘kulācaryakataśkapāta’. The sidelong-glance of the kulācarya is that of Śiva himself, adds the PM, citing an Ágama: kulācaryam adhiṣṭhāya devo dikṣayitā śivah, ‘Taking up residence in the teacher of the Kula, the god is Śiva in the form of him who confers initiation’. Same reference to the deśikakataśkapāta in PM 58.

helayā — it is perhaps worth noting that B&R, for the “root” hel, refers the reader to the root kriḍ. Mayrhofer recognizes no such “verb” but, for helā (whose etymology, as a noun, has not been satisfactorily clarified), refers chiefly to derived forms found in the two epics — to which one might add those of B&R for helayā: ‘leichtsinniger Weise, mit Leichtigkeit, ohne sich irgend einen Zwang anzutun, ohne Weiteres, mir nichts dir nichts’, which capture a range of the term’s allusions, but weigh more heavily on the side of ‘absence of intention’, thus according well with the present passage. Those usages that tend toward ‘elegantly, gracefully’, etc., seem to be either contextual interpretations or late acceptations. The nominalized helā, found in the dramaturgical literature, seems rather a technical usage which extends a bit further the usual sense of the “adverbial” term (on that notion, see Bansat-Boudon 1991: 199-226). According to the dictionaries, it is only in such texts that the term is employed in its full nominal dress: the quasi-totality of non-dramatic citations is “adverbial” — our helayā; see also YR ad 98-99.

mukhāmnāya — the relevance of the objection appears to concern the sense to be attributed to the term āmnāya, which in normal usage presumes a long apprenticeship at the feet of the teacher — as in the case of learning the Veda, which requires eight years of daily study (note the borrowing of the term dhnika to designate the chapters of the TĀ itself), or learning Sanskrit grammar, which requires even more. YR seems eager to adduce that a verbal transmission of this sort is at issue, at least in the sense that the concluding “lesson” is received directly from the mouth of the master.

In the alchemical traditions of “Ayurveda and Tantrism, mercury (rasa or pārada), by undergoing a certain process, called pāradasamskāra (which includes eighteen modes of transformation — samskāra), is ultimately ‘perfected’ (siddha). In the present context, mercury, which is celebrated at length as a means to acquire an enduring body, is also seen as a means of attaining the highest goal, liberation; see Sarvadarṣanasaṁgraha IX, where, at the outset, it is explained that ‘mercury is called pārada, because it is a means of conveyance beyond the series of transmigratory states’, and the citation, there, of the Rasasiddhānta: ‘One not living cannot know the knowable, and therefore there is and must be life’. YR’s commentary alludes only to that tradition according to which this mercury, poured into melted copper,
Now the purport of this is as follows: the acquisition of the knowledge of one’s own Self has for its unique means (upāya) the favor of the Supreme Lord. Here, such [acts] as silent recitation, meditation, offering sacrifice, etc., which arise thanks to the [Lord’s] power of causal constraint, are ineffectual as means.

Rather, in this case, the secret of the verbal tradition [received directly] from the mouth of the deity\(^{1366}\) attracts violently,\(^{1367}\) without delay, the heart of him whose heart\(^{1368}\) has been pierced by the energy of [the Lord’s] favor — thanks to which [reception] he becomes the Supreme Lord at once. Hence, the marvelous grace of the Supreme Lord should not be brought into question [or ‘inquired into’, ‘doubted’].

**Kārikā 97**

As for the [aspirant] unto whom the [Lord’s] grace descends with middling, feeble, or very feeble intensity, etc., he too may acquire the condition of Śiva (śivatva), when the body falls away, provided he has meditated (vimṛṣat) on the words of the preceptor up until the moment of death in accordance with the stages of his discipline (yogakrama). Thus, the master now explains:

97. Identification with Śiva\(^{1369}\) is his [also] who accedes to the utterly transcendent state in graduated steps,\(^{1370}\) finally gaining familiarity with the ultimate principle.\(^{1371}\) instantaneously transforms it into gold. Yet, the more speculative dimension of the alchemical process, as developed in what the Rasasiddhānta calls the raseśvaradarśana, is also implicitly present.

\(^{1366}\)In the Āgamas, the first person is normally reserved to the deity, or to a sage; the office of the guru is to transmit their teachings.

\(^{1367}\)Here the way of hathapāka, ‘forced maturation’, is referred to, which TĀ III 260–262 deals with elaborately.

\(^{1368}\)The repetition is in the text itself, although it is not a strict case of “repetition” by Indian standards, for one instance of the word hṛdaya is a noun, whereas the other is part of an adjectival compound describing the acolyte (to be supplied).

\(^{1369}\)śivamayibhāva — lit, ‘making oneself into Śiva’.

\(^{1370}\)sopānapadakramena — Silburn translates: ‘gravissant pas à pas l’échelle (des catégories)’ [— ‘the ladder (of the categories)’], but, in her commentary, which takes into account YR’s, she understands that the reference here is to the cakras, which seems to be more correct. Also see her Intr., p. 45, in which she stresses that YR ad 97 alludes to the ‘seven stages’ of the kundalini’s ascent. It appears, nevertheless, that YR enumerates eight of them.

\(^{1371}\)On the linguistic application of the term rūdhī, see n. 1089. The mention of rūdhī in this odd context, as well as in the avat. to 98–99, may help to fix the sense of this problematic term. In effect, the problem the aspirant is deemed to face here is twofold: the words of the teacher have not induced in him a “sudden” insight (kā. 97) nor has that insight been vouched for him as he confronts his final moments (kā. 98–99). The term rūdhī applies suitably in both contexts: the acolyte has not understood the “direct sense” of the teacher’s instruction, and that sense remains mysterious to him even at the moment of death. In both
Thus, as has been said, for him who, because of the feeble descent of the [divine] energy, accedes to the utterly transcendent state, without having [at first] appropriated the teachings [of his master] regarding perfect knowledge (pūrajñāna), that is, who comes [at length] to experience directly the state that is above all the principles ...

— But, interrupts an objector, how [is this possible]? The master says: ‘[It is done] in graduated steps’, that is, little-by-little: [his awareness is concentrated first] in the bulb, then in the navel, then in the heart, etc.

The steps (sopāna”) are these: the ‘bulb’ (kanda), the navel (nābhi), the heart (ḥrd), the throat (kaṇṭha), the ‘drop’ (bindu), the ‘resonance’ (nāda, or ‘phonation’) [through which] energy [progresses], that is to say, they are the stages (tūrtha) for moving [the śakti] upwards; [each] of them is a state (“pada”) and [at the same cases, what is missing is the rūḍhi — the ‘immediate apprehension’ that guarantees liberation; hence our translation by ‘familiarity’.


nābhi, ḍṛ, kaṇṭha, are three of the six cakras — but should not be confused with the organs themselves. The ‘bulb’, kanda (or medhrakanda), also named guhyasthana, the ‘secret place’, is the opening of the mūlādhāra (the ‘radical support’, the lowest of the cakras, at the base of the spine, in the area of the genitals, where the different nāḍīs, or canals of vital energy, join). In fact, represented as a triangle in tantric accounts, the mūlādhāra may be turned downwards (then called adhovaktra, the ‘downwards opening’), or upwards, and called kanda. Located at the root of the sexual organ [Avalon says ‘between the genitals and the anus’] (i.e., five fingers below the navel, and two fingers above the membrum virile), near the anus, it allows the virile power to pass into the central channel; at that point, it is called trikona, the ‘triangular sanctuary’, inasmuch as it is made of the three divine śaktis: icchā, jñāna and kriya. See Silburn 1983: 43.

Rather, lampikā (or lambikā, lit., ‘which hangs down’) is the uvula, the flexible extremity of the soft palate. It is also called tālu, or catupāda, for it is seen as the intersection of four ways, and, as such, symbolized by a lotus with four petals where the two ways of the ordinary external breath (one descending in the lungs, the other going up through the trachea) cross the two ways specific to the interiorized breath of the kuṇḍalinī (one descending to the mūlādhāra, the other going up to the brahmāndha). Described as located below the brahmāndha, and turned toward the bhūmādhyā, the lampikā, as is the case with the lālāṭa (in the middle of the forehead) or the triveni (also situated at the level of the bhūmādhyā), is not a cakra. Rather it is a place where air gathers in such a way that breath changes its nature, and, becoming tenuous, is a source of peace and bliss. See Silburn 1983: 45, Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 274, Hugues 1997: 106–107, Sanderson 1986: 177–181.

bindu, nāda and śakti are included in the stages of ascent of the kuṇḍalinī (see VBh 30, and its commentary which details this twofold process, in Silburn VBh: 81–82). Explicitly relating to the realm of phonic energy, the first two are also associated with a specific place in the subtle body. bindu, representing “mental” energy, is located in bhrūmadhyacakra, and nāda, representing conceptual thought, in the space which extends from laḷāṭa, in the middle of the forehead (the place for those subtle modulations of the phonic energy which are ardhacandra and nirodhini, between bindu and nāda in the ascending movement), to the summit of the head. śakti (as a level of sound in the uccāra, viz., in the articulation of the mantra and the upward movement of phonic energy) is beyond the corporeal process, since the yogin has transcended the frame of the body at this stage. Through nāda, its unarticulated and almost imperceptible resonance (itself ending in nādānta, even more subtle, which resides higher, at the level of the brahmāndhacakra), that power of the mantra dissolves into śakti, Śiva’s
time] an acquisition; [by going] from one [to another], by abandoning one and accepting another, there is sequence ("kramaḥ") —

... there is for this [kind of] yogin as well acquisition of the condition of Śiva1377 on the occasion of abandoning his corporeal body,1378 to the extent that he has grasped the ultimate reality evolving1379 [within him] — [an acquisition] "by degrees".

Thus has been expounded the sequential procedure (kramayuktī) [which too permits merging in the absolute].

Energy, which is its very source, and where some form of sonorous vibration remains. Then the dissolution of this sonorous vibration goes on, within śaktī itself, with three more stages which are not referred to here, by YR, viz., vyāpini, the ‘Pervading’, samanā, the ‘Conscious’, and unmanā, the ‘Transmental level’. On this entire process, see Padoux PTLvř: 83ff., and Sanderson 1986: 178–180 (from whom we borrow the translation of vyāpīṇī, samanā and unmanā).

Thus, according to the commentary, kundalinīyoga seems to be referred to in the kārikā (see also the avat. which speaks of yogakramā). Unless (though less probably) one is to understand that AG meant another ascent: perhaps from an inferior practice, such as the visualization of deities, to the superior one of the PT, as AG understood it, meditation on sounds, etc. (see PT: 265–266, where occurs the desiderative noun āturukṣuh, 'the one who desires to ascend'). This process of the ascending kundalinī is indissociable from the yogin’s ascent through successive levels of phonic energy, experienced in the articulation of a mantra (probably the parabija SAUH, as may be inferred from the similar passage of TĀ V 54b–62a); such is suggested by the reference to bindu, nāda and śaktī. This ascent also coincides with the process of the reabsorption of the differentiated into pure consciousness (itself correlating with the cosmic reabsorption of the entire phenomenal manifestation). What is hinted at, here, is a complex and most elaborate practice involving the differentiated stages, up to the nābhi, of the ānavopāya, the 'means, or way, of the finite soul', and the śāktopāya, the 'means, or way, of energy', referring to the ascent of the subtle energy through five stages (ḥṛd, kaṇṭha, tālu, bhrūmadhyā and lalāṭa) before reaching the supreme phases that start from nāda (see Silburn VBh: 82). As stated above, PS 97 may be compared to TĀ V 56b–57a, not only because both passages use the term sopāṇa, but also because they appear to describe the same process. By enumerating bindu, nāda and śaktī, YR’s commentary seems to echo TĀ V 56b–57a, where the kundalinī, explicitly mentioned, is seen as ‘blossoming into a garland (mālikā) [of subtle energies] going, through successive stages, from bindu, in the middle of the eye-brows, to nāḍānta and śakti’. JR, explaining bhrūbindunāḍāntasaktisopānāmālikām, expounds the process more fully, adding the missing items, viz., nāda, vyāpini and samanā: ‘The garland of [the subtle energies:] bindu, nāda, nāḍānta, śakti, vyāpini and samanā, which are [considered as] degrees (sopāṇa), inasmuch as [the yogin] has recourse to ascending the steps higher and higher (urdhvordhvapaddārohopāyatvāt).’

Lit., ‘of a condition whose essence is Śivahood’.

Such a yogin will attain the complete liberation that is named videhamukti, only at death, for the body remains in some way a sheath for him. This explains the two concepts of jīvanmukti and videhamukti.

paramārthapraroha.
Kārikās 98–99

Should such familiarity [with the object of his practice] not be acquired, even though the adept has practiced confidently the yoga of “stages” (kramayoga), then some obstacle to the attainment of his desired goal has intervened. And if death itself should intervene with his goal yet unattained, then ‘what will be the issue’? The master removes this apprehension:

98. But, it may at some time or other happen that for him [the “sequential” yogin], because of a pause in the course of his practice, death intervenes before he has gone to the extreme limit where ultimate reality is experienced, though his heart yearns to reach the [highest] state.

99. He, whom the Teaching terms ‘fallen from discipline’, becomes in consequence a lord of worlds full of wonderful enjoyments; then coming again into existence in a following birth, he will become Śiva, thanks to the stage of progress achieved when he paused.

And so, because of a pause in the course [of his practice] means that, due to some obstacle, [the adept] who practices yoga (yogābhyaśa) in progressive stages has remained content with the experience acquired on one of the [lower] cakra-levels; and, before he has gone to the extreme limit where ultimate reality is experienced means that he has not attained the state proposed [by his
preceptor], which, above and beyond all the paths (adhvan), has the form of the ultimate principle;

If, however, though his heart yearns to reach the [highest] state, that is, though eager to realize the presence of ultimate reality, as taught [by his preceptor],

at some time or other, in the midst [of the process], an inopportune event is seen to befall him, then, what will be his future course when the body falls away, [inasmuch as] he had not attained what was to be attained?

The master replies: ‘He [whom the Teaching terms] “fallen from discipline”, etc.’.

He is, in the Teaching, that is, in the authoritative text, termed or said to be ‘fallen from discipline’ (yogabhrasta), that is to say, he is one fallen, or swerving, from the discipline [of realization] (yoga), from absorption (samādhi) [in the absolute] — or from both.

What sort of person, then, would he be?

The master replies: ‘[A lord of worlds full] of wonderful enjoyment —

The paths referred to here are the ‘six paths’, the sadadhvan — the six factors of differentiation, thanks to which the entire creation or manifestation begins. By reversing the process, they are also ways of returning to unity — a meaning that is underlined by the traditional etymology of the word, from the root ad, ‘to eat’; see TĀ VI 30: adhva kramena yātavye pade samprāptikāraṇam/ dvaitinām bhogyabhāvāt tu prabuddhānām yato ‘dyate, ‘[The term] adhvan (‘route’) — given that the [final] state is to be reached in stages — here signifies the means of finally reaching [that state]; hence, because all things possessed of duality are [en route] to be consumed [lit., ‘of the nature of something to be enjoyed’], [that ‘route’] is said to be ‘eaten’ by those who are enlightened. TĀV ad loc. explains: yātavye pada iti sivatatvatvāmani/ bhedadāśāyām hi tattvattvavallīghanakramena śārīrinsām śivatattvam prāpyavtenoktām/ bhogyabhāvād ity adānīyatvād/ adhigatasaṃsvaṭitaḥ hi sarvaḥ svāmāsākūrvatvāti bhāvah/ tenadhvaivasvadhvā, adyata ityadhvā ceti, ‘By “a place to be gone to” he means [the final stage of the discipline] invested with the Śiva-principle. Indeed, it has been said that the thirty-sixth principle, Śiva, is to be approached gradually by proceeding [upwards] from principle to principle — it being obvious that the condition of difference [then prevails]. By “for it is of the nature of something to be enjoyed” he means that it is fit to be eaten. The meaning is that those who have approached [or mastered] the principle of pure consciousness (svaivattvā) [the 36th] have transformed everything into their own self [have “eaten” everything]; such is the meaning. Thus by “path” is here meant either “path” [simply, viz., the process], or “what is [to be] eaten, or consumed” [viz., the result — for in progressing toward the śivaattvā, the route may also be said to be “eaten, or consumed” ‘. See n. 441.

Thus is śāstra glossed as ḍgamangrantha. It seems likely that the ‘śāstra’ referred to here is the Bhagavadgītā, especially its sixth chapter, which deals with the nature of yoga. A discussion of the yogabhrasta and his fate occurs there as well (see, in n. 1385, BhG VI 37–45, esp., v. 41, which is to be compared with PS 98–102). Even YR’s question: kā gatih echoes that of Arjuna to Kṛṣṇa, at the outset of the passage: kām gatiṁ gacchai. Furthermore, in the commentary to kā. 102, below, YR explicitly quotes its first and last verses. See also APS 85b (= PS 101b): bhuvanesu sarvadevair yogabhrastas tathā pūjyaḥ.

Or ‘from [the path of] yoga’.

 Cf. BhG VI 37: yogāc calitamānasaḥ, he ’whose mind falls away from discipline’.
When the body falls away, he becomes a lord (patī), a potentate (īśvara), in worlds (bhuvana) that correspond to the levels [of meditation] attained when a pause [in his practice occurred] — worlds inhabited by the Lords of the tattvas (tattveśvara), and which abound in wonderful enjoyments, that is, in various marvels, such as women, food, beverages, garlands, garments, anointments, songs, music, etc. — in other words, immediately after dying, he is associated with these divine delights.

Again, once his entitlement to such delights is exhausted, how would he fare, who had fallen from discipline? [That is, what happens then to him?]

The master replies: ‘[Thanks to the stage (of progress) achieved] when he paused, etc.’

Now, by stage [of progress] achieved when he paused, is meant the place, [for example, one of the cakras, the] kanda, etc., [at which his meditation was interrupted];

thanks to that [stage, means], thanks to its power of awakening root impressions [that were occasioned] as he exercised himself in that [place wherein a pause occurred],

he, coming [again] into existence in a following birth, viz., the next birth — that is, having acquired another fit body suitable for yogic practice in this world of transmigration,

and, after much effort, having taken possession [again] of the yoga he had previously practiced,

easily rises to the [highest] state [wherein is experienced] ultimate reality — which was his goal in his previous life — and, when his body falls away, becomes Śiva himself.

Kārikās 100–101

Now, when the body falls away, what is the [future] course of [the adept] who, though he practices [yogic] discipline [assiduously], finds no repose [viz., satisfaction], be it only a little [viz., 'even slight'], in any part [of the discipline], due to unsteadiness of mind (manaścārīcālya) — yet [despite this] retains faith in the discipline itself? To this concern, the master

1393 Or 'where each world exhibits, in principle ('pradhāna), an enjoyment proper to itself, such as that of women, of food [...], etc.'
1394 helyā; cf. n. 1363.
1395 Lit., 'mounts upon'.
1396 śiva eva bhavati. His practice has lasted for two lives.
1397 In the preceding verses (98–99) are treated two types of "failed" aspirants — both failures signaled by a 'viśrānti' in the discipline. Either the aspirant has found a 'satisfaction'
replies as follows:

100. But, as for [the adept] who, though practicing this path of ultimate reality, does not attain true discipline, he will yet with delighted mind rejoice at length, partaking of the pleasures of the worlds of the gods.

101. Just as a monarch who rules over the entire earth is venerated by all people in his domains, so is he who has fallen from discipline venerated by all the gods in their worlds.

Although he practices this path, whose essence is knowledge of his [true] Self, that has been explained [to him] hundreds of times, that is, though he devotes [himself to that practice] with faith and devotion,

— should he die in the midst of life without attaining the repose that is the mark of yoga proper, due to the circularity of mental faults [such as inattention, anger, etc.],

— then he, [whom we term] 'fallen from discipline', partakes of the pleasures of the worlds of the gods, his mind rejoicing; there he remains joyful for a long time, thanks to the force of his devotion, which to him is a favor, and the faith that had grown strong in him regarding [the efficacy of] the discipline leading to [final] insight; he is venerated by the gods themselves in their worlds, that is, in their respective abodes.

To whom is he comparable?

The master replies: to '[... him who rules over] the entire [earth]'.
TRANSLATION

Just as a monarch who rules over the entire earth, that is, a universal emperor, lord of the seven continents, is venerated, shown respect, by all people in his domains, in his various territories,

so likewise is he praised even by the gods, saying: ‘By us is he to be revered, for his [next] birth will be his last;¹⁴⁰² [indeed] he has cultivated nothing but dispassion [in this life]; merits and demerits have ceased to be for him objects [of experience]. It is he [after all] whose striving in a previous life was motivated by a desire to know regarding his own Self. This is the purport.¹⁴⁰³

Karikā 102

What will be his future course after his entitlement to experience the pleasures of other worlds terminates? Replying to this question, the master says:

102. He reaches again the human condition after a considerable time and, then, by practicing [anew] his discipline, he attains [finally] divine immortality — from which state he does not return.¹⁴⁰⁴

Having enjoyed the delights available in the divine worlds as just described, after a very long time, he who has fallen from discipline obtains, on the dissolution of his body, divine immortality (divyam amṛtam), which is of the nature of the ultimate principle.¹⁴⁰⁵

[This happy result following ineluctably ...]

¹⁴⁰² In YR ad 96, the same compound appears in the context of the jīvanmukta and has been translated accordingly ‘of whom this birth is the last’.

¹⁴⁰³ The explanatory order of the commentary is here reversed. It seems that the clause: ‘surair api bhuvanesu nijanijasthanesu pujyo bhavati’, which precedes the question: ‘To whom is he comparable?’, is to be taken as a résumé of what follows, which is in fact the gloss of the final portion of the kārikā; this detailed explanation then closes with iti yāvat, indicating that it is “another” way to interpret the résumé.

¹⁴⁰⁴ Cf. APS 86: mahatā kālena mahān māṇusyaṃ prāpya yogam abhyasya/ prāpnoti divyam amṛtam yat tat paramam padam viśnoḥ/, and BhG VI 45, which, developed by our verses 100–102, is quoted below by YR at the end of his gloss on 102: prayatnād yatamānas tu yogi samuddhiḥkiliṣṭah/ anekajanmamasi siddhas tato yāti parām gatim/, ‘But striving zealously,/ With sins cleansed, the disciplined man,/ Perfected thru many rebirths,/ Then (finally) goes to the highest goal’.

¹⁴⁰⁵ In our text, the words divyam amṛtam, ‘divine immortality’ (qualified in the text of Ādiśeṣa by paramam padam viṣnoḥ) constitute a problem in the sense that they could be interpreted in a dualistic manner, as referring to some divine paradise, akin to our ‘Elysian Fields’ where the departed are indeed happy, but from which they must return eventually — as observes the avat. to PS 102 about the ‘divine worlds’ (suraloka) of kā. 101: ‘after one’s entitlement to [experience] the pleasures of other worlds terminates’. The words might also refer to a notion of liberation comparable to that of Rāmānuja, who considers mukti to be a devotee’s residence without end in the proximity of the Lord — a notion more in conformity with the requirements of bhakti — where the idea of an ‘identification’ with the Lord is seen rather as arrogance or lèse-majesté. The very notion of bhakti or devotional fervor seems to require an
— once he returns to the human condition in this world of transmigration, that is,
— once he acquires [again] a body fit for the realization of yogic practice,
— [and starts] cultivating [again] that yoga, constantly practicing it— a discipline that was difficult to acquire in his previous lives due to unsteadiness of mind, but which is now [acquired] effortlessly, [re]awakened thanks to root impressions [bringing to the fore] latent dispositions that were produced by the discipline previously cultivated, which had grown strong through the faith and devotion he had previously given evidence of.

In other words, he becomes unshakable in [his attachment to] the ultimate principle. For this very reason, there is thence, for him, no object worthy of that fervor — which is evidently not the devotee. Such an interpretation, where ‘residence’ occupies the place of ‘liberation’, might hold in the case of the first PS, strongly colored by Vaisnava devotionalism (though even this interpretation is debatable), but it cannot be held in the context of the second PS, strongly nondualist. The substitution, by the second PS, of yasmād āvartate na punah for yat tat paramam padam viṣṇoh of the first (ĀPS 86) is well conceived for dispelling the ambiguity introduced by divyam āmṛtam. YR’s commentary, as well as the organization of the textual ensemble of kā. 97–102, leaves little room for doubt as to the interpretation of what is intended by these words. This ‘divine immortality from which one does not return’ is a periphrasis, unusual indeed, for ‘liberation’. We have seen that kā. 100–102 evoke a type of inferior ascetic ‘fallen from discipline’ (yogabhrastā), whose practice is entirely unsatisfactory. To him, whose aspiration to achieve liberation in this life has failed, is ascribed delightful (and lengthier) residence in ‘divine worlds’ (kā. 100–101); he is then reborn, takes up the practice of yoga where he had left it, and is ‘freed’ at the end of his second life, without however experiencing jivan-mukti (kā. 102). Similarly, YR observes that ‘divine immortality’ (divyam āmṛtam), is ‘of the nature of the supreme principle’, and concludes by citing the Gītā (VI 45): ‘perfected thru many rebirths,/ (he) Then (finally) goes to the highest goal’. Thus kā. 103 may fairly end by assuring the devotee that he will reach the ‘condition of Śiva’ (śivata), that is, ‘liberation’, designated in the commentary of YR ad loc. by terms such as prakṛṭamukti, śreyas, paraśreyas, and paramapurusārtha. As well, it is noteworthy that kā. 103 summarizes kā. 97–102. Cf. BĀU IV 4, 7 (quoted n. 1062), where the adjective ‘immortal’ (āmṛta) has been interpreted by Śaṅkara as designating a state of jivanmukti. Cf. also BĀU IV 4, 8, understood by Radhakrishnan in the light of Ṣ ad loc.: tena dhiṛā apiyanti brahmavidā svargaṁ lokām ita ārdhvaṁ vimuktāh//, ‘By it, the wise, the knowers of Brahman go up to the heavenly world after the fall of this body [Ś: itaḥ asmac charirāpātāt], being freed (even while living) [Ś: jivanta eva vimuktāḥ sanātha]’, and Śaṅkara’s exegesis of svargaṁ lokām: apiyanti apiçcāchānti brahmavidāyāpālam mokṣaṁ svargaṁ lokām / svargalokāsābdahā trīvīṣṭapavācyapi san iha prakrāntat mokṣābhīdhāyakah/ itaḥ asmac charirāpātāt ārdhvaṁ jivanta eva vimuktāḥ sanātha//, ‘…they go to the heavenly sphere, or liberation, which is the result of the knowledge of Brahman — ‘Heavenly sphere’ generally means heaven, the abode of gods, but here from the context it means liberation — after the fall of this body, being freed even while living’ (tr. Swāmī Mādhāvānanda).

1406 YR does not comment samabhāsyas (= abhyasas of the kā.).
1407 Cf. a similar phraseology in YR ad 103, obviously inherited from BhG, especially VI 37, which YR quotes, below, at the end of the passage.
1408 Lit., ‘he goes to a condition of unshakability with respect to the essence of the ultimate [principle]’. 
Even a bit of reflection on the important and auspicious subject which is that of Self-knowledge tends not to the perpetuation of the round of existences.

As has been said in the revered Gītā:

In it there is no loss of a start once made, nor does any reverse occur; even a little of this duty saves from great danger.

And one should [also] remember the text, recorded by the Sage [Vyāsa], that starts from the question:

An unsuccessful striver who is endowed with faith, whose mind falls away from discipline; without attaining perfection of discipline, [To what goal does he go, Kṛṣṇa?]

... Perfected thru many rebirths, Then (finally) goes to the highest goal.

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1410 The allusion is medical: medicine may sometimes cure, sometimes not; such inconveniences do not affect the path of karmayoga, the 'yoga of action', which, according to Śaṅkara, means 'the performance of actions [rites and duties] with detachment after destroying the pairs of opposites, with the intention of adoring God' (nihsaṅgatayā dvamuprahāna-pūrvakam iṣvararādhanārthe karmayoge karmānupātha). Also Śaṅkara: kim ca nāpi cikitsāvat pratyaśyā vidyate: 'Nor does any contrariety result, as happens in therapy'. Same argument in YR ad PS 103. GAS II 40 offers another image: yathā ca parimittena śrīkhandakanena jñātāyamāno pi tailakatāh sadyah śīto bhavati evam anayāpi svapayā yogabuddhyā mahābhayaṃ sansārarūpam vināsayate/, 'Just as a burning pan of oil immediately cools down with the application of a small amount of sandal-paste, even so the great terror of sansāra is destroyed even by a small bit of Yogic doctrine' (tr. Sharma, who does not translate 'mahā' of mahābhaya).

1411 BhG II 40. Cf. the commentary of Śaṅkara: mahato bhayāt sansārabhayāj janmamaraṇadī-lakṣaṇāt, 'The great fear, i.e., the fear proper to that world of transmigration characterized by birth, death, etc.' Same verse quoted in IPV I 1, vol. I: 31.

1412 Śaṅkara comments: antakāle ca yoṛgā calitam mānasam mano yasya sa calitamānam so bhraṭastmrīthi, where calitamānasah is explained as bhraṭastmrīthi, 'whose memory/consciousness has been lost'. This explanation may take us back to the argument discussed in the commentary ad kā. 94–95.

1413 BhG VI 37.

1414 According to BhGBh VI 45, 'perfected' or 'accomplished' (samsiddhah) means 'he by whom perfect insight has been attained' (labdhasamyagdarśanah), through the accumulated samskāras: [...] anekeṣu janmasu kimci kinciti kiṃcitsamskārajanapicīta tenopacitenānekeṣaṃ māṅkṛtyena samsiddhah [...] labdhasamyagdarśanah, [...] Accumulating little by little in many births a homogenous mass of root impressions, he is [finally] accomplished (samsiddhah) through that totality [viz., those root impressions], acquired in many births [...], that is, he attains perfect insight'.

1415 BhG VI 45. Commenting on this, AG emphasizes that the verse refers to the 'yo-
Kārikā 103

The master now explains that those whose hearts have been softened by reflection (viveka) should be wholly attentive to the cessation of birth and death, inasmuch as the excess of glory (vibhūti) attaching to one who has even slightly been touched by the ordered discipline leading to [final] insight is so great as to be indescribable:

103. This being the case, [the adept] should bend every possible effort toward that ultimate goal, thinking that whosoever is deeply engaged in this right path [to liberation] reaches the condition of Śiva.\(^{1416}\)

Because, in this way, the practice of reflecting (pratyavamarśa) on one's own Self, thanks to the method just explained, [itself involves] obtaining the highest result,\(^{1417}\)

therefore it is shown, by the words 'whosoever engages in this very beautiful path' — that is, in the path leading to the most excellent [form of] liberation (prakṛṣṭamukti) — that there is no restriction of qualification [on such practice].\(^{1418}\)

Now, by whosoever is deeply engaged is intended anyone who, stricken with the countless afflictions of birth, death, disease, etc., delights fully in that path with a discerning mind — who is therein immersed, placing there his entire faith.\(^{1419}\)

Such a man, very soon, that is, without delay, reaches the condition of Śiva,\(^{1420}\) that is, he attains to that goal that has no goal beyond it\(^{1421}\) within [the confines of] a single birth after having shaken off all the afflictions of this world of transmigration.

\(^{gabhṛsta\text{ exclusively devoted to God'}}\) (yasyānanyavyāpāratāya bhagavadvyāpārānurāgītvam sa yogabhṛṣṭa iti), who has to practice yoga through several lives before being liberated, and that this liberation takes place only after the dissolution of his body: \text{na cāsau tenaiva dehe na siddha iti mantavyāyam/ api tu bahuḥi janmāni tena tadabhyaśtam iti mantavyāyam/}, 'He is not perfected [viz., he does not attain realization, or liberation] in that very body; this ought to be noted. And it should be also noted that he has practiced that [yoga] through several births'.\(^{1416}\)

\(^{Note\ that,\ inadvertently,\ this\ kārikā\ has\ been\ omitted\ in\ Silburn's\ translation.}\)

\(^{1417}\)The compound \text{uttamaprayavamarśābhāyaśah} is taken as an appositional predicate (a KD) of the subject \text{svāmapratyavamarśābhāyaśah}.

\(^{1418}\)That is, such practice is subject to no prerequisites, such as the prior qualifications, whether ritual or social, that condition the sacrificer's 'authority' (adhiṣṭara) to perform the sacrifice.

\(^{1419}\)This passage is doubtless intended to echo the portrait of the disciple who comes to question Ādharā that is sketched in kā. 2–3.

\(^{1420}\)śīvatvam eti.

\(^{1421}\)\text{parāśreyas} — the terms \text{parāśreyas} (also YR ad 105) or \text{nīhāśreyas} (YR ad 104) appear to contain, as it were, the memory of an historical evolution, whereby the notion of \text{mokṣa} replaced (or complemented) the \text{śreyas} of the ritualists; taken literally, \text{parāśreyas} means 'that which is beyond, or exceeds, \text{śreyas}'.\(^{Note\ that,\ inadvertently,\ this\ kārikā\ has\ been\ omitted\ in\ Silburn's\ translation.}\)
As has been stated in the teaching entitled Śivadhamottara:¹⁴²²

Here is expounded the liberation that takes place within the span of one life [only]. Let it be examined [first]! [But, if that fails,] what prevents you from attaining the liberation that takes place within the span of several lives?

Thinking that such is the case, that is, reflecting on it (vimśyā) [viz., reflecting on the promise that whosoever engages in this path reaches the condition of Śiva], he should strive in whatever way possible, by every possible means, to reach that ultimate goal (paramārtha), that is, he should make this preeminently his effort.

Keeping in mind [the maxim]: 'The effort done for the highest [objective], [always] brings [highest] fruit',¹⁴²³ not the slightest pride need be presumed [on the part of the adept] in this matter.

Hence, if the formation of one’s own self[-awareness] is perfected by practicing the discipline, then the desired [goal] of ours [i.e., liberation] is attained [in this birth]; if not, the attainment of other divine worlds [is ours].

And, once he returns therefrom, he takes up again the discipline, on the strength of the awakening in him of the latent dispositions left by the discipline previously practiced.¹⁴²⁴

Thus, no hindrance of any sort afflicts the practitioner [of yoga] as a result of engaging with determination in the path leading to the ultimate goal.¹⁴²⁵

And not the slightest pride need be presumed on the part of the one who

¹⁴²² Referred to, here, as a ‘śāstra’, the text has not been edited, but has survived in several MSS; see e.g. Goodall 1998: 375–376 (n. 616), 421; Sanderson 2004: 406 and passim. It belongs to the Śivadharma corpus, whose affiliation is that of a ‘laukika’ Śaivism, which preaches ‘devotion to Śiva for pious laity’ (Goodall 1998: 376, n. 616; Sanderson 2004: 231). We are indebted to D. Goodall for the communication of Śivadhamottara X 26–30a, from 2 MSS: Cambridge Add. 1645 (dated 1136 AD (samvat 256); palm-leaf, early Newari script) and a paper transcript in Devanāgarī, 1FP, T. 510. Here, YR’s quote agrees with the MSS for the second hemistich (X 30a), but the first hemistich does not correspond verbatim with what precedes in 1645, namely, jijñásyatám iyatâvan muktir ekena janmaná/ yadi náma na muktih syà ekenivátra janmaná// X 29 — from which one could infer that there could have been two different recensions of the text.

¹⁴²³ Mahābhāṣya (paspasāhnikā) which reads: pradhāne kṛto yatnāḥ phalavān bhavati. The issue, for Patañjali, is that of interpreting the injunction to study the Veda ‘along with its ancilliaries’ (vedāṅga) that is incumbent on any brahmin. According to Patañjali, that means, first and foremost, ‘along with grammar (vyākaraṇa)’, for this is the most important (pra-dhāna) among the six vedāṅgas, and by studying it without delay, one arrives more quickly at the desired goal. See also BhG VI 40: na hi kalyāṇakṛt kaścid durgātin tātā gacchati//=, ‘For no doer of the right/ Comes to a bad end, my friend’.

¹⁴²⁴ Cf. YR ad 102.

¹⁴²⁵ Śreyas — for a similar statement, see YR’s commentary ad 102.
devotes himself to the attainment of the ultimate human goal (*paramapuruśārtha*). Let it be auspicious.\textsuperscript{1426}

**Kārikā 104**

The author of the treatise\textsuperscript{1427} [here commented upon, viz., Abhinavagupta] has in this way expounded, in accordance with the system of nondualistic Śaivism, the teachings on the essence of ultimate reality (*paramārthasāra*)\textsuperscript{1428} [first] uttered by the revered Śeṣa, with the aid of argumentation, experience and scripture;\textsuperscript{1429} he now proceeds to sum up the purpose of the text, indicating that ‘it alone is the teaching that serves as means for realizing the highest among the goals of [human] life’ — subscribing here his own name with no other goal [in mind] than that of expressing his own delight:\textsuperscript{1430}

104. To him who meditates on this transcendental *brahman*, as concisely expounded by Abhinavagupta,\textsuperscript{1431} Śivahood comes without delay, once it has pervaded\textsuperscript{1432} his own heart.\textsuperscript{1433}

\textsuperscript{1426} *iti śivam* — the formula signals that kā. 103 is a sort of *praśāsti*. Compare the similar promises found in the epic and purānic literature promising success to those who hear even a single word. The text thus magnifies its own efficacy.

