The *Dhvanyaloka* of Anandavardhana with the *Locana* of Abhinavagupta

Translated by

DANIEL H. H. INGALLS,
JEFFREY MOUSSAIEFF MASSON,
AND M. V. PATWARDHAN

Edited with an introduction by

DANIEL H. H. INGALLS

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VOLUME FORTY-NINE
THE DHVANYĀLOKA
OF ĀNANDAVARDHANA
WITH THE LOCANA
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This volume is the result of work by three men. The inception was an annotated translation by J. M. Masson of the First Chapter of the Dhvanyāloka and the Locana, a work carried out in the Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies at Harvard University. As Chairman of the Department at that time, I read it and approved it as Masson's doctoral thesis, Harvard, 1970. Later, Dr. Masson spent two years in India, much of it in study under Professor M. V. Patwardhan. With Patwardhan he completed a translation of the remaining chapters. Of that translation the brief Chapter Four was published in the Journal of the American Oriental Society 97 (1977), pp. 285–304, 423–440. The complete translation was offered for publication to the Harvard Oriental Series. As editor of the Series, I stated that two major alterations would first be necessary. The separate parts, Ānanda's and Abhinava's, must be integrated; and the quotations of poetry in both parts must be rendered into verse, not prose. I was asked if I would be willing to make these alterations myself and any others that I saw fit.

I accepted the request and have spent what my colleagues must have thought an unconscionable time in fulfilling it. I have altered the original considerably. What is wholly my responsibility is the Introduction, the verse translations, the indices, and large sections of the notes. In the notes when it seemed necessary, as in the expression of opinions, to make a distinction, the first personal pronoun singular is used to refer to Ingalls (for example, "I believe," "It seems to me"); the plural pronoun refers to a consensus. In the notes on Chapter Three several long passages are given verbatim from the written communications of Patwardhan. They are indicated by his name in parentheses. As for the prose translations of the texts, while I have altered the wording throughout, the substance remains basically that of Masson and Patwardhan.
Foreword

After these changes had been made, preliminary drafts of Chapter One and portions of Chapter Two, and later the finished version of the Introduction were sent to Patwardhan. Several alterations have been made in Chapters One and Two as a result of Patwardhan’s comments. In the Introduction nothing has been changed, but I have added a long note (note 42) dealing with a matter which Patwardhan regarded as important. Shortly before going to press there came the sad news of Professor Patwardhan’s death, which will be felt by all Sanskritists as a major loss to their field of study.

As the basis of our translation we have used the edition published as Volume 135 of the Kashi Sanskrit Series, *The Dhvanyāloka of Śrī Ānandavardhanācharya with the Lochana and Bālapriyā Commentaries* (Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1940). The edition is not without faults, as may be seen from the Corrections of the Kashi Text at the end of this book, but its text of the *Locana* is better than that of the *NS* edition and it is the only edition which contains the invaluable *Bālapriyā* commentary on the *Locana*.

An effort has been made to explain technical terms the first time they occur. If we have delayed an explanation by inadvertence, or if the reader has forgotten it, he may consult the general index, where he will find a reference to the passage where the explanation occurs.

In the translation, verse quotations from scientific works (*śāstras*) are usually rendered in prose; so also always the *Kārikās* of the *Dhvanyāloka*. Verse quotations from literature (*kāvya*), on the other hand, are rendered, with a very few exceptions, into unrhymed verse.

The breaking up of the commentarial matter on many *Kārikās* into sections (for example, 1.13 a, b, c,) is in order to keep the two commentaries (*Vṛtti* and *Locana*) close to each other and close to the footnotes for ease of cross-reference. Likewise for ease of cross-reference, quotations and pratikās of the *Dhvanyāloka* which occur in the *Locana* are printed in boldface.

The process of production was more complicated than I had at first envisaged. I began typing out the text on a Macintosh 512K computer. For about a third of the text Mrs. Ann Palmer, Secretary of the Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies, Harvard University, took over this onerous task. For her skillful and time-consuming assistance I express my sincere thanks. When my Macintosh printer did not give sufficiently fine resolution for press copy, Dr. Gary Tubb came to my aid. He transferred my files to IBM disks and typeset the volume using the Multilingual TeX program from Personal TeX, Inc. The text was
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then run off on a Linotronic 300 by Chiron Inc. of Cambridge, Mass. In developing the formatting packages Dr. Tubb was aided by technical advice from Dr. Dominik Wujastyk of the Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine, London. The output from the Linotronic 300 has been photographically reproduced by the Harvard University Press.

But my indebtedness to Dr. Tubb goes beyond this. In the course of transposing the text, he added his own proofreading to the three or four proofreadings I had given it. No volume containing so many different fonts of type and so much index material can hope to be absolutely free from error. But if this work approaches the ideal, it will be in large part owing to Dr. Tubb.

Daniel H. H. Ingalls

Hot Springs, Virginia
August 1989
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The pages which follow carry a translation and annotation of two Sanskrit texts. The first has been known for many centuries as the *Dhvanyāloka*, or “Light on [the Doctrine of] Suggestion,” and has been ascribed to Rājānaka Ānandavardhana, a Kashmiri author of the ninth century A.D. The fact that this was not the original title of the work and the fact that many scholars have recently claimed, I think wrongly, that Ānanda wrote only the *Vṛtti* or prose portion of it, are matters of which I shall speak later. The second text is a commentary on the first, called the *Locana*, or “The Eye,” composed in about A.D. 1000 by another Kashmiri, the critic, philosopher, and Śaiva mystic, Abhinavagupta. These two texts have proven over the centuries to be the most influential works of India on the theory and practice of literary criticism. For the last thousand years all Indian critics of Sanskrit, and many even of those who have written on the literatures of India’s modern languages, have studied their doctrine, if not directly from the texts themselves, at least through the rendering of Mammata. Even when an author has disagreed with their pronouncements he has treated these works with honor and has taken pains to answer their point of view in establishing such other doctrines as he might favor.

How did Ānanda’s view of literature arise? I use this general phrase because, as will soon be clear, the doctrine of *dhvani*, of suggestion or suggestiveness in literature, forms only a part of it. And what is there about his view and about Abhinava’s commentary on it that placed these works in such a magisterial position? In this Introduction I shall try to answer these questions, steering a course between the generalities of brevity and a full-scale exposition, which would be nothing less than a history of Indian aesthetics.

As both Ānanda and Abhinava were Kashmiris and drew heavily on Kashmiri traditions of scholarship, it is to that northern province of India that we should look for the historical background of their works.
Kashmir in the narrow sense is a small valley ringed in by the immense ranges of the Himalaya and Karakoram mountains. The floor of the valley, some eighty by twenty miles in extent, lies a mile above sea level and is watered by the Jhelum River, which twists its way northwesterly into the Wular Lake, issuing westward from which it breaks through the mountain barrier. The soil of the valley, helped by winter snows and spring rains, is fertile. In those brief periods when the valley was well governed and when measures were taken to prevent annual flooding, both produce and population rose to a high level, permitting the kings of Kashmir to extend their sway well beyond the narrow limits of their homeland.

The first of our two authors lived toward the end of the longest period of strong government that Kashmir ever enjoyed, a period in which for once this little valley played a major role in the political history of Asia. This strong Kashmir was the achievement of two long-reigning kings of the Karkota dynasty: Lalitāditya, “the World Conqueror” (reg. A.D. 725–761), and his grandson, Jayāpīḍa, the great patron of literature (reg. A.D. 776–807). Kalhana’s Rājatarangini gives a delightful account of their reigns, mixing history with the romantic adventures of folk tales. As the reader may follow the account in Sir Aurel Stein’s edition and translation of the Rājatarangini, I shall limit myself to selecting the few items which are strictly to my purpose.

In A.D. 732 or 733 King Lalitāditya borrowed from the Bhūtesa Temple ten million dināras to finance an expedition to the south. The goal of his expedition was King Yaśovarman of Kanauj, who controlled through feudatory rights the Punjab and most of the Ganges valley. In 733, the date perhaps being confirmed by a solar eclipse,¹ at the confluence of the Jumna and the Ganges, 700 miles as the crow flies from where he had set forth, Lalitāditya met with and defeated his

¹ The Gaûdavaho, a Prakrit poem describing the victories of Yaśovarman, contains a passage (vv. 827–832) mentioning various portents, including a solar eclipse, which occurred just before Yaśovarman’s “royal position became suddenly weakened” (khana-nivāda-niyaya-paya-bhaṅge = khaṇa-nivāta-niśā/ka/-pada-bhaṅga). Such is the reading of three of the four manuscripts of the poem as edited in the Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, No. 34, second ed., 1927; see Introduction, p. cclvii. Hermann Jacobi took this weakening of the royal position to refer to Yaśovarman’s defeat at Prayāga by Lalitāditya (Göt. Gel. Anz. 1888, II, pp. 67–68). A total eclipse of the sun would have been visible from Prayāga (Allahabad) in A.D. 733. But the reading of the latest edition of the Gaûdavaho (Prakrit Text Society, Ahmadabad, 1975), khaṇa-nivāda-bhūla-bhaṅga-bhaṅgurāpāṅge, eliminates the “weakening of the royal position.”
enemy. A temporary peace seems to have been arranged, for in 736 we find that Lalitāditya’s ambassador to the Chinese emperor apparently refers to Yaśovarman as Lalitāditya’s ally. Meanwhile Lalitāditya had advanced eastward to raid the former adherents of Yaśovarman in Magadha and Bengal. Before 740 the peace was broken, Yaśovarman was rooted out of his kingdom, and the revenues of his capital city of Kanauj were given to a temple of the Sun in Kashmir. Lalitāditya, who was now the paramount ruler of northern India, repaid the Bhūteśa Temple 110,000,000 dinārās for the 10,000,000 that he had borrowed.

The World Conqueror spent the last twenty years of his reign founding cities and religious institutions in the valley of Kashmir and in expeditions against his northern neighbors, the Dards, Tibetans, and Turks. On the second day of Caitra (April/May) of an unspecified year he won a great victory over the Turks. Three centuries later the Arab traveler Alberuni reports that in Kashmir this victory was still the occasion of an annual celebration. The nationalist pride which Kashmiris felt in the victories of their king is reflected in the boast of Kalhana:

The rulers of many lands to this very day wear symbols of their defeat, which the fierce king forced them to adopt. Clearly it is by his command that the Turks, to show that they had been enslaved, still walk with their hands behind their backs and wear their heads half shaved, while he forced the rulers of the South, in token of their having been reduced to the state of beasts, to wear a tail to their dhotis, which reach to the ground.

The World Conqueror ended his days on an expedition across “the ocean of sand,” that is to say, in what is now either Russian or Chinese Turkestan, in quest of further glory. After the brief reign of his two sons, he was succeeded by a grandson, Jayāpīḍa, whom his tutors, following the dying instructions of the World Conqueror, had constantly urged to “be like your grandfather.”

Jayāpīḍa, as soon as he reached the throne, attempted to follow their advice. He too gathered a force for a great southern conquest. Fate turned against him at Benares, where most of his troops deserted. But by reckless bravery the young king retrieved his fortune. He allied himself with the king of Bengal, whose daughter he married. In the
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course of his return he once more subjected Kanauj to the rule of Kashmir. Then at the entrance to his homeland he defeated a usurper who had arisen in his absence.

We are told that after his return Jayāpiḍa became a great patron of learning, attracting so many scholars to his court that there came to be a dearth of wise men in other kingdoms. Kalhana lists many of the scholars and poets whom the king brought into his service. Among them was the grammarian Kṣīra, from whom the king himself took lessons (Rāj. T. 4.489). The person meant is doubtless Kṣīrasvāmin, the well-known commentator on the Amarakoṣa and the Nirukta. "The king engaged Bhaṭṭoddbaṭa as his sabhāpati at a salary of a lakh [of dināras] a day and made the poet Dāmodaragupta, the author of the Kuṭṭanimita, his chief minister" (Rāj. T. 4.495–6). I shall have more to say below of Bhaṭṭoddbaṭa, or Udbhata as he is now generally known, for his influence on Ānanda and the Dhvanyāloka was great. The minister Dāmodara was perhaps the most original of classical Sanskrit poets. That may be why his work later fell out of fashion. Fortunately nearly the whole of it has now been recovered. Among other ministers is mentioned Vāmana, doubtless the poetician quoted in our texts, and among other poets is mentioned Manoratha (Rāj. T. 4.497), whom Abhinava identifies as the author of a verse opposed to the doctrine of dhvani, quoted by Ānanda (1.1 c A). Finally, we are told that the king, having dreamed that the sun was rising in the west, was happy to realize that the Buddhist scholar Dharmottara had entered his kingdom (4.498). This will explain how Ānanda came to write a commentary, as Abhinava tells us (3.47 L and see note 6), on Dharmottara's Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā. The man had been the leading Buddhist scholar in the kingdom in the generation previous to Ānanda's.

3 The frame story, which gives the title to the work ("The Bawd's Advice"), can be likened to several other Sanskrit works, but the emboxed stories are sui generis. The combination of comic and tragic in the tale of Hāralatā and Sundarasena is against all the classical conventions of rasa. The tale is told by the bawd with an explicitly cynical purpose, but it the death of Hāralatā will break the reader's heart. Dāmodara's is the only example I know of in Sanskrit of this double attack on the reader's sensibilities.

6 The works of Dharmottara were not yet known to the West when Stein wrote his translation of the Rāj T. (1900). Stcherbatsky's edition of the Nyāyabinduśākā was published only in 1909. This explains Stein's misunderstanding of the passage, where he failed to see that dharmottara was a proper name. As for the sun rising in the west, Dharmottara, like most visitors to Kashmir, would have entered the valley through one of the western passes of the Himalaya.
It was under King Jayāpīḍa that the school of literary criticism in Kashmir originated. The sabhā to which Udbhata was appointed as director (pati) was doubtless a paṇḍitasaṇhaba rather than a political body. One might therefore translate Udbhata’s title approximately as Director of the Royal Academy. His salary, by the way, was not so immense as it sounds. The dīnāra (the word derives ultimately from the Roman denarius) had become by this time a money of account, of less worth than the smallest coin. A lakh of dīnāras in Jayāpīḍa’s reign would have equalled approximately twenty-five silver rupees of Akbar’s mintage (Stein, Vol. II, p. 323), a princely but not a fabulous daily retainer.

It is pertinent to our understanding of Ānanda and Abhinava to inquire what materials were available for the teaching and research of such an academy, or to the individual scholars who might compose it. To judge from the quotations and references in the Dhvanyālōka and Lōcana, Kashmiri critics of their time had access to all the epic material and most of the early classical material that we now possess. A few works that are now standard in a library of classical authors are absent—those of Aśvaghoṣa, as one might expect, and more surprisingly the Bhattikāśya and the plays of Bhavabhūti—but not many. On the other hand, they had much that we have now lost. In addition they were acquainted with a substantial literature in Prakrit, most of which is now lost. The only two works in this category quoted by Ānanda which have come down to us are the Sattasaṣi and the Gaūdavaḥo. These account for only about a fourth of his quotations.

While the Kashmiri critic thus had access to a substantial library of Sanskrit and Prakrit literature, his library of literary criticism, in the early years of its development in Kashmir, was extremely modest. It consisted of little more than the eighth-century works of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. There existed also the ancient manual of the theater, the Bhāratīyanāṭyaśāstra (BhNS), but until Udbhata turned his attention to it, this work had played almost no part in general literary criticism.

7 Of Ānanda’s 131 Sanskrit literary quotations, we still possess the originals of 59, to which one may add 29 more that may still be found in anthologies of later date, in reworkings (the Hanumnāṭaka), or in the work of later literary critics. This leaves 41 for which our only source is Ānanda.

8 To be precise, 10 out of 39. Seven verses, not counted in the 10, may be found in the supplement to Weber’s edition of the Sattasaṣi, but they most probably found their way into the manuscript sources of the supplement from the Dhvanyālōka.
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Bhāmaha and Dandin had spent most of their effort in defining and exemplifying the figures of speech, a science which they had developed to a point comparable to what the West has to offer in the Greek of Demetrius or the Latin of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. Beyond that, they had listed the faults and the good qualities (guṇas) of poetry and had spoken of its different styles (rūtis). But what they had to say on these subjects suffers from two serious weaknesses. The qualities are so general that they offer no operable criteria of what is great or beautiful in poetry and what is not. The three primary qualities were given as sweetness (mādhurya), clarity (prasāda), and strength (ojaś). How is one to say when a stanza, much less a whole poem, is sweet and when it is not, or how judge whether it has strength? In an effort to render the qualities more precise, Bhāmaha and Dandin made the error of identifying them with measurable elements of phonetics and structure. Thus, a large number of retroflex consonants and consonant clusters and the use of many long compounds were said to exhibit strength. The modest use of compounds and the avoidance of harsh phonetic combinations gave sweetness. No better was the attempt to associate these qualities with regional differences. The sweet style was associated with Vidarbha in the Deccan, the harsh or strong style with Bengal. A third style, Pāncāśī, fell aesthetically and geographically somewhere in between.

Such concepts and associations died hard. Not until Ānanda was it pointed out that long compounds are not really necessary for strength (*Dhv. 2.9*). In fact Vāmana, who belonged to the first generation of Kashmiri criticism, if anything exaggerated and worsened these early faults. He extended the number of qualities to ten and defined each as of two sorts, depending on whether it was viewed as a quality of sound or a quality of meaning. Unfortunately his new qualities, such as samatā (regularity), saukumārya (delicacy), and kānti (brilliance), are as vague and as difficult to define as the original three. It is these qualities, he said, which give beauty to a poem, a beauty which may then be enhanced by the use of figures of speech (*Vāmana 3.1.1–2*). He continued the old association of certain qualities with regional styles and so came to the dictum for which he is chiefly remembered, “Style is the soul of poetry” (*rītir ātmā kāvyasya, Vāmana 1.2.6*).

While Vāmana, who may well have come from some older center of literary studies outside Kashmir, looked backward for his inspiration, Udbhāṣa, whose name indicates that he was a native Kashmiri, may be said to have looked forward. We know that he wrote a commentary,
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unfortunately now lost, on the BhNS. It was the first of a series of commentaries on that work that were to be written in Kashmir in the following two centuries, by Lollaia, by Śaṅkuka, and by Abhinavagupta. The importance of this new interest is inestimable, for as we shall see, it was by bringing Bharata's doctrine of the rasas, the flavors or moods of a theatrical piece, into a general theory of literature that Ānanda arrived at a critique which finally could furnish workable criteria of literary excellence.9

Fate has been unkind to the works of Udbhāta. His other great commentary, the Bhāmabhāvavivāraṇa, is also for all practical purposes lost to us. What appear to be minute fragments of it, written on birch-bark in a hand of the ninth to eleventh century, have been lovingly reconstructed by the Italian scholar Raniero Gnoli. But while Gnoli makes out a persuasive case for Udbhāta's authorship of these fragments, even if his case were fully proved none of them is of sufficient continuity to furnish evidence for the new ideas which Udbhāta must have propounded in that work. We know that it did contain new ideas. Ānanda and Abhinava ascribe to it, for example, the doctrine that the beauty of particular words depends on the rasa that the author wishes to achieve (see 3.16 m A and L). This would be a major step toward their critique. Jacobi goes so far as to say that "Udbhāta was the first to designate rasa as the soul of poetry" (ZDMG 56, p. 396). But this is saying too much. The verse on which Jacobi based his statement is not by Udbhāta at all, but by some unknown, and doubtless later, author quoted by Udbhāta's commentator Indurāja.10 What is true, rather, is that Udbhāta was the first of the literary critics to concern himself seriously with the concept of rasa. He was not prepared, however, to make it the chief goal of poetry, as Ānanda was to do.

The only book of Udbhāta's that we possess in readable form is the Kāvyālankārasārasaṅgraha, "A Compendium of the Most Important

9 The older poeticians had been aware of rasa, but had not shown what I should call much interest in the subject. Both Bhāmaha and Dandin relegated examples of it to the rasādī figures of speech (rasavadalankāra, preyō'lankāra, ṛjapśvin), figures where they found the emotions (bhāvas) to be strongly or strikingly expressed.

10 The verse runs:

rasādyadhisthitam kāvyam jīvadrūpatayā yatah / kathyate tad rasādānām kāvyātmaktvam vyavasthitam || It occurs in Indurāja's commentary on Udbhāta's definition of kāvyahetu (6.7; in the numeration of the Viṇīt 6.14). That it is not by Udbhāta is clearly indicated by the words with which Indurāja introduces it: tad dūḥa. The error in identification originated with Col. Jacob, JAOS 1897, p. 847, and has been corrected by P. V. Kane, HSP, p. 128.
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Figures of Speech in Poetry.” This little work furnishes definitions of forty-one figures, which are then illustrated in verses narrating the story of the Kumārasambhava up to the point reached by Kālidāsa in the fifth canto of his poem on the same subject. Many of the definitions are the same as those of Bhāmaha. But we should not let that fact obscure Udbhata’s innovations. In the definition of the very first figure of sense, rūpaka (1.11 Indurāja, 1.21 Viṃti), we meet with a distinction that was new to Sanskrit poetics and that was destined ultimately to transform the analysis of all the figures. This is the distinction between the furnishing of a meaning srutya, that is, explicitly, and furnishing it arthena, that is, by the power of the contextual facts, or implicitly. The same distinction appears in the analysis of simile (1.16 Indurāja, 1.33 Viṃti). Thus rūpaka (metaphor)\textsuperscript{11} differs from simile by the fact that the similarity between the superimposed object and its real base is always given arthena, is “understood” from context, whereas in simile it is given by sruti, that is, usually by an explicit word (e.g., iva, yathā = “like,” “as”) expressing the fact that the similarity is shared.

This concern with the implications of words appears in many of Udbhata’s definitions. In dipaka (zeugma), for example, the paired properties are said to contain or imply a simile. Thus, where a poet writes that “the doom of autumn carried off the beauty of the kadamba flowers and all the joy of damsels separated from their lovers,” he is suggesting an implicit similarity between the beauty of the flowers and the joy of the damsels. To follow the concern for the implied or suggested sense through the whole of Udbhata’s book would require a more detailed exposition than is justified in this Introduction. It appears in his definitions of paryāyokta, aprastutapraśamśā, sandeha, and elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{11} Rūpaka is not what a Greek would have called metaphor, but that translation has come to be used by every Sanskritist. Rūpaka is actually a simile in which the particle of assimilation has been omitted, e.g., “her moon face, her cherry lip.” In a Greek metaphor the object as well as the particle is missing: “her stars shone upon my face,” meaning that her eyes looked at me. The distinction is noted by Gero Jenner, Die poetische Figuren der Inder, p. 68, Ludwig Apfel Verlag, Hamburg, 1968.
Pratihāra Indurāja, who commented on Udbhata’s book some time after Ānanda’s Dhvanyāloka had become popular, concludes his commentary with a disquisition on why Udbhata had nothing to say of dhvani, “which some connoisseurs [i.e., Ānanda and his followers] consider to be the very life of poetry.” His answer, in brief, is that Udbhata included dhvani in his treatment of the figures of speech. The answer is not strictly true but it points the way to an important truth. Udbhata nowhere uses the word dhvani. He speaks of a meaning’s being understood (pratīyamāna), or implied (gamyate), or of its being included (antargata) in another meaning, but he avoids using the more technical terms vyāyate or dhvanyate for “is suggested.” His avoidance cannot have been because he did not know the use of the words in this sense, for his contemporary Manorathā laughs at critics of the time “who will tell you with delight that a poem is full of dhvani but cannot tell you just what this dhvani is” (Dhv. 1.1c A). Perhaps Udbhata wished to distance himself from the new enthusiasts and to keep as far as possible to the old terminology of criticism. But Indurāja’s remark is justified to this extent: Udbhata was fully aware of that type of semantic operation that Ānanda was later to call suggestiveness (vyāñjakatva, dhvani) and of the importance to poetry of the suggestions which it could bring about. One might fairly say that in Udbhata’s mind the two main building blocks of Ānanda’s critique, rasa and dhvani, were present, the first consciously, the second perhaps only subconsciously. But the blocks had not yet been built into a system.

It is said that in his old age King Jayāpīḍa became ruthless in the exaction of taxes, oppressing both his peasants and the brahmins. He died after ruling for thirty-one years and was succeeded by a number of worthless descendants. For nearly fifty years Kashmir fell back into its habitual state of misrule. Then in A.D. 855/856 a strong-willed minister set up a young man of a collateral line, Avantivarman, who was to rule for nearly three decades. King Avantivarman was descended from Ut-
pala, an uncle of Jayāpīḍa’s daughter-in-law, whence the new dynasty has come to be known as the Utpala Dynasty. Avantivarman and his minister Śūra brought the treasury back to solvency. They installed major works of drainage and irrigation. Once more the king became resplendent through the poets who graced his court. Kalhana gives us the names of four of them (Rāj. T. 5.34): Muktākana, Śivasvāmin,
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Ãnandavardhana, and Ratnäkara. The works of Muktâkana are lost. Of Śivasvämin we possess a Buddhist kāvya, the Kapphinābhyudaya. Of Ratnäkara we have the longest of all classical kāvyas, the Haravijaya, and a small collection of clever verses, the Vakroktipaṅcāstika. Of Ãnandavardhana it is now time to speak.

Of Ãnandavardhana’s life, beyond the fact that he was patronized by King Avantivarman, we know nothing except what can be inferred from his two extant works and their colophons. From these it appears that he was the son of Nona (Devisataka 101) and that he bore the title Rājānaka (Dhv. 4 Conclusion A and note 3). Nothing is known of Nona. The title denotes no political position and probably implies no more than that he was given a stipend by the king.

Ãnanda was the author of many books. In the Dhvanyāloka he refers to two earlier works, which are now lost: the Arjunacarita, “The Adventures of Arjuna”; and the Viṣamabāṇalilā, “The Sports of the Bowman Love.” The first of these was evidently a Sanskrit mahākāvya. Ānanda tells us (3.10-14 e A) that he altered the traditional account of Arjuna’s life so as to include new material of his own invention on Arjuna’s adventures in the underworld. Abhinava quotes one stanza (3.25 L) of the poem, written in an unpleasing meter of unrelieved iambics, but it would be unfair to judge the work as a whole from one accidental quotation.

Of the Viṣamabāṇalilā we can say somewhat more. We are given four quotations from it and several remarks about its subject matter. The quotations show that it was written in Māhārāṣṭrī Prakrit. It may have been in the form of a play (or a narrative work would be possible), for 3.15 A refers to “the scene where the God of Love meets with his friends [Youth and Springtime] in my Viṣamabāṇalilā.” The purpose of the work, however, was to give instruction in poetry. In speaking of the variety which may be achieved by handling an insentient object as if it were sentient, Ānanda remarks, “This is a well-known procedure of great poets and has been described in detail for the instruction of poets in the Viṣamabāṇalilā” (4.7 A). I believe we can be more specific. The quotations which we have from the work exhibit various types of suggestiveness. The stanza at 2.1 b A exemplifies arthāntarasankramitavācyadhvani; that at 2.27 b A is of alankāradhvani. Concerning the verse quoted by Abhinava there may be some question as to the precise type of dhvani intended (see 3.15 L and notes), but it is certainly dhvani that is being illustrated. I would say, then, that the Viṣamabāṇalilā was Ānanda’s first work propounding the new doctrine of suggestiveness, in a play or narrative written quite appropriately in
Prakrit, for Prakrit was the language in which this style of suggestive-ness first became popular and it may well have been from Prakrit that Ānanda's interest in dhvani was first stimulated. The work was most certainly not an anthology, as Sten Konow once suggested.13 Ānanda also wrote on philosophy. Abhinava twice refers (1.4 b L and 4.5 L) to a work of Ānanda's called the Tattvāloka, which from the context of the references seems to have dealt with both metaphysics and literature. Again, Ānanda himself speaks of his intention to write a book which would examine the doctrines of the Buddhists (3.47 A). Commenting on this passage, Abhinava tells us that the book to which Ānanda refers was his Dharmottarīvīrti, an "explanation" of Dharmottara's commentary (tīkā) on the Pramāṇaviniścaya of Dharmakīrti. Although the underlying texts here of Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara are preserved, at least in Tibetan translations (see 3.47 L, note 6), Ānanda's Vīrti, like the Tattvāloka, seems to be irretrievably lost.15 It is perhaps natural that Ānanda should have chosen Dharmottara as representative of the Buddhist viewpoint, for Dharmottara had taught his doctrine in Kashmir under the recent reign of King Jayāpīḍa. But it is unusual for a devout Hindu to have written on such abstruse points of Buddhist epistemology and metaphysics as Ānanda must have found in the Pramāṇaviniścayadharmottari.

Ānanda was indeed a devout Hindu, as appears from the stanza quoted at 3.43 b A and from the Deviśataka, a poem that has been published in the KM Series (ninth guchchaka). The poem consists of 103 trick stanzas (yamakas and citrabandhas) in praise of the mother goddess. It culminates in a sort of crossword puzzle, a great wheel, the spokes of which are formed by sixteen stanzas, the outer rim by four other stanzas the syllables of which interlock with the spokes. The secret of the puzzle lies in an "inner rim" which gives the message: "The son of Noṇa has thus performed his worship of the Goddess under the
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title of 'The Goddess's Century,' as instructed in a dream, a worship unsurpassed by reason of her having been the instructress."

For suggestions as to why Ānanda chose to write this citrakāvya in praise of the Goddess when he casts such scorn on this type of composition in the Dhvanyāloka, I refer the reader to my forthcoming essay on the Deviśataka in the Ernest Bender felicitation volume. I shall here remark only on the fact that the yamakas of the poem are musical and the citrabandhas extremely clever. If one may speak of better or worse citrakāvyas, the Deviśataka must rank with the better.

In the Vṛtti of the Dhvanyāloka Ānanda proves himself one of the great prose stylists of Sanskrit literature. No matter how delicate or complex the subject, he is always clear. He varies his expression, so that no matter how often he comes back to the importance of rasa and dhvani he seems never to repeat himself or become tedious, while the rhythm of his sentences gives constant delight. In comparison with his prose, his verses for the most part are disappointing. They go against his own advice by being too consciously clever. But I make exception of the noble stanza which he gives us at 3.43 b A. I should like to think that it represents his view of his life and of his life's work.

I am weary from much painting of the world,
for although I used the new and wondrous sight of poets
which busies itself in giving taste to feeling
and used the insight of philosophers
which shows us objects as they really are,
I never found, O God recumbent on the Ocean,
a joy like that which comes from love of Thee.

It is for the content of the so-called Dhvanyāloka, however, rather than as a poet or a master of prose style, that Ānanda has become famous. As regards the original title of his great work, one should note that none of the manuscripts gives it the name of Dhvanyāloka.16 The colophons of the manuscripts refer to it usually as Sahādayāloka, "A Light for Connoisseurs"; sometimes as Sahādayāḥdayāloka, "A Light for the Hearts of Connoisseurs"; and rarely as Kāvyāloka, "A Light on Poetry." The oldest commentator on the text whose work has survived, Abhinavagupta, refers to his commentary as the Sahādayālokayālocana, "An Eye for the Sahādayāloka,"17 and this is the title found in the colophons of the first three chapters of his commentary in the printed

17 The references are noted by Kane HSP, p. 170, note 1.
editions. The colophon of the fourth chapter, which derives from a separate manuscript tradition, gives the name of the work as Kāvyāloka. In the absence of a critical edition of Ānanda's great work the colophon readings may not be decisive, but the weight of Abhinava's testimony when added to their evidence seems to clinch the matter. The name which Ānanda gave to his work, I believe, was Sahrdayāloka.

The Sahrdayāloka, then, to give it that title, opens with a spirited defense of suggestion as an independent semantic power. As I have indicated, the subject of suggestion was not a new one. It had occupied the thoughts of Udbhāta. The term dhvani that Ānanda uses had been laughed at by Manoratha. An important stimulus to discussion, it seems to me, must have been the Prakrit literature which formed an important part of Kashmiri critical studies. The first five quotations in Ānanda's opening defense are all taken from Prakrit. The reason is not far to seek. If we look at the verses of the Sattasai, we see that it is suggestion upon which the effect of almost every stanza depends. The gāthā stanza, in which they are written, is so brief a poetic form that it could scarcely attain a powerful effect by any other means. Such verses lend themselves naturally to the thesis which Ānanda set out to defend.

To understand the argument we must cast a brief glance at the traditional Indian theories of meaning into which the new doctrine was introduced. These theories had been developed over a long period of time by the grammarians and the ritualists (Mīmāṃsakas). The Buddhists too, in the writings of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, had had their say. It was generally agreed that words had two sorts of semantic power: the power of direct denotation (abhidhā) and a secondary power of indirect indication (gunavruttī, bhakti, upacāra, laksanā). By denotation, a particular group of phonemes in a particular order, say g-au-h ("ox"), denotes an animal with horns, hump and tail. But when one says gaur vāhikah, "the Punjabi is an ox," meaning that the man is stupid, it is the secondary power that is working in the word. The secondary power may be elicited by a common property of two objects, as in the example just quoted, or it may be elicited by some other relation; for example that of possessor with the thing possessed, as in

19 Krishnamoorthy's edition is helpful, for he gives the variants of a South Indian MS from Moodabidre as well as of the NSP MSS and occasionally of other MSS from the BORI. But there exist many manuscripts about which he is silent.
30 For the distinctive uses of the Sanskrit terms see 1.1 K. note 2.
nagaram praviṣanti kuntāḥ, "the spears enter the city;"
meant is spearmen.\textsuperscript{21}

In addition to these two powers, the school of ritualists founded by Kumārila held that there existed a third power which furnished a "final meaning" to the sentence as a whole. They called this the tātparyāsakti, and defended its reality against their opponents, the Prābhākara ritualists, who claimed that the denotative force in each word kept on operating until at the conclusion of the sentence it worked automatically in harmony with the other words.

These three powers left no room for what Ānanda considered to be of all semantic powers the most valuable for poetic expression, a power which in its most general aspect he calls vyanjakatva, the power of suggestion, or, more literally, the power of revelation (as of a lamp which reveals the objects upon which it casts its light). He calls this power dhvani when it is in its purest form, that is, when it predominates over the other semantic powers in the sentence. He begins the proof of its existence by a number of humorous examples. The suggestion may be of an act that is the very opposite of what is denoted. One of his examples is this (1.4c A):

Mother-in-law sleeps here, I there;
look, traveler, while it is light.
For at night when you cannot see,
you must not fall into my bed.

What is denoted here is a prohibition. There is obviously no secondary operation of metaphor or the like in the stanza. The tātparyāsakti, if such there be, merely conveys the syntax of the sentence. The syntax is still impeccable if we take the statement as a prohibition. And yet we know, as the traveler must have known, that the prohibition is unintended and that the woman speaking is inviting him to sleep with her.

By the use of examples Ānanda builds up a typology of suggestion. The type to which the example just given belongs he calls avivakṣitä-vācyā, suggestion "where the denoted sense is unintended." The type has two varieties. In the variety just exemplified the denoted sense is atyantatiraskṛta, "entirely set aside." The second variety is where the

\textsuperscript{21} In a rough way one may say that a secondary meaning in Sanskrit corresponds to the Greco-Latin "trope"; but only in a rough way, because several of the traditional Greco-Latin tropes (e.g., hyperbole, allegory) are treated by the Sanskrit poeticians as figures of speech.
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denotation is not wholly abandoned but is "shifted to something else" (artha\ntara\nsa\n\nkramita). When we say, "The spears enter the city," we are using the secondary power (we are using a trope). The literal meaning of "spears," its denoted object, namely, weapons of a specific shape, has been replaced by men carrying spears. But why do we speak in this way? Why do we use such secondary or tropical expressions? Usually, say Ánanda and Abhinava, in order to achieve some suggestion. In the case of the spears entering, one imagines a more compact and injurious force breaking into the city than would be expressed by the literal statement.

The "first of poets," Vālmīki, wrote of the winter:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{The sun has stolen our affection for the moon,} \\
\text{whose circle now is dull with frost} \\
\text{and, like a mirror blinded by one's breath} \\
\text{shines no more.}
\end{align*}
\]

Ánanda quotes this verse (2.1 c A) for its use of the word "blinded" and Abhinava comments both on the secondary usage and the suggestion. The word "blinded," he says, is used in a secondary sense here, because only sentient creatures can be literally blind. The purpose, though, of using this trope is to suggest "numberless properties [of the winter moon] such as uselessness, an exceptional loss of beauty, and so on." A point that is noticed often by both our authors is that suggestion vastly increases the scope of words. The denotation is extremely narrow; the secondary sense includes only things (objects, properties, acts) which are closely related. The suggestion opens up a new world.

So much for suggestion of the first type. In one of its varieties it is poetically useful, but in neither does it yet reveal the ultimate purpose of literature. That revelation lies within a second type of suggestion, which Ánanda calls vivakṣitānyaparavācya, "where the literal sense is intended but only as leading on to something further." This type also Ánanda divides into two varieties, depending on whether or not we are conscious of the succession from the literal to the "something further." Much the more important of the two varieties is that where we are not conscious of any interval between the two senses (asamlaksitakrama), for in this variety the "something other" is a rasa or something closely allied to a rasa; and rasa in the critique of Ánanda is the ultimate aim of literature.

The word rasa in its most literal sense means juice, taste, flavor. In a technical sense the Bh\r\n\textit{S} uses it to express the flavor or mood which
characterizes a play if the author and actors are successful in their work. According to BhNS 6.15 there are eight possible flavors which a play may exhibit: the erotic (śṛṅgāra), the comic (hāsya), the tragic (karuṇa), the furious or cruel (raudra), the heroic (vīra), the fearsome or timorous (bhayānaka), the gruesome or loathsome (bībhatsa), and the wondrous (adbhuta). To these Ānanda adds a ninth, the rasa of peace (śānta). These flavors, as their names indicate, are based on various human emotions, the sthāyibhāvas or “abiding emotions,” as they are called, which are listed in BhNS 6.17. Just how the rasas differ from the emotions was a question much argued in Ānanda’s age and in the following two centuries. Curiously, Ānanda has never a word to say on the subject; and unfortunately most students of the Dhvanyāloka have inconsiderately filled the gap by superimposing Abhinava’s explanation on the text of Ānanda. I propose to come at an answer more cautiously by recalling the words of BhNS and its oldest commentators and then examining Ānanda’s use of the term.

BhNS 6.31 +3 (the famous rasasūtra) tells us that “A rasa is produced by the combining of the determinants (vibhāvas), the consequents (anubhāvas), and the temporary or transient states of mind (vyabhicārinah or vyabhicāribhāvas). These technical terms require explanation. By determinants are meant those factors which make the realization of the emotion and the rasa possible. They are of two sorts, objective (ālambanavibhāva) and stimulative (uddīpanavibhāva). The objective determinants are the objects toward which the emotions are felt. In the erotic flavor they will be the lover and his beloved; in the tragic, the person or persons who suffer; in the loathsome, the object of disgust. The stimulative determinants in the erotic will be such factors as the springtime, gardens, or a bridal chamber; in tragedy, such factors as separation from dear ones, death, or capture. The consequents of the emotions may be regarded by the audience as its symptoms; in

33 They are: sexual desire (rati), laughter (hāsa), grief (soka), anger (krodha), heroic energy (utsāha), fear (bhaya), disgust (jugupsā), and wonder or amazement (vismaya).
32 Vibhāvānuvibhāvanyabhicārīsamyojagād rasanispatiḥ. The commentator Lollata supplied a genitive, sthāyinah, to go with the ablative compound. That is, he interpreted the sūtra to say, “A rasa is produced by the combining of the abiding emotion with the determinants, the consequents, and the transient states of mind.” Later commentators found fault with this interpretation, for they restricted the rasa to the audience. In the case of the audience, the basic emotions cannot be observed without the previous presence of the determinants, etc. But as we shall see, Ānanda did not restrict the rasa in this way.
the erotic flavor, for example, they will include the sidelong glances, smiles, the graceful movements of the limbs. The temporary or transient states of mind are listed as thirty-three in number. Among them are discouragement, apprehension, jealousy, embarrassment, intoxication. Some are appropriate to only one basic emotion, some to several. To them are added eight involuntary states (sättvikabhadāvas), which a good actor, however, was trained to represent at will: perspiration, horripilation, trembling, fainting, and so on.

An example will make these technical terms clearer. Ānanda quotes (4.2 a A) the following stanza from the Amaru collection as an example of the erotic flavor (śṛṅgārarasa):

> Seeing that the attendant had left the bedroom, the young wife rose half upright from the bed and, gazing long upon her husband's face as he lay there feigning sleep, at last took courage and kissed him lightly, only to discover his feint from the rising flesh upon his cheek. When then she hung her head in shame, her dear one seized her, laughing, and kissed her in good earnest.

Here the objective determinants are the husband and his bride. The stimulative determinant is the bedroom in which the lovers find themselves alone. The consequences of the bride's basic emotion are her gazing at her husband's face and kissing him; the consequences of his, the laughter and kisses with which the stanza ends. Meanwhile we have the bride's transient state of shame or embarrassment and the involuntary state evident in the rising flesh on the husband's cheek. It is by the combination of these factors that śṛṅgārarasa, here of the type "love-in-enjoyment" (sambhogāśṛṅgāra), is suggested.

Bhaṭṭa Lollāta, the oldest commentator of the Bhāṣa whose views are known to us,24 said that the rasa was simply an intensified form of the abiding emotion,25 which it assumed after being strengthened by the determinants and similar factors; and this is clearly the sense in which Daṇḍin had taken the term many years earlier.26 Lollāta also stated that the rasa had its place both in the character being portrayed...

24 Tena sthāyy eva vabhāvānubhāvādhāvān upacito rasah
25 Daṇḍin 2.275: yuktottorṣaṁ ca tat trayam, where trayam refers to the three rasādi figures of speech. Again, after giving an example of the figure urījasvin, he explains (2.283): utārūhyo pariṃ koṭīṃ krodho raudrātmātāṁ gatah.
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and in the actor.\textsuperscript{27} The most glaring fault of this interpretation, that it leaves out the audience, was partially addressed by Saṅkuka, the next commentator, who may have lived about Ānanda’s time. He stated that the basic emotion (bhāva), supposed to exist in the character being portrayed, was imitated by the actor for the delight of the audience and was given a different name, namely, rasa, because it was an imitation.\textsuperscript{28} This theory too has its drawbacks, which led to still further theories by Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinava. But those lie beyond the time of Ānanda, and I have shown enough now to take up Ānanda's use of the word.

Ānanda uses the word rasa of a basic emotion that has been heightened,\textsuperscript{29} sometimes from whatever reason, but most specifically from the combination prescribed by BhñŚ. An example of his use of the term in the most general sense is Dhv. 3.26 a A:

The peaceful is indeed apprehended as a rasa. It is characterized by the full development of the happiness that comes from the dying off of desire. As has been said, “The joy of pleasure in the world / and the greater joy of pleasures found in heaven / are not worth a sixteenth of the joy / that comes from the dying of desire” (MBh. 12.186.36).

Here rasa is simply a heightened form of peaceful happiness (sukha). Similarly, “For śrṅgārārasa, as it is regularly the object of the experience of humans and is therefore dear to them, is the most important [of the rasas]” (3.29 A). Here one cannot argue that the regular object of human experience is the aesthetic pleasure of love poetry. What he means is a heightened emotion of sexual love.

Ānanda conceives this rasa to abide in the character invented by the poet or in the poet himself, as well as in the audience. As for the first: “The speaker may be the poet or a character invented by the poet. If the latter, he may be devoid of rasa and bhāva, or he may be possessed of rasa and bhāva” (3.6 g A). As for the poet himself, it is when he is under such a heightened state of emotion as rasa that he becomes capable of writing the suggestive poetry that will transfer this rasa to his hearers. The process is illustrated by the story of the first poet, Vālmiki,

\textsuperscript{27} Sa cobhayor apy anukārye 'nukartary api.

\textsuperscript{28} Sthāyī bhāvo mukhyarāmādiśthāyyanukaranaṁpi 'nukaranarūpapatvād eva ca nāmāntarenā vyapadiṣṭo rasah; Abh. on BhñŚ 6.31 (Vol. 1, p. 272, two lines from bottom of page; given also by Gnoli, The Aesthetic Experience, p. 4, lines 8-9).

\textsuperscript{29} Even after the time of Ānanda, Indurāja considered a rasa to be simply the basic emotion which had undergone strengthening (Indurāja on Udbhata 4.3-4). The Candrikākāra seems to have held this same view; see 3.4 a L. note 4.
who was so saddened by the wailing of the curlew bird who had lost its mate that Vālmīki’s grief (śoka, the basic emotion) was transformed into the tragic rasa of the Rāmāyana (Dhv. 1.5 K and A). The notion of Abhinava that Vālmīki ruminated on the determinants and consequents of the bird’s bereavement and so developed his rasa in the scriptural way strikes me as an addition quite foreign to the view of Ānanda.

In most cases, of course, Ānanda’s rasa is indeed produced in the scriptural way by the poetic use of determinants and consequents. The examples of this use, as in the verse of Amaru quoted above, are legion throughout the book. I wish to emphasize, however, that Ānanda’s sense of rasa has none of the aesthetic removal, the impersonality and generalization, which we shall see Abhinava give to the term.

Ānanda was the first Indian critic to state that a rasa cannot be directly expressed. If we say, “A young man and his bride were very much in love,” we give the hearer no flavor at all of what the love was like. This can be done only by suggestion. Accordingly, rasa is as important in poetry and literary prose as it is in plays, for there is no other way of enlisting the sympathy of the reader. By suggestion the rasa arises without any conscious realization that our experience has been preceded by a perception of the determinants, consequents, and transitory states of mind. These have been denoted literally and are not unintended by the author. They are intended, however, only as being productive of the rasa.

I shall not describe in this Introduction the second variety of vivakṣītānyaparāvācyā, the variety where we are forced to think about the literal sense for a moment before we perceive the suggestion and are therefore conscious of the interval between the literal and the suggested sense. The reader may examine that variety with all its subvarieties in the translation which follows (2.20ff.). Here I wish to speak of matters more strictly pertinent to my purpose.

Ānanda tells us that dhvani, that is, suggestion, or more specifically suggestion acting as the primary sense of a passage, is the soul of poetry (1.1 K). But that is only half the story, for his critique is one which explains the goal of poetry to be rasa, and dhvani to be its means. Now the concept of rasa, it seems to me, is more important than that of dhvani in furnishing a criterion of beauty. For not all dhvani leads to rasa, nor does all dhvani lead to beauty. Only the most ardent enthusiast will find beauty in the punning suggestions of the verses quoted under 2.21f.
of a workable critique of beauty in literature that Ānanda merits the fame which has long been accorded him. The works of previous poeticians in India, although of interest for their analysis of language, are almost useless for this, the chief goal of literary criticism. One might write a poem embodying all the figures of speech listed by Bhāmaha and Dandin and compose it in a style calculated by its phonemic and word-joining form to produce sweetness or strength. With a modest amount of care in syntax one could add clarity. All this would not ensure the poem's being beautiful, delighting its hearers. Indeed, if one followed the definitions too closely, the composition would more likely bore them. One gets to the reader only through the flavors deriving from the basic emotions. To do that, suggestion is necessary, but the test lies in the flavor.

It might be thought that for purposes of furnishing a criterion of beauty or of literary excellence the achieving of a rasa suffers from a touch of the vagueness and lack of precision of which we complained in speaking of the "qualities" of poetry. On what basis is one to say that one verse achieves rasa and another does not? Of course the final test will be the judgment of the heart. But to help the reader and the composer—for Ānanda always writes with both types of student in mind—he speaks of several supplemental tests.

The literary piece must exhibit appropriateness (aucitya). To begin with, the plot must be appropriate to the emotions, the determinants, and the consequents which are to produce the intended rasa. In exhibiting the heroism of a human king, for example, one should not engage him in adventures that could be accomplished only by a god (3.10-14 A). If a plot as given in the epics and Purāṇas contains a trait that is inappropriate to the character of the hero or to the intended rasa, one must either omit it or add some element to the plot to achieve the needed appropriateness (3.10-14e A). In this regard Ānanda cites Kālidāsa as an example to be followed. His reference is in general terms only, but we might supply such a specific instance as the Śākuntala, where in the epic prototype the king abandons with needless cruelty the heroine whom he has seduced.1 Such action would be inappropriate to

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1 In the Critical Edition of the MBh., after being forced by a voice from heaven to recognize his son, the king says to Śākuntalā, "It was to purify you [i.e., to convince my people of your purity] that I did this" (MBh. 1.69.40). The Southern version, however (MBh. 1.627* S), says that he had simply forgotten her.
true love and to the noble character of King Duṣyanta as Kālidāsa conceives it. So Kālidāsa invented the story of the ring of recognition, by losing which Śakuntalā unhappily brings upon the king his involuntary forgetfulness.

All the sandhyāṅgas, the plot-components which are prescribed act by act for a play in the Bhāṣa, are to be employed only insofar as they are consistent with the rasa which the author intends to display. In this regard Ānanda very justly praises the Ratnāvalī and reprehends the Veṇīsamhāra. In the latter play Duryodhana suddenly exhibits amorousness (vīlāsa) in the second act, which is otherwise filled with preparations for war and vengeance, simply because Bharata prescribed vīlāsa as a sandhyāṅga of second acts. As Abhinava puts it, the author should have taken the word vīlāsa in a wider meaning and have depicted in Duryodhana a yearning not for sex but for some goal more appropriate to the spirit of the play.

The concept of appropriateness was further elaborated by later critics of the Kashmir school. Kṣemendra in the generation following Abhinava wrote an entire treatise on the subject. What is characteristic of Ānanda's treatment, and what I would emphasize in taking a view of his work as a whole, is that he always associates his appropriateness closely with rasa. In great literature the words must be appropriate to the plot, the characters, the immediate situation, but they become appropriate only through their enabling these factors to build up to the intended rasa.

Ānanda brings also other, older elements of the critical tradition i a subservience to the same final goal. He redefines the old quality of sweetness and strength by treating them as ornaments of particular rasas. Sweetness is what ornaments śṛṅgāra, whereas strength ornaments the rasa of fury (2.6 A to 2.9 A). Style (saṅghatānā, riti) also is influenced by the rasa, as it is in intimate connection with the qualities, but a sparingness or frequency of compound word structure is no sure guide, in Ānanda's opinion, to the presence or absence of

3 Winternitz and others supposed that Kālidāsa had taken the story of the ring from the Sṛṣṭikhaṇḍa of the Padmapurāṇa. The Sṛṣṭikhaṇḍa occurs only in the Bengali version of the Pad.P. and is a late Vaiṣṇava reworking of an earlier text. The reworking is later even than the Muslim conquest of Benares. The Śakuntalā story occurs in chapters 1–6, which are part of the Vaiṣṇava reworking. They are therefore likely to be a derivative of Kālidāsa's play and are certainly not its source. See Asoke Chatterjee, Padma-Purāṇa: A Study, Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series LVIII (1967), pp. 104 ff., especially p. 114.
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sweetness or strength. Furthermore style is influenced by genre. The single stanza (muktaka) offers less scope for a heavy style than linked stanzas (e.g., the kulaka). The heavily ornamented compound style is especially appropriate to the prose romance (3.8).

Ānanda’s critique with its emphasis on rasa offers for the first time a criterion for the figures of speech. A figure of speech is well constructed when it strengthens the rasa. To do this it must not be overworked. Ānanda quotes a verse (2.18-19e A) which begins, “In anger she has bound him tightly in the noose of her soft arms.” Abhinava remarks that “were one to continue the metaphor furnished by the woman’s creeper-like arms acting as a noose for binding, the woman would become a huntress, the bedroom would become a prison or cage, and so on, all of which would be most inappropriate.” In general, figures should never be so elaborate as to take either the poet’s mind or the reader’s mind off the main goal, which is rasa. As Horace would say, there should be no purple patches.

In several passages (e.g., 2.3ff. and 3.34ff.) Ānanda distinguishes between dhvani, as a suggestion which furnishes the predominant meaning of a sentence, and a subordinated form of suggestion which he calls gunibhūtavyaṅgya. Among his examples of the latter type is a stanza which he quotes twice (at 3.34 A and 1.13 e A).

The sunset is flushed with red; the day goes ever before. 
Ah, such is the way of fate that never the two shall meet.

As the Sanskrit word for sunset is feminine (sandhyā) and the word for day masculine (divasah), the suggestion arises of two lovers prevented by adverse fate from ever joining. But the stanza is obviously from a description of sunset. The literal sense remains predominant. The suggestion functions as a figure of speech.3

This distinction has often been misunderstood by modern Sanskrit scholars and among them by some of the best. Jacobi, in the introduction to his admirable translation of the Dhvanyāloka (ZDMG 56 [1902], p. 400), speaks of the poetry of subordinated suggestion as “eine Poesie zweiter Güte,” a phrase repeated by Winternitz twenty years later.4 S. K. De, in his History of Sanskrit Poetics (II, p. 162), uses the same pejorative. “By the side of dhvani kāvya,”5 he writes, “in which the

3 There was argument over whether to call the figure samāsokti or ākṣepa. See notes on the passages where the stanza is quoted.
4 Geschichte der indischen Literatur III, p. 18.
5 A phrase, by the way, which Ānanda nowhere uses.
suggested sense is predominant, we have poetry of second-rate excellence, designated *gunī-bhūta-vyaṇgya kāvyya*, in which the unexpressed plays a subordinate part."

This error should be corrected, for nowhere in the *Dhvanyāloka* does Ānanda characterize the poetry of *gunībhūtavyaṇgya* as second-rate. That characterization appears first in Mammaṭa (1.4–5), who speaks of *madhyamam kāvyam* as opposed to *uttamam*. Mammaṭa threw all cases where the suggestion was obvious (*agūḍha*) or not beautiful (*asunḍara*) into the category of *gunībhūtavyaṇgya*. Ānanda, on the other hand, refers to subordinated suggestion (3.36 b `A`) as having been used by the great poets and states that it can be extremely beautiful and should be studied by sensitive readers. The very examples which he gives of *gunībhūtavyaṇgya* (e.g., at 1.13 d, e, 3.39, 3.40) should inform the reader of his evaluation, for they are among the most beautiful stanzas in the whole book. I shall not quote them here, as the reader, if curious, can look them up in the translation.

What prompted Ānanda to make this distinction between *dhvani* and subordinated suggestion was an historical fact, not an aesthetic judgment. Many cases of suggestion had been preempted by the older poeticians, especially Udbhata, under their definitions of the figures of speech. Thus, according to Udbhata, the figure *samāsokti* (compound statement) occurs where from a description of the object-in-hand (*prastutārtha*), that is, the primary object of the sentence, one understands some other object (Indurāja 2.10; *Vivṛti* 2.21). An example would be the little stanza which I have just quoted, "The sunset is flushed with red." The figure *aprastutaspaṃsā* (reference by means of the extraneous; in some instances equivalent to allegory) occurs where from an extraneous object (*aprastutārtha*) we understand the object that the poet really has in mind (Indurāja 5.8; *Vivṛti* 5.14). Now it was Ānanda's goal to break away from the tradition of figures of speech, to set up suggestion (*dhvani*) as an independent power of words, and to establish the suggested meaning as the soul of poetry. As the Sanskrit term for a figure of speech (*alankāra*) means literally an ornament, Ānanda was also faced with the logical problem of how the soul could act as an ornament. One might conceive of the soul's being ornamented, say by its body or its virtues, but by what sort of logic could a primary element, the thing-to-be-ornamented (*alankārya*), itself act as an ornament?

Ānanda's solution to the problem was to relegate all instances of suggestion which had been included in the figures of speech by the
older critics\textsuperscript{6} to a subordinate position. In that position they could very well serve as ornaments. An example will show the method which he followed and its success in achieving his goal.

There is a famous stanza, written perhaps by Bāṇa but included in the collection of Amaru, which likens the purifying power of God to the fire by which he destroyed the triple citadel of the demons.\textsuperscript{7}

\begin{quote}
The women of the Triple City wept from lotus eyes as Śambhu’s arrow-flame embraced them; but still, though shaken off, the fire caught their hands, though struck, did pluck their garments’ hem, denied, it seized their hair, and, scorned like lover who has lately loved another, lay before their feet. May this same fire burn away your sins.
\end{quote}

In this stanza, as Ānanda remarks, the description of the demon women suggests that unhappy variety of īrṇīgāra which is so close to tragedy, namely love-in-separation, here brought about by jealous anger. But this flavor (īrṇyāvipralambhāśrīnīgārarasa) is not the final aim or meaning of the stanza, which is rather the extraordinary power of God. As the suggested rasa of love is not the final aim, he characterizes it as subordinated suggestion, not dhvani in the strict sense. This subordinated element can logically act as an ornament. Bhāmaha’s definition of rasavadalānākāra is thereby maintained without injury to Ānanda’s new doctrine of dhvani. But there is nothing second-rate about such instances of subordinated suggestion. He calls such instances “derivative of dhvani” (dhvanīniśyanda, 3.36 b A and 3.41–42 b A) and remarks under 3.40 that such instances “may again turn into dhvani when regarded from the viewpoint of [the final] rasa.” In the stanza just quoted one may take the final meaning to be the rasa of God’s heroism or the rasa of the worshiper’s love of God. The historical reasons which prompted Ānanda to make the distinction between predominant and subordinated suggestion are no discovery of mine. They were noticed by both Jacobi and S. K. De.

One final question must be raised and answered concerning Ānanda before I move on to the period of his commentator Abhinava. This is the question whether he was the author of the whole of the Dhvanyāloka or of only a part of it.
The text of the Dhvanyāloka consists of 138 Kārikās, written in simple verses (almost all in sloka or āryā meter) and intended to be memorized. Expatiating on the verses is a prose commentary (Vṛtti), approximately twenty times their length. Within this prose commentary again are some twenty-nine simple verses, indistinguishable in style from the Kārikās, but usually introduced with some such remark as “This is a supportive (parikāra) stanza,” or “Herewith a summarizing (saṅkṣepa, saṅgraha) stanza.” These supportive and summarizing stanzas can also be distinguished from the Kārikās by the fact that the prose Vṛtti never comments on them. In the case of two of them (3.41-42 a A), which are not introduced by the usual remark but by the simple phrase, “it is stated,” Abhinava tells us specifically that the matter is stated by the author of the Vṛtti.

Until the mid-nineteenth century it was always supposed in India that all this material was the work of one man, Ånandavardhana. And this is quite in keeping with the form in which other Sanskrit treatises on literary criticism have been handed down. Kuntaka’s Vakroktijīvita, written in the age of Abhinava, comes to us in precisely the same combination of Kārikās, prose commentary, and supplemental stanzas. Except for the absence of supplemental verses the same is true of the text of Māmāṭa, Ruyyaka, Hemacandra, and Viśvanātha. Not only literary criticism but Sanskrit treatises on most scientific or philosophical subjects tended to be composed in this form. One may instance the works of Bhartrhari the grammarian, Kumārila the ritualist, Dharmakīrti the Buddhist.

Then in the mid-nineteenth century a remark of Georg Bühler suggested that the Kārikās of the Dhvanyāloka might be by an older author and only the Vṛtti by Ånanda. Thirty years later Hermann Jacobi took up the question in earnest. He pointed out that the question of dhvani must have been discussed for many years prior to the time of Ånanda. This follows from the variety of opinions on the subject of dhvani which Kārikā 1.1 ascribes to “others.” So far so good. But

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8 In the Kashi Series text, upon which we have based our translation, the Kārikās come to a total of 142. But three of them (4.4, 4.9, and 4.10) are almost surely not intended as Kārikās but as summary or supportive stanzas, while 3.5 is a quotation from some other author. See notes to the translation of those passages.


10 See especially the i
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Jacobi went on to claim that Abhinava, the oldest commentator that we have on the text, furnishes evidence of a dual authorship.

With the adherence of other Sanskritists to the theory of dual authorship, a vast amount of ink has flowed on the question. It was pointed out that the Abhidhāvrttimātrkā, written in about A.D. 900-925, attributed the doctrine of dhvani to sahrdayāḥ ("connoisseurs," or possibly "the honorable connoisseur"), whereupon one misguided scholar claimed that the name of the author of the Kārikās must have been Sahrdaya. On the other hand, it was established that Rājaśekhara about the same time attributed one of the supplemental ślokas of the Dhvanyāloka to Ānanda and, in a verse preserved in the Śūktimuk-tāvalī (4.78), attributed to Ānanda the whole introduction of dhvani into poetics.

The student who would examine all the arguments which can be adduced for dual authorship should consult Kane’s HSP, pp. 153-190, where that great scholar, like the lawyer that he was, gives a full-dress argument in its favor. Almost all of Kane’s arguments, like those of Jacobi, are based on the remarks of Abhinavagupta, who frequently supplements such a phrase of the Vṛtti as idam pratipāditam (“this has been stated”) by some such addition as vṛttikāreṇa (“by the author of the Vṛtti”) or by asmanmūlagranthakāreṇa (“by the author of the basic text [i.e., of the Kārikās”). From such passages Kane argues that Abhinava regarded the two portions as written by different authors. Against his view, Dr. Satkari Mookerjee (B. C. Law Volumes, I, pp. 179-194), followed by Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy (IHQ 24, pp. 180-194 and 300-311), has argued that Abhinava is merely distinguishing the different functions of one man. To me the arguments on both sides are inconclusive because Abhinava is so inconsistent. There is no doubt that he regarded Ānanda as the author of the Vṛtti. There are passages in the Locana, I admit, where he seems to regard the author of the Kārikās as someone else. But then in his Abhinava-bhāratī (Vol. 2, pp. 299-300) he explicitly ascribes two of the Kārikās of the Dhvanyāloka to Ānanda.11 I am not at all confident that Abhinava had any historical knowledge on the matter. A man who could speak of Manoratha as a contemporary of Ānanda (1.1 c L) and who confuses

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11 Kane tries to explain away this inconsistency by saying that Bhaṭṭatāuta was Abhinava’s teacher in BhNS, whereas Bhaṭṭendurāja was his teacher in Dhu, and that in both cases Abhinava merely followed his teacher’s opinion. But that argument is destructive of Kane’s goal. Bhaṭṭatāuta’s opinion would be more valuable than Abhinava’s and no less valuable than Bhaṭṭendurāja’s.
Abhinanda with his father Jayantabhatta (3.7 L, but cf. note 3) is not to be much trusted in matters of history.

Two considerations persuade me of the single authorship of the Dhvanyāloka. First, there is not a single instance in the Vṛtti of substantial disagreement with the Kārikās. There is not even a case where the Vṛtti interprets a Kārikā in a forced or unnatural manner. This is rarely the case where one Sanskrit critic comments on the work of another. There is much matter and long arguments in the Vṛtti which are not in the Kārikās, it is true. If there were not, there would have been no purpose in writing the Vṛtti. But these matters and arguments are auxiliary. They do not change the basic system.

Second, if some earlier genius had established the system of dhvani and the general critique of literature in terms of dhvani and rasa which is found in the Kārikās, I find it inconceivable that a later author should not have given some praise, some respect, to him. Indeed that he should not even have mentioned his name. Important texts are never treated by the Sanskrit tradition as anonymous. They always carry the name of an author, even if modern scholarship may prove that the name is mistaken or fictitious. If the Kārikās are not by Ānanda, his silence regarding their authorship would be an instance of disrespect to an intellectual master without parallel in Sanskrit literature.¹²

¹² Professor Patwardhan has called my attention to an article by Dr. Senarat Paranavitana, "The Dhvanyāloka in fifteenth century Ceylon," JAOS 94 (1971), pp. 131-133. The article contains the text and translation of a Sanskrit inscription giving a thesis (sthāpana) upheld in debate by a scholar at the court of King Parākramabāhu VI (A.D. 1412-1467) to the effect that the Dhvanikārikās were written by a Buddhist named Dharmanā. The debater's evidence consists in his statement that a manuscript of the Dhvanikārikās in the library of the King of Suvarnadvīpa (Sumatra) bore on its last page the statement "Dharmanā-pandita-viracitam." The debater seems not to have seen this manuscript himself, but to have heard of it from a Rādhākrṣna-pandita, who gave the further information that the first twenty Kārikās of the manuscript were not to be found in copies of the Dhvanikārikās in India. In these verses the author divided semantic powers into arthaiakliś and vyanjanasakti, from the latter of which springs dhvani. The debater argues that Ānandavardhana left out these verses because they were too obviously connected with the tradition by which the Buddha is said to have taught sārthaka and vyanjananātha dharmas. Professor Patwardhan, I think, gives more credence to this thesis than I do. If there was indeed such a manuscript in a royal library of Sumatra, I should think it must have been a Buddhist reworking of the Dhv. verses. The normal meaning of arthato vyanjanato dharmadesāna in Buddhist texts is "the teaching of the letter and spirit of the Law." I much doubt that these terms would have been applied
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Soon after the death of King Avantivarman (A.D. 883) literature seems to have lost its royal patronage in Kashmir. We are told of one learned brahmin, Näyaka,13 who was given charge of a newly erected temple (Rāj. T. 5.159), but the court poets, such as Bhallaṭa (5.204), fared badly. The favorites of the new king Šaṅkaravarman (A.D. 883-902) were men of low birth. Kalhana speaks with scorn of Šaṅkaravarman’s ignorance of Sanskrit, claiming that he spoke “an Apabhramśa dialect worthy of a drunkard” (5.206).

With the death of Šaṅkaravarman things went from bad to worse. The history of Kashmir in the tenth century falls roughly into two parts. The first half saw the breakdown of royal administration and power under the demands of the Tantrin footsoldiers who time and again sold the throne to the highest bidder. Then from about the middle of the century the guidance of political affairs passed into the hands of the terrible Diddā. Diddā was born a Khaṣa princess. Her father held the fortress of Lohara on the main route from Kashmir to the Punjab. On her mother’s side she was descended from the Shahi kings of Und and Kabul. Outliving her royal husband, Diddā governed for some years in the name of her child son, securing her own safety by fomenting discord among the military and political factions. When the son died not long after coming of age, she established a grandson in his place. There were three of these little grandsons whom the unnatural Diddā placed on the throne only to murder each child after his enjoying for a few years the titular sovereignty. Finally, from 980-1003 she assumed the royal title in her own right, governing with the aid of her paramour Tuṅga whom she had elevated from the peasantry. In the end she left a strong kingdom to a nephew whom she had chosen by carefully testing him against other candidates. And so began the Lohara Dynasty with a return of prosperity under two long-reigning kings.

Because of the withdrawal of court patronage, court literature virtually disappears from Kashmir during the tenth century. From this century in Kashmir we have no plays, no Sanskrit lyrics. The only
to the technical study of semantics without a stimulus from non-Buddhist sources. And the total silence of India about Dharmadāsa’s authorship of the work strikes me as strong evidence against the thesis. Kashmiri brahmīns of Ānanda’s time, including Ānanda himself, showed no prejudice against Buddhist authors nor any desire to hide Buddhist ideas.

13 The name and the date suggest an identification with Bhāṭañāyaka, of whom I shall have more to say. But “Nāyaka” was not an uncommon name.
mahākāvya that we have from this period is Abhinanda’s Kādambarī-
kathāsāra, a work which retells in verse what Bāna in a former century
had told better in prose. The traditions of Sanskrit scholarship, how­
ever, were not broken. The brahmīns living in the capital or on their
tax-free grants of land saw that their sons were taught Sanskrit gram­
mar and the traditional Sanskrit sciences, in many cases teaching their
sons themselves. The tradition was especially well maintained in Śaiva
philosophy and literary criticism.

Śaiva philosophy owes its origin in Kashmir to two sages of the ninth
century, Somānanda and Vasugupta. The views of the former were
developed by his son Utpala into the doctrine of recognition (pratya-
abhijnā); those of the latter, with the help of his disciple Kallāta,
into the doctrine of cosmic vibration (spanda). These two branches
of philosophy were preserved during the difficult years of the tenth
century, the former by Utpala’s son Lakṣmanagupta, who became one
of Abhinava’s teachers. The school of vibration had a more checkered
career, for Kallāta’s son, Mukula, seems to have turned away from
philosophy toward literary criticism. His one surviving work, the Abhi-
dhāvrttimātrkā, is concerned with the nature of denotation and the
secondary use of words. His son, Pratīhāra Indurāja, followed in his
steps and wrote a commentary on Udbhata. Meanwhile, the school of
vibration was carried on in the family of a scholar named Bhūtirāja,
who also taught the Krama Tantras and, as an old man one presumes,
taught tantrism to Abhinava. Bhūtirāja’s son, Bhattachīndurāja, also
taught Abhinava in other subjects, notably in the Bhagavadgītā and
the Dhvanyālōka.

Among these brahmīn scholars with their thoughts turned away from
politics to mystic philosophy and literature the Dhvanyālōka was much
studied. The first commentary on the Dhvanyālōka, now lost, was
called the Candrikā. It was written by some member of Abhinava’s
family, to whom Abhinava often refers but never by name. Sometimes
he calls him “the author of the Candrikā” (3.26 b L), sometimes “a

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14 At the end of the ninth century, Abhinanda’s father, Jayantabhaṭṭa, had writ-
ten an admirable work, the Nyāyamanjāri. Jayanta not only gives a lucid account
of the Nyāya system; he writes with style and with the true Kashmiri gift for satire.

15 Bhattachīndurāja, Bhūtirāja’s son and the teacher of Abhinava, must not be con-
fused with Pratīhāra Indurāja, the son of Mukula and the oldest commentator on
Udbhata. See Kane, *HSP*.

16 A brother of this Bhattachīndurāja, it appears, was Helarāja, the well-known
grammarian. It was a learned family indeed.
commentator, an older member of my family” (3.24 a L, 3.40 L). Always his references carry a criticism: “The author of the Candrikā who could easily fail to see an elephant in front of his eyes” (3.33 b L): “A certain commentator now enough of arguing with persons who think themselves wise but whose references are wrong” (3.4 a L). If one glances through all such passages, one will find that the author of the Candrikā usually chose the simple or natural meaning whereas Abhinava gives a more subtle interpretation. In several cases I think the Candrikā came closer to what Ānanda actually meant (e.g., 3.33 b L and 1.1 b L).

Another scholar before Abhinava’s time occupied himself with the Dhvanyāloka but for a different purpose. Bhaṭṭanāyaka’s intention was to demolish the concept of dhvani. He seems to have gone through the book systematically, examining Ānanda’s examples, showing how each one might be explained without reference to the new concept. Bhaṭṭanāyaka’s work was called the Hṛdayadarpāṇa, and it too is now lost. But Abhinava describes for us, largely in his opponent’s own words, the theory which Bhaṭṭanāyaka hoped to substitute for that which he destroyed. I shall treat of it in dealing with Abhinava’s doctrine of rasa. for Abhinava, although he vigorously opposed Bhaṭṭanāyaka, borrowed from him not a little.

Abhinavagupta was born about the middle of the tenth century into a learned family that descended from a brahmin named Atrigupta, who had been brought to Kashmir from Kanauj by King Lalitāditya after his conquest of that city.17 The king had given him a dwelling place in his capital of Pravarapura (the modern Srinagar) on the bank of the Jhelum river facing the Śaiva temple of Sitāmsūrām.18 From his loving description of its environs one infers that Abhinava had lived in that ancestral mansion at least as a child. His father, whose proper name was Narasimha, but who was popularly known as Cukhalaka, was an ardent devotee of Śiva.19 Becoming a vairāgin by strenuous asceticism, he overcame the miseries of worldly existence. Before departing from the world, however, he introduced Abhinava, and presumably his younger brother also, to Sanskrit grammar. The brother, Manoratha, was to be the first of Abhinava’s disciples.20
The number of Abhinava's works is large. Even the preserved works very nearly fill a half shelf in my library. To these must be added a considerable number of lost works, of which we know the title or subject matter from references in the works which are preserved. As a complete bibliography is available in V. Raghavan's Catalogus Catalogorum, and as details on the subject matter of most of the works may be found in Pandey's Abhinavaagupta, I shall give only an outline.

In general Abhinava's oeuvre falls into three parts. (1) Commentaries on the Tantras and surveys of their doctrines. The greatest of these works is the huge Tanträloka, published in twelve volumes in the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, and the summary, Tantrasâra, published in the same series and now available in an Italian translation by Raniero Gnoli.\(^{21}\) (2) Works on literary criticism. The first of these was a commentary on the Kāvyakautuka of his teacher Bhāṭṭatauta. Both it and the work on which it commented are known only from references and quotations,\(^{22}\) chiefly from the Locana and the Abhinava-bhāratī. The Locana\(^{23}\) must have come second, for Abhinava refers to it in the Abhinavabhāratī. The latter work is Abhinava's commentary on the Bhāṣa. An almost complete, though sadly corrupt, text of the ABh. is now available in the GOS.\(^{24}\) (3) Commentaries of the Recognition (pratyabhijñā) School of philosophy. There are three of these. On Somānanda's Parātrimsikāvīrti (the Parātrimsikā, or verses on the ultimate, form the final portion of the Rudrayamalatantra), Abhinava wrote the Parātrimsikātattvavivaraṇa, or Anuttaratrimsikāvīrti (KSTS 7, 18). On Utpala's Īśvarapratyabhijñāsūtra he wrote the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti (KSTS 7, 18). On Utpala's Īśvarapratiyabhijñātikā he wrote the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarṣini, called also "the Great Commentary" (brhatī vimarṣini), KSTS 60 and 62.

\(^{22}\) Gathered by P. V. Kane. HSP, pp. 209-212.
\(^{23}\) The Locana has been printed several times. We have used the Kashi text as the basis for our translation. Although it is marred by numerous misprints it carries the valuable Bāliopriyā commentary, which supplements the still more valuable Kaumudi, available only on Chapter One. For particulars of these texts see Abbreviations and Works Cited.
\(^{24}\) One should use the second edition of the first volume, as it contains numerous improvements in the text. Four chapters (6, 7, 18, 19) have also been edited by R. P. Kangle with a Marathi translation and commentary. His emendations of the text will be useful even to those who cannot read Marathi.
In addition to writings on these three subjects Abhinava was the author of numerous religious verses (stotras); of the Paramárthasára, a Śaiva reworking of a Vaisnava text; of the Bhagavadgítárthasaṅgraha, a brief collection of notes on important passages of the Bhagavadgítā; and of a commentary on the Ghaṭakarpura.

The order in which Abhinava wrote these works is not quite certain. He gives the dates of completion of only three of them. The Kṣemastotra was completed in A.D. 990, the Bhairavastotra in 992, and the Īśvarapratyabhijñāviniṁśītivimāsinī in 1014. K. C. Pandey in his monograph on Abhinavagupta believed that a period of Tantric studies in Abhinava’s youth was followed by his work on literary criticism and this in turn by a final period of concern with Pratyabhijñā philosophy. The linchpin of his belief was a reference in the Locana which he believed was to the Tantrāloka. But this linchpin has now broken. The reference exists only in the false reading of the NS edition (p. 19) of that work. Furthermore, the hypothesis does not agree with the general order of Abhinava’s intellectual interests which seems to be given in the biographical information at the end of the Tantrāloka:

[The author] was introduced into the forest of grammar by his father, had his mind clarified by a few drops of the sea of logic, and, when intent on enjoying the full rasa of literature, was seized with an intoxicating devotion to Śiva. Being wholly filled with that, he no longer cared for any worldly pursuit, until, in order to increase his enjoyment of that devotion, he went to serve in the houses of [religious] masters. (Tantrāloka 37.58-59)

There follow the names of a great many of his teachers, among which is the name Bhūtirājatanaya, “the son of Bhūtirāja,” that is to say, Bhattendurāja, Abhinava’s master in the Dvānyāloka, as also the name of Laksmanagupta, his teacher in Pratyabhijñā philosophy. The

25 The false reading is as follows: taduttirnāte tu sarvam paramesvarādāvayam brahmety aṣamacchāstraṇusārena vaiditam tantrālokagraṇtham vicāraya. The correct reading, given by the Kashi edition, p. 67, carries a very different meaning: taduttirnāte tu sarvam brahmety aṣamacchāstra-kāreṇa na na vaiditam tattvāloka-grantham vicāraya. Thus the reference is to a work of Ānanda called the Tattva-loka, not to the Tantrāloka of Abhinava. The Kashi reading is substantiated by Abhinava’s later reference to this Tattvāloka under Chapter 4, Kārikā 5 of the Locana (Kashi edition p. 533, line 5 of Locana): etac ca granthakāreṇa tattvāloke vityoktam.
26 Laksmanagupta is also praised in TA 1.11.
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Tantrāloka and Tantrasāra should therefore be placed among the last of his works. His initiation into Kaula tantrism by Śambhuṇātha and his dūtī Bhāgavati (see TA 1.13 and commentary) seems to have given the final spiritual increment to his life. By it he became a siddha and there was nothing more to learn.

Whether the literary studies followed or, as I should think, preceded the works on the philosophy of recognition, is not certain. In the Locana he quotes one verse of Utpala's Īśvarapratyabhijnā (see 1.8 L and note 3), but this proves only that he was acquainted with the works of Utpala at that time, not that he had already commented on them. In the Locana he comments on a verse from the Gītā (Bh.G. 2.69), giving much the same interpretation as that given in his Bhagavadgītārtha-saṅgraha (see Dhv. 3.1 b L and note 3). This likewise does not prove that he had already written that work.

It would take more space than I propose to allow myself and more knowledge than I possess to give an account of Abhinava's entire contribution to Indian thought. What I shall have to say in the following pages is limited to the contribution furnished by the Locana.

Abhinava chose the title Locana for his commentary on the Sahrdayālōka (Dhvanyālōka) because he intended it to serve as an “eye” by which one could see the “light for connoisseurs” which Ānanda had furnished. If we are to be fair to him, it is by his achievement of that purpose that we must judge him, not by modern standards of historical or philological accuracy, nor even by the criterion of originality.

Like all Sanskrit commentators Abhinava had no interest in history. I have already noticed two of his historical errors. Just how uninterested he was in history appears still more clearly from his comment on the first Kārikā. In order to justify the perfect tense of the verbs there used (tasyābhāvam jagadur aparē, etc.) Abhinava says, “The author had not actually heard the alternative views of those who deny the existence of suggestion. Rather, he will imagine such ideas and then refute them. Hence his use of the perfect tense,” for Pāṇini prescribes the perfect to be used in the Bhāṣā only for that which occurred in the past outside the range of one’s experience. Abhinava would rather allow his author to have been obtuse than to have committed a grammatical error. Frequently throughout the Locana Abhinava will depart from a natural interpretation of Ānanda’s words in order to save him from some inconsistency (see, for example, 1.13 i or 2.26 A, note 2). He will even exclude an example as being spurious if he believes it has been improperly adduced (see 2.27 a A, note 2 and 2.27 a L).
Introduction

As against such instances which are faults by a standard foreign to the Sanskrit tradition of scholarship, Abhinava exhibits a high degree of skill in those abilities which his own tradition sought to develop. He is an impeccable grammarian, possesses a sound knowledge of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, and has the works of the older poeticians by heart. He uses his formidable education not in order to show off but to give the reader an accurate understanding of Ānanda’s critique. In example after example he points out just where the suggestion lies, the range of its meaning, and often just what it is that gives to it its camatkārti, its sudden effect of delight. For examples see his comments on the stanza “White herons circle against dark clouds” (snigdhasyāmalakāntiliptaviyuṭi, 2.1a), “Why do you laugh” (kim hāsyena, 2.5b), “Say, happy friend, if all is well” (gopavadhūvilāsasauhrdām, 2.5f). Such careful aesthetic explications de texte had just come into vogue. We find the fashion also in Abhinava’s contemporary Kuntaka. I know of no examples in the older literature. But, once established, it became characteristic of Sanskrit literary criticism and is what gives to that tradition of criticism its great strength. In our Western classical tradition there is nothing to compare with it except pseudo-Longinus.

This careful analysis of Ānanda’s examples leads Abhinava at times to remarkable discoveries. I may here point out just one of these. In 2.9 Ānanda cites two examples of the rasa of fury (raudrarasa), the first composed in the style of long compounds traditionally associated with that rasa, the other in a non-compounded analytical style. The point that Ānanda would make in the passage is that either style may serve the purpose of suggesting fury. He adduces the two stanzas as examples and leaves it to the reader to savor the effect. Abhinava analyses the examples. Both examples are taken from that drama of vengeance, the Veniśamhāru. In the first it is the hero Bhīma who speaks. He vows to crush the thighs of Suyodhana, who had dragged Queen Draupadī through the Kuru assembly. Then he will deck Draupadī’s hair with his “hands new-reddened in that fresh-congealing blood.” The stanza begins with an immense compound: caṇcādbhujabhramitacandagadābhīḥhatasaṅcūrntoruyugalasya suyodhanasya (literally, “of the by-my-whirling-arm-held-brutal-war-club-stroke-crushed-thighed Suyodhana”). After commenting on the suggestions of the stanza, Abhinava remarks, “From the long compound, flowing in an uninterrupted stream and allowing the hearer no pause in all its course, there results an apprehension of the whole scene as a unity up to the representation of the broken-thighed Suyodhana.”
This serves to intensify the impression of Bhīma's violence."

On the other hand, in the second, analytical, stanza adduced by Ānanda, Abhinava sees the effect to lie in a protracted climax. He says, "Here the anger of the speaker rises to the highest pitch by a progression from word to word through meanings which, being presented separately, are reflected upon by the hearer in succession. And so the very absence of compounds acts as a cause of rising excitement." When one reads such verses over after reading Abhinava's comments, one reads them with a new appreciation and with some degree of the excitement and delight that he found in them himself. This is the highest gift that a literary critic can possess in any tradition.

In only one important respect did Abhinava change what he found in Ānanda's text. I refer to the new explanation he gave of rasa and of the psychological process by which it appears in the heart of the reader or the poet, for with Abhinava rasa is sharply excluded from the character invented by the poet or portrayed on the stage by an actor. The experience of Rāma on losing Sītā is the emotion of grief (soka). If the hearer of a poem or play were to experience the same emotion, he would close his book or leave the theater. There must be a qualitative difference between the sthāyibhāva and the rasa to explain how we can relish the tragic or the rasa of fear.

Most of the components of Abhinava's new theory are borrowed, strange to say, from Ānanda's chief critic. Bhaṭṭanāyaka had insisted that we do not perceive rasa as belonging to someone else, for in that case we would remain indifferent. Nor do we perceive it as belonging to ourselves—here Abhinava was to disagree—for the factors which Bharata says are productive of rasa, the determinants, as for example Sītā and the abduction of Sītā, work on Rāma, not on us. Indeed, said Bhaṭṭanāyaka, rasa is not perceived at all, it is simply enjoyed. What happens is that in a great poem a second semantic operation comes into play by which denotation assumes a new dimension. Bhaṭṭanāyaka gave this operation the name of bhāvanā (aesthetic efficacy). He borrowed the term from the technical vocabulary of Mīmāṃsā, where it is used of the efficacy residing in the verb of a Vedic sentence, which explains how that verb can bring an actor to pursue a given aim. By bhāvanā

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29 Some years ago I made the following remarks on this stanza with reference to Abhinava's interpretation in a paper published in The Harvard Advocate (CXV, No. 4, summer 1982, p. 126). "The whole scene is before our eyes as soon as we understand the words at all. We are not allowed to dilute the effect by relishing it bit by bit. It hits the aesthetic sense not like pebbles but like a rock."
the ritualists meant the efficacy of a Vedic command. Bhaṭṭanāyaka then applied the term to poetry as the aesthetic efficacy of a particular combination of determinants and consequents. This aesthetic bhāvanā, he claimed, has the effect of universalizing the determinants and other factors, so that they may bring about or realize a rasa. Upon the realization of the rasa, a third stage of the aesthetic process begins, namely enjoyment (bhoga), which Bhaṭṭanāyaka regarded as springing from a third semantic power, bhogakṛtva (enjoyment-efficacy). We enjoy the rasa in a manner different from our enjoyment of direct experience or of apprehensions derived from memory. This enjoyment takes the form of melting, expansion, and radiance, and is like the bliss that comes from realizing one's identity with the highest Brahman. This is the purpose of poetry. Any instruction that poetry may furnish is incidental.

One should bear in mind that we know of Bhaṭṭanāyaka's theory only through the writings of his opponents, Abhinava and Abhinava's follower Mammata. The questions that arise in one's mind as to the exact nature of bhāvanā and why it should work to the effect claimed for it are ones for which he may have given answers of which we are not told. Abhinava's most telling criticisms are two. First, that the newly extended use of the word bhāvanā refers to nothing other than the suggestion of rasa (rasadhvani) described by Ānanda. Second, that it cannot be that rasa is never perceived. We must perceive it, or we should be unable to discuss it. And granted that this perception may be of a different sort from sense perception, we perceive a rasa as belonging to us.

Beyond these specific criticisms, however, the reader will be struck by how much of his rival's theory Abhinava incorporates into his own. He too excludes the actor and the portrayed character from enjoyment of rasa. What the character experiences is the basic emotion. As for the actor, if he experienced either the emotion or the rasa, he would forget his lines. Then too, although Abhinava holds to Ānanda's term of suggestion or dhvani, he sees in rasadhvani a transforming power that bears a close resemblance to Nāyaka's bhāvanā. The grief, for example, that the observer perceives in the poetic character or the actor, by the observer's ruminating on its determinants and consequents, meets with a response from his heart in which he identifies that grief with the griefs in his own memory. Rasa is not simply the apprehension of another person's mental state. It is rather a supernormal relishing based on
an involved sympathy. By this sympathy, one might say, the reader or audience loses his own grief in the larger dimensions of compassion. Abhinava, like his opponent, sees rasa not as an object to be enjoyed but as the ongoing process of enjoyment itself. He too uses the word "melting" as one of its characteristics (see 1.5 L, note 3). He too is struck by the similarity of rasa to the relishing of the ultimate Brahman (2.4 L). One might say in sum that Abhinava has taken over most of the new ideas of Bhattānāyaka but trimmed them here and there so that they may fit into the terminology and the general view of Ānanda. He even agrees at one point with the statement that enjoyment (he calls it bliss) is the chief goal of poetry, in comparison with which instruction is a far lesser goal (1.1 e L). But later, in Chapter Three (3.10-14 f), he brings this admission into harmony with a more orthodox view by attempting to show that delight and instruction are not different in nature.

Abhinava adds much that is not in Ānanda. He adds arguments against all the opponents of dhvani, not only against Bhattānāyaka but against both schools of Mimāmsā. He gives numerous examples of varieties of dhvani and of subordinated suggestion which Ānanda had passed over. Interesting are his remarks on rasābhāsa, false or improper rasa. According to the tradition going back to BhNS, a love that is not mutual, a love implemented by violence such as Rāvana's love for Sītā, or an adulterous love, is productive only of rasābhāsa. If one guides one's criticism strictly by the words of Bharata (BhNS I, p. 295) such false love should lead to comedy. In fact, says Abhinava, it may lead to comedy only at a time long after our experience. When we hear Rāvana's passionate words in the Rāvanakāvya (alas, now lost) there is no occasion for relishing comedy (2.3 L). This qualification opens up to favorable evaluation much that would have been rejected or reprehended by older standards.

Since Sanskrit criticism has been accused of concentrating too much on the individual verse or stanza, one will take a special interest in Abhinava's tracing of the predominant rasa throughout a whole play, as he does with the Tāpasavatsarāja (3.10-14 g L). His survey should impress the Western reader with the basic difference of movement in Sanskrit works of literature from that in European works. This difference, between a tortuous or cyclical movement, a periodic distancing from and return to the predominant theme, as against the climactic

Abhinava's argument with the Mimāmsā at 1.18 L.
achievement of a final result, is found, I believe, in all the traditional Indian arts. The Indian style is found only rarely in the West, as in the music of César Franck or in Joyce’s Finnegans Wake.

To continue with a listing of interesting or illuminating passages in Abhinava’s commentary would be otiose. The translation is here for the reader to find them on his own. I would sum up my opinion of Abhinava’s work in the Locana by saying that he accomplishes admirably what he set out to do. He expresses Ānanda’s views more logically than Ānanda expressed them; he defends them against those who had opposed them. Under the provocation of Bhaṭṭanāyaka he develops the concept of rasa into something different from what I believe Ānanda envisaged, but the new concept is more consistent than Ānanda’s and was to become, after Mammata’s incorporation of it in his Kāvyapratikāsa, the leading view of rasa in Indian criticism. More than all this, Abhinava’s analysis of Ānanda’s examples will give the sensitive reader a hundred new insights into the beauty of Sanskrit poetry.

There is nothing in our Western classical (Greek and Latin) tradition of criticism that corresponds to rasa and nothing that corresponds to dhvani in the grand dimensions in which Ānanda and Abhinava conceived it. Our classical rhetoricians, all but one of them, chose the path that Bhāmaha and Dandin chose: they included such instances of suggestion as they recognized in the tropes and figures of speech. One man of this tradition, however, the author of the treatise On the Sublime, had an uncanny skill at recognizing passages of literature which excite the reader or, as he put it, drive him to ecstasy. I have noticed that almost every instance of what pseudo-Longinus cites of what he calls “the sublime” in literature, is actually an instance of suggestion.

31 Sanskrit dramaturgy speaks of the achievement of a result (phalayoga), it is true. But the phalayoga, for example in the Tāpasavatsarāja, namely Udayana’s retrieval of Vāsavadattā and acquisition of universal sovereignty, is aesthetically far less important than the recurring manifestations of śringārarasa throughout the play.

32 In the Greek ὄμωσις, the significatio of the Rhetorica ad Herennium and of Quintilian, it is the figure itself that is usually striking. Only under irony and allegory does Greco-Latin rhetoric come to what would qualify with Ānanda as dhvani, and at that only as vastudhvani.

33 Manuscript P of the Περὶ ὑψοῦ, from which apparently all our texts descend, refers to him as “either Dionysios or Longinos.” He appears to have been a Jew and perhaps for that reason had no following among the Greek and Roman rhetoricians. His fame began only with the rediscovery of his work in Renaissance times.
I translate here from just one of his instances, the famous φαίνεται μοι κήνος ἵσας θεοῖσιν:

He seems to me the equal of the gods who sits beside you,
listening to your sweet speech closely

and to your lovely laughter.
which has quickened the heart in my breast.
When I see you, Brochea, my voice leaves me.

my tongue is broken, a thin fire runs over my flesh,
my eyes have no stren
my ears ring.

Longinus, if that was his name, says that the beauty of Sappho's poem comes from its arrangement and that the result is the sublime. Ānanda would have said that the beauty comes from dhvani and that the result is śṛṣṭiśāraasa. If only Longinus had had followers, they might have worked out a critique of literature not unlike that of Ānanda and Abhinava.
TRANSLATION AND NOTES
CHAPTER ONE

A Of Madhu's foe
  incarnate as a lion by his will,
  may the claws, which put the moon to shame
  in purity and shape,
  by cutting off his devotees' distress
  grant you protection.¹

1. In this benedictory verse which introduces his work Ānandavardhana takes as subject an attribute of his chosen divinity (iṣṭodevata) Nṛsimha, the man-lion incarnation of Viṣṇu (Madhu's foe). Viṣṇu became incarnate as a man-lion in order to destroy the demon Hiranyakasipu and thereby remove the distress of the Vaiṣṇava devotee Praḥrāda. For the story, see Bhāg. Pur. 7.2–8. Benedictory verses to Nṛsimha usually take his claws as their subject; see SRK 116, 128, 141. As is appropriate to a verse introducing a work on ‘suggestion (dhvani), the present verse contains numerous instances of dhvani. Abhinava points out one occurrence of rasadhvani, five of vastudhvani, and three of alankāradhvani.

L Victorious is the Muse's double heart,
  the poet and the relisher of art:
  which has created brave new worlds from naught
  and even stones to flowing sap has brought,
  imparting beauty to all within its reach
  by successive flow of genius and of speech.¹

At Bhaṭṭendurāja's lotus feet I heard
all that I know and love of letters;
from that, echoing but a little portion,
I, Abhinavgupta, shall explain
with my own Eye the Light of Poetry.²

43
Although the author of the commentary (vṛttikāra) has himself accomplished his own aim in life by his continuous and perfect devotion to the highest God, in order to achieve a desired purpose, namely, that teachers of his work be unhindered in their explanation and students be unhindered in their audition, he enlists God’s attention to this purpose by publishing an appropriate benediction. “May the claws of the foe of Madhu protect you,” that is, may they protect you teachers and students of this work; for teachers and students are the only appropriate objects of address here and the word “you” implies direct address. To “protect” is to furnish help toward attainment of a desired goal and that help comes about by such means as the opposing of hindrances. Such is the protection that is here meant.

The heroic flavor (vīrarasa) is here suggested by our apprehension of energy (utsāha), an apprehension furnished by the association of God, who is constantly exerting himself [on behalf of mankind], with the characteristics of clarity of purpose and diligent resolve. Again, as claws are weapons and as protection requires a weapon for instrument, the extraordinary power of these claws, which are identical with instruments, is suggested by treating them as agents. Also suggested is the absence of dependence on extraneous instruments on the part of God. The word “Madhuripu” conveys the fact that he is always active in removing whatever is a menace to men.

What sort of Madhuripu (“Madhu’s foe”)? “Incarnate as a lion by his own will,” not because he is subject to his earlier deeds (karma), nor to the will of another; rather, he took the form of a lion in conformity with his entertaining a desire to do so, a desire which is appropriate to the killing of a particular demon.

What sort of claws? Those which “cut off his devotees’ distress.” The power to cut is appropriate to claws and while it is impossible for ordinary claws to cut away mental anguish, it becomes possible in the case of these claws because God’s creations are conformable to his desires. Or [we may take it as follows]: Hiranyakasipu was the thorn of the three worlds, a torment to everyone, and so in reality he himself was pain in concrete form to those who come to God as their sole refuge. When these claws destroyed him, it was the very pain [of God’s devotees] that was rooted out; so this shows how God, even in such a state [i.e., even while engaged in an act of destruction], is still exceptionally compassionate.

Furthermore, the claws by their svaccha, that is, their property of being pure, their purity—for words like svaccha and mrudu in their
primary sense refer to abstract properties—and by their shape, which is curved and lovely, have “shamed,” that is, have distressed, the moon. It is here suggested by a suggestion based on the power of meaning that the moon is new. By the moon’s being afflicted, it is suggested that it appears pale and devoid of charm in the presence of the claws; and it is generally well known that claws can cause pain. But in the case of the man-lion this property of causing pain has been presented in superhuman form [viz., by saying that His claws are pure and lovely although causing pain]. And so, when the new moon looks at the purity and curved shape of these claws, he feels an inner pain [as follows]: “Although I may be equal so far as purity and my curved shape go, these claws are skillful in removing the distress of devotees, whereas I am not.” In this manner the figure of speech known as contrast (vyati-reka) is suggested. “Moreover, in the past I alone was desirable to all people because I was possessed of unequalled clarity and beautiful shape, but now all these ten claws have the same shape as the new moon and in addition to that they are skillful in removing both mental and physical pain and so now people regard them and not me with the respect due to the new moon.” Thinking in this manner, the new moon experiences, as it were, continual torment and so the two figures of speech, fancy (utpreksa) and denial (apahnuti), have been suggested. Thus in this verse the three varieties of suggestion, namely vastudhvanii, alankara-dhvani, and rasadhvani, have been explained by my teacher.

1. The inner glory of literature is here derived from its three characteristic abilities: to create (prathayitum) new worlds; to impart a relish (sârayüum) to even the dullest objects in the actual world, so that they may elicit aesthetic response (rasa); and to render both these areas bright (udbdhasayitum) with a beauty constructed out of the poet’s genius and the words with which he communicates. This much is a fine characterization. What is even finer in my opinion is Abhinava’s realization that the beauty of poetry, or of art in general, depends upon the audience as much as on the artist. One may find echoes of this verse in the benedictions of later critics. Compare, in Mammata’s benedictory verse to his Kâvyaprakâsâ, niyamarahtum with vinâ kâranakalam of our verse, or navarasarucirâm with nijarasabharât sârayati. 2. Here the name of Anandavardhana’s work is given as “The Light of Poetry” (Kâvyâloka). Elsewhere Abhinava refers to it as the Sahrdaysâloka; see Introduction, p. 12. Abhinava gives to his own commentary the title “The Eye,” (locana) and by his words here indicates, according to the Kaumudî, that he will comment on only parts of the text, the parts that are difficult or subject
to doubt. In the fourth line of the verse, janasya is proleptic genitive: I shall explain “to the world.” 3. Abhinava attributes the introductory stanza to the author of the Vṛtti, not the author of the Kārikās. That the two were the same man has been argued in the Introduction, pp. 25–27. 4. BP notes that as Ānandavardhana proposes to show that suggestion is the soul of poetry, his introductory verse might naturally be supposed to contain suggestions; accordingly, Abhinava points out the three types of suggestions which it contains, beginning with the most important type, rasadhvani. For the technical terms rasa, sthāyibhāva, vibhāva, anubhāva, and vyabhicāribhāva, see Introduction. Abhinava here discovers a suggestion of the heroic rasa. Of its components he points out the sthāyibhāva as the utsāha (energy) of Nṛśimha. For utsāha as the sthāyibhāva of vīrārāsa see BhNS 6.67. The ālambana-vibhāva of course is Nṛśimha himself. The vyabhicāribhāvas are given by Abhinava as the god’s asamūmohā (clarity of purpose) and adhyavāsāya (diligent resolve). According to BP, God’s constantly exerting himself (nityodyogitva) is the anubhāva. 5. The point is this. Usually the karana (instrument) and the kārtṛ (agent) are kept distinct and given different case endings. Nakha is usually a karana, the means of accomplishing something, and not a kārtṛ. Now a kārtṛ is the chief of all the kārakas; all other kārakas are dependent (svatantrāh kartā). Therefore by presenting the nakhas themselves as the agent, that is, by placing nakhāḥ in the nominative instead of the instrumental case, the extraordinary power of these claws is suggested. This is an instance of vastudhvani. 6. Dhvanitas ca refers to a second vastudhvani. 7. Tasya sadāva jagattraśa, etc., is the third vastudhvani. Abhinava has used the word uktā here to mean sūcita. Kaumudī, p. 19: vyañjita iti vaktaye satis uktā iti vacanam abhidhāvyāpārcocaravat prakatapratipatitkāvam vyañgārthasya pradarsayat; that is, uktā has been used in order to show that the matter is as clear as if it were conveyed by abhidhāv itself. 8. In the long compound visistadānava— I have taken the word ucita to modify uccāḥ; it might equally well modify parigraha. The point is that the form of a man-lion was required for the slaying of this particular demon, who could not be slain by a god, a man, or an animal. Had Viṣṇu wished to slay another demon, he would have wished for some other form. 9. Tasyām api avasthäyām means that he is compassionate even when he is engaged in the act of killing. This is Abhinava’s interesting explanation of the apparent contradiction in a verse like kṣipto hastāvalagnah (2.5 c A), where it would appear that Śiva is being cruel. Abhinava would argue that he is really acting out of compassion since he is acting for the sake of the world, not for the sake of killing.

10. It is a doctrine of the grammarians that adjectives (like śukla “white”) denote primarily a quality (e.g., śuklatā “whiteness”). Only secondarily do they come to denote a substance qualified by a quality (as in “a white horse”). See Patañjali on Pāṇ. 2.1.30. Accordingly, Abhinava is here analysing the
compound as "pained by their pure-ness and by their own (curved and lovely) shape," rather than taking svaccha to modify svacchāyā. 11. This is another case of vastudhvani. The idea that the moon is new, i.e., at its most beautiful, on the first day of its appearance as a slender crescent, is not conveyed by slesa and so is not an example of suggestion based on the power of a word. It is conveyed by the meaning of the words and so is an instance of arthasaktimuladhvani (suggestion based on the power of meaning). See 2.20 K. 12. This is the first of the three cases of alankāradhvani discovered by Abhinava in the verse. For definitions of vyatireka see Bhāmaha 2.75, Dāṇḍin 2.180, Al. Sarv. p. 101. In vyatireka the upameya (the thing itself) is usually shown to be superior in some respect to the upamāna (the thing to which it is likened); for example, "her face by being spotless puts to shame the moon with its spot." 13. For utpreksā see Bhāmaha 2.91, Dāṇḍin 2.221, Al. Sarv. p. 69. In utpreksā the possibility which one fancies is usually in cold fact an impossibility. It is of course impossible that anything should pain or shame the moon, for the moon is an insentient object. 14. For apahnuti see Bhāmaha 3.21, Dāṇḍin 2.304, Al. Sarv. p. 63. Bhāmaha's example is: "The bee is not buzzing; this is the sound of Love's bow." In Ānanda's verse the suggested apahnuti would take the form: "People deny me the status of new moon and look only on these claws in that way." Note that all these figures in the present stanza are suggested, not directly conveyed. Thus they are examples of alankāradhvani.

§ 1.1 K] Some have said that the soul of poetry, which has been handed down from the past by wise men as "suggestion" (dhvani),¹ does not exist; others, that it is an associated meaning (bhākta);² while some have said that its nature lies outside the scope of speech: of this [suggestion] we shall here state the true nature in order to delight the hearts of sensitive readers.

1. The key word of the book, dhvani, is used in many different senses. Of the senses used by literary critics, as opposed to the grammarians (for whom see 1.13 A and L) Abhinava specifies the following (1.13 L): (a) sadbha: a word which gives rise to a suggestion; (b) artha: a meaning which gives rise to a suggestion; (c) vyāpāraḥ: the operation, the suggesting of the implicit meaning; (d) vyānāyam: the suggested meaning itself; (e) samudāyaḥ: the
group; or a poem which embodies all the above factors. \( K \) and \( A \) restrict the senses of the word to (c), (d), and (e) and, wherever they would be precise, specify that the suggestion involved must be the primary suggestion of the sentence. It is not immediately clear in which sense \( K \) is here using the word. The \( \text{Vṛtti} \) in setting forth the first argument (1.1a \( A \)) seems to take it in sense (c) or (d). In the second argument (1.1b \( A \)) it clearly takes it in sense (e).

2. \( \text{Ānanda} \) uses the word \( \text{bhākta} \) to cover both types of secondary or associated meaning: the metaphorical (which Abhinava calls \( \text{gauna} \)), as in "The boy is a lion," where "lion" takes on secondary sense because of the boy's similarity in some respects to a lion, and the relational (which Abhinava calls \( \text{lāksanīka} \)), as in "Bring in the spears," where "spears" is used for "spearmen" because of some relation other than similarity between the two objects. \( \text{Ānanda} \)'s general words for secondary usage or the secondary operation of a word are \( \text{bhakti} \) and \( \text{gunavṛtti} \). In 3.33 \( \text{h} \) \( \text{Ānanda} \) distinguishes the two types of \( \text{gunavṛtti} \) as \( \text{upacāra} \) (metaphorical) and \( \text{lakṣaṇa} \) (relational). For making this distinction Abhinava prefers the terms \( \text{gauni} \) and \( \text{laksanik} \). He uses the words \( \text{lakṣaṇa} \) often and \( \text{gunavṛtti} \) occasionally in a very general sense for any sort of secondary operation.

\( A \) By wise men, that is, by those who know the essence of poetry named "suggestion" (\( \text{dhvani} \)), which has been handed down from the past through a succession [of wise men], that is to say, has been made fully known far and wide:¹ this [entity], in spite of its being clearly apparent to the hearts of sensitive readers, some have claimed to be non-existent.

The following alternative ideas are possible for those who deny the existence of suggestion.

1. In glossing \( \text{samāmnāta} \), \( A \) takes \( \text{sam} \) to mean \( \text{samyak} \), "fully, thoroughly"; and he takes \( \text{ā} \) to mean \( \text{samantāt} \), "far and wide." One can harmonize this interpretation with the verse at the end of 3.33 \( \text{p} \) \( A \) by supposing that it had been long held by some critics that suggestion was the finest part of poetry but that suggestion had nevertheless been \( \text{aviditasattvah} \), "not precisely understood."

\( L \) [Commentary on the \( \text{Kārikā} \):] Now the author states directly the nature of the subject matter [viz., suggestion, the soul of poetry], making it the predominant element of his sentence. Through a subordinate element of the sentence ["to delight the hearts of sensitive readers"] he states directly the purpose of the purpose of the book [the
The purpose of the book is "knowledge of the nature of dhvani"; the purpose of attaining this purpose is "to delight the hearts of sensitive readers". By implication he shows us the purpose of the book, that purpose being connected [with the second purpose]. Thus he says, "[some have said that] the soul of poetry," etc.

(Commentary on the Vṛtti: In view of the proximity of the term "soul of poetry," the term "wise men" in the verse must be taken in the sense of those who give instruction in the soul of poetry. With this in mind, he explains "wise men" by those who know the essence of poetry. Explaining the meaning of the word "soul" by the word "essence," he shows the prime importance of suggestion and the fact that what it produces lies far beyond the reach of other word-powers [namely, the literal and the secondary].

It may be objected that the word iti refers to the phonetic form of the word dhvani, for the denotandum of the word cannot be the referent as this is still a matter of controversy and has not yet been decided. He explains away this difficulty by the word named. In truth the word dhvani has not been used [in the Kārikā] as a mere name; rather there is a thing called by the name of dhvani and it is the essence of all poetry, for otherwise the wise would not have taken pains to hand down a mere name. Thus he will go on to explain, "in spite of its being clearly apparent to the minds of sensitive readers." But the following is a better explanation. The word iti is used out of normal order. It must refer to the sense of the clause as a whole [and not to the word dhvani alone]. So we should construe the clause as follows: "The thing, namely dhvani, which has been traditionally called the soul of poetry." For if the word iti referred only to the word dhvani, how could we reconcile this with the commentary's speaking of a thing named dhvani? For if that were the case [i.e., if iti governed the word dhvani alone], we should have to understand that "the word dhvani is also the soul of poetry," as when we say, "He says 'ox'." That which has no reality [viz., a mere name] cannot be a matter of controversy. Only when a thing (dharmin) exists [distinct from its name], do its properties become a matter of controversy. But now enough elaborating on an irrelevant topic that will only annoy sensitive readers.

Should only one scholar have made such a statement [viz., that suggestion is the soul of poetry], it is possible that he could have been mistaken, but that is not likely where many have been involved. Accordingly, [the Kārikā] uses the plural: "wise men." [The commentator] expatiates on the matter: through a succession. That is, they have
said this in an unbroken succession, without, however, putting it down in specific books. This is what he means. For many scholars could not teach, with great respect, something that really did not merit such respect. And this they did teach with respect. Therefore [the Kārikā] says “which has been handed down from the past,” for the phrase “from the past” shows that one should not imagine this to be the first mention of dhvani. And [the commentator] explains by saying: this [entity] has been made fully known far and wide.

How can one entertain the thought that an entity which one should strive to understand can be non-existent? What can one say? The sense is that those who deny its existence exhibit an extraordinary stupidity. Also [it is implied by the author of the Kārikā that] he has not actually heard the alternative ideas of those who deny the existence of suggestion; rather he will imagine such ideas and then refute them. Hence [his use of the perfect tense (jagaduh), which implies] absence of direct perception [by the subject of the verb].4 [He could not have used the future tense, as] it is not proper to refute something that is in the future, for the simple reason that it is not yet there. If it be argued that a hypothetical fact can be refuted, we say that its futurity would be abrogated by its being [already] hypothesized. Thus, because these views are imagined to be in the past, because they are beyond the range of direct perception, and because they have not been specifically characterized as belonging to present time, the perfect tense can be used. Accordingly, the alternative views will first be imagined and then refuted. But even in imagining something, it is improper to imagine an implausible thing; one should imagine only a plausible thing. Otherwise there would be no end to the products of imagination and their refutation. And so, in order to give substance to these hypotheses, to be stated presently, he has said in advance that they are possible. Had the term “are hypothesized” (sambhāvyante) been used, there would be tautology [in the use of the optative of hypothesis in what follows]. And what is possible is not only hypothesized here but appears to him clearly as a present reality; hence his use of the present tense [in “they are possible”].

Fearing that someone might object that it is impossible to criticize that which has been predicated by a hypothesis based on something impossible, he says, “ideas” (vikalpaḥ). There is no real thing to which these hypotheses refer; they are merely ideas.5 Furthermore, they might have occurred through an ignorance of the true nature [of poetry]; and
so he uses optative forms like ācaksīran which refer to possibilities and hence amount to a reference to past time [i.e., "they might have said"]. The same usage can be instanced in the following verse:

If what is within the body
had been outside,
people would need take sticks
to drive off dogs and crows.⁶

The meaning is that if the body had been visible in such a way, such [a result] would appear. The sense of past time is here implied. The same in the following [negative condition]:

[But] if it were not thus,
what would be the case?²

The meaning is: what would be the case if there had been no hypothesis as above of [the body's] being [inside out]? Here we have the same [preterite] sense. But now enough of dilating upon an irrelevant topic.

Here in brief are the vikalpas, the alternative ideas, that might be put forward against the concept of dhvani. (1) Words transmit meanings because of the conventions (samaya) which we have assigned to them. Accordingly, there can be no suggested sense over and above the denoted senses [which we have assigned]. Or, (2) granted that there are extra senses, such a sense will be implied by the denotative operation and will be merely an associated sense (bhākta) since it has been drawn into our mind by force of the understood meaning of the word. Or, (3) the suggested sense is not implied in this way, but is impossible to describe, just as the happiness of having a husband cannot be described to virgins who have not experienced it. These are the three main varieties of disagreement [with our doctrine]. But of them, the argument that the suggested sense does not exist may be divided into three sub-arguments. The first of these may be put thus. (a) As it is the qualities (gunas)⁶ and figures of speech (alārikāras) that impart beauty to words and their senses, and as a poem consists of words and senses which are more beautiful than those used in conversation or in scientific works, there can be no source of beauty of which we have not already taken account [in our definitions of the qualities and the figures of speech]. The second is this. (b) Whatever we have not taken into account is not a cause of beauty. [Now the third:] (c) If suggestion is a source of beauty, it must fall under either the qualities or the figures of speech, in which case it shows no great scholarship to give it another name; while if it is not actually included in the qualities or figures.
still it will be only by reference to some minute differentiation that
you give it another name, such differentiation being possible because
of the endless varieties of loveliness in simile. The fact remains that
suggestion is not really outside the area of the qualities and figures of
speech. By giving it a new name what have you accomplished? It is
always possible to imagine a new shade of beauty. For we see that the
ancients, such as the sage Bharata, accepted only two figures of speech,
the yamaka\(^9\) for sound and the simile for meaning. What later writ-
ers on poetics have done is only to show the direction in which these
figures are to be multiplied [by giving independent names to the different
forms of strikingness which they possess]. Suppose a man, familiar
with the grammatical rule karman\(\text{y}\) an (Pāṇ. 3.2.1) and hearing such
examples as kumbhakāra “pot-maker,” were to invent such a word as
nagarakāra “city-maker,” would it not be foolish for him to feel proud
on this account? The same principle applies to the topic under discus-
sion. This then is the third subvariety. And so, the first view having
three subvarieties and being joined to the other two [major views], we
get five alternative views in all. Such is the overall meaning.

1. Abhinava here examines 1.1 \(K\) for information on the anubandhas,
those “pertinent points” concerning a work which commentators on Sanskrit
philosophical texts always try to make clear, for it is by them that an intelli-
gent man will decide whether or not to study the text; see also 1.1 e \(L\), p. 69.
The traditional anubandhas are four: abhidheya, prayojana, sambandha, and
adhikāra. Abhinava finds the abhidheya “the subject to be treated” clearly
expressed in the subject of the sentence, viz., “the soul of poetry called ‘sug-
gestion’.” The prayojana “purpose” of the work, he states, is given only
by implication. It is of course “knowledge of the nature of suggestion,” as
implied by the statement, in a subordinate clause, of the purpose of the
purpose, as this is “connected with the purpose.” We take the reading of
both Chowkhamba and Kashi editions tatsu\(s\)ambaddham prayojana\(m\) ca. The
Kaumudi, wishing to bring in a third anubandha, reads tatsu\(s\)ambandham pra-
yojana\(m\) ca and supposes that sambandha refers to the connection between
the subject and the purpose. One may add to Abhinava’s information that
the adhikāra “the qualification required of the reader” is that he be a “sen-
sitive reader.” 2. The difficulty which Abhinava here discusses arises from
the placement of the word iti in the verse and from the gloss saññīta in the
Vṛtti. The word iti functions like quotation marks in English to shift the
denotandum from thing to word. An ox (gauḥ) is an animal; “ox” (gaur iti)
is a word, beginning with ‘o’ in English and with ‘g’ in Sanskrit. This shi-
ing power (viparyāsakarana) of the word iti is often noticed by the grammarians;
cf. Nyāsa on Kād. 1.1.44 and on 1.1.66. Now if we take 1.1 \(K\) to mean that
wise men have called the soul of poetry "suggestion," but some have said that it does not exist, we are in danger of making the verse say that "some have said that the word 'suggestion' does not exist," which is nonsense. So Abhinava first claims that dhvanir its means more than just the word. Next he gives a better explanation, namely that the word its is out of place. It really goes with kāvyasyātmā, the sense being, "wise men have said, 'dhvani is the soul of poetry.'" A more radical solution of the difficulty would be to change the wording of the verse. Mahimabhaṭṭa suggests changing the first line to read: kāvyasyātmety amalamatbhīr yo dhvanir nāma gītah (Vyaktiviveka, p. 397). This would be in fact a considerable improvement. 3. See Mahābhāṣya 1.1.44, Vṛttī. 3. 4. The perfect tense is to be used for an act in past time which one has not directly perceived (parokṣe iti, Pāṇ. 3.2.115). The remarks which follow are occasioned by Abhinava's desire to reconcile the perfect tense (jagāduḥ) used by the Kārikā with the optative (ācakṣiṇa) about to be used by the author of the Vṛttī (beginning of 1.1 a 4). He claims that the perfect is used in strict accordance with Pāṇini's prescription to refer to past time which has not been directly experienced and he will claim of the optative that it here refers to past time rather than present ("might have said" rather than "might say"). Such an interpretation of the optative is grammatically justifiable, for Kāś. on Pāṇ. 3.3.154 states that in an hypothesis the optative shall take precedence over all other tenses and moods (sarvalakāraṇāṁ apavādah). If the author of the Kārikā actually had heard the criticisms of dhvani, he should have used the form āgadaṇ (imperfect) rather than jagāduḥ. Abhinava is so little interested in the historical data on which the Kārikā and the commentator based their criticism that he is willing for the sake of justifying a grammatical inflection to deny that such data ever existed. And yet later (1.1 c L) he will speak of Manoratha, who ridiculed the concept of dhvani, as having been a contemporary of Ānandavardhana. It seems to me that Abhinava's strict grammatical interpretation of the perfect tense is here quite misguided and that Kārikā and commentary are both referring to views which their author had actually read or heard expressed. 5. If someone says "the flowers that grow in the sky are red," an opponent cannot validly criticise him by saying that the flowers that grow in the sky are not red; but he can criticise the idea as a whole by saying that flowers do not grow in the sky. 6. The verse is a paraphrase of Brh. Ar. Up. 3.9.25. Sanskrit makes no formal distinction between past time and present in conditions expressed by the optative (see note 4 above). So Abhinava is grammatically justified in taking the optative inflection here to refer to past time. He has thus reconciled the tense used by the Kārikā with the mood used by the Vṛttikāra. 7. "Yadi na syāt tataḥ kim syāt" forms another quarter-verse that follows the half-verse just quoted. Abhinava forces the same preterite interpretation upon the condition. The moral of the three quarter-verses taken together, according to BP, is this. If one were to imagine the body's being constructed
inside out, one would be disgusted by the thought of dogs and crows rushing toward such filth. But even without such a repulsive hypothesis "the body remains a disgusting collection useful only for the pursuit of worthless sense enjoyments." 8. See below, 2.6. 9. See below, 2.15 K, note 1.

A Here some might contend¹ that poetry is nothing more than what is embodied in word and meaning.² The means of beautifying this pair that lie in sound, such as alliteration, and those that lie in meaning, such as simile, are well known. Also well known are [those qualities] such as sweetness, which possess certain properties of phoneme and arrangement.³ The vṛttis,⁴ which have been described by some writers under such names as upanāgarikā, and which are not different in function from these [figures and qualities] also have reached our ears. So also the styles (ṛitis) such as the Vaidarbhī.⁵ What is this thing called dhvani that it should differ from these?

1. Abhinava interprets as referring to past time: "some might have contended"; see 1.1 L, note 4. 2. See Bhāmaha 1.16, Dandin 1.10, Vāmana 1.1, and compare the opening of the Raghuvamsa: vāgarthāviva samprktau. 3. I follow the reading of the Kashi Sk. Ser. edition: varnasaṅghatandadharmas ca. Abhinava, the Kaumudi, and Krishnamoorthy's MS MB drop the word varna. My preference is based on the following consideration. The old view of the qualities mādhurya, ojas, etc., was that they were based solely on the choice of certain phonemes (varṇa) and certain degrees of compounding (saṅghatand). Ānanda will insist later in this book (2.7) that factors of meaning must also be taken into account. Here, however, where he is giving the objection of an old-fashioned opponent of dhvani, it is likely that he would give it in the old-fashioned terms. But Abhinava, noticing the discrepancy with Ānanda's later pronouncement, would have been glad to drop the word varṇa. By doing so he could supply "śabdārthayoh," thus making the qualities depend on both sound and meaning. For the technical term saṅghatand (arrangement, texture), see 3.5 K and 3.5 A, note 1. 4. The word vṛtti, literally manner of employment or place of employment, bears two different technical meanings in this book: the one derived from Udbhata, the other from Bhanś. The word is here used in Udbhata's sense, who applies this term (Indurāja 1.7) to the three varieties of simple alliteration, that is, to what later writers call
He now describes these views in sequence. Nothing more than what is embodied in sound and meaning: By saying "nothing more" he shows that no one will object [to this definition]. Now this sound and meaning themselves cannot be dhvani, for what advantage would arise merely from giving them an extra name? But perhaps you suppose that dhvani refers to some special beauty of the sound or meaning. Very well; we may speak of two sorts of beauty: the beauty of a thing in itself and the beauty that arises from its arrangement (saṅghatanā). Of these sorts, the beauty that belongs to the sounds themselves derives from the figures of sound [such as alliteration], while that which arises from their arrangement derives from the qualities (gunaḥ) of words [when they are so juxtaposed as to produce sweetness, harshness, etc.]. So also of the meanings: the beauty in themselves derives from such figures as simile, while the beauty that arises from their arrangement derives from the qualities of meanings. So there is no such thing as dhvani distinct from the figures and qualities.

Which possesses certain properties of arrangement:¹ that is, arrangement of sound or meaning. The proof by negative probans will run thus: Whatever is other than the figures and qualities is not a cause of beauty, as for example the absolute faults such as solecism and the relative faults such as harshness;² and dhvani [you say] is a source of beauty; therefore, dhvani is not other than the figures and qualities.

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¹ saṅghatanā
² solecism

He calls the three types parusā (harsh), upañgargarīkā (polite), and grāmyā (rustic or vulgar). He calls the third type also komalā (soft). For further details see 1.1a L and note 4. On the other hand, Bhāṣa applies the term vṛtti to four modes of gesture and speech (Bhāṣa 18.7 and 20.8ff.); see below, 3.6g L, and note 1, as also 3.33 K and A. 5. As will be seen from L, the vṛttis are not different from the figure alliteration, while the styles (ṛiti) are not different from the qualities sweetness, etc. 6. Three styles (ṛiti), to which are given the geographical names Vaidarbhī, Gaūḍī, and Pāncālī, are described by Daṇḍin 1.40ff. Daṇḍin assigns all the good qualities of poetry to Vaidarbhī, which he further characterizes as employing few compounds and avoiding harsh sounds. In these last two respects the Gaūḍī style is its opposite, while the Pāncālī lies intermediate between the two. The differentia are similar to those used by Udbhāta in distinguishing the three vṛttis. But the evaluation was different. Udbhāta regarded the intermediate vṛtti as best, whereas Daṇḍin chose as best the soft ṛiti. The concept of ṛiti was emphasized by Vāmana to the point of calling ṛiti the soul of poetry (1.2.6ff.). On ṛiti in general see P. C. Lahiri, Concepts of Ṛiti and Guna in Sanskrit Poetics.
To this argument it might be replied: Just as the *vṛttis* and the styles (*ṛtis*) are distinct from the figures and qualities and at the same time are causes of beauty, so it may be that *dhvani* is distinct and is also a cause of beauty. It is with this reply in mind that he [who denies the existence of *dhvani*] continues: the *vṛttis* also ... which are not different in function from these. It has not been proved that the *vṛttis* and styles are distinct from the figures and qualities. For it is merely three types of alliteration that are called by the name *vṛtti* in order to group these alliterations under three broad classes to be distinguished as harsh (*paruṣā*), graceful (*lalitā*), and intermediate, so called because of their utility in describing three types of subject matter, namely that which is fiery (*dipta*); smooth (*mārṣṇa*), or intermediate. [The literal sense of the word *vṛtti* is that] the alliterations occur (*vṛt*) in these forms. As has been said [by Udbhata, *Indurāja* 1.7, *Vivṛtti* 1.12]: “The wise hold that alliteration (*anuprāsa*) is the placing of homogeneous consonants, separately for each separate class, in these three ways (vṛtti).” “Separately for each separate class”: thus, harsh alliteration is the *nāgārīka* (citified) *vṛtti*; smooth alliteration is the *upanāgārīka* (polite), so called on the analogy of a sophisticated lady of the city (*nāgārīka*); the intermediate variety is between gentle and harsh; such is the sense: it is called *grāmyā* (rustic, vulgar) on the analogy of a country woman, who lacks sophistication and is neither gentle nor harsh by nature. The third of these varieties is also called *komalānuprāsa*. Thus the *vṛttis* are simply classes of alliteration. We are not using the word *vṛtti* here in the sense in which the Vaiṣeṣika philosophers use it, for [by Vaiṣeṣika rules] there could be no occurrence (vartamānatva) of a member in its class; all that is meant is that the alliteration functions by means of such and such a *vṛtti*. Just as it is said: “Kings function (vartante) on a plane of insight above that of common mortals.”