\textsuperscript{1427} *śāstrakāra*.

\textsuperscript{1428} Or ‘has set forth the [ensemble of] instructions known as the *Paramārthasāra*’.

\textsuperscript{1429} See the avat. to PS 8 and 10–11.

\textsuperscript{1430} Probably a pun is intended: the line may also be read ‘... expressing the delight proper to his [absolute] Self’. The teacher seeks no glory, power nor wealth; like a Bodhisattva, he delights only in the benefit others may derive from his teaching. Not only has he passed on the secret knowledge to someone qualified, but his teaching serves to express his obeisance at the feet of Śiva.

\textsuperscript{1431} Or, by punning on Abhinavagupta’s name: ‘To him who meditates on the transcendental *brahman* in reference to which a concise summary has been stated [in such a way that such a *brahman* is now understood as something] quite novel (abhinava), and [heretofore] hidden (gupta) [...]’.

\textsuperscript{1432} *nijahṛdayāvēśam* — this *āvēśam* is doubtless to be taken as a gerund of type *namul*, which often appears in composition with its direct object, as here (see Whitney 1983: §995c, Renou 1968: §§104–105). The gloss *āvīśya* indicates this as well, and the fact that YR does not take *āvēśam* as the direct object of the verb. He also prefices his gloss of *nijahṛdayāvēśam* with the adverb *katham*, implying a circumstantial function of the compound. The *namul* is generally employed, as Renou observes, in order to emphasize ‘la rapidité du procès’ — which suits very well here the sense of the kārikā: acirād eva [...]. We differ therefore from other translators, who apparently understand *āvēśam* as an accusative; cf. Barnett: ‘The being of Śiva speedily comes to penetrate the very heart of him who meditates [...]’; Silbum: ‘Lorsqu’il médite [...], avant peu la nature de Śiva pénètrera dans son propre cœur’; B. N. Pandit: ‘An aspirant who meditates [...] attains quickly a *samāvēśa* of Śivahood in his heart’; Pelissero: ‘La condizione d’identità con Śiva penetra velocemente nell’intimo del cuore di chi mediti [...]’. The ‘*kṛtvā*’ that follows in the commentary the *pratikā* (*nijahṛdayāvēśam*) is a gloss intended to flag the odd gerund; it functions thus as a parenthesis, to note that a noun is not at issue, that is, as a grammatical notation of the usage itself.

\textsuperscript{1433} That is, his core consciousness. The kārikā is somewhat puzzling in its construction,
This transcendental, or most excellent, brahman, which has been explained as ‘that which expands that which is unfolding’\(^{1434}\) is [so called] because [of its inherent tendency to] grow [or to strengthen] and is [thus] composed of utterly complete bliss (paripūrṇānanda), being of the nature of one’s own Self.

Now, to the person who meditates on that brahman, who is able to reflect (pratyavamśat) effortlessly on his own Self, Śivahood comes without delay, that is, speedily, not after numerous births, [for] he has become brahman already in the way mentioned. [This means that for him] the ultimate goal\(^{1435}\) is [now] attainable.

How [does Śivahood come to him]? [Śivahood comes to him ...] ...

... once it has pervaded his own heart, once it has entered into his own heart, the very locus of self-awareness (parāmarśa).\(^{1436}\)

What sort of brahman is this?

It is like unto [that brahman], in reference to which a concise summary (saṃkṣepa) containing the essential purport (tātparya) [of our doctrine] has been stated, and explained, by Abhinavagupta, whose name is to be mentioned with reverence [i.e., celebrated].\(^{1437}\)

And this also may have been intimated [by the author], on the pretext of mentioning his name: ‘It is like unto that brahman in reference to which a concise summary has [here] been stated, or revealed, in such a way that the exceeding secret of that transcendental brahman, is [now understood as something] quite novel (abhinava), never before seen by others, and [heretofore] hidden (gupta), concealed, as it were [from others].’

And in making this known in this way, the difficulty of access of the
teaching is set forth [by the master].

Kārikā 105

Mentioning the size of the text, the master declares his authorship in respect of this manual:  

105. Thus, the supremely recondite core of the teaching has now been condensed in one hundred āryā-verses by me, Abhinavagupta, illumined by remembrance of Śiva’s feet.

This core of the teaching (śāstrasāra), that is, that essence (satottva) spread throughout numerous texts, has been condensed by me; that is, has been stated [by Abhinavagupta] after having mastered it himself, within the small span of a hundred verses, though it can hardly be explained in a thousand texts. By this is stated [as well] the resourcefulness [of the author’s] luminous consciousness (pratibhā).

The pronoun ‘me’ [in the phrase ‘by me’] is how qualified? [The person referred to is said to be] ‘illumined [viz., inspired] by remembrance of Śiva’s feet’.

[This compound is to be analyzed as follows:]  
... illuminated means ‘resplendent with the marvelous experience of supreme ipseity’; [by what is he illuminated?]  
... by remembrance (smarana) — that is, with constant awareness (nibhālana) when perceiving such [external] objects as sound, etc., never, at any moment, being deprived of the experience of his own Self (svānubhava); [by remembrance of what?]  
... of the feet, that is, the rays of consciousness [that are]  
... of Śiva, [appropriation of] whose nature is [for the aspirant] the ultimate goal, who reposes in one’s own self (svāmasthan), who is solely formed of blissful consciousness (cidanandaikamūrti).

Hence is the [master’s] name to be celebrated.

Otherwise [viz., if not to Abhinavagupta — that is, if his name had not been mentioned], could authority and authorship in a teaching such as this [of limited] size, on ultimate reality (mahārtha), be reasonably  

[prakarāṇa — see n. 276.]

[carana, ‘foot’, is here given an esoteric interpretation, as meaning ‘ray’, probably after the fashion of kara, which means both ‘hand’ and ‘ray’ (see p. 269).]

[Or ‘on ultimate meaning’. Perhaps also an implicit allusion to the Mahārtha mystic tradition, from which the Krama current proceeds; cf. the Mahārthamañjari of Maheśvarānanda (12th cent.), which sets forth a synthesis of the various mystic and philosophical currents of monistic Śaivism as they then flourished in Kashmir, those that are referred to as the Mahārthadarśana (also termed Mahānaya and Krama), the Kula (originating in Assam), the Trika (in the restricted sense of Spanda) and the Pratyabhijñādarśana.]
attributed to anyone else, who was beset by the confusion of the body (and the like) and the Self and who had not recognized that his essence is the identity of his Self with the Great Lord? Only he, whose nature is so described, would dare to discriminate [the true doctrine from so many false doctrines]!

Thus, by this expression ['illumined by remembrance of Śiva’s feet'], it is [also] said that the very nature of the Great Lord has coalesced with the preceptor. Let it be auspicious.

***

Thus ends the Paramārthasāra, ‘The Essence of Ultimate Reality’, composed by the master Abhinavagupta, most eminent among the great Śaiva teachers.1441

***

This commentary, whose subject is the nondualism of plenitude,1442 has been composed by me, by name Yoga[rāja], an ascetic, without passion, who resides in the auspicious Vitas-tāpurī,1443

Under the tutelage of the revered Kṣemarāja, a scion of the lineage of true teachers, in whom Maheśa himself is incarnate.1444

***

Thus ends the commentary on the compendium [entitled] Paramārtha-sāra,1445 the work of the revered Rājānaka Yogarāja, most eminent among the Śaiva teachers.

1441 This is the colophon (puspikā) to the Paramārthasāra. YR’s formulation echoes that of his direct master, Kṣemarāja, who paid homage similarly to his own direct master, Abhinavagupta, in the colophon to the commentary on the first chapter of ŚS.

1442 pūrṇādwaya — or ‘entirely composed of [the doctrine that teaches] non-difference from the plenum’.

1443 Another name of Pravarapura, the modern Śrīnagar? TĀ XXXVII 48–52 describes it as situated on the bank of the river Vitastā (the modern Jhelum), which, according to legend, has its source in blow struck by Śiva’s trident (on the legendary origin of the Vitastā, see Jayadratha’s Haracaritacintāmani XII 2–34, and RT, vol. II: 411).

1444 These verses, called pūṣpikāloka, precede the colophon to the commentary.

1445 This is the colophon to the commentary. It is doubtful that paramārthārasamgraha should be taken as another title of AG’s work. Rather, it is a characterization of the work entitled Paramārthasāra, which is a summary, a concise exposition (samgraha, ‘compendium’) of nondualistic Śaivite teaching. This interpretation is corroborated by the 2nd maṅgala verse, where YR refers to himself as the author of a commentary on the compendium (samkṣepa = samgraha) that is the Paramārthasāra (paramārthārasamkṣepa). Both synonyms are most likely intended as oblique references to the samkṣiptam of AG’s final kārikā. It is probably because of this colophon that several manuscripts of the commentary are catalogued as Paramārthārasamgraha-vivṛti or -ṭikā.
Appendix

1. Rudra (YR ad 1)

In rudraksetrajña, Rudra, or, rather, the Rudras, emblematically repre­sent the category of the adhipatis, presiding deities of the ‘spheres’ (aṇḍa) constituting the universe, which are at the same time levels of subjectiv­ity and experience; on Rudras, see TĀV VIII 306 (so ‘vyaktam adhiṣṭhāya prakarotajaganiyogataḥ śambhoḥ/ śuddhāsuddhasroto ’dhikārahetuḥ śivo yasmāt //): tacchaktīticachabdenānāntaparāmarṣāh / anena ca na kevalamayaṁ kṣetrajñānām eva sthitim vidhatteyavad rudrāndm api — ity uktam//, and MVT V 12. Thus Rudra is ‘the one who presides over the condition of pure [limited] subjectivity represented by the Void or by an extremely subtle body formed by the puryaṣṭaka — in other words, over the condition in which there is a reabsorption of every other cognizable reality’ (ĪPvṛ III 2, 1, tr. Torella: 197). The deity presiding over a given level of subject­ivity and experience brings his devotees to this plane. Therefore, Rudra is also the model for such a subject: he who is able to reabsorb within himself all cognizable reality, he is Pralayākala seen in his divine dimen­sion (on Pralayākala, see YR ad 14 and 23, n. 625, and Appendix 10, p. 330). Responsible for the withdrawal from phenomenal world, Rudra is thus ontologically higher than Brahmā and Viṣṇu, ‘who preside over the manifestation of differentiated cognizable reality, the former causing creation and the latter continuity’ (ĪPvṛ III 2, 1, tr. Torella: 197). In the hierarchy of the cognizers, the line is clearly drawn between Rudra (or the Rudras) and the kṣetrajñas. Rudra(s) as well as Brahmā, Viṣṇu, etc., belong to the category of the Lords (pati), for, as stated by ĪPK III 2, 3, ‘they see things (bhāva) [i.e., the universe (viśva)] as their own body (svāṅgarūpa) [i.e., as their own Self]’. Thus, they transcend the ordinary dichotomy of subject and object, as do yogins; cf. ŚSV I 14, which comments on dṛṣyam śarīram, ‘[The yogin’s] body is the perceptible’, in almost the same terms: yad yad dṛṣyam [...] tat tat sarvam [...] svāṅgkalpam asya sphurati na bhe­dena, ‘Whatever is perceptible, all that [...] appears to him [...] as his own body [i.e., as his own Self], and not as different from him’. Therefore, the Lords are endowed with ‘sovereignty’ (aiśvarya); see ĪPvṛ III 2, 3. As such,
Lords (pati) rule over their subjects, who thus deserve to be called ‘cattle’ (pašu, viz., ‘fettered souls’, according to the traditional etymology — TĀV IX 144b–145a): pāśyatvāt pašur ity ucyate, ‘He is called pašu for he has to be fettered’ (see also YR ad 5) — for not only do they abide by the law of their Lord, but also by the law of difference. The concluding verse of TS IV, p. 32 (quoted by YR ad 33), shows that the pašu is a potential pati and vice versa. It is the supreme pati, Paramēśvara, who opts for servitude, in the free movement of his play. Taking their bodies — as the locus of all worldly experience — to be the Self (or the cognizing subject), instead of consciousness, they are also called kṣetrajña or kṣetravid, lit., ‘knower of the field [viz., of the body in which pure consciousness finds a substratum]’.

The notion is defined by BhG XIII 1–2:

\[
\text{idam śarīrāṃ kaunteya kṣetram abhidiḥyate/ etad yo vetti tam prāhuḥ kṣetrajña iti tadvidah/ kṣetrajñām cāpi māṁ viddhi sarvakṣetreṣu bhārata/ kṣetrakṣetrajñayor jñānam yat taj jñānaṃ matam mama//,}
\]

‘This body, son of Kunti,/ Is called the Field./ Who knows this, he is called/ Field-knower by those who know him./ Know also that I am the Field-knower/ In all Fields, son of Bharata./ Knowledge of the Field and Field-knower,/ This I hold to be (true) knowledge’. AG comments on these two verses, adding a third verse found only in some versions of the Kashmiri recension of the BhG (see Schrader 1930). For the detailed and most intricate demonstration, see Sharma’s translation of the entire passage (GAS: 182–183). We quote here only AG’s development of the kṣetra metaphor: saṃsārināṃ śarīrāṃ kṣetram yatras karmabija-prarohah, ‘For those involved in the process of saṃsāra, the body is the field (kṣetra), wherein the seed of karman sprouts’ (tr. Sharma). See a similar explanation in TĀV IX 144b–145a: karmabija-prarohāhāṃ kṣetram śarīrāṃ evātmatvena jānānaḥ, ‘He who takes the body, i.e., the field bringing about the sprouting of the seed of karman, to be the Self [is called kṣetrajña or kṣetravid]’.

As such, the kṣetrajña belongs to the category of the anu, the finite soul, thus defined by TĀ IX 144b–145a: aṇavo nāma naivānyat prakāśātmā maheśvarah// cidacidṛapatābhāsi pudgalaḥ kṣetravit paśuh/, ‘The finite souls, indeed, are not different from the supreme Lord who is of the nature of Light. When he manifests his conscious as well as unconscious state, he is [known as] pudgala, kṣetravit or paśu’. See also YR ad 5 and ad 45: ‘And it is that Lord alone, ascending through the different levels [of subjectivity], who appears as the different [categories of] cognizers, from ordinary souls to Rudras’.

2. sarva (YR ad 1)

Cf. MBh XII 47, 54: yasmin sarvam yataḥ sarvam yah sarvam sarvataḥ ca yah/ yaś ca sarvamayo nityam tasmai sarvātmane namah//, ‘To that omnifarious one do I bow, in whom lies all, from whom all starts, who is all, who is everywhere, and who is eternally made of all’. As developed by
Ramakantha, in the long avat. of his Sarvatobhadra ad BhG (pp. 1–14), that verse is the concluding śloka of the hymn — designated by Ramakantha (p. 3) as the stāvarājan, ‘king among hymns’ — addressed to the Lord by Bhīṣma, in the Mokṣadharma-prakaraṇa of the MBh. Ramakantha quotes (and comments on) it in order to establish the essential meaning of the BhG, which he formulates (p. 3) as: ātmaivedam sarvam, ‘This entire [world] is the Self’, thus agreeing with the upaniṣadic statement: idam sarvam yad ayam ātmā (BĀU II 4, 6 [= IV 5, 7]). He emphasizes the interplay of the two pronouns, yat and sarva, showing how the Lord, represented by yat, is described in terms of the [Lord’s] relation to the universe (sarva): tasmai yac chabdapañcakaviśiṣṭaviśesānapratipādyasvarūpāya sarvātmāne namah, ‘Salutation to him, who is of the nature of the All [viz., the universe], and whose essence is to be expounded in terms of qualifications determined by the pentad of the word yat [i.e., in terms of five relative clauses declining the different modalities that presuppose a commonality of essence between the Lord and the world’]. YV VI 36, 18 also quotes the verse in the chapter entitled Parameśvara-vāranṇa. In turn, AG quotes it, segment after segment, as a part of his argument, while commenting on PT 4 (see PTV: 27–32, Skt. text). It is noteworthy that, in the same passage, AG also cites SpK I 2: yatra sthitam idam sarvam kāryam yasmac ca nirgatam/ tasyānāṃtarūpavān na nirodho ‘sti kutracit, which establishes the transcendence of the Lord ‘in whom all this world (sarva) rests and from whom it has come forth [as an ‘effect’, kārya]’. SpN I 2 first develops the logic of the inherent presence of the effect in the cause; cf. SpP ad loc., p. 13 of Dyczkowski ed. (1898 ed. omits it): satkāryatvat. It establishes that the world (sarva) as an ‘effect’ (kārya), i.e., a product, is produced by the action of an agent, not by any insentient cause, for the word kārya, as a gerundive (kṛtya), presupposes the activity of a sentient agent: kāryapadēna cedam eva dhvanitam kartuḥ kriyayā nispādyam hi kāryam ucīte na tu jaḍakāraṇānantarabhāvi, ‘The word kārya, “effect”, suggests only this much: that is said to be an “effect” which is to be accomplished by the action of an agent, and not that which is consequent to an insentient cause’. On this point, Śaivites differ from Buddhists, for whom the inevitable priority and posteriority of cause and effect demonstrate, not the logical priority of the agent, but a mere temporal succession. Then, in the same passage, he demonstrates that the Lord, being all, does not require anything additional in order to create the ‘All’ (sarva) — that is, any material cause, viewed as different from the agent — as does the potter, who needs clay: sarvaśabденopādānādinairapeksyaṃ kartuḥ dhvanitam, ‘The word [viz., the pronoun] sarva, “all”, suggests that the agent is independent of any material cause, etc.’ Cf. also ĪPK I 5, 7: cidātmaiva hi devo ‘ntahshhitam icchāvaśād bahih/ yogīva nirupādānam arthājātaṃ prakāśayet//, ‘Indeed, the Lord, who is consciousness, mani-
fests externally the multitude of objects that reside within him, without having recourse to material causes, through his sole will, as does a yogin'; also ĪPṛ ad loc. and ŚD I 44–45a: yogināṁ icchayā adyānā nānarūpopa-pattitā/ na cāsti sādhanaṁ kimcīn mṛdādīccām vinā prabhō/ tathā bha-gavadicchaiva tathātvena praṛjāyate/, 'The yogins, by their sole will, create various forms, without having recourse to any cause — such as clay — other than the Lord's will. Similarly, it is by his sole will that the Lord generates [all objects] in this way'. This is a way of establishing the absolute freedom (svatantratā) of the Lord, which SpK I 6–7 defines as akṛtrinā, 'natural', 'non-adventitious', that is, according to Rāmakaṇṭha's SpV ad loc. (p. 33), 'innate' (sahajā), insofar as it is 'not dependent on any material cause or other auxiliary cause [in achieving its object]' (na tūpādānasahakāryādikāraṇāntarāpeksīṃ). Similar reflections on sarva are found in BhG X 8, which SpV IV 21 (= ad III 19) quotes (along with BhG X 9–11) in the Kashmiri recension, in support of the kārikā celebrating the advent of the supreme Subject (bhoktr) as the Lord of the Wheel (cakreś-vara): ayaṁ sarvasya prabhava itaḥ sarvaṁ pravartate// [for ahaṁ sarvasya prabhavo matalḥ sarvaṁ pravartate//] itā matvā bhajante māṃ budhā bha-vasamanvitāḥ//, ' “This is the source of all and all things evolve out of this”. Realizing this, enlightened men, filled with fervor, adore Me’ (our transl.).

3. camatkāra (YR ad 1)

In Trika texts, and especially, here, in YR's commentary, camatkāra appears mainly in composition, mostly with parāhantā or its synonym pūrṇāhantā, or with sva, or svātman, or cit; thus is described as wondrous the experience of supreme ipseity, or of consciousness itself, or of the Self. It seems that the first occurrences of the concept (also in the form of its synonym: camatkṛti) are to be found in Ānandavardhanā's विर्त्ति ad DhĀl IV 16, quoted below (the only occurrence of camatkṛti in DhĀl), and in Utpaladeva: ĪPṛ I 5, 11; ŚDvṛ I 8, where camatkāra, defined as svarūpa-parāmārśarūpah, 'awareness of one's own essence', glosses āmoda of the kārikā; and ŚSā XIII 41 (camatkṛti). The usual explanation of the term's etymology takes camat* as an exclamation of wonder, probably an onomatopoeia. According to V. Raghavan (1942: 269), ‘[...] originally the word camatkāra was an onomatopoeic word referring to the clicking sound we make with our tongue when we taste something snappy, and in the course of its semantic enlargements, camatkāra came to mean a sudden fillip relating to any feeling of a pleasurable type'. However, on the basis of ABh ad VI 31, vol. I: 278, and at the cost of correcting the manuscript — camataḥ karanaṁ, instead of ca manahkarananā — Gnoli (1968: 59–60) has proposed taking camat as the present participle of the root cam, 'to sip'; camatkāra then would be the ‘action of one who tastes’. Such an
etymology appears doubtful: not only the -kāra here is much more likely the same -kāra we have in omkāra, etc., but the reading ca manahkaranam makes perfect sense (see, below, the complete text). Various characterizations of camatkāra have been given. See, for instance, very probably the first description of the experience, that of the vṛtti ad Dhāl IV 16: sphuraṇeyam kācid iti saḥdayānām camatkṛtir upadhyate, ‘“Here some extraordinary [meaning] flashes forth” — such is the wonderment that arises in sensitive readers’. Cf. YR ad 75, who develops the notion in the context of speculations proper to PS. It is noteworthy that two texts of AG, the ABh and the ÍPVV, one from the sphere of aesthetics, one from Pratyabhijñā, give almost the same definition of the term; compare ABh ad VI 31, vol. I: 278: bhuṇjānasyādbhūtaḥbhogaspandaviṣṭasya ca manahkaranam camatkāra iti, ‘The word camatkāra, indeed, properly means the mental activity of the enjoying subject (bhuṇjāna) who is immersed in the vibration of a marvelous enjoyment (bhoga)’, and ÍPVV I 5, 11 (vol. II: 177): camatkṛtir hi bhuṇjānasya yā kriyā bhogasamāpattimaya ānandah, ‘camatkṛtī means the action of an enjoying subject (bhuṇjāna), that is the bliss (ānanda) consisting in the perfect realization of enjoyment (bhogasamāpatti)’. Later on, ÍPVV I 5, 11 (vol. II: 179) enumerates a few glosses for parāmarśa, among which is camatkāra: [...] rasanaikaghanatayā parāmarśāḥ paramānando nirvṛttī camatkāra ucyate, ‘Since it is indistinguishable from rasa [lit., ‘being of one mass with rasa’], reflective awareness is called “supreme bliss” (paramānanda), “serenity” (nirvṛtī), “wonderment” (camatkāra)’. The immediately preceding passage of the ABh ad VI 31, vol. I: 278 deserves to be quoted. Defining camatkāra as ‘the form of consciousness that is devoid of obstacles’ (sā [...] avighnā samvit), it adds: tajjopī kampapulakolukasanādir vikāraḥ camatkārah/ yathā “ajja vi hari camakkai kaha kaha vi na maṃdareṇa daliāṃ/ caṃdakalākaṃdalaṃ sacchāḥāṃ laṃcāḥām aṃgāiṃ”// tathā hi sa ṭṭptivyatirekenācchhinno bhogāvēsa ity ucyate, ‘The changes proceeding from it, namely, trembling, horripilation, joyful movements of the limbs, etc., are also called camatkāra. For instance: “Hari is still in a state of wonder: How, o how is it that the limbs of Lakṣmī, which are as beautiful as fragments of the moon, have not been broken by Mount Mandara [churning the ocean]?” Indeed, this [camatkāra may be] likewise [defined as] immersion in an enjoyment that can never achieve satiation and is thus uninterrupted’ (tr. Gnoli 1968: 59, modified). Note that such a statement would justify the reading ca manahkaranam, since it contrasts the mental aspect of camatkāra (referred to as ‘mental activity’ or ‘consciousness free from obstacles’) with its physical effects (trembling, horripilation, etc.). On camatkāra, see also Torella ÍPK: 118-119, n. 23.
This verse is frequently mentioned in Kashmirian Śaiva literature, with a few minor variants: jagat kṛtsnam, śaktayas tu (or śaktayaś ca); śaktayo 'syā jagat kṛtsnam is the reading of TĀ V 40a. It appears, in this form, in JR’s long discussion of TĀ VIII 168–174 (vol. IV: 1474, pāda c), which, as we have seen, quotes and develops the definition of anda given by the Raurava. One should note particularly that all the commentaries on SpK I 1 quote it: Kṣemarāja’s SpS I 1 (pp. 14–15; second hemistich) and SpN I 1 (pāda c, p. 7), Rāmākanta’s SpV I 1 (p. 9; full verse), and Utpalavaiṣṇava’s SpP 1 (p. 12; full verse). This confirms that PS 4 and its gloss should be understood in the light of SpK I 1. See also Utpaladeva’s ŚDvṛ III 18–20: 107 (pratīka of the second hemistich: śaktayas tu jagat kṛtsnam; see below), Kṣemarāja’s ŚSV III 8, III 30 (pāda c) as well as Varadarāja’s ŚŚvā III 30 (second hemistich), Abhinavagupta’s PTV 1, on khecarisamatāṃ vrajet (second hemistich, in Singh, p. 13), as well as TĀV I 112 (vol. II: 155; full verse), III 67 (vol. II: 428; pāda c), III 79 (vol. II: 441; pāda c), III 99 (vol. II: 460; second hemistich), III avat. ad 143 (vol. II: 497; second hemistich), III 190 (vol. II: 538; second hemistich), III 205 (vol. II: 549; pāda c), III 228 (vol. II: 569; pāda c), TĀ V 40 (vol. III: 963; second hemistich) and TĀV V 40 (ibid.; full verse), TĀV V 68 (vol. III: 990; full verse), VIII 174 (vol. IV: 1474; pāda c); IX 154 (vol. IV: 1754; pāda c), XIII avat. ad 266 (vol. V: 2363; pāda c); also in SvYU XI 194 (pāda c) and (second hemistich) in Dīpikā ad YH III 203 (Dviveda: 390) (and Padoux YH: 401). The Sarvamaṅgalā is given as the source of the quotation by YR as well as by the authors of ŚŚvā III 8 and TĀ V 40; the latter quotes the entire second hemistich and attributes it to the ‘Maṅgaḷaśāstra’ expounded by Śrīkantha. As observed by Torella (ÍPK: XXX, n. 43), the Maṅgalā ‘is included in the list of Bhairavatantra given by the Śrīkanṭhisamhitā. According to Padoux (TĀ: 270), the Sarvamaṅgalāśāstra, known only through this quotation, could be a hymn in praise of Śiva, whose names include Śrīkantha. Citing the full verse, the SpV (ad 1, p. 9) refers to the Pārameśvara[śāstra]; this does not however permit us to conclude that the same work is referred to under a different title; it should be noted that SpV (p. 9), quoted above, attributes the statement to Śiva himself, by referring to the text it quotes as pārameśvara, and that TĀV IX 154 uses the term udghosyate, ‘is proclaimed’ (yad abhiprāyenaiva śaktayo 'syā jagat kṛtsnam ityādyudghosyate). Other texts make allusions to its source as āmnāya, ‘Tradition’ (in ŚŚvā III 30), Āgama (in SpN: 7, SpS: 14–15, and Varadarāja’s ŚŚvā III 30), and rahasyaśāstra, ‘esoteric Scripture’ (in SpP: 12). Similar assertion in ŚD III 2b–3: na śivaḥ śaktirahito na śaktir vyatirekini// śivaḥ śaktas tathā bhāvān icchayā kartum ihaṭe/ śaktiśaktitum bhedaḥ śaive jatu na varnyate//, ‘Neither is Śiva devoid of energy, nor is energy
independent [of him]. Empowered in this way, Śiva exerts himself to create objects of his own free will. Indeed, according to Śaiva doctrine, energy and the Possessor of energy [or energies] are not described as different ['as do unauthoritative schools of thought (apramāṇika-darśanasya)', comments Utpaladeva]; also ŚD III 20b: [...] sarvam śiva-tmakam, which Utpaladeva glosses by quoting the aforementioned passage of the Sarvamāngalā: śiva-tmakam eva sarvam na tu śaktyātmakam/ vyāvahārikaśakti-bhedaśrayeṇu tu śaktyātmakam uktam śaktayās tu jagat kṛtsnaṁ iti vastutas tu śiva-tmakam eva (ŚDv 3 III 20b); also, TĀ III 168b: saktiśaktimadaikātmya”; also SD III 20b: sarvam sarvatmakam, which Utpaladeva glosses by quoting the aforementioned passage of the Sarva-

5. āṇḍas, tattvas, adhvans, bhuvanas (YR ad 4)

Quoted in TĀV XI 8, MVT II 49 enumerates the four āṇḍas: pārthivām prakṛtam caiva māyiyaṁ śaktyam eva ca / iti sanskhēpataḥ praktaṁ etad āṇḍacatusṭayam/. The word āṇḍa, lit., ‘egg’ or ‘envelope’, connotes a form which is both impenetrable and constrictive. Underlined by TĀ VIII 169-170 and XI 12b-14a, constriction is a main feature of the āṇḍas, in terms of which the infinite is reduced to the finite. Thus Paramaśiva becomes a paśu, rather all the varieties of paśus. Defined in YR ad 4 (by citing TĀ VIII 169) as an ‘aggregate of entities’, i.e., as an aggregate of bodies, faculties and worlds, and clearly described in YR’s commentary as four sheaths fitted within one another, these āṇḍas are not only to be seen as cosmic spheres. They are also metaphors for the different grades of experience, whether this experience takes place at the level of pure manifestation, or pure subjectivity, which is that of śaktyānda, or at the level of phenomenal manifestation and embodied subjectivity which māyānda, prakṛtyānda and prthvyānda account for. Everything starts with śaktyānda, lit., the ‘sphere of Energy’. In fact, śakti, the very power of the Lord, once transformed by him, out of his absolute freedom, into the power of negating his own essential nature, which is plenitude, gives rise to the other three levels of experience which are, as śaktyānda itself, as many levels of bondage.

Why is this theory of the āṇḍas set forth at the very outset of the exposition? It is because the entire text, considering the main problem of empirical being to be that of delimitation, aims at explaining how diversity takes place so as to enable the reversal of the process and the recognition and re-experience of one’s own fundamental plenitude. This reversal of process takes place through adhvaśuddhi, the ‘purification of the paths’. In kārikās
14–22, the PS enumerates in decreasing order Paramaśiva’s “manifestations”, the thirty-six principles that the methodical analysis of perceptual diversity reveals. Nevertheless, before broadening the analysis of the constituents of external and internal reality meant to explain Creation itself, the treatise endeavors to apprehend the manifestation of sensible experience in its totality, in its seemingly paradoxical relation to the deity, the unique entity, the supreme reality, which is defined by its essential freedom. Thus, it is an essentially philosophical effort that produces the theory of the four andas, or concentric ‘envelopes’, through which the exposition seeks to account for the organization of the Creation — thus giving rise to the concept of the cosmic ‘sphere’ — as well as to account for the degrees of experience understood as degrees of finitude and bondage, which are to be overcome in order to regain one’s essential plenitude. This is the reason why śaktyanda, the first of the four andas, is composed of the three inferior tattvas of the ‘pure path’ (śuddhādhvān), starting with Sadasiva, where first emerges ‘this’ as an ideal potentiality. Yet it is a finitude and a bondage altogether relative, for what is at stake, at this level of non-duality, is the pure manifestation that has not yet materialized itself into actual creation. As Michel Hulin states: Śiva follows the pure path ‘pour faire, si l’on ose dire, le tour de sa nature’ [— ‘... so as to, so to speak, take an overall view of his own nature’] (1978: 305). The position of the śuddhādhvān is, for the nondual Śaivism of Kashmir, a way of showing that consciousness ‘does call for cosmic manifestation’ and that ‘far from being defilement and degradation, its relationship to multiplicity is enjoyment, because it expresses its inmost possibility’ (Hulin 1978: 286). This is why YR states, in his avat. ad 4, that ‘this universe is nothing but the blossoming of the Lord’s energies’, and later on, that ‘the universe is in essence nothing but the marvel of supreme ipseity’. BĀU I 4, 1–3 describes of the Primordial Androgyne as one who ‘evokes in imagination a possible cosmic multiplicity and rejoices in realizing that he already encompasses all of it’ (Hulin 1978: 302). The same description is appropriate for Paramaśiva, pure consciousness, itself understood in this system as the unity of prakāśa and vimarśa. Yet such a consciousness ‘cannot be satisfied to contain the objects as “a bag contains nuts”; it possesses them only if it recovers them at every moment’ (Hulin 1978: 301; note that the image is present in SpN I 2, where it is said that the world ‘has not come out of him [the Lord], as does a walnut from a bag’ — na prasevakād ivāk-śoṭādi tat tasmān nirgatam api). Thus there is a double movement: on the one hand, cosmic dispersion, when consciousness, disaggregating its host of energies, brings about the creation of the universe; on the other, its reabsorption within consciousness. Moreover, such delimitation, seen as bondage, is nothing else than the alteration, freely chosen by Śiva, of his own śakti, energy or power. Hence, his omnipotence, in play (we meet
here the notion of divine krīḍā) reducing itself so as a ‘this’ emerges as antagonist to the ‘I’, appears as the altered and constrictive form of the saktyaṇḍa, the ‘sphere/envelope of Energy’, that is the reduced, as well as reducing, energy (or power) of the Lord.

Actual creation begins with the power of division and dichotomization that is māyā, associated with the five kañcukas. Thus is constituted māyaṇḍa, the ‘sphere of māyā, or Illusion’. Its seven tattvas, from māyā to puruṣa, stand for that level of experience where the one who was pure subject starts seeking, in illusion and delusion, for what is outside of him. As such māyaṇḍa is the condition required for the manifestation of prakṛtyaṇḍa, the ‘sphere of Nature’, which, beginning with prakṛti and consisting of the following twenty-three tattvas, offers the complete delineation of cognizable reality (meya) divided into draṣṭṛ, the ‘seer’ (who is but his karaṇas), and draṣṭya, the ‘seen’, viz., the five tanmātras and the five bhūtas.

At the core of prakṛtyaṇḍa, the last ‘sphere/envelope’ is to be found — which coincides with the grossest tattva, earth — which stands for the body itself, according to reasonings first put forth by Sāmkhya (see kā. 22 on this point). Thus is constituted the prthvyaṇḍa, the ‘Terrestrial sphere’. It represents the grossest level of experience, where one mistakes the body for the Self, i.e., when pure consciousness fully appropriates to itself those fictitious contents, the body and so forth (buddhi, etc.), that are extrinsic to it. Thus the way the four andas are fit into each other expresses the progressive constriction of pure, free, ever-radiating consciousness, in other words, a ‘genesis of bondage’, to borrow the formula coined by Hulin (‘une genèse de la servitude’) in the context of the theory of the thirty-six tattvas (1978: 304).

Since the entire manifestation exists within the four andas, they may be seen as encompassing an infinite variety of worlds and their inhabitants. Again those inhabitants are endowed with an infinite variety of bodies and faculties which may differ from world to world, as well as, within the same world, from one level of being to another (see YR ad 5). The eighth chapter of the TĀ deals with the bhuvanas (as well as with the notion of anda, in 168b–174) in the course of expounding the deśādhvan, ‘Path of space’, of which the bhuvanas represent the most concretized aspect. As recorded by TĀ itself, their number varies widely from text to text, although they are fundamentally innumerable, as indicated by SvT X, which posits universes along with their subuniverses. Quoting SvT X 2–5a, JR observes, in his avat. to TĀ VIII 9, that ‘since there is an infinite number of bhuvanas, there is an infinite number of their presiding deities also. Therefore, nobody would attain the Absolute ever, by meditating on each of them, even if one devoted innumerable births to it. Such a practice would be thus impractical’ (bhuvanānāṁ ānantye tadadhīṣānāṁ...
In a reply to such reservations, TĀ VIII 9–10 refers to Śrīkanṭhanātha’s Dīkṣottaratāntra (XIII 63–67), according to which there are just five bhuvanas, presided over by Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra, Īśvara and Anāśritaśiva respectively. However, according to SvT IV, TĀ VIII 407–427 reckons 224 bhuvanas. TĀ VIII 428–434a refers to the account of the bhuvanas in the Mataṅgatantra. At the end, TĀ VIII 436–452 adopts the count of the MVT (V 1–33), which TĀ VIII 436b reaffirms to be the main authority in the Kashmirian nondual Śaivism. Thus 118 bhuvanas are enumerated, related to just four of the five kalās, since the fifth kalā, in MVT, does not contain any bhuvana (contrary to the SvT which attributes 16 bhuvanas to the fifth kalā). JR offers an explanation (avat. to TĀ VIII 428) for such discrepancy of classification: the bhuvanas are expounded in keeping with the specific prakriyā, or process of initiation (dikṣā), adopted by such and such authoritative text, the difference of the prakriyās corresponding to the difference of the aspirants’ entitlements. However, the common feature of all these expositions is that they are made in the context of dikṣā, which SvTU V 88a (vol. III: 38) defines as ātmasaṃskāra, ‘perfecting the Self’; thus the Vth chapter of the MVT is entitled dikṣāprakaraṇa, and the Xth chapter of the SvT: bhuvanādhva-dikṣāviddhi. This process of dikṣā implies the process of the ‘purification of the paths’ (adhvasuddhi), whose lower level is the ‘purification of the universes’ (bhuvanaśuddhi).