So the *vṛttis* do not act as anything other than alliteration. They have no extra function; and as they have no separate function, they should not be counted separately. Thus we see that in the compound *anatirikta-vṛttayah* the meaning of the word *vṛtti* is function (vṛṣṭāra). It is because the *vṛttis* are nothing other [than alliteration] that Bhaṭṭa and others made no mention of them. Although Udbhata and others did mention them, they nevertheless convey no additional meaning [beyond that of alliteration] to our minds. It is with this thought that he says have reached our ears. So also the styles (*ṛtis*): One is to construe these words [with the preceding sentence] thus: So also the styles, which are not different in
function from these, have reached our ears. The word “these” [as here supplied?] refers to the qualities. Now in giving the appropriate vṛtti to a passage⁸ these guṇas may be combined, through their capability of mixing with one another, in the form of a texture (saṅghaṭanā), just as the tastes of sugar, pepper, and the like may be combined in a drink. Such a combination is called a rīti. It is of three sorts, as it applies to a subject matter that is fiery, or delicate, or something intermediate, in accordance with what we see to be most eagerly sought in the country of Gauḍa, or Vidarbha, or Pañcāla. The class is here not different from its members and the whole is not different from its components. So the vṛttis and styles are not different from the figures and qualities; and the negative probans [which we just gave] is valid.

So he says: what is this thing called dhvani that it should be different from these? It is not a substrate of beauty, as it is neither in the form of sound or meaning. Nor is it a cause of beauty, as it is other than a figure of speech or a quality. If we examine poetry analytically, despite the fact that it should be appreciated synthetically,⁹ even so we find no distinct thing which can be called dhvani. He says as much by using the phrase “this thing called” dhvani.

1. Abhinava omits the term varna (phoneme) in the compound varna-saṅghaṭanādharmanā.

2. The faults (doṣas) have been treated by almost every Sanskrit literary critic. For accounts in English, see Raghavan, Bhoja’s SP., pp. 203-243, and Krishnamoorthy, “Doctrines of Doṣas,” IHQ 20.217-232. The distinction of nityā doṣāḥ, usages which are always faulty, i.e., absolute faults, from anityā doṣāḥ, usages which are faulty only in certain contexts, i.e., relative faults, is known to Ānanda (see 2.11 below). An example of the latter type is harshness, which is reprehensible in a passage of love but may be praiseworthy in a passage of heroism or cruelty. 3. Abhinava takes the term (by Saunāga Vār ṭīka 7, see Mahābhāṣya 2.2.18) as nāgarikayā vidāṅghayā upamāṇa: given its simile by, i.e., similar to, a nāgarikā, that is, a sophisticated lady. The same explanation was given by Indurāja on Udbhata 1.5 and is grammatically unexceptionable. But it leaves us wondering why the harsh variety of vṛtti should be called nāgarikā, a term not found in Udbhata and which seems to originate with Abhinava. To that the Kaumudi says that the harsh variety is like a city lady in brilliant costume. 4. It will be seen that Abhinava has changed the distribution as given by Udbhata. Udbhata gives three vṛttis: (1) harsh, which alliterates by means of ś, the retroflexes, and certain harsh conjuncts; (2) upanāgarikā, which alliterates by means of the stops other than the retroflexes and by conjuncts of which the first member is a nasal; and (3) vulgar (grāmyā) or soft (komalā), which alliterates by means of the remaining consonants, i.e., the semivowels and ṛ. Obviously his vṛttis are
ordered according to a decreasing degree of harshness. What is reprehensible in the third type is its excessive softness or liquidity. But Abhinava wants to harmonize the three vṛttis with the three vṛttis given by Dandin and Vāmana. Accordingly, he keeps the first vṛtti as harsh, makes the second vṛtti soft, and makes the third vṛtti a mixture of the two. He is left with the contradiction that the third, mixed vṛtti bears the traditional name of komalā (soft). The commentators (BP and Kaumudi) are forced to say that the term komalā is here rūdhā, i.e., used without regard to its etymological meaning. Such was Abhinava’s authority, however, that his scheme is followed by Mammata (9.80 and cf. 8.74-75) and other later authors. 5. Udbhata had said that alliteration occurs in three vṛttis, to which Abhinava has added the statement that these three vṛttis are classes (varga). Now in the Vaiśeṣika system a member cannot occur (vartate) in its class; the class occurs in, or inheres in, its members. So it is necessary to specify that “alliteration occurs in a given vṛtti” means simply that it functions in a certain way. 6. That is, these terms have reached our ears but not our minds. 7. When the compound tadanatiriktavṛttayah explicitly modifies the word vṛttayah, one will take tad to refer to the figure anuprāsa. When the compound is supplied as a modifier of rītayah, the tad will refer to the gunas. 8. samucittavṛtttyarpane: Abhinava’s conception seems to be that a combination of gunas, say of mādhurya and prasāda, transfers to a particular vṛtti, say the upanāgakā vṛtti, its ability to express an appropriate rasa, say, śīrṣāgra. The word yad which follows in the sentence modifies sanghāṭarūpatāgamanam. 9. The notion that the āsvāda of poetry is akhandā belongs really to the siddhāntin, to Abhinava himself. The idea might have been borrowed from Bhartrhari, who says that we understand the sense of a phrase without analysing or dividing it, but as an indivisible whole. We achieve this by means of pratibhā. See Vākyapadiya, ed. Abhyankar and Limaye, 2.143-147 and Filliozat, p. xviii.

A Others might say: There is no such thing as dhvani. For a type of poetry that falls outside our well-known system would no longer be poetry. The correct definition of poetry is that which consists of sounds and meaning which delight the heart of a sensitive audience. To a method which differs from the system which has been laid down this [definition] is inapplicable. Moreover, if you were to confer the title of “sensitive audience” on some few persons who belong to your
persuasion and on that basis assign to dhvani the title of poetry, you
would not thereby gain the assent of the general body of educated men.

1. Here used to mean a type of poetry; see 1.1 K., note 1.

L Now it might be granted that dhvani does not consist of sound
or meaning; furthermore that it is not a cause of their beauty; and
yet it exists and for the aforesaid reason is different from the figures of
speech and the qualities. In order to combat such a position the author
introduces a second type of persons who deny the existence of dhvani:
others.

[Others might say:] It may well be [that such a thing as dhvani exists,
distinct from the figures and qualities]. But this dhvani is not such as
you would have it in your definition. For you were going to speak of
something related to poetry; and this [dhvani] is no more related to
poetry than are dancing and singing and instrumental music. Poetry
must be spoken; therein lies its nature. One cannot claim that dancing
and singing are spoken.

Well-known: The well-known system is one of sound and meaning
and of the figures and qualities. "System" means the path which people
follow in a continuous tradition. Type of poetry: this method of
yours is intended by you to be a type of poetry, for you have called it
"the soul of poetry." Why is it not poetry? Because of the definition
"...of a sensitive audience." To a method: what he means is such
a method as is used in dancing, singing, motion of the eyes, etc. This:
supply "definition" [viz., that which consists of sounds and meanings
which delight the heart] of a sensitive audience.

Now it might be argued that the only sensitive auditors are those
who recognize this novel form of poetry; and as that which lies outside
[the well-known system] is approved by them, it may well serve as a
definition of poetry. With this in mind he says, moreover. The case
is similar to a man's saying, "I will define a sword" and proceeding to
do so as follows. "A sword has length and breadth, it can be worn,
it covers the whole body, it is soft, it is woven of variegated threads,
it can be spread out or rolled up. it cannot cut. but can itself be cut.
This is the best kind of sword." Then when someone objects that he
has described a cloth, not a sword. he says. "This is what I consider to
be a sword." Just so is this [definition you are giving of dhvani]. What
the author means is that what we define should be what it is known to
be, not a figment of the imagination. So he says, the general body of educated men. As a few educated men might hold this strange opinion, he rules them out by saying "the general body." For even should a few hold it, what difference does it make? It merely proclaims their insanity. This is his meaning.

Another commentator has taken this passage otherwise. He would have the denier of dhvani to argue thus. "What you recognize is a dhvani that is the very life of poetry. Now such a life of poetry lies outside our well-known system because it has not been mentioned by the experts on the figures of speech. Furthermore, this word dhvani is not an accepted term for poetry in common usage."1 This interpretation runs counter to everything the text has said. For if dhvani as a vivifying principle of poetry is admitted by the denier of dhvani, the fact that it has not been mentioned by the ancients should rather be a reason for now defining it. Therefore, the meaning should be taken as we have taken it above.

1. This interpretation is simpler than Abhinava's. It amounts to this. The first argument of the dhvani-deniers was against dhvani as the content of poetry or as the cause of the beauty in poetry. This second argument is against dhvani as the highest type of poetry itself. Dhvani is not that, because the ancients made no mention of it as such and because people do not commonly use the word dhvani in that sense. Such an interpretation is too simple for Abhinava, for it would leave the proponent of dhvani with the reply: "That the ancients failed to notice this type of poetry is all the more reason why it should now be defined."

Still others might argue for its non-existence in another way. Dhvani simply cannot be something entirely new because, being something that falls within the area of beauty, it must be included in the means of beautifying poetry that have been mentioned in earlier works on poetics. It is trivial to single out one of these means and merely give it a new name. Moreover, as the possibilities of speech are limitless, there may well be some small variety that has not been dealt with by the well-known compilers of definitions for poetry.1 Even so,
we cannot see any justification here [for the proponents of dhvani] to close their eyes in the fond imagination that they are sensitive critics and to dance about chanting "dhvani, dhvani." Others, great men too, have shown in the past different varieties of beauty in poetry by the thousand and continue to do so. But we do not find them acting in this indecorous fashion. As a matter of fact, dhvani is mere prattle. It is simply not possible to put forward anything as a definition of dhvani that can bear critical examination. In this vein someone has written a verse on the matter:

A fool will take a poem that has no content
to make the heart rejoice, no ornament,
no words to show the author's skill,
no striking turn of speech:
and tell you with delight
that this same poem is full of dhvani.
If you who are wise should ask him, I am sure
he could not tell you what this dhvani is.

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1. What are meant are those who have defined the figures of sound and meaning, the qualities and styles, e.g., Danḍin, Bhāmaha, and Vāmana.
2. Alāṅkāra here does not mean specifically a figure of speech, but rather beauty of poetry in general. Cf. the opening of Vāmana's KA: kāvyam grāhyam alāṅkārāt, and the second sutra: saundaryam alāṅkārāḥ and its vṛtti: karaṇasyutpattiḥ punar alāṅkārasabdo 'yam upamādiṣu vartate. 3. Cf. Danḍin 2.1: te cādyāpya vikalpyante kas tān kārṣṇyena vakṣyati. 4. According to Abhinava (see below) the author of the verse was Manoratha.

L But suppose that dhvani is a cause of beauty and that it can be included under the figures or qualities either of sound or sense; still, this entity has not been spoken of as "dhvani," nor has anyone heretofore spoken of it as the life [of poetry]. In order to combat such a position, the author now introduces a third variety of those who deny the existence of dhvani: still others.

"Beauty" (kāmanīyaka) is the passive abstract of "beautiful" (kāmanīya), i.e., the source of our notion of cārutva (dearness, beauty).

But now, as there is an endless number of charming things, [the proponents of dhvani might argue that] they have discovered a certain charming thing that cannot be included under such [figures] as alliteration, or under such [qualities] as sweetness, as defined by earlier
writers. The opponent refutes this after first accepting it for the sake of argument: the possibilities of speech (vāc). Vāc can have any of three meanings: (1) that which expresses, namely a word; (2) that which is expressed, namely a meaning; or (3) that by which a meaning is expressed, namely the denotative function.2

A small variety: for such a source of beauty will be either a quality or a figure of speech and so will be included under the general definition. As has been said: "The factors which make for beauty in poetry are the qualities. The figures are what add to this beauty."3 Also: "An unusual or striking turn of word or meaning (vakrokti) is considered an ornament of poetic utterances."4

Dhvani, dhvani: the repetition suggests the excitement [of the proponents of dhvani] and shows the awe [with which they regard their concept]. Dance about: one may supply as subject "those who define dhvani, those who compose poems that use it, and those who experience a thrill on hearing it."5 Why, he means, should there be such reverence for this word "dhvani"? Dhvani is mere prattle: a general view, summing up all [three] positions of those who deny the existence of dhvani. It is mere prattle (1) because if it is a cause of beauty, it is not different from the figures and qualities; (2) because if it is different, it is not a cause of beauty; and (3) because even if it is a cause of beauty, it is not worthy of our serious attention [as it has already been included under the general definition of the figures and qualities]. This is the meaning.

Now this imagining of the position of those who deny dhvani cannot be charged with being [historically] baseless. Thus he says, in this vein someone. The reference is to a poet named Manoratha who lived at the same time as the author of this book.6

[To explain Manoratha's verse:] As it has "no ornament," therefore it does not "make the heart delight." This shows that the poem lacks the figures of meaning [simile, etc.]. "No words to show the author's skill": this refers to the figures of sound [alliteration, yamaka]. "Striking turn of speech": elevated style or arrangement (sārighatanā). That it lacks this implies that it lacks the qualities of sound and meaning. Some have taken this phrase [viz., "no striking turn of speech"] to mean that since the poem lacks this general characteristic of the figures of speech, it must lack every figure.7 But by this interpretation one could not avoid involving the author in tautology. I shall not argue the point further. "With delight": he means a passion for following by rote the example of others. "Who are wise": for if a fool asked him,
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he could reply with such [silly gestures] as rolling his eyes.8

1. By Pāṇ. 5.1.132 the suffix uṇī (vrddhi + -aka) is added to certain noun stems in the sense of bhāva or karma. Such formations are nouns. Bhāva refers to a nominal abstract, the state of being beautiful; karma to a passive nominalization, “that which has been beautified.” In English we may render both concepts as “beauty.” But note that in the phrase kāyasya kāmaniyakam (the beauty of poetry) Abhinava takes uṇī specifically in the sense kāmanī, the whole word kāmaniyakam denoting something that has been made beautiful. 2. Vāc is here etymologized as the verbal root vac plus the null suffix kvip with irregular vrddhi by Unādisūtra 225. Normally kvip is used actively, by Pāṇ. 3.4.67: thus, vaktiti vāk or ucyaate ‘nayeti vāk. But by drawing down kāmanī from Pāṇ. 3.2.1 it may be taken passively: ucyaata uti vāk. 3. This is from Vāmana’s Kāvyālankārasūtra 3.1.1-2. Under gūna Vāmana includes the sābdagūnas and the arthagūnas, viz., ojas, prasāda, etc.: ye khalu sābdārthayor dharmāh kāvyāsobhām kurvanti te guṇāh. Under alāṅkāra he includes the sābdalāṅkāras and the arthalāṅkāras: alāṅkārā ca yamakopamādayah. 4. Bhāmaha 1.36. Vakrokti here has therefore a very general application, as it has in Daṇḍin as well. See Daṇḍin 2.363, Bhāmaha 1.30, 1.34, and especially 2.85: saīśī sarvāvam vakroktir anayārtho vibhāvyate / yatno 'syām kavinā kāryah ko 'lankāro 'nayā vinā. 5. It is not fully clear whether “it” (the tat in tac-chṛvana) refers to the poems that make use of dhvani or to the word “dhvani” itself. 6. Abhinava uses the term granthakṛt (Kane, HSP, p. 156) as synonymous with vṛttikāro. He uses the term asmanmulagranthakṛt for the author of the Kārikās (ibid., p. 158). Thus, whether or not we suppose that he is following a tradition of dual authorship, we must charge him with here saying that Manoratha was a contemporary of Ānanda. For this error see Introduction, pp. 4, 9, 26-27. 7. This is certainly the more natural interpretation. 8. Cf. the similar passage in Abhinava’s Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimārśini, Vol. 2, 2.3, p. 91, where he refers to the Buddhist definition of pramāṇa: anyathā mukhabhaṅgamūrdha-kampāṇugulimotanādīmādratatattvatam tat.
A  “Others say that it is an associated meaning (bhākta)”: others say that this soul of poetry which we call dhvani is [merely] secondary usage (gunañcitt). And although the authors of definitions for poetry have not given the specific name dhvani to secondary usage nor to any other sort of thing, still, in showing how secondary usage is employed in poetry, they have at least touched on the process of dhvani even if they have not actually defined it. It is with this in mind that [the Kārikā] states, “Others say that it is an associated meaning.”

1. See 1.1 K. note 2.

L  The [three] alternative views of the non-existence of dhvani were presented successively and not without connection of thought. That is why he used the phrase “still others” in introducing his description of the third alternative; and [with this close connection] the unitary conclusion [viz., “dhvani is mere prattle”] is in keeping. As the doctrine of the non-existence of dhvani is completely hypothetical, he used the perfect tense\(^1\) in reporting it. On the other hand, the view that dhvani is no more than an associated meaning can be found in written texts; and so he now employs a present tense: [others] say that it is an associated meaning, using the present tense for the expression of that which takes place constantly.\(^2\)

[Abhinava now gives four different etymologies to explain the meaning of the word bhākta.] (1) Bhakti (“association”) is a property that is associated (bhajyate), or is in company with,\(^3\) or is regarded [by the speaker] as commonly recognized in, a word-object [let us say, river-bank]—e.g., a property such as proximity to the direct object of the word [here, river]. Now the relational secondary sense (lākṣanīko 'ṛthah) that derives from [i.e., that is made possible by] this property is called the bhākta (“associated”) meaning. [Thus, river-bank is an associated or relational meaning of “river,” as may be seen in the phrase “a village on the river.”] As has been said,

Lakṣanā (secondary usage) is held to be of five sorts, as it is based on the proximity of the secondary object to the direct object, on its similarity to it, its involvement in it, its opposition to it, or its being connected with the same activity.\(^4\)
(2) Bhakti ("portion") is a portion (bhāga) of the meaning of such a
word as is used of a group of properties, e.g., the portion of the word
"lion" that means fierceness. Now a metaphorical meaning (gauno
ṛthah) that arises thus is called a bhākta ("partial") meaning. Such
a meaning may be seen in the sentence "the boy is a lion," meaning
that the boy is fierce. (3) Bhakti ("attachment, love, affect") is the
intense desire one may have to express such a concept as proximity [to
a holy river] or fierceness [in a young man]. The meaning that arises
from such eagerness is called a bhākta ("affective") meaning and may
be either a metaphorical (gauna) or a relational (lākṣānaka) meaning.
(4) Bhakti is the blocking or breaking (bhaṅga, from bhaṅju āmardane)
of the primary meaning. Hence a meaning that arises from blocking of
the primary sense is a bhākta meaning.

These etymologies will show that the presence of three factors forms
the seed from which secondary usage (upacāra) arises. They are: the
blocking of the primary meaning; a cause [e.g., proximity to or sim­
ilarity to the primary object]; and a purpose [e.g., one's eagerness to
express forcefully this proximity or similarity].

What lies back of the apposition between soul of poetry and sec­
ondary usage is this. Although secondary usage [sometimes] found
in that variety of dhvani where the literal meaning is not intended, as
in "like a mirror blinded by breath," nevertheless dhvani is not iden­
tical with it, for we find dhvani without secondary usage in such a
variety of dhvani as that where the literal meaning is subordinated to
a second meaning. And we shall show that even where the literal
meaning is not intended there may be secondary usage without dhvani.
So our author will say: "This dhvani is not identical with bhakti (sec­
ondary operation), because it differs from it in form; nor is it defined by
that, because the definition would be both too wide and too narrow."
(1.14 K) and "It might, however, be an adventitious mark (upalakṣaṇa)
of a certain type of dhvani." (1.19 K).

[Abhinava now takes the part of the opponent, etymologizing the
word gunavṛtti to show that just like dhvani it may denote a word, a
meaning, or an operation or usage.]

Gunas are properties such as proximity or fierceness. Gunavṛtti (lit­
erally, "of which, or in which, there is an occurrence because of prop­
erties") may be either a word or a meaning [depending on whether we
analyse the compound as a genitive or locative bahuvṛthi], viz., "that
(word) of which there is an occurrence in (or, application to) a meaning other than the primary meaning because of these properties," or "that (meaning) in which there is an occurrence of a word by these means." Or: gunavrttī may be the occurrence, that is, the operation, of the secondary power of meaning through these properties. This is as much as to say: in whatever sense we understand the word dhwani, viz., as that which suggests, or that which is suggested, or the operation of suggesting, still it is nothing different from a word used in a secondary meaning, or the secondary meaning itself, or the secondary operation. For, as denotation is the only operation in conveying the primary sense, we are left with only one possibility: that dhwani is the secondary operation, as there is no third.

But who ever said that dhwani was gunavrttī? With this objection in mind, [the denier of dhwani] says, and although, etc. Any other sort of thing: e.g., any sort of quality or figure of speech. In showing: he is referring to such authors as Bhāṭṭodbhāta and Vāmana. For where Bhāmaha says, "Words, meters, designations (abhīdhanā), meanings,"12 Bhāṭṭodbhāta explains the difference between words and designations as follows: "Designation means the denotative function of words, which may be primary or secondary (gunavrtti)."13 And Vāmana has said, "Vākrokti is secondary usage (laksanā) based on similarity."14

Have at least touched on: that is, they showed the direction in which dhwani lies, but being men who read literally, they gave no definition of its true nature, as they were unable to distinguish it. Indeed, they scorned it, merely taking up as they found them the words which contained it [without examining their precious inner meaning], as a man might take up a coconut [with no conception of the delicacy of its inner meat].15 Hence [the Vṛtti] says that it is with this in mind that the Kārikā states .... If one fails to interpret the passage as we have done, the statement of the dhwani-opponent that [former writers] have "at least touched on" the process of dhwani will be contradicted.

1. Viz., "jagaduh"; cf. 1.1. L, note 4. 2. The word āhuh "they say," although it carries a perfect suffix, is regarded by Pāṇini as a present (Pān. 3.4.84). "The present tense for the expression of that which takes place constantly" (nityapraṇavarttavartamāne lat) is an expression taken from Vārttika i on Pān. 3.2.123. It is given by Bhoja (SP 5, Josyer's edition, p. 164) as one of the six uses of the present tense. 3. The wording sevyate padārthena ... dharmah is awkward, as may be seen by the variant reading prājñena for padārthena noticed by the Kaumudi and accepted by Kane in his notes on
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SD, p. 320. But the variant is surely wrong. Abhinava is forced to use sevya-te in glossing bhajyate because that is its gloss in the DhP (1.1047 bhaja sevayām). 4. The quotation is from a Mīmāṃsā author Bhartrmitra whose works are dated. See Kane, SD, p. 320, footnote. Abhinava uses a different version of it in commenting on 1.18. The word sārūpyāt is there replaced by saṁyogāt, which would exclude the metaphorical variety of secondary usage from laksanā. The verse is quoted in the Abhidhāvrttimātrkā on Kārikās 9–10 in still a different version, but one that does include the metaphorical variety (abhidheya sambandhāt sārūpyāt samavādyatah). The Abhidhāvrttimātrkā is about a century older than the Locana. 5. For the distinction of gauna and lāksanika see 1.1. K, note 2. 6. By blocking is meant that the context renders the primary meaning impossible. Boys, for example, are not really lions. 7. Abhinava is here speaking in propria persona, not in the role of the denier of dhvani. He admits that there can be sāmānyādhikaranya (apposition, syntopicity) between dhvani and gunavṛtti. This is very different from saying that they are identical. “An oak is a tree” is a sentence which exhibits syntopicity, but a tree is not an oak. For the distinction see NVTT 1.1.4 (Kashi ed., p. 110, lines 16ff.; Calc. ed., p. 96, lines 2ff.) 8. One must correct the punctuation of the other editions by the Kaumudi, thus: tadvatirekenāpi bhāvātī vivakṣitānyparaṇavācyaprabhādevādau / avakṣita For the two varieties of dhvani here mentioned see below, 1.13m A and 2.1 Introduction A. 9. Cf. 3.33j. 10. An upalaksāna is a characteristic that helps define a term only temporarily or under certain conditions. The laksāna (definition proper) of the washerman’s house might be “the first house east of the lake.” An upalaksāna of this house might be “the house on the roof of which a crow is sitting.” 11. Gunavṛtti is actually used almost exclusively in the third of these senses. But the point of the etymologies is to show correspondence between gunavṛtti and dhvani which might be thought to support the opponent’s view. 12. Bhāmaha 1.9. 13. See J. Masson, “A Note on the Authenticity of the Bhāmahavivarana Attributed to Udbhata,” IJJ 13, pp. 250–254. 14. Vāmana 4.3.8. 15. Vidyanātha speaks of drākṣapāka “grape-taste,” where enjoyment is easy and immediate, and nārīkelapāka “coconut-taste,” which is more difficult to obtain, but finally gives unsurpassed pleasure. See De, HSP, II, p. 242. See also Agnipurāṇa 346.22–23.

A Finally some, whose minds have shied away from attempting a definition, have declared that the true nature of dhvani lies outside the
realm of speech, that it can only be felt and that only by a sensitive reader.\(^1\) Therefore, in view of such disagreements, we shall state its true nature in order to delight the hearts of sensitive readers. For the nature of this dhvani, which is the secret of all good poets' poetry, which despite its extraordinary beauty has not been opened to view by the subtle minds of the ancient makers of definitions of poetry, which, moreover, is clearly seen to be at work in such great poems as the Rāmāyana and the Mahābhārata, will here be revealed so that the bliss [which arises] in the hearts of sensitive readers on their noticing it in [the poems that form] the object of their attention, may take firm hold in their hearts.\(^2\)

1. One may note that the Kārikās, while they refute both the abhāvavāda and the bhāktavāda, are silent about the anākhyaeyavāda. This may be, as the Vṛtti claims at the end of the chapter, because the author felt that the very statement of his own theory was sufficient answer. 2. This is a difficult sentence to translate. If one breaks it up, one loses the tight connection that subsists between its parts. The bahuvrīhi compound prasiddha-vyavahāram is in a double construction (kākāksigolakanyāyena). The nature of dhvani, which is clearly at work in all great poetry, will be revealed for the delight of those readers who notice that it is clearly at work in all great poetry. Their initial observation of dhvani has brought them bliss, but this bliss will take permanent hold on their hearts (or minds) only by the clear definitions of dhvani that the author is about to reveal. Abhinava gets carried away by the discovery of latent implications in the sentence. To him it suggests arguments against all the preceding wrong views of dhvani. In order to find an argument against the last of the wrong views, viz., that dhvani cannot be defined, he takes the word laksayatām here to mean "who are defining" rather than "who are noticing." This seems to me (D.I.) to mistake entirely the intention of the sentence. If sensitive readers are already defining the nature of dhvani in the poems of their reading, what need would there be to write the Dhvanyāloka? Abhinava's remark on the word ānanda should be accepted. The author is here playing on the proper name. The effect of his book will be to give firm footing in the hearts of sensitive readers not only to the bliss of understanding dhvani but to the fame of Ānandavardhana.

L Whose minds have shied away: who were of ti id intellect. The three [sets of critics, viz., those who deny the existence of dhvani, those who say that it is merely an associated meaning, and those who say that it cannot be defined.] are such that each one later mentioned is of sounder judgment than the preceding. Those of the first
set are completely wrong; those of the second, while they recognize its nature, deny it [to be dhvani] because of indecision:¹ those of the last set do not deny it but know not how to define it. So what characterizes the three groups is in turn error, indecision, and insufficient knowledge.

Therefore (tena): He uses the singular (tena, lit., "because of this") since any one of these [three] statements of divergent view might serve as justification for the following description [of dhvani].

Such disagreements: locative of limitation; the sense is, because of any one type among these divergent opinions.²

We shall state its true nature: These words imply that the subject matter of the book is the true nature of dhvani, that the relation of dhvani to the book is a relation of subject matter to speech, that the relation of speaker to hearer is a relation of instructor to instructed, that the purpose of the book is [to give] a knowledge of the true nature of dhvani by refuting wrong opinions on the subject, and that the relation of the book to this purpose is a relation of means to goal.³

Now in order to explain the portion "to delight the hearts of sensitive readers," a portion which sets forth the purpose, resident within the hearer, of the purpose [of the book], he says: for the nature of this, etc. The meaning of "this" is "this dhvani which has become a matter of controversy." The structure of the sentence is as follows. The nature of dhvani will be revealed in order to effect a purpose, namely, so that bliss (ānanda), which is a sort of delight (nirvrti) also known as "rapture" (camatkāra), may assume a firm stance—firm enough not to be shaken by other critics who suffer from error, [indecision, and ignorance]—within the minds of those who define (laksayatām, see 1.1 e A, note 2 and remarks of L below) [this nature of dhvani]. As one understands the purpose [viz., the giving of delight to sensitive readers] to be that which ultimately prompts [the author to furnish] the matter [viz., the definition of dhvani] which achieves the purpose, this explanation takes the words [of the last line of the Kārikā, viz.,] prītaye tatsvarūpam brūmah as part of a single complex sentence.⁴

In explaining the words "its true nature," the Vṛttikāra indicates briefly his rebuttal of the five divergent views which he has mentioned above.⁵ All: By the word “all,” combined with good poets, he refutes [the view that dhvani might consist] "in some small variety" [that has not been dealt with previously; cf. 1.1 c A]. By its extraordinary beauty he shows its difference from associated usage [cf. 1.1 d A], for there is no particular beauty in such instances of associated meaning as "The boy is a lion," or "A village on the Ganges." By calling it the
secret [of all good poets’ poetry], he refutes the view that it is merely a new name [for something already defined by earlier critics; cf 1.1 c A]. By speaking of [dhvani as not having been opened to view] by the subtle minds [of the ancients], he shows that it cannot be included in the qualities or in the figures of speech [cf. 1.1 a A]. By the passage stating that moreover [dhvani is clearly seen to be at work in great poems], he refutes the suspicion of cliquishness that [was brought against proponents of dhvani when the objector] spoke of “some few persons of your persuasion” [cf. 1.1 b A]; and by mentioning the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata he shows that dhvani has been revered by every one from the time of the very first poet.

By the participle lakṣayatām [which in translating A we have rendered as noticing it] he sets aside the objection that dhvani lies outside the realm of speech. The noun lakṣa means that by which something is recognized, that is, a definition (lakṣana). The denominative verb lakṣayati means to describe something by defining it. So the participle lakṣayatām means “describing it by means of definitions.”

Of sensitive readers (sahrdayānām): The word sahrdaya (lit., “having their hearts with it”) denotes persons who are capable of identifying with the subject matter, as the mirror of their hearts has been polished by the constant study and practice of poetry, and who respond to it sympathetically in their own hearts. As has been said, “The realization (bhadva) of that object (e.g., vibhāva, etc.) which finds sympathy in the heart is the origin of rasa. The body is pervaded by it as dry wood by fire” (BhNS 7.7).

The bliss: In showing the primary object to be bliss, which is nothing more than the relishing of rasa, he shows that [of the three types of dhvani] it is the suggestion of rasa that is the most important and is the real soul of poetry. Hereby the following verse [of Bhaṭṭanāyaka11] is given a mortal blow: “Supposing that one could prove dhvani to be a separate verbal operation. whose nature is suggestion, it would still form only a part of poetry, not its very self.” For you [i.e., Bhaṭṭanāyaka] have admitted that while poetry consists of the three parts, designation (abhidhā), aesthetic efficacy (bhāvanā), and the relishing of rasa (rasacarvanā), it is the relishing of rasa that gives it its life. As you yourself have said, “It is the man who relishes [what he reads], not he who learns it nor he who obeys it, [who is eligible] for [reading] poetry.”

If your saying that dhvani is only a part of poetry is a statement made with reference to vastudhvani (the suggestion of a fact) or to...
alankāradhvani (the suggestion of a figure of speech), you are merely confirming what we regard as already confirmed: but if it is made with reference to rasadhvani, your statement stands in contradiction to the experience proclaimed in your own admission.

In this matter [of the primary goal's being bliss, one may make a distinction]: For the poet, delight is certainly his goal, but it may be achieved also by fame, as the verse proclaims: "for they say that fame has heavenly reward." For the auditors (or readers), it is true that both instruction and delight are goals, for it has been said, "The study of good poetry imparts skill in dharma, artha, kāma, mokṣa, and the arts; it gives both fame and joy" [Bhāmaha 1.2]. Nevertheless, of instruction and joy, joy is the chief goal. Otherwise, what basic difference would there be between one means of instruction, viz., poetry, which instructs after the fashion of a wife, and other means of instruction, such as the Vedas which instruct after the fashion of a master, or history which instructs after the fashion of a friend? That is why bliss is said to be the chief goal. In comparison with [poetry's] instruction even in all four aims of human life, the bliss which it renders is a far more important goal.

"Ānanda" ("bliss") is also the name of the author. Therefore [the concluding sentence of the Vṛtti on 1.1e] also means: may the teacher Ānandavardhana attain by means of this book an imperishable place in the hearts of sympathetic readers, as [the statue of a god, properly consecrated, attains such] a place in a temple. As has been said:

The authors of great works,
even after death,
leave with us in their poems
a body of undiminishable beauty.

[Bhāmaha 1.6]

From the place he attains in their hearts, one may judge the heart of the author himself: the sense is that he is a prince of connoisseurs. The same use of "place" is found in the line of verse: "In battle the highest place was Arjuna's." The mention of his own name is simply to encourage his readers [to study the work] by arousing their respect and their trust, as we shall explain at the end of the book. Thus [the word "bliss" hints at] the primary goal of the author, of the poet, and of the reader.
1. Sandeha (indecision) is that type of doubt which cannot decide which of two identifications is correct, e.g., "Is it a man or a tree? Is it a cloud or smoke?" Here the sandeha would take the form "Is this an instance of dhvani or of associated meaning?"

2. Abhinava does not take the locative evam-vidhāsu vimatīsu as a normal locative absolute (lakṣaṇā-saptami), as we have taken it. He assigns it rather to the locative of limitation (Pān. 2.3.41). So the literal sense by his interpretation would be: "because of this or that misunderstanding among [or, within the limit of] these divergent opinions, we feel compelled to set the matter straight." One should place a danda after tenaiva hetunā.

3. This sentence elicits the anvbandhas essentially as Abhinava has already given them; see 1.1 L and note 1 thereon.

4. The first Kārikā says in essence: "Dhvani has been understood in various ways; therefore, we shall state its true nature for the joy (prītaye tātsvarūpam brūmāḥ) of sensitive readers." Other things being equal, two methods of interpreting the Kārikā would be possible: (1) by vākyabheda, as furnishing two parallel clauses, in which case the sense would be: "Because dhvani has been understood in various ways we shall state its true nature and we shall state its true nature for the joy of sensitive readers"; (2) by ekavākyatā, as furnishing a single complex sentence, in which one clause is subordinated to another, viz., "Since dhvani has been understood in various ways, we shall state its true nature for the joy of sensitive readers." Of these two possible interpretations, only the second is correct because the purpose of stating the nature of dhvani is to furnish delight to the readers; the need of refuting the various wrong opinions is subordinate to this purpose. We have followed the preference of BP in taking vyākhyeyam as vyākhyā + iyam. It could of course be understood as a single word, a gerundive modifying the iti-clause prītaye tātsvarūpam brūmāḥ. One would then translate: "The words prītaye, etc., are to be interpreted as part of a complex sentence."

5. What follows is an instance of Abhinava's passion for discovering hidden indications and suggestions in Ānanda's text. He not only finds suggestions to refute the five arguments against dhvani, he assigns special suggestions to no less than nine words or phrases in the brief passage comprised by 1.1 e A. His enthusiasm pushes him into a false interpretation of the word laksayatām, as it is only by this false interpretation that he can find in this passage a reference to the last anti-dhvani argument, viz., that dhvani cannot be described in words. Cf. 1.1 e A, note 2.

6. If dhvani is the secret of all good poets' poetry, it must be more important than any of the components of poetry mentioned by the older authors. We cannot call it merely a new name for one of those anciently defined components.

7. Vālmīki was the first poet. The Rāmāyana according to Indian tradition is older than the Mahābhārata.

8. In ABh. Vol. 2, p. 339, Abhinava defines sahartdayatva (literary sensitivity) as the faculty of entering into identity with the heart of the poet (kauhṛdayatādātmyapattiyogyatā). The passage has been pointed out by Gnoli, p. xlv.

9. The polished mirror is a favorite image...
of Abhinava. Cf. IPV, beginning of Vol. 2: vitatavisadasyaítmadreśe suvañkti-
rasojjvalam, and Tantrāloka, Vol. 2, p. 4, vs. 4: nirmale mutule yadvidh bhänti
bhūmijalādayaḥ / amisrās tadvid ekasmimś cinnāthe viśvaivyayāḥ. Mirrors,
which were of metal, were polished with ashes; cf. Vajjāлага 33.

10. By this quotation Abhinava seems to indicate that it is only within
the sahrdaya that rasa can arise. Unfortunately the MSS of ABh. break
off just before this passage of the BhNS. In its place one may use the
Kau-
mudi’s remarks, for its author had probably read an undefective MS of the
ABh. and is most likely following it in commenting on this verse. “Whatever
thing,” he says, “that is, whatever form of vibhāva, etc., occurs in a good
poet’s description. ‘Finds sympathy in the heart,’ that is, is such as to become
the object of the heart’s sympathy. ‘The realization (bhāva) of that thing,’
in other words, its blossoming within the frame of the spotless mirror of the
heart: that is, the origin, or more strictly, the cause of the rise of, rasa. ‘By
it,’ that is, by a vibhāva, etc., of such a sort, the heart is pervaded. For
this sudden and uniform pervasion he gives an example: ‘as dry wood by
fire.’ It is dry wood that is so pervaded, not stone or some other substance.
Accordingly, to speak of what is exemplified. Vedic scholars (srotayah) and
such like persons have no poetic sensitivity, for their hearts lack any proclivity
(vāsanā) toward such emotions as love. By the wood’s being ‘dry’ he indicates
the purity of the heart achieved by its study of poetry, while by ‘fire’ he shows
that the property of being a vibhāva depends on the beauty of the poetic
qualities and figures of speech by which it is expressed.” 11. Abhinava
later refers to the author of the verse by name (1.4a L).

12. Rūpatā is here
used, metri causa, for svarūpatā. K glosses it by svarūpatvam, ātmatvam.

13. To explain the verse Kau. supplies the words sarva eva kāvye ‘dikriya-
ta. As Kau. elsewhere quotes Bhattānāyaka independently of Abhinava, its
author must have known the text of the Hṛdayadarpana at first hand. He is
therefore a reliable guide in such instances as the present. Bhattānāyaka is
here envisaging three types of reader to fit the three types of literature, viz.,
that which delights (poetry), that which instructs (history), and that which
commands (the Veda). 14. In Abhinava’s system vastudhvani and alaṅkā-
dhvani are merely parts of poetry, being superior to direct designation but
not being the real soul of poetry, which is rasadhvani. 15. We have taken
the reading svābhuvapagama-prasiddha-samvedanā, preferred by Kau., rather
than the reading with prasiddhi. The latter, given by both Chow. and Kashi,
makes an awkward dvandva: “stands in contradiction to your admission, to
what is well known, and to inner experience.” Furthermore, the point is that
Bhṛtaṇāyaka has admitted rasacarvanā to be the essential delight of poetry,
so how can he make rasadhvani a subordinate part? 16. Abhinava does not
spell out the connection of his thoughts here. It seems to be this. Ânanda has
chosen the word bliss to express the final goal of his work: it will give bliss to
his readers. His choice of words is appropriate because it hints at the thesis
that the primary purpose of poetry itself is the bliss that it gives, rather than any instruction one may gain by it. For the relative importance of enjoyment and instruction in the reading of poetry, see also 3.10-14 f L and Introduction, p. 36. 17. One may take svarga either literally, understanding that fame leads one to heaven, or metaphorically, understanding that fame gives to its possessor a delight equal to heaven.

A At this point, although it is only dhvani that the author has undertaken to define, he states the following in order to lay a groundwork.

L Now the reader might ask what the train of thought can be, for after promising to "state the true nature of dhvani," the next Kārikā goes on to speak of the literal meaning, telling us that "there are two varieties of meaning, the literal and the implied." To show what the trend of thought is, [the Vṛtti] furnishes an introductory remark.

At this point: that is, the subject matter (of the book) and its goal being as stated. 1 Groundwork: anything similar to a ground or basis. Just as when one wants to build something new, one first prepares the ground, so also when one is about to describe the true nature of dhvani, which is none other than implied meaning, one takes as groundwork the literal meaning, which is undeniable and known to everyone, because the implied meaning will be more clearly noticed when placed beside it. Its being placed here on the same level with the literal meaning is in order to convey the fact that it also is undeniable.

1. The subject matter is dhvani and the goal is to give delight. Both factors seem to be inconsistent with a mention of the literal meaning.

K Meaning, which has been praised by sensitive critics and determined to be the soul of poetry, is traditionally held to have two varieties, the literal and the implied. 1
1. This is a badly constructed verse, as many Sanskrit critics have noted. Taken literally, the relative clause is restrictive, for the anaphoric pronoun \textit{tad} must take both subject and predicate of the relative clause into its reference (\textit{tasyeti tatpadenodde\text{\`y}a\text{\`y}asamudit\text{\`a}rthav\text{\`a}sasasyaiva tatra par\text{\`a}mars\text{\`a}}). Accordingly, a literal translation would be: "That meaning which has been called the soul of poetry is held to have two varieties." This cannot be what the author intended, for it flies in the face of later statements by both the \textit{K\`\text{\`a}rik\`\text{\`a}s} and the \textit{Vrtti}. The soul of poetry is limited to the implied or suggested sense alone. It is meaning in a general sense that has two varieties. The contradiction is pointed out by Mahimabhatta (p. 89 Benares ed.), Vi\text{\`s}van\text{\`a}tha (Book I, p. 29, just before the first half of verse 3), and others. In our translation we have given the sense that the author seems to have intended by marking the relative clause off with commas as if it were descriptive. Abhinava, by the use of considerable ingenuity, arrives at much the same conclusion.

\textit{A} Meaning, which is praised by sensitive critics as being essential to a poem and therefore what the soul is to a body already charming by the configuration of graceful and appropriate parts, has two varieties, the literal and the implied.\footnote{1}

1. This prose sentence suffers from the same fault as does the \textit{K\`\text{\`a}rik\`\text{\`a}}: the relative clause is properly restrictive. "Charming by the configuration of graceful and appropriate parts" goes with the word "poetry" as well as with "\text{\`b\text{\`o}d\text{\`y}}."
sensitive critics. The one general concept "meaning" is distinguished in the mind of discriminating critics into two branches. Now, both of these being equally "meanings," why should sensitive critics praise just the one? There must be something special about it. This special something is the part of meaning that is implied and that is determined by discriminating critics to be the soul of poetry because it is a cause of the special property [of poetry]. Other persons, however, whose minds are confused by the close connection [of the implied] with the literal meaning, dispute its separate existence, just as the Carvākas dispute the separate existence of the soul. Accordingly, while he begins with the word "meaning" in the singular, he goes on to say that there are two varieties or sorts of this meaning, giving the reason for this by mentioning the distinction [enjoyed by the implied meaning] of being "praised by sensitive critics." He does not mean that there are two souls of poetry.

[Comment on the Vṛtī:] To explain the word "poetry" as used in the Kārikā, the Vṛtī says, to a poem, etc. By the word charming he indicates that the qualities and figures of speech impart this charm to it. By the word appropriate he hints at the fact that rasadhvani is the real life of a poem because he will show that propriety is always with respect to the rasa. For if the rasa is absent, with respect to what could one use this word "propriety" that has become so popular?

Meaning, which is ... By the pronoun "which" (yad)¹ he picks up as subject of the relative clause a fact already known. Thus he shows that this fact at least (viz., that artha, "meaning," is admired by connoisseurs) is accepted even by the opponent. By the main clause, viz., tasya, etc. ("of it there are two varieties," etc.), he shows that this acceptance is possible only if there are two varieties [of meaning]. [Furthermore] he hereby demonstrates that the argument that "dhvani is not different from the gunas and alaṅkāras because it is a cause of beauty" suffers from a falsely assigned reason, because dhvani [is not a cause of beauty but] is the soul itself of poetry. For we do not say that the soul is the cause of the body's beauty. Or, even if we grant that we might say so, the objector's reason becomes inconclusive when applied to the literal meaning, for at least that [portion of the literal meaning] which is to be ornamented cannot be itself an ornament (alaṅkāra), nor can that [portion] which possesses a poetic quality be itself a quality. It is for this reason that the author has brought in the literal meaning.² And that is why he will go on to say, "the literal meaning is well known," etc.
1. yadānuvadan: yadā is the instrumental of the word-stem yād.  
2. The cause of the difficulty in this passage is that Abhinava is trying to justify a statement of Ānanda's that is really not justifiable. We have noted Ānanda's fault (1.2 K, note 1, and A, note 1), viz., the bringing in of the literal meaning to share in the designation "soul of poetry." In the present passage, from yo 'ṛtha iti to vācyo 'ṛthopakṣeṇāḥ, Abhinava seeks to justify what Ānanda has done. It is necessary, Abhinava says, to bring in the literal meaning in order to exhibit a logical fault in an argument of the pūrvapākṣa. The pūrvapākṣa has argued that dhvani must be the same as the qualities (guna) or ornaments (alāṅkāra, figures of speech). The parts of the syllogism may be identified as follows.

Pakṣa: dhvaniḥ = pratītyamāno 'ṛthaḥ (the implied meaning)  
Sādhya: gunālāṅkārānātiriktaḥ (is not different from the gunas or alāṅkāras)  
Hetu: cārutvaheṭutvāt (because it is a cause of beauty).

The first and most obvious fault of this syllogism is that it suffers from asid-dhvaheṭutva, that is, its hetu is not true of the pakṣa. Dhvani is not a cause of beauty; it is the beauty of poetry. Now the pūrvapākṣa might reply that while this is strictly true, one might, by metonymy, speak of dhvani as a cause of beauty in poetry. A result may be referred to as a cause; we might allow that the soul is a cause of the beauty that is found in the complex of body and soul called man. Very well, says Abhinava, in that case your syllogism suffers from another fault. If we substitute vācyo 'ṛthaḥ (the literal meaning) for pratītyamāno 'ṛthaḥ as the pakṣa, the hetu will be inconclusive (anāikāntika). The substitution is permissible because the vācyo 'ṛthaḥ is inextricably bound up with the pratītyamāno 'ṛthaḥ. But now the hetu will occur in the absence of the sādhya as well as in its presence. Being a cause of beauty will occur in that portion of the vācyo 'ṛthaḥ which is to be ornamented (alāṅkārya) as well as in that which is an ornament. And the alāṅkārya cannot be an alāṅkāra. Similarly that which is a gunin cannot be a guna. Here is Abhinava's pièce de résistance. The vācyo 'ṛthaḥ must be brought in in order to show the inconclusiveness of the proving an artha to be a guna or an alāṅkāra from the fact of its being a cause of beauty.

§ 1.3 K  
Of these [two varieties] the literal meaning is well known and has been analysed by others into many figures such as sitile. We shall therefore not expatiate upon it here.
A  By others, viz., those who have made definitions of poetry.¹

[Shall not expatiate: i.e.,] we merely mention it whenever there is need.

1. Many MSS here add the phrase bhaṭṭodbhata-prabṛttibhiḥ "such as Bhaṭṭodbhata." See Kaumudi and Krishnamoorthy ad loc.

L  Of these: the sense is, "although there are two varieties." Well known: he means such things, well known in the world, as a lady's face, a garden, moonrise.¹ The construction is: "has been analysed in many ways into the figures simile, etc." The Vṛttī explains the word "others" of the Kārikā by "those who have made definitions," etc. We shall therefore not expatiate: the Vṛttī shows that by this particular negation the remainder remains unnegated; so it says "we merely mention it," etc.²

1. Abhinava here lists objects that might serve as ālambana or uddīpana-vibhāva-s for the production of rāsa.  2. The negation is a particular one. It does not negate all mention of the literal meaning.

K  On the other hand, the suggested is something different, found in the works of great poets. It is that which appears as [something] separate from the well-known elements [of poetry], just as charm in a woman [is something that appears different from the well-known individual parts of her body].

A  The suggested, on the other hand, is something which is found in the speech of great poets, different from the literal meaning. It is that which is well-known to sensitive readers and is separate from the known, ornamented, elements [of poetry], after they have been examined, being thus like charm in women. For just as charm is a certain something in women, a feast to the eyes of the discriminating, distinct from all
the parts of the body after they have been examined, just so is this suggested meaning.

\[ L \]  Something different: The word punar ("on the other hand") reinforces the difference [of the implied meaning] from the literal. What he means is both "different from that" and at the same time "the very essence [of poetry]." The plural in great poets conveys the fact that this [suggested meaning] extends throughout their works. In fact, the title of "great poet" is used only of a poet who has the inspiration needed to produce poetry which is enlivened with suggested meanings such as we shall explain in this work. It is because [a suggested meaning] of this sort exists that it is apprehended. For it does not stand to reason that something completely non-existent should be apprehended. Even the silver [for which we mistake the mother-of-pearl] is not wholly unreal. The apprehension of something is due to its actual existence; and so from apprehension we infer existence. This is as much as to say that what appears is such as it appears. For the purpose of syllogistic demonstration [one may say that] the well-known literal meaning is that which will be shown to have a property [i.e., is that which forms the pakṣa of the inference]. It has that property by its being accompanied by an implied meaning distinct [from the literal]. It is thus because it so appears, as do the limbs of a woman endowed with charm.

'Well-known: The word prasiddha has the two senses "well-known to all" and "ornamented."'

That which (yaṭ tāḍ): [By its indefiniteness] the double pronoun shows two characteristics of both the example [viz., charm in women] and that which the example illustrates [viz., the implied meaning]: namely, that neither can be precisely described—this serves to emphasize the aesthetic effect—and that each is readily mistaken for that with which it is intimately combined, [charm being confused with beauty of the limbs and the implied meaning being confused with the literal]. The Vṛtti renders this by a certain something. For charm is revealed by the configuration of the limbs, but is a special property different from [that of] any particular part. Charm does not consist in the mere faultlessness of the limbs or in their association with ornaments. For we find that discriminating critics will say of a woman, "She is not really beautiful," even though the parts of her body on being examined are found to exhibit no fault, such as dullness of the eye, and even though her
limbs be ornamented with jewels. On the other hand, of a woman who is not such, they may exclaim that she is the very paragon of ambrosial charm.  

1. Abhinava is here attributing to Ánanda the anyathākhyāti theory of error. In our errors we do not invent objects. The erroneously perceived object is not unreal, but is merely in a place or relation other than that in which it is perceived. This is the standard Nyāya-Vaśesika theory of error.

2. For prasiddha in the sense of ornamented see Kum.Sam. 5.9 and 7.16, on which Mallinātha quotes Amarakosa: prasiddha khyātabhūṣitau; so also Ragh. 18.41.  3. The basic difference between the single pronoun yad and the compound yat tad is that the latter is indefinite whereas the former is definite. See Speyer 287c. Abhinava goes on to specify two ways in which the double pronoun is here indefinite.

4. The distinction is admirably put by an ancient Roman: *non est formosa cuius crus laudatur aut brachium sed ulla cuius universa facies admirationem partibus singulis abstulit* (Seneca. Epist. 33.5): "She is not *formosa* [= Sanskrit *lāvanyavatī*; the word is opposed to *bella* or *pulchra*] whose thigh or whose arm is praised, but she whose whole configuration steals our admiration from the individual parts."

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A  For this meaning, implied by force of the literal sense, will be shown to be divisible into several categories: a simple thing (*vastumātra*), a figure of speech, a *rasa*, etc. In each of these varieties what is suggested is different from the literal meaning. Thus, even the first variety [viz., *vastudhvani*] is totally different from the literal sense. For sometimes where the literal meaning is an injunction, the suggested meaning takes the form of a prohibition.

1. Throughout the book reference will be made to "*rasa*, etc." (*rasādi*). The term refers to all the elements that belong to *rasadhvani*: not only *rasa* but *bhāva*, *rasabhāsa*, *bhāvabhāsa*, *bhāvodaya*, *bhāvasandhi*, *bhāvasabala*, and *bhāvaprasama*. For definitions see 1.4 g L and for examples 2.3 L.

L  Now it may be objected that charm is widely recognized to be different [from beauty of the limbs], but we do not know what a
suggested meaning is; much less is there any general recognition that it is different [from the literal]. So the hetu of the syllogism [viz., "because it so appears"] is untrue. Anticipating such an objection, [the Vṛtti] states the nature [of this suggested meaning] in the words for this meaning, etc.; and in the words in each of these varieties, etc., it will establish the fact that it is generally recognized as different.

Here we may begin by distinguishing two varieties of suggested meaning, a workaday variety and a variety that is found to operate only in poetry. The workaday sort is that which may take the place of a literal form of expression; and its types, such as injunction, prohibition, etc., are designated by the term vastu ("things"). This workaday dhvani is in turn twofold. One type, a sense which enjoyed the nature of an alaṅkāra, being in the form of a simile, etc., as it was exhibited in some previous [literal], sentence-meaning, is now [in the suggestive mode of speech] no longer an alaṅkāra because there is no other factor to which it can be subordinated. But because of our recognition of it from the past, it is still called alaṅkāradhvani, much as a śramana (Buddhist monk) who was once a brahmin is called a brahmin śramaṇa. On the other hand, what lacks this special form is called [suggestion of] a simple thing (vastu-mātra). By the word simple (mātra) the other form is excluded.

On the other hand, rasa is something that one cannot dream of expressing by the literal sense. It does not fall within workaday expression. It is, rather, of a form that must be tasted by an act of blissful relishing on the part of a delicate mind through the stimulation (anurāga) of previously deposited memory elements which are in keeping with the vibhāvas and anubhāvas, beautiful because of their appeal to the heart, which are transmitted by [suggestive] words [of the poet]. The suggesting of such a sense is called rasadhvani and is found to operate only in poetry. This, in the strict sense of the word, is the soul of poetry.

When Bhaṭṭaṇāyaka says that dhvani could form "only a part of poetry, not the very self" (cf. 1.1 e L), if by any stretch of the imagination this could be considered a valid reproach, it would be so only in respect to vastudhvani and alaṅkāradhvani. He himself has [in effect] admitted that rasadhvani is the soul of poetry by his setting the third mode of speech, which he identifies as the relishing of rasa, far beyond the mode of designation (abhidhā) and aesthetic efficacy (bhāvanā). That vastudhvani and alaṅkāradhvani lead to rasadhvani alone is a matter
that we shall illustrate from time to time in what follows. So we let
the matter rest for now.

Implied by force of the literal sense: this characterization holds
for all three varieties of dhvani, for although suggestion is an operation
of the word, the force of meaning never fails to act as an auxiliary cause;
so we may speak of the suggestive operation as being implied by force
of the literal sense. Even in that variety of dhvani called sabdaśakti-
mulanurananavayaṅya (that form of suggestion which is similar to a
reverberation and which is dependent on the suggestive power of words;
for this type see 2.20-21 below), we shall show that our understanding
of the implied meaning comes from the force of the literal sense, the
power of words being only a subordinate auxiliary.

Is totally different: no one will gainsay the fact that injunction
and prohibition contradict one another. That is why he illustrates them
first.

1. The following remarks of Abhinava will be more easily understood
if the reader will keep in mind the three traditional types of suggestion:
(a) vastudhvani: suggestion of a thing. What is covered by the term “thing”
is extremely various: a prohibition may be suggested, or an injunction, or a
fact, or a situation. (b) alankāradhvani: what is suggested seems to be a figure
of speech. (c) rasadhvani: what is suggested is a rasa, bhāva, etc. Abhinava
magnifies the value of the last type. To him it is vastly more beautiful than the
other two and it alone forms the real soul of poetry. So he begins his analysis
of suggested meaning by setting forth just two categories: poetic suggestion
(= rasadhvani) and workaday suggestion (= all other forms of dhvani). All
workaday suggestion, he says, is really the suggestion of things (vasta), but
one particular type of thing occasions a special designation. When the thing
suggested seems to be a figure of speech, we call it alankāradhvani. 2. This
is the essential characteristic of workaday dhvani. The sense given by poe-
etic dhvani (= rasadhvani) cannot be expressed by any other verbal means.
On the other hand, prohibitions (cf. the suggested prohibition in the verse
quoted under 1.4 b), injunctions (cf. 1.4 c), figures of speech—all these can be
expressed by either a literal or a suggested mode of speech. 3. Alankāra-
dhvani is discussed in Chapter Two of the present work, esp. 2.21 e, but some
anticipation of what is there said is needed if the reader is to understand
what Abhinava says here. Take the illustration of rūpaka-dhvani atrāntare
ajṛmbhata grīṃmabhidhānah phulamalikādhvalāṭṭahāsa mahākālaḥ. Here
the literal meaning, as demanded by the context (a description of the passage
of time), is: “Then expanded the long season called Summer, in which there
was a blossoming of the market stalls which were white with jasmine.” But
the power of words suggests a non-contextual meaning, viz.: “Then yawned
the God of Destruction, whose terrible laughter is white as jasmine." The confrontation of the second meaning with the first suggests a figure of speech, viz., rūpaka: the long season of summer is a god of destruction. Now this figure of speech can perfectly well be furnished, and in another context might well have been furnished, by the literal sense of a sentence rather than by a suggestion. Note further that the suggestion is not, strictly speaking, an alāṅkāra, for Ānanda will define an alāṅkāra as something subordinate. Just as jewelry is subordinate to the limb or body on which it is worn, so a figure of speech is subordinate to a sentence meaning, a rasa, bhāva, etc. But in the rūpaka-dhvani just instanced there is nothing to which the dhvani is subordinated. It is itself the sentence meaning. Accordingly, it is only by a fashion of speech that this can be called alāṅkāra-dhvani.

4. Strictly speaking, a sramana cannot be a brahmin, for his initiation will have forced him to give up all marks and distinctions of caste.

5. The long compound would be easier to understand if we read samudita in place of samucita, as does the KM edition. The more careful editions, though, give only samucita.

6. At 1.5 L, etc.

A For example:

Go your rounds freely, gentle monk;
the little dog is gone.
Just today from the thickets by the Godā
came a fearsome lion and killed him.

[Sattasaī 2.75]

1. The text of the verse is given with better readings in Weber’s edition of the Sattasaī:

bhama dharmīva viśaddho so sunaho ajjha mārio teṇa /
golādaviaśakudāṅgavāsīnā daryasiheṇa //

In Sanskrit, if we disregard meter, this would be:

bhrama dhārmīka viśrabdhah sa śunaka ‘dya māritas tena /
godāvartiṇaśakuskūṭiṇa jāvāsīnā daryaśimheṇa //

The word kudāṅga is given by Hemacandra in the Abhidhāna-cintamani (1115) in the sense of kunja. For daria (Sk. darya) “fearsome, causing fear,” see
gana on Pan. 5.1.2. The traditional rendering by drptā is incorrect: drptā would become ditta in Prakrit. As regards the meaning of the verse, one may correct Abhinava’s comment by the remarks of Mammaṭa p. 253 (5.139) and his commentators as well as those of Hemacandra (KA 1.19). A religious mendicant has hitherto been frightened away from a certain house by the family dog, but has wandered along the riverbank nearby, gathering flowers for pūjā. Now, the young wife of the house has been accustomed to steal out and meet her lover in a grove by the riverbank. She fears interruption by the mendicant and furthermore begrudges him the loss of flowers from her trysting spot. So she tells him that the dog has been killed by a lion who lives in the thickets by the river. As Mammaṭa puts it, the invitation to the mendicant, through the death of the dog, to make his rounds at the house suggests that he will no longer make visits to the riverbank when he hears of the lion.

L [Abhinava begins by translating the Prakrit verse into Sanskrit. He renders the second half as godāvariṇadikālalatāgahanavāsinā drptasimhena: “by a proud (or fierce) lion dwelling in the thicket of vines by the bank of the Godāvari River.” He then explains the meaning of the verse.]

These are the words of a certain woman spoken in order to save a trysting place, close to her heart, from the intrusions of a mendicant and from his spoiling its beauty by plucking its leaves and flowers. His walking in that place1 is a natural activity that has been inhibited by fear of a dog; so the injunction here is merely the absence of prevention that arises from lifting of a ban and is not an original command; for the imperative inflection here conveys the sense [not of command but] of permission (atisarga) or of “the proper time to do something” (prāptakāla) [Pan. 3.3.163]. As there is contradiction between an activity [e.g., walking] and its absence, both cannot be directly expressed [by the same word] simultaneously. Nor can they be expressed by this word successively, for the dictum, “Abhidhā cannot express the individual,” etc.,2 states that after the denotative function has once ceased to operate, it cannot operate again.

[Objections from the Abhihitānvaya-vāda and their rebuttal.]

Now according to the view of the abhihitānvaya-vāda, the expressive power of the sentence (tātparya-sakti), without coming to rest [in a permission], produces a notion of prohibition as the sense of the sentence.3
It does this by the cooperation of the speaker's intention (vivakṣa) with the secondary assignment of reversed sense (vīparīta-lakṣāṇā) to the words, brought about by a contradiction, that is, by the blocking of the primary sense [here in the form of “you may wander fearlessly”] which is not construable with the sense of the words “fierce [lion],” “pi­ous monk,” and “that [dog].” Thus the final meaning is entirely based on the [denotative] power of the words. And this is what we find in actual communication. People say, “This is what he said” [not “This is what he suggested”]. So there is no other sort of meaning here than the literal [i.e., there is no dhvani].

But this is not true, for one can observe three semantic operations in this verse. The operation of denotation (abhidhā) conveys senses that are of a general nature, for denotation is a semantic power which depends on convention, and convention is tied to the general; it lacks reference to the specific individual, for otherwise there would be no end [to the conventions that would have to be made for each word] and there would be failure of a word connected with one [individual to refer to other individuals of the same class]. After abhidhā, the power of tātparya conveys the sentence sense, in which [the general and unconnected] word senses are particularized and mutually connected according to the maxim, "The general senses [of the words] lead to a particularized sense, for if that were not the case, no effect could ensue." Now in the example under discussion, in the second stage [i.e., in the moment when tātparya operates], nothing more is understood than the injunction “you may go,” for this is what is furnished by the mere syntax of the words [i.e., by the syntax as opposed to the other semantic factors]. Such is not the case in the examples “There is a village on the Ganges,” or “The boy is a lion.” For in those examples, the syntax [i.e., the logical connection between the sense of the different words], while it is on the point of taking place, is thwarted because of the inherent absurdity. But in the case of the present stanza there is no such difficulty with regard to the logical connection between the senses of the different words: “That dog, which prevented you from going, has been killed by the lion and therefore, because of the absence of that which prevented your going, it is now proper for you to go.” Therefore no blocking of the primary sense can be suspected and accordingly there is no occasion for lakṣāṇā (secondary usage, metonymy) to give a reversed sense. [What we have here is rather suggestion (dhvani).]

Or we may even admit [for the sake of argument] that there is lakṣa­ṇā here. Still, it cannot be said to occupy the second stage [i.e., to
operate simultaneously with the force of tātparya]. For lakṣanā takes
place when there is a blocking of the primary sense. This blocking
takes the form of an apprehension of inconsistency. In the case of the
present stanza, there is no inconsistency in the sense of the words them­
selves. Should you argue that they are inconsistent with each other,
that must be understood as an inconsistency with regard to the syntax.
Now there can be no apprehension of this inconsistency until the syn­
tax is understood, and the understanding of the syntax does not come
about through abhidhā, for abhidhā exhausts itself in conveying the
[individual] word-meanings and has no power to function further. Our
understanding of the syntax comes about only through tātparya-sakti.

It has been objected that if that were the case, there would be an
apprehension of syntax even in the phrase, “There are a hundred elephants
on the tip of my finger.” Well, we reply, is there not an apprehension of
syntax in that phrase, as there is not in the phrase, “Ten pomegranates,
six pancakes,” etc.? [Of course there is,] but this syntax, although it
has been understood, is countered by other valid means of cognition,
such as perception, as in the cognition “There is silver” in regard to
mother-of-pearl. Hence, the sentence which conveys such a meaning
is not valid. In the example “The boy is a lion,” on the other hand,
there arises a third power called lakṣanā, which is different from both
the power of abhidhā and the power of tātparya. It arises immediately
after the emergence of the factors repugnant to the syntactical connec­
tion conveyed by the power of tātparya belonging to the second stage
and it is able to neutralize those repugnant factors.

Our opponent may object: “If this were so, such examples as ‘The boy
is a lion’ would be poetry, because, as you will shortly say, the soul of
poetry, which you define as suggestion, is found in such examples as well
[as in poems which exhibit rasa].” To which we answer no; one might as
readily say that a clay pot is alive, because, as the soul is omnipresent,
it must be in the pot as well. Should you try to reply to this answer
by saying that it is only when the soul is present in a body that serves
as basis for particular [sense faculties and the like], and not when the
soul is present in any other sort of locus, that we speak of life, very
well, we will employ the title “poetry” only when dhvani is embodied
in a composition containing guṇas, figures of speech, propriety, and
beautiful words and meanings. But in neither case does the soul [or
dhvani] lose its precious nature.

One cannot say that dhvani is simply bhakti (associated usage), for bhakti
is the same as the operation called lakṣanā and it belongs
to the third stage [of verbal understanding], whereas the operation of suggestion belongs to the fourth stage. We may put the argument thus. You have agreed that *laksanā* comes into play on the concurrence of three conditions. Of these the first, which is the blocking of the primary sense, is based on other means of cognition, such as perception. [The second,] which is known as the cause, i.e., such relations [between the primary and secondary objects] as proximity, etc., can also be understood from other means of cognition. But the purpose [for which the secondary sense has been employed] are notions such as the extreme holiness, coolness, fitness to be visited, etc., in the case of the village, or the extreme courage in the case of the boy, notions which cannot be expressed in other words and for which there is no other valid means of cognition. In our cognizing of these [notions] the process cannot be other than verbal, [as we shall now demonstrate.]

[The process cannot be inferential.] To infer the existence of qualities [like holiness in the village] from its proximity [to a holy river] would be to draw an inference faulty because of an ambivalent *hetu*.

In the case of the boy, the fact that he is referred to by the word “lion” will constitute only an illusory (*asiddha*) *hetu*.

Or, if the inference appears in the following form: “Wherever there is use of a word [e.g., ‘lion’] in such a way [viz., as in ‘the boy is a lion,’ where the word ‘lion’ is not used as denotation but by *laksanā*], there is the existence of those qualities,” it will be necessary to furnish another supporting means of cognition [such as perception] at the time of comprehending the *vyāpti*. And there is no valid supporting cognition.

Nor is this [knowledge of the purpose, viz., to furnish a suggestion of holiness, etc.] a case of remembrance, because it is not possible to remember something we have not experienced. And there is no rule of association by which we could determine what the speaker intended [namely, just this property and not some other]; so there would be no way of determining the meaning. Therefore, the operation [of understanding] in these cases must be verbal.

The verbal operation cannot be the operation of direct designation (*abhidhā*) because there is no conventional association here. It cannot be the operation of sentence meaning (*tātparya*), because that operation exhausts itself in giving us our apprehension of the syntax. It cannot be the operation of secondary usage or metonymy (*laksanā*), because it lacks the stumbling gait (*skhaladgati*) that *laksanā* assumes due to [the blocking of the direct object], a reason already mentioned. For if this operation too ran a halting course, it could only be because its
primary goal was blocked, which could only be because of some further purpose or intended goal (prayojana), so that an infinite series of intended goals would ensue. Accordingly, the name lakṣita-lakṣanā (secondary operation arising from a secondary operation), given by a certain author to this type of operation, is a piece of stubborn perversity. We are thus forced to admit that this is a fourth type of operation, distinct from abhidhā, tātparya, and lakṣanā, one which has been described by such closely related terms as suggesting (dhvanana), indicating (dyotana), hinting (vyāñjana), giving a notion (pratyāyana), and giving to understand (avagama). As will be said:

When a word abandons its primary operation and reveals an object by secondary usage, the purpose for which this is done is one to which the word moves without interruption (1.17 K).

So then: the power of denotation is the power, regulated by convention, to convey the literal sense [of the individual words]; the power of sentence-operation is the power to convey a sense [of the whole], a power which is aided by the impossibility of the literal sense without it; the power of secondary usage is the power to reveal a sense as regulated by such cooperating factors as the blocking of the primary sense; the suggestive power is the power to suggest, a power which has its origin in one's understanding of objects revealed by the first three powers, and which is then assisted by the imagination of the listener which has been prepared by these revelations.

This suggestive power, this suggestive operation, overshadows the three operations which precede it and is the very soul of poetry. This is the author's intention; and although this power has for its object in this verse the purpose [for which the metonymy was used, viz., the saving of the trysting place and the adulterous intentions of the speaker], still, as these notions are introduced by the notion of a prohibition, the author has spoken simply of its having a prohibition for its object.

The preceding has been said merely for the sake of argument. In truth there is no secondary usage (lakṣanā) in the verse in question, for neither is the primary meaning entirely set aside here, nor is it shifted to another meaning. In fact there is never any operation of this [secondary power] in the type of suggestion which is based on the power of meaning. And it is obvious that from a difference in cooperating causes one may have a difference of power. One and the same word may operate, when aided by the memory of a concomitance (vyāpti), as an inferential mark for the apprehension of the speaker's intention, and,
when aided by sense perception, as that which renders the perception determinate. So much, then, is incontrovertible by those who hold to the abhihitānvaya-vāda.

[Objections of the Anvitābhidhāna-vāda and their rebuttal.]

Now the school of anvitābhidhāna holds dearly to the doctrine that "the word’s meaning is that to which the word [finally] leads," and would have it that the denotative operation continues longer and longer, like the course of an arrow. We ask them: if the operation continues so long, how can it be one, for its objects will be various? And if it is more than one, it stands to reason that it consists in heterogeneous elements, because both its objects and its cooperating causes are various. Furthermore, if its effects were homogeneous, it would have to pause at each object and then operate again. But such repeated operation of a word, an activity, or a cognition is ruled out by [all] metaphysicians, while if you admit that its effects are heterogeneous, why, this is our very position.

But perhaps our opponent, in speaking of longer and longer operation, means only that the meaning found in the last stage of apprehension is expressed so rapidly by the sentence [that this final, suggested meaning appears to be furnished by the initial semantic operation]. But how can this meaning possibly be understood when there is no convention connecting it [with word or sentence]? Our opponent may answer that conventions subsist between the causal factors [namely, the individual words and their meanings] and are therefore unnecessary between the result and its meaning. Now, look at the skill of this Vedic scholar! Here he is saying that the later understanding of the individual words—for according to his theory it does come later—becomes a cause of the meaning which occupies the final stage, a meaning which [according to his theory of semantics] enters the apprehension first. Why, this Mīmāṁsaka might claim to be the descendant of his own great-grandson!

Our opponent might claim that such understanding [viz., of the final meaning] occurs only to one who has previously been initiated into the conventions [of the initial, denotative meanings]; and because the matter stands thus, the [initial] meanings do act as a cause. But by recourse to this argument he would not be saying anything of use. Furthermore, in our opponent’s theory there is no previous understanding of the individual word-meanings, for they are invariably used in sentences
[which are understood as wholes before the meaning of their components can be inferred]. If he says that such understanding does indeed come about by insertion and removal (āvāpoduapābhyām), this is tantamount to saying that the convention applies to individual words [which are general] and that the understanding of the specific [sentence meaning] comes later.

Now [the anvītābhidhānāvādin] may say, "The final sentence meaning occurs to us immediately; there is no way around it." This is a fact that we too are not unwilling to accept. Our author will go on to say:

Just so does the suggested sense flash forth in an instant in the minds of the intelligent auditors who are averse to the literal sense and in quest of the real meaning (1.12 K).

But this is because the auditor has considered the subject so often that the succession, which must be hypothesized, is not felt, because there is no overt manifestation of succession among notions that belong to the same category, just as we are unaware of succession in our memory of concomitance and verbal convention. A relation of cause and effect [between the initial meaning and the final meaning] must be accepted if we are to keep the secondary sense, of either metaphorical (gauna) or relational (lākṣaṇīka) type, distinct from the literal sense, or [if our opponent is] to avoid impugning the doctrine that "of the six exegetical criteria—direct statement (sruti), implication (liṅga), etc.—each that follows in the list is weaker than those which precede" (Mīmāṃsā S. 3.3.14), for this can only be justified by the causal efficacy [of different sorts of meaning]. And if you accept a variety of causal efficacy, what point is there in your ill will toward us?

[Remarks on the Sphoṭavāda.]

Those too who claim that both sentence and sentence meaning are an indivisible entity called the sphoṭa, when they descend into the world of communication, follow our system in all respects. Above that world, of course, everything is brahma, which is identical with God Supreme: a point of view not unknown to our author, who also wrote a work called Tat.tvāloka. So now enough.

[Bhaṭṭanāyaka's interpretation refuted.]

Bhaṭṭanāyaka has said: "In this verse our understanding of the prohibition is brought about by the entrance of bhāyānaka-rasa (the flavor
of the timorous) through the use of the words ‘fierce lion,’ etc., with the use of the word ‘pious,’ for there would be no understanding of the prohibition in any other way if we lacked an understanding of the two characters [portrayed] here as fierce and as timid respectively. So it is not simply the suggestive force of the situation that causes this understanding.”

To this we reply [as follows]. Who ever said that without an understanding of the particular speaker and the particular person addressed, and without the operation of suggestion that belongs to the words, there could be an understanding of the prohibition? We have said that it is essential to suggestion that it be helped out by the imagination of the hearer. And we do not [even] rule out the entrance of the bhayänaka-rasa, for we admit that it may arise from a simple [emotion (bhāva) of] fear. And this rasa may enter the hearer if the rasa is manifested [in the verse]. But the rasa must be suggested. Its being directly denoted is not admitted even by Bhaṭṭanāyaka; so it must be suggested. Furthermore, this rasa does not necessarily enter the hearer, for the sensitive reader is not necessarily similar to the timid monk. Or, if Bhaṭṭanāyaka supposes a special nature of the reader [viz., that he must be aesthetically sensitive to fear] to be a cooperating cause [in producing rasa], why should he be so opposed to an operation of suggestion enlivened by the imagination of both speaker and hearer? What is more, by trying to deny vastudhvani in the verse, he has made out a case for rasadhvani. What a powerful critic of dhvani he turns out to be! As has been said, “Even the anger of a god is like a gift.”

If he should claim that all that has been shown [by this example] is the supremacy of rasadhvani, who would deny it? But then, he might say, it was not right to adduce this verse as an example of mere vastudhvani. To this we reply that as this example is of poetry, let it exemplify two types of dhvani; what harm is there? But if he insists on the mixture with rasa, know that a mixture with the bhayänakarasa does not sit well in the mirror of a connoisseur’s heart. Rather (the connoisseur will feel that) in this verse there is the erotic rasa, which arises in the manner we have described, from a mixture of vibhāvas and anubhāvas: we have the trysting place serving as a vibhāva (stimulating determinant) of the [basic emotion which is] the desire for intercourse; and we have such anubhāvas (symptoms) as a specific tone of voice appropriate [to the mention of a trysting place].

It is because rasa is unworldly and cannot be understood straight off that the author has begun with this example of vastudhvani, intending
thereby to exhibit [an instance of literal and suggested meanings that are] indisputably distinct, [viz.,] injunction and prohibition.

As for him who set himself up as an explainer of dhvani and said that it was nothing but the power of sentence-meaning (tātparya-sākṣī) or inference of intention (vivākṣā-sūcakatva), he does not appeal to us. As they say, "Each to his own taste." As we shall deal with this later in the book as occasion arises, let the matter rest for the present.

[Glossing the words of the verse.]

Go your rounds: you are permitted; it is time for you to wander. Pious monk: it is appropriate for you to wander about gathering flowers for pūjā. Freely: because of the removal of the cause of your hesitation. The little dog: viz., he who caused your slender little body to tremble with fear. Just today: the sense is that you have had a stroke of luck. Killed: so he will not appear again. Lion: that lion whom you heard about from hearsay and who lives in the thickets along the Godāvari. For, to protect [her trysting place] she had already seen to it that he was told [of such a rumor]. But now, because of his fierceness, he has emerged from the thickets. So the monk's going anywhere near the bank of the Godāvari is out of the question; how much more his entering the thickets.

1. The word tatra ("in that place") is misleading. If the dog had frightened the mendicant from the trysting place, there would be no reason for the woman to invent a lion by which to terrify him further. We prefer the interpretation given above (1.4 b A, note 1). 2. The quotation is said to be from Maṇḍana Miśra (so Jhalkikar on KP, p. 44). The full line is: vīśeyāḥ nābhidhā gacchet kṣīṇasaktir viśeṣane, "as the power of direct designation is exhausted in [denoting] the classifying character, it cannot operate on the classified individual." Maṇḍana followed the Mīmāṃsā theory that words denote class characters or universals. When we say gām ānaya, "bring ... cow" (Sanskrit lacks the definite article), the word gām refers directly to gotvam (bovinity). The sense of a particular cow, or the cow, characterized by bovinity, is given only by the sentence meaning, which depends on context. The verse here quoted is Maṇḍana's refutation of an opponent who argues that the word gām might denote both the universal and the particular. It cannot do so, he says, because the abhidhā (power of direct designation) in a word dies after it has once operated. Abhinava in the present passage uses Maṇḍana's dictum to show that we cannot let bhāma ("go" or "walk") in the exemplar verse designate directly two different things ("go your round" and "do not go into the thickets"). It can mean directly only one of these; the other
meaning must be furnished by a different semantic power, viz., suggestion.

3. The abhihitänvaya doctrine, held by the Bhattachārya-Mimamsakas, or followers of Kumārila, holds that the final sentence meaning (tātparya) is furnished by the syntax (anvaya) of the directly expressed (abhihita) meanings of the individual words. The meanings of the individual words are universals; the tātparya is specific. The doctrine is directly opposed to the anvītabhidhāna view of Prabhākara, which argues that there is no need for two semantic powers here. All meanings, according to Prabhākara, are specific, the signification (abhidhāna) of words being understood only with reference to the specific acts and situations in which they are involved (anvita).

4. The three operations that Abhinava here points to are abhidhā, tātparya, and vyājana (dhvanana).

5. If you tell a boy "gām ānaya," he cannot direct his action to the class character bovinity. He can only act with regard to a particular cow. Accordingly, we are forced to understand these sentences by the semantic power of lakṣaṇā (secondary usage or metonymy). They mean, respectively, "There is a village on the bank of the Ganges," and "The boy is brave as a lion." Note that the Sanskrit sentence gangāyām ghośah, unlike the English translation, "a village on the Ganges," is literally impossible. The locative case does not mean as wide a span of meaning as the English preposition "on," which may mean "by the side of" as well as physically "on top of." The Sanskrit phrase means literally a village situated in the Ganges, so if we take the phrase literally, we will suppose that the inhabitants are drowning.

6. If one admits that lakṣaṇā is at work in the verse "bhama dhām-mia," the nature of the verse's suggestion (dhvani) will differ from what it was taken to be when the operation of lakṣaṇā was denied. Without lakṣaṇā the suggestion in the verse is a vastudhvani that takes the form of a prohibition, viz., "you must not wander into the thickets by the river." With lakṣaṇā, the prohibition is furnished by lakṣaṇā and the suggestion becomes a rasadhvani, viz., a suggestion of the love between the speaker of the verse and the man the speaker hopes to meet at the tryst.

7. The words na hi (Kashi ed. p. 57, line 2; Vidyābhavana ed. p. 55, line 2) construe with kācit kṣatiḥ (Kashi 57.5; Vidy. 55.5). If one admits that lakṣaṇā is at work in the verse "bhama dhām-mia," the nature of the verse's suggestion (dhvani) will differ from what it was taken to be when the operation of lakṣaṇā was denied. Without lakṣaṇā the suggestion in the verse is a vastudhvani that takes the form of a prohibition, viz., "you must not wander into the thickets by the river." With lakṣaṇā, the prohibition is furnished by lakṣaṇā and the suggestion becomes a rasadhvani, viz., a suggestion of the love between the speaker of the verse and the man she hopes to meet at the tryst.

8. Literally, "Why should there be no apprehension of syntax here, as in 'ten pomegranates,' etc.?' BP says that Abhinava here furnishes an example by giving the opposite (vaidharmyena drśṭāntam āha). "Angulyagre," etc., does have syntax: "daśā dādimāni," etc., does not. The latter quotation is from Mahābhāṣya on 1.1.3, Vārt. 2 (repeated on 1.2.45). It became a standard example of word groups that are meaningless because of lack of syntax. The full quotation is: daśā dādimāni saḍ apūpaḥ kundam ajājinam
palalapindha adharorukam etat kumaryah sphayakrtasya pitā pratisinah, “ten pomegranates six pancakes basin goatskin sesame seed-cake petticoat this of a girl of sword-maker’s-son the father curdled.” The individual words have meaning and one can even make sentence meanings out of some of the component parts by supplying the verb to be (e.g., “there are ten pomegranates”), but there is still no syntax of the whole. The whole is not absurd but meaningless. 11. The fact that suggestion is found in many utterances—it is found in connection with all tropes and metonymies unless they have become frozen—does not cheapen it. It remains the central and most essential element in poetry. If one seeks a more precise nomenclature, one may call the unpoetic uses of suggestion vastudhwani, saving the term rasadhwani for the type of suggestion that is poetically effective.

12. Abhinava here gives his clearest proof of the difference between dhvani and laksana; the matter is not treated by Ánanda until later on (1.14) and his distinction is not so clear. 13. The inference “That village possesses holiness because it is close to the Ganges” suffers from ambivalence because the hetu “proximity to the Ganges” occurs in upaksha objects (e.g., unholy objects such as filth and dead bodies) as well as sapaksa objects (holy objects such as temples or the village in question). For the fault of anākāntikatva in inference, see N.S. 1.2.5 and the commentaries thereon.

14. An illusory probans (asiddha-hetuh) is one which does not really occur in the minor term (pakṣa). For example, if we argue hrado vahnimān dhūmāt, “the lake contains fire because it has smoke,” the probans, smoke, is asiddha, for there really is no smoke on the lake. Now there may be mist or fog on the lake, but a probans in the specific form (rūpa) of smoke is absent. Hence the probans in such an example may be more precisely termed svapāsiddha: “not found in that specific form in the pakṣa.” To come to the case at hand: the Mīmāṃsaka wishes to argue that we arrive at the notion of the boy’s extraordinary courage by an inference: the boy has extraordinary courage because he is simhasabdavācyā, “denoted in a primary sense by the word ‘lion’.” But that is just the point. The boy is not so denoted; he is denoted, that is, spoken of in a primary sense, by the word “boy.” So the Mīmāṃsaka must substitute a different inference.

15. An inference must always be backed up by perception and memory. If someone says, “The boy is courageous (parākramavān māṇavakah),” we can infer courage to be a property of the boy, because we have perceived courage in a number of persons who were directly denoted to us as parākramavān and we have a memory of those perceptions. But in the case of a metaphor no such background exists. We will have observed “lion” used metaphorically of persons who are cruel, royal, proud, or courageous. Without any rule of association (niyama) we cannot determine by inference what the speaker’s intended meaning (vivakṣita) may be. We can arrive at that knowledge not by inference, nor by the previously mentioned powers of the word and sentence, but only by a separate power, suggestion, as Abhinava proceeds to demonstrate.

16. The samaya is between
17. The operation of *abhidhā* that runs from the word *gāṅgā* to a river runs a direct course. The operation of *lakṣaṇā* starts out from *gāṅgā* for a river but then shifts course to a river bank or some such nearby object. Accordingly, it runs an interrupted course. The course that runs from *gāṅgā* to the suggested meaning of purity again runs a direct course, being in this respect like the denotative operation and unlike the operation of metonymy. 18. Abhinava means that the term has been used only in order to avoid using the correct term “suggestion.” The term *laksitalaksanā* misrepresents the basic nature of the operation, which is not a *lakṣaṇā* at all because it lacks *skhaladgatīta*.

19. The substance and often the very words of the foregoing paragraph are repeated in Mammaṭa’s *Sādāvāyāpāṇivācāra*, pages 5–6.

20. The words *tadanyathānupapattyā* have given the commentators trouble. The *Kaumudī*’s explanation, which takes *tad* to refer to *abhidhāśakti*, seems the simplest. The power to convey a sentence meaning, a meaning which is of a specific situation that exists in the external world, is helped out by the fact that the individual word-meanings cannot be found in the world without it. In *gāmānāya* “bring the cow,” the *vācyrtha*, bovinity, cannot be found except as characterizing an individual cow such as we find in the sentence meaning. Hence we are forced to go on from the literal sense of the individual words to the specific sense of the sentence.

21. “The preceding” (etad) refers to everything that has been said in the English translation from “Or, we may even admit,” page 85, up to the present point; in the Sanskrit, from *bhqvatu vāsau* (Kashi ed. 57.7 to 63.2; Vidyābhavana ed. 55.7 to 61.3).

22. The reference is to the two types of suggestion which are based on *lakṣaṇā*: *atyantatiraskrtavācya* and *arthāntarasanākramitavācya*. They are described and identified later on (2.1 a–c). 23. Having given up the “admission for the sake of argument,” Abhinava comes to what he believes the nature of the suggestion truly to be in the verse in question. It belongs to the second great class of suggestion, called *vivāksitānyaparavācya* (2.1 Introduction and 2.2 A. note 1). Within this class it belongs to the type *samlaksyakramavācya* (2.2 K) and within that type to the sub-group *arthāsaktimūla* (2.20 K). In other words, he has now given up the interpretation by which the object suggested was taken to be the saving of the trysting place and the adulterous intentions of the speaker. The object is now taken to be the prohibition of the monk from wandering into the thicket. This is *vivāksitānyaparavācya* because the literal meaning (a permission) is subordinated to something else which is primarily intended. It is *samlaksyakramavācya* because we are aware of an interval between our understanding of the literal meaning and our understanding of the suggestion, as is not the case in *rasadhvani*. It is *arthāsaktimūla* because the suggestion is based on the force of the situation rather than on that of an ambiguous word.

24. A difficulty has arisen, which Abhinava seeks to solve by an analogy. The difficulty is this. How is it that the very
same words, "go your rounds freely, pious monk," may be said according to one theory to have the power and the operation of laksanā and according to another theory may be said to have the power and the operation of suggestion? This is possible, says Abhinava, by a change of cooperating causes. BP explains. If we suppose a blocking of the primary meaning to occur because that meaning is incompatible with "fearful lion," etc., a power of laksanā will arise in the words "go your rounds"; and the laksita meaning will be "do not go your rounds." On the other hand, if we are not aware—as we ought not to be, according to Abhinava—of this blockage and if, instead, we are aware of some special characteristic of the speaker (an adulteress) or of what she seeks to convey, a power of suggestion will arise in the words. An analogy is furnished by the word "Devadatta," let us say, in the sentence "This is Devadatta." The word may operate in the realm of inference, if we are seeking to infer that the speaker has an intention to convey certain information. It may operate within the realm of perception if we are seeking to form a determinate perception of the indeterminate thatness in front of our eyes. The powers that arise in words depend on the causes that cooperate with words in giving us our cognitions. 25. That is, the followers of Prabhākara; see note 3 above. 26. The Prabhākara doctrine of word-meaning is brought up again at 3.33 d L (the long operation). The Kaumudi here gives the following explanation of the simile of the arrow. Just as a swift-handed Bowman might shoot an arrow that would pierce his enemy's armor, then take the man's life and finally enter the earth, just so a single denotative operation may run on to the final stage of our comprehension, leaping through the intermediate stages. As so much of what Abhinava says in this section, this too has been taken over by Mammata (KP 5, Jhal. ed. p. 225, and Anand. ed. with Govinda and Nāgoji, p. 213). 27. Its objects: the literal meaning, the secondary meaning, the suggested meaning. Its cooperating causes: the convention, the blocking of the literal meaning, the special properties of speaker or context. 28. Cf. Śābara 1.1.25: padāni hi svam artham abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāṇi and cf. note 2 above. But the doctrine extends farther than to words. A given action carries only one result. If we do one good deed, we reap the benefit of that good deed only once; we do not continue to enjoy the benefit time after time. We make a valid cognition only once; it is valid only for the time at which we make it. We may perceive smoke on the mountain and infer that there is fire there now. We may not, after perceiving smoke today, infer tomorrow that there is fire there. 29. BP: "Because the person who has learned the conventions would understand the meaning that is conventionally associated with the denotative meaning (i.e., the meaning of the first stage). How would he come to understand the meaning of the final stage, for which there is no convention?" 30. Insertion and removal (āvāpa-udvāpa) is the method, according to the anvītābhidhāna-vāda and other schools, by which a child learns the meaning
of words; see KP ed. Jhalkikar, p. 221; ed. Anand. with Govinda and Nāgojī, p. 210. A child hears an older man say, “Devadatta, bring the cow,” and observes a younger man go and bring a cow. Later the child hears such sentences as “Caitra, bring the cow,” “Devadatta, bring the horse.” By the removal of words from, and the insertion of words in, the various slots of a sentence, the child gains a knowledge of the meaning of the individual words. 31. Because cause must precede result. 32. “The same category”: verbal, inferential, etc. We jump from the notion of Ganges to purity and holiness without awareness of the succession of our ideas, just as on seeing smoke we almost instantly conceive of fire, without being conscious of the concomitance, “where there is smoke there is fire”; or just as, on hearing the word “cow,” we understand the object cow without consciously remembering the convention, “the sound ‘c-o-w’ shall represent the class notion underlying an object with horns, hoofs, tail, etc.” 33. Cf. 1.1 K, note 2. 34. Abhinava is not fair here to the sphota-vāda. The grammarians conceived of sphota in the world of ordinary communication (vyāvahāra, avidyā) as well as in the rarified metaphysical world of param brahma. For sphota, see John Brough, “Theories of General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians,” Transactions of the Philological Society, 1951, and “Some Indian Theories of Meaning,” ibid., 1953; also K. A. Subrahmanija Iyer, “The Doctrine of Sphota,” Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Inst., Vol. 5, Pt. 2. 35. Presumably, this lost work dealt with metaphysics. The only other reference to it, so far as we know, is again by Abhinava; see 4.5 L and note 9. 36. See Corrections of the Kashi Text. Here, as elsewhere, Bhaṭṭanāyaka’s effort is to deny the need of positing dhvani in order to explain the verse. He supposes that a feeling of rasa is brought about by the verse’s bhāvakatva, its possession of bhāvanā or aesthetic efficacy. See Introduction, pp. 35–36 and 2.4 L. It here consists of the poet’s having so arranged the words as to impress on us the terror of the pious monk. Once we relish aesthetically the monk’s emotion, we shall understand ipso facto that the words of the verse amount to a prohibition. The term artha-sāmarthya (“suggestive force of the situation”) is approximately equal to vastu-dhvani. 37. It is a cause of some confusion in this passage that the same word, pratipattr, is used for the hearer in the verse, i.e., the pious monk, and the hearer of the verse, i.e., the reader or connoisseur. In the phrase vaktṛpratipattr-visēṣāsvagama the former must be meant. In pratipattr-pratibhā and in pratipattus ca rasāvesah the latter is meant. 38. The point is this. In a work of philosophy it would be considered a fault to give an example that illustrates two principles at once when you are concerned only with one. But in poetry to do so is inevitable, since so many verses contain more than one excellence. So Kau­mudi, p. 129: bahuvisayatvād ekasyāpi kāvyasya niyatagocaratvāt. 39. By “the method we have mentioned” is meant the method of suggestion following upon the literal sense. The thirty-nine syllable compound beginning sambhoga- is curiously compressed. Abhinava means that the śrīgārārasa
arises from a combination of anubhāvas appropriate to a vibhāva of the sthāyibhāva.

40. None of the commentators has identified the person to whom Abhinava is referring in this passage. Tātparyāsakti for dhvani would be a likely substitution for a Mīmāṃsaka. The Kaumudi finds the substitution of vivaksāsūcakatva to be characteristic of a Buddhist. 41. Ragh. 6.30. If this was not a proverb before Kālidāsa's time, it has become one since. 42. Abhinava's incorrect interpretation of the verse here leads him to a farfetched hypothesis.

A Sometimes when the literal meaning is a prohibition, this [suggested meaning] takes the form of an injunction (or invitation), as in:

Mother-in-law sleeps here, I there:
look. traveler, while it is light.
For at night when you cannot see
you must not fall into my bed.¹

1. The verse is a variant of Sattasaś 7.67, which has been imitated by the Sanskrit verse SRK 812. As in the case of the verse in 1.4 b above, one may analyse in either of two ways. If one finds no laksana in the verse, the suggestion will be simply an invitation to the traveler to come to the woman's bed. Presumably this was Ânanda's understanding. If one takes the invitation to be conveyed by laksana, the suggestion will be of the woman's love of the traveler. Viśvanātha gives this the title rasabhāsa rather than rasa because the underlying love is adulterous; see SD, p. 26, prose following the 9th verse quoted after 1.2.

L [After translating the Prakrit stanza into Sanskrit, Abhinava continues:] In the Prakrit, maha is an irregular form used in many senses. Here it has the sense of the genitive plural ("our"), not the genitive singular.¹ Had she referred specifically to herself, she would have aroused suspicion² and so have been unable [later] to receive him secretly.

[The situation is this.] The sprout of love has suddenly arisen in a traveler as he looks at a young woman whose husband is away from
home. By means of this prohibition she gives him permission. So, what we have here is an injunction that consists in the absence of prohibition. It is not a command, setting someone to do that which he has not set about, for such would be insulting to her opinion of her own charms. In keeping herewith is her hint in the word rātryandha ("blind at night") that he will be out of his senses with the desire that will come over him at that opportune time. As an action and its absence are self-contradictory, it is clear that the suggested sense is here different from the denoted sense.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka has said: "In this verse too, as in the preceding verse, the meaning is furnished verbally, by the woman’s conveying her state of desire by the use of the word 'I' (in 'I sleep there') accompanied by particular gestures." We reply that the word "I" does not directly denote this sense [of sexual eagerness]; while if, in conjunction with a tremor of the voice, it may hint at this sense, that may count as a help to the theory of dhvani, not a hindrance.

From the word "mother-in-law" it follows that he must make love quietly so that it may not be known. And in speaking of "this miserable day" (divasaka) she suggests, "I know that your heart is being shot in pieces by volleys of Love’s arrows and that I should take heed of you, but what can I do? The contemptible daylight is still with us." It is [called] contemptible because it is unsuitable for love. In Prakrit the distinction of masculine and neuter does not hold. "Nor do I fail entirely to take heed of you, as I remain right here. So look at me. I am not leaving you. We can get through the day with the solace of looking at each other’s face." Such is the meaning. And there is a suggestion that "you should not join me in bed, being blinded [by passion], the very minute it grows dark, but should be very secret and wait until you have discovered that sleep has overtaken this thorn in my flesh called a mother-in-law."

1. Maha, or, according to the Kaumudi reading, maham, is irregular and is used for various cases of the singular first person pronoun: accusative and genitive, the latter of which may also substitute for the dative. But it seems never to be used for the plural. The reason that prompts Abhinava to this interpretation is his overrefinement of the woman’s character. 2. Abhinava supposes that the words are spoken in the presence of the mother-in-law. 3. Ananda has quoted the verse as an example of vastudhvani, a suggestion which arises artha-sāmarthyat ("from the capability of the situation"). Bhaṭṭanāyaka is saying that the suggestion here does not arise from the situation; it arises from a skilful use of the word "aham." 4. Abhinava is
interpreting the word diasam of the Prakrit as though it formed an elliptical sentence, standing for divasako 'yam, "This is miserable daytime." He takes the suffix to be the -ka of contempt given in Pān. 5.3.74. The interpretation is wrong on both counts and forces him to find a reason for the supposed neuter gender of the word. It is not neuter, of course, but accusative masculine: "during the daytime." This is to explain how diasam has been used in the neuter (see preceding note). Actually, the grammarians permit divasa to be used as a neuter even in Sanskrit (Gaṇa on Pān. 2.4.31 and AK 1.1.3.5), but we do not remember ever having seen it so used.

A Sometimes the literal meaning is in the form of an injunction, while the suggested meaning takes a form that is neither [injunction nor prohibition]. Thus,

Go, and let the sighs and tears
be mine; nor let them rise
from you as well, tortured,
being without her, by your hateful courtesy.¹

¹. Found in a non-Vulgate version of the Sattasai (Weber 944). The literal sense of cd is probably "May they not arise from you, being without her, destroyed by your courtesy." But dakkhinna-haassa could (it is just possible) stand for ḍata-dākṣīṇasya, "possessing hateful (damned) courtesy." Weber's suggestion that haasa may represent ḍṛṣṭasya is improbable. The point of the verse lies in the lady's fury at her lover's affectionless politeness. Whether she says that the politeness is damned or that he is damned is not important. But it would ruin the verse to say that he is "carried away (ḥṛta) by politeness."

L Here the word "go" is an injunction. We understand from the verse the intention of a woman who has been slighted¹ and whose pride has been deeply wounded. Her intent is: "Your union with this other mistress was not a careless adventure, but arose from the deepest love, as may be seen from your change of color and from your having inadvertently called me by her name. You remain here only out of the
courtesy [of pretending] to maintain our former relationship. You are a complete hypocrite.” There is no [suggested] prohibition here in the form of not letting him go, nor is there a non-prohibition in the form of some other injunction.

1. Khanditā (“slighted”) has been defined by BhNŚ 22.217 as a woman whose lover fails to visit her at the accustomed time. What is there meant is probably a lady of the harem who misses out on her “turn.” SD defines the word as one whose lover arrives bearing signs of having enjoyed another. In the present instance the sign of the lover’s faithlessness seems to have been his calling the speaker by another woman’s name (gotraskhalana).

A Sometimes the literal meaning is in the form of a prohibition, while the suggested meaning takes a form that is neither [prohibition nor injunction]. Thus,

Turn back, I beg you. You are making trouble for other ladies stealing to their lovers.
The moonlight of your countenance destroys their covering darkness, wretched woman.¹

1. Supplement to Sattasai (Weber, No. 968). Cf. also Hemacandra AC 1.22 (K.Anu. p. 55) and Mahimabhaṭṭa p. 747. The verse is addressed to an abhisārikā, a woman who steals forth at night to visit her lover. The simple explanation of the stanza is that it is merely complimentary. One may remark further that much of the charm of the verse comes from its having hatāse for the last word, using it only after the pretty compliment has shown that the lady in fact is far from being what that term implies. Hatāse has much the same double sense that “wretched woman” has in English. It can be a term of compassion, if used of a woman who is truly wretched, or a term of reproach, if used of a woman who is vicious or cruel. The lady of our verse is shown, on the other hand, to be both beautiful and loving. But the simple explanation meets with a difficulty. In 2.4 and 2.5 our author will distinguish true dhvani, where the predominant meaning is a suggested rasa, from figures of speech like preyo’ārikāra (“a figure of complimentary address”) which involve a subordinate use of dhvani. Now by the simple explanation the present
verse would exemplify preyo’laṅkāra rather than true dhvani. I doubt that this would have troubled Ānanda, who is not concerned at this point with whether dhvani is used for final meaning or as a subordinate element. But the difficulty did trouble Abhinava and is the cause of his whole comment.

L  "De" is a particle used in making a request. "Ā" has the sense of "tāvat"; so the meaning is: "Just turn back please," etc. As we understand the stanza to say "turn back" from your intended going, the literal sense is a prohibition.

[One might explain the suggested sense as follows:] A lady had come to her lover’s house, where he had slighted her in some such way as addressing her by another’s name, whereupon she had started to go home. He now turns her back with this clever piece of flattery: "You are putting difficulties in the way not only of your own pleasure and mine, but of those other ladies. You will never attain a drop of happiness. So you are a most ‘wretched woman.’" Here the suggested sense is a particular compliment that represents the true feeling of the lover [BP: viz., that no other woman is her equal].

Or, [we might say that] a lady has been warned by her female friend not to go, but scorps the warning. Now the friend tells her, "Not only are you making difficulties for yourself, cheapening yourself by this light conduct, and so are a ‘wretched woman,’ but you are making difficulties for other women, stealing out to visit their lovers, by your lighting up the street with the moonlight of your countenance." Here the suggested sense is a particular compliment representing the feeling of the friend.

But in both these explanations, [the suggestion] comes back to rest in the literal sense, namely, a request to desist: from the intention of going back home, or from her going to a lover’s house. And so this verse would be an example of a subordinated use of suggestion, that is of an alaṅkāra, either preyo’laṅkāra or rasavadaḷaṅkāra, and not of [what our author calls] dhvani. So let us explain as follows. A certain lady is hurrying to her lover at night, who in turn is on his way to her and meets with her on the way. Pretending not to recognize her, he addresses her with this stanza. That is why he adds "wretched woman" as a joke at the end, to let her know who he is: "You are causing difficulty for other women too, so how can you hope to receive your own desire? So either come to my house, or let us go back to yours." So the suggested meaning is a clever compliment that represents an
intention on the part of the lover, an intention that is in the form of neither [injunction nor prohibition] because the final sentence meaning allows of both.

Others have explained the stanza as being the words of certain gentlemen of taste who happen to be present [as the lady passes by]. But I ask persons of taste whether it would be at all proper in such a case to use an expression like “wretched woman.”

1. This is, essentially, the explanation that Mahi (p. 474).

A Sometimes the suggested meaning is made to be directed to a person (or persons) different from that (or those) to whom the literal meaning is directed. Thus:

Who wouldn’t be angry to see his dear wife with her lower lip bitten?
You scorned my warning to smell the bee-holding lotus. Now you must suffer.

[Non-Vulgate Sattasañ, Weber No. 886]¹

1. The stanza is quoted by Abhinava in Abh. on BhNS § 18.123; by Mamanśa § 5.135; by Hemacandra K.Anu. 1 vs. 25, who in his AC repeats the comments of the Locana; and by SD on 5.2.

L In the previous examples there has been shown to be a difference between the literal and the suggested meanings even when the two meanings were addressed to the same person, viz., the monk, the traveler, the lover, or the abhisārikā. Now he shows that the suggested meaning may differ by its being addressed to a different person (or
persons) [from the person addressed by the literal]: sometimes the suggested meaning, etc.

Who wouldn’t: that is, even a man without jealousy would be angry if he even [thought that he] saw it, that is, if he noticed her lip as being wounded because it appeared different for some reason even if it had not been [wounded].¹

Is made to be directed: What he means is that although various persons lie in the direction of application, a sensitive reader can make out the correct direction. [Abhinava here gives a Sanskrit translation of the Prakrit verse, literally:] Who wouldn't be angry on seeing his dear wife's lower lip with a wound? O you whose habit it is to smell bee-concealing lotuses, you who are averse to being prevented, now you must suffer.

O you whose habit it is to smell bee-concealing lotuses: because a person's habit cannot in any way be prevented. Averse: unwilling to accept. Being prevented: prevention. Now you must suffer: viz., a long and severe scolding.

The meaning of the stanza is as follows. An unfaithful wife has had her lip bitten by a lover. To save her from her husband's reproaches she is here addressed by a clever female friend, who knows that the husband is nearby but pretends not to see him. Now you must suffer: the literal sense is directed to the adulterous wife. The suggested sense, on the other hand, is directed to the husband and informs him that she is not guilty of offense.² There is also a suggestion directed to the neighbors who, if they hear the wife being roundly abused by the husband, may suspect her of misconduct. The suggestion in this case is the assurance provided by this concealment of her adultery. There is a suggestion directed to her fellow wife, who would be delighted by the abuse of her rival and by [the news of] her adultery. The suggestion lies in the word dear ("dear wife"),³ which shows that the wife addressed is the more attractive. There is a suggestion to the adulterous friend of the speaker, informing her, "You should not take on humiliation at the thought of being accused of bad character in front of your fellow wife; rather, you should take to yourself high esteem and now shine forth (sahasva).⁴ To the wife's secret lover there is a suggestion, telling him that "Today I have thus saved your heart's beloved who loves you in secret, but you must not bite her again in a place that is so obvious." To anyone clever who is standing nearby the speaker's cleverness is suggested, [as though she were to say,] "This is the way I have concealed things." All of this is indicated by the expression is made to be directed.
§ 1.4g A ]

1. akr̥tvā, even if it had not been wounded: this appears to be the interpretation of the Kaumudi and of BP. The grammatical interpretation, “seeing her lip wounded even if he had not done it,” makes no sense. Obviously the husband would not be angry if he had bitten his wife’s lip himself.

2. Most printed texts insert here the brief sentence: sahasvety api ca tadvijayam vyāṇgyam. “There is also a suggestion that he must suffer.” The sentence is missing, however, from the MS used by the Nirnayasāgar edition. The trouble with it is that such a suggestion, if present, would be directed to the reader, not to the husband as portrayed by the poem. Pāṭhak omits the sentence in his Hindi translation.

3. What I have translated as “dear wife” is in Sanskrit a single word, priyāyah, a word which has two meanings, “wife” and “beloved.” The literal meaning here is simply wife, but a suggestion arises sabdabalat, from the verbal force, to the effect that this wife is also her husband’s beloved, that is to say, the one of his wives that he finds most attractive.

4. In assigning the sense of sobhāsva as a second meaning to sahasvā, Abhinava is probably following some Prakrit grammar. Hemacandra (8.4.100) gives the root sah as a synonym of rāj (rājati). The Kaumudi prefers the ancient Vedic meaning of sah, to win or overcome: “sahānam is here used in the sense of overcoming her fellow wife.” That any second meaning is intended in sahasvā seems to me most unlikely.

A Other differences of the suggested meaning from the literal meaning are possible along these lines. We have merely indicated the general direction. How the second variety of suggested meaning, viz., alāṅkāradhvani, differs from the literal will be shown in detail in what follows. But the third variety, involving rasa, etc., which appears as something implied by the inherent capability of the literal sense but as an object on which no words can operate directly, must necessarily be different from the literal. This may be shown [more formally]. For if such states as rasa are to be denoted, it must be either by reporting them under their own names, or through conveying them by means of the vibhāvas, etc.1 If the former were the case, it would follow that wherever the rasas, etc., were not reported by name there could be no apprehension of them. But it is not true that they are everywhere reported by name. Even where they are, our apprehension of them
is through their being conveyed by means of particular vibhāvas, etc. 

This apprehension, while it may later be referred to by name,² is not produced by the naming, because in other cases we do not find it. For in a poem which merely uses such words as "erotic," etc., but fails to convey the vibhāvas, there is not even the slightest apprehension that the poem contains any rasa. And since there is the apprehension of rasas, etc., from particular vibhāvas without any naming of these rasas and there is no apprehension of them from the mere naming of them, it follows by the application of positive and negative concomitance that the rasas, etc., are implied by the force of things that are literally denoted and are in no way denoted themselves. So it stands proven that the third variety [of suggested meaning] also is different from the literal meaning. That we apprehend it as though it were simultaneous with the literal meaning will be shown in what follows.

1. This sentence lacks Änanda's usual clarity, for the conveying of rasa by means of the vibhāvas is not an instance of väcyatva ("being denoted") at all, but of vyāyatva ("being suggested"). Abhinava tries to exculpate our author by supplying tātparyaśaktyā. 2. This concession is worth remarking on, for it is generally overlooked by later ālākārikas. Later authors were generally of the opinion that to use a word denoting the actual emotion (bhāva) or rasa constituted a major fault, so much so that such cases could not be considered examples of dhvani. Änanda's concession allows for such words if used as an anuvāda (mere reference). The concession allows many fine poems to pass muster which are lowered in value by the later critics.

In what follows: viz., in Chapter Two, where suggestion in which the literal meaning is intended but is subordinated to a second meaning (vivakṣitānyaparavācya) is said to be of two types, "one where the suggestion is produced without apparent sequence [i.e., immediately, together with the primary meaning], the other where the sequence is apparent," (2.2). There, in describing the second of these types, [the variety here referred to, namely alāṅkāra-dhvani, is dealt with in detail; see 2.20–21 and 25–26]. While it is easy to summarize vastu-dhvani under the heads of injunction, prohibition, and neither injunction nor prohibition, it is not easy to summarize alāṅkāra-dhvani, because the figures of speech (alāṅkāras) are so numerous. And so he says: in detail.

But the third variety: the word "but" is used to point a contrast. In the first place, the property of being expressible by the denotative
force of words [as well as by suggestion] attaches to a situation (vastu) or to a figure of speech (alankāra). On the other hand, a rasa, an emotion (bhāva), an improper rasa or emotion, or the cessation of a rasa or emotion, are never directly denoted. They appear rather as matters that come to life in the process of being relished (āsvādya-māna), and for this there is no explanation other than the operation of suggestion. For we cannot suspect as being here at work any of the conditions of lakṣaṇā, such as blocking of the primary meaning, because there is here no halting gait in the journey [from word to meaning; cf. 1.4 b L, note 17].

[Definitions of rasa, rasābhāsa, etc.]

Rasa appears when a stable state of mind (cittavṛtti), constantly directed toward a proper object, is aesthetically relished. Bhāva appears when a transitory state is so relished. The improper variety (abhāsa) of rasa or bhāva appears when either of them is directed toward an improper object, as when Rāvana’s love is directed toward Sītā. While that case really belongs to the comic flavor, in accordance with [Bharata’s] dictum that “the erotic leads to the comic,” that stage of realization overtakes the audience only later. Since the relish one experiences in the stage where one is identifying [the portrayed emotion with one’s own] is of love, the rasa will appear to be the erotic rasa as long as we overlook the broader context, as we do when hearing:

I merely heard her name
and it acted as a magnet or a maddening charm.

This is therefore a case of the improper or spurious erotic, [not of the comic]. An emotion (bhāva) which goes to form an improper rasa is an “improper emotion” (bhāvābhāsa). As the cessation or checking of an advanced emotion is especially delightful to the heart, it is separately mentioned [in the list that we just gave], although it is actually included [in the term bhāva]. An example is:

They lay upon the bed each turned asi
and suffering in silence;
though love still dwelt within their hearts
each feared a loss of pride.
But then from out the corner of their eyes
the sidelong glances met
and the quarrel broke in laughter they turned
and clasped each other’s neck.
Here we have the cessation of a pride which has taken the form of jealous anger.  

Now this suggested entity, rasa or the like, is not generated within us after the fashion that joy is generated from [the direct force of] the words "A son is born to you." Nor does it come from the secondary power of the words. Rather, it makes itself felt (parisphurati) as something the whole life of which consists in the ongoing process of relishing and which thereby differs from something like joy or grief that is a finished or frozen state. This process of tasting arises in a sensitive person through his empathy upon apprehending the vibhāvas and anubhāvas, an empathy made possible by his heart's being in tune with [the poetic message]. Our author states this: which appears as something, etc. And so in these instances of rasa, etc. suggestion is an operation of a word as helped out by [that word's literal] meaning. But this [literal] meaning, which will be a vibhāva or the like, does not generate an emotion like the joy generated by the birth of a son. So suggestion is said to be an operation different from generation (janana), an operation which belongs to meaning as well [as to word].

Under their own names: reporting them by the operation of denotation by using the words śīrīgāra ("the erotic"), etc. By means of the vibhāvas, etc.: He means "through the sentence meaning." Here, by ruling out rasa, which consists essentially in the process of relishing, by the use of positive and negative concomitance, from the use of the very words which denote it, he shows that these concomitances belong to suggestion.

It is not true that they are everywhere [reported by name]: for example, in this stanza of Bhaṭṭendurāja,

A tremulousness of the eyes,
hesitating in mid-glance;
limbs daily growing thinner
like severed lotus stems
and cheeks so pale they seemed
to imitate white dūrūrī grass:
such was the costume put on by the gopīs
as they and Krishna came of age.

Here, after we become aware of the anubhāvas and vibhāvas and have joined ourself to them by empathy, the meaning, in the form of a rasa, makes itself felt (sphurati) as that which is blissfully relished by the self-consciousness, which is colored by latent impressions (vāsanā, see 2.4 L, note 6) responsive to these vibhāvas and anubhāvas; all of this without
the use of any such words as abhilāsa (desire), cintā (worry), autsuk-ya (eagerness), nidrā (sleep), adhṛti (frailty), glāni (drooping), ālasya (languor), śrama (weariness), smṛti (remembrance), vitarka (speculation), or the like.12

Having thus shown the failure of a negative concomitance,13 he goes on to show the failure of the positive concomitance:14 even where they are. “They” refers to words that directly name a rasa, etc. Through their being conveyed: by the conveying of vibhāvas, etc., through the use of words. It may be merely [referred to by its name]: as in the following stanza:

When Madhu's foe had left for Dvārakā
his Rādhā hugged the slender tree
on Kālindī's bank from whose wealth of frondage
he had in time past given her gifts.
With high-pitched voice and heavy falling tears
she sang a song with longing,
to which the birds who swam upon the wave
gave back a yearning cry.18

In this stanza the vibhāvas and anubhāvas are clearly apprehended16 and longing is [thereby] conveyed as the object of one's relish.17 The word sotkanthā (“with longing”) gives us no more than has already been given. But although it is merely a reference to the anubhāva [which has been learned through non-direct means], the word is useful, as it is employed to draw together the stated anubhāvas [e.g., the sad song and tears of the heroine] with the word “yearning” [applied to the cry of the birds]. For if the poet had conveyed the whole set of anubhāvas all over again, the stanza would suffer from tautology and we should not empathize.

Is not produced by the meaning:18 he gives the reason for this with the words, because in other cases, etc.; for example, in the stanza, “A tremulousness of the eyes,” [where there is no naming of the rasa or its components]. The sense is that A cannot be produced by B if A comes into existence in the absence of B. He strengthens [the statement of] our not finding rasa by the next sentence, beginning na hi. He clarifies the expression such mere words, etc., by [adding the condition that the same poem fail to convey] the vibhāvas, etc.

In a poem: whereas in your opinion [i.e., according to the opponent who claims that naming the rasas should give rise to aesthetic relish], it should become poetry. Not even the slightest: as in the following
stanza there is not the slightest aesthetic relish although it names all the rasas.

The erotic, comic, tragic, and heroic,
the flavors of fury, fear, disgust and wonder:
such are the rasas, which number eight,
in our tradition of the drama.

Having thus shown by a persuasive argument employing negative and positive concomitance that the rasas, etc., are absent [from a verse] when they are directly named in it, he now sums up the matter in similar fashion\(^{19}\) in the passage beginning with and since there is and ending with and are in no way [denoted].

[Explanation of the phrase by the force of things which are literally denoted.\(^{20}\)] When the suggestion of rasa is ascribed to a word, the force (sāmartṛya), that is, the cooperating force, viz., the vibhāvas, etc., is the directly denoted meaning. When the suggestion of rasa is ascribed to the directly denoted meaning—inasmuch as the suggestion of rasa is not a case of one thing's begetting another, because of the different nature (yogakṣema) of joy at the birth of a son; and not a case of one thing's being inferred from another, because of the distinct nature of the inference of a man's eating at night from the premise of his being fat compounded with his not eating in the daytime\(^{21}\)—then the force (sāmartṛya, śakti) of this meaning is the totality of denotative words arranged in their particular way.\(^{22}\) Thus the suggesting is an operation of both word and meaning. And so, in addressing the alternatives [A, that rasa, etc., can be conveyed through the mere naming of a rasa, etc.; and B, that rasa, etc., are conveyed by one's furnishing the vibhāvas, etc.,] the former has been refuted, while the latter has been partly refuted and partly accepted. If taken as meaning that the operation [by which the vibhāvas lead to rasa, etc.] is a begetting or inferring, that is refuted; if taken as meaning that the operation is a suggesting, that is accepted.

He who thinks that even here suggestion is nothing more than tātparyāśakti (the power of the sentence meaning) does not know the truth of the matter. For in a sentence that conveys the vibhāvas and anubhāvas, the tātparyāśakti exhausts itself in giving the syntax (samsarga) [of the sentence] or its difference [in meaning from that of other sentences];\(^{23}\) it does not concern rasa, the essence of which consists in the process of relishing. Let us say no more.
The word so is used in the sense of cause. The connection is: and for this cause also, the third variety too [of suggested meaning] is different from the literal.

As though it were simultaneous: By saying "as though" he shows that although there is really a succession, the succession is not noticed.

In what follows: in Chapter Two (2.20–21 and 25–26).

1. cittavṛtteh sthāyinyāḥ: the more usual term would be sthāyi-bhāvasya. The phrase aucityena pravṛttau is taken from Udbhata (Indurāja 4.5, Vivṛti 4.9).

2. The rasa is improper because Sītā is another’s wife and because the emotion is not reciprocated. On the concept of rasābāhāsa see Sivaprasad Bhattacharya, Calc. Or. JI, pp. 237–247, and J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan, Aesthetic Rapture I, p. 42 and II, pp. 57–58. The concept of rasābāhāsa is highly restrictive of literature. If we are to limit rasa, the sole aim of literature, to only such subjects as conform to propriety and even to the ś-tràtras, as Udbhata would have it, not a little of Sanskrit literature and surely the greater part of Western literature will be judged to be of little worth. Abhinava seems to have been the first Indian critic to face this problem and find an answer: the abhāsatva, the impropriety, of such experiences is something we realize only later; during the actual experience we are absorbed.

3. BhNS 6.39. The next verse specifies that it is when the erotic is parodied (śṛṅgārāṇukṛtī) that it becomes comic.

4. A larger fragment of this stanza is introduced at 2.3 L by the identification “Rāvanakāvye” (see also Abh. 6.40), but whether this means “in a poem called the Rāvanakāvya,” or merely “in a poem about Rāvana” is not clear. The full stanza is given in Hemacandra’s AC on K.Anu. 2.55 as dūrākārṣanamohamantra iva me tan-nāmni yāte śrutim, cetakkālakālām api prasahate nāvasthitim tām vinā/ etais ākūlasya vikṣasarater anāgair anangāṭurāh sampadyeta katham tadāp-tisukham ity etan na vedmi sphuṭam.

5. One might regard all the conditions of bhāva, such as bhāvoddhava, bhāvasandhi, bhāvasabalatā, and bhāvaprasāma (see 2.3 L) as being included in bhāva. 6. Amaru Sat. 23, quoted in nearly every anthology of Sanskrit. (a) vītottaram: probably, “without reply, in sil-ence.” BP’s interpretation “without any of the action that [normally] follows lying down in bed” seems to me farfetched. (b) The MS and anthologies vary between kaṇṭha-graham, adverb, and kaṇṭha-grahah, bhavurthi. The former makes for clearer syntax.

7. Whether one considers such verses as examples of bhāvaprasāma or bhāvodaya depends on whether one finds more charm (camatkāra) in the description of the ceasing emotion or the originating one. Mammata (4.51) quotes Amaru 22, a verse similar to the present one, as an example of bhāvodaya.

8. Abhinava would here make another, radical, distinction between suggestion and the other powers of words. The denotative and secondary powers (abhidhā-sakti and lakṣanā-sakti) are able to give us only cognitions or concepts. The joy that may follow from “You have a new
son," or the grief that may follow from "Your unmarried daughter is pregnant" (KP ed. Jhalkikar, p. 229) is a subsequent development growing out of the word-meanings or concepts. In the case of suggestion, on the other hand, the meaning itself is the rasa, the flavor that we relish. Aesthetic pleasure is not the result of a meaning; it is the meaning itself. 9. Siddha-svabhāva: the comments, I think, fail to understand this term. BP’s first explanation misunderstands the syntax, taking the whole compound as “different from sukha, etc., by being of a siddhasvabhāva,” as if it were sukha, etc., that were sādhya. Its second explanation agrees with the Kaumudi and supposes that sukhdādi stands for rati and the other sthāyibhāvas. The correct interpretation surely will connect sukhādi with the put yanmahāra just referred to and shortly to be mentioned again. The contrast is between (a) the denotative force of words which produces a meaning, which in turn generates a fixed mental reaction, pleasure or grief, and (b) the suggestive force of words which produces an ongoing process of relishing or enjoyment.

10. The Vṛtti has stated that rāsadhvani is vācyasāmarthyaāksipta. And so (tena) the suggestive power of the word must be helped out by a meaning, viz., the vācya meaning. 11. The literal meaning should not be said to help generate (janayati) the rasa; it should be said to help suggest (dhvanayati) the rasa. Abhinava is merely distinguishing the primary production of the rasas from the secondary production of pleasure and pain. Later, on 2.4, he will admit, even insist, that the rasas are produced (utpādyante). 12. Of the ten words on the list, abhilāsa probably represents the sthāyibhāva, rati; the five words glāni, śrama, cinṭā, autsukya, and nidrā are listed by BĀNŚ 6.45 as denoting anubhāvas of vipralambhsāṅgāra; the three words ālasya, smṛti, and vitarka denote vyabhicāribhāvas, listed in BĀNŚ 7.47, 53, 91. Only of adhṛti can I not furnish a technical assignment. 13. The negative concomitance would be: “Where there are no words directly naming the rasa or its components, there is no rasa-experience.” 14. This would be in the form, “Wherever there are words directly naming the rasa or its components, there is a rasa-experience.” 15. The author of the stanza is unknown and the text of the first line is in question. All the printed texts write taddattayhampānatām, "bent down by the leap which had been given by him." It is certainly odd to speak of “giving one’s leap to a tree.” BP tries to make out that this was the tree from which Krishna leaped into the Kālindī. But the tradition is unanimous that that tree was a kadamba (Harivamsa 55.57, Viṣṇu P. 5.7.10, Bhāg.P. 10.16.6), not a vanjula. Neither is it clear just what tree is here meant by vanjula, except that it cannot be a kadamba. The word is used for an asoka, or a syandana (=tintīśa, the Anglo-Indian sissoo), or a reed. Whichever tree is meant, I prefer the reading of the Malayalam MS quoted by Kuppuswami Sastri in his edition of the Kaumudi, viz., taddattasampannatām, and have translated accordingly. 16. The ālambana-vibhāvas are Krishna and Rādhā; the uddipana-vibhāva is the bank of the Kālindī; the anubhāvas
are embracing the varjula, shedding tears, etc. 17. This is as much as to say that longing is thereby suggested. 18. One should place a danda after the words atanmayibhavo vā. In the text the words na tu tatkrta should be printed in boldface. 19. Viz., again by the use of positive and negative concomitance.

20. The complicated and highly improbable interpretation which follows is occasioned by Abhinava’s desire to bring this statement, which ascribes the suggestion of rasa, etc., only to meanings (viz., to vibhāvas, etc.), into line with the opinion elsewhere expressed by Ānanda that the suggestion of rasa derives from both meaning and word. To accomplish this aim, Abhinava takes abhidheya-sāmartthya first as a karmadhāraya compound and next as a sasthi-tatpurusa. The meaning assigned to sāmartthya differs in the one case from the other. 21. The stock example of the arthāpatti of the Mīmāṃsā here reduced, as it is by the Nyāya, to an inference. 22. BP: put together with such guṇas and alāṅkāras as are conducive to rasa. 23. That relating and differentiating are the two functions of the sentence is a notion first found in Mahābhāṣya 2.1.1. Vārt. 2 (Kielhorn ed., I.364.24; S. D. Joshi, ed. and trans. of 2.1.1, para. 84). To explain: the sentence “Gām ānaya” not only relates the object cow to the action of the addressed person; it differentiates the command from one concerning horses or concerning some other action.

§ 1.5 K

It is just this meaning that is the soul of poetry. And so it was that, long ago, grief, arising in the first poet from the separation of the pair of curlews, became verse.

1. In order to make sense of the Kārikā, we must take “this meaning” to refer not to the suggested meaning in general that was mentioned in 1.4 K, but specifically to rasa, etc., the third type of suggested meaning, which has been mentioned only by the Vṛtti on 1.4. It was this element arising in Vālmīki, whether one regard it with Ānanda as the bhāva, soka, or with Abhinava as the karunarasa, that produced the first poem, for it is rasa, etc., that gives life to poetry as the soul gives life to the body. Note that Ānanda’s concept of bhāva and rasa is much simpler than Abhinava’s. To Ānanda rasa is no more than the sharpening of Vālmīki’s emotion of grief. See Introduction, pp. 15-19. The quarter stanza ślokah śokatuam āgataḥ is quoted from Rām 1.2.39.
A  It is just this [inner] meaning that is the essence of a poem, which has [outward] beauty in its wealth of direct meaning, word, and structure.\(^1\) And so it was that the grief (śoka) of the first poet, Vālmīki, born of the wailing of the cock curlew desolated by loss of its slain mate,\(^2\) turned into verse (śloka). For grief is the basic emotion of the flavor of compassion (karunarasa) [which, as has been said, appears only as suggested].\(^3\) Although other types of suggested meaning may be found, they can all be supplied from the mention of rasa and bhāva because those are the most important.

1. The phrase väcyavācakaracanā recurs at 1.8A. What is here meant is the choice of word, direct meaning, and structure (degree of compounding and degree of phonetic harshness) appropriate to the rasa that is to be suggested and that forms the inner or essential meaning. Vācya is used in distinction from vyāṅga. 2. Both the reading and the sense of the passage have been questioned, wrongly. The reading nihatasahacari is found in the Kerala MS, in Krishnamoorthy's MB MS (see p. 311 of his ed.), in the text of the Locana, and in the semi-quotations by Rajaśekhara's Kāv. M. p. 7 and by Caṇḍīdāsa's Dīpikā (see Krishnamoorthy loc. cit.). The reading sannihitasahacari occurs only in two of the Nīrṇaya Sagar MS (KM ed.). The difficulty with the sense is that in the form of the legend given in the Rāmāyana, a form that every Indian schoolboy used to know, it is the male bird that was killed (Rām. 1.2.10). It was the grief of the female bird that Vālmīki transformed into verse. In order to reconcile these traditions the learned Kuppusvāmi Śāstrī (Upalocana pp. 163–164) proposed an unnatural analysis of Ānanda's compound, taking nihata by a frog's leap with kraunca instead of with sahacari. Pt. Badari Nāth Sārmā in his Dīdhiti emended the text. All needlessly. Ānanda has altered the legend to suit his purposes. See J. L. Masson, "Who Killed Cock Kraunca," J.O.I. Baroda 18 (3), March 1969. 3. The phrase pratīyamānārūpa eveti pratipādītam, translated above by the words placed in brackets, appears in most of the MSS, but Abhinava makes no mention of it. One cannot say with certainty whether it has crept into the text from a marginal annotation or whether it has dropped out of an early copy of the text by haplography, the eye of the scribe having jumped from the initial word of pratīyamānārūpa to the pratīyamānāsyā of the next sentence. It is missing from the Kashi and Vidyābhavan texts.

L  [Comment on the Kārikā:] So far, by stating that the suggested, on the other hand, is something different (1.4 K),
the nature of suggestion has been explained. Now, by making use of a
well-known legend, he will show that it is the soul of poetry: the soul
of poetry.

It is just this: while the antecedent is suggested meaning in general,
what we are here to think of is the third variety, namely suggested rasa
(rasadhvani), for that follows from the use of the legend and from the
immediately preceding passage of the Vṛtti. So it is rasa that is the real
soul of poetry. Vastudhvani and alaikāradhvani, however, regularly end
up in [producing] rasa, and it was in order to mark their superiority to
the literal sense that he said [in 1.1 K] that dhvani in general was the
soul of poetry.

Grief: That grief which arose from the separation of the pair
of curlews, that is, from the destruction of the mating arising from
the killing of the bird’s mate, a grief which was a basic emotion differ-
ent, because of its hopelessness, from the basic emotion of love found
in love-in-separation: that grief, by the poet’s ruminating upon its
[ālambana-] vibhāvas [i.e., the birds] in their [unhappy] state and on
the anubhāvas arising therefrom, such as the wailing [of the surviving
bird], met with a response from his heart and with his identifying [of
the bird’s grief with the grief in his own memory] and so transformed it-
self into a process of relishing. It thus became the flavor of compassion
(karuṇarasa), which differs from ordinary grief by its being experienced
primarily as a melting of one’s thoughts. Then, like the spilling over
of a jar filled with liquid, like the pouring forth of one’s emotion into a
cry of lament, this [grief now transformed into the rasa of compassion]
found its final form in a verse cast into fixed form of meter and into
appropriate words, for cries of lament and the like are suggestive of
a state of mind without the need of semantic convention; appropriate
also because Vālmiki was wholly engrossed and the words came from
him naturally. His words were:

May you never find honor, Niṣāda,
for everlasting years,
who have shot the loving mate
from this pair of curlew birds.

But we must not suppose that the sage experienced grief, for if that
were the case there would be no occasion for calling rasa the soul [of
poetry], as the poet would actually be in pain, pained by that grief. Nor
does such a state [BP: the exalted state of being able to pronounce
a curse, or to write a śloka] belong to one who is afflicted with pain.
Thus, since it forms the nature of this overflow [viz., the verse just quoted] of the flavor of compassion, of which the abiding emotion is a grief amenable to relishing, this *rasa* is therefore the soul of poetry, that is, its essential nature, that which produces a result beyond the reach of any other word-powers [than suggestion]. It has been said [by Bhaṭṭanāyaka] in the *Hṛdayadarpana*:

> Until he is filled with this *rasa*
> the poet does not spill it forth.

[In the quotation given above from the *Rāmāyana*] the form agamah shows Vedic retention of the augment.6

It is just this: by the word “just” he would say that there is no other soul [of poetry]. Accordingly, Bhaṭṭanāyaka is wrong when he writes: “One may distinguish the śāstras by the prominence they give to the word. One knows that stories are wedded to meaning. One forms a just notion of a poem by subordinating these two, viz., word and meaning, and making the operation ( vyāpāra) paramount.” For if the “operation” he speaks of is essentially suggestion and consists in relishing, he is saying nothing new, while if he means the operation to be denotation (abhidhā), we have already shown that it holds no prominence.7

[Comment on the Vṛtti.]

The Vṛtti comments on the [Kārikā’s] stanza. In its wealth of direct meaning, word, and structure: that is, because a poem is varied in accordance with whatever *rasa* is to be suggested. [Only such a composition is called a poem and] therefore, although suggestion occurs everywhere, we do not speak of [poetry being everywhere], just as we speak of life only in some places although the soul exists everywhere, as we have said before [1.4 b L]. So there is no occasion for what is objected in the *Hṛdayadarpana*, that “we should have to use the term poetry everywhere.”8

Its slain mate: here we have the [ālambana-] vibhāva; the wailing: with this word, the anubhāva. Born: one must supply, “through being the object of his relish.”9

But if verse (*śloka*) arose from relished grief (*soka*), why is the thing that is suggested [i.e., the *raso*] said to be the soul of poetry [rather than grief]? It is with a view to this objection that he says: for grief is, etc. Grief is the basic emotion of the *rasa* of compassion, for compassion
consists of relishing (or aesthetically enjoying) grief. That is to say, where we have the basic emotion grief, a thought-trend that fits with the vibhāvas and anubhāvas of this grief, if it is relished (literally, if it is chewed over and over), becomes a rasa and so from its aptitude [toward this end] one speaks of [any] basic emotion as becoming a rasa. For the basic emotion is put to use in the process of relishing: through a succession of memory-elements it adds together a thought-trend which one has already experienced in one's own life to one which one infers in another's life, and so establishes a correspondence in one's heart.

It may be objected that it is anything that takes the form of a suggested meaning that forms the soul [of poetry] and that three varieties of this [suggested meaning] have been stated, not simply that which takes the form of rasa, whereas the Vālmīki legend seems to say that only rasa is the soul. Our author foresees this objection and accepts it, saying although other types of suggested meaning: the other types are vastudhvani and alaṅkāradhvani.

The inclusion of the word bhāva indicates that even a transitory state (vyabhicāribhāva) may form the life of a verse although the relishing of it is not complete in itself [but will go on to a relishing of a rasa] and although it never achieves the position of a rasa belonging to the final state of relishing a basic emotion. An example is the following:

Rubbing one nail with the tip of another,  
turning about her loose bracelet,  
slowly drawing a line on the earth,  
her anklet softly jingling ...

Here we have [the transitory state of] shyness [forming the life of the [verse].

Furthermore, by the words rasa and bhāva there are included the improper varieties (ābhāsa) of these as well as the termination (praśama) of these, for although there are many sub-types, a single form runs through them all. Because these are the most important: they are so because the other types end up in or lead to rasa. Vastudhvani and alaṅkāradhvani, while they are not complete in themselves, can be called the soul of a verse from their aptitude, that is, because of their ability [also] to furnish [a delight] that lies beyond the reach of other word-powers.
1. Grief characterizes not only karunarasa (the flavor of compassion or tragedy), but also that variety of the erotic flavor that is based on the separation of lovers (vipralambhaśtriṣṭigāra). Between the two sorts of grief is this difference: the grief of tragedy, as in the present instance, expects no relief; the grief of separated lovers looks forward to reunion. The term nirapeksabhāva for the hopelessness of tragic grief is taken from BhNS 6.45, near end of prose. 2. The all-important transformation from the emotion, grief (bhāva. soka) of the character portrayed, to the relish (āsvāda) or flavor of compassion (karunarasa) of the poet or of his audience is here passed over very rapidly. Abhinava furnishes more detail at the end of his comment on the present passage and in commenting on 1.18 and 2.4. The sympathetic response (ārdyayasamvāda) to the vibhāvas and anubhāvas is said to “transcend the experience of the workaday world” (2.4 L). Where the Westerner may think of empathy as rendering Hamlet’s griefs and problems his own, Abhinava thinks of the process of empathy with, say, Rāma, or with the grieving bird, as liberating one’s personal memory of grief into a universal, impersonal flavor. 3. This melting of the mind (druti) is one of the symptoms assigned to the relishing of rasa by Bhattanāyaka (2.4 L). The others are expansion (vistara) and radiance (vikāsa). At the end of 2.4 L, Abhinava somewhat grudgingly accepts these characterizations from his rival, but insists that they are not exhaustive. 4. Rāmāyaṇa 1.2.14. The pair of birds had been mating as the Nisāda shot, a fact that doubtless would have brought a curse upon him even if Vālmīki had not been present to versify it; compare the curse of Pāndu, MBh 1.109. The legend is built on a folk etymology deriving sūka from soka, and from the despised status of the Nisāda caste. As the incident is told at the beginning of the Rāmāyaṇa, it has been taken as introducing the tragic flavor of that work. If we accept Ānanda’s alteration of the story, one may take the hunter to foreshadow Rāvana; the slain hen-bird, the kidnapped Sītā; and the heartbroken survivor, Rāma. 5. One must remember that Abhinava regards rasa as a form of bliss. Naturally it must be different from grief, which is a painful emotion. Here Abhinava is writing of the poet. On 2.4 he brings out the same contrast in the case of the audience: if they felt pain at a representation of the Rāmāyaṇa story, for example, they would not return to the theater. Masson has written of the Indian recognition of the poet’s need to distance himself from his emotions before writing of them (Santarasa, p. 84). Ingalls would add that if we follow Abhinava’s account strictly, we must say that the poet in fact never writes of his griefs. He writes only of the griefs of others, which he has relished. By relishing them it is implied that he has lost his own griefs within them. This is a far more refined view than that of Ānanda, who writes quite unconcernedly of the “grief of the first poet.” And Abhinava’s view, as Masson points out in the passage just referred to, differs from that of the Rāmāyaṇa itself, which in narrating the incident speaks time after time of the poet’s grief and pity. 6. According to the Kāśikā, such cases are covered by
the word bahulam in Pan. 6.4.75. They are noticed by Whitney, para. 579e.

7. What Bhattanäyaka meant doubtless was neither. He must have meant the operations (bhâvanâ, bhoga) of the word’s powers of bhâvakatva and bhogakrt-tva, these being the special terms by which he explained the nature of poetry; see Introduction, p. 36, and 2.4 L, near end. One may note that Vidyådharä in his Ekâvali (pp. 13-15) combines this triple distinction of Bhattanäyaka’s with Abhinava’s doctrine of the three vyutpattihetavah (means of instruction; see p. 71), but in doing so substitutes dhvanipradhâna for Bhattanäyaka’s vyâpârapradhâna.

8. Bhattanäyaka must have singled out 1.5 for criticism, saying that if suggestion in general is to be called the soul of poet, the title of poetry will be assigned to almost every sentence, as suggestion is found in every metaphor and trope. There are two ways to silence this objection: by showing that it is only rasadhvani that really qualifies as the soul of poetry; or by specifying other properties that poetry must have. Abhinava used the first way in commenting on the Kärikä. He now uses the second in commenting on the Vrtti. 9. See how subtly Abhinava alters the meaning of his text. We are not to think of the grief as belonging to Vâlmîki. The grief is the bird’s. It gives birth in Vâlmiki not to grief but to a relishing of the bird’s grief.

10. Note that this statement is metaphorical, not exact. It is one’s own citta-vrtti (thought-trend, state of mind), not the basic emotion, that becomes the rasa. How it does so is indicated in the next sentence. 11. It is this hrdayasamväda (response of the heart) which permits the expansion and depersonalization of one’s own emotions. 12. It seems highly improbable that Änanda meant any such thing. By bhâva he probably meant sthâyibhâva and he probably intended such a sthâyibhâva, grief (soka), to be the meaning suggested by Vâlmîki’s first verse.

K Sarasvatî. [working] within great poets, in pouring forth this sweet matter (arthavastu) [viz., the emotions and flavors] reveals a special, vibrant, genius (pratibhâ), which is superhuman.

A The divine speech of great poets, in pouring forth this essential matter (vastu-tattva), reveals a special, vibrant, genius, which is superhuman. Thus it is in this world, where there has been a long
succession of poets of every possible kind, that only two or three, or maybe five or six, such as Kālidāsa, can be counted as great poets.

L Having thus shown by means of a legend that the suggested meaning is the soul of poetry, he now shows that this is also a matter of one’s own experience. Sarasvatī: He means that goddess in the form of speech. For the components of the compound arthavastu in the Kārikā, the Vṛtti substitutes vastu for artha and tattva for vastu. Pouring forth: giving forth from her very self the divine rasa of bliss.¹ As Bhaṭṭanāyaka puts it:

Prompted by the thirst of these children,² the cow of speech gives forth this rasa as her milk; to which the experience milked by yogis bears no comparison.

For without the afflatus of this rasa,³ what the yogis milk they milk by force. [How different from the yogis are those who are found worthy to receive the gifts of a goddess will appear from the following lines:]

The mountains made Himalaya their calf; then with Meru playing the skillful milkman and Prthu giving instruction to the mother, they caused to flow for him from Mother Earth her milk of mighty herbs and shining gems.⁴

So runs the stanza [of Kālidāsa] which shows the worthiness of Himalaya to receive the most precious things.

Reveals a vibrant [genius]: The poet’s genius is not inferred by the audience, but shines forth with immediacy because of his inspiration with rasa. As my teacher Bhaṭṭatauta has said, “This is why the experience of hero, poet, and audience is the same.”⁵

Genius is an intelligence capable of creating new things.⁶ The special genius here is one which is capable of composing pure and beautiful poetry because of the inspiration of rasa. As the sage [Bharata] has said: “[They transmit] the inner mental state of the poet.”⁷

Thus it is: The sense is that the number of great poets is arrived at by counting those who reveal this special, vibrant genius.

1. aanandarasam: that rasa which is bliss. The association of the two words is ancient. Cf. Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 1.1 12, where Śaṅkara in explaining
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ánandamaya quotes from Tait. Up. 2.7 raso vas saḥ rasam hyevāyam labdhwānandí bhavati. 2. By "these children" is meant men of taste, connoisseurs.

3. tad-āvesena vinā: without the afflatus, the divine inspiration, of this rasa. Sarasvatí gives freely to the sahṛdaya or rasika, as the earth gave her gifts freely to the calf Himalaya. Yogis, on the other hand, must withdraw their mind and senses from all objects in order to force their way to their goal. For passages from the ABh bearing on the comparison of aesthetic and mystic bliss see Aesthetic Rapture Vol. II, p. 45 (note 263). 4. Kum. 1.2. The stanza furnishes the mythic explanation, drawn from the Viṣṇu Purāṇa, of how the Himalaya came to be the possessor of jewels and of the herbs to cure all diseases. 5. An extraordinary statement for Abhinava to quote with approval in view of the careful distinction which he makes elsewhere between the emotions of the hero and the aesthetic relish of the poet and audience. Of course the only point of the quotation here is to show a similarity of experience between poet and audience because of Sarasvati's gift of rasa. If only we could take nāyakasya as an objective genitive, all would be well; the poet's and the audience's experience of the hero is the same. 6. This definition is close to Bhattatâuta's: "an intelligence which keeps blooming with ever new things is called genius" (prajñā navanavonmesādālini pratībhāmatā); see Sāntarasa, p. 18. 7. BhNS 7.2; it forms part of a verse explaining the etymology of bhāva. The bhāvas (the word is used in a very broad sense to include the vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicāribhāvas as well as the bhāvas proper, all of which are to be described in BhNS 7) are so called because they transmit (bhāvayān) to the audience the inner state (bhāva) of the poet. Here Abhinava takes the words to substantiate the statement of 1.6 that the words of great poets reveal their genius. The phrase is quoted again 3.41-42a L.

A Here is another proof of the existence of a suggested meaning:

L Here is: It is not only, as indicated in 1.4 K when it spoke of the suggested as something different, that literal and suggested sense may differ in nature and in the person to whom they are directed. There is proof that the suggested sense differs from the literal in that it is understood through a wholly different set of causes.
It is not understood by the mere knowledge of grammar and dictionaries. It is understood only by those who know the true nature of poetic meaning.

1. *sabdārthaśāsana*: We take *sabdāśāsana* to equal *sabdānuśāsana*, as in the beginning of the *Mahābhāṣya*; *arthāśāsana* will then be the teaching imparted by dictionaries.

Because this [suggested] sense is understood only by those who know the nature of poetic meaning. If this meaning were denotative, one would get to it by a knowledge of literal, denotative meanings and the words that convey them. But this meaning is beyond the range of those who have taken pains only on the definitions of words and who have paid no attention to the study of poetic meaning, just as the character of the notes (*śvaras*) and *śrutis*, etc., is beyond the range of those who know the definitions of music but are not good singers.

1. Text and meaning are doubtful. The reading *iva praṇītānām* ("just as of good singers") is found in the *KM* ed. and in the three MSS on which it is based. All other MSS seem to read *iva praṇītānām* ("just as ... of not good singers"). The *Locana* says nothing of the negative, although the commentaries on the *Locana* infer or supply its presence: Kuppusvāmi Sāstrī ad *Kaumudi* pp. 173-174, *BP* p. 95, and, most ingenious of all, Pāthak (Vidyābhavana ed., foot of p. 95), who supposes that the *Locana*’s two explanations are furnished the one to fit *aprṇīta*, the other to fit *praṇīta*. Despite all this ingenuity it is unparalleled for Abhinava to gloss the second half of a negative compound without mentioning the negative. Jacobi, who had only the *KM* ed. to work with, translated the passage: "wie solchen, welche nur die Theorie der Musik kennen, die individuelle ganze und Zwischentöne guter Sänger unkennbar sind." This destroys the parallelism of the sentence. We have chosen the reading with the negative and a translation essentially the same as Krishnamoorthy’s. If one accepts this reading of the text, one will explain the passage as follows. Most would-be poets know only the literal meanings of words; only a few, like Kālidāsa, are capable of using words in their full suggestive meanings. In this respect they are like singers. Those
who know merely the definitions of the books on music, if they are not good
singers, are incapable of producing the notes and srutis of the various melodies
(grāmas; cf. 1.7 L below). I owe this explanation to Dr. Gary Tubb.

L Is understood: it is not [to be left as] not understood, by
which [one might suppose] it does not exist. That is his intention.

Who have paid no attention to the study, that is, to a repeated
reflection on matters other than the literal, of the meaning which is the
nature of poetry.

The notes: of these there are seven, beginning with the tonic
(sadja). A sruti is a change [of pitch] of such size as to make any
alteration of a note. There are twenty-two of these srutis, formed of
the notes, note-intervals, or both.1 By the word “etc.” he would in-
clude the [grāmas or melody types] such as the jātyamśaka, grāmarāga,
bhāśā, vibhāśā, antarabhāśā, desī, and mārga.2

Good singers (pragitāḥ): Those of whom the singing is good are
called pragitāḥ. Or, those who have begun to sing are pragitāḥ, the
past passive participial suffix being used in the sense of beginning an
action (Pāṇ. 3.4.71). By the beginning is here indicated everything up
to the final result.

1. [Note furnished by Dr. Gary Tubb.] What Abhinava is referring to
is the classical system of twenty-two srutis, described by Nijenhuis, p. 10,
as “micro-intervals used to describe interval arrangements” and by Capwell,
p. 780, as “modally diagnostic microtones.” It is by the srutis, the minimum
units of measure of pitch interval, that the basic notes (svara) of a melody
type are defined. If any of the notes associated with the melody type is given
a new assignment differing in pitch by a single sruti, the type will fall under a
different designation. 2. [Dr. Tubb] Jātyamśaka is a term found frequently
in BhānŚ (chapters 28–33 in the GOS edition), while the other terms are
discussed in Mataṅga’s Brhaddesi, from which Abhinava most likely took
them. Part Three of the Brhaddesi discusses the grāmarāgas. Bhāśā, vibhāśā,
and antarabhāśā (so-called because these melodies were used in dialect songs)
are discussed in Part Four. It is of interest to note that the Brhaddesi (p. 105
in Śāmbaśiva Śāstri’s edition, near the beginning of Part Four) uses the term
pragita exactly as Ānanda and Abhinava have used it: prakāśam na ca laksyate
yatnāhānais tu gāyakaih / pragitā tu prasiddhyanti susvarānām viśeṣatah.
"[The melody type called bhāśā] is not manifested clearly by singers who
have not practised hard. Good singers, however, succeed, especially those of
perfect pitch."
A Having thus proven the existence of a suggested meaning which differs from the direct meaning, he goes on to show the greater importance of the suggested:

L Thus: that is, he has proven it by the difference in the nature and person addressed of the suggested and by the fact that it is apprehended through a different complex of causes.

K This meaning and whatever particular word has the capability of conveying it are the meaning and the word which should be carefully scrutinized (or recognized, pratyabhijñeyau) by a great poet.¹

1. Jacobi has taken mahākaveḥ as possessive genitive. One will then supply some such word as sahrdayaiḥ with pratyabhijñeyau. But the Vṛtti by rearranging the word order seems to take mahākaveḥ as subjective genitive (Pāṇ. 2.3.71) and Abhinava takes it definitely in that sense.

A The suggested meaning and the particular word that has the capability of conveying it, not just any word: this word and meaning should be scrutinized (or recognized) by a great poet. It is by the proper use of the suggested sense and the word that suggests it that a great poet deserves his name, not by mere structuring of the denoting word and the denoting meaning.

L Should be scrutinized (or recognized): the gerundive su x is here used in the sense of "should,"¹ for the fact that everyone strives
in this way [viz., for the suggested word and meaning] in itself furnishes proof that they are well known to be more important [than the denotative word and sense]. And by the suffix's use in this mandatory sense he indicates that this [seeking out of the suggestive word and sense] forms part of [a poet's] education. By using the word pratyabhijneyau he would indicate that although poetry may flash forth (parusphurati) of its own accord in the way described [by Bhāmbha 1.5], "Poetry comes to the man of genius, and at that only sometimes;" still, it increases in a thousand ways if that man will keep considering his poem carefully, thinking, "this should be like this," i.e., "I should say such and such, not such and such." in this way always seeking the suggestive word and sense. The matter was put as follows by my teacher's teacher, the renowned Utpala:

As some lover brought by many prayers
to a lady's side, only to find
that she does not recognize him when he is come
and so all hope of making love to her is gone;
just so is God, although he be
our very soul, misprised within us
and cannot share with us his glory.
Therefore I have written this book
called "Recognition."

One sees from this that pratyabhijnā (recognition, scrutiny) is a careful inspection of and continuous reflection upon an object although that object is already [in some sense] known. This is what is meant by pratyabhijnā and not the mere recognition that consists in noting that "this is the same thing I saw before."

A great poet: One hopes that one also may be a great poet.

By his speaking thus of the importance of the suggestive word and the suggested meaning he has implied an importance also of the relation between the suggestor and the suggested. Thus he has shown that the three [senses of dhvani] will fit: that which suggests, that which is suggested, and the operation of suggesting.

1. More literally, "in the sense of the worthiness or desert of the subject" Pan 3.3.169. The suggested word and its meaning deserve to be scrutinized.
2. The contrast of effort and genius (inspiration, imagination) in the making of poetry is noticed in Aṅguttara Nikāya 4.230 and Daṇḍina, KA 1.103. See also J. L. Masson, "Imagination vs. Effort," JJP 1.
3. The book is Utpala's Īśvarapratyabhijnā, "Recognition of God," where this stanza occurs at 4.1.17.
(p. 313 of the Bhāskari, Vol. 2). It is also found in the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtti-vimarsini 4.4.2 (Vol. 3, p. 403). The lady, presumably, has sent a go-between to the potential lover, whose reputation she had heard of. He then steals to her garden some night only to find that she mistakes him for a stranger and will not come forth or allow him to enter. This simile of God’s lying unrecognized within us suggests to Abhinava another simile. Just as God, if unrecognized within us, cannot impart to us his glory, just so our poetic genius, if we do not recognize or scrutinize it—and he goes on to give a very special sense to this term—cannot produce the great poetry of which it is capable. 

4. Thus the study of the suggestive word and its meaning will form part of the education of every poet. 5. These are the first three senses that we listed in 1.1 K, note 1.

A Now, although a correct choice of suggested meaning and suggestive word is more important, it is right that poets should first turn their attention to the correct choice of denoted meaning and denoted word.

L The author anticipates that an inference might be drawn of the greater importance of the denotative word, meaning, and operation from the fact of their being taken up first for consideration.¹ So he shows, with now, etc., that as a reason (or middle term) this [fact of being taken up first] is contradictory to what is here sought to be proved, viz., greater importance, for he takes the view that it is the means that are first taken up, [not the all important goal].

¹. The inference would appear as: pradhānā vācyavāca-katadbhāvāḥ prathamopādiyamāṇatvāt. But here prathamopādiyamāṇatva is a virodho hetuḥ because pradhānavastuṣu prathamopādiyamāṇatvādbhava eva.
§ 1.10

\textbf{K} Just as a man who wishes to see will take pains with the flame of the lamp as a means thereto, just so will a man who cares for this [suggested meaning] take pains [first] with the denoted sense.

\textbf{A} For just as a man, although the object of his wish is to see, ill take pains with the flame of the lamp as a means thereto, for it is impossible to see without the flame of the lamp, just so will a man who cares for the suggested meaning take pains with the denoted sense.

So far the author has described the communicating poet's engagement with the suggested meaning. In order to describe the engagement of the recipient audience he goes on to say:

\textbf{L} To see: seeing. The reference is to seeing such things as the lotus-like face of one's beloved, and for that the flame of the lamp is a means.

\textbf{K} Just as the sentence-meaning is apprehended through the meaning of the words, just so is the apprehending of this matter preceded by the denoted sense.'
1. This analogy is later qualified by Ānanda (3.33 f A). It is intended merely to show that the denoted sense is a means, and occurs at a time previous, to the suggested sense. In other respects the relation of word meaning to sentence meaning differs from the relation of denoted sense to suggested sense.

A For just as the sentence meaning is understood through the meaning of the words, just so is the understanding of the suggested meaning preceded by an understanding of the denoted sense.

L [Comment on the Kārikā.]

The word pratipat (apprehending) contains the null-suffix kvip used to form an action noun (Vārt. 9 on Pān. 3.3.108). Of this matter: viz., of the essential, that is, the suggested meaning.

This verse shows¹ that the sequence [of meanings, as first denoted and then suggested,] is clearly noticed only by those who are not sensitive to poetry, just as the sequence word meaning, sentence meaning, is noticed only by one who is not knowledgeable in the use of words. On the other hand, to one whose sensitivity is at a maximum, just as to one who is really skilled in the use of words, the sequence, although it exists in fact, is not noticed any more than one is aware of one’s memory of the concomitance in an inference that has been frequently repeated.²

1. The words anena ślokena construe with iti darśitam at the end of the comment. 2. When we see smoke, we infer fire without being aware of remembering the rule “wherever there is smoke there is fire.”

A Now the author shows that the greater importance of the suggested meaning is not impugned by the fact that it is apprehended after the apprehension of the denoted meaning.
L Is not impugned: Since persons [of training or sensitivity] hasten with eagerness toward the end [viz., the sentence meaning or suggested meaning] because of its importance, and do not pause with pleasure along the way, they fail to notice a succession of meanings although it actually exists. This failure is thus a proof of the importance [of the final meaning].

K Just as the meaning of an individual word, by force of its capability, acts toward conveying the sentence meaning, but is no longer distinguished after its activity is completed.

A Just as the meaning of an individual word, by force of its capability, acts toward revealing the sentence meaning, but is no longer distinguished apart [from the sentence meaning] after its activity is completed...

L Capability: The capability of a word is its ākānksā (the 'expectancy' of its meaning's being completed by other words in the sentence), yogyatā (its compatibility with those other words), and san-nidhi (its contiguity to those other words). Distinguished (vibhāvyate): The prefix of the word denotes separation; the sense is "is not noticed as being separate." This states that the succession [of sentence meaning to word meaning], although it exists, is not noticed. In contradiction with this statement is what the grammarians say, speaking according to the theory of sphota, namely that the succession does not exist.1

1. The view of Bhartrhari is that the sentence as a semantic symbol (sphota) has no parts; it is only the sentence which we hear that has parts. See Vākyapadīya 1.73 vākyat padānām atyantām praviveko na kaścana.
§ 1.12

$K$ just so does the suggested sense flash forth in an instant in the minds of intelligent auditors who are averse to the literal sense and in quest of the real meaning.

$L$ Who are averse to the literal sense: whose selves or hearts find in the literal sense no satisfaction that could arise from dwelling on it. This brings out the force of the word *sačetasām* ("intelligent," but literally, "possessing a mind or heart"). One might suppose that this [rapid appearance of the suggestion] lies in the brilliance of sensitive auditors and [reflects] no special excellence of the poem. So he says: flashes forth. Because of this [rapid scintillation] the literal sense does not appear as something separate, but this does not mean that it does not appear at all. So there is no contradiction of this passage with that in Chapter Three [3.33 f $A$] where he will state that our apprehension of the literal does not disappear when we apprehend the suggested sense, any more than the lamp disappears when [by its light] we perceive the pot.

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$A$ Having thus shown the existence (*sadbhāva*) of the suggested meaning as distinct from the literal, he puts it to use in the matter at issue.

$L$ Existence: the word *sadbhāva* has [also] the meanings of excellence and predominance, both of which he wishes to convey. Puts to use: gives one to understand its use.¹ In the matter at issue: _viz._, in the definition [of *dhvani*].

¹. What $A$ and $L$ mean is that the use of proving the existence of *dhvani* is that only then can one proceed to define it.
§ 1.13 L

The type of poetry which the wise call dhvani is that in which sense or word, subordinating their own meaning, suggest that (suggested) meaning.

1. See 1.1 K, note 1. Dhvani is here used in the fifth of the senses there listed, viz., of a type of poetry. But this sense is not sharply distinguished from the fourth sense, viz., the suggested meaning. The Vṛtti on this verse slides very easily from the one sense to the other.

A The type of poetry which the wise call dhvani is that in which sense, viz., a particular literal sense, or word, viz., a particular denotative word, suggests that meaning.

L [Abhinava here comments only on the Kārikā. The Vṛtti is so similar as to need no separate comment.] That meaning: here he puts [the proven existence of the suggested meaning] to use.1 [The compound upasarjanikṛta-vārtha ("subordinating their own meaning") is to be analysed as follows:2] sva = self; svārtha = self and meaning; upasarjanikṛta-vārtha = subordinating itself and its meaning. Here we must pair off the terms in order, viz., the meaning subordinates itself and the word subordinates its meaning. That meaning: viz., the meaning that he has already referred to in speaking of "Sarasvatī, pouring forth this sweet matter" (1.6 K).

Suggest: i.e., indicate. Here he uses the dual form, [rather than the singular], for while it is true that in the avitarkita-vācya type of dhvani a word is the suggestor,3 the cooperation of its [literal] meaning cannot be wholly dispensed with; otherwise, a word of whose meaning we are ignorant might be a suggestor. And in the vivakṣita-nāpara-vācya type4 there must be the cooperation of words, because the meaning [which is there predominant] could not be suggested if the denoted sense were not furnished by a word or words. Accordingly, the operation of suggestion always belongs to both word and meaning. So when Bhaṭṭanāyaka
criticizes the dual here, he is overlooking the obvious facts. But [we must remember that] in stating the alternative “word or sense” our author means [to include the notion of] predominance.

The type of poetry: One may analyse the compound (kāvyavīśeṣa) as a karmadhāraya or as a genitive tatpurusa. By using the word “poetry” he shows that that soul which has been characterized as dhvani falls in the area of words and meanings embellished by the poetic qualities and figures of speech, so that there is no occasion for applying the word dhvani to the “material inference” (arthāpatti) [of the Mīmāṃsā].

As for what has been said that “then the apprehension of beauty (cārutvapratīti) will be the soul of poetry,” we are quite willing to accept it. The only dispute is about a name [viz., whether to call the soul of poetry cārutvapratīti or dhvani]. But when it is said that “If the soul of poetry is [nothing more than] the apprehension of beauty, the soul of poetry could arise from any means of cognition, such as visual perception and the like,” we reply that the statement is nonsense. The context is an effort to define the soul of poetry, which is an entity consisting of words and meanings. How would there be any occasion [for bringing in visual perception]?

[The five meanings of dhvani.]

That in which: we may consider the reference to be to the sense, or the word, or to the operation [of word and sense]. And the sense may be either the literal sense, for it suggests (dhvanati), as does the word, or the suggested sense, for it is suggested (dhvanyate), [while] the operation is an alternative [because it is] the suggesting (dhvanana) of word and sense. But the Kārikā would convey by the word dhvani primarily the sum total of these elements in the form of poetry.
§ 1.13 a A

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A  This shows that the habitat of dhvani is different from that of causes of beauty in the denotative sense and word, such as simile and alliteration.¹

The objection that "there is no such thing as dhvani because what falls outside our well known system would no longer be poetry" (1.1 b A) is unjust, for it is only to the makers of definitions [of poetry] that dhvani is not well known. When poetry itself is examined, one finds that dhvani is the poetic essence that delights the heart of the sensitive
ience. Whatever differs from it is mere citra (display), as we shall in what follows.

1. "Such as simile" stands for all the figures of meaning; "such as alliteration" for all the figures of sound. 2. Citra: lit., a bright picture, but in the technical sense, a display of mastery in poetic figures and meters. Citra verses are discussed in 3.41–42.

L Is different: dhvani cannot be included in them because the life of poetic qualities and figures lies in the nature of word and literal sense, whereas the essence of dhvani lies in the nature of the suggestor and the suggested, which are different from that. The word habitat (visaya) shows that it exists in no other place. In this way the deprecation is silenced that took the form of "What is this thing called dhvani that it should differ from these?" (1.1a A).

The makers of definitions: [In inferring the non-existence of dhvani] its being not well known to the makers of definitions is a reason contradictory to what is sought to be proved (viruddho hetuh).1 In fact this is all the more reason for trying to frame a definition. On the other hand, its not being well known in the poetry itself would be a "falsely assigned reason" (asiddho hetuh).2 And the suggestion that it might be something like dancing and singing (cf. 1.1b L) [is nonsense because that] would have nothing to do with poetry.

Citra: it is called "display" because its use of meters and other [embellishments] causes admiration, while it lacks the exudation of that nectar of true beauty that is sought by the sensitive audience. Or it may be called citra in that word's sense of "picture," as an imitation of poetry, or because it is a mere written design,3 or because it is simply one of the arts.4

In what follows: , in Chapter Three [verse 41, which Abhinava here quotes].

1. Cf. 1.9 Intro. L and note 1. 2. Cf. 1.2 L, note 2. 3. This would apply to the topiary verses, e.g., verses composed in the shape of a sword or lotus, with which the Indians, like the ancient Greeks, amused themselves. 4. The last suggestion is not quite clear to me. Perhaps Abhinava feels that any of the sixty-four arts may be called citra in the sense of bright, interesting, amusing.
A  The objection is also wrong which said that "Dhuanī cannot be something entirely new because, being something that falls within the area of beauty, it must be included in the types of figures of speech, etc., which have been recorded" (cf. 1.1c A). For how can dhuanī, which is found to occur always in dependence on suggestive word and suggested meaning, be included in a system that depends on only the literal word and meaning? Furthermore, the causes of beauty in the literal word and meaning are subordinate to it whereas it is principal to them, as will be shown in what follows. The following couplet will give support (parikara) [to our position]: “As dhuanī depends on the relation of the suggestor and the suggested, how can it be included in the causes of beauty belonging to the denoter and the denoted?”

L  A supportive couplet is a verse (śloka) intended to supplement the Kārikās in order to fortify (parikara) their argument.

A  Now an opponent of dhuanī may allow that [a figure of speech] where a suggested meaning is not clearly apprehended falls outside the habitat of dhuanī. But where it is perceived, as it is in such figures as samāsokti, ākṣepa, the type of viṣeṣokti where the reason is not given, paryāyokta, apahnuti, dipaka, saṅkara, and the like,1 he will say that dhuanī must be included. It is in order to refute such a suggestion that it was specified [by the Kārikā] that “word and sense subordinate themselves.” It is where a sense by subordinating itself, or a word by subordinating its literal sense, reveals another [suggested] meaning, that we have dhuanī. That is to say, since dhuanī is found only where the suggested meaning is predominant, which it is not in samāsokti and the like, how can it be included in them?
1. For these figures of speech see the Index.

L Where: viz., in a figure of speech. Clearly: he means both with beauty and clarity. Specified: The Vṛtti uses the past tense because it has already dealt with the word “suggest” [in 1.13 b]. Sub-ordinating itself: the Vṛtti explains the sense of sva (“own”) of the Kārikā by ātman (“itself”). Which it is not: this predominance of the suggested sense is not. That is to say, its predominance does not appear as we are understanding the verse, because we spend our enjoyment in an unbroken relishing [of both literal and suggested meanings] on the principle of [what was said in 1.12 K]: “in the minds of those in whom the real [meaning] appears.” But [in a second stage], when a man of discrimination seeks the enlivening element, since it is the suggested meaning that gives life to the literal, he will decide that he is presented with a figure of speech, because the suggested is helping out that [literal sense]. And so he will say that he received his delight from the literal meaning as helped out by that [suggestion]. Although in a final [third] stage, there is indeed rasadhvani; nevertheless this suggested meaning in the second stage does not point to rasa; for its own part it simply hastens to ornament the literal meaning. And so the Vṛtti speaks of the suggested meaning as being subordinated.  

1. The usual word for the Vṛtti to use in such references is āha, which the Pāññians take to be a present tense (Pān. 3.4.84). Abhinava feels that he must give a reason why abhihitam, a past tense, is here substituted. His reason is that the Vṛtikāra has already explained the word vyanktah, which occurs in the second half of the Kārikā. He now turns back to explain upasarjant-kṛta-adhau, which occurred in the first half of the verse. So in referring back to it he uses a past tense. 2. Abhinava is quoting from memory. The Kārikā actually used the word tattvāvabhāsinyām, not tattvāvabhāsinyām. 3. The complication of Abhinava’s thought in this passage is caused, it seems to me, by the fact that he is trying to reconcile matters that are irreconcilable. There is no doubt that the figure samāsavokti involves suggestion, as the example about to be quoted in 1.13 d A will show. The old poeticians were aware of this fact and defined this sort of suggestion within their system of figures of speech. Ānanda, seeking to make suggestion into a wholly new semantic category but unwilling to defy the definitions of the past, abandoned the group of suggestions that had already been categorized by the older writers under the figures of speech and tried to find an area where suggestion could form its own independent species. To do this he invented the distinction between predominant and subordinate suggestion. Where it was predominant it could form its
own species. All the cases of suggestion contained in the old, defined, figures of speech could be left out as instances of subordinate suggestion. See Introduction, pp. 22-24. There would still be room for an important new species: predominant suggestion. The only trouble with the innovation is that many of the old type, many instances of samāsokti, ākṣepa, etc., move us as deeply, both emotionally and aesthetically, as any new examples which he can adduce. How can one explain this fact, if true dhvani exists only where it is predominant? So Abhinava, like Ptolomy inventing new pericycles to rectify a system that is basically wrong, invents still another distinction: the three stages in our response to these long-recognized instances of dhvani. In the first stage we respond automatically without distinguishing what is predominant and what is subordinate. In the second stage we realize upon reflection that the suggestion is helping out a defined figure of speech. Finally in a third stage we relish the rasadhvani despite our intellectual decision that it does not belong in the same category as that which is produced by a predominant suggestion.

\[\text{§ 1.13 d A }\]

A Let us begin with the figure samāsokti (compound statement):

The reddening moon has so seized the face of night with her trembling stars, that all her cloak of darkness in the east falls thus unnoticed by her in confusion.¹

In this, as in similar verses, the literal meaning, although it is accompanied by a suggestion, is apprehended as the more important, for the main purport of the sentence concerns the moon and the night,² on which have been superimposed the behaviors of a lover and his lady.

1. In päda d I have taken the reading of the oldest version, mohād, in place of rāgād, which avoids the awkward repetition of rāga. The words of the stanza have double meanings, which are immediately brought to our attention by the obvious pun in rāga: redness, or love, and by the masculine gender of the word for moon in contrast with the feminine gender of the word for night. Proceeding from these hints, the mind soon finds a suggested meaning for
each word (see Abhinava's comment below). The suggested meanings, when combined, furnish a sense as follows: "The lover, with aroused passion, kisses the face of his beloved, whose eyes (tārakā = 'pupil' as well as 'star') tremble, so that she drops her robe entirely before him (purah = 'in front of' as well as 'in the east') without noticing what she has done in her confusion." The traditional interpretation of such verses insists on keeping the two versions distinct, allowing one message to suggest the other, but refusing to mix the images. Masson writes: "When I attempted to mix the two, speaking of the moon kissing the face of the night, which is after all rather poetic, Pandit Srinivasa Shastri of the Deccan College looked astonished: "Katham ś īcetanavastu-van niśām cumen nanu? Tathā nāsti, sarvathā asambhavam." The verse is quoted in most of the anthologies, usually without variant, and invariably attributed to the poet Pāṇini, for whom see Peterson, JRAS 1891, pp. 313-316. Thus it is in Śāṅkha 3634, SūktiM. 72.5, Saduṭki. 412 (where we find the better reading mohād in d). The first word and last quarter of of the stanza are preserved among the fragments edited by Gnoli of Udbhata's Commentary on the Kāvyālakāra of Bhāmaha, fragment 37, pp. 34-35, where the reading of d appears as pura 'pi mohād galitam na raksitam. The word mohād has been changed in the later versions, presumably because of the difficulty of finding a pun in it. 2. It is context which tells us which of the two possible meanings is the main purport (vākyārthā). Even without other verses which may once have accompanied it, we may be sure that the context of the present stanza is a description of moonrise, that being one of the favorite topoi of Sanskrit poetry. The lover and his beloved are a secondary suggestion.

L Samāsokti:

Where in a statement a second meaning is understood because of epithets common [to both meanings]: the wise call that samāsokti, because the meaning is composite. (Bhāmaha 2.79)

In the four quarters of this verse the author has given successively the basic characterization of samāsokti, the reason for it, its name, and the explanation of the name.

Reddening (literally, possessing redness): [in the case of the moon this means] assuming the red color of twilight; and [in the case of a lover it means] assuming the feelings of love. With trembling tārakā: in which the lights of heaven are trembling and in which a portion of the eye is trembling. So: i.e., suddenly [of the moon] and with a rush of love [of the lover]. Seized: illumined [of the moon with respect to the night] and seized in order to kiss [of the lover with respect to his beloved]. The face of night: the beginning [of the night] and the lotus
face [of the woman]. Thus: suddenly [of the night] and with a rush of love [of the woman]. Cloak of darkness: Of the night timirāmsukam means timiram (darkness) and sūkṣmāmsavah (feeble rays), i.e., her mass of darkness spangled with a few rays [of the stars]; of the beloved timirāmsuka means the dark veil appropriate to a newly wed bride who is shy. [In place of mohād (in confusion) Abhinava reads rāgād, which he explains as follows:] Rāgād [in the case of the night] means "from redness," that is, immediately following the redness produced by twilight; and [in the case of the woman] it means "from love," that is, because of love. In the east [in connection with night] and [in connection with the woman] in front of her. Fallen: vanished in the one case and fallen in the other. By her: by the night as instrument (Pāṇ. 2.3.18) the mass of darkness is spangled [with starlight], or we may take the pronoun to be an instrumental of identification (Pāṇ. 2.3.21). Unnoticed: it was not realized that this was the beginning of night, for people recognize the face, or beginning, of night when they see a mass of darkness spangled with starlight, but not when a clear light [as of the moon] is present. In the case of the woman, on the other hand, "by her" will be an instrumental of agent ["unnoticed by her"]). In the case of the night the word api [in puro 'pi = even in front of her] must be transposed to follow upalakṣitam [i.e., "was not even noticed by people"). And here [in the case of the woman] the veil falls, or drops, in front, as the lover coming from behind begins to kiss her. Or, we may take the syntax to be that the lover [standing] in front seize her face.

So although we understand a suggested sense in this stanza, it is not predominant. That is to say, the [superimposed] behavior of lover and beloved in ornamenting the moon and night, which thus take the form of vibhāvas of the erotic flavor, acts as an ornament or figure of speech. But then from the literal sense [of moon and night] which has been turned into a vibhāva, there issues forth a steam of rasa.

Here someone has said, "The word 'by her,' viz., by the night, expresses agency, and since agency is impossible on the part of an insentient being, the behavior of lovers which we infer is given by the denotative force of 'night' and 'moon' and not by a suggestion. That is why the stanza forms a compound utterance (samāsokti). This explicator has ignored the clear sense of the text with which we are concerned, [for the Vṛtti has clearly said] "accompanied by a suggestion." At that rate the figure would be ekadeśāvivartti rūpakam (a partial metaphor) like the couplet:
The pond kings were fanned
by autumn with her wild geese.

(Udbhaṭa, l.*12 Induṛāja = 1.24 Viśṛti)

It would not be a samāsokti because it would not contain epithets that apply [in each instance] equally to both [the denoted and the suggested sense]. Furthermore, the denotative function is ruled out [in Bhāmaha's definition of samāsokti just quoted] by the phrase “is understood” [rather than “is stated”]. But let us not run on at too great length on a subordinate matter.

[Here it might be thought that Ānanda should have written samāropitanāyaka-vyavahārayoh rather than samāropitanāyikā-nāyakayoh.8 However,] there is no need for an ekaśeṣa compound [viz., nāyakayor] if we explain the meaning to be that the behavior of a lady toward her lover is superimposed on night and the behavior of a lover toward his lady is superimposed on the moon.

1. He is taking the compound as a dvandva rather than as a karma-dhāraya. In omśuka he is taking the suffix as the diminutive -ka (Pān. 5.3.85) appended to the stem omśu-, “ray.” 2. Abhinava's interpretation of the second meaning of timirāmsukam seems to me as faulty as his explanation of the first. In his interpretation the word “all” (samasta) will have no force. Nor does the falling of a mere veil indicate much passion (rāga). What is in fact suggested is the falling of her entire garment. It is a commonplace of Classical Sanskrit poetry that the knot of the beloved's garment opens of itself and her dress falls as her lover embraces her; see Meghadūta 73, KumSam. 8.4, Śisūpāla 10.45 and 50, Kirāta 9.47-48. 3. Abhinava takes the ablative inflection of rāga as denoting cause only in the suggested meaning, which concerns the woman. To explain the ablative in the first meaning concerning night, he supplies the word anantaram, “immediately after.” This word governs an ablative on the analogy of Pān. 2.3.29. 4. This is the usage found in such phrases as api bhavān kamandalunā chātram adrāksit, “Did you see the pupil with a water pitcher?” where “with a water pitcher” serves to identify the pupil who is intended. Here the mass of darkness spangled with stars that was “with the night,” i.e., that characterized or identified the night, was not noticed. Both interpretations are wildly improbable. Tayā must be taken as instrumental of agent with laksitam in the case of the night as well as in the case of the woman. If it is objected that an insentient thing like night cannot "notice" anything (this difficulty doubtless led Abhinava to his interpretation), one may have recourse to the older reading rakṣitam.
5. The anonymous opponent holds that words have only one operation, abhidhā (denotation). When context forbids our taking the usual meaning of the word, we choose a second meaning. But the opponent refuses to call this second meaning taksita, any more than he will call it vyaṇgya. As night cannot be supposed to "notice" anything, we are forced to take "night" to mean a woman, whereupon we shall take "moon" to mean a lover. These meanings are denotive, just as night and moon are denotive. It is because of the double denotations in the verse that the figure is called samāsokti. 6. This is a sure refutation if the explicator was commenting on the Dhvanyāloka. But if he was attacking it, the statement of the Vṛtti would carry no weight. 7. Chowrie-bearers fan kings and one can express ponds metaphorically as kings, but autumn does not perform the function of such intelligent beings as fan-bearers. The example is quoted again at 3.36 L. 8. If we take Ānanda's compound, as I have done, to mean "on which has been superimposed the behaviors of a lover and his lady," we make Ānanda guilty of disregarding Pāṇ. 1.2.67, which states that in such cases the feminine component of the pair is dropped and the masculine component, as an ekāṣeṣa compound, suffices for both. Abhinava exonerates Ānanda by giving the compound a meaning other than "the behaviors of a lover and his lady."

\[ A \] In ākṣepa (a hint, often in the form of a denial) also, while it hints at a particular suggestion, the literal sense is charming. The literal sense\(^1\) is known to be predominant from the very fact that [the figure] is called ākṣepa. Thus, it is the hint itself, in the form of a denial explicitly stated with a view to expressing some particular,\(^2\) that forms the principal body of the poem, even though it hints at some particular suggestion. This is because the decision whether literal or suggested meaning is the more important depends on which is the more charming. An example is this couplet:

\begin{quote}
The sunset is flushed with red, the day goes ever before,  
Ah, such is the way of fate that never the two shall meet.\(^3\)
\end{quote}

Although we apprehend a suggestion in this verse, it is this [literal sense] that holds the greater charm. So [we should take it that] the literal is intended to be predominant.
1. There is a problem of reading here. The Kaumudi, and presumably all but the two KM MSS which it mentions as being in disagreement, reads vācyārtha for vākyārtha. The KM edition, however, chose the reading vākyārtha from those two MSS and has been followed by all the printed editions. If one accepts that reading, one must understand the word as a locative and take the whole passage from ākṣepa 'pi to jñāyate as a single sentence: “In ākṣepa also, while it hints at a particular suggestion, the fact that the beauty of the literal sense is predominant is obvious from the force of the expression of the hint in the final or sentence meaning.” This is awkward, to say the least. I prefer to read vācyārtha, which I take as a nominative, and to put a danda after cārūtvam. The sense, as I have given it in the translation, is then clear and to the point. 2. In the phrase viśeṣābhidhāne cchatā one must not take abhidhāna too narrowly. BP glosses the word by vyāhgyabhūtaviśesa-pratipādayiṣayā. 3. What is hinted at in this anonymous stanza is a pair of lovers who are prevented, by their parents or by social differences or by reasons of state, from ever uniting. Clearly Ānanda considered this couplet to be an example of ākṣepa. Other Ālāṅkārikas who quote the verse consider it to exemplify samāsokti or viśeṣokti or saṅkara; see KP 9.382 (p. 526), SD 10.99 (Sanskrit p. 63 Kane), and the Locana in what follows. To explain this difference of judgment some historical remarks will be helpful. The word ākṣepa is post-epic. Whether its earliest meaning was “hint” or “denial” or “censure” I cannot say, for it bears all these senses in the later literature. As a technical name of a figure of speech it is defined by all the Ālāṅkārikas starting from Bhāmaha and Dandin. Usually it is defined as a denial (pratisēdha, nisedha) which hints at something unexpressed. The denial may be of a fact or of a word that has been spoken, or it may be mere reticence, the refusal to say something that would be painful. For examples, see Abhinava’s comment below and 2.27c A with note 2. Vāmana, however, has a definition of ākṣepa that differs from that of all other authors. The meaning of his laconic definition: upamāṅkāsepaḥ cākṣepah is shown by his examples to be “Ākṣepa is the censure of, or hint of, a simile.” His examples will be found quoted by Abhinava in his comment on this passage. It is the second half of the definition (hint of a simile) that Ānanda must have in mind here. Neither Vāmana nor Ānanda tells us how to distinguish this second type of ākṣepa from samāsokti, so we are left to speculate. Presumably samāsokti was allowed to be the more general figure, ākṣepa preempting to itself only those instances where the hint was specifically of a simile (upamāna).

L In ākṣepa: [The figure has been defined thus:]
The denial (or holding back) of an intended [statement] out of a wish to convey some special [suggestion] is ākṣepa (denial, hint, censure), which is of two types depending on whether the statement was about to be spoken or has been made. (The first half of this verse is Bhāmaha 2.68)
An example of the first type is this:

If in my longing
I should lose sight of you but for a moment
But I say no more.
Why say that which would pain you?

(Bhāmaha 2.69)

Here we have ākṣepa in the form of withholding the death that the lady was about to speak of. The words “But I say no more,” while they suggest the statement “I will die,” are themselves the cause of the beauty in the verse. So we must say that the ākṣepa (the hinting reticence) as embellished by what it hints at is the predominant element. An example of the second type, where a statement that has been made [is denied or censured] is a verse of mine:

“My dear traveler, what causes this sudden collapse?”
“What else can I do who have such thirst, when the miserly road here hides its water?”
“Your thirst is mistimed, good sir, and misplaced. Vent your anger on it. The glory and greatness of the desert road are famous throughout the world."

In this verse a servitor is present. His heart is torn by desire and he asks why he receives nothing from his lord. Some one puts him to a right way of thinking by this censure. Here it is the literal meaning, expressing distress at the lack of recompense from service with a bad master, being transformed by a censure in the form of a denial into the vibhāva indifference (nirueda) which is the basic emotion of the flavor of peace (sāntarasa), which gives beauty to the stanza.

Vāmana, in different fashion, defines ākṣepa as censure of the simile. It amounts to saying, “When this is present, of what account are you?” He gives an example:

When we have the fair clarity of her face,
who would care for the full-orbed moon;
or who would care for water-lily flowers
before the vast beauty of her eyes?
What price would you pay for the tender, lovely opening of a leaf, when you see her lower lip?
Ah me! but God shows a stubborn zeal for tautological creation.

(Vāmana 4.3.27.1)
In this stanza the simile, although it is suggested, merely serves the literal sense. The expressed censure, in its casting away [of the simile] with a “who would care for it?” is the source of all the charm.

Or again, äkṣepa [here simply hint, not censure] of the simile may be brought in by the inherent capability [of the literal sense], as in this example:

Lady Autumn beautifies the moon
although his face is made imperfect by its mark,
and bearing on her cloud a rainbow
like a wound left by a lover’s nail,
has made the sun grow hot.

(Vāmana, ibid. vs. 2)

In this stanza, although a simile is hinted at, namely a lover who is pained by jealousy, it serves only to beautify the literal meaning.

But the stanza [which Ānanda] here [quotes, viz., “The sunset is flushed with red,” etc.] is really an instance of samāsokti [if one follows the normal definition, as of Bhāmaha].

So he says: “[depends on] which is the more charming,” and apropos of this quotes a well-known example: The sunset is flushed with red. Note that he has not yet finished his consideration of ākṣepa and that it is as an example of ākṣepa that he quotes this samāsokti couplet.

Ah, but such is the way of fate: The [suggested] sense is that there is no union [of the lovers] because of some such obstacle as their subjection to their parents. This: i.e., the literal sense.

Realizing that the figure of speech here is ākṣepa according to Vāmana’s definition and samāsokti according to Bhāmaha’s, our author by joining the two figures has given this single example. Let it be an example of samāsokti or of ākṣepa, what does it matter to us? All that we are trying to demonstrate is that in figures of speech the suggested sense is always subordinate to the literal. This is how my teacher [Bhaṭṭatauta] explained the intention of the present passage.

1. This is the definition that most later authors have followed. It is unfortunate that several of the best Indian scholars have adopted the term “paraleipsis” as a translation, for that is quite a different figure both in form and intent. An example from the Rhetorica ad Herennium is: “I would speak of your vices, had I time. But I pass over them and over the fact that you often left the army without leave” (4.27). Here one neither denies a statement made nor suppresses a statement about to be made. Rather, one passes over a fact (this is the literal meaning of paraleipsis) lightly in order by minimizing
it to increase the effect of one's major charge. If one wants a Greek or Latin translation for Bhāmaha's first type of ākṣepa, the Greek would be apostopēsis, which the author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium calls praecisio (ad Her. 4.30) and Cicero calls reticentia (de Or. 3.538). 2. What the verse suggests is a conversation between courtiers in which the first complains that his service is not rewarded and the second censures his complaint. Accordingly, most Ālankārikas would take the figure of speech here to be aprastutapraśāmsā. But Abhinava is thinking of Bhāmaha's second type of ākṣepa and he is influenced by the sense of censure that Vāmana, whom he is about to quote, attributes to the name. We have here clearly a censure of what has been said. In general, when we can assign a figure of speech to either of two defined types, we should assign it to the narrower type; see 1.13e A, note 3, end. There is room for aprastutapraśāmsā where an allegory suggests the matter in hand without a censure of what has been said. One may add that to a tenth-century Kashmiri the desert road was still famous as a road to wealth; compare the expeditions across the northern desert of King Lalitāditya recorded in Rāj. Tar. 4.172, 277 ff., and 337 ff. 3. The literal meaning describes the phenomena of autumn, when the moon appears at its loveliest (our "harvest moon") despite the dark birthmark (kalaiika, our "man in the moon") on his face. In an Indian autumn, which comes directly after the cooling season of the monsoon, the sun again grows hot. Several of the words of the stanza are puns. Prasādayanti: making beautiful or granting favors to; payodhara: cloud or breast; tapah: heat or pain. Hence the suggestion of a courtesan favoring a lover of bad character and so making her noble lover jealous.

§ 1.13 f L ]

A And as in dīpaka, apannuti,1 and the like, although we apprehend a simile as something suggested, we do not call these figures of speech by that name because the simile is not intended to be prominent, so the same applies here [viz., we do not call a figure of speech by the name of dhvani because the dhvani is not intended to be prominent].

1. These figures of speech are defined below in L and the notes thereon

L Having thus provided an example of where [the literal] is intended to be predominant, he now gives an example, acceptable both to
his followers and his opponents, of how the name [of a figure of speech] derives from its predominant element: and as in, etc. [Although we apprehend] a simile: he means that we apprehend a relation of subject and image. By that name: viz., "simile." For example, in dīpaka—of which the definition runs thus: "Dīpaka is held to be threefold, as it falls at the beginning, middle or end"\(^1\) (Bhāmaha 2.25)—the beauty of the verse is occasioned by the operation of the dīpaka, [not by the suggested simile,] as in this example:

A jewel placed against the whetstone,
a victorious warrior wounded by the sword.
the moon when left with its last digit
a young woman thin from exercise of sex,
an elephant in rut, a river
drawn back from its lovely sandbanks in the autumn,
and the rich who spend their wealth by giving to the poor:
all these by lessening grow resplendent.

\((\text{Bhartṛhari,}\ \text{Nitiś.}\ 11)\)

Apahnuti has been defined: "The denial of what one really accepts, if it contains to some extent a simile, is apahnuti" (Bhāmaha 3.21).\(^2\) In this figure it is the denial itself that is charming, as in:

This is not the buzzing of a bee,
busy in her drunken joy;
it is the twangling of the string
as Cupid pulls his bow.

\((\text{Bhāmaha}\ 3.22)\)

1. Bhāmaha’s “definition” is in effect no definition at all. It merely divides the figure into three types. Dīpaka, “the lamp,” is so called because a single verb or property serves to illuminate more than one object. Among early authors dīpaka is the same as the Graeco-Latin zeugma. Mahābhārata 2.52.21: Dhṛtarāṣṭraṁ cāhūṭaḥ kālaśya sāmayena ca, “challenged by Dhṛtarāṣṭra and by the doom of fate.” Ovid, \textit{Met.} 7.133: \textit{demisere metu vultumque animumque Pelasgi}, “the Greeks lowered their faces and spirits in fear.” From the time of Udbhāta the definition was further particularized. Udbhāta (1.14 Indurāja = 1.28 Vivṛti) distinguished dīpaka from tulyayogīta (originally quite a different figure, which had come to encroach on dīpaka) by claiming that in dīpaka the common verb or property must join the matter-in-hand (pradhāna, prākaranīka, prastuta) with some extraneous matter (gauna, aprākaranīka, aprastuta), whereas in tulyayogīta the combined items are all within the subject of discourse or all outside it. Thus, an example like the following, which \textit{BAHŚ} 16.55 gives of dīpaka, becomes an instance of tulyayogīta
According to the new view: sarâmsi hamsaśth kusumaś ca urkṣaśth ... tasmin na śūnyānī sadā kriyante. "In autumn lakes are ever filled with geese, the trees with flowers, etc." for all the objects joined by the verb are within the subject of discourse, autumn. Later authors usually follow Udbhata's distinction.

2. The printed versions of Bhâmaha all have the reading apahnuti abhiṣṭā ca. If we take Abhinava's reading, we must use the technique of āvṛtti, that is, we must read apahnutī twice. One might best render apahnutī in English as "feigned denial." Its definition remains essentially the same in all Ālankārikas except Dandin, whose view does not here concern us. 3. Note that there is an appropriateness to the simile based on sound. The bee is a sign of spring, when Cupid annually renews his archery.

§ 1.13 g A]

Also in that type of višeṣokti (here = cause without effect) where the reason is not expressed, as in such verses as

Although his friends have waked him,
although he answers, "yes,"
although his mind tells him to go, the traveler
does not uncurl his limbs.

(Bharścu)¹

we merely apprehend the suggestion from force of the context, but there arises no particular beauty from the apprehension; so the suggestion is not predominant.

1. The verse is by a once famous poet, whose odd name Bharścu appears also as Bharvi, Bhaścu, Bhatsu. A handful of his verses are preserved by the anthologists. What little is known of him may be found in V. Raghavan's Bhaja's SP, sec. ed., pp. 817-818. Bharścu served the Maukhari kings of Kanyākubja, was Bāna's teacher (see Kādambari, Introductory verse 4), and accordingly belongs to the early seventh century. The verse here quoted is found in the anthologies (Śārīg. 3932, Śūkti.M. 63.23, Subh.Ā. 1838) under descriptions of winter, which shows that they followed the interpretation which Abhinava (see below) ascribes to Udbhata, viz., that the unexpressed reason for the result not to occur is the fact that the traveler was cold. Abhinava's Locana is the earliest of our preserved texts to mention a more romantic interpretation.
After considering ākṣepa in the above manner, he now speaks of the subject that immediately followed it in the order of his initial statement: and in that type of viśeṣokti. [The figure in general is thus defined:] "The praise of one quality in the absence of others, if made in order to reveal some excellence, is traditionally known as viśeṣokti" (Bhāmaha 3.23). An example is the following:

Alone the god of the flowered bow
conquers all three worlds,
whose body Śiva destroyed
but left him still his strength.

(Bhāmaha 3.24)

As the reason in this case [viz., the reason why incineration should not lead to impotence] is inconceivable, there is no suggestion [of a reason]. Even where the reason is explicitly stated, since the statement amounts to no more than giving the nature of the object, there is no question of a suggested sense. For example:

I give my praise to him
who like camphor grows stronger with burning,
against whom no man prevails,
the god of the flowered bow.

(Bālarāmāyana 3.11)

Accordingly, our author passes over these two varieties and examines only a third type [as a possible case of a predominant suggested sense]: when the reason is not expressed.

[We merely apprehend] the suggestion: viz., according to Bhaṭṭodbhata, the discomfort caused by the cold, this being the reason [for the traveler's remaining curled up in his bedding]. Conformably with this interpretation, our author says, there arises no particular beauty here. Some men of taste have imagined a different reason here, namely that the traveler does not uncurl his limbs because he wishes to bring back sleep, thinking that a dream would be a quicker means of union with his beloved than setting forth [on his farther journey]. But the experts in figures of speech have not taken even that reason as a source of beauty here, but have taken the source of beauty to be the words "does not uncurl his limbs," which form part of the viśeṣokti itself, as embellished by the suggested reason. Otherwise this would not be an example of viśeṣokti at all. So our author here accommodates
both views by speaking generally [i.e., by not mentioning the precise nature of the suggested reason]. It should not be thought that the text is based exclusively on the view of Udbhata.

1. In the initial list (1.13c A) anuktanimittā viśeṣokti followed directly on ākṣepa. The subject of apāhnuti and dīpaka has intervened merely for the sake of an example. Ānanda will come back to them again later in their proper sequence (1.13h A). 2. The name viśeṣokti (statement of the excellence) finds its explanation in the old concept of the figure as seen here and in Dandin, where a viśeṣokti was a statement of deficiency in certain respects, made in order to give special prominence or praise to an excellence or efficiency in some other respect. Thus, Dandin's example (2.328): “He has a one-wheeled car, a crippled driver, an odd number of horses, and yet the sun in his glory travels the whole sky.” But Udbhata (5.4 Indurāja = 5.5 Vivṛti.) changed the definition to “A statement that the result fails to arise when all the causal factors are present, if made from a desire to point out a [particular] excellence.” He further divided the figure into two types, one where a reason is expressed for the failure of the result to occur, the other where it is not expressed. Later writers all follow Udbhata. In Bhāmaha's definition, here quoted, somatuti has its natural meaning “praise,” not the watered-down meaning of “mention” by which it is glossed by commentators seeking to broaden the definition. 3. The reason why Kāma remains strong despite his incineration is here stated: because he grew stronger with being burned, as does camphor. We remain with a literal description of Kāma's nature. Liquified camphor gains not only in scent but in refrigerating power, a fact that is again used as a simile in Naiṣadhitya 7.25. 4. Presumably Udbhata quoted the verse in his commentary on Bhāmaha. It is not found in his Kāvyālāṅkārāṇātmasaṅgraha. 5. Obviously, if the suggestion were the chief cause of beauty, we should cease to have a figure of speech; we should have dhvani instead.

A In paryāyokta (statement of periphrasis),¹ if the suggestion is predominant we may well include it in dhvani. But by no means may we include dhvani in it, for as we shall demonstrate, dhvani is of much wider range and is always the predominant element. Furthermore, in examples such as that adduced by Bhāmaha, the suggestion is not
predominant, because there is no intention there of subordinating the literal sense. In *apahnuti* and *dipaka*, on the other hand, the literal is always predominant and the suggested [simile] merely follows along with it, as is well known.

1. See note 1 on the *Locana* on this passage. 2. Read *upasarjani-bhāvena*.

**L** In *paryāyokta*: It has been defined thus: “*Paryāyokta* is when something is said in a different manner, namely through an understanding that lacks the operation of denoter and denoted” (*Udbhāta*, 4.6 *Indurāja* = 4.11 *Vivṛti*).\(^1\) An example is this:

The sage Rāma, who had strayed i
in his rage to cut down his foes,
was instructed in the path of duty by this bow.

In this stanza, although we understand [the suggestion] that the might of Bhīṣma overcame the might of Paraśu Rāma, it is merely as helped out by this suggestion that the literally used phrase “was instructed in the path of duty” ornaments the final meaning of the verse.

When what is said is distinguished by a *paryāya* (periphrasis), that is, speaking in a different manner, which consists in a giving to understand, [that is, when it is distinguished] by a suggestion, then the literally used words themselves form a *paryāyokta* (statement of periphrasis). Here “when something is said” forms the definition, “statement of periphrasis” is the thing to be defined, and the general characteristic of this thing is as a figure of speech based on meaning (*arthālāṅkāras*). And so everything is here in order. On the other hand, if one forces on the phrase “when something is said” the unnatural interpretation that it means “when something is apprehended as the chief element,” and if one offers as an example such verses as “Go your rounds freely, pious monk” (cf. 1.4 b *A*), then the statement of periphrasis will cease to be a figure of speech at all, for it will end up as the soul [of poetry, namely *dhvani*]. In that case it should not be included in figures of speech. Furthermore, in that case we should have to list subvarieties of it [just as injunction, prohibition, etc., were listed as subvarieties in 1.4 b, c, d, e *A*]. Our author says this in the words if the suggestion is predominant. That is, by including it in *dhvani, paryāyokta* would be the soul of poetry, not one of the *āṅkāras* (ornaments, figures of speech). In it: *dhvani* cannot be included in that sort of statement
which is intended as a figure of speech. We have not defined dhvani as something (subordinate) of that sort. For dhvani has a wide range. As it exists in all [sorts of statements], it is widely spread (vyāpaka), being the principal element on which all the [gunaś and alaṅkāras] are placed. A figure of speech is not widely spread any more than any other ornament, [e.g., a bracelet is worn only on the wrist, an anklet on the ankle]. And it is not the principal, as it is subordinate to the object which it ornaments. Or, if you assume that the suggestion here is both of widely spread type and principal, and that there is no figure of speech here, why then you would be accepting our own position but out of mere spite continuing to call it a paryāyokta.

Our author now shows that even this much [viz., that the suggestion can sometimes be predominant] was not understood by the ancients but was first revealed by himself: furthermore. Bhāmaṇa furnished his illustration of paryāyokta in accordance with the nature he conceived the figure to have. Now in his illustration the suggested element is not predominant because it is not the source of any special beauty. Accordingly, we may agree that in such other illustrations as may be composed along the same lines, there is likewise no predominance of the suggested sense. If you disregard the illustration just given and give as an illustration some such verse as “Go your rounds freely, gentle monk,” you will have become our author’s pupil [for you will be talking about dhvani]. But one must say that you have behaved in an unmannerly fashion by educating yourself in his doctrine with disregard of the rules and by an illicit hearing of it. The experts in sacred history say:

He who shows no respect to the teacher
but listens in hiding to his teaching
goes straight to hell.

The illustration which Bhāmaṇa gives is this:

Neither at home nor when abroad
do we eat food that is not eaten
by learned brahmins.

(Bhāmaṇa 3.9)

This statement of the blessed Krishna by a periphrasis averts his being given poison. As Bhāmaṇa says himself, “This is to avoid his being given poison.” Now there is nothing charming in this suggestion of the averting of poison by which we might suppose it to be predominant. Rather, the statement of periphrasis itself, viz., that he does not eat without the prior eating of brahmins, as embellished by this suggestion,
ornaments the matter under discussion, namely his eating of food. The intention of the statement is not to say “Give me unpoisoned food.” And so *paryāyokta* is simply a figure of speech according to the opinion of the ancients. This is what it all comes down to.

In *apahnuti* and *dipaka*: These are figures which he has already discussed; so he says, as is well known. He means the matter has already been proved with valid means of proof. Previously he brought up these figures to serve as illustration of how a figure does not take its name from the [subordinate] simile, etc., [which it might contain,] whereas now he mentions them in a different way to show that they are not *dhvani* because their suggestions are not prominent. This mentioning of them a second time is to keep the order of his original list so that he may make his text all of one piece. But the matter on both occasions is basically the same, for one might suspect them of being *dhvani* from the fact that they suggest a simile.

As for the statement of the author of the *Vivarana,* based on an examination of many instances, that a [suggestion of] simile does not always accompany a *dipaka,* it is unhelpful, without merit, and can easily be refuted. In the stanza:

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Infatuation creates desire;
and that, love with its loss of pride;
that, a yearning to gain the beloved;
and that, unbearable pain of heart.
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(Bhāmaha 2.27)

one can easily imagine a relation of subject and simile between the terms even though the terms are produced successively. One cannot say that such a relation of similarity is impossible among successive objects, for we have the verse:

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Daśaratha was like Rāma,
Raghu like Daśaratha and Aja like Raghu
and the whole race of Dīlīpa like Aja:
marvellous is the glory of Rāma.
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where one cannot say that it does not exist. So why worry whether sequentiality or contemporaneity hinders the [suggestion of] simile? Enough of trying to milk a mule.

1. In defining *paryāyokta* Bhāmaha merely says: “*Paryāyokta* is when something is said in a different way.” (*paryāyoktam yad anyena prakārenābhis-dhiyate, 3.8.* ) Udbhata here repeats the words of Bhāmaha but adds a second
half verse, which for the first time introduces into the figure the notion of suggestion. His definition is followed by Mammata 10.175, p. 680 and Ruyyaka 10.171. Only late in the history of alankāra-āstra does the restriction appear by which most present-day students recognize the figure. "In a different way" is then taken to mean "by stating the result." So SD 10.61. Thus paryāyokta in the modern view is the suggestion of a cause by stating the result. 2. The quotation is presumably from some Purāṇa. It is not found in MBh or Rām. One is supposed, of course, to bow down and touch the teacher's feet before hearing his words; and the punishments of śūdras who overhear Vedic teaching are famous. But the quotation is here intended humorously. 3. The English reader may need more explanation than Abhinava furnishes. The words are supposed to be spoken by Krishna on his visit to Śīśupāla, where he stands in danger of assassination. Without the hint of that possibility the words, taken literally, express the highly pious protocol that Krishna might be expected to follow. Out of respect he always has his priests fed before himself. The expression is enlivened, is given a twist of wry humor, by the suggestion, but it is the expression itself that delights us. 4. amuyā cchāya: the same as amunā prakārena. "of this sort, [namely, that a figure, etc.]." 5. Viz., in 1.13c A. See also 1.13g L, note 1. 6. granthāsaya: a smooth text, an orderly presentation. Kaumudi: śayyā nāma ekāraṇam sannyavaisesaḥ, "śayyā is a particular way of arranging matters so that they are all of one and the same form." See PW's third definition under śayyā, which gives as synonyms gumphana, sabdagumphana, granthasya nirmitha. The term has an interesting development in later writers, where padaśayyā, like pāka, comes to mean the perfect choice of words; see Pratāparudrīya 2.34 (p. 49) and Taralā on Ekāvalī 1.13 (p. 22). 7. Kane (HSP p. 126) supposed that this was a reference to Udbhata as the author of the Bhāmaḥaviyavaraṇa, a work specifically referred to by Abhinava at 3.16m L. But Kane was forced to rely on the incorrect text of the KM edition, where the negative is omitted from upamāṇavya nāstīti. The supposition seems to me impossible. In Udbhata's Kavyaśāṇ-kāraṇaṅgroha there is no mention of such a theory as is here attributed to the Vivaraṇakṛt. In fact he there defines dipaka as containing a simile (1.14 Indurāja = 1.28 Vivṛti). Furthermore, I cannot imagine Abhinava referring to Udbhata as a mule (see end of section) even if he disagreed with him. 8. The verse is given by Bhāmaḥ as an example of adidipaka, as the common verb ("creates") is given in the first quarter. It is really a sortes (kāraṇamāla) sharing the peculiarity of dipaka that the common verb is bracketed after its first occurrence. Presumably in order to make it more clearly illustrate dipaka, the Jayamanjala commentary on Bhāṭṭikāvya 10.22 alters it drastically: mado janeyati prītim ānandam mānabhāṅgūram yat priyāsangamotkāntihām asahyām mānasah sucam. 9. The figure here is rāṣānopamā (chain simile); see KP 10.113, p. 580, SD 10.25.
A  In *sārikāra* (fusion, see *Locana*, note 1) also, when one figure assists another with its color or charm, the suggested figure cannot be intended to be predominant and so falls outside the area of *dhvani*. Where either of two figures is possible, there is equal prominence of the literal and the suggested. But if the suggested figure subordinates to itself the literal figure, then we may assign it to the area of *dhvani*. We cannot say, however, that *dhvani* is just that, because of the same reasons that we gave in speaking of *paryāyokta* (cf. 1.13 h A). Furthermore, in all cases of *sārikāra* the very name “*sārikāra*” will prevent us from thinking of *dhvani*.

1. We have followed Abhinava’s interpretation of *api ca sārikāralaṅkāre ’pi ca kvacet... nirākaroti* to mean *sārikāralaṅkāre ca kvacet api... nirākaroti*. The natural meaning of Ānanda’s sentence would be, “And sometimes in *sārikāra* the very name ‘*sārikāra*’ will prevent us from thinking of *dhvani*.” But the natural interpretation gives a less logical train of thought. 2. The name “*sārikāra*” denotes a figure of speech. A figure of speech cannot be an instance of *dhvani*.

L  In the figure *sārikāra*. One type of *sārikāra* is defined thus:

When contradictory figures appear,
when they cannot function together,
and when there is neither right nor wrong
in accepting just the one, we have *sārikāra*.

(Udbhaṭa, 5.11 Indurāja = 5.20 Viśvaṭi)

An example is a verse of mine:

Moon-faced she is,
dark water-lily-eyed
and with teeth of white jasmine:
God has given her forms of beauty
from sky, river and earth.

Either metaphor or simile may appear here, depending on whether we analyse “moon-faced” as “having a moon for her face” [by Pāṇi
2.1.72], or as “having a face like the moon” [by Panini 2.1.56]. As both figures cannot be entertained at the same time and as there is no compelling reason to accept or reject one of the other, we have here the figure saṅkara. As there is no evidence that one of the components is denoted and the other suggested, what possibility is there here of dhvani?

And what chance is there in the second type, where a figure of sound and a figure of sense occur in one [sentence]? As i

Remember as Kāma your lover,
in whose embrace you have found delight,³

where we have the figure of sound yamaka⁴ and the figure of sense simile.

In the third type too, where more than one figure of sense is found in a single portion of a sentence, inasmuch as both are equal[ly presented literally], how can either be suggested? As in:

They rise and sink together.
so when the bright sun has set,
the weary day for rest
enters as it were the cave of night.

(Bbāmaha 3.48)⁵

For in this stanza the partial metaphor [viz., “the cave of night”] implies a full metaphor of a well-bred man eager to perform the appropriate duty [of self-immolation] on the fall of his master. [The partial metaphor is directly expressed] and poetic fancy is also directly expressed, viz., by the term, “as it were."⁶ These two types are embodied in the following definition: “When figures of sound and sense occur in one sentence or one portion of a sentence, we have the figure saṅkara” (Udbhāta, 5.12 Indurāja = 5.22 Viśvānti).

The fourth type is where there is a relation of assistance between the figures. As in this:

These glances of the long-eyed maid
that tremble like water-lilies in the wind:
did she borrow them from the does of the wood.
or did the does borrow them from her?

(Kumārasambhava 1.46)

Although a likening of Pārvati’s glances to the glances of female deer is here suggested, the simile becomes subordinate from its role as assistant in giving rise to the figure sandeha (poetic doubt),⁷ for by its
assistance we end up with the figure sandeha. This [fourth type of sankara] is defined: “Where figures are placed in mutual assistance and lack independent being, that too is the figure sankara” (Udbhata, 5.13 Indurāja = 5.25 Vivṛti).

This is what our author refers to in the words when a figure, etc. And so the existence of dhvani in the fourth type is ruled out. We have already stated that there is no possibility of dhvani in the second and third types. But in regard to the first type, exemplified in “Moon-faced she is,” etc., one might suspect the possibility. This he now rules out: where either of two figures. Equal: because our mind sways between the two.

But now, when the suggested sense appears to be predominant, what are we to do? Take the example:

The masses have no care of quality
but easily fall for reputation.
The moonstone sweats at sight of the moon
but not at my true love’s face.8

Here the figure arthāntaranyāsa (substantiation) appears, literally expressed, but vyatireka (contrast) and apahnuti (feigned denial) appear by suggestion and are predominant. Having this in mind, he says, but if, etc. He answers the problem with then we may assign it. That is to say, this is not sankara at all, but is the second type of dhvani called alankāradhvani (suggestion of a figure of speech).9 What was said under the subject of paryāyokta [viz., that dhvani is of wider range than the figure and is always predominant] may be equally applied here.

Now he gives a general means of denying the possibility of a [predominant] suggested sense in any form of sankara: furthermore. One must construe by changing the position of the particle api. The sense is, “everywhere in the figure sankara,” as distinguished from any particular variety. For fusion means a mingling, a complete commixture.10 How would one element predominate any more than in the mixture of milk and water?

1. Frequently more than one figure of speech is found in a sentence or stanza. Such cases are assigned to samsṛṣṭi (association) or to sankara (fusion). In samsṛṣṭi the figures are associated “like sesame grains and rice grains”; that is, they can be distinguished and separated. In sankara the mixture, “like milk and water,” is irresolvable. By Abhinava’s time sankara was divided into four types, which he will here define and illustrate. (a) alankāra-sandigadhatua, where there is doubt to which of two alankāras the case should
be assigned: (b) alankaśaiśvākāyāmsānupraveśa (also called alankaśaiśvācakānupraveśa), where two or more figures, with no doubt as to their identification, are combined in a single sentence; (c) alankaśaiśvākāyāmsānupraveśa, the same as type two except that here the figures are combined in a single portion of a sentence; (d) alankaśaiśvāngiśita (or alankaśaiśvāhyānugrāhakabhāva), where the two figures assist each other, where the charm of each depends on its involvement with the other. The whole scheme is often simplified by combining types two and three. Ānanda shows a clear awareness of types one and four. Abhinava, in interpreting Ānanda’s remarks to cover all four types, quotes ancient authors whose verses, as the footnotes will show, do not always fit exactly the later scheme which he has in mind. 2. The text of Udbhata reads anekaśākṛīyā, “more than one figure,” rather than “contradictory figures.” 3. The better attested reading is priyam sma ramose (Kaumudi). If one takes priyam ramaye, the sense will be “whom you delight with your embrace.” The line is in prthu meter. 4. Yamaka is the repetition of two or more syllables of the same sound but in different meaning, e.g., smaram and sma ram(ase). 5. Abhinava is taking this verse as an example of the third type of sankara called ekākāyāmsānupraveśa. Bhāmaha furnished it as an example of a figure which he called upreksānvaya, a figure of far more restricted application than the type of sankara which Abhinava wishes to exemplify. Bhāmaha requires for his figure an ambiguous expression (śāśta), here instanced in udayāvasāna, which may mean the rising and setting of heavenly bodies, or the success and failure of humans. In addition there must be upreksā (poetic fancy), here evidenced by the particle iva, “as it were,” and also “a sense of metaphor” (rūpakārtha). By the last stipulation I suppose he refers to the partial metaphor (ekadesavivrutarūpaka) that is directly expressed in the stanza. It is partial because it encompasses only one element of the sentence, the darkness to which the day goes. The much larger, suggested metaphor, which involves all elements of the sentence, is another matter, which Abhinava will speak of and which we shall remark on in the following note. 6. We are left with the difficult problem of the implied metaphor. It is difficult to see how it can be regarded as other than suggested. Presumably Abhinava takes the suggestion as subordinate to, and merely embellishing, the literally expressed partial metaphor. By such a view he could claim that as none of the figures is predominant, there is no dhvani in the verse. But surely this is a perverse reading of the poem. The suggested metaphor, or aprastutaprasāmsā, forms its heart and its whole beauty. What we relish and remember is the suggestion of a faithful servant who begins to die a little when his beloved master dies. Abhinava’s rejection of dhvani in this case can be explained only by his wish to exclude all cases of suggestion that were involved in the old system of alankaśas. This is an old verse by an author who did not recognize dhvani. 7. Our reading sanēha here and in the next line is preferable to the Kaumudi’s reading sasandeha. Udbhata, whose
remarks on this figure are referred to by Ānanda later on (2.26 A), makes a
distinction between sasandeha (embodiment of doubt) and sandeha (poetic
doubt). The first figure he finds in those verses where the doubt is expressly
corrected, e.g., “People wonder on seeing the conch in Viṣṇu's hand, 'Is this
a wild goose that has come to the lotus growing from his navel?' But no, it
does not move.” In sandeha, on the other hand, the doubt is not removed.
Rather, it gives rise to a suggestion of some other figure of speech. The ex­
ample here quoted from Kalidāsa is clearly of the latter type. Whether we
regard the sandeha as giving rise to upamā or the suggested upamā as giving
rise to sandeha is unimportant. The doubt is not resolved and there are two
figures here assisting each other. In later authors the terminology is changed.
Both of Udbhata’s figures are known by the same name (by Mammata as sa­
sandeha, by most others as sandeha), but the former type is distinguished as
“containing a resolution” (niścayagarbha or niścayānta) while the latter type
is called “pure” (suddha). 8. We have taken the readings of the Kaumudi,
pahnavaï (for the senseless pahnusat) and na before piämuhe. The point of
the verse is that the poet would portray the face of his beloved as more beauti­
ful than the moon. He arranges the stanza in such fashion that the suggestion
of her beauty is expressed by an arthāntaranyāsa (substantiation) apparently
intended for quite a different purpose. For definitions of substantiation see
Dāndiu 2.169, Mammata 10.109. A general statement may be substantiated
by a particular (as here), or a particular by a general. Moon-stones give off
moisture (they are said to sweat or to weep) when exposed to the light of
the moon. But, ignorant creatures that they are, they fail to sweat at the
lady’s face, which is more beautiful. This instance substantiates the general
rule that common people respect reputation rather than true quality. The
figure substantiation is explicit. The vyatireka (see 1.1 Intro. L, note 12), in
the form “My true love’s face is more beautiful than the moon,” is merely
suggested, as is also the opahnuti in the form “This is not the moon; the true
moon is my beloved’s face.” 9. Ananda will treat alarkāradhvani under
2.21.

10. We take this sense for lolībhāva from the comment
not found in PW.

A  So also in aprastutaprasāmsā (reference by means of the ex­
traneous, allegory). 1 When, by a relation of general and particular, or
cause and effect, there is a connection of a literally stated extraneous
matter with the suggested subject in hand, then the literally stated and the suggested meanings are equally important. To begin with the case where there is a connection of a literally stated extraneous generality with a suggested germane particular: although we apprehend the particular as important [for that is the final intention of the sentence], we must admit that the general statement is equally important because the particular cannot exist without the general. Again, when a [literally stated] particular ends up in a general suggestion, [although the general suggestion is important as being the final intention] the particular is also important because all particulars are included in the general. The same principle holds where the relation is one of cause and effect [viz., cause cannot exist without effect, nor effect without cause; so both are equally important]. But in an aprastutaprasamsā where the connection of extraneous and germane is based solely on similarity, there, if the literally stated extraneous [member of the] similar [pairs] is not intended to be predominant, the case falls in the area of dhvani. Otherwise, it will just be one of the figures.

1. The literal meaning of the term aprastutaprasamsā is “praise by means of the extraneous.” The extraneous is the matter not in hand. Bhāmaha (3.29–30) and Dandin (2.340) take the name quite literally. To them aprastutaprasamsā was simply a special type of samāsokti where the matter in hand (the prastuta or real subject intended) is praised by a statement of something extraneous (aprastuta). Thus in Bhāmaha’s example we find praise of the magnanimity of trees, by which one understands the intended praise of good and generous men. Dandin’s example praises the simple life of deer in the forest, from which one is to understand his praise of a life away from court where one need not fawn upon kings. It is Udbhāṭa (5.8 Induraṇa = 5.14 Viṇṭi) who dispenses with the notion of praise. Any mention of an extraneous matter, if it is so connected with the subject in hand as to suggest it, is called aprastutaprasamsā. Ānanda accepted Udbhāṭa’s definition and then divided the figure into three or five types. The five types are: where something general suggests the particular, where a particular suggests the general, where a cause suggests the result, where a result suggests the cause, and where like suggests like. The first and second, as also the third and fourth, may be taken together, giving only three types. The last type of all (also called anyokti) is essentially the Graeco-Latin allegory. Later writers went on to subdivide the last type also.
The praise of something different, that is, other than the matter in hand, is called aprastutapraśamsā. It is threefold.¹

What is meant is a description of extraneous matter which hints at the matter in hand. This hint is threefold, as it is based on a relation of general and particular, on a relation of cause and effect, or on similarity. In the sentence beginning When by a relation and ending with equally important our author sets forth the thesis that in the first two of these types the extraneous matter and the matter in hand are equally important.

In the type based on a relation of general and particular there are two methods of procedure. One method is where a general statement which is extraneous is literally expressed and the particular, which is the matter in hand, is suggested; as in the following:

Ah, the cruelty of worldly life,  
the malignity of misfortune!  
Ah, the tragic ways of fate  
deceptive in its very nature.

Here the power of fate in its general form, which is extraneous to the poet's real intention, and which is stated throughout the verse, ends up in a suggestion of the matter in hand, which is a particular disaster that has befallen someone. Here the general statement, which is literally expressed, is as important as the particular, which is suggested, because the species is logically included in its genus; for there is no contradiction in the simultaneous importance of general and particular.

When a particular which is extraneous suggests a general statement which is germane, we have the second type; as in the following:

It is not so much that at first the fool imagined  
a drop of water upon a lotus leaf  
to be a pearl; but hear what happened next:  
as he tried to take it slowly on his finger tip  
with gentle motion, it melted at his touch.  
At this he cried, "Alas, it has flown away!"  
and now he cannot sleep from inner grief.

(Bhallatāsataka 94)²
§ 1.13 j \ L \ j

In this stanza the matter intended by the poet is the general principle that people imagine greatness in what is really nothing, while the extraneous subject is particular, that of imagining a pearl in a drop of water. Here too there is no contradiction in the simultaneous importance of the general and the particular, as has been said. In this way our author has dealt with the first type in its two varieties in the passage from "to begin with" to "all particulars are included in the general."

Extending the same principle to the type based on a relation of cause and effect, our author shows that it too has two varieties: where the relation is one of cause and effect. Sometimes a cause, which is extraneous, is presented literally in order to suggest an effect, which is the matter in hand. For example:

They who take joy in your success 
and stay with you in adversity 
are your true relatives and friends; 
other seek only their own benefit.

Here the speaker states explicitly a cause which is extraneous to his real intent. The cause is that good men by their faithful attachment are friends and relatives to us. He states this in order to suggest what he really intends, namely that his own words should be trusted. Although we apprehend the effect here, our apprehension of the cause becomes important from its giving life to the effect; so both cause and effect are important.

Sometimes an effect, which is extraneous, being literally presented suggests a cause which is the matter in hand. An example will be found in the Setubandha:

I remember before the churning of the sea 
heaven without its pârijâta trees, 
Viśṇu without his Lakṣmî by his side 
or the kaustubha jewel upon his breast, and Śiva 
without the lovely moon within his locks. 

(\textit{Setubandha} 4.20)\footnote{Setubandha 4.20}

Here Jāmbavān describes his memory of Viśṇu's breast without the kaustubha jewel or Lakṣmî, and so on, which are matters extraneous to, and at the same time a cause of, what is his real intention. He does this in order to suggest the result, namely that his service of the elder gods, his longevity, and his skill in negotiations fit him to be accepted as an advisor. Here the suggested and the literal senses are equally
important, for although we apprehend the cause to be important, the
effect, which is literally presented, raises itself [into importance] by its
giving life to that cause.

After dealing with these two types, each of which is twofold, he ex­
amines the third type, which is based on similarity. Here too there
are two varieties. Sometimes the charm [and therefore the importance]
comes from the extraneous matter which is literally presented, while
the suggested matter is subservient. An example is this verse by my
teacher Bhaṭṭendurāja:

He who brought you back to life
and by his strength supported,
who carried you upon his back
and even gave you worship:
that man you kill with but a smile.
O brother zombie, you show yourself
to be the prince of gratitude.³

Here, although some other ingratitude is suggested by the power of simi­
larly, the charm and interest of the stanza lie in the anecdote of the
zombie (vetāla), which is extraneous. The sense is not impossible as
would be a reproach against an insentient being, and the anecdote is
not without attraction. So the predominance here lies in the literal
sense.

But if the matter in hand is charming and is suggested by a literal
description of an extraneous subject possessing properties such as in­
sentiency which render it impossible for the described purpose, then
we have a case of vastudhvani. An example is a verse of my own:

Troop of delights, who storm the hearts of men
and make them dance in many an antic step;
concealing your own intention as you play;
men call you brute and stupid, in their ignorance
thinking themselves intelligent thereby.
That title of stupidity, I think,
if given to them would be honorific,
for it would seem to liken them to you.

Here the germane matter, which is revealed by suggestion, is the ex­
traordinary way of life of a man while he is being despised by the
world as a fool. What is meant is a great man, who has rolled back
the curtains of darkness by an eye of deep penetration and who lives
a worldly life on the principle of "unimpassioned yet as though with
passion," concealing his real self and accepting the reproaches of men
as he causes their tongues to wag.

[The literal meaning.] A delight, such as a garden or moonrise, is
despised by men as being a brute thing, but it can make the heart
of an absent lover grieve with yearning, or make the heart of another
overflow with joy. Of what sort its own heart may be no one knows.
In fact it is vastly deep and intelligent, utterly void of pride and skilful
at play. Now if people for that reason call it brute and stupid when
it stands rather in honor because of its implied intelligence, and for
the same reason honor themselves as intelligent when they are, rather,
worthy of being considered stupid, then the expression "you are brute
and stupid," being established as an epithet of the troop of delights,
which we have seen are really intelligent, will, rather, be an honorific.
What is hinted at is that men are worse than stupid. He indicates all
this in the sentence but if.

Otherwise: otherwise it will just be another figure of speech, that
is, the particular figure of speech [aprastutapraśamsā], but never when
the suggested element is predominant.

1. The definition is, basically, the one given by Bhāmaha (3.29), but
Abhinava has changed the last pāda. The original says nothing of the figure's
being threefold. The second half reads aprastutapraśamseti sā caiva kathyate
yathā. The division into types is first found in Ānanda. 2. I have fol-
lowered the interpretation of both Kaumudi and BP. The point of the stanza
is that it is not so egregious a folly to mistake a drop of water for a pearl;
after all, they look alike. But to be so convinced of one's error that one will
attribute volitional flight to a pearl shows the overwhelming power of vain
hope in humanity. Abhinava's readings are superior to those of the printed
text of Bhallata, which has śīnu aṃ akasmād api in b and tatas in place of
janais in c. The alteration in b seems to have arisen from a reader who
misunderstood tasya mukhāt to mean "from his mouth," presumably from
the mouth of someone playing a joke on the fool. The verse is quoted again
by Mammaṭa 10.441, p. 621. Bhallata's Śatakā comprises the work of vari-
ous authors; see 1.14 A, note 6. 3. One could scarcely elicit this meaning
without knowing the context in which the words were spoken. But Abhinava
doubtless knew the context, as did Hemacandra who also quotes the verse
(A 559, p. 365), where he says that the words are spoken by Jarāsandha
(the enemy of Krishna, soon to be slain by Bhima). Presumably the quota-
tion is taken from some lost play. 4. The stanza forms the opening lines
in Jāmbavān's speech of advice to the leaders of the army about to attempt
an assault on Laṅkā. Jāmbavān is the Methuselah of Indian legend. The
trees, Laksbī, the kaustubha jewel, and the moon were all acquired from the
The verse is ironic and is used allegorically. In the "Vetâlapaṇca-vaṁśati" the belief is found that a corpse can be brought to life as a vetâla (zombie). As first revived, the vetâla cannot walk but must be carried. If worshipped with Tantric rites he may give the practitioner magic powers. Perhaps one may infer from this stanza that if the vetâla smiles the practitioner will die. The translation of vetâla by "vampire," though sanctioned by long usage, is misleading. The vetâla does not suck blood; he is a revived corpse, a zombie.

What is one to make of Abhinava's account of his own verse? The literal meaning of the stanza is not difficult. "Men who decry, as do the non-Tantric philosophers, the delights of love and of the senses, calling them brute pleasures, are really stupider than the pleasure they run down. So I will not copy them by calling names. To call them stupid would be to compliment them." Now it is true that the literal sense is impossible from the realistic point of view in which the words "possible" (sambhâvya) and "impossible" are used by the Ālãkãrikas. Neither garden nor moonrise, being insentient, actually makes the heart dance, nor do they conceal their own heart, for they have none. So one is forced to look for a second meaning. To pass to that second meaning is more difficult. Abhinava has thrown what seems to me a needless stumbling block in our way by the discrepancy between the plurality of delights (or stimulants, bhâvavârtta) and the singularity of the great man (mahâpurusa). But the great man does conceal his thoughts. His causing the tongues of men to wag, in the case of the Pãšupatins and I dare say of many Tantrics, was a premeditated instigation of reproach; see D. H. H. Ingalls, "Cynics and Pãšupatins: The Seeking of Dishonor," *Harvard Theological Review* 55.4 (1962). There is also an underlying compatibility of the Tantric adept, seeking mokṣa by the path of bhoga, and the worldly stimulants amidst which he lives.

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A. Here then is a summary of the matter:

Where the suggested meaning does not predominate but merely accompanies the literal sense, there we clearly have ornaments of the literal [i.e., figures of speech] such as samâsokti and the rest.

Where the suggested appears only faintly, or merely follows along with the literal, or is not felt to be the more important: in such places there is no dhvani.
Accordingly, dhvani cannot be included in any other category. And for this reason too it cannot be included: because it is a particular poetic whole (ārīgīm) that has been called dhvani. Its parts will be shown in the sequel to be the figures of speech, the qualities (gunaśī) and the alliterations (vṛttis). A part, if taken by itself, is never known as a whole, while if taken together with the whole, it is recognized as a part of it, not as the whole itself. Even where one of the elements [which are normally parts] does constitute a case of dhvani, ďhvani because of its vast range is not limited to it.

1. For the gunaśī and vṛttis see 1.1a A, notes 4 and 5. 2. As in certain cases of paryāyokta (see 1.13 b A) or saṅkara (see 1.13 i A).

§ 1.13k L

In the list [of seven figures of speech] with which our author began [his discussion (1.13 c A)], the words “and the like” refer to any other figure where a suggestion may be imagined, that is, to vyājastuti (trick praise), etc. Our author proceeds to give a general answer to all cases of that sort: Here then, etc. His feeling is that it is useless to write on each particular figure.

Among such figures [we may give] an example of vyājastuti:

What good is done by telling on other wives?
And yet, being a chatterbox by nature
and a southerner as well,
I can't keep still.
She's in everybody's house,
in the market, at the crossroads and at drinking bouts;
she runs about like a drunkard, does your mistress.
Oho, but her name
is Fame.

(Vidyā?)