Apprehended in the light of these spatial correspondences, the four anđas are evidently to be seen as cosmic spheres, all the more so as a presiding deity rules over each of them.

Vv. 41–46 of the PS (esp. 41 and 46) deal again with the anđas, as related to the mantra SAUH, the hṛdayabīja, which stands for the whole, inasmuch as it is posited that the first three anđas (or kalās) are pervaded by SA, and the fourth by AU, whereas the fifth kalā is pervaded by the visarga Ḥ: such is the teaching (see MVT IV 25 and PTLvṛ 21–24 in Padoux 1975: 110ff., n. 241 and 275). The correspondences do not end here since, in the context of the ritual of absorption within the hṛdayabīja (PTLvṛ 27–28), the four anđas are again related to four limbs or organs of the body, according to their place and function. In the PTLvṛ, the correspondences are just alluded to. Nevertheless, according to Swami Lakṣman Joo quoted by Padoux in his translation (PTLvṛ: 118, n. 303), the four anđas — from prthvyanda, the lowest one — are respectively related to pāda, hasta, pāṇi and mukha, an interpretation that requires a slight alteration in the order of the text which reads: pādapaṇīhastamukha*. Similarly, correspondences are established between kalās and parts of the body (see Brunner SŚP, vol. III: fig. III, IV), as well as between tattvas and parts of the body, in the process of internal worship (see Padoux 1986: 178–180).
6. spanda (YR ad 4)

On the notion of spanda, see AG’s definitions in ÍPV III 1, 3 (vol. II: 221–222): śuddho ‘yaṃ spandah [...] kimcíccalánatmatayá sphuradrúpavá, ‘[Sadāśiva] is pure spanda, for he manifests himself in a form which is subtle movement’, and TÀ IV 184–186a: kimcíccalanan etávad ananyasphuranam hi yat, ‘[spanda] is subtle movement, autonomous glitter’ (see also Torella ÍPK: 121). The same definition of spanda is found in SpN I 1: cítsvábhavyád acalasyápi śríbhagavatah svátantryaśaktír [...] kimcíccalattátmakadhátvarthánugamáti spanda ity abhihítá, ‘The svátantryaśaktí of the Lord, though he moves not, being of the nature of consciousness, is known as spanda in accordance with the root-meaning of the word signifying “subtle movement” (kimcíccalattá)’. That this movement be imperceptible is required in order to prevent the objection that the dynamism of the ultimate principle, consciousness, implies its perishability (for activity implies the transformation of the cause, hence its perishability). The Trika postulates self-awareness in the form of a vibration, or a pulsation, that is, a movement that is not a movement, continuous, yet unchanging, and therefore imperceptible. ÍPV I 5, 14 (vol. I: 256–257) develops this line of thought: spándanas ca kimcíccalanan/ esaiva ca kimcídruptá yad acalanam api calam ábhásata ity/ prakáśasvarúpám hi manág api nátićyate ‘tiricyata itet tad acalam evábháśaśabheyuktam iva ca bháti/’, ‘spanda means imperceptible movement. And this imperceptibility [of the movement] consists in this, that what is surely motionless appears as if in motion. For, although the essential nature of consciousness is not to change, it appears to change; [in other words,] that [essential nature of consciousness] which shines as motionless appears as endowed with an infinity of manifestations’. Similarly, TÀ IV 183b defines spanda as svátmányucchala, ‘expansion in one’s own self’, before developing it (TÀ IV 184b) through the metaphor of the wave that is not different from the ocean (quoted n. 872).

7. Anáśritaśiva (YR ad 4)

See TÀ VIII 10, giving the exposition of the bhuvanas according to the Díksottaratantra: [...] anáśritaḥ śivas tasmád [viz., sádákhyagocarád] vyáptá [...] , ‘Anáśritaśiva pervades [the tattvas] beyond [the realm of Sádákhya, viz., beyond śúdhavidyá, Íśvara and Sádákhya (or Sádáśiva)].’ JR ad loc. observes: tasmád iti sádákhyagocarád arthád ārdhvaṇa śaktíttattvastátháne tu, ‘He pervades [the tattvas] beyond the realm of Sádákhya, that is to say, he remains above, at the level of śaktitatta’. At this level of experience, the subject, viz., the yogin, is no longer Paramáśiva who contains the universe within himself. As observed by Silburn (Kálikástotra: 37) this yogin does not possess the form of perfect consciousness, which, consisting of the free play of exteriority (idántá) within interiority (ahántá) and
vice versa, enjoys cosmic bliss (jagadānanda). Cosmic bliss, as defined by TĀ V 50–52a, implies a relation of the Self with the universe, in the form of their co-essentiality. It is in this sense that the yogin deprived of this experience of jagadānanda is deemed ‘unrelated [to the universe]’: cidaikyākhya-timayānāśritaśiva*, ‘[...] Anāśritaśiva does not experience the unity of absolute consciousness [in which the universe is identified with consciousness]’ (PHvṛ 4). Nevertheless, Anāśritaśiva is the stage of experience in which the universe yet to come, that is, empirical manifestation, is prepared, since it is the state (avasthā) in which Śakti begins to veil the Self temporarily, and, separating the universe from it, to produce akhyāti,nescience, or failure to recognize the real nature of the Self. This is the reason why śunya-tiśūnya, the ‘Void beyond the Void’, or ‘absolute Void’, is given in PHvṛ 4 (p. 55) as a synonym for Anāśritaśiva: cidaikyākhya-timayānāśritaśivaparyāyahānāśritaśūnya-tiśūnya-tiśūnya-tiśūnya-tamaya. Paramāśiva, the Whole having nothing outside himself, has to create a Void within himself in order to make room for the universe that he wishes to manifest as different from himself. And it is this Void that will assume the form of the objective universe. Cf. TĀ VIII 402: anāśritaṁ tu vyāpāre nimittaṁ hetur ucyate, ‘In the process [of creation], the cause that is not dependent (anāśrita) is called the impelling [cause] (hetu), and TĀV ad loc.: vyāpāre itiṣṭyādikriyāyām/ iha hi sa eva paraḥ paramesvāraḥ svavātantrāt prathamāṁ śūnya-tiśūnya-tam avabhāsayan anāśrita-dīrūpa-taya prathitaḥ, ‘In the “activity”, i.e., in the act of creation, etc., the Supreme one, Paramesvara, out of his freedom, first manifests himself as Void, and, manifest in that form, is known as Anāśrita’. In terms of mystical experience, Anāśritaśiva represents the yogin’s stage of passive samādhi, or extasis (cf. Silburn Kālikāstotra: 27, 36–37). ŚŚV I 2, quoted n. 226, whose phraseology is similar to that of YR here, describes Anāśritaśiva as the first manifestation of auto-limitation, freely chosen by Paramāśiva, which eventuates in the māyāpāramāṭṛ.

8. Gahana (YR ad 4)

TĀ VIII 317–319 has Gahana the first among the six Rudras occupying the lower fold/cavity (puṭa) of the māyāgranthi, the gross level of māyā: madhye puṭatraayam tasyā rudrāḥ śaḍ adhare 'ntare/ eka ūrdhve ca pañce- ti dvādaśaite nirūpitaḥ// gahanāsādhyau hariharadasyēśvarau trikalagopatī śaḍ ime/ madhye 'nantah kṣemo dvijeśāvidyeśavīśvaśivāḥ// śaṭsu ca putageśu tatparāvṛttyā/ parivarttate sthitih kila devo 'nantas tu sarvāthā madhye//, ‘Within that [māyāgranthi], there is a triad of folds/cavities (puṭa). In the lower one, there are six Rudras, in the middle there is one, in the upper one there are five. Thus twelve Rudras have been described. The six [Rudras] are Gahana, Asādhya, Harihara, Daśeśvara, Trikala, Gopati. Ananta is in the middle. [The five Rudras are] Kṣema, Djiveśa, Vidyeśa,
Viśva and Śiva. [Regarding those five] and those six [Rudras] remaining in their [respective] folds/cavities, the location is liable to change, for they are interchangeable. Nevertheless, Lord Ananta always remains in the middle. Those two lines are a paraphrase of SvT X 1124–1127, as shown by TÀV VIII 317–319, which quotes it (p. 1566). Although SvT X 1124–1127 enumerates thirteen Rudras, placing six Rudras in the upper fold, among which Ananta (to be distinguished from the Ananteśa in the middle fold, who is defined as jagatpati, the ‘Lord of the world’), the two lists are parallel: Daśeśāna in SvT corresponds to Daśeśvara in TÀ; Kṣema to Kṣema; Brāhmaṇaśvāmin, the ‘Lord of the Brāhmaṇas’, to Dvijeśa; Vidyeśāna to Vidyeśa, and Viśveśa to Viśva. One observes that JR’s reading of SvT 1124–1127 allows emendation of the SvT ed.: brāhmaṇaśvāmin instead of brahmaṇaṇaḥ svāmin (since Brāhmaṇaśvāmin is the synonym of Dvijeśa), viśveśa instead of vidyeśa (since Viśveśa is the synonym of Viśva).

9. Phonemic emanation (YR ad 10–11)

Such speculations appear to be quite in keeping with those of VP I 1–2 and its vṛtti, which establish that since, in our cognition, we identify the objects with their words, the objects are essentially of the nature of the word. Cf. VP I 1–2: anādinidhanān brahma śabdatattvam yat aksaram/ vivartate 'ṛthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ// ekam eva yat āmnātām bhinnasaktivapāśrayāt/ aprthaktve 'pi śaktibhyah prthaktvenevā varate//, ‘Ce Brahman sans commencement ni fin, Parole principielle, Phonème (impérissable), qui se manifeste sous la forme des objets et d’où procède le monde animé, Lui qui, révélé comme un, est le support de pouvoirs différents et paraît divisé sous l’effet de ses pouvoirs, quoi qu’il soit indivis [...],’ which may be summarised as follows: brahman, which is Word-principle (śabdatattva), ‘appears as the objects’ (vivartate 'ṛthabhāvena). Thus, the creation of the world proceeds from it. The brahman is the one appearing as many, for it is the holder [lit., ‘substratum’] of a multiplicity of powers (śakti). Though not different from its powers, it seems to be so. As Biardeau (VP: 25, n. 1) puts it: ‘C’est l’Absolu lui-même qui se manifeste sous la forme des phénomènes par l’intermédiaire de ses pouvoirs. Le śabdabrahmavāda est donc un monisme de type bhedābheda’ [— ‘It is the Absolute itself which manifests in the form of phenomena through its powers. Therefore, the śabdabrahmavāda is a monism of the bhedābheda category’]. Here also, the process of the Lord’s manifestation is nothing but the progressive display and differentiation of his supreme energy — a notion which MVT III 5–9a, quoted in both SpN III 13 and ŚSV III 19, clearly develops: yā sa śaktir jagaddhātuh kathitā samavāyinī/ icchātvam tasya sa devi sīrksaḥ pratipadyate// saikāpi saty anekatvam yathā gacchati tac chṛṇu/ evam etad iti jñeyam nānyatheti suśniṣcitam// jñāpayantī jagaty atra
When the Master of the world wishes to create, his [supreme] Sakti, the Goddess who is said to be inherent in him, becomes Will [viz., energy of Will]. Listen how she, though one, becomes many. Similarly, when she makes the knowable known as definitely “this” and not as something else, she is named in this world “energy of Knowledge”. Similarly, when she becomes intent on acting, considering: “Let all this come to be [just as I have willed and known it]”, [that same energy], arisen at the very moment she creates the object, is then named the “[energy of] Action”. Thus, though [already] of two forms [Knowledge and Action], she differentiates herself again, becoming innumerable, thanks to those objects, which [function as her] contingent attributes. Therefore, this sovereign Goddess is to be compared to the thought-gem that yields all desires'. MVT III 9b–13a goes on to describe the form assumed by the supreme Sakti when considered from the point of view of phonemic emanation: becoming Māṭṛkā, she shifts from the level of parāvāc to that of paśyantī, again dividing herself into different phonemes or groups of phonemes, grouped into eight vargas and presided over by eight māṭṛkās. Thus emerge from one another in succession the Lord’s energies, seen as a ‘wheel’ — a multitude assuming the forms of all possible words and things.

10. saptapramātrs (YR ad 14)

The notion of a hierarchy of subjects — usually seven in number, but not uniformly — is common to all schools of Śaivism, including those that are dualistic. The notion itself of a ‘heptad of subjects’ (pramātrsaptaka) seems to be mainly of Saiddhantika origin, as is suggested in TĀV X 7–8 (avat.), wherein a Traika adept questions the need for the seven just mentioned (TĀ X 6–7a): nanv asmaddarśane naraśaktiśivātvamakam eva viśvam iti sarvatrodghosyate tat katham iha siddhāntadarśanādisamucitam pramātrbhedam avalambyaitad uktam [...], ‘But, one might object, is it not everywhere proclaimed, in our school, that the world consists of nara, Śakti and Śiva? So why has this [doctrine of the seven pramātrs] been stated here [in TĀ X 6–7a] by adopting the types of pramātrs congenial to schools such as the Siddhānta?’

The seven subjects represent different levels, or modes, of consciousness, that is, of cognitive experience, as is made clear by the metaphor of SpN I 1, in which they are said to be different ‘roles’ (bhūmikā) assumed by Śiva: śrūmān maheśvaro hi svātāntrayāsaktya śivamantramahēśvaramantreś-varamantravijñānakalaprayākalasakalāntām pramāṭībhūmikām tadvedya-bhūmikām ca gṛññānah, ‘By his power of absolute freedom, the glorious Great Lord assumes [on the subjective level] the cognitive roles of Śiva,
the Mantramahesvaras, the Mantresvaras, the Mantras, the Vijñānākālas, the Pralayākālas and the Sakalas [whereas, on the objective level,] he assumes the roles [of the objects that are] made known thereby. For other examples of the theatrical metaphor applied to Śiva, or the Self, and of the use of bhūmikā in the sense of ‘role’, see ŚS III 9–12, YR ad 1 and 5; see also SvTU VIII 31 (vol. III: 175): devaḥ parāvāksamāt sivabhūmikā eva sadāśiva iti grhita-tattadbhūmikā svayam gurūṣyapade sthitvēti, ‘Sadāśiva is Lord Śiva [half-]made of that sakti that is supreme Speech (parāvāc). And the fact that “he adopts by himself the [double] posture of the teacher and the pupil (gurūṣyapade sthitvē)” means that “he [alone] assumes each of those roles (bhūmikā).” ’ As modes of consciousness, the seven categories of subject are related to the tattvas understood as different levels of experience.

So variable are Śaiva texts, both in describing the levels of subjectivity and in locating them on the scale of the tattvas that it would be difficult, within the limits of our exposé, to give an account of them in detail (see, notably, Torella ĆPK: 199ff., Vasudeva MVT: 151–178). It is, however, possible to account for the more systematic classification of the ‘heptad of subjects’ later proposed by AG and his immediate followers, which is modeled on the MVT (I 14ff., II 1–9), itself reformulated in ĆPK III 2, 6–20. And it should be noted that AG, particularly in his TĀ, emphasizes the regular correspondence not only between the levels of subjectivity and those of manifestation (tattvas), but also between the levels of subjectivity and the three impurities (mala), or, more exactly, between those levels and the stages of the process by which the aspirant gradually frees himself from those impurities (see TĀ IX 93b–96, translated by Vasudeva MVT: 172). AG elaborates, and, indeed, rationalizes the Śaiva doctrine of a hierarchy of subjects in TĀ IX 84–96, X 6ff. (he refers again to that doctrine elsewhere, such as TĀ XV 339–341, etc.), TS IX, PTV 5–9b, ĆPV III 2 and ĆPVV ad loc. (vol. III: 319–323) and ad I 7, 14 (vol. II: 404–405). So do, on the one hand, his exegetes, Jayaratha ad TĀ and YR ad PS (see kārikās 14 and 23), and, on the other hand, Kṣemarāja, in his PH (sūtra 3) with auto-commentary, and in several other commentaries (SpN I 1, quoted above, ŚSV I 2–3, etc.). We sketch here the hierarchy of the seven subjects in descending order, as does YR in his gloss to PS 14, dealing with the first five, and in his gloss to PS 23, dealing with the last two, according to the distinction between suddhādhvan and asuddhādhvan: 1) As pure, undivided, vibrating consciousness, Śiva (i.e., Śiva/Sakti) is the highest subject. 2) The Mantramahesvaras, the ‘Great Lords of Mantras’, are located at the level of Sadāśiva. Thus the level of Sadāśiva is that very high level of consciousness where ‘this’, although appearing at the horizon of consciousness, remains immersed within the ‘I’. Nevertheless, the essential unity of consciousness has been somehow fragmented, as shown
by the plural applied to those Mantramahesvaras. 3) Then come, a grade below, the 118 MantreSvaras, the 'Lords of Mantras'. Located at the level of Īśvara, they represent the level of consciousness that operates there. Whatever may be the interpretation of the experience which the Īśvara state symbolizes (see YR's exegesis ad PS 14, which differs in some way of the classical one), it is the level of consciousness corresponding to the state in which one experiences more distinctly the emergence of an ideal objectivity, without deviating from one's own essential ipseity. As different modes of this essential ipseity, Śiva, the Mantramahesvaras and the MantreSvaras are free of all impurity. 4) Being located at the level of śuddhavidyā, pure, perfect Knowledge, the Mantras still belong to the plane of the śuddhādhyātan. Nevertheless, although ideal, the clear introduction of differentiation, which characterizes the stage of śuddhavidyā, implies the presence of māyā, even if not yet fully developed (aprarūḍhā), inasmuch as no sense of alterity is generated (see n. 508). Therefore, the experiencers located at this level, the Mantras, are affected by the māyiya mala (see ĪPK III 2, 9 on the Vidyeśvaras, with Utpaladeva's vṛtti). They are associated with the Vidyeśvaras, a group of eight deities (SpN II 2 mentions two of them: Anantabhaṭṭāraka and Vyoṃavyāpin; see also IPV III 1, 6: vidyeśvarā bhagavanta 'nantādyā vartante), whose specific task is that of accomplishing four of the five cosmic functions (pañca kṛtya), as well as striving for the liberation of limited souls, 'acting as intermediaries in the revelation of the teachings of Śiva, etc.' (Torella ĪPK: 201, n. 14); see n. 510. Being etymologically 'those who ideate [creation]', the Mantras are perfect instruments for the Vidyeśvaras who employ them in this double task. Thus the plane occupied by the crowd of the seventy million Mantras headed by the Vidyeśvaras represents 'the mode of consciousness in which vast but internally differentiated segments of the universe flash into view' (Sanderson 1986: 192). Facing a reality considered other than themselves, the Vidyeśvaras, residing at the plane of śuddhavidyā, are omniscient inasmuch as 'they are identified with consciousness' (ĪPV III 2, 9). For the same reason, since that consciousness is made of both prakāśa and vimārśa (that dynamic principle which manifests itself as the activity of the 'I' and receives therefore the name of kartṛtā, 'agency'), they are endowed with agency, as is shown by their accomplishing four of the five 'duties' (kṛtya). Yet, since they conceive the objects of their action as different from themselves, due to the māyiya mala, such agency is partial (ĪPK III 2, 9), and can be contrasted with the omnipotence of the MantreSvaras and Mantramahesvaras. 'Therefore, ĪPV III 2, 9 concludes, they too must be considered finite souls (anutva);' see n. 510. 5) The presence of agency, even though partial, is what distinguishes the Vidyeśvaras/Mantras from the next level of consciousness, namely the Vi-jñānākala (or Vijñānakevalas) — defined (ĪPK III 2, 6-7) as pure con-
sciousness (\textit{suddhabodha}), in the sense that 'they no longer contaminate self-representation with the projection of the impure \textit{tattvas} from māyā to earth (\textit{prthivi}') (Sanderson 1986: 191). In other words, they no longer consider what is not the Self, viz., the body, the mind, etc., as the Self (a mode of consciousness which is that of the Sakalas). Therefore, in contrast to the Vidyeśvaras, the Vijñānākālas are free of the māyāyamala, the impurity of differentiation, and in contrast to the following states, Pralayākālas and Sakalas, they are also free of the kārmamala, the impregnating of consciousness with impressions left by one's good or bad actions; thus do not transmigrate any longer. On the other hand, they are completely devoid of agency (kartrā), i.e., of I-consciousness (vimāraśa, or spanda), with the result that they consider themselves incomplete or deficient. Thus, they are subject to the ānavamala, the impurity consisting of the intuition of limitedness, that is, they fail to recognize their own creative freedom (svātantrya) and own essential plenitude (pūrṇatā). Their name, 'those Inert in Gnosis' as Sanderson translates it, accounts for those two symmetric features. So does their location on the scale of the \textit{tattvas}, since, according to some texts (notably YR ad 14, and PTV 5–9b quoted n. 511), they hang suspended between the pure (\textit{suddhādhvan}) and the impure universe (\textit{asuddhādhvan}), being placed below \textit{suddhavidyā} and above māyā, in an intermediary \textit{tattva}, created \textit{ad hoc} for purposes specific to Śaiva speculation, namely, the mahāmāyā, the 'Great Illusion'. Thus the Vijñānākāla represents the mode of consciousness belonging to the yogin engaged on the path leading to liberation. According to the ĪPVVV (vol. III: 322), it is a kind of experience (bhogaviśeṣa) which may be attained through a special initiation intended to facilitate leaving [behind] the realm of māyā, either through meditative realization (bhāvanā), or through concentration (dhāranā), contemplation (dhyāna) or absorption (samādhi) that have māyā for their object (cf. Torella IPK: 200, n. 12). Thus, PTV (Skt. text: p. 57) teaches that 'the Vijñānākālas and the Pralayākālas do not have the idea of mama, "[this is] mine", [in certain states as samādhi]' (vijñānākālānām pralayākālānām ca [...] mameti vyatiriktaṃ nāsti). 6) The Pralayākālas, or Pralayakevalas, 'those Inert in Dissolution', represent the mode of consciousness in which the Self is suspended in a state of inertia, which explains the common analogy of deep, i.e., dreamless, sleep. On the meaning of the term 'Pralayākala', see ĪPV III 2, 8 (vol. II: 252), quoted n. 625. The 'dissolution' of their name is a metaphor for the state of total absorption found in deep sleep, which is itself further analyzed as twofold, according to whether some internal sensation (\textit{savēdyā} or \textit{prāṇa}) persists or not, the latter stage being that of real absorption or 'dissolution'. Thus the doctrine distinguishes between two levels of Pralayākālas (ĪPK III 2, 8). Sanderson (1986: 191) defines the lower one, as 'analogous to dreamless but blissful sleep (savēdyāpralayākalatā) and the other to
dreamless sleep completely void of sensation (\textit{apavedyapralayākalatā}). In Utpaladeva's fourfold division of the limited self (\textit{māyāpramātra}), the lower Pralayākala is also termed \textit{prānapramātra}, for he experiences the Self as an internal sensation (\textit{prāna}), and the higher one is termed \textit{sūnyapramātra}, for he experiences the Self as the Void (\textit{sūnya}). In the \textit{prānapramātra}, the \textit{māyiya\textit{mala}} persists, whereas it is transcended in the \textit{sūnyapramātra}, with the complete, although transitory, dissolution of the māyic world. However, \textit{kārmamala} remains at both levels, for, though all actions have dissolved in the perfect inertia of deep sleep, 'the impressions of past actions remain, waiting to regenerate world-experience' (Sanderson 1986: 191) when the period of dissolution comes to an end, that is, when one awakes. Thus, as is the immediately inferior Sakala, the lower Pralayākala is subject to the three impurities, whereas the higher Pralayākala is free of the \textit{māyiya\textit{mala}}. See also YR ad 23, who defines the Pralayākalas as the ones 'who are freed from the particular [that is, from gross materiality] and from the body'. 7) At the bottom of the ladder, the Sakala, 'endowed with factors of fragmentation (\textit{kāla})', is the ordinary limited consciousness existing solely in the states of waking and dream, immersed in the māyic world, taking as the Self what is not the Self, and denied even the transitory redemption of dreamless sleep. See YR ad 23: 'Are called Sakalas those cognizing subjects who are of a bodily nature because of the factors of fragmentation (\textit{kāla}), beginning with the faculties in their “pure” state [that is, without adjunction of object] (\textit{indriyamātra}) and ending with particular [objects] [that is, with the \textit{mahābhūtas}].' For a detailed exposition of the reverse process, through which the meditator, gradually freeing himself from the sentiment of differentiation, aims at reaching the intuition of identity with the deity, that is, consciousness itself, see TĀ IX 90b–97a, XIII 275b–76; also Sanderson 1986: 190–193.

11. \textit{guṇatattva} (YR ad 19)

In Sāmkhya, unconscious nature (\textit{prakṛti}) is the “cause” (at least in the sense of the material cause) of the world; in Trika, consciousness itself is that cause, the world being nothing but its external manifestation. The Trika explains the phenomenal world as resulting from the progressive obscuration and constriction of the Lord's supreme energy, which is his freedom. Thus it establishes a 'genesis of bondage' (Hulin 1978: 304 — une 'génèse de la servitude') against the background of an essential vibration which, though progressively weakened, or so it seems, never ceases to tremble. Śakti is the fundamental principle that distinguishes Trika from Sāmkhya, despite similarities in the cosmologies of the two systems. The Trika understands empirical diversity in terms of the dichotomy of enjoyer (\textit{bhokṣya}) and object of enjoyment (\textit{bhogya}). In this context, \textit{purusa} is the enjoyer whereas \textit{prakṛti} represents the totality of such objects — an
argument similar to that of the Sāṃkhya concerning the puruṣa, who “contemplates” prakṛti as though she were a dancer, or an actress, performing before him (SK 59). prakṛti offers the entire objective world to the en­joyer, although its objectivity is as yet potential. Thus TS VIII, p. 83 con­trasts the actualized world (prakṛtitattvasya sargah), with prakṛti defined as the homogeneous and quiescent aggregate of the three guṇas. prakṛti is not only creation in potentīa, it is also the fundamental principle persist­ing in each and every particular object of enjoyment, once creation has taken place: [...] esa eva sukhaduhkhamohdtmakabhogyaviṣeṣānusyūtasya sāmānyamātrasya tadguṇasāmyāparanāmnah prakṛtitattvasya sargah, ‘[…]’ Such is the creation pertaining to prakṛtitattva; this prakṛtitattva, which is nothing else than the common principle (sāmānya) inherent (anusyūta) in [each] specific object of enjoyment made of pleasure, pain and delusion, is also termed the equilibrium of those guṇas (taguṇasāmya)’. The TS (pp. 84–85) gives an alternative definition of prakṛti as bhogyasāmānya, ‘state of equilibrium of the objects of enjoyment’, which makes it the archetype of objectivity itself. Some disturbance of this ideal equilibrium is necessary so that actual objectivity emerges from its potential “cause”. So TS (p. 85): evam kṣubdhāt pradhānāt kartavyāntarodayo nākṣubdhaḥ iti, ‘Thus other effects [buddhi, etc.] emerge from the disturbed pradhāna, and not from the undisturbed one’. The point is of so much importance that the TS postulates additionally a guṇatattva: kṣobho ‘vaśyam eva antarāle bhuyapagantavya iti siddhaṁ sāṃkhyaśaiparidṛṣṭam prthagbhūtam gunatattvam, ‘One must necessarily accept that this disturbance takes place in-between [the two principles]. Thus has a guṇatattva distinct [from prakṛti and buddhi] been established, which Sāṃkhya has failed to discern’. The term ‘kṣobha’ has itself been borrowed from the Sāṃkhya, more precisely from late Sāṃkhya, where it appears intended to gloss over a glaring lapsus in the system — for the initial coming into contact of two utterly unlike principles (for so it conceives puruṣa and prakṛti) is indeed difficult to jus­tify. A true dualism is thus difficult to maintain, and this may have been the reason for the introduction of the three qualities, which are never, in fact, in a state of equilibrium; their ‘resting’ being then nothing but an hypo­thesis motivated by the doctrine itself. This means that, regarding the guṇas, the loss of equilibrium is as much a category in its own right as the equilibrium itself, and thus deserves to receive a name, that of guṇatattva.

12. Evolution of the phenomenal world (YR ad 19)

In the Sāṃkhya (see SK 22), whereas puruṣa stands isolated, neither an effect, nor a cause, buddhi and ahaṅkāra proceed successively from prakṛti, the primal cause; cf. also SK 3, which defines four types of entities by having recourse to the opposition ‘producer-product’ (prakṛti-vikṛti). Then, from ahaṅkāra, the ‘group of sixteen’ emerges, which includes manas, the
five buddhīndriyas, the five karmendriyas and the five tanmātras. A further analysis (SK 25) distinguishes the ‘group of eleven’ (manas and all the ten indriyas), effect of the sāttvikāhaṅkāra (also named vaikṛta), from the five tanmātras, products of the tāmasāhaṅkāra (also named bhūtādi, for it is the secondary cause of the bhūtas); see n. 593. And all of them are directly, i.e., horizontally, related to ahaṅkāra, instead of vertically evolving from one another (SK 25–28). As for the five bhūtas, they proceed from the five tanmātras; see Hulin 1978: 73ff. and Larson 1979: 179ff., 236 (chart). On the other hand, although SK 33 defines the antaḥkaraṇa as threefold, its identity as a whole is not fixed, buddhi, ahaṅkāra and manas being clearly distinguished from each other and endowed with different status. The Trika also derives the manas and the ten indriyas from the sāttvikāhaṅkāra (see n. 593), whereas the five tanmātras proceed from the aspect of the sāttvikāhaṅkāra in which tamaś assumes predominance, as shown by two parallel passages of TS VIII. See TS VIII, p. 87: tatra sāttviko yasmād manaś ca buddhīndriyapaṅcaśaṁ ca, tatra manasi janye sarvatanmātrajananasāmarthiyuktaḥ sa janakaḥ, ‘From the sāttvika [ahaṅkāra] manas and the pentad of the buddhīndriyas proceed. Once the manas is evolved [from the sāttvikāhaṅkāra], the same ahaṅkāra [in the aspect in which tamaś is predominant] becomes the cause capable of giving rise to all the tanmātras’, and TS VIII, p. 89: bhoktramācaḥdakāt tu tamāḥpradhānāhaṅkārāt tanmātrāni vedyāikarūpāni pañca, ‘However, from the [aspect of the sāttvika] ahaṅkāra in which tamaś assumes predominance, and which veils the enjoyer’s part [viz., the subjectivity], proceed the five tanmātras, which are only object of knowledge (vedya) [and which do no partake of the knower, as is the case with the manas and the indriyas]’. This conception of the tanmātras originating from the sāttvikāhaṅkāra (even though it is from its tāmasa part) is an innovation as regards the Sāṃkhya scheme. In fact, in the Trika reasonings, the sāttvikāhaṅkāra itself is trigunātmaka: although it abounds in sattva, some traces of the two other guṇaś remain; see Mukund Rām Śaṅstrī ad TS VIII, p. 87, n. 80 (ad tatra sāttviko yasmād manaś ca...): sāttvikaḥ sattvapradhāno yato guṇihūtattayā rajastamasor api sambhāva ity arthaḥ. Therefore, one has to understand that, once the manas has emerged from the sāttvikāhaṅkāra equally characterized by the three guṇaś, the five tanmātras are produced from the subordinated tamoguṇa of the sāttvikāhaṅkāra. The Trika agrees again with the Sāṃkhya by making the bhūtas directly emerge from the tanmātras. However, its perspective is altogether different, since it emphasizes, with the concept of kṣobha, ‘disturbance’, the persistence of vibrating consciousness within all the levels of phenomenal diversity. Thus, the entire process of the manifestation of the tattvas takes place according to the principle that the cause in its disturbed form is called the effect (see TS VIII, p. 90, in Appendix 13).
Each tanmātra is considered to be the quintessential form of the corresponding mahābhūta, inasmuch as it constitutes its distinctive quality. Thus sound is associated with ether, or cosmic space, considered to be the substratum of the propagation of waves; touch with air, etc. Yet, with the exception of ether which has sound for its unique quality, one has to admit that other mahābhūtas possess more than one sensible quality, or, to put it differently, that one tanmātra may be present in more than one mahābhūta: for instance sound is present in all the mahābhūtas. Thus classical Sāṃkhya (e.g., Yuktidīpikā 38) has elaborated the theory of the progressive accumulation of the qualities, furthermore explained — just as in YR ad 22 — as the cumulative combination of the tanmātras, according to the principle that the effect is proportionate to the cause. Hence, if space is experienced as sonorous, air as sonorous and tangible, fire as sonorous, tangible and visible, water as sonorous, tangible, visible and savory, earth as sonorous, tangible, visible, savory and fragrant, it is because space proceeds from sound, air from sound and contact, etc. This is also the position of the Trika (see YR's commentary itself) with the difference that emphasis is once more laid on the principle of ksobha, as shown by TS VIII, p. 90 (emending śabdatanmātram to sparśatanmātram): tatra śabdatanmātrat kṣubhītād avakāśādānavyāpārām nabhaḥ — śabdasya vācyādhyāsāvakāśasahatvāt/ sparśa(śabda)tanmāraṁ kṣubhitaṁ vāyuḥ śabdas tv asya nabhasā virahitābhāvāt/ rūpe kṣubhitaṁ tejah pūrvavunau tu pūrvvavat/ rasaḥ kṣubhita āparah pūrve trayah pūrvvavat/ gandhaḥ kṣubhito dharā pūrve catvāraḥ pūrvavat/ anye śabdasparsābhāyaṁ vāyuḥ ityādikramena pāñcabhyo dharany iti manyante/ guṇasamudāyamātrām ca pṛthivī nānyo guṇi kaścit/, ‘From disturbed (kṣubhita) sound (śabdatanmātra) emerges the ether [or space] (nabhaḥ), with its function of providing space — for the word [as articulated sound] gives place to the expressed meaning. Air (vāyu) is nothing else than disturbed touch (sparśa); however, sound (śabda) is also present, for air cannot exist without space (nabhaḥ) [whose quintessential quality is sound]. Fire (tejas) is nothing else than disturbed form (rūpa); however, the two preceding principles [i.e., tanmātras] are also present, as in the previous scheme. Water (āpas) is nothing else than disturbed savor (rasa); however, the three preceding principles are also present, as in the previous scheme. Earth (dharā) is nothing else than disturbed odor (gandha); however, the four preceding principles are also present, as in the previous scheme. Others maintain that earth proceeds from [all] the five [tanmātras] in keeping with a scheme according to which air proceeds from both sound and tangibility. Moreover earth is merely the aggregate of the qualities [i.e., of the tanmātras] and there is no substratum of qualities (gunaḥ) which would be different from [earth as aggregate of the qualities]’. For what matters
in soteriological systems as the Sāṃkhya and the Trika is not so much the question of creation as manifestation as the correlated questions of the process of cognition and that of liberation. This is why the Sāṃkhya contends that, during the process of cosmic dissolution, each mahābhūṭa is reabsorbed into the tanmātra from which it proceeds, and all the tanmātras are in turn reabsorbed into ahaṅkāra. Ṣ PV 3, 10–11, vol. II: 242, synthesizes the Trika's viewpoint not only on the entire meya, that cognizable reality made of twenty-three elements (the thirteen kāraṇas and the ten kāryas) whose cause is prakṛti, but also on the entire 'genesis of bondage' which starts with māyā. Observing that, in Ṣ PK 3, 11, 11, the bhūtas are mentioned first, before the tanmātras, AG develops all the implications of such an order: sthūlaṃ kāryaṃ pṛthivyā ṛpaḥ tejo vāyur nabha iti paṇca bhūṭāni/ sūkṣmam eśām eva rūpam gandho raso rūpam sparśaḥ śabda iti/ tatraikāṅkagunām ākāśādy ekaikavrddhagunāṃ veti darśanabheda iti na vivecito 'nupayogat/ tatra sthūlaṃ vibhaktam avibhāgasyānumāpakam iti sthūlarūpapakramam uktam/ atra pṛthivyādyābhāsā eva miśrībhūya ghaṭādisvalaṅkanbhūṭāḥ karmendriyair upasarpitā buddhendriyair ālocitā an-taḥkaraṇena sāṃkalpābhāwimatiṣcitārūpā vidyāyā vivecitāḥ kalādibhir anurāṇijitāḥ pramātari viśrāmyanti/ iti tātparyam, 'The gross effect [manifests itself] as the five physical elements (bhūta): earth, water, fire, air and ether. Their subtle forms are odor, savor, color, touch and sound. On this point systems differ. Some hold that ether, etc., have only one quality each. But others maintain that each item, in the order given here, has one quality more than the item succeeding. However, since this point is not very important, it has not been discussed here. The gross, which presents the state of differentiation, is the means of inferring the undifferentiated state. Hence the gross categories are stated here first. According to this system [i.e., to the Trika], the manifested principles (ābhāsa) such as earth, etc., mixing with one another, assume the form of a definite object, such as jar, etc. They come to rest in the subject as they are approached by the organs of action, or perceived by the cognitive organs, synthesized, taken as one's own, and ascertained by [the manas, the ahaṅkāra and the buddhi constitutive of] the antaḥkaraṇa, differentiated by circumstantial Knowledge (vidyā) and affected by [the other kāhaṇkas as] kalā, etc. This is the implied meaning' (tr. Pandey, modified); see the Tantrasaṅkhāvā, quoted n. 545.