Here it is the literal meaning that is embellished by the suggestion in the form of praise. Another critic has offered the following as an example of the figure:

```plaintext
What good is done by telling on other wives?
And yet, being a chatterbox by nature
and a southerner as well,
I can't keep still.
She's in everybody's house,
in the market, at the crossroads and at drinking bouts;
she runs about like a drunkard, does your mistress.
Oho, but her name
is Fame.
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The great earth, lord, engirdled by the sea,
was wedded to your grandsire;
she next became your mother, while today
to raise a family you keep her as your wife.
After a full century, without reproach,
she will be married to your son.
Say is this decent in a line of kings
who know the rules of proper conduct?

This stanza strikes me as obscene, because it causes one to think of
highly indecent things. And what does the praise amount to? That
you are king by hereditary succession. What is so great about that?
Trick praise of this sort will be reproved in any company of sensitive
critics and deserves to be ignored.

[To explain the term "etc." in his remark "vyājastuti, etc.," Abhinava
takes up another figure of speech, bhāva (expression of inner feeling):]

If an alteration [of a given state of mind], arising from an [apparently] un-
connected cause, gives us to understand the intention and its connection with
that cause, we have the figure bhāva. (Rudrāṭa 7.38)³

Here too if the literal sense is predominant, the case is one of a figure
of speech, bhāva. That is to say, if an alteration of a state of mind
appears, such as the speaking of certain words not normally connected
[with their apparent cause], and gives us to understand for what reason
the intention embodied in that state of mind [has arisen]—here the
reason may be such as the aim of enjoying the pleasures of love without
stint—we have the figure of speech, bhāva. For example:

As I am a weak woman,
young and left in the house
while my husband has gone abroad,
with no one here but my blind and deaf mother-i
how can you be so foolish, traveler,
as to ask to spend the night?

(Rudrāṭa 7.41)⁴

Here a suggestion embellishes the literal sense of each word and so the
literal sense is predominant. On the other hand, if the suggested sense
were predominant, we should not have a figure of speech at all, as we
have shown before.⁴ So enough of many words.

Where: i.e., in a poem. Ornaments: it is because they are orna-
ments that they act only to embellish the literal sense.
Appears only faintly: that is, where there is a vague impression, as in the simile, etc. [suggested by the figure dipaka, etc.]. Follows along with the literal: the meaning of following along with the literal is the having of equal importance with it, as in aprastutaprasamsā. Not felt to be: where its predominance does not appear clearly, but must be forced on it and so does not really enter the heart, as in the verse, “Turn back, I beg you,” as explained by other commentators. By these two verses he shows that in four cases we are not justified in speaking of dhvani: where the suggested sense, although it is present, is not predominant [being a mere ornament], where it is faintly perceived, where it is equally important with the literal, and where its predominance is not clear. Where then are we justified? He tells us, only where word and sense are subordinate. He adds, where there is no fusion. By “fusion” he means the possibility of inserting any figure of speech. It is wrong to interpret as “without the figure called saṅkara (fusion),” for then it would be difficult to take the proviso as prohibiting other figures.

And for this reason too: not only by reference to the contradiction of denoter-denoted to suggestor-suggested can it be shown that the figures of speech and dhvani are not identical, but because there is a contradiction between the nature of a whole and of a part, as there is between that of master and servant. Its parts: that is, taken singly, as he goes on to say: if taken by itself. Very well, then, let us not take [a figure of speech] by itself but regard it in the context of the whole. In defense against this proposal he says, if taken together with the whole. It is then not the whole itself because other constituents are included in the whole; and among its constituents is the suggested sense which is not a figure of speech because of its predominance. He makes this point with the words: not the whole itself.

Now it may be objected against our author that he has consecrated an occasional instance [of what appears to be a figure of speech] with predominance and has recognized it as the soul of poetry, dhvani. With this in mind, he now says, even where one of these, etc. He has not consecrated any one of the figures, such as samāsokti, as dhvani itself, because each figure may exist separately from dhvani and because dhvani is found in the absence of all figures of speech, samāsokti and the rest, as in the stanzas “Mother-in-law sleeps here” (1.4 c A) and “Who would not be angry” (1.4 f A). He makes this point with the words, is not limited to it.

1. Vyājastuti = vyājena stutī, “praise by means of a trick.” The immediate impression is one of reproach, but as one thinks of the implications one sees
that praise has been expressed. This is the old sense of the term, as defined and illustrated by Bhāmaha (3.31), Dandin (2.343), Vāmana (4.3.24) and Udbhāta (Indurāja 5.9 = Vivṛti 5.16-17). There is no evidence that Abhinava recognized the extended definition which Mammata (10.112, p. 670) picked up from Rudrata’s vyājaśteṣo (Rudrata 10.11) and which has been followed by all later Ālaṅkārikas. In the later view, vyājaśtuti may be either trick praise or false praise (vyājarūpā stūṣṭa), i.e., a sentence apparently offering praise, but as one thinks of the implications, expressing reproach. 2. The stanza is ascribed to Vidyā by the oldest of our preserved anthologies, SRK 996. The ascription has this in its favor, that Vidyā was a southerner and an admirable poetess. But other anthologies ascribe it to Mātahga-divākara (śārīra. 1227, Subhā. 2544). The verse has given rise to much discussion; see Ruyyaka, p. 144, and Rasagangādhara, p. 418. 3. Abhinava here quotes Rudrata’s definition of the first type of bhāva. He goes on to interpret the definition so that it may fit Rudrata’s illustration of the second type of bhāva, which he quotes, omitting the illustration of the first type and the definition of the second type. I cannot say whether Abhinava does this advisedly, with the intention of reducing Rudrata’s two types to one, or by mistake. He may have read from a defective copy of Rudrata, where the verses were omitted, or his memory may have played him false. At any rate, the original, as it stands in Rudrata, runs as follows: 7.38 (naturally interpreted): When an emotional alteration (vākōra) of a person, arising from a cause which is not [normally] connected with it [i.e., productive of it], gives us to understand what that [cause] means to that person and that [in this case] it really is so connected, we have the figure bhāva. 7.39 (illustration): On seeing the village youth / with a vānīcūla flower in his hand / the face of the young girl / changes color. The commentator Namisādhhu explains. The girl would not normally be affected at sight of a vānīcūla flower, so we seek for an explanation. It lies in the suggestion that she has made a rendezvous with the youth in a vānīcūla grove, which she was prevented from keeping. When she sees the youth with a vānīcūla flower in his hand, she realizes that he kept the tryst and that she has missed the opportunity of lovemaking. 7.40: When a sentence, in denoting just this, gives us to understand something that differs from this in regard to good and bad, we have another type of bhāva. 7.41 (illustration): As I am a weak woman, etc., as quoted by Abhinava. 4. The verse has been a favorite and is quoted in virtually all the great anthologies: Śārīra. 3773, Subhā. 2234, SūktīM. 87.11, Sadukti. 547. It portrays by innuendo an unchaste wife (asati) and has just as good a claim to be considered a case of vastudhvani as the verse “Go your rounds freely, pious monk” (1.4 b A). But see the following footnote. 5. Viz., 1.13 h L, commenting on the remark of A: “if the suggestion is predominant.” It is of course a matter of taste whether one regards the literal sense or the suggested sense as more important. But Abhinava takes the fact that the verse was quoted by Rudrata as illustrating a figure of speech to show that the literal sense must
predominate. On the other hand, the verse “Go your rounds freely, pious monk” was quoted by Ānanda as an illustration of dhvani. A Sanskrit commentator, without strong provocation, will not argue with ancient authorities. The irreverent Westerner of course is free to do so. 6. See the interpretation given in 1.4 e L of this verse, where it is shown that some critics took the verse to exemplify preyo’larikāra or rasavada’larikāra. 7. See 1.13 j A, end of passage, and the illustrative stanza “Troop of delights,” etc., in 1.13 j L.

A When [Kārikā 1.13] says “which the wise call dhvani,” this means that the term was invented by men of knowledge and that it has not been put into use inadvisedly. The preeminent men of knowledge are the grammarians, for all the sciences rest upon grammar; and they gave the name dhvani to the sounds of speech that are heard. In the same manner other wise men, who knew the true essence of poetry, have followed the example of the grammarians by giving the title dhvani to that verbal entity which contains a mixture of denotative and denoted elements and which is designated as “a poem.” They did so because of the similarity [to acoustical dhvani] in its being a manifestor [of suggested meanings just as the heard sounds manifest words]. Now this being the nature of dhvani, the range of which is immense when one counts up all the types and subtypes which we shall soon describe, its illumination bears no comparison to a report on some mere individual figure of speech that has hitherto remained unknown [cf. 1.1 c A]. So the excitement of those whose minds are saturated with dhvani is quite within reason, nor should others exhibit toward them an intellect stained by jealousy. And so by this, those at least who deny the existence of dhvani stand refuted.

L Was invented by men of knowledge. The compound vidvad-upajñā is a bahuvrihi modifying uktih, literally, “a term of which the upajñā or first use was by men of knowledge.” Accordingly, the neuter gender demanded by Pāṇ. 2.4.21 when upajñā is used in a tatpurūṣa is here inapplicable.

The sounds of speech which are heard: According to the process [described in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika] it is the last sound of a chain of sounds that enters the orifice of the ear, so the heard sounds are sounds born of sounds, [not the original sounds produced by the organs of
These sounds in form are like the reverberations of a bell, and it is these sounds that are called *dhvani*. As the master Bhartrhari has said:

Others have expressed the view that the *sphota* is born from conjunction and disjunction with the organs of articulation; the *dhvanayah* (plural) are the sound-born sounds. (*Vākyapādiya* 1.102)

In the same way, the suggested meaning has been called *dhvani*, as it too is often characterized by a reverberation analogous to the pulsations of a bell. Again, the phonemes as heard, technically called *nādasabdās*, manifest the semantic unit, which we comprehend as soon as we cognize the final phoneme. These phoneme-manifestors are called *dhvanis*. As the same master says:

The true form [i.e., the semantic content] in the word that is manifested by the *dhvani* is determined by a series of cognitions [viz., the cognitions of the successive phonemes], which are unnameable [that is to say, each phoneme-cognition in itself is unassignable to this word or that], but favorable to the final [word-identifying] cognition. (*Vākyapādiya* 1.83)

So we too use the term *dhvani* for the word and the [literal] sense which manifest [the suggested meaning].

Furthermore, it is in the *varnas* (the phonemes produced by the conjunction and disjunction of the vocal organs) that the differences of prosodical length (e.g., *a* and *ā*, *i* and *ī*) reside, as has been said:

Either the mind does not perceive a sound if it is pronounced too softly, or it perceives clearly the whole phoneme. [e.g., we never hear half an ā]. (*Kumārilā, Ślokavārttika, Sphota-vāda*, vs. 10)

As these same differences are heard in the secondary sound, [or *dhvani*, that reaches the ear], it is only such other elements of the speaker’s speech, such as its slow or rapid delivery, elements over and above the well-defined operations of articulation [e.g., prosodical length, aspiration, closure, etc.] that are more particularly called *dhvani*. As Bhartrhari has said:

The derivative *dhvanis* (i.e., the sounds which reach the ear) after they have manifested the word continue to carry in themselves the variations in speed of utterance, but the nature of the phonemes is not altered by them. (*Vākyapādiya* 1.77)

In like manner we [poeticians] apply the word *dhvani* to an operation over and above the well known operations of denotation, sentence-meaning and secondary usage. Thus we have four senses of *dhvani*;
and by combining them we may speak of a whole poem as dhvani. It is for this reason that statements both of its difference [from poetry, as in "dhvani is the soul of poetry," 1.1 K] and of its identity [as in 1.13 K, which Abhinava interprets as speaking of "poetry, as a distinctive type of literature, which the wise call dhvani"] are not improper.

[Abhinava now gives a highly artificial analysis of the compounds vācyā-vācaka-sammiśra and śabdātmā, which we translated as a mixture of denotative and denoted entities and as verbal entity respectively.] Vācyā-vācaka-sammiśra is a compound from which the penultimate member has been dropped. It stands for vācyā-vācaka-sahita-sammiśra, "possessing mixtures as well as denotative and denoted elements." The sense of addition is given without the use of "and," as in "ox, horse, man, beast." By this analysis one can see that the denoted sense can be called dhvani and the denoted word can be called dhvani, for both of them are suggestive inasmuch as both hint at (dhvanati) the suggested sense. As they form a mixture when they are combined with the vibhāvas and anubhāvas, the suggested sense also, [which consists of such a mixture,] can be called dhvani, for it is what is hinted at (dhvanyate). The word śabda in the compound śabdātmā means śabdana, "a putting into words," or verbal operation, and that not in the form of the denotative operation but in the form of the ātman, "the soul," of poetry. This [suggestive operation] can also be called dhvani, for it is a hinting. Finally the object "which is designated as a 'poem'" can also be called dhvani because it is composed of the four other types of dhvani in the manner just described.

And so he states the reason common [to both the grammatical and the poetical traditions for the use of the same term dhvani]: because of the similarity in its being a manifestor. The relation of manifestor and manifested, present in general in all four senses [of poetic dhvani], is common [to the term as used by the grammarians]. This is the meaning.

It was objected [in 1.1.1] that because the possibilities of speech are endless, [there may well be some small variety which has hitherto remained unknown and which might be called dhvani]. He answers that objection with now this being the nature of dhvani, etc. The types which we shall soon describe: there are two main types. The subtypes: for example, the subtype "where the literal is shifted to another sense" (arthāntarasanākramitavācya) and that "where the literal is entirely set aside" (atyantatiraskṛtavācya), both of these belonging to the main type "where the literal meaning is not intended"
and the subtypes "where the suggested meaning is produced without apparent sequence" (asamālaksyakramavyānigya) and that "where the sequence is apparent" (samālaksyakramavyānigya), these belonging to the type "where the literal is intended but is subordinated to a second meaning" (vivāksītānyaparavācya). And even among these subtypes there are further divisions. The range of which is immense: the sense is that it covers the whole of poetry. By the word individual he indicates the restricted nature [of a figure of speech]; by the word mere, its being subordinate. Saturated (bhāvita): that is, whose minds are intent on the nature of dhvani, or, it may mean, whose minds, by being perfumed with its charm, cause them to show such symptoms of emotions as closing their eyes (cf. 1.1c A). Those who deny the existence of dhvani: that is, those divided into all three categories [described in 1.1 a, b, c A].

1. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas regard sound as a quality set up in the ether by the conjunction and disjunction of matter. This quality spreads from its place of origin through ether in all directions, as waves spread out from a stone dropped in a pond. Just as the wave which reaches the shore is wave-produced, not stone-produced, so the sounds of speech which reach the ear are sound-produced. 2. The basis for comparison is the succession of replicas through a span of time. 3. The view, although here ascribed to others, is close to Bhartṛhari’s own. Note that the word sphota as used here is close to its etymological origin, “explosion.” But Bhartṛhari regards the sphota not simply as an inferrable physical fact, viz., the sound-explosion that is the ultimate source of the derivative sound that one hears, but as the accompanying metaphysical explosion of a phonemic pattern, a pattern that is devoid of the speed or slurring or variations in pitch and volume of the heard sound (dhvani). Bhartṛhari never took the further step, taken by his commentators, of identifying the sphota with the semantic content of the sounds. See S. D. Joshi, The Sphota-nirnay, pp. 33 and 54. 4. Here Abhinava justifies the use of “dhvani” in sense d of 1.1 K, note 1, viz., as the vyāṇiya. 5. Note that Abhinava is careful to use the word upalaksita, not laksita. As will be shown in Chapter 2 (see 2.2 and 2.20), it is only the varieties of dhvani other than rasadhvani that give this impression of bell-like reverberation, for in them a sequence is perceived by the auditor between the literal and the suggested sense. In rasadhvani no such sequence appears. Accordingly, it would have been wrong, by using the word laksita, to characterize dhvani as a whole by an impression of reverberation. The word upalaksita is more modest and may be used of a partial or temporary characteristic. A house may be upalaksita by a crow perched on its roof. 6. Sphota is here used in its final, post-Bhartṛhari sense as the sememe or
meaningful unit of speech. 7. Here Abhinava justifies the use of “dhvani” in senses a and b of 1.1 K, note 1, viz., as sābdārthaḥ vyanjakāṇu. 8. Sa eva does not here refer to the author of the previous verse. It is used in the manner of Irish dialect: “Himself told me,” referring to the master of the house, or the most important man in the speaker’s frame of reference. 9. Sphoṭa is here used in Bhartrhari’s sense, not the later semantic sense.

10. Abhinava here justifies the use of “dhvani” in sense c of 1.1 K, note 1, as the vyanāpāra, vyanjana. 11. Here, finally, sense e. One can only marvel at Abhinava’s skill in justifying all the poetic uses of “dhvani” by grammatical precedent. 12. Such madhyamapadālopin compounds are legitimized by Pān. 2.1.69, Vārṭ. 8. The anointed example is sāka-pārthiva “the vegetable- (eating) king.” 13. Abhinava is forcing the text here; vyanjakatva does not mean vyanjya-vyanjaka-bhāva. 14. See 2.1 K. 15. See 2.2 K and note 1.

§ 1.13 m A ]

1.13 m

A There is such as thing as dhvani. And it is in general of two sorts: where the literal sense is not intended (avivakṣitavācyā) and where the literal is intended but is subordinated to a second meaning (vivakṣitānyaparavācyā). An example of the first is this:

Three men reap the earth
of its flower of gold:
the warrior, the man of learning,
and he who knows how to serve.

(Mahābhārata 5 35.64)¹

And of the second, this:

On what mountain,
for how long,
and what was the name of his austerity?
I mean this little parrot’s
that he should bite into a cherry
as pink as your lip?

(Dharmakīrtī)²
1. The verse is also found in late versions of the \textit{Pancatantra}: Bombay 1.45, Kosegarten 1.51. One may argue over the syntax of \textit{suvarnapuspām}. My strong feeling is that it is a \textit{karmadhāraya}, used \textit{karmany akathite} (Pān. 1.4.51; the verb \textit{ci} is listed in the \textit{parīgaṇana}). The learned Kuppusvāmī Śāstri was of the same opinion (\textit{Upalocana}, p. 254). The gender of \textit{puspā} may have been influenced by that of \textit{lātā} or by its proximity to \textit{prthīvi}. Those who would make the \textit{Mahābhārata} agree with Classical syntax will of course take the compound as a \textit{bahuvr̥hi}. Abhinava has a more improbable explanation. The “flower of gold” here does not mean what it says. It means success, worldly advancement.

2. Quoted also in \textit{SRK} 439. Poetical use is often made of the belief that sensual pleasures are a reward for merit gained by asceticism in past lives. See \textit{SRK}, translation, note on vs. 408. According to Abhinava’s first explanation, the stanza is an instance of \textit{rasadhvani}.

\textit{L} He states the result of refuting [the position of those who deny the existence of \textit{dhvani}]: there is such a thing. Now, that \textit{dhvani} should be no more than secondary usage (\textit{lakṣanā}) [which was the fourth objection to the \textit{dhvanivāda} set forth under 1.1 d A] can be easily explained and answered only after giving examples. So despite the fact that one would expect straightaway a refutation of the view that \textit{dhvani} is secondary usage [the fourth objection], or that it is indescribable [the fifth objection, cf. 1.1 e A], the author of the \textit{Vṛtti} here sets forth the two main varieties of \textit{dhvani} in order to be able to give examples. In doing so he follows \textit{[the system set forth by the Kārikās in]} the next chapter:¹ and it is

To fit the five meanings of “\textit{dhvani},” the grammatical agreement [of the compound \textit{avivaksitā-vaṃya} with \textit{dhvani}] can be achieved by taking it as a \textit{bahuvr̥hi} which has simultaneous instrumental, locative, ablative, dative, and genitive relations [to its exocentric member].² When “\textit{dhvani}” has the sense of \textit{vaṃya} (the literal meaning), \textit{dhvani} itself will be referred to by the element \textit{vaṃya} in the compound. The \textit{avivaksitā-vaṃya} \textit{[dhvani]} will be that type of \textit{dhvani} (i.e., \textit{vaṃya}, literal meaning) by which that literal meaning itself is not intended, that is, is not intended to predominate [in the final meaning]. Such a \textit{dhvani} will be a suggestor.³ The same sort of analysis can be made of \textit{vivaksitānyapara-vaṃya}. Or, in the one option [of the five] where “\textit{dhvani}” means \textit{artha} (the literal meaning), we can analyse the compounds as \textit{karmadhāraya}s (simple adjective compounds). \textit{Avivaksitavaṃyaḥ} will then be an unintended literal meaning. \textit{Vivaksitānyaparavaṃyaḥ} will be “a meaning which is literal and which is subordinated to something else which is
intended [to predominate]." In these two types, sometimes [viz., in avivaksitavācya] the literal sense is not intended for such reasons as that it makes no sense in the context; sometimes [viz., in vivaksitānyaparavācya] it is intended insofar as it does make sense in the context, but by the power of its beauty it extends our apprehension to a suggested sense. It is on this account that in the second type a meaning is primarily the suggestor, in the first type a word. But is it not a contradiction to say that a meaning is intended and then say that it is subordinated to something else? No, because what is meant is that it is intended only insofar as it is subordinated to a second meaning.

In general of two sorts: His view is that although there are three kinds of dhvani—vastudhvani, alankāradhvani, and rasadhvani—they are included in these two sorts. But we may ask what benefit accrues, after giving the name dhvani, from adding these [particular] names [for its two main varieties]. The benefit is this. The first name indicates the cooperation in the operation called dhvanana (suggestion) of the apprehension on the part of the auditor of meanings implied by the three other operations of denotation, sentence-meaning, and secondary usage, while the second name indicates the cooperation of what is wished to be said, that is, of the intention on the part of the poet. In this way the true nature of dhvani is rendered more apparent.

Flower of gold: the compound suvarnapuspām [is an upapada compound agreeing with prthivi; it]4 means "which flowers forth in gold pieces." As the sentence thus embodies an impossible meaning, the literal sense must be unintended. Accordingly, after setting forth the literal sense of the words by denotative power (abhidhā) and giving us the syntax by the power of sentence-meaning (tātparyāśakti), the stanza, abandoning this sense because of the obstacle [of impossibility], gives us by the power of secondary usage (laksanā) a meaning which is related by similarity, namely that the three men easily partake of great wealth. The purpose of this secondary usage is that the praise of the warrior, man of knowledge and servant, which hides because of its not being expressed literally, should rise to the highest value by being suggested, just as the breasts of a beautiful woman [are the more beautiful from being half hidden].5 The primary manifestor of the suggestion here is the word [suvarnapuspām], but the literal meaning cooperates. All four semantic operations are in use.

On what mountain: for not even such mountains as Śrīparvata,6 which give unobstructed success of the highest order, furnish such success as this. The time spent there must have been measured in millenia
of divine aeons. And no form of austerity, such as sitting amid five fires, has been recorded as being productive of such reward. The word tava has been given separately lest it be understood with weakened force, as it would be if placed in compound. His intention is to bring the action of biting into close relation with “you.” Accordingly, those who say that the author failed to use the expression tvad-adhara-pāṭalam simply because it would not fit into the meter are mistaken.

Bite: [the suggestion is that] he tastes it in an unbroken continuity; [that] he does not eat it like a glutton, but rather acts like a connoisseur. Hence [it is suggested that] he has gained his refined taste, just like the other reward, from his austerity. Little parrot: From this indication of his youth, we see that he has gained his reward at the proper time. This also must derive from his austerity. We have in this stanza a suggestion made by a lover, which stimulates the [ālambana-vibhāva [i.e., the lady who is the object of his love]. It takes the form of a clever compliment which transmits his own hidden desire [viz., to kiss the lady's lip].

In this stanza there are only three semantic operations, viz., denotation, sentence-meaning, and suggestion, [as opposed to the four operations contained in the preceding stanza], for here the third, or middle-stage, operation of metonymy (lakṣanā) is missing as there is no blocking of the primary meaning, etc. Or, by a different interpretation, we may say that the third operation, lakṣanā, does intervene. We may suppose that the primary meaning is blocked by the impossibility of taking literally these improbable questions [directed to a parrot] and that a secondary meaning [of the lover as obtaining the chance to taste his lady’s lip], based on similarity, ensues. But the purpose of the lakṣanā is still that which is being suggested, which enters in the fourth stage. There is this difference, however, that in the former verse (“Three men reap the earth”) lakṣanā was the chief semantic power to cooperate with suggestion, while here the chief powers are denotation and the power of sentence-meaning, for it is because of the beauty of the literal sense that we apprehend the suggestion. This shows that the operation of lakṣanā is helpful only to a very small extent. In that variety of suggestion where the sequence is not noticed at all (asamlaksyakramavangya) [= rasadhvani] there is no apprehension of lakṣanā at all, for the sequence [from the literal to suggested meaning] is not apparent, as we shall show. So we may take it that in the second type of dhwani also [at least as here exemplified] all forms of semantic operation are present.
1. It has been argued that the present passage, taken in connection with 2.1 K and 2.2 K, shows that the author of the Vṛtti and of the Kārikās was one person. The argument takes the form of a question: “Why would the author of the Kārikās define the subtypes of dhvani under 2.1 and 2.2 if he had not already described the major types to which they belong?” But the argument is not conclusive, and I would base my belief in a single authorship on other grounds (see Introduction, pp. 25-27). 2. An English example may put the reader who is innocent of Sanskrit grammar on the right track. The phrase “cut-rate competition” can be glossed as “competition by which rates are cut.” Sanskrit grammar would regard “cut-rate” as a bahuśr̥̄hi compound. It agrees grammatically with the word “competition.” Its exocentric (unexpressed) member is “which.” Its relation to that member is instrumental. 3. Vyañjaka here = vyañjako ‘ṛthah. Abhinava does not trouble to give analyses of the other relations. The locative will apply when “dhvani” has the sense of kāvyā; the ablative (“because of which”), when “dhvani” has the sense of vyañjya (the suggested meaning); the dative (“for the purpose of”), when “dhvani” has the sense of vyañjana (the suggestive operation); the genitive, when “dhvani” has the sense of vācaka (the denotative word). 4. Apparently Abhinava takes suvānapuspām as suvarṇa plus the root pusp (Dhp 4.15, puspyati) plus suffix an (Pan. 3.2.1). 5. The same simile, spelled out in full, is used by the Pāla poet Vallāna (9th or 10th century), SRK 1705. 6. A peak of the Western Ghats. For an interesting description of it some centuries later, see the account of the 15th-century Russian traveler Athanasius Nikitin, India in the 15th Century, Hakluyt Society, 1857. 7. Sitting with a fire on each side and the sun above. 8. It is normally considered incorrect to use an expression in which a member outside a compound (here tava) must be construed with the subordinate member of the compound (here adhara in àdhara-pātam). Abhinava’s remarks are designed to clear the author of the verse from the charge of incorrect usage. The meaning that Abhinava reads into the sentence would be rendered in English by emphasis: “that he bites a cherry as pink as your lip.” Accordingly, the commentaries Kaumudi and BP say that if the word for you were here placed in compound, the author would be guilty of avimśta-vācyā, “not giving sufficient prominence to a predicative element.” 9. Abhinava’s reason for offering the second interpretation lies in his general view of the pertinence of both stanzas quoted in this section by Ānanda. He views them as introduced before the discussion of bhakti (= laksanā) in 1.14 in order to give examples where laksanā occurs but where it can be shown to be distinct from dhvani. It is true that avivaksitavācyā will always furnish such examples. But Abhinava wishes to show that there are cases even of avivaksitānyaparavācyā where a small degree of laksanā is possible. Otherwise there would be no point in Ānanda’s mentioning or illustrating that type of dhvani at this point.
§ 1.14  

K  This dhvani is not identical with bhakti (secondary operation), because it differs from it in form; nor is it defined by that, because the definition would be both too wide and too narrow.

A  Here he refutes the objection that dhvani is nothing more than secondary operation (cf. 1.1 K, 1.1 d A). This dhvani, that is, dhvani of the sorts just mentioned, is not identical with bhakti, because it differs from it in form. Dhvani is where a meaning other than the literal is revealed by the literal word and meaning to be the final sense and in that sense a suggested meaning is predominant. A secondary operation is merely a subordinate one. The second half of the couplet shows that bhakti cannot define dhvani. Why cannot dhvani be defined by bhakti? Because the definition would be both too wide and too narrow. Too wide, because bhakti occurs in areas outside those of dhvani. Poets are often found to use words in an associated sense, being prompted by idiom or conformity (to convention),¹ without any great beauty being generated by the suggestion. An example is:

Wilting at either end
from touch of heavy breasts and loins,
green in between
from a waist that bears no weight,
and here all disordered
from tossing about of loosened arms:
this lotus-petal couch
speaks the fever of a slender maid.

(Harṣa, Ratnāvalī 2.12)²

Or again

You kiss a hundred times,
embrace each other a thousand
and rest only to unite again.
But when this happens with a lover,
it is not tautology.³
§ 1.14 A ]

And again,

Whether angry or pleased,
in tears or in smiles.
however you catch them, wanton girls
carry away your heart.

With a newly flowered vine
the husband gives his young wife a tap
on her breast.
Such a gentle tap;
but the pain went straight to the heart
of her fellow wives.

It suffers pressure for others' sake, is sweet when broken,
even in altered state it is prized by all.
What if it fails to grow if cast on barren land:
is this the fault of the sugar cane or of the hostile desert?

(Bhallataśataka 56)

In this last stanza the word "suffers" [is to be taken in a secondary sense]. Instances like those quoted above are never the domain of dhvani, because ... [sentence completed by 1.15 K].

1. Idiom and conformity to convention: this distinction between prasid-dhi and anurodha is made clear by Abhinava in 3.33 i L (Text, p. 426), where Ānanda uses these words in the dual. 2. Here it is the verb "speaks" that is used in a secondary or associated sense for "makes it clear that." Couches do not actually speak. In the play, the lotus-couch furnishes the king with evidence of the heroine's love fever. The stanza is quoted in SRK 709 and in most of the great anthologies. 3. "Tautology" is a trope for "tedious repetition." The action here is repetitive but not tedious. The verse is badly misprinted in the Kashi ed.; see Corrections of Text. The verbs cumbbijjai, avarundhijjai, and ramiijjai are passives used statically (bhāve yak): lit., "there is kissing," etc. 4. Here "carry away" is a trope for to charm or fascinate. I am not sure of the sense of uccinta. Prakrit uccitta means "crazy" according to Pāía-sadda-mahānnavo. Abhinava renders it together with mahilāo as svairinyah, lit., women who disregard in the pursuit of their own inclinations the constraints of husbands or parents. The term is used as a synonym for abhisārikāh; see SRK 233. 5. According to Abhinava, "gives to" is here used in the sense of "rewards with." 6. The verse is an aprastutaprasamsā (see 1.13 j A, note 1), an allegory of a virtuous courtier who cannot live under a vicious king. The
whole verse makes this suggestion, which is embodied in the figure of speech, as it is the literal meaning that is charming. But the verse is here quoted simply for the secondary usage of "suffer." Sugar cane cannot suffer, so "suffers pressure" means no more than "is squeezed." The stanza is certainly not by Bhallata, who lived under Śankararvarman (A.D. 883-902), that is, after the time of Ananda; see RājTar. 5.204 and Jacobi, ZDMG 56, p. 405. Bhallata's Śataka is an anthology drawn from many authors. This stanza is ascribed to Indurāja in Sāṃg. 1052 and SüktiM. 35.5, to Yaśas in SubhĀ. 947.

L And so it is only after giving examples of both [major types of dhvani] that he comments on and refutes the view expressed [in 1.1 K] by "some say it is bhākta (secondary operation)." What he has in mind is this. Are bhakti and dhvani identical, the two words being merely synonyms? Or does bhakti define dhvani, marking it off from what is other than dhvani as prthivītva (earthness) marks off from earth what is other than earth? Or is it an upalaksāna (occasional characteristic), as a crow may be of Devadatta's house because a crow may be perched on it? [The Kārikā] begins by denying the first possibility: not identical with bhakti. The [Vṛtti's] phrase, of the sort just mentioned, should be referred to the five meanings of dhvani: word, literal meaning, operation, suggested meaning, and poem. To show the difference [of the two concepts] he begins by stating the nature of dhvani: [where a meaning other than] the literal, etc. To be the final sense: i.e., the sense that permits our apprehension to come to rest, the sense which is the purpose [of the poet's employing just those particular words]. Is revealed: he means, is suggested. Merely a subordinate operation (upacāra): that is, secondary usage (guṇavṛtti), metonomy (laksanā). To use an associated sense is to speak in transgression [of the literal sense]. By the word "merely" he is referring to cases where a fourth semantic operation, of the nature of suggestion, may be inferred as possible from the mere fact that the third operation has been employed, but where this fourth operation, being neither useful nor important, is as good as absent. For the definition of a [primary] purpose is "that with a view to [the acquiring or avoiding of] which one starts about an action." Inasmuch as secondary usage is found even in such cases, how can one say that the suggestive operation and the operation of dhvani are one and the same thing?

[The Kārikā] then rules out the second possibility: because the definition would be too wide, etc. Nor is it, viz., dhvani, defined by that, viz., by secondary operation. It may be objected that the
suggestive operation must take place [wherever a secondary operation is employed], so how can one distinguish the area [of dhvani from that of lakṣaṇa]? To provide against this, [the Vṛtti] says: without any great beauty. He means, for the reason that the purpose in question is of no importance and nothing is therefore accomplished by the suggestion of it. By the use of the word “great” [he admits that there is some beauty in such cases but that] there is only enough to qualify as a guṇa (poetic quality), as shown by the definition [of the quality, aptness (saṃādhi)]: “the imposition of the property [of one thing] on some [other] thing should be called aptness.”

But if there is no real purpose in using such expressions, how is it that an author uses them? He answers this objection: “because of prasiddhy-anurodha,” for such has been the usage through a long succession [of writers]. But I would say that prasiddhi implies [not that there is no purpose but] that the purpose is too obvious. Although the purpose appears in clear form, it stands in need of something hidden, like buried treasure [in order to be in the domain of dhvani]. For in the case of the secondary usage (upacāra) illustrated by “speaks” [in the first of Ānanda’s illustrative verses] the purpose is the apprehension by the auditor of “making something quite clear.” If the author had used the obvious literal expression, would the verse lose an element of beauty? Or by his using this covert expression is any element of beauty added? With this in mind our author will say [that dhvani reveals] “a beauty which cannot be conveyed by any other form of expression” (1.15 K).

[In the second verse quoted by Ānanda] the Prakrit word avarun-dhiṣṭai means ālivigate (there is embracing). “Tautology” is used in its secondary sense of something to be avoided, because the literal meaning [viz., repetition of words] is impossible in the context.

[For the third of the quoted verses Abhinava furnishes a Sanskrit translation of the Prakrit and then adds:] In this verse “catch” is used in the secondary sense of receive, “carry away” in the sense of subjecting to their power.

[The fourth verse:] Here a husband in the course of normal love-play gives a light stroke of a fresh vine to the breast of his youngest wife. As this indicates the favor she has attained with him, it proves from its very softness hard to bear in the heart of her fellow wives, who no longer share in his love-play. That a light stroke given to one person should have its effect on another and be hard to bear “even although so soft,” is startling. In this stanza giving is used in the secondary sense of rewarding.
[The fifth verse:] Although the word “suffers” is used in its primary sense with respect to the virtuous man, who is the subject really intended, still, with respect to the extraneous subject, sugar cane, which is being praised, as the “suffering” of pressure is impossible, the word is used in a secondary sense of undergoing pressure, so that the whole expression ends up meaning nothing more than “is squeezed.”

Now in such cases of course there is some purpose, so how can we avoid saying that there is dhvani? It is in response to such an objection that our author says: Instances like those, etc.

1. prthivī prthivītvasambandhāt, Praśastapāda, Benares ed., p. 41. This so-called definition of earth is justified by Udayana in his Kiranāvalī. He points out that it is not intended to be definitive. We shall still require a definition of prthivītva, which he gives. But such definitions, he insists, do not lead to an infinite regress, in logic any more than in medicine or grammar. One goes on defining until the uneducated man is educated. Then one stops.

2. This interpretation is historically impossible. Ānanda never distinguishes the five senses in this way. Ānanda’s phrase actually refers to the two major types of dhvani that he has just mentioned: avivakṣitavācya and vivakṣitānyāparavācya.

3. Every use of laksanā implies some purpose, for otherwise the speaker would not have departed from literal usage. Thus even in the first of Ānanda’s quotations (the verse from the Ratnāvalī) one may say that the word vadati is used instead of gamayati in order to give the notion that the couch shows very clearly the lady’s suffering. But this is a secondary sort of purpose, not the main purpose of the sentence. It is not really useful to that purpose nor poetically important.

4. Nyāya S. 1.1.24. Harṣa did not set about writing his verse with the view to expressing only a little more vividly the action of the couch on the king’s inferential judgment.

5. The source of this definition of samādhi appears to be lost. For other, and better, definitions of the term, see BhNS 16.102 and Dandin 1.93. Dandin’s example is: kumudāni nimūnti kamalāny unmīsantī ca, “the water-lilies close their eyes and the lotuses open theirs.” The imposition must be within the range of everyday speech, or we would have a figure such as hyperbole or fancy. It must be apt and should impart vividness.

6. Abhinava seems to take the compound prasiddhyanurodha here as a tatpuruṣa. Kuppuswami Śastri in his Upalocana on the Kaumudi remarks that Abhinava’s explanation here does not fit with the use of prasiddhyanurodha in 3.33 i A.

7. Kaumudi and BP explain the hidden something as the transmission of an element of beauty that does not appear in cases of non-suggestive use.
A word can justly be termed dhvani only if in its being suggestive it lights up a beauty which could be achieved by no other [i.e., non-suggestive manner of] expression.\(^1\)

1. In the bracketed words of our translation we are following Abhinava's interpretation. Without them the sentence might seem to be limiting dhvani to the Flaubertian *mot juste*, which is surely not the case.

In the area of the examples just given there was no word that caused the manifestation of a beauty which could not have been achieved by some other [manner of] expression.

By no other expression: that is, by the use of literal word and meaning, and so other than dhvani. "Word" is to be understood in all its five senses.\(^1\) Can be justly termed dhvani: i.e., can be denoted by the word "dhvani" The examples just given: e.g., "speaks" [in the first verse quoted under 1.14 A].

1. Such is certainly not Ānanda's intention, but the interpretation makes for a more systematic presentation. The Kaumudi, followed by BP, shows that śabda may be analysed so as to give the same five senses given by Abhinava in his analysis of dhvani (1.13 L). Thus: śabdyata iti śabdah = vācyah; śabdyate 'neneti śabdah = vācakah; śabdyate vyajyata iti = vyāṅgyam (here I suppose one must employ the principle anekārtha dhātavaḥ); śabdānam = vyāpāraḥ; while the combination of these four senses will give the samudāyah = kāvyam.
Furthermore, words such as lāvanya, which are used idiomatically in a sense other than their proper (etymological) sense, are never instances of dhvani.

In these words there is indeed a secondary semantic operation. And in the context where they occur we may speak of dhvani, if it happens to arise, but that will be only because of some other consideration. Dhvani never occurs primarily because of such words.

Our author has already said that there is no operation of dhvani where the purpose [of choosing to employ a secondary sense] is unimportant. Where there is secondary usage without any basic purpose at all, there too there will naturally be no operation of dhvani. He states this by saying, furthermore, etc.

Words like lāvanya, which means properly "possessing a salty taste," but which is idiomatically used in such other senses as "charm, beauty," by the very fact that they are used idiomatically lack that separation [from their proper meaning] which is occasioned by the presence of the triad [and so cannot give rise to dhvani]. As has been said, "Some cases of secondary usage, being idiomatic, so far as their force is concerned are just like direct denotation" (Tantravârttika, p. 683). Such words, although used in a sense different from their etymological sense, do not carry any dhvani and we cannot speak of dhvani in such cases. By speaking of secondary semantic operation he refers to secondary usage of both the gaunt and lâksanikî varieties. By saying "such as" lāvanya, [the Kârikâ] would include words like ānulomya, prâtikûlya, sabrahmacārin. Ānulomya (smoothness, orderliness) means literally rubbing in the direction in which the hair grows. Pratikûla (antagonistic) is used properly of a current that fights against the bank of the stream. The
primary meaning of sabrahmacārin (companion) is one who has had the same teacher. In each case the other meaning is secondary. As one does not adopt the secondary use of these words without any purpose in mind, we cannot speak of a suggestive operation in their case. But now in such verses as:

\[ \text{de vaditi lunāhi paludisi gasittha} \]
\[ \text{lāvāṇṇujjala-gugharidhollavapattā (?)} \]

a suggestion is indeed apprehended in the presence of the word lāvanya. True, but it does not derive from the word lāvanya. It derives rather from the operation of dhvani that follows after we have understood the meaning of the whole sentence, for in the sentence it is suggested that his beloved’s face has illuminated the whole sky. But enough of many words. Our author says the same thing: because of some other consideration. He means, because of the suggestive power [of the sentence], not because of the use of such a word as lāvanya in a secondary sense.

1. The triad is: blocking of the literal sense, connection of the literal object with the secondary object, and a purpose (prayojana) for shifting from the use of one sense to the other. Actually it is only the third of these conditions that the word lāvanya, as used idiomatically, lacks. 2. Gaunt is based on the similarity of the primary and secondary object, lākṣaṇī is based on some other relation subsisting between them; see § 1.1 K, note 1. 3. No one to our knowledge has been able to make sense of any of the versions of the Prakrit verse. Each manuscript shows a different reading, all of them being mostly jibberish. After the first two syllables I have transcribed the readings of Kaumudi’s MS ca, in which at least the words lāvāṇṇujjala, “resplendent with beauty,” make sense.

A And again

K When a word abandons its primary operation and reveals an object by secondary usage, the purpose for which this is done is one to which the word moves without stumbling.
§ 1.17

A Because when a purpose is to be achieved of revealing a meaning of special beauty, if the word accomplished that purpose only through a non-primary sense, the author would be at fault in using it. But that is not the case.

1. That is, he should have used some other word. What is meant becomes clearer by the help of an example. "A village on the Ganges" suggests the beauty, peacefulness, and holiness of the village. These suggestions spring from the primary sense of the word "Ganges," not from the secondary, or shifted, sense of "bank," which we need in order to make sense of the expression. It is logic that demands the secondary sense (see 1.4 b L, note 6). The suggestion, the poetry, springs directly from the primary.

L The foregoing argument has shown it wrong to say that wherever there is bhakti (associated usage) there is dhvani. And so, if we use bhakti to define dhvani, the definition will be too wide. But even if we were to grant, for the sake of argument, that bhakti occurs wherever there is dhvani, the object on which the bhakti operates will be different from the object on which dhvani operates. There can be no relation of substance and attribute between entities that occupy different areas; and a definition must be an attribute. Lakṣanā (bhakti) operates on a secondary object. The operation of dhvani takes place in the area of the purpose. The second semantic operation, laksanā, does not take place in that area, because that area lacks the set of conditions (blockage, similarity, etc.) for secondary usage. It is with this in mind that our author says, and again, etc.

[Comment on the Kārikā:] When a word abandons its primary operation, that is, after completing its denotative operation, and reveals, that is, brings to our apprehension, a secondary object by secondary use (gunaurttti)—here gunaurttti is a synonym of lakṣanā—the purpose, or goal, at which—accusative case—this illumination is aimed, is one where another operation comes into play. And this operation is not lakṣanā, because the lakṣanā of a word is an operation which moves haltingly, that is, the word's power of giving information is disturbed by the working of some hindrance, whereas that word in giving us to understand the purpose does not meet with any hindrance. For if it did, we should have to discover a reason for it, [which could only be] some further purpose, which we should have
to discover; and so we should be forced into an infinite regress. Accordingly, there is no place here for laksita-laksanā (secondary usage growing out of secondary usage). To reveal: the word darsanam is a form that includes the causative suffix [i.e., the meaning is “revelation,” not “sight”].

[Comment on the Vṛtti:] Accomplish here means “suggest.” Through a non-primary sense: i.e., as disturbed by some hindrance. In using it, viz., the word. Would be at fault: It is so that the purpose may be easily apprehended that a word is used in its secondary sense. In the expression “the boy is a lion,” where the notion of the boy’s unusual bravery is to be conveyed, if the word were to operate haltingly, it would not convey to us this notion; so why should it have been used? If you reply that it will convey that notion by a [further] secondary operation, then we shall have to discover a subsequent purpose and still another secondary operation to go with it. So we shall be led to an infinite regress. On the other hand, if you admit that there is no halting motion here, then there can be no secondary operation prompted by the purpose to be conveyed, for the set of conditions for a secondary operation [hindrance, etc.,] will be absent. You cannot say that there is no operation [for conveying the purpose]; and that operation cannot be denotation, for the conventional agreement [between denoter and denoted] is absent. This operation, over and above the operations of denotation and secondary usage, can only be the operation of dhvani.

But that is not the case: The author is not at fault, because the purpose is readily apprehended. So we see that the denotive power, wishing to pass to its primary meaning but being blocked by some hindrance, continues on because it has not fulfilled its aim. That is why, in speaking [of the associated sense which it does reach], we say, “This is the non-primary sense of the word.” As there is an acceptance of convention even in the non-primary sense, [one may say that] secondary usage (lakṣanā) is simply an appendage to denotation (abhidhā).

1. To define a substance is to furnish its peculiar attribute, that is, the attribute which rules out all other substances. If the attribute occurs in a different area from that of the substance, it obviously cannot serve as a definition. 2. Such is the correct reading furnished by the Kaumudi. The other printed texts read laksana- for laksita-. See 1.4 b L and note 18. BP gives an example to which the term laksita-laksanā may be properly applied: “How is this, slender maid! The month of Srāvana is in your eyes, autumn in your cheeks, summer in your limbs and winter in your lotus face.” Here the month
of Śrāvana is used in the sense of the rainy season, which in turn gives rise to the second secondary sense of tears. See also 2.9 L and note 2. 3. These rather odd remarks are occasioned by Abhinava's effort to clarify the following Kārikā. Kārikā 1.18 will say that secondary usage (gunaḥṛtti) depends on no more than vācakatu (the denotative power of words), a statement that seems at variance with the semantic system that has been described, where lakṣaṇā (as likewise gunaḥṛtti) is an independent semantic power which depends on a triad of conditions. Abhinava furnishes us here with two considerations which may explain the apparent change of viewpoint. Lakṣaṇā arrives at its object, the secondary sense, only at the end of a journey which set out toward the denoted object. In that sense it occurs as an appendage to abhidhā. Then also, it shares in the peculiar property of abhidhā, the convention (samaya, sanketa) between word and meaning. Lakṣaṇā does not veer aside from the primary sense to any meaning, but only to a secondary meaning that also attaches to the word by convention. One may find many of the secondary senses of a word in a dictionary. In this sense too lakṣaṇā is closely related to abhidhā. Dhvani, on the other hand, although it requires denotative word and meaning as its trigger, is not dependent on, or closely related to, abhidhā in the two respects here brought to our notice.

K Secondary usage (gunaḥṛtti) depends on no more than the denotative power of words. How can it be used to define dhvani, which is based wholly on suggestive power?

1. The distinction is expressed here unclearly. Both gunaḥṛtti and dhvani depend to a greater or lesser extent on vācakatu. The distinction lies in the manner in which they depend on it. Abhinava does much to clarify the passage. See 1.17 L, last paragraph and note 3, and his comment below.

A Therefore dhvani is one thing and secondary usage another. As a definition it would be too narrow too, because the type of dhvani where the literal is intended but is subordinated to a second meaning,
and many other varieties, do not fall in the same area with associated meaning (bhakti). Therefore associated meaning furnishes no definition.

§ 1.18 L He sums up: therefore. Since secondary usage (lakṣaṇā) forms simply an appendage to denotation, for that reason; that is to say, since secondary usage (guna-vrtti)—he means both its varieties, gauni and lāksaniṁ—depends on denotative operation inasmuch as it arises from an obstruction to that operation and forms an appendage to it, how can secondary usage form a definition of dhvani, which is a suggestive operation? The two processes occur in different areas.

[The Vṛtti] sums up the matter: therefore. The author means, because he has shown its forming too broad a definition and apropos of that discussion [has noted] that it occupies a different area. So, having explained the overextension referred to in the Kārikā which stated “it is not defined by that, because the definition would be both too wide and too narrow (1.14 K),” he now explains the underextension: it would be too narrow.

It would be: that is, secondary usage would be. The definition would be of sufficient extension only if bhakti (associated usage) occurred wherever dhvani occurs. And that is not the case, for while bhakti occurs in the presence of that type of dhvani where the literal sense is not intended, as in such verses as “Three men reap the earth” (1.13 m A), how shall we find it in such verses as “On what mountain” (ibid.)?

[Objection from the Mīmāṁsā point of view:] But now, let us examine the concept of laksanā (secondary usage); it extends throughout the qualitative (gauna) as well as the relational (laksaniṁka). The only difference between the qualitative and relational varieties is that in the qualitative the word which indicates an object by laksanā enjoys grammatical agreement with the word [which denotes that object], as in “The boy is a lion.”2 Or, we may say that one object [e.g., a lion], by indicating a second object [e.g., a boy who shares in the qualities of a lion], makes the word that denotes the second object agree with the word that denotes itself [i.e., makes the word “boy” agree grammatically with the word “lion”]. Or, we may say that the word “lion” and the object lion cooperate in indicating; and so both of them fuse with the word denoting that thing and with the thing itself. It has
been said that "the [denotative] word is used in the qualitative variety, but is not used in the relational variety (laksanā). But secondary usage (laksanā) is present there too and so extends to all varieties. And this relational variety is of five sorts, as it is based on (a) a conjunction [of the secondary object] with the direct object: for example, a direct object of the word "dvirepha" ("possessing two r's") is the word "bhramara"—now the word "bhramara" is connected [by the conventions of language] with the six-legged creature, a bee; that object may be indicated by the word "dvirepha" because of the bee's connection with a direct object [of the word "dvirepha"]; (b) the proximity (sāmīpya) of the secondary object [to the direct object], as in "a village on the Ganges" [where the bank of the river is close to the direct object, river]; (c) samavāya, that is, a connection: for example, "Bring in the spears," meaning bring in the spearmen, [who are connected with the spears]; (d) opposition, as when one says with reference to an enemy, "In what has he not benefitted me?"; (e) its being connected with the same activity, that is, when it is based on a relation of cause and effect: for example, "he takes away my life," when the expression is used of one who takes away one's food [here the direct object, life, is the effect of the secondary object, food]. In this way, laksanā occurs in all varieties.

And thus, in your verse "On what mountain," since an obstruction to the literal sense is introduced by the improbable questions [addressed to a parrot], laksanā, based on similarity, comes into play.

[Abhinava:] But we admitted this, saying that laksanā occurred in the middle stage [between denotation and suggestion].

[Mimamsaka:] Then how can your author say that "the type of dhvani where the literal is intended but is subordinated to a second meaning, [and many other varieties, do not fall in the area of laksanā]"?

[Abhinava:] He was referring to the chief subtype [of this type of dhvani], viz., where a succession from literal to suggested meaning is not noticed. And by its many varieties he meant the suggestion of rasa, of bhāva, of improper rasa, of improper bhāva, or of the incipience or cessation of any of these; all this, as well as the subvarieties of each. And in every one of these, laksanā is impossible. The reason is that in a poem that sets forth the vibhāvas and anubhāvas there can be no hindrance to the primary meaning; so what chance is there for laksanā to arise?

[M:] Let us forget about hindrance. The true definition of laksanā is this: "That is called laksanā where we have an apprehension of an
object invariably connected with the primary meaning." In the type
of poetry here of which you are speaking, when the vibhāvas, the anu-
bhāvas, etc., are the primary meanings [of the words], the rasas, etc.,
being invariably connected with them, will be indicated by lakṣanā, for
the vibhāvas and anubhāvas stand in a cause-effect relation to the rasas,
while the vyabhicāribhāvas stand in a relation of accompaniment.

[A:] By no means. At this rate, whenever we apprehend the object
smoke from the word "smoke," we would be reminded by lakṣanā of
fire, and from that we would be reminded of the repelling of cold, and
so on, until there would be no end to a word's meanings.

[M:] The word "smoke" finds a point of rest in its own literal
so it will not go on operating any further.

[A:] Here you have come around to our view, that it is a hindrance
to the literal meaning that brings lakṣanā to life, for when such a
hindrance occurs, the word does not rest in its literal meaning. And in
the setting forth of the vibhāvas, etc., there is no hindrance.

[M:] Very well then, we may say that just as the memory of fire arises
after one has understood the presence of smoke, so the apprehension
of such mental states as sexual desire arises after the apprehension of
the vibhāvas, etc. There is no verbal operation here at all.

[A:] This Mīmāṃsaka who knows so much about our apprehension
should be asked this question. Do you suppose that the apprehension
of rasa is nothing more than the apprehension of another person's men-
tal state? You should not make such an error. What aesthetic relish
(rasatā) would there be in the mere inference of emotional states that
are found in the everyday world? The relishing of rasa is a super-
normal (alaukika) delight. It consists in savoring the vibhāvas, etc.,
which are found in poetry, and it must not be degraded to the level
of memory and inference, or the like. Rather, the connoisseur, whose
mind has been trained by everyday inferences from effect to cause,
when he apprehends the vibhāvas, etc., does so not in an uninvolved
manner (tātasthyā) [in which everyday inferences are achieved], but by
bringing them into the power of his sensibility, or in other words, con-
fronting them with sympathy, a process that forms the seedling for the
full relishing of rasa about to ensue. The nature of his apprehension
consists in a savoring of the vibhāvas that springs from his identifying
with them, a process that is entirely removed from the path of mem-
ory and inference. This savoring has not been produced by some other
means of knowledge in the past so that it might qualify as memory.
Nor is it produced now from any other means of knowledge, because
perception and the other means do not operate in a super-normal experience. That is why the terms vibhāva, [anubhāva,] etc., are used, which are terms for the super-normal.15 As Bharata says: "It is called a vibhāva because its purpose is to give understanding (vijñā)."16 In dealing with normal experience we speak of a cause, not a vibhāva.17 Anubhāva also is a term for the super-normal. "The dramatic representation of voice, body, and emotional expression, since it per its us to experience (anubhāvayati) [the represented mental states], is called anubhāva."18 By experiencing (anubhāvāna) is meant one's identification with the mental states [so represented]. In dealing with normal experience we speak of an effect, not an anubhāva.19 And so, lest one suppose that [in the enjoyment of rasa] the mental state of another person is being inferred, Bharata omitted the word "basic emotion" (sthāyībhāva) from his definition: "Rasa is born from the combination of vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicāribhāvas."20 Had it been included it would have proved a stumbling block.

The statement that a basic emotion turns into a rasa21 is based on suitability, that is, because the relishing of beauty arises in us from our memory bank (samskāra) of mental states which are suitable to the vibhāvas and anubhāvas of those basic emotions [that are being portrayed in the characters of a literary work]; and because, while we are in the stage of understanding the mental state of another person, which may prove helpful to our sympathetic response, we understand such basic emotions as sexual desire from such [vibhāvas] as a garden and such [anubhāvas] as horripilation of the actor's skin. The transient emotion (vyabhicāribhāva) is also a mental state [resident in the portrayed character], but since it is relished only as dependent on a principal mental state, [there is no danger in its being mentioned in the sûtra and so] it is listed along with the vibhāvas and anubhāvas.

So what is born here is a rasyamāṇatā (a being tasted, a gustation, of beauty),22 that is, a savoring that eclipses such worldly mental states as the joy that might be produced by reunion with a constant stream of old friends. And for this reason, [viz., because of its super-normal character,] the savoring serves to manifest something, not to inform one of something, as might be done by an established means of knowledge (pramāṇa). It is not a production such as results from the working of a cause.

[M:] But if it is not a cognition and is not produced, what is it?
[A:] We have told you. It is the super-normal rasa.
[M:] But the vibhāvas, etc.—are they what inform us of it, or are they productive of it?

[A:] Neither informative nor productive;

[M:] Where else is such a thing found?

[A:] The fact that there exists nothing else of this sort is why we have called it super-normal.

[M:] But then rasa will not be a valid means of knowledge.

[A:] So be it. Since we receive pleasure and instruction from savoring it, what else do you want?

[M:] But still, there will be no way of knowing that it exists.

[A:] Wrong. It is proved by our own self-awareness, because savoring is a form of knowledge.

Enough arguing now. But one more reason why rasa is super-normal: namely, that soft and harsh alliterations, while they have no effect on meaning, can be suggestive of rasa.23 What possibility of laksanā can there be in such a case? One finds too that there can be relishing of the words of a poem by mulling them over, for we see a connoisseur reading the same poem over and over and savoring it. That the words of such a poem are unlike other words, which become useless after we have understood them according to the dictum, “One takes them up [as means] only to abandon them [after they have served their purpose],”24 shows that such words must have a suggestive operation. And that is why the succession [of the suggestion to the primary meaning] passes unnoticed.

It has been objected by a certain person that this theory of suggestion would result in vākyabheda (giving two different meanings to one sentence),25 but his objection is based on a misconception because [of the following consideration].

A ritual text (śāstra),26 uttered once, conveys a meaning by means of semantic convention. As it is impossible for us to remember simultaneously numerous contradictory conventions, the text cannot convey two meanings, while if the conventions are not contradictory, then obviously there will be just one sentence meaning. The sentence cannot convey contradictory meanings successively, because a semantic operation cannot begin again after it has once ceased. If the sentence is uttered a second time, the meaning will be the same, because there has been no change in the semantic conventions or the context. If it could convey a second meaning, obliterating the meaning obtained by context and convention, there would be no semantic rules at all. At this
rate when we hear the words, "A man desirous of heaven must perform the fire oblation," what assurance should we have that the meaning is not that a man must eat dog meat?27 Nor would matters stop there. Language would become wholly unreliable. Accordingly, väkyabheda is there counted as a fault.

But in poetry, the vibhāvas, etc., as they are being conveyed to us, tend to become objects of our relish. There is no need then for semantic convention.28 There is nothing here comparable to the apprehensions we receive from a ritual text: “I am enjoined to do this; I will do it; I have accomplished my purpose,” since such a text, being on a normal plane,29 tends toward what one should do in the future. But in poetry, the savoring of the vibhāvas, etc., is essentially a matter of the present, arising like a magic flower, without reference to past or future. In this sense the relishing of rasa is different from normal relishing, as it is also different from a yogi’s meditation.

And so it is that in the stanza “On what mountain.” connoisseurs will sense the clever compliment which is the speaker’s intention without noticing the succession to a blocking of the primary meaning. That is the [true] reason why our author has stated as a general principle that there is no bhakti in that type of dhvani where the literal meaning is intended but is subordinated to a second meaning. It was we, seeking to persuade you when you were being obstinate,30 who granted that laksanā might be found in the stanza. for it was our thought that no matter how angry you might be, you could say nothing against cases where no succession could be noticed. But if you will not be angry, we will point out that even in the stanza “Three men reap the earth,” where the literal sense is not intended, regardless of the fact that all the conditions for laksanā, such as blocking of the primary meaning, are present, the sentence comes to rest in the suggested meaning. And so enough of this long discussion.

Our author sums up: therefore associated meaning [furnishes no definition].

1. In the text, kevalam construes with the words ity evam laksanikād gunasya bhedaḥ four lines below. 2. “Lion” is here used by secondary usage to mean a boy with the qualities of a lion. It is accompanied by the denotative word “boy,” with which it stands in grammatical agreement. In the relational variety, on the other hand, this accompanying use of the denotative word is not found. “A village on the Ganges” indicates a village on the river bank, but the denotative word “bank” is not used. 3. It is confusing to have the same word (laksanā) used in two different senses in the same sentence. To
make matters worse for the reader, the pronoun (sa) with which the next sentence begins must refer to the first, not the second sense. 4. Abhinava now specifies the five sorts, following the verse of Bhartrmitra which he quoted under 1.1 d L. But he here follows a different reading from that which he there gave: abhidheyena samyogat samipyat samavayatah in place of abhidheyena samipyat saryupyat samavayatah. See 1.1 d L, note 4. In effect the version given under 1.1 d L includes the gauñi variety, that being the variety based on sārūpya, whereas the present version excludes it. The sense here given to samyoga is peculiar; in Nyāya a vācyavācakasambandha is never referred to as samyoga. Furthermore, the illustration of the type based on samavāya implies a non-Nyāya sense of samavāya. But these facts cannot be used as arguments against the present version, for Bhartrmitra may have defined the words in other than their Nyāya-Vais ika senses. 5. Note that samavāya and samyoga are here glossed by the same general word. In its normal sense samavāya cannot be used of the relation between spears and the men who hold them. 6. This is a case of irony. The direct sense of the word “benefitted” is the opposite of the secondary sense which the speaker intends. 7. For these varieties see 2.3 K and for examples, 2.3 L. 8. Rasadhvani may be divided into the eighth, or according to some, nine, rasas. Even single rasas have their subvarieties; thus, sambhoga-sṛṅgāra and vipralambha-sṛṅgāra. So also with the bhāvas and rasabhāsas, etc. 9. The text from this point, Kashi ed., p. 154, line 4. to p. 158, line 7, has been translated by Gnoli. Aesthetic Experience, pp. 102-106. 10. The quotation, given inexacty, is from the Tantravārttika, p. 354. The original reads abhidheyavinābhūte pravṛttir laksanesyate, “the operation of a word on an object invariably connected with its direct meaning should be called laksanā.” It is not a good definition, because the connection need not be invariable. 11. The vibhāvas are the determinants of the rasas; they cause them to arise. The anubhāvas result from the rasas (at least as rasa is understood by the Mimāmsaka here speaking, viz., as a sharpened emotion). The vyabhicārabhāvas accompany the rasas. 12. Here the Mimāmsaka would reduce the achievement of rasa to an inference, the third valid means of knowledge. The fourth means, verbal apprehension, would play no part. 13. The words are ironic. Among poeticians the Vedic ritualists are stigmatized as the most insensitive of all men to poetic beauty and to the understanding of literature. 14. This is another distinction between rasa-pratiti and inference (anumāna). In inference the sight of smoke gives rise to a memory of fire which has been perceived in the past as accompanying smoke. 15. alaukika eva vyavahāra: that is, they refer to a super-normal means of apprehension. Abhinava returns to this idea in commenting on 2.4. The apprehension (pratiti) of rasa, he says there, is lokottara-rūpā; it transcends the experience of the workday world. The term alaukika had already been used by Nyāya and Buddhist epistemologists for types of perception that
could not be explained by normal physical causes. 16. BhNŚ 7.3 (Vol. I, p. 346): _atha vibhāva stī kasmāt / ucya te, vibhāvo vijñānārthaḥ._ 17. Here Abhinava is adding to the words of Bharata, who does not make this distinction. He merely says, _vibhāvāḥ kāraṇam nimittam hetur stī paryāyāḥ_ (ibid.). 18. BhNŚ 7.4 (Vol. I, p. 347). Abhinava is following a Northern version of the text, closer to that given by MS ba of the Gaekwad edition than to the text as it has been printed. 19. One may say that the determinant (_vibhāva_) is the cause of the mental state and the dramatic portrayal (_anubhāva_) is the result, so long as one remembers that these words are used not of an everyday mental state produced in the actor, but of the super-normal state produced in the audience.


24. Vākyapādiya 2.38. The dictum of course applies only to words that are denotative. That the words of poetry are different shows that they must have a different sort of power and operation. 25. The anonymous opponent (Bhaṭṭanāyaka?) must have held Mīmāṃsā views, for it is only in the Mīmāṃsā that much is made of this fault. To the ritualists it was important to harmonize the many apparently discrepant statements in the Vedic texts. They did this by subordinating certain passages to others and so producing _ekavākyatā_, "the state of a single sentence," or, if many grammatically distinct sentences were involved, by forming a single _mahāvākya_, "great sentence," i.e., a single consistent logical presentation. The grammarians, on the other hand, eager to make the text of Pāṇini apply to as many linguistic situations as possible, often instruct us to make two statements out of his one (_yogavibhāga_ or _vākyabheda_). One feels that Abhinava would have answered the present charge more simply and more truthfully by pointing out that in cases of _dhvani_ the primary sense is always subordinate to the suggested sense, whereas in the _ālāṅkāras_, if there is a suggested sense, it is subordinated to the literal. In either case there is _ekavākyatā_. Instead of this, he makes an elaborate distinction between _śāstra_ and poetry, which leads up to the claim that _vākyabheda_ is a fault in the former but not in the latter.

26. The Kaumudi advises us to take _śāstra_ in a broad sense, as referring to any text that is not literary. But the argument that follows, it seems to me, implies a very narrow sense. It is only a ritual or Mīmāṃsā text that is "directed to what one should do in the future," or that gives rise to such notions as "I am enjoined to do this," etc. 27. The words _tenāyānātām kā pramāṇa_ form a _sloka_. Gnoli (Udbhata's Vivarana, p. xxix, note 1) has pointed out that it is a quotation from Dharmakīrti's _Pramāṇavarttika_, 1.318.
(Manoratha ed. 3.318) 28. Kaumudi and BP make clear that the need for semantic convention occurs in the stage of conveying the vibhāvas, etc. In the next stage, where they suggest rasa, semantic convention plays no part. As opposed to the supernormal plane of rādsvāda.

29. Durdurūṭām: the word appears also in other forms in the MSS—dvandvarūṭham, daduruṭam, durdurabham. As I see no satisfactory etymology, I translate simply from context.

§ 1.19 L ]

K It might, however, be an adventitious mark (upalakṣaṇa) of a certain type of dhvani. And if dhvani has been defined by others, our view would stand confirmed.

A While bhakti might be considered an adventitious mark of one type out of the various types of dhvani that we shall describe, if one were to say that dhvani is fully characterized by secondary usage, one might say that all the figures of speech which differ from dhvani are characterized by the operation of denotation, a statement that would imply the futility of constructing definitions of the individual figures of speech.

Even if dhvani had been defined by others previously, this would simply confirm our view, for our view is that there is such a thing as dhvani. If this has already been proved, we have gained our wish without effort.

Those too who have said that the nature of dhvani is something sensed in the hearts of connoisseurs but incapable of being expressed, have spoken without reflection. For when the general definition has been given in the manner stated and the particular definitions in the manner about to be stated, if it were still held to be inexpressible, the same charge would apply to all things. On the other hand, if they mean this as a hyperbolical way of saying that its nature is superior to all other types of poetry, then they are speaking the truth.

L Now our opponents may admit that dhvani and bhakti are not identical and also that bhakti does not fully define dhvani. But it
does sometimes characterize it. As bhakti occurs in [some] areas where dhvani occurs, it serves as an upalakṣaṇa (adventitious characteristic) of dhvani. True enough, but it does not occur everywhere that dhvani occurs, so what do our opponents gain by this fact, or what do we lose? And so [the Kārikā] says, it might be of a certain type.

And bhakti has been described by the ancient authors. Using it simply as an adventitious characteristic, we might be able to mark out dhvani and know it in all its varieties. What use is a [specific] definition? To dispel such a view, [the Vṛtti] argues, if one were to say, etc. The relation of denoter and denoted is found in all areas where figures of speech are found. So, since the working of denotation has been described by the grammarians and the ritualists, where is there any need of work by definers of figures of speech? In the same way, by adopting the dictum of the logicians that the effect is born of the cause, we might ask what useful new accomplishment has ever been made by any creator or discoverer, beginning with God.1 At this rate no one would ever undertake anything. Our author states this, saying [it] would imply the futility of constructing definitions.

Let us suppose that we have not revealed anything new, that [the nature of dhvani] has already been revealed and we have merely described it correctly [by following precedent]. What harm would this do? With this in mind, our author says, even if, etc. Previously, that is, previous to our work.

By thus refuting the three varieties of the view that dhvani does not exist, as also the view that it is included in bhakti, it follows that among false views the view that it is inexpressible has also been refuted.2 Accordingly, there is no Kārikā directly aimed at refuting this view. The author of the Vṛtti, however, in order to make a neat presentation of the whole subject, brings up this implicitly refuted view and gives an explicit refutation: those too who have said, etc.

Its general definition has been given in the manner stated, viz., "That [type of poetry] in which sense or word," etc. (1.13 K). The particular definitions will be given in the manner about to be stated, viz., "It may be shifted to a different meaning," etc. (2.1 K). In regard to these [we may note that] in Chapter One the general definition of dhvani has been given by the author of the Kārikās. In Chapter Two, the author of the Kārikās gives definitions of the subtypes of dhvani and refers to the two main types as though they had already been given. In conformance with this, the author of the Vṛtti had stated the basic divisions already in this chapter. by saying, "and it is in general of two sorts" (1.13 m A).3
To all things: both everyday matters and scientific matters. A hyperbolical way of saying: by this he shows that the inexpressibility may have been used as a hyperbolical expression, as in the verse "those syllables keep on sounding their ineffable message in my heart," in order to show its supreme excellence.

[May my words prove] auspicious.

[There follows a colophon verse made up of puns, so that one is forced to render it by two separate translations.]

Will the world be clear even by moonlight, if there is no eye to see? So Abhinavagupta has opened an eye. I praise the goddess Śivā, God's blessed sakti of understanding, who resides within her own self and who, by the power which awakens within her wakes instantly the universe.5

Will the [Sahṛdayāloka-Āloka be clear, even with the help of the Candrikā,6 if it lacks the Locana? So I have made a beginning of the Locana. I praise the blessed inspiration [of poetry], which resides within [the poet] himself and which by its power of revelation reveals instantly the universe.

Herewith the First Chapter of the Sahṛdayāloka-locana, an exposition of dhvani, revealed by the great Śaiva master, the revered teacher, Abhinavagupta.

1. The argument of the Kārikā, explained in the preceding paragraph, was that bhakti cannot serve to define dhvani, that is, to rule out the application of the term "dhvani" from all instances of non-dhvani, because bhakti is present only in some instances of dhvani. The argument of the Vṛtti, explained in this paragraph, is more general. Even if a characteristic occurs throughout the area of the thing to be defined, it is of no use as a definition if it is too general. 2. The references are to the five false views set forth or implied in 1.1 K. 3. I suppose the reason for Abhinava's again (see 1.13 m L) bringing up this distinction between the exposition of the Kārikās and the Vṛtti at this point is to justify the curious discrepancy between the future tense of
vakṣyamāṇayā ("in the manner about to be stated") and the past tense of pratipādite ("has been given") in the present passage of the Vṛtti.

4. The quotation forms the last line of the following stanza: nidrādhānimūlistadrīśo (or in some versions nidrānimūlistadrīśo) madamantharāyā nāpy arthavanti na ca yāni nirarthakāni / adyāpi me varatanor madhurāṇi tasyās tāny aksarāṇi hṛdaye kim api dhvananti.

With half closed eyes, lazy with wine, my lady spoke sweet syllables. They were neither meaningful nor yet unmeaning, but were such that even now they keep on sounding their ineffable message in my heart.

Abhinava may well have taken the quotation from Kuntaka, who uses it in his Vakroktijñīvita (1.19, vs. 51) and says that the indefinite pronoun kim api conveys the fact that the excitement of the heart cannot be expressed but can only be experienced. The stanza is found as number 36 in the Kashmiri recension of Bilhana’s Caurapāṇikāsīkā (ed. W. Solf, Kiel, 1886) and is variously ascribed in anthologies to Bilhana (Śāṅg. 3468), Kalasha (Śūktām. 43.26), or Kalaśaka (Subhā. 1280). As Bilhana was a contemporary of King Kalaśaka (regn. A.D. 1080–1088), the ascriptions must be wrong. Kuntaka lived a century or more earlier.

5. In the final ālokas to the chapters of his Locana Abhinava renders homage to the powers or stages of Vāc: at the end of the First Chapter, to the pari sakti; of the Second, to the pāśyanti sakti; of the Third, to the madhyamā sakti; and of the Fourth, to the vaikhanā sakti. That speech exists in four stages is a concept as old as R̥gveda 1.164.45. We first meet with the traditional names of these stages in Bhartrhari; they are missing in the Mahābhāṣya, although that work quotes the famous R̥gvedic verse (Kielhorn ed. I, p. 3, lines 24–25). To Tantric authors like Abhinava the four saktis represent a double process of evolution: on the metaphysical plane, from undifferentiated unity through two intermediate stages to the sensible everyday world of diversity; on a linguistic plane, from the undifferentiated sābdabrahman, again through two intermediate stages, to the physically manifested speech by which worldly communication is carried on. For Abhinava’s description of these stages, see his Paryantapaṇīcāsīkā, verses 41–48, or Jayaratha’s commentary on Tantrāloka 1.18. Pratibhā (imagination, inspiration) is used, as well as cit (the self-conscious), as a name of Śiva’s highest sakti in TA 1.2. It is a serviceable term in the present stanza, because the pratibhā of a poet is the power which enables him to make use of dhvani for the achievement of rasa. Compare the verses with which Abhinava concludes the later chapters of the book.

A Thus it has been shown that dhvani is of two kinds:¹ one where
the literal meaning is not intended (avivaksitavācya), the other where
the literal meaning is subordinated to a second meaning (vivaksitānyaparavācya).
In this regard, the Kārikā makes a statement in order to
show the subdivisions of the first kind.

1. The word “dhvani” may be taken here in any of the last three senses
listed in 1.1 K, note 1, viz., as suggestion, suggested meaning, or a suggestive
type of poetry. Note that it is the Vṛtti that has shown the distinction between
the two main types of dhvani, not the Kārikās. See 1.13 m A and 1.13 m L,
ote 1.

L I praise the magic branch that bears
the wished-for fruit,
Śivā the generous;
who, as we think of her, gives blessing
and removes our grief.

The author of the Vṛtti, providing the logical connection between
this [and the preceding] chapter, begins by saying thus, etc. Shown
means: “by me, in my capacity as the author of the Vṛtti. Nor in
saying this¹ did I depart from the intention² of the basic text; rather,
I followed the intention of the author of the Kārikās.” That is why he
says what follows.³

In this regard: that is, in regard to the statement of two kinds of
suggestion made by the author of the Vṛtti, this [Kārikā which now
follows] is the seed [from which that statement sprang]. Or we may
take tatra to mean “at that previous time.” The sense will then be:
the author of the Vṛtti showed previously, in the First Chapter, the

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kind of suggestion where the literal sense is not intended. To show a difference (prabheda), that is, a sub-type within that, the Kārikā now makes a statement. And by showing these sub-types it will be possible, by reference to them, to show [in the second Kārikā] the difference (prabheda) of [the first kind of suggestion] avivakṣitavācyā, that is, the difference of its nature (prabhinnatva) from [the second type] vivakṣitányaparavācyā. Basically, the sense is that the author of the Kārikās is in full agreement with the view that there are two kinds of suggestion.

1. "This" refers to the naming of the two varieties of dhvani in 1.13 m A.
2. Utsūtram means "beyond the scope or intention of the basic text," viz., the Kārikās. The word is used in Śisupāla 2.112. 3. The meaning of Ānanda's second sentence, on which Abhinava now comments, is perfectly clear. But Abhinava is not satisfied with the apparent sense, because the distinction of the two main types of suggestion has nowhere been stated in the Kārikās, but only in the Vṛtti. Accordingly, Abhinava tortures the sense in order to turn it into a statement by which the Vṛttikāra may justify himself. 4. We have emended the word prakāsitah to pra-kāsitasya. As the text stands, one can make sense of it only by the expedient of taking avivakṣitavācyasya yah prabhedah to mean avivakṣitavācyarūpo yah prabhedah, on the analogy of such phrases as rāhoḥ śirāḥ. 5. Thus Abhinava takes prabheda in two different senses. He thereby increases the implications of Ānanda's statement.

K In that type of suggestion where the literal meaning is not intended, it may be shifted (saṅkramita) to a different [associated] sense, or it may be entirely set aside (tiraskṛta).

A The suggested meaning likewise is distinguished (i.e., differentiated into two kinds) by virtue of the two mentioned varieties.
1. The point of this sentence is that one might question the propriety of the term väcya (literal sense) in a definition that should deal with the suggested sense (dhvani). The response is that the suggestion is also distinguished by the very distinction that has been made in the väcya. The KM edition adds after the word väesa the following: iti vyanjayaprakäsana palaṝṣya dhvaner prakārah, apparently only in order to make clear what we have stated in this note. The extra words are not found in the recorded MSS and seem to have been missing from Abhinava's text.

L The causative suffix in the past passive participle sanskr̥mañita\(^1\) denotes a group of conditions (sahakārīvarga),\(^2\) and it is by their power that the sense is caused to shift in the suggestive operation. The word tiraskṛta refers to the same agents. The connection is this: that literal meaning which, being unintended, gives to the form of suggestion called "where the literal meaning is unintended" (avivaksitaväcya) its name, is twofold. [In the first variety,] that meaning which, although possible, is not as such of any use; which seems to have become something else because of its involvement with various properties; and which remains as an unnoticed\(^3\) property-possessor like the thread of a necklace, is said to be [shifted, i.e.,] developed into a different shape. That meaning, on the other hand, which is not possible in the context and which serves merely as a means to perceiving some other [suggested] sense, after which it runs away as it were, is said to be "set aside."

Now it may be objected that we are supposed to be describing sub-varieties of dhvani, that is to say, the suggested sense. So surely it is inappropriate to speak of varieties of the literal sense. With this doubt in mind, our author says: the suggested meaning likewise. The word ca (likewise) is used in the sense of "because." He means: Because of variety in the suggestor [i.e., the väcyaṁraha, the literal sense], we can appropriately speak of variety in the suggested sense [i.e., the distinctions of the suggested meaning depend on distinctions of the literal meaning]. Or if we take the word dhvani to be used in the sense of suggestor [i.e., the literal sense, as explained in 1.1 K, note 1],\(^4\) there will be no difficulty.

Feeling that there is no need to give a definition since the definition of this variety is furnished by its very name, the author [of the commentary] proceeds to give an example.
1. *saṅkramita* is the past passive particle of the causative verb: *sam + krat + nic + it + kta*. The suffix *nic* drops by Pāṇ. 6.4.52, but not without denoting the causative agent. Abhinava identifies the agent, i.e., that which causes the shifting of the sense, as “the group of conditions” (*sahākārīvarga*).

2. The *sahākārīvarga* is composed of the three conditions of *lakṣanā*, namely *mukhyārthabādhā*, *nimitta* (i.e., *sambandha*), and *prayojanavattva*. Both forms of *avivaksitavācya* depend on *lakṣanā* and thus on the conditions that bring *lakṣanā* into play. Another name for *avivaksitavācya* is *lakṣanāmūladhvani*.

3. Against the interpretation of *BP*, I have taken *lakṣyamānah* to include a negative, i.e., as *lakṣyamānah*. Only thus does the passage make sense. Both the *saṅkramitavācya* and the thread of a necklace are unnoticed property-possessors. What are noticed are the meanings suggested by the *vācya* and the flowers or gems strung on the necklace.

4. Abhinava has already explained several times in the first chapter, e.g., Text p. 31 (Translation 66), 99 (Tr. 125), 105 (Tr. 132), 135 (Tr. 171), that one of the meanings of *dhwani* is *vyānjaka*, i.e., the *vācya-rtha*. The alternate interpretation strikes me as impossible, for what is obviously at issue is the *vyāngyārtha*. Moreover, the full name is *avivaksitavācyadhvani*.

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A An example where the literal meaning is shifted (*arthāntara-saṅkramitavācya*) is the following:

White herons circle against dark clouds
that paint the sky with their wet lustre.
Winds carry the small rain.
The peacocks, friends of the clouds, cry out with joy.
Let all this be: my heart is hard;
I am Rāma and can bear it all.
But Vaidehl, how will she live?
Alas, my queen, alas, be brave!

In this verse the [suggestive] word [whose sense is shifted] is “Rāma.” By this word we understand Rāma as developed into various suggested qualities, not simply as the possessor of the name.
1. The stanza is quoted anonymously by Māmāṭa 4, vs. 112 (p. 188), Hemacandra AC, vs. 68, and SūktiM. 90.6. Jacobi pointed out (JRAS, 1898, p. 296) that it occurs as Mahānāṭaka 5.7 (the Eastern version of the Hanumāṇnāṭaka). The Western version lacks it. The quotation begins with a description of the rainy season, a time when lovers long to be together. The point in quoting the verse here is that the word Rāma qualified by "hard-hearted" reminds one of, or rather suggests, many other qualities that are associated with Rāma, namely his having undergone so many other hardships, such as the loss of his kingdom, his exile in the forest, etc. The beauties of the verse are explained by L below. One may point in addition, however, to the skill with which the stimulants of sight, touch, and hearing are combined in the first two lines (the first four lines of the translation).

L Taking it for granted that the definitions are sufficiently indicated by the names of the types and their subtypes, our author proceeds to give an example. An example where the literal meaning is shifted: this phrase is syntactically joined with "As in this verse, the suggestive word is Rāma." Snigdha means "moist" because of its connection with water. Śyāmala is the dark color commonly found among Southern women. Kānti means brilliance. Lipta means covered; that is, the sky is covered by clouds of just such a brilliance. "Clouds that are vellad-balākāḥ," that is, in which the herons, a species of white bird, are vellat: the word means "conspicuous" (vijṛmbhamāna), sc., because of the contrast of their white bodies with the black clouds, and "flying about" (calat), sc., because of their joy [at being with their friends, the clouds]. And so the sky is painful to look at [since it reminds one of days of love]. All the directions are also hard to bear. The use of the plural in "winds" shows that they blow from all directions; and by their releasing small drops of water it is suggested that they are blowing very gently [and thus linger over one's body and make one all the more love-sick]. Well then, perhaps Rāma should enter a cave somewhere and stay there for the duration of the rainy season. With this in mind, the poet says that the clouds have friends (or helpers) among whom are the peacocks who produce out of joy sweet sounds that resemble the sadja note and become reminders of that whole unbearable scene of the clouds. On their own as well, these sounds are quite unbearable. This is what is meant. In this way Rāma, whose feeling of love in separation has been aroused by stimulating factors (uddīpana,vibhāvas), knowing that these determinants of emotion (vibhāvas) will be shared [by Sītā], since love is based on
mutual feeling, from here on in the poem conjures up his beloved in his heart. First he reports on himself: “Let this be.” Drśham means “exceedingly.” The word “hard-hearted” (kaṭhora-hṛdaya) gives scope to the particular suggestion that is achieved through the word Rāma and its literal sense, just as the word natabhitti in the verse that begins tad geham natabhitti (“That house with crumbling walls,” cf. 3.161 A). Otherwise how would the word Rāma not suggest other meanings connected with other qualities, e.g., the fact that he was born in the family of Daśaratha, that he was the object of Kausalyā’s love, the deeds of his childhood, and the acquisition of Sītā? Asmi means: “I am the self-same person [who has undergone all these sorrows].” Bhavisyati expresses action in general, so the meaning is: What will she do? It can also be taken in the sense that “her very being is impossible” [i.e., she will kill herself, or die of a broken heart]. In this way by a succession of memory, name [sc., “Vaidehi"], and speculation [sc., “what will happen to her?”], he has conjured up his beloved from his heart into being present before him. To her, as her heart is about to break, he says with agitation, “Alas, my queen, alas, be brave!” The word “queen” suggests that fortitude will be the proper response.

By this: that is, by the word Rāma, the literal sense of which is not strictly useful here [to the idea intended]. The suggestions of other properties, which suggestions form the purpose [for shifting from the literal to the secondary meaning] are endless; for example, his banishment from the kingdom, etc. And since these suggestions are countless, they cannot be conveyed [simultaneously] by means of the denotative function of words. Even if these innumerable suggested properties were to be conveyed [by denotation] one by one, since they will not be had in one single act of cognition, they will not be the source of a wondrous aesthetic experience and hence they will not give rise to great beauty. But if these properties are suggested, they will assume countless forms (kim kim rūpam na sahate) because in the suggestion their separateness will not be clearly perceived. In this way they will become the source of a strikingly beautiful aesthetic pleasure that is analogous to the flavor of a wonderful drink, or cake, or sweet confection [where the individual ingredients cannot be separately tasted but yet add to the flavor of the final product]. For it has been said already that a word which is suggestive reveals a beauty “which cannot be conveyed by another form of expression” (1.15 K). In all cases where the purpose [in a secondary usage] is to achieve a suggestion, this [viz., the simultaneity
of a number of suggestions should be considered the cause of excellence. The word simply shows that the literal sense of the denoted object (śaṇjñin) is not wholly set aside.

1. parabhāga: from the sense of emphasis, work done in relief, etc., parabhāga often comes to mean contrast, though that sense is not given by PW; cf. Ragh. 5.70, KirArj. 8.42. 2. Sobhanahrdaya is merely a literal gloss of suhṛd. 3. This is a poetic convention (cf. Ragh. 1.39 with Mallinātha thereon), just as the cuckoo is said to imitate the pañcama. 4. Note that Abhinava mentions elements from rasadhvani, whereas Ānanda has given the verse as an example of avivakṣita-vācyāya. Abhinava mentions the terms vibhāva and upralambha/sṛṅgāra. This is not, however, a departure from the view of the basic text. There is textual justification, but it will not come until Chapter Three. There, under 3.43, mention is made of all the possible combinations of dhvani, guṇibhūta-vāṅgya, and vācyālāṅkāras. In fact Ānanda there mentions this verse as an example of the combination of different types of dhvani. 5. The idea is that “Rāma” by itself might conjure up suggestions that are not meant. But the fact that the adjective kathorahrdaya is used lets us know that it is Rāma’s character in the face of sufferings that is meant.

A Another example is found in my Viṣamabāṇalilā:

Virtues blossom
when admired by men of taste.
When graced by the sun’s rays
a lotus becomes a lotus.

is example the suggestive word is “lotus” in its second occurrence.¹

1. By “virtues” the verse no doubt refers to poetic beauties. They shine forth only under the eye of the connoisseur, just as the lotus opens its petals only in the sunlight. We have here a case of pure vastudhvani as opposed to the combination of vastudhvani and rasadhvani in the previous example.

L Another example: tālā in Prakrit means “then,” and jālā “when.”¹ Gheppanti means “are taken [i.e., admired].”² He gives a corroborative statement in the line beginning with ṛavikirana.
The suggestive word is "lotus": he is speaking of the bearer of the name "lotus" as transformed into a hundred varieties by such properties as being the abode of the goddess of beauty, etc. [In both this and the previous example] there is blocking of the pure, literal sense [of the words "Rāma" and "lotus"]. The cause [of adopting the secondary sense] is the inherence of those [secondary] qualities in the literal or primary sense. It is through this cause (viz., this connection or inherence) that the word "Rāma" conveys by means of secondary usage (lakṣayati) a meaning that is transformed by other qualities. The sense that is suggested [and that forms the purpose of employing the secondary usage] consists of still other qualities which are extraordinary and which are beyond the scope of words [i.e., beyond the scope of denotation]. The same holds true of the word "lotus." On the other hand, the word "virtues" (guṇa) denotes merely the bearer of its primary sense. The forced view taken by some that what we have here [sc., in "Rāma" and "lotus"] is [simply] a metaphorical (or secondary) sense (āropita) is unconvincing, because wherever a primary sense is blocked by its uselessness we are in the area of suggestion and the secondary sense is only that from which the suggestion arises.

As for what the Hṛdayadarpana says, that the aesthetic delight of the verse [of 2.1 a] is occasioned by the distress (samrambha) that comes from the particles "alas, alas," we must point out that even in this interpretation the suggestion of an aesthetic experience (rasadhvani) is admitted, because distress or agitation (āvega) is a transient emotion (vyabhicāribhāva) of the aesthetic experience of love in separation (vipralambhaśṛṅgāra). Furthermore, without the help of the meaning suggested by the word "Rāma," this distress would not blossom forth. For the emotion takes the form of "I can bear it, but what will happen to her?" Moreover, in the case of the word "lotus" what agitation can there be? Enough arguing then.

As there is failure of the literal sense, that sense being useless, we have in these verses examples of something that is based on the secondary meaning (lakṣanāmūla) and that may rightly be called suggestion of the type where the literal sense is not intended (avivaksitavācyā), for in it there is no intention to express its direct meaning. But the literal sense in the form of property-possessor is not totally set aside, since it is carried along [in the sense of Rāma, who is qualified by the loss of his kingdom, etc.]. Hence I have used the expression pārīṇata (developed or transformed).
§ 2.1 c A ]

1. See Hemacandra, Prākṛtavākaranā 8.3.65. 2. Ibid., 8.4.256.
3. According to BP the laksyārtha of “Rāma” is Rāma transformed by exile from his kingdom, etc. (rājyabhramśādiparinatarāma) and the vyangyārthas are discouragement, weariness, etc. (nirvedaglānimohādi); of “lotus” the laksyārtha is laksātpāratvādiparinatakamala, the vyangyārthas are manoratha-tvādi. Abhinava is not so precise. 4. What Abhinava is objecting to is an interpretation that would rest satisfied with finding some single property of Rāma or of the lotus as the final intention of the verses, this property being arrived at by laksanā or āropa. Such an interpretation is far from being unreasonable and can be dismissed only by appeal to the general theory of suggestion. The theory demands that everywhere that we find mukhyārtha-bādha together with a laksya sense that does not rest merely on rūdhi, there must be a suggestion. In the present examples the suggested sense, except that it is said to be multiple, does not differ very noticeably from the laksya sense. 5. Abhinava’s point is that the samrambha does not actually consist of the words ha ha hā. It consists in the fact that Rāma thinks, “I can bear it, but she cannot.” Now this knowledge we cannot have without the use of the word “Rāma” as a vyanjakasabda. He is not fair, however, in saying that Bhaṭṭānāyaka’s interpretation must admit rasadhvani in the stanza. Bhaṭṭānāyaka admits that there is rasa in the stanza, but not dhvani. As though aware that he has pressed his criticism too far, Abhinava turns to an example where there is no rasa. And yet the process of our understanding “lotus” is the same as the process of our understanding “Rāma.” 6. In the case of the first example “Rāma” in its literal sense is useless to the idea of the capacity to endure those stimulating emotions (uddīpanavibhāvas) that are described in the stanza. In the case of the second example the second occurrence of the word “lotus” is useless in its literal sense, which would merely be a repetition of the prior occurrence.

A  An example of the second variety, where the primary meaning is entirely set aside (atyantatiraskṛta) is a verse by the first of poets, Vālmīki:

The sun has stolen our affection for the moon,
whose circle now is dull with frost
and like a mirror blinded by breath
shines no more.¹

is example the suggestive word is “blinded.”
1. The verse is Rāmāyana 3.15.13, from Laksmana's description of wintertime. L is incorrect in assigning the words to Rāma. Saubhāgya means literally success in love. The moon, which is loved for its coolness in summer, loses its hold on our affection in winter, when we turn to the sun for warmth. Compare Rāmāyana 3.15.5 from the same description: subhago havyavāhanah, "and fire has won our affection." The point of quoting the verse is for its phrase "a blinded mirror," which L will discuss in detail.

L By the first of poets shows that [this kind of] suggestion is well known in literature.1

The sun has stolen: these are the words of Rāma describing the winter when he was at Pañcavati. "Blind" (andha) means one whose sight is destroyed, for even a person born blind has had his sight destroyed in the womb. [When we say of someone:] "He is blind; he cannot see in front of him," the meaning of the word "blind" is only partly set aside, not entirely. But to a mirror, such as we have here, blindness cannot be applied even by an imaginary superimposition of this literal sense [for a mirror, being insentient, has no sight which could be destroyed]. The word "blind" can apply to a mirror only in the secondary sense of "being incapable of making a clear representation," a sense occasioned by the presence of that incapability in a man who is literally blind. The purpose of using this word here is that it suggests numberless properties such as an exceptional loss of beauty, uselessness, etc.

As for what Bhattānāyaka has said, that because of the use of the word “like” (iva) there is no secondary usage at all in this stanza,2 he said this without really thinking about the meaning of the stanza. For the word iva conveys the similarity between the moon and the mirror. The words “blinded by breath” qualify “mirror.” If, however, the word iva is connected with the literal sense of the word “blind” (andha), then we shall be left with the presentation [of an identity] “the moon a mirror.” This construction of the word iva is harsh.3 To say that the word iva should be connected both with “blinded by breath” and with “mirror”4 is not proper. This procedure might be valid in the Mīmāṃsā system; it has no place in poetry. So enough.

1. The line is mispunctuated in both the Kashi and the Vidyābhavan editions. In Kashi, p. 172, Locana, line 2, delete both dandaśas and put dandaśas in place of the dashes. 2. Bhāttānāyaka would join the word iva with andha: “a mirror blinded as it were.” Here “blinded” is used in its literal sense, the
fancy being expressed by the word iṣṭa and therefore not being suggested. 3. Abhinava's argument is that we need the word iṣṭa to connect moon and mirror: cāndramā ādarsa īṣṭa. If you borrow the word īṣṭa to express the fancy andha īṣṭa. you will be left with an awkward rūpaka: ādarsa cāndramā. The only solution would be to take the word īṣṭa twice (āvṛtti), as the grammarians and the Mīmāṃsakas sometimes do; the exegetical technique is known as tantra; see 2.4 L, note 12. Abhinava then repels such a solution. 4. In niḥsvāṣāṇtha īṣṭa. īṣṭa would serve as utprekṣāvācaka (a word expressing the fancy). In ādarsa īṣṭa it would serve as aupamyavācaka (a word expressing the simile).

§ 2.1 d L ]

A In the following verse the suggestive words are "drunken" (matta) and "pride" (aḥaṅkāra).

Though the sky is filled with drunken clouds and the woods with arjunas thrashing in the downpour, these black nights too when the moon has lost its pride carry off my heart.¹

1. This Prakrit verse is Gaudavaho 406. It describes a monsoon night, dear because of its associations of marital intimacy. The arjuna is a grey-barked tree with leaves of immense size. It is probably on their account that it is singled out for thrashing in the monsoon storm.

L “Though the sky,” etc. [L follows this by a Sanskrit translation of the Prakrit verse; then continues:] The word ca should be understood in the sense of api (even).¹ Even when the sky is full of drunken clouds [it carries off my heart], not only when it is full of stars. So also the woods when their arjuna trees are thrashing in torrents of rain, not only when they are filled with mango blossoms shaken by the breeze from the Malaya moutains. Even these black nights when the moon has lost all pride carry off [my heart], not only nights that are whitened by the rays of the moon. “Carry off” means that they produce longing. The word “drunken” in its primary sense is impossible in
the context. As its sense of “a person who has become intoxicated by the use of wine” is blocked, it applies to the clouds through a metaphorical extension to other properties common [to an intoxicated man] and so suggests thousands of properties, such as irrational conduct, unruly behavior, etc. The phrase “without pride” is also applied by secondary usage. In applying to the moon it suggests the subservience, the lack of luster, the lack of will to rise up and overcome, etc., of one who has literally lost his pride.2

1. The literal rendering of the verse is: “And it be filled with drunken clouds,” etc. This use of “and” for “although” is found in Latin and Shakespearean English as well as Sanskrit. 2. The literal sense of “pride” can apply only to a sentient being. In the compound tatpāratantrya, tat refers to nirahārikāra.

K The soul of dhuani,1 where the literal meaning is intended (vivakṣitābhidhheya), has two varieties: one where the suggested meaning is produced without apparent sequence (alakṣyakrama) [i.e., immediately, together with the primary meaning], the other where the sequence is apparent.

1. Dhvaner ātmā is a somewhat ambiguous phrase. One might translate the present Kārikā as “The nature of dhuani has two varieties,” and this is the way Abhinava takes it. But in 2.3 K, A and in 2.11 A, 2.17 K, A, and 3.16 A, the term seems to mean dhuani par excellence, the very soul of dhuani. In all these passages the term refers to the suggested sense in vivakṣitānyparavacayadhvani. For this eleven-syllable title, which will not fit into śloka meter, the Kārikā substitutes the abbreviation vivakṣitābhidhheya. As L will point out, the portion anyapara (subordinate to another sense) can be supplied from the context.

A The nature (or very self, ātman) of dhuani is a suggested sense which takes precedence over the literal sense.1 It has been divided into two varieties: one where the suggestion appears without a perceived sequence between the literal and the suggested meanings, the other where a sequence is apparent.2
1. That is to say, when the literal sense is subordinate to the suggested sense (anyapara = vyanyapara). 2. First we perceive the literal sense; then, after a momentary interval, the suggested sense dawns on us. There is of course a krama even in asamlaksyakrama, but it is so swift that we no more notice it than we notice the succession of punctures when a needle pierces a pile of lotus petals.

§ 2.3 Introduction A )

L When the "different nature" (prabhinnatva; see 2.1 Intro. L) was mentioned of that type of suggestion where the literal meaning is unintended, from what was it meant to be different? For a thing cannot be different from itself. With this point in mind, he says that that type is different from the type where the literal sense is intended; for "intended" and "not intended" contradict one another. So the Kārikā says "imperceptible, etc." The word asamlaksyakramoddyota is a bahuvrīhi compound and means "that of which the revelation, i.e., the process of revelation, is such that its sequence in time cannot be well perceived." The fact that the literal sense is subordinated to something else (anyapara), although not expressly stated [in the Kārikā], is implied by the expression vivaksitäbhidheya ("where the literal meaning is intended") because of the proximity of this expression to the word dhvani.1

Of dhvani: i.e., of the suggested sense. The nature (ātman): In the previous Kārikā the varieties of suggested sense were distinguished on the basis of the literal sense. Now the present varieties are distinguished solely within the suggested sense itself, the distinction being based on the process by which the suggestion operates.2 But what sequence can there be within the process of suggestion itself? He tells us: a sequence with respect to the literal sense. The literal sense will here be the vibhāvas, etc.

1. The word dhvani used in the Kārikā implies that the vācyārtha leads up to the suggested sense; in other words, that it is anyapara. 2. The division in vivakṣitānyaparavācyadhvani is based on the vyānjanavyāpāra, whereas in avivakṣitavācyadhvani the basis of division was the vācyārtha.
A rasa, bhāva, rasābhāsa, bhāvabhāsa, bhāvaprasānti, etc., appearing as a predominant element and [so] constituting the soul of dhvani, are assigned to the non-sequential type.

1. For these technical terms see Introduction, pp. 17-20, 37, and Abhinava's remarks on this section and on 2.4 and its various subdivisions. For bhāvadhvani Abhinava invents a wholly new meaning. 2. This is the natural interpretation, with ātman having its full value and vyavasthita having its normal meaning of "assigned, distributed." L's interpretation is slightly different.

For the suggested sense, such as a rasa, etc., is apprehended nearly at the same time as we apprehend the literal meaning. When it predominates, that is the soul of suggestion.

Of these: among the two. Only that meaning which is of the form of rasa, etc., constitutes the variety of suggestion that is non-sequential. But this is not to say that such a meaning is always non-sequential. For sometimes we find that rasa does involve a sequence. When it does, we have a variety of arthaśaktyuddhavnusvānarūpadhvani (suggestion similar to the resonance of a bell, a suggestion based on the power of meaning), as will be stated later in the text. The word ātmā, which means literally one's own nature (svabhāvavacana), here conveys the idea of "variety" (prakāra). Hence a [suggested] sense such as rasa, etc., is called the nonsequential variety of dhvani. What is meant is that it the sequence [from the literal to the suggested sense] is not perceived.

Are rasa, etc., invariably a variety of dhvani? He says no, only when they are revealed as the predominant element, that is, as of major importance [in the poem]. Although at the time of giving the general definition [of dhvani in Chapter One, Kārikā 13], this was explained by using the phrase "to which all other elements are subordinated" (gunaikṛtasvārthau), it is here repeated in order to give occasion for the
discussion of rasavat (that which contains rasa in a subordinated position) and other figures of speech [in Kârikâ 2.5]. And these elements such as rasa are distributed (vyavasthita, i.e., are everywhere present in poetry), for without them there is no such thing as poetry.¹

Although it is through rasa that all poetry lives and despite the fact that rasa is essentially an undifferentiated mass of aesthetic delight, it may still give rise to an extra degree of aesthetic pleasure through the agency of some particular element which acts as its cause. In such cases, when some particular transient state of mind (vyabhicärin) reaches a high pitch and gives rise to exceptional aesthetic delight, we have what is called bhāvadhvani.² An example is [Vikramorvaśīya 4.9]:

Can she be angry
and using her magic to remain invisí
But she was never angry for long.
Has she flown off to heaven?
But she loves me deeply in her heart.
Even the demons could not steal her from me
when I was with her.
Yet now she has utterly disappeared.
What turn of fate is this?

Although the rasa of love in separation is present throughout this example, the exceptional pleasure is occasioned by the striking effect of the transient state of mind known as “speculation” (vitarka).

Transient emotions have three states: inception, stasis, and cessation.

As has been said,³ “Vyabhicärinś are so called because in bringing [the rasas] before us they act in diverse ways.”

Sometimes the emotion is presented in the stage of inception. For example:

The slender damsel heard him when in bed
address her by another woman’s name.
She thought of turning away—
decided to try to do so—
had almost done it, loosening one graceful arm—
but could not lift her bosom
from her lover’s breast.⁴

In this stanza the words “could not” show that the state of jealous anger is arrested in incipience, since they deny its full emergence; and on this depends the aesthetic enjoyment of the verse.

The stasis [of a vyabhicāribhāva, in this case speculation or doubt] has been illustrated just above in the verse “Can she be angry?”
Sometimes it is the cessation of a transient state that occasions the aesthetic delight. This was illustrated earlier in the verse "They lay upon the bed" and is called bhāvaprasama (the cessation of an emotion). In the verse in question we might also speak of the cessation of a rasa, viz., of love in separation due to jealous anger.

Sometimes, again, the cause of aesthetic relish is the coming together of two transient emotions. For example:

He who has kissed a face
beautified by jealousy
has known the bliss
of drinking nectar.

In this example, in which anger is directly expressed, the man who kisses the face of his beloved as she weeps softly, sobbing with anger, is said to have known the satisfaction of swallowing successive drafts of nectar. The cause of the aesthetic delight is thus a mixture [of the directly expressed] anger and [the suggested] reconciliation.

Sometimes it is the mixture of different vyābhicārins that is the object of [aesthetic] satisfaction. For example:

How can a king of the Lunar Dynasty do a forbidden deed?
May I see her once again!
I have learned the scriptures in order to abstain from sin.
Even in anger her face was lovely.
What will the wise and sinless say?
One could not find her even in a dream.
My heart, come to your senses!
But what blessed man will drink her lower lip?

In this stanza the states of mind arranged in pairs are mutually contradictory: compunction and longing, intellectual thought and memory, doubt and despair, firmness and anxiety. Yet since the last state is anxiety, the preceding states confer importance on anxiety alone and thus [by being mixed together] they give rise to the highest aesthetic pleasure. In like manner other [examples] may be supplied. All of these: incipience, conjuncture, mixture, etc., are intended by the use of the term etcetera (ādi) in the Kārikā.

It might be objected that in like manner great aesthetic delight is conveyed through the vibhāvas and anubhāvas, and so we should speak also of vibhāvadhvani and anubhāvadhvani. But no. For both vibhāvas and anubhāvas are conveyed directly by denotation [and not by suggestion]. And the aesthetic delight arising from them terminates in
[certain] states of mind (cittavrtti, namely the sthāyibhāvas) alone; so there is nothing to be aesthetically enjoyed in them apart from rasa and bhāva [to whose aesthetic enjoyment they lead]. But there is nothing wrong with saying that when the vibhāva and anubhāva are suggested, they are cases of vastudhvani.¹¹

Now when false love (ratyābhāsa, literally “the appearance of love”) arises out of a false vibhāva, the enjoyment is false because of the falsity of the vibhāva and hence is known as rasābhāsa, “false or improper aesthetic enjoyment.” An example is the śrṅgārābhāsa (the false aesthetic feeling of love) that arises when we listen to the poem of Rāvana.¹² Although Bharata has said that “the imitation of the erotic (śrṅgāra) is comic (hāsyā),”¹³ the feeling of its being comic arises only at a later time. In the verse

I merely heard her name
and it acted as a magnet or a maddening charm.
Since that day my heart has known
no moment’s rest without her.

there is no occasion for relishing comedy. Now someone will object, “In this verse love is not the basic emotion (sthāyibhāva), for it lacks the bond of mutual affection.” But who ever said that there was love here? Rather, we have here a case of false love (ratyābhāsa, the appearance of love). And it is false precisely because it never occurs to the heart [of Rāvana] that Sitā might be indifferent to him or even hostile. For if this were to occur to him, his desire would disappear. And even if he thinks that she is in love with him, that thought gives no assurance,¹⁴ for he is infatuated with passion. Accordingly, the love is established to be in reality spurious, just as the silver which one cognizes in a piece of mother-of-pearl is spurious. But Bharata himself indicated as much when he used the term śrṅgārānukṛti (imitation of the erotic), for anukṛti, amukhyatā, and ābhāsa are all synonyms. Therefore when writers use the word śrṅgāra in situations where the love is one-sided, it should be understood in the sense of an imitation (ābhāsa) of real śrṅgāra. The word śrṅgāra [in Bharata’s phrase śrṅgārānukṛtir yas tu so hāsyah] implies further the possibility of imitation (or falsity, ābhāsa) of the heroic and other rasas.

Thus, bhāvadhvani, etc., are the outflow of rasadhvani. [In setting up these categories] we merely single out one major cause of aesthetic delight and consider it separately, just as connoisseurs of scent, even when they enjoy the unified flavor of a perfume, are able to say that the
sweetness comes from the nard, or some other element, alone. But rasadhvani is par excellence the intense relish occasioned by the audience's (pratipattuḥ) tasting of the basic emotional element when their understanding of this basic emotion has arisen from the combination of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicāribhāvas. For example:

My eyes with difficulty pass her thighs
to wander long in the land about her hips;
then at her waist, uneven with the triple fold,
become quite powerless to move.
But now at last, like travelers parched by thirst
they've climbed the mountains of her breasts
and see at last what they had hoped,
their counterparts, her eyes, that flow with tears.

In this example, from the King of Vatsa’s looking at the painting [of two figures] which is honored by his own portrait and which he is describing [to his friend] because of the portrait of the heroine, [we know that] the sthāyibhāva of love is in that state where it is mutually shared. This sthāyibhāva, by means of the combination of vibhāvas and anubhāvas, has reached a point where it can be aesthetically enjoyed. So enough of this long discussion. It is now established that a meaning in the form of rasa, etc., when it appears as the major element [in a work of literature] is a variety of that kind of dhvani known as asamlaksyakramavyaṅgya.

Nearly at the same time: the word “nearly” (iva) shows that although there is a sequence, it is not perceptible. As we apprehend the literal sense: viz., the vibhāvas, anubhāvas, etc.

1. Abhinava’s literal interpretation of the Kārikā is: rasa, bhāva, etc., when appearing as predominant, constitute the variety of suggestion that can appear without perceived sequence, a variety that is widely distributed [in poetry]. 2. Presumably Abhinava understands this term as an elliptical compound meaning “suggestion of [a rasa brought about by] a striking vyabhicāribhāva.” 3. The quotation is from Bāhū Book 7 (Vol. 1, p. 355), where the MSS disagree on the text. The editors have chosen the reading vividdham abhimukhyena rasesu carantiti vyabhicārinah. Abhinava’s commentary on Book 7 is lost. Presumably he interpreted vividdham (in various ways) to mean “by their inception, stasis, and cessation.” 4. This verse is found also in Pratihārendurāja’s commentary on Udbhata, p. 88, and as No. 151 in the parisista to the Amarasataka. 5. Quoted above in 1.4 g L. 6. Love in separation (vipralambhasṛṅgāra) is a rasa, not a bhāva. In the verse in question the separation is caused by jealousy. The rasa disappears into its contrary rasa, love in union. 7. Read vyabhicārinoh. 8. This verse is
§ 2.4 Introduction A

Now it will be shown that this type of dhvani where the suggestion is without apparent sequence [from literal meaning to suggested meaning] is different from the figure of speech known as rasavat.¹

¹ The figure of speech rasavat was known to the older poeticians. Dandin says merely that it was a figure charming with rasa (2.275). Bhāmaṇa says little more: "The figure rasavat is such that the rasa śṛṅgāra, etc., are clearly exhibited therein" (3.6). Udbhata brings into his definition the formative factors of rasa as given in BhNS: "The figure rasavat is where the rise of a rasa such as śṛṅgāra is clearly exhibited. It is a locus of rasa, sthāyibhāva, sañcārīn (= vyabhicārīn), vibhāva, and dramatic portrayal" (4.3 Indurāja =
For Ānanda to establish his system, in which the aim of poetry is rasa achieved by means of dhvani, it was necessary to distinguish this rasadhvani from the old figure of speech. See Introduction, pp. 23-24. He proceeds to do so here by assigning rasadhvani to cases where the rasa is predominant and limiting the figure of speech to cases where the rasa is subordinate or ornamental.

\[ § 2.4 \text{ Introduction} A \]

\[ K \] Wherever the varied word, meaning, and their causes of beauty are subordinated to rasa, etc., this is considered the domain of dhvani.

\[ A \] Wherever the words together with the alaṅkāras (ornaments, figures) of sound, the meanings together with the figures of meaning, and the qualities (guṇas), all variously arranged so as to be kept distinct from suggestion, subordinate themselves to the main suggested sense which consists of rasa, bhāva, rasābhāsa, bhāvābhāsa, or bhāvaprasānti, one may apply the term dhvani to that poem.

\[ L \] Kārikā 2.3 spoke of rasa, etc., “appearing as predominant elements.” It may therefore be asked if rasa, etc., can ever appear as subordinate elements so that it should be necessary to qualify them [as predominant] in order to rule out [their subordination in dhvani]. By way of answer the [the Vṛtti] proceeds to say, Now, etc. His thought is that there is subordination of rasa, etc., when they assume the form of the figures of speech known as rasavat, preyas, ārjasvin, and samāhita. His turn of phrase indicates that rasadhvani, bhāvadhvani, etc., are not included within the figures of speech rasavat, etc. [i.e., the provinces of the two are different], for [in the same way,] it was earlier shown that vastudhvani is not subsumed under the figures of speech samāsakti, etc. [cf. 1:13 c]:

The expression used in Kārikā 2.4, vācyavācakacārūtvahetu (words, meanings, and their causes of beauty), is a dvandva compound meaning “the literal sense, the denoting word, and their causes of beauty.” In the Vṛtti [the expression sabdārthālāṅkārā] is also a dvandva compound meaning “words together with figures of speech based on sound;
and meanings together with figures of speech based on meanings." Is considered: i.e., has already been said [by us in 1.13].

But now, Bhaṭṭanāyaka has said: "If rasa were perceived (pratiyate) as belonging to someone else, the spectator would remain indifferent. Nor can rasa, which stems from a poem dealing with a subject like the life and deeds of Rāma, be perceived as belonging to oneself. For if it were perceived as belonging to oneself, we should have to admit that there was a physical production (utpatti) of rasa within oneself. And such a physical production would be inappropriate coming from Sītā, for she cannot serve as an [objective] determinant (ālambanavisāna) to the spectator. Should it be argued that a certain universal "belovedness" (kāntātvā) causes her to become such a determinant [to the spectator] in the sense of causing a flowering of his latent impressions (vāsanā), we may ask how such a process could be possible in the case of the description of gods, etc. Nor can it be said that during a dramatic performance there is [on the part of the spectator] a recollection of his own beloved. And how can a [stimulative] determinant (uddipana-visāna) such as building a bridge over the ocean by an extraordinary hero like Rāma ever become generalized [since nobody else could ever do it]? Nor can it be said that Rāma, as full of heroic energy (utsāha), is remembered, for he has never formed part of our past experience. Again, to perceive Rāma's energy through a verbal source of knowledge is not to experience rasa, just as when we watch a couple making love there is no experience of rasa. And if we accept that rāsas have a physical origin (utpatti), the spectator would be so pained by his [physical] sorrow (karuna, i.e., soka) that he would never return to watch a tragic (karuna) performance. Therefore there is no physical production. Neither is there a manifestation, for if the erotic rasa were a power [located within him] that is manifested, the spectator would make ever greater efforts to obtain those objects [which bring about the manifestation]. And if you hold that rasa is manifested [we must ask the same question as before]: Is rasa in the spectator himself, or in someone else? The same difficulties arise now as arose before. Therefore rasa is not perceived (pratiyate), nor physically produced (utpadyate), nor manifested (abhivyajyate) by a poem. Rather, poetic words are of an altogether different nature from ordinary words, thanks to their threefold operation. Their denotative power (abhidhāyakatva) operates within the limits of the literal meaning; their aesthetic efficacy (bhāvakatva) operates in the area of the rāsas, etc. [i.e., it transforms the vibhāvas, etc., into rasa]; and their efficacy of aesthetic enjoyment
(bhogakṛttvā) operates within the sensitive audience. The working of a poem consists of these three operations. If one were to claim that in poetry denotation alone held sway, then what would differentiate silesa (artistic double meaning) and other figures of speech from such devices as the forcible taking of a word in two senses (tāntra),¹² etc., in scientific works? Moreover, the varieties of alliteration would be virtually useless. And what purpose would be served by the avoidance of such faults as indelicacy of sound (śrutiduṣṭa)?¹³ Therefore there is a second operation known as the efficacy (bhāvanā) of rasa (i.e., the ability to create rasa), thanks to which denotation assumes a new dimension. A poem's having the efficacy (bhāvakatvā) to create rasas is nothing more than a poem's power of making the vibhavas, etc., universal. Once a rasa has been thus realized,¹⁴ its enjoyment (bhoga) [is possible], an enjoyment which is different from the apprehensions derived from memory or direct experience and which takes the form of melting, expansion, and radiance.¹⁵ This enjoyment is like the bliss that comes from realizing [one's identity] with the highest Brahman,¹⁶ for it consists of repose in the bliss which is the true nature of one's own self, a nature which is basically sattva but is intermingled with the diversity of rajas and tamas.¹⁷ It is this aesthetic pleasure (bhoga) alone that is the major element [i.e., the purpose of poetry] and it is something already [eternally] accomplished (siddharūpa).¹⁸ Any instruction that poetry may furnish is incidental."¹⁹

On this subject we may make the following remarks. To begin with, there are different opinions among the critics on the very nature of rasa. Some, for example [Lollata], say that what is a stable emotion (sthāyibhāva) in a former state, being nourished by the addition of the transient states of mind (vyabhicārins), etc., just that much, as belonging to the character portrayed (anukārya), is rasa. The rasas [are not located in the actor or audience of a drama. However, they] are called "dramatic" rasas (nātyarasāḥ) because they are used in drama.

[Against this view it may be said]²⁰ that a state of mind (cittavṛtti) is something that underlies a series of properties [i.e., is really a trend of mind],²¹ so what can it mean to say that one state of mind is nourished by another state of mind? Wonder, grief, anger, etc., are not gradually augmented; [on the contrary, they diminish with time].²² Therefore there is no rasa in the character being portrayed. [On the other hand] if rasa were to lie in the actor, he would be unable to follow the tempo (laya),²³ etc. Again, if one were to say that rasa lies in the spectator, how could there be delight? On the contrary, in tragic (karuṇa)
performances the spectator would experience only pain. Therefore the above theory will not do. What will do? As states of mind are endless [chains], it is impossible to imitate them exactly. Moreover it would be useless to do so because if we did perceive the exact state, we should derive nothing from it, because we should be indifferent [as the state would belong to someone else].

Therefore⁹⁴ rasa is an apprehension (pratipatti) of a stable emotion whose nature is not exactly fixed. It results from the addition of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicārins and takes the form a of relishing (āsvāda) different from memory because there is a direct object (gocara) of its perception of the sthāyin, e.g., “This Rāma [standing before me as represented by the actor] is happy.”⁹⁵ This apprehension of rasa depends on the actor and is found only in plays. It requires no other basis. But the actor must be thought to be⁹⁶ the character portrayed in order for the audience to enjoy the experience. Only this much⁹⁷ and nothing more is required for the aesthetic experience of the rasa. Therefore, rasa exists only in the drama and not in the characters to be portrayed, etc. This is the view of some.

Others⁹⁸ say: The appearance (or semblance, avabhāsa) of a stable emotion in the actor, which has been brought about by a set of causes such as dramatic representation, etc., is like the semblance of a horse drawn on a wall by means of yellow and other pigments. When it is relished by an act of perception, known otherwise as a relishing (āsvāda) because it is beyond ordinary experience, it is called raso. And so the expression nātyarasāh is to be explained as nātyād rasāḥ, i.e., rasas arising from drama.

Others, however, say: The vibhāvas and anubhāvas are presented to the spectator with the help of particular dramatic equipment (viśīṣṭa-sāmagrī = acting, music, dialogue) so as to engage the latent impressions of the spectator that underlie that mental state which forms the stable emotion that is sought to be produced by these vibhāvas and that is brought within view by these anubhāvas.⁹⁹ The vibhāvas and anubhāvas when accompanied by this relishing of bliss within the self are the rasa. [That is to say,] these vibhāvas and anubhāvas themselves are the rasa and the term nātyarasāḥ means the rasas which are the drama.

Still others say⁰⁰ that rasa is the vibhāva alone, others that it is the anubhāva alone, and some that it is the sthāyibhāva alone, some that it is the vyabhicārībhāva, still others that the combination of these four is rasa. Some say that rasa is the character being portrayed. Others
say that rasa is the conglomeration of these five elements. But enough on this score.

Another point is that the occurrence of rasa in poetry is wholly analogous to its occurrence in drama. Where drama makes use of realistic style (lokadharmi) and theatrical style (nātyadharmi), poetry uses the styles of direct expression (svabhāvokti) and artificial expression (vakrokti). In both cases rasa is produced in these styles by the combination of extraordinary vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicārinis presented in language that is clear, sweet, and forceful. Granted that the perception of the rasas in poetry is distinct in nature from that experienced in drama, because the means differ whereby it is brought about, still, the same scheme (sarani) holds for both forms of art.

Having arrived at this point, we can see that Bhaṭṭānāyaka's criticism, pointing to the impossibility of a rasa's residing in the spectator or in someone else, applies only to the first view [that we described after Bhaṭṭānāyaka's]. But in all the views [that followed Bhaṭṭānāyaka's] the unavoidable fact remains that rasa is perceived. For if it were not perceived, we could have no dealings with it, just as we can have no dealings with a goblin. However, just as we have sensory, inferential, verbal, intuitional, and yogic perception, all of which are undifferentiated so far as being perceptions, but each of which is distinct because of differences in its means of production, just so may we have this other type of perception that is called tasting (carvanā), relish (āsvāda), enjoyment (bhoga), [which is distinct from other types of perception,] because its basic components, namely the vibhāvas, etc., helped by sympathetic response (hrdayasamvāda), etc., transcend [the experience of] the workaday world. To say that "rasas are perceived" is a turn of phrase as when we say "he is cooking the rice pudding," for the rasa consists in the being perceived [of the vibhāvas, etc.]. Relishing (rasanā) is a special kind of perception. This perception [of rasa] in drama is distinct from every-day cases of inference, although it depends on inference in the initial stages [since one first infers, from the vibhāvas, etc., the stable emotion that is being portrayed]. Similarly, in poetry the perception of rasa is different from other kinds of verbal cognition (abhidhā, laksanā, tātparya), but in the initial stages it depends on direct denotation (abhidhā) as a means [of reaching the suggested sense].

Accordingly, the case [of Bhaṭṭānāyaka] against us is destroyed because it never really had occasion to arise. Again, it is a rash statement indeed to say that the extraordinary deeds of Rāma do not win a
sympathetic response from everybody. For minds are characterized by a great variety of latent impressions (vāsanā). As has been said: “Latent impressions are endless because desire is eternal.” and “Though separated by birth, place and time, the latent impressions are uninterrupted because of the correspondence of impressions and memory” [i.e., though several lives intervene, impressions still give rise to the old reactions].

Therefore it is now established that there is perception of rasa. Moreover, this perception in the form of aesthetic relishing is physically produced (utpadyate). And the verbal operation in bringing about this perception is the hinting (dhvanana), the suggesting (uṣṭijana), of the literal sense and denotative words, which is an operation different from abhidhā and laksanā. [What Bhaṭṭaṇāyaka calls] the poem’s operation of causing aesthetic enjoyment (bhogikarana) of the rasas is nothing other than the operation of suggestiveness. As for aesthetic efficacy (bhāvakarana), this too is nothing more than what is included in the use of appropriate qualities (guṇas) and figures of speech, a subject of which we shall speak in some detail [later in this chapter]. What is new about all this? And when you say that poetry is effective (bhāvaka) of rasas, you have revived through your aesthetic efficacy the theory of physical production (utpatti) [which you had hoped to destroy].

Again, one cannot say that in poetry the words alone are effective of rasa, for if their meaning is unknown, no rasa can arise. Nor can one say that it is the meaning alone, for if the same meaning is expressed in other words, rasa does not arise. We explained that both word and meaning were effective when we said, “In which a sense or word suggest that suggested meaning, etc.” [1.13 K]. Accordingly, with the operation known as suggestiveness serving as means and with the qualities, figures of speech, and propriety, etc., serving as procedure (itkārtavyatā), poetry, which is effective (bhāvaka) [of rasas], effects (bhāvayati) the rasas; and in this three-termed scheme of efficacy (bhāvanā as understood by the Mīmāṃsakas) suggestiveness fits in as the means.

Again, aesthetic enjoyment (bhoga) is not produced by the words of poetry [i.e., the power of aesthetic enjoyment (bhogakṛttvā) is not a third function of poetic words, as BN would have it]. Aesthetic enjoyment, which is a melting, expansion and radiance, otherwise known as relishing (āsvāda), comes about rather from the cessation of that obscuration [of the true nature of the self] which is caused by the thick darkness of ignorance. In bringing this cessation to its
superlative degree it is suggestiveness that should be given the place of honor. When *rasa* has been achieved by means of suggestion, this power of aesthetic enjoyment inevitably follows. For enjoyment is nothing other than the incomparable thrill of delight that arises from tasting the *rasa*. But it is wrong to think that the varieties of relishing are fully enumerated by melting, expansion, and radiance, because there are innumerable possible variations on account of the endless variety [of human character] created by the varying degrees of predominance among the components of character, *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. We admit [with Bhaṭṭanāyaka] that the relishing of *rasa* bears a family resemblance to the relishing of the ultimate brahman. [We further admit that] the educative effect (*vyutpādana*) [of poetry] is different from that which comes from scripture through its mandates and from history through its narrations. For in addition to the analogy which it furnishes that we should behave like Rāma [and not like Rāvana], it produces in the final result an expansion of one’s imagination which serves as the means of tasting the *rasas*. With this view we find no fault.

Accordingly, it is established that *rasas* are suggested and that they are enjoyed by their very perception. Now this suggestion can be either primary [i.e., the *rasa* that is suggested can be the primary sense of the sentence or stanza] or secondary. If it is primary, it is a case of *dhvani*. If not [i.e., if the suggested *rasa* is only secondary], it is a case of a figure of speech such as *rasavat*, etc. This is what he now says in: the main suggested sense, etc. Kept distinct: viz., because of their having been determined to be distinct by the reasoning already employed [in 1.13a and following passages].

1. *Preyas*: name of a figure of speech also known as *preyasvin* (3.34 L) and *preyolanākāra* (1.4 a A, et passim). Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha give no definition, but their common example (Daṇḍin 2.276, Bhāmaha 3.5) seems to show that they understood the figure to be a form of complimentary address. L on 2.5 ascribes to Bhāmaha the view that “preyolanākāra is a loving description addressed to a god, a king, or a son.” See 2.5 a L, and note 2. 2. *ūrjasvin*: an expression of pride or egoism, Daṇḍin 2.275, Bhāmaha 3.7. Udbhāta: “the description of *bhāva* and *rasas* that exceed the bounds of propriety owing to love, anger, etc.” (4.5 Indurāja = 4.9 Viśrī). 3. In Daṇḍin (2.298) and Bhāmaha (3.10) *samāhita* is the description of a happy coincidence. Udbhāta completely changed the definition and brought it into connection with *rasa*: “A passage concerned with the cessation of *rasa*, *bhāva*, or their improper
varieties, in such a way that there is no trace of a new anubhāva is called samāhita” (4.7 Indurāja = 4.14 Vivṛti).

4. Abhinava now takes up the question of the nature and genesis of rasa. The question involves him in a long criticism of the views of his predecessors. For the views of Bhaṭṭanāyaka and for the meaning of his technical terms bhāvanā, bhāvakatva, and bhāvita, see the remarks in the Introduction, pp. 35–36. The passage 2.4 L from this point on has been translated in an appendix by Raniero Gnoli, *The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta*, 2nd. ed., Chowkhamba, 1968. In the same book Gnoli also translates the longer version of the same argument found in the Abh., Vol. 1, 2nd ed., pp. 272ff. 5. BN means that Sītā is a vibhāva only with respect to Rāma, not to the spectator. This holds, of course, only so long as rasa is regarded as a physically produced, perceptible, emotion. If rasa is admitted to be imaginatively achieved (bhāvita rather than utpādita), BN presumably would admit what Abhinava and all later critics hold, that Sītā is a vibhāva with respect to the spectator’s rasa.

6. vāsanā: literally, the perfuming of the self by its former experiences, including those of previous lives; hence, the latent impressions of the mind, which give it a proclivity to particular tastes and sympathies.

7. Energy (utsāha) is the sthāyibhāva that underlies the rasa of heroism (virya). But how can Rāma’s energy produce any such rasa in us? We cannot remember it, for the definition of memory in Indian philosophy involves direct experience (anubhava).

8. The expanded version of this passage in *ABh.,* Vol. 1, p. 278 (Gnoli p. 10) reads: na ca sabdānumānādibhyas tatpratītau (where tat refers to utsāhādīsthāyibhāva) lokasya sarasatā yuktā pratyaksād iva. The point is that these various forms of perception lead only to information (jñāna), not to rasa, which must be experienced through some other pramāṇa, viz., through the bhāvanā of poetry.

9. Abhinava in *ABh.,* Vol. 1, p. 278 (Gnoli p. 10) expands the analogy of watching a couple making love by adding: pratyuta lajjaugupsāsphādīsvocitacittavṛttyantarodayavyagratayā kā sarasatvākathāpi syāt, “On the contrary, because one becomes preoccupied with one’s own respective emotional reactions such as embarrassment, disgust, or even sexual desire, we cannot say that this is an aesthetic experience at all.” Abhinava makes the same point in *ABh.,* Vol. 1, p. 35. See also *DR* 4.39 and *Avaloka* thereon.

10. BN’s distinction of utpatti and abhivyakti is presumably the common distinction in Indian philosophy. Utpatti is the origin of an entity that was previously non-existent. Thus the Naiyāyika says that when a jar is made, there is utpatti of the jar. Abhivyakti is the transformation into sensible form of what was formerly imperceptible although existent. When a jar is in a dark room, it is manifested by the light of a lamp. It seems unlikely in view of what follows that BN is using abhivyakti in Abhinava’s more restricted sense, namely, the manifestation of a suggestion by verbal means.

11. The basic argument against abhivyakti is omitted, presumably as being obvious. BP supplies it:
there can be no manifestation of rasa in the spectator because he had no rasa in the first place, that is, prior to his experience of the play or the poem. The argument against abhivyakti that is expressed is an argument against someone who supposes that the rasa might indeed be present in the form of the spectator’s latent emotions. These might be roused into manifested, sensible, form by the vibhāvas. But then, the hypothesiser should push his analogy further. When we are looking for a treasure in a dark room, we want more than to be told about a lamp. We want to take the lamp in hand. Spectators would rise from their seats and try to carry Sita away with them. See DR 4.39 and Avaloka thereon: itāreṣām asūyānurāgāphārecchādayah prasajyerañ. 12. This meaning of tantra is not found in PW. It occurs in Vāmana, KAS 4.3.7, in Padmapāda’s Paścapādikā, Madras ed., p. 37, line 4, and elsewhere. BP exemplifies the technique of tantra by an old interpretation of Pān. 1.3.3. The sūtra reads haḥ antyam, apparently meaning “the final consonant [of a technical term of grammar is an exponential marker].” But we cannot know that the expression “haḥ” means a consonant until we are told that its “l” is an exponential marker. So Kātyāyana (Vart. 5) recommended taking the word haḥ in two ways, that is, by tantra, as (1) the l of “haḥ” [here haḥ is a tatpurusa compound] and as (2) haḥ (= all the consonants from h to the exponential marker l). The sūtra then means: “The l of haḥ is an exponential marker and all the consonants from h to the exponential marker l are used as exponential markers when final in a technical term of grammar.” This is how to make a computer bank, not poetry. 13. śrutiduṣṭa: see 2.11 below. The term goes back to Bhāmaha 1.47. 14. bhāvite ca rasa: the notion of universalization is not present in the term bhāvita itself but derives from BN’s explanation of how the realization or creation (bhāvanā) comes about. 15. Druti, viṣṭara, and vikāsa. We can point to no technical use of these terms earlier than BN, but they occur frequently in later texts. Dhanika on DR 4.43 assigns expansion (viṣṭara) to the enjoyment of the heroic, and radiance (vikāsa) to the enjoyment of the erotic. Melting (druti) would naturally be connected with the rasa of compassion and with love in separation; see 2.8 K below. But BP, on the authority of the Kāvyaprakāśasanketa of Rājānaka Ruyyaka, identifies the three forms of enjoyment with the three respective components of the enjoyer: rajas, tamas, and sattva. On those terms as connected with the rasas, see Gnoli, p. 46, and Raghavan, Bhoja, pp. 467ff. 16. BN seems to have thought that aesthetic bliss was actually superior to yogic bliss; cf. the quotation of BN in 1.6 L. Abhinava in 3.43 b L seems to reverse this value judgment. 17. Abhinava’s summary is so condensed that it almost misses the point. From Mammata 4.28, prose following verse quotation 26 (page 90), it appears that BN conceived of the bliss of poetic enjoyment as bringing about a predominance (udreka) of the basic goodness (sattva) of the soul over its adscititious elements of passion (rajas) and brutishness (tamas). For an account of the relation of BN’s views to the Sāmkhya, see M. Hiriyanna’s

18. Siddharūpa: The term and its implications are taken from Vedānta philosophy. Śankara argues that knowledge of Brahmān cannot be learned or produced or manifested or developed in any way; for knowledge of Brahmān is Brahmān, which is not a sādhya (that which is to be produced) but a siddha. Brahmān and Brahmān-knowledge are eternally present, the appearances to the contrary being due to illusion. Just so Bhaṭṭānāyaka would take aesthetic enjoyment to be an eternal mode of being, which is not produced or manifested. In the last analysis he puts the relation between the aesthetic efficacy of the poem and the self-realization of the audience outside the relation of cause-effect which applies to the phenomenal world. It would be the same relation as that between the Upaniṣads and knowledge of Brahmān. Abhinava in what follows will object to this high-flying mysticism. 19. Abhinava himself adopts this view at 1.1 e L. But cf. 3.10-14 f L. The view is not held by earlier authors of known date, but may be found in the *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa* 15.2.

20. *BP*, followed by Jagannāth Pāthak in the Chowkhambā edition, assigns the following criticism to Śrīśaṅkuka. 21. The point seems to be that a pure sthāyībhāva such as grief or anger is never found so that we could speak of its being nourished by the transient emotions (vyabhicārins). What we find is a complex mental state (cittavṛtti), composed at any one time of a sthāyībhāva and vyabhicārins, this complex flowing forth like a river until it loses itself with the passage of time. 22. This passage has been expanded in *Abh.*, Vol. I, p. 272: *sokasya prathamaṁ tvatvam kālo tu māndyādarsanam.* A mental state becomes intensified or weakened because of external objective stimulants and not because of other mental states like the vyabhicārins. 23. *BP* takes laya differently: *layo nāma nṛttagāvīdāyānām ekatānārūpam sāmyam.* But we feel that the normal sense which the word laya has in music fits the context better. 24. *BP* identifies the following view as svamata: "his own view," meaning thereby the view of Śaṅkuka, whose objections have just been recorded. Jagannāth Pāthak also supposes that Śrīśaṅkuka’s remarks are here continued. The identification seems to me probable but not quite certain. The seeing of the actor as *ayam rāmah sukhi* occurs in the account of Śaṅkuka’s view given in *Abh.*, Vol. I, p. 273, and if nothing is here said about inference (see note 26 below), the same is the case with the account in *Abh.* The only occasion of doubt is that the analogy of the painted horse, which Māmmapāta attributes to Śrīśaṅkuka, occurs not in this view but in the view which follows. 25. *ayam rāmah sukhi* is explained by *BP*, p. 185, as rāmo ‘yam sītānāyakarātimān. 26. Nothing is here said about inference. Apparently Śrīśaṅkuka claimed that the spectator infers the identity of character and actor. It is this hypothesis of inference that brings the sharpest criticism on Śaṅkuka in other texts. 27. *adah* means idam, as often in *L.*
See Text, p. 160, line 5; p. 239, line 3; p. 258, line 9. 28. It is difficult to identify the person who held this opinion. According to Mammata, line 8 of prose following 4.28 (page 88), the painted horse analogy (citraturaganyāya) belongs to Saṅkūka. 29. This is a difficult passage. Tadanubhāvaniya means vihbāvanubhāvaniya: "the sthāyībhāva that is sought to be produced by those vihbāvas." Tadanubhāvaniya means anubhāvanubhāvaniya: "the sthāyībhāva which is intended to be brought within the purview of the spectators by means of those anubhāvas." Vīsīṣṭasāmagrīya samarpayānam means abhinayaśādīsamagrīya sāmājikānām purastād upasthāpyānamān.

30. For the theories mentioned in this paragraph see Raghavan, Bhoja, p. 437. As he points out, Jagannātha Pandita also refers to such theories. 31. The preceding views, except for Bhāṭṭaṇāyaka's and perhaps those mentioned in the last paragraph, were developed by commentators on the Nātyaśāstra and apply strictly only to the theater. Abhinava now makes it clear that a theory of rasa must apply to poetry as well as drama. 32. On lokadharma and nātyadharmi see the long article by V. Raghavan, JOR 7 (1933), pp. 359–375 and JOR 8 (1934), pp. 57–74. Lokadharma refers to everything in the drama that is realistic, nātyadharmi to those artificial conventions that are peculiar to the theater, such as asides that nobody else can hear, monologues, talking animals, gods on the stage. In the thirteenth chapter of the Nātyaśāstra (Vol. 2, beginning p. 214) Bharata gives a long list of the characteristics of each type. One may note an interesting verse that Abhinava quotes from his teacher on this passage. The verse reads as follows: yad atrāsti na tatrasya kaver varṇanām arhati / yan nāsambhavi tatra syāt sambhavy atra tu dharmatah // "Not everything that is in the world deserves to be described by the poet in his plays. And what is not possible in the world may occur in plays quite properly." In ABh., Vol. 1, p. 269, Abhinava again voices his opposition to strict realism. 33. These are parallel terms, svabhāvokti corresponding to lokadharma and vakrokti to nātyadharmi. Thus Abhinava is using the terms in their widest sense. The basic distinction is made by Bhāmaha 1.30 and by Daṇḍin 2.363; see also Udbhata 3.8–9 (Viṣṇu). The most valuable discussion of svabhāvokti is found in the first chapter of Kuntaka's Vakroktiyūvita, but his use of terms is peculiar. For Kuntaka vakrokti is almost what dhvani is for Ānanda. See the valuable article of V. Raghavan, "History of Svabhāvokti" in Some Concepts. See also 4.7 A, note 1. 34. BP takes the word-stem alaukika to modify sabda: "presented in a language that is more than normally clear, sweet, and forceful." But the vihbāvas are called lokottararūpa on the very next page (Text, p. 187, line 5), so they are probably the recipients of the synonymous epithet here. The intention, I suppose, is that the characters and emotional situations of a work of art are in themselves more striking than those that we know from the workaday world. 35. prasanna, madhura, ojasvin: these are the śabdagasṇas mentioned by Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, and Vāmana. Ānandavardhana completely altered the older teaching
by bringing them under the system of rasas. For him the guṇas are the properties of the rasas; see 2.7 below. Instead of the ten guṇas mentioned by the older writers, Ānanda accepts only the three mentioned here. 36. The difference in perception (pratiti) results from the difference in presentation (upasthāpana), the play being presented to the sight and the poem to the ear. But the constituents of rasa in the form of the vibhāvas, etc., are the same in both. Furthermore, the same scheme of natural and artificial is found in both. 37. i.e., Lollāṭa's view, because Lollāṭa belongs to the utpattipakṣa. He held that the rasas are physically produced. Others held that they were manifested or relished. 38. The insistence that rasa is perceived is directed against Bhāṭṭānāyaka, who said, just above, that it was not. But Bhāṭṭānāyaka would not on that account have admitted that rasa was nonexistent like a goblin. Obviously he meant that perception (pratiti) is too physical a concept to express the manner in which rasa is experienced. So Abhinava goes on to give "perception" a wider area of application. 39. Although we say odanam pacati: "he is cooking the rice pudding," a more accurate description would be taṇḍulāṇ pacati, "he is cooking the rice grains," because the pudding is the result of the activity while the grains are the object on which the activity works. Similarly, instead of the phrase rasaḥ pratiyanto "the rasas are perceived," we would be more accurate to say vibhāvādi pratiyante "the vibhāvas, etc., are perceived," for the vibhāvas, etc., form the object of our perception; the rasa is the result. Or one may even say that the rasa is the process of perceiving itself. This qualification of his term perception leaves very little distance between Abhinava's view and that of Bhāṭṭānāyaka.

40. There is a similar passage in ABh., Vol. 1, p. 277, which Gnoli misunderstood: tatra pūrvapakṣo 'yam bhāṭṭālollāṭapakṣānabhupaganāット eva nābhupagata iti taddāṣanām anutthānopahatam eva, "This pūrvapakṣa [viz., the view of Bhāṭṭānāyaka that has just been set forth] is unacceptable because we do not accept the view of Bhāṭṭālollāṭa. [If we did accept Lollāṭa's view of the physical production of rasa, the view called utpattipakṣa, then Bhāṭṭānāyaka would have a good argument against us; but we do not.] So the criticisms made by the pūrvapakṣa are destroyed, never having had a chance to arise.

41. Yogasūtra 4.10 and 4.9. In ABh., Vol 1, p 282, Abhinava has an interesting passage where he claims that the nine sthāyi vibhāvas are present in all human beings, although some predominate in certain people and others in others. He ends by saying: na hy etac citrauṛṣuvānasāṁsūnyah prāṇi bhavati. In the course of our beginningless journey through this universe we have experienced all emotions. Thus nobody fully aware of his own humanity can fail to be moved by another person's experiences. Again, on p. 283 Abhinava quotes a line from the Yogabhāṣya of Vyāsa (2.4): na hi caitra ekasyām strīyāṁ rakta ity anyāśā viraktah, "the fact that Caitra is in love with one woman does not mean that he is out of love with others." This is not meant humorously, but is intended to show that beneath the particular emotions
which we manifest there lies a latent capability of many others. 42. This is a practical man's argument against a mystic. What else than cause and effect can Bhaṭṭanāyaka be speaking of when he says bhāvīte ca rasa "once a rasa has been realized"? The identical argument is used against Śāṅkara by the ritualists and by Bhāskara: we are not in mokṣa now; if we get there, something must produce the change. See note 18 above. 43. Abhinava's point is that BN said that there are three functions of words; he made no mention of the part played by meanings in producing rasa. This seems to be unfair of Abhinava, as he too says over and over that vyanjana is a sābdavāyāpāra. Why criticise Bhaṭṭanāyaka for an imprecision of terminology of which Abhinava is equally guilty? 44. Cf. what Ānanda says on 3.16m. 45. Abhinava here reduces Bhaṭṭanāyaka's term bhāvanā to the technical sense given it by the Mīmāṃsā. In the Mīmāṃsā bhāvanā is an efficacy residing within the verb of a Vedic sentence which explains how that verb can bring an actor to pursue a given aim by certain means and procedures. For example, we are given the sentence jyotiṣṭomena svaryākāmo yajeta "one who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice with a jyotiṣtoma sacrifice." In the verb yajeta "one should sacrifice" there is said to reside bhāvanā (we may here overlook the refinement of Kumārila who speaks of two sorts of bhāvanā). This bhāvanā is connected with three terms or factors: (1) a sādhyā, an objective aimed at by the action, (2) a sādhana or karaṇa, the means leading to that objective, and (3) an itikartavyatā, a procedure to be followed in reaching the objective. These terms answer the questions: "What does it effect (kim bhāvayet)? With what does it effect it (kena bhāvayet)? How does it effect it (katham bhāvayet)?" In the case of the sentence "one who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice with a jyotiṣtoma sacrifice," heaven is the sādhyā, the jyotiṣtoma is the sādhana, and the performance of the minor sacrifices prayāja, anuyāja, etc., is the itikartavyatā. Abhinava now argues that in poetry or drama rasa (or rasāsvāda) is the sādhyā, dhvanana or vyanjanaḥvāpāra is the sādhana, and guṇālahākāraḥvīcāryādi is the itikartavyatā. By reducing Bhaṭṭanāyaka’s term bhāvanā to its position in the Mīmāṃsā paradigm, Abhinava claims that it implies nothing more than is already furnished by his own theory. It is Abhinava's “suggestion" (dhvanana) which is the sādhanā by which rasāsvāda is achieved. 46. A few lines farther on Abhinava will refuse to limit aesthetic enjoyment to this threepart description (melting, expansion, radiance). He is here simply using Bhaṭṭanāyaka’s description to show that even under Bhaṭṭanāyaka's definition aesthetic enjoyment should not be regarded as a power of words. It is rather a state of the audience that comes about after the words and meanings have produced rasa. 47. This admission falls a good bit short of BN’s view. BN had said. “Any instruction that poetry may furnish is incidental.” Abhinava admits that enjoyment is the main goal and that the instruction of poetry is different from the instruction of other types of literature. But the instruction given by poetry is not without importance
to him. It has a moral value. Furthermore, inasmuch as it trains us to experience aesthetic bliss, it may even be said to be spiritually instructive. In this way Abhinava is able to make enjoyment and instruction come to much the same thing. In commenting on 3.14 he will say: \textit{na caite pritiyutpati bhinnarüpe eva, dvayor apy ekaviśayatvät.}

\textbf{K} But where a \textit{rasa}, or the like, is subordinate and the main purport of the sentence lies elsewhere, then it is my opinion that in that poem the \textit{rasa}, or the like, is only a figure of speech.

\textbf{A} Although others have defined the domain of the figure of speech known as \textit{rasavat}, nonetheless my own position is this: if in a poem some other sense is principally conveyed and is the main purport of the sentence, to which purport a \textit{rasa}, or the like [e.g., \textit{bhāva}, \textit{rasābhāsa}, etc.] is subordinated, then the \textit{rasa}, or the like, comes under the domain of a figure of speech.

\textbf{L} [Commentary on K:] Lies elsewhere: that is, in a \textit{rasa} or something like a \textit{rasa}, or in a mere fact, or in something peculiarly fit to form a figure of speech. My opinion: This shows that the author holds back other views as being faulty and is first giving his own view as being worthy of acceptance.

[Commentary on A:] Nonetheless: for the province [of the figures of \textit{rasavat}, etc.] as propounded by others is not reasonable, as will be shown later [in Ānanda’s comment on this \textit{Kārikā}]. If in a poem: to clarify this loosely constructed sentence, it should be interpreted as follows: In that poem in which a \textit{rasa}, or the like, as already mentioned, is subordinated, and some other sense is the main purport of the sentence—understanding the word “and” in the sense of “but”—that \textit{rasa}, or the like, which though subordinated is yet connected with the poem,\(^1\) should be considered as falling within the province of the \textit{rasādi} figures of speech, called by the terms \textit{rasavat}, etc.\(^2\) The upshot of this is that a \textit{rasa}, or the like, deserves the name of a figure of speech only when it is subordinate, not when it is otherwise.
1. Thus Abhinava takes the word tasya in tasya cāṅgabhūta (Text p. 191, line 4) as construing with yasmin kāvye rather than with vākyārthibhūtasasya.

2. The rasaśī figures of speech are preyas, rasavat, ūrjasvin, and samāhita.

A As an example of this, in passages of flattery, even though a figure of complimentary address (preyolänkāra) is the main purport of the sentence, a rasa, or the like, may be found as subordinate.¹

1. This sentence presents a difficulty. It seems to speak of an alankāra as forming the vākyārtha (the main purport of a sentence), which is an impossibility, for an ornament (alankāra) must ornament the purport; it cannot be that purport. Abhinava will offer three solutions of the difficulty.

L He gives an example for this statement: As an example of this. "This" refers to subordination. His meaning is: as in the example about to be given, so in other places also.

If we follow the doctrine of Bhāmaha,¹ we will take the passage cāṭuṣu dṛṣyate all as one sentence, meaning: "even though preyolänkāra is the main purport, [as it is] in passages of flattery, a rasa or the like may be found to form a part"; for Bhāmaha has said, "preyolänkāra is a loving description addressed to an elder, a god, a king, or a son."² In this interpretation, the word preyolänkāra [in A will be a bahuvrihi compound and so] will mean: "that [passage] in which a very dear person (preyān) is an ornament."³ Such a preyolänkāra can be ornamented. It will not do to take the main purport itself to be an ornament (alänkāra).

Or, we may take "the main purport" to mean simply the most important element of the sentence, that is to say, the element that is most strikingly beautiful.

Or, we may follow the doctrine of Udbhata and split the sentence in two. [First we will read] cāṭuṣu vākyārthatve preyolänkārasyāpi viṣayāh, taking cāṭuṣu vākyārthatve as locative absolute (viṣayasaptamī), [transposing the word api,] and supplying the word viṣaya from the previous sentence. This will mean: "where flattery is the main purport of
the sentence, there is scope also for preyolankāra." For according to Udabhāta any bhāva can be called a preyas, for affection (preman) is used to cover all the bhāvas. The sense of the word api is that not only is there scope for the figure rasaavadalankāra, but for the figures preyas, etc., too. By the word rasavat and the word preyas all the (four) alankāras beginning with rasavat are included. This is just what he says in that (portion of the split sentence) which now follows: rasādayo 'rīga-bhūtā drṣyante, to which we must supply uktaviṣaye: "the rasas, etc., when subordinate, are found to have the same scope."

1. So also, just below, "or if we follow the doctrine of Udabhāta." One must not translate, "According to the opinion of Bhāmaha ... the sentence is to be taken as one," for it is out of the question that such early authors could have seen and commented on the words of Ānanda. 2. The text of Bhāmaha as we now have it says no such thing, although the example of preyolankāra that Bhāmaha furnishes at 3.5 does not disagree with such a definition. The absence of the quotation in Bhāmaha has already been noticed by Kane, HSP, p. 82. But we cannot explain the absence, as Kane was inclined to do, by impugning our present MS of Bhāmaha's verses, for the quotation is not in verse but prose. Possibly Bhāmaha wrote a vṛtti on his verses which is now lost, but if so one would expect other quotations from it to survive. Nearly the same words as in the present quotation occur in Rājānaka Tilaka’s Vi .ti on Udabhāta 4.2: ratir tha devagurun pādīviṣayā gṛhyate, kānti viṣayāyās ta rateḥ sūcane rasaavadalankāre vakṣyate. 3. Just such a meaning is given to preyas by Indurāja in his comment on Udabhāta 4.2 (p. 51, line 27): preyah-fabdavācyaṇa priyatarena ratyaśaltanena vibhāvena. 4. For bhāvālankāra, we must read bhāvā and omit alankāra. See Udabhāta 4.2.

A This use of rasa, or the like, as a figure of speech can be either pure or mixed. An example of the first is:

Why do you laugh? You will not get away again now that I have finally caught you.
Pitiless man, what is this strange love of travel that drove you from me?
So speak your enemies' wiv
clinging to the necks of their husbands in their dreams, 
only to weep aloud 
when they wake to the empty circle of their arms.\(^1\)

Clearly this is an example of the figure of speech known as *rasavat*, for pure *karunarasa* (the aesthetic experience of compassion) is subordinated to the predominating eulogy. And thus in similar cases it is clear that other sentiments can be subordinated.

1. The verse occurs also in *Subha.*, 2570. Its author is unknown. I have followed Abhinava in the interpretation of *riktabāhuvālaya*. Another possible interpretation would be to take *valaya* not as a metaphor but simply in the sense of bracelet. The women's arms would be devoid of bracelets, as they are now widows. A and L speak of only two instances of *dhvani* in the verse: the suggestion of *karunarasa*, which is subordinate and which is therefore a case of the *rasavat* figure, and a *vastudhvani*, viz., the glory of the victorious king (*nrpatiprabhāva*), which is predominant. In commenting on similar stanzas commentators sometimes speak of the *vastudhvani* as leading to a third type of suggestion, namely the poet's love of the glorious king (*nrpativisayarati-bhāva*); cf. 2.5d L, note 1.

L Pure means that there is no mixture with another subordinated *rasa*, or with any other figure of speech. Mixed means that there is a mixture.

As a dream comes into being in the likeness of what one has experienced, a wife [here] sees her husband laughing in her dream.\(^1\) "You will not get away again," that is, now that I know your unfaithful nature, I will not free you from the noose of my arms. This explains the "empty circle of their arms" later in the verse. It is only natural to scold a lover who is received back; so she says, "Pitiless man, what is this ... that drove you." She means that she never nagged him even when he called her by another woman's name. "In their dreams" refers to their talking in their sleep.\(^2\) "Dreams": the plural shows that this happens again and again. This is what the wives of your enemies say, that is, the wives of the kings hostile to you,\(^3\) while their arms encircle the necks, that is, are tightly entwined about the necks of their beloveds. Just as they are in that condition, they awake to find the noose of their arms turned into a vacant circle, at which they cry aloud, with full throat. In the stanza the greatness of the king [which is the main purport of the sentence] is beautified by our relishing the flavor of compassion
(or, tragedy, karunarasa), whose sthāyibhāva is sorrow that is stimulated by the vision of the dream. Here compassion unmixed [with any other rasa or alankāra] forms the figure of speech. The main purport of this sentence is not baldly stated, without any embellishment, as for example, “You have killed your enemies.” Rather, the purport of the sentence is beautified and the beauty is due to the experience of compassion [used as a subordinate element]. Just as an object, such as a face, can be embellished by another object, such as the moon, for it appears with greater beauty by having the moon as its simile, so also a fact [such as the king’s greatness], or another rasa, if embellished by a rasa used as a subordinate element, will appear with added beauty. So what objection can there be to our using a rasa, like any other object, as an ornament (alankāra)? But tell us, an objector may say, in precisely what manner the matter in hand (prakṛtārtha) is beautified by rasa. Well; [we might ask him the same sort of question:] just how would it be beautified by a simile? If he says that the matter in hand would be compared to something else by the simile, we can say the same of rasa: the matter is made more tasteful (sarasikriyate) by the rasa. This is obvious. Therefore, what some have asked in the form of an objection, namely, “Just what among the vibhāvas, etc., can be beautified by a rasa?” is answered by our not accepting the premise. For it has already been stated that it is the matter in hand that is beautified:

He now shows that this [subordination of rasa to the main purport] is often found in literature: and thus. In similar cases means in such cases as those where the greatness of a king, etc., is being described.

1. Perhaps she remembers a scene such as that depicted in the verse quoted at 2.18–19e A. 2. svapnāyita: talking in one’s sleep; the more usual verb is utsvapnāyate, cf. Mālavikāgnimitra 4.15.30. 3. Abhinava is explaining the use of te in the verse; it is gaṣṭhi sambandhe. 4. It is a pity that Abhinava does not really explain here, or at 3.20c, d L, which deals with the same subject, how the relish of compassion makes the main purport of such verses more beautiful. To judge from what follows, the problem troubled him. Most readers will agree that the stanza is beautiful. In HOS 44, pp. 372–373, I have spoken of the cruelty of such verses, but also of “their strong poetic effect.” But it is hard to explain the effect without admitting that the compassion is really more important in such verses than the glory of their nameless kings. 5. Read yatād vāstravataram for tathā vāstravataram and remove the danda after cārutayāvabhāsānāt. 6. In this respect a rasa is not different from an upamā or other figure of speech. 7. prakṛtārthaḥ, like prastūto
'rthah just below, is used as a synonym of the pradhāno vākyārthah of 2.5 K. 8. We do not accept the fact that the vibhāvas, etc., are beautified by rasa. The vibhāvas, etc., are the means for achieving rasa. What is beautified by the rasa in the figure rasavat is the matter in hand or the main purport of the sentence.

A  An example of mixed rasa, or the like, when it is subordinate

The women of the Triple City wept from lotus eyes
as Śambhu's arrow-flame embraced them;
but still, though shaken off, the fire caught their hands,
though struck, did pluck their garments' hem,
denied, it seized their hair, and, scorned
like lover who has lately loved another, lay before their feet.
May this same fire burn away your sins.¹

Here the [flavor of love in] separation due to jealous anger (īrsyā-vipralambaḥaśtrigāral) together with the ambiguities (ślesas)² is subordinate to the main purport of the verse, which is the extraordinary power of the enemy of the Triple City [i.e., Śiva]. It is in such an area that the figures of speech like rasavat, etc. properly belong. That is why there is nothing wrong in including two [usually contradictory] rāsas, namely, compassion (karuṇā) and love in separation, in one stanza, precisely because they are both subordinate. For when rasa is the main purport of the sentence, how can it be a figure of speech? Everyone knows that a figure of speech is meant to add beauty to a poem. Surely a thing's own self cannot act as its own beautifier.

¹. This famous verse is usually attributed to Amaru, in whose collection it occurs as the second benedictory stanza. But Amaru is likely to have borrowed it, perhaps from Bāna (so SRK 49). It describes the destruction of the demon city Tripura by the god Śiva, an act that the demons themselves had long before prayed for. The act, although painful in immediate effect, is regarded as one of purification and mercy. It is here likened by sugestion to a lover's insistent embrace of a jealous mistress. The verse is quoted again and again in the critical literature; cf. Kosambi's apparatus, SRK ad loc.
have discussed the meaning of the verse, HOS, Vol. 44, pp. 21-22. Ānanda will have more to say of it under 3.20c. 2. The śleṣas in the verse are not sabdaśleṣas (puns), but arthaśleṣas, that is, adj tives (participles) that can apply to two sorts of object, fire or a lover.

§ 2.5c L ]

L [Commentary on the verse:] “Shaken off” (ksipta) in the case of the lover means rejected; in the case of fire, physically shaken. When it is said that the lover was scorned (avadhūta), it means that he was not greeted with an embrace in return. In the case of the fire the same word means that the fire was fragmented (visarārūkṛta) through the shaking of the entire body. Their eyes were filled with tears in the one case because of jealousy and in the other because of despair.

[Commentary on A’s comment:] The love in separation because of jealousy that is suggested by the simile “like a lover,” which simile is in turn supported by ambiguities (viz., kṣipta and avadhūta), is subordinated together with the simile and ambiguities and not by itself alone. It is subordinated to the main purport, namely the greatness of Śiva. Although the relish of compassion (karunarasa) is in fact also present in the stanza, inasmuch as it is not involved in our perception of the beauty of this [love in separation], Ānanda has said that this [relish of love in separation] is combined only with ambiguities and has not said that it is combined with karunarasa. As this matter [namely the subordination of the figures rasavat, etc.] was not thought of by previous writers, he emphasizes it, saying: only such. That is why: sc., because [the relish of love in] separation is only an ornament in this verse and not the main purport of the stanza. Nothing wrong: If either of the two rasas [viprālambhaśṛṅgāra or karuna] had been predominant in the verse, the second rasa could not have been combined with the first. For love in separation, whose primary emotion is love (rati) and which consists in a hope for reunion, is in contradiction to tragedy (karuna), whose primary emotion is sorrow and which consists in the despair of reunion.

Having thus demonstrated the [possible] co-presence of two opposed rasas in the course of treating the expression alāṅkāra [used in 2.5 K “alāṅkāro rasādir iti me matih”], he now explains the intention behind his use of [the emphatic word] “only” (eva) [in his comment] by saying: for when, etc.
1. The word \textit{tat} in the compound \textit{tat-cärutva} refers, as \textit{BP} correctly states, to the \textit{ṣṛṣyāvipralambha} mentioned in the preceding sentence. Abhinava is not denying tragedy or the aesthetic relish of compassion (\textit{karunarasa}) in the stanza. How could he, when \textit{Ānanda} admits it in his next sentence? He is simply making it clear that the \textit{karunarasa} does not beautify the \textit{ṣṛṣyāvāra}-\textit{rasa}. The two are held distinct and both are in subordinate positions. Hence they can both be contained in one stanza; cf. 3.20 \textit{K} together with \textit{A}'s comment. The reason that they cannot be combined in \textit{rasadhvani} is that in \textit{rasadhvani} one would have to be subordinated to the other, in which case their contradictory natures would clash.

\[\text{§ 2.5 c L}\]

\textbf{A} Here is a summary of the matter:

What makes any figure of speech a figure of speech is the fact that it is introduced in dependence on a \textit{rasa}, \textit{bhāva}, or the like, which serves as the purport of the sentence.

Therefore, wherever a \textit{rasa} or the like forms the main purport of a sentence, that is not to be included under the domain of the figure of speech \textit{rasavat} or any other, but must be considered to fall under the domain of suggestion (\textit{dhvani}) itself. Of this [suggestion], simile and the like act as the ornaments. On the other hand, wherever anything else predominates as the meaning of the sentence, and where \textit{rasa} or the like contributes to its beauty, that is where \textit{rasa} or the like acts as a figure of speech. Thus the domains of suggestion and of such figures as simile and \textit{rasavat} are distinct.

\[\text{L} \] Any figure of speech: e.g., simile, etc. The sense is this: the function [viz., ornamentation] that makes a simile a figure of speech works equally with the \textit{rasas}, etc., [making them figures of speech when they serve in the same function]. There must always be something else to be ornamented. Now this something else, even if it be only a fact (\textit{vastumātra}), if it develops into a \textit{vibhāva}, etc., may furnish a \textit{rasa} or
the like as the purport of the sentence. And so everywhere it is rasa-
dhvani that is the soul or essence. This is what has been said in the
words a rasa, bhāva, or the like, which serve as the purport of
the sentence.

Of this: viz., of that which is in a dominant position and is the soul
[of the poem]. That is to say, although it is the literal meaning [of a
sentence] that is ornamented by simile, nonetheless, the ornamenting
of this literal sense consists in its being endowed with the capacity to
carry a suggested sense, and so in reality it is the soul of dhvani that
is ornamented and not the literal sense. For it is the soul that is
ornamented by bracelets, armbands, etc., which are worn on the
body, for these ornaments indicate what is likely to be in the thoughts
[of the wearers]. Thus, an insentient corpse, even if provided with
earrings, etc., is not beautiful, for there is nothing [sc., no soul] to be
ornamented. And the body of an ascetic adorned with bangles, etc.,
would look ridiculous because of their inappropriateness to that which
is to be ornamented. Nor is anything inappropriate to a body; so it
must really be the soul that is ornamented. This agrees with what
people feel. They say “I am adorned” [and not “My body is adorned.”]
Where rasa or the like acts as a figure of speech: [the Sanskrit
phrase] exhibits two genitives that are not in apposition. The meaning
is: that alone is the province of the functioning as a figure of speech
of rasa and the like. In consonance with this, one should explain in
similar manner the earlier passage in the Vṛtti [Text, p. 198, line 1, na
rasāder alaṅkāraśya visayah], understanding it to mean: “that is not
the area of an act of beautifying, of which act rasa or the like is the
agent.”

Thus: that is, by distinguishing their spheres as we have done. Such
figures of speech as simile: In cases where rasa is that which is
ornamented [i.e., where rasa is predominant], and where there is no
other rasa subordinated, i.e., no rasa adalāṅkāra, there such figures of
speech as simile are pure [i.e., are not mixed with any second figure of
speech]. Therefore the domain of simile, etc., is not eliminated by the
figure samsṛsti.

And rasavat: the term here includes the figures based on bhāva and
the like [viz., rasābhāsa, bhāvabhāsa, and bhāvapraśama when used as
an ornament], that is, the figures called preyasvin, ūrjasvin, and samā-
hita [as well as rasavat].

Here is an example of a bhāva used as an ornament without any other
figure of speech or rasa mixed therewith:
Your foot, O Mother,
with its sole as soft and red as a lotus petal
sings with the jingling of its anklets
like the gabbling of walking geese.
How did this foot,
 stamping on the head of the buffalo demon,
grow as ponderous as the Golden Mountain?

In this example the main purport of the verse is praise of the Goddess,
but the emotions (vyabhicāribhāvas) wonder and speculation act as
sources of beauty. As they are subordinated to the main purport, this
is a case of bhāvālāṅkāra.7

An example of rasābhāsa used as an ornament is a prayer of my own
composition:

If all poetic qualities
and every ornament of speech
were to embellish you, my Muse,
you would not show so fair
as by taking your words whichever way they come,
if thus they may delight your heart's love, Śiva.
So only will you be beyond compare.

In this example the main purport of the sentence is that the highest task
of speech is to praise God. This fact is made to appear more beautiful
by an appearance of the relish of love (śrīgārābhāsa) together with the
figure of ambiguity (śleṣa). It is not the normal relish of love because
the beloved is without qualities and without ornaments. For Bharata
has said that śrīgāra “deals with beautiful clothes and with young and
noble people” (BhNS 1, p. 300).8

An example of bhāvābhāsa as subordinated to the main sense of a
poem is the following:

May he protect you,
upon whose killing of their kinsmen
the surviving demons tremble
to see the dark color
even in the collyrium used by their women
to paint their lovely waterlily eyes.9

In this verse we have an example of bhāvābhāsa because the accom-
panying emotion (vyabhicāribhāva) of dread (trāsa) which is subor-

are terrifying by nature.10 Similarly, an example of bhāvaprasāma [as subordinated to the main purport] may be supplied.

1. Abhinava here has in mind the third sort of suggestion that we mentioned in the footnote to 2.5b A. The BP gives an example. In the verse "Why do you laugh?" the fact that is ornamented is the power of the victorious king. But this fact itself may assume the form of a stimulant to the emotion (bhāva) of love for that king in the heart of the poet. One might better choose as an example "The women of the Triple City." The power of God is a vastumātra, but one will readily grant that for many persons this fact stimulates their love of God.

2. dhvanyātmā: for the ambiguity of the term see 2.2 K, note 1. BP glosses the present occurrence as dhvanirūpa ātmā. What is meant is the suggested sense in the form of a rasa, etc.; but by calling it dhvanyātmā Abhinava is able to give the analogy which follows.

3. BP. Thus, the necklace and bracelets worn on the body of a young person indicate the likeliness of affairs of the heart, while the staff and orange robe of the ascetic indicate his distaste for worldly pleasures.

4. Abhinava wishes to make the two passages parallel. But surely in rasāder alāṅkārasya Ānanda intended to use the words in apposition: "of the figures of speech called rasādi (i.e., of rasavadalāṅkāra, etc.)."

5. The reason for this comment of Abhinava's on upamādīnām is that, strictly speaking, there is no figure upamā in the verse "The women of the Triple City" that has been under discussion. The upamā in that verse is associated with rasavadalāṅkāra, so the figure should be known technically as samsṛṣṭi (association); see 1.13 i L, note 1. At this rate it might be thought that samsṛṣṭi will preempt the whole habitat of upamā and of rasavadalāṅkāra, and that Ānanda should have written dhvaneh samsṛṣṭes ca vibhaktaviśayatā bhavati. But no, says Abhinava. There are other instances where upamā in a pure form may ornament the predominant meaning. So Ānanda is justified.

6. Abhinava here constructs a more logical system of the rasādy alāṅkāras than we find in the older critics. Originally the four figures rasavat, preyasvin, āurjasvin, and samāhita formed a very disparate collection. In Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin they represent, respectively, an emotional passage, a complimentary address, a passage of boasting or pride, and a happy coincidence. Udbhata was the first to bring some sort of logical order to the group, defining rasavat as a passage with strong śṛṅgāra-rasa, preyas as a passage where some other rasa was involved, urjasvin as a passage showing rasaḥbhāsa or bhāvabhāsa, and samāhita as a description of bhāvaprasa. Abhinava now takes the five concepts listed in Kārikā 2.3, viz., rasa, bhāva, rasābhāsa, bhāvabhāsa, and bhāvaprasānti, and in effect sets up five alāṅkāras to cover the five cases where one or the other of these concepts plays a subordinate role in a sentence.

7. According to the older scheme of alāṅkāras the figure here will be called preyasvin. 8. Abhinava's point is that śṛṅgāra, suggested through śleṣa, here serves an ulterior
purpose. Hṛdayavallabha means “one’s heart’s love” and Śiva will suggest the nāyaka because of the masculine gender, whereas vāni (speech, which we have translated as “Muse”) will suggest the nāyikā because of the feminine gender. Ranjayeḥ in the case of the lover will mean not to delight but to make love to. The śṛṅgāra that is here suggested by ambiguities and that in turn ornaments the religious statement of the verse is not śṛṅgāra precisely as defined by Bharata. Accordingly, Abhinava calls it śṛṅgārābhāsa. The translation “false love” here would misrepresent Abhinava’s intent and one should not press his remarks on 1.4 g L (anaucityena tadābhāsaḥ) too far. There is nothing inappropriate here in the relation of the poet’s muse to God. The ābhāsaṭva comes simply from the fact that the relish of this love falls outside the strict definition of śṛṅgāraṣa. God, as conceived in Abhinava’s Śaiva-Vedānta theology, is essentially without qualities. 9. The black collyrium reminds them of the black-complexioned Krishna. The metaphor in “waterlily eyes” (nayanotpala) derives from the color of the dark blue waterlily, to which the color of the pupil is likened. The verse is quoted also in ABh. I, p. 297. It appears in Subhā. as No. 32, ascribed to Candaka.

10. The figure will therefore be īrjasvin according to the definition of Udbhāṭa; see note 6 above.

A Should one urge that figures like rasavat occur only when the purport of the sentence deals with sentient creatures, this would amount to saying that such figures of speech as sīle have a very small domain, or have no domain at all. The reason is that when the situation of something that is not a sentient creature forms the purport of the sentence, we shall find that in some way or other there is some connection with the activity of a sentient creature. If you argue that, regardless of this connection, wherever the literal sense of the sentence concerns that which is not a sentient creature, this is not an instance of rasavat, your argument will amount to saying that great works of poetry, the very mainstay of rasa, are devoid of rasa.¹

1. The Sanskrit passage rendered in this paragraph is puzzling enough to have made Jacobi suggest that a portion of it (from tarhi, Text, p. 200, line 1, through satyām api tasyām, line 3) is an insertion. But it is clear that Abhinava read the passage as we have it and the passage as a whole becomes
clear if one bears in mind that the objector belongs to an old-fashioned school of critics whose view of rasa is radically different from Ānanda's. To the objector there is no such thing as dhvani. Accordingly, he makes no distinction between rasa and rasavadalankāra. If the sentence meaning contains rasa, bhāva, etc., we have a case of rasavadalankāra. If it does not, we have the domain of the other alankāras such as simile. Now as the criterion by which to distinguish these domains, the objector first proposes cetanavṛttānta. If the purport of the sentence concerns a sentient creature, we have rasavadalankāra; if it concerns anything else, we have simile, etc. Ānanda replies that this will leave no domain for simile, etc., for we can always show some connection between the purport of the sentence and sentient creatures. The objector then refines his criterion. He will disregard these possible connections: if the sentence meaning is prima facie concerned with what is not a sentient creature, the domain belongs to simile, etc., not to rasavat. The answer to this argument is that great passages of poetry, which everyone recognizes as the paradigms of rasa—for example, the description of the oncoming season of rain in the Rāmāyaṇa, or Purūravas' apostrophes to nature in the mad scene of the Vikramorvaśīya—will lack rasa by the objector's criterion. This is because the objector's theory can admit rasa into a poem only in the form of rasavadalankāra and by his last refinement he is excluding the descriptive passages of the Rāmāyaṇa, etc., from that figure.

§ 2.5 e L ]

L Should one: with these words he introduces the refutation of the opponent's view that was hinted at by the words "my opinion" [in Kārikā 2.5]. The opponent's view is this: as a rasa is a mental state, it cannot belong to non-sentient objects.1 So there is no possibility of rasavadalankāra or the like in descriptions of such objects. Accordingly, the sphere of simile, etc., is different from the sphere of rasavat, etc. Our author refutes this. This would amount: that is, because of the preceding statement. But the opponent may reply, "It has [already] been said [by us] that the descriptions of non-sentient objects is the sphere [of simile and the like]." Anticipating such a reply, he gives the reason for his statement [that simile and the like would have little or no sphere at all]: the reason is. In some way or other: that is, by taking the form of a vibhāva, etc. Regardless of this: i.e., even though there may be some connection with a sentient creature. Devoid of rasa: the position of the opponent is that wherever there is rasa there must necessarily be rasavadalankāra. So if there is no rasavadalankāra, there will surely be no rasa. Hence, according to this view of the opponent, there would be no rasa in cases where a living creature is not described. But [our position is different]: we do not say
that there will be no rasa if there is no rasavadalaṅkāra, but only if there is no rasa in its form of dhvani. And this kind of rasa is present in such cases [as the description of the rainy season in the Rāmāyaṇa].

1. As the objector belongs to an old-fashioned school (see note on 2.5 e A), he presumably follows Bhāma and Dandin in supposing that rasa is simply an intense form of bhāva that occurs in the character portrayed. It was the Dhvanīlīka that changed Indian views on this matter.

A For example:

Its waves are her frowns,
its startled birds the strings of her jeweled belt.
In her anger she trails an opening robe of foam
and twists and turns as her heart strikes upon
my many faults.
Surely her grievance has transformed my love
into this river.1

[Vikramorvāṣīya 4.52]

This slender vine with its rain-wet leav
shows me her tear-washed lip;
its flowers fallen with the passing of spr'
show her without her jewels.
The loss of its bees
is the silence of anxiety,
as though my angry lady, having spurned me
at her feet,
now feels remorse.

[Vikramorvāṣīya 4.66]

Say, happy friend, if all is well still with the bowers
that grow upon the Jumna bank,
companions to the dalliance of cowherd girls
and witnesses of Rādhā’s love.
Now that there is no use to cut their fronds
to make them into beds of love,
I know their greenness will have faded
and they grown old and hard.

[SRK 808, attributed to Vidyā]

1. This and the following quotation are from the mad scene, where Purūravas, distracted by the disappearance of his beloved Urvasī, fancies that he sees her transformed into the various natural beauties of the forest. The commentators differ as to whether yathā-viddham in the third line of the first stanza is to be taken as two words or one. In the first alternative: "since [the river exhibits these properties, it must be Urvasī]." In the second, yathā-viddham will mean "struck from side to side, with irregular motion." In the second stanza, line 3, read cintā-maunam together as a compound.

L Its waves, etc. Tarangabhrūbhaṅgā is a bahuvrīhi compound, literally, "whose frowns are [or, have become] waves." "She trails": literally, "forcibly pulling away the trailing [foam]." "Robe": garment. The idea is [that she pulls away her dress] to prevent her lover from holding it. Collecting together in her heart my "many faults," that is, offenses, she is unable to bear them.¹ What is meant is a proud, angry woman (mānīni). And then, unable to bear the remorse caused by my absence, in order to calm her suffering, she has transformed herself into a river.

This slender vine, etc. A woman who has grown thin from separation and is stricken with remorse abandons her ornaments. "[With the passing of] its season [of flowering]" this is usually spring or summer. She is silent because she is considering a means [to effect reconciliation] and also because she is thinking, "Why did I reject my beloved who had fallen at my feet [in supplication]?" "Angry": wrathful. Although the sentence-purport in these two stanzas is the description of a river and a vine, in fact they are the utterances of Purūravas who is overcome by madness [and thus they are clearly connected with an emotional situation].

Say, happy friend, etc. "Those bowers" means those that are firmly entrenched in my heart. They are the friends in pleasure, the gay companions of the gopīs, the wives of the cowherds. For none else [but bowers and vines] can really be the friends of women who are engaged in secret love affairs [since only they can be trusted to keep a secret and to provide shelter for love-making]. He shows that these bowers
were much loved by Rādhā: they were direct witnesses of Rādhā’s love-making. Are those arbors on the bank of the daughter of the Kālinda mountain, i.e., the Jumna, well? The question is conveyed by interrogative intonation. The blessed Krishna, residing now in Dvārakā, his memories awakened at seeing the cowherd, asks him this question, and then soliloquizes in a manner full of longing and with feelings of love awakened by memory of the ālambanavibhāvas [viz., Rādhā and the gopīs] and uddīpanavibhāvas [viz., the bowers]. The purpose of these bowers lay in their being cut, because they were soft, that is, delicate, for making beds of love, that is, love-couches; and that purpose is now fulfilled. Or, we can interpret the line to mean that the preparation, that is, the finished arrangement, into a love-couch, was gentle, that is, delicate; that this was the result of the cutting, which result has now come to an end. The idea is: now that I no longer recline there, what use is there in making love-couches? And so, with assurance that his love for the gopīs is mutual [i.e., that they will never make love-couches for anyone else], he says, “I know, etc.” The grammatical object of the verb “I know” is the sense of the whole sentence which follows. “Will have grown old and hard”: If I were present, the leaves would be constantly used, as described above, and would never have time to reach such an old, faded, left-over condition. The remark that the leaves have lost their dark lustre suggests that Krishna has been away [from Gokula] for some time, but is still filled with constant longing for it. Thus, the second half of the stanza can be taken to be what Krishna says to himself. Or, we can take it as addressed to the cowherd to ascertain [the fate of the bowers]. The many examples here cited bear out what he has said, [that this applies to] “great works,” that is, to many works, of poetry.

1. Abhinava brings out only half the meaning, the half that applies to a sentient being. In reference to the physical river, the line will mean: “aiming frequently at rough or stony ground, its course is irregular.”
2. We have followed BP in taking the three compounds beginning with prabuddharatibhāvam as adverbs, but it is not impossible to take the second and third as adjectives qualifying ratibhāvam, the object of āha.
A. In these and other similar examples, although the main pur-
port of the sentences is a portrayal of inanimate objects, we find that a
portrayal of human beings is connected therewith. Now, if you should
say that whenever such portrayals are given, we may regard them as
examples of rasa, etc., used as figures of speech, you would leave simile,
etc., with a reduced domain or with no domain at all. Because there
is really no case of a portrayal of something sentient which is not
connected with a portrayal of living creatures, at least in so far as it
furnishes an emotional determinant (vibhāvatva). Therefore rasa and
the like are ornaments (figures of speech) when they are subordinate.
But when a rasa or a bhāva predominates, then, by all means, it is that
which is ornamented, that is, the soul of suggestion (dhvani).

L. Now: one may here supply "with a view to prevent a lack
of rasa from obtaining in such cases." But it might be objected that
simile and the like will have their domain in those cases where there is
absolutely no question of that which concerns a living being. With this
in mind, he says: Because, etc. At least: When sentient reactions
are described, for example paralysis, horripilation, etc., because of the
fact that such reactions are anubhāvas (the physical consequences of
an emotional situation), they necessarily bring into consideration living
beings [as their basis]. Why say more? Even a totally sentient object
such as the moon, a garden, etc., though it is described [apparently]
as an end in itself, will necessarily have no part in poetry at all, or
even in historical or learned literature, except in so far as it may be a
determinant (vibhāva) of some state of mind (cittavṛtti)². Having thus
refuted the opponent's position, he ends the discussion by repeating his
own view: Therefore. He means, since the distinction in the domains
proposed by the opponent is not correct. Or a bhāva: The word "or"
shows that bhāvabhāsa, bhāvaprasama, etc., are to be included. By all
means (sarvākāram): to be taken adverbially, "in any way." That
which is ornamented: and not an ornament (figure of speech).
1. Replace the comma after tāvat with a danda and replace the danda after kim atrocyaṭe with a comma. 2. BP: What is implied is that it could not otherwise be written about. There is no such thing as does not provoke some sort of mental state or thought.

A Furthermore,

K Whatever depends on the predominant sense should be regarded as qualities (gunaś). On the other hand, whatever resides in the non-predominant sense should be considered as ornaments (figures of speech), just like bracelets, etc.

A Whatever matters depend on the predominant sense [of a poem], which [sense] will be a rasa or the like, are called qualities, just as courage, etc. [are called qualities of the human soul]. On the other hand, whatever matters reside in the constituent elements [of the poem], namely, the words and their literal meanings, are to be considered ornaments (i.e., figures of speech). just as bracelets, etc. [are considered ornaments of the body].

L An ornament must be admitted to be different from that which is ornamented, for this is what we find in the ordinary world, just as a quality is different from [the substance] which possesses the quality. Furthermore, the use of the words quality and ornament is possible only where there is something that may be qualified and something that may be adorned. Now it is only by our theory that this usage can be seen to be logical. With these two propositions in mind,¹ he says: Furthermore. The word has the sense of addition, i.e., it is not only the
arguments already given\textsuperscript{2} that show that \textit{rasa} must be predominant, for there are others as well. The \textit{K\text{"{a}}rik\text{"{a}}} too can be brought into accord with these two propositions. However, in regard to the first, the first half of the \textit{K\text{"{a}}rik\text{"{a}}} should be explained as an illustration.\textsuperscript{3} The text of the \textit{Vr\text{"{i}}tti} should also be explained in this way.

1. The two propositions are: (a) An \textit{ala\text{"{n}}k\text{"{a}}ra} (figure of speech) must be different from the \textit{ala\text{"{n}}k\text{"{a}}rya} (the body of poetry); (b) One can only speak of an \textit{ala\text{"{n}}k\text{"{a}}ra} and a \textit{guna} (poetic quality) where an \textit{ala\text{"{n}}k\text{"{a}}rya} and a \textit{guna} (viz., \textit{rasa} or the like) are present. 2. It is not clear just what arguments (\textit{yuktij\text{"{a}}tam}) Abhinava is referring to. But \textit{yukti} refers to something less than formal proof (\textit{s\text{"{a}}dhana}), e.g., to circumstantial proof and analogy, and one can find arguments of this sort for the predominance of \textit{rasa} in the comments on 2.5. Even when the main purport of a sentence is a mere thing, it will lead eventually to \textit{rasa} if the sentence deserves the name of poetry. The two new propositions are more in the nature of formal proof. 3. The first half of the \textit{K\text{"{a}}rik\text{"{a}}} does not state the proposition that an \textit{ala\text{"{n}}k\text{"{a}}ra} must be different from an \textit{ala\text{"{n}}k\text{"{a}}rya}, but illustrates it by the analogy: a \textit{guna} is that which depends on a \textit{guna}.

\textit{K} It is just \textit{sr\text{"{i}}ng\text{"{a}}ra} (the flavor of love) that is the sweetest and most delightful \textit{flavor} (\textit{rasa}). Sweetness (\textit{m\text{"{a}}dhurya}) has its seat in poetry that is full of this \textit{flavor}.\textsuperscript{4}
1. The old vocabulary of poetic criticism is here preserved, but it is made to express new relations. From the time of Bharata the critics spoke of the qualities or virtues (guna) of poetry. The early critics emphasized the qualities of sound. Later, qualities of meaning came in for their share of attention. But in all these critics the qualities were considered virtues in themselves. Now the Dhvanyāloka reduces the ten qualities of Bharata to three: sweetness (mādhurya), force (ojas), and clarity (prasāda); and it regards them as virtues only insofar as they lead the audience to rasa. This is Ānanda's position: the qualities reside in the sound and sense but depend on, exist only for the production of, the rasa. Abhinava goes even further, saying that the qualities are ultimately qualities of the rasa, of the experience itself. Their names are then applied metonymously to the sound and the sense that bring about such an experience.

A The rasa of love is sweet in comparison with the other rasas, because it gives delight. The quality known as sweetness is attributed to a poem if the poem consists of words and meanings which reveal this flavor. As for being pleasing to the ear, this characteristic belongs to [the poetic quality] force (ojas) also.

L Now it might be claimed that the qualities sweetness and the like belong to word and meaning. One may therefore ask how these qualities were said to depend on the predominant element, namely a rasa or the like [see 2.6]. Anticipating this question, he says: so also. He means that this [dependency] is perfectly reasonable because of the particular refutation [of the old-fashioned view] that our author has in mind and that he is about to announce.

[Commentary on K] "It is just śṛṅgāra, etc." He gives the reason why it is called sweet with the words "most delightful." For in all creatures: gods, animals, men, and the like, there is an unbroken proclivity (vāsanā) towards the emotion of love (rati).1 Accordingly, there is no one who is not inclined to respond sympathetically to it. Even an ascetic can be struck by its charm. And so it is said to be sweet. For a sweet substance, such as sugar or the like, when it comes in contact with the tongue, will immediately prove desirable to everyone, wise or foolish, healthy or sick. "Full of this": viz., that poem in which śṛṅgāra is the main concern of the poet and is conveyed through suggestion as the essence of the poem.2 "Poetry," i.e., both word and sense. "Has its seat": takes its seat. This is as much as to say that in reality what is
called sweetness is a quality only of the rasa, such as srngâra, etc. This [quality] has been metaphorically transferred to the word and meaning which are suggestive of this sweet relish. For the definition of sweetness is the capacity of words and meanings to suggest the sweet relish of love [etc.]. Therefore it was correct to say, "whatever depends on," etc. [2.6 K].

[Commentary on A] The Vṛtti gives the meaning of the Kārikā: The rasa of love, [etc.]. Now sweetness has been defined [by Bhāmaha 2.3, where he says]: "That [poem] which is pleasing to the ear and which does not contain many compound words and compound ideas is what is called sweet." Our author rejects this with the words pleasing to the ear, etc. He uses "pleasing to the ear" as an abbreviation of the whole definition of Bhāmaha. Belongs to force also: for in the verse "Whatever man proud of his strong arm," [which is an example of force,] there is both pleasingness to the ear and absence of long compounds.

1. All creatures have had some previous experience, if not in this life at least in some previous life, of rati. This has left them with a latent proclivity toward this emotion, a predisposition to be affected by the stimulants of this emotion. 2. To speak in simple terms, Abhinava is rejecting the sense "poetry which is full of this relish" and substituting the sense "poetry in which this relish forms the essence." To speak in technical terms, Abhinava is rejecting the Kāśikā's interpretation of Pan. 5.4.21: tatprakṛtvacane mayat. Here the Kāśikā says that prakṛta means prācuryena prastutam. Thus the sūtra means, according to the Kāśikā, "the suffix mayat [may be added to a word designating a substance when we wish] to express that there is an abundance [of that substance]." Abhinava, on the other hand, wishes to take prakṛta to mean ātmatvena prakṛta and would understand the sūtra to mean "... when we wish to express that the substance forms the essence [of something]." 3. The verse will be given in full in 2.9 A.

§ 2.8 K

In the rasa of love in separation and that of compassion (karuna) sweetness is intense. This is because in these cases the heart is softened to a greater degree.
A  In both these rasas, sweetness alone [of the qualities] is at its most intense, because the heart of the sensitive audience is overcome [by these rasas] to a greater degree.

L  As the relish of love in separation is sweeter than that of love in union, and the relish of compassion is sweeter still, it follows that the higher degrees of sweetness of word and meaning are in reality their ability to suggest these [two forms of aesthetic experience]. It is with this in mind that he says, In the rasa of love, etc. And in that of compassion: the word "and" shows the sequence. Intense: what is meant is an intensity that progresses [in step with the sequence]. Softened: the meaning is that the heart of the sensitive audience hereby abandons its natural hardness, its imperviousness, its liability to the flame of anger and its passion (rāga) for the marvelous and for laughter. To a greater degree: to a progressively greater degree. This is as much as to say that in the relish of compassion the heart completely melts. Now an objector will question us: "If there is sweetness in the relish of compassion as well, how do you explain the fact that in the previous Kārikā the word "just" (eva) was used ["It is just śṛṅgāra," etc.]? Our reply is that this was not meant to exclude other rasas, but only to show that in strict fact poetic qualities such as sweetness and the like belong only to a rasa, the very soul [of poetry], and that only by extension are they attributed to words and meanings. This is what the use of "just" was meant to indicate.¹

The Vṛtti gives the sense of the Kārikā: in both these rasas, etc.

¹ Abhinava is quick to notice discrepancies of statement. But he does not rest content with noticing them, as a Western critic might do. He is a partisan of his author, so he hastens to defend him. He does so in the present case by suggesting that we understand the first half of 2.7 K to say "It is just the flavor (rasa) in śṛṅgāra that is sweet, not the words, etc."
The rasas of fury (raudra) and the like in poetry are characterized by excitement (dīpti). Strength (ojas) has its proper place in words and meanings that manifest this excitement.

A The rasas of fury and the like give rise to a high state of excitement, of inner flaring up, and so by metonymy (laksanā) it is said that these rasas themselves are "excitement" (dīpti). A word group capable of producing this excitement is a sentence adorned by the use of lengthy compounds, as for example:

The brutal war-club whirling in my arm
will crush both thighs of this Suyodhana.
so that he whose name is truly Bhīma
may deck your hair, my lady, with his hands
new-reddened in that fresh-congealing blood.

[Venīsamhāra 1.23]

Equally capable of producing this excitement, however, is a meaning which is expressed in lucid words, without recourse to a style of length; compounds, as for example:

 Whatever man proud of his strong arm
bears weapons in the Pāṇcāla clan: dotards,
children, down to babes in the very womb;
and whoever saw that deed:
I will slay them all when I come upon the field,
every man who fights me, though he be Death himself:
in blind fury will I be the death of Death!

[Venīsamhāra 3.32]

In both these and other similar examples there is strength.

1. All printed editions except Krishnamoorthy's read ucyate (singular); Krishnamoorthy takes the reading ucyante from his Moodabidre MS. Either reading may be justified, the former by taking the whole iti clause as the subject, the latter by taking ta eva as the subject. 2. The translation does not attempt to imitate the long compounds of the Sanskrit verse. For th
mise-en-scène see Editor’s Introduction, pp. 34–35, where the effect of heavy compounding in Sanskrit is also discussed. 3. That is, words which have the poetical quality prasāda (clarity). 4. In this verse Aśvatthāman is vowing vengeance for the treacherous killing of his father, Droṇa.

L  Fury and the like: the word ādi is used in the sense of “similar cases.” Thus the rasa of the heroic and that of the marvelous are included as well.1 Excitement is an apprehension characterized by radiance, expansion, and a blazing forth in the heart of the sensitive audience. It is what is primarily denoted by the word strength (ojas). Raudra and other similar rasas consist in the relishing of this excitement. They are characterized as effects, that is, they are distinguished from other rasas, by this excitement, this particular kind of relishing. Hence, by a metonymy which applies the name of the effect to its cause, raudra and similar rasas are called by the name “strength” (ojas). Then by resorting to a second metonymy, even a word-group which reveals excitement, namely a sentence with long compounds, is called “an excitement” (dīpti),3 for example, the verse “The brutal war-club whirling.” In addition to this, a meaning which produces excitement, being expressed by lucid, quickly intelligible words without recourse to compounds, is also called “an excitement” (dīpti), for example, the verse “Whatever man proud of his strong arm.”

[The brutal war club, etc.:] With this “brutal,” that is, cruel, war-club which will be wielded by my “whirling” arms, that is, arms circling with great speed; with the full attack of this war-club the “two thighs” will be simultaneously “samcūrṇita,” that is, completely crushed so that the man cannot stand up again. I shall so despise5 Suyodhana [= Duryodhana] of whom the thighs are in this condition that I will become one of whom the hands are “red,” crimson, with the blood that is “thick,” that is, does not run off because it comes from a deep [wound] and is not the thin liquid [of a superficial cut], and which will stick to my hands because it is “congealing,” that is, in the process of coagulating, there not having been time enough for it fully to dry. It is for just this reason that I shall be “Bhīma,” that is, one who strikes terror into the hearts of cowards. “Your” hair: of you, to whom so many insults were given—“my lady” shows how little deserving she was—I shall deck the hair, that is, I shall change it from its braided state and give it as it were a coronet of red flowers with the bits of blood falling from my hands. Thus we have an implied figure
of utpreksā (poetic fancy). By using the vocative "my lady," which reminds us that a noble woman was humiliated [by the Kauravas], the author has applied a stimulus (uddīpanavibhāva) to the relish of anger. Accordingly, in spite of the reference to a normally amorous act, the decking of a beloved's hair, one cannot suspect any suggestion of the relish of love. There is both despite of Suyodhana and an absence of any effort to strike him again with the war-club because his thighs will have been completely crushed [with the one blow]. The use of the word "congealing" suggests Bhima's impatience to wash away the grievance of Draupadi [before the blood even dries]. From the long compound flowing in an uninterrupted stream and allowing [the hearer] no pause in all its course, there results an apprehension of the whole scene as unity up to the scorn of the broken-thighed Suyodhana. This serves to intensify the impression of Bhima's violence. Other commentators, we may note, take suyodhanasya as a possessive genitive and explain that Bhima's hands will be reddened by the thick blood "of" Suyodhana.

Whatever man proud of the strength of his own arm and [fighting among the (Pāṇḍava) regiments] this refers to such warriors as Arjuna. Because Drona was killed by Drśṭadyumna, the son of the Pāṇcā king, Āśvatthāman is especially incensed against that clan. "Whoever saw that deed" refers to such as Karna. [Now we may understand carati mayi rane in either of two ways:] (1) when battle is to be engaged, whoever comes against me, that is, interferes with my fighting or (2) when I am moving in battle, whoever opposes or resists me. Such a man [will I kill] even if he were the death of all creatures, how much more if he were a mere mortal or a god. Here the anger [of the speaker] rises to the highest pitch [by a progression] from word to word, through meanings which, being presented separately, are reflected upon by the hearer in succession. And so the very absence of compounds acts as cause of dipti.

By showing that sweetness (mādhurya) and excitement (dīpti = ojā strength) are opposed to each other in love and fury, our author would indicate that in comedy (hāṣya), the fearsome (bhayānaka), the loathsome (bibhatsa), and peace (sānta), these qualities exist together varying proportions. So far as comedy is subordinate to love, sweetness will predominate; and so far as it partakes of the nature of expansion (vikāsa), strength will predominate; so the two qualities come to equal in that genre. In the fearsome, although that rasa consists in broken (bhagna) state of mind, the stimulant (vibhāva) is exciteme
and so strength is greater and sweetness less [in that rasa]. The same applies to the loathsome. But for the rasa of peace there is a great variety of determinants, so that sometimes strength will predominate and sometimes sweetness. Such are the distinctions [among the rasas].

1. BP and Mahādevaśāstri (see Text, p. 208, footnote) are worried by this statement because the relish of the marvelous should produce rāga rather than dipti according to what Abhinava has just said (2.8 L; Text, p. 208, line 1 of Locana). But we need not suppose the characteristics of the separate rasas to be so rigidly departmentalized. 2. A lakṣitalaṅkanā is a second laṅkanā which comes into effect after a first laṅkanā has already operated. 3. Observe how elaborately Abhinava has complicated the natural sense of these words. To take the words naturally, ojas (strength) is a property of words and meanings which enables them to produce a rasa of fury or of the heroic. This rasa is characterized by dipti (excitement, or, literally, “inflammation”). But in Abhinava’s explanation, dipti and ojas become synonyms. Dipti is what ojas primarily means and ojas denotes primarily the result of an experience. The word ojas (or dipti) is then transferred by metonymy to the experience, the relishing, itself. Then by a second metonymy dipti (or ojas) is transferred to the words and meanings that produce the experience. 4. Abhinava uses the word gamako to paraphrase the word prasanna used in the Vṛtti [Text, p. 211, line 1]; so it means yhatīṛthabodhaka (BP) “instantaneously conveying the intended sense.” Abhidhiyamāna paraphrases the abhidheya of the Vṛtti. 5. As will appear from his further comments, Abhinava is taking the genitive suyodhanasya as anādare āsāthi (Pān. 2.3.38) and eliciting some such meaning as “I shall so despise Suyodhana in his weakness that I will wash my hands in his blood.” This is of course an unwarrantable extension of what Pāṇini means by the genitive absolute of despite. Furthermore, this genitive in actual use almost always contains a participle, e.g., rudato ‘vrājit. “despite his (father’s) weeping he became a monk.” The Kāśikā actually insists on the presence of a verb form. The interpretation probably appealed to Abhinava on two grounds. It avoids construing suyodhanasya with the subordinate member of a compound, śoni; and it intensifies the raudrarasa. Abhinava uses a similar interpretation for the locative, 3.10–14 c L and note 1, 3.24 L and note 2. 6. No iva is used, so it is not a direct upreksā. But the red blood reminds the hearer of red flowers, so that a fancy is suggested. 7. The reading bhagna of Pāṭhak’s edition seems better than the magna of our text or the bhaya of Tripathi’s. The point would be that in relishing fear, our mind, it is true, is reduced to weakness: but as it is strong stimulation that so weakend it, strength plays a predominant part in literature of that genre. 8. Under 4.5 Ānanda will assign the Mahābhārata to the genre of peace because its varied scenes lead our minds by a sort of catharsis to
an attitude of peace. Of the Mahābhārata one may well say that strength sometimes predominates and sometimes sweetness.

\[ \text{\textsection 2.10 L} \]\n
\(K\) A poem's ability to communicate [to the reader] any rasa, an ability which is found operative in all rasas and styles, is called clarity (prasāda).

\(A\) Clarity is clearness both of word and meaning. And while it is a quality common to all rasas and common to all structures (racanā) we should restrict it primarily to its connection with the suggested sense.\(^1\)

1. Here again the vocabulary is traditional but the idea is new; cf. 2.7 F note. Clarity is generally taken by the older critics to be a quality of meaning; only Vāmana added a "clarity" of sound. This clarity was regarded as a virtue in itself without regard to what was being clarified. The Dhvanyāloka now defines it primarily in terms of rasa. Clarity belongs only to that word and meaning which clearly reveal a rasa. It is common to all rasas, that is, it is found in the words and meanings which produce all rasas. In this respect it differs from sweetness and force, which have more restricted domains. In saying that it is common to all structures, Ānanda may be making a criticism of Vāmana (3.1.6), who believed the sabdaguna prasāda to consist in an uncompounded structure.

\(L\) Ability to communicate, literally an ability to communicate (arpakatva) that is complete (samyak), is the ability to fill (vyāpakatva)\(^1\) the hearer quickly with a sympathetic response by entering into him, as fire quickly pervades dry wood, or water pervades a clean cloth. This lack of impurity, this lucidity, is a quality of all the rasas. By metaphorical extension the word clarity is also used of the power, possessed by both words and meaning, to communicate suggested meanings of that sort (viz., rasas).
The Vṛtti explains: Clarity, etc. Anticipating an objector who might ask how this purity that belongs to the rasas can be attributed to words and meanings, he says, And it is, etc. The word “and” is here restrictive [i.e., is used in the sense of eva]. In its primary sense clarity is a quality only of all the rasas and only this quality is such [sc., common to all the rasas]. [In a secondary sense] clarity is common to all structures both of word and sense, whether they make use of many compounds or none. Primarily: This ability to communicate can be intended only with reference to the suggested meaning, not others, for what is so wonderful in a word’s communicating its literal sense that one should use the word “quality” or “virtue” of such a word? This is what our author has in mind.

Thus according to Bhāmaha [2.1-3] only three qualities were accepted: sweetness, strength, and clarity. And these three qualities refer primarily to the relishing of the audience. By metaphor their names are extended to that which is enjoyed, namely the rasa [in that word’s sense of object rather than process], and even further to the words and meanings which suggest this rasa. This is the essence of what he means to say.

1. We follow BP in reading vyāpakatvam in place of vyāpārakatvam; cf. the use of vyāpyate in the verse from which the analogy of fire and dry wood is taken (BhnŚ 7.7, quoted Dhv. 1.1 e L, Text, p. 39, lines 2-3). 2. Remove the danda after drṣṭāntena and place it after ca. For the first analogy see previous footnote. The second is used by Mammaṭa 8.70 (Jhalkikar p. 476), who has doubtless taken it from Abhinava, as is clear from the commentary of Śrīdhara, p. 277. The sense is that if a clean cloth is put into water, it will quickly absorb the water, whereas if the cloth is greasy the water will not easily be absorbed. Cf. Jhalkikar, p. 476: svacchajalavat—jalam yathā svacchām patam sahasatva vyāprnīti malināpate jalasyāprasārāt tadvat. 3. This sense of ca has the authority of Paṭanājali, Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇ. 2.1.16. Kaiyāṭa justifies it by the fact that “particles have many meanings” (anekārthatvān nipātāntām). Abhinava not only takes the word here in this unnatural sense, but he reads it twice (by āvṛtti or tantra) so that it may restrict both rasa-sādhanāna and sa gūṇāh. 4. BP: the first restriction rules out its being a property of word and meaning; the second restriction rules out sweetness and strength.
§ 2.11

K And those faults such as indelicacy of sound, which have been shown [by earlier writers] to be relative, are found in [their] illustrations to be shunned only in the essence of dхvani [and there only] in the rasa of love.

1. None of the commentators or translators remarks on this little word "and." It would seem to connect the present Kārikā with the immediately preceding Vṛtti in a way that can be shown by the following paraphrase. "The designation of clarity should be restricted primarily to the suggested meaning and the relative faults also are faults only where the meaning is suggested."

2. Four faults are intended, as first listed by Bhāmaha 1.44: śrutiduṣṭa, artha-duṣṭa, kalpanaduṣṭa, and śrutakaṣṭa. They are explained below by L.

3. That is to say, indelicacy of sound and the like are faults only in vivakṣitānyaparuvācyadhvani where the vyāngya is śrṅgārārasa.

A Faults such as indelicacy of sound, which have been indicated to be relative, also need not be shunned when the literal meaning is the sole object, nor when a meaning other than the rasa of love is intended, nor when the rasa of love is not suggested by that type called the soul of dḥvani. It is seen from illustrations that these faults are to be avoided only in the soul of suggestion, when love is suggested as the primary element [of the poem]. If this were not the case, these faults would not be relative.

So now the essence of dḥvani, where suggestion is indicated without apparent sequence (asamlaksyakramavyāngya), has been shown in general terms.

L Having previously shown that the distinction in usage between the words "quality" (guna) and "ornament" (alankāra) is a logical one only if one accepts our position (see 2.6 L), our author now sets forth to show that the distinction of absolute and relative faults also makes sense in our position only. Such as indelicacy of sound (śrutiduṣṭa): Words like vānta (vomited) are indelicate of sound because
they bring to mind objects that one does not speak of in polite company. Indelicacies of meaning (*arthaduṣṭa*) are such as cause us to understand something indecent because of the purport of the sentence as a whole. An example is [the ambiguous verse]: “Seeking his chance, the great proud [man] advanced to the attack,” [which can also mean “Seeking for the hole, the great stiff (penis) advanced to the attack”]. An indelicate arrangement (*kalpanādūṣṭa*) occurs by the arranging of two words: for example *kuru rucim* (do what you like) if arranged in reverse. Harshness of sound (*śrutikāṣṭa*) is seen in such words as *adhākṣīt* (has burned), *akṣautsīt* (has stamped), *tṛṇedhī* (pierces). The relish of love is meant to include other appropriate rasas as well, because these faults are avoided in other rasas such as the heroic, the peaceful, the marvelous, etc.

Have been indicated: The early authors have not shown the relativity of these faults by showing any distinction in the areas [where they may and where they may not be used]. Neither have they shown how they differ from such [absolute] faults as error in meter, nor have they really shown how they differ from virtue. Our position is that they are allowable in the relish of disgust, of comedy, and of fury; and that they are to be shunned in the relish of love and the like. This explains why they are called relative. Such is what our author has in mind.

1. Place a *danda* after *śrutiduṣṭa* instead of *hetavah*. 2. I.e., *rucim kuru*. BP says that *cirkū* means the clitoris. The word is not listed in *PW*. Bhāmaha’s example involves no reversal but merely an infelicitous juxtaposition: *sa sauryābharanāḥ* “this ornament of courage,” which brings together the syllables *yābha*, the vulgar Sanskrit word for sexual intercourse. 3. An indecent ambiguity might be a virtue in a comic verse; one can easily find examples in the anthologies. As for Abhinava’s negations, they are all strictly true of Bhāmaha. Bhāmaha admits that some of these faults may appear as virtues in just the right context (1.54–55) and he gives us two or three examples. But he states no general principle such as is stated here by Ānanda.
The varieties of the elements subordinate to this [rasa or the like] and the varieties within itself, when one imagines all their possible combinations with one another, are infinite.

It has been stated that a rasa or the like when suggested as the main element of a poem constitutes the very soul of that type of dhvani in which the literal meaning, though intended, is subordinate to a second meaning. Of its subordinate elements, namely the figures of speech which are based on word or meaning, there are endless varieties. And of the main element itself, the varieties, namely the rasas. bhāvas, rasābhāsas, bhāvabhāsas, bhāvapraśamas, taken together with the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicārins which produce these rasas, etc., are endless, having no limit in respect to the bases [in which they may be portrayed].

Now if one were to consider all the possible combinations of these [two sets of] varieties, one could not count up the varieties of a single rasa, much less of all. Thus, of the rasa śṛṅgāra there are two main categories to begin with: love in union (sambhoga-śṛṅgāra) and love in separation (vipralambhaśṛṅgāra). Of love in union there are the varieties represented by the lovers' looking at each other lovingly, their sexual enjoyment, their recreation, and so on. Of love in separation we have yearning in separation, the separation caused by jealousy, by love quarrels, by exile, and so on. And all of these may be divided according to the vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicārins in each case. And as there are differences of these according to the base in some location and the stage in some time-span [in which and at which they occur], even this one single rasa will prove to be endless in respect to the varieties which exist within itself. How much more so if we take account of the varieties of its subordinate elements! For if we consider all the varieties of subordinate elements [i.e., all the figures of speech] in their possible combinations with the varieties of each main element [i.e., with each rasa, bhāva, etc.], we shall surely arrive at infinity.
1. *svāṣrayāpeksayā* (Text, p. 215, line 6) cannot mean "when considered in themselves," as Jacobi seems to have taken it, for that much is already implied by *svāgatās* in line 4. Ānanda expands the phrase on page 217, line 2 into *desakālādyāṣrayāvasthābheda iti svāgatabhedāpeksayā*. In both cases *svāṣraya* must refer to the *āṣraya*, the physical base, in which the *vibhāvas*, etc., reside. In the expansion Ānanda has added a reference also to their residence in time, that is, to the various stages of the emotion. There are notably nine stages of love in separation before the subject dies of it. Now the spatially qualified residences of the emotions can scarcely be anything else than the characters in whom the emotions are displayed, "the appropriate male and female characters," as Abhinava puts it. But Abhinava strangely misinterprets the expanded phrase. See below. 2. It may be well to give literal translations of these technical terms. *Sambhogasṛtigāra* is literally love in enjoyment; *vipralambhasṛtigāra* love in frustration. For *vipralambha* means literally *varṇa-,* deception, frustration. The subtypes of love in frustration are *abhilāsa-vipralambha:* frustration that takes the form of yearning; *īṛṣyavipralambha:* frustration caused by the jealously of the woman; *vrahanvipralambha:* frustration caused by the woman's intentional separation (*vraha*) of herself from her lover; and *pravāsanvipralambha:* frustration caused by the man's leaving home (because of tour of duty, exile, etc.).

*L* Subordinate elements: that is, figures of speech. Within itself: belonging to itself (*ātmagata*), such as love in union and love in separation, and belonging to what belongs to itself (*ātmīyagata*), that is, whatever belongs to the *vibhāvas*, etc. One could not compute all the relations of principal and subordinate even by a marker and table of elements. 1

The bases: what is meant are such bases as the appropriate male and female characters. Looking at each other lovingly implies other varieties as well, such as talking together, etc. Sexual enjoyment is divided into sixty-four items, beginning with the (eight) embraces. 2 Recreation: that is, walking in the park. "And so on" will include such activities as water sports, drinking parties, watching the moonrise, games, etc. Yearning in separation is when a mutual love (*rati*) has arisen in a man and woman such that each values the other as his own life and when for some reason they are unable to meet, as in the case of the King of Vatsa and Ratnāvalī in the *Ratnāvalī* from the passage "Why do you ask whether she pleases me?" onward. But not before that passage in the play, because when mutual love (*rati*) is absent, one can speak only of the stage of physical desire (*kāma*). Separation caused by jealousy is to be taken as the estrangement of a woman.
who has been injured by her lover's infidelity, etc. Separation caused by a love-quarrel refers to an experience with just such a woman, who has not accepted her lover's attempts to placate her and who is subsequently filled with remorse and longing because of his absence. Separation caused by exile refers to a husband's love for his wife whom he has left at home. "And so on" will include separation caused by a curse, etc. The word vipralamha is used in a secondary sense to mean that which is "like a deception," for in a deception one fails to gain one's object; and such is the case here. Of these means "of love-in-union, etc." on the one hand and "of the vibhāvas, etc." on the other.

If we were to take the base (āsaya) to mean a geographical location such as the Malaya Mountain which is the location of a vibhāva such as the Malaya breeze, its sense would already have been anticipated by the word "location" (desā). Therefore it is best to take "base" in the sense of "cause." An example [of such variety of cause] is found in a verse of mine:

I have kept this garland woven by my love close to my heart.
Even as it fades, it drips ambrosia to dispel my pain of loneliness.

This one: viz., śrīgāra. Main element: what is meant are the rasas; if we consider all the possible combinations with the various rasas.

1. For lostaprastrāranyāya see Jacob, Vol. 1, p. 44. The losta (piece of clay or pebble) is the marker that was moved from one position to the next to count up the number of possibilities. Abhinava uses the maxim again 3.161 L. 2. This is the dictum of the Bābhārviyas, Kāmasūtra 2.2.4 (Kashi ed. 2.2.5). The editor of our Text, Pandit Paṭṭābhīraśastra, lists the sixty-four items in his footnote p. 216. 3. As in the Śārundala. 4. See above, 2.12 A, note 2. 5. It is difficult to see why Abhinava chooses this most improbable interpretation. We have explained our interpretation above (2.12 A, note 1). Even the interpretation to which Abhinava objects, presumably by some earlier commentator, is preferable to his, for Abhinava must interpret teṣām desākālādyāśrayāṇavasthābheda to mean "difference of these [aspects of love] brought about by place, time, etc., and by causes and stages." As an example of variety of cause, he cites a verse in which a garland acts as a peculiar cause (uddipana-vibhāva) of vipralambha śrīgāra in that by reminding the lover of his beloved it pains him, but through his knowledge that she has made it it assuages his pain.
A mere indication will be given here, by which the minds of persons of education and taste may be furnished with a criterion for all other cases.

Because persons of education and taste, if by a mere indication they recognize the correct relation of subordinate and predominant between the figures of speech and one particular rasa [viz., srngâra] will have a criterion for their judgment in all other cases.

By which: sc., by which indication. Persons of taste: he has in mind those who wish to become great poets and connoisseurs. For all cases: this should be construed with the bahuvrihi compound to mean: a judgment by which a criterion, an understanding, a correct educated view, has been obtained with regard to all rasas and the like.

1. That is, the instruction is addressed both to writers and readers.

This being the case, [we will state that]

Alliteration used continuously in the same form, because of its laboredness, is not helpful in revealing love in any of its varieties when this love is [intended to be] predominant.
§ 2.15 A ]

A The varieties of love when it is predominant have been given. In all these varieties, alliteration used continuously and always in the same form is not suggestive. By the use of the word "predominant" it is implied that the continuous use of alliteration in the same form is permissible when love is subordinate.

L This being the case: i.e., since we are about to give an indication. Because of its laboredness: because it can be accomplished only by labor; he means this as a reason [why such alliteration is ineffective]. He uses the phrase "the same form" to indicate that if one abandons this monotony and composes in varied alliterations, this will not constitute a fault.

K In love, when it is the soul of suggestive poetry, the use of echoing alliteration (yamakas)¹ and the like, even if the author is well able to compose them, is [what can only be excused as] carelessness on his part, especially in love-in-separation.

1. Yamaka is the repetition of a set of phonemes in the same order. If the sets bear meaning (i.e., if they form complete words), their meanings must differ.

A In love, the very soul of suggestive poetry when it is suggested as the primary sense by words and meanings [which are subordinate], the use of yamakas and similar figures, such as difficult [arrangements],¹ or puns involving the breaking up of words in two different ways,² even if the author is well able to compose them, is carelessness on his part. The word "carelessness" implies that while a solitary instance of yamaka may occur by accident, this figure should not be used in abundance as subordinate to a rasa in the way that other figures of speech may be used. By saying "especially in love-in-separation" it is shown that love-in-separation is exceptionally delicate. When it is being suggested, a subordinate yamaka or the like should not be employed.
1. We have translated duskara as a noun, rather than as an adjective, in accordance with Abhinava’s interpretation and with Ánanda’s use of the word in 2.16 (yamakaduskaramārgesu). 2. A simple pun (sabdaslesa) would be, for example, the word guna used so as to mean both bowstring and virtue. A sabdabhāṅgaslesa is a more complicated pun, a word that can be divided in different ways, e.g., aśoka (= the aśoka tree, or = a-soka “not grief”).

L Yamakas and the like: the word ādi refers to similar figures. Difficult (arrangements): e.g., verses shaped like drums or wheels. Puns involving the breaking up of words: note that a simple ambiguity (arthaslesa) is not a fault, as in the example “You are rakta.” Even in puns involving the breaking up of words in two ways it is only the difficult ones that make for a fault, not [an easy pun] like aśoka.

1. Most of the handbooks of alankāras give descriptions of these citrabandhas. The drum-shape can be read zigzag as well as linearly. See the illustration in the Kashi ed. of Śiśupāla facing p. 716. See also 3.41-42 A and note 1. 2. An arthaślesa is not a pun but an ambiguous word, usually an adjective which can apply to two different substantives. It is distinguished from a pun (sabdaslesa) by the fact that the effect remains the same even when we substitute a synonym. 3. The example will be quoted in context 2.18-19c A. 4. See the example quoted in 2.18–19c A.

A The reason for this is:

K Only a figure which can be composed in the course of one's preoccupation with rasa and that requires no separate effort in itself is acceptable as an ornament in suggestive poetry.
Although the emergence of a given figure of speech may seem wonderful, it may still be acceptable as an ornament in the type of suggestive poetry in which the passage from literal to suggested meaning is unnoticed, if it can be produced through one's very preoccupation with rasa. For only this sort of figure is, in the real sense of the term, a subordinate element of rasa. For example:

Your palm erases from your cheek the painted ornament
and sighs have drunk the ambrosial flavor of your lip;
the tears that choke you agitate your breast:
anger has become your lover, stubborn one, in place of me.

[Amaruśataka 81; SRK 664, etc.]

Inasmuch as a figure that is subordinate to a rasa is characterized by the fact that no separate effort is required on the part of the poet to create it, it follows that if a poet who is concentrating on putting together a rasa should leave that trend of thought and apply himself to some other effort, the figure that might result would not be subordinate to the rasa. When one intentionally and repeatedly makes yamakas, there invariably is involved the undertaking of a separate effort, which takes the form of searching for the particular words that will fit. To the objection that the same will hold true of other figures of speech, we say not at all; other figures, even those which are difficult when described, will rush to present themselves to a poet of imaginative genius precisely while he is concentrating his mind on the rasa. An example is the passage in the Kādambarī where Kādambarī is [first] seen [by the hero]; again, in the Setubandha where Queen Sītā is shocked by the illusion of the severed head of Rāma. And this stands to reason, for rasa is suggested by particular meanings and by words that convey these meanings. Now it is figures of speech such as rūpaka (metaphor) and the like that are the particular meanings which are able to reveal rasa. Therefore they are not extraneous devices in helping to suggest these rasa. On the other hand, this [character of being extraneous] does attach to yamakas and difficult arrangements of words. As for those few yamakas and the like which are found to possess rasa, those are cases of the rasa's being subordinate and where the yamaka or the like is the predominant element. In rasabhāsa, of course, it does not contradict [our theory] for a yamaka to be used as a subordinate element. But when rasa is to be suggested and is to be of primary
important, yamakas and the like cannot be subordinated to the rasa because they require of the poet a separate effort.

The following is a verse-summary of the matter.

A great poet can produce with a single effort some matters that contain rasa together with figures of speech. But for composing yamakas and the like, he must make a separate effort even if he is well able to compose them. Therefore these figures cannot play a part subordinate to rasa. There is no objection to using yamakas and the like as elements subordinate to rasābhāsa. But this subordination is impossible in the case of love, the soul of suggestive poetry.

1. The point of citing the verse is that it contains several figures of speech which detract in no way from the overall rasa, which is love in separation caused by jealousy (īrsyānipralambha). The figures are ambiguity (arthaśleṣa), metaphor (rūpaka: the anger acting like a lover), and contrast (vyatireka: anger is your lover, not I). 2. atyūhya: according to Pāṇ. 7.4.23 the ā should be shortened: atyūhya. 3. Remove the danda after ākkeṣtavyāḥ and place it after śabdaih. The tat in tatpratīdakāḥ refers to vācyaviśeṣa. The tat in tatprakāsīnāḥ refers to rasas.

L The reason: what is meant is a general principle. Only, etc.: on the road to rasa it is only what one happens on directly, as one is fitting the vibhāvas and the like into the combined1 form of rasa, that can serve as ornament. Accordingly, yamakas and the like are always an obstruction to the rasa (aesthetic experience) both of the poet and of the reader, [not only in śṛṅgāra but] also in the heroic, the marvelous, and other rasas. That our author spoke [in 2.15] of avoiding those figures especially in love-in-separation was doubtless for the purpose of drawing the attention of persons who are in the rut of tradition and who have not attained the height of good taste.2 And so in what follows he will speak in very general terms, saying, “therefore these figures cannot play a part subordinate to rasa.”

The emergence: what he means is its self-generation through the favor of genius without any apparent making of it. May seem wonderful: that is, one wonders how it could have been formed.

[In the verse quoted from Amaru] a lady is described as resting her face on her tender hand, her lower lip pale because of her sighs, her throat choked by a welling stream of tears, and her breast shaken by her steady sobbing. The lady, unwilling to renounce her anger, is being
appeased by the speaker with flattering compliments. And while he does so his mind concentrates on relishing the symptoms (anubhāvas) [which appear in the lady] of this love in separation caused by jealousy. To this speaker [who is here the poet] such figures of speech as ambiguity, metaphor and contrast emerge effortlessly and cause no interruption of his relish, any more than they do of the relish of the reader.

Characterized: he means invariably characterized. Repeatedly (prabandhena): the word construes with the word “being made” (kri-yamāne); and since that which is made repeatedly must be made with intent, he uses the word “intentionally.” A separate effort: an effort other than that of joining one component with another into a rasa. These spontaneous figures are described as being difficult (nirūpyamānāni durghaṭanāni), that is to say, even if one wishes to make them one could scarcely do so. And they are difficult when described (nirūpyamāne durghaṭanāni), that is to say, they arouse the reader’s wonder at their having been made. Will rush to present themselves (ahampūrvikayā parāpatanti): the Sanskrit term derives from the phrase “me first!” meaning “I will go first.” The abstraction of this is ahampūrvikā, meaning a situation where each one seeks to go first. The element aham is a particle of the same phonetic structure as an inflected form of “I” and with the meaning of “I.” This: viz., this rush to present themselves. Those few refers to those used by Kālidāsa and others.

[In the verse summary] even if he is well able construes with “he must make a separate effort,” not with with what follows. These refers to yamakas and the like. What was said above [in 2.15-16] is here summarized in its essentials in the half verse: in the case of love, the soul of suggestion.

1. samavadhāna is a technical term of Nyāya meaning co-presence, e.g., the presence of z together (with y) in z. See Upaskāra on Vaiś Ś. 3.1.12 and 3.2.1 (p. 103, line 11); or Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvali p. 167. line 2. Abhinava’s use of the term here is very precise. He means when one is forming a vibhāva or the like so as to fit with the co-presence (the presence of all the other elements: anubhāvas, vyabhicārins) required in a given rasa. He uses the same word again eleven lines farther on. 2. Abhinava imagines the author to be reasoning as follows. Yamaka is so well-loved a figure that it will be impossible to convince a conservative that it should be abandoned in all good poetry. I may be able, however, to make him see that its most glaring misuses are in bad taste. 3. Abhinava’s intention here is to guard against taking prabandhena directly with buddhipūrvakam. It is not that the poet constantly
has the intention of making yamakas, but that he makes them constantly and we therefore infer that he makes them intentionally. 4. The doctrine of vibhaktipratirūpakanipātas goes back to a Ganasūtra on Pāṇ. 1.4.57. It is useful in justifying irregular and idiomatic expressions. To take the present case: if the aham in ahampūrvakayā were the real pronoun aham, it would have to shift to its stem-form mad in the the compound (Pāṇ. 7.2.98). 5. As in Raghuvamsa 9.1–54.

A Now it is shown that a whole group of ornaments (i.e., figures of speech) can suggest love, the soul of dhvani.1

1. I.e., can suggest śṛṅgārarasa as the predominant meaning of a sentence. See 2.2 K, note 1.

K The whole group of ornaments such as metaphor and the like, when they are used with circumspection in śṛṅgārarasa, the soul of dhvani, will merit their name.

A An ornament is said to be a factor that beautifies the element of primary importance [i.e., the rasa] just as an external ornament [e.g., an earring or bracelet beautifies the person]. The whole group of expressed figures1 such as metaphor and the like, both those that have been described [in the past] and those that will be described by anyone in the future—for figures of speech are endless—this whole group is such that if any of them is introduced [in a poem] with circumspection, it may serve as a source of beauty for all the varieties of suggestion where the passage from the literal meaning to the suggested meaning is unperceived (alakṣyakramavyāngya).
§ 2.18–19 A]

1. vācyālarikāra, expressed figures, as opposed to suggested figures of speech, which will be treated in 2.25–27.

L Now: he has in mind that the things to be avoided have been stated and that it is now time to state the things which should be sought. Can suggest: supply "which" and "how," [so as to understand the passage as "it is shown which group of ornaments can suggest love and how they can suggest it"]. Merit their name means to merit their name as causes of beauty. That have been described: sc., by Bhāmaha and others who have given definitions of the figures of speech. And those that will be described: he gives the reason for this in the words "for figures of speech are endless." He means that they will be described by other critics, for [critical genius] is endless.

A Now this is the circumspection [that is needed] in introducing a figure:

K The intention must be to keep them subordinate [or helpful] and never acting as the chief element; they should be taken up and dropped at the proper time and should never be oversustained; when sustained [throughout a verse] special care should be taken to insure their subordination [or helpfulness]: these are the means of insuring the subordination of the figures metaphor and the like.

A A figure of speech which a poet intends as subordinate will be able to manifest a rasa, as in this example where the poet gives great care to the forming of the rasa:
Many times you touch
the trembling corner of her eye,
as if telling secrets
buzzing in her ear,
or, while she shakes her hands,
drinking Love's treasure in her lip.
Here I am cursed with asking questions,
while you, O bee, have entered heaven.

[Kālidāsa, Śākuntala 1.20]

for here the figure svabhāvokti (naturalistic description) of the bee is
totally harmonious with the rasa.

1. "Will be able to manifest a rasa" is the conclusion of the sentence,
found nine pages later (Text, p. 233, line 5). For the analysis of this sentence,
which we have broken up, see Abhinava's remarks below.

L By the word circumspection1 he means what is stated in
the Kārikā. In the first śloka and a half [of the two Kārikās] we
have the means stated of achieving subordination. Of the figures
metaphor and the like: this should be construed with each [preceding half śloka].2

[In the Vṛtti on these two Kārikās] we have a long complex sentence
[of which the framework is as follows]. A figure of speech which a poet
desires to present as subservient and not as the principal element; a
figure which he takes up at the proper time and which he drops at the
proper time; a figure which he does not push too far; a figure which
[even if carried throughout the verse] he is careful to keep subsidiary: a
figure so composed will bring about the manifestation of a rasa.3 Within
this complex sentence other matter has been included in order to give:
(a) the point which forms the occasion for furnishing an illustration;
(b) the illustration itself; (c) the application of the illustration to the
point; and (d) the justification [i.e., showing how the observance of
a given point is congenial to the rasa]. Such is the structure of the
passage in the Vṛtti.

Many times you touch the trembling corner: O bee, although
we are eager for just such flirtatious action and words [as you are ex-
hibiting], we are cursed, that is, we are burdened, with the trouble of
seeking the truth of a problem that must be solved [sc., the nature of
Śakuntalā's parentage, whether it is noble or brahmin]. “While you”:
the particle khalu (“of course,” “as is well known”) indicates that the
bee has gained his object effortlessly. These are the words of Dusyanta,
who desires Śakuntalā [and speaks to the bee as if to say]: “How can
I become the recipient of her sidelong glance? How can I get her to
listen to secret words that will suggest my intentions? How can I steal
a kiss from her even if she is unwilling? All these aims which lie in
the land of my daydreams have been accomplished by you with no effort.”
For the bee keeps touching the corner of her eye, thinking it a dark
waterlily, which it does indeed resemble. And as his illusion contin­
uues, for her eye extends [like a lily ornament] to the opening of her
ear, he continues to buzz there. And while she is frightened because
of the timidity of her natural delicacy, he drinks her lower lip, which
is as sweet as the fragrance of lotuses in full bloom and is the very
treaasury of love (rati). Thus the figure of speech, which is a svabhā­
votti (a naturalistic description) of the bee, has become subordinate
to that rasa [viz., abhilāsavipralambhāśṛṅgāra] which is the poet’s chief
concern. Other [commentators], however, interpret the Vṛtti’s phrase
bhramaraskvabhāvottir alankāraḥ to mean “the figure of which there is
an expression in the course of describing the bee’s behavior” and they
identify this figure as rūpakavyatireka.5

1. Clearly one must read samiksā in place of samiksya in order to get
a feminine noun for uktā to agree with. In the next line one must correct
rupakādir to rupakāder as in the Kārikā. 2. In other words, one is to un­
derstand aṅgitvena rūpakāder, grahaṇatyāgau rūpakāder, etc. The same effect
will be obtained in the translation by substituting “metaphor and the like”
for “them” and “they.” 3. Thus the relative pronoun yam in yam alani­
kāram. Text, p. 224 line 2, is repeated p. 226 line 1, p. 227 line 2, p. 232
lines 1 and 7, and is finally resumed by the apodeictic sa alankāro on
p. 233 line 5, where the sentence ends. A Sanskrit sentence (vākya) of course
admits of more parenthetical material than a sentence of Latin or English.
4. Abhinava is reading into the close succession of the first two images of the
verse the suggestion that Śakuntalā’s eye “stretches to her ear,” this being
the convention by which the erotic poets refer to a beautiful eye that keeps
casting sidelong glances. 5. The rūpaka (the superimposition of the charac­
ter of lover on the bee) would be suggested, the vyatireka (contrast) would be
directly expressed. While this identification of figures is at least possible, it is
surely not what Ānandavardhana meant when he used the phrase bhramar­
svabhāvottir alankāraḥ. Whether Abhinava accepts the second interpretation
is unclear. Usually he refers to other commentators only to disagree with
them. Accordingly, BP claims that he disagrees here, that is, that he prefers the first interpretation. But in 3.43b Abhinava seems to favor the second.

A "Never acting as the chief element" means never predominant. For it sometimes happens that an ornament which the poet has intended to be subservient to a rasa or the like actually appears to be intended as the chief factor. For example:

By the imperious command of his discus stroke
he rendered love's festival for the wives of Rāhu
empty of passionate embraces
and left only with a kiss.¹

In this stanza [there appears to be] an intention to make the figure paryāyokta (periphrasis)² the chief element although the overall meaning of the sentence is a rasa or the like.³

1. The author of the verse is unknown. It refers to Viṣṇu's cutting off the head of the demon Rāhu with his discus. As Rāhu's disembodied head continued to live on—to be the cause of eclipses by its occasional swallowing of the moon or sun—it still remains possible for Rāhu's wives to enjoy his kisses. But they have been robbed of the full enjoyment of love. 2. Paryāyokta: see 1.13b L, note 1. The more restricted definition ("an implication of the cause by statement of the effect") will apply to our verse. 3. Ānanda's text is not as logical as one could desire and we have been forced to add the words "there appears to be" in brackets. The overall meaning of the stanza is the courage of Viṣṇu (Vāsudevasya prātāpāḥ), which suggests the relish of heroism (vīroraśa). But the striking effect of the figure of speech, its cleverness and brilliance, casts this overall meaning into the shade and what appears as the predominant element in the stanza is the figure of speech. The difficulty with Ānanda's sentence lies in vivakṣā. How does he know what the poet intended? All we know is the result, from which we may say that the poet seems to have intended the figure to be the chief factor. We need the word dr̥ṣyate after vivakṣā just as we had it after vivakṣito two lines before the verse. But I fear to change the reading lest I be charged with emending the author rather than him...
§ 2.18-19 a L 

L He who, by means of his imperious command, that is, his untransgressible order [delivered] in the form of his discus stroke, made the festival of love to possess a mere remnant in the form of kisses; for this festival of love was rendered barren, that is, empty, of its amorous sportings among which embraces are the chief element. But someone may object that what the poet here intended to be predominant was precisely the figure paryāyokta and not rasa or the like. So how can one claim that the overall meaning of the sentence is rasa or the like? But no. For what is intended to be expressed here is the courage of Viṣṇu. And this does not appear as a cause of beauty, whereas the paryāyokta does. Although the poem is not faulty on this account, it may still serve as an example of how a subordinate figure can obscure the nature of the matter in hand which it was supposed to support. And from this there results a certain impropriety. Such is our author’s view. And so when he states [a few lines below] that “the criticism of a great poet is simply a criticism of oneself,” it must be clear that he did not give this example as an example of a fault.

1. Abhinava takes ālinganoddāmanilāsa as a karmadāraya containing a bahuvañhi. In doing so he takes uddāma as a noun in the unexampled sense of chief element. We have preferred to give uddāma its normal meaning and to take the compound as a tātpuruṣa, literally, “a wild passion of embraces.”

2. To explain this puzzling passage I suppose that Abhinava is interpreting the stanza as an instance of rasavadalaṅkāra, in which the poet intends the initial suggestion of the heroic rasa to subserve an ultimate suggestion of love of Viṣṇu; see 2.5 b and c A. But in the working out of his verse the poet has given greater brilliance to the paryāyokta than to the virarasa. This interpretation would allow Abhinava to avoid condemning the poem, for the ultimate rasa would still be an arīga to the arīga of paryāyokta. Only the intermediate rasa would be downgraded.

3. I doubt that Ānanda’s intention was as Abhinava says. Ānanda’s opinion here, it seems to me, is that the overall meaning of the stanza, which is the heroic rasa, has been spoiled by the cleverness of the figure of periphrasis.
A Even when a figure is intended as subordinate [or helpful to the rasa], it must be taken up at the proper time and not at the wrong time. An example of a figure taken up at the proper time is the upamā ślesa (simile with ambiguity and puns) of the following:

It is bursting with new buds and pale of hue;
She longing
It has just begun to blossom
she stretch with languor
and exhibits a reaction to the constant advent of the breezes.

., this garden vine today on its madana tree
in her passion
is like a rival woman and by my gazing on it
her
I shall doubtless make my queen's face blush with anger.

[Harsa-deva, Ratnāvalī 2.4]

1. The use of the simile helped out by puns and ambiguities is indeed felicitous, as Abhinava will point out. The king here describes a vine in the palace garden in terms that will apply to Ratnāvalī, who has recently arrived in his harem as a servant girl. The verse occurs in the play before the queen knows of the king's new infatuation with Ratnāvalī. The puns and ambiguities, given in small type in the translation, not only confirm the simile but prepare us for the scenes of jealousy to come. If the verse had been used after the queen's discovery, the figure would not be apt. The word prārabdha jīmbhā has been rendered by one translator with "has commenced to yawn." The translation carries a sadly inappropriate image to the English reader. What is meant is the impatient and anticipatory stretching of the body of girl who is daydreaming of her lover and forced to bide her time. The same gesture arising from the same cause is described by the Latin poets also; see Juvenal 6.64-65.

L It is bursting with new buds, etc.: uddāmotkalikām mean "whose buds (kalikāh) have arisen (udgatāh)"; also "whose longin
(utkalikā) has arisen." Prārabdhajrmbhām kṣānāt means "at a moment, i.e., at that very instant, it has begun to blossom"; but jṛmbhā is also a stretching of the limbs caused by love. "Exhibits a reaction." namely the motion of swaying, a reaction on the part of the vine caused by the advent of the wind, namely the gentle approach of the spring breeze. The phrase also means "exhibits a reaction," that is, manifests the fever in her heart, by the succession of her sighs. Samadanam means "with a madana, a species of tree" and also "with passion (kāma)." Here the figure upamāsleśa, being placed as trail-blazer to the relish of jealous love that is to follow, calls our attention to the enjoyment of that relish. So the figure is taken up at just the right moment inasmuch as it comes forth just as this rasa is about to begin. That is what our author has in mind.

[One may] also [note that] the acting out of the primarily intended meaning, [namely that pertaining to the vine,] should be at every word. while the acting out of the secondary meaning [which pertains to the woman] should be only of the general meaning of the stanza and should be effected by upāṅgas (facial gestures). On the other hand, it would be wrong to give no gesture at all [to the secondary meaning]. But enough on this incidental matter. The word "doubtless" (dhruvam) is the very heart of this preparation for the coming jealousy.

1. We wish we knew more about the abhinaya, the acting out a description by means of gesticulation and expression, that Abhinava has in mind. How would one act out the description of the vine? At just what point would one use an upāṅga to indicate that the description applies also to a woman? The āṅgas and upāṅgas are listed in BhNS 8.14 (Vol. 2, p. 3):

tasya sīḥstorahpāparsvakatipādōdatāḥ śad āṅgāni / netrabhrūṇādharakapalacibukāny upāṅgāni. From this it will be seen that an upāṅga is a facial expression, a subtler indication of meaning than an āṅga, which is a gesture of the body.

A A figure that has been taken up, if it is abandoned at the right time for another figure better adapted to the rasa, will likewise [bring about the manifestation of a rasa], as in:
You are rakta with your new blossoms
and I am too with my beloved’s virtues;
the ūlimukhas come to you,
so do those shot by Love to me;
the stroke of a damsel’s foot brings joy to you,
so would it me and both of us should be,
āsoka tree, the same, if fate
had not made me saśoka.

[Yašovarman; also Hanumannāṭaka 5.24]¹

For here the puns and ambiguities (ślesa) with which the stanza begins,
by their being abandoned for the expression of a contrast (vjasireka),
give strength to the particular rasa [sc., love-in-separation]. It may
be objected that there are not two figures of speech here, but one
entirely different figure of speech, of composite nature like a man-lion,
a figure consisting of ambiguity and contrast together.² But our answer
would be no, because that composite type of figure has a different
sort of distribution. The domain of the composite figure is where we
apprehend the contrast³ in the very same word in which we apprehend
the ambiguity, as in the line: “The god [Indra] is Hari by name (sa
hariḥ), [whereas] your majesty is sahariḥ (one who has horses) because
you have a host of steeds.” But in our stanza one word is the domain
of ambiguity and another is the domain of contrast.⁴ If we were to
imagine the presence of the “entirely different figure” [i.e., saṅkara] in
an area such as this [i.e., so wide as this], no area at all would be left
for samsṛṣṭi.⁵

1. Rakta: “red” and “in love”; ūlimukhas: “bees” and “arrows”; āsoka:
name of a kind of tree and “without grief”; saśoka: “with grief.” The
Hanumannāṭaka, in which the verse occurs, is a cento made up of verses
taken from many poets and adapted, sometimes by slightly altering the text,
to the story of Rāma; see Kosambi, HOS Vol 42, p. civ. The Subhāsitāvali
(1364) ascribes the present verse to Yašovarman, which is not improbable. To
judge from line c the original context would have been one of love in separa-
tion caused by jealousy (īṛsyāvpralambha). There is a superstition that the
āsoka tree will blossom only at the touch of a woman’s foot; see Bloomfield
JAOS 40, 1-24 and Ingalls HOS Vol. 44, p. 111. As regards the lover, the
stroke of his mistress’ foot might serve as his penance and mark the end of her
anger. But with the adaptation to the Rāma story the context becomes dif-
fervent. Sitā is not jealous, but has been abducted. Hence the commentators
on the Hanumannāṭaka and on the Rasagarīgādhara (KM edition, p. 354),
with invincible logic but questionable taste, explain the kick desired by Rāma as a reference to an acrobatic position of intercourse.

The stanza has furnished matter for disagreement to Sanskrit critics for ten centuries (see Kosambi's references under SRK 770), so it is not surprising that even the present editors hold different opinions concerning the figure or figures of speech which it contains. The problem briefly is this. Ānanda quotes the verse as an example of a felicitous shift from one figure of speech to another. The verse begins with similes strengthened by puns and ambiguities. The lover in three respects is like the asoka tree. But the lover is separated from his beloved so that he is in grief (saśoka), whereas the asoka tree is, as its name proclaims, griefless (a-asoka). The shift to contrast (vyatireka) in the last line is certainly effective in emphasizing the relish of love in separation.

The chief objection to Ānanda's analysis is that the stanza does not really drop one figure and take up another; the two figures are interlocked. The contrast cannot arise without the pun in "asoka" to support it. Ānanda himself raises this objection (2.18-19 d) and answers it, not very happily, by pointing to other cases where contrast is effective without the use of puns. On this matter J. Masson remarks, "It is perfectly true, as Ānanda says, that vyatireka can arise apart from slesa. But surely the point is not whether it can or cannot theoretically, but whether it does in the case of the verse 'raktas tvam,' etc." Accordingly, Masson finds himself on the side of the obj tor. But Abhinava supports Ānanda (see below), saying that the opponent's view is incorrect because it goes against one's inner feeling for the poem, a feeling that even the objector must share. Ingalls finds himself basically on the side of Ānanda and Abhinava. Granted that the figures are interlocked, the charm of the stanza derives from its shift, its turnabout. The logic of Ānanda's argument is not convincing, although Abhinava does much to improve it, as we shall point out in the notes which follow. But the poetic sensitivity of these two critics, it seems to Ingalls, was correct. After examining what Ānanda and Abhinava have to say, the reader may come to his own conclusion.

§ 2.18–19 c A]

2. This "entirely different figure of speech" would be a form of fusion (saṅkara) as opposed to saṃsarṣṭi (the association of distinct figures). The critics divide all cases of the presence of two or more figures in a single sentence or stanza into these two categories. Saṅkara (as opposed to saṃsarṣṭi) is a figure distinct from the interlocked or interdependent members of which it consists. The objector is claiming that the asoka-stanza embodies that figure. Ānanda will argue that it embodies a saṃsarṣṭi.

3. One should drop the prakārantaraṇa before vyatirekapratitir. It probably arose by dittography from the prakārantarana in the preceding line.

4. This is strictly true: raktas, sīlimukhāh, mude and asoka are the domain of slesa; asoka and saśoka are the domain of vyatireka. The fact that the figures overlap in asoka does not make Ānanda's statement false.

5. For saṃsarṣṭi see note 2 above. The argument from nirviṣayatvā is a favorite with the grammarians. Ānanda has already used it before (2.5 e A).
"Rakta" means red. "I am too": here rakta means "my passion has been aroused." One should understand the red color of the asoka bloom to be the stimulant (vibhāva) which arouses this passion. And hence the ideas expressed first in each quarter of the stanza are to be explained as stimulants [of what is expressed in the second half of the quarters].

So this is a hetuslesa. For ślesa is very commonly an aid to the figures sahokti, upamā, and hetu. This is all that Bhāmaha meant in describing ślesa as being "of three varieties, viz., sahokti, upamā, and hetu." In making that remark he did not intend to deny that ślesa may be an aid to other figures also.

The particular rasa: viz., love-in-separation. The word sasoka, which brings in the contrast, also gives scope to such transient states of mind (vyabhicāribhāvas) as depression, anxiety, and the like, which strengthen the relish of love-in-separation. But: this [different figure of speech] is the single figure fusion sankara, so there can be no question of discarding one figure (ślesa) and adopting another (vyatireka). That is the objector's point.

That: i.e., fusion. For fusion is the flashing into view of two figures of speech in one area. Thus, the word saharīḥ is a single area. [It has two meanings:] "he is Hari" (sa hariḥ) and possessing horses (saha haribhiḥ). But in our verse: the particle hi is here used in the sense of "but" (tu). The reference is to the stanza raktaḥ tvam.

One word: the words rakta, etc. [i.e. rakta, sīlimukha, mude, which are the area of double meaning]. And another: viz., asoka, etc. [i.e. asoka and saṣoka, which are the area of contrast]. But it might be urged that if we take the area to be the whole sentence, we can still have fusion here residing in a "single area." Anticipating such a suggestion, he says if. In an area such as this: that is, a [whole] sentence. The singular inflection of viṣaye is intentional. The sense is, if one will call something a single area from its being a single sentence, then there can be no association (samsrṣṭi) anywhere because it will be logically included in fusion.

1. In the second line, it is the sight of the bees flying toward the asoka flowers that excites the lover's feeling of separation from his beloved. In the third line, it is the touch of a woman's foot which gives delight to the asoka and may cause the lover to think of his own lady's touching him in the same way. He is also excited at seeing the joy of the asoka. Abhinava's point is that each element in the description of the asoka tree furthers the lover's emotion and is therefore the cause of the second meaning of the ambiguous
2. Bhāmaha divides śleṣa into three varieties (3.17): sahōkti-śleṣa, upama-śleṣa, and hetu-śleṣa. Sahōkti-śleṣa is where a word having the meaning “and” or “together with” (saha) is used in connection with the ambiguity, e.g., “Being easy to ascend (or approach) and generous of fruit (or reward), wayside trees and good men serve the benefits of others.” Upama-śleṣa is where a word meaning “like” is used, e.g., the same example with the substitution of “like” (iva or tulya) for “and” (ca). Hetu-śleṣa is where a cause is expressed, e.g., “Because you are unfathomable and because you never transgress the proper bounds, you are like the ocean.” In this example of hetu-śleṣa (taken from Bhāmaha) both the word “like” and an expression of cause (the ablative case) are used. In the aśoka-verse a word for “like” is used and, according to Abhinava, cause is suggested. Bhāmaha would doubtless have identified the figure in the aśoka-verse as upama-śleṣa, but Abhinava’s extension of the term hetu-śleṣa allows a more suggestive interpretation of the verse. Whether Bhāmaha would have allowed śleṣa to be an aid to still other figures, as Abhinava claims, is uncertain. But the opinion is ancient. Daṇḍin says that śleṣa can increase the beauty of any figure (2.363).

3. And so this one area furnishes both pun and contrast.

4. And so we have translated it. However, I think that the literal meaning of ātra hi in Text 229, line 1 is the same as of the ātra hi with which 2.18-19 c A begins. The sentence here is furnishing another reason to explain Ānanda’s disagreement with the objector (iti cen na Text 228, line 3). But Abhinava is fond of this explanation of the particle āḥi (e.g. 3.6 a L) and uses āḥi in this sense himself (3.33 k L, Text 434, line 7).

5. The correct reading is doubtless aśokādiḥ, to which some absent-minded scribe added saśoka without thinking to remove the ādi. As the text stands it is nonsense, for it is only the words aśoka and saśoka which carry the vyatireka.

\[\text{§ 2.18-19 d A}\]

A Should one object that our stanza is not an instance of samīrṣṭī because the contrast comes into existence only by means of a pun [whereas samīrṣṭī demands that the two figures be independent of one another], our reply is no, for we see that contrast can arise in a quite different manner also (i.e., without a simile based on puns). For example:
The wind of doomsday, whose fierce blast
will tear down mountains, will not blow it out;
it blazes far by day,
it is quite untouched by the soot of night.
*Patánña* gives birth to this unique wick
nor ever serves to extinguish it:
may this light for the lamps of every land, this sunlight,
ever bring you joy.

[Mayūra, *Sūryasataka* 23]\(^2\)

This is an example of contrast without the expression of any similarity at all.\(^3\) Again, it cannot be said that we perceive there [in the *asokastanza*] a cause of beauty to lie in the puns alone [without regard to similarity] and that the puns must therefore be intended to be subordinate to the contrast and not an independent figure on their own.\(^4\) Because in such an area [viz., the area of contrast] we find that beauty can result also from a well-stated simile alone [without puns], as in the following and other examples:

My groans are like your thunder;
the water of my eyes, your ceaseless downpour;
the fire of grief born of her separation,
is like your flashing lightning;
I bear my loved one’s face
within my heart, you hide the moon in yours:
in all this we are similar, friend Cloud;
why then would you destroy me?

[Yaśovarman]\(^5\)

1. Ānanda’s sentence suffers from both ellipsis and bad logic. Abhinava fills in the ellipsis, as we have done in brackets. But the conclusion does not follow from the premise. One cannot deduce a particular from a particular. For Abhinava’s attempt to improve the logic, see his commentary below and our note 1 thereon. 2. The stanza contains a pun in *patánña*: the sun (which gives birth to sunlight), or a moth (which serves to extinguish the wick of a lamp). So Ānanda will furnish another example below of contrast in the complete absence of puns. 3. There is no expressed similarity because the stanza contains no word “like” or “similar to (*tulya*).” There is of course a suggested simile as Abhinava will point out. But Ānanda overlooks this point because it is unimportant. See end of note 1 on Abhinava’s comment below. 4. The disavowed statement, if true, would imply that the verse contains the figure of interlocked members *sāṅkara* and not the two figures *śleṣa* and
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vyatireka held distinct in samsrṣṭī. 5. The verse occurs in SRK 240. It is attributed to Yaśodharman by Sadukti. 993; to Yaśovarman by ŚūktiM. 43.33.

L Now an objection may be raised. Contrast always contains a simile within itself; and in the case here [of the aśoka-stanza] the simile has been brought in by means of puns. So the puns in the verse are an aid to the contrast. Thus the stanza is the domain of the figure fusion. On the other hand, where there is no relation of aider and aided between the two figures, that can be a case of association, even if the two figures reside in one sentence. This [is the objection which] our author now states. By means of a pun: what he means is “by means of a simile which is brought in by force of a pun.” Our author counters the objection with no. What he has in mind is this: Does contrast everywhere arise only when the simile [or similarity] is directly expressed, or does it arise when it is implied? He rejects the first alternative by saying: in a quite different manner. He means, “even though the simile [or similarity] is not directly expressed.

"Will not blow out" means “cannot extinguish.” The flame of a lamp, on the other hand, can be extinguished by a mere breeze. “The soot of night”: soot in the form of night. “Not not freed from” means “quite untouched by.” The wick of a lamp, on the other hand, is accompanied by night (or darkness) because, as the wick is very slender, soot envelops its surface. “From pataṅga, that is, from the sun.” The wick of a lamp, on the other hand, is extinguished by a pataṅga, that is, by a moth, and does not take its birth therefrom.

Similarity: he means, with a series of similitudes or similes but without any word, e.g., “like” or “such as,” proper to the conveying of this [relation]. This is as much as to say that as a simile by being merely suggested can be helpful to a contrast, the simile need not be expressed in so many words. Accordingly, the slesopamā (simile occasioned by puns) was not taken into our verse for its being helpful to the contrast.

But, [a new opponent may object,] granted that this may not be the reason in other cases, in the case of the aśoka-stanza the slesopamā has been taken in because it was favorable to the contrast, because if it were not favorable, it would have no power to beautify. This is why the slesopamā cannot be a separate alāṅkāra (figure of speech = beautifier). This [is the objection which] our author now states with it cannot be said. Our author realizes in his heart that the opponent’s view is wrong because it goes against one’s inner feeling [for the verse].
Accordingly, he produces an example in which beauty arises without puns, simply through simile, which silences the opponent, who is really denying his own inner feeling. He does this with the sentence because, etc.

In the exemplar verse the word “like” is to be construed with all the words ending in the instrumental case. Everything else is to be understood as in the case of the stanza on the aśoka.²

1. Ānanda's argument is actually different from that which Abhinava here supposes. Ānanda in effect shows that (a) contrast can be produced by puns without simile, and (b) contrast can be produced by simile without puns. From this he passes to the conclusion (c) that the contrast in the aśoka-stanza is not in need of either puns or simile: the figures of that stanza are independent. This is arguing from a particular to a particular. Doubtless Abhinava saw the logical fault, for he makes an attempt to remove it. He supposes an objector to base an argument on a universal, thus:

Contrast always involves simile,
the simile in the aśoka-verse is ślesopama, 
therefore the contrast and the ślesa are i

This argument can be logically disproved by showing a single case where contrast does not contain a simile. The verse from Mayūra is such an example, for there is no expressly denoted simile in it. Nothing is said of its suggested simile, for that is beside the point. A suggested simile falls in the category of dhvani, not of figures of speech. Technically, the interlocking of śleṣa and suggested simile does not produce saṅkara. 2. BP explains that the thundering of the cloud is to be taken as the cause of the speaker's groans, and so on for the other elements of the verse; see 2.18-19c L and note 1 thereon.

A Again, when the poet's mind is concentrated on carrying out the rasa, a figure which he will not wish to press too far [will bring about a manifestation of the rasa].¹ For example:
§ 2.18-19 e L }

In anger she has bound him
tightly in the noose of her soft arms
and in the evening leads him to the bedroom,
where before her attendant friends
she points to the signs of his deceit and conjures hi
never, never to do such a thing again.
O lucky lover:
as he is hiding his transgression with a laugh,
she weeps and strikes him.

[Amarusataka 9]

for here a metaphor (rūpaka), being introduced but not fully carried
out, greatly strengthens the rasa.

1. The bracketed words follow in Text 233, line 5; see 2.18-19 L and
note 3. 2. The stanza belongs to a type of Sanskrit verse which depicts
a man’s delight in provoking an outburst of jealousy from his mistress; see
SRK 682. The essence of the situation is furnished by the collocation of the
two contradictory words (almost an oxymoron) at the very end of the stanza:
rudatyā hasan “he laughing (is struck) by her weeping.”

L Having thus shown the application of [the advice for] taking
up and dropping a figure of speech, he now explains the portion [of
the advice] that says “they should never be oversustained.” [Again,
when carrying out] the rasa: the word “again” (ca) serves to add
another variety of circumspection [see 2.18-19 A, note 1]. Were one
to continue the metaphor furnished by the woman’s creeper-like arms’
acting as a noose for binding, the woman would become a huntress,
the bedroom would become a prison or a cage, and so on, all of which
would be most inappropriate.

“Before her friends”: the implication is that they have all along been
telling her that her lover is faithful; well, let them just look now. “[Con-
jures him] with faltering voice,” that is, with a voice that is indistinct
because of her access of anger and that is also a sweet voice. And what
does she say? “Never do such a thing again.” What she means by
“such a thing” is shown by the word “deceit,” for example nail-marks
and the like [imprinted by a rival], to which she points with her finger.
“She strikes him”: she cannot be held back by the placations of her
friends, because he is intent on hiding his fault under the pretext of
laughing and because he is so dear to her. Who would be able to bear the infidelity of such a man?

A. Even if the poet decides to sustain the figure, if he takes care to keep it subordinate, [it will bring about a manifestation of the *rasa*], as in the following and other examples:

I see your body in the *śyāmā* vines,
your glance in the startled eyes of deer,
your cheek in the moon, your hair in the peacock's tail,
the play of your eyebrow in the rippling stream.
Alas, my timid darling, I can nowhere find your complete likeness in one place.

[Kālidāsa, *Meghadūta* 2.41 = Pathak ed. 109]

1. Bhīru (timid), on which *L* expatiates, is a characteristically Kashmiri reading, found also in Vallabha's commentary and in the *Subhāṣitāvali*, as opposed to the vulgate *caṇḍī* (cruel).

*L* [Decides] to sustain is means, to carry all the way through.

In the *śyāmā* vines: that is, in the fragrant *priyangu* (*Aglaià* *oderata*), because it is pale, slender, and *kaṇṭakīta* ("thorny" or "exhibiting horripilation"). In the moon: because of its paleness. "I see (*utpaśyāmi*)," that is, by effort I fancy. The sense is that he indulges this fancy in order to preserve his life. Alas: what a misfortune. The implication is that since I cannot find your whole likeness in one place, I wander about, but wherever I go I lack the satisfaction of a single likeness of you in anything. Timid: the sense is that one of timid heart will not put all her wealth in one place.

In this stanza the similarity [between the Yakṣa's wife and various objects of nature], which animates the figure *utprekṣā* (poetic fancy), a
sustained fashion just as it was begun and yet gives strength to the [dominant] relish of love-in-separation.

2.18-19

A figure of speech which a poet forms under these precautions will bring about a manifestation of rasa. On the other hand, if he departs from these principles, a loss of rasa will certainly ensue. Examples of such loss are to be found in abundance even in the works of great poets. But we have not demonstrated these lapses because publishing the faults of great men who have shown their greatness in thousands of fine verses would be simply a criticism of oneself. However, the general direction has been given of how the whole collection of figures of speech such as metaphor and the like can be useful in suggesting rasa. If a good poet, with concentrated mind, will follow this lead, discovering still other principles on his own account, and will thereby construct the soul of dhvani, of which we have just spoken, [that is, a suggested meaning] which appears without a perceived interval, then this [type of dhvani] will arise in all its glory.¹

¹ Tasya (Text, p. 234, line 1) refers back to dhvner āt:

L But these, sc., examples, should be construed with the word "demonstrated." With however, etc., he shows that although no counterexamples have been given, one will achieve what is necessary by studying the positive examples. Other principles: he means other types of precaution; for example the taking up again at the right time a figure that has been dropped, as in a verse of my own composition:

If the rays of the moon are pencils of ambrosia
how come they to burn my heart?
Or were they long ago infected
by their dwelling with the kālakūta poison?
Then how is it they have not destroyed my life?
Perhaps it is saved by the magic syllables
in telling over my beloved's name.
Then why do I faint?
In this verse the figures rūpaka, sandeha, and nidarśanā being successively abandoned and then again taken up, lead to a strengthening of the rasa. And so enough.

1. The moon is traditionally supposed to be the reservoir of ambrosia drunk by the gods, but it once dwelled in the sea where one of its companions was the kālakūṭa poison. Pencils of ambrosia (amrtacchatā): the dictionary definitions of chaṭā are misleading. It is regularly used as a noun adjunct for things which are long and slender, e.g., drṣṭicchatā (Text 309, line 6 of Loc.), sasidyotacchatā (Udbhāta, 2.*15 Indurāja), katākṣacchatā (SRK 465).

2. There is rūpaka (metaphor) in the phrase “if the rays are pencils of ambrosia.” The figure is abandoned in the next clause for sandeha. 3. There is sandeha (poetic doubt) in “or were they long ago infected,” etc. It is abandoned in the next sentence for nidarśanā. 4. The phrase “saved by magic syllables in telling over my beloved’s name” (priyatamāsaṇjalpamantrākṣarat rakṣyante) contains the figure nidarśanā. This is the later conception of nidarśanā (from Udbhāta onward), more technically called asambhavadvastusambhavanibandhanā nidarśanā. This type of nidarśanā occurs where a relation (in the present example the relation between rakṣyante and priyatamāsaṇjalpa) is logically impossible unless we envisage a simile (unless we take the whole phrase to mean priyatamāsaṇjalpena mantrākṣarat iva rakṣyante), in which the qualifiers (viśeṣanāni) of the upamāna and the upameya (in the present instance priyatamā and mantra) appear as image and reflection (bimba and pratibimba) of one another. In general, whenever a rūpaka is extended by viśeṣanas qualifying the upameya and upamāna such that these viśeṣanas appear as bimba and pratibimba, the figure is called nidarśanā not rūpaka. In the stanza under discussion the nidarśanā is given up in the question which follows. 5. Apparently the last sentence of the stanza “I know not what to think” (no vedmi keyam gatiḥ) is regarded as reestablishing all three of the preceding possibilities and therefore reviving the three abandoned figures.