14. Doctrines of the Self (YR ad 27)

See also PH 8 and its vṛtti: naiyāyikādayo jñānādīgiranāgaśrayam buddhāturāprāyam evātmānaṃ samsrtau manyante, apavarge tu taducchēde śūnypārāyam/ ahampratitipratyeyah sukhaduhkhādyāpmādhibhiḥ tirakṣāta atmeti manvāna māṁsasakā api buddhāv eva nivēṣtāḥ/ jñānasamśāna eva tatvam iti saugata buddhāvṛttiṣeva paryavasitaḥ/, ‘The Naiyāyikas, etc., admit a Self,
which, being the substratum of knowledge and other qualities, is for all intents and purposes (praâyā) identical with the category of buddhi, as far as worldly experience is concerned. At the moment of liberation, when all [guna]s disappear, the Self is for all intents and purposes identical with the Void. The Mimâmsakas are settled [in taking the Self] as buddhi, inasmuch as they consider the Self that which is apprehended in the cognition 'I', veiled by the contingent conditions (upâdhi) of pleasure and pain. The followers of Sugata [i.e., Yogâcâra Buddhists] have concluded that [the Self is to be found among the] modes of the buddhi (buddhivâttri), holding that the Real (tattva) is nothing but a series (or continuum) of cognitions (jñânasamâtana).

15. Vaiśeṣika and Vaiyākaraṇa concepts of jâti, sâmânya, sattâ, and mahâsattâ (YR ad 27)

It is a typically Vaiśeṣika notion that even the ‘universal’ (sâmânya) must be distinguished into at least two varieties: 'being' (sattâ) — which is devoid of external distinction, therefore, unqualified — and what comes to be known as jâti, ‘genus’ — which is common to various individuals but differs from genus to genus, on which distinctions depends our behavior in the world. Frauwallner observes, apropos (II: 104), that what are called sâmânyaviśeṣa, ‘Gemeinsamkeit-Besonderheit’ (‘generality-particularity’), occupy the logical space between sâmânya as such, that is, sattâ, ‘being’ (untouched by particularity), and viśeṣa as such, the ‘particular’ (the ‘atom’, untouched by any universal). This ‘sâmânyaviśeṣa’ was by the Vaiśeṣikas then termed jâti, so as not to confuse it with their ‘âkṣṭī’, which for them did not mean ‘common form’ (op. cit.: 102). YR seems however to confound ‘genus’ (jâti) with ‘universal’ (sâmânya), which, according to Frauwallner, should be distinguished. mahâsattâ as such is not a Vaiśeṣika term. It appears in the grammatical tradition, particularly in Helârâja’s commentary on Bhartṛhari (avat. to VP III 1, 33), in a characterization of the ‘advayanya’, presumably the advaya of Bhartṛhari: [...] advayanaye paramârthasatyekai jâti mahâsattâkhyâ parabrahmasvabhâvâ, ‘In a monistic doctrine, this jâti termed mahâsattâ is of the nature of para-brahman, the highest brahman, the only ultimate reality (paramârthasat).’ The term mahâsattâ appears also in the Trika; see ĪPK I 5, 13–14 (quoted n. 238), which passage characterizes consciousness endowed with awareness as supreme Speech (parâvâk), freedom (svâtantra), sovereignty (aiśvarya) of the supreme Self, fulguration (sphurattâ), ‘great being’ (mahâsattâ), unmodified by space and time (deśakâlâviśeṣinti). In the Trika tradition, the mahâ- of mahâsattâ may be understood as a reference, somewhat corrupted, to Vaiśeṣika and Vyākaraṇa doctrine, ‘great’ signifying ‘par excellence’, vis-à-vis all the other ‘sâmânyas’ that are tinged with particularity — as ‘great’ in the English idiom “God is the one great cause”. On the
Vaiśeṣika notion of sattā, see further Frauwallner 1973, vol. II: 103–104; Lysenko 2007. It is difficult to recognize in YR’s idiosyncratic account any particular Vaiśeṣika theory (see Keith 1921: 192–196; Frauwallner 1973, vol. II: 3–180; Halbfass 1992; Scharf 1996; Lysenko 2007). What is implicitly at stake here is the Trika criticism of the Vaiśeṣika system, which distinguishes radically between dharmin, ‘substance, substrate’ [lit., ‘that which has the property’], and dharma, ‘property, quality’ — whereas Trika holds the contrary view, namely, that there is no essential difference between dharmin and dharma, or in Trika terms, between śakti(s); see TĀV I 158–159 (vol. II: 194): [...] khalu kānḍā ātmavābhisambandhād ātmā ātyādinā dharmirūpaṃ ātmānam nirūpya [...] , ‘Verily, the followers of Kaṇḍā, having explained that the ātman is “that which supports the attributes” (dharmin), according to the statement: “The Self (ātman) is such due to its connexion with Selfhood (ātmavā)” . [...]’ — meaning that, for Vaiśeṣikas, ātman is considered a dravya, a substance, and as such is connected with its jāti, namely, ātma, as well as with its qualities (guna), namely, jīvā, sukhaduhkha, etc., and is thus a dharmin distinct from its attributes (dharma). JR concludes his gloss by affirming the Trika position: na vastutaḥ kaścit śaktitadvator bhedaḥ, ‘In reality, there is no difference between energy (śakti) and its possessor [viz., śaktimat’.

16. Mīmāṃsaka position on the Self, according to the Trika (YR ad 32)

After interpreting SpK I 4 from the Trika viewpoint, according to which anyatra, ‘elsewhere’, refers to the Supreme Lord, or supreme Self, Kṣemarāja shows that the verse may also be understood both as formulating the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine and as its implicit and logical refutation. ‘anyatra’ thus refers to the puryaśṭaka — a position conditionally adopted by Kṣemarāja in order to demonstrate that one must not stop at that understanding, but should rather recognize, within this puryaśṭaka, a transcendental Subject who is Śaṅkara or Śiva, as a ‘[uniform] mass of blissful consciousness’ (cidāṇandaghana); see SpN I 4: mīmāṃsakaparāhāraya tv etad ittham vyākhyaṭavyaṃ/ aham sukhītyadisaṁvido yāṣ tā anyatreti puryaśṭakasvarūpe pramātari sukhāyavasthābhīr anusyūte otaprotarūpe [...] na tv asmadabhyupagāte ’smimś cidāṇandaghane śaṅkarātmanī svasvabhāve — iti na sarvāda sukhāyupādhitrāśṛṣṭo ’yam ātmāpi tu cinmayah/ yadā tu ni-jāsuddhā vakṣyamāṇayāyaṃ svasvāpuraṃ gūhayitvā tiṣṭhati tadā puryaśṭakāyavasthāyāṃ sukhītādigrāmatāsya tatēpi na nirodhīṣhīr asya [...]/ aham kṛṣo ’ham sthūla ityādipratītiparihāreṇa aham sukhī duhkhi-tyādi vaddato ’yam āśayaḥ, ‘In order to refute the Mīmāṃsakas, this [i.e., the term ātman] should be interpreted as follows. The cognitions such as “I am happy”, etc., exist elsewhere (anyatra) [i.e., ‘in another substratum’, viz.,] in the cognizer (pramātṛ) in the form of the puryaśṭaka, which
is threaded through (anusyūta) the states of happiness, etc., that is, which
is interwoven (otaprotā) with them. [But] it does not signify for the [Mī-
māṃsakas] that essential nature which is accepted by us, namely, Śaṅkara
[Śiva] as a uniform mass of blissful consciousness. [As a consequence of
our definition], this Self [according to us] is not always veiled by contin-
gent attributes (upādhi) of pleasure, etc. [as Mīmāṃsakas say]; rather, it is
pure consciousness (cīnmayā). When, through his own impurity (asuddhi)
[that we will later expound], he conceals his own nature and appears [con-
tditionally] (tīṭhāti), he then, being in that state of puryaṣṭaka, etc., takes
on the form of [the experient of] pleasure, etc. Even in this state, there
is no obstruction [of his real nature] by those experiences of pleasure, etc.
[...]. This is the real intention of him [viz., the Mīmāṃsaka] who says: “I
am happy”, “I am sad”, etc., in rejection of assertions such as “I am thin”,
“I am fat”, etc. [as characterizations of the Self]’; in other words, from
the Trika point of view, the Mīmāṃsaka's real intention is that the sub-
stratum of such experiences is a transcendent Self, defined as one mass of
consciousness and bliss. Showing thus that the Mīmāṃsaka view implies
within itself its own completion, Kṣemarāja adds that one has only to sub-
merge the puryaṣṭaka along with phenomenal diversity within the supreme
Self (SpN I 4):
sukhitvādipratitisambhinnāṃ puryaṣṭakabhūnīṁ antarṃukhe
pade nimajjayams tadanaṃsrāṇeṣa bāhyasyāpi dehtaghaṭāder galanāt
pratyabhijānāti eva svan śivasvabhāvatvam, ‘Indeed, one recognizes
(pratyabhijānāti) one’s own essential nature as Śiva by submerging one’s own
condition, that of puryaṣṭaka, replete with experiences of pleasure, etc., in
the inner state [viz., the Self], and by dissolving along with it the externality
that consists of body, jar, etc.’ (tr. Singh, modified).

17. śūnyavāda (YR ad 32)

According to the avat. of SpN I 12–13, the Śūnyavādins are ‘the Vedān-
tins (śrutiyaṇtavid), the Naiyāyikas (viz., Ākṣapāda) and the Mādhyamikas,
for whom remains only the principle of naught or universal destruction’
(viśvocchedarūpam abhāvātmakam eva tattvam avaśīyate). The Vedāntins
(or Brahmavādins) are otherwise called Abhāvabrahmavādins, as this is
developed by PHvṛ 8: asad evedam āśīt ity abhāvabrahmavādinaḥ śūnyabhu-
vam avagāhya sthitāḥ, ‘The Brahmavādins, adepts of non-Being (abhāva),
descend into the region of Void (śūnyabhū) on the basis of [ChU VI 2, 1]:
“In the beginning, this [world] was just Non-being” and remain [there]’.
The discussion of SpN I 12–13 starts with the same quote from the ChU,
whose full form is: sad eva saumya idam agrāśīd ekam evādvitīyam/ taddhaika āhur asad evedam agrāśīd ekam evādvitīyam/ tasmād asataḥ
sad ajayati, ‘In the beginning, my dear, this was Being alone, one only
without a second. Some people say “In the beginning, this was non-being
alone, one only; without a second. From that non-being, being was
produced." Similarly, the Śūnyavādins include the Mādhyamika Buddhists, as stated by PHvṛ 8 (mādhyamikā apy evam eva), ŚSV I 1 and TĀ I 33a, which formulates thus the Mādhyamika position: antahśūnya 'ham, 'I am internally Void'. SpN I 5 describes the Mādhyamikas as sarvesām ahāvavādinah, 'those who assert the non-existence of everything', whereas SpN I 12–13 quotes and refutes Nāgārjuna. See also ĀŚ II 23, which characterizes the Mādhyamikas as those who take the ātman to be amīrta, 'without form', which, according to the commentaries, means niḥsvabhāva, 'devoid of essence'.

18. neti neti (YR ad 32)

This apophatic phrase comes first as a litany in the BĀU at the moment of celebrating the ātman. Cf. BĀU II 3, 6: athāta ādeśo neti neti/ na hy etasmād iti nety anyat param asti, 'Now therefore there is the teaching not this, not this for there is nothing higher than this, that he is not this', and Ś ad loc.; also BĀU III 9, 26: sa eṣa netī neti ātmāgrhyo na hi ghyate 'sīryo na hi sīryate 'sango na hi sajyate 'sito na vyathate, na risyati, 'That self is not this, not this. It is incomprehensible, for it is not comprehended. It is indestructible, for it is never destroyed. It is unattached, for it does not attach itself. It is unfettered. It does not suffer. It is not injured'; same text in BĀU IV 2, 4; IV 4, 22; IV 5, 15. See also MāU 7 and ĀŚ III 26 (which quotes the pratīka of BĀU III 9, 26): sa eṣa netī neti vyākhya- tam niḥnute yathā/ sarvam agrāhyabhāvena hetunājam prakāsate//, 'De ce que [le passage scripturaire:] "Il n'est, quant à lui, ni ainsi, ni ainsi ..." nie tout ce qui avait été exposé en détail, en invoquant comme raison [son] insaisissabilité, il appert clairement que le [brahman est] non-né' (tr. Bouy — 'Since, by stating: “It is not this, it is not that”, [the Śruti] denies what it had elaborately expounded, giving as a reason that [the brahman] is entirely ungraspable, it clearly appears that this [brahman] is unborn'); also ĀŚ IV 83a, where the Śūnyavādins' position is alluded to by [...] nāsti nāstītī [...] in the course of referring to various conceptions of the Self (ātman), considered quà its being or existence. As observed by Ānandagīri ad loc., the repetition (vīpsā) of nāsti is meant to signify the Void as absolute (ātyantika). Note that the Yogācāras have accused the Mādhyamikas of professing nihilism (cf. Bouy ĀŚ: 295–296). So do the Śaivas, as YR demonstrates here. They hold that not only does nihilism amount to an aporia, but also that it has for its corollary the superimposition of a false insentience on the Self. Even though the Mādhyamikas deny the accusation of nihilism, claiming rather that their doctrine of śūnyatā is catuṣkotivinirmuktā, 'free from the tetralemma' — that is, the four alternative propositions: idam sat, ...asat, ...sadasat, ...na sadasat, 'X exists', '...does not exist', '...both exists and does not exist', '...neither exists nor does not exist', Śaivas take all this to be mere empty logic.
19. Kallaṭa (YR ad 42)

As stated in the auto-commentary, PH 18 deals with mystical techniques alternative to ‘the rigorous disciplines that are prāṇāyāma, mudrā, bandha, etc.’. Kṛṣmarāja quotes Kallaṭa in the context of the exposition of the śaktivikāsa, ‘blossoming of energy’, which he presents as extraneous to Pratyabhijñā doctrine (śaktisankeḍayās tu yady api pratyabhijñāyaṁ na pratipādītaḥ), and as ‘resorting to the sacred tradition’ (āmnāyika), which the context further allows us to identify as the Krama (see PHvṛ 19, which refers to the Kramasūtras). Kallaṭa’s line appears there as an aphoristic definition of the śaktivikāsa, a technique of inner absorption with external expansion of the senses, also called bhairavīmudrā (bhairavīmu-drāṇupraveśayuktā bahiḥ prasaraṇam), and described as śaker vikāsaḥ antarnigādhāyā akramam eva sakalakaraṇacakravisphāraṇena, ‘The blossoming of the energy hidden internally results from the simultaneous opening of the entire wheel of sense-organs’. It is again defined by the Kakṣyāsotra cited in the same passage (also quoted in SpN I 11): sarvāḥ śaktiś cetasā darśanādyāḥ sve sve vedye yaugapadyena viśvак/ ksiptvā madhye hāta-kastambhabhūtās tiṣṭhān viśvādhāra eko 'vabhāsi///, ‘Throwing by will all the powers like seeing, etc., simultaneously and on all sides into their respective objects and remaining [unmoved] within, like a gold pillar (hāṭaka-stambha), you [O Śiva] alone appear as the foundation of the universe’ (tr. Singh). Later on, the vṛtti relates the śaktivikāsa to the practices at work in the Ṽṛdhvakaṇḍalinī, according to a process requiring ‘the restraint of the prāṇa between the two eyebrows, which [restraint] is accomplished by the energy of the subtle prāṇa which develops gradually through the regulation of the vibrations in the cavities of the nose’ (nāsāpuṭaspandra-moniṣṭaḥsūkṣma-prāṇasākyā bhrūbhedanena; tr. Singh, modified); on the details of this esoteric and complex procedure, see the lengthy exposition of PHvṛ 18, Singh PH: 41–42, 150–152. It is noteworthy that the śaktivikāsa resorts to the sāktopāya (Singh PH: 30), inasmuch as the exposition of PS 41–46 is mainly made from this viewpoint. Therefore, Kallaṭa’s aphoristic statement means that the ‘blossoming of energy’ takes place by means of the transformation of extroverted into introverted consciousness, at the very moment that consciousness turns outward, simultaneously opening all the sense-organs; a paradoxical practice that consists in reaching the greatest interiorization at the moment of, and through, the widest externalization.

The hemistich quoted here by YR is not found in the Spandakārikā, if indeed the text is to be attributed to Kallaṭa at all: according to some, among whom Bhāskara (ŚŚvā I 4–5: 2–3), and Utpalavaiṣṇava (SpP, 7th liminary verse), Kallaṭa is the author of the SpK, whereas Kṛṣmarāja (ŚSV II 4–7) ascribes the authorship of the SpK to Vasugupta (on this question, see Dyczkowski SpK: 21–24, and Sanderson 2007: 405–407, who concludes in
favor of Kallata's authorship). Nor is the hemistich found in Kallata's vṛtti to the Spandakārikā — a brief gloss, which he himself calls Spandasarvasvava in his first concluding stanza. According to AG (IPV, vol. II: 30), Kallata is also the author of two commentaries on the ŚS, the Tattvārthaśicintāmaṇि [TĀC] and the Madhuvāhini, of which the TĀC is most often referred to and quoted (see Sanderson 2007: 405, n. 578). From all those quotes, it appears that the TĀC had a section dealing with the movement and spiritual properties of breath; cf. Tā X 187–227, and probably Tā XXVIII 338–340, on which JR comments by citing three sūtras (among which: prāk samvit prāñe pariṇatā, also quoted in TĀV III 141, V 6, V 44–48a, XV 303, XVII 85, XXVIII 293, 338–339), which he ascribes to Kallata, although without giving a source. It appears also that the TĀC dealt with a peculiar method of animal sacrifice involving the withdrawal and absorption by the officiant of the animal's breath, referred to in Tā XVI 36–45 and in Kṣemarāja's NTU XX 27ff. (vol. I: 226), where the teaching of this technique is ascribed to Kallata's TĀC. The TĀC seems also to have been famous for its exposition of the mystical practice of tutīpāta, the 'fall of the moment'. It is indirectly referred to by Tā X 208 (vol. V: 2026), which names Kallata, while JR quotes from TĀC: tutīpāta sarvajñatādayah; SpP 22 [= ad I 22]: 31, quotes it more extensively, although not referring explicitly to TĀC: tutīpāte sarvajñatvasarvakartṛtvasarvēṣitādayah/ esa ca gurūpadeśesānādārāt parikṣyayah, 'It is during the “fall of the moment” that omniscience, omnipotence and mastery of all things, etc., (become clearly manifest) and (so) that should be examined with reverence in accord with the Master's teachings' (tr. Dyczkowski SpK: 159, modified); same quote in PTV 5–9a (Gnoli PTV: 61). Let us note that Utpalavaisnava takes Kallata, whom he considers to be the author of the SpK, to be the author of two other works: the Tattvicāra and the Svavabhāvasambodha, from which he quotes (in SpP 1: 9, and SpP 30 [= II 4a]: 38–39, for the former; in SpP 1: 7–8, for the latter). For lack of other clues, we may only advance the hypothesis that the line from Kallata quoted by YR and Kṣemarāja may belong to the TĀC, insofar as the verse that SpP 21 [= I 21], p. 30, draws from the TĀC agrees with the context in which the PHvj (ad 18: 98, in Singh ed.) quotes that same line of Kallata, namely the description of mystical techniques of inner absorption responding to the Krama doctrine. This is this verse from the TĀC: itūhaṃ tattadanalpamobadalanprāptasvarūpodaya yogī niyam anātmabhāvavirahāt svātmasthitā nirvṛtah/ dṛṣyadraṣṭrvivekavid bhavapadyāpi vinuktāmayo vyuthāne ’pi samādhibhāg bhavati san mokṣa-sriyah kāraṇam//, ‘Thus, blissful is the yogin who, cutting through each of the many [forms of] ignorance, has attained the dawning of his own nature. Established within himself, eternally free as he is of [all] that he is not, perceiving the distinction between the seer and the seen, he, from whom every sickness has been expunged, pervades the plane of ordinary
existence. He delights in contemplation (samādhi) even when he rises from [his meditation] (vyuthāna), and so is the fount of the glory of true liberation’ (tr. Dyczkowski SpK: 158, modified). Similarly, as we have seen, PHvṛ 18 quotes Kallāṭa in order to support its definition of the bhairavīmudrā, a Krama practice, and PH 19 describes the great yogin whose samādhi-state persists even in vyuthāna, i.e., even when he rises from his meditation, which is exactly the purport of the TĀC quoted above. Moreover, Utpalavaiṣṇava’s SpP 43 [= III 11] might offer a clue as to whether the line of Kallāṭa (quoted in YR ad 42 and in PHvṛ 18) that deals with the practice of the bhairavīmudrā should be ascribed to the TĀC. In effect, Utpalavaiṣṇava identifies the yogin’s state described in SpK III 11 as the vikāsavati, ‘process of expansion’, in other words as the bhairavīmudrā or saktivikāśa described also in PHvṛ 18 and SpN I 11. In support of his interpretation, Utpalavaiṣṇava not only quotes the passage of the Kaksyāśotra that is also quoted in PHvṛ 18 and SpN I 11, but he explicitly refers to the TĀC as a text describing the same state (sthiti), which is called there ‘secret mudrā’ (rahasyamudrā): yā ca iṣā sthitasya tattvārthacintāmaṇau rahasyamudreyā uktā. In addition, one should consider Kṣemarāja’s assertion (SpN I 1: 6) according to which his first two interpretations of sakticakravibhavaprabhava (in SpK I 1) [the first taking the saktis to be the twelve Kālīs of the Wheel of energies; the second re-establishing the absolute sovereignty of the Lord] agree with the very terms of Kallāṭa’s vr̥tti: tad uktam śrībhāṭṭakallaṭena vijñānadēhātmakasya sakticakrāśvarasya utpattiḥetuvat/ ity etad vr̥ttyakṣarāṇām atra vyākhyādvaye ṣpy anurūpyam, ‘The revered Kallāṭa has said: “It is he, whose soul and substance are [nothing but] consciousness, who has [therefore] mastery of the Wheel of energies, who is the cause of the production [of the universe]”. The two interpretations given here [by me] agree with the wording of his gloss’; cf. Kallāṭa’s vr̥tti ad SpK I 1 quoted above, where Śiva is said to be ‘the cause of the generation of the Wheel of energies’, and his Tattvavicāra quoted in SpP 1: 9: saktiprasarasāṅkocanibaddhāv udayavayau/yasyātmā sa śivo jñeyāḥ sarvabhāvāparavartakah/, ‘[All things] arise and fall away in consonance with the extension and withdrawal of [Śiva’s] power. Know that their essential nature is Śiva, Who impels all things’ (tr. Dyczkowski SpK: 145).

20. bhāvanā (YR ad 68)

On bhāvanā, see TĀ II 12-13, which distinguishes between bhāvanā, ‘realization’, and avadhāna, ‘concentration’; TĀ IV 14b defines it as illumination or revelation: sphutayed vastu yāpetam manorathapadād api/, ‘[bhāvanā], which discloses suddenly a reality exceeding the realms of desire [that is, a reality that transcends anything one might imagine] ...’. As emphasized by TĀV IV 13-14, bhāvanā is nothing but the ‘ultimate term
[or limit]’ (parā kāṣṭhā) of reasoning (tarka, in TĀV IV 14, or sattarka, in IV 14), namely, the ‘ultimate term [or limit]’ of the certitude (niścaya, in śloka 13) that is proper to ‘those who know’ (kovidāḥ, in IV 14), that is, which consists in knowing that nonduality is ultimate reality: tarka eva hi parāṁ kāṣṭhām upagato bhāvanety ucyate, ‘When reasoning reaches its ultimate limit, it is called bhāvana’ (TĀV IV 14, vol. III: 629). Similarly, TĀV IV 13, vol. III: 629: sa eva hi mahātmanāṁ dehādyālocanena yathā-yathamabhyaśātiśayāt vikalpaśuddhim ādadhānaṁ, parāṁ kāṣṭhām upagataḥ san, bhāvanātmakatāṁ yāyāt, yenāspuṭam api saṁvidṛüpam śpuṭatām āśādayet/, ‘Indeed, after [reasoning] has effected the purification of the thought constructs (vikalpaśuddhā) through one or another of the ways of reaching the end of the stage of repeated practice — [in other words] by studying the revered great Masters’ [teachings] concerning the body, etc. — [that reasoning,] thereby reaching its ultimate limit, becomes bhāvana, by which [process] what was unclear, even though of the form of consciousness, reaches clarity’. This passage of JR’s commentary sheds light on the organization of PS 39-41, for ‘the revered great Masters’ [teachings] concerning the body, etc.’ alludes to the eradication of the double error expounded in PS 39-40; once that process of eradication is complete (that is, when reasoning has reached its ultimate limit, annulling all idea of difference), that certitude becomes bhāvana (the matter at issue in PS 41), the fulgurating awareness of one’s own essence as consciousness. Thus is formulated the experience that transforms the yogin into a jīvan-mukta (YR ad 39): ‘I alone manifest myself as the Self of the universe’. See also the definition of bhāvana given by SpN II 6–7: 52–53, quoting the SvT: […] sarvam śīvaśaktimayam smaret [v.l. (KSTS 44) sarvam śīvamayam smaret] (SvT VII 244b) / […] jīvann eva vinukto ’sau yasyeyam [v.l. (KSTS 44) yasyaiśa] bhāvana sadaḥ/ yah śīvam bhāvayen nityām na kālaḥ kalayet tu tam [v.l. (KSTS 44) śīvo hi bhāvito nityām na kālaḥ kalayec chivam] (SvT VII 259)/,’ ‘One should consider everything as made of Śiva and Śakti’. […] He becomes liberated, even in this life, who gives himself over once and for all to that realization (bhāvanā), for time could not act on him who would realize (bhāvayet) Śiva continuously’. Thus bhāvanā is defined as the ‘realization that everything is made of Śiva and Śakti’, that is, as perfect knowledge: tad eva paramaṁ jñānam bhāvanāmayaṁ iṣyate, ‘Supreme knowledge consists of bhāvanā’ (quoted in TĀV IV 14, vol. III: 630). As such, bhāvanā is characterized as instrumental in attaining the state of jīvanmukti. Also Silburn 1981: 191; Chenet 1987, and 1998–1999, vol. II: 545ff.
Sanskrit text

On the Sanskrit text

The KSTS edition has been used as the basis of the Sanskrit text reproduced here, for, although it is not a critical edition, it represents a fairly correct Sanskrit text, which appears to need corrections only occasionally. This does not imply of course that a truly critical edition would not be necessary, but it could not be produced for the present publication.

In the course of the preparation of the translation, it has nevertheless turned out that the KSTS edition may need revision at some places, or at least we felt that it would be important to consult several other witnesses. Therefore we have collected a number of manuscripts and collated them on a few occasions on which we thought to have stumbled on a problem. Since such occasions were not frequent, we give a list of variants and changes to the text of the KSTS below, instead of reporting the variants in notes to the Sanskrit text. We also discuss some of these textual problems in more detail in the notes to the translation whenever the problem seems to require it.

In addition, we have made some minor corrections and adjustments. We have noticed and corrected what we considered merely typographical errors, which are listed below. Moreover, we have silently standardized the Sandhi, which was sometimes applied and sometimes not in the KSTS. We have left the text without applying Sandhi only before and after words cited from the kārikās. We have similarly removed geminations that sporadically occur in consonant clusters (as vibudhyeta for vibuddhyeta in kārikā 66). Words of the kārikās appear in bold face in the commentary. We have not maintained punctuation marks other than dandas, for they depend on the reader's interpretation and do not belong to the original text. All identifications of citations are to be found in the notes to the translation, where they are often discussed in detail; therefore we have not kept the references of citations in the Sanskrit text.
List of typographical errors corrected

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List of variants in some collated passages

The following list contains, on the one hand, all passages in which we have changed the text of the KSTS, on the other hand, variants of passages for which we have consulted our manuscripts but decided to keep the reading of the KSTS. An asterisk signals when our reading differs from that of the KSTS. For the abbreviations, see the description of manuscripts below. References are to the KSTS edition. In most cases, we explain our choice, sometimes referring to more detailed discussions in our notes to the translation. In all cases, we give the reading of the KSTS first.

*p. 8, l. 11:

iti diyate paramaṁ jñānam kṣiyate karmavāsaneti ca KSTS KaGaGha: diyate paramaṁ jñānam kṣiyate karmavāsaneti N: diyate paramaṁ jñānam kṣiyate vāsaneti ca P1: om. WCKha: iti P2P3P4IS
We have chosen to omit this line, which was printed as the second half of a citation. Given the evidence of our manuscripts, it is doubtful whether this line was cited by Yogarāja, and it is more likely to be a scribal addition than an original quote. Moreover, it is also somewhat out of context, for initiation and its nirvacana are only indirectly related to the topic of finding a guru.

*p. 12, l. 1:

pratiprakāra* KSTS KhaGaGhaCP4: pratiprakāra* KaWP1P2P3INS
Not only does the manuscript evidence point to the fact that the original reading must have been pratiprakāra, but also to Yogarāja’s usage, for he employs the same word ad karika 23 (KSTS, p. 55).

p. 17, l. 12–13:

ayam eva bheda bhedahetur bhāvānāṁ yat viruddhadharmadhyāsaḥ kārañabheda vā KSTS P3P4S: ayam eva bheda bhedahetur vā bhāvānāṁ yo
ON THE SANSKRIT TEXT

yam viruddhadharmādhyāsah kāraṇābhedo vā TĀV before XI 98: ayam eva ca bhedo bhedahetur vā bhāvānām viruddhadharmādhyāsah kāraṇābhedas ca W: ayam eva hi bhedo bhedahetu (1 akṣara deleted) rbhāvānām yad viruddhadharmādhyāsah kāraṇābhedo vā P₁P₂: ayam eva ca bhedo bhedahetur vā bhāvānām yad viruddhadharmādhyāsah kāraṇābhedas ca I: ayam eva bhedo bhedahetu (one vertical line) bhāvānām yad viruddhadharmādhyāsah kāraṇābhedo vā N: ayam eva khalu bhedo bhedahetur vā bhāvānām viruddhadharmādhyāsah kāraṇābhedas ca Gnoli’s edition of the Pramanavārttika p. 21

In the view of the manuscript evidence and the citation in the Tantrāloka, the KSTS’s reading has been kept. Yogarāja may be citing from memory or from a manuscript that has a different reading compared to Gnoli’s.

p. 59, l. 6:

aksayaṃ NISP₁P₃ KSTS: avyayam Na₃P₂P₄: avyavam W

The manuscripts have been consulted here to decide whether the KSTS’s variant of the Gita should be accepted, although the meaning does not change fundamentally in any case. Almost all Śāradā MSS agree with the KSTS, except the original reading of N, which was then corrected by a second hand. Therefore, it seems possible that aksaya was a Kashmirian variant in this passage of the Gita. This is also corroborated by the fact that the distribution of the variants seems somewhat unusual compared to other cases, which may be explicable if one assumes that some scribes, perhaps mostly of non-Kashmirian origin, wrote down the passage relying on their memory rather than on their exemplar. However, we have not been able to confirm the Kashmirian provenance of this variant with parallels. For Abhinavagupta does not gloss this word in his Gitārthasamgraha, and the variant does not appear in the critical edition of the Mahābhārata, nor in Schrader BhG. Whatever is the case, it is quite certain that Yogarāja’s text had aksayam.

*p. 82, l. 4:

ajaḍapramāṇsiddhāv KSTS: nareśvaraviveke Codd

Although the identification of the work referred to by the manuscript is problematic (see our notes to the translation), the KSTS’s conjecture does not seem justified to us.

p. 82, l. 7:

niruddhā KSTS P₁P₂NS: nibaddhā WI: om. the whole line P₃P₄

Since all other citations of this passage have niruddhā (see notes to the translation), we have kept the KSTS’s reading.

*p. 83, l. 13–14:

gaganatayā tathāvaśiṣyate KSTS P₁ac P₂P₃ S: gaganatayā tathā viśiṣyate P₄: gaganatayā tathā viśiṣyate WI: gaganatayā tathā tathāvaśiṣyate
P₁/P₂: gaganatathāvaśīṣyate N
We have accepted the reading of P₁, for avaśīṣyate does not yield good sense. The confusion of a and i is unexceptional. Since W and I have usually secondary readings, we have adopted a single tathā, attested by all the other manuscripts. Note that the correction in P₁ is made in a second, more recent, hand.

p. 92, l. 7:
bhāgau KSTS I P₁P₂P₃P₄NSW Rau: bhaugau P₂/ac: bhāvau Iyer
We have retained the KSTS's reading of this word, which agrees with all our MSS and Rau's edition of the Vākyapadiya. Iyer's choice is probably to be rejected, all the more so as his translation appears to follow the reading bhāgau.

*p. 105, l. 8-10:
The KSTS has been rejected here on the basis of our manuscript evidence and because of the meaning required by the context. Our best MSS, S, N (before a secondary correction) and P₃, all attest that the shorter reading is authentic; their readings differ only on minor points: N omits the privative prefix, while P₃ misses the anusvāra. The KSTS agrees with the group of manuscripts we have rejected elsewhere as secondary: I and W. Furthermore, the shorter version fits the context much better, for the passage expounds the ignorance of the individual when he identifies himself with what he is not, i.e., when he considers himself the performer of a sacrifice. The original expression was perhaps expanded first as a marginal note and then came to be included in the text. This is not surprising, given that a similar sequence of words and ideas can be found in Abhinavagupta's text itself, see kārikā 39.

*p. 146, l. 15:
bhāttaśrīviravāmanakah KSTS: bhāttaśrīviravāmanah W P₁P₃P₄S: [bra]-śrīviravāmanah P₂: bhāttaviravāmanah I
Given the manuscript evidence, we accept the form of this proper name without the suffix -ka. (For a more detailed discussion of the identity of this author, see our note to the translation.)

*p. 149, l. 11:
caturvimāṇasatyuttara GaGha S P₁P₃P₄: catvārīṃśaduttara KSTS KaKhalWP₂
The KSTS’s reading has been rejected for several reasons. First of all, we have found no other occurrence of 240 bhuvanas instead of the standard 224, and it is unlikely that Yogarāja should use an obscure number of bhuvanas in this gloss. The Mālinivijayottara, which differs from other texts on this point, also has only 118. Although the relevant folio is missing in our copy of N, two of our best manuscripts, S and P₃, both of them in śarada, have the number 224. The corruption is explicable, since the two words are quite similar. However, it is curious that the editors of the KSTS preferred 240. Did they consider it a lectio difficilior?

p. 163, l. 2:
kularatnamālikāyāṁ KSTS P₁P₂P₃P₄NS: srikularatnamālikāyāṁ WI
The KSTS’s reading has been kept.

p. 164, l. 10:
lakṣmīsamhitāyāṁ KSTS P₁P₂P₃P₄NS: lakṣmipatisamhitāyāṁ WI
The KSTS’s reading has been kept.

p. 169, l. 12:
ubhayathā punar KSTS P₁P₂P₃P₄NS: ubhayathā WI
The KSTS’s reading has been kept.

p. 179, l. 8:
vā parāmarśadasāṁ KSTS P₁P₂P₃P₄NS: parāmarśadasāṁ W
The KSTS’s reading has been kept.

p. 191, l. 10:
prasādasāmarthyaṇa KSTS P₁P₂P₃NS: sāmarthyaṇa WP₄
The KSTS’s reading has been kept.

p. 192, l. 15. – p. 193, l. 1:
prāgjītā° KSTS P₁P₂P₃NS: prāgjāti° WP₄ °yoga° KSTS P₁P₂P₃NS: om. WP₄ °prabodhaṃ KSTS KaKhaP₂: °prabodhabuddham WGaGha P₁P₃ NS: °prabodhabuddham P₄
The KSTS’s reading has been kept.

p. 193, l. 4:
parasvarūpatādārṣhyam KSTS GaGha P₁P₂P₃S: svarūpadārṣhyam Ka: [°]-svarūpatādātmyam Kha: parasvarūpatādātmyam P₄NW
The KSTS’s reading has been kept.