K That form of suggestion which appears after an interval and which is similar to the reverberation [of a bell] is itself distributed into two varieties: it can be dependent on the [suggestive] power of words (śabdaśaktimūla), or it can be dependent on the [suggestive] power of
§ 2.21 Introduction A

A Of suggestion where the literal meaning although intended leads to a further sense, the variety which is similar to a reverberation because the suggested meaning appears at an interval [from the literal meaning] has itself two varieties, one based on the 'suggestive' power of words and the other on the [suggestive] power of meaning.

L Having thus considered the first variety of that suggestion where the literal meaning although intended leads to a further sense, that is, the variety where the sequence is not perceived, he now proceeds to analyse the second variety with the words [that form of suggestion which appears] after an interval. These words of the first quarter of the Kārikā, resuming a subject from the earlier discussion, are used to furnish a reason [for the relative clause that follows]. The resonance of a bell always appears at an interval from the sound produced by the striking of the bell. Is itself: not only is suggestion basically divided into two varieties [viz., avivakṣitavācyā and vivakṣitānyaparavācyā]; and not only is vivakṣitānyaparavācyā divided into two varieties [viz., asamlaksyakramavyaṅga and samlaksyakramavyaṅga]; but even samlaksyakramavyaṅga is divided into two varieties [viz., śabdāsakti-‘mūla and arthāsaktimūla]. ¹ This is the force of api (“also,” “itself”).

¹ Samlaksyakramavyaṅga really has a third variety also, based on both the power of words and the power of meaning. See 2.23.

A Now it may be objected that if this domain, where a second meaning appears by the power of a word, is given to a variety of suggestion (dhvani), there will be no domain left for the pun ([śabda-]sleṣa). But one can show that this is not the case:
§ 2.21

K because it is where a figure of speech appears by the power of words, being only implied (ākṣipta) and without being directly expressed by a word, that we have this [variety of] suggestion that arises by the power of words.

A Since what we mean is, that a figure of speech, not a mere fact, appearing in a poem by the power of words, constitutes this type of dhvani arising by the power of words. But when two facts appear by the power of a single word, we have the [directly expressed] figure of the pun (sleṣa), as in the following:

[In the punning verses which follow, the translation of the second meanings will be given in small print below the translation of the first meaning.]

He who destroyed the cart and is unborn
He who destroyed the mind-born god
and who once, the conqueror of Bali, made his body into a woman;
and who once made the body of the conqueror of Bali into his weapon;
who slew the upraised serpent; whose ultimate state is sound;
whose necklace and bracelets are raised serpents;
who upheld the mountain and the earth;
who upheld the Ganges;
to whom the immortals give the praiseworthy name
to whom the immortals give the praiseworthy name
of the Seizer of the head of the moon-destroyer;
of the Seizer (hara) who bears on his head the moon;
who brought about a habitation for the Andhakas;
who brought about the destruction of Andhaka;
who is all-giving and named Mādhava:
who is always the husband of Umā:
may he protect you.

may he protect you.
§ 2.21

1. The mythological references are explained below by L. The stanza is ascribed by SūktiM. 2.104 to Candraka, by Saḍukti. 163 to Bhāravi. It is left anonymous by Subhā., Mammaṭa, and Hemacandra.

L By since he explains the word “because” of the Kārikā. By not a mere fact he shows what the Kārikā means to exclude when it says “a figure of speech.” But when two facts: the word ca (“and”) is used in the sense of “but.”

[Interpretation of the verse as referring to Viṣṇu:] He who destroyed the cart while he was playing as a child; the unborn, that is, who is without birth; balijit [Abhinava takes the word otherwise than as we have taken it]: ‘he who conquers the strong ones (balināḥ), viz., the demons; who made his body into a woman long ago at the time when the ambrosia was churned from the sea; who slew the upraised, that is, proud, serpent named Kāliya; whose dissolution is into sound, for it is said that Viṣṇu is the phoneme a;1 who [as Krishna] held up the mountain Govardhana and [in his boar incarnation] raised up the earth from Pātāla; to whom the sages give a praiseworthy name. What is this name? He who destroys the moon, Rāhu; [Viṣṇu’s name] is “remover of the head of Rāhu.” May this Mādhava, that is, Viṣṇu, who is all-giving, protect you. [Again] how is he qualified? As he who gave kṣaya, that is, habitation, to the tribe of Andhakas at Dvārakā; or one can take the term to mean he who, at the time of the Mausala battle, made kṣaya, that is, destruction, of the Andhakas by means of the iron reeds.

The second interpretation [referring to Śiva]: Who, having destroyed Kāma, transformed the body of the Destroyer of the Strong Ones, that is, of Viṣṇu, into his weapon, that is, his arrow, at the time of the burning of the Triple Citadel; whose necklace and bracelets are upraised serpents and who bore the Ganges; to whom the sages give the praiseworthy name “he whose head carries the moon” and who is called Hara; may he, the blessed one, who himself was the cause of the demon Andhaka’s destruction and who is always, that is, at all times, the husband, the lover, of Umā, protect you.

In this stanza the second meanings which we perceive are simply facts and not a figure of speech; and so it belongs wholly to the domain of the pun (slesa).
1. Short a is the source of all the phonemes, from which comes the Veda, from which comes everything. God (Viṣṇu) in his ultimate form is śabda-brahman, the verbal source of the universe.

A But now there is a difficulty. Udbhaṭa has shown\(^1\) that even when a separate figure of speech appears [together with śleṣa (an ambiguity or pun)], that [combination] is to be designated an instance of the figure śleṣa. So now it appears that there is no domain left for dhvani based on the power of words. In anticipation of this difficulty, the Kārikā has used the word “implied.” Here is what is meant. Whenever by the power of words a figure of speech appears in addition [to śleṣa]—this figure being directly denoted—all that is the domain of śleṣa. But where by the power of words a figure of speech appears in addition [to śleṣa], this figure being implied by the inherent capability of the situation (sāmarthya-ākṣipta)\(^2\) and not directly denoted—in other words, being suggested (vyaṅgya)—all that is the domain of dhvani.

The direct appearance by the power of words of a second figure [together with śleṣa] may be seen in the following:

As even without a necklace
they had a natural charm,
necklace,
in whom did this maiden’s breasts
not arouse wonder?\(^3\)

Here a transient state of mind (vyabhicāribhāva) of love, named “wonder,” and the directly expressed figure of speech virodha (contradiction) both appear [together with a pun]. So this is in the domain of śleṣa favoring the semblance of virodha.\(^4\) It is not in the domain of that type of dhvani which is like a reverberation.\(^5\) However, it is in the domain of the type of dhvani where the suggestion appears without an interval, the suggestion being here suggested either by the pun or the virodha.\(^6\)
1. This refers to Udbhata, Indurāja 4.10 (Vivriti 4.24), where he speaks of ślesa as "generating the appearance of other figures of speech" (śiṣṭam... alankārāntaragatām pratibhām janayat padaḥ). Both his commentators interpret his words to mean that where we have the impression both of ślesa and of some other figure such as upamā or rūpaka one is to identify the figure as ślesa only. The reason given is anavakāsātvād, i.e., that ślesa has no other scope. It never appears without the appearance of some other figure, whereas those other figures do have their own spheres where ślesa is not present. If we do not have the overlapping instances to ślesa it will have no scope at all. Another solution, of course, would be to recognize the symbiotic nature of ślesa and give it no independent domain. The overlapping instances would then be instances of fusion. In cases where ślesa and a second figure are mutually dependent, Abhinava (in his comment on this section; see below) claims that Ananda follows this anti-Udbhata explanation. But that seems unlikely.

2. The translation is clumsy but I cannot find a simpler English phrase that does not falsify the meaning. Sāmarthyāksipta, taken most literally, means "implied by the capability [inherent in the situation or in the sentence]." Compare 3.30c L arthaśāmarthyād iti vākyārthaśāmarthyād iti yāvat (Text 411, Loc. lines 2-3). One may render it less literally by "implied by the available possibilities." or "implied by the principle of compatibility." Compatibility is one of the glosses given to sāmarthya by the grammarians on Pāṇ. 2.1.1.

3. The verse occurs without ascription of author in Subhā 1534. 4. The word virodhacchāyā, which we have translated "a semblance of virodha," is not a synonym of the later term virodhābhāsa. Ananda does not mean that the contradiction itself is false or merely apparent, but that it forms a false figure. The figure is not really virodha because the dictum of Udbhata (see note 1 above) requires us to identify the figure as ślesa. 5. Naturally not, for there is no suggested figure of speech in it. 6. Ananda means that the stanza tasāya vināpi hāreṇa suggests śṛṅgāraraśa. It would thus fall under the type illustrated at 3.4d A, where rasadhvani is helped out by figures of speech. It is disconcerting, however, to find the actual name of a vyabhicārin (viz., vismaya) given in a stanza which is said to suggest rasā as this goes against the principle laid down in 1.4g A. Presumably Ananda regarded the word as merely incidental. Certainly it does not add to the rasā. Finally, one wonders why Ananda wrote va ("or") instead of ca ("and"). Abhinava’s explanation seems unnatural.

L To show what the Kārikā means to exclude by the word "implied," our author begins with a possible objection: But even when a separate figure of speech.

As even without, etc.: Here the word “even” (api) directly denotes a contradiction¹ and so forces the denotative power [of hāriṇau]
into a double meaning. *Hārīṇau* may mean "they must captivate one's heart," or it may mean "possessing a necklace (hāra)." And it is because of this presence of *api* that the word *vismaya* (wonder) strengthens this very sense. For if the word *api* were not present, there would be no direct denotation of a double meaning, since the natural charm of the maiden's breasts could be taken as the cause of wonder.

A state of mind named wonder: he uses this phrase to furnish an illustration. Just as wonder appears directly through the very word "wonder" [and not as suggested by the description of an *anubhāva* or the like], just so does the figure of contradiction appear directly through the word "even" (*api*) [and is not a suggested figure]. Now one might doubt that there is any suggestion at all in this stanza. To allay that doubt he says, however, etc. Or by the *virodha*: by the use of "or" he shows that this is a case of the figure fusion composed of an interlocked *śleṣa* and *virodha*, for the word "or" indicates that due to the presence of mutual aid there is no basis for rejecting the one and accepting the other.

1. When the word *api* is used, a *virodha* is said to be directly expressed (*vācyo*). When it is omitted, the *virodha* is said to be suggested (*vyangya*). Thus Rangacharya Raddi Shastri, commenting on Dandin 2.333, quotes Vāmanā’s exemplar verse (*KASV* 4.3.12.1) and says *esa ca apiśabdaprayoge vācyo, anyathā vyangyah.*

2. For the interpretation of the -in suffix (*nini*) as indicating necessity, see Pan. 3.3.170.

3. Without the word "even" we would take the word *hārīṇau* only in the first, its common, sense. The word "even" makes us look for a contradiction, which we find in the second, unusual, meaning.

4. As the verse stands, the reader understands it to mean that men wondered at the contradiction, viz., that the maiden's breasts could have a necklace without having a necklace. If the word "even" were omitted, the reader might understand the verse to mean that men wondered at her breasts, which happen to be without a necklace, simply because the breasts were beautiful.

5. The presence of mutual aid (*anugrahayogāt*): What Abhinava means is that the relation of aider and aided (*anugrahānu-grāhakabhāva*) between *śleṣa* and *virodha* is mutual. If there were no pun (if, for example, we substituted the word *manohara* for *hārīṇau*), there would be no contradiction. Again, if the contradiction expressed in *api* did not make us look for a second meaning, there would be no pun. According to Abhinava, Ānanda would go against Udbhata’s dictum (see 2.21 a A, note 1) in such instances and identify the figure not as *śleṣa* but as *sankara*. This is putting words into Ānanda’s mouth that he might reject.
A similar instance occurs in a verse of my own:

As he holds in his hand the discus "Beautiful"
As he is one whose hand is beautiful
while her whole body merits praise;
as he had stepped across the universe
surpassed the universe
with the graceful motion of his lotus feet
while she had conquered the universe
with the grace of every limb:
as he bears an eye that is the moon
while her whole face is of lunar beauty:
it was with reason that Hari regarded Rukmini
as more precious than his very self.
as superior to his own body.
I pray that now she give you aid.¹

In this stanza ślēṣa appears, favoring a vyatireka (contrast) through its direct expression.

1. The name of Hari’s (= Viṣṇu’s) discus is “Sudarśana” (the name means “Beautiful”). In three steps Viṣṇu covered earth, sky, and heaven. In his cosmic form his two eyes are the sun and the moon. Rukmini was his favorite wife when he lived as Krishna in Dwārakā.

L Normally sudarśanakara will mean “he who carries the discus Sudarśana in his hand.” But in the alternative demanded by the contrast it will have to mean “he whose hands only, [not the other parts of his body,] are beautiful.” “The graceful motion of his lotus feet,” that is, the playful action of stepping across the three worlds. “Bearing an eye”: possessing an eye that consists of the moon.

Through its direct expression: because the contrast is directly expressed by the words “superior to his own body.”
And another example is:

The cloud serpents pour forth water
pour forth venom
which brings to ladies whose husbands are away
a sudden dizziness, a listlessness and weariness of heart,
then fainting, darkness, emaciation, death.

[Śakavṛddhi]¹

Or again:

Whose war elephants are his mighty arms
whose fame has spread through their crushing
who have scattered pollen by their crushing
of the golden lotuses of the hearts of his foes
of the golden lotuses of Lake Mānasa
and whose flow of gifts is ceaseless
and who flow constantly with ichor.²

In these two stanzas śleṣa appears as aiding the semblance of metaphor (rūpaka)³ through its direct expression.

1. The ascription to Śakavṛddhi is furnished by Subhā. 1538, which quotes some twelve verses by this poet. Ānanda quotes the stanza again at 3.20 b A. 2. The verb camadhā is given by Pāṇiniyamahānāvo as meaning to crush; hence camadhā (here camadhā), crushed. “Of his foes” is supplied by Abhinava. The words mānasa (heart; also the lake of that name) and dāna (gift, or ichor) are puns. In the last quarter of the Prakrit one must read ccia for vvna (see Hemacandra, Prāk. 2.184). This should be translated by eva, not iu. The word iu would produce upamā, not rūpaka. It may also be remarked that Sanskrit has trouble in rendering the grammatical number of the Prakrit nouns. As the ending -ā represents equally the dual or plural in Prakrit, the war elephants (plural) of the king can be likened to his arms (dual) without any grammatical difficulty. But in Sanskrit with its distinct inflections this would constitute a fault, which the Sanskrit translator has avoided at the expense of giving the king more than two arms. 3. In the first stanza the compound jaladabhujaga must be analyzed as a rūpakasamāsa into the elements jaladā eva bhujagāḥ, where the eva shows that the metaphor is directly expressed. For the distinction of rūpakasamāsas, which are justified by Pāṇ. 2.1.57, from upamitasamāsas, which are justified by Pāṇ. 2.1.56,
see Nāgojī Bhāṭṭa on Mammaṭa 10, example 421. and Rangacharya Raddi Shastri on Daṇḍin 2.66.

$L$ In view of the meaning of "serpent," the word viṣa cannot stop at its normal denotation of water but is forced to denote its second meaning, "venom," for without that meaning the denotative power [of the sentence] cannot be completed.¹ Dizziness and the other [afflictions], on the other hand, are common [to both interpretations].²

[The application of the second verse to the king is as follows.] The hearts, that is the hearts of his enemies, have been crushed by having been plunged in despair. These hearts are called lotuses made of gold because of their strength.³ Because of these [broken hearts], his "fragrance has been churned," that is, the essence of his valor has been spread abroad. His war elephants are his mighty arms, which flow constantly with gifts. Because of the presence of the word "war elephants" the words camahia, parimala, and dāna transmit the respective meanings crush, perfume, and ichor; but they have not completed their denotative function in so doing and they go on to denote the other meanings which I have enumerated above.

1. Water does not normally bring dizziness and death. To make sense of the literal meaning of the sentence, we have to understand the second literal sense of viṣa, viz., venom, as well as the first, water, which was needed for the connection with clouds. 2. Dizziness and the other affictions can result equally from snake-bite or from the absence of one's husband during the monsoon. Accordingly, the words dhramim etc., exemplify arthaśās̄a, not sabdaśās̄a. 3. The heart is often likened to a lotus. But BP notes the instance in KumSom. 5.19 where Parvatī’s heart is likened to a lotus made of gold because, while tender, it can endure the most severe exertions. The text of $L$ is mispointed; one should place the danda after sasāratvāt instead of before. Again, in the next line, one should place the danda after prasṛta-pratāpasāra(h) instead of before.

$A$ Where the figure of speech, although implied, is then again directly expressed by some other word [in the stanza], we likewise cannot speak of dhvani in the form of a resonance arising by the power
of words. In such cases we must speak of some directly denoted figure such as *vakrokti* or the like,\(^1\) as in this example:

O Keśava, my eyes were blind
my judgment was blinded
with the dust raised by your cattle;
by passion for the cowherd;
I could see nothing and so I stumbled;
I fell from virtue;

why do you not help me up, my lord?
why do you not take me as a husband [takes a wife]?

You are the one refuge of the weak
of women
when their hearts fail them on rough roads
in their troubles.

Thus did the Gopī once express a hint to Hari,
who now, I pray, may grant his help to you.\(^3\)

Everything of this sort we would place in the domain of the expressed figure *śleṣa*.

1. *Vakrokti* in its *śleṣa* variety is the figure exhibited in the verse which follows. Ānanda uses the term here in the sense of Rudraṭa 2.14 and Mammaṭa 9.1 (＝ *sūtra* 103), of a specific figure (*śabdālaṅkāra*) rather than in the general sense of “ornamented speech” employed by earlier writers. Mammaṭa’s definition is “*Vakrokti* (crooked speech) is when a sentence expresses one meaning taken in one way and another taken in another, the combination being effected by puns (*śleṣa*) or by tone of voice (*kāku*).” *Vakrokti* of the first type is really nothing more than a complex or extended *śleṣa*. 2. The stanza is quoted in *SūktaM*. 2.93, where one MS ascribes it to Tribhuvanapāla.

*L* Having thus shown what was meant to be excluded by the word “implied” (*āksipta*) [in 2.21 *K*], he now proceeds to show what is excluded by the word “only” (eua): where the [figure although implied], etc. The meaning of this sentence is as follows. When words capable of denoting two senses are employed, if there is no reason for restricting the power of denotation to only one of these senses, as, for example, in the stanza “He who destroyed the cart” [2.21 *A*], or to take a different situation, when there is some reason [such as the use of words like “even”] which awakens us to the presence of a second power of denotation [which conveys a second sense], as for example in the stanzas beginning from “As even without a necklace” [2.21 *a*.4] and
extending to "Whose war elephants are his mighty arms" [2.21 c A], it is of course obvious that that [second] sense is denoted, [not suggested]. But where there is some reason such as the context, which delimits the power of denotation to only one of the two senses, so that the power of denotation cannot extend to the second sense: in such a case the second sense is said to be suggested. Now even in such a case, if a word is then used [in the poem], by which that restrictive factor, such as the context, etc., loses its force, then that power of denotation, although once inhibited from rendering the second sense, is revived so to speak and such cases do not fall in the domain of suggestion. The particle ca [the second word in the sentence of the Vṛtti which has just been explained] has the sense of api and has been placed out of position; [it belongs after āksipta]. Thus what is referred to is a figure of speech which, although (api) implied, that is, it begins by giving the immediate impression of being implied, is not really implied, but rather is directly expressed because of the revival of the [second] power of denotation by some other word. The word again (punah) indicates this revival of the power of denotation as explained above. Thus the word "only" (eva) [in Kārikā 2.21] rules out a figure of speech that is apparently, but not really, suggested. This is the meaning.

"O Keśava": here the words have their powers of denotation limited by the context in the following sense. O Keśava, as my eyesight was blinded by the dust raised by [the feet of] the cattle, I could see nothing and because of that I stumbled on the way. Why now, that is, for what possible reason, do you not give me, who have fallen, your hand for support? For you alone, being of extraordinary strength, are the refuge, i.e., the means of support in rough places, for all those who are weak: children, the aged, and women, whose hearts are distressed and who are unable to proceed.

But while the context inhibits the denotative powers of the words from the second sense, which will be explained presently, these denotative powers are revived by the word salesām "with a hint." Leśa means something small and, as to hint at something is to make a small [reference] to it, salesām means "with a hint." The meaning hinted at is this: O Keśava, O cowherd, O lord of my life! Because my eyes were blinded by passion—or the words may be construed as follows: "Because I was deprived of my judgment by my passion for Keśava"—I stumbled, that is, I became guilty of a moral lapse. Why do you not assume patitā, that is, the office of a husband, toward me? You are the one, that is, you alone possess perfect success in love, for all women,
their hearts yearning with desire but without any stain of jealousy, 
worship you as their refuge, that is, for the preservation of their lives. 
This is the second sense.

1. In the prior interpretation gopa is taken as a separate word in the 
vocative. In the latter, and far preferable interpretation, gopa is taken as the 
stem-form in compound with rāga.

A On the other hand, where by the power of words a figure of 
speech in addition [to ślesa] appears, this figure being implied by the 
inherent capability of the situation: all such cases are in the domain of 
dhvani. As [in a prose passage]:

Meanwhile the long period named Summer, 
Meanwhile the God of Destruction, 
when the market stalls are white with the laughter 
whose terrible laughter is white 
of their blossoming jasmine flowers, 
as jasmine flowers, 
expanded as it put an end to the two months of Spring.¹ 
yawned as He put an end to the aeons of time.

[Bāna, Harṣacarita 2, lines 19–20]

And as [in a verse]:

They are high, with flashing necklace 
They are high, with flashing downpours 
and dark with aloe paste: 
and dark as aloe paste: — 
whom would the breasts of this slender maid 
whom would this wealth of clouds 
not fill with yearning?

[Śakavṛddhi]²
§ 2.21e A

Iving joy to all creatures
to their progeny
by their absorption and release of water,
of milk,
scattering to all directions in the morning
and disappearing at the close of day:
and gathering together at the close of day:
they are a ship for crossing
the sea of transmigration, the source of our long pain.
May these rays of the blazing sun engender
May these cows
in your purified selves unmeasured bliss.

[Mayūra, Sūryaśataka 9]

In these examples, by the power of words a second, non-contextual (apräkāraṇīka), meaning appears. In order that the sentence should not convey a [second] meaning that is unconnected [with the first], one imagines a relation of image and subject (upamāna and upameya) between the non-contextual meaning [e.g., cows] and the contextual meaning [e.g., the rays of the sun], this imagining being made possible by the inherent capability of the situation (sāmarthyāt). And so the śleṣa here is implied by the sense and not furnished by words. Thus the domain of that type of dhwani which is like a reverberation is indeed different from that of the [figure of speech] śleṣa.

1. The figure is rūpaka. We have translated according to Abhinava's interpretation. On the other hand, the natural way of taking phullamallikā- dhavalāṭṭahāso is as a rūpakasamāsa: "whose white laughter was the blossoming jasmine." But taking that compound as a rūpakasamāsa would make the passage unfit as an example of a suggested figure of speech. Hence Abhinava's interpretation. Note that the way in which such passages are explained by the Ālāṅkārikas may be defended logically but does not satisfy the psychological process of our apprehension. Meeting with the passage from Bāna, atrāntare dhavalāṭṭahāso mahākālaḥ, etc., the reader immediately sees what Ananda regards as the suggested sense: "Then Śiva with his terrible laughter," etc. Only later and painfully does he absorb the other meaning. To Ananda the direct meaning (sāksādvācya) is the contextual meaning. After all, the story is describing the shift of spring to summer. There is no reason of syntax, no word marking a figure of speech (like iva for upamā, tu for vyatireka, eva for rūpaka), that would make us choose the meaning that refers to Śiva the destroyer. So that meaning, which the reader has absorbed
so readily, is to Ānanda the suggested meaning. But now for the psychological difficulty. This suggested meaning is defined as samālkṣyakramāvanātyā, that is, a meaning which is apprehended at a moment recognizably later than our apprehension of the denoted meaning. In instances like that of the quotation under discussion, that simply is not true. 2. Here the suggested figure is simile. The girl's breasts are like clouds. The stanza is quoted by Subhāṣitāvalī (1538), which quotes some twelve verses by this same poet. 3. The text of the stanza is uncertain, with the variants aklistasṛstaiḥ appearing in a (Dhv. ed. Badari Nath Sarma) and pavanās tāḥ appearing in d (Kāvyasamgraha, Vol. 2). For the image of the salvific ship, one may note that the soul of the dying man passes by way of the rays of the sun to release (Īśa Up.) and that the cow, being sacred, is sometimes used as a psychopomp, the tail of a cow being placed in the hand of a dying man to lead him to heaven. 4. The slesa in the preceding three examples is furnished by the capability, inherent in the two senses of the stanza, of entering into a relation of upamāna and upameya. The two senses have an inherent similarity. If, for example, the two senses of Mayūra's stanza did not have this capability, we would not think of taking the words pmjānām, payobhih, and gāvah in two senses. On the other hand, in a verse like "As even without a necklace" (2.21 a A), the slesa in hārīnāu is pointed out by the word api.

L Having thus distinguished the domain of the figure of speech slesa, he now explains the domain of suggestion(dhvanī): on the other hand, where, etc.

[Comment on the first example from Bāna.] The contextual meaning is as follows. The summer puts an end to the two months that constitute the season of spring; [the summer,] in which the laughter, that is, the blossoming, the whiteness, of the full-blown jasmine flowers is such as to whiten, to make beautiful, the attāni, that is, the market stalls. If [phullamallikādhavalāṭṭahāsa is] explained as [a rūpakasamāsa, viz.,] "[summer] which possesses Śiva's white laughter in the form of full-blown jasmine flowers," this example would be in no way different from "cloud serpents" [2.21 b A; it would be a case of a directly expressed metaphor]. It is a "long time" (mahākālaḥ), that is, a long season, because its days are long and hard to endure. Here the denotative powers of the words are restricted by the context, namely a description of the summer season. For that reason mahākāla [which as a compound means the destructive form of Śiva] and the other [word attahāsa, which as a compound means the wild laughter of Śiva] do not follow the maxim that "the denotative power of a compound is stronger...
than the denotative power of its components," but fulfill their denotative functions [by furnishing the sense of their component members] in the way we have described. The apprehension of the sense [of the compound] which takes place afterward is the result of the power of suggestion based on the [denotative] power of words.

On this problem, some people hold the following view. Inasmuch as these words [mahākāla, etc.] have been seen in former contexts to have a different power [from that of mahān kālah, etc.], giving a different sense [from that of "a long season"], it is from that other power which has been seen to give that other sense that the hearer can now apprehend that sense from these words even when their denotative power is restricted by context, this apprehension being due to the operation of suggestion. Accordingly, there is no contradiction in saying that this sense is a suggested sense based on the [formerly experienced] denotative power of the word.

Others say that since the second denotative power [e.g., the power in mahākāla that furnishes the meaning of "Śiva"] relies for aid on the inherent capability of the situation, namely the similar properties of summer to those of the terrible god, it is therefore said to take the form of a suggestive operation.

Some follow the view that just as śabdaślesa is possible only where two separate words are present, so also in arthaślesa there must be two words because there are two denotations. Accordingly, in both these cases a second word is bought in. Sometimes this is done by a denotative operation, for example where the answer sveto dhāvati is given to two separate questions, or in riddles and the like. In these cases the figure [ślesa] is a denoted figure. But where the second word is brought in by a suggestive operation, it is reasonable to regard the meaning understood from the second word as a suggested (pratīyamāna) meaning because it is based on that which is suggested.

Others say that inasmuch as it is a second denotative power that is revived according to the explanation of the second view [put forth above], the second meaning must be denoted and not suggested. But there appears an identification of this second meaning, after it has been apprehended, with the first, contextual, meaning; and as this identification cannot come from a non-linguistic source, it must come from the suggestive power of the words; because one cannot suppose that any denotative power is responsible for it. And this [suggested identification] is based on the second denotative power, for without
that power it would not arise. Accordingly, it is reasonable to speak of this as the suggestion of a figure of speech (alaṅkārādhyāni). And the Vṛttikāra is about to say, “in order that the sentence should not convey a [second] meaning that is unconnected [with the first].” Now in the previous [examples, where the figure was not suggested,] the lack of connection [in the verse “O Keśava, my eyes were blind”] was prevented by the word salesam “with a hint”; in the verse “He who destroyed the cart” a lack of connection simply did not appear; in the verse “As even without a necklace” the lack of connection was prevented by the word api “even”; in the verse “As he holds in his hand the discus,” by the word adhika “superior”; in the verse “The cloud serpents,” by the metaphor-compound [the rūpakasamāsa “cloud-serpents”]. [They say that] this is the overall meaning.

[Commentary on the verse of Mayūra.] The word payobhih means both “with water” and “with milk.” Samhāra means “disappearance” and “gathering into one place.” Gāvo means “rays” and “cows.”

Conveying a meaning that is unconnected: that is, a meaning that is unintelligible. A relation of image and subject: By this relation, which is in the form [that the figurative operation takes] in simile, one should judge that contrasting [one thing with another], denying [one thing in favor of another], etc., in fact, any form of [suggested] operation, furnishes us with the chief goal of aesthetic delight, rather than the base and simile, etc., [on which these operations work]. This consideration applies to all suggested figures of speech.

By the inherent capability of the situation: that is, by the suggestive operation.

1. Other things being equal, one would naturally take mahākālah to mean Śiva. But the present context forces us to take the denoted sense as that of mahān kālaḥ, a long season. If we also apprehend the sense of Śiva, that sense must be suggested, for the denotative operation has been completed.
2. This is the view accepted by Mammata 2.19 (Jhalkikar ed. p. 63) and by Viśvanātha (SD 2.14).
3. This interpretation stays closer to the language of Ānanda. The hearer already knows that mahākāla can mean Śiva. But hearing the word in a context where it must denote a long season, he would not think of the denotation Śiva unless there was some similarity in the new context that suggested that other sense. The fact that summer puts an end to a period of time, namely the spring, and Śiva puts an end to a period of time, namely the aeon, constitutes the similarity that allows the suggestion to operate.
4. This is the view of Udbhata as is also the peculiar distinction of śabdāsleśa and arthāsleśa. Udbhata defines śleśa, by which he
means a sticking together, an adhesion, of two meanings or of two similar sound groups, in 4.9–10 Indurāja (4.23–24 Vivrti): ekaprayatnoccdrydndm taccchāydm caiva bibhratōm / svaritādīgnair bhinnair baṇhāḥ śliṣṭam īho-
cyte // alankārāntaragatām pratiḥbham janayat padaḥ / dinirhār artha-
śabdoktvīśīṣṭam tat pratiyātām // "The use of expressions that have identical phonetic shape, or of expressions that seem to have identical shape because their differences are in properties such as the Vedic accent, is called śliṣṭa (= sīlesa). This figure produces the appearance of other figures by means of word-pairs of these two types and is to be understood as characterized by a [conjoined] expression of meaning or of sound-groups [i.e., as artha-
sīlesa or śabdāsīlesa]." The commentators explain that in Udbhata's view there must be a separate word (padam) for every meaning. Thus, if kara is used to mean both "hand" and "ray," we have two words of identical phonetic shape. This usage he calls arthaśīlesa, adhesion of meaning, for two meanings adhere together in one phonetic datum. On the other hand, when the expression asvāpaphala is used to mean both "producing a result that is not easily obtained" (a-su-âpam phalam yasya) and "the result of lack of sleep" (a-svāpa-phalam), we do not have two words of identical phonetic shape. According to Pan. 6.2.172 the former will be accented asvâpaphalā (a negative bahuvrīhi has terminal accent), while by Pan. 6.2.139 the latter will be ac-
cented asvāpaphala (in a tatpurusa the final member takes its natural accent). This usage Udbhata calls śabdāśīlesa, adhesion of sound, for two sound-units adhere so as to appear identical. Udbhata's two types are almost equivalent to Dandin's abhinnapada and bhinnapada. Udbhata's terminology is infelicitous because both types depend on sound and this terminology was abandoned by the later Ālankārikas whose works are preserved to us. But the commentator from whom Abhinava is here quoting apparently accepted it. 5. The two questions are ka ito dhāvati "what is running hither?" and kimvarno dhā-
vati "What color is the thing that is running?" The answer to the first is śveto (śvā ito) dhāvati "A dog is running hither"; to the latter śveto dhāvati "Something white is running." The second word (śveto "white") is brought in by denotative operation. The question demands that some color be denoted. The example goes back to Patañjali, Mahābhāṣya, Intr. to 1.1.1 (Kielborn Vol. 1, p. 14) and 8.2.3 (Kielborn Vol. 3, p. 388). 6. Context demands that mahākālah apply to summer. So the "first word" denotes a long season. But we have previously heard a "second word" of identical phonetic shape, which means Śiva. If we now understand the meaning Śiva also, it is because the second word has been brought in by suggestion. Vācyā and pratiyamānā are used, like śrūta and ērtha, of that which is expressed and that which is understood (suggested). 7. Because the denotative powers are used up in furnishing the first and second meanings 8. The suggested identification is not furnished (utpādita) by a denotative power because the denotative powers are now exhausted. But it is based on, that is, it presupposes, a denotative
power. Specifically it presupposes the second denotative power because one cannot have the relation of identity without having a second term to identify with the first. 9. Both meanings of the verse furnish praise of God and so both are contextual. There is no non-contextual meaning in the stanza which could exhibit a disconnection.

10. According to BP this view (the fourth view of “others” given by Abhinava) is accepted by Appayya Diksita in his Kuvalayānanda. 11. In characterizing suggested figures of speech Ānanda spoke merely of our being forced to imagine a similarity. Abhinava extends his statement, taking it as an upalaksāna of other relations which we may be forced to imagine. He then points out that this imagining of various relations is what gives the chief aesthetic value to this species of dhvani. In denoted figures of speech our pleasure ends with the apprehension of the objects which are brought into relation by the figure, e.g., the subject (upameya) and the image (upamāna). In suggested figures of speech we receive a special relish from imagining the relations.

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A Other figures of speech as well [as simile] can occur in this type of suggestive poetry that is based on the power of words and where the suggested meaning is like the reverberation of a bell. Thus, contradiction (virodha) may appear in the form of a reverberation based on the power of words, as in Bhattā Bāna’s description of the land called Sthānviśvara:

where the women have the [slow] gait of elephants
have affairs with outcastes,
and are virtuous,
are of fair complexion and fond of wealth,
are Gaurīs and are fond of places where Śiva is absent,
are youthful and wear rubies,
are black and have the red color of lotuses,
have mouths that are bright with white teeth
have mouths as pure as those of pure brahmans
and breaths that are perfumed with wine.

[Bāna, Harṣacarita, p. 98, lines 3–4]
(Chapter 3, lines 228–229 out of 654)
For in this example one cannot say that the contradiction is directly expressed or that the puns favoring the semblance of contradiction are denoted; because the figure contradiction is not directly revealed by any word [such as “although”]. For where the figure of contradiction is directly expressed by a word, in such a poetic expression of ambiguity we have the domain of a denoted figure of speech, either contradiction (virodha) or pun (śleśa).

An example may be given from the same work of Bāna:

She was the meeting place as it were of contradictions,
for her figure was brilliant
for there was the figure of the sun
although accompanied by the blackness of her hair.
even in the presence of the young night.

[Bāna, Harṣacarita, p. 27, line 15]
(Chapter 1, line 403 out of 689)

Or, [one may see an example of suggested contradiction] in a verse of my own own:

Bow down to the sole refuge of men, the everlasting,
to the soie house of men that is no house,
the overlord, the lord of our thoughts,
the non-lord of thoughts that is lord of our thoughts,
Hari-Krishna, fourfold of nature,¹ beyond all action,
the golden, the black, of dexterous self who does not act,
the destroyer of enemies who bears the wheel.
the destroyer of the spoke-holder who bears the wheel.

For in this verse contradiction in the form of a [suggested] reverberation based on the power of words is clearly understood.

Contrast (vyatireka) of the same sort also appears i

May both sets of the sun god's feet lead you to welfare
[those which are his rays and those on which he stands]:
those which light up the sky, dispelling darkness,
and those whose toenails are refulgent;
and those which do not illumine the sky;
those which nourish the beauty of the pond lotus
and those whose beauty puts the lotuses to shame;
those which shine on the tops of mountains
those which shine on the heads of kings
and those which tread on the heads of the immortals.
In the same way there are other varieties of dhvani based on the power of words where the suggested meaning is like the reverberation of a bell. They may be sought out by sensitive readers on their own. I have not dealt with them here in detail lest my book should become too extensive.

A reference to the four emanations (vyūhas) of Viṣṇu.

L [Commentary on the first quotation from Bāna.] [Mātanīga-gāminyāh] means they walk like elephants. The contrast [with what follows] lies in the [second] meaning "they visit outcastes." "They delight in wealth" also means they take delight in a place where Śiva is absent. "They possess the gems called padmaraṇga (rubies)" also [means] they have the red color (rāga) of lotuses (padma). "Their mouths are pure," that is, bright "with white teeth (dvija)" also [means] their mouths are as pure as those of pure, that is, the most exalted, brahmans (dvija).

For where: namely in a poetic expression of ambiguity [where the contradiction is directly expressed], there we have the domain of contradiction (virodha) or pun (slesa), that is to say, of the figure fusion (saṃkara).

He means that this [figure in such instances] becomes the domain—of what?—of a denoted figure of speech, of a denoted ornament. The meaning is, it becomes the domain of something which possesses the property of a denoted figure of speech. This is as much as to say that it is only in such cases that one may rightly call the contradiction or the pun a denoted figure.

[Commentary on the second quotation from Bāna.] Night, that is, blackness, was in her hair (vāla), or the night, that is, darkness, was young (bāla), new.

Now it might be objected that in the passage "Where the women have the gait of elephants," etc., the particle ca ("and") being used with the pairs of properties actually expresses the contradiction. For if a mere additive sense had been intended, ca would have been used with each property separately, or would have been used just once at the end, or would not have been used at all. With this objection in mind, he furnishes another example: or.

How can a śaraṇa, a house, be in the form of a-kṣaya, a non-house? How can he who is not dhīśa, lord of our thoughts, be lord of our thoughts? How can he who is golden (hari) be black (krṣṇa)? How
can one whose self is dexterous, valiant, be actionless? How can he
who is the destroyer of that which possesses spokes proudly bear the
wheel?

Contradiction: the word virodha here means contradiction in gen-
eral [not the expressed figure of speech virodha]. Is understood: what
he has in mind is that it is clearly understood but is not expressed by
any word.

[Commentary on the final verse.] “Those whose toenails are resplen-
dent” also means “which certainly do not shine in the sky.” “Both”
[sets of feet] means those which are his rays and those which are limbs
composed of toes, heel, etc.

1. I.e., such an instance falls into the category of the figure fusion. See
above, 2.21 a A, note 1 and 2.21 a L, note 4. 2. I.e., such a case of the
figure fusion falls into the category of a denoted figure of speech. 3. The
same effect appears in English. If I say, “He is wise and young, handsome and
not proud,” I am emphasizing the contradictions as I would not do if I used
the word “and” three times, or just once (before “not proud”), or not at all.
4. The reason for Abhinava’s gloss is that in his view the suggested figure is
sankara, not virodha.

$\S$ 2.22 A

\[K\]

On the other hand, we have another type of [dhvani] that
arises from the power of meaning (arthāsāktyudbhava) when a meaning
appears which by itself and without [the use of] words, manifests a
second meaning as the tātparya (the chief meaning of the sentence).

\[A\]

Where a meaning by its own inherent capability manifests,
without the operation of words, another meaning, we have that variety
of dhvani, arising from the power of meaning, where the suggested
meaning is similar to a reverberation. For example:

While the heavenly visitor was speaking, Pārvati,
standing with lowered face beside her father,
counted the petals of the lotus in her hand.

[Kālidāsa, KumSam. 6.84]
For here the counting of the petals of the lotus subordinates itself and without the help of any verbal operation reveals another matter in the form of a transient state of mind (vyabhicāribhāva) [of the emotion love, namely shyness]. This example does not fall under the sole heading of “suggestion without a perceived interval” (alaksyakramavyaṅgya), for it is only where we apprehend the rasa or the like directly (sākṣāt, i.e., immediately) through a verbal presentation of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicāribhāvas that we have a suggestion that is exclusively of that type,1 as for example in the Kumārasambhava where, in the context of the advent of spring, we have the description of events beginning with the arrival of Pārvatī wearing spring flowers for jewelry, up to the point where the god of love places an arrow on his bow and takes aim at Śiva. All this, as well as the description of the particular actions of Śiva as his calmness is stirred, is conveyed directly by words. But in the present example the rasa is apprehended through its transient state of mind, which in turn is implied by the inherent capability [of the described action of counting the lotus petals, etc.]. Therefore this is a different variety of dhvāni.

1. Note that Ānanda will admit, in 3.43 A, that this stanza does contain rasa dhvāni, for the suggestion of the shyness leads on to an apprehension of the rasa, śrṅgāra. In the stanza the two varieties of dhvāni, he says, are fused. What he says here is that the stanza does not contain rasa dhvāni only (alaksyakramavyaṅgya dhvāni). It also contains a suggestion of perceived interval, namely the suggestion of shyness.

The phrase sākṣācchabdanivedita used here and three lines below has long caused difficulty. Śrīdhara in commenting on the Kāvyaprakāśa (Vol. 1, p. 128) attributed the phrase to Ānanda’s temporary forgetfulness or inattention. For modern discussions of the passage, in addition to Jacobi’s note, ZDMG 56 (1902), p. 766, see K. Krishnamoorthy, The Dhvanyāloka and its Critics, p. 266, and M. V. Patwardhan and J. L. Masson, “Solution to a Long-confused Issue in the Dhvanyāloka,” JOIBaroda 22 (1972-73), pp. 48-56, to which Krishnamoorthy has replied in a long note to his text and translation of the Dhv., pp. 354-360.

The difficulty is this. Ānanda has already said (1.4g A) that rasa and the like (rasādi) are never sākṣācchabdaṁpyāpāravīṣaya, that is, never the object of the direct (denotative) operation of words; they are always suggested. And within the term “and the like” the bhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas are included. If we take sākṣācchabdanivedita in the present sentence to mean “where the vyabhicārinś are conveyed by direct denotation, or actually named,” we will have to charge Ānanda with flatly contradicting one of his most basic theories. Furthermore, in the passages of the Kumārasambhava to which he refers as
exemplifications of alakṣyakrama, the vyabhicāriḥbhāvas are nowhere directly named.

Abhinava's solution, followed by Patwardhan and Masson in the article just referred to, is to connect the sense of the adverb sāksāt more closely with pratiyate than with sabdaniveditebhya. It is when we apprehend the suggestion directly, that is, immediately, from the description of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicārins that we have the type of suggestion where the interval is not perceived (asamlaksyakramavyangyadhvani). In Ānanda's judgment the verse which describes Pārvati's counting the petals of the lotus does not belong in that category. He feels that we must reflect for a moment before we realize that what is being described is really the shyness of young love. So he assigns the verse to the samalaksyakrama type.

Abhinava's solution becomes somewhat more difficult in the passage three lines below, where sāksācchabdanivedita is used without the verb pratiyate, the sense of which must be understood. That is, we must understand "conveyed by direct words" to mean "conveyed by words which give an immediate understanding of the suggestion." Difficult or not, this interpretation fits with the whole tenor of Ānanda's aesthetics. We can now charge him perhaps with inexactitude of expression (Śrīdhara's inattention) but not with a lapse of theory (Śrīdhara's forgetfulness).

§ 2.22 L

Having in this way dealt with that variety ofdhvani where the suggestion rests on the power of words, he now proceeds to explain the variety that depends on the power of meaning: [On the other hand], etc. Another: sc., other than that which rests on the power of words. By itself [manifests] as the tātparya: This word (tātparya), being followed as it is by a denial of the denotative function [in the words uktim vinā], must refer to the suggestive process, not to the tātparyasakti (the power belonging to the syntax of the sentence), for we have already said [1.4 b L] that the power belonging to the syntax of the sentence has exhausted itself once we have understood the literal sense.

With this same intention he now says in the Vṛtti: Where a meaning by its own inherent capability. The term "by itself" (svatah) of the Kārikā has been rendered by "its own" (sua) in the Vṛtti. He now explains the significance of "without words": without the operation of words. He illustrates: For example "While [the heavenly visitor], etc."

Another matter: shyness. Directly: the meaning here intended is that the vyabhicārins are "directly conveyed" where our perception
of them arises from their appropriate vibhāvas and anubhāvas without anything's being interposed, inasmuch as we do not perceive any interval [between the literal and suggested meanings]. Hence there is no contradiction with what was stated before [in 1.4g A]. For it was stated before at some length that the vyabhicāribhāvas, being emotional manifestations (bhāvas), cannot be conveyed by being directly named (svaśabdatah). This is as much as to say that although rasa, bhāva, and the like are invariably suggested and never directly expressed, still they are not always in the domain of that type of suggestion where the interval [between the literal and suggested meanings] is not perceived. We have that type of suggestion only in those cases where the suggestion of rasa and the like occurs immediately from the full presentation of the vibhāvas and anubhāvas belonging to the sthāyibhāvas and the vyabhicāribhāvas. For example:

Then came the daughter of the mountain king
with her attendant nymphs. Her loveliness
seemed to rekindle in the god of love
his near extinguished courage.

[KumSam. 3.52]

In this and the following stanzas there is a full description of [Pārvatī’s] nature which is well suited to act both as an objective and a stimulative determinant (ālambanavibhāva and uddīpanavibhāva.)
We are told how these vibhāvas take effect in the stanza:

As Śiva, favoring his devotee,
moved to accept the offering,
the love-god fitted to his flowery bow
the deadly shaft Infatuation.

[KumSam. 3.66]

But Śiva, stirring slightly from his calm
as the ocean stirs at moonrise,
busied his eyes on Umā’s face
and her fruit-like lower lip.

[KumSam. 3.67]

First we have been told of Pārvatī’s inclination toward Śiva and now we are told of Śiva’s turning his attention toward Pārvatī. His prejudice in her favor has been indicated as a “favoring of his devotee.”
From a strengthening of this prejudice comes the basic emotion (sthāyi-bhāva) love (rāti). The author has revealed all the symptoms (anubhāvas) common to this basic emotion and to its transient states of mind (vyabhicārins) eagerness, agitation (āvega), instability (cāpālya), and the like. And so our relish of the determinants (vibhāvas) and the symptoms ends up as (paryavasyati) a relish of the transient states of mind. And as the transient states of mind are dependent on the basic emotion, there is no perceived interval between our relishing of them and our aesthetic goal of relishing the basic emotion, which is like the string of a garland of which the transient states are the separate flowers.

But in the stanza which our author is discussing, a young maiden's counting of lotus petals and lowering her face can be imagined as due to other causes [such as inattention or naivete] and so do not cause our heart to fix immediately on shyness [as her state of mind]. Rather, these acts suggest the idea of shyness in love only after the reader calls to mind the earlier incidents [of the poem], such as Pārvati's asceticism [undertaken in order to win Śiva as her husband]. So the suggestion of [the accompanying emotion] shyness comes after a perceived interval.

The rasa in the stanza is also removed, but as it appears the moment that the true nature of [Pārvati's] state of mind has been realized, it is not at a perceived interval from that. The suggestion of perceived interval in this stanza is with respect to the shyness. This is what our author has meant to indicate by his use of the words “sole” (eva) and “exclusive” (kevala).2

1. Pārvati herself acts as the ālambanavibhāva; her physical qualities act as the uddipanavibhāvas. 2. There is no strict or exclusive asamlaksya-kramadhvani in the lotus petal stanza because while the rasa is asamlaksya-krama from the vyabhicārin, the vyabhicārin is samlaksyakrama from the presentation of the anubhāva. To put the matter in simpler form: there is a perceived interval between the presentation of the anubhāva (counting the lotus petals) and the suggestion of the vyabhicārin (shyness); there is no perceived interval between the suggestion of shyness and the suggestion of the rasa of love. This is a subtle distinction, which permits Abhinava to say that the rasa itself is always suggested without interval even when it “stands far off” (dūratah) by reason of its transient emotion's being suggested at an interval.
A But a meaning which is aided by the [denotative] operation of words in suggesting a second meaning does not fall in this category [of suggestion by the power of meaning]. For example:

Knowing that her gallant had set his heart on a rendezvous, the subtle lass smiled and to show her meaning folded the petals of the lotus in her hand.\(^1\)

Here we are expressly told of the suggestiveness of the girl's folding up the lotus blossom with which she is playing.

1. As lotuses close their petals at sundown, she means that he is to meet her at that time. Ānanda quotes the stanza again at 3.34 A as an example of alaksyakramagunibhūtavyangya. The suggestion is the fact that her lover should come at night. We arrive at the suggested meaning immediately. The stanza is also found anonymously in Subhā. 2043. Dandin has a very similar stanza, KA 2.261.

L He proceeds to show what is sought to be excluded by the Kārikā's phrase "without [the use of] words": But a meaning, etc. The particle ca ("and") here has the sense of "but." In this [category]: he has in mind that it may, however, fall in [a different category, namely] that of suggestion where the interval is not noticed.\(^1\) He illustrates: "Knowing that her gallant, etc."

The suggestiveness: sc., that evening will be the right time [for the rendezvous]. Expressly told: sc., by the first three lines. It is true that no one word in these three lines, even in connection with its neighbors, has the power of denoting the sense of "evening," and to that extent the suggestiveness of the stanza is not undone. However, we are expressly told that the sense is suggestive of some other sense and thereby the very life of suggestion, which consists of the charm of something's being said in a hidden manner, is destroyed. It is as if some one should say:

I am a deep man.
No one knows what I will do.
I do not say anything
that my facial expression has indicated.
Here the speaker, who should indicate his depth of character by his facial expression, instead speaks of it outright. Hence our author says, "we have been told of the suggestiveness."  

1. Compare 2.21a A, end; also 3.38 A.  
2. I am not sure that I have understood the verse fragment. Jagannāth Pāṭhak translates it into Hindi: maim gambhir hūm, bīna bataē marā kām koi bhi nahīṁ jāntā, (is lie) kuch kahtā hūm, "I am a deep man. No one knows of my doings unless I give a hint, (therefore) I say something." BP punctuates so as to get a very different sense: "I am not a deep man. Therefore no one knows my intention although it is indicated (by my expression). So I will say something." Pāṭhak may be right. BP, I am sure, is wrong.

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K When a meaning, even though it has been implied by the power of words or meanings, is then again revealed by the poet in so many words, it is [to be considered as] a figure of speech and different from dhvani.

A When a meaning, even though it has been implied by the power of words, by the power of meaning, or by the power of words and meaning, is then again proclaimed in so many words by the poet, it is [to be considered as] a figure of speech and different from this type of dhvani that is like a reverberation. Or, if there is a possibility in the verse of a suggestion of unperceived interval, this [implied and then revealed meaning] will be a figure of speech and different from that sort of suggestion.¹
An example of a meaning implied by the power of words [and then revealed] is:

"My child, come hither and be not distressed; come to this one [Viṣṇu] and go not to the poison-eater [Śiva]; leave off this rapid upward surging breath; abandon the rapid Wind-god and him of vertical motion [Fire]; and why this heavy trembling? Have done with what use is the god of Water or Brahmā? Have done with this exhausting stretching of your limbs." the proud destroyer of Bala [Indra]."

Thus Ocean, under guise of calming Lakṣṇī's fear, for she was dazed by the churning of the sea, caused her to reject the other gods and gave her to him who now, I pray, may burn away your sins.

An example of a meaning implied by the power of meaning [and then revealed] is:

"That's where my aged mother sleeps, and there sleeps daddy, the oldest man you've ever met. Here sleeps the slave-girl worn out by her chores, and here sleep I, who must be guilty to deserve these few days absence of my lord." By these statements the youthful wife suggested to the the traveler his opportunity.

An example of a meaning implied by both powers is "O Keśava, my eyes were blind" [2.21 d A].

1. The genitive alaksyakramavyangyasya goes naturally with sambhaye and tādṛś refers most naturally to alaksyakramavyangya. There is no need for the grammatical gymnastics employed by Abhinava (see below). 2. Vertical motion is a basic characteristic of fire in the Vaiśeṣika system (VS 5.2.13) and is used as an epithet of fire in poetry (e.g., Śīṣupālavadha 1.2). 3. The stanza is quoted anonymously in SūktiM. 3.65 and under Kuv. 155. Lakṣṇī was among the precious objects churned up by the gods from the sea. The motion might well have left her out of breath and trembling. For jṛmbhita, context as well as the opinion of Abhinava favors the meaning of stretching the limbs (angaṃsabhita) rather than yawning; see also 2.18-19 b A, note 1. The ocean is pictured as Lakṣṇī's father, comforting her and by puns directing her away from all suitors but her future husband, Viṣṇu. While the sequential suggestion of second meanings is destroyed by our being told of it in so many words, there is the possibility of the other type of suggestion, with no perceived
interval (asamlaksyakramavyaŋgyadhvani) in the verse. We may take the main
purport of the stanza to be a relish (śṛṅgārasābhāṣa) of the poet’s love
of Viṣṇu (Viṣṇuviṣayakaratibhāva) of which the stimulant (uddipanaubhāva)
would be Viṣṇu’s qualities which are here suggested to be superior to those
of all the other gods by the fact that Lakṣmi chose him for her husband.
4. The reading avasara in line 4 is found in ancient quotations of the stanza
only here and in RG. With this reading a literal translation of the line will be:
‘Thus was the traveler addressed by the young woman with a hint of
his opportunity in her statements.” Most ancient quotations (SRK 812, Sād-
ukti. 2.15.3, Aufrecht ZDMG 36, 539) read abhimatam: the wife informed
the traveler of her intention. Subhā. 2247 reads avasatha (resting place):
the young wife spoke to the traveler under the pretext of stating the resting
places (of the members of her family]. The verse is variously ascribed in the
anthologies to Rūdraṭa or Bhaṭṭa. The two authors: Rūdraṭa, author of the
Kāvyaśākāra, and Rūdra Bhaṭṭa, author of the Śṛṅgārātilaka are constantly
confused in the anthologies. As Rūdra Bhaṭṭa was apparently of later date
than Anandaśadvardhana (see Kane HSP, pp. 149–151), it is Rūdraṭa that has
the best claim to the verse.

§ 2.23 L  

The author of the Vṛtti wishes in a single construction to
resume the foregoing two types of suggestion and to indicate a third
type. Accordingly, he introduces the Kārikā with a phrase that serves
both purposes: and in the same way. 1 The meaning is that together
with the aforementioned two types a third type must be considered.
1 [In the Kārikā] sabdārtha is an ekaśeṣa compound. 2 Different: it is
not a suggestion but an [expressed] figure of speech such as sīḷa. Or,
taking “suggestion” (dhvani) [in the Kārikā] to mean suggestion with
an unperceived interval, this suggested meaning can be considered an
ornament of that suggestion to which it is subordinated, an ornament
that is different from merely expressed figures of speech and one that
forms a second, far superior (lokottara) type of figure of speech. He
will explain the passage in these two ways in the Vṛtti. 3

[Comment on the first verse.] Viṣāda (distress) [also] means eater of
poison. “Of vertical motion” refers to Fire. [To obtain a satisfactory
pun] one must understand the word “and” [as connecting svasanam
and īrđhva-pravṛttam]. Kampah (trembling) [also] means lord (pāh)
of waters (kam). Or [why] choose kāḥ, that is, Brahmā, your ancestor
(guru)? 4 Have done with balabhid, that is, Indra, who is jṛmbhita, drunk
with the pride of his sovereignty; that is [one] meaning. Jṛmbhita also
means a stretching of the limbs, which is balabhid, that is, destructive
of one's strength because it causes exertion. By the word "rejection" (pratyäkhyāna) we are informed that a second set of meanings is denoted by the words. "Having caused her": now Lakṣmī had arisen from the sea with a desire for Puṇḍarikākṣa (= Viṣṇu) in her heart and so she naturally [would have] rejected the other gods; but because of the delicacy of her constitution she was in a state of shock from the crashing waves churned up by Mt. Mandara and was brought to do what was natural to her only by her father's reminder in the form of his revealing the faults of the other gods and his saying, "Come hither (come to this one, [Viṣṇu])" with a gesture indicating his respect for all the virtues [of her future spouse]. That is why the poet says "dazed by the churning." The structure of the sentence is this. May he burn away your sins, to whom Ocean gave Lakṣmī after causing, under the guise of stilling her fears in the manner described, her, who was dazed from the churning, to reject the other gods.

[That's where my aged] mother [sleeps]: the suggestiveness of the individual words in this stanza can easily be imagined by a sensitive reader, so we refrain from explaining them in so many words. The phrase "with a hint of" constitutes the direct expression which is the statement of the poet himself.6

Under the guise of summing up7 [what has gone before], our author has described and illustrated two varieties of suggestion. He now proceeds to mention a third variety: implied by both powers. [The stanza "O Kesāva, my eyes are blind" contains sequential suggestion by] the power of words because of the puns in goparāga ["the dust raised by your cattle" or "passion for the cowherd"], etc.; the power of meaning because of the context.8 For so long as it is not known that Krishna is the object of the intense, secret love of all the young women [of Gokula], the second sense [i.e., the suggested sense] cannot be perceived. The word salesām ("with a hint") is the statement of the poet himself.

1. "In the same way" (tathā) refers to the foregoing two types "based on the power of words" and "based on the power of meaning." "And" (ca) indicates that there exists a further, third type "based on the power of words and meaning." 2. Pan. 1.2.64. Just as vrksāḥ can be analyzed into vrksa-vrksa-vrksāḥ = vrksas ca vrksas ca vrksās ca, so śabdārthaḥ can be analyzed into śbdas ca arthaś ca śbdārthaḥ ca. 3. Ānanda explains the Kārikā phrase sānyairāḷakṛtir dhvaneḥ in two ways, but not in the two ways described by Abhinava. There is no need to take dhvaneḥ in the Kārikā as a genitive as well as an ablative. It appears as a genitive in the second explanation of the Vṛtti.
simply because it is in construction with sambhave. Nor is there any reason to suppose that Ānanda made a value distinction between the alāṅkāra involved in the first interpretation and that involved in the second. 4. Abhinava here discovers still another pun, which we have not rendered in the translation. The interrogative kasmai in RV 10.121 “To whom shall we offer the oblation?” was understood as a name of Brahmā. Brahmā would be an impossible choice as husband for Lakṣmī as he was her grandfather. 5. BP: Abhinava is taking the causative suffix nīc in the sense of causing a person to do what he is naturally about to do, not in the sense of setting him on a course which he has not begun on; because this interpretation is harmonious with the rasa of the verse. 6. The statement “proclaimed in so many words by the poet,” as A has put it, which gives away the suggestion. 7. The phrase upasamhārayādjena may mean little more than “by way of summing up.” But we have taken it at full value. Ānanda has actually done more than sum up what had been said before. His examples of sequential suggestion that fails or is spoiled by open revelation give us a fuller knowledge of this type of suggestion. 8. A knowledge of context, of course, is necessary in sabdaśaktīyuddhavadhvani also. But it is a particular kind of context that Abhinava has in mind, as his next sentence shows. The knowledge of Krishna’s character permits the arthaśaktīyuddhavadhvani here just as the knowledge of the gay housewife’s character permits the same type of suggestion in “That’s where my aged mother sleeps.”

K A meaning that reveals a second fact [or situation, vastu] is also of two kinds. It may be given body simply by an imaginative expression (praudhokti),1 or it may be inherently possible (svaṭāḥ sambhavīn).

1. For an explanation of praudhokti based on the etymology of the word, see Abhinava below. The term is used of a sophisticated, striking (camat-kārdnuguna) expression arising from the poet’s imagination rather than from the data directly-presented by the everyday world. We translate it by “imaginative expression,” but the term always connotes boldness, vividness, fancy, and the irreality of what is expressed.

A In the type of suggestive poetry that is like a reverberation, within the variety that is based on the power of meaning, the suggestive
meaning is itself of two types: the first, which is given body simply by an imaginative expression of the poet or of a character created by the poet; and the second, which is inherently possible. An example of the type which is given body simply by an imaginative expression of the poet is:

The fragrant month prepares,  
but gives not yet for his use against young maids,  
the arrows, pointed with mango bud  
and feathered with new leaves, to the god of love.1

An example of the type which is given body by an imaginative expression of a speaker created by the poet is the verse already quoted “On what mountain, for how long” [see 1.13 m A]. Or,  

Attentive youth  
has lent a hand to your breasts  
that they might rise as it were to greet  
the visitor love.2

The type that is inherently possible occurs when the fact can be imagined as appropriate in the world of reality, a fact the substance of which is not produced only by a turn of phrase. An example is the verse we have quoted “While the heavenly visitor was speaking” [2.22 A]. Or,  

The hunter’s wife strolls proudly  
with peacock feather behind her ear.  
She strolls amid fellow wives  
who are decked with pearls.3

1. The stanza describes the earliest days of spring before its full effect is seen. For similar descriptions see SRK 164 and 166. The syntax follows the metrical pattern. That is, there is a syntactic break after surahimāso; the words na dāva are to be construed with what follows. By failing to observe this, Jacobi’s translation misses the point of the stanza. In line b the alternate reading lakkhasāhe given by BP is better than lakkhamuhe, as it avoids the repetition of the word muhe. V. V. Mirashi in “Some Royal Poets of the Vākāṭaka Age,” IHQ 21, pp. 196ff, ascribes this verse to the Harinjaya of the royal poet Sarvasena, for whom see below 3.10-14 e A. There is no compelling reason for the ascription, but the verse is written in the literary dialect and has the simple charm of other verses of that author. 2. The author is not known. Literally, “An abhyutthāna (rising to meet a guest) has been given to Love by your swelling breasts, an abhyutthāna that has the support, respectfully bestowed (vitiñṇa), of the hand of Youth.” 3. The readings of
the Sattasaī are of a purer Māhārāṣṭrī than Ānanda’s: (a) sshipēhuṇāvaamsā bāluṇā; (c) gaamottiaracīa-. Abhinava will explain the suggestions of this little stanza below.

§ 2.24 L  

In this way the author has so far given a general definition of suggestion that arises from the power of meaning. He has also explained that its province is separate from that of figures of speech such as slesa and the like. He now proceeds to explain its subdivisions: It may be given body, etc. The meaning which [in the Kārikā] is said to reveal, that is, to suggest, another meaning is also of two kinds. Not only is reverberatory suggestion [i.e., samlaksya[kramadhvani] of two kinds [viz., based on the power of words and based on the power of meaning], but even its second variety is of two kinds through the dichotomy of the suggestive meaning. That is the force of the word also.

[In the Vṛtti] he states that imaginative expression also has subvarieties: of the poet [or of a character]. Hence there are three varieties of the suggestive meaning.1 Praudha is formed of pra in the sense of highly, extremely (prakarsena) and ādhah “carried out,” that is, [of a meaning, when it is] fully competent for the matter to be conveyed; so praudha means effective. An expression also is called praudha when it is appropriate to the matter to be conveyed.

[Abhinava gives a Sanskrit translation of the Māhārāṣṭrī verse “The sweet month.” He then comments.] Here spring, figured as a sentient being and the friend of the god of love, only prepares but does not give over [the arrows to his friend]. By this expression, which is effective in conveying the meaning which should be conveyed, that stage of spring is referred to when the mango is just coming into bud. It is hereby suggested that the depredations of love are just beginning and that they will gradually grow stronger and stronger. If, on the other hand, the poet had written, “In the spring the mango begins to bud and leaf,” he would have stated a fact that suggests nothing. This is an imaginative expression of the poet speaking in his own person.2

“On what mountain”: here if the poet had written “the parrot bites a red bimba fruit,” there would be no suggestiveness at all. But when there is an imaginative expression of this sort contained in the stanza, spoken by a young man of the poet’s invention, who is filled with desire, there is suggestiveness.
Abhinava gives a Sanskrit translation of the Māhārāṣṭrī stanza “Attentive youth” and then comments. Here the girl's breasts have become great persons, but love is worthy of still greater respect, so they are figuratively said to rise up to greet him; and youth acts as their attendant servant. By this striking expression the speaker's intention is indirectly suggested: that “every man will fall deeply in love with you as soon as he sees your breasts.” If he had said, “Your breasts are high because of your youth,” there would be no suggestion.

Not only by: this phrase implies that strikingness of expression is always useful.

Abhinava translates the Māhārāṣṭrī stanza “The hunter's wife” and then comments. In his attachment to her the most that he can do is kill a peacock. When attached to his other wives, he killed even elephants. Thus the success in love (or sexual attractiveness, saubhāgya) of the new wife is suggested [uktā, i.e., vyanjita] by the wording of the stanza. By saying that the other wives are decked with pearl ornaments, that is, possess pearl ornaments which are variously arranged, it is suggested that because these wives are not preoccupied with sexual enjoyment their major occupation is a display of skill in the arrangement of these ornaments, which in turn suggests that now [after the arrival of the new wife] they suffer the greatest neglect. One need not fear that the poet's statement that she is “proud” gives away the suggestion, because it is possible for the wife's pride to come from the ignorance of youth or the like [and not from a realization of her success in love]. This matter, as it is described, or put aside the description and suppose that one were to see it directly in the external world, suggests the great success in love of the hunter's wife. [Hence it is an inherently possible situation.]

1. Abhinava soon overlooks the subvarieties of praudhokti and will speak of “the two varieties of suggestion arising from the power of meaning,” 2.25 L, first sentence. Of later authors Hemacandra (AC, p. 73) denies explicitly, and Jagannātha (RG, p. 136) implicitly, that there are three types. 2. Spring is not really a sentient being and does not prepare and hand over or refrain from handing over arrows to the god of love. 3. Later commentators note that the elephants would be farther off in the forest, with the result that killing them would require of the hunter a longer renunciation of his amorous sports. 4. I should prefer a simpler explanation of the stanza. The young bride might well be proud of her peacock feathers, for they are the very hallmark of a hunter, worn next to his body, around his waist (see KumSam. 1.15). But Abhinava's explanation is essentially the same as that given by Ānanda under 3.1 i A and it remains the explanation invariably given by
later commentators. Also in its favor is the large number of similar verses in Prakrit. See the whole of Section 22, on hunters, in the Vajjalagga, together with Patwardhan's translations and notes.

\[\text{§ 2.25 L }\]

\(K\) Also where a new figure of speech is understood by the power of meaning, we have another variety of suggestive poetry in which\(^1\) the suggested sense is like the reverberation [of a bell].\(^2\)

1. In the Kārikā the relative clause modifies prakārṣaḥ (variety). In the Vṛttī it modifies dhvaniḥ (suggestion). The difference in meaning is minimal. 2. In the previous four examples of sequential suggestion arising by the power of meaning (arthāṣaktiṣudhvauṣāmākṣaṃṣaṃvyaṣṭiḥvadhvani) a meaning suggested a fact or situation (an artha suggested a vastu). The present Kārikā shows that a meaning may also suggest a figure of speech (an artha may suggest an alankāra).

\(A\) Where a new figure of speech, that is, a figure other than an expressed figure of speech, appears to our understanding from the inherent capability of a meaning, that is another [type of] suggestive poetry, arising from the power of meaning, in which the suggested sense takes the form of a reverberation.

\(L\) The two varieties of suggestion\(^1\) arising from the power of meaning have heretofore been described as a form of vastudhvani (the suggestion of a fact or situation) because that which was suggested in both types was a mere vastu.\(^2\) He now states that this [same type of suggestion arising from the power of meaning] can be an alankāradhvani if that which is suggested is in the form of a figure of speech. Thus he says Also where a new figure of speech, etc. The purport of the word "also" is that a figure of speech is not necessarily suggested by the power of words, as has been described, but may also be suggested by the power of meaning. Or, we may explain the word "also" as meaning that it is not only a vastu that may be understood there [viz.,
in suggestion by the power of meaning], since a figure of speech also may be suggested.

The Vṛtti explains the word “new” (anya): other than an expressed figure of speech.

1. See 2.24 L, note 1. 2. Abhinava fails to mention here that in the svatah sambhavin variety the suggestion may be of a rasādi rather than a vastumātra. An example is the stanza quoted in 2.22 A.

A Lest it be thought that the scope of this [type of suggestive poetry] must be very small, the following is said:

K It has been shown that the whole collection of figures of speech such as metaphor and the like, which use direct expression, are often met with in suggested form.

A It has been shown by the venerable Bhaṭṭodbhata and others that figures of speech such as metaphor and the like, which are well known to be directly expressed in some occurrences, in other occurrences are understood (i.e., suggested), and this quite frequently. For example, it has been shown that in such a figure as doubt (sasandeha)¹ there may appear the figures simile, metaphor, hyperbole, and the like. And so it is not difficult to prove that one figure of speech may be found suggested in another figure of speech.²
1. Sasandeha: In the light of Udbhata's only surviving work one would say that Ananda, and following him Abhinava, are here using the wrong word. Udbhata distinguishes sasandeha from sandeha (see 1.13 i L, note 7) and says specifically that it is the latter figure which gives rise to the appearance of other figures. His example of sandeha (6.3* Induräja, 6.6 Vrtti) is a stanza which describes Viṣṇu "of whom, black of color and riding on the sun-bright king of birds, one doubts whether he is a black cloud on Mt. Meru or smoke over the fire of doomsday." Induräja identifies the suggested figure in this stanza as poetic fancy (utpreksä). Udbhata's two examples of sasandeha do not suggest a second figure in this fashion. If the reading of our text is wrong, the error must be ancient, for Abhinava (see below) clearly read sasandeha. Krishnamoorthy in his var. led. notices sandeha, which he attributes to BP. But this is an error; the word does not occur in that text. 2. This is the sense that Abhinava finally assigns to the passage. He begins, however, by taking alankārāntare as a locative of cause, which would give the passage the meaning, "it is not difficult to prove that one figure of speech may be suggested because another [directly expressed] figure is present."

L Lest it be thought: the source of his concern is that it is easily understandable that by the power of words such figures as sleṣa and the like may appear, but it is hard to see what figure of speech could appear through the power of meaning. By the words "the whole [collection]" and "has been shown" he makes it clear that this difficulty is specious.

"[Bhāmaha 3.43 and Udbhata 6.2 have defined sasandeha as follows.] "A statement containing doubt made for the sake of praise by a person who states the identity [of the upameya] with the upamāna and then again its difference, is known as sasandeha."1 For example,

Is this her hand, or might it be
a frond whose finger-leaves are moving in the breeze?²

In such lines there is a suggestion of either simile or metaphor. And as for hyperbole (atiśayokti) it is suggested in almost all expressed figures.³

Because another figure of speech is present: [Abhinava begins by understanding the Vrtti to say that one figure may be suggested because another figure is present, i.e., by means of another figure; cf. 2.26 A, note 2.] If a figure of speech suggests another, it is not impossible that a figure may be suggested by a vastu (fact or situation). If this is the meaning, the author of the Vrtti has used the word alankārāntare [to exclude that possibility here], but it does not fit the context. The
context here is not that a figure can be suggested by a figure. The context is that in dhvani based upon meaning, a figure, just as well as a vastu, can be suggested. Thus in the passage where the subject is summed up, the Kārikā (2.28) will state that “these figures attain the highest beauty when they form a part of dhvani”; on which the author of the Vṛtti begins by saying that a figure can belong to suggestion in either of two ways [viz., by suggesting or by being suggested] and concludes that “here, because of the subject at issue we must understand ‘a figure that is suggested’ to be meant, [not one that suggests].” As an alternative [which will avoid this lapse from the subject at issue] we shall take the word antara in both occurrences to be a synonym of všeša and take the locative as a locative of the sphere rather than a locative of cause. Thus the meaning will be as follows. “In an area of expressed figures various suggested figures [may also] appear.” This has been stated by Udbhata and others and they have thereby admitted that a figure can be suggested by the power of meaning. The only qualification to be made is that as they were definers of figures of speech, they spoke of these [suggested] figures in an area of expressed figures. Such is the real meaning of the passage.

1. Abhinava does not quote the verse which follows this in Udbhata (6.3 Indurāja, 6.5 Vr̥tti), where Udbhata specifically states that in sandeļha (not sasandeha) one figure may suggest another. 2. The source of this example is unknown to us. 3. See below, 3.36. 4. One of the thirteen meanings of antara given by the Amarakośa is bheda = všeša = difference, variety. 5. See 2.26 A, note 2.

is much deserves to be stated:

*K* Even where a second figure of speech is apprehended [without being directly expressed], if the [first,] expressed figure does not appear as subordinate to it, we are not on the road of dhvani.
Even where there is an apprehension, like a reverberation, of other figures of speech in expressed figures of speech, if the beauty of the expressed figure does not appear chiefly in its conveying of the suggested figure, we are not on the road of dhvani. For example, although simile is regularly understood in a figure like zeugma (dipaka), if the beauty of the zeugma does not lie in its suggesting the simile, one should not use the designation of dhvani (i.e., one should not label the simile as upamādhvani). For example:

Night is ennobled by moonlight,
the pond by its lilies, a vine
by its clusters of flowers,
the beauty of autumn by wild geese,
and the very name of poetry
by good listeners.¹

In passages of this sort, although a simile is contained within the dipaka, the beauty of the poem lies chiefly in the expressed figure and not in any subservience of it to the suggested figure. Therefore it is reasonable for the poem to be given its designation by the expressed figure.

1. Author unknown. For kāvyakathā, literally “all talk of poetry,” see Abhinava’s remarks below. Sajjanaiḥ means literally “by good persons.” But what is meant is persons of taste and fair judgment, the opposite of those asajjanāḥ (SRK, Section 38) who seek out the faults of a poem “as a camel looks for thorns” (SRK 1255). The expressed figure of the verse is dipaka because the same action, ennobling, is predicated of several subjects, one of which is prākṛta (truly the subject matter, here “poetry”) and others of which are not.

Now it might be objected that if all this has been said by former authorities, there is no need for our author to exert himself. Sensing this objection, he says: but this much [deserves to be stated]; supply “by us.” The word “but” indicates that there will be some difference [in what he will say] from what those [authorities] have said. “By moonlight”: moonlight achieves its greatest glory only at night; and what would good listeners be good for without poetry?² The ennobling of night by moonlight consists in its rendering the night brilliant.
and enjoyable; the ennobling of the pond by its lilies in their giving it beauty, fragrance and wealth; the ennobling of the vine by flowers, in giving it attractiveness and charm; of the autumn by wild geese, in their making it a delight to the ear and charming. All these [effects of ennoblement] are granted to poetry by good listeners. All these meanings are furnished by the words "is ennobled" by force of the zeugma (dīpaka).2 The "name"3 of poetry implies this: put aside the subtle distinctions of poetry; the very word "poetry" disappears without good listeners. But when they are present, a mere collection of words becomes blessed and possessed of the appellation "poetry," for the effect of these [good listeners] is to bring it to a position of honor. Thus it is the figure dīpaka that predominates here, not the simile.

1. It is odd that Abhinava begins his comment on the stanza by eliciting this incidental suggestion from a reversal of its terms. This reverse implication is not important and he does not refer to it again.  2. That is, the sense "is ennobled by" is supplied to each pair of subject and agent by the figure of speech.  3. Abhinava is here explaining why the word kāvyakathā (literally, "all talk of poetry") is used rather than the simple word kāvyā (poetry).

A But where the expressed figure of speech is placed in subordination to a suggested figure, it is reasonable to designate the poem by the suggested figure. As in

"Why should he, who has attained to royal glory, who has won Śrīī for wife, burden me again with the pain of churning? I cannot believe that one so active should seek his former sleep. Why, when he is attended by lords of all the islands, should he build a bridge once more?"

Such are the doubts, it seems, which make the ocean tremble when your Majesty marches to its shore.1
Or as in a verse of my own:

Truly insensate is the ocean
that it is not now stirred by this your smiling face,
tremulous-eyed beauty,
which fills the horizon with the splendour of its loveliness.

In instances such as these, inasmuch as the beauty of the poem lies in a metaphor that appears like a reverberation, it is reasonable to designate the poem as poetic suggestion of metaphor (rupakadhwani).

1. Author unknown. The stanza flatters the royal patron of the poet by suggesting, in a fused figure (samkara) of doubt (sandeha) and poetic fancy (utpreksa, indicated by "it seems"), that the patron is Visnu whom the ocean knew on three previous occasions: before the obtaining of Sri from the churning of the sea, in the time of pralaya when Visnu slept on the sea, and when, as Rama, he built a bridge to Lanka to defeat Ravana. 2. At this point we should probably read the passage rejected by Abhinava; see below. We omit it in the translation only in order to avoid repetition. 3. The verse contains a pun. The woman's face, like the moon, should stir the ocean (jalarasi) if it were not insensate (jalarasi). In puns l and d are regarded as identical (ladayor abhedah). The verse has been picked up by several of the anthologies; see Kosambi's apparatus on SRK 421.

§ 2.27 a L ]

In this way he has shown the negative meaning of the Kārikā by a negative example. He now explains the positive intention implied by what the Kārikā has excluded. This positive intention is that where [the expressed figure shows] subordination to the suggested figure, we are on the road of dhvani: But where, etc. Actually there are three possibilities here [viz., in the area of figures of speech suggested by the power of meaning]: (a) a second figure may be suggested by an expressed figure; (b) there may be an expressed figure but one that does not suggest; and (c) there may be no expressed figure at all. One should attach these possibilities, each as it may fit, to the examples [that follow].

He illustrates: "Why should he, who has attained to royal glory," etc. A certain king has come to the shore of the sea with an immense collection of troops, whereupon the sea begins to tremble (or surge) either because of moonrise or because of the plunging of these troops into it. As this trembling is fancied to be due to doubts [as described in the stanza], we have the fusion of sasandeha and utpreksa, so the
expressed figure is fusion (samkara). And by this there is suggested the superimposition of the character of Vāsudeva [= Viṣṇu] on that king [i.e., the figure rūpaka is suggested]. Granted that a contrasted superiority (vyatireka) of the king [to Vāsudeva] also appears, that is because of a superiority to Vāsudeva in his former, not in his present, condition. Because the blessed Vāsudeva has now obtained Śrī and lives as an active monarch who is victorious over the kings of all the continents. The rūpaka is not forced upon us by any impossibility of the fancied doubt so that we might say that it served simply as a support (upaskāra) to the expressed figure, for we can imagine [the ocean's] reasoning to take the form that anyone who has not obtained wealth and is inspired by an unconcealed desire of conquest might be likely to churn its waters. Nor is this sense [of the identification of the king with Vāsudeva] forced on us by the words “again” (punar api), “former” (pūrvam), and “once more” (dhūyah). Because the words “again” and “once more” can reasonably be used even if the agents should differ, since the ocean remains the same. As one might say, “The earth was formerly conquered by Kārtavīrya and then again by Jāmadagnya.” And “his former sleep” can be explained as the king’s habit of sleep when he was a prince [before he had assumed the responsibilities of a ruler]. Thus it is established that the stanza is an example of suggested metaphor (rūpakadhvani) [and not a case of a metaphor subordinate to an expressed figure]; because we apprehend the superimposing [of the character of Vāsudeva on the king] in the absence of direct denotation simply from the beauty of the expressed sense.

Here some [authorities] read another example: “And as in

On this sand bank of the Sarayū
whitened by flooding streams of moonlight
two angels once held long debate.
One claimed that Keśin was the first to die;
the other, Kamsa. Tell us truly now
which did you slay first?”

This passage is spurious, because the sense that “you are Vāsudeva” is here made clear by the direct expression of the word “you.”

“Loveliness” (lāvanya), that is, a charm of configuration; “splendour,” i.e., brilliance. The horizon is “filled,” that is, furnished with, made enchanting by, these two qualities of your face. “Now”: now that your face inclines toward graciousness after its recent disturbance by [the] anger [of jealousy]. “Smiling”: with lips slightly parted in a smile.
“Tremulous-eyed beauty”: the word is a vocative, designating a person of whom the eyes are tremulous, that is, beautiful because of their motion and dilation prompted by their owner’s graciousness. And yet the ocean is not stirred “now,” although it was stirred a moment ago [when the moon rose]. Inasmuch as your face, flushed by its [recent] disturbance of anger and [now] smiling is the very disc of the full moon rising at sunset, any sensitive being must be stirred, must experience a motion of the heart. As the ocean “is not stirred,” it clearly exhibits an accumulation of insensibility (jâdyasañcaya) in conformity with its name “the accumulation of waters” (jalarâsi). We have said before [see 1.1 Intro. L and note 10 thereon] that adjectives like jâda can be nominalized [e.g., jâda can be used in the sense of jâdyâ]. In the stanza the denotative function of the words comes to a halt after furnishing the sense “a sensitive person must be stirred,” must experience an alternation brought about by love. “on looking at your face.” Accordingly, the metaphor (rûpakâ, i.e., the identifying your face with the moon) must be the work of suggestion. The pun (slesa) is an expressed figure of speech in the stanza, but this pun does not suggest anything. The metaphor that appears like a reverberation is suggested by the power of meaning; and as the beauty of the poem depends on this metaphor, the poem should be designated by it as an instance of rûpakadhvani. This is the connection [between the verse and the thesis that stood in need of illustration].

1. The passage from “actually there are three possibilities here” (tatra ca. etc.) to “one should attach to the [following] examples” (udâharanasya yogyam) becomes clear after one reads further in the commentary. Abhinava was apparently struck by the fact that several of the examples given under this Kârikâ by the Vrtti do not exhibit a figure suggested by another figure. Although that seems to be the area marked out by the Kârikâ, the Vrtti covers the wider area of figures suggested in any way by the power of meaning. Abhinava divides this wider area into three categories. The first, which is clearly referred to by the Kârikâ, in where the suggested figure is suggested by an expressed figure. This is exemplified by the following example, prâptaśir ese “Why should he.” The second, where the verse exhibits an expressed figure but where the suggested figure is suggested by something other than the expressed figure, is exemplified by the stanza lâvanyakânti “Truly insensible is the ocean.” The third, where there is no expressed figure but where there is a suggested figure, would be exemplified by the verse jyotsnāpraprasara “On this sand bank of the Sarayu, which Abhinava rejects as an insertion, if the suggestion were not spoiled by the direct expression “you.”

2. These
are the real causes of the surging of the sea, as opposed to the fancied cause. In supposing that the trampling of an army could disturb the sea, Abhinava was doubtless picturing in his mind a Kashmirian lake rather than the Indian Ocean. 3. If the rūpaka arose in this way, it would be subordinate to the samkara and we could not categorize the poem as rūpakadhvani. The point of view that Abhinava here denies might be put as follows. So long as the character of Viṣṇu is not superimposed on the king, the speculations (vitarka) regarding the purpose of the king’s visit to the ocean, which constitute the sandehālakāra, are not reasonable. Nor is the fancy (utprekṣā) that these speculations are the cause of the ocean’s agitation reasonable. The superimposition is needed in order to justify or rationalize the expressed figures. But Abhinava denies this view. The speculations regarding the purpose of the king’s visit to the ocean do not force the rūpaka upon us, he says, because they can be differently explained. 4. As the ocean was supposed to be a line of jewels, anyone desiring wealth would be a potential miner of these jewels. Again, a king bent on conquest would be likely to churn the sea by transporting his army to distant lands. It does not take a Viṣṇu to think of troubling the sea. 5. The argument which Abhinava rejects might be put thus. We grant that any ambitious king might churn the sea. But only Viṣṇu could churn it “again” and build a bridge across it “once more.” Abhinava’s rejection points out that the adverbs can refer to the relation of verb and object rather than to the relation of verb and subject. The sea, churned by Viṣṇu, can be agitated at the thought of being churned by someone else. 6. This categorizing of the verse by Ānanda and Abhinava is criticized in RG, p. 247. 7. These words are added to make it clear that the present example is a case of arthaśaktyudbhavadhvani. 8. Abhinava’s criterion of textual authenticity is that what the text says must be worthy of his author. If, in his opinion, it is not, the text must be spurious. By modern principles of textual criticism the rejected passage has a good claim to be genuine. It is included in the Nepali manuscript of the Dhu (see Krishnamoorty’s ed.) and is cited in the Vyaktiviveka (p. 430) where it appears between the verses prāptadrīr esa and lāvanyakānti, precisely its position in the Nepali MS. 9. Abhinava takes lāvanyakānti as a dvandva. In the translation we have taken it as a tatpurusa. 10. The full moon also as it rises turns from red to white.
A The following is an example of the poetic suggestion of si (upamādhvani).

The eyes of warriors take not such joy
in their ladies' saffron painted breasts
as they take in the cranial lobes, painted with red minium.
of their enemies' elephants.¹

Another example is from my Viṣamabāṇalilā, speaking of the conquest of the demons by the god of love:

Their hearts once bent on theft of those gems
born of the same womb as Śrī
were transferred by the god of flower arrows
to the bimbā-like lips of their women.

1. The comparison of a woman's breasts to the two frontal lobes of an elephant's cranium is a stock simile of Sanskrit poetry, but the notion that a warrior might take more joy in handling and crushing the upamāna than the upameya of this simile is original.

L Our author gives two examples of suggested simile (upamādhvani), but does not state expressly how the definition [of a suggested figure] applies to them because the application is the same [as in the preceding examples of suggested metaphor].

[Abhinava gives a Sanskrit translation of the Prakrit verse “The eyes of warriors,” on which he comments as follows.] Here, while there is a weighing of the inclination [of these warriors] to fondle their ornamented ladies against their emotional eagerness for an approaching battle, the eagerness for battle is [shown to be] greater. Thus the directly expressed figure of speech is contrast (vyatireka). But a similitude is suggested between the cranial lobes of enemy elephants, ready for battle, objects of terror to all men, and the swelling breasts of their ladies. By this simile we see the esteem [of these men for battle], as if they were deriving sexual pleasure from it, and this simile effects a striking
portrayal of their heroism. Hence the [suggested] simile is of primary importance [in the verse].

The conquest of the demons: for in that poem his conquest of all three worlds is described. “Their hearts,” that is, the hearts of the demons who dwell in Pātāla and who had engaged in every sort of outrage, such as injuring the city of Indra and the like; hearts whose resolution was unshaken by the most arduous adventures.¹ “Born of the same womb as Śrī”: the sense is “and therefore of inexpressible value.” The hearts of these demons which had been bent on, that is, wholly intent on, the theft, that is, the abduction from every [hiding place], of these gems: these hearts were transferred by the god of flower arrows—he was supplied with the gentlest artillery imaginable—to the lips of their women; that is to say, Kāma brought their hearts to regard the gazing at, kissing, and biting of these lips as the highest purpose of these demons’ lives, whereas their hearts had just now been blazing with the fire of martial ambition. Here the expressed figure of speech is hyperbole (atiśayokti).² The suggested figure is simile, for the bimba-like lips are similar to the best of all gems and hence the high value placed upon these lips is real. That is why the suggested figure is not rūpaka, because a rūpaka is a superimposition [of the character of one object on another, actually different, object] and so is unreal.³ The similarity of the lips of their women to the best of gems appears to these demons as a matter of actual fact and this similarity by its predominance is the source of the striking effect of the verse.

1. The words tam hīmad of the verse are glossed by Abhinava by hṛdayam taca: the heart, and such a heart! 2. Māmāṣa quotes this verse (Book 10, vs. 515) as an example of the trope paryāya (where one object, here “their hearts,” is described as existing in different places). Paryāya is apparently an invention of Māmāṣa’s, as it is not found in such older authors as are preserved to us. His reason for the assignment of it to this verse is that atiśayokti had ceased to mean hyperbole in his time and the verse will not fit easily into any of his four types of atiśayokti. But the verse fits naturally into the older definitions, e.g., that of Bhāma 2.81 “A statement the sense of which exceeds reality, when made for some [poetic] purpose should be considered atiśayokti (hyperbole)”; or of Udbhāṭa (Vivrāti 2.23). BP by ingenuity manages to fit the present verse even into a late definition of atiśayokti. “Heart,” it says, really refers to nothing more than cittavṛtti, a mental or emotional state. The demons’ emotional drive toward robbery really had no connection with their later amorous state, but the two states are here pictured as connected. This fits the definition asambandhe sambandhaḥ of
§ 2.27 c A ]

Alankārasarvasva, p. 83 and of SāhDarp. 10.47. 1. If I say “My lady’s face is like the moon,” my statement is true or real because the face does have, at least to me, qualities of brightness and charm which are like those of the moon. But if I say her face is the moon, the literal sense of my words is false. This distinction between the reality of upamā and the unreality of rūpaka goes back to the beginning of the Alankara tradition; cf. BhNŚ 16.56, saunkalpena racitam rūpakaṃ, “rūpaka is a figure formed by one’s imagination.”

A An example of poetic suggestion of ākṣepa (feigned or pregnant denial) is as follows:

He can express all Hayagrīva’s virtues
who can measure by jars the water of the sea.¹

Here by means of the [expressed] figure hyperbole there appears a [suggested] ākṣepa, which takes the form of proclaiming that Hayagrīva’s virtues are indescribable and which has the purpose of showing that in their excellence these virtues are unique.²

1. The verse is later quoted by Hemacandra AC 1.77 and AlSarv, p. 151. Possibly it is taken from Bhartṛmēthā’s lost poem, the Hayagrīvavadha. 2. The directly expressed figure here, in the older system of poetics, is hyperbole (attāyokti) because measuring the sea in jars is a purely imaginary action that exceeds the bounds of reality; see 2.27 b L, note 2. In the later system the figure would be identified as nidarśanā, as it is identified by our late commentators on Śāk. 1.16, which contains a similar turn of phrase. The suggested figure is ākṣepa, a denial which hints at something unexpressed; cf. 1.13e A, note 3. Bhāmaha (2.68) defines the figure as “a feigned denial of what is or was one’s intention, made with the purpose of emphasis (or exaggeration).” : pratiśedha ivesṭasya yo viśesābhidhīta:yā. What he means can best be seen from examples. “It is wonderful that you have no pride although you have conquered the earth. But what can produce an alteration of the sea?” (Bhāmaha 2.70). “As he thought about her, it was wonderful that his thought knew no end. But where is there any end to thoughts of love, or time?” (Udbhāta, 2.2* Indurāja, 2.5 Viṃṭi). In both examples there is implied a denial (the denial is not directly expressed in these examples) of the predication “wonderful.” but in both cases the denial is not because the
denied fact is not wonderful (it is wonderful) but because the word wonderful is not strong enough. The graciousness of the conquering king and the never ceasing thoughts of the lover are more than wonderful; the one is as steady as the ocean, the other as ceaseless as time. In the present example cited by Ānandvardhana, there is an implied denial that the virtues of Hayagrīva can be enumerated or described (both Ānanda and Abhinava speak of avarnaniyata rather than aparisaṅkhyaṇyatā). This is not because the poet really means that they are indescribable (his poem doubtless went on to describe them), but because he wishes to emphasize or exaggerate. He means that Hayagrīva’s virtues were unique.

By means of hyperbole: he means, as the expressed figure. The implication that his virtues are indescribable is a form of ākṣepa (feigned or pregnant denial), because it is a denial of what is actually intended. He shows us that this ākṣepa forms the predominant sense of the verse by the adjectival compound “[which has the purpose of showing that] these virtues are unique.”

Poetic suggestion of the figure substantiation (arthāntaranyāsa) is possible both as a suggestion arising from the power of words (sabdasaktyudbhavavyaṅgyadhvani) and as a suggestion arising from the power of meaning (arthasaṅkyudbhavavyaṅgyadhvani). An illustration of the former is:

Since fruit depends on fate, what can be done? This much, however, we can say: the flowers of the red aśoka tree are unlike those of others.

As the suggestion is here revealed by a word [viz., phale “fruit”], it does not conflict with the overall sense of the sentence, which is different.
An example of the second variety is as follows:

O clever lover, to apologize
even when I have disguised my face
and hidden the grievance in my heart.
Though you have been unfaithful,
one cannot be angry.²

By the fact that one cannot be angry at a particular individual denoted [by the primary force of the words], who is clever though unfaithful, there is suggested as the primary sense a substantiating general statement connected [with that particular statement].

1. The Sattasai reads devâattammi, the regular reflex of Sanskrit devâ-yatte, and Pischel knows only the form âatta. But âya might change to e on the analogy of aya, so our reading may be correct. For kânikâollavā read kânikellâollavā. Kânikell is the Mâhârâstrî name of the âsoka; see Hemacandra, Abhidhâncintâmanî 1135. The word occurs again in Sattasai 5.4. The âsoka tree bears brilliant red flowers, which appear on its fronds (pallavâ) before the leaves appear. Its fruit is inconspicuous. The direct meaning and suggested figures of the stanza are as follows. Direct meaning: “The âsoka tree bears no fruit; that cannot be helped. It bears beautiful flowers.” There is no arthântaranyâsa (substantiation, see 1.13 i L, note 8) in the direct meaning because a particular cannot be substantiated by a particular. The first suggestion arises from the double meaning of the word phale (fruit, reward) and so is a suggestion arising from the power of a word. “The âsoka tree bears no fruit. The reward of all living things depends on fate.” This is arthântaranyâsa of Mammata’s second type (10.109), where a particular statement is substantiated by a general statement. The second suggestion depends on the power of meaning and derives from the stanza as a whole, read in the context of advice to a king. “Even a hero may fail of success, for success depends on fate. But his virtues shine above those of other men.” This is aprastutaprasâmsâ, a figure which consists in a statement (prasâmsâ) of a non-contextual or allegorical (aprastuta) meaning and which suggests a contextual (prastuta) meaning, that is, a sense that concerns the matter that is really in one’s mind. The prastuta meaning in an aprastutaprasâmsâ is always suggested; it cannot be expressed. A problem now arises. Our text has said that we can speak of a suggested figure of speech only when that figure forms the predominant sense of the verse (2.22 K). How can there be two predominant suggested senses in one stanza? Ânanda does not answer the question very satisfactorily. He merely says that there is no contradiction because one figure is suggested by a single word, the other by the sentence as a whole. 2. Viewing this little verse out of context and without reference to the commentators, one may be
puzzled how to take it, whether as the remark of a woman who is naive, forgiving, cynical, or clever. Ananda's implied and Abhinava's expressed opinion is that it is the remark of a clever woman, who has been hurt and who is letting her husband or lover know that she sees through his excuses. This is why they assign the verse to "suggested substantiation" (arthāntaranyāsa-dhvani), a figure that demands that a particular statement be substantiated by a general statement or vice versa. The particular statement of the woman concerning her lover suggests the general principle that false lovers always act in this way. After reading Abhinava's comment on the verse one will agree, I think, that this interpretation gives the verse a greater charm than it would have under other interpretations.

...
When I have hidden the grievance in my heart": literally, "I being one by whom the grievance is placed within the heart and not revealed." Accordingly, you clever one who apologize to me even when I show no anger in my face, there can be no cause of anger at you although you have been unfaithful. The vocative singular "O clever one" determines [the denoted sense to refer to] a particular. But then as one considers the sense, a substantiation in the form of a general statement is apprehended and this is strikingly poetic. For we have here a woman who has been wronged [by her husband or lover], who is clever and who, when he apologizes, shows her annoyance by saying [in effect]: "Every clever rascal although he has been unfaithful covers up the occasion of his transgression in this way; do not pride yourself falsely on that account." Connected: sc., because the general statement is connected with the particular.

1. aprastutaprasamsa pradhanyena vyangya: Abhinava is speaking inexacty, as BP points out. What he means is that the contextual (prastuta) meaning of the aprastutaprasamsa is suggested (aprastutaprasamsasthale prastutartho vyangyah). The distinction should be kept in mind because in 2.27 h Abhinava will give us an example where the aprastuta sense as well as the prastuta sense is suggested. That is not the case here. 2. Abhinava gives no reason for this greater predominance. BP says simply that it appears that way to men of taste.

A Poetic suggestion of contrast (vyatirekadhvani) is also possible in both forms [sc., by the power of words and by the power of meaning]. The first of these types has been illustrated above [2.21 f A]. An example of the second is this:

I would rather be born somewhere i
as a crippled, leafless tree
than be born in the world of men, a man
yearning to give and poor.

[Sattasai 3.30]

In this example it is directly stated that to be born as a poor man who wishes to be generous is not a matter for rejoicing and that to be born
as a stunted, leafless tree is a matter for rejoicing. This statement, after we first apprehend the comparability (upamānopameyatva) of such a man with such a tree, shows as the predominant meaning of the verse that the man’s degree of misery is greater.

_L_ A suggestion of contrast is also possible: By using the word “also” he shows that just like the suggestion of substantiation (arthāntarānyāsadhvani), the suggestion of contrast vyatirekadhvani is also of two kinds. Above refers to the verse “May both sets of the sun god’s feet” [2.21 f A].

“I would rather be born somewhere in a forest”: in a secluded part of a forest, in a thicket where, being surrounded by the luxuriance of numerous conspicuous trees, I shall not even be noticed by anyone. “Crippled”: unfit for being made into any shape. “Leafless”: the meaning is that it affords no shade, how much less should it have flowers or fruit. What the poet wishes to convey is that even such a tree might be useful for making charcoal or might serve as a roost for owls. “Of men”: that is, where suppliants are plentiful. “In this world”: sc., where he is seen by suppliants and where suppliants are seen by him and yet he can do nothing [to help them]. The poet means that this is an agonizing situation. There is no directly expressed figure of speech in the verse.

Comparability: thus our author prepares the ground for contrast (vyatireka) [as contrast is always based on similarity]. Shows that the degree [of misery is] greater: i.e., shows the contrast.²

1. In our text ‘kham ye ‘tyujjvalayanti’ iti is followed by ‘raktas tvam navapallava’ iti. As BP notes, the second reference is in error, for that stanza was not an example of vyatirekadhvani but of vācyavyatireka adopted after giving up the slesopamā. It is easier to suppose that a careless reader added the extra reference than to suppose that na tu has fallen out before raktas. 2. Cf. Mammata 10.105 upameyasya vyatireka ādhikyam “‘Contrast’ is where the subject of comparison (upameya) possesses [some property in] a greater degree [than the image (upāmāna)].”
An example of the poetic suggestion of fancy (utprekṣādhuṇi) is this:

In spring the Malabar wind, 
swollen by the breathing of snakes 
that encircle sandalwood trees, 
makes travelers swoon.

For in this example the capacity of the Malabar wind to cause travelers to swoon in spring is [actually] due to its stimulation of love. But this capacity is fancied (utpreksita) to be due to the swelling of the wind by the poisonous breath of snakes wrapped around the sandalwood trees [of Malabar]. This fancy, although it is not directly stated, is noticed like a reverberation because of the inherent capability of the sentence meaning. One may not object that because there is no use of such words as iva [e.g., “as if,” “like,” “as it were”] the fancy in such cases is disconnected (asambaddha, also “nonsensical”), for it is readily understandable, as we find in other cases too that fancy arises through suggestion even in the absence of such words. For example in

Although your face is afflicted by anger, 
the full moon, having achieved this once 
a similarity thereto, 
cannot, it seems, contain himself.

Or, as i

A timid deer ran about among the tents. 
No men with bows pursued him; yet he rested not, 
his lovely eyes being struck with shame 
by the ear-reaching arrow-glances of the women.

[Māgha, Śīśupālavadha 5.26]

When it comes to the relation between words and sense [i.e., to the question whether particular words suggest a given sense or not], the generally accepted view is authoritative.
1. Sandalwood trees grow in Malabar and are said to be a favorite haunt of snakes (SRK 801, 1078). The verb mūrcchati means both to swell and to swoon. Swooning may be caused either by snake bite or unfulfilled love. The spring breeze brings back to travelers memories of their wives and mistresses waiting at home. With this verse compare Dandin 2.238. 2. Or, because of the natural compatibility of the sentence meaning with such a fancy. On sāmarthya see 2.21 a A, note 2. 3. BP: As persons of taste will understand the sense of fancy in such passages even in the absence of a word like iva, the rejection of such passages as disconnected or nonsense is wrong.

L Is fancied: because [it is fancied that] the wind, swollen by, that is magnified or increased by, poisonous exhalations, causes swooning. Furthermore, it is fancied that one individual among the travelers [viz., the wind], being poisoned (mūrçchita), causes mūrçchā, that is, loss of health, to other individuals. So we have a double fancy (utpreksā). Now it might be objected that we have no fancy here at all, because the adjectival phrase ["swollen by the breathing of snakes"], being otherwise a useless addition, makes sense only if taken as giving the cause [of the increase of the wind and the swooning of the travelers]. But what if the phrase is taken as giving the cause. This is not the real cause [of those effects]; rather, it is fancied as the cause. So the objection amounts to nothing. Of such words: because we see that this sense, viz., that of something fancied, may be understood even when words like iva are not used. He now illustrates this point: As in, etc.

“Afflicted by anger”: tinged with redness. Should the moon attain similarity to your face when your face is pleased, or that it should always be similar, then what would it not do [in its joy]? That it could really become your face—why, this would be beyond the power even of its daydreams. This is what the word “although” (api) conveys. He “cannot contain himself” in his own body, as he is filling the horizon [with moonlight]. “Just this once” means after such a long time and then too for one night only [sc., for the night of the full moon]. In this stanza the filling of the horizon by the light of the full moon, which is a natural event, is fancied in this manner [sc., as being prompted by the moon’s desire to equal the face of the woman].

But now our author senses that the word nanu (“it seems”) might be regarded as an expression of reflection, that is, of fancy (utpreksā), and that by this direct expression the disconnection (asambaddhatā) [to remove which, as we have claimed, the reader supplies a suggested
fancy) might be removed. Accordingly, he gives us another example:
Or, as in, etc.

That the deer, running among, that is, all about, the tents, did not
halt although it was not chased by any men with bows and arrows,
was due, in actual fact, to its natural timidity and restlessness. But a
poetic fancy is here suggested: that the deer did not halt because the
beauty of its eyes, which was the deer's most treasured possession, had
been hit [i.e., surpassed] by the women with arrows in the form of their
large eyes [also: arrows pulled back on the bow string as far as the
ears]. Our author anticipates a criticism, namely that this verse too?
is disconnected (or nonsense) as there is no word like īva to denote the
fancy; and so he says: when it comes to the relation, etc.

1. In actual fact the wind is not appreciably increased by the breath of
snakes, nor in actual fact does it poison travelers so that they swoon. 2. As
well as the verse, “In spring the Malabar wind.”

A The following contains a poetic suggestion of puns (sleṣa).

Where young men with their wives enjoyed
covered terraces with sloping eaves,
with curving folds at the waist,
derked with banners to give them beauty
winning fame because they were beautiful
and stirring passion by their privacy
by their adornment.¹

In this stanza after we have perceived the direct sense of the sentence,
viz., that with their wives they enjoyed the terraces, we perceive puns
(sleṣa) to the effect that the terraces are like the wives. This sleṣa,
[which arises] from the non-verbal inherent compatibility of the [ex-
pressed] meanings [with the second meanings], acts as the predominant
figure of the stanza.
1. This stanza, which forms part of Māgha’s description of the city of Dvārakā, has been analyzed by Vallabhadeva and Mallinātha as well as by Ānanda and Abhinava. There is no disagreement about the double meanings of the adjectival phrases. But the commentators disagree on how to interpret the little word aamam (“together with”) and on this question hangs the understanding of the expressed meaning of the stanza, the identification of its figures, and the problem of what, if anything, the stanza suggests. Aamam is an adverb, but does it modify the verb’s relation to its subject or to its object? In the first case, the direct meaning will be: “together with their wives the young men enjoyed the terraces.” In the second case, the direct meaning will be: “the young men enjoyed the terraces together with, that is, as well as enjoying, their wives.” Only Mallinātha takes the latter course. Ānanda and Abhinava take the former course and explain the appearance of the second meaning as a suggestion. Ānanda’s explanation, which is elliptical, and Abhinava’s, which is clearer, may be put as follows. After we have understood the direct meaning (the first of those just given), there occurs to the mind the second meanings of the adjectival phrases. These senses are suggested to the mind by the natural compatability of the primary sense for these second meanings. What our authors mean is that the primary sense gives us an erotic context in which it is entirely appropriate that the women be beautiful, endowed with the graceful triple fold at the waist, and elegantly adorned. Once we perceive these puns, we realize that the terraces are like the wives. That is to say, we arrive at the second meaning by way of a simile that grows out of the suggested puns. As the charm of the verse lies in the suggested puns, it should be counted as an example of ślesadhvani. Mallinātha, setting off from a different direct meaning of the verse, sees in it the expressed figure tulyayogīta (paired objects). The Dhvanyāloka analysis seems to me a better description of the psychological process of understanding the stanza; Mallinātha’s of course is simpler.

L “Possessing patākāḥ,” that is, [of terraces] possessing flags on flagstaffs. The phrase rāmyā iti (“to give them beauty”) expresses the cause. [As applied to the women] “possessing patākāḥ” will mean possessing fame. The phrase rāmyā iti will then express the form that this fame takes [i.e., the fame of being beautiful]. Viviktāḥ (private) [is used of the terraces] because they are not crowded with people; and for that reason they increase rāga, that is, the desire for sexual enjoyment. Other [commentators], however, explain rāga here as color, “having a profusion of beautiful color.” Also, [as applied to the women,] the sense will be “increasing [their husbands’] passion (anurāga) since they are viviktāḥ, of ornamented limbs, that is, handsome. [The terraces] have
curved eaves, that is, curved edges of the thatch. [The women] have curved lines at their waist in the form of the triple fold. Samam means together with. But someone may say that from the word sama (equal, similar to) one understands [that the terraces are] similar to [the wives]. That is true; that too [is understood] from the puns. But the puns are not brought in by the denotative force of the words, but by the inherent compatibility3 [of the primary sense for these second meanings]; and so the puns are most certainly suggested. That is why the author of the Vṛtti, while he says that the terraces are like the women, does not say that we have here a case of suggested simile (upamādhuani), because the simile is based on the puns. If the poet had said clearly [that the young men enjoyed terraces which were] samāh (similar to) [their wives], then the simile would be directly expressed and the puns would be brought in by the simile. But the indeclinable samam has the direct meaning of saha (“together with”), which can furnish a pun only by suggestion through its modifying the verb.4 If we omit the puns, there is no incompletion of the denotative power of the words. So it is only after the denotative power of the words has exhausted itself that a second meaning is understood and this only by persons of refined taste, who understand it without any separate effort.5 As has already been said [1.7 K], “Not by a mere knowledge of grammar and dictionaries is the suggested sense known.” And this [principle of analysis] is to be followed in all [these] examples.6 In the sentence “Fat Caitra does not eat by’ day,” it is the denotative power that is incomplete and that demands a further meaning or a further word for its exhaustion. And that demand furnishes occasion for the inference (anumāna) of a Naiyāyika or the verbal presumption (srutārthāpatti) of a Mīmāṃsaka. There is no occasion there for suggestion.7 But enough of this long [explanation]. It is this [principle of analysis] that our author refers to when he says non-verbal.

1. The terraces were decked with flags because they (the flags) were beautiful; ramyā refers to patākāh, not to valabhiḥ. 2. Abhinava is here probably referring to Vallabhadeva, who in his commentary on the Śīṣupālavadha explains rāga in this verse as referring to the painting of the terraces with red realgar and minium. 3. The context, I think, demands arthesāmarthya in place of arthesaundarya. 4. In vadhūbih sāmā vañabhīḥ the word for similar connects “terraces” and “wives” directly. In vadhūbih sāmam vañabhīr aśeyanta “terraces” and “wives” are connected only through the verb. 5. If the denotative sense were incomplete without the puns (as in the verse of 2.21 c A
"The cloud serpents pour forth water"), the puns would be part of the denotative process and would not be suggested. Furthermore, the understanding of the two meanings of the puns would be by two separate efforts, for there would be two denotative powers to understand. Here the second meaning arises after the denotative process has ceased and its understanding is part of the same effort by which we understand the denoted meaning. 6. By "this principle" Abhinava evidently means the rule that once a logically complete meaning has been given by direct denotation, any further meaning that appears in a poem does so by suggestion, not by anumāna or arthāpatti, of which he goes on to speak. 7. The Naiyāyika regards the sentence "Fat Caitra does not eat by day" as furnishing the līṅga for the inference that Caitra eats at night. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka regards it as presuming a suppletion by the word rātrāu ("at night").

A An example of poetic suggestion of yathāsanākhya (ordered sequence) is the following:

The mango tree puts forth
sprout, leaf, bud and flower.
In our heart love puts forth
sprout, leaf, bud and flower.¹

In this stanza there is a beauty similar to a reverberation in the fact that the words "sprout," etc., used in the predicate of "love," occur in the same sequence in which they were used in the prior statement [about the mango]. This beauty is noticed as something distinct from the expressed figures of tulya-yogita and samuccaya that apply to love and the mango tree.²

In this way other figures of speech may be adduced [as examples of figures suggested by the power of meaning], according to the proper connection in each case.³

1. BP notes that for the nominatives in the first verse-half another reading gives locatives; and such is the reading of SRK 188 and Sadukti. 1232: ankurite palla-vite karakite puspite ca sahakāre. But the change to nominatives is doubtless intentional on Ānanda's part and is repeated in the Vyākrtiviveka, p. 442; see the following note. None of the sources gives the author's name.
2. The expressed figures are tulyayogitā, the assignment of the same verbs to two different subjects (the mango tree and love) that are both proper to the context; and samuccaya, defined by Rudraṭa 7.27 as the occurrence of the same quality or action in two different objects at the same time. Yathāsanākhya (ordered sequence) occurs when a number of things are referred to in a later passage in the exact order in which they were referred to in a prior passage. In an expressed yathāsanākhya the sense of the sentence is not logically complete or satisfactory unless we apply this principle of ordering. “You surpass the lotus, the moon, bees, elephants ... by your face, radiance, eyes, gait ...” (Bhāmaha 2.90). If we mix up the references, we get nonsense. So yathāsanākhya is necessary for an understanding of the primary sense. The same necessity applies to our present verse if we read locatives in the first half line, for the verse will then mean that as the mango puts forth sprouts, love begins; as it leafs, love unfolds; as its buds appear, love develops into a sharp yearning; and as it flowers, love reaches it full development. The yathāsanākhya principle is needed in order to assign the appropriate conditions to the appropriate effects. But if we read nominatives, the verse sets two whole sentences against each other, as we have done in the translation of A. It is not necessary to correlate the components of the two sentences in order to avoid nonsense. Rather, the perception comes as a pleasant surprise, after we have understood the direct meaning, that the components of the two sentences can be sequentially paired off. Thus the yathāsanākhya appears as a suggestion similar to a reverberation and not as an expressed figure. One may note that Simhabhūpāla (also spelled Śiṅgabhūpāla and Singabhūpāla) equated the terms of our little verse with various Sanskrit words for love: aṅkura with prema, pallava with māna, koru/a (= kalikā) with pranaya, puspa with sneha, phala with rāga (Rasārnavasudhākara, ed. T. Venkatacharya, 2.111ff.). Mallinātha refers to this passage at KumSam. 8.15. 3. In some cases the connection will be with a suggestor (vyanjaka) which is itself a figure of speech; in other cases with a suggestor that is a vastu (fact or situation).

$L$ In this way other [figures of speech]: Every figure of sense (arthālankāra) can be found in suggested form. For example, a suggestion of dipaka (zeugma) is:

Not fire or wind
or maddened elephant!
Not ax or lightning!
O tree, may you be ever
safe with your vine.

[The meaning of the verse is “May fire, wind, etc., not harm you,” but] the zeugma of the verb “harm” is hidden, from which we understand
that the tree is specially dear to the poet and by which the verse is given beauty.

A suggestion of aprastutapraśamsā is as follows:

Flying about the ketaka trees,
you will kill yourself on their thorns, O bee;
while in your wandering you will not find
a flower sweet as the jasmine.

A certain lady, walking in a garden with her lover, sees a bee and addresses these words to it. Thus the direct statement about the bee is contextual. You cannot say that we understand this meaning to be non-contextual from the use of the vocative, because the vocative can be contextual, being due to the lady's simplicity. So the aprastuta-praśamsā cannot be reached simply by the power of denotation. It is only after the denotative process has been completed that a reference to some other matter is suggested by the force of the directly expressed sense. The suggestion is that a lady of good family, beautiful and proud, comparable to a delicate, sweet-smelling jasmine, prompted by her sincere love, berates her lover who has been roaming hither and yon among prostitutes of low birth, who have gained a reputation for their artificial skill, who are surrounded by thorns in the persons of their bawds, and who can well be represented by a grove of ketaka trees with its far-reaching perfume.

A suggestion of apahnuti (denial accompanied by false affirmation) is found in a verse by my teacher Bhaṭṭendurāja:

On this reservoir of nectar, whose bold and lovely curve
is like the curve of a pale maiden's breast,
that which we see, precious as the application
of ornamental markings in black aloe,
is Love, my graceful lady, stretching out his limbs
on that cold bed to assuage the heat engendered
by his dwelling in the heart of many a damsel
burning with the fire of separation.

In this verse a denial of the mark on the moon is suggested by the [false] affirmation that it is the figure of Love, turned black by the fire arising from the hearts of damsels who suffer the fire of separation.

The same verse carries also a suggestion of the figure sasandeha (doubt), for the mark of the moon has not been mentioned by name but has been referred to as exhibiting the value, or excellence, of the spot painted with ornamental markings of black aloe on the moon as represented by the curve of a pale maiden's breast. Accordingly, a doubt
is suggested to the effect that "I do not know what it is." There is also a suggestion of prativastūpamā. The prativastūpamā that is suggested is this. A lady who has refused to accept her lover's apologies subsequently feels remorse and pain at the separation occasioned [by her anger], so she prepares to welcome her lover back and after completing the decoration of her person is ready in the love chamber for his arrival. It is a full-moon night and her lover arrives, guided by the go-between. The lover flatters the lady, telling her, "the ornamental markings on your swelling breast stir my passion." to which the analogous sentence is that "this beautiful appearance, dark as the petal of a blue waterlily, on the moon does the same." The term "reservoir of nectar," although it is used only as a synonym for the moon, still suggests the reason for the god of love's seeking to allay his heat there. So we have also a suggestion of hetvalankāra (the figure cause). There is also a suggestion of sahokti (pairing) in the form that the beauty of your breasts and the beauty of the moon together stir my passion. From the apprehension of the sense that "the moon is like your breast and the curve of your breast is like that of the moon, the figure upameyopamā12 is also suggested. In this way, other varieties [of suggested figures of speech] can be imagined. For these words of a great poet are like a magic wishing-cow, [endless in the gifts they can furnish]. For it has been said:

The playful gesture of one man produces results unending; another's effort cannot achieve a particle of gain.
If an Elephant of the Quarters stirs a hair, he shakes the earth, while if a bee should fall from heaven itself, he would not shake a vine.13

The combination of these figures [in Bhaṭṭendurāja's verse] into sam-
sṛṣṭi and sanikāra (associated and fused combinations) can be worked out [by the reader for himself].
A suggestion of atisayokti (hyperbole) is in a verse of my own:

Your eyes are the chief embodiment of beauty's springtime when it sends forth its first shoots of gaiety; the successive motions of your eyebrow are the bow bending in Love's hand to its varied curvature; the wine of your lotus mouth, fair lady, at first sip begets intoxication: truly God has centered in you alone the treasures of his universe.
There is a suggestion of atisayokti here, for while spring, love, and wine are blessed with success in the world by reinforcing one another, they are here (said to have) combined into an unique body in your person. There is also a suggestion of the figure vibhāvanā (the occurrence of a result in the absence of cause), for by saying that "the wine of your mouth causes intoxication at first sip" it is suggested that a result, namely intoxication, comes about without its proper cause, namely a frequent imbibing [of the inebriant]. There is also a suggestion of tulyayogitā (paired subjects) in saying that the lady's two eyes are the chief embodiment of beauty's springtime.

It should be understood that in this way every figure of speech can be suggested. It is not that only certain figures can be suggested within certain limits as some writers claim.

According to the proper connection in each case: one should connect [with the suggestion] the [power of] meaning that is appropriate in each case. In some cases the suggestor will be a figure of speech; in some cases it will be a vastu (a fact or situation).

1. It is so dear to him that he silences the unlucky word bàdhista ("harm"). The dipaka, not being expressed in words, is suggested by the contextual meaning. One cannot argue that as the verb must be supplied in order to get a logically satisfactory sense, the dipaka should belong to the denotative operation; because we might get a satisfactory primary sense by supplying a different verb with each subject (may fire not burn you, wind not break you, etc.). The choice of a single verb, which occasions the dipaka, is due to suggestion. Abhinava does not here observe the distinction between dipaka and tulyayogitā that we find in Udbhaṭa and later authors. See 1.13f L, note 1.

2. Here Abhinava is speaking precisely (contrast 2.27d L, note 1). Not only the contextual (prastuta) meaning but the non-contextual meaning (apрастута) itself will be suggested.

3. The verse is included as stanza 985 in Weber's supplement to the Sattasai (Das Saptācatakam des Hāśa, p. 512). It is also quoted by Mammaṭa. The ketaka is Pandanus odoratissimus, Linn., a tree with leaves "drooping, from three to five feet long, tapering to a very long, fine, triangular point, very smooth and glossy, margins and back armed with very fine sharp spines" (Roxburgh, 707). Without being given some special explanation one would take the verse as a directly expressed aprastutaprasamśa. It is only by inventing a special context that the figure can assume the form of a suggestion. Abhinava proceeds to furnish such a context.

4. That is to say that the expressed meaning is not aprastutaprasamśa, where the direct meaning must be non-contextual. 5. The point of the objection is that a person would not normally address a bee in this personal fashion. In order to make sense of the vocative we have to suppose that the lady is really
referring to something else. 6. The lady is not a biologist or a logician. She might well address a personal remark to a bee. 7. The description of the bee's folly is singularly compatible with the folly of the lady's lover. So a reference to his fickleness suggests itself to us. 8. The "reservoir of nectar" is the moon. That which appears on the moon is its mark (our "man in the moon"). Women painted designs (patrabhaḥaṅga) in red saffron or in black aloe on their breast or cheek; see Ingalls, An Anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry, HOS Vol. 44, note on vs. 389, p. 498. This verse is discussed by J. L. Masson, "Abhinavagupta as a Poet," Journal of the Oriental Institute (Madras) Vol. 19 (1970), pp. 247-253. 9. A prativastūpamā is a figure consisting of two sentences, the latter forming an analogy to the former. In the later system of figures (from Udbhāta onward) a prativastūpamā must fulfill three conditions: (1) there must be no word such as iva to denote the similarity; (2) the analogous objects must possess the same quality or action (not a similar one as in the figure udāharana ("example"); (3) the common property must be expressed by a different word or phrase in each of the two sentences. An example is Kālidāsa's description of King Dilipa (Ragha. 1.18) "To benefit his people he took taxes from them. The sun draws up water to pour it forth a thousandfold." "Take" and "draw up" refer to the same action by different words.

10. The literal sense of the stanza is that a substance which lies on the moon and which has a beauty like the beauty of aloe markings on a woman's breast, is really the god of love. This suggests two sentences related as in a prativastūpamā: (1) The aloe markings on your breast are really the god of love; and (2) "The dark substance on the moon is really the god of love." The phrase "dark as the petal of a blue waterlily" is introduced by Abhinava in order to fulfill the third condition of a prativastūpamā, mentioned in the previous footnote, that the phrase used to describe the common quality in the second sentence must be different from the phrase used in the first sentence. 11. Hetu is Dandin's name for the term (2.235). Udbhāta (Indurāja 6.7) calls it kāvyahetu and later writers know it as kāvyaṅga. 12. Upameyopama: a simile followed by a sentence in which the two terms of the simile are reversed. 13. Source unknown. In the cosmology that regards the earth as flat and circular, four (or sometimes eight) elephants are said to support it at the chief compass points. Their stirring causes earthquakes. The impact of a bee, on the other hand, though the bee falls from a great height, is scarcely felt. 14. For once BP errs in interpreting the sentence. The identification of the lady's eyes with springtime, of her eyebrows with love's bow, and of her mouth with wine are metaphors (ṛūpaka) and are directly expressed. The atis'ayokti consists in joining three objects (spring, love and wine) which in the real world are not joined but merely cooperative. This joining is only suggested. Spring, love and wine are not actually said to be joined in the stanza, but as they are identified with the eyes, brow and mouth of a single
body, we see that they must be pictured as joined. 15. We do not know who these authors were.

A Having thus analysed the province of suggested figures of speech, in order now to show their usefulness [the Kārikā] says:

K Those figures of speech which cannot be made into the body of a poem when they are directly expressed, attain the highest beauty when they form a part of dhvani.

A Forming a part of dhvani can occur in two ways, by being a suggestor or by being suggested. Here, in view of the context, we are to understand that being suggested is meant. But figures of speech, even when suggested (vyāṅga), form a variety of dhvani only when they form the predominant sense of the passage. Otherwise they fall under "subordinated suggestion," as will be explained [viz., in 3.34].

L Now figures of speech have long ago been defined by the critics, so it might be doubted that anything very wonderful has been accomplished by our author in showing that they may be suggested. To allay this doubt he says, Having thus analysed, etc.

[Abhinava first interprets the Kārikā by taking vācyatvena as a single word, thus eliminating the negative.] "Those figures of speech which by being directly expressed are made into the body of a poem." Making into the body of a poem means taking a figure, which as it is something other than the subject matter in hand is not naturally the body of the poem any more than a bracelet or the like is the body of the person
who wears it, and making this figure into the body of the poem, a
transformation that can be effortlessly achieved by great poets.

[Abhinava next gives the more natural interpretation of the Kārikā,
dividing the word vácyatve from na so as to express a negative.] Or
[we may interpret the Kārikā to say that] figures of speech which are
not made into even the body of a poem—the sense is that it is difficult
so to make them—when they are directly expressed: these same figures
of speech by taking a suggested form become an integral part of the
operation of suggestion or of the poem itself and even attain to the
highest and rarest beauty, which one may call the very soul [of the
poem]. What is implied is this. A good poet, like an experienced
woman, uses ornaments skilfully; and yet, it is difficult for him to make
an ornament pass for the body of a poem, just as it is difficult to make
rouge pass [for the true flesh]; how much less can an ornament become
the soul itself. But such is the property of being suggested that it
imparts to an ornament, even when the ornament is not predominant,
a superiority over expressed ornaments. It is like the property of royalty
which imparts a peculiar distinction even in the games of children.1 It
is with the foregoing in mind that our author says, otherwise, etc.

1. The “king” even in children’s games acts differently from other chil-

A Now there are two ways in which a figure of speech can be
suggested as the predominant element: it may be suggested by a mere
fact or situation (vastu), or it may be suggested by [another] figure of
speech. Of these [two ways],

K when figures are suggested by a mere fact or situation, they
invariably form a variety of dhvani.
A The reason for this is that

K the poetic functioning is founded on them.

A That is, because in such cases the whole poem comes into being in dependence on this sort of suggested figure. Otherwise the poem would be merely a statement (and no poem at all).

L Of these: there being these two ways. The reason for this: these words form part of the Vṛtti, [not the Kārikā]. Because the "poetic functioning," that is, the functioning of the poet’s activity is slanted toward the figure which depends on that [fact or situation]. Otherwise; sc., if it did not come into being in dependence on that. Accordingly, there is no room in such cases for a suspicion that the suggested figure might be subordinate.¹

1. The reasoning that underlies K, A, and L in this section is the following. In order to have poetry one must either have suggestion predominant in the poem (as in dhvani), or one must have an alaṅkāra predominant in the poem (as in subordinated suggestion). When one alaṅkāra (directly expressed) suggests another alaṅkāra, the question can arise whether the second alaṅkāra is predominant or the first. But where a mere fact or situation suggests an alaṅkāra, the suggested alaṅkāra must be predominant, for if it were not, the verse would not be poetry at all.

A These same figures

K when they are suggested by another figure,
they will form a part of dhvani if the suggested sense is seen to be predominant by its greater degree of beauty,

for we have already said [1.13 e A] that "the decision whether the literal or the suggested meaning is the more important depends on which is the more charming."

The province of figures of speech which are suggested by a mere fact or situation can be deduced from the examples just given. Accordingly, arthaśaktyudbhavānurāṇarūpavyāngyo dhvaniḥ (that type of suggestive poetry where the suggested sense appears like a reverberation arising from the power of meaning) is to be understood as occurring wherever a meaning of any sort, or a meaning in the form of a particular figure of speech, gives rise to a second meaning or a second figure of speech such that the second is predominant by its possessing a greater degree of beauty than the first.

These same figures: this furnishes the words that must be supplied in the Kārikā which immediately follows. Then: this word is supplied in the middle of the Kārikā. The word dhvanyāṅgata [used in the Kārikā and meaning literally "a property of dhvani"] means "a variety of dhvani." If the suggested sense is predominant: the reason follows: by its greater degree of beauty. "If": what our author has in mind is that if the expressed sense rather than the suggested sense is predominant, the suggested sense will belong to "subordinated suggestion."

Now a figure of speech is sometimes suggested by a fact or situation and sometimes it is suggested by another figure of speech. So it may be asked why our author did not give examples [of the former variety as well as of the latter]. He replies [to this question by the sentence, "The province of figures of speech which are suggested] by a mere fact or situation, etc."

He summarizes the whole matter in conclusion: Accordingly, etc. The upshot is that there are four varieties of arthaśaktyudbhavadhvani
(suggestion arising from the power of meaning), deriving from the two forms, vastu (fact or situation) and alankāra (figure of speech), in which either the suggestor or the suggested may appear.

1. All the examples under 2.27 are of an alankāra suggested by an alankāra. Under previous Kārikās examples were given of suggestion by a vastu, but not of an alankāra being suggested by a vastu.

A Thus the varieties of dhvani have been given. The followi

K Where the suggested meaning appears indistinctly, or as sub-

A A suggested sense is of two sorts: it may be clear or indistinct. Whether occasioned by the power of words or of meaning, it is only that suggestion that appears clearly that falls in the province of dhvani, not an indistinct suggestion. And even a clear suggestion is not in the province of the [type of] dhvani where the suggested sense is similar to a reverberation, if it appears as subordinate to the expressed meaning. For example:

O auntie! Without touching the lotuses
or scaring away the geese,
someone has laid out a cloud
upside down on the village tank.¹

[Miaṅka, Sattasai 2.10]
The suggestion here, that a naive girl has seen the reflection of a cloud in the water, is subordinate to the expressed meaning.
1. maliā = Sanskrit mṛditāḥ (Pischel p. 171), not malitāḥ as given in the chāyā. piucchā = Sanskrit pitrsvasar (Pischel p. 112); I know not what confusion has lead to the gloss sahasā. uttānāam: on its back, i.e., in the reverse of the position it held in the sky. phalihām (= Sanskrit sphaṭika, parihā, pariḥā) makes no sense to me; surely it cannot mean prakṣiptam as Abhinava seems to take it. I have substituted the Sattasāi reading vṛūḍham (= vṛūḍham). Both Ānanda and Abhinava see nothing more in the verse than a naive expression of wonder. If that is all there is, they are correct in finding a greater charm in the naive expression itself than in the suggested explanation of optical illusion. But the commentators on the Sattasāi see much more. A young wife, they say, has gone off in the early morning on the pretext of drawing water from the village tank before it is muddied by the advent of others, but really in order to keep a rendezvous with her lover. The lover, however, failed to appear. Later he comes by as the young woman is chatting with her aunt. The verse is spoken by the woman in order to inform him that she kept her promise as he did not, but at the same time to hide this information from her aunt. As so often with verses from the Sattasāi, one does not really know how much the author himself intended.

L Thus [the varieties of dhvani have been given, etc. The two major divisions [of suggestion] are: anivakṣitavācyā (where the literal sense is not intended) and vivakṣitaparavācyā where it is intended, but is subordinated to a further, suggested, sense). The former is divided into atyantatirakṣṛavācyā (where the literal sense is entirely set aside) and arthāntarasankramitavācyā (where the literal sense is shifted). The latter is divided into alakṣyakrama (where no interval is perceived between the literal and suggested meanings) and anunāṇanarūpa (where the suggestion is similar to the reverberation of a bell). Of this pair the former has endless varieties. The latter has two: śābdasaktimūla (where the suggestion arises by the power of words) and arthasaktimūla (where the suggestion arises by the power of meaning). This last has three subdivisions: kavipraudhoktitāṣārā (where the suggestion is embodied in an imaginative expression of the poet), kavinibaddhavaktipraudhoktitāṣārā (where the suggestion is embodied in an imaginative expression of a character invented by the poet), and svatāṣṭānambhavin (where the suggestion is inherently possible in the real world). Now each of these three subdivisions is of four kinds depending on the distinction just given that the suggested sense and the suggestor may be either [a vastu (fact, situation) or an alankāra

\[ \text{§ 2.31 } L \]
(figure of speech). Adding to these the four major divisions of suggestion that were mentioned first (viz., atyantatirākṛtavācya, arthāntara-saṁkramitavācya, alākṣyakrama, and śabda-ākṛtīmūla), we arrive at sixteen varieties of suggestion. Now each of these sixteen varieties will be stated [3.1 K] to be twofold according as the suggestion is revealed by a word or by a sentence. But as alākṣyakramadhvani is revealed not only by words and sentences but by phonemes (vāna), by style (saṁghaṭana), or by an entire work [cf. 3.2], we get in all thirty-five varieties.

To distinguish, that is, to separate, [these thirty-five varieties] from the false varieties of suggestion

That sort of poem is not the province, not the domain, of this dhvani which is the soul [of poetry].

[Abhinava translates the verse from the Sattasai into Sanskrit as follows.]

The lotuses have not been sullied
and the geese have not suddenly been driven off
[but] someone has thrown a cloud
upside down into the village tank.

But others say that piucchā [does not mean “suddenly,” but] is a vocative, meaning “aunt.” “Someone”: some one extremely dexterous.

Subordinate to the expressed meaning; from the expressed meaning, it being in the form of a manifestation of wonder, we understand the extreme naivete [of the girl]; and so the charm of the verse lies just in the expressed meaning. On the other hand, it is only because the expressed meaning wants support in order to become rationally intelligible that it suggests to us a second meaning.1

1. To say that a cloud has been thrown (as Abhinava understands the verse) into the village tank is absurd and irrational. The absurdity is rationalized by our accepting the suggestion that the girl has seen a reflection of the cloud in the water.
As the young wife
busy with her housework hears birds
flying up from the cane thicket,
her limbs fail her.¹

Such verses, as will be shown later, are generally to be adduced as examples of subordinated suggestion.

1. The verse is included, as number 874, in Weber's edition of the Sat-tasai. The young woman has apparently promised to meet her lover in the cane thicket but is prevented by the dreary chores of her married life. The flight of the birds tells her that her lover has kept his promise and is awaiting her in vain. The suggestion (that her lover has entered the thicket) has no particular charm or beauty; hence Mammāṭa categorizes the verse under asundaram vyāngyam (5.132). The description of the young woman, however, physically broken by her disappointment, moves our emotion. Thus the expressed meaning is predominant over (more beautiful than) the suggested.

L [After translating the Prakrit verse, Abhinava comments as follows.] What is here suggested, namely that the secret lover has arrived at the agreed upon rendezvous, serves merely to support (or rationalize) the expressed meaning. To explain: “busy with her housework”: although her mind is intent on other things. “The young wife”: although she is constrained by great shyness and by subserviency [to her elders]. “Her limbs”: there is not a single limb which can be prevented by the deepest dissimulation [from revealing her longing]. “Fail her”: far be it from finishing the housework, she cannot even support her own body. While she was engaged in housework her limbs were not seen to be in that state. From this expressed sense we understand that the young woman is utterly overcome by love and from this comes the charm of the verse.

A But where the particular meaning of a direct expression has been determined by our understanding of the context or some like factor
and where this expressed meaning then appears as subordinate to the suggested meaning, we are indeed on the road of this type of *dhvani* that is similar to a reverberation. For example:

> O farmer’s bride,
> gather the flowers on the ground
> and don’t shake the *śephālikā* tree.
> Your bangles will end on an ugly note
> if your husband’s father hears them.¹

Here we have a wife, who is engaged in sex with her paramour, being warned by a friend because of the noise, heard afar, of her jingling bangles. This context is necessary in order to understand the direct meaning. But after the expressed meaning has been understood, inasmuch as it has been expressed only in order to furnish the final meaning which is the hiding of the woman’s adultery, it becomes subordinate to the suggestion. Accordingly, the verse should be included in the type of *dhvani* where the suggested sense is similar to a reverberation.

¹ This verse too is included in Weber’s edition of the *Sattasai* (number 959). The reading of our text in c can scarcely be right, as *virāva* repeats the sense of *saddo*. The *Sattasai* reading is *esa avasānaviraso*. Abhinava seems to have read *esa avasānavisamo*. For the *śephālikā* (or *sinduvāra*) tree, see M. Emeneau, *University of California Publications in Classical Philology* 12 (1933-34) pp. 333-346 and Ingalls, *HOS* 44, p. 490 (note on vs. 271a). The tree blooms only at night, with beautiful, scentless white flowers. Thus the time of the adultery as well as the place (a garden) is indicated. The father-in-law is presumably within hearing of the friend’s advice. He might well be annoyed at his daughter-in-law’s shaking flowers from his favorite tree, but the friend regards the rousing of such annoyance as a lesser evil than the fury which would seize the old man if he guessed the true cause of the jingling bangles.

**L** But where: where the sense has its nature determined by our understanding of a factor in that set of factors beginning with context and including the proximity of another word, inherent capability, gender, etc.,¹ but where this expressed meaning then—then because, having been directly expressed, its own understanding has been completed—does not conclude the sentence meaning by just this sense but goes on to assume a subordinate role in a suggested meaning: such an instance is in the realm of *dhvani*. Our author’s clearly stating the connection with a final meaning in the form of suggestion is tantamount
to saying that we must consider such cases to be the very opposite of "subordinated suggestion."

"Your bangles will end on an ugly note if your husband’s father hears them": because the father-in-law has been preserving the *sephālikā* tree with particular care and will be angry at its being pulled or shaken. We are to suppose [the expressed meaning to be] that the ugly result will be on this account, for otherwise [that is, if the ugly result were taken to be on account of the daughter-in-law’s adultery], the suggested sense of the verse would be given away by the direct expression. Beyond this, we are to interpret the stanza as we did the stanza, “Who wouldn’t be angry” (*kassa vā na hoi roso*).²

This, i.e., this suggestion, is necessary for our understanding, our getting at, the direct meaning. That is to say, without it no direct meaning can be got because this meaning [without the suggested sense given by the context] would be something perfectly obvious [to the adulteress] and so not worth saying. But now it might be objected that at this rate the suggested meaning serves merely to support (or rationalize) the expressed meaning [and so is subordinate to it]. To prevent such an objection our author continues: but after the expressed meaning has been understood; in other words, after it has been directly expressed.

1. The reference is to the list of factors by means of which an inherently ambiguous expression can be narrowed down to the particular sense intended. The list occurs in Bhartrhari, *VP* 2.315-316 and is repeated by Mammata under 2.19. 2. See 1.4 f *A, L*, where Abhinava gave six different suggested senses, the suggestions differing according to the various persons supposed to be overhearing the verse. Tripathi (p. 649), following Abhinava’s direction, does the same for the present stanza.

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*A* While on the subject of distinguishing in this way *vivakṣita-vācya dhvani* (suggestive poetry where the literal meaning is intended but leads to a further meaning) from the appearance thereof, one may distinguish *avivakṣitavācya* (suggestive poetry where the literal meaning is not intended) in the same way. To do this, the *Kārikā* says:
K If a word that shifts [from its primary meaning] (skhaladgati) is used out of lack of mature judgment (avyutpatti) or lack of skill, such [a word] too is not in the province of dhvani.

A If a word that shifts [from its primary meaning], that is, a word of secondary sense (upararita), is used out of lack of mature judgment or lack of skill, such [a word] too is not in the province of dhvani.

L While on the subject of distinguishing: this is a locative, used causally. The sense is, because of the cogency [to the subject about to be raised] of the [previous] mention (prastāva) of the distinction from the appearance—appearance of what?—the needed completion of the sense is furnished by the word vivakṣitavācyasya. On the other hand, if we take prastuta in its simple (spasta) meaning [of "begun" or "under discussion"], the passage makes no sense, for the distinguishing of vivakṣitavācya from the appearance thereof has already been completed; it is not now begun, nor is it to be continued in what follows.

A word that shifts from its primary meaning: that is, a metaphorical (gauna) word or a word used in a relational secondary sense (läksanika). Lack of mature judgment: as writing with a view merely to compose alliterations and the like; for example:

_Prənkhatpremaprabandhapracuraporicaye praudhasimantininām cittākāsāvakāse vharati satatam yah sa saubhāgyabhūmiḥ._

Happy is he who strolls within the rooms of women's hearts, the which are well acquainted with every subtle sort of swaying love.

Here the word "swaying" (prənkhat), used in a relational secondary sense [sc., for unsteady, fickle], has been used because of the poet's passion for alliteration and the metaphor "rooms" which the poet has used [for hearts] leads to no beautiful goal whatsoever in the form of suggestion.
§ 2.33 Introduction A ]

Lack of skill: such as inability in filling out the meter; for example:

O foremost of the numerous entourage of Love,
your sinking to the ocean, this dish of rolling waves,
has imparted undulation to your level self.

Here the first word (the compound word “foremost of the numerous entourage of Love”) is an indirect expression for the moon; “dish” is used for receptacle; and “level” (literally “wall-like”) for unmoving. None of this produces any beauty [or has any use at all] except to fill out the meter.4

Such [a word] too: In the first Uddyota, apropos of “poets who use words in senses furnished merely by convention,” our author gave an example of secondary usage (bhākta = upacarīta), viz., “the lotus-petal couch speaks [the fever of a slender maid].” [1.14 A]. The force of the word “too” in the present passage is to say that not only was that example not in the domain of suggestive poetry, but so also a word such as is here referred to.

1. See 1.1 K, note 2. 2. BP seems to take cittākāśa as a rūpakā-śamāsa, i.e., cittauākāśa, heart and space having the same property of imperceptability. Such an interpretation explains Abhinava’s denomination of ākāśa as gaṅa. But it would be more natural to take cittākāśa as equivalent to hṛdayākāśa, the physical interior of the heart. The real vice of the stanza, it seems to me, is not its misuse of laksanā but its verbosity: avakāśa adds nothing (except alliteration) to cittākāśa, pracura is needless; saubhagyabhūmih achieves a repetition of the phoneme bh but means nothing more than suabhagaḥ. 3. The only poetic purpose of using laksanā is to produce dhvani. Here it has been used only to produce alliteration. 4. The ākāśa meter, incidentally, is mishandled despite all the padding, for the first caesura (between sañcaya and pravara) falls within a word, forcing an unnatural prolongation of the final syllable of sañcaya.

A  This is because
the clear appearance of the suggested sense as the predominant sense of the passage is the essential mark of dhvani in all its varieties.

And this mark is found only in such examples as we have given.

Here ends the Second Chapter of the Sahrdayāloka composed by Śrī Rājānaka Ānandavardhana.

1. As in the colophon to the First Chapter, the MSS vary between Sahrdayāloka and Kāvyāloka. None of them reads Dhvanyāloka, the form printed in the Kashi text.

Taking the view that the Kārikā now repeats the definition of dhvani as a cause for distinguishing it from the appearance thereof, the author of the Vṛtti introduces the Kārikā with because.

The appearance: what is meant is "the suggested sense appearing clearly [as the predominant sense]"; this on the principle that when told to bring a verbal abstract, one brings a substance [qualified by that verbal activity] The essential mark of dhvani: that is, the full nature of dhvani. Or we may take "appearance" to mean the perception of dhvani; that is the mark, i.e., the proof (pramāṇa) of dhvani and it is complete, for it informs one of the whole nature of dhvani. Or, the perception is the mark of dhvani because the mark of dhvani can only be ascertained by perception [of the suggested sense].

By the word only the author of the Vṛtti indicates that what differs therefrom is a false appearance of dhvani and has thereby carried out the purpose which he undertook to distinguish dhvani from the appearance thereof. [May my words prove] auspicious.

I, Abhinavagupta, praise God's perceptive force, which by its perceiving of the world, this vast and mere appearance, makes it to seem other than Himself.
Herewith the Second Chapter of the Sahrdayâlokalocana, an exposition of dhvani, revealed by the great Śaiva master, the revered teacher, Abhinavagupta.

1. The principle is enunciated by Patañjali on Pāñ 2.1.51 and again on 5.1.59. For example, we cannot bring a “collection of five bushels,” if we understand “collection” (samāhāra), as Patañjali does in those passages, to be a verbal abstract meaning “the activity of collecting.” We bring the five collected bushels.

2. In the Perceiving (Pasyantī) stage of metaphysical or linguistic evolution, arise time, the concept of the ego, and a differentiation of subject and object. See 1.19 L, note 5.
CHAPTER THREE

A In this manner the nature of dhvani and of its varieties has been described through [an analysis of] that which is suggested. It will now be described again through [an analysis] of those factors which act as the suggestors:

L I call to mind the Goddess.
who, after Śiva had shown his skill
in effortless annihilation of Love's body,
stole half of Śiva's body for herself.

The author of the Vṛtti proceeds to establish a logical connection with the preceding chapters: In this manner, etc.. While it is true that in the preceding chapters the types [of dhvani] such as avivakṣitavācya were distinguished by means of the literal sense (vācyā) and thus, insofar as the literal sense may act as a suggestor—and we see from 1.13 “either sense or word, etc.” that it can—these types have already been distinguished by the factors which act as suggestors, nevertheless these literal senses were there analysed according to what was suggested by them. Thus the unintended literal sense (avivakṣitavācya) was subordinated to the suggested sense and the intended literal sense (vivakṣitānyaparavācya) was said to “lead toward the suggested sense.” Thus the meanings that act as suggestors of the basic types of suggestion and of the sub-types were distinguished only by recourse to, by reference to, the meanings they suggested. Therefore he says: through an analysis of those factors which act as the suggestors.

But more than this, while it is true that a meaning that acts as a suggestor may also be capable of being suggested, a word can act only as a suggestor and can never be suggested. For this reason too he says: through an analysis of those factors which act as the
suggestors.\(^1\) [By the Vṛttikāra's use of the word punah ("again") he indicates the following.] It is not the case that in analyzing dhvani through the types avivaksita, etc. there was no analysis by reference to suggestor factors. That analysis was indeed made by reference to suggestor factors. But although made, it will now be made again by reference to purely suggestor factors.\(^2\) Thus, without reference to the suggested sense, one can divide suggestors into words, sentences, phonemes, word-components, texture (saṅghaṭanā), and long sections of poetry. But none of these, like the literal meaning, is ever capable of being suggested. So the point of his statement is that the varieties [of dhvani in the Third Chapter] will be described exclusively on the basis of the [verbal] suggestors.

A certain commentator\(^3\) has explained the Vṛtti's phrase "through an analysis of what is suggested" as follows: "by reference to that which is suggested, namely vastu, alaṅkāra, and rasa." He should be questioned in these terms: It was not the author of the Kārikās who made this threefold division; it was the author of the Vṛtti who pointed it out [cf. 1.4 a A]. And it is not the author of the Vṛtti who will make the [new] divisions [in Chapter Three].\(^4\) Therefore, what kind of logic would it be to say, "he did that and now he is doing this," when the agent is not one and the same person?\(^5\) Moreover, this explanation hardly makes a contextual connection with the whole of the book that has gone before, because other varieties also, such as avivaksitavācya, have already been shown.\(^6\) But enough argument with an elder member of my own family.\(^7\)

1. i.e., the discussion in Chapter Three will be distinguished by its treating suggestor words (as opposed to suggestor meanings), which were not treated in the previous chapters. 2. By purely suggestor factors (suddha-vyanjaka) Abhinava means words, phonemes, etc., which are purely suggestive, never suggested. 3. The reference is to Abhinava's kinsman, the author of the Candrikā. 4. The division into padaprakāśatā, vākyaprakāśatā, etc., is given by the author of the Kārikās in 3.1-2 K. 5. Certainly Abhinava here speaks as if he supposed the author of the Kārikās to be a different person from the author of the Vṛtti. But in introducing 3.2 he will take quite the opposite point of view. For the question whether Kārikākāra and Vṛttikāra were the same man, see Introduction, pp. 25-27. In view of Abhinava's own ambiguous stance in regard to the question, his criticism of the Candrikākāra here seems a carping one. Nor is it greatly strengthened by the argument that Abhinava subjoins. 6. Abhinava's point is that the explanation given by the earlier commentator can, at the very most, demonstrate the logical
connection of the third chapter with only a part of the earlier portion of the work, namely the portion in the first chapter where vastu, alankara, and rasa were mentioned as divisions of dhvani; it will not demonstrate the logical connection with chapter two, where avivaksitavācya and vivaksitānyaparavācya have been mentioned as divisions of dhvani.

7. Kane (HSP p. 198) is probably correct in here emending pūjyajanasaṅgottaraiḥ to pūrvajanasaṅgottaraiḥ, for Abhinava in other passages regularly refers to the author of the Candrikā as pūrvavāṁśa, and saṅgottra is merely a synonym of vaṁśa. The printed reading, if we take it to mean "with my own relatives who are persons I should respect," is awkward because of the separation of nija from saṅgottaraiḥ.

§ 3.1 A  ]

Either a word or a sentence may serve as the suggestor in the type of dhvani where the literal sense is not intended and, of the other type, in that sub-type where the suggested sense resembles a reverberation.

One sub-type of dhvani where the literal sense is not intended is that where the literal meaning is entirely set aside. In this variety a word may serve as the suggestor, as in this line of the great sage Vyāsa:

these seven are the kindling sticks of royalty.1

Another example is in a line of Kālidāsa:

When you put on your armor, who could be forgetful of his wife pining in his absense?2

for what serves not as ornament to a sweet configuration?3

In these examples the words "kindling sticks," "armor," and "sweet" have been used for their suggestive qualities.
1. From Vidura’s advice to Dhṛtarāṣṭra, *Mbh.* 5.38.35. The verse is quoted in full by *L* below. The *samidhāḥ* were the sticks laid out at the base of the sacrificial fire, for the choice and arrangement of which elaborate directions are given in the ritual texts. The word is here used metaphorically of the virtues upon which the success of a king must be based. 2. Words of the Yakṣa to the cloud in *Meghadūta*, vs. 8. As the monsoon season was normally a time for staying at home and enjoying domestic bliss, the sight of gathering clouds would naturally remind a traveler of his wife waiting for him at home. As a cloud does not actually don armor, one takes the word *samnaddha* in the secondary sense of *udyata*, prepared as for a campaign, here accompanied by wind, thunder and lightning. The suggestion, as *L* will point out, is of a cruel and irresistible opponent. 3. *Sākuntala* 1.17. The whole verse:

   The pond lily circled by moss is charming;
   the moon’s mark though black,
   gives it a royal beauty;
   and this slender damsel,
   even in her rough dress, is lovely;
   for what serves not as ornament
   to a sweet configuration?

   *L* In the *Kārikā* the word “and” (*ca*) serves to prevent a sequential ordering of the two pairs of terms.1 Thus *avivaksitavācya*, in both its types, is twofold insofar as it can be suggested by either a word or by a sentence. The type, namely “suggested gradually” (*kramadyotya*), of *vivaksitānyaparavācya*, which latter is other than *avivaksitavācya*, along with its sub-types [namely *sabdāsaktimūla* and *arthaasaktimūla*] is likewise twofold. It is called *anuṛanānarūpavyaṅgya* because its suggested meaning (*vyāṅgya*) is such that its appearance is like the appearance of a reverberation.

   The great sage: this harks back to what was said earlier [l.1e *A*], that suggestive poetry “is also found in such works as the *Rāmāyana*, *Mahābhārata*, and the like.”

   Firmness, forbearance, self-control
   purity, pity, kindliness of speech,
   and constant faithfulness to friends:
   these are the seven kindling sticks of royalty.2

   Here the literal meaning of the word kindling sticks is completely set aside because it is impossible. What the word “kindling sticks” suggests
is the intention of the speaker, the suggested sense, namely that the
capacity to strengthen royalty depends on nothing other [than these
seven factors]. Although the purpose of giving the present example
has been served by such examples [already given] as “like a mirror
blinded by breath [cf. 2.1 c A], nonetheless these further examples have
been given here, where an occasion for them arises, in order to show
how they pervade a great part of literature. As one may easily supply
the discarding of the literal sense here from what our author has just
said, there is no need for his expressly repeating the fact.

The word armor, because it is here impossible in the literal sense,
conveys, by secondary usage, the sense of being prepared, and thus sug-
gests what the writer intends, namely cruelty, irresistibility, rashness,
etc. In the same way, the word sweet conveys, by secondary usage, the
giving of pleasure, satisfaction and the like, to all people, and suggests
the speaker’s intention, namely that it is not surprising that such a
shape should be the object of intense desire.

1. Without co, we should follow the principle laid down by Pāṇini (1.3.10)
and connect the first member (avivakṣitavācya) of the pair of suggestions
with the first member (pada) of the pair of suggestors; likewise the second
member (anuraṇanarūpavyāṅgya) of the suggestions with the second member
(vākya) of the suggestors. This would be wrong, for either pada or vakya
can suggest either avivaksitavacya or anuraṇanarūpavyāṅgya. 2. See note 1
to A above. In pada a our text reads dayā instead of damah; doubtless a
misprint or a scribal error, for dayā would be nothing more than a synonym
of kārunya in pada b. 3. In a footnote to our text Pt. Śrī Māhādeva Śāstri
points out this distinction. The secondary meaning (laksyārtha) of the word
samidh is capability of production; what is suggested (vyāṅgyārtha) is the
fact that royalty depends on nothing other than these seven factors. 4. In
his commentary on Śāk. 1.17 Rāghava Bhaṭṭa repeats Abhinava’s remarks on
madhura almost word for word.

Of the same type, [in the variety] where the literal meaning is
shifted, [a word may serve as the suggestor], as in this:

Rāma, being overmuch in love with life,
has failed, my beloved, to be worthy of his love.
Here the literal sense of the word “Rāma” has been shifted to the suggested sense of one who possesses the very quintessence of courage, etc.

Again,

Let others thus compare
her cheek to the lunar orb;
yet if they really compare, the moon
is no more than the poor old moon.

Here the sense of the second occurrence of the word moon is shifted from the literal.

L Of the same type: viz., the type where the literal sense is not intended; of this type he refers to the second variety. [The complete stanza from which he quotes is as follows:]

The cruel demon treated you as one expects
of such a being angered by rejection:
and you too bore the blow as a lady of high bi
should bear it, with your head held high.
But the witness of your death, who bears
his weapon now to no avail.
Rāma, being overmuch in love with life,
has failed, my beloved, to be worthy of his love.

When [Rāvana] was forcibly rejected [by you], since he is cruel by his very nature as a demon and through evil pride feels that his orders are not to be disobeyed, he acted, blind with rage, in conformity with his spirit when he cut off your head, for his intention was that no one else should ever transgress his command. Treated “you”: the sense is, you, by whom even such [a despot] was not heeded. And you bore the blow without flinching, open-eyed and with a face as calm as on a holiday. “As”: in the manner of. “A lady”: even a woman of low birth who wishes to be called a lady will hold her head high to give the impression that she is a lady. But you held it up bravely at the moment of decapitation, as if to say, “let it be done quickly.” You held your head high as real ladies do because you had always done so. Thus both Rāvana and you behaved throughout with propriety. But the part I played turns out to be most improper. My banishment robbed me of opportunities to use my bow, but it might at least have proved useful in protecting my wife. Now that I have failed to protect
you in your need, it becomes wholly useless; yet here I still carry it. The only reason one can imagine is to protect my own life; and this is not proper. "By Rāma": the meaning of this word is developed into suggested qualities² [beside the literal meaning of Rāma, the son of Daśaratha], such as being disposed to unequalled daring, truthfulness, appropriate behavior, etc. The explanation of the term "et cetera," found in a [certain] commentary, that it stands for cowardice and other such qualities, is incorrect. For this behavior, far from being inappropriate, would be proper in the case of a coward. "My beloved": this has become a mere word now, for that which justifies the use of the word "beloved" is love, and that has been sullied by impropriety. Thus, the tragedy of Rāma³ is made clear by the combination of [the sthāyibhāva] grief, the ālambanavibhāva [namely Sītā's death], and the uddīpanavibhāva [namely her noble behavior].

Let others thus compare: [After translating the Prakrit stanza Abhinava continues:] By "thus" the poet implies that people are naturally blind to distinctions. "People": that is, those whose only course is the steps of those who have gone before. "Her cheek": that is, of her whose precious figure possesses unique beauties. "Give the moon as a comparison to her cheek": In order to furnish a rhetorical comparison to her cheek, which is the central and predominant element of a face which is the perfection of genuine beauty, one must find some object that is of greater beauty; whereas the orb of the moon, being spoiled by its spot, is grossly inferior. Thus, although ordinary people follow in a line like sheep, if discriminating people will consider the matter, [they will see that] this wretched thing deserving of pity that is called the moon is really a thing to which should attach the properties of waning, of being without real charm, and of being sullied. For the shift of the literal sense to various suggested properties, one may compare what I have said previously [viz., in 2.1 a L]. The same appears in what follows.

1. The verse is taken from some Rāma play that has not been identified. Apparently it contained a scene in which Rāvana produced before Rāma an illusion of the severed head of Sītā, an illusion that elicits from Rāma the present verse. Such an element of plot would be an easy invention in view of the scene in the Rāmāyana where Rāvana produces before Sītā an illusion of the severed head of Rāma. 2. See 2.1 a A and L. 3. Abhinava writes loosely here. The tragic experience (karuṇarasa) does not belong to Rāma.
A [Coming back to] the sub-type where the literal meaning is entirely set aside, [we find that] in this sub-type a sentence [just as well as a single word] may serve as the suggestor. Thus:

In what is night to all creatures
the true ascetic wakes;
where others wake, the sage who sees
sees that it is night.

[Bhagavadgītā 2.69]

For in this sentence the meanings night and waking are not intended. What is communicated is rather the attention of the saint to a knowledge of truth and his aversion to what is not truth. Thus the suggestive force is of the sub-type where the literal meaning is entirely set aside.

L Having in this manner illustrated the two sub-types of the first variety as revealed by single words, he now illustrates them as revealed by sentences: “in what is night.” Intended: if we take the words literally, they furnish no advice for those who are to be advised.¹ What would be the use of saying that one must remain awake during the night and that one must act as if it were night the rest of the time? Therefore this sentence, its primary sense being obstructed, suggests that the ascetic, because of his extraordinary nature, is attentive to the preception of truth and averse from false perception. As the word “all” is a relative term, the literal statement is logically possible. Accordingly, it is wrong to suppose that the true sense is [not suggested but is] implied (ākṣipta) by the fact that “all” cannot otherwise be logically construed.²

[Now to interpret the verse:] That which is night, that which causes utter confusion, to all fourteen classes of living beings from Brahmā down to plants is the vision of truth. The true ascetic wakes here,
seeking to attain it. This rather than mere avoidance of sensual pleasure is what asceticism really consists in. Or, one may take the words differently. That which is night to all creatures is the deception [of mäyä]. The ascetic wakes here, seeking to avoid it. On the other hand, all creatures wake in false perception, that is, they are wide awake to [its presentations], whereas to the ascetic it is night, a field of non-awareness, for he is not awake to its activity. Thus he whose conduct is defined as extraordinary [i.e., the true ascetic] really sees and thinks. Of him alone are the outer and inner organs of knowledge profitably employed. Others do not see and do not think. The general sense of the verse is that one must be intent on the perception of truth. In the same way, the words "sage" and "who sees" do not cease operating on rendering the literal meanings, but only after giving a suggested meaning. As the pronouns yat and tat [represented in the translation by "what" and "where"] are dependent on the other words of the sentence, we may say that the whole sentence, verbs and all, is suggestive. Our author states as much in the words For in this sentence, etc. Is communicated means is suggested.

1. It is assumed that every verse in the Bhagavadgïtä must constitute God's advice to those who are in need of it. A verse from the Gïtä must therefore be so interpreted as to furnish such advice. 2. An objector claims that the intended sense of the verse is furnished by arthâpatti (that which one supplies in order to resolve a logical contradiction). Abhinava insists that the intended sense is furnished by suggestion. The objector's argument would run as follows. "The literal sense of 'night' is 'a time for sleeping.' Now there is a logical contradiction in saying 'the ascetic wakes in the sleeping-time of all creatures,' for 'all creatures' is inclusive of ascetics. Thus the so-called suggested sense of waking at night, viz., the pursuit of truth, is a necessary implication, not a suggestion." Abhinava rejects the argument by allowing "all" to mean "most" or "all other." Thus the literal sense becomes merely inappropriate, not logically impossible. 3. The second explanation is the one chosen in Abhinava's Gïtabhâsya: yâ sarvesâm bhûtânâm nisâ, mohini mâyâ, tasyâm munir jâgarti katham iyaṁ heyeti. With this and with the statement just above that the true ascetic is more than one who simply avoids sensual pleasure, one may compare Abhinava's comment in his Gïtabhâsya on this verse: yogi ca sarvâyavahârân kurvâno 'pi lokottara iti nirûpayatâ paramesvarenâ samsâpyasya svârûpam kathyate: "God (i.e., Krishna) here shows that the yogin, though he may take part in every sort of worldly activity, is of extraordinary nature; and he tells us briefly what this nature is."
A Of the same type but of the sub-type where the literal sense is shifted a sentence may serve as suggestor, as in the following:

The passing of time is poison to some,  
nectar to others;  
part poison part nectar to some,  
neither poison nor nectar to others.¹

For in this sentence the information is conveyed by words which have been shifted from their literal sense of poison and nectar to the sense of pain and pleasure. Accordingly, the suggestive force is of the sub-type where the literal sense is shifted.

¹ Source unknown. In our printed text pāda a is two mātras short. Badarinath Śarma corrects it by inserting uṇa after visamañō. In b he reads bolei = Sk. vyapacala(ya)ti (cf. Turner Dict. 12167), which is better than vai = valayati, though the latter is barely possible (time “rolls on”).

L That which is made of poison (visamayitah) means that which has come to consist of poison (visamayatam prāptaḥ). [The first group of] “some” are those who are wicked or those who have a keen judgment. For [the second group,] those who are virtuous or those who lack judgment, times passes as if it were made of nectar. For some, who are of mixed conduct or who are partly of sound, partly of weak judgment, [time is] part poison, part nectar. While for those who are complete fools or who have reached the final stage of yogic concentration, time passes as if it were neither poison or nectar.¹ This is the construction. The words poison and nectar, by a sort of dead metaphor such as one sees in the word lāvānyā,² are used in the sense of causes of pain and pleasure, just as we say that a lemon is poison and a wood-apple is nectar; but they end up by referring to the pain itself and the pleasure that they cause. However, it is not the intention of the sentence that they should not at all refer to the cause, for without the cause pleasure and pain would not exist. This is what our author means by saying that they have been shifted from their literal sense.³ [The sense
of the other words in the sentence has been shifted also; the sense of “some” is shifted from the indefinite to the definite [groups which the author has in mind]; the sense of “passes” is shifted to the general sense of an activity; the sense of “time” to all the elements of worldly life. The author of the Vṛttti has used the shifting of the single words poison and nectar as an example [by which the other shiftings may be judged]. That is why he specifies “in this sentence.”

1. Time brings pain to the wicked by bringing them retribution for their bad deeds. It is likewise painful to the man of judgment, who sees the essential misery of transmigration. Groups two and three follow naturally from the first. Group four is composed of those unaffected by time—those whose ahedony is due to stupid insensitivity and those who have overcome the emotions by yoga.

For lāvanya see 1.16 K and L. When used as a frozen metaphor to mean charm, beauty, it cannot give rise to dharma. The same holds for the words visa (visa) and amrta (amia) in the present stanza. It is not these words but the stanza as a whole that gives rise to dharma. 3. So the primary intention of the author of the verse is to suggest the pain and pleasure of the world as it affects different types of persons. He does this by a secondary use of words, but the literal sense of the words is not wholly abandoned. 4. Abhinava here guards against an objection which might be made to Ānanda’s example. We might ask how this example differs essentially from the example in 3.1 a, where a single word is shifted. Is the only difference that here two words are shifted? It will be seen that by Abhinava’s interpretation the present example is essentially different from that of 3.1 a. The suggestion here comes from a shift of meaning of the whole sentence. The way in which anything in the world affects persons depends on their karma, their judgment, and their practice of yoga.

A Of that type of dharma where the literal sense is intended but where there is [subordination to] a suggestion resembling a reverberation, in its sub-type arising from the power of words, a single word may act as suggestor, as in the following:

If fate will have it that I am not born
to fill the wants of needy men for riches,
why was I, being jada, not made to be a well
or pond of limpid water by the wayside?
Here the word *jāda* (witless, insentient, cool), used by the discouraged speaker in grammatical agreement with himself, comes to have, as a reverberation brought about by its own power, grammatical agreement with the well.¹

1. A question may arise how to correlate the present passage with Ānanda's statement in 2.21. He said there that we have *sabdāsaktīyuddhāvadṛhṇā* only where an *alaṅkāra* is suggested. Where *vastumātram* (a mere fact or situation) is suggested, we have *ślesa*. In the light of that statement the present verse at first sight would seem to exhibit *ślesa* and not any form of *dhvani*. The answer is that the present verse does carry the suggestion of an *alaṅkāra*. Although neither Ānanda nor Abhinava mentions it here, both of them refer to it in 3.33c. The verse suggests a simile (upamā), for the speaker is likened to the pond and well. One should note that the term *sabdāsaktīyuddhāvadṛhṇā* applies here only to the suggestion of simile. There is also *rasadhvani* in the verse, namely, a suggestion of *sāntarasa*: "As my lot is so much worse than that of an insentient pond or well, all worldly objects must be regarded as useless and empty." This final suggestion of the verse is referred to in 3.33c (see 3.33c A, note 6 and 3.33c L). It is immediately perceived by the sensitive reader and does not arise like a reverberation.

L Having in this manner given examples of the four kinds [of *dhvani*] referred to in the first half of the *Kārikā*, he now proceeds to give, in order, examples of six other variétés covered by the second half [of the *Kārikā*] by saying: Of that type of *dhvani* where the literal sense is intended, etc. *Prātum* means "to fill." The plural in "riches" is meant to suggest the fulfilling of whatever need any particular suppliant may have. This is why the word "needy" has been used. "Of men":¹ because generally people want money; they do not want help from virtues. "By fate," the decree of which cannot be questioned. "I": that is to say, someone else certainly has been created [for this purpose], but not I, for which reason the speaker is dejected. A pond of limpid water is one that is useful to people. "Or a well": the suggestion is: "even although it is not noticed by people." Used in grammatical agreement with himself: the word *jāda* has the sense "unable to think of what to do." In the same sense *jāda* can apply to a well, for a well lacks knowledge of who needs what. And that is why the well is *jāda*, "cool," i.e., not fevered by distress at the situation. At the same time the well is *jāda* by its connection with cool water (*sītalajala*)² and so is able to help others. In this third sense the word
$jada$ if applied to the pond would be tautologous. So he says that it comes to have grammatical agreement with the well. By its own power: thus he assigns the suggestion to the category of those arising from the power of a word.

1. Abhinava's point in this remark is that the word $jana$ (men in general, ordinary people) has been used because the common run of men want just wealth. It is only a few unusual persons who may want moral or spiritual aid, which the speaker might be able to give. 2. In interpreting puns and suggestions, $d$ and $l$ are regarded as interchangeable. So $jada$ can be the same as $jala$ (water). 3. Abhinava here seeks to explain why the $Vṛtti$ speaks of $jada$'s attaining grammatical agreement with the well rather than the pond. It is because this third meaning which he has discovered of $jada$ (possessing cool water) would be tautologous with $prasannāmbudhara$ (containing limpid water) already, used of the pond. 4. More literally, thus he joins [to the suggestion] the property of arising from the power of a word.

A In the same sub-type of $dhvani$ a sentence may act as a suggestor, as in the speech of Simhanāda in the $Harṣacarita$:

In this great disaster you are now all that is left
In this cosmic destruction you are now the world-serpent Śeṣa
for the support of the earth.

[Harṣacarita, p. 192 bottom
(Chapter 6, lines 421-2 out of 628)

for this sentence clearly suggests by the power of its words a second sense that comes like a reverberation.

1. Simhanāda, the field marshal, is addressing Harṣavaṇḍhana after the deaths of the latter's father and elder brother.

$L$ The word $mahāpralaya$ in its first sense is to be analyzed as $maha-ā-pralaya$, the complete cessation of happiness. When this cause of grief has occurred, you are the only one remaining for the support,
the consolation, of the dhāraṇī, that is, the yoke-beam, of empire.\(^1\)
When the sense of this sentence has been thus completed, a second
sense ensues, namely that after the elephants of the quarters, etc.,
have perished, the king of serpents alone is able to support the weight
of the earth.\(^2\)

1. Abhinava tries to elicit a pun from every word in the sentence. Surely
no reader would understand this "direct meaning" at a moment noticeably
previous to the "suggested meaning." See 2.21 e A, note 1. 2. One might
add that the two senses in conjunction suggest a simile, viz., that King Harṣa
in qualities to the world serpent.

\(\text{A} \quad \text{In the same type of dhvani [viz., where the suggested sense}
\text{appears like a reverberation] but in the sub-type where the suggestion}
\text{arises from the power of a meaning furnished by a poet's imaginative}
\text{expression [cf. 2.24], a word may be the suggestor, as in the Harivijaya.}\(^1\)

The face of early spring is decked with mango buds
and scented with the rich sweet wine
that soon will flow.
The god of flower arrows
snatches from her a kiss without consent.\(^2\)

Where it is here said that the god of love snatches a kiss from the face of
spring without her consent, the word \textit{asamarpitam} (lit., "unoffered"),
which denotes the state [of early spring], suggests by the power of its
meaning [since it implies that Love seized Spring without her consent]
the violence of the god.\(^3\)

1. For this lost Prakrit poem by the royal poet Sarvasena, see V. Raghavan,
\textit{Bhoja}, pp. 810–11. It described Krishna's victory over Indra and his carry-
ing off of the \textit{parijāta} tree as a present for Satyabhāma. A. K. Warder iden-
tifies the author with the fourth-century Vākāṭaka king of that name (\textit{Indian
is that given by Hemacandra: \textit{chanapasaramahagghamananaharasurasūmoam}. For
Prakrit \textit{manahara} = Sanskrit \textit{manohara}, see Pischel, para. 347. \textit{Dhvanyāloka}
KM edition (followed by Badarināth Śarmā) emends the verse to bring it into strict giti meter, but this is wrong. All the gāthās that are preserved of the Harivijaya appear to have twenty mātrās in the second pāda; see Sarasvatī-kantābharana 4.235; 5.287, 330, 350, 351. It will be seen that I interpret the verse differently from Abhinava. His interpretation seems to me impossible.

3. Hemacandra (on AC 1.74) makes the suggestion more specific: “when spring has come fully of age, what will he not do!”

§ 3.1g A  

The beginning of spring, or the face of spring, in which there is delight (āmoda = camatkāra) on the part of the god (sura) Manohara (= the god of love Manmathadeva) because of the precious (mahār-gheṇa) festival-influence (utsavaprasaṭa). Here the attributive “precious” is placed after its noun in the compound because there is no rule of order in Prakrit.1 Chana means festival. Mukham means both beginning and face: and this is joined to surāmodam.2 The basic meaning is that in the beginning of spring love stirs our hearts. But this becomes suggestive of a further sense because of the striking expression of the poet.

1. But this is not true. If it were, the Prakrit language would be unintelligible. Furthermore, in Abhinava’s interpretation prasara makes very little sense. 2. Abhinava’s interpretation amounts to this. At the very beginning of spring comes the Love-Festival (Manmathotsava). Under its influence the love god in our hearts takes delight in the vernal beauty and seizes it even in its childhood. This suggests how violent our love will become when spring is fully grown. Abhinava does not note the obvious meaning of surāmodam (scented with wine).

A  Within the same sub-type a sentence may act as the suggestor, as in the verse already quoted “The fragrant month prepares,” etc., [see 2.24 A]. There the meaning of the sentence, viz., that the fragrant month prepares but does not yet give the arrows to the god of love, being embodied in an imaginative expression of the poet, suggests spring’s destructive stage of stirring up love [which is about to come].
L Our author has not given an example either of a word or a sentence as suggestor of the sub-type of suggestion arising from a meaning embodied in an imaginative expression of a character invented by the poet [cf. 2.24 A]. This is because what he has given is sufficient to illustrate the specific words of Kārikā 2.24: “it may be given body simply by an imaginative expression.” An example of a word acting as suggestor in that sub-type would be:

Truly fair women are obj
and truly wealth is fair;
but life is unsteady and as quickly gone
as the glance of a tipsy girl.

[Cāṇakyarājanītīśāstra]

In this verse there speaks a disenchanted (virāgin) character created by the poet, suggesting by force of the meaning embodied in the word “life” the following. All these sensual pleasures and riches are of use only to one’s life. When one’s life is gone, even though they still exist, they come to be as if non-existent. And life, which consists in preserving the vital breaths, is nothing to rely on, because the functioning of the vital breaths is so tenuous. So what is the point in maliciously proclaiming the faults of the poor objects of sense? [Rather,] one’s own life is to be blamed. But since life is by its very nature so unsteady, even it is not at fault. All this leads to a thorough disenchantment with the world (vairāgya).

An example [of suggestion of this sub-type] produced by a sentence is the verse “On what mountai ,” etc. [see 1.13 m A].

1. Ānandavardhana will quote this verse under 3.30. It occurs in many Cāṇakya collections, as well as in SRK 1608, and is quoted by Hemacandra, Kṣemendra, and others. For particulars see Sternbach. Cāṇakya Niti Text Tradition, Vol. II, p. 231, item H. 2. This is the definition of DhP: jīva prāṇadhāraṇe.
A [In the same type of dhvani] in the sub-type where the suggestion springs from a meaning that is embodied in something inherently possible, a word may be the suggestor, as in:

Ab merchant, how should we have ivory
or tiger skins for sale,
when daughter-in-law is strolling about the house
with the curls dancing on her forehead?¹

Here the word lūlitālakamukhī ("with curls dancing on her forehead"), by the power of the situation, inherently possible, to which it refers, suggests the young wife’s eagerness for sexual play and her husband’s weakness from his constant enjoyment of that pleasure.

¹. The verse is again quoted by Mammaṭa (10, vs. 528, p. 709) and is included in Weber’s Sattasai (951). Parisakkae: DhP lists the verb svaskate (DhP 1.100) in the sense of motion; it has been found only in Prakrit. Lūlitālakamukhī: lit., whose face bears tossing curls; but as alaka regularly refers to the curls in what we call the bangs, I have translated "on her forehead." The picture is not of a slattern who hasn't time to fix her hair, but of a young woman who gives careful attention to arranging her hair so that it will be attractive to her husband.

L [Abhinava translates the stanza, then adds:] Parisakkae: walks about flirtatiously. There is no difficulty here in applying the literal sense of the words.¹ The adjective “[with curls] dancing [on her forehead]” is a simple description of [the wife's] appearance, while the husband’s failure to procure ivory might be due simply to his arrogance.²

¹. If the literal sense of the words were illogical, it might be argued that the suggested sense was forced on us (āksipta) as a necessary inference rather than being suggested (vyāngya). That is not the case. ². BP: he might feel that he had made enough money already.
A In the same [sub-type] a sentence may act as a suggestor, as

The hunter's wife strolls proudly
with peacock feather behind her ear.
She strolls amid fellow wives
who deck themselves with pearls.

[Sattasai 2.73]¹

This verse suggests the good fortune in love of a certain hunter's wife,
newly wed, who wears a peacock feather behind her ear. For it is
suggested from the meaning [i.e., from the given situation] that her
husband, wholly intent on enjoying her charms, is now able to kill
only peacocks; while the ill fortune of the other wives, who have been
married a long time, is revealed in their decking themselves with pearls,
for it is suggested from the situation that the same husband had time,
when he was enjoying them, to slay elephants.

L "The hunter's wife," etc. The verse has been quoted i
precedes.

¹ Now the following objection may be raised. "You have claimed
that dhvani is a type of poetry [cf. 1.13 K]. How then can there be a
revelation of it in a single word? For a type of poetry is a particular
collection of words that causes us to apprehend a particular meaning.
Its nature is such that a single word cannot reveal it, for the individu-
al words remind us of objects; they do not denote."¹ To which we
reply: There might well be a fault here if it were the denotative power that occasioned our use of the term dhvani, but it is not so; it is by the suggestive power that we assign the term. Furthermore, poems, like human bodies, are collections defined by a particular arrangement of parts. The idea that we form of their beauty can be assigned, by positive and negative agreement, to particular parts of the collection. Accordingly, there is no contradiction in our assigning of dhvani to individual words insofar as they are suggestive (of this kind of beauty in the whole poem). The following slokas will give support to our position.

"Just as the sound of what is unpleasant makes a verse faulty, as is manifested in the faults śrutidusṭa, etc.; just so does the reminding us of what is pleasant constitute a virtue.

"Therefore there is beauty in all those varieties of dhvani which appear in single words, even though a single word serves only as a reminder.

"Just as a woman appears beautiful by a single ornament which imparts to her some special attraction, so the speech of a good poet is beautiful by means of the dhvani revealed by a single word."

1. The objection must come from a Prabhākara Mīmāṃsaka. In Prabhākara’s theory vācakatva, conceived as the power of transmitting valid information, must produce a new cognition. The individual words simply remind us of objects which we already know. 2. Abhinava will point out that this answer is a chala, a trick in which the opponent’s meaning is intentionally misunderstood (cf. Nyāya S. 1.2.10-17). By vācakatva the Prabhākara means the power to convey a specific piece of new information, whether fact or suggestion. Ānanda takes it in the more limited sense which it bears in his own system, viz., as the power to denote, as opposed to the power to suggest, a meaning.

L Now, etc.: The objection arises from the view that dhvani is a collection. Its nature: that is, the nature of a type of poetry. He first takes the phrase used by the objector “because words do not denote (avācakatvā)” and by intentional misunderstanding shows that this is an insufficient reason for the conclusion. Thus he says, There might well be a fault here, etc. After answering the objection by this trick, he then answers in all seriousness with Furthermore, etc. Suppose the objector were to reply, “I am not taking the word’s lack of denotative power as a cause of its lack of dhvani. I am saying that dhvani is a poem. And a poem is a sentence which conveys a complete meaning; it
is not a single word." Our author might continue, "True; but neither have we said that dhvani is a word. Dhvani is a collection. That is why the word 'reveal' (prakāśa) may be used in speaking of it: 'dhvani is revealed by a single word.'" Now the objector may ask how it is, if a single word has such a capability, that the process of understanding [suggestive poetry] is an unbroken whole. It is with this in mind that our author says: poems [like human bodies], etc. For it has been said before: "the teaching that [a sentence] has parts applies only at the time of analysis."4

But how can we shift the area in which we apprehend beauty to the parts [of the sentence, which are its words], for the individual words do not express the sentence meaning but merely bring objects to mind? Well, why not? Why should words not be causes of our apprehending beauty, since they remind us of beautiful suggestions? To take a contrary instance: a word such as pelava "delicate" is not denotative of any obscene sense such as pela "testicle," but merely brings that sense to mind; and on that account a poem, as being a thing of beauty, is "spoiled by its sound (śrutiduṣṭa)." This fault of being śrutiduṣṭa is assigned by positive and negative agreement to the parts of a poem. The same should be the case with [the causes of beauty] which are under discussion. He puts the matter thus: Just as the sound of what is unpleasant, etc. The sense is, the sound of what reminds us of that which is unpleasant. Makes a verse faulty: that is, un-beautiful. Virtue: as much as to say beauty. Having thus given a [counter-]example in the first three quarters of the śloka, he gives that which the example illustrates in the fourth. Then he sums up: Therefore there is beauty, etc. The syntax [of his argument] is this. As the memory of what is pleasant constitutes a beauty, therefore in all varieties of dhvani that have been described, even in that which appears in single words, even in that which is revealed by a single word, there is beauty, even though words function only as reminders. The word api ("even though") is construed in both directions on the principle of a crow’s eye.5 Finally he shows by positive and negative agreement how our apprehension of beauty arises from a single word: Just as a woman, etc.

1. That is, the view is based on the fifth of the five meanings assigned to dhvani by Abhinava (1.131). From the points of view represented by the other four definitions the objection could not arise. 2. See 3.1j A note 2. 3. What follows is a pratyavasthāna (see NyāyaSBhāṣya 1.2.12), a correction,
of Ananda's misinterpretation. 4. Cf. Vākyapadīya 1.90. 5. In the second parikarasloka the word api is to be taken both with smarakatve an with padamātrāvabhāsānaḥ. A crow is popularly supposed to have only one eye, which he shakes from one side of his head to the other when he would change the direction of his gaze. Hence the term kākāśinyāya for the construction āpi koinvō.

§ 3.2 L

K But [that variety of] dhvani where the passage from the literal to the suggested meaning is imperceptible shines forth in phonemes, words, etc., as well as in a sentence, in texture, and in a complete work.

L Having commented thus on the [first] Kārikā, he now proceeds to set forth in detail that variety [of dhvani] which was not included there, namely, where the passage from the literal to the suggested meaning is imperceptible:1 But [that variety], etc. The word “but” serves to contrast this variety with those treated above. A word is a collection of phonemes. A sentence is a collection of words. Texture is a property both of words and sentences. A complete work is a collection of connected sentences. It is with this in mind that the author of the Kārikā has listed phonemes, etc., in the order here given. The term “etc.” refers to parts of a word, groups of two words, etc. The locative in varnapadādīṣu is the locative of cause.2 The term “shines forth,” as it implies the illuminating of the entire poem, confirms the nature of dhvani to be a type of poetry, as [we have seen] before.

1. Note that in this sentence Abhinava writes as if the author of the Vṛtti were the same person as the author of the Kārikās. Contrast 3.1 Intr. L, note 5. 2. Wherever possible Abhinava wants to understand dhvani as “suggestive poetry,” rather than as “suggestion.” He is able to do so here by taking the locative according to Vārttika 6 on Pāṇ. 2.3.36 (carmāṇa dviṇīpaṃ hanti: one kills a leopard for its skin). Instead of meaning “dhvani (i.e., suggestion) shines forth in phonemes, words, etc.,” the Kārikā will mean, by Abhinava’s interpretation, “dhvani (i.e., suggestive poetry) shines forth
because of [skilfully employed] phonemes, words, etc." The locative in vākya, however, he will take differently; see 3.4 c L.

\[\text{§ 3.2 L}\]

A Lest one should hesitate in accepting this statement, feeling that phonemes are meaningless and therefore cannot suggest anything, the following is stated.

K The phonemes ś, ṣ, ḍh, and conjunct phonemes containing r, when used to excess, are hindrances in [the rasa of] love. These phonemes do not produce rasa [of that variety].

These same phonemes, when used in the rasa of loathing, [cru­elty,] etc., illumine their goal. Hence they do produce rasa [in those varieties].\(^1\)

1. In Kārikā 3 one must read te na separately; in 4 one must read tena as a single word. Rasacyut can only mean "dripping rasa"; cf. the similar compounds madacyut, madhucyut, etc. In other words, Abhinava's first explanation (see below) is the only one that can be justified by idiom. The varieties of harshness remarked on in these Kārikās pass unnoticed in so generally harsh a language as English, but they have often been noticed in more musical languages. For the effort to avoid sibilants in Latin, see Quintilian 9.4.37-38, for other harsh conjuncts ibid 11.3.35. The letter r was called by Persius (1.109) canina littera (the dog's letter) from its suggestion of a dog's growl. Both Latin and Sanskrit had a sharply trilled r.

A In this pair of slokas the suggestive power of phonemes has been shown by positive and negative [precept].
§ 3.3-4

L [Commentary on K:] When used to excess is to be construed with each [of the phonemes]. Thus one should explain as "where s is used to excess, [or where ś is used to excess," etc]. Conjunct phonemes in which r is predominant: e.g., kr, rhr, rdr. Are hindrances: the harsh alliteration\(^2\) is opposed to śrīgāra because these (te) phonemes when used to excess do not (na) emit, that is, do not let the rasa flow. Or, [we may interpret as follows:] therefore (tena), viz., because they are opposed to śrīgāra, the phonemes ś, ś, etc., fall off from rasa (rasāc cyavante), that is, do not suggest rasa. This is the negative precept. These same [phonemes]: viz., ś, etc. Their goal, viz., the rasa of loathing (bībhatśā), etc. Illumine: reveal or suggest.

[Commentary on A:] He explains the overall sense of the two Kārikās: In this pair of ślokas (ślokadyeyena). His avoidance of the dual form (ślokābhīyām) is to prevent our taking the expression by the principle of sequential ordering,\(^3\) for the negative precept is given by the first verse and the positive by the second.

The net result of the teaching here given is that a man who seeks to be a good poet should not use the phonemes ś, ś, etc., in that which is characterized as śrīgāra; and it is because of this negative result of the teaching that the author of the Kārikās places the negative precept first. The positive precept comes after in the form of a qualification that this usage is not always to be avoided but is permissible in such rasas as bībhatśā. The author of the Vṛtti, on the other hand, places the positive first in order to observe the custom of placing the word anvaya before the word vyatireka.\(^4\)

The following is meant. Although the cause of aesthetic pleasure (rasa) is the combined apprehension of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicāribhāvas,\(^5\) it is self-evident that the vibhāvas, etc., are conveyed by words of a given phonetic shape. Therefore even the particular character of phonemes, as soft, harsh, etc., which is grasped by the ear regardless of whether the meaning has been noticed at the time when they are heard, is helpful to the relishing of rasa. It is on this account, namely in order to convey the fact that phonemes are helpful, that the locative of cause was used [in 3.2 K] in the expression varṇapadaśadīṣu. It is not that rasa is suggested solely by phonemes, for we have said many times that aesthetic pleasure arises from a combination of the vibhāvas, etc. But phonemes have a nature of their own, grasped only by the ear, which does take part in producing the flow of aesthetic pleasure. They
are similar in this respect to the sounds of a song without words, or to the various notes (jāṭi), rhythms (karaṇa) and ghra, etc.\(^6\) of a drum, guitar, or the like.

1. By Abhinava’s addition of the word pradhāna, it would seem that he interprets the verse as a warning against conjuncts that contain a predominance of r’s, i.e., more than one r. If so, we should expect rkr instead of kr in the first example. But the combination rkr is not likely to occur in Sanskrit.

2. Parusā vṛtiḥ “harsh alliteration” is defined by Udbhaṭa, 1.4 Indurāja, 1.6 Vīrūti, as containing these phonemes. 3. If Ānanda had written slokābhyaṁ anvayavyatirekābhyaṁ ... darśitam, we would naturally take his meaning to be “it has been shown by these two verses, by the positive statement (of the first) and by the negative statement (of the second).”

4. The order anvaya-vyatireka is made obligatory by Pāṇ. 2.2.33. 5. See above, 1.18 L and note 20; also Introduction, p. 16. 6. Our text reads ghrādi; others read gharādi. We are ignorant of the meaning.

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A In the variety of dhvani where the passage from the literal to the suggested meaning is imperceptible, suggestiveness may also be present in a word, as in the following:

You were trembling; in your fear
the robe was slipping from your shoulders;
and you cast those eyes
helpless in all directions.
But the cruel fire, pitiless,
burned on with swift att
blinded by its smoke,
it destroyed you without seeing.

Mātrarāja, Tāpasavatsarājacakrīta 2.16\(^1\)

For in this verse it will be clear to sensitive readers that the word “those” (te) is full of rasa.
1. The verse gives the words of King Udayana, who wrongly believes his queen Väsavadattā to have perished in a palace fire. The situation has been dramatized in many plays but this particular verse is from the play of Mātra-rāja. In commenting on this verse as quoted by Mammata (7, ex. 187) Nāgęa Bhatta and others have erroneously ascribed it to the Rañṇavali. Some MSS follow this verse by another verse exemplifying the same suggestive use of the word fe. The extra verse, which is not commented on by L, begins jhagiti kanakacitre and is given by our text in a footnote to page 304. Its translation is as follows.

The moment the golden deer appeared,
my beloved’s eyes blossomed and sent forth those glances,
like blue waterlily petals ruffled in a breeze,
which as I remember them still burn my heart.

The words will be those of Rāma remembering Sītā.

L May also be present in a word: that is, may be present also when a word acts as a cause of the suggested sense. Thus the intention is as follows. Aesthetic pleasure comes [strictly speaking] only from the vibhāvas, etc. But when these vibhāvas, etc., being conveyed by some particular word, bring about a specially delightful relish (rasa-camatkāra), we ascribe the power [of suggestion] to the word alone.

For in this verse: this is the lament of Vatsarāja, in whom heavy sorrow is aroused by his hearing of the burning of Väsavadattā. And inasmuch as the sorrow has here arisen from the destruction of a beloved person, such gestures of that person as the motions of her eyebrows or her sidelong glances, which formerly made her an object of sexual desire—these very gestures as now recurring to his memory—give rise to tragedy (karuna), in which the sense of loss is absolute. This much is clear. Now, in the phrase “those eyes,” the word “those” (te) serves as the special cause of the tragic rasa by suggesting various memory-pictures of the qualities that her eyes possessed. qualities which are indescribable and which can only be felt by the speaker.

Thus, what a certain [commentator] has objected to and answered are both false. He objected that the word “those” cannot possess this power, since it must refer to something previously mentioned. His answer was that the speaker was under the influence of rasa [when he spoke]. Neither the objection nor the answer should ever have been raised. Where the relative yad has shown that a thing possesses a property that may occur together with some second property still to
be mentioned, there the word *tad* then shows the copresence [of that second property] with the first property that we still bear in mind. So the rule that "*yad* and *tad* must go together" refers to the anaphoric usage of *tad*. On the other hand, where the word *tad* is used to suggest a particular memory-picture induced by some cause, as in the phrase "that pot" [meaning the pot which I remember as having seen before], in such and similar expressions, the word *tad* has no reference whatever to anything mentioned previously. So enough of arguing with persons who think themselves learned but whose references are wrong.

By the words "trembling," etc., the speaker of the stanza imagines the symptoms (*anubhävas*) of the queen's fear. The thought that he has been unable to prevent [that fear] is a stimulus (*vibhäva*) of the sorrow which fills him. [He speaks of] casting "those" eyes, that is, eyes which, although they were always the unique abode of beauty-in-motion, were now helpless, finding no goal of sight in their terror and as if asking "Who will save me? Where is my husband?" That "those" eyes of hers should have been reduced to such a condition acts as a stimulant (*uddipana*) of the speaker's sorrow in an exceptional degree. "Cruel": such is the very nature [of fire] and cannot be helped. And yet, the fire was blinded by smoke and so was unable to see [the queen], for it is inconceivable that an informed agent should do such an improper deed. Thus the memory of the beauty of her eyes now acts as a stimulant of the sorrow which overwhelms the king. All this development of meaning is achieved by the presence of the word "those." In this manner [the suggestive power of particular words] should be explained in the case of other examples.

1. Abhinava is taking the locative word *pade* (Text, p. 304, line 1) as *ni ittasaptamī* rather than as expressing place where. See above, 3.2 L, note 1. 2. BhNS distinguishes tragedy (*karunarasa*) from love in separation (*vipralambhaśrīgāra*) by the fact that the emotion (*bhāva*) is absolute, unqualified (*nirapeksa*), whereas in *vipralambhaśrīgāra* the emotion is relative; its object is merely removed, not destroyed. 3. The commentator who is being criticized (presumably the Candrikākāra) based his criticism on the anaphoric use of the pronoun *tad* (its use as "picking up" the relative *yad*). 4. And hence apparently unable to remember grammatical requirements. The remark is historically interesting, as it shows that the Candrikā-kāra still held to the old conception of *rasa* as simply a heightened form of *bhāva*. See Introduction, p. 18 and footnote 29. 5. For the expression *anuṭhānopahata* see 2.4 L., note 40. 6. The passage becomes more lucid if we read *anüddesiyamāna*, as BP suggests, in place of *anüddisiyamāna*. In the sentence *yo vidvān*
sa püjyaḥ, "he who is learned is worthy of honor," the relative pronoun yo shows the man's possession of the property vidvattva to be combinable with some second property. This second property turns out to be püjyatva. The anaphoric pronoun sa shows püjyatva to be something copresent with the vidvattva that we still bear in mind. See also 3.161 L, note 3. 7. The appearance of recollections is always due to some cause, such as the experience of something similar to or something in some way connected with the recollection.

A  The suggestion may arise through a part of a word [e.g., through a single component of a compound word], as in the following.

Her face was bowed in shyness
   in the presence of our elders
and she forced back the grief
   that gave motion to her breast.
But did not the mere corner of her eye,
   lovelier than a startled deer's,
somehow, as it dropped a tear,
tell me not to go?1

Here the component tribhāga ("corner")2 [in the compound netra-tri-tribhāga ("eye-corner") is suggestive].

1. The verse is ascribed by Śāṅk. 3464 to "Eye-corner" Brahmayasasvin, as though the poet had taken his sobriquet from this verse. In SüktiM. 43.21 the verse is given as anonymous (kasyāpi). One may supply a context in which a husband tells his friend of the difficulty in taking leave of his young bride to go on some journey. 2. The literal meaning of tribhāga is "a third." A "third of the eye," as Jacobi notes in his translation of the present passage, implies the pupil of the eye. But what is precisely meant is the pupil in a position at the corner of the eye, as in a sidelong glance. It is this meaning that gives suggestiveness to the element in the present verse. If so small a fraction of a remembered trait could tell the speaker of his bride's love, how great must be his pain in separation from her.
The component "corner": The speaker remembers how she looked at him, despite the presence of their elders, with a sweet glance that contained yearning, grief, and despair. The recollection serves as a stimulant of the grief of separation, caused by a journey, of persons who cannot live without each other. This stimulation is made clear by the presence of the word element "corner."

1. The reading of the Kashi edition -garvamantharam makes very little sense. We have preferred the KM reading (also accepted by Badarínāth Šarmā) -garbhamadhuram, and have so translated.

2. Paraspakṣetukatvapraṇa seems to mean that each one is the cause of the sustenance of the other's life, i.e., if one should die, so would the other.

A Where the passage to the suggested meaning is imperceptible, dhvani having the form of a sentence is of two sorts, being either pure, or mixed with a figure of speech. Of these, the pure type is exemplified in the verse from the Rāmābhuyudaya "though with feigned anger." For the sentence taken as a whole shows how the love [of Rāma and Śītā] for each other has reached full bloom and so reveals the perfect essence of rasa.

1. The complete verse is given below by Abhinava. The lost play Rāmābhuyudaya was written by Yaśovarman, the eighth-century king of Kanauj and patron of Vākpatirāja and Bhavabhūti.

L Having the form of a sentence: the term is expressed in the nominative in order to show that the sentence and the dhvani are coextensive. For while the suggested meaning appears when phonemes, words, or components are present [as special causes], that meaning appears [over a greater area than theirs] as running throughout the whole verse, for it takes its life from the combination of vibhāvas, [anubhāvas, and vyabhicāribhāvas]. Thus it is that phonemes, etc., are
merely subsidiary causes of dhvani where the passage from literal to suggested is imperceptible, but the sentence is not a subsidiary cause, merely helpful like the phonemes, etc., but is engaged in conveying the whole complex of vibhavas, etc., and so appears as wholly made up of rasa or the like.\(^2\) Accordingly, where 3.2 \(K\) says [that the suggested meaning may] “appear in a sentence,” the word \(väkye\) (“in a sentence”) is not to be interpreted as a mere locative of cause but rather as a locative [of place] having the sense that this type of dhvani can occur in no other area.

The pure type, that is, unmixed with any figure of speech [is as follows].

> Although with feigned anger,
> with tears and with despairing glances,
> my mother sought to hold you back,
> you followed me in exile out of love,
> who now, without you, gaze upon
> the horizon black with its new clouds:
> how hard this shows your lover’s heart
> to be, my love, that he still lives!

_Yaśovarman, Rāmābhyyudaya_

Her following him despite his mother’s seeking to hold her back in these various ways shows that she disobeyed the command of a parent out of the depth of her love. The collocation of “your lover” and “my love” expresses the basic emotion (sthāyibhāva) of love where each of the lovers is the very life of the other. “New clouds” shows that Rāma is gazing at the clouds of the monsoon season which he has never before endured [in the absence of Sītā] and so expresses a stimulant (uddīpanavidhāva) of love-in-separation. In the phrase “still lives” (jivaty eva) the particle “still” (eva) by its expressing a qualification prevents the appearance of tragedy.\(^3\)

Taken as a whole: the sense is that no one word reveals the rasa more than another. Essence of rasa: the essence, that is, of love-in-separation (vipralambhaśrīṛgāra).

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1. If the Vṛtti had said \(väkye dhvaniḥ\) “suggestion occurring in a sentence,” one might take the sentence to be merely a special cause of the suggestion, just as “in a word” and “in a component part” were taken in that sense (nimittasaapati) by Abhinava in the foregoing comment on Kārikā 3.2.
2. “Or the like” refers to rasābhāsa, bhāva, bhūvābhāsa. 3. If the verse pictures Rāma and Sītā as never to meet again, its effect will be tragedy
karūṇā). If it is felt that they will meet again, its effect will be the sad variety of the erotic (vipralambhaṣrṅgāra); see § 3.4a L, note 2. Abhinava here argues that the statement that Rāma still lives implies that the lovers will meet again; for otherwise Rāma surely would have died. One may of course challenge his interpretation. It is true that Rama will meet Sītā again. But Rāma, as pictured in this verse, does not know this; only the audience knows. And Abhinava has said (p. 107 = Text p. 79, line 1) that paurvāparyavimarśa is not relevant to the immediate aesthetic impact on the reader. That is why, as he explains, Rāvaṇa's love for Sītā is a case of śṛṅgāra, not of hāsa, although ultimately it becomes hāsa as the love is not shared. By analogy a case might well be made for assigning the present verse to tragedy.

A. The type that is mixed with a figure of speech may be exemplified by such a verse as “carried together by the flooding river of passion.”¹ for in this verse the rasa, [viz., love-in-separation] is strongly manifested and is adorned with metaphor following the rules laid down above [viz., in 2.18] concerning the suggestor.

1. The verse, from the Amaruśataka, is given in full by Abhinava below.

We have seen lovers carried together by the flooding river of passion. who find the flood to be blocked by a dam in the form of their parents. When forced, with desire unfilled, to stand frozen as in a painting, they still drink of each other's love through the lily stems of their eyes.

Narasimha (Subhā. 2057 = Amaru 104)

With metaphor: passion is the flood of a new river, that is, a monsoon freshet, because it has swollen up suddenly. "Carried together" by this, that is, brought face to face without having so planned it. Thereupon their parents (guravah). mother-in-law and the rest, act as dams
by blocking the flood of their desire. \(^1\) [There is also a pun here, for] the dams are heavy (puravah), that is, impassable. The will [of the lovers] is thereby blocked and so they stand “with desire unfilled.” However, interchanging their persons as they face each other, with limbs as it were painted because devoid of all motion in their bodies, they pass their time in the strategem of mixing slender glances of mutual longing, tasting the relish of each other’s longing which is brought to them by the lily stems which are their eyes.

Now it may be noticed that the metaphor is not made complete, for the lovers have not been identified with a pair of wild geese or cakravāka birds or the like, for such birds are accustomed to play at drinking water from a single lily stem. \(^2\) That is why our author speaks of the rules laid down above. For it was said above “the intention must be keep them [viz., the figures of speech] subordinate and [they] should never be oversustained” [2.18 K]. “Adorned”: by the ornamentation of the vibhāvas the rasa is also adorned.

1. In India it is considered unseemly for young married couples to kiss and fondle one another in the presence of their parents and in-laws. Thus the verse does not imply, as an English reader might at first take it, any opposition on the part of the parents to the relationship between the young people. The obstruction is merely to overt gestures. 2. Sanskrit poetry is full of references to the monogamous affection of shelldrakes (cakravākas) and wild geese (hamsas). A common picture is of a pair of such birds nibbling at the two ends of a nalini, the long stem of the water lily which descends below the surface of a pond. Now the eyes of the lovers have the shape and dark color of water lily buds. Their mutual glance is likened to a lily stem. They drink rasa just as the birds drink the water contained in the stem. Thus the poet could have completed, or elaborated, his metaphor by likening the lovers to such birds. But he did not.

\[\text{§ 3.5 Introduction A}\]

It has been said [in 3.2 K] that the variety of suggestive poetry where the passage from the literal to the suggested meaning is imperceptible may shine forth in texture (saṅghaṭanā). So it is here necessary first to define the nature of texture.
K Texture has been said to be of three sorts: lacking in compounds, having compounds of medium length, and having long compounds.

A “Has been said,” that is, by certain [critics].¹ After simply inducing the reader [of this definition],² the following is stated.

1. Presumably, then, Kārikā 3.5 is a quotation, but it is not known from whom. The term saṅghataṇā is not used by the early critics, who use rasanā or rīti instead. On the evidence of Abhinava’s comment on 3.6 it appears that Udbhata used the term. He may have been the first to use it and the present Kārikā is possibly a quotation from him. 2. In other words the definition will be accepted without criticism or discussion.

L In Texture: the word saṅghataṇāyām is [an abstract noun] formed [from the verb saṅghaṭ- “to put together”] with an abstract suffix [viz., yuc = ana]. The form is locative of cause, like the forms of varṇa, etc.¹ Has been said: viz., in 3.2 K. To define: that is, to determine how it differs from the qualities.

K This, standing in dependence on the qualities (gunaṁ āśrītya tiṣṭhanti) such as sweetness, manifests the rasas. The principle by which it is regulated is that it must be appropriate to the speaker and to what is said.
A This texture, standing in dependence on the qualities, manifests the rasas, etc.¹ Now in this matter² one can imagine two main positions: (1) that texture and the qualities are one; or (2) that they are different. And if they are different, two further views are possible: (2a) that texture depends on the qualities; or (2b) that the qualities depend on texture. Now if we accept the position of unity, or the view that the qualities depend on texture, the meaning of the verse will be that texture, depending on qualities that are its own self, or on qualities that reside in it, manifests the rasas. But if we accept the position of difference and within that position the view that texture depends on the qualities, then texture, standing in dependence on the qualities, will be by nature subordinated to the qualities but will not be identical with them.

1. By adding “etc.” the Vṛtti shows that rasābhāsa, bhāva, and bhāvabhāsa are to be included. 2. The long and complicated commentary which follows is motivated by Ānanda’s desire to justify his very different view of texture from that of the older poetics. Bhāmaha (2.1–2) implies that the guṇas of a poem depend on the degrees of word compounding in the texture. Vāmana states explicitly (1.2.7–8) that the guṇas are special properties of the texture (which he calls riti). Udbhata, according to Abhinava and others (see 3.6 L, note 2), states that the guṇas are properties of the texture (saṅghaṭana); and a property both resides in and is dependent on the substance in which it resides. So the older view was that the guṇas depend on texture. Ānanda shows (in 3.6 a A) that this older view fails to accord with the facts of literature. His own view of guṇa and texture is radically different. In Ānanda’s view the guṇas reside in the rasas. The śrīgāraraśa is sweet (has sweetness), the raudraraśa is strong. The guṇas are not related to the texture in this way. The texture, since its purpose is to manifest rasa, may rather be said to depend on the guṇas. Abhinava points out that “depending on” (āśritya) is here used in a different sense from the sense which it bears in the older view. Ānanda does not mean that a given texture resides in a guṇa; he means that it follows the lead of, is subordinate to, operates for the sake of, a guṇa. The Vṛtti is complicated by its examining other views, notably the guṇasaṅghaṭanaśrayapakṣa or view that texture and guṇas may be identical (3.6 e A). The conclusion of the Vṛtti is that on either view, Ānanda’s or that of identity, some regulation of the use of the various textures must be given. That rule is furnished by the second half of the present Kārikā: the texture must be appropriate both to the speaker and to the content (rasa or otherwise) of what is said. Thus, Ānanda accomplishes his underlying purpose of
subordinating the old concept of texture (rīti or saṅghatāṇā) as well as the old concept of the gunas to his new concept of rasas which must be suggested. See Introduction p. 21.

L [Commentary on K:] “The rasas” forms the initial word of the second half verse. The whole second half reads as follows: “the rasas. The principle by which it is regulated is that it must be appropriate to the speaker and to what is said.”

[Commentary on A:] The Vṛttikāra shows that the plural inflection of the word rasān is meant to include similar entities: the rasas, etc. Now in this matter, i.e., in regard to [what is said in] the first half of the verse, it is possible to imagine, or to explain, these various matters by means of alternatives, which he states: that texture and qualities are one, etc. He shows how three possible views can be explained: Now if we accept the position of unity, etc.

That are its own self: To show the exact nature of a thing we often use an expression which refers to it as the basis of some entity hypothetically distinguished from it, as when we say that the property of tree-ness belongs to a simśupa.1 Which reside in it: According to Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa and others the qualities are properties of texture;2 and the generally accepted view is that properties depend on their property-possessor.

Will be subordinate to the qualities: in this case the expression “depends on” will not refer to a physical relation of superstratum and substratum (ādhārādheyabhāva).3 For the texture does not reside physically in the qualities. So the sense is similar to what is intended when we say that the estates are based on the king, meaning that the ministers and the like are appropriate to that [kingdom] on which the king is based. Thus we arrive at the sense that texture is by nature subordinate to, is at the mercy of, looks up to, the qualities.

1. A simśupa is a tree. But in order to show this point clearly, we hypothesize as different from it a property tree-ness, which we then say belongs to the simśupa. So in the case at issue. According to one theory, a given quality, strength, consists in (and so is really one with) the texture of long compounds. But we may bring out its nature with clarity by saying that the texture of long compounds belongs to the quality strength. 2. The view is attributed to Udbhaṭa also by the Ratnaprabhā, which comments on the words of the Pratāparudriya, saṅghatāṇāśrayā gunāḥ (p. 245, lines 2–3 = Section 7, lines 9–10) by stating Udbhaṭamatenoktam eva. Presumably Udbbaṭa
expressed this view in his lost Bhāmahavivarana. In his only preserved work he has no occasion to speak of gunas or texture, as he is concerned only with figures of speech. 3. Ādhārādheyabhāva is the relation that obtains between property and substance, part and whole, etc.

A Now what is the point is raising these various possibilities? It is this. If texture and qualities are one (1), or if the qualities depend on texture (2b), we shall be forced into the untenable position that the qualities, like texture, have no fixed rules of usage. [It is an untenable position,] because, of the qualities, we know that a high degree of sweetness (mādhurya) and clarity (prasāda) is limited to the area of tragedy and love-in-separation and that strength (ojas) belongs to fury (raudra), wonder (adbhuta), and the like. Furthermore, sweetness and clarity are found only in the area of rasa, bhāva, rasābhāsa, and bhāvabhāsa. Thus the sphere of the qualities is regulated. But this breaks down in the case of texture. Thus we find the texture of long compounds in the area of love as well [as in the area of fury] and uncompounded texture in the area of fury [as well as in love]. Of these [irregularities] an example of the texture of long compounds in love is:

mandhāra-kusuma-reṇu-piṇjaritālakā
with locks engoldened by the pollen
of the flowers of Paradise;

or such a verse as:

anavarta-nayana-jala-lava-nipuna-parimusita-patralekham te, etc.

Who would not grieve, fair lady, to see your face
supported by your open hand
as the ever dropping tears
rob it of its painted ornament?

In similar disagreement, the uncompounded texture is found in examples of fury such as:

Whatever man proud of his strong arm.

Accordingly, the qualities are not one with the textures, nor are they dependent on the textures.
Like texture: because in the first view, since qualities and texture are held to be one, they will be equivalent in all respects, while in the other view (2b), because the qualities are held to be properties of the texture. Suppose that there are indeed no fixed rules of usage. With this in mind, he says, because, of the qualities, etc. The word "because" here has the sense of "but." 1 On the one hand, this does not square with the facts [because the qualities are in fact regulated], while on the other hand, it is forced upon us by logic [if we accept either of these two views]. This: this regulation that has been laid down for the qualities. He now sets forth examples from the literature to prove that such is the case: Thus.

By saying "we find," he has let us know that there are places where this may be observed. This lays the ground for [his furnishing] an example: Of these. Lest some one object that there is no śrīgāra in this example, 2 he gives a second example: or such as. This is the speech of a lover for the purpose of placating his beloved who is angry over a love-quarrel. Accordingly: that is to say, these two views do not fit with the Kārikā.

1. See 2.18–19c L, note 4. Abhinava's interpretation comes to the same result as ours, but is less literal. 2. Śrīgāra is produced by a combination of vābhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicāribhāvas. In the first example, as it is only the fragment of a verse, we are given only the ālambhanavābhāva.

Now if the qualities do not depend on texture, on what do they depend? The answer has already been given [in the Second Chapter]: "Whatever depends on the predominant sense should be regarded as qualities. On the other hand, whatever depends on the non-predominant sense should be considered as ornaments (figures of speech), just like bracelets, etc" [2 6 K].

Or we can even let the qualities depend on words [rather than the sense of the words]. They will still not be on a par with alliteration and
the like. For alliteration and the like are properties of words regardless of the meaning of the words, whereas qualities are the properties of words capable of expressing a primary sense which gives rise to a certain suggested meaning. These qualities can be called properties of words although they really depend elsewhere, just as heroism and the like are said to depend on the body [as the body is the place where they are manifested].

On what do they depend: what he has in mind is that it has already been remarked on by previous [critics] that if they depend on words and meanings, they would differ in no way from figures of speech. Has already been given: viz., by the author of the Kārikās.

Or: This alternative is possible because it does not follow from the fact that two things depend on [i.e., reside in] the same base that they are identical. If it did, the color [of an object] and its contact [with some other object] would be identical. If you object that the contact requires a second object [and so does not, strictly speaking, rest on the same base as the color], the same may be said of the point at issue: the quality requires [in addition to its word base] a literal meaning [of that word] that may help it to a suggested sense. But this is not really my [i.e., the Vṛttikāra’s] point of view. I would merely let the qualities be the property of words according to the opinion of those who do not make clear distinctions, just as they take heroism and the like to be the properties of the body. For the man who does not make clear distinctions is unable to distinguish between primary and metaphorical usage. Still, there will be no fault. This is what I intended by my remark.

So he says they can be called properties of words. The sense of although they really depend elsewhere is: although they really belong to the soul.

1. Its base comprises two objects whereas the color base is one obj
2. I.e., to the rasa in the case of the poetic guṇas. to the jīvātman in the c of heroism, etc.
Now it may be objected that if the qualities depend on words, it will follow that they are identical with texture, or that they depend on texture. For words that are untextured (asariṅghaṭita, i.e., not structured into a sentence) cannot be the basis of the qualities, because such words cannot express qualities, which depend on rasa and the like, since rasa and the like are conveyed by specific meanings [viz., the vibhāvas, etc., not by the general meanings that belong to words taken individually].

But this objection does not hold, because it has been shown that rasa and the like can be suggested through phonemes and words. Or, if we admit that sentences suggest rasa and the like, we need not admit that these sentences depend by rule on any particular texture. One may thus say that the base of the qualities consists only of words, words that are untextured [i.e., free to belong to any one of the three textures] so long as they are accompanied by some particular suggestive meaning.

Depend on words: if, metaphorically speaking, the qualities reside in words, the conclusion will be as follows. The quality sweetness (mādhurya) is the capacity of words to convey a literal sense which [in its turn] suggests such rasas as love; and that capacity of words can be attained only by a specific texture. It follows that the texture is nothing separate [from the words]. Rather, it is textured words to which this capacity belongs. This amounts to saying that this capacity [to express the rasa of love, etc.] depends on texture. Such would be the conclusion.

But let the guṇas be properties of the words, or even identical with the words. What need is there to bring in texture? Anticipating this response, the objector continues: For words that are untextured cannot, etc. The rasas, bhāvas, and the false varieties and cessations of rasa and bhāva are suggested when they are conveyed by specific meanings [i.e., the vibhāvas, etc.], not by the general senses of individual words¹ unconnected with one another. Even metaphorically speaking, untextured words cannot be the basis of qualities dependent on, or

¹ Note: The superscript numeral indicates a footnote or an annotation typically found in a book or academic text.
strictly speaking residing in, these rasas and the like. The reason for this is because such words cannot express, etc. For untextured words cannot express a literal meaning which is syntactically complete and therefore useful to the production of a suggested meaning. This is the sense.

He now refutes [the foregoing objection]: But this objection does not hold. For just as it has been said that a phoneme can suggest a rasa, just so can a word, without expressing any meaning, suggest sweetness, which becomes the manifestor of a rasa, by the beauty that results from the mere hearing of it, as in the case of the phoneme. What need is there for texture? And just as it has been said that dhvani may be manifested by words, just so may a separate [unstructured] word, by its reminding us of its [general] sense, reveal a meaning capable of suggesting rasa. And this [meaning] in itself is sweetness. Here again what use is there of texture?

Now it may be objected that at least in that variety of dhvani which is manifested by the sentence it will be necessary to introduce texture, for without it how could the sentence or how could its literal meaning have any beauty? With this objection in mind, he says: Or, if we admit. The word “or” is used in the sense of “also” and should be construed with the word vākyavyānyatvē. This is as much as to say: bring in texture; we make no objection to its presence. But a specific texture is not the base of, nor one with, sweetness, for sweetness and the like exist without it wherever rasa and the like are suggested by phonemes and single words. It follows that where rasa and the like are suggested by a sentence, it is the sentence, independently of any given texture, that suggests rasa and that the texture, although present, is needless for suggesting rasa. Hence, even if we speak metaphorically, the qualities depend only on words, [not on texture]. He states this conclusion by saying, only of words, etc.

1. The objector is following the Mīmāṃsā theory that the individual word denotes a general or class character. See 1.4 b L, note 2.
2. I.e., the meaning intended is abhyupgate vākyavyānyatvē 'pi: "if it is also admitted that rasa and the like can be suggested by sentences."
A Objection: "We can understand that this might be the case as far as sweetness is concerned, but we cannot understand that strength does not depend on words as set in a particular texture. Because a texture without compounds could never serve as the basis of strength." This objection too we are not unwilling to answer, if your mind is not spoiled by habitual acceptance of what is commonly believed. Why should a texture without compounds not be a basis for strength? After all, it has already been shown [2.9 L] that strength is just another name for the excitement of a poem conveying the rasa of fury and the like. What fault is there if strength is expressed in a texture without compounds and sensitive readers find no lack of beauty therein? Accordingly, there is nothing wrong with saying that qualities depend upon words that are not regulated by any particular texture. But these qualities will not stray from their own field any more than will the eye, etc., relate to a sense object which is not their own (e.g., the eye will not hear sounds). Therefore the qualities are one thing and texture is another. Nor are the qualities dependent on texture. This is one view.

L Objection: some [commentators] say that this objection is concerned only with dhvani suggested by sentences. But we would say that in strength, which is the special character of the rasas fury and the like, even when this strength is suggested by a phoneme or a word, its special beauty does not really blossom in the individual phonemes and words until they are given the mark of texture. And so we would take the objection as a general one. Conveying: the present participle (by Pāṇ. 3.2.126) expresses characteristic or cause. Here the sense is that strength is characterized by the conveying of fury and the like.¹ And [sensitive readers]: the word "and" has the sense of "for." What he means is that since there is no lack of beauty in "Whatever man proud of his strong arm" [see 2.9 A and 3.6 a A], it therefore follows, etc. By these: these qualities. Their own: the field [of love] has been restricted [to sweetness] by the statement: "it is just śṛṇgāra that is the sweetest and most delightful flavor" [2.7 K].
§ 3.6 e A ]

1. Abhinava does not express his meaning clearly. Prakāśayataḥ actually agrees with kāvyasya, not with ojas. But presumably he identifies the two: the strength of a poem which conveys rasa is a strength which conveys rasa. His meaning is that from the conveying of fury, etc., we can infer the strength of the poem. This is on the analogy of the stock example of Pāṇ. 3.2.126: śayānā bhūnjate yavanāḥ “the Greeks eat lying down.” From the knowledge that someone eats lying down we can infer that he is a Greek.

A Or let us consider [another view, namely] that the qualities are one with texture. But it was said earlier that [if they are one,] the qualities, like texture, would have no fixed rules of usage, for in literature we find irregularities [in the correlation of texture and rasa]. The reply to this is that when in literature we find an irregularity in a sphere that we have circumscribed, we should regard it as an aberration (virūpa). If you ask how it is that sensitive readers nonetheless find beauty in such instances, our reply is: because the aberration is concealed by the poet’s skill (sakti). For a poetic fault is of two kinds: it may be due to the poet’s lack of mature judgment (avyutpatti) or it may be due to his lack of skill. A fault that is due to lack of mature judgment may be concealed by the poet’s skill and so never be noticed. But a fault that is due to the poet’s lack of skill will appear immediately. The following sloka will give support to our position: “If a poet commits a fault out of lack of mature judgment, it may be concealed by his skill. But if the fault is due to lack of skill, it will immediately appear.”

And so it is that the impropriety of a great poet, such as his well-known writing of the sexual enjoyment of the highest gods, does not appear as vulgarity because it is concealed by his skill. An example is the description of Śiva’s enjoyment of Pārvatī in the Kumārasambhava.¹ That the charge of impropriety cannot be cancelled in such cases² has been shown in what follows [3.10–14 b A]. But it will appear in conclusion by positive and negative examples that this fault can be concealed by poetic skill. That is why, if a poet devoid of this skill were to describe this type of love in the area of such actors, his work would
clearly appear faulty. But if we adopt this view [that texture and qualities are one], what lack of beauty can we find in such such a stanza as “Whatever man proud of his strong arm”? The answer is that we may hypothesize a lack of beauty which is not perceived because it is concealed by skill.\(^3\)

1. The reference is to the Eighth Canto, of which there is no good reason to doubt Kālidāsa’s authorship. While the general meaning is clear, the exact wording and interpretation of Ānanda’s text are in doubt. In the BP text, which we have adopted, it would also be possible to break the compound as uttama-devatā-avīṣaya; "(sexual enjoyment,) which is an improper area in dealing with the highest gods." Compare Abhinava’s analogy nirvedāparākramasya purusasyāṅsyaye ‘pi. Furthermore, Dr. Krishnamoorthy has reported from his Moodabidre MS the reading uttamedevatāviṣayaprati-
siddhasambhogaśrīgāra: “such as his writing of sexual enjoyment, which is forbidden in the case of the highest gods.”

2. 2. auctityatyāgās (MB MS, Krishnamoorthy) gives better sense than auctityatyāgās (Kashi ed.).

3. The quoted stanza fails to use long compounds to express the rasa of fury. Accordingly, since the quality strength (which by tradition is to be expressed by long compounds) belongs to fury, if quality and texture are the same, the stanza breaks the rules. I have long puzzled over this passage before deciding to adopt the interpretation suggested by the punctuation of the Kashi text and the specific direction of BP, which states that nanu kim acārutvam is an objection, to which apratiyamānam evaṁropayāmahaḥ is the answer. By so interpreting we are forced to recognize the gunasāṃghatanaikya theory as an alternative acceptable to Ānanda. My chief reason for accepting such a conclusion is that Ānanda uses the hypothesis of “fault hidden by skill” in 3.10–14 b A as though he approved of it. The reader will do well, however, to consider carefully a very different interpretation proposed by Badarinātha Sarmā in his Sanskrit commentary, p. 272. The whole gunasāṃghatanaikypākṣa, he says, is wrong and is not accepted by Ānanda. He interprets the present passage as follows. “But if we adopt this view [that texture and the qualities are one], will we [be willing to] superimpose on such a stanza as “Whatever man proud of his right arm” some wholly unperceived lack of beauty?” He goes on to say, “To hypothesize wilfully a lack of beauty in this stanza, when this lack is not perceived even by connoisseurs, is grossly unreasonable (mahīṣasy anupapattih). Accordingly, this view [of the identity of quality and texture] is wrong.”

L Or [let us], etc. What he has in mind is that the power of words to manifest rasa consists in their being textured in some particular fashion. Skill: the word śakti (lit., “power”) means pratibhāna
(imagination or skill), the ability to make new presentations of everything one wishes to describe. Mature judgment (vyutpatti) is skill in the careful weighing (pūrvāparaparāmarśa) of all that may be helpful to such [presentation]. His lack of skill: that is, the poet's. Impropropriety: the most important point in [producing] rasa is to avoid any disturbance of delight to those who are relishing it, because rasa is wholly tied to this relishing. Now treating the sexual enjoyment of the highest gods is like treating that of our parents. Shame and horror will leave us no room for delight. This is his meaning. Because it is concealed by his skill: for even sexual enjoyment is there so described by the imaginative poet that our heart fixes on the description itself without any careful weighing of the context, just as when a man of unimpeachable valor is engaged in a battle, even if it be in a wrong cause, we give him our bravos at that moment, but not later when we weigh the matter carefully. Such is our author's meaning. Has been shown: he uses the past tense because the passage is by the author of the Kārikas, for it will be stated that "for the spoiling of rasa there is no cause other than impropriety" [3.10-14 a A]. Is not perceived: that is, not even by those well-trained, who weigh matters carefully.

1. We are not convinced of the justice of this interpretation, however artistically Abhinava has phrased it. Ānanda says nothing about subsequent compunction. He says only that the impropriety is tiraskṛta, concealed, or more literally, set aside, by the poet's skill. Nor do we find that those who have once loved the Eighth Canto of the Kumārasambhava ever reverse their opinion of its beauty. Those critics who are shocked by its impropriety were doubtless shocked at their first reading. 2. This is an extraordinary statement, for the quoted passage is not a Kārikā. Nowhere else does Abhinava ascribe one of the saṅgraha-slokas, or the parikara- or saṅksepa-slokas, to the Kārikākāra. If one is to distinguish the Kārikākāra from the Vṛttikāra, the śloka here indicated (3.10-14 a A) must be ascribed either to the Vṛttikāra or to some extraneous author. If the śloka in question were a kārikā, the Vṛttikāra would have commented on it. I can only suppose that Abhinava's eagerness to justify the past tense of darśitam has led him into confusion.
A So, whether we suppose that texture and qualities are one or that they are different, we shall need some other determinant of the correct use of texture. Accordingly, the Kārikā goes on to say: "The principle by which it is regulated is that it must be appropriate to the speaker and to what is to be said (vācyā)."

1. Other than the rule which says that heavily compounded texture, as identical with strength, is productive of the rasa of fury.

L Or that they are different: if the two are different, there will be no principle for regulating the texture, while if they are one, the rasas cannot furnish the regulation. So some other principle must be given.

The principle by which it is regulated, etc.: this forms the remaining portion of the Kārikā [3.6].

1. Because we see that the same type of texture can be used for quite different rasas.

A Of the two factors, the speaker may be the poet or a character invented by the poet. If the latter, he may be devoid of rasa and bhāva, or he may be possessed of rasa and bhāva. The rasa may belong to the hero of the story, or to his rival. The hero of the story may be brave and noble (dhirodātta), or may belong to one of the other categories of heroes. Then too there are primary and secondary [heroes]. All these distinctions are possible. What is to be said (vācyā) may be subsidiary to true rasa, which is the soul of dhvani, or it may be subsidiary to false or unconventional rasa (rasabhāsa). Its meaning may be dramatically representable or not. It may be concerned with upper class characters, or with others. Thus there are many varieties [of both speaker and content].
1. It is perfectly clear that Ānanda is here using rasa in its old sense of a particularly vivid emotion (bhāva), especially of love, not in the new sense established by Abhinava, of aesthetic delight. See Introduction, pp. 18–19.

$L$ The hero of the story, called the näyaka (leader) because he leads the story in the sense of subordinating it to his own activity, is he who enjoys the reward at the conclusion. Brave and noble, etc.: a brave and noble hero is most notably heroic in justice and righteous war; a brave and arrogant hero (dhīrodhata) is notable for heroism and fury; a brave and amorous hero (dhīralalita) is noted for heroism and love; a brave and spiritually calm hero (dhīraprāśānta) is noted for heroic generosity and justice and for his spiritual calm. These four types of hero are for the most part represented by the sātvati, ārabhati, kaisikī, and bhāratī modes of gesture and speech (vṛtti) respectively. Primary refers to the main hero, secondary to the secondary hero. Distinctions: differences of speaker.

What is to be said (vācyā): here "subsidiary to true rasa" means being a manifestor of this rasa which is the soul, that is, the very nature, of dhvani. [As vācyā has also the more technical sense of "primary meaning," Abhinava now seeks to justify Ānanda's statement if the word is taken in that sense.] A primary sense (vācyā) of dramatically representable meaning (abhineyārtha) is one where meaning in its suggested form, that is, the very nature of dhvani, can be brought (neya) into (ābhimukhyam) almost direct representation through speech, gesture, inner symptoms, and costume. This is what is called [by Bharata] the goal of poetry (kāvyārtha). It alone is susceptible of enactment. As the sage [Bharata] has said in several places in such words as, "The bhāvas produce (bhāvayanti) the goals (or meanings) of poetry (kāvyārtha) with their accompaniment of speech, gesture, and inner symptoms." But as the primary sense (vācyo 'rthaḥ) in the form of the vibhāvas, etc., is acted out in the course of enacting the rasas, it is quite proper to speak of the primary sense (vācyā) as having a [further, suggested] sense that is dramatically representable (abhineyārtha). We should not speak here of vyapadesivaddhāva as others have done. Others: that is, it may be concerned with middle class or lower class characters.

1. These four vṛttayah are described BhNS 20.8ff. They are not there associated with the different types of hero, which are listed BhNS 24 17. But
the first three associations are natural enough. The sātvati is the heroic mode par excellence, the arābhati is the mode of violence, and the kaisākī the graceful, delicate mode. The bhārati is more difficult to characterize and is usually limited to speech, not gesture. For the history of the modes in criticism see V. Raghavan, JOR 6 346–370 and 7.34–52, 91–112. In what follows Kāmkā 3.33 will refer briefly to the modes. Vṛtti in this sense is to be distinguished from vṛtti as a type of alliteration (see 1.1 a A, note 4) 2. Inner symptoms (sattva): what is meant are the sāttvikābhāvas, e.g., blushing, perspiration, etc. 3. BhNS, prose preceding 7.1. We know of no other statement to this effect in BhNS. 4. Abhinava's point is that it is only the suggested meaning, the rasas and the like, that are really abhineya (to be dramatically represented). But it is justifiable to speak of the primary, literal sense as abhineya because it forms an ever-associated part of the process. 5. For vyapadesīvābbhāva, see Paribhāṣenduśekhara 30. It is a grammatical technique by which one treats a linguistic element that lacks some particular mark as if it were an element which bears that mark. The following is a non-linguistic example. The demon Rāhu consists only of a head, but we speak of rāhoh āryas “the head of Rāhu,” placing rāhoh in the genitive case as if Rāhu, like other beings, possessed a head. In the case at issue, some commentator(s) previous to Abhinava interpreted vācyam in vācyam abhineyārtham by this principle. The vācyam (primary meaning), they must have said, is nothing other than the abhineyārthah (the dramatically representable meaning). But in the grammatical analysis yasya artho 'bhineyas tad vācyam it appears in the genitive, as if distinct. Abhinava solves the difficulty by saying that the dramatically representable meaning is not the literal meaning but the suggested meaning to which the literal meaning leads.

A Among these cases, when the poet as speaker is devoid of rasa and bhāva, the type of structure (racanā) is optional. The same holds when the speaker is a character invented by the poet and is without rasa and bhāva. But when the speaker, either the poet himself or a character invented by him, is possessed of rasa and bhāva, and when the rasa, from its being the predominant element, forms the soul of dhvani, then, by necessity,1 only the uncompounded texture or the texture employing compounds of medium length can be used. But in the rasas of tragedy and love-in-separation [the restriction is greater and] only
the uncompounded texture [is allowed]. Why is this? Our answer is, that when a rasa is set forth as primarily important, one should do one's very best to avoid anything that interferes with or opposes the perception of it. As compounds can be interpreted in many ways, a texture of long compounds sometimes interferes with our perception of the rasa. Accordingly, in passages of rasa, the frequent use of this texture spoils the effect, especially in drama and, in other forms of literature, especially when the rasa is tragedy or love-in-separation, for these are very delicate rasas where the slightest lack of clarity delays our understanding of the words and meaning. On the other hand, when other rasas are being presented, such as fury, a texture of medium length compounds and sometimes, in order to describe the action of a hero who is brave and arrogant, even a texture of long compounds, may not be at fault and need not be entirely avoided. in view of the needs of a literal meaning that becomes appropriate to the rasa only by recourse to this texture.2

1. See note 1 on Abhinava's commentary below. 2. Ākṣepa: literally, a drawing toward oneself, or introducing into one's work. Badarināth Śarmā explains the implication of its use here by the gloss, ākṣepa 'nupapattimulako 'dhyāhāraḥ, "the supplying of an element because failure would otherwise ensue." Note how Ānanda justifies the use of texture here. It is "appropriate to the vācyā, because it enables the vācyā to be appropriate to the rasa."

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Having thus listed the varieties of speaker and the varieties of what is to be said (or primary sense), he now states the appropriateness to each of these which regulates [the texture]: Among these cases.

Of structure: that is, of texture. An ascetic devoid of, that is, unmoved by, rasa or bhāva, may be helpful to the main rasa by his functioning in the plot, although he himself is indifferent. In his proper character, however, he is called devoid of rasa. The same: viz., option [of texture]. Having thus considered propriety as it relates solely to the speaker, he goes on to speak of it as combined with propriety to what is said: But when. Although the poet when he speaks should be filled with rasa, for otherwise the poem will be tasteless, as our author will state in the passage "If he himself becomes dispassionate," etc. [3.41-42 a 4], still, when he gives his chief attention to exhibiting skill in complicated figures such as yamakas, he is said to be devoid of rasa. [When] the speaker is restricted (niyamena) to one filled with rasa and bhāva, and so is not indifferent; and [when] the rasa is limited (eva)
to that type which is the soul of poetry, not being of the type which exhibits rasa as a figure of speech (rasavadalankāra); then the type of texture must be only (eva) that which lacks compounds or which has compounds of medium length, whereas otherwise long compounds [are permissible]. This being the logical structure, one cannot complain of tautology in the use of the word niyama (restriction) and two restrictive particles eva [in one sentence].

Why is this: his attitude is, is this a pronouncement of some legal text? Our answer is: i.e., a reasonable explanation is. [Whatever interferes with] the perception of it: whatever interferes with the relishing of the rasa, that is, whatever is an obstacle to the relishing or opposes it by containing some contradictory relish. Can be interpreted: the compounds can be interpreted [by the reader] in many ways; but the texture is [also] a causal agent in this interpretation. Hence there are two causal suffixes in sambhāvanā. Especially in drama: to begin with, one cannot act out the meaning of a compound without breaking up the suggested sense. The shifts of intonation and the like and the antara and prasāda songs are difficult to perform in this case. Furthermore, in this case [i.e., in the use of long compounds] the understanding [of the audience] is subject to constant doubts, which is improper in a play, because in a play the understanding should be direct and immediate. And in other forms of literature: in non-dramatic forms.

Delays our understanding: the sense is that our relishing of the rasa is hindered by the obstacles presented to it. [May not be at fault;] The reason why a texture of long compounds may cease to constitute a fault is that it may be needed by a literal meaning which has been chosen in order to suggest a rasa, which is appropriate to the rasa, but which is incapable of suggesting the rasa without the texture of long compounds. The explanation that has been given [by a previous commentator] of tadākṣepa as “[only] by drawing in the action of this hero” [instead of “by recourse to this texture”] does not fit well; so enough of that.

1. The problem is to explain the apparent presence of three expressions of restriction in the single sentence yadā tu kaviḥ ... sanghatane. Abhinava does so by explaining that three different variables are restricted, three areas are excluded. This explanation plays havoc with the word order; niyamenai-va must go together. 2. Abhinava here avails himself of a grammatical fiction based on Pāṇ. 6.4.51 ner anīti. By this rule the causative suffix nic
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(= i > e > ay) drops before any further suffix that is anīt. As nīc itself is anīt, a causative suffix will drop before a second causative suffix and a double causative will be phonetically the same as a simple causative. Thus "Caitra causes Maitra to cause the boy to eat rice" becomes caitro maitrena bālam odanam bhojayati (= bhuj + [nīc] + nīc + śap + ti). In the case at issue Abhinava is interpreting samāsthāām anekaprakārasambhāvanā as "the causing by the texture of the reader to cause [i.e., bring about] a manifold analysis of compounds. 3. For antargāṇa and prasādagāṇa, see ABh. on BhNS 6.29.

A The quality called "clarity" is required throughout all types of texture, for it has already been said that it is "common to all the rasas and common to all the textures."¹ If one swerves from clarity, even a texture without compounds will not suggest tragedy or love-in-separation. If one holds to it, even a texture of medium length compounds will not fail to reveal them. So clarity is always to be sought. Accordingly, if you feel that the quality strength is missing in the verse "Whatever man proud of his strong arms," [we would point out that at least] it has the quality called clarity and it does not have sweetness.² Furthermore, it does not lack beauty since it reveals the rasa which its author intended. So whether texture is one with qualities or whether it is different, the sphere of [the various types of] texture is regulated by the proprieties set forth above. In this way texture too is a suggestor of rasa. And the above mentioned principle of the regulation of texture as a cause of the manifestation of rasa [namely appropriateness to speaker and content] is precisely what regulates the qualities. So there is no contradiction in saying that the distribution (vyavasthāna)³ of texture is dependent upon the qualities.

1. Ānanda is quoting his own remark from 2.10 A, substituting the synonym sanghataṇa for racāṇa. 2. Ānanda's point is that strength may not be required for ratidra rasa. The quality of clarity without sweetness may suffice. 3. Vyavasthāna implies the assignment of one type of texture to one type of speaker or content and of another type to another.

L Throughout: this is as much as to say that every type of texture is to be so constructed that there shall be immediate perception of
the primary sense. Has already been said: viz., under Kārikā 2.10: “A poem’s ability to communicate,” etc. Will not suggest: he means, because the suggestor will not transmit its own literal sense. To it: if one holds to clarity. As the matter [of clarity] is so important to our author, he explicitly gives a positive as well as a negative statement. It does not have sweetness: he implies that as strength and sweetness have already been described as mutually contradictory,¹ a combination of the two is quite unheard of. Intended: the sense is that the raso has been revealed simply by clarity; it is wrong to say it has not been revealed. So: The meaning of the whole passage [3.6–3.6 i] may be stated as follows. If the qualities are one with texture, the regulation of the texture will be identical with the regulation of the qualities. In the view that texture depends on the qualities, we reach the same conclusion. Even if the qualities depend on texture, the very appropriateness to speaker and content which have been described as regulating, as being sources of, the texture, will likewise be sources for the regulation of the qualities. Thus there is no serious fault in any of the three views.²

1. See 2.9 L, last paragraph. 2. This may be true, but Ānanda never specifically defends the third view.

K  Also another sort of appropriateness, namely to the [particular] viṣaya (genre) [in which one is writing], regulates the texture, for texture differs as it is found to occur in different varieties of literature.

A  In addition to what is appropriate to speaker and content, that which is appropriate to the viṣaya (genre) also regulates the texture. For the varieties of literature are many, such as the muktaka (independent stanza), which is written in Sanskrit, Prakrit, or Apabhramśa; the sandānitaka (couplet), viśeṣaka (triplet), kalāpaka (quatrain), and kulaka (connected group of more than four stanzas); the paryāyabandha (poem on a fixed subject); parikathā (round of stories); khandakathā
§ 3.7 L  

He shows that there is another principle of regulation: to the viṣaya. The word viṣaya means a particular aggregate (saṃghāta). And just as a man who enters a social aggregate such as the army, even if he should be individually a coward, adapts himself to the character appropriate to an army, just so a poetic sentence introduced into a particular aggregate such as a couplet, must become appropriate thereto. If the muktaka (independent stanza) has been listed under the word viṣaya, this is only in order to show that because of the absence of any aggregation of poetic units in the muktaka, it is entirely free [of regulation by aggregate] and rests on itself like the ether [of the Upanishads].1

By the word also he as much as says: when there also exists a need to be appropriate to speaker and content, the need to be appropriate to the viṣaya extends only to differences of degree; the need to be appropriate to speaker and content is never set aside by the need of the viṣaya.

The muktaka: the term is formed from mukta, “freed,” not bound to anything else, plus the suffix kan used in forming a conventional term (saṃjñā).2 Because of [the conventional associations of] this [term], a verse occurring independently in a cohesive form of literature, even if that verse is in no need of syntactical completion, is not called a muktaka. The adjectival phrase “written in Sanskrit, [Prakrit, or Apabhramśa]” qualifies muktaka only.3 He names the languages in this order because they originated in this order. In a sandānitaka the syntax is completed in two verses, in a viḍēṣaka in three, in a kalāpaka in four, in a kulaka in five or more. These varieties are expressed in a copulative compound because they all possess the property of being distinguished by the length of their sentences. Paryāyabandha is a description of springtime, etc. Although the sentences (i.e., stanzas) which it contains are complete in themselves (and so make up a plurality, so to speak) it goes under the title of the single object which is to be described.4 A parikathā concerns one or another of the four goals of man, such as dharma, which it exhibits variously with a wealth of incident and description.5 A khaṇḍakathā contains only a portion [of
the above]. A *sakalakathā* follows all the plots to their conclusion. These two types have been named together in a copulative compound because they are both commonly found in Prakrit. In the previous types, from the *muktaka* on, there is no limitation of language. The poem composed in cantos (*sargabandha*) is the *mahākavya*, treating all the aims of man and describing everything. It is written in Sanskrit only. The play consists of the ten types together with such sub-types as the *nāṭkā*, *troṭaka*, *rāsaka*, *prakaranikā*, etc., and is written in a mixture of languages. The *ākhyāyikā* is a tale divided into chapters called *ucchvāsa*, etc., and contains occasional verses in *vaktra*, *apavaktra*, and other meters. The *kathā* lacks these two characteristics. The two are expressed in a copulative compound because they are both written in prose. And others: this will include the *campū*. Dandin says: "the *campū* is written in a mixture of prose and verse." (1.31).

1. Abhinava’s interpretation of *viśaya* as *saṅghāta* gives him an opportunity for the fine simile of the man in the army, but it falsifies Ānanda’s view. *Viśaya* (area, sphere, genre) simply does not mean *saṅghāta* (aggregation). Ānanda means, for example, that one type of texture (relatively lack of compounds) is appropriate in the sphere of plays, another type of texture (relatively long compounds) is appropriate in the sphere of the *ākhyāyikā* and *kathā*. This is borne out by the majority of extant examples of these genres. Compare, for example, the texture of the *Ratnāvali* with that of the *Daśakumāracarita* or the *Kādambari*. The reason that a sentence of the *Kādambari* may be textured in long compounds is not that it must fit with other sentences of the *Kādambari*; this would be circular reasoning. It is permitted to be so textured because it is in the sphere (genre) of the *kathā*. Abhinava’s difficulty in explaining how the *muktaka*, an independent verse that has no fellows, can be brought under the word *viṣaya* is a difficulty of his own making. 2. See Pan. 5.3.87. It is important from Abhinava’s view to derive the word thus, rather than from *muktā* + *svārthe kāh*. A *saṅjñā* always denotes something more specific than the mere etymology of the word would warrant. Thus, *kroṣṭa* as a common agent noun means “a howler”; but as a *saṅjñā* the same word means only a jackal. So in the case at issue. As a common noun *muktaka* would mean a free entity or a small, free entity. As a *saṅjñā*, according to Abhinava, it means, more specifically, a verse that is free not only by the fact that its syntax is not bound to its neighbors, but by the fact that it is not inserted into some other genre of literature. Krishnamoorthy translates *muktaka* as “a pearl,” as if derived from *muktā*, but one cannot justify such an etymology by Panini. 3. Something is wrong here. Either the word *eva* must be rejected, or a sentence of explanation must be supplied; because Abhinava says below that the types from *muktaka* onward (presumably on
are all unregulated in respect to language. BP supplies the needed explanation: "the adjective compound applies [strictly] only to muktaka because the termination of the compound is singular. But we are to draw it down to sandânitaka, etc., and supply the necessary conversion to plural." 4. This definition would fit many of the satakäs preserved in Sanskrit. 5. Bhoja’s example of a parikathä, the Śûdrakakathä, seems to have taken kâma for its subject, on which it gathered a number of stories around (pori) King Śûdraka. It was written in Prakrit, whereas Abhinava seems to imply that such works should be in Sanskrit. On the type see V. Raghavan, Bhoja’s SP, pp. 591–593, 604, 805–806. In the same book he also gives such information as is available, unfortunately very little, on the next two genres. 6. “Everything” is an exaggeration. What is meant is the long list of subjects demanded by the ancient critics, e.g., Daññin 1.16–17. 7. Prakrit poems of the same type were called skandhabandha (Daññin) or āśvāsa-
bandha (Bhoja).

A. Among these [different genres], the principle that applies in muktakäs is that when the poet seeks rasa formation, the texture should be appropriate to that [raso]. This has already been shown [cf. 3.6 b A]. When [his intention] is otherwise, [the texture is] optional. There are examples of a poet’s seeking rasa formation in the genre of muktakäs, just as he might seek it in a long poem. It is well known that a single muktaka of the poet Amaru, for example, may flow with a flavor of love (śrîgāraraśa) equal to that of a whole volume. But in the sandânitaka and the other [syntactically connected verse sequences] a texture of medium length or of long compounds is in order, because of their appropriateness to the wider area of composition. Where these sequences occur, however, in long poems, the texture should follow whatever is appropriate to the given longer poem.

But in the paryāyabandha [as opposed to the sandânitaka, etc.,] the texture is non-compounded or of medium length compounds. Even if on occasion one may use long compounds because of their appropriateness to the subject matter, one should avoid both the harsh and the vulgar types of alliteration. 1 In the parikathā the texture is optional, for its concern is solely with the telling of stories and there is therefore no
particular intention to create rasa. The khandakathā and sakalakathā are commonly found in Prakrit. As they contain many kulakas and other [syntactically connected verse sequences], there is no objection to their having long compounds. The choice of alliteration should accord with the rasa.

In the Sanskrit mahākāvya when its overall purpose is rasa, the texture should be appropriate to the rasa; otherwise, the texture is optional. For we see that the authors of mahākāvya have traveled on both roads. Rasa is the better purpose to have in view.

In plays, as opposed to the foregoing genres, one should always seek rasa formation.

1. Harsh and vulgar vṛttis have reference to types of alliteration that are too obvious, the first by its piling up of harsh phonemes and conjuncts, the second by its exclusion of all conjuncts and its overuse of soft phonemes; see 1.1 a A, note 4 and 1.1 a L, note 4. Vṛtti is here used in the sense employed in 1.1 a A, to be distinguished from that of 3.6 g L. 2. The compound vṛttyaucitya is evidently of different formation from the compounds prabandhaucitya and arthaucitya used a few lines above and from the terms vaktrvācyaucitya and visyaucitya used by Abhinava in 3.7 L. The present compound means the appropriateness of the alliterative style, whereas those other compounds were elliptical, e.g., prabandhaucitya = prabandhagataucitya or prabandhāśritaucitya, “the appropriateness to the type of work.” Ānanda uses the term again 3.16f A, 3.19 K, and 3.18–19c A.

L When otherwise: sc., when he does not seek rasa formation.

Now it may be asked, how can there be a combination of vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicārins, by which a rasa could be attained, in [so short a space as] a muktaka? With this in mind, he says: “there are examples [in the genre] of muktakas.” In the following stanza of Amaru there is a clear perception of the vibhāvas and the rest in all their perfection.

She had suffered in his absence
and finally agreed to take her lover back;
and then he called her carelessly
by another woman’s name.
She pretended not to hear, but glanced aside
in terror that her unforgiving friend had heard;
then seeing that her friend
had left the room, she ceased to care.

[Amaru 75]
§ 3.7a L ]

The wider area: What he means is that if a texture without compounds is used [in such long sentences], our understanding is delayed, being held in suspension and forced to travel the long road to the verb, so that by the time it has apprehended the literal meaning it is already weary and not in a position to relish the [suggested] rasa.\(^1\) Occur in long poems: That is, when any of the verse sequences from the sandānitaka to the kulaka so occur. Or we may take the view that the muktaka may occur in a longer genre as well [as in a collection of mutakas], for a muktaka can be any stanza the relishing of the rasa of which is independent of what precedes and follows, as the stanza “When I would paint you as you stood after we had quarreled.”\(^2\) On occasion: viz., in the area of fury and the like. No particular intention: The logical connection is: the texture is optional because there is no particular intention to create rasa.

The choice of alliteration: the harsh, gentlemanly (upanāgari-ka) and vulgar types of alliteration should be appropriate to the type of work and to the rasa. Otherwise: When its purpose lies only in the narrative, the type of alliteration also is optional. On both roads: the word is locative. A mahākavya like the Kādambarikathāsāra of Bhaṭṭa Jayantaka\(^3\) is concerned only with narrative, while poems like the Rāghuvamsā are concerned with rasa. Others have explained “both roads” as referring to Sanskrit and Prakrit. But this would be an unpardonable obscurity,\(^4\) for to what then would our author be referring when he says that of these “rasa is the better purpose to have in view?”

1. One must bear in mind that in rasadhvani the rasa unfolds immediately from the poem. Where there is a delay in the perception, as in laksitakramavyaiigya. we are dealing with a different type of poetry. Now this immediate, unitary perception can be achieved without compounds in short sentences, for they follow the natural syntax of everyday speech. But in a sentence extending over several verses the suspensions become difficult. We must hold the sense of three or four words in our mind before we come to the verb that gives them meaning. Even after we come to the verb, there may be a delay while the mind fits the puzzle together. In such sentences the comprehension is aided in Sanskrit by compounds, just as it is aided in Greek and Latin by the conventions of classical syntax (subjunctive, optative, infinitive clauses), which Sanskrit lacks. 2. This is Meghadūta 110 (2.42). Abhinava calls it a muktaka because it can be taken out of the Meghadūta with no harm to the rasa of the verse, which could apply to any lover separated from his love. At this rate, of course, many of our favorite verses of Kālidāsa would be
3. Our text reads bhaṭṭajayantakasya, but the reading is in question and the fact is that the Kādambarīkathāsāra was written by Abhinanda, the son of Jayantabhaṭṭa. Conceivably the ka of jayantakasya is a diminutive or pejorative. But V. Raghavan (Bhoja’s SP, p. 592, n. 2) reports that India Office MS 1135 (of the Locana) here reads bhaṭṭajayantasutasyābhinandasya kṛte kādambarīkathāsäre. 4. For the fault of neyārtha see Bhāmbha 1.38 and Vāmana 2.1.12.

A As the ākhyāyikā and kathā consist chiefly of prose and as the methods of prose composition differ from those of verse, the basis of the regulation [of the texture] in prose, which has not been touched on before, is here set forth briefly.

K The aforesaid propriety governs texture everywhere, even in prose, although it lacks the regulations of meter.

A The regulation already given of texture, that it must be appropriate to the speaker and content with due consideration given to genre, is the source of regulation in prose, even though prose lacks the regulation of meter. Thus, there too, when the poet or the character invented by the poet is devoid of rasa and bhāva, [the type of texture is] optional; but when the speaker is possessed of rasa or bhāva, one must follow the aforesaid regulation. Even here [sc., in prose], appropriateness to genre [is to be observed]. The ākhyāyikā is distinguished by a predominance of medium length or long compounds because the beauty (chāya) of prose depends on its long sentences and they are carried to the greatest extent in the ākhyāyikā. In the kathā, although it contains many long sentences of prose, one should observe the proprieties relating to rasa which we have given.
§ 3.9 A ]

L With due consideration given to genre: by the word visāya we are here to understand the varieties of prose composition.

K Whenever it is based on the aforesaid appropriateness to rasa formation, the texture (racanā) will be beautiful. But this [factor of propriety] is given some variety by considerations of genre.

A Rather, [we may put the matter thus.] In prose just as in verse a texture (racanā) based on the aforesaid appropriateness to rasa formation will be everywhere beautiful. This [propriety] will assume some alteration by considerations of genre, but will not be wholly changed. For example, even in prose a texture of very long compounds will not be beautiful in an ākhyāyikā in passages of love-in-separation or tragedy, while in a play a structure [completely] without compounds will not be beautiful in a description of fury or heroism. But the appropriateness to the genre takes away from or adds to the measure [given by the rasa]. Thus in an ākhyāyikā one will never go so far as to write without any compounds at all, while in plays, etc., which are the sphere [of uncompounded texture], one will never go so far as to write with really long compounds. This is the direction to pursue in the matter of texture.

1. A summary verse appears at this point in MS ga of the KM edition, in Krishnamoorthy's Moodabidre MS, and in the Kalpalatāviveka. It has been accepted in the text printed by Badarināth Śarmā. Iti kāvyārthaviveko yo 'yam cetaścamatkṣītividhāyi / sūriḥḥīr anusṛtasaśārair asmadupajñō na vismārayah: "This discriminative understanding of poetry, which imparts delight to the mind and has been discovered by us, should not be forgotten by scholars who are in search of basic principles." We must understand asmadupajñō as a bahuvrīhi modifying vivekah, although such compounds are normally used as neuter tatpuruṣas; cf. Pān 2.4.21. It is not clear to just what ayam kāvyārtha-viveko refers and the verse is not mentioned by Abhinava. It seems unlikely that it belongs in Ānanda's text.
He now sets forth clearly the correct position: Whenever it is based on the aforesaid appropriateness to rāsa formation, etc.

In the Vṛtti the word “rather” (vā)\(^1\) indicates that this position alone is correct, as in the verse:

> Women, kings, poison, fire,  
> may be used, carefully, to advantage.  
> Or rather say, however used,  
> they bring us only grief.

Racanā: the word means sanghaṭanā (texture).

Is appropriateness to the genre then wholly abandoned? He says, not so. The very appropriateness to the rāsa by its dependence, for help, on the genre, becomes a factor possessed of some variety, that is, of subsidiary variations, in the course of its development. This is what he explains in the sentence beginning with this [propriety].