*p. 196, l. 12:
parapuruṣārthasādanopāyaḥ KSTS Kha: parapuruṣārthasādanopāyaḥ Ka-GaGhaW P₁P₂P₃P₄NS
We have accepted the reading of the majority of the manuscripts against the KSTS. Cf. p. 196. l. 6: paramapuruṣārthasādanāyām.
Description of the manuscripts consulted

The KSTS edition seems to have relied on four manuscripts, none of which is described by the editor. We can infer their existence from the occasional footnotes referring to manuscripts designated as Ka, Kha, Ga and Gha. Judging from the very small number of variants given, they were probably not fully collated. However, sometimes they provide us with important variants of manuscripts that are probably no longer in existence or no longer accessible.

Other manuscripts we have been able to consult include Śāradā and Devanāgari ones described below. Since we have not prepared a critical edition, we have not attempted to define their relation to each other or to a supposed archetype. Not surprisingly, Devanāgari manuscripts show many errors and corruptions, while the Śāradā manuscripts tend to be more correct. None of these manuscripts is identical with any of those used for the KSTS edition and all of them are independent witnesses, there are no identifiable apographs. Two manuscripts, W and I, share readings against all the others several times, which shows that they may form a subgroup (W being generally more corrupt than I).

1. P₁ Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona MS no. 459/1875–1876. Paper, Devanāgari script (of Kashmirian origin), 37x17 cm. 33 fol., 14 lines to a side, complete. Catalogued as “Paramārthasārasamgraha of Abhinavagupta with the vṛtti of Kṣemarāja” (sic! omitting Yogarāja's name).

Some corrections secunda manu, using kunkuma. A later pagination is added to the original one.

Beginning: Om śrīganeśāya namah / om cidghano pi jaganmūrtya śāno yāḥ sa jayaty ajāḥ svātmapracchādane kriḍāvidagdhaḥ parameśvarah //
End: śrīmataḥ kṣemarājasya sadgurvāṃṣyasaśālināḥ sākṣātkṛtamaheśasya tasyāntevasinā mayā sampūrṇeyam paramārthasārasamgrahavīrtiḥ //
A photocopy of this manuscript has been used for collation.


Beginning: om namaḥ siddham // śrīganeśāya namaḥ // om cidghanopi jaganmūryā śāno yaḥ sa jayaty ajāḥ / svātmapracchādananakriḍāvidagdhaḥ parameśvarah //
End: śrīmataḥ kṣemarājasya sadgurvāṃṣyasaśālināḥ sākṣātkṛtamaheśasya tasyāntevasinā mayā 1 śrīvīrastāpuridhāmnā viraktena tapasvinā vivṛttir yoganāmneṇyam pūrṇādvalayamayi kṛtā 2 sampūrṇeyam paramārthasārasamgrahavīrtiḥ ['vṛtti ante correctionem] iti śivam //
A photocopy of this manuscript has been used for collation.
3. **P₃** Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona MS no. 166/1883–1884. Paper, Śāradā script, 14x25 cm. 80 fol., 16 lines to a side, complete. Catalogued as "Paramārthasārasaṃgraha saṭīka?" [The cover has the following text: vedānta paramārthasāra paramārthasāraṭīkā 80 / 17 / 19. The second line is in Śāradā, the others are in Devanāgari.]

Beginning: om namo vighna ?? // śrisadāśivāya namaḥ // cidghano pi jaganmūrtyā śyāno yaḥ sa jayaty ajaḥ // svātmapracchādane kriḍāvidagdhaḥ paramesvāraḥ //

End: śrīmataḥ kṣemarājasya sadgurvāmnāyaśālināḥ // sākṣātkṛtamahēśa-sya tasyāntevasinā mayā // śrīvitastāpurināmnā viraktena tapasvīna // vivṛtōgoyanāmīṇyam pūrṇadvayamayā kṛtā // sāṃpūrṇeyam paramār-thasārasaṃgrahāvivṛtiḥ kṛtīḥ śrīparamamāheśvarasārājānaka-yogarājasya // o // o // ṣubham bhavatu // o // o // o // o // o // ṣubham bhavatu // o [This text is followed by two pages of invocations, written in a later hand and less legible. Then, on the last page, the following text figures in two lines, in Devanāgari: paramārthasārasaṃgrahāvivṛtiḥ kṛtīḥ rājānaka-yogarājasya.]

A photocopy of this manuscript has been used for collation.

4. **P₄** Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona MS no. 167/1883–1884. Paper, Devanāgari script, 10x13 cm. 153 fol., 14 lines to a side, complete. Bound as a book.

Beginning: śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ śrīgurave namaḥ // śreyase // cidghanopi jaganmūrtyā śyāno yaḥ sa jayaty ajaḥ svātmapracchādane[svātmapracchadane ante correctionem]kriḍāvidagdhaḥ paramēśvarah //

End: śrīmato yogarājasya sadgurvāmnāyaśālināḥ sākṣātkṛtamahēśasya tasyāntevasinā mayā śrīvitastāpurināmnā tasyāntevasinā mayā vivṛtiḥ kṣe-manāmīṇyam vānadvayamayā kṛtā // iti paramārthasārasaṃgrahāvivṛtiḥ samāptā śivāya bhavatvānusilavanatāṃ // sam 26 pāusūti 25 somavāre pāriteti śivaṃ // // [Recent corrections on the margins on the last two pages.]

A photocopy of this manuscript has been used for collation.

5. **C** Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta. MS no. G-8698. Paper, Devanāgari script, 15x23 cm. 38 fol., 17 lines to a side, complete. Beginning: Oṁ namo nārāyaṇāya Oṁ cidghanopi jaganmūrtyā śyāno yaḥ sa jayaty ajaḥ svātmapracchādānakriḍāvidagdho hi māheśvarah

End: śrīmataḥ kṣemarājasya sadgurvāmnāyaśālināḥ sākṣātkṛtamahēśasya tasyāntevasinā mayā śrīvitastāpuridhāmnā viraktena tapasvīna [7 akṣaras are illegible]

A photocopy of very bad quality, containing only the first and last folios
has been obtained of this MS, therefore it has been used only occasionally.

6. **W Bodleian Library, Oxford. MS Wilson 531e**


**Beginning:** srīganesāya namaḥ // cidghanopī jaganmūrtīyā śyāno yaḥ sa jayaty ajāḥ svātmaprachādaṇānāriṇādvidagdhō hi maheśvarāḥ //

**End:** śrīmatō yogarājasya sadgurvāmnāyaśālīnā sākṣātkṛtamaheśāsya taśyāntevāsinā mayā śrīvītastāpuridhāṁmā viraktena tapasvinā vivṛtīr yo- 
ganāmneyaṁ vāṇādvayamayī kṛtā // [in red:] iti śrīparamārthasāravīvī This manuscript was fully collated in the Bodleian Library by Judit Tor- 
zsōk.

7. **I Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, New Delhi.**

Uncatalogued manuscript, belonging to a group of Śāradā manuscripts the Institute received from pandits who had left Kashmir.

Paper, Śāradā script, approx. 16x12 cm, loosely bound (and preceded by other texts), 71 fol., 16 lines to a side. Incomplete. Ends in the middle of the commentary on kārikās 87–88 (KSTS edition page 171).

Beginning: (1st line in black and red ink alternating between aksaras) Oṁ ganeśāya namaḥ om śrīvāgdevi jayatuḥ (Then in black ink:) om cidghano pi jaganmūrtīyā śyāno yaḥ sa jayaty ajāḥ svātmaprachādaṇānāriṇādvidagdhō hi maheśvarāḥ //

End: [...] upādhvīśeṣaṇaṁ tato muktām pṛthakṛtam viśeṣanāntarābhāvāt (pc, viśeṣāntarābhāvāt ac) tacchivarūpam ābhātyeva dehabhaṅgāt para- 
maśātvatena bhāsata iti yāvat | yathā samudgakopādhvīrahān ma

We are grateful to Prof. Raffaele Torella, who has kindly provided us with photographs in electronic form, which he himself made with the per- mis- 
sion of G. C. Tripathi, coordinator of the IGNCA.

8. **N National Museum, New Delhi.**

MS catalogue number (card catalogue, for internal use) 57.106/939. MS number 1693 Paper, Śāradā script, approx. 11x14 cm. 117 fol., 9–10 lines to a side. Loosely bound, preceded by the Parāprāveśikā (which starts with 'om namo śrīgurave śivāya // oṁ viśvātmikām ...', and ends with 'parāprāveśikā samāptam / samvat 97 navamyāśann*au* Complete (but without colophon).

Beginning: oṁ namo gurave sarasvatīr jayāya // śri jvālāmukhyai namaḥ oṁ cidghano jaganmūrtīyā śyāno yas sa jayaty ajāḥ // svātmaprachā- 
danukriṇādvidagdhā porameśvarāḥ //

End: yato yo yatsvabhāvāḥ sa tatsvabhāvan vaktuṁ pragalbhatā iti upa- 
deṣṭuḥ samāviṣṭamaheśvarasvabhāvo nena vākyenoktaḥ syād - iti śi-
We are grateful to Prof. Raffaele Torella, who has kindly provided us with photographs in electronic form. Unfortunately, two sides must be missing, for the file 3228 ends with bhedabijabhūtasya (KSTS p. 146 middle) and the next one, 3229 starts with the top of KSTS p. 148.

MS no. 1260-II.
Paper, Śāradā script, 26x17 cm. 28 fol., 27-33 lines to a side.
Catalogued as 'Paramārthaśāransahavīrtti' of Yogarāja rājānaka with the commentary of Lākṣmaṇa Pāṇḍīt. (N.b.: As the colophon shows, Lākṣmaṇa Pāṇḍīt was the scribe's name.)
Dated AD 1730, loosely bound in book form.
Beginning: svasti // Śrīgaṇeśāya namah // oṁ namaḥ śambhave // oṁ cidghano pi jaganmūrtya śyāno yaḥ sa jayaty ajah // svātmapracchādane kṛīdāvidagdhaḥ paraṃevaḥ //
We have obtained an electronic copy of this MS, photographed on May 19, 2005 by the National Mission for Manuscripts (numbered as DS 00001 8940). We are grateful to Prof. Alexis Sanderson for kindly providing us with the PDF file.
परमार्थसारः

श्रीममहामहेश्वरार्थसारःश्रीमदभिनवगुपार्थसारःसारः।

परर्थसारः

परे परस्य गहनादनादिमेके निविष्ट बहुधा गुहासु।
सर्वार्थं सर्वच्यारस्य लामेव श्रेष्ठं शारणं प्रप्ये॥ १ ॥

त्वाम् सर्वप्रारंभाणुरसारं स्वमदेवतार्थसारं श्रीमूम् अनुतात्त्वेऽवभावं सतास्तमकम् शारणम् ताते त्वतसमाकालस्य संबंधे॥ ॥

नवम् त्वाम् सर्वत्रेद्वकारमेव प्रपोस्य न पुनम्यान्तत्त्वार्थं कथिस्त्रिथं देवमित्रयुगम् प्रविष्ट्वति। अन्यथा किभूतम् परम् पूृण् चिदानन्देव्यङ्गानिक्षिपितान्तरस्य तथा परस्य गहनात् एति गहनाम्यविधानान्तरस्यभिस्मिन्यूग्न्ये एव शिवादिवित्तव्ययं शुद्धयति स्वरुपे तिथंत् न पुनस्तरस्यार्थाविच्यंत्ये नुस्ततस्य तपस्याविरूपणं तहुं भवति। यदुकश्रम्

जायदिवितिविलेक्षकमु तदभद्रे प्रसति।
निवत्ते निजान्तैव स्वरुपारुपलुक्त:॥

इति स्पन्द्याश्रे। अनादिमु पूर्णं सर्वप्रारंभातिनमुभितुतस्य प्रमात्वेनादितिनिश्चल्वते। एवम् इत्यसः

हायं चिदेवभ्यं स्थुरणादीद्वस्तावतुपन्ते। तथा निविष्टमु इत्यवदि। एवंतात्त्वकमपे सर्ववाच्यं बहुधा
नाणाप्रकारांनेमः: गुहासु रुद्रेशेत्राकुपासु इत्योपनांतराविष्टे चेतनरूपोपिः स्वयं जडाजडातस्तामाभायः न्यक्षक्षनामानातुताति रशि इति यावः। अतं सवालम् इति सवर्स्य रुद्रेशेत्राकुपामात्र-मेयरूप्यया जगतः: आलम् विशिष्टस्थितां। सवर्मिदं किंतु पौर्णागमारि स्थितं सदाश्रयाहकुपाल-कापेश्वरामामिव मंदेन प्राकाशाणान नाणाप्रेष्यपिदिश्यते नवभागस्त्राक्षणाधिनस्य सर्वे न्यायतु इतेऽविशिष्टितं सवर्मन्यमात्रावर्तमाने। नैतावता भगवतः: समुत्तरीण विधिपतियाह वर्मचारचरस्यम् इति। सवर्मिदं घण्डाजडातस्वभावं विशेष तृप्ततया तित्तन्ते।
कार्यसि सवर्स्य यत: स्वयं विभो तत: सवर्मिदं त्यगे।
इति न्यायनें हि विशिष्टस्त्राक्षणाधिकाशायमानस्य कार्यतवानुपयोगे।
भोगव भोगभावने सदा सवर्स्य सन्तिष्ठतः।
इति भगवानेव तथा तथा चकासतीत। एवविवेकं ल्यमानुसारं सवर्स्य स्यात्मदेवस्तवरूपं परामहवाचकर्मपरस्यर्मानेम्युपस्याधिकारिकायुक्तस्वभावं भगवतं शरामुप्रभवेऽसामे शरीरानिलक्षांकर्मांस्ते रथमे स्यात्मानं परामहवाचकर्मस्य समाविशालिताः यावः। अनेन यद्यवादकवें भर्मोपेयान्व स्वस्तवावस्माचारयां दुःशुमापिदिशता गुरुणा। वऽख्यामण्ड्योऽगच्छायेः पाद्यात्मया लकज्ज्वार्यप्रेक्ष्पकः कृता। ॥ २ ॥
एवं प्रकरणसत्वस्तवरूपं स्तुतिर्दर्शोऽत्र प्रतिपादेयं नाशवातात्ममिद्धत्वंसत्वानाविधेयादिकं ग्रन्थार्यावधेयेनाधण।
गणभिव्वस्वपूर्वकमरणानकः लकविविभाषणः। आधारेः भगवत्ती र्षिः प्रत्यं भर्मार्यम् ॥ २ ॥
आधारस्तविविभाषणं सत्तारः ॥ ३ ॥
कथयत्विविभाषणं शिववाशान्दिर्योगेन ॥ ३ ॥
कृष्णद्वग्नपपादात्मस्यप्रवर्तयोऽयमःः संसारिीतितिपुरुः शास्त्रीयतमस्मिततः भण भस्थ्यमाकां नत्व। तदा तदोपसारिकाक्रमरुपणिर्दशलक्षणक्रमेण तमो जिवं विगलितान्-करणं भण सोड्यायध्यात्ममलनहो निःस्याशाशोपेयान्: परमार्थसारास्मा आधारस्तविविभाषणं इत्यत्पारिवाय। नेत्रान्तराविकारमिबृहतपरमार्थमयमेव वेक्षनात्मविवासच्चितिर्दृश्यमेति शिष्यं र्षिकान्तान्। स एव वह्यापेदाः: परमार्थसममस्वरुपस्यत्वात्मस्वित्र र्षिकान्तित: सत्युपूवितो भवितां मला सर्वत्र जनानुभ्रह्म्हातुं परमार्थावीर्ययुक्तं। गुर्भविवेकसेव अन्तिकोन्वाचिच्छ्यात्मकार्यकरणमु: ऋम: उर्व: सहस्रस्य इति:। नीपित्यु पुरस्मान्याविनिति: तत्तारः। तत्सवर्स्यानवेयां भण मार्यादास्याच्यायं यस्तस्ताः दूरो नवतीतिविचारयापेदाः परमार्थमर्पः: सम्बद्धिपद्धण्यातै।।एवं सवमार्याभीमेवाभिः। पान्यप्रयोजनाद्व्य पर्याप्तिः नेतुनु: शालाग्नाय्यप्रायात्मन्यस्ते। बीके: स दिश्ये इत्यहैगमर्याविवस सवर्स्य। गणभिव्वस्वपूर्वकार्यमाय पापेश्ये विपर्यायकार्यमेव परिवर्त्याने तद्वपयाद्वाच्चित्र्यं भ-श्रवविविकारणामिबुथ्यम्। भर्माला विविकारणाकमुः यतः क्रमानातहकुपासु आविभवितसेवोपवस्तवसंसर्पस्यभावता चक्षुपं च-क्रम्य तास्मिनं विभाषणं: विपर्यकुः।। अनेनात्य प्राध्यत्वस्मार्यावो धाराभिंवां चोतीतोऽन्याय
गच्छति गच्छति जल इव हिमकरिबन्मि स्थित्य स्थिति याति।
तत्तुकारणमुखनवग्मि तथायामत्मा महेशान: ॥ ७ ॥

यथा जलप्रवाहे याति सति हिमकबिन्मम् चन्द्रपुरस्तुतंभोकाश्चरथ स्वयमचलतात्मकं जलप्र-
वाहान्त:स्थितमिति: तत् गच्छति प्रयाति इव तथा तस्मिनेव श्रीगणेन्यज्ञ मायशे नि:स्थितिमि: सति तदेव
हिमकबिन्मि स्थितिम् गच्छतीनेवयथा स्वर्णमातुमितिस्वभाविन्ने न पुनः परमार्थेन तत्तथेऽथ यस्य।

वै जलस्तातु देशारूपः प्रकटया चन्द्रमस् स्वरूपः गानस्थितः परमार्थात्: केवल जलमेव दातिमायथ च
तत्तत्वतीर्थवत्वस्य चन्द्रमध्यमवत्तात्ततात्तिझको भोजो व्यवहित दत्तेऽवतावता गायकमनात्तस्य
कर्मपरित्तस्य वा शाश्वः: स्वस्तिपरस्तताः न कालित्तित।: तत्तैवायामत्मा चतुन्ययत्वामः: स्वर्य निर्भरते
tतत्तुकारणमुखनवां धर्षीण सति समुच्चयं वा प्रश्नीः: समुपकृष्टिः मायावायामोहाताः व्यवहारमाः
अथेतजगतात्तक्रतव्रतु: पुनः स्वात्मा जायते नियते वेति। गीतासंवेदेयोक्रमः

न जायते नियते वा कर्मायावरो भूताभिवो वा न भूत:।
अजो नित्यः शाक्तोर्युरुणाः न हन्यते हन्याने शरीरः।।

इति। तस्मादयामत्मा महेशान: स्वतंत्र: सर्ववात्मात्त्वमन्मर्याभासः सर्वंत्मातुमातुमुवितत्वाय प्र-
धमानसतसतसदस्यात्त्वकालोपे समुपवत्ता वा स्वस्तिपर: पुनः। ऐसाच च दुर्घटकारिः महेशानात् संवित्ता
स्वरूपः यथात: तथा प्रदुष्टंत्मातुया स्वर्णार्काद्धिमोहात्तिझकार्ती स्वर्णमातुमितिस्वभाविन्ने नि:पुनः
प्रत्युत्तपद्यागमनरकशृद्धितिसागितौ दोषाः पुष्मावो कक्षकरः नियतः: स यद्य भवान्त: स्वाम्याकारणोऽ
प्रकाशितः: परमाश्च स्वाच्छदमा दोषाकरः तथात: हमनेऽस्तथा नि: वर्णावै वेशे इति कर्म स्वामन:।
तत्तैव महेशाश्च स्वरूप्यविश्वासः प्रययवताः। स्वाध्यायः
स्वतंत्र: महेशाश्च स्वरूप्यविश्वासः प्रययवताः। स्वाध्यायः
स्वतंत्र: महेशाश्च स्वरूप्यविश्वासः प्रययवताः। स्वाध्यायः
स्वतंत्र: महेशाश्च स्वरूप्यविश्वासः प्रययवताः। स्वाध्यायः

इत्यंपि: सर्ववात्मात्मात्वमा विश्वायावत्वाभासः ऐस: सवित्तार्यमार्याभासः: सर्ववात्माः सर्वत्र सविनुग-
मादित्वयुक्तामाश्च प्रतिपन्द्दतिश्चकित्तिति होशद्राच्यविश्वासः स्वरूपः प्रवचनमानाः न स प्रतियते: भयुपागमे
वा जडाजड़ववत्वथेयस्य भावानाः न संगच्छये लोकव्यवहारं जडाजड़रूपः इति कर्ममात्त्वादित्वान:

राहुलस्यविन्यासः यथा वाशिविन्यासः प्रकाशते तदात्।
सर्वगोधार्यात्मात्वमा विश्वायात्त्वमा । । । ।

आयुकादेवाः राहुः सर्वेऽपरिवर्मणाः नोपल्यन्ते च एव पुनर्होरायुकादेवाः चन्द्रमूर्तीस्यः प्रधमान-
नोदयाः राहुः परिवर्मणाः नोपल्यन्ते च एव पुनर्होरायुकादेवाः चन्द्रमूर्तीस्यः प्रधमान-

अयातमाः स्वातुमध्यस्तुत्तत्तत्ततथात्त्वकरः प्रतिपन्द्दतिश्चकित्तिति होशद्राच्यविश्वासः स्वरूपः प्रवचनमानाः न स प्रतियते: भयुपागमे
वा जडाजड़ववत्वथेयस्य भावानाः न संगच्छये लोकव्यवहारं जडाजड़रूपः इति कर्ममात्त्वादित्वान:
व्याख्या कार्यालय शाफतिनन्दनश्रे: केन्द्रभरूणागतर भव्यपाठाल: ।
ज्ञानानन्दा च विनिर्दृष्ट गुणानन्दकुर्मवर्ण करोत्यभिमुखं पुरुषं विमुखी ॥

इति ॥ ९ ॥
एवंस्मिदं सत्वभुगमनुभवविवर्तमानं प्रतिपादः पंचाकालाधारणेण प्रतिपादित तदन्तराधारितं समुपतिमानेन श्रद्धेश्चात्मंकं जगद्यानं भावं तत्तः कारणार्थं परस्परविवर्तस्वरूपं कारिकायत्रेणाहि

भावृपरिपूर्णं स्वतंत्रमिव विशावान्तितो महान्तं ।
इच्छासितिकर्मेनिन्दितमन्त्याधारपरिपूर्णम् ॥ १० ॥

सर्वविद्याविनों शुद्ध शान्ति शुद्धबिनीन्द्रकर्मेऽकारं
यत्तत्त्वं तस्मात्मकाभितो ज्ञिशादात्मं जगत् ॥ ११ ॥

यदृ एवविधम् परम् पूर्णं विवतत्वं तत्र विवादधारपर्यंतं वश्यमणं विशेषं विशावान्त सत्कारातो तदपभ्रेमञ्चकालुक्योपपति इति यावत् । ननु तन्यते सर्व सन्तं यत ततत्त तन्नाद्वा तदार्थं तस्त भावं इति वा तत्तमित्रे परम्परा तत्ववाच्य पदेशों याज्ञवादादेख: कर्मं अविदुर्षे महावितिः परस्परविवेच स्वार्थींपरं । उपयोगप्राप्तेऽस्य यावत् शक्तिनन्दमित्रवाच ततात्वं तस्त तत्ववाच्य पदेशे न वस्तुः । की-दशं तर्पं तत्त्वम् । भाः: प्रकाशः प्रमाणम् समस्तमायसु महाप्रकाशाविपुरित्यर्थः । तत्व परिपूर्णम् निरा-कालम् । निराकारश्च विद्याविदे द्विगुणान्त जड्येष्ठु स्वतंत्रमिव विशावान्तितो महान्तं ॥

स्वस्मिन्त्यवभावेच्यद्वासात्मकारसः स्वमान्नामावनान्तः: परा निर्धारित्यर्थः । तदेव परस्मा-हातका वदुश्कात्मकायात्मस्थात्मकतिरिपुर्व दादृश्यण्युक्तं भवति। अत् एवाह इच्छासितिकर्मेनिन्दितम् इति। इच्छाज्ञानकर्मेश्च वामाभेतसः नवनाथितिः जानकारे हितात्मेव ।

अनयः अनन्तविद्यापरिपूर्णम् इति। अनन्तः: निःसंहारं घट्यपुत्र नामारुपालिका: शक्तयः: इच्छाज्ञा-
निकायाभित्वं न्दुचर्मान्यायायं वाहायायं: शक्तयः: शन्द्राष्ट्रसुरुङ्गायायं परस्मा: समतात् पुर्वेम् यात्
तत् एवोऽस्मिन्त्यवाच्य: शास्त्रीति: । एवं परवायुंभवान्तथेत्यमेव वायुस्वतं स्वातः। ननु वायुः चेत्तरं
तत्ततेत्त्वां कालप्रार्थं शन्द्रस्वभिमतवाच्ये शुद्धक्राशाशुरुङ्गायें इत्यावशेषे सर्वविद्याविनी-नम् इति।

यस्माति वोऽयो धर्मान्तमकराः: स वायुयोऽपः: निर्धारितः । विकत्यं व्यायापौर्वकारणं
द्विघटत्यपापग्रहितादिकां घटं निधिनाति । प्रकाशं युवाः: पराहत्यामकारसार्यायी
नामास्रारुप: प्रकाशद्य: प्रतिपक्षाय विद्ये यथावच्चेदात्म्यतं विकल्पपुतः स्वातः । व्यवहरयो अः-
थोऽपाकाराश्च प्रकाशसुरुङ्गाय यथास्वतं विकारः प्रकरणाते पतिः

ततस्मेवस्रव्यवह तात्त्वात्म्यप्रतिपादितः ।

इत्यादिद्यायेन योऽयोः: प्रकाशस्वभावतं यत्: सतस कर्म स्वातंसतयीय व्यवहरयोः प्रकाशश्चक: स्वाहोऽपि
विकल्पपुतः तत्र समावहि: । अथ प्रतिपक्षाय न प्रकाशते इति कथितमहाप्रकाशमानं: पदार्थः प्रतिपक्षोऽपि
पोष्टस्तिति परिभेद्यमापि शक्तेति: यत्काल्चिदत्त्वात् । यत: सर्वः: व्यवहाराद्यं: विकल्पप्रविविनीनम्
इति। येन तत्रस्य मन्त्रा महामायातुपवेशादानव इत्युच्यते। मायात्मकोपि शुद्धविद्याय विज्ञानकाला-प्रमादार आणवमहाभाजनम्। एवमेकमेवेदशीवस्वरूपं तुर्यातिमायि तुर्यारुपं तत्सप्तकारा गीते। तस्मात्करुपस्वयं तत्त्वकारात्मक सदादिवेखाधमृत्व ॥ योऽपि पति देवेऽदेवज्ञानस्य करणं मायात्मादित्यान्ततत्त्वसंग्रहं कार्यवित्तेऽव कार्यकरणक्षिप्य एक एवाला स्वतंत्रे-स्वरूपमाह ॥ १४॥

मायात्मकस्वरूपमाह

परमं यत्त्वात्मके दुर्गृहस्थानं महेश्वरेऽ ॥

देवी मायाशक्ति: स्वतामारण: विश्वयेतु। ॥ १५॥

परमम् अनन्येऽपि यत् परमेश्वरगुप्त: स्वत्तत्वम् विश्वनिर्मातृतवं संवेद्यम्। मायास्य शक्ति: तत्त्व शक्तिन्तः। मीते धर्मायिन्ते धर्मं प्रमातुमयेवमहथ्या यथा सा माया विश्व शोकं हृतः वा माया। एष देवस्य कीमतिविनिः संविनिति कृत्वा देवी न पुनः वर्णविनिमात्व व्यापिता काचिमन्ययपप्राहं ज्ञातं। कीम्तं तत्त्वात्मकम् दुर्गृहस्थानम् इति। हुः शनेन घटिपित शक्तिन्ति तुर्यस्य कार्यस्य प्रमात-प्रमेयारुपस्य संवेदयत ॥ प्रशंसाप्राप्तम्। ॥ १५॥

व्ययायां च प्राणायिक सुविदारुपं भिन्ने भोगे यज्ञोऽरुपम पुनः तत्त्वात्मकम्

मायापरियग्निशालाद्रोहो मदिन: पुण्यायुर्विद्वाती।

कालकलानिषिद्विशालागामिनासवेचन संबंधः। ॥ १६॥

माया स्वीकृत्वापारतम्यास्तस्वरूपस्वरूपकृत्वमोक्षी: सर्वश्रवणारुपह्यनाल्यात्मिकस्वरूपम् मधुमयोऽपि येन घटिकाशास्त्रगृहविकारिः वाहिन्यकियस्य अरुपस्य संवेदिनः चैव च भोगवेदिन: ॥ १६॥

वालक्षेत्रे इति वेष्यायानरुपे: कालाधिपि: आवाहायिता स्वष्टि: ॥ १६॥

कालश्रेष्ठो तत्त्वाय चैत्येणस्वरूपमाह

अयुपौ विषिदेशेऽव स्वरतमैव जानामि।

मायापहितेषु कुशुक्ष्वाहोऽनुमीदाणुमाहः। ॥ १७॥

इति व्ययोद्विष्टोऽपि बोधः: स्वमायाप्य यथापूर्वाय प्रामाण्ये तदाये ज्ञानिकियाशानि संकुचिते अत्य भस्व-रूपस्य विद्याकलेत इत्युच्यते। यथा राजाप्रसन्नविचरसतास्यमथमहारिः किंचिदैत ततोंत दीपेते तथ्यावपस्तािपपाल्पन्तथास्यकारः कालिकधारिणिः महानिनानि वदनिष्ठाय धीरं ध्याते। इदं कुशुक्ष्वाहाः उत्तरकुप्या मायायु पुजः। अपि: आणव-लापारितस्वरूपादेव: चुः: स्वरवाचार्यस्य स्वरायं कालिकेऽण्त्व निः कलितम्। किरुपमित्वाय अहुः प्रायोऽरति। अयुपौ जानामि इति स्ववपुर्वतस्तभादेव प्राप्याय कहतं जानामि ज्ञानिकियाष्टेव-मधिषु कृता कर्मोऽवते इति ज्ञानिकियास्वरूपमाहावानिः तथा कल्याणविन्यस्तत् चेत्योऽस्य कालः।
तथा किचिढेव इत्यवच्छिद्रमेव करोति सर्व कर्त्तृ नालं घटामात्रकरणाय प्रभवति न पटादाविद्ये दत्ताश्च।
कलात्त्वम्। इदमेव इति नियतात्कारानाविविषयं कार्य यद्यर्थं यथा वद्वरेण्य धौद्योधमापेदाकरणम् एव वर्गा दिविषयं न सर्वामादित्वेऽन्यमेव स्वसंक्षेपकृतकरणम् प्रवचनसंभवम्।

इदमेव इति कत्वम्। इति किचिढेव कार्यसंस्कारं दक्षतिः स भूमिस्य व तदस्य नियत्तित्वम्।
तथा सर्वात्मना इति यथा मनुष्यान्यतया सर्वं मनेत्रपुजयते भूमिस्य व न कत्वाचित् भूमिस्य नियत्तित्वयोऽगतत्त्वम्।

वुद्धिवमयो यो रागः स वनी कुञ्जापि कार्यालयेऽद्विरुद्धप्रायः ऐसे रागः इत्यवच्छिद्रमेव न सर्वामात्रायम्।

धृतिवच्छिद्रणे कार्याकार्याविविषयं करिते न नुपुर्वस्यहितं विव्यत्तिः।

कुप्रथापायात् भागसहितम् भेदग्राहयुद्धतत्वमकुसकिः पशोरितः।

कथ्यमेतस्य कत्वुक्त्वस्यायुः प्रत्यभवख्याति।

कमुकुमिव कत्वुक्त्वस्यविविषावेऽ हिमक्षमायिदा।
भजते तत्सु विपिदं शिवमारागमीमुखायोगेन। २८।

वातवनं कृत्तं किचिढेव कमुकुम्व मया अभियो तत्थुक्त्वस्यविविषावेऽ हिमक्षमायिदा।
इत्यवच्छिद्रमेव तत्थुक्त्वस्यावत्त्वः यथवादित्वे।

भासते निर्गरीपि यथतः। प्रक्षिप्यामायं तत्थुक्त्वस्यावत्त्वः यथवादित्वे।

वुद्धिवमयो यो रागः प्रवचनसंभवम्।

विकास्य स्वत्सामाधेशस्य योऽसोऽमायं।

स्वामज्ञानवान्नामृत्त्वसः ममेवें ममेवः

हितिरिग्रहयुद्धित्यतः पूर्णसंभवत्वमस्यचाचाः।

विचित्रशिष्यमकुसकिः।

विशिष्य स्वात्मनावत्त्वसः मयोगः।

परमार्गाचिचादनं दैवन्योर्षेसिस ममेवें ममेवः।

विशिष्यमकुसकिः।

विशिष्य स्वात्मनावत्त्वसः मयोगः।

परमार्गाचिचादनं दैवन्योर्षेसिस ममेवें ममेवः।

विशिष्यमकुसकिः।

सुखुमः।

विशिष्यमकुसकिः।

सुकृतिरक्षानातः।
वशमाणे शब्दाणी विषये ह्यांप्राधानानि श्रोताणीनि पवेणिन्द्राणि क्रियाप्राधानानि चेन्द्राणि पव माणी। वचनादानविश्वासविभागवात्मका: कर्मनिद्राणि विषया:। इत्युभयथा च श्रुणामी- त्याहैकारातुगमादुहाकाराणि॥ २०॥

एवं शब्दादिसङ्गस्वरूपम कथयति

एवं ग्राहो विषय: सूहम: प्रविवागवितस्तो य: स्वात:।

तन्मात्रपर्यंत तत्केव:। स्पर्शो महो रसी गन्ध:॥ २१॥

ज्ञेयकार्यच्या स्वीकार्य: य शामू इन्द्रियाणाम् विषय: गोचर: स्वात:। स कीर्ताः प्रविवागवितस्तो

विषयों वहितपूर्त: सामान्यताम् सूहम:। योढ़ीं भवेत तदेव शब्दादि सामान्यरूपम् तन्मात्रम् शब्दसा-

मान्यं शब्दतामात्रात्मिति। एवमनानि। विषयविषयों: परस्परसंकल्पनादिन्द्रियविद्युतमापि तन्मात्रपर-

क्रमः आहस्वारकमेवेति॥ २१॥

विषयाणि परस्परसांकेश्यां पुष्पिकाराणि कार्यमित्याह

परस्परसंब्रवेतस्तुव: विषयस्तु पृथ्विक्षयितम:॥

अनेति नमः पवनस्तेजः विलित च पृथ्वी च॥ २२॥

एतेषा सृस्त्यवादत: परस्परसंघर्षार्थोऽध्योऽविषेष: सृस्त्यालो विषयः। स एव भूतपूर्वतं याति।

तथा हि शब्दमात्रात्माल्पविशेषों नभो जायते शब्दसामायां पवनो रूपसंकल्पाध्येमात्मां तेजस्वेयो र-

स्तुक्ष्यां गक्लस्तुक्ष्याः पृथ्वीपूर्ति पव माहृतानि कार्य कारणातुगमाम्। इति कुलेकौर्तरुगम-

नीति। एवमेव प्रकृति: कार्यकारणात्मा पृथ्वीय पारस्परस्ये: भोगयत्या प्रयति पद्धित्तात्माकं

जगद्धित्य वितिन्त्य निरुपितम:॥ २२॥

मायाकुशुक्तंप्रत्य: कशुकता पुरूर्य प्रत्याह

तुष हव तथुदलक्षणकामात्रूले प्रकृतियुक्त: सर्गः।

पृथ्वीपर्विद्यात: चैतन्ये देहावेन॥ २२॥

अयमपि प्रायाधिक: सर्गः। धारायत्नत: तद्दुलक्षणम्। यथा तुष: धान्याशि आदीपुरे सामायतः।

तथेव मायाकुशुक्तं कशुकखर्षानीयेन समाहतम:। चैतन्यम्। पुनःपि तुषानाशीयेन देहावेन। परस्पर-

क्षुले तत्त्वात्मकतत्वा स्थयति। अतेन प्रामात्य: कर्मविनित्रियात्मावित्त्याविशेषान्त्यवधाभाव:।

सकला इत्युत्तो विशेषविशेषात्तिथिः। प्रत्यक्षता इति च। एव शिवादिस्वकल्पात्मानुसारसनाधन-रूढश्रेष्ठान्तित जगतिति॥ २३॥

कशुकखर्षात्तत्व परस्परम्यकथूतरूपतामाह

परमार्यम मह इति सृहस्त मायाकुशुक्त स्पृहम:॥

ब्रह्म विश्रांकृत: कोशात्रयेति द्वात्मा॥ २४॥
चैतन्य्य स्वत्व्रुपापति तत्तत्त्वायात्यतिरिवावणः मलः आन्तः स्वर्गस्य कालिकेव परमः अन्तः रजसः आर्यम् चादनं तादात्मयेन स्थित्वतः। मायादी विद्यनं काद्रूकपद्मः सूक्ष्मम् आत्मनं आवरणं तन्द्रानुसरणः क्रमशः सवितावरणेन पुण्यतात्त्विनेतरः चेन भेदस्य इत्तययाद्विदिर्यतः प्रथत इत्येष मायेः।

एतदेशायां बाद्रम् तुस्थानीश्य प्राधानिकं जरीरसत्तात्त्वायात्मणयामरम् स्यूक्ष्मः स्यूक्ष्मयासांतिरुपः लादेष तुतियः कांवां मलों चेन प्रमाता शुभायुक्तमर्मस्यच्यभाजनं भवति। एत्यमेव चरस्त्रूकम्पूरूपेण कोशवेयेन वेषितः विकल्पोदयो घटकाशास्त्रसंकीर्तिकः। आत्मा इत्यणिर्गतिः पत्तुतुत्वयते॥ २४॥ एतसंवधानिकुपहत इव भवतीत्वाह। 

अज्ञानवितिमिष्येयादेकमपस्व स्व स्वभावमातमानम्। प्रामाणकाननावैवचित्वेयावृजयेत॥ २५॥

एष कोशायसेवं आत्मात्मायात्मने पारसविन्यत। एकमपि अद्द्वास्थावासपि स्वामन्तनि नानाय- समापत्तमतः आत्मसाभावम्। चैतन्यकमसत्तात्त्वः स्वरूपं प्रमातुप्रमाणप्रामाणप्राप्तमाचार्यः जानात्मपरिपतेन भेदनानिमित्तं इति यातु॥ यथा रेवातिमिरोपहतः पुरुषं एकमपि चन्द्रं पश्चात्तः चन्द्रविमो नानि सत्य इति परिच्छेदाभ्यक्तमपि दर्शयति ही चन्द्रविमो पश्यति । वस्तुवृत्त्वातं एवासो चन्द्र इति तिमिरवात्स्तथा भवते। चेनेगात्त्त्वायात्मणानवन्दल्भ्याः। वार्तकविः स तैमिरिकं प्रामोति। त-थावायात्तिमिरप्राप्तेः च विस्मान्तरि भेदनं चार् चार्याणं कर्मफलमयर्यते चेन भूप्रमूः। स्वर्गिनियानिर्देशगाभावति। अतःज्ञानस्य तिमिरिण रूपत्यां विपरीताभासनात्॥ २५॥

आत्माद्व द्वात्त्वेन निःशृणनाति। 

रसायनतांतकरकिंगुचिन्वयायेभुवसुः पचः।

तद्रसायनेयेत॥ २६॥

रसायनम्। इश्युमेदा: यथा एकः यथेयेभुवसुः परमार्थाः सर्वन्य साधुपुरुषानामत्वेश्व जानात्मदि अवस्थापेदा: प्रायाज्ञानप्रयाेणः। सर्वं विशेषः परमात्मान: स्वाभावस्य शर्मो: चैतन्यमहेश्वर्यः। यत: स एव भगवान्तः भयं स्वाभावः। स्वाभावस्य तामिल भूमिकां समाप्तस्तथा प्रायाज्ञानाधिकवाच्यस्विशिष्टं। प्रथते यथेयेभुवसुः न पुः। स्वाभस्तरसाद्वादित्रूं किरिदर्शति । स एव सर्वव्यास् सविद्युनामात्। इत्यथ रसायनकरकुपतात्त्वात्माता सर्वस्य भवति। यथाह श्रीसांभुप्रियारकः।

एको भावः सर्वव्यासः शर्मो: भावा एकभवव्यासः।

एको भावस्वत्वयो चेन हि: सर्वं भाववस्त्वत्तत्त्वेन हि:॥ ॥ 

इति। भगववेदीस्वस्य।

सर्वभूतेऽन्यं शर्मेण भाववाच्यमिष्टे।

अविभक्तं विभक्तं तज्ज्वलं विद्यम्य आत्मिकम्।

इति । २६॥

तीथिंत्यापरिकारिणिः भेदः संवृत्यापस्युषगातीतेऽपि न सत्यभूमावकल्पत इत्यत्वे।
विश्वानात्मकप्राणिविरोद्वेशनातिपिण्डान्तः।
व्यवहारमात्रेतपरमार्थं तु न सत्येव ॥ २७ ॥

विश्वामुः इति वोपयानत्रेयेव केवलमुनयापि नामस्तंहितमन्यनादिवासनाप्रवोधव्यचित्रसामर्थ्यात्री-
तत्सृष्टिरूपं वाचरूपः पत्या नाना प्रकाशत इति विश्वामवादिनः।

पुरुष एवेद सर्वम् ... ॥

नेह नानास्ति किंचि ... ॥

इति न्यायेन अत्यंतः सर्वशेषति परं बहुविधाविद्वाराध्येष्टेन प्रकाशत इति वहवादिनः। अत्रोपय-
आपि वेदेन्त मुनयापि जीवितत्थूं विश्विनिर्माण्येते तृतीयतः न वेदेतमृ।

अन्ये प्राण बहवादिनस्तु, यथाप्राणामेव विश्वामार्णेव वर्तते न न हि भागामात्रेऽव्यक्तिविद्वाणूः रूप-
मिति सर्वविदं शवदर्पहताः।

अप्रे प्रतिपता यथा विरोधेदुः इति वेदारमपिर वहरणः सत्यभूमिति। यथेक्रमः।

यत्वात्मस्य दौर्भूर्ध्य च नामित्वानि श्रिति:।
सूर्यशुद्धिरिः श्रेयं तस्मै लोकास्तने नमः।।

इत्त्वेवमादी।

जाति: इति महासत्तासामान्यत्वक्षणं सर्वगुणाःश्रयं वस्तु परमार्थसदिःति वेदारम्भकादयो बुवते।

अन्ये पिण्डः: इति व्यक्तय एव परमार्थसंस्कारितरशं न नामान्य नाम किंविदेकनककुशेष्ठाणश्रयं प्रकाशते
नायुपपरसंस्कारिते वेद वैपीरूपमुनयापि व्यवहारः: परिसमेजः कि सामान्येनिति नामित्वानित्विकल्पे: सामान्य सिव-
दुनान्य व्यक्तयो नामन्यावत्त्वन्यावत्त्वनापि न भासत इत्त्वेवमादि वह बुवतो जातितर्थ परमार्थं इति र्तिपतिरा
इत्त्वेव विश्वामिरिः: पिण्डान्ते येव भेदानां ते तथोत्तरः: व्यवहारामात्रेतुद | इत्त्वेवमादि एव सिद्धधेष्टक्षण 
विरुद्धार्थेन प्रकाशाते परमार्थं तु न सत्येव इति न पुनः: सत्यत्वमैस्वेदार्थणांतरपरिकल्पितमेति विद्माणा एव।

तस्मादेक एव परमार्थरमार्थं: स्व-दृश्यात्मयमेहं इत्त्वमिति चक्कित योऽस्यस्येवाविदेषं स्वक्षणः विकारार्थ प्रकाशामात्रावातु।

यथूकः।

तीर्थिक्यव्यक्षेन: स्वमनन्दिकाभिन्नेष्य तत्त्वमिति प्रशद्धी बदनित।

तत्त्वमेव भवतोडःति न किंचिदन्मतंज्ञापु केवलमर्थं बुवाणां विवादः।।

इति ॥ २७ ॥

इदानी भान्तस्तद्धार्थाध्या भृत्व निद्दर्शनमाह।

रज्जा नाति भूजक्षारं कुतुरं च मूढुपुष्पन्तमः।

एन्तर्वेदेन्त्रि शक्ति न विवेकः शक्तेति नाम ॥ २८ ॥
अन्तः: पूर्णवाच्यातिकृप्या अतात्र्यप्रतिभासे महती शक्ति: उत्तम सामर्थ्यः न केनखित वि-वेकुः शक्ते न केनचिद्यायितुः परत्य इति यावत् । यथा वर्तवृत्ते रजुः परिष्कारमाया दीर्घत्वकु-पंडितनीपुरंब्रमात्सङ्गेयसिद्धमिविसंसातुः रजुः वेय्यासर्वदेश्यतिभासोऽयं सर्पंक्ष्वसः सदर्श-तिभासार्थः मरणावसायः विद्वधातुः। अनुव्यवस्थायें योत्तथायुः भूतार्थित मत्या स्वयं भीषणं वाकारे समुद्तिक्षय अन्तः: सन्तो हुढ़ाहनारं के नाम न याता इति विभभ वहार्तलपथः हेतुरितम् ॥ २८ ॥

प्रत्यकृते सामर्थ्ये
तद्वर्धार्प्ललिन्येयोऽपितिमणसुकुः खः।
वर्णाश्रमः चालन्यसदि: विभ्रमवालाहवति ॥ २९ ॥

एवं यथा रजु: परमार्थसति भ्रान्त्या सर्पण्या विमृङ्गापि सर्पंतामयक्षियाने करोति तथेव देहातम-मानिनां चेतासि फर्माच्यापि तत्ततोक्षिणामनाम, विभ्रम वाशामायायायांमोहसामयांदिव भवति पत्तेव तत्त्वमिति भ्रान्त्या सत्ता रम्भते । धर्म: अथवायदिः अथवा: बहवाहनादिः: स्वः: निविर्धायशाः प्रतिः: स्वियः: यातना उपसितः: जनम मरणम: जन्मभावः सुखम: आहारः: दुःखम: रात्तस: सोभस्तंशा वर्णः: बहव-पोष्यमित्वादि अर्थमः बहवाचारिवतादि आदि श्रवणात्तपः बृजवतार्थिः सततः कल्याणमात्राः: विभ्रमविज्ञ-भिमतमेव मायायाक्या देहावात्त्वायामिन्याते । पत्तत्वार्थः अन्तः: भ्रमिति यवनवर्तवर्तनकल्याणमर-णव्यभाजः: पदवो न पुन: परमार्थतः: स्वामतनोविचक्ष्मित्रिदानदेशकथनस्यार्थः धर्मार्थार्यायांकिकिचिन्हिदी-यत इति ॥ २९ ॥

एवमसद्धार्प्लतिभासने अन्तः: सामर्थ्य विचार्य सुधुतपितामह
पत्ततद्वषकारय पद्मारेशु प्रकाशामान्तायः।
अत्मानितिरक्षेषापि भवतयनात्माभामिनोऽयम् ॥ ३० ॥

पत्ततद्वषकारम् इत्येषा सा समन्तप्रतिपदाति विभ्रमोहिणी पूर्णवाच्यातिकृपः अन्तः: पद्मारेशु प्रमादःप्रयुक्तेपेशु पिथववित्तुः पदार्थेशु प्रकाशामान्ताय इति

... नामकाहः प्रकाशे।

इति प्रकाशामान्तात्मनानुपपत्तया प्रकाशशारीरीपूर्वेः आलम्: चेतन्येः थ्राभारुपुस्थेः सत्यमेषः अतिरेकानामी भाव ग्राहा वाहा मतो भिन्नतेः इति अनात्माभाम: वास्तवाभिन्नतापहत्तनेन यत्त्वोवासथव सज्जत्यासपम्। अथवाय भावप्रकाशनेयसंस्कारसुपपत्या वासस्वासानाध्याक्षतिरुपप-प्रत्येकनवात्त्वात्माकारया एव स्वतःअर्धीचीन्तुदादिता प्रकाशतेतस: प्रमादःप्रयुक्तेपेशु चित्यवर-पोड़मेते प्रकाश इति यात्ततवर्त रूपः तत् प्रकाशते केवलेवात्त्वासथो भेदः: प्रथत इति तात्तिक्यप्रभाम-बाधात्ते रवेद्यकारोण रूपमिति ॥ ३० ॥

आनन्दमत्ताभिमानोपूवीद्वानन्दमत्ताभिमानो भवतीति: प्रतिपद्यन्त्राते: सूतरां मोहरूपतामह
तिम्राश्रिषति तित्तिरिमिन्दं गण्डस्योपरि महानय स्वादः।
यद्वात्माश्रिषि देश्यात्तात्माभानित्वम् ॥ ३१ ॥
आदी तावदेकसविवतततवेचचपि भावेषु भेदमयं जायपादनमत्विततिमिरणं कृतं यत्स्वातमनोऽभ्यानं भावानं ततो भेदं प्रथमम एवं तिमिनित्व तिमिमिः अव्याति। यथोकामं चन्द्रं: चक्षुष्णेन रेखातिमिरणं हिम्म भाव्यते ही चन्द्रावितं तत्वाव्यातितिमर्मकपि सर्वं स्वातमक्रमं वर्तते भेदे-नानामस्तं प्रकाशितं। एवम्विस्तन्ते तिमिमिः अपरमायतं महामोहोऽहोऽमापितं: गण्डस्योपि पितकोत्तरं यतु आल्यात्पहस्तितस्वस्वप्पेष्ये क्षिथिः पदार्थं जाय्याचारदेशेतु मध्यावृत्ते व्यांतिरिक्तं जडे देहाग्राणां वेयकाण्डेथु कुसोखं स्थूलोऽसं शुप्तिः सुप्तिः सुव्ययिम न किचिदहमिि मानसुत्-पदस्तं बालसिद्धे आत्मसनत्वमेत्र अतिदृप्यं ताटायामतिरंविरंतिविरंमाम। यदि तावदात्माभावानं विना वैवस्मतिः ततैवस्युवादित्यस्तु मा वा कुतौपि भृजस्तुः कतिपयं जडे देहाण्णो लोधाप्राप्त: आस्त्याव-हन्तारामिन्तोकोज्यं नीलसुखादाविद्यनायामतिस्पितामेदं एवं पूर्णं संसारं: शाचांनवो यद्भिमा-नोपनो दन्तदाहिंधान: कर्तित्व पशूपिनि। यदृक कार्ण्डेवपुराणो योगिन्या नदालंया।

यानं श्रीतां यानगतं देहो देहसिपी चानं: पुरुषं निविषति।
ममतमुच्छं न तथा यथा यवे देहसितश्च निमूलं तिष्ठः।

इति॥ ३१॥

एवम्यातिवशमिध्याविश्वितिपरितथामात्रं वामातित्याघ।

देहाग्राणवामातिनीमणि:प्रस्पष्योगेन।
आत्मानं वेशयते पित्रं जालेन जालकार इव॥ ३२॥

आल्यायपहस्तितस्ततेन्तं: सर्वं: प्रामाता स्वोऽध्येक्यविन्दांविंद्यकपकमपी आत्मानं वेशयते। कथमि- त्यानो देह हयाद्रि। देहाण्णवेशयकार्शनं शिशोऽशानः शिबयः: नमसा प्रप्पः: विन्यः: तत्योगेन देहादिव-कत्यवस्त्यं। यथा कृपा: स्थ्यूऽ रुपायाणिपत्तामिती बालाचारः वालाजनास्मारः: कार्यका इवं स्वविक्षेपने देहत्बमात्यलेन्तिपतिः: किचिदिवेिकर्मायः।

देहाण्णवेशयस्ततेय प्रलोकयं कुतोऽस्तत्यकमतयं य: श्रुपि: पिपिषित: सोपहमिति प्राणात्मानिनभर क्वित्स्वेच्छन्तन्यताः।

देहाण्णो जडी लोधाधिक्रूहसनयोात्मात्मानस्ततं: सुव्ययं हृ: स्वहमिः य: सुपुखु: तानदे चेत्तते स आत्मिति पूर्णकामिनिनो भूमासाकाद्योपि विवेच्चकमाशं।

पततसुधहः: शालिपि वृक्षविधम्: कथामात्यसा बहू प्रकर्षारो देहाण्णविविक्षनां यत्राभाव: स आ-त्मिति सुव्ययिमिनि:। एवं यस्यपितितित: भाति तत्वामहितत्राध्येक्यरूपं स्वुपमेव सर्वोपपहनत्वभावामितीति नम: शादेकमकः। तद्वपि शूर्यं यदा समाधानावसे वदिकुर्वत्त पदार्थं एवं भावस्तत: सूर्यात्म-रमात्यजेतु किरदारना नेति नेति वहायाःपञ्चमतत्तच्युतपरित्यस्तीति नाम: प्रप्प: कार्यकायं निहूपित:। इवेघं सूर्यः परिवर्ष्यन्तान्तच्युतयात्मामिनि: योगिन: सुरुगुहाः-निम्नान जमाण्णो भान्ता वालमानं संविज्ञायतुपरिपाते जाज्ञेनातुमहिम। चित्रमु: इयायथप्रमेयंयथु सूचीत: नैत्यकरणं कर्तृ पार्य्य इति। अत: दुर्यात्मामान जालेन इत्यदि। यथा जालकार: कथितकृत्वर्मं स्वर-निमित्ते वेये जालामार्णं निमायं सर्वं गत। आत्मानं वेदयते सर्वं स्वात्मानिन्याय वामातित्यंतर
संस्कृत चतुर्थ तत्त्वदासेन्यम्।

इति सर्वस्ववस्थातु सुरीयं रूपममुन्युदलेन स्वितम्बिति परमायं। एतावतात तत्र तै: स्वरूपमाच्छादितं स्त्रयात्र वेद्वाय तथापि तैनैवृतं भार्त: इति। इत्थमिपि तै: स्वरूपस्तत्तान्त्रमुत्तमपि तथ्य: समुत्तरीर्णत्यां सर्वनामित्यात्रयं सर्वार्थाभासं एव न पुनोस्तदार्येन पूर्वस्वरूपं तत्र तिरोधनं इति निश्चयम् सर्वावस्थायं सदेव परिपूर्णम्॥ ॥

वेदान्तभाषणिं ग्रामद्रादिनं निजायं स्वरूप्यं व्यवहरसतदुन्युतममायं तत्: परं तृतीयमावेदयति।

जाग्य्य्यिव्रयेऽऽेऽ्येः प्रकाशमहात्म्यात्।

प्राहं: सुनस्वयं शान्तनन्दवत्ततं परं तूर्यम्॥ ॥

जाग्य्य्यिव्रयेऽऽ्येः प्रकाशमहात्म्यात्।

थि  सर्वार्थान्त्रमुत्तमपि नानेनिद्रप-झानविच्छेदम्। अत्यं शिवनुबुधु।

झाने जाशयति।

इति। एषा बहस्तं विराजवस्या गीतेत। चच्छृति:

यो विश्वचक्रशुर्ल विश्वतोमुषो विश्वतोहरस उत्त विश्वतन्त्रमाय।

संवाहंस्य नमते संयतेयार्यावृद्धिवी जनयन्देव एवं।।

इति। तथा स्र्वं: तेनेववस्या बहस्त:।। कुतं इत्त्रात प्रकाशमहात्म्यात्। इति। स्र्वं: वहिष्ठिकगणि शादायानि विभोगे तवच्छ ग्रहन्ति नापि तत्व बहां शालदिर्क्षक नाम किंचित्यमार्गसंहित्यति जानी बालदायचक्चा विश्वचक्रविषयनिक्षिपहितं किमेतिहितभविष्यं कारणान्तररुपस्तं गुज्जसिक विचारमाणे लोकप्रदेरथ च स्र्वं: सर्व प्रकाशतेवति इदमं वसवादात्यं वदस्य एव भगवानस्वभावसो देवतण्त्रमातुतं समाविष्: स्वायम: स्वायमेनष्का प्रकाशस्वचालनाहुर हुरादात्रानेमकुमारुस्वचालनरुपम्यात्या प्रतिवंश प्रतिमातु वस्य-प्रेसाथिरमेव विष्य प्रकाशत्तेवति बहस्ता। स्वातन्त्र्य स्र्वं एव भावादिभिर्सुभस्तात्।। यतो वेदान्तेनेविदितसर्वः

प्रतिभ्यज्ञानान्तम्य सुद्धा भावायुर्थविधयम्।

सर्वधरः: सर्वमयः स्र्वं भोक्ता प्रकाशते॥

इति प्रकाशमहात्म्येन्तवात हेतुतुरं। स्र्वं: बहस्तं तेनेववस्येति। तथा प्राहं: सुमातस्या इति। सवर्म-मातुरः या सुमातस्या सुपुत्र सा प्राहं। इति बहस्त: प्राज्ञावेदयति। यतः सर्वमात्रां ग्राहयाहकप्रप-वशलयानमहाकृत्यमुत्तमं श्राद्धिवितियं संस्कारायं सुपुत्रे विश्वत्वा बीमभूतस्य बहस्त एव प्राहं बहा प्रज्ञात्यात्म्यममविस्त्यतं इति यावत्। सर्वस्य प्रमातुस्वसुविभवविश्वविच्छेद्याप्राय: संसा संस्कार-रूपमिस्त: प्रकुल्यस्य प्रागुपुमुहबवहारदशान्तन्तरं वदायसं भूमी रिधि प्रज्ञात्यात्म्यमस्य सर्वकोटिकरणेषु।
वहन न प्राकाशिष्यत कृततत्त उत्सििष्य प्रमातुः प्रागनुभूतवसुतुनसतः तदित्यनुभूतचरवेन स्मृतिः

सर्वनुभुत यदि नातन्थस्वहातमसाधारसुधिश्चतिः रसः

विज्ञातवसाधिमोचरुणा कामितमृतिः न संभवेनत्

इति। इत्य सुपुरस् चिन्मयमेव बहाःः प्राज्ञावस्थेश्वति गीयते। कुतः ह्यानयनहासः इति। सुपुरस्तुःियोः

साधारणयोः हेतुतित्युपस्त्र योजयम्। इति। सुपुरस्तुःियोः ह्यानयनहासः प्रकाशानीतुवेनः केवलं विश्रपस्त्रस्वकारेण

प्रायमाल सति शुद्धचिन्मयी न भवतीतः। यदृकः स्त्रादशाख्ये

ह्यानभवस्वपिन्या शतकः परम्या युतः।

पद्यं विभुवर्णितं तदन्त्य तु चिन्मयः।

इति। तथा ततः परे तुर्मृषः इति। तस्मातपुरुषात। परम् अन्यत्रः शेषपादवाससाधारसाधारापरिशाखाया

चुक्षपूर्वाणनाथत्योः बहाःः रुपनुभुतुश्च नाम। यद्यव नामात्मः न किचरुपपरस्ते शोभायास्य

स्थानत्तरतमालेनानुप्राणितः चतुः संविद्युपासनेन तुर्मृषः इति। पूर्णपरत्येव संविद्युपासनेन

चतुः संविद्युपासनेन तुर्मृषः इति। वतो जागदाभोस्वतः सरेभ्धवर्णात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मानहनमासवसुःकोक्षोभ्रुवस्त्रस्वकारेन

प्रद्धवागवक्षक्षिणन्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यs
संस्कृत टेक्स्ट
अनातम अनेतनत्वकाय देहदी कृत्ता। स्वधार्मिकतमाता यत् तद्भवाभासम् अनात्मात्मात्मा परमर्यादाम्। तथा तत्समान्। पुरा आदायो निराकृत् अहं विदानन्देकरोकविचिन्तनस्वरूपः। स्वसत्तं त्वक्तक्रियामहात्माकृपणया कृप्येहदिन्द्रमातुत्तमपरिहारपर्याये विकृतित्वर्धेकं।।

देहालिक्रियामुखाभिमानजनिता भेदधोज्यानां बद्विद्यधेऊतमेको विविधपदयो प्रकाशपुष्पि विज्ञाप्तेऽपि यथा भावनि। देहानुवासात्माभिमानजनिता न भेदधोज्यानां गात्मकतत्तवः प्रत्यक्षेऽपि जगति। भेदप्रशास्त्रोऽसम्भवशिष्यादात्मत्तमालाभिमानाभावनि परमात्मस्व स्वतःमहेश्वरो भगवानेऽर्ण। निवारणित नायन्यात्र सामाचारम्। ॥ ३९ ॥

एवं अनात्मायपासाराणायपेररीभृत्तयोगिनो न किंचित्कार्यमविशिष्यत इत्याह।

इत्य विश्वमुगलोकसमूलविच्छेदने कृतार्थस्य। करियानत्त्वकल्लया न जातु परयोगिनो भवति। ॥ ४० ॥

इत्यम् कारिकार्यप्रतिपादित्वप्रकाशः अनात्मायप्रयोगविद्यविकारः कृतार्थस्य स्वसत्तत्वघ्याय परिष्ठ-परेशोपसंबंधविद्विधधारणा। कः। प्रामाण्यः अर्थः। कृषि योगे यथा तथा। प्रकृत्योगुभ्यक्तम् न कदाचित्त। कर्त्तात्ववर्गृष्टा। तीर्थात्त्वकत्ते तक्तपरिवर्त्तकायादात्मत्त्व। अदिकार्यस्य कल्लया। मनोव्याख्यानोऽरोपिण न विचते। अयमेव परो धर्मेऽयोग-लाभार्यानुत्तमम्।

इति हि स्वात्मणानुस्य भ्रान्तायगतस्तत्तत्वाय। नायन्यान्तत्त्व परिभ्रमः। पूर्णेऽयोगिनः। युक्तम्।

यदा ते मोक्षकिल्लु विद्विष्टितितरिष्पि।

तदा गत्तासि निर्भयेऽश्रुत्वाय श्रुत्तसः। ॥ ॥

इति गीतातु॥ ४१॥

संप्रति पृथिविद्यासार्यात्मान्त्वे भेदाभासाभाजो विश्वस्य भेदभेदमयाशक्तमूर्मकावेशे। पूर्णप्रकाशानन्दन्द्रश्वमवपदमापमत्त्वाय भेदविलायने तदभेदमयात्माविभावयत। शांभवात्मदसंपूर्णसुभोधिकायायामहावाहेदींशक्तमसरोदसाधार्यायुववसिद्ध महामहान्तर्मसिद्धससमसमस्तविद्विविभाषात्माभिर्भाष्यायुववसिद्ध। नाराशिष्यादात्माभिकर्मार्यायुर्य नस्मात्विन्यासार्यात्माभिभाष्यायुववसिद्ध।

पृथ्वी प्रकृतिमाय तत्त्वमिदं वेदश्च वात्तितमात।

अवैधव्यकपन्नुत्तमाय। सहस्रपरिशोकम। ॥ ४२॥

पारिविकर्तृतमायांद्रात्मकं यत्कुलुमसुमपरुण्य त्रिविधम्। वेदश्च वात्तित्तमात| ज्ञानगचारः प्रात-तात।
तत्तदृपत्या ज्ञान वहितत् प्रकाशते ।
ज्ञानाभिन्नता ज्ञानस्य सर्वतो जगतः ॥
वद्ध ज्ञानाभिन्न भावः केनचित्तिः प्रीकृता: ।
ज्ञानं तदात्मनं यात्ममेतस्मात्वदस्यीते ॥

इति श्रीकालिकाकमोक्षन्यायेन यत् अद्वितेयवनम् तद्वित्तमेक्ष्यतेः सम्मात्सनापरिवेशम् प्रकाशामानात्मकस्ततः तात्म्यात्मात्मात्मकस्तम् भवति। हि: यस्माद्वः ॥ ४१ ॥

एतदेव भेदयावस्तवत्तत्त्वप्रतिपादनाभ्याये गोपपाद्यति

रश्नाकुण्डलकर्तर्क भेद्यत्यागे दशयते यथा हेम ।
तद्वद्येद्यागे सम्मार्थसे सर्वामात्मति ॥ ४२ ॥

यथा किल सौवर्ण रश्नायामार्षण सुवर्णार्थिनो रश्नाविचित्रसाधराये रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्वत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः रश्नायामात्मसत्िः

रूपादित्य परिश्रमात्तितितिः ।

इति भूत्तक्षेत्रस्तुक्तस्तुत्वात् भेद्यागे सति सम्मात्रस्य सत्तमात्मतकस्य आभाविः ॥ ४२ ॥

तद्देवः सर्वब्रह्मसंकोशवादश्चात्मवाचसुप्रशिष्टा नरसरस्तु शाक्त्रूपोपाराहि मन्नस्यप्रदायं क- 

टाक्षरार्थविध्वस्ति

तद्द्वारे परं शुद्धं शान्तमेद्यात्मकं सर्वं स्तम्भ: ।
असूभ तत्त्वं शाक्ती विश्रामात्ति भावरूपायायम् ॥ ४३ ॥

तद्द्वारे परं शुद्धं शान्तमेद्यात्मकं सर्वं बृहस्च। ब्रह्म: शृष्णनतविदः ।

सद्वेद्वेद सोम्य अग्र आसीतः ।

इति पूर्ववाच्च परम् शुद्धे हेयोपदेर्यामावात् शुद्धम् पूर्वत्वपशामात् शान्तम् अत एव अमेदात्मकम् प्र- 

कर्मचक्षुषमावात् सम्म्

प्रदेशोपिपवहणः सार्वरूपमनस्तिकान्तात्त्वविकल्प्यः ।

इति सिद्धव शक्त्रम् अत एव अमृतम् अविनाशः

सत्तवाचर्य तु यो भागो प्रतिभावं व्यवस्थितः ।

सत्तत्व वत्तत सा जातिसत्वं स्तम्भ: सिद्धतः: ॥

इति ॥
यदाद्रि च यदुते च यमने चतु सत्यता ।

इति तत्रभवदृत्तार्किनिरपितगीता सत्यम् तदेव सत्तामात्रात्मकपरमेतेऽत्तर्मभावकुपायम् इच्छाज्ञानकियारूपात्माशिकासाहसमरस्त्रायिकायाः परस्यां शरी विशारायति ।

विविधिलोका विषयायवरदिति ।

इति सिध्दत्वा तन्मयीवनविति ।

अथ च शान्तमु शकारस्याते यन्तृभवन्यरूपम् ततः पर्यं यतु अमृतमु अमृतवीजात्मकं भगा सन्नातात्मकं साधारणपदस्त्रायां। शुद्धमु अत एवाहिनं सर्वभिस्तिसंस्करणां समं सकलम् चाताभावात्माविनिग्रहानां सत्यम् । यदादित्र भवतात ।

तुतीय वहा सुधोणी ।

इति श्रीतिकरायाम् । तद्इतिस्तीभावाचामृट वसदाः शिवपदपापमेलयिशात्मकं बहा प्रागुकायां शरी विशारायति ॥ ४१ ॥

किम्यानेन्निमुखैन परशाये यत्र विश्वामिति तत्र किंचिदित्वाह ।

इत्यत्र इति वेष्टत इति संपादत इति च भावव्यवेण ।

अपरापूर्ण यदापि तु नमः प्रसूततवमेवते ॥ ४३ ॥

इति च यदृत् वेष्टत इति संपादत इति च भावव्यवेण ।

अपरापूर्ण यदापि तु नमः प्रसूततवमेवते ॥ ४४ ॥

इति च वेष्टत इति संपादत इति च भावव्यवेण ।

अपरापूर्ण यदापि तु नमः प्रसूततवमेवते ॥ ४५ ॥

इति च वेष्टत इति संपादत इति च भावव्यवेण ।

अपरापूर्ण यदापि तु नमः प्रसूततवमेवते ॥ ४६ ॥

इति च वेष्टत इति संपादत इति च भावव्यवेण ।

अपरापूर्ण यदापि तु नमः प्रसूततवमेवते ॥ ४७ ॥

इति च वेष्टत इति संपादत इति च भावव्यवेण ।

अपरापूर्ण यदापि तु नमः प्रसूततवमेवते ॥ ४८ ॥

इति च वेष्टत इति संपादत इति च भावव्यवेण ।

अपरापूर्ण यदापि तु नमः प्रसूततवमेवते ॥ ४९ ॥

इति च वेष्टत इति संपादत इति च भावव्यवेण ।

अपरापूर्ण यदापि तु नमः प्रसूततवमेवते ॥ ५० ॥

इति च वेष्टत इति संपादत इति च भावव्यवेण ।

अपरापूर्ण यदापि तु नमः प्रसूततवमेवते ॥ ५१ ॥

इति च वेष्टत इति संपादत इति च भावव्यवेण ।

अपरापूर्ण यदापि तु नमः प्रसूततवमेवते ॥ ५२ ॥

इति च वेष्टत इति संपादत इति च भावव्यवेण ।

अपरापूर्ण यदापि तु नमः प्रसूततवमेवते ॥ ५३ ॥

इति च वेष्टत इति संपादत इति च भावव्यवेण ।

अपरापूर्ण यदापि तु नमः प्रसूततवमेवते ॥ ५४ ॥

इति च वेष्टत इति संपादत इति च भावव्यवेण ।

अपरापूर्ण यदापि तु नमः प्रसूततवमेवते ॥ ५५ ॥

इति च वेष्टत इति संपादत इति च भावव्यवेण ।

अपरापूर्ण यदापि तु नमः प्रसूततवमेवते ॥ ५६ ॥

इति च वेष्टत इति संपादत इति च भावव्यवेण ।

अपरापूर्ण यदापि तु नमः प्रसूततवमेवते ॥ ५७ ॥

इति च वेष्टत इति संपादत इति च भावव्यवेण ।

अपरापूर्ण यदापि तु नमः प्रसूततवमेवते ॥ ५८ ॥

इति च वेष्टत इति संपादत इति च भावव्यवेण ।

अपरापूर्ण यदापि तु नमः प्रसूततवमेवते ॥ ५९ ॥

इति च वेष्टत इति संपादत इति च भावव्यवेण ।

अपरापूर्ण यदापि तु नमः प्रसूततवमेवते ॥ ६० ॥

इति च वेष्टत इति संपादत इति च भावव्यवेण ।

अपरापूर्ण यदापि तु नमः प्रसूततवमेवते ॥ ६१ ॥
तथा आहैवेव विष्यः। इत्यादि। अहंमितेव यः। पूर्णश्रीरित्यपरामर्श एव एवास्मि नानादेहादिउपमातुः समाप्तः। विष्यः आगोपालवािजनाधीननत्तरभेदेन सुप्रतमित्विभाषि ममेव रूपांगीति यावत्। क इव कर्त्तरामिदविभावो देह इव यथा सामायेन सर्वत्रायेको देहः। कर्त्तरामिदविभावः। प्रतिमातुः। स्वाभावः। नानारूपस्तम्भवेक्ष्यत्वलः। पदार्थः। सर्वरूपस्वाधीनन्तः। इति। तथा सर्वस्मिनः। प्रमादममात्रः। प्रमायररूपः। सूक्ष्मः। सर्वस्य स्वाभावमुखस्वतः। प्रकास्यतः। कर्म भावेशु भावरूपमिव। इति। वा नानाधिकतुः। भावरूपः। अनिधियो धोन्तीश्रीः। वस्तु। देहायते। तस्ये जगेदसनागत्वेकुण्ठः। दूपमायिति। अचाव द्रष्ट इत्यादि। देहेन्द्रियारंजितोऽपि। चिरमृत्तिकात्रमेव परायम्। श्रणिम मज्रायिम। रस्यायि। स्मरणमै। सर्वधेयारमै। स्वाभावितं सर्वः पूर्णांतत्ताविशेषः। कृतकृत्यः। देहेन्द्रिययां हि पदार्थारीश्वादी दभ्यते। परं द्वाराध्यायाभावस्मातः। उन्महेन्द्रियादिविरागभुवाक्षत्वार्जितोऽपि। चिदानन्दक्षमः। सर्वभूतान्त्याचारी। विष्णुकोमोक्षमन्त्रस्वध्वाचावः। परः। पुरुष। एव। तथा च श्रुतः। अपाणिपादो जस्ये ग्रहीता पश्यत्यच्छसः। स श्रुणास्यकः। स वैति वेदेः। न च तत्स्यांति वेदं त्वामहृद्यं पुरुषं महान्तन्तः।}

इति। तथाकर्त्तापि संदिन्तागम इत्यादि। स्वाभवातार्तापि। देवमुनिनुष्ठायायाविविदः। संस्केरविस्तारविक्ष्यायाः। अतिमायुस्कृपोऽहः। संस्कृताराजाध्याविन्यासकरोः। न पुरजज्ञानं लोकस्थान्तरं देहेन्द्रियाविविदः। तत्करणः। शक्तिमिति। तत्तथाध्यायनबहेतवर्णमतिन्तर्लितम्। अनेन प्रान्तवन्तुरूपम्। स्वाभवमहेश्वरश्रीः। सत्याः। न प्रमाणोपयोगं। उपपधान्त उपयुक्ते। वेत्तुकु खः। स्वाभाविविदः। अहम्म। इत्येव। मनुष्यविद्वन्तुः। सर्वान्मि। स्वाभाविविदः। शिवः। सर्वातविश्वतः। सर्वत्रांगेवदिशिदस्यी इति। ५७। ५८। ५९। ५०।

तदेव व्यायातेन केमगं। सर्वा। ममार्थ। विभव इति। दार्शन चर्चायन। प्रत्येकमायनमुयायनमहास्वरूपः। योगी। भवतीप्रयाह।

इत्येव। वैतिकवत्तेः। गस्ति। प्रविज्ञेः। मोहिनी। मायामृ। सृजिते। वैतिकवत। कृत्वा। कृती। कृतमिव। भवाणी। लघुः। स्यात्। ॥ ५७ ॥

अनेन प्रकारेः। सर्वाभावां भावकर्त्तापिरीतिनुक्तः। वैतिकवत्तेः। गस्ति। महेद्रश्या। विलीनाया। मोहिनी। मायामृ। प्रविज्ञेः। अनन्तान्तरमायुस्मात्मातिवाति। भेदश्रीहेतुमायुभल्ल्ही। विशेषता। संकोचस्यांगेव। समुस्त्वं ज्ञानी। भवाणी। वृहतांः। पूर्ण। भवानन्दक्षमं। स्वाभाविविदः। लघुः। स्यात्। संकोचविविदः। लघुः। कृत्वा। कृतमिव। भवाणी। वैतिकवत्तेः। तदस्य। न मोहिनी। मायामृ। महेद्रश्या। विलीनाय। भवतीप्रयाहः।

जाते। देहभावप्रीत्यप्रेमः। प्रातेक्षे। भूषिते। वोषिते। अव्यात्त्वः। विचित्रन्याममन्त्यायः। लेन। नित्य। एकोक्षभासि। ॥
इति कश्यास्ते ॥ ५१ ॥

एवं बहासत्तात्परव्रजस्य योगिनों हनुमानभिमोक्षपि ब्रह्मयय एवं स्वरूपविवेकलोपय प्रगतभत इत्याह

इत्य तत्त्वसम्मु भावनया शिवप्रसवसमियाते ।
कः शोकः को मोहः सर्व बहासवलोकयतः ॥ ५२ ॥

एवं निर्माण्यन्त विश्रामकुशकुन्यप्रस्य योगिनः तत्त्वसम्मु भूतविश्वेंद्रियाते भावनया सर्व-मिद्मेका स्वति-विधिता इत्यादित्याच्या शिवप्रसवलनमुः, आते परमाद्यप्रत्ययतः याते शोकमोहोपकलिता हनुमान-भिवा: सर्वमूः इदं तत्त्वातमः बहा पदयोज्यस्य न केवलै ते बहासरवतासर्व स्वरूपस्य इति न खेदाय प्रभवन्ति ॥ ५३ ॥

ननु परमाद्यप्रस्यस्यापि ज्ञानिनोऽवस्य सिथ्यते शरीरिधि प्रदेश्य शुद्धाशुभकर्मकालसंचयः किमित्ति न

स्त्यादिति परिहरति

कर्मादिकु शुभमशुभे भिम्याज्ञानेन संगमादेव ।
विषयो हि सन्तुष्टस्तकरोऽपरुस्तकस्वेष्टः ॥ ५३ ॥

अश्चेष्याभिधाननादिकुपुष्पगुणकर्मकालसंचयोऽपि भिम्याज्ञानेन संगमादेव प्रादुर्भवत्वः शारीरिकम्यमथेनादि ममोपायतप्रतिबिधिः यदनात्मायात्मायमविचारसायनं चैत्यज्ञान तत्त्व तेन योद्भिष्यकर्मसम्म मादेव पशोः सुभासुभि शमकर्मसंचयः येनास्वस्तिधिशिवसितः सोसाराधामाभाव भवति। ननु बहास-त्वस्यापि प्रमातुः किमित्ते तेतात्परता कशुद्धमायात्यत्वार्तांत्य्रमुशिष्यित्यिवै विषयो हि इत्यादि। यथात्

सन्तोषः सर्वविक्रियः यथास्यापूर्वकोश्यस्ततसाधारणेऽपि स्वाभाविन्दम्यभावः कुतर्वे तत्वेऽशुद्धापिप्रमाध-

स्त्यावित्तज्ञानितो भयंकरः, पशुवत्मापाय शुभमशुभकर्मसंचयः ददुर्वट ॥ ५३ ॥

जनममणयाधिपि न शुद्धार्थस्य योगिनोऽपि तु मायप्राप्त्राणमेवेत्याघ

लोकब्यक्राकृताः त इश्वारवामस्य भूतः।
ते यान्ति जन्ममूत्य घर्मायमर्गालाभः ॥ ५४ ॥

ये प्रमातारो देहात्मामानिनो भूतः भक्तकामनाकलपिता लोकारधरूः पुष्पायुपमप्रयम्य, अविदाम्

तेष्ययामास्य माया जगति स्वर्गसङकर्मकालप्रयुपपक्षरे सेवनेत् ते मृदा: अतः: पुष्पायुपयनिगड्ठ- दशास्तकप्रकारहः पुनः पुनः पुनः प्रयत्नेत् प्रयत्नेत् चेतननवतःसङ्कर्मप्रकारहः प्रवति न पुनः प्रश्चिनोहां-

्वान्य विगतित्यंगर्मायमवनो भस्मवाभायो योगी जायते प्रयत्नेत् प्रयत्नेत् वेति ॥ ५४ ॥

एवम्बिश्चोपित्तायापि कमाणि ज्ञानिविभवादेव क्रीयातने नान्यथेत्याघ

अज्ञानकालिनिति घर्मायमर्गाम्यमके तु कमाणि।
पिरसिनितिमधुः तदुपपस्विति विज्ञानदीर्दिविशालः ॥ ५५ ॥

अज्ञानकाले व्ययमायनानात्मानाः पुष्पायुपमप्रयम्य, कर्मे अनुभुतफलप्राप्तनाः यत् निन्दो- दलूः स्वत्कृत्त: ततः विज्ञानदीर्दिविशालः, विशिष्टज्ञानदीर्दिविशालः, नस्यति अहारे परं बहोति क्रित्रिमासमस-

तादाहसमथ विज्ञानं तत्य या पौष्पेन प्रत्यक्षमार्गान्तः तत्सार्यास्तत्तदार्जी याति। किमित्ते वहाः
तुक्कुकीकाशात्कुरुक् बीज यथाकृति कुरुते।
नैव तथायान्यायाकृत्तिविमुक्तो भवाकुरे द्वात्मा इति।

यथा किषारूक्तुक्कुक्कुक्कुक्कुक्रेय: पृथकृत्त शालिनीं वीजस्वाभाविक्षाराकार्किसामग्रीवाहिकस्तिअसतता-ताम्य्यवत्यप्रगृवे नैव अकुरेरनननपायायायेन हेतुविवित तथाय कृकुरकथानीपेन आणेन मलेन तुसुस्वानी-पेन मायमलेन किषारकार्कथानीपेन कार्ममलेन च मुख: पृथभूत: आल्मा चैतन्य मलेनरपसावर-प्राववत्सु पुनः भविुकुम् संसारसा विदिधाति केवल विशेष्यानन्यापदार्थपारिकप्रियतादिविभाविशाविभिंचिंच व्यावानुग परमं देशखं एव मधवति।

एव ज्ञानासर्पकुवकनीर्जस्य ज्ञानिनो न कंपितं त्रिधाराय एवोपादेयं केवल आह।

आत्मानं न कुस्तनं बिनेति सर्वं हि तत्त्व निजरूपम्।
नैव च शोचिৎ यस्मातपरमायाः नाशिता नासित।

व: आत्मा: व्यावानुगोद्धेशन्यात्मक्षिल्लिः न कुस्तनं बिनेति न स कर्मादिरं राजः श्रावः श्रविद्यो वा भयमादुते। कुस्तं पतिविद्याय सर्वं हि तत्त्व निजरूपम्। इति पात: तत्त्व व्यावानुगोद्धेशवदेयतां: सर्वं। पद्धार्यजातिमंदं विशेषं, निजस्य स्वात्मनो महाप्रकाशांस्कवपु: एव रूपम् आकारः सर्वं प्रकाशानुगमः-दिति प्रकाशा एव स्वात्मन्यात्मस्यात्मना प्रकाशातेतेत एव भवश्यानन्यां लोकं विमिकाचितात्मांति तत्त्वं तथैव
त्वास्त्रक्तमेव कथ भवजनक स्याद्वत्त स्यात्मनो व्यतिरितः पदार्थं भयेहतुपवेलकः पुनः सवर्तः परिपूर्णायामिष्ठे किंचि यमादिरित्तरसमाजान्यपहितसत्तद्वात्मानिन्त्योपिषि विभियाविदित सर्वं निपर-पोपते: संसारिष्ठोपायको विगतितस्वपरिविभागत्या नि:शावे विचरत्येव। यथोक्त परमेशिपाप्ते:

योऽरवित्यमद्धर्माण्डलः परस्तरीश निक्षितः भवद्वः।
स्यात्मात्रपरिपूर्णते जगत्यस्य नित्यपुलिनः कुतो भयम्।

इति। ग्रन्थकारोपि

एकोगृहिमिति संज्ञातः जननासाहसारमेव सिद्धे।
एकोगृहिमिति कोपरीशिति मे इत्यस्यमस्म गतत्भवितविशिष्टः।

इति। अन्यच नैव च शोचिति इत्यादि। नायात्मः: शोचिति यथा धनंजारिदिकं मम नर्त रिकोर्टिस्म
व्यापनकालीकाः सवके वेषति यतो व्यापनन कम्य परमार्थ सत्तको वस्तुनि चतुर्भुजायुज्यामुखे
प्रभावते नाशिता क्षयपालितं न विच्यते। तव्ह भाविन्चारिकां कार्यंवेषन प्रतिभासनामामिदिनाभायिन्द्रमु-
त्त्यते स्वायत्ते च न पुनः: सविमवर्त्यायत्नोहस्तारसायुक्तिमयायत्न स्मतवत्य नर्तान्यमुपायवाला।
थे:। न चैत्यतात्त्व स्वस्वपिमल्योः: स्यादिति विमुखता योगिनो देहस्तास्यापि तद्युतः: शोकाविभावः
स्वस्वाधाकलते न भेदितिः। प०॥

नापि स्यात्मात्रद्वजस्वरुपपरिशेलनदारायदय ज्ञानिकृतीत्यपूर्णाविदेशः: स्यादिति प्रतिदापिति
अतिगुहस्यद्वजालयपरमाशीर्षस्वतंत्रः।
अहृते वेति महेश्वरभक्ष्य कार्यं का दुःर्गः। कर्म॥ ५॥

अतिगुहस्य अतिस्वेषे गुज्यमुः स्यात्मात्रद्वजस्वरुपविवातमानिन्त्यसामस्याभावं भाण्डार-
गारं तव योक्तितीत्वमसात्माधाशिस्वभूतः परमार्थः: सत्तकोपिषि: स्मतस्मालस्मातः स एव्य सर्वविभूतिहे-
तुवालस्वस्य इव राजस्वस्य: तेन हेतुता अहृते विन सर्विकोमस्मीति य आविर्भूतः: पूर्णः पराह्नाविशेष-
निष्क्रियः: महेश्वरभक्ष: शर्यरिणीस्पि स्यात्मप्रकारप्रत्यात्मगत: तरिमस्यः सति का नाम वर्षी कु दुःर्गिति:
दरिद्धाभावारपुल्लितो वा कठिनात्मृतिमो विभृत्याविदेशः: स्यातः। आभासाराहि हि सवः पदार्था दृष्टिवा
भासान्ते तद्यु: योगिन: स्यात्मक्त: नतः: कथमुद्धर्मपाबित्यान प्रमाणमत इति न किन्तुधर्माविदिकं भ-
वेतुः। कर्म वेति को वायु: दुःर्गः: समाधिश्च देहार्यालमामिनिः हार्याय दुःर्गः: समाधिश्च भवन्तु: यतस्ति
व्यतिरितिक्रियास्य प्रात्येकारात्मन्यारिति इति। य: पुत्रकृत्यामहानात्यान्त्यवर्त्यपरमार्थः ज्ञानी
सर्वमित्यत्वतिगतिस्यस्मीकां महेश्वरः स कथ व्यतिरितायाभावार्यार्यात्मद्वार: न व्याद एव
गद्धा नाशस्य रजस्ववशवर्त्यपरस्यवशविश्वस्य: व्याद: पुत्रप्रत्याहारयात्माय दुःर्गः: स्यात्मात्रालयपरमार्थः
महानिबिकृतिमार्थाविकार्यः विवेकावान्तपुर्णातिदाति। प०॥ ५॥

इदानी महेश्वरस्वपपुषाः
मोक्षस्य नैव किंचिदधारिति न चापि गमनमन्यथ।
अञ्जानालिधिभिश्च स्वस्तार्थस्मिन्तः मोक्षः। प० || ६॥

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अनेक अज्ञातमेव बनयः इति प्रतिपादितम्। तथा विग्रहयोगेश्वरि यस्यः प्रक्रिया स स तद्यथा जीवनेव मुक्तुः न पुनः। शरीरयोगो बन्यस्तद्वपमो मुक्तितितिः किं तु देहपातात्त्वाः मोक्ष इति। ॥ ६१ ॥

जीवमुक्तिस्य कर्महति शरीरे सिद्धति शरीरस्वाभावसाधिकारः ज्ञानेऽदृश्यस्य कर्म न फलाय तस्य भवतीत्यः प्रपैतिमाहः

आयाभिदृशी बीजः यथा प्रोहसमयंतागति।

ज्ञानार्थपितेमेव कर्म न जन्मप्रदेह वालति। ॥ ६२ ॥

विद्यनिर्धृता शास्त्रस्वार्थः क्षिप्तलिङ्गात्प्रवर्त्यां सामप्रेक्षाक्यायाधारिनजनेदशाहतातः यथात

तथेऽव ज्ञानस्य द्यापम्। परमायोगवधेशतः युगम्। कर्म यथायोगेत्यथ विभाषतमा सुरामीयेवेकऽपृण

देहायात्मानमधिकानः योपादस्युद्धिशिरस्यावृत्तां विलिंकिचुभासुः कर्म किष्माणाः तह्रयविय न पुनः

इन्द्रियात्त्वां। संस्थानासभावाधित्यक्यत्वादिअधिक्यात्यां ज्ञातर् भूयो जनम दात्तू प्रभविते। ॥ ६२ ॥

एवं पुनर्वनिलापि विचित्राक्ष। कर्तारां देहकार्य स्वाधित्याः

परिमिततुद्वितिनेन हि कर्मचिन्ति मद्देहायानव।

सकुचिता चिन्तितेहस्यस्त तथा भान्ति। ॥ ६३ ॥

परमात्मा परिमिततुहृतिनेन आयात्मजनितेन देहायात्मानवासानूर्तककामनाकालुण्ठित्येश्येन य-त्त्वातः। कर्म यथायमेवमेहो यथा इहामुक्त च सुवी मोहास मा कदाचन हुः। यथायोगेव भूयो समापनां कर्मणा वैद्यं पदं प्राप्तयोगित्येव वासानविशिष्ट्यं कालेवमनुगृणं कर्म तत्स्य मनोवासानाथप्रत्यक्ष: कर्मणं। उ-चित: तदनुनुनायोगोऽसौनास्यं भव्याः। प्रायाकर्मविकृतस्य वायुर्विशिष्ट्यं कालेवमनुगृणं कर्म तत्स्य मनोवासानाथप्रत्यक्षः कर्मणं। उ-चित: 

दत्त भोगात्मकधर्मोऽसौनास्यं भव्याः। प्रायाकर्मविकृतस्य वायुर्विशिष्ट्यं कालेवमनुगृणं कर्म तत्स्य मनोवासानाथप्रत्यक्षः कर्मणं। उ-चित: तदनुनुनायोगोऽसौनास्यं भव्याः। प्रायाकर्मविकृतस्य वायुर्विशिष्ट्यं कालेवमनुगृणं कर्म तत्स्य मनोवासानाथप्रत्यक्षः कर्मणं। उ-चित: 

प्रायाकर्मविकृतस्य वायुर्विशिष्ट्यं कालेवमनुगृणं कर्म तत्स्य मनोवासानाथप्रत्यक्षः कर्मणं। उ-चित: 

प्रायाकर्मविकृतस्य वायुर्विशिष्ट्यं कालेवमनुगृणं कर्म तत्स्य मनोवासानाथप्रत्यक्षः कर्मणं। उ-चित: 

प्रायाकर्मविकृतस्य वायुर्विशिष्ट्यं कालेवमनुगृणं कर्म तत्स्य मनोवासानाथप्रत्यक्षः कर्मणं। उ-चित: 

प्रायाकर्मविकृतस्य वायुर्विशिष्ट्यं कालेवमनुगृणं कर्म तत्स्य मनोवासानाथप्रत्यक्षः कर्मणं। उ-चित: 

प्रायाकर्मविकृतस्य वायुर्विशिष्ट्यं कालेवमनुगृणं कर्म तत्स्य मनोवासानाथप्रत्यक्षः कर्मणं। उ-चित:
दिकालकलनविकलेभुवनमयिमीयसुरपरिकृपा।
बहुतरसस्तिष्टमतरमप्रवेषििनसधकारतम। ॥ ६५ ॥

सूक्ताधिविधिस्वनेवसमायमनौ श्रवणमविवुधेत।
कथमिव संसारी स्थायितवस्य कृतः का सरणम्। ॥ ६६ ॥

यदि पुनः पराशिकताविद्वद्वयः प्रामाण्यां देहादिप्रभुतातिभिमानमयस्यदीक्षुत्य स्वात्मन। श्रवणमविवुधेत पिदानन्दकरण विजनिनायत्स परिहारवतस्मदेहरावः। कथमिब केन प्रकारण संसारी संसरणशीलो भवेन स्थायित्व यावतरथिदियन्तृपुरुषकार्य कार्ममलसंबन्धन संसरणयः। पुनिकयकृतूर्वू मित्या श्रवणमवारिडलकृतः। स कर्म संसारीति तत्तथमुः। ननु चिन्दकृतमितिः। स्यातंसत्तारी च भवेद्वितिः कि। दुष्टैहंर्वेदारुकाश्रावः वित्त इत्यादिः। विवेत्त्व अन्वचिच्छिद्रेष्टकालकरस्य प्रमारुप्तेहायिमानन्नेतृस्वरुक्तवासनपरिष्कर्षणस्य तत्त्व कृतः। सरणम। स्वर्णविपातविद्वदज्ञितिः किमस्तिः यद्यवस्तपेश्य ततो विशिष्टोपयत्र भिन्नी संसरण गमन कुरुपात्तो देहादिप्रभुतातिभिमानाविश्विचिन्ताय ष्टितापादनाधिकरण

dिका करस्योऽयः। पुनिकदेहकरणो वहामूलो नवचिच्छिद्रेष्टकालः। प्रामाण्यां तत्त्व संसरण। वाच्यतुककिंपि न

भवेद्वितिः। कीर्तिः शिवरूपमारणविवुधेते त्वाह अपरम पोढ़म। इत्यादिः। अपगत आण्वादिमला

चमोय यत्त एव वैमम्यात बोधम। दुर्वद्वत्मम्। तथा सर्वसमस्तीौधीमिः निरिष्टिः श्रामाकियतावत्वम्

प्रकृत यथेष्टि तत्म। विवेत्त्व देहादिकृतविच्छिद्रा। भावायिनिः। अन्य तत्वाः। परमार्थाः। सकलम्ब्रा। मेवचाविवाहा

यस्य यव्यदिर्च्छति तत्त्व एव भवती ततमेवविवेकः। तथा दिकालकाकरस्यविरिष्टीविनिर्घटति वापनम

नित्यतथः योगायतं एव लूधम। कृतस्थम। अवयवमिः। अदिविशिष्टम। तथा इर्षयम् स्वःस्य। अन्य तथा

सुरीण्यम्। सुहु निरकाकम।। तद्नु हुहुहुहुहु।। तद्नु बहुतापणं प्रभुतानि शान्तिरसिमम-भानि। वाहादिर्विष्टितीक्रि

तानि घटपविद्विधाशनातानि तेषां लघुपरिवृत्तिः स्वत्त्वम।। अन्य शूक्ताधिविधिसुवेष्टकम्। सुवी

णम्। वेशधा। विधातार्यमविद्विधिरेष्टः। स्वर्त्तेः। परिपूर्त स्वात्ममेद्वर जाननो यत्किंचिति कुर्वाणो


dर्धकर्मविनो न पुनः संसारभानीक्रियेव मिरुको महाभिभित्ति यावत्। ॥ ६५ ॥ ६५ ॥ ६६ ॥

एवं स्वामन्यमवमाप्रपत्ताः प्राणिना विगत्तकस्मिनमवविभियवृणो कृतस्य कर्म न फलोपवेदवन

न्नामयुभविस्तिर्नलक्षात्माताः

इति युक्तिकिर्तिः रिद्ध यह्वस्य दानिनों न सर्फेल तत्त्व न ममदेवमि तु

तथावति दार्श्नी नित्यो फले तोके॥ ६७ ॥

अहमेव चिदन्तः स्वत्त्वः सत्यमान्ततानतान्तज्ञेन नस्कर्मकारी नाहि वा कर्ता पारमेश्वरी स्वात्मन्यशाक्षितिर्त्वं करोतीत्वं मम बुद्धचतुर्दशप्रायत्तात्वा किमातायतं। इति युक्तिः। प्राक्ष्ट्रितिविद्वस्यरुपाभिवि

पपविनिर्घ्यस्यायतसप्तवतस्मरविपक्षः। प्रामादुभयम्य देहातहावाभावाभावोपयास्यश्लेषवेदन। नमस्य नियममाप्य कृतमन्। न सर्फेल न तत्त्वलेन युज्ते तत्स्यात्मानिन। प्रतिष्ठादिकर्तुभयम्। क्रिमित्वाभवावावकृतमाप्य कर्म कुर्ष। फलेन योगं कुर्षः दिर्वेदादिप्रभुतातिभिमानस्वमविद्वायाभवावावाव चुस्मिद्विति यावत्।।

कृतस्य कर्मणो वा प्रामाण्यां। प्रामाण्यमनुष्टिरि एवाध्यो ज्ञानास्तिभिमानाभावायावात्सिम्मज्ञात्व प्रेतीण
बिमुच्यते इत्येवमपि केषवर्तनया परानुग्रहार्यमः कालमतिवाहयन् बिमुच्यते परमशिवभवति । उ-कः

येन केनचिदायकः येन केनचिदायति ।

यत्र कचन शाश्व यस्तं देवा ब्राह्मण विदः ॥

इति । मोक्षधर्ममृत्यु

अनायतस्मानविध्यतेषयेव विधिपरिणामविभवतेशकालम् ।

हृदसुखमस्वेति कदर्येवति सर्वनाशमाजगरे सुचिश्रामि ॥

इति । कथमेवमपि कुर्वा ज्ञानी स्वयं मुच्येतेवाह सर्वभूतात्मा इति । यत् स ज्ञानी सर्वभूतात्मा सर्वासि
भूतानामात्मा सर्वाणि च भूतानि तस्याभित्ते कृता न विक्रिद्वन्धकततया भवति सर्व विमुच्येतस्य संपरंत
इति ॥ ६९ ॥

नापेवेनपुरस्त्यां निरिममानस्त्य परिचितं केदारसतोापि पुण्यपापसंभव इत्याह

हयपेष्टसहस्राणपि कुरुते बहिर्दत्तक्षाणि ।

परमार्थविविध पुण्येन च पापेः पुण्यस्य विमलः ॥ ७० ॥

य एवम परमार्थविविध स्वातम्महंकारस्वाभावसत्तथवः सोऽथशभराजसुपारात्मांदिवशाक्तः संव्या-
सिलकामनामिभिनिविहल्लत्वात्मामाधभ्रमिदिप्तेवृत्ता कृता कीर्दाधयां यदिके कदाचिद्विहितानि
कर्माणि विद्यात्तथवा वहंतनसुपारात्मानिविदिवित्तानि प्रमादैपनतानि महापापात्माविविहितान्यप्यशारिरतया
चेतुमथाः वेमेत्तिमामामान्यात्मासिद्धेयंकेवति विजुज्मर्थिं मम किमायातित्मि वुढ्या न पुण्येः
श्रुभुर्वर्ताणि पापे अध्येये स ज्ञानी स्मृत्ये मस्तीकृत्य इति । कथमेतदिक्तयां विमलः । इति।

ययस्य विगता: प्रश्नीणा आपि आपि निपातपूर्वार्यामानमालः संसरणत्वत इति । एवं विद्यालयम हि प्रमादाचिबिचिन्द्र्देहार्वसिम्भुतवात-
त्त्वात्मीयाखानानाथी येन ममदिकम्युणित्यावहिमान्यादात्मायुपापसंचयं: स्वावाहमकर्मिनिलस्चयं
ममत्त्वहुर्मल्लक्षयो विगतः स्वतत्त्वामामानात्मान्यादात्मायुपापसंचयं: ॥ यथा
श्रीभगवाद्वीतासु

यस्य नाहिकृतो भायो वुद्रिष्यत्त्येन स्विप्यते ।

हत्वापि स इयाधाकात्र हस्ति न निवधयते ॥

इति ॥ ७० ॥

एवविधार्य ज्ञानिनो नियतचर्या परामृष्ठानाह

मदर्शकपमानविशाधिभयोमोहपरिवर्जिनै ।

निःस्तौत्त्वद्वारास्तु तदं इव विच्छेदाद्वादति: ॥ ७१ ॥
लिखित कथा का अनुवाद नहीं किया गया है।
वहिन्तर्परिक्तनमेदमहाबीजनितिचमयमपर्यतः।
तस्यातिदीसविवजनेन यजनान्निनभवति होमः। ३९२॥

तस्य एवविधम्य स्वात्मेदवतापूजकस्य अर्थिकी विभिन्नकारेर वैत्यावि यजनान्निन तिलायनादिद्वीयकर्तर्धनायः व्रतेऽहोऽृत्यादिः।

dहि: नीलादिः प्रमेवे यत्स्वप्रभुमातुकल्पनमन्त्राध्या सुवादीः ययत्संकल्पनमित्येवंरूपः वः भैयु: वा-

हावाहायः: प्रभुमात्रमेयोनिश्चयसंकल्पनाभिमानवृत्तिस्वाभाव नानाविन्यक्तेवे महासीमूः प्रभुमात्रप्रेयः-

योस्ततः समुप्रस्ततस्य कुमारस्य भैयुज्वृहस्य निवयः: भैयुञ्ज्वृहस्थ्राणिश्चस्य अर्धंत: प-

रमाहुपत्नाशिकसंविदृपङ्काहो भैयुवर्तम्य स्वत्त्ववीहः ज्ञेतत् इति।

अयमाशयः: परजस्वातावकस्य योगिनो

देहादिमातुताभिमानाभावाचः व्यससिद्धः स्वप्रभुमात्रप्रेयकल्पनतपरिश्रयः स स्वस्त्रत्रिमो होमः। य- 

याहः भैयुञ्ज्वृहस्थ्राणामः।

यजयन्ते दंतयन्ते मुत्रेऽरव महापशुः।
अरिरकेने याहैन्ते हेतु नित्य यजामहे॥

इति॥ ३९२॥

एवत्तृप्तस्य याज्यकस्य ध्यानमाहः

ध्यानस्वरस्तिसर्वरस्तिः पुनरेष् हि भगवानिचित्रस्य

सुनिःति तदेव ध्यान संक्त्यासित्सतस्यरुपमूः। ३९३॥

नियताकारार्चिततस्यास्यायन्त्र मनोवृत्तेभानानक्षोद्तस्तीमः।

पुनरस्तम्भित्व ध्यानमूः परमातृ

एव भगवान्। अयन्तत्: स्वत्त्वस्य महेश्वरः कियातिश्वभावविक्षम्यात्स्थयेण वावि चित्रितां श्रु-

पाणि सुनुति अन्तरां नानादाॅर्चितस्यरुपानাকारानृत्तिक्षां च मृत्युः अस्तोद्वयवर्जी-

समेतस्य ध्यानमूः चित्रान्तो नातिमन्नतिक्षित इति। इतरत्र तू देवताविशोऽत्यनानकार्परिक्तनस्य नैवयं न्यायः

स्यात्।

सर्वं मनोवृत्ताः: पातालस्याध्याद्रृतमू: इति जानामस्यानव्यछर्मिडं सर्वं परमेष्ठ्रीभूतमू।

तथा संक्त्यानस्य माया आलिङ्गितस्य संस्नित्तिः चित्रीकृतस्य सत्यरुपमूः परमार्थता तस्य ध्यानस्य

तत्।

एवं यतः सर्विद्य फ्राकामानस्य विक्षितं भ्रान्तरपेयम तिमारातितिर्तिं सत्यं सर्वन संविदुख्यामादिति।

तदृश श्रीस्वस्त्वचन्द्रशाखे

यत्र यत्र मनो याति तत्र तत्रेव धारयेत्।

चलिता कुत्र गन्तातिस तस्य विवयश्य यतः॥

इति।

तथा श्रीव्रषोपिदि

यत्र यत्र मनो याति वाहो वाम्ययत्र तिमे।

तत्र तत्र शिवायिस्य व्यपक्वतात यात्यति॥
इति तस्मान्त्वसाधारणं तत्त्वादित्याः यान्मिति ॥ ७७ ॥

जपधार्मिक यज्ञाः स्वादित्याः

भुवनावली समस्तं तत्त्वकमक्लपनामावाक्षणणम् ॥

अन्तःबोधे परिवर्त्याति च यत्सोधस्य जय उदितः ॥ ७८ ॥

वश्यमाणेन कर्मेन यो विश्वस्य प्रतिक्षणमेकेत्रेन पराहतामत्ववर्त्यम्: सः अयमः अत्य जय उदितः अ-कृतिमल्लन्ति करितं । कोंडसावित्याश्च भुवनावली समस्ताम् पद्मशालंसमहांट्वर्त्तिनि चतुर्विश्वकोटसतुर-शात्त्वकसंयतां प्राकरण्डा निःशेषं तथा तत्त्वकमक्लपनाम् इति तत्त्वकमस्त्व आत्मविद्यावाचार्यस्य परिक्लपनाम् परिच्छेदम् अथावागमाम् इत्यत्वहिपकरणामिद्विवस्मूहं नेति अन्तःबोधे मध्यमप्राव-णात्त्वकस्वूर्यवायुः स्तवस्वितयां नात्त्वकनुप्वाहकमेण यत्यावर्त्याति अरघुराप्तियन्तरतिप्रावणिविद्वेष- सृष्टिधिर्मवस्तहरकमेण सर्वेप्रत्यक्षाविदायों परिभ्रमणाति प्रतित्वनं नादत्त्वतः परामृशतितः यावत् । स एव पूर्णाहन्ताविधिनिष्ठाप्रवेशन्तः कृत्रिमायोश्यजः प्र। । अयमाराध्यायः प्रयित वाच्यरूपाया देवताया वाचकस्य मन्त्योचारः सः चायमालयाणं प्राणशास्त्रिकायाक्ष्यारतिकायाकर्त्तावयोगः संवेद्येऽः । परमाद्र्यंधबिनिष्ठस्तः स्वा प्राणाक्षरिकास्तितमूल्यममयाणगे प्रवाहकमेण नदन्तिः स्वरसोदितसर्वायाकोटकारोण सहजेज्ञात्मालो-च्यते यत् नस्ये सर्वेग्रहे च पद्मशालचाह्मस्तः विष्णु प्राणयानक्षेत्र प्रतिज्ञेत सत्त्वानिविद्रेवेवध महापराशाक्षारेस्व पराशारभावे भगवती प्राणस्वभाषाशित्वम विष्णुवान्ति प्रतिश्रययमन्दव्याकारं योगिनी जयमक्लितमम साधि तीत । अन्त्र ज्ञसंवेद्याः

एकविशयशस्वाणि प्रसाणि दिवनिभाणः ।

dीपोऽनिषिद्धः विभवसूक्ष्णः

कथा जयः ।

इति एवमेष क्रत्वचरणानाभवानवतामेव गोचर इति ॥ ७८ ॥

इद्व यथावस्तेऽत्यां

सर्वं समयं दृढं यत्संपरितं यथा सवितं मनुरते ।

विश्वसरसादनिनांतिम् विमहल्झक्लपनाककिमां ॥ ७९ ॥

विश्वसरसावपूर्णं निजरघम वेदालंककनपालम् ।

रसपितं च तत्त्वदेवसत्यसु जुरस्तेन च सुरमेव च ॥ ८० ॥

एवमु यथव वश्यमाणमु पद्धतेऽवाण द्विन्न्नः ब्रम्हसमस्तेवास्माराधनाय नियमः ।

कीर्तिः तथा सुरुषेन च सुरुषां च इति । सुरुषां दुःश्चेनाध्यायानविश्वासयोगायोगविद्यापरिहरुपेण परमेश्वरानु-यशेन तस्मय इत्यतः सुरुषेन तथा सुरुषेन ववादास्मात्मसाधर्मानाश्रययोगायोगविद्याकार्यः त विना रूपम् इत्यतः सुरुषां च । केवः तद्वर्तित्वाभस्वं इत्यतिदि । यत्संपरितं प्रातितिकं भेदाभासानु- पुरुषागमानुष्यविरलीननाभेद्याश्च सर्वमिरनेम्: स्तुरामिति समीक्षरे । यथा श्रीममन्दव्वधितासु
इत्य व्याप्तिम्: व्यानिधित्वेन सर्वत्त्वं विधूतनानात्मकम्।
निर्मलस्वरमन्नदं वेदं स तन्मयो भवति॥ ८२॥

इत्यथा: इत्युदेश्व व्याप्तिम् अनविच्छिन्नविद्यावक्षणं शिवम् अभिद्वतम्। अस्वाभावाभुतम् तुव्रुतायमा- नुवरपरिमोक्षणमातिदिशितम्। यो वेदं: कश्चिदेव प्राणिप्राप्यो जानाति स: सर्वव्यक्तसंकोचं: तन्मयः
शिवेन श्वस्त्रतिः। अत्र स्वाल्प्यानि नाथ्यार्थिनयं यतो ये केवल जन्मयोपाधिप्रागतिप्रतियोगि
वा ते सर्व्य स्वात्मानेनोप्रात्मविपर्यायमात्मम्या वामवतीस प्रचुबुद्व्यम परामांः। कौद्यं च सर्वेत्रानात्मम्। 
इति। सर्वोऽन्न प्रामाण्यमेकत्तममर्मिणि वा प्रामाण्येकत्तमम्य वस्त्तत्त्वसंसर्वपरमम्यति यथा। अत एव बिध्वमृ: 
न्यक्तत सर्व्य स्वाल्प्याववचुप्यत्वं स्पृहाः। नानात्मम् भेदवन्नदं वेदं तमोव- 
मानकाविविहारातः। निर्स्म: विशेषाधिपिः: प्रकृतं: आन्नदं: वस्त्य तमोविविहितं स्वात्मानं जानान्: सर्वः
विकृतप्रस्तुतिः इति॥ ८३॥

एवंपरिक्षेत्रवस्त्वार्थायं: स्वशरीराधिकारपरिश्वरः कुऽ शालीं परित्यजतिं तथा याति तदन्तद्विरासिं श- 
पिनिरपरिष्ठति

तीर्थं ध्वचानु: वा नस्तस्मृतिप्रिपरित्यजरदेहम्।
प्राणसमका स्तु: कैवल्यं याति हतशोकः॥ ८३॥

एवं परिष्ठितस्वस्थवस्तुः स्नानीः स्वयंदर्श स्वात्मप्रकाशस्वात्मन्न्यमितम्य परमात्मायेव गाढं समाप्त- 
स्तहदुः: तीर्थ्य यापानुकुरुक्रेवातथ महापुरुषं वान्ननेथ वा यापानुकुरुक्रेवात्स्थानान्धा योगितामिति 
प्रकाशमणे शारीरिकाणुस्तवाय स्वाकारपरिवर्तको द्वाराविकितोस्मत्तम्मांदेव कैवल्यं याति कैवल्य- 
रक्षायायाधारान्न्यतीकारणोऽयोण्यं चिदानन्देकर्तानं तृप्तातिन्तरुपं केवलता यातित्वम्। 
यतोस्त्व रविश्व स्वत्स्थानं पूर्वैः समाहनं परमेश्वराधित्व पद्यां न क्षेत्रान्तेकालाविभागं एव 
हुः: पराकृती विकृतिदण्डसमुक्तम्: शोकः: येन स एवम्। यथाकृतम्।

हिमवति गंगानारे वारणस्यं कुऽ क्रियागे त। 
वेदयमि चण्डालदीः: विभवस्तवविदं समं मरणम्॥

इति श्रीनिर्भयाम्योगोऽसि नात्याय देहातावस्ते स्वरूपयोगं इत्याह नस्तस्मृतिप्रिपिः इति। आस्तं संस्मृ- 
तिरितिरिपिष्ठत्वः। यदि वा स ज्ञानी शारीरिकाप्रकाकाकेचतुः वान्ननेथोऽपि श्वस्त्रतस्तवमाभिभवत। नस्तस्मृतिः: कालो- 
पाणामुत्ववान्ननायाधारान्न्यतान्नियं: कोणवर्धको भुवना तपजिता तथापि प्राणिग्रहतवात्मानां कैवल्य- 
मवर्धम्य याति ततोऽन्न स्वात्मानाधिगमे प्रयत्नमस्य वस्त्तत्त्वायने विशोबिन्तसि। नन्तु तीर्थाय तीर्थाय- 
भागोत्त्वय स्वात्मान्नानविदं भागुपनस्तन्त्रकाले स नस्तस्मृतिप्रिपि यवेव स्वात्मानामपात्यता गृहीतां 
तस्य देहातावस्तिः तु निमित्तशेष चेताम्भिः कथय स मुक्तम्: स्वरूपम्। यथूर्म्

अन्त्याभोन्तपिमामेव स्मरणुत्तवस्य कैवल्यम्।
य: प्राणय स महावर्धम्य याति नास्त्यत्र संस्तयः॥

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इति श्रीगीतात्। एवमयः स्मरणस्येव उपयोगः यद्यपि परमेश्वरमारणाभवेदयत्नकाळे तदावापतिः:
स्माताः सर्वः पशुजान: प्रमयसमये मूर्तिदेवी विशेषाभावातः स्मरणसमपतिः पायाहावकायानि चेत्वादि- न्यप्रमाणात् स्तुतीं चैविन्यत्रोतस्मात् ज्ञानसमाकल्मुक्तः। इति। सत्यं नास्य स्मरणेऽपयोः: किंतु सदृशुणा यदैव तत्स्थ स्मातृसङ्गीते स्मात्वमेवः श्रावणेऽपदेशः कृतसति ममेव कालेिहमेव सर्वांमिदामित्विधिर- दस्त्वात्मानान्यर्मार्यं विगलितमायादिकुम्भाभ्यो नान्यनितिं चिदेश्यते केवलं संक्षिप्तरेतयाः चक्षुम- वर्षारभी वहमान इति न पुनर्वात्मात्तरकाले स्मरणसमपर्वर्थ्याकाले स्मादशाह्नितामायावायुक्तः- कस्यभी सत्य देहकुरक्त भ्रमित स्मादशाह्नापेदेशान्यासनितामायादिकुम्भक्षणाः देहकुरक्त बिन्दुप्रायः
पर्यते ज्ञानीऽ यन्त्राः कर्तुमालिमीति स्मादशाह्नकथनवासरं एव स जीवनं चुकः स्मात्। यथोक्ते कृ- तर्तलमालिकां साखिकायाम्।

यदा गुरूः सम्यक्ष्यात्तदसंगायम्।
मुक्तस्तत्रेव कालेःस स यन्त्रवेक्तवलं वसेत्।

इति। श्रीमतिशाखातेन्द्रियः
गोदाहिमप्रातु वा नयोनमीलानात्कम्।
सकुरुस्तं परे ततुः स मुखो मोचयेतरान।
यत्मात्तर्वं परे नयते येतात्या बब्राणि क्षणम्।
स्मारणं तु कर्त्य तत्वां ब्राह्मानं समुपस्थिते।

इति। अथ वातविद्: पर्यंत्वण: स्मानुवैकसाशी केनानुभूते यद्यात्तत्व स्मरणस्मपरज्ञा वा परिक- कल्यते यावत तत्ववर्षादाव नास्यति गोचर इति सवर्जात्र ममेव न पुनः शरीरेतादात्तान्यन्तराः चेतनाकारोऽवस- 
रेतं चिदेश्यते देहत्यागान्यं: श्रुतादस्येव नान्यन्तरात् शक्यः।
तस्मादवस्यां च देहावभावितं स्मात्त्वानिविद्व स्मात्त्व कथावसे स्वं सवर्ज्ञा काप्तापाणास्वथायमिन्यो चार्यवति। यदु- 
कम्।

स्मानुवैकसाशी केनानुभूते यद्यात्तत्व स्मरणस्मपरज्ञा वा परिक- कल्यते यावत तत्ववर्षादाव नास्ति गोचर इति सवर्जात्र ममेव न पुनः शरीरेतादात्तान्यन्तराः चेतनाकारोऽवस- 
रेतं चिदेश्यते देहत्यागान्यं: श्रुतादस्येव नान्यन्तरात् शक्यः।
तस्मादवस्यां च देहावभावितं स्मात्त्वानिविद्व स्मात्त्व कथावसे स्वं सवर्ज्ञा काप्तापाणास्वथायमिन्यो चार्यवति। यदु- 
कम्।

स्मानुवैकसाशी केनानुभूते यद्यात्तत्व स्मरणस्मपरज्ञा वा परिक- 
कल्यते यावत तत्ववर्षादाव नास्ति गोचर इति सवर्जात्र ममेव न पुनः शरीरेतादात्तान्यन्तराः चेतनाकारोऽवस- 
रेतं चिदेश्यते देहत्यागान्यं: श्रुतादस्येव नान्यन्तरात् शक्यः।
तस्मादवस्यां च देहावभावितं स्मात्त्वानिविद्व स्मात्त्व कथावसे स्वं सवर्ज्ञा काप्तापाणास्वथायमिन्यो चार्यवति। यदु- 
कम्।

इति भगवता लक्ष्मीसिंहतापायुमुक्तः।
एवम्यं सदितङ्गबःवातिंतवस्य हेतुरत्वाय दूरादात्यथा पूर्वानुभूतसंस्कारादायचः
विना कथमले स्मृतिपिठ स्यावतिः न केनचिदिप ज्ञानो मार्गवसे समुपयोग इति।

तथा

रिये चेतसि सुवस्ये शरीरि सति यो न:।
रातुसामे रिके सर्ता विधायतं च मामकम्।
तसत्तु यियाणां ते काप्तापाणास्वथायमिन्म्।
अहं स्मानम। मदवं नयाय परमां गतिन्।

इति भगवता लक्ष्मीसिंहतापायुमुक्तः।
एवम्यं सदितङ्गबःवातिंतवस्य हेतुरत्वाय दूरादात्यथा पूर्वानुभूतसंस्कारादायचः
विना कथमले स्मृतिपिठ स्यावतिः न केनचिदिप ज्ञानो मार्गवसे समुपयोग इति।

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यदि पुनस्तीर्थाध्यायमुक्तकारण न कुञ्जिविद्याभवं याति ताहि किमिति विद्वद्विस्तस्तमाश्रीयत
इति विषयविभागमाह

पुण्याय तीर्थसेवा निर्याय श्यकसदनिधन्यगति: ।
पुण्यायपुण्यकल्याण्यशरीरामावे तु कि तेन ॥ ८४ ॥

येषा बिद्यापापी देहादिमातुतायाः साम्पति न विगतित: स्वाम्यजानकर्षण्यां च न तथा समाभाः
सत्तयामिश्यात्तुतात्तुर्द्धसंह कुञ्जिनामध्यसंह च वा प्रयागाद्विर्येसे वर्णार्थसे मरणास्वे क्षेत्रपरियं: पुण्याय
उत्तमनलकाराये निधितं स्यादेव । तथेव श्यकसदनिधन्यगति: इति । श्यकादिगुणोपलितेति पपीयसि
स्थाने निधन्यगति: प्रमायार्थं: निर्याय अविचादिनरकपातापतेषी निर्मिति न भवेद्विस्तस्तमाश्रीयत
विषयविभागमाह । मरणस्थानान्वयी भोगापि भुक्ता शुभायुपेशु देहेवु जायते पुनर्वियोर्ते चेत्यनवर
रत्नमन्मररणवर्या देहादिमातुतामानिन् एवार्थः: सृष्टि: । यथेष्ट पुन: स्वात्मज्ञानप्रत्ययमार्थाद्विहादिप्र-
मातुतामानिनि निद: शोषेन विगतितस्तत्विन्यायः: स्वाभवस्य धर्म्यर्षमत्ववास्तवच्छास्यश्रीवेषे वृत्ते सति
कि तेन । एवं स यत: शुभायुपकर्षणां तीर्थादिपरिमहस्तस्ततेन तीर्थसेवादिना विमलस्य ज्ञानिनो
नास्तुपुष्पोऽय: । यद्यक नावने धर्माभारे

यमो वैवस्तो राजा रत्नवेश हुद्दि सिद्धत: ।
तेन चेत्यनवादुस्म: मा गाजः मा गायः गमः ॥

इति । अत्र देहादिमातुतातिरूपद्वर्यर्थीमय: साधे: पूर्वाभवहेष्ठरस्वभावपुस्तकः संभेषिताति तेषां
कथमेव तीर्थादिपरिमहस्तस्य इति सिद्धान्तः ॥ ८५ ॥

ननु प्राकृतितर्थितं यथा ज्ञानद्वाध्यायमार्थीकाामार्थकनकप आत्मा पिण्डपातार्थस्वप्नपर: एव
न पुनर्वियोहुँ विष्टे दर्शवीज्ञिरदारकर्षित: । स्वात्मज्ञानबर्षाकर्षाकाले देहाकुक्कुलकथेश्वात्तुत्तरता या
विघ्रात्य पुनर्वियामाने देहादिकुक्कुलन्येकार्थकाऽ स तद्वत्तर्मार्थितो न स्यात्माद्वभुत: । सम्मूतः कथं
न संसारिति चोधापविद्धति

तुषक्कुभक्कुकुक्कुतपञ्चकालकुमुदलालसरसः ।
तप्पुतकर्षायुः तुरते न पुनस्तुमुदलालसरसः ॥ ८५ ॥

तद्धककुकुक्कुलपतिपुष्कर्त्ता सिद्धितं सरसार्यात: ।
तित्तन्तपि मुक्तामात तत्स्तिर्विविजितं भवति ॥ ८६ ॥

तुषक्कुभक्कुभक्कुमुदमुद: सुसु पुष्कर्त्त: विनिर्भ: य: तप्पुतकर्षायुः तस्य: तस्य: तुषदलालसरसः: प्रागिव पुन-
स्तर्शेष विद्याः: स यथा तुषदलालसरसः: तप्पुतकर्षायु: तुषदलालसरसः रिष्टोऽपि तादा-
लालसरस: गादातपमुद: न कुर्ते अयः शालकययज्ञावेशां पुष्कर्त्तान्तः तित्तः न पुनरस्त्यार्थकनकपन्य्याती
भवत: तद्वत: तत्तव ज्ञानिन हेम: सावित: चेताना कुक्कुलपतियाः आण्वमातिकुक्कुलसमूहः: पुष्कर्त्ताता
अहमेव स्वात्ममेवधर्मस्वभावो विशार्यायं सर्वदा सर्वं सुरामीति स्वात्मज्ञानपरिभ्रमीन्द्राद्वित्तसामुदृतः
शास्त्रदिगमामाण्यादिविचित्रत्रदायायी तन्मयताम्।
प्रासः स एव पूर्ण स्वर्ग नरकं मनुष्यत्वम्॥ ८९॥

आगमामाण्यादुहुःपदेशपर्यर्पर्यक्षोधानायुक्तिपरिशिल्लायादायानामस्मृद्धया अध्रुव्या वा स्वात्मज्ञान
इद्यापूर्वः पाशवे कर्मणि वा कृतायायां। प्रामाता दौद्य ततस्तंकारप्रदोहेण तन्मयताम् तत्तद्यथावस्तुस्तुवः-
रुपताम्। प्रासः समुज्जरत् दौद्यातस्तासनात्मुपयेण स्वर्गः। निरितिसि प्रीतिम् निरःकम्। अव्ययदीतिः।
लम्। मनुष्यत्वम्। सुखः। कोभयपपं मनुष्याभावम् प्रामाति न पुनर्व्यस्तवसास्त्रायत्व पुरुषस्तु दौद्यात्-
देव यत्तत्त्वदाये। यत्। सर्वं। प्रामाता पैनायायेन। यद्यनरस्तय तदृः स सूक्ष्मो भवति किंतु बुद्धसम्यं
स्नियात्तया यत्नितयितम्। वसूलु तत्प्रामारभ्रम्यत्र। यत्तत्त्त्वनुः। कदाचित्तिरपञ्चश्री। स्वात्मायण-
भयस्तवस्तुस्तुवः किंतृदृष्टेतेतपश्चैति वसूलु पूर्णायां। एवं कारणामिति भावः॥ ८९॥

एवं सदातद्रामव्यविस्तेत् क्षामतवः देख्यात्चतवः देपुर्णादेहनुं पुनर्लोकपरिश्रयः। पुराणापपयरुपोरो
मरणासतः। क्षातिस्थरिगिरिादिकारणं परिक्षिप्नीत्यमः।

अन्तः। क्षणस्तु तस्मिन्युपया पापं च वा रिचित पुष्यन्।
मूलानं सहकारीभावम् गच्छति गति तु न स हेतुं।॥ ९०॥

येठपि तदात्मचेतनं किंतु। पञ्चपिलसिदःसृषः। स्वगतिम्।
तेठपि पुरातनसङ्कोचसक्ष्टातः। गति यान्ति।॥ ९१॥

एवंप्रतिपद्वते ज्ञानिनि अन्तः। क्षणः। चरमो देख्यानासहभावी कालो। प्रातुदिपवशेऽने दुष्यायनु-
भवादा समीपर्यंतः। प्रामातुर्मिनुमितमा। पुर्णाः पापपरी। वा रिचित पुष्यन्। सेवमानं। सत्। मूलानम्।
देख्यात्तमानानिति। प्रामातुःगयं च सहकारीभावम्। कारणाऽस्तु। गच्छति। गच्छतु। वासको नेतावाना निर्माणेहात-
त्मानिते। सदा। स्वात्मायणेश्चरनिलाभमात्रूं। तत्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्। योगिनि। सः। अन्तः। क्षणः। गति। देख्यात्तमात्राप्रापि
हेतुं। कारणं। अंतेः। कु त एदागतित्वं निदर्श्यात्रहे। येठपि। इहे। येठपि। केनायायात्तवेऽने शारिदाना
वा पापवानोः। पञ्चपिलसिदः। गति। यान्ति।॥ ९१॥

प्रभुगायणादृश्यः यथा। हरिकी। पञ्चपिलसिदः। सतः। प्राक्षरितिशिलितप्रस्थितित्वस्त्रायुक्ति। विषुः। भगवतं। स्तुत्तः। सम्य-
कुः। बिहायं। स्वस्त्र्वपुरुषस्तुवः कस्तुर स्म्रणं बंहतुः। अर्थं। भावः। शरीराधुःपदेशपश्चास्तकानाय
धारणामेको। ज्ञानी। पुर्णं। पापपातः। विचारावलिविदालिङ्क। वा। यथितिमिदत्वस्तुयते। तज्ज्ति। नेतावोऽवस्तुच्छेत्तया
यथास्त्ततः ज्ञानादिकं।। तस्य। विविधायोः। स्वाच्छरीसंगितमात्रा। धमाः। शरीरादृश्यं। नियमित्व। न पुनः। सदा। भवितं
वसूलु। स्थागतियू भवान्तित्यमानकारणं। सर्वं। प्रश्नरितेऽवलः। परमाथः॥ ९२॥

ये ये वापि स्मरणाभावानुवितम्।
तं तमेवेति। कौन्तेयसदा। तदात्माभावितं।॥

तथा
ंतत्वमानों भजताः प्रीतिपूर्वकम् ।

dardham bhuvidhyo 'n t etem manmapsanit te ।

इति भावितान्: करणेऽव यर्मनापादितानहेतुः ॥ ९१ ॥

evं दशितद्वाय यतः सदा तद्वाभावितमयपदस्य नूतनतेन शाश्रिविनायो नापूर्वं किंचित्मापयते
ज्ञानिनो यतो देह एव विनाशी केवलं स एव विनाशयति न पुनर्वासनाप्ररोहः इति दर्शयत्राह

स्वर्गमयो निरयमयस्तदयं देहानानारागः पुरुषः ।

tadṛṣ्ठे स्वाभित्यादेहाननारायणस्यमुपदेशः ॥ ९२ ॥

एवं ज्ञानवसे स्वात्मा सकृदद्वय यातर्गतवादः ।

tadṛṣ्ठेव एव तदात्ते न देहपातेन्यथा भवति ॥ ९३ ॥

तत् मध्यरूपान्तरोपदिनिविषः पुरुषः: सर्वस्य कार्यात्माधिवा स्वात्मा स्वर्गादिभिर्भिन्न्युप्नृत्तृत्तात्मकं
कर्मव्रतज्ञायानाविश्विति करण: स्वर्गमयः प्रहुल्लर्ग्यस्त्राव्यानाविश्वितवात्स्वर्गफलभोक्तिकारः
तवृत्तेऽव यस्य कर्मव्रतानां नर्कवृत्तेऽव यस्य कर्मव्रतानां नर्कवृत्तेऽव यस्य कर्मव्रतानां
तद्रृत्ते स्वाभित्यादात्मकं इति तस्मिन्दैवेष्येत्यस्य आत्मना यथाहितवासना नुकृष्ण्याद्वायने भोगायतने शाश्रितान्वे
सम्भवित्याधिकारानि जनः विभिन्नव्रतज्ञायानाद्वात्मकं भोगायतने शाश्रितान्वे यथाहितवासनानि
सम्भवित्यात्मकं जनः विभिन्नव्रतज्ञायानाद्वात्मकं भोगायतने शाश्रितान्वे यथाहितवासनानि
अन्यथा समाचारित: भवति। न हि भातसमातां स्वात्मपथे न कथितिकिंपद्यभोजस्यविदिति
सर्वायानविप्रवोधोऽपि भवेत्।

धर्मं गमनमूर्त्यं गमनमभ्रास्तदात्रात्त्वधर्मं ।

झानेन चापर्गं विपर्यायाचिन्तये वन्यः ॥

इत्यादि सर्वं च ज्ञ त्वात्मान्तरणकाले शारीरे यथास्तु तथास्तु केवलं वासनाप्ररोहं: स्वामगत: सर्वस्य
वन्ये मोक्षे च हेतुरितिः ॥ ९३ ॥

यदि पुनर्वात्मास्यप्रज्ञारतीर्थेण मरणव्यस्तपार्थिः: स्वाजीतावत्मायाप्ररोहोऽस्पदस्य काचिकक्षातिरित्यावेदितामेव
स्थितविपलवं परिहारते

करणगांसंप्रमोऽषं स्मृतिनास: शासकविरित्या च्चेद: ।

मरम्मतु रजनीविशेष: शारीरसंक्षारणो भोगः ॥ ९४ ॥

स कर्म विप्राहोऽगे सति न भवेते मोहोऽगे चपि ।

मरणासे हानि न च्यवते स्वातामपरमार्थाः ॥ ९५ ॥
करणगणस्य वाहानात्मकात्य न्योद्वात्मकात्य सम्प्र: प्रमो:ः स्वतृप्रवश्चालपः यथा कषुरार्थीनिन्द्याया रूपाविशेषायाभिचीनायां न प्रगात्स्ते वागार्थिनिन्द्यायान्ययथवं वजनान्यादानी न प्रवत्न्ते नापि बुद्धशङ्कर्यमयोऽध्यक्षश्च निवृत्तयथमयोऽध्यक्षश्च निवृत्तयथाखण्डनानान्यतरं तच्चारमुक्तं वर्तवं शतावशानुभूत्तमपूर्वे न प्रत्येक्षानात्ति एव सदा तद्वाविभावतं विना करणाविद्यायनस्तान्ताको देवस्यत्वस्यायां नृपभाविनावं न चितत्र प्रथतमितः किंतु तत्तत्त्वत्त्वतात्र कार्यविर्तमिति नियोः। तथा त्योः दण्डवत्त्वत्त्वत्त्वत्त्वतात्र कार्यविर्तमिति नियोः। तथा त्योः दण्डवत्त्त्वत्त्वत्त्वत्त्वतात्र कार्यविर्तमिति नियोः। तथा त्योः दण्डवत्त्त्वत्त्वत्त्वत्त्वतात्र कार्यविर्तमिति नियोः। तथा त्योः दण्डवत्त्त्वत्त्वत्त्वत्त्वतात्र कार्यविर्तमिति नियोः। तथा त्योः दण्डवत्त्त्वत्त्वत्त्वत्त्वतात्र कार्यविर्तमिति नियोः।

तदा सच्चे प्रवृद्धे तु प्रत्येक पायि देहनृतु।

tदोपरमविदा लोकान्मलामातिरिपते।

इत्यादि। सत्याद्यो गुणा: प्रकृतितमातस्तन्मयप्रय नियच्छ निवृत्ते विद्धनये येन पुनर्णतो विविधतिता विरङ्खलिता न तो प्रत्येके केन्द्रिते ज्ञानोद्धार्य एव पन:। ये पुनर्ण स्मृत्युरुपर्वण:ः पशुप्रभावार्थस्ते स्वतंत्रभावार्थ स्वतंत्रभावार्थ न्यायार्थरूपवर्तने यथा यद्यपि ज्ञानमातिरिपते केन्द्रितात्र यथा विचारोऽपि नागर्थस्ते भवते राजस्य अन्यत्रात्ति । रक्षानी ज्ञानन्यायान्ययथवर्तनी न च च विचारान्यात्ति । ज्ञानन्यायान्ययथवर्तनी न च च विचारान्यात्ति । ज्ञानन्यायान्ययथवर्तनी न च च विचारान्यात्ति । ज्ञानन्यायान्ययथवर्तनी न च च विचारान्यात्ति । ज्ञानन्यायान्ययथवर्तनी न च च विचारान्यात्ति ।

इति ॥९॥

इदानीमकरण करणे च ज्ञानयोगपरिशीलने विचित्रपरशक्तिपालकेव ज्ञानारुप रूपमें प्रतिपादनकल्पमेवाह
परमार्थमार्गेन्न इतिति यदा गुरुमुखात्मयेति ।
अतितीव्रकालिकात्तदौ निर्विकालिव शिवः ॥ ९५ ॥

यथिर्मेव काले जनः पश्चिमजन्मा गुरुमुखात् प्रवर्द्धिकवाकात् एसमू शास्त्रः प्रतिपादितम् प- रमार्थमार्गेम् पूर्णवार्तमार्क्त्यक्षणं स्वातंस्वतीवमुखायाराहस्यसरसिकं ज् कथितः अथेति सम्भविताः सः । तदैव तत्स्मिनवारसे गुरुपद्धासानन्दरेवसामायायात्मकार्यं कृतः शिवं एव स्यात् । श्रीकुले यथोक्तम्

हेदया क्रिया वापि आदराद्वात् तत्तत्वितः ।
यथे संपातेत्विन्दु सुकृत्वमार्त्तिनिवे ॥

इति ॥ नन्तु कथेन्विविचं मुखायाराहस्यमेवास्येन्द्रित्याः अतितीव्रकालिकात् इति । अतिविवेयन तीव्रं
कर्क्षो योगामुखायाहृत्याः पारस्मयाः: शाश्वे: पातः पशूहकलामवतत्वं वेन पशूरपि गुरव्याप- वेदनावृत्तिमात्रानि जीवस्वस्तु मुरु इति यावत् । यथा तात्त्वाद्विसिद्धस्यपालिताः जपथयान्यावदिभक्ष्मायात्मकम् क- मते । अनुवाचमार्धविद्धवस्य तु हठदेवाक मेवादिमुखायाराहस्य हृदयमार्च्छिन्तिते वेन इत्तमेव
परमेश्वरीयार्ये यातीत्त्वराधुतो विचिन्तः पारमेश्वर: शाक्तात् इति ॥ ९६ ॥

यथे पुरानमयमन्द्रान्तरितेऽऽेव इति: शाक्तात्तस्य गुरुपद्धासात्मकार्यं यावयोगकमेन
विशुद्धं: पिण्डपातात्तिस्थितं स्याविद्ति प्रतिपादितः ॥

सवृत्तितरुपं सोपाणाधिकरणं संबंधतः ।
परत्वदुर्भिलामे पर्यन्ते शिवमयीमभावः ॥ ९७ ॥

एवं किंत शाक्तिपादमन्द्रान्तरित्याभिनंपदेशात्मकात्मकातनेव सवृत्तितरुपं सर्वतन्त्रात्तिस्थित्वभ- 
वम् संबंधत: यातीत्त्वराधुतो योगिनं सोपाणाधिकरणं इति । कण्ठनाभिव्यक्तमलयमाचिन्द्रदात्सर- क्तिरुपानं सोपानविन उघरवकमणा तीर्थन्येव तेन पद्म आसादन तन हासादनरुपः कम: शाशवे: कन्दे तनो नामभो ततो हृदीवकमणं तेनेति । एवं यात्त्वसर्वायामोपतुहृं पिण्डपातासरे योगिन्तत्त्व कक्रेन शिवतात्मकाभवास स्थिरितमेवतीत्या कमयुक्तं: कथिता ॥ ९७ ॥

एवमिति कमयोगमर्याद्यो योगिनं: समाधिस्स्थिरपि सत्सत्त्वारुविनं स्यावभीप्राषाकार्यात्मकयो जा- 
यसे यदि परमनासदितत्वत्स्य मरणं स्यात्तदा कि भवेदित्याशक्तं परिहर्षि

तत्र तु परमार्थमयार्थं भारामार्गस्य मध्यविवेश्यात: ।
तत्तद्वृत्तोक्तकृतसङ्गिः मरणं कदाचिन्तितः ॥ ९८ ॥

योगश्रेष्ठ: शाश्वे कथितोत्साई चित्रमोहिवकुन्तपति: ।
विभाषित्यास्यावाक्षुं जनान्ते तिथिभवति ॥ ९९ ॥

एवमुद्धवनकमेन योगमभाष्यस्त: क्रेन्यायन्तररेवाधिकारिणं मध्यविवेश्यां: कुत्वचित्तकायारेवर्युन्योपवावेज्या- 
स्सन्त्रेव परितोष्ण गतस्य सत्त्वं एव परमार्थमयार्थं भारामार्गस्य परत्त्वस्य प्रतिज्ञानं द्वारा सर्वार्थोत्तीर्नयश्चात- 
स्तवतः यदि वा सत्तद्वृत्तोक्तकृतसङ्गिः प्रतिज्ञातपरमार्थसात्मादसाहितमयार्यस्यार्घ्या कदाचित् मध्ये
परमार्थवान्मैनेन दुह्स्थयाप्रायः योगमग्नप्रायः
सुलोकभोगभागी मुदितमना मोदते सुचिम्वः॥ १००॥

विवेयेषु सार्वभौमः सर्वज्ञेन पूज्यते यथा राजा।
भुजनेषु सव्वेदेवयोगास्तत्त्यमपुःपुः॥ १०१॥

पुमूः इति शताः प्रतिचित्तितां स्वत्मज्ञानसत्तत्त्य पतनाम्नम्। अम्बर्य प्रदानिन्तिया सेविनिन्तियाचित्त- 
दोषापवस्थास्य वायुहर्द्योगाल्क्षण विश्वार्थितं जनमसम्प्रेयोपनिधित्वं: सम्भवत्केतत्र स योगभ्रोजा ज्ञानभ्रोजा।
विश्वाय प्रसुङ्क्षिप्त्रासांसत्तत्त्यं देवलोकोभोगभागी साहित्यः। सुचिम्वः काठ तर्क प्रयाति सुरूपं भूलनेपुरुषी प्रजनितकायान्यः पुरुषो भवति। क इत्त्रत्वां सर्वं इत्त्रार्दिः। यथा सर्वभौमो राजा सत्तवे वेधपिर्या राजा चक्रवर्ति। विवेयेषु नानामण्डलेऽसर्वज्ञेन: पूज्यते समस्यार्थं तद्भवति अर्य प्रस्तारापुष्पायुणविविष्यम्।
समुद्यास्वरूपः पश्चिमामुखस्य वन्योस्मांक पद्य वायुन्ति निधासार्थः प्राणमन्त्रधोमोत्तुतिः सुरूपं 
स्तुत्त: इति यवत्॥ १००॥ १०२॥

तस्य लोकांतरभोगाधिकारिनुवितार्तं कं स्यादित्वाः

महत्ता कालेन पुरमाणत्य प्राप्त योगमयस्य।
प्रामोदि दिव्यमूर्तं यस्मादावतेते न पुनः॥ १०२॥

देवलोकेऽसु यथानिर्देशस्य भोगन्मुखतातितिम्यें। कालेन स योगमए॥ सौतोऽसिद्धमन्त्रमूलमामध्यगतिः। योग्यायासाधनमंगलेऽप्यासाधनामग्निमं सिद्धात्मात्वयोग्यो योगो दुःपर्यंभृतस्मवो योगमुः प्राणजातकामहाप्रगस्यवासनसंस्करोक्षुऽन्त्यानसुहः प्राप्त् समभियाः । देवहानि दिव्यस्माः परस्परस्वरूपमुलमेते परस्परस्वरूपतदावः गच्छतीति। अत: पुरुषार्द्धस्तरत्नस्य तस्य न स्यादित्वाः।
एव प्रामोदि कल्याणेऽपि स्वत्मज्ञानविषये मनागमपि प्रत्यवमिश्रः समसारसर्वाधिं न भवति। यदुक्त श्रीगार्गासु
नेधातिर्यानाशोयंस्य प्रत्यवमिश्रो न विव्येः।
स्वत्मफलस्य धर्मस्य जापते विवेयेः॥
इति। तथा
अयतः: अद्वैतो योगाचारितमानसम्।
अमर्थः योगसत्सिद्धम् ...॥

इत्यादिश्रादारणम्
अनेकजन्मसिद्धस्ततो याति परं गतिम्॥

इत्युत्तप्यतं ग्रन्थो मूलिना प्रतिपादितोऽपि स्मर्यः इति॥ १०२॥

एवमेव नानायोगाधि उपासनाग्रहव वस्तुस्त्र सत इत्याविभूत्तिरतिरायोऽयः: प्रवचनं न पार्थते तस्मात्त्वार्तमाना विवेकार्थार्थार्थसोनसरनिवृत्ती सावधार्यावैव्यमिति निरुपयति

तस्मात्सन्नागensiblyः सः शिवम्।
इति मत्वा परमार्थवातात्पर्व प्रयत्नीयम्॥ १०३॥

यतं एवं स्वात्मत्त्ववृत्तमाणाः: प्रतिपादितकमवानहदत्तपवत्तभोः तस्मात् एतस्मतसुश्रोभं मां। ग्रन्थं प्रकृतसुनिष्ठेयप्रके र पथं: कायिकितिः: इत्यदिकारिनिमाभावः प्रदर्शितः॥ यः: कृष्णः जनो जनन-मारणायायाविवेकशास्त्रपररिपीतिः। निःसः: विवेकवृद्धा निः: शेणेन रतस्तवैः अद्वानो भूतवा निम्नः। जन्तुरविराहपुवैः तालेन शिवत्मेति सकत्सांवारिहेतुशानावधूः परंत्योरुपवसाहनेकेन जनमना प्रा-प्राप्तः। यथा विशिष्ठमात्रेयं शास्त्रेः

इहैवतिविवेलिको मोक्षः एवं ताव्यसिद्धिन्यतम्।
अनेकविवेति मुक्तिवेति केन वार्तेत॥

इति। इति मत्वा एवं विमयवत्तमाणं परमार्थवातात्पर्व स्वातां येन तेनापि प्रकारेण प्रयत्नीयम्। प्रकरण स-मुद्राम् कार्यः। प्राणे यह: फलविनितिः क्रत्त्वाश्च येन मनायथवच्चलेभोऽयां: वेनो योगाचारिण स्वात्म-प्रकरिष्ठेतस्मुनुक्षत्र सिद्धं न: समीपितं न चेतद्विकार्यात्माति:। ततोऽपि प्रत्याभृत्तस्य प्रकाराभ्यस्तः योगवाचारमाहांतिवलेन पुनरि पुनरि योगसंस्कर्थेः इति श्रेयोमार्गपरिवर्तीन्तब्रज्ञितं किंतु किंतु: समापतीति कथमुलकार्थसाधारणाः मनायथवच्चलेभोऽनुमानवयः न कार्यं इति शिवम्॥ १०४॥

परं शास्त्रः: शेषम्बाहराकारोकारारोपिताः परमार्थतारोपिताः शिवायमार्थानन्दमेकेन युक्तयुक्तविवाहामनस्तिः प्रतिपादः स्वात्मः: परमार्थवातात्परिवर्तितोऽयान्तमार्थानन्दार्थाप्येवोपि: परस्परार्थसाधानोपि इति निरुपयतन्त्रार्थार्थसहस्रार्थाः

इहैवतिविवेलिको मोक्षः सः शिवम्। इति।
अचार्यांविविशेषं निजहृदयवेशस्थिति॥ १०५॥

इदम् यथामान विनित्त्वत्त्तप्रतिपादितं यतं परम्। प्रकृत्यम् भवं प्रवृक्तयत्वात्तप्राणितार्थार्थस्मात्स्वरूप-पम्। इति। अनायासुन्त्यवारिहेतुशानावधूः परंत्योरुपवसाहनेकेन जननामान्त
प्रभावमणिन निरूपयज्ञिनकरण कर्तृकवाहः

आर्यादेशेन तदिदं संक्षिप्त शाक्तसारमस्थितगृहम् ।
अभिनवगुप्तेन मया शिवचरणस्वरूपदीन्द्रेन ॥ १०५ ॥

इदं शाक्तसारम् धृतान् यथात्मानाः यत्कर्ष सतत्वं तत्र यमा संक्षिप्तम् । यथासहस्रोपपादपितुम- शकं तदेव तप्याल वृताशिरमार्गिणे स्तोत्रक्षमात्मा तपस्विन स्वात्मिकाकारणे ॥ १०५ ॥

श्रीमहामहेश्वरचारीभिनवगुप्तकारिकः

परार्थसारः ॥

श्रीमतः स्मरणस्थापनायानीनित्तिरिहृति
साक्षात्कृत्तमहेश्वरस्य तस्यार्थोदयासिना मया ॥ १ ॥
श्रीविविधशुरीभाग्यविशेषस्य विशेषायानालितायानीनित्तिरिहृति
विविधात्मिकानुभावाच्यायानालितायानीनित्तिरिहृति ॥ २ ॥

संपूर्णं परमार्थसारसंहितेनविद्वद् । कृत्तित्रत्रयंद्वित्यस्मार्थमहेश्वरश्रीराजांनकयोगराजस्य ॥
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Abbreviations

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ABh   Abhinavabhāratī
AG    Abhinavagupta
APS   Ajañapramātrisiddhi (Siddhitrayi)
ÄpDhS Apastambadharmasūtra
ÄPS   Ādiśeṣa’s Paramārthasāra
ÄPSV  Paramārthasāravivarana
ÄŚ    Āgamaśāstra
ÄŚV   Āgamaśāstravivarana
BĀU   Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad
BĀUBh Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya
BhG   Bhagavadgītā
BhGBh Bhagavadgītābhāṣya
BS    Brahmaśūtra
BSBh  Brahmaśūtrabhāṣya
ChU   Chāndogyopaniṣad
DhĀl  Dhvanyāloka
GAS   Gitārthasamgraha
GBh   Gauḍapādiyabhāṣya
ĪPK   Īśvara-pratyabhijñākārikā
ĪPV   Īśvara-pratyabhijñāvimarśini
ĪPVṛ   Īśvara-pratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti
ĪPVV  Īśvara-pratyabhijñāvivruttivimarśini
JUB   Jaininīyopaniṣadbrāhmaṇa
KauBU  Kauśitakibhrāmaṇiopaniṣad
KāU  Kāthakopaniṣad
KS    Kāthakasamhitā
LT    Lakṣmitantra
MāU  Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad

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**Institutions, journals and series**

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Primary sources are alphabetically listed by title. editions precede translations in the listing — in each case, in chronological order of original publication (1st ed.). The same principles apply to the commentaries, which are to be found under the heading of the commented text.

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Prabodhacandrodaya, Candrikā


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Prasnopanisad [PU]
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aham aham, 'I am I', 122
aham eva, 'It is I [who am the Lord]', 226
aham eva Caitanya Mahāprabhu, sarvamāna sarvādā evam sphurāmi, 'It is I who am the Great Lord in the form of consciousness, who manifest ever thus, intensely', 244
aham eva cidghanāḥ svatantrāḥ sarvapramāṇītātmanānāṃ sarvakarmākāri, 'I am indeed formed [entirely] of consciousness, free, the accomplisher of all actions inasmuch as I exist as the innermost Being of all cognizers', 240
aham eva eko viśvātmanā sphurāmi, 'I alone manifest myself as the Self of the universe', 192
aham eva idam sarvam, 'It is I who am all this', 244
aham eva itthāṁ viśvātmanā sphurāmi, 'It is I who appear as the Self of everything', 233
aham eva mahēśvarāh, 'I am myself the Great Lord', 138
aham eva paraṁ brahma, 'I am indeed the supreme brahma', 220
aham eva sarvam idam, 'I myself am all this', 274
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caitanya-kathāh na navacchinnasvabhāvah svatantrā ca, 'I am a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, [hence] I am free', 174
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sarvam idam asmi, ‘I am all this [universe]’, 226

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sarvam idāṁ svatmapraśasvātantryam, ‘All this universe is nothing but the freedom that is manifest in my own Self’, 273

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śaṁbhuṁ svātmadevatakāram eva prapadye na ca punar māyāntaścārināṁ kimcid bhinnāṁ devam, ‘I take [refuge] in Śaṁbhu, not in some other god operating within the realm of Illusion, who is [therefore] different from me — Śaṁbhu, the divinity who has taken the form of my own Self’, 64

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