Wholly: the word sarvākāram is used as an adverb. Without compounds: supply “completely.” For the sage [Bharata] has said in defining dramatic presentation (vākyābhinaya) “by clear, uncompounded words,” etc.\(^2\) [He here states an exception: “and not,” etc.\(^3\)]

In plays, etc.: this construes with “which are the sphere.”

1. In other contexts vā means no more than “or.” But when introducing the second or last point of view in a discussion, it often indicates the author’s preference for that point of view. The verse here quoted by Abhinava exemplifies this force of indication.  
2. Cūrnāpadaḥ prasannaiḥ: Is the text here corrupt? The only pertinent quotation we have found in Bharata is:  
> nānārasārthair vṛttanibaddhaḥ kṛtaḥ sacūrnāpadaḥ / prāktasamskrtaṁ bho vākyābhinayo budhair jñeyah (BhNŚ 22.44). The term cūrnāpada (uncompounded words) is defined BhNŚ 14.40.  
3. As there is no na ca in our printed text of the Vṛtti, we bracket the passage. But Abhinava might have read na ca raudravīrādviṃśante (Text p. 328, line 3).
§ 3.10–14 \(K\) ]

3.10–14 Introduction

\(A\) Now it is well known that \textit{dhvani} where no interval is perceived between the literal and suggested meanings, in its whole-work variety,\(^1\) appears in such works as the \textit{Râmâyana} and \textit{Mahâbhârata}. Just how it is so made to appear, however, will be explained in the following.

1. That is, in that variety where the whole work rather than a word or sentence, etc., acts as manifestor. For the word \textit{ātman} in the sense of "variety," cf.: 2.20 \(A\), opening sentence.

\(L\) It has been explained above how poetry of unperceived interval is revealed in the presence of texture.\(^1\) That it may be revealed by a work taken as a whole is a matter beyond dispute that needs no special statement. In order, however, to instruct poets and sensitive readers in the means of achieving such suggestion in a work as a whole, these means should be described. Hence what follows. Now: the syntax of this word carries on. The sense is: "now the various means will be explained."

1. The locative case is here \textit{ni} indicating that the texture acts as a cause of the revelation.

3.10–14

\(K\) The means by which a work as a whole becomes a suggestor of \textit{rasas} and the like [are five].

(1) The forming of a plot, either traditional or imagined, which will be beautiful because of the appropriateness of its \textit{vibhâvas}, (\textit{sthāyi-}) \textit{bhāvas}, \textit{anubhāvas}, and \textit{saṅcārins}. 
(2) The abandoning of a pattern traditionally imposed on a story if it fails to harmonize [with the intended rasa]; and the introduction, by invention if need be, of incidental narrative appropriate to that rasa.

(3) The construction of sandhis and sandhyāṅgas designed to reveal the rasa and not brought in merely out of a desire to fulfill the requirements of a textbook system.

(4) Intensifying and relaxing of the rasa at the appropriate occasions within the work; and the revival of the predominant rasa whenever it begins to fail.

(5) The application of figures of speech in conformity with the rasa even though one may have the ability to construct more elaborate figures.

A It has been said above [3.2] that a whole work may be a suggestor of rasa and the like. “The means by which it becomes a suggestor” are: first, “the forming of a plot which will be beautiful because of the appropriateness of the vibhāvas, (sthāyiibhāvas, anubhāvas, and saṅcārins.” That is to say, if [each] vibhāva, bhāva, anubhāva and saṅcārin is adapted to the rasa or bhāva which the poet wishes to convey, the plot will be beautiful because of the appropriateness of these elements. The forming of such a plot is one means by which a work as a whole becomes a suggestor. What is meant here by appropriateness of the vibhāvas to the rasa is obvious. Appropriateness of the (sthāyi-) bhāvas is derived from appropriateness of the characters. Characters differ by their having the emotions (bhāvas) of the upper, middle, or lower classes and by their having the emotions of gods or humans. A basic emotional drive (sthāyiibhāva) that is described by following these distinctions and not confusing them will be “appropriate.” On the other hand, if one describes the energy (utsāha) or the like of a god as belonging to a mere human, or that of a mere human as belonging to a god, the emotion will be inappropriate. For example, in a passage dealing with a king who is a mere human, if one describes activities in which he leaps across the seven seas, one’s description, even if beautiful in itself, will as a rule be without rasa and tasteless. The reason for this would be its inappropriateness.

L First: The various means by which a work as a whole may be suggestive of rasa can be described helpfully only if presented in a
certain order. First, then, comes of the consideration of plot. Next, the
insertion of other elements, the carrying [of the whole] to a conclusion,
watchfulness over the rasa, and finally the appropriateness of the figures
of speech used to describe the appropriate vibhāvas, etc. [The Kārikās]
now set forth these five elements in order: The means by which, etc.

The appropriateness of these elements: If one would describe
love, one should adopt a plot in which there may be a clear appear-
ance of such vibhāvas as seasons,1 garlands, etc., of anubhāvas such
as playful gestures (līlā),2 and of saṅcarins such as joy, firmness, etc.
Obvious: being known from everyday life as well as from Bharata's
textbook. Activities: the term is meant to include the basic emotional
drive of energy which would find its scope in such activities. For it is
the appropriatemess of a sthāyibhāva that is under discussion at this
point, not the appropriateness of an anubhāva.3 Even if beautiful:
so far as the power of description is concerned. For this: viz., for this
tastelessness.

1. Springtime is a favorite uddīpana-vibhāva of love-in-enjoyment, the
rains of love-in-separation. 2. Bharata places līlā among the vibhāvas rather
than the anubhāvas (BhNS Vol. 1, p. 303), but by the term he probably means
graceful costume or general attractiveness of the characters. Abhinava, on
the other hand, seems to be using the word in its sense of playful or amorous
gesture; it would thus include the sidelong glances (BhNS 1, p. 305), revealing
motions of the arms (Bhaṭṭalolita, quoted by Mammaṭa, p. 87), and similar
gestures, regularly included in the anubhāvas. 3. The vyāpāra (activities) of
the king would properly speaking form an anubhāva, a subject not properly
under discussion here. Hence Abhinava's explanation that vyāpāra really
refers to the utsāha (a sthāyibhāva) which prompts the activities.

3.10–14 a

A But now we hear of such adventures as journeys to the nether
world taken by King Sātavāhana and others. So what impropriety is
there in describing the extraordinary and superhuman power of kings
who ruled over all the earth? The objection is not to the point. We
do not say that descriptions of the extraordinary power of kings are
inappropriate; rather, that in a narrative which has been invented and
is based on purely human characters, matters that are appropriate to gods are unsfitting. If the character in a narrative is partly divine and partly human, there is no contradiction in introducing matters appropriate to both, as in the narrative of Pāṇḍu and his sons. As for the heroic deeds traditionally ascribed to Sātavāhana and others like him, if we treat of their deeds within the traditional limits, our description will be proper. But anything other than that, even in the case of such kings as these, will be improper. The heart of the matter may be put thus:

For the spoiling of rasa there is no cause other than impropriety. On the other hand, composing a work within recognized proprieties is the very Upanishad of rasa.¹ Accordingly, Bharata has laid down a rule which must be observed in the making of plays of the nāṭaka type: that "they shall contain a well known plot and a hero who is well known and noble" (BhNS 18.10). By this means the poet will not find himself in doubt concerning the hero's appropriateness to the rasa or his lack thereof. But if one were to compose a nāṭaka or some other type of play² by using an invented plot and a hero that is not well-known and not appropriate, he would commit a great folly.

¹ Upanishad: i.e., the true means of attaining the goal. The verse has already been referred to by Abhinava 3.6e L. ² The word nāṭakādi presents difficulties, for strictly speaking a play with an invented plot cannot be called a nāṭaka. Abhinava offers several explanations; cf. end of L section below. It seems to me that Ānanda's lack of clarity is due to his compressing several ideas into a short space. He seems to mean the following. If one were to compose a nāṭaka with a hero whose character does not fit the recognized proprieties, or if one were to compose a play other than a nāṭaka with an invented plot and an inappropriate hero, for the likelihood of the hero's impropriety would be greater in an invented plot, the result would be faulty.

L But anything other than: i.e., in addition to that. What our author really implies is this. Matters should be so described that there may be no breach in the credence of the audience. That a mere mortal should leap over the seven seas in a single stride is quite impossible and would strike the hearer's heart as a falsehood. Hence it would instill into his judgment a suspicion that the poem's teaching
concerning the means to all the four goals of man was also untrue. A similar feat, however, if told of Rāma, would not strike the audience as untrue, for it would have acquired conviction from a long line of ancient tradition. It is for this reason that our author says that even in the case of Rāma, if other wondrous powers are invented, they too will be improper. So one should not describe something that cannot be believed.

By this means: viz., by using a well known plot and a noble hero. Find himself in doubt: i.e., ask himself what he should write. If one: if a poet. A great folly: The general sense is that this is the reason why the sage Bharata did not describe nāṭakas and the like with invented plots and thus one should not attempt them. The element ādi in nāṭakādi means “similar to.” Its purpose is to refer to the āma and the like, where the well known exploits of a god are described. Another commentator, however, has said that nāṭakādi is a bahuvrihi denoting a subsidiary element and that what is meant is a prakaraṇa. Or, we may take a different reading: nāṭikādi. There again the sense of ādi will be “similar to.” Now Bharata defines the nāṭikā as a play in which “by its combining the character of a prakaraṇa and a nāṭaka the plot is invented and the hero is a king” (BhNS 18.58). Accordingly, we are to understand [the term nāṭikādi] as referring to the invented plot [of the one component] and the kingly hero [of the other component] respectively.

1. Abhinava expatiates on this subject (prapattāv ayogyatā) in ABh 1, pp. 280 ff. Cf. also Masson and Patwardhan, Sāntarasa p. 74. 2. By this explanation nāṭakādi would be an atadgunaśamvijnānabahuṛhi, meaning “a play belonging to the list of play types in which nāṭaka stands first.” The term would not refer to nāṭaka, but to the subsidiary members of the list, such as the prakaraṇa, the type of play with invented plot. Two objections may be raised. First, ādi-compounds are invariably of the other, tadguna, type (see Mahābhāṣya on Pān. 1.1.27) except in the hands of ingenious commentators (e.g., Kāśikā on Pān. 6.1.6; Śaṅkara and Bhāskara on Brahmāsūtra 1.1.2, etc.). Second, suppose we allow nāṭakādi to stand for prakaraṇam. If a play were to have a well known hero, it could not be called a prakaraṇa. So we have jumped out of the frying pan into the fire.
3.10–14 b

A  An objector may here grant that in describing the basic driving force of energy and the like the poet must take into some consideration the differing propieties of the human and the divine. But what is the use of such consideration, he may ask, in dealing with love? Surely the love of gods may be described by the actions that are appropriate to love here in India. Such an objection would be wrong. From improprieties in this area even greater faults will ensue. Thus, if we assign a type of love to characters of the upper class by recourse to what is appropriate to the lower class, how ridiculous will be the result! Even in India what is appropriate in love differs according to the three classes of men. But, says the objector, that the proprieties of the gods should differ from those of humans [in matters of energy and the like] cannot help us here in dealing with matters of love. We answer by pointing out that we do not claim any difference between divine and human proprieties in the sphere of love. Indeed, love among the gods will be well described if it is based on love as practised among the upper classes, such as kings, here in India. But just as what is recognized as vulgar love is not found to be attached to kings in plays of the nāṭaka type and the like, just so should it be avoided in writing of the gods. If you say that nāṭakas and the like are performed, and that it is because the performance of sexual enjoyment is indecent that this subject is there avoided, we reject [your limitation]. If a performance of this subject is indecent, how can a poetic description of the same subject be free of the same charge? Accordingly, whether in the literature of performance or in poetry which is not performed, the description of vulgar sexual enjoyment between characters of the upper classes, kings and ladies, is highly indecent, just like a description of the sexual enjoyment of our parents. Precisely the same charge appears within the sphere of the gods.

Furthermore, sexual intercourse is not the only form of love-enjoyment (sambhogaśṛṅgāra). Other forms, such as the interchange of glances and the like are possible and can be used in writing of upper class characters. Thus, that which is appropriate to the character is to be followed in treating of sexual desire (ṛti) just as of energy (utsāha). The same is true of wonder (vismaya) and the other sthāyibhāvas.
The fact that literature furnishes examples of careless writing by great poets in this area [of sex] is to be accounted a fault of those poets. But, as they have concealed it by means of their skill, it passes unnoticed, as we have already remarked (3.6 e A).

The need for appropriateness of the anubhāvas [to the rasa] is obvious in Bharata and other authorities.

§ 3.10-14 c A

In answer to the question how a poet is then to write about love-in-enjoyment, he says "[sexual intercourse] is not [the only form]," etc. Thus: Bharata too, in various places and in diverse ways, has made appropriateness to the character a criterion [for the description] of vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and the like, as when he says [of the vyabhicāriḥbhāva surprise (āvega)] that it is received “with fortitude by upper and middle class characters and with consternation by the low.”¹

BhNS 7.63, where the text reads cōpasarpanaiḥ (running away) in place of the consternation (sambhrâmena ca) here quoted.

3.10-14 c

A What the foregoing amounts to is this. A poet who follows the system of Bharata and others, who studies the work of great poets of the past, and who gives rein to his own genius, must still be attentive and exert the greatest care not to relax or depart from the proprieties of the vibhāvas and the other factors of rasa. In saying that the choice of an appropriate plot, whether traditional or invented, will be suggestive of rasa, the Kārikā implies that however many and delightful (rasavat) may be the tales furnished by tradition and history, the poet must choose for his plot only such a one as will furnish vibhāvas, etc., appropriate to his rasa. He must be even more careful if he invents his plot than if he takes it from tradition, for if the poet stumbles here out of heedlessness, he will incur a heavy suspicion of his lack of judgment. The following verse gives support [to our position].

A plot consisting of invented matter should be so made
that every portion of it may appear full of rasa.

The means of achieving this is to keep exactly to the proprieties of vibhāva, etc. And this we have shown.
What the foregoing amounts to: in brief, the poet should follow knowledge of the rules, a study of the literature, and the inspiration that is given him by destiny. The word rasavat (lit., possessing rasa) is a locative of despite. The possession of rasa [by such tales] is here considered as merely the false opinion of the undiscriminating, for how could they possess rasa without the vibhāvas, etc., appropriate thereto? The poet: the reason is that he cannot here plead the excuse that he was led astray by tradition. Of achieving this: of achieving fulness of rasa.

1. This is the same abuse of Pāṇ. 2.3.38 that Abhinava employed in explaining suyodhanaṣya in 2.9 A. It allows him to take rasavatītu here in its technical sense, whereas we have taken the word in its popular meaning ("delightful").

A further point:

There are sources of stories like the Rāmāyaṇa which are famous for perfected rasa. One must not join matter of one’s choice with them if it contradicts this rasa. Into these stories one must not add matter of one’s own choice. As has been said: “not the slightest departure from the story’s path.” Even if one should add matter of one’s own choice, one must not add anything that contradicts the rasa.

1. As Abhinava informs us, the quotation is from Yaśovarman’s Rāmābhyaudaya. We can judge from Bhoja, who quotes the whole verse, that the passage comes from the introduction to that lost play. The date of its composition doubtless falls before the defeat of its author by Lalitāditya of Kashmir (see RajTar. 4.134-140), which is perhaps to be set in A.D. 733 (see Introduction, p. 2) and certainly within a few years of that date. For the text of the complete verse, see V. Raghavan, Bhoja’s SP, pp. 393, 418. It runs as follows:

\[ \text{aucityam vacasām prakṛtyanugataṁ sarvatra pātrocitā} \\
\text{puṣṭih svāvasare rasasya ca kathāmarge na cātikramah} \\
\text{suddhiḥ prastutasamvidhānākavandhau praudhis ca sabdārthayoḥ} \\
\text{vidvaddhiḥ pariḥhāvyatām avahitair etāvad evāstu naḥ} \]
Words appropriate to each character
and each character appropriate to the whole;

Words appropriate to each character
and each character appropriate to the whole;
a fulness of rasa at the right occasion
and no departure from the story's path;
a clear arrangement of component parts
together with elaborated words and sense;
such are the virtues which we hope may win
attention from our learned audience.

L Perfected (siddha): in such works the rasa awaits only the
relishing; there is no need to work it out. Sources of stories, that
is, histories. Matter of one's own choice should not be added to the
matter of these histories. A relation of accompaniment [expressed by
the instrumental case] here in the quoted verse is explained [in the
Vṛtti] by the relation between area and occupant of the area. Thus
the Vṛtti says, into these stories, using the locative case. Matter of
one's choice must not be added into these stories. If for some reason
or other something is added, it must not be something that contradicts
the established rasa. For example, if one were to give Rāma a brave
and amorous character and make him the hero of a nāṭikā, the result
would be outrageous. As has been said: viz., in the Rāmābhīyudaya
of Yaśōvarman.

3.10-14 e

A [Commentary on point (2) of 3.10-14 K.] Now for another
means by which a work as a whole may become suggestive of rasa: the
abandoning of a pattern traditionally imposed on a story if it fails in
any way to harmonize with the rasa; and the introduction, by invention
if need be, of incidental narrative appropriate to that rasa. This is to
be carried out as it is done in the works of Kālidāsa and in the Hari-
vijaya of Sarvasena1 and in my own mahākāvya, the Arjunacarita. A
poet when writing a poem must concentrate with all his soul on the
his invention. A poet has no need to carry out a mere chronicle of events. That is a task accomplished by the historian.

1. See 3.1f A, note 1 and Abhinava's remark on the present passage.

L A pattern: The way the narrative is arranged. Of Kālidāsa: the descriptions of the marriages, etc., of such kings as Aja in the Rāghuvamśa are not found in the traditional histories. In the Harivijaya the abduction of the pārijāta tree is described as part of Krishna's assuagement of his beloved, a pattern which is not found in the traditional accounts. Again, in the Arjunacarita, the description of Arjuna's victorious battles in Pātāla and such like matters are not found in traditional accounts. This is quite right according to our author, who goes on to say: A poet, etc.

1. yathāsasyā: see 1.13 b L, note 6. 2. The remark is of interest, for this is precisely the pattern of the story in the Vulgate version of the Harivamśa; see Bombay text 2.65–76. These chapters follow on the simple statement of 2.64 that Krishna dug up a pārijāta tree and took it to Dvārakā. They record the jealousy of Satyabhāmā, Krishna's assuaging promise to give her the tree which brings youth and assures a wife of her husband's love, Krishna's battle with Indra, and the transportation of the stolen tree to Dvārakā on the back of an elephant. These chapters are found in all MSS collated by the critical edition except those of the Śāradā family, from Kashmir, and M 1–3 from Kerala. The critical edition relegates them to Appendix 1, number 29. Abhinava's remark is evidence that the pārijātaharana was never regarded as scriptural in Kashmir. It is tempting to make the further inference that the scriptural accounts now available are based on the imaginative work of Sarvasena. There is room in a history of Sanskrit literature for a small chapter on Purānic borrowings from kāvya next to the large chapter on the borrowings of kāvya from the Purāṇas.

3.10–14 f

A [Commentary on point (9) of 3.10–14 K.] Now for a further, major means by which as work as a whole may become suggestive of
rasa. One should construct the sandhis (the successive stages of plot development), which are called mukha (beginning), pratimukha (development), garbha (the center), avamarśa (dubiousness, also called vimarsa, "the struggle"), and nirvahana (conclusion), as well as the component parts of these sandhis, which are called upakṣepa (planting the seed), etc., with a design toward the revelation of rasa, as has been done in the Ratnāvalī, and not merely toward fulfilling the prescriptions of a textbook, as for example in the Venīsamhāra, where the component known as vilāsa (amorousness) has been used in the development section in the Second Act simply out of a desire to follow the dictates of Bharata, although this component is inharmonious with the rasa.

1. The sandhis and sandhyoṅgas are defined in BhNŚ Chapter 19 and in DR Chapter I. For a detailed study of how the traditional prescriptions are applied in the case of a classical play (the Uttararāmacarita) see Margaret Kane, The Theory of Plot Structure in Sanskrit Drama.

L The sandhis. Princes, who are not educated in scripture—those works of śruti and smṛti which consist in commands, like those of a master, to do this or that—and who have not received instruction from history, which like a friend reveals to us the connection of cause and effect with such persuasive instances as "This result came from such an act," and who are therefore in pressing need of instruction, for they are given the power to accomplish the wants of their subjects, can be given instruction in the four goals of man only by our entering into their hearts. And what enters into the heart is the relish of rasa (rasāsudda, the imaginative experience of emotion). Now since this rasa is brought about by the union of the vibhāvas and their related factors, a union which is invariably connected with instruction in the four goals of man, it follows that the subjection of a man to the relishing of the rasās by a literary construction of the vibhāvas, etc., appropriate to rasa, serves at the same time for the instruction (vyutpatti) that naturally results. In this way [literary] delight (pratiti) is an aid to instruction. Our teacher [Bhaṭṭatauta] has put the matter thus: "Rasa is delight; delight is the drama; and the drama is the Veda [the goal of wisdom]." Delight and instruction are not different in nature, for they occupy a single realm. It is the appropriateness of the vibhāvas and their related factors that is the basic cause of literary delight, as we have said more than once. Our inner understanding (svarūpavedana)
of the nature of the vibhāvas, etc.—that they are appropriate to this or that rasa—may be called our instruction insofar as it ends in that result. Now results may be brought about by the unseen force of our karma, or by the grace of the gods, or otherwise [sc., by accident]. But none of this is to be taught, for we would then not be applying our instruction to the means. Accordingly, by showing in the person of the hero and the villain how success attends upon him who employs right means and destruction upon him who employs wrong means, we should educate the audience in the distinction between means which are helpful and those which are harmful.

A means when employed by a human agent falls into five stages (avasthās): svārūpa (the directed activity itself in its undeveloped stage), then a certain swelling or development [from the svārūpa], then its attainment of a state fit to produce a result, then its falling into a position of doubt under the attack of opponents, and finally, when the opposition has ceased and all hindrances have been hindered, the definitive result. These are the elements of the causal process at least so far as it appears in characters who are capable of enduring hardship, who fear to be separated [from their loved one], and who act with circumspection. The five stages of this causal process have been described by the sage Bharata:

Writers should know that where a goal is to be achieved, the causal activity takes place in five stages in the following order: beginning, effort, possibility of success, certainty of success, and achievement of the goal. [BhNS 19.7-8]

Such are the stages of the causal process. The plot by which the actor carries them out is likewise divided into five sandhis (joints): the mukha, pratimukha, garbha, avamāraśa, and nirvahana. They are called “joints” in accordance with their function, for they are the parts of the plot which are joined together (sandhiyante) [to make the play]. Since we observe a certain order within the function carried out by each of these sandhis, the plot is further divided into subsidiary divisions. These are the sandhyaṅgas (components of the sandhis) such as the upakṣepa (planting the seed), parikara (working it in), parinyāsa (reaffirmation), vilobhana (temptation), etc. The five stages of this causal process have been described by the sage Bharata:

Writers should know that where a goal is to be achieved, the causal activity takes place in five stages in the following order: beginning, effort, possibility of success, certainty of success, and achievement of the goal. [BhNS 19.7-8]

The five artha-prakṛtis (plot stimulants) are included within the sandhis. To be specific, there are three artha-prakṛtis belonging to the hero insofar as his success depends on his own efforts (svāyattasiddhi): the bija, the bindu, and the kārya. The bija [prompts] all his actions, the bindu sets them in motion again [after an interruption], and the
kārya brings them to a conclusion. These are three different natures (prakṛtis) or dispositions of the agent, namely that of observation, pursuit, and achievement, in attaining of his goal (artha). Insofar as the hero's success depends on his friends, the action of his helper may be for the hero's sake, or for the helper's sake, or for the helper's sake as well as the hero's. As the type of action common to both these purposes can be designated as prakāri when it is extensive and as patākā when it is particularly noticeable, these two terms prakāri and patākā have been used (by Bharata as names of the fourth and fifth arthaprakṛtis).

Thus the principal action, which ends with the achievement of the stated goal, should be composed with five sandhis and a full set of sandhyaṅgas and should impart instruction to all people. But in the subordinate action these rules do not apply. Thus Bharata has said:

In a subordinate plot, because it depends on something else, [namely, the main plot,] these rules do not apply. [BhNS 19.19]

Such are the rules. And so in the Ratnāvalī, a play in which the character of the hero, as "brave and amorous," removes any impropriety in his pursuit of enjoyments so long as they are not opposed to dharma—indeed their pursuit is praiseworthy by the maxim that "one should not be without pleasure"—we find a mention, at the very beginning of the play, of the aim as the obtaining of a maiden, an aim closely connected with another great aim, the obtaining of universal sovereignty. With this revelation as a beginning, we are then shown the five sandhis with the five stages and all the appropriate sandhyāṅgas and the artha-prakṛtis. For the requirements that begin with the bija have been displayed in the words "In this undertaking which will cause my lord's prosperity" [Ratn. 1.8], and the requirements that begin with the upakṛṣpa have been displayed by the words "Through whom all talk of war has ceased" [Ratn. 1.9] and "The kingdom is now without an enemy" [Ratn. 1.10] and "Now is the time to pursue enjoyment." But to exemplify all the sandhyaṅgas by adducing the full text in each instance would add too much to the size of my commentary, while if I were to exemplify them without giving the context, my examples would only lead to confusion. So I say no more.

As our author wishes to emphasize the care that should be given to this matter [of harmonizing the sandhyaṅgas, etc., with the rasa of the play], he comments on the contrary fault, which the Kārikā expressed in the words "and not brought in merely to fulfill the requirements," by explicitly giving an example: not merely, etc.
The reason for the use in the Kārikā of the words “merely” and “out of a desire” is as follows. Bharata has stated that the purpose of the sandhyāṅgas is to be auxiliary to the rasa by rendering the plot beautiful. They are not intended to have an invisible effect or to remove obstacles, as do the components of the pūrvarāga. Thus he says:

The purpose of the anīgas in this textbook is visible and is sixfold: (1) the proper arrangement of the subject matter; (2) preserving the plot from failure; (3) enabling one's production to please the audience; (4) hiding [i.e., leaving out] that which should be hidden; (5) expressing [the matter] in a wonderful [i.e., impressive or striking] way; (6) revealing [all of] that which should be revealed. [BhNS 19.15-52]

And later, in defining vilāsa (amourousness) as a component of the pratimukhasandhi, he says: “Vilāsa is said to be a yearning for the enjoyment of rati” [19.76]. The term “enjoyment of rati” is used to imply such vibhāvas and the like as shall suggest the basic emotional drive (sthāyībhāva) of the main rasa of the play. [The author of the Venīsamhāra] has failed to understand the meaning properly, for in that play the rasa in question is the heroic (vīra).

1. Both are found where rasa is present. 2. Compare Namisādhū on Rudrāta 1.18: yuktāyuktaviveka ucitānutucataparṇāṇam [vyutpattir nyam]. “Education (vyutpatti) is the discrimination of right and wrong, the thorough knowledge of what is appropriate and what is not.” 3. The only useful thing to teach is that results come about by human effort (purusākāra). Then we have a subject for instruction, namely the means that our effort may employ. 4. The reason for this qualification appears from Abhinava's comment (ABh) on BhNS 19.17-18. In the types of play called ādīma and samavakāra, the fourth stage of the causal process is not expressed and consequently the fourth sandhi is dropped. This, Abhinava tells us, is because the heroes of such plays are so arrogant (atyuddhatā) that they do not fear any opposition such as appears in the fourth sandhi. Where the hero is ārtaśahisṇu and worries about opposition, all five sandhis must be given. In the vyāyoga and ṭhāmrga types two sandhis are omitted, in the prahāṣana type three (the second, third, and fourth). In the prahāṣana the hero is adharmaprāyya “pretty much a rascal.” Presumably he would lack all the qualities here mentioned, ārtaśahisṇutā, upralambhahārītā, and prekṣāpūrva-kāra, that necessitate the full set of avasthās. 5. Niyataphalaprāpti. The Indian tradition is unanimous in interpreting this phrase as “certainty of achieving the goal,” although the commentators are forced to qualify it by adding “if some particular opposition can be overcome.” Sten Konow, Das Indische Drama, p. 19, took the phrase to mean “withheld success” (zurückgehaltene Erlangung). This is etymologically possible and makes better sense.
than the traditional interpretation. 6. For definitions of the sandhyāṅgas see BhNS 19.69 ff., DR 1.27 ff., Lévi p. 36 ff. 7. The syntax of the Sanskrit is obscure in parts of the passage which follows. The content consists in an effort to derive the meaning of arthatprakṛti from the meaning of its component words and to assign the individual arthatprakṛtis to their proper agent. Abhinava here takes arthatprakṛti to mean the disposition or nature which the agent assumes in his pursuit of his goal. In Abh 19.20 he offers a different analysis, viz., the various means (prakṛti = upāya) which are used in pursuit of the goal. Neither explanation, it seems to me, throws much light on the subject. What we have in the arthatprakṛtis are five very disparate factors by which the plot is impelled forward. The nature of the separate factors can best be understood by reference to examples. In the Śākuntalā the bija, or seed, first appears in Act I, verse 11, where the ascetic who greets Dusyanta blesses him with the words “May you obtain a son who shall be a universal monarch.” The achieving of such a son becomes the seed of the whole drama which follows, the final cause, in Aristotelian terms, of all the action. The bindu (“drop”) appears in Act II after verse 7. The main business of the drama has been interrupted by the general of the army with his plans for the king’s hunting expedition. Dusyanta cancels the expedition and, left alone with the clown, reverts to a confession of his love for Śākuntalā. Thus the “drop” sets the main action in motion again. The metaphor of a drop may have arisen by reference to a drop of oil which spreads out over water (so ABh on 19.23), or by reference to the continuous dripping of ghee which keeps a fire burning (Bhoja’s SP p. 578). The kārya (“result”) comes in Act VII with Dusyanta’s discovery and recognition of his son. The prakṛti and patākā are two types of interlude, long and short respectively, in which the chief characters do not appear. They too help the plot forward by bringing to bear on it events which are undiscoverable from the action directly represented through the hero and heroine. As for the term arthatprakṛti itself, the original sense must have been the forwarding or advancing of the dramatic goal, then by metonymy the factors which so advance it. The three categories avasthās, sandhis, and arthatprakṛtis may be distinguished functionally as follows. The avasthās are the stages of the causal process from onset to denouement. The sandhis are the plot-segments corresponding to these stages. The arthatprakṛtis are five factors which stimulate the action through the course of these stages and segments. 8. In ABh 3, pp. 5–8 Abhinava distinguishes two types of hero: the hero whose success depends on his own efforts (svāyattasiddhi), such as Rāma, and the hero whose success depends on the effort of his friend or minister (saucidvāyattasiddhi), such as King Udayana in the Tāpasavatśarāja. Here, however, he seems to envisage the hero as characterized in both ways. 9. In ABh on 19.20 Abhinava claims that the chief character of the patākā works both for his own aim and for that of the hero (svārthasiddhisahitayā parārthasiddhyā yuktah),
whereas in the prakáři he works solely for the heru (parárthasiddhyā śuddhayā yuktah).

10. Arthaśāstra 1.7.3 (p. 39). 11. prastāvopakrame: “at the very beginning.” One cannot take prastāva in its technical sense of “prologue,” as the bija is revealed directly after the prologue, in the first speech of Yaungandharāyana. 12. It has been foretold that the king will gain such sovereignty if he marries the Princess of Ceylon, Sāgarikā. 13. To make sense of the text one must emend hi to ca. But is this the sense that Abhinava intended? Dhanika on DR 1.27 gives Ratn. 1.6 as the upakṣepa. One could equally well choose Ratn. 1.8, which likens the hero to the bow of the love god. One might then take the next two quotations to exemplify the immediately following sandhyāngas, the parikārā and the parṇyāsa. Our present text of the Ratnāvalī lacks the last of Abhinava’s quotations. Reference to the ABh is no help, for there Abhinava takes his examples from the Veniśamhāra. 14. The components of the pūrvarāga (the musical ritual preliminary to the play) are essentially religious and so have an adṛśtārtha like a Vedic sacrifice (yajña) where one must follow the scriptural rules in every detail. The sandhyāngas, on the other hand, have a visible effect, namely the beautifying of the play. It is that effect which determines how much of the instruction one shall use in a given context. Abhinava draws a similar contrast in ABh Vol. 3, p. 32, but there states, more accurately, that the effect of the pūrvarāga is partly invisible (religious) and partly visible (secular). After all, the pūrvarāga too can be beautiful. 15. “So that it may have clarity and not appear like so many sticks [thrown together],” ABh Vol. 3, p. 32. 16. Surely some words must have dropped out of the text. 17. Abhinava’s meaning in this passage is obscure, perhaps because of a lacuna in the text. It can be clarified by reference to his remarks in ABh Vol. 3, p. 42, where he takes Bharata’s term ratiṁbhoga to mean not “enjoyment of sexual pleasure” (the natural meaning) but “enjoyment of one’s emotional needs,” the emotion being that given by the rasa. His remarks run in part as follows. “The vilāsa that is exhibited between Duryodhana and Bhānumatī the Veniśamhāra is most inappropriate in Duryodhana in the situation he is in. This has been remarked on by former critics, as by the author of the Sahrdyāloka. [He then quotes our 3.12 K and continues.] I have explained the matter at length in my Vivaana [on Bhaṭṭatauta’s Kāvyakautuka; see Introduction, p. 31]. In the text of Bharata here the term rati refers by implication to a sthāyibhāva useful to a man’s needs (pumupayogin) and belonging to the rasa of the play. Accordingly, in a play where viṇa is predominant, especially in the pratimukha, energy (utsāha) should be placed [emend hy āsthā to pratisthāpyo?] as the rati.
§ 3.10–14 g L 

3.10–14 g

A [Commentary on point (4) of 3.10–14 K.] And now for another means by which a work as a whole may become suggestive of rasa: the intensifying and relaxing of the rasa at the appropriate occasions within the work, as in the Ratnāvalī; furthermore, the revival of the predominant rasa wherever it begins to fail, as in the Tāpasavatsarāja.

L Intensifying: by intensifying the vibhāvas and their related factors, as in the words of Sāgarikā: “So this is King Udayana.” etc. [Ratn. 1.24 +1]. Relaxing is exemplified when she later flees from Vāsavadattā [Ratn. 1.24 +14]. The rasa is again intensified at the mention of the painting [Ratn. 2.0 +23].1 It is again relaxed at the entrance of Susaṅgatā [Ratn. 2.0 +43].2 The constant close handling of a rasa, like that of a delicate jasmine flower, causes it to fade quickly [cf. 3.18–19c A], especially if the rasa is love. As Bharata has said:

It is because of her frowardness, because of her refusals, because she is hard to get, that a woman is a lover’s chief passion. [BhāNŚ 22.207]

The same principle holds in works of the heroic rasa. If there is no intensification and relaxation at the right occasions and if the result is achieved quickly like some miraculous reward, the relation between means and end that the author had intended to display will not be shown.

Furthermore: the reference is to cases where, because of the exigencies of the plot, we find a rasa of which the failure, the breaking off, has begun, that is to say, seems likely soon to occur, but has not yet fully occurred. By [the revival of] the principal rasa: what he means is by [a revival of] some element that is subordinate to the [principal] rasa.3 For in the Tāpasavatsarāja the king’s love for Vāsavadattā, which is such that he values her more than his own life, takes on various disguises as it flows through the play, appearing as tragedy, as love-in-separation, and in other forms, depending on the propriety of the vibhāvas, etc., to these forms. But it persists because the final goal of the play, namely the recovery of Vāsavadattā, is what the king by a great measure most desires, [although it is] enhanced by the recovery
of his kingdom through the skilful machinations of his minister, a recovery to which the obtaining of Princess Padmāvatī is attached as a subordinate element. [This is clear] because the play ends in a conclusion which shows the overriding importance of the recovery of the queen: “I have obtained my queen and [sovereignty of] the earth and have formed an alliance with Darśaka” [Tāpas. 6.9]. The king’s continuing love for Vāsavadattā is like a wall on which the variegated plot is painted, for it remains throughout, from the first plotting of the minister, and remains even in the marriage to Padmāvatī. So it is that this love for Vāsavadattā, even when it seems about to fail because of the exigencies of the story, is revived.

Thus, in the very first act the love is given clear form in the verse:

I have spent the day in gazing at her moonlike face,
the evening in her conversation, and the night
in her embrace, to which the God of Love gave ardor.
Why should my heart yearn, even now as I set forth
to find her waiting with her eye fixed on my path?
But yes, our festival of love is still unfinished.

[Tāpasavatsarāja 1.14]

And in the Second Act, after this love has been interrupted [by the report of Vāsavadattā’s death in the palace fire], the king’s love survives:

Did not your eyes rain moisture
and your mouth stream honey?
Was not your heart dripping with love
and your limbs with sandal ointment?
What foothold could an earthly fire
find on your body to do its cruel will?
Surely the flame that did the deed
Was of remorseless lightning.

[Tāpasavatsarāja 2.9]

, in the Third Act:

The rooms are blazing on all sides
her attendants have all fled;
the queen is trembling in her fear
and falls at every step.
The fire that ended that unhappy lady’s life
as she cried out for her lord,
though now long since burned out to ash,
keeps burning me.

[Tāpasavatsarāja 3.10]
§ 3.10-14 g L ]

And in the Fourth:

If I slept, I should doubtless dream about the queen and if, in dreaming, I should call this beauty by the queen's name, I should deeply wound her pride; wherefore I somehow kept myself awake, only to suffer the alternative and lose all night by my accursed courtesy the chance of seeing my beloved queen.

[Tāpasavatsarāja 5.3] 7

In the Fifth Act, where the rasa of tragedy gives way before the hope of reunion, the rasa of love-in-union begins to arise:

When the sage's words come true, my love will scarce be able to restrain her anger at my unfaithfulness.

"Forgive me," I will plead and she will stand before me, her sweet words broken by the flowing tears, saying "I am not angry."

[Tāpasavatsarāja 5.1] 8

th Act:

My ministers persuaded me to live by tempting me with your recovery

[Tāpasavatsarāja 6.3a]

and so on.

1. Enter Sāgarikā, holding a painting board and enacting her state of love. Sāgarikā: "Be still, my heart, be still. Give over this constant seeking of a person who cannot be obtained," etc. 2. The attention of the audience would be distracted for a moment by the entrance of another character. But the relaxation is very brief. Susaṅgatā's sympathy soon prompts her friend to exhibit intense symptoms of love. 3. Abhinava alters the obvious meaning of Ānanda's text because the principal rasa, in a well-constructed play such as the Tāpasavatsarāja, never really dies. Technically, therefore, it cannot be revived. What can be revived is some subordinate element such as a vibhāva. This revival may make us more sharply aware of the predominaţ rasa. 4. Literally, "in the painting, which is the plot, the love of V. is the wall." 5. This stanza is quoted by Kuntaka for its felicitous turn of phrase in the last line (Vakrokti 1.7, Vṛtti, p. 23). Abhinava quotes only the beginning and end. I have supplied the middle from Śrī Rāmānuja Muni's printed text of the Tāpas. In the next stanza Abhinava gives only the first line. For the rest
I follow the text of Tāpas, except for reading te (with BP) in place of kim i pada c. 6. The scene of Act Three is Rājagṛha, where Princess Padmāvatī, through the machinations of Yaugandhārayana, has been shown a portrait of King Udayana and by its means has fallen in love with him. Yaugandhārayana has also arranged for Queen Vāsavādattā, who, unknown to the king, escaped the fire and is cognizant of the plot necessary to her husband's welfare, to be given into the care of Padmāvatī. Through the conversation between the two young ladies concerning the subject of the portrait, our attention is drawn from the central love of the play to the new love arising in Padmāvatī. Then King Udayana enters, clad in the garments of an ascetic (tāpasa). His first verse as he comes on stage is the one here quoted, in which the central theme of the play is vividly revived. 7. The stanza appears as 5.24 in the printed text of the play, but the figure is corrected to 5.3 in the errata (skhalitaśodhana) inserted in the middle of the index of verses. In the appendix (pariṣṭa) of his Sanskrit introduction (bhūmikā) the editor discusses the discrepancy in the number of the Act between this passage of the Locana and the manuscript text of the play. He insists that "there is no chance whatever of this stanza's being connected with the Fourth Act." I am inclined to agree for the following reason. The stanza is spoken by Udayana on the morning after his marriage to Padmāvatī, "this beauty" whom he fears to offend. The marriage, which we are told of but do not witness, must occur between Act IV, where the king rescues Padmāvatī from suicide and in pity for her betrothes himself, and Act V. As all the events of a single act in a Sanskrit play take place in one day and as the present verse could not be spoken before the day after the marriage, it must fall in Act V. Abhinava's memory has apparently played him false. 8. The Vidūṣaka has reminded the king long since (Act 3, 13 +13-14) that a holy man had foretold that "after marrying a maiden similar to the queen" he would meet with the queen again. Then on first meeting Padmāvatī the king was struck by her resemblance to Vāsavādattā (3.14-15). Before his marriage to Padmāvatī he already remarked (4.12) that if he should facilitate the prediction by entering this marriage, his queen would be jealous when he regained her. In the present verse Vāsavādattā has not yet reappeared, but the king's eagerness to regain her overcomes his concern for her anger. I have taken the Tāpas. reading purah in pada d, as the verse gains in vividness by the king's desire to have the queen, whether angry or jealous or sad, at least standing before him in the flesh.
§ 3.10–14 h

3.10–14 h

A  [Commentary on point (5) of 3.10–14.] For a work as a whole, such as a nātaka, to become suggestive of rasa, we should understand this further means: that the application of figures of speech should be in conformity with the rasa even though one may have ability [to construct more elaborate figures]. For sometimes an able poet becomes engrossed in the construction of figures and thereby fails to take into consideration how the rasa is to be built. These words may serve as a warning, for there are many examples of poets who have been solely intent on figures and who have neglected rasa.

L  Of figures: this is an objective genitive, to be taken with "application." Many examples: as in the play called Svapnavaśavatata:

Opening by the stroke of her beauty
the eyelash doorpanels of my eyes,
the princess entered the chamber
of my heart.¹

¹ The verse is not found in the extant Svapnavaśavatata and has therefore provoked much comment. It is likely, but not certain, that the extant play is a version of a play by Bhāsa and that Abhinava is referring to another version of the same play. See Kuppusvāmi Sāstrī, Intr. to Āścāryacūdāmani, p. 24; M. Winternitz, Woolner Comm. Volume, pp. 297-308; Otto Stein, IHQ 14 (1938), pp. 633-59; E. J. Thomas, JRAS 1925, pp. 100-104; A. D. Pusalkar, Bhāsa.—A Study, sec. ed., pp. 26-28 (with further references).
 Furthermore:

The type of dhvani that is similar to a reverberation also appears throughout some extended passages.1

1. In both K and the following Vrtti we take the natural interpretation of the words dhvaner asya. As will be seen, Abhinava gives a very different interpretation.

This type of dhvani where the literal meaning is intended but only as leading to an additional meaning, which has been described as carrying a suggestion similar to a reverberation, in both its subtypes, also appears throughout some passages, as for example in the words of Pāncajanya in the Madhumathanavijaya,1 or in the scene where the God of Love meets with his friends in my Viṣamabāṇalīlā,2 or in the Conversation of the Vulture and the Jackal in the Mahābhārata.3

1. The Madhumathanavijaya was a Prakrit khaṇḍakathā; see V. Raghavan, Bhoja’s ŚP, p. 883. Two verses from it are quoted by Śrīdhara on KP p. 121. The verse quoted by Abhinava below is also quoted by Hemacandra, Viveka, p. 81. 2. For the Viṣamabāṇalīlā see Introduction, p. 10. 3. MBh 12.149.

An extended passage may suggest rasa not only directly, but indirectly. In order to show this he begins with the word Furthermore. That variety of dhvani which has been described as similar to a reverberation, whether based on the power of words or on the power
of meaning, sometimes occurs as the suggested element where the passage as a whole occasions the suggestion. Nevertheless this suggested element stands—we must here supply "as a suggestive factor"—to rasadhvani, the matter with which we are here concerned. The passage in the Vṛtti is to be interpreted in the same way. Or, we may construe "dhvaner asya" [as a genitive of instrument] with the words "dyoto y laksyakramah" of the next Kārikā. The sense will thus be: "sometimes by an extended passage, the dhvani of imperceptible succession is also suggested by this variety which has been described as resembling a reverberation."

This amounts to saying that sometimes a whole passage may directly suggest dhvani of the type where the suggested meaning appears like a reverberation, but this ends up by being transformed into rasadhvani. On the other hand, if we interpret the text in a straightforward manner, the present passage, set as it is between preceding and following passages that deal with suggestion of imperceptible interval, will appear as a non sequitur. Furthermore, the words of Pāncajanya and similar passages would be without rasa. So enough of this discussion.

In such passages as the following

How can it be that you who lifted
on the tip of your tusk the whole circle of the earth
now find even a lotus-stem bracelet
too heavy for your limbs!

we have the suggestive words of Pāncajanya, which are intended to reveal Krishna's feelings on being separated from Rukmini. Once these feelings are suggested, we end up with the relevant rasa [love-in-separation] itself.

Where the God of Love meets with his friends: viz., Spri Youth, and Malabar Breeze, we have such words as the following:

Though I may have acted out of line,
without restraint, without consideration,
know that never, even in my dreams,
have I forgotten my devotion to your doctrine.

Such words suggest the nature of Youth and the other [companions of Love], suggestions which end us up with the relevant rasa itself.

Or [in the Conversation]: In order to deceive the parents who have come to a burning ground for the office of cremating their son, a
vulture, who hoped to eat the corpse while it was still day, told them to leave quickly. He urged them in these words:

Stay not at the burning ground
amid its vultures and its jackals,
gruesome with its skeletons
and fearful to all living beings.

Whether hateful or whether dear,
one he has met with Time's decree
no one has here returned to life:
such is the way of mortal man.

[Mahābhārata 12.149.8-9]

But the jackal thought to himself, "Let them stay here till night. Then I shall get the corpse away from the vulture and eat it myself." So he urged the parents thus:

The sun still shines,
so show your love of your son.
This may be but a moment of danger
which when it passes he will live.

How can you be deceived
by the words which the vulture spoke?
How can you abandon
your gold-complexioned child?

[Mahābhārata 12.149.15 and 60]

The intentions of the vulture and the jackal, being thus suggested, bring us to very height of sāntarasa.

1. Abhinava's interpretation of dhvaner asya in K and of asya... dhvaneh in A as meaning rasadhvaneh (instead of vivakṣṭāṇyaparavācyā) is surely wrong. It necessitates the supplying of words that would not have been omitted if they were intended. Equally unnatural is his second explanation, which follows. Abhinava has been led to these unnatural interpretations by a desire to exculpate his author from a charge of non sequitur. K and A had been speaking of rasadhvani and will continue to speak of rasadhvani in 3.16. By hook or by crook Abhinava seeks to avoid a departure from that subject in the present section. 2. Abhinava's point is that the passages from the Visamabānaṇīlī, which Ānanda has in mind, do in fact contain rasa and that consequently Ānanda could not have meant the straightforward interpretation, which excludes rasadhvani, to be accepted. 3. The text of the verse as printed in the Kashi Locana is corrupt. One can make out an acceptable text.
by drawing on Hemacandra's quotation, Viveka 1.151 (p. 81), and on BP's emendations. Thus,

\[ \text{līlādādhaguvūdhasaalamahimandalassa cia ajja} \]
\[ \text{kīsa mṛṇālāharaṇam pi tujha guruśī anīgammi.} \]

The word līlā is used of any attribute of an incarnation of Viṣṇu, as these attributes are all assumed by the god playfully, not as a result of the karmic process. Thus līlā-dādghā means "the tusk which you assumed in your boar incarnation." For dādghā = Sk. daṃṣṭrā see Pischel, para. 76. Uvūdha must be a lightened form of uvūdha (metri causa). The BP reading uddhārion is metrically impossible. On the other hand, BP is correct in reading māhī (Hemacandra, māhī). For cia = eva, see Pischel, para. 336. A literal (unmetrical) Sanskrit rendering of the stanza would be, līlādamstrodvyūdhamahimandalasyayūdhyā / kasāmā mṛṇālāharaṇam api tava guru bhavaty anīgam //

4. The suggestiveness of the verse, as Abhinava sees it, is similar to that of KumSam. 6.84 (see 2.22 A, above) or Sattasaṭ 2.73 (see 2.24 A, above). It takes the reader, or hearer, a moment to assign a cause for the apparent contradiction (virodhābhāṣa) in what Pāṇcajanya says. If Viṣṇu, who lifted up the earth on his tusk in his boar incarnation, now as Krishna finds a lotus-stem bracelet too heavy, it must be because the fever of love makes insupportable even those objects which are normally cooling agents. But as soon as we understand Krishna's fever of love, we immediately have a relish of vipralambha-śṛṅgāra.

"Compare our remarks in 2.22 L, footnote 2. 5. The text of this stanza is wildly corrupt in the Kashi text. One is forced to reconstruct it on the basis of BP, Hemacandra (Viveka 1.152, p. 82), and Mammaṭa (KP 7, exemplar-verse 320, p. 432). All these agree on the first half (in the form printed at the end of this note). But all three show different readings in the second half. BP has sivinē vi tumammi pūna bhāttim [misprint for bhāttim] na pasamāraṁī. Hemacandra has sivinē vi tujha samae pattia bhāttim na pupphusī 1. Mammaṭa has sivinē vi tumammi pūna pattithi bhāttim na pumāmaṇī. Of these versions Hemacandra's is the only one that is metrically correct; but I make no sense of pattia and I think that the final verb should be pummaṁśi i (from pramṛś, to forget). So I would reconstruct the stanza and its Sanskrit translation as follows:

humi avahatthareho nirankuso aha viveharahio vi
sivinē vi tujha samae pattithi bhāttim na pummaṁśīmi.

[bhavāmy apahastitarekho nirankuso 'tha viveharahito 'pi
svapne 'pi tava samaye pratitthi bhāttim na vismarāmi]

6. By suggesting the way in which Youth is affected by Love and presumably in later verses the way in which Spring and Malabar Breeze are devoted, the passage as a whole gives us śṛṅgārarasa itself. 7. MBh reads punar for ceha in 8c. 8. The vulture cannot see at night and so eats carrion only
by day. The jackal can see at night. 9. Abhinava’s readings in these two verses are quite peculiar, being furnished by none of the MSS, including those from Kashmir, which are collated in the Critical Edition. But such was his authority that Hemacandra (AC p. 81) and Mammata (KP, exemplar vss. 95–96) repeat his version without correction. The MBh variants are as follows. 15b, mā bhayam (sāmpratam); c, bahurūpo; d, jīvetāpi; 60a, imam (amum); b, bhūṣanaiḥ samalankṛtam; c, putram (bālās); d, pitṛpiṇḍadām (avāśankītāḥ). In 15c one may argue that Abhinava’s version is superior. His sense seems to be as follows. This particular hour, viz., near twilight, is subject to many dangers from evil spirits. Accordingly, it is possible that the child is temporarily possessed by an evil spirit. When the hour has passed, viz., at sundown, he may come to life again. Bahuvighno leads to this sense better than bahurūpo.

10. The intentions of the two animals are suggested. This is the vastuddvani. Once we realize how callous and self-interested they are and, by implication, that most people are similar, we become disgusted with the world. This feeling of disenchantment is the basis of sāntarasa (the aesthetic perception of peace).

K The dhvani (suggestion) of imperceptible sequence [i.e., rasa-dhvani] is sometimes suggested by sup (case endings), tiri (personal endings of a verb), vacana (grammatical number), sambandha (relationship as expressed by the genetive); by the force of the kārakas (complements of the verbal activity: agent, object, locus, etc), and by kṛt (primary suffixes attaching to the verb root), taddhita (secondary suffixes attaching to a substantive stem), and by compounds.1

1. The distinction between sup, a morphological category, and vacana, sambandha, or kāraka, which are semantic categories, must be maintained in grammar but is of no real importance to the present purpose. Take the two sentences: annaṁ labhate “he receives food” and annāya vrajati grāmam “he goes to the village for food.” In both sentences food is the object complement of an activity (karmakāraka). In the first, where the activity is expressed by a verb, the accusative sup is used, whereas in the second, where the activity (“to seek”) is unexpressed by a verb, the dative sup is used; cf. Pāṇ. 2.3.14. But in a context where rasa (say, karuṇarasa) is occasioned by the fact that...
food is the object of a poor man's journey, one may point equally well to the sup or to the kāraka as the suggestive factor. Hence it is that in the examples which follow one may often substitute one of the listed factors for another.

§ 3.16 A Dhvani in the highest sense (dhvaner âtmā), which is of imperceptible sequence, namely rasa [bhāva, rasābhāsa, and bhāvabhāsa], is [sometimes] found to be manifested by the use of particular case endings, particular personal endings, particular grammatical number, particular relationships; by the force of the kārikas, by particular primary suffixes, particular secondary suffixes, and particular compounds. By the use here of the word "and" we may understand particles, verbal prefixes, tenses, and other such factors to be included also. Thus:

It is already a humiliation
that I should have opponents. But that among them
there should be a holy man and that he here should slay
a host of demons: can it be that Rāvana lives?
Shame on my son akrajit! What use
was in the waking of my brother Kumbhakarna?
What use these twenty arms, so vainly proud
of having robbed that miserable village known as heaven!

[Mahānātaka 9.15 = Hanumānātaka 14.6, variant]

In this verse nearly all the above factors can be clearly seen as suggestors. The suggestiveness of sup, sambindha, and vacana appears in the phrase me yad arayah "that there should be opponents of me."² In the phrase tatrāpy asau tāpasah "even among them this holy man" we have suggestiveness of a secondary suffix and a particle.³ In the passage so 'py atrāiva niḥanti rākṣasabalam jīvaty aho rāvanaḥ "that he should slay here a host of demons [and] that Rāvana lives" we have the personal endings of the verbs [ti of niḥanti and jīvati] and the force of the kārakas [locus expressed by atra, object by balam]. In the second half of the verse, dhig dhik śakrajitam, etc., "shame, shame on Śakrajit," etc., we have suggestiveness of a primary suffix [the kvip suffix of śakrajit], of a secondary suffix [the suffix tikac of grāmaṭikā], of a compound svargagraṃatikā, and of a verbal prefix [vi in viluṇṭhana].

In a poem of this sort, put together with so many suggestive factors, an extraordinary beauty of composition is apparent. For if there is a certain beauty of composition in a poem where a single word reveals a suggestion, how much greater is this beauty where there is a combination of so many [suggestive factors], as here in the verse just quoted. For
while the word “Rāvana” is here ornamented by the type of suggestion where the denoted meaning is shifted (arthāntarasamkramitavācya), many other kinds of suggestion, which we have just explained, appear in the stanza.

1. It is worth noting as indicative of the differences of evaluation among Indian critics that this verse, so much admired by our authors, is quoted as an example of poetic faults by Mammaṭa (7, ex. 183). Mammaṭa objects to the word order of the first line and to the attributive position in the fourth line of vrthā, which should be in predicative position. A fault that most commentators pass over in silence is the use of prabodhitavatā, active, for metrical reasons in place of prabodhitena, passive. Nāgoji explains it as prabudh + bhāve kta + matup: “being one of whom there has been an awakening.”

2. Sup and plural number appear in arayah. The sambandha of self and opponents is expressed by the genitive in me. Each of these factors emphases the outrage felt by Rāvana and consequently the raudrarasa of the verse.

3. tāpasah = tapas + taddhita suffix an (Pan. 5.2.103). The particle is api “even.” For the suggestive force see Abhinava below.

4. In the foregoing text our author has shown all the suggestive factors of rasadhvani, which arises without perceived interval, from the phoneme up to the work as a whole. There would thus appear to be nothing left in the area to describe. However, in order to furnish instruction to lovers of poetry, he examines the suggestive factors further, testing them in a subtle way by positive and negative agreement: by sup, tīri, etc. But I would understand the following statement [of the Kārikā] together with [that of] the Vṛtti, in this way. A suggestion of the type similar to a reverberation may appear through the agency of sup endings, etc., this suggestion taking the form of a speaker’s intention. Now this suggestion similar to a reverberation effected by sup endings, etc., in turn suggests that type of dhvani where the succession is imperceptible.

Sometimes: this is to be construed with the preceding Kārikā. For sup endings, etc., always reveal a particular intention of the speaker; but in the examples here given this suggested intention by its assuming the form of a vibhāva suggests the rasa, [bhāva], etc., appropriate to that [vibhāva]. To state the matter in other words: Rasa may be suggested directly by the various suggestive factors from a single phoneme up to the work as a whole by [the poet’s directly] designating a vibhāva; or it may be suggested indirectly through the suggestion [rather
than the designation] of a vibhāva, etc. Now it is here [viz., to this latter case] that the statement [of 3.15] applies, which spoke incidentally of this indirect sort of suggestiveness belonging to a work as a whole. Now the present Kārikā speaks of this [indirect suggestiveness] as belonging to phonemes, words, etc. Hence where the Vṛtti says is found to be manifested and later says can be seen as suggestors, we must supply “indirectly, through the suggesting of a vibhāva, etc.”

[Comment on the verse:] “That I should have opponents”: here the impropriety of a relation (sambandha) of opponents to “me” and the plural of “opponents” suggest a stimulation (vibhāva) of anger. [That is to say, Rāvana feels that no one should dare oppose him, how much less many persons.] Tāpasa (holy man) is formed by the secondary suffix an added to tapas (ascetic fervor) with possessive sense: “he of whom there is ascetic fervor.” By this suffix is suggested [Rāma’s] lack of manliness. The combination of particles tatra and api (“even among them”) suggests the utter impossibility of Rāma’s opposition. So long as I live there should be no slaying [of my rākṣasas by enemies]. The [second] api (that “even he should slay) suggests that the agent of this slaying is a mere human. “Here” viz., in a land ruled by me: this is the locative complement of the verbal activity while “a host of demons” is the object complement through their being altogether slain by him. The words that carry the personal ending (i.e., nihanti) and the force of these complements (i.e., atra, rākṣasabalam) suggest a failure of active measures [on Rāvana’s part] inasmuch as this inconceivable situation has come upon him. The word “Rāvana” carries suggestion of the sort “shifted to another object,” as has been explained before. The particles dhig dhik (shame, shame!) taken together with the upapada compound [viz., sakrajit] suggests that [the literal meaning of that compound, namely that] “he has conquered Indra” is a myth, while the compound beginning with “heaven,” viz., svargagrāmatikāvilunthana-vṛthācchūnath, suggests Rāvana’s memory of his own brave deeds. The secondary suffix tiṣṭ in grāmatikā, indicating smallness, together with its feminine inflection, suggests a village deserving of no respect. The prefix vi in vilunthana (robbing) suggests a pitiless invasion. The indeclinable vṛthā (“in vain”) suggests a belittling of his bold deeds. The word “arms” by its plural number suggests that these arms rather [than being helpful] are a mere burden. What else can we say than that every portion of this verse, no matter how minutely we analyze it, appears to be suggestive.
He now shows the result of this demonstration: [In a poem] of this sort, etc. He then examplifies what he has said about a single word's [giving beauty to a poem]: as in the verse just quoted.\textsuperscript{11}

1. That is to say, the analysis of suggestive factors is logically complete without the present Kārikā. All cases of the suggestiveness of sup, tiṇ, etc. fall under the categories phoneme, word, sentence, work as a whole, already listed. But it may be useful for the exact appreciation of a poem or for guidance in the writing of poetry to observe just what sorts of words and word elements give rise to the suggestion of rasa. By observing the effect of a poem with (anvaya) and without (vyatireka) a particular sup, tiṇ, etc., one can see in greater detail exactly where the suggestiveness of rasa may lie.

2. The adversative particle tu may, but does not necessarily, imply that another commentator had understood the passage otherwise. Abhinava is here continuing the line of interpretation that he adopted in 3.15. The particle tu differentiates this line from the straightforward interpretation. The straightforward interpretation would see in all the examples of suggestion that Ānanda notices in the Mahānāṭaka verse so many instances of direct rasadhvani (of imperceptible succession). Abhinava denies this. What we have, he says, is first a vastudhvani, a suggestion of Rāvana's intention or feelings. This suggestion comes after a perceptible interval from our noticing the suggestive factors such as sup, tiṇ, kārakasakti, etc. But once we have this suggestion of Rāvana’s feelings, we have the very vibhāva (stimulative or revelatory factor) that immediately suggests raudrarasa (the aesthetic perception of anger and cruelty). The succession from sup, etc., to rāvanābhīpṛāvyakti is perceptible; the succession from rāvanābhīpṛāvyakti to raudrarasa is not perceptible. Abhinava here shows an admirable analysis of the aesthetic process, but I cannot believe that his interpretation renders accurately Ānanda's intention.

3. Abhinava construes thus: dhvaner asya [i.e., anurananopamadhvaner] dyotyo 'laksyakrama kvacit, “the alaksyakrama variety is suggested by this [anurananarūpa-]dhvani.”

4. Place a comma at Locana, p. 348, line 2, after pratipādānadvārena. One must understand abhidhayā before vibhāvādipratipādanadvārena, in contrast to cases where the vibhāvas, etc., are suggested rather than directly expressed.

5. Bandhasya here equals prabandhasya. Abhinava uses the word prasaṅgāt (incidentally) to show that anurananopamadhvaner was not in itself the subject of discussion in 3.15 but was brought in because of its indirect effecting of rasa. 6. I have supplied the word ca at the end of the sentence mama bahuvacanam. This keeps sambandha and vacanam parallel, as they are in the Vṛtti. 7. tatra is listed in the cādigana (Pān. 1.4.57) of nipātas. 8. “Rāvana,” in addition to directly denoting an individual, suggests that individual's possession of those properties of strength, heroism, cruelty, for which Rāvana was famous. Cf. the remarks on the word “Rāma” 3.1 a L, above. 9. One may put a comma after
the word sahakrtaḥ of Locana p. 349, line 4. With ākhyāyikeyaṁ iti one must supply uvaṁjaktatvaṁ from the clause which follows. The formation sakrajit is prescribed by Pāñini. Although Pāñini does not give the formation a sense of past time (uṣṇapa ṣuffixes with the sense of past time begin only after Pāñini. 3.2.84), it is often so taken by commentators and dictionaries; thus Sadākalpadruma defines the word sakrajit: sakram jītavān, Rāvaṇaputraḥ. The Rāmāyana tells of his gaining the name Indrajit (= Sakrajit) by his having defeated Indra (Rām. Vulgate, 7.29.20ff.).

10. For iti svārthikaṭaddhitaprayogasya we should probably read ity alpa-ṛthikataddhitaprayogasya. Compare Nāgoji's Uddyota commenting on the same verse as quoted by Mammaṭa 7, ex. 184: grāmasabdāḥ alpārthe taddhitā iti bahuvacanabodhyas ūkacpratyayah. This suffix ūkac is not mentioned by Pāñini. Nāgoji justifies it by the fiction invented by Kāśikā on 4.1.76, that the word taddhitāḥ in that sūtra, being used in the plural, implies that there are many taddhita suffixes, even in addition to those prescribed by Pāñini. One of these, according to Nāgoji, is ūkac, used after grāma and carrying the sense of “small.” 11. What Abhinava means is that the following explanation of the dhvani carried by the word Rāvāṇa exemplifies the beauty that the suggestiveness of a single word can give, as opposed to the greater beauty furnished by a plurality of suggestors.

### A

This sort of composition is frequently found in the works of great men who are endowed with special imaginative genius. Take, for example, this verse of the great sage Vyāsa:

> All times of happiness are passed,  
> times of hardship are at hand;  
> tomorrow and tomorrow every day grows worse,  
> for the earth has lost her youth.

[Mahābhārata 1.119.6]

In this verse we see primary suffix, secondary suffix, and grammatical number producing a suggestion of imperceptible succession [i.e., rasadhvani]. In the phrase “the earth has lost her youth” we can see a suggestion of the type where the direct meaning is entirely set aside. 1
1. The word *yauvana* (youth) in its direct meaning can refer only to an age span of living creatures. As applied to the earth it can only be used metaphorically, the direct meaning being set aside. Cf. 2.1c A, L.

L Times in which happiness has "passed" (*atikrānta*), that is, in which happiness does not ever occur as a present reality.\(^1\) All such times have passed; not the smallest portion of time now makes for happiness.\(^2\) "Times of hardship are at hand" (*pratyupasthita*), that is, they are facing us, they have returned to us, having been afar they are now present. Since every portion of time now furnishes the most manifold misery, time (as a whole) first suggests a disenchantment with the world and this suggests *sāntarasa* (the aesthetic perception of peace).\(^3\) He speaks of space as well (as time): the earth [a vast extension of space] is such that tomorrow and tomorrow—that is, morning after morning, from day to day, its days are *pāpiya*, that is, connected with evil ones, under the guidance of most evil persons.\(^4\) The sense is that time is inherently evil to begin with, but by the spacial evil consisting in a space coterminous with earth being under the governance of the most evil persons, time has become especially evil. Thus, tomorrow and tomorrow, that is, from day to day, [the earth is] losing its youth, is becoming like an old woman with whom the pleasures of sex are unimaginable; and because of this loss of youth every day that arrives is worse than the day that has passed. Alternative explanations are that the sage has used *pāpiya* as a word ending in the comparative suffix *iyasun*,\(^5\) or that he is using a denominative ending in *nic*.\(^6\)

Is entirely set aside: He means that this type of suggestion is subordinate to the *rasadāvani*.

1. This is what is suggested by the past participial suffix *kta* (a primary suffix) of *atikrānta*. 2. This is what is suggested by the plurality of "times." 3. Abhinava here specifies the double process of suggestion that he holds to throughout his interpretation of 3.15-16. The first, delayed, suggestion (*anu-rānanopamadāvani*) is of the speaker's intention, viz., that he is disenchanted with the world. This leads to an immediate suggestion (*asamlaksutakramavyāngya*) of *sāntarasa*. 4. This farfetched interpretation is in order to avoid admitting that the author has committed a solecism in writing *pāpiyadivasa* for *pāpiyodivasa*. Abhinava is taking *pāpiya* to be formed from *pāpa* plus the *saisika taddhita* suffix *cha* (= *iya*), which according to Pāṇ. 4.2.114 may be employed after stems with an initial *ṛddhi* vowel (such as *pāpa*-). Its sense could be the general sense of connection therewith (*tasyedam*, Pāṇ. 4.3.120).
which Abhinava renders more specific by tatsvāmika. Later he will admit
the natural analysis (iṣa = the comparative suffix -iṣa) as an alternative
explanation. 5. In which case the dropping of s would be ārya (by epic
licence). 6. BP explains. First one forms the comparative pāpiyaś"more
evil." One then adds nic (= i) to form a denominative verb meaning "it
makes greater evil" (Patañjali 3.1.26, Vārt. 5, tāt karotity upasāṅkhyānam).
One then adds ac to form an agent noun: pāpa + iṣa + nic + ac "[days
which are] makers of ever greater evil." Now before the nic suffix the noun
stem (by 6.4.135, Vārt. 1, of which a variant is included as a ganasūtra in the
curādi dhātupātha) must be treated as it would be treated before the suffix
iṣṭha; that is, the last vowel of the stem together with its following consonant
must drop (tiḻopa). This gives us pāpiy + nic + ac. Finally Pān. 6.4.51
(ner aniti) comes into play: the suffix nic drops before any further suffix that
dispenses with the union vowel i (as does ac). Hence pāpiy + a.

A The suggestiveness of case endings and of these other ele­
ments is frequently found in the works of great poets both singly and
in groups. An instance of the suggestiveness of a word because of its
case ending1 is:

On which your friend the peacock perches,
learning how to dance
from my beloved's clapping of her hands
beautiful with bracelets.

[Kālidāsa, Meghadūta 2.16cd]2

1. Literally "of a word with case ending"; but as every noun in Sanskrit
has a case ending, the meaning is as we have translated. The suggestiveness
of the instance quoted could equally well have been attributed to the gram­
matical number of the noun: compare our remarks in footnote 1 to 3.16 K.
2. The half verse is part of the Yakṣa's address to the cloud messenger. Pea­
cocks are the friends of clouds because they dance as though in joy as the
moonsoon approaches. Abhinava explains the suggestiveness of the plural in
"clappings," which I should fail to see without his aid. Note that Ānanda
preserves what is doubtless Kālidāsa's original reading śīnjadvalaya (with the
participle śīnjat) in place of the corrected form śīnjāvalaya (with the noun
śīnjā) transmitted by Mallinātha. See Pathak's note, p. 106 of his ed. of Megh. The reason for Mallinātha's correction is that śīji (Dhātupātha 2.17) is an anudāttet verb. Thus its present participle, if used, should be śīnjāna, not śīnjat.

L Of a word because of its case ending: What our author has in mind is to give examples of the suggestiveness of these factors taken singly, now that examples of their combined use have been given. "Clappings": the plural suggests that her skill [in music and dancing] is of many varieties and so stimulates the rasa of love-in-separation.¹

1. Tāla means not only clapping of the hands but also musical tempo. The suggestion seen by our authors seems to be that the Yakṣa's wife teaches the peacock various rhythms. Her doing so implies an artistic skill that renders her absence more poignant to the Yakṣa.

A An example of a verb that is suggestive because of its personal ending is:

Go away! Don't wipe my miserable eyes.
God intended them only for weeping
So they got drunk on the first sight of you, and failed to show me what your heart was like.¹

1. The verse is found in a non-vulgate version of the Sattasaśi (Weber No. 706). In the Kashi text of the Locana the Prakrit as usual is corrupt. For the opening words read osara rottum; in the second half read damsana- and jehim. For the Prakrit word pumsa (= Sk. apamsa) see Pischel, para. 486.

L [After giving a Sanskrit translation of the verse, Abhinava continues:] Since a drunkard knows nothing, no one is at fault here;
everything has been done by fate. Go away! Make no false efforts [at reconciliation], for fate cannot be reversed. Here the imperative with its personal inflection is suggestive, as are the other words which it flavors. This is what our author has in mind.

1. BP says that what "go away" suggests is the woman's jealousy. Actually, the second person active of the imperative (ɔsara and mā pumsa) is more violent and emotional than it would be in Latin or English. Politeness normally dictates a use of the third person passive in Sanskrit imperatives.

A. Another example is:

Don't block my way; move on.
Young fool, you are utterly shameless!
I cannot stay from my chores;
I have to take care of an empty house.

1. The verse presupposes that a traveler has stopped a young woman on the road and has tried to engage her in conversation. Secretly she wishes to accept him as a lover. So under the pretense of sending him off she informs him that there is an empty house nearby where they can make love unobserved. An "empty house" is the conventional rendezvous of village lovers in Sanskrit poetry; see note on SRK Translation, 813. The woman is probably not referring to her own house. The verse is given with different readings in Weber's Satasaí 961 and in Hemacandra's AC, Parikh's edition, p. 84 (the NS edition simply copies from the Locana). In the Locana version we must emend to rundhī no [Weber: mā pantha rundhasu pahām; Hem.: mā pantha rūndha mahām]. For aniricchāo read anirikkhāo = Sk. anirikṣyakāh "not free from constraint," i.e., dependent on the command of others.

L (After a translation of the Prakrit, Abhinava continues:) Here the imperative "move on" with its personal ending suggests the following. You are inexperienced to show your feeling thus where other people are present. But there is an empty house that could serve as a rendezvous. That is where we should go.
Both this verse and the next exhibit some similarity to the verse quoted under 1.4 b, "Go your rounds freely, gentle monk," etc. In all three verses a command is to be understood otherwise than as expressed. But our authors took the verse of 1.4 b as an example merely of vastudhvani whereas these two verses are said to exhibit rasadhvani, directly according to Ananda if we understand him correctly, indirectly by a suggestion of vastudhvani leading immediately to rasadhvani, according to Abhinava. One may ask where one draws the line. Where does an ironic use of words lead only to the lower form of suggestion (vastudhvani) and where does it become the soul of poetry (rasadhvani)? The answer, I think, lies in the passion of the utterance. In both this verse and the following a woman is directly addressing her potential lover. We feel her passion in the imperatives that she uses. The verse bhamma dhammia, addressed to a stupid old monk, while it hints at an erotic situation, lacks any passion of utterance and ends up in the reader's heart as merely comical.

A  An example [of a suggestive relationship expressed by] the positive is:

Go somewhere else you innocent puppy.
Don't stand here staring at me bathing.
A bathing beach is not a place for men afraid of their wives.¹

Prakrit verses that make use of the suffix ka² show the suggestiveness that is possible in secondary suffixes. Ka expresses heavy scorn.

1. In the text of the Prakrit verse join hnaanti, together and separate puloesi eam. Eam represents the Vedic etad "bere, thus," not Sk. evam, which is evam in Prakrit. In the second half, read cia na hoi for viana hoi. ² As in bala[k]a and bhuru[k]anam in the verse.

L  Go somewhere else, bala [lit., pitiable child], you of ungrown intelligence. Why do you keep looking at me here as I am bathing? Bho (you!) is a form of scornful address. A beach is not to be related to men afraid of their wives. That is, between those who are afraid of their wives and this place the relation is widely remote. By expressing
such a relation, a woman who is covertly in love with the man shows her jealousy.

That make use of the suffix *ka*: By mention of *ka* he implies the same possibility of other secondary suffixes. Specifically he is speaking of sentences of poetry in which the suffix *ka* is used, as in *jāyābhīru-kānām* (pitiable men who are afraid of their wives). In this word the suffix *ka* expresses the heaviest scorn, as if to ask, “Who are more despicable in the world than they whose affection is bound to their wives and who are strangers to real passion?”

\[\text{§ 3.16 f l \[ 463}\]

A There is a suggestiveness of compounds when they are used with appropriateness of literary style.\(^1\) And there is suggestiveness of particles, as in:

I cannot bear to lose my love
and at one stroke endure these days,
to which the newly risen clouds
impart their lovely shade.

[Kālidāsa. *Vikramorvasīya* 4.10]\(^2\)

Here the particle “and” (*ca*) is suggestive.

1. *Vṛttyaucityena*: the same term as in 3.7 a A; see footnote 2 on that passage. But Ānanda probably means here that the degree of compounding must be in accord with the genre of the work. Ānanda gives no example here of this type of suggestiveness. 2. The association of the monsoon with days spent at home in marital bliss (cf. *HOS* Vol. 44, p. 127, para. 6) makes Purūravas’ loss of Urvaśī harder to bear. In d the reading of our text *nirātatāpārdharamyaṅaiḥ* makes no sense to me. Dr. Krishnamoorthy does the best he can with it: “I believe the beauty of days will be halved for want of any sunshine,” but the point of the verse must be that the days are too beautiful to bear, not that their beauty is reduced. So I have taken the reading of the printed editions of the play *nirātatāpatvaramyaṅaiḥ*.

\[L\] The particle *ca*: he uses the singular in the sense of a class to refer to the two occurrences of *ca* (“both and”). These two
occurrences tell us that the separation [from Urvâsi] and the advent of the moonsoon, coming by chance together, like a boil on a tumor, are more than life can bear. By this means the word "lovely" (ramyaih) becomes especially stimulative of rasa.

Another example is:

She turned her face aside, with its long lashes, and her fingers covered her lips which struggled to pronounce the words of prohibition. I dared to lift her face, but dared not kiss it.

[Kâlidâsa, Sâkuntala 3.22]

Here it is the particle "but" (tu).

The particle "but": By its indicating his regret it suggests that if the king had only received one kiss, he would have satisfied his every desire. This is what our author has in mind.

Note that while the suggestive function of particles has generally been recognized [by the grammarians], what we are referring to here is their suggestiveness with respect to rasa. Verbal prefixes have [this sort of] suggestiveness in such verses as:

Rice grains lie scattered at the foot of trees, dropped by the parrots from their nesting hol Here and there are rocks profuse with oil, that show where oil-nuts have been lately ground. The deer with long-acquainted confidence stroll by untroubled by the sounds of men. The paths that lead from the waterside are tracked with drippings from the hem of hermits' bark-cloth.

[Kâlidâsa, Sâkuntala 1.13]
1. The verse describes Kâsyapa's hermitage, which King Dusyanta and his charioteer have just entered. "Oil-nuts" (*ingudīphala*): *Terminalia catalpa*. The leaves were fed to camels (*MBh* 2.47.4). The oil expressed from the nut was used to heal wounds (*Śāk. 4.14) and, by persons living removed from civilization, as a substitute for mustard or sesame oil. Märkandeya *Purāṇa* 28.26 remarks that the *vanaprastha* must use "wild oil." The point of Ānanda's quotation lies in the word *prasnigdhāh* "profuse with oil," where the prefix *pra* intensifies the basic sense of *snigdha* "oily." 2. The Kāvyamālā edition here adds a second quotation and a summary remark of the *Vṛtti*. As Abhinava does not comment on the passage, it may not be genuine. But given the rarity of remarks in Sanskrit on the aesthetic effect of meter, the passage is of interest. It runs:

\[
\begin{align*}
& \text{madamukharakapotam unmayūram} \\
& \text{praviravāmanavṛksasannivesām} \\
& \text{vanam idam avagāhamānabhīmaṁ} \\
& \text{vyasanam ivopari dārūvatvam eti} \\
& \text{ityādau prāśabdasyaupacchandikasya ca vyānjanatvam adhikam dyotate},
\end{align*}
\]

which may be translated:

With its enraptured sound of doves and eager peacocks,
this waste land of sparse, dwarfed trees
is like unto human vice: it is dangerous to him who enters
and bodes cruel consequence.

In these examples suggestiveness is intensified by the prefix *pra* [sc., in the example from the *Śākuntala*] and by the *aupacchandasīka* meter [sc., in the example just given].

With regard to the meter the remark seems to me to be just. The contrast between the happily tripping syllables of the line openings and the heavy cadence (— — — — — —) is very nicely parallel to the contrast between the tempting beauties of the forest (and of vice) as first seen and then the heavy disaster which follows if one yields to the temptation to enter.

§ 3.16 h L  

Has generally been recognized: He says this because it is proclaimed in the schools of the grammarians that particles are suggestive (or indicative, *dyotaka*) on the ground that they lack the properties necessary for direct denotation. Thus, they are used as prefixes [to verbs], or are dependently used; they lack case inflections and they lack gender and number.¹

"Profuse with oil": The prefix *pra* intensifies the meaning and by telling us that the *ingudi* nuts were especially juicy suggests the great
beauty of the hermitage.² [Another commentator has made] the remark that "what is suggested is the strong craving of the hermit for this particular kind of nut." This is wrong, for in the play this is the speech of the king, not of the hermit.³ So enough.

1. A particle can only indicate which of several potential denotations is to be given to the independent, inflected words. See Vākyapadīya 2.189–206 and Abhyankar, Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar, s.v. nipātoddyyotakatva. But this sort of dyotakatva has nothing to do with rasa. ² This remark is quoted verbatim, but without attribution, by Rāghavabhaṭṭa in his commentary on the Śāk. ad loc. ³ If the hermit had been speaking, the intensive expression might suggest his intense feelings about ingudi nuts. But the king has no use for ingudi oil. If he notices its profuseness it can only be to suggest the wealth and beauty of the forest products in the hermitage.

A The use of two or three prefixes in a single word is not to be counted a fault if it is consistent with the suggestion of rasa, as it is in the passage:

When darkness drops her garment, straightway the sun god,
perceiving from on high the nakedness of creatures …

[Mayūra, Sūryaśataka 4ab]¹

or in the verse:

So human is the guise in which you serve …

1. Perceiving their nakedness, the sun sends forth his rays to clothe them. The word samudvīksya (perceiving from on high) contains three prefixes. ² Abhinava completes the verse, the source of which we have not found. It sounds very like the Bhāgavatapurāṇa. The reference is doubtless to God's incarnation as Krishna.

L Two or three: By this he would prohibit more than three. That the blessed sun god looks with care (vi-), from above (ut-), with
perfect [comprehension] (sam-), suggests his great compassion. The second verse referred to runs as follows:

So human is the guise in which you serve
that the foolish seek to understand you, reasoning
with inferences made according to their wit:
you, incomprehensible
even to the greatest yogis.

The participle samupācarantam is to be understood as "acting toward (ā = nearly, or in behalf of) in perfect (sam = samyañc) disguise (upa = upamśukṛtvā). Hereby is suggested the extraordinary compassion of God as he acts in various ways [in behalf of his devotees].

§ 3.16j A ]

A Particles may be similarly [multiplied with suggestive effect], as in

Ah verily, your courage must be envied!

[Kālidāsa, Kumārasambhava 3.20]¹

or in such verses as:

Once, when people saw a man of virtue
they thought that only then they lived,
nor could contain themselves but danced for joy
as tears course down their happy cheeks.
Woe is me, alas, alack! Nowhere
can I find a refuge of such people,
for Fate, the scoundrel, prospering only those
who hate the good, has brought them all to death.²

1. The remark applies to Kāma as he offers to attack Śiva. 2. The Kāvyamālā ed. has svavapuṣi for sma vupuṣi. While mānti svavapuṣi is more idomatic, one needs the sma to throw the first half of the verse into past time. The contrast of virtuous past with vicious present is an important part of the suggestion of the verse.
Similarly: the sense is that the use of two or three such particles if done suggestively is not to be counted a fault. In the first of the two quotations the two particles aho and bata increase the suggestion of wonder. In the second quotation hā and dhik increase the suggestion of disenchantment.¹

1. Thus the first verse quoted suggests adbhutarasa, the second sāntarasa. In the second verse there are actually four exclamations: hā, dhik, kaśṭam, and bata. But kaśṭam is not a nipāta, because it can be inflected.

A The repetition of a word, too, if used for suggestiveness, sometimes adds beauty, as in a verse like the following:

A scoundrel aims at his own interest,
puts his mind to deception, and brings forth words filled with flattery and artifice.
It is not that good men do not know his tricks;
they know, but cannot bring themselves
to disappoint him of a favor.¹

1. The verse, attributed in Subhāṣītāvalī (271) to an otherwise unknown Bhagavattārārogya, is quoted by Mammaṭa (7 ex. 312) and Hemacandra (AC 3, ex. 232). The repetition of the negative suggests that good men know these tricks very well. What the repetition of vidanti suggests is less clear. Abhinava takes it to suggest that they know still more. Perhaps he means that they are aware of the selfishness and deceitfulness of most men. Mammaṭa and Hemacandra say that it excludes others from this knowledge. In any event the two repetitions seem to emphasize the wisdom and generosity of good men.

L The foregoing brings up the subject¹ of another form of repetition which may be suggestive: The repetition of a word, etc. The
term “word” is meant to imply the inclusion of sentences and other units also wherever they may be [repeated suggestively].

“They know”: The suggestion is that they know everything else as well. An example of a repeated sentence is [in the Ratnāvali] where, after [the stage manager speaks] the words “Look you, from even the farthest island,” etc., there follows [the speech of Yaugandharāyaṇa] “No doubt about it; from even the farthest island.” The repetition here suggests that the goal of the play will be obtained without obstruction.2 In the repeated passage “What, what! Shall they be safe while I still live?” what is suggested is [Bhima’s] excessive wrath.3 [In the Vikramorvasīya] the repetition of the words “Lord of all mountains, have you seen that perfect beauty?” suggests [Purūravas’] excess of madness.4

1. The subject is incidental to the main topic, as the suggestions under this heading are of the vastudhvani type, not of rasa. 2. The passage here referred to (Ratn. 1.7 and ff.) exemplifies the kathodghāta type of prastāvaṇā, as Abhinava states in his ABh (BHNS Vol. 3, p. 94). The prastāvaṇā is the introduction or prelude to a play. Bharata (20.33) speaks of its five angāni (Abhinava interprets as “types”), of which the kathodghāta is where a character enters by taking up a sentence that has been used in a conversation between the stage manager and one of the actors (20.35). As appears from other accounts of the kathodghāta and from the examples adduced, the sentence must be applied to one situation by the stage manager and repeated with an application to the plot of the play by the entering character. In the Ratn. the stage manager has been comforting his wife, the chief actress, by assuring her that fate will bring back her daughter “from even the farthest island.” Yaugandharāyaṇa, on the other hand, applies the words to the princess of Ceylon, whom he hopes to see married to King Udayana. He has just heard that she has been saved from shipwreck and brought to Ujjayinī. He has just heard that she has been saved from shipwreck and brought to Ujjayinī. 3. The passage here referred to forms the kathodghāta of the Venāsamhāra (Poona ed. 1.7–8; Madras ed. 1.9–10). The stage manager concludes his stanza of propitiation with the words “And may the sons of the Kuru king rest safe with all their followers” (svasthā bhavantu kururājasutāḥ sabhṛtyāḥ). There are then heard offstage the words of the wrathful Bhima. The text differs in the different editions, but all contain the words svasthā bhavantu (or bhavantī) mayi jīvatī “shall they rest safe while I still live?” The stage manager then retires and Bhima enters with Sahadeva. 4. The reference is to the scene of Purūravas’ madness Vik. 4.51. He asks the mountain if it has seen his lost Urvasī: sarvākṣitibhṛtām nātha, drṣṭā sarvāṇgasundarī... mayā vimhitā tvayā “Lord of all mountains, have you seen that perfect beauty lost by me?” He then listens to the echo of his words from the mountain caves. The echo repeats the words exactly but Purūravas construes them differently, as “O lord
of kings, I have seen that perfect beauty lost by you." In the ABh (BhNS Vol. 2, p. 458) Abhinava gives this passage as an example of the viṭṭhayāṅga called triṁata. The "parts of a Vīthi" (viṭṭhayāṅga) are often transposed to types of plays other than the Vīthi proper; see Raghavan, Bhoja's ŠP, p. 573. "That is to be known as triṁata where because of similarity of sound many meanings are artificially construed" (BhNS 18.124, Vol. 2, p. 458). Commenting on Bharata, Abhinava says, "many meanings: sc. where the text is made out to consist of question and answer." In the exemplar verse, the sentence that is first construed as a question is next construed as an answer. A simpler version of the same rhetorical trick is found in Ovid's delightful story of Echo and Narcissus, Meta. 3.380ff. (dixerat, ecquis adest? et, adest, responderat Echo, etc.).

A tense may be suggestive, as in the followi

The floods level out high and low;
ever fewer come travelers
over the roads, which soon wi
impassible even to wishes.

[Sattasaś 7.73]¹

Here the phrase "roads, which soon will be" the suffix of the word bhāvīṣyanti (will be) by its expressing a particular time shows itself as a strengthening of the rasa (emotional content), for the sense of the verse contains rasa when it is viewed as stimulative of love-in-separation caused by the husband's staying abroad.

Just as it is here the suffix of a word that proves suggestive, it may elsewhere be the stem. For example:

That house with crumbling walls, and now
this palace stretching to the skies;
that old decrepit cow, and here comes marching
this troop of cloud-black elephants;
that humble sound of pounding rice
and this sweet singing of young damsels:
wonder of wonders, that the days have raised
the brahmin up to such prosperity!²
In this stanza, it is the stem of the word *divasaih* ("days") that is suggestive.

Pronouns, too, can be suggestive, as in the verse just quoted. And it is because he realized that the pronouns were suggestive that the poet did not use a word [directly expressive of contrast,] like *kva* ("how different!"). Sensitive readers will be able to ferret out along these lines even other types of suggestive factors. All of these of course were included in [our] speaking of the suggestiveness of words, sentences, and style (cf. 3.2 K), but the subject is retraced with this subtlety of distinction for the purpose of instruction.

1. Gangādharabhatta's first explanation is doubtless the correct one: "To a companion who has been trying to console her when the gentleman has not returned even at summer's end, the lady speaks these words." The Sanskrit contains a pun that I have not rendered in English: *manomtha*: desire or, in its apparently literal sense, the chariot of the mind.

2. The verse is quoted by Mammāta (10, ex. 517) as an example of the figure of speech *paryāya*. In his commentary on that passage Bhīmasena Dīksita identifies "the brahmin" as Sudāman, whom Krishna had enriched. Hemacandra also quotes the verse AC 1, ex. 91. The commentators on Mammāta point out that the word *divasaih*, "days," as opposed to months, years, or time in general, suggests the rapidity with which the brahmin has gained his prosperity. This adds to the *adbhutarasa* (relish of wonder) of the verse.

3. The reference is to *tad* and *idam* ("that" house ... "this" palace, etc.).

4. E.g., *kva dhenu jarati kva ca karīṇo ghanabhāḥ*.

5. A tense: A finite verb through its tense, number, *kāraka*, and *upagraha* contains a package of meanings. Our author feels that we should investigate suggestiveness in such detail as to assign it, by positive and negative example, to one or another of these elements. A strengthening of the *rasa*: What is here suggested might be put thus: "If the time of the rains makes me tremble i its anticipation, what will it do when it arrives?"

Apropos of the distinction of part and possessor of the part (e.g., of suffix and stem), he says, Just as, etc.; for the sense of the word "days" here suggests the utter improbability of the thing described.

Pronouns too: he means, together with the stem of a word. That is to say, it is the pronoun as taken together with a word stem that is suggestive. Hence there is no tautology. Thus the pronoun *tad* (that) taken together with the stem of the word *natabhitti* (of crumbling walls) suggests a house that is overrun with mice and miserable
in every way. For if the word "that" had been used alone [to qualify
the word "house"], one might suppose the house to have been very
prosperous; while if the word "of crumbling walls" were used [without
the pronoun "that"], the extreme misery of the place would not have
been suggested. The same reasoning applies to "that cow," etc. In
all such cases the word "that" suggests something that one remem­
bers and is to be distinguished, as previously stated, from the "that"
that is correlative with "which." Thus it is by such words as tad and
idam ("that" and "this"), through their suggesting the contradictions
between [the speaker's] memory and his present experience, that the
stimulants of wonder are brought together. For if the words tad and
idam were omitted, the images would not hold together. Thus we may
take it that the very heart [of the suggestiveness or charm of the verse]
lies in these portions, tad and idam. This double combination [of sug­
gestive factors] implies that we may have triple combinations. Thus by
using a marker and a table of elements, we may say that the varieties
[of suggestive factors] are endless, as our author is about to state in
the passage even other types, etc. As this [analysis] has been spread
over many [pages], he draws it together, lest the student have missed
the point, with All of these, etc. At the same time, he reminds us of
the purpose that has led to this breadth of analysis, with the words,
[the subject is retraced] with this subtlety of distinction [for
the purposes of instruction].

1. A verb has agent or object or agent-object kāraka as it is active,
passive, or reflexive in meaning. Upagrāha refers to the choice of parasmāi—
pada or ātmanepada endings. This choice may tell whether the verb denotes
action that benefits (or affects) the agent, or action that benefits someone
else. 2. If the stem of a word were already suggestive of something, there
would be no need of a pronoun to suggest the same thing. 3. See 3.4a L
and our note 6 on that passage. One might put the matter as follows. In
expressions such as "O those eyes!" "Ah that house," the pronoun takes the
deictic construction (as in "those eyes are brown," "that house is miserable"),
not the anaphoric (as in "that house which stands on the hillside"). The
reason is obvious: one may point to something in one's memory as well as
to something in the outer world. 4. "Such words" (ādi): the ādi refers to
the pronoun etad used in the second line of the verse.  5. As opposed to
the portions consisting in the qualified substantive stems. 6. The double
combination is pronoun and substantive stem. A triple combination might be
pronoun, stem, and suffix  7. See 2.12 L, footnote 1.
3.16 m

A At this point it may be objected that we have described the rasas, [bhāvas, rasabhāsas, and bhāvabhāsas] as being suggested (ākṣepya) by the force of [sentence-]meaning and that it is therefore illogical to speak of case endings, etc., as being various suggestive factors (vyanjaka). But we answered this objection when we spoke of the suggestiveness of words [cf. 3.1 j above]. Moreover, even if the rasas are suggested by particular [sentence-]meanings, since these meanings cannot arise in the absence of suggestive words, a thorough knowledge of the nature of suggestors, dividing them up in the manner shown above, cannot fail to be useful. Furthermore, the beauty of particular words, as it has elsewhere been shown with careful distinctions, must be understood to be wholly contingent on their suggestiveness.

Even where suggestiveness does not appear in some passage [that we are now reading], if it contains words in which we once saw beauty in a suggestive passage in some other work, we will find by force of habit the same beauty in those words now taken out of the context that they had in the flow [of that former work]. How else would there be any difference in the beauty of words of which the denotative sense is the same? If it be objected that the difference is other than in suggestiveness, being something that is felt only by sensitive readers (sahṛdaya), we may ask what it means to be a sensitive reader. Is the prerequisite the recognition of certain conventions that apply to poetry and that bear no relation to rasa and bhāva? Or is it a broad and subtle knowledge of the nature of poetry as consisting in rasa, bhāva and the like? On the former alternative there would be no criterion for the beauty of particular words set up as beautiful by such readers, for one could perfectly well set up a different set of words by a different convention. But on the second alternative, being a sensitive reader amounts simply to having a knowledge of rasa. Now the peculiar property of words [sc., the property that renders them beautiful] that is felt by sensitive readers of this sort is the natural power such words have to transmit rasa; and so the primary beauty of these words is based on their suggestiveness. The only peculiar beauty that words can have when used denotatively is clarity when their beauty depends on meaning, or, when it is not dependent on meaning, alliteration, etc.
1. According to Abhinava "elsewhere" here refers to Udbhata's Bhāmaha-vivarana. The remains of what may be this work, edited by R. Gnoli, are not sufficient for us to discover what Udbhata said on this subject, but he is not likely to have attributed the beauty of words to their suggestiveness. What we have here in Ānandavardhana is likely to be a criticism to the effect that in spite of what Udbhata said on the subject, the real cause of a word's beauty is its suggestiveness. 2. This complicated sentence furnishes a persuasive argument against the critic who might object: "How can the beauty of a word be contingent on its suggestion when some words are beautiful everywhere they are used, even in expository prose?" The answer is that such words carry over their suggestions from other contexts. 3. Abhinava offers the example of tatam, tatāh, and tatś, all meaning river-bank or shore, of which he finds only the last word beautiful. In English I would call "cellar" beautiful as opposed to "basement." The former suggests to me (D. I.) the cool milk and stored apples of my childhood, the latter the oil furnace and cast-off ironware of modern times. 4. (J. M.) Ānanda’s argument here is not strong, although his objection to other critics of his day may well be taken. He argues that either one admits that rasa is the essence of poetry, or one does not. If one does not, then there is no objective basis for asserting that such and such is beautiful in poetry and such and such is not, for a different critic will hold a different view. Whereas if one believes in rasa, then rasa becomes the touchstone of beauty in poetry. But this is a valid argument only if one already accepts rasa. An opponent could argue in precisely the same manner, substituting some other criterion in place of rasa. If one were to put forward vakrōkti or svabhāvokti as the essence of poetry, one would in no less degree have a standard by which to judge any given work. To do Ānanda justice, however, one must consider that at the time he wrote his work, no one had come forward with a comprehensive theory of poetics that allowed all the elements within literature to fall into place. Ānanda with his theory of rasa and dhvani was the first to do this. So if we interpret his words here as an objection to assertions that such and such elements in poetry are beautiful without a coherent theory to underlie such statements, we may fairly agree with him.

L It may be objected: The objection has already been resolved [at 3.1 j A], but is here brought up in order to recall it to the reader's attention and to add something new. We answered: We have already said that denotativeness is not so necessary to the operation of suggestion that a non-denotative element may not be suggestive. But when there is suggestiveness of rasa in a word, the word is not, as is a song, etc., without a linguistic operation toward that end. Rather,
such a word is suggestive in the highest sense. That is the meaning; and it has been explained by us under Chapter One.\textsuperscript{3}

In order to show that this [doctrine] is no new invention on his part our author proceeds with Furthermore the beauty of particular words, etc. Elsewhere: viz., in the \textit{Bhāmahaivivarana}.\textsuperscript{4} With careful distinctions: Where Udbhata says that the words \textit{sraj} (garland) and \textit{candana} (sandalwood) are beautiful in the erotic but not in the gruesome (\textit{bibhatsa}), he is making a distinction based on \textit{rasa}. We have already stated\textsuperscript{3} that it is the suggestive force only of a word that makes for \textit{rasa}.

\textbf{Even where}: Such words as \textit{sraj} and \textit{candana}, even when they are at that time in a passage that lacks any suggestion of the erotic, etc., will still have the power to convey a meaning that has become beautiful by a sort of fragrance from our frequent experience of their suggestive power. For example, in \textit{taṭi tāram tāmyati} ("the shoreline suffers sharply") the man of taste (\textit{sahrdaya}) rejects the masculine and neuter forms and uses the feminine \textit{taṭi} on the principle that "even a name is sweet by being feminine."\textsuperscript{6} Or as in the following verse of my teacher Bhaṭṭendurāja, that prince of scholars, poets, and sensitive critics:

\begin{quote}
Even if he bore not
his water-lily colored stigma,
even if, by merit gained
in other births, he might assume
those tempting graces that alone
win all our wonder,
still, could the moon have, could be ever have,
the lovely softness of her cheek?
\end{quote}

For here the words \textit{indīvara}, \textit{lakṣma}, \textit{vismaya}, \textit{suhṛd}, \textit{vilāsa}, \textit{nāma}, \textit{parināma}, \textit{komala}, etc., all of which we have seen elsewhere to be suggestive of \textit{śrīgāra}, bring to the verse the highest degree of beauty.\textsuperscript{7}

That this [basis of verbal beauty in suggestiveness] must be admitted he states in the words How else, etc. As one cannot claim that this [difference in the beauty of words] is not felt, he says by sensitive readers, etc. A different set: for how could there be any criterion if the convention depended on unregulated individual whim? Primary beauty: to be construed as in agreement with "the peculiar property" above. Depends on meaning: that is, depends on the denoted (literal) meaning. Alliteration, etc.: this peculiar property of words depends on their arrangement in relation to other words. By the term
"etcetera" he would include the excellences of sound (śabdāṇugānas) and the figures of sound (śabdālārikāras). The meaning of the whole passage is that in poetry one should use words that are strengthened by their arrangement, their clarity, and their beauty (of suggestiveness).

1. Cf. Abhinava’s remarks, 3.3–4 L.  2. As is clear from BP, we must read na tu na gitādviṣa (not nanu na).  3. Compare pages 87–88 and 187 in Chapter One.  4. See above 3.16 m A, note 1, and also J. Masson, “On the Authenticity of the So-called Bhāmahaviṇavaraṇa.”  5. 1.4 g L.  6. Both the quotation and the reason given for the choice of words seem to be taken from some earlier author (Udbhata?), for they both appear in Kuntaka’s Vakrakṣīyūṣa (2.22, ex. 79), which gives the verse from which the quotation comes as follows (I emend the last word from subhagā to subhagaḥ):

\[
\text{yatheyam grīmosemaṇyatikaravati pāndurabhidā}
\text{mukhodbhinnamānaśatātālamaravallikṣisalayā}
\text{tatī tāram tāmyatī atisāśyaśā ko ’pi jalaśād}
\text{tathā manye bhāvī bhuvanaivalayākrāntisubhagaḥ}
\]

I do not know what bhidā means, but for the rest, the stanza may be rendered as follows.

The shoreline suffers sharply in the summer heat, pale and with her foliage trembling under the exhausted breezes of her sighs: from which I guess that soon some lucky cloud will rob the moon of his white glory and will lie victorious on this bracelet of the earth.

The original choice of tatī here, it seems to me, had little to do with the inherent beauty of the word. The shore must be made feminine to fit with all the other suggestions of a lady and her lover. Just as a lady pines in her lover’s absence, stirring the curls above her forehead with the sighs from her mouth, just so the shore in the summer heat. And the black cloud, defeating the white moon in combat and thereby overcoming the earth, will be blessed with the joy of physically “overcoming” or lying upon his beloved. The sight of a shoreline just before the advent of the monsoon has put the poet in mind of these suggestions. But the odd alliterating phrase tatī tāram tāmyatī sticks in the mind. Udbhata or some other ancient critic must have explained its haunting beauty by the “feminine” charm of the word tatī. Of course to one who remembers the verse, the word tatī even in other contexts may retain some of the charm it has in this verse.  7. Abhinava, it seems to me, here goes too far. By seeing suggestive force in so many words he runs the danger of ascribing true art to a work merely because of its poetic diction. In fact
one does not write poetry simply by stringing together words that Keats or Kālidāsa once used.

§ 3.17

A Having thus stated the nature of the suggestors of rasa and the like, he proceeds as follows in order to define that which is obstructive to rasa.

K An intelligent author who would compose rasas and the like in an extended work or in a single verse must take care to avoid those things which obstruct them.

A A poet who has set his mind to composing rasas or bhāvas in an extended work or in a single verse must take the greatest care to avoid that which obstructs them. If not, he will not succeed in producing a single verse that contains rasa.

L Thus:¹ The connection with the preceding is that he has stated the nature of the factors suggestive of rasa and the like: namely phonemes, words, and so on up to the work as a whole; now he proceeds, etc. What the present Kārikā does is to state the purpose in defining the obstructive factors, namely that one can thereby avoid them. The actual definitions will be given in the next two Kārikās, beginning with the words virodhirasasambandhi.

1. One must supply the pratīka “evam iti” before the word rasādīnām.
3.18–19 Introduction

A  Now what are the obstructive factors that a poet must take care to avoid? They are:

3.18–19

K  (1) The taking into a work of vibhāvas, etc., that belong to an obstructive rasa;
(2) the description at great length of something alien, even though it be connected with the subject in hand;
(3) breaking off [the rasa] too suddenly;
(4) revealing it too suddenly;
(5) flashing it on again and again after it has reached full maturity;
(6) and impropriety of style (vṛtyanaucitya).

These are the factors obstructive to a rasa.

1. The Vṛtti will allow a very wide meaning to the term; see below, 3.18-19c A and note 2.

A  [The first type of obstruction.] The taking into a work of a vibhāva, a bhāva, or an anubhāva1 which belongs to a rasa that is obstructive of the rasa in hand must be considered a cause of obstructing that rasa. Thus one would be introducing the vibhāva of an obstructive rasa if after having described persons and situations as being revelatory (vibhāvatayā) of sāntarasa one were to describe that which is revelatory of śrṅgārarasa or the like.2 One would be introducing a [basic] emotion (bhāva) that belongs to an obstructive rasa if when the wives of the hero have been angered by a love quarrel he were to console them with remarks on disenchantment with the world (vairāgyakathābhīh).3 One would be introducing anubhāvas that belong to an obstructive rasa if when his beloved is angered in a love quarrel and refuses to be appeased, one should describe the hero as beside himself with anger and exhibiting the symptoms (anubhāvas) of fury (raudra).
1. *vibhāvabhāvānubhāvānām*: the reading of the compound is in doubt. All editions except the Kashi read *vibhāvānubhāvāvyabhicārānām*. In favor of the Kashi reading is the order of the examples which follow. The commoner reading seems to have been introduced by someone who misunderstood Abhinava's gloss on *bhāva* (see L below, esp. footnote 3). 2. Ānanda, in introducing 3.24 below, lists four pairs of *rasas* which are mutually obstructive. One of the four pairs is *sānta* and *śṛṅgāra*. 3. Vairāgya or nirveda is the *sthāyībhāva* of sāntarasa; cf. ABh Vol. 1, p. 268.

*L* It might be objected that these obstructions could all be understood by the negation of [those prescriptions for the forming of *rasa* listed in 3.10–14, as “a plot] beautiful because of the appropriateness of its *vibhāvas*, [sthāyī|bhāvas, anubhāvas, and sañcārins,” etc. But no. By negation one would understand only the absence of these merits, not what is contrary to (or obstructive of, a *rasa*). And the mere absence of a good property is not so injurious as the possession of its contrary. The failure to eat healthy food is not so productive of illness as the eating of unhealthy food. That is why he says one must take care [to avoid these obstructions].

The half *slokā* 3.18ab gives the contrary to what was expressed in the full *slokā* 3.10. The half *slokā* 3.19ab gives the contrary of 3.13ab; 3.19cd the contrary of 3.13cd; while 3.19ef gives the contrary of 3.14 together with other matter that is obstructive.

The *Vṛttikāra* explains these items one after another: The taking into a work, etc. He realizes that there is no contradiction between the *vibhāvas* (revelatory factors) of comedy and the erotic, of the heroic and the marvellous, of the cruel and the tragic, of the fearsome and the loathsome.1 So he mentions the peaceful (*sānta*) and the erotic (*śṛṅgāra*), as there is contradiction between calm (*prasama*) and passion (*rāga*).2

Introducing an emotion that belongs to an obstructive *rasa*: he means, [as a] transient emotion (*vyabhicārin*), because the basic emotion (*sthāyībhāva*) of the obstructive *rasa* could not be introduced as basic, so the case could never arise. However, as a transient emotion it could be introduced. That is why he has chosen the [neutral] term *bhāva*.3 What he is referring to by the word “disenchantment” (*vairāgya*) in remarks on disenchantment with the world is disillusionment (*nirveda*), the basic emotion (*sthāyībhāva*) of the peaceful (*sānta*). An example is the verse which begins:

Turn to forgiveness. Show happiness and leave your anger
only to end with a figure of substantiation (arthāntaranyāsa) expressed in these words:

Sweet lady, the antelope of time does not run backward.4

The slightest introduction of disillusionment will kill the emotion of sexual love (rati), for how can a man who has once realized the true nature of the objects of sense give himself to a woman under the illusion that she is the all in all of life? To a man who realizes the true nature of the nacre that shines as silver, the idea of taking possession of it will not occur except as being an illusion (samṛti). By the use of the plural in “remarks” (kathābhās) in “remarks on disenchantment” our author would include other transient states of peace such as firmness (dhṛti), intelligence (māti), etc.5

1. These four pairs are given by Bharata (BhN Ś 6.39) to exemplify various ways by which one rasa can lead to another. They are what one might call compatible rasas. 2. Prasāma and rāga are not vibhāvas but aspects of the sthāyibhāvas of the two rasas in question. However, it would follow by a small inference that the vibhāvas of the two rasas must likewise be contradictory. 3. By bhāva Ānanda certainly meant sthāyibhāva, for such is his regular usage. Nowhere does he use the simple word to mean vyabhicāribhāva. But Abhinava wishes to furnish a reason for Ānanda’s abbreviating the full expression (sthāyibhāva) in this way. His explanation is that if one removes the sthāyibhāva from sānta and places it in śrīgārā, it must there become a vyabhicāribhāva. Otherwise there would not be simply obstruction to śrīgārā: śrīgārā would cease and sānta would take over. Thus, according to Abhinava, Ānanda used the neutral term bhāva because he wished to cover that which is a sthāyibhāva in the obstructive rasa and at the same time a vyabhicāribhāva in the rasa that is being obstructed. 4. The two lines are the first and last of a verse by the Kashmirian poet Canda or Candraka. The verse is given in Śarīrig. 3565 and Subhā 1629. For the poet, see Rāj.Tar. 2.16. For arthāntaranyāsa, see 1.13 i L, note 8; a particular injunction is here substantiated by a general law. A good English parallel is from Andrew Marvell, who begins an anunaya with “Had we but world enough and time,/ This coyness, Lady, were no crime” and proceeds to the arthāntaranyāsa: “The grave’s a fine and private place,/ But none, I think, do there embrace.” 5. For the vyabhicāribhāvas of sāntarasa see Abh. Vol. 1, p. 340, line 4 and Masson and Patwardhan’s Sāntarasa, p. 139. Abhinava’s reasoning seems to be that the plural shows that the lover makes remarks on other subjects as well.
§ 3.18–19 A

3.18–19a

A [The second type of obstruction.] Here is another cause of obstructing the rasa, namely the describing at length of some alien matter, even if it may be somehow connected with the matter in hand. As, for example, when a description has been begun of the chief character in a state of love-in-separation, if the poet then proceeds, because of his liking for the composition of ornaments such as yamakas, to describe mountains or the like in a long passage [decked out with these ornaments].

L As no one other than a madman would describe a wholly alien subject, much less do so at length, he says, even if it may be somehow connected.

3.18–19 b

A [The third and fourth types of obstruction.] And here are what must be considered further types of obstruction to the rasa, namely the sudden breaking off of the rasa or its sudden revelation. An example of an inopportune interruption of the rasa is this. The chief character has arrived at the highest pitch of love for a certain lady with whom he longs to have a rendezvous. Further, it is known that this love is mutual. Suddenly he abandons the action appropriate to his concern for a rendezvous and we have the description of another action in no way related. An example of an inopportune revelation of a rasa is this. A battle has begun in which many great heroes are dying, as in the destruction at the end of an era. And now we have a hero, and almost a god at that, who has not experienced love-in-separation, described as suddenly and without any proper occasion speaking of love. In such a case one cannot use the excuse that the character in the tale
has been driven out of his senses by fate; because the chief reason for a poet's writing at all is to produce rasa. The plot is merely a means to that end; as was said above (1.9 K), "Just as a man who wishes to see will take pains with the flame of the lamp as the means thereto," etc. Poets frequently stumble in this way by giving their main attention to the plot and by constructing rasas and bhāvas that lack a proper relation between what should be predominant and what subordinate; and it is on this account that we have worked at this treatise: not because of an infatuation with every possible description of dhvani, but in order to show that the proper goal of poets is suggestion in the form of rasa, bhāva, or the like, this and nothing else.

1. The example, as Abhinava points out, is taken from the Ratnāvalī, just as the following example is taken from the Venīsamhāra. But Ānanda here follows his frequent practice of criticizing without mentioning any names.

2. devaprāyasātipi tāvat: The Kashi ed., but no other, adds the word rāma-before deva. As this makes no sense to us, we have omitted it in the translation. Badarināth Śarmā (Haridas ed. p. 358) explains the force of the passage thus: devaprāyaṭvavakthanena nāyakasya dhūrodattatayā nucitopanyāsaparān-mukhasīlata sūcyate "by speaking of his being 'almost a god' it is indicated that the hero is of the 'firm and noble' type and should be averse to the mention of anything inappropriate."  3. dhvanipratipādanamātrabhīhinvesa:
The word mātra is here used in its sense of extension ("all"), not restriction ("only"). Examples of this use are M.Bh. 13.22.3 dyāvāprthivimātratvasā kāmyā "this desire exists throughout all heaven and earth." Kāśi, on Pāṇ. 3.2.106 linmātroṣya yathā syāt "so that [the substitution] may apply to all cases of lit." This seems to be the way that Abhinava understood the word here.

L Of another action: as in the Fourth Act of the Vatsarāja-carīta [= Ratnāvalī], where Vijayavarman gives his report, without even a mention of Ratnāvalī's name.1

By the two words at that (api tāvat), which show that such a scene is really out of the question for Duryodhana, he hints at the fact that the Second Act of the Venīsamhāra is the example he has in mind. That is why he goes on to say driven out of his senses by fate. The passage here referred to was mentioned earlier (3.10-14 f A) as an example of how not to compose a sandhyānga. The character in the tale: here he means the villain [Duryodhana].

On this account: viz., because the construction of rasa is the chief business of a poet and if he gives his chief attention to narrating the
plot, he will construct rasas and bhāvas that "lack a proper relation between what should be predominant and what subordinate." that is to say, where no consideration has been given to the relation of major and minor. In this way he will stumble and all sorts of faults will arise; that is the sense. With every possible description of dhvani: What he has in mind is that the mere instance of a suggested sense is of no importance. To become infatuated [with describing] all such instances would be like examining crows' teeth.²

1. There can be no doubt that by Vatsarājacakrī Abhinava is referring to what we now know as the Ratnāvalī by King Harṣa, for in its Fourth Act just such an interruption occurs. The king and the Vidūṭaka have been talking about the disappearance of Sāgarikā (Ratnāvalī), whom the king yearns to meet with. Suddenly Vijayavarman is brought on stage and gives a long account of his uncle's victory over the King of Kosala. We should probably read vijayavarmano in place of vijayavarma in compound, which breaks the rule of syntax that the subordinate member of a compound should not be construed with a word outside the compound. 2. Examining crows' teeth is a proverbially useless endeavor because a crow has no teeth. J. M. adduces a popular verse: kākasya kati vā dantā mesasyāṇḍam kiyapalam / gardabhe kati romāṇi vyarthoivaisa vincarapā // The third of these proverbial follies would seem to offer a more appropriate nyāya here. Describing every instance or type of dhvani would be useless because there would be so many and most of them poetically insignificant.

3.18–19 c

A [The fifth type of obstruction.] And here is what we must regard as another cause of obstructing the rasa, namely that one should keep flashing it after it has reached full maturity. For a rasa, after its set of causes (i.e., vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyābhicāribhāvas) has brought it to maturity and it has then been enjoyed, will wilt like a flower if it is then constantly handled.

[The sixth type of obstruction.] Likewise any impropriety of vṛtti, that is, behavior (vyavahāra), can only be obstructive to a rasa, as, for example, if a certain lady were to state her desire of sexual enjoyment to the hero without the use of appropriate periphrasis. Or we
may take “vṛtti” to refer to the modes of speech and action, known to Bharata, such as the ṭaśikī (the graceful mode), etc., or to the style of compounding and alliteration, such as the upanāgarikā, known in other works on poetics. Any impropriety in such a vṛtti, that is, its use in the wrong place, is a cause of obstructing the rasa. In order to avoid these obstructions to the rasa and others along the same line that he may discover by himself, a good poet must be attentive. The following verses will give support to our position.

The principal object of the work of poets are the rasas, [bhāvas,] and the like. In constructing them he must be constantly on guard.

A work that lacks rasa is a deep reproach to a poet. By it he ceases to be a poet and is forgotten by others.

It is true that the ancient poets gained fame without chaining their language [to rules]. But a wise man will not abandon our system in reliance on them.

The system that we have set forth is not alien to the aims that were held by the great masters of poetry, beginning with Vālmīki and Vyāsa.

1. BhNŚ 20.8ff; see above 3.6g L and footnote 1. 2. To keep kāvya-lanātānaprasiddhānāṁ parallel with bharataprasiddhānāṁ, we must take the phrase kāvya-lanka to refer to a book, such as Udbhata’s Kāvya-lanākara-sārasānāgaha, rather than to “poetic figures of speech.” Udbhata does use the word vṛtti to refer to such styles as the upanāgarikā; see 1.1a A, note 4. Only the last of the Vṛtti’s three explanations of vṛttyanaucityam agrees with the way in which the Vṛtti has used the similar phrase vṛttyaucityam (3.7a A and note 2; 3.16f A and note 1). The fact that the Vṛtti here gives three explanations has been used as an argument in favor of dual authorship of Kārikās and Vṛtti (Kane HSP p. 181), as though the Vṛttikāra had not been certain of the Kārikā’s meaning. But it is not unusual for an author to elicit from his own words as wide a scope as their meaning will bear.

L He explains the Kārikā passage vṛttyanaucityam eva ca (“and impropriety of style”) in several ways. By likewise he is glossing the word “and” (ca) in the Kārikā; and by the word only (eva) in “can only be obstructive to a rasa” he shows that the order of the words is reversed in the Kārikā, for what the Kārikā means is vṛttyanaucityam ca rasasya virodhāya eva. To the hero: The reason is that a hero,
to whichever of the four different types of hero he belongs, must be steeped in *vīra-rasa*. To give him a timidity\(^1\) characteristic of a coward would be a fault.

Them: viz., the *rasas* and the like. They: viz., good poets. Reproach: the sense is, disgrace.

But now Kālidāsa keeps flashing the *rasa* of tragedy in the laments of Rati\(^2\) even after it has reached maturity. So why this insistence on avoiding obstructions to the *rasas*? In anticipation of such an objection he says, the ancient poets, etc. If for some reason Vasiṣṭha and others left the path of tradition, we are not also to leave it on that account;\(^3\) because those of exalted conduct have reasons that we cannot understand.\(^4\) The word *iti* (sc., the closing quotation mark) marks the end of the supplementary verses.

1. Such timidity would naturally be assumed if the lady had to tell him directly of her desire. 2. *KumSam*. Book 4. 3. Vasiṣṭha begot a son on the wife of King Kalmāśapāda (*MBh* 1.113; 1.173). But we must not on that account imitate Vasiṣṭha's example by begetting children on other men's wives. Similarly we are not to imitate the exceptional traits of the ancient poets. 4. Abhinava is quoting from Kālidāsa, *KumSam*. 5.75.

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\(K\) But when the intended *rasa* has been firmly established, there is no fault in mentioning these obstructive factors if they are stopped short, or if they are brought into a subordinate role.

\(A\) But when the intended *rasa* has been brought to maturity by its set of causes (i.e., *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and *vyabhicāribhāvas*), there is no fault in the mention of obstructive factors, that is, elements belonging to an obstructive *rasa*, if they are stopped short, or if they are brought into a subordinate role. For obstructive factors are stopped short only when they can be overcome, not otherwise; and in that case their mention serves to magnify the intended *rasa*. And when such factors are brought into a subordinate state their obstructiveness ceases.
That such factors should become subordinate may be due to their very nature; or it may be due to some artificially imposed property. To begin with those which become subordinate by their own nature, there is no obstruction at all in mentioning such factors; as, for example, in love-in-separation, the mention of such states as physical illness which are subordinate to this rasa [as being its vyabhicārins, although they are also elements of the obstructive rasa tragedy (karuṇa)]. But it is only of such [obstructive factors] as are subordinate to the intended rasa that the mention is without fault, not of such as are not subordinate.

Death, while it can form a subordinate element [in love-in-separation], is an element the use of which is inadvisable, because if the human receptacle of the rasa is cut off, the rasa itself will be cut off. One should not argue that the tragic will thereby be increased, because tragedy is not what is here aimed at and what is aimed at will be cut off. Only where we are actually aiming at the tragic will death prove unobstructive. Or we may admit the use of death to be occasionally not entirely obstructive in śṛṅgāra if there is a possibility of revival in a short space of time. But if the revival occurs only after a long time, the force of the rasa will be lost in the interim. Accordingly, a poet, who is chiefly concerned with constructing a rasa, should avoid such a element in his plot.

1. The erotic embodies the largest set of transient (and therefore subordinate) states of any of the rasas. BhNŚ Vol. 1, p. 306, specifies that śṛṅgāra is capable of all the vyabhicāribhāvas except dāsya (laziness; Abhinava restricts the word so as to exclude languor), auṣṭrya (cruelty), and jugupsā (disgust). In love-in-separation the lovers can become physically ill, a state that is also found in the obstructive rasa tragedy (kāruṇa). What Ānanda is telling us is that to introduce this factor of illness (vyādhi), which is prima facie an element belonging to an obstructive rasa, into vipralambhāśṛṅgāra, is not a fault because illness by its very nature can be subordinate (as a vyabhicāribhāva) to śṛṅgāra.

2. There are only three of these (see previous footnote). To introduce dāsya, auṣṭrya, or jugupsā into vipralambhāśṛṅgāra will indeed be obstructive because these states cannot naturally be subordinated to the intended rasa.

3. Death (marana) is specifically included by Bharata among the vyabhicāribhāvas of śṛṅgāra, because one can die of love.

L [Comment on the Kārikā] Having thus laid down a general rule for avoiding obstructive elements, he states an exception within a limited area: But when the intended rasa, etc. If they are
stopped short: The meaning is [that they may be introduced] with the intention of stopping them short or with the intention of making them subordinate. Acchala means "without fault."

[Comment on the Vṛtti.] He explains the intention of stopping them short by saying, For [obstructive factors] are stopped short, etc. He explains the intention of subordinating such factors in two ways. Of these he first describes the natural way: which are subordinate to this, etc. Now tragedy (karuṇa), by its being without hope of relief (nirapekṣabhāva), is obstructive to love-in-separation, which contains an element of hope (sāpekṣabhāva)2 and physical illness and the like are certainly seen as its factors. Of such [factors the mention is without fault], for while they occur in tragedy and they alone occur there, they also occur in śṛṅgāra, but not only they.3 Of such as are not subordinate: such as laziness, cruelty and disgust.4

While it can form a subordinate element: because it has been said that all the vyabhicārins [except the three mentioned above] are found in śṛṅgāra; our author is aware of this. But if the receptacle, that is, the man or the woman who forms the base, is destroyed, then love (rati) will be cut off because it stands in each of them in the form of the illusion that the other is their all in all in life.

What is here aimed at: viz., love-in-separation. Actually aiming at: i.e., when that is the matter in hand. But at this rate the doctrine that all the vyabhicārins exist in śṛṅgāra will be destroyed. Anticipating this objection, he says, Or we may admit, etc. Death may serve as a vyabhicārin (subordinate state) of śṛṅgāra in those cases where the death, being of brief duration, is not the point on which our apprehension comes to rest.5 Occasionally: that is, when a poet is skilful enough to accomplish such a turn. For example:

Leaving his mortal body at the junction of Ganges and Sarayū and being thus admitted into everlasting life, he met once more with his beloved queen, now of fairer form than ever, and enjoyed her love in the pleasure halls of Indra's paradise.

[Kālidāsa, Raghuvamśa 8.95]6

In this passage death is clearly subordinated to physical love (rati). And because it is to be subordinated, this wise poet has not allowed death a foothold [in our memory], mentioning it merely in the non-predicative part of the sentence.7 If he had given it a foothold, the
result would certainly be to produce sorrow, no matter how short the period of time before reunion.

But now, can it be with reference to what sensitive critics would consider a long time that death is stated to be subordinate whenever it is followed "in no long time" by reunion? At this rate, since intelligent persons when they hear of the machinations of Yaugandharāyana and his accomplices, will not believe that Vāsadattā has really died at all, there could be no tragedy in the Tāpasavatsarāja. So enough of this side issue and let us take "long time" to mean rather the furnishing of a foothold [for our memory to dwell on].

Here ends the explanation of natural subordination. As one may infer the nature of artificially imposed subordination by its being contrary to natural, he does not explain it in so many words [although he will give examples of it].

1. pratiprastava: lit., a reviving of the permission that naturally obtained before the prohibition was made. The term is taken from the grammarians. 2. The terms sāpekṣabhāva and nirapekṣabhāva are taken from Bharata (BhNŚ Vol. 1, p. 309) where they are used to distinguish vipralambhāśṛṅgāra from karuna. Love-in-separation is always a temporary form of rasa. It looks toward and hopes for and is succeeded by love-in-union. Tragedy (karuna) does not have this apeksā, this relativity, or this ulterior state to which to look forward. The two rasas being thus distinguished, the question arises how we are made aware of the apeksā or its lack. Does the difference lie in the perceived experience of the character portrayed, or in the reader's knowledge (his knowledge, for example, of how the story will end), or in the poet's emphasis? Abhinava will raise this interesting question and will favor the last of these explanations. 3. Illness and other painful factors (e.g., discouragement, weariness, despair) are the only vyabhicārbhaivas of karuna (see BhNŚ Vol. 1, p. 317), so they certainly belong to karuna. But they are also vyabhicārbhaivas of śṛṅgāra and therefore subordinate to it also. The only difference is that they are not the exclusive subordinates of śṛṅgāra, which contains pleasurable factors also. 4. Ālasya and ugratā are given in the list of vyabhicārbhaivas BhNŚ 6.18 and 20. Jugupsā is listed as the sthāyibhaiva of bībhatsā (BhNŚ 6.17). As Bharata says that śṛṅgāra possesses all the vyabhicārins except these three (Vol. 1, p. 306), Abhinava in his Abh. infers that the sthāyibhaivas (when outside their proper rasa) may act as vyabhicārins. 5. viśrāntipadabdanda: Hemacandra, who borrows largely from this passage of the Locana, renders the term as pratitiṣrāntisthānatva (Parekh ed., p. 110, lines 19–20; KM ed., p. 85, line 3 from bottom). 6. In pada c the reading adhikacaturayā is also given by the oldest commentator on Ragh., Vallabhadeva. There is no need to emend, as is commonly done, to
adhikatarutuca. Kālidāsa elsewhere uses the word caturuc to mean “beautiful.” In Ragh. 9.47 Mallinātha glosses it by upabhogaksama, which would do very well here also. 7. The tātparya or final purport of a sentence, that on which our apprehension comes to rest (vārānti), is the vidheya, approximately translatable as predicate. The vidheya is the new information which the sentence gives us as opposed to the uddeśya or anuvāda, the matter already known, about which this new information is stated. What Abhinava here means is that Kālidāsa has not written in such form as “And then King Aja died,” in which case our mind would come to rest on the unhappy event of his death. Rather, his words have taken the form, “King Aja, having died and been reborn in heaven, enjoyed the love of his queen.” Here the tātparya, the portion of the sentence that leaves its impression on the mind, is concerned with love, not death. 8. Ānanda’s doctrine that death in love-in-separation must be of short duration is unpalatable to Abhinava because if it means short in the opinion of the audience, any verse dealing with Aja’s death would qualify. There would be no need for skill on the part of the poet, as the audience can guess from what preceeds (cf. Ragh. 8.93) that Aja will be shortly reunited with Indumati; while in the Tāpasavatsarāja the audience will not even believe in the death of Vāsavadattā at all. As usual, instead of changing Ānanda’s doctrine Abhinava reinterprets it. A “death of long duration” is to be taken as a death so described, by being placed in the predicate or by being made in some other way predominant over śṛngara, etc., as to linger in the memory.

§ 3.20 a A ]

A Of these [types], an example of the mention, when the intended rasa has been firmly established, of obstructive elements, a mention without fault because they are stopped short, is the following:

How can a king of the Lunar Dynasty do a forbidden deed?
May I see her once again!
I have learned the scriptures in order to abstain from sin.
Even in anger her face was lovely.
What will the wise and sinless say?
One could not find her even in a dream.
My heart, come to your senses!
But what blessed man will drink her lower lip?
Another example would be the lecture [in the Kādambarī], given by the other young ascetic to Puñḍarīka who has fallen deeply in love with Mahāśvetā.

1. The verse was quoted above by Abhinava. See 2.3 L and footnote 10 thereon. 2. The passage begins on p. 313 of the NSP ed. of the Kādambarī (Peterson’s ed., p. 146) with the words sakhe Puñḍarīka, naitad anurūpam bhavatah.

L Having thus explained the three types [of situation where obstructive elements may be mentioned], he illustrates them in the order [of his presentation]: Of these. “How can a king,” etc. Here compunction is stopped short by longing, intelligence by memory, doubt by despair, and firmness by anxiety. We have already said this toward the beginning of Chapter Two. The other [young ascetic]: What he has in mind is that the strength of [Puñḍarīka’s] passion is expressed by its proving unshakable even when disenchantment (vairāgya) and the vibhāvas of an obstructive rasa [viz., sānta] are particularized.

A There is no fault in the natural subordination [of an obstructive element], in such a verse as:

The cloud serpents pour forth water
pour forth venom
which brings to ladies whose husbands are away
a sudden dizziness, a listlessness and weariness of heart,
then fainting, darkness, emaciation, death.¹

There is likewise no obstruction where [the subordination is] artificially imposed, as in “Your pale emaciated [face],” etc., or

In anger she has bound him
 tightly in the noose of her soft arms.²
1. The verse has already been quoted under 2.18-19e. Dizziness, fainting, etc., are vyabhicāribhāvās of karuṇa but also of vipralambhāśrigāra. Apparently listlessness of heart (ālasyaḥ) is regarded as different from ālasya; see above, 3.20a A, note 1. 2. For the first quotation see Locana below; for the second, see above, 2.18-19e A.

L Artificially imposed: one must supply "subordination." the verse,

Your pale emaciated face,
your surfeited breast
and your listless limbs, my gentle friend,
proclaim a terminal malady
in your heart.1

the disease, as belonging to tragedy, is imposed by the trick of a double meaning.

[Comment on the verse "in anger," etc.] The referents of "in anger," "has bound," "is struck," are symptoms (anubhāvās) of the cruel (raudra) which have been imposed by metaphor on, and have been made subordinate to, (the erotic) because they are not fully carried out (in their proper sphere). This was spoken of above in connection with never oversustaining (a figure of speech; cf. 2.18-19 K).

1. The word kṣetriya in kṣetriyarogam (terminal malady) is noticed by Pāṇini 5.2.92, who says that it denotes that (disease) which is curable only in another body, that is, in the next life; in other words, a terminal malady. But the context of the present verse: the vocative sakhi "my female friend" and the pun in hṛdayam sarasam (a heart that has received too much nourishment from eating strong foods or a heart that is filled with passion) give to "terminal malady" a second meaning, viz., "a fatal passion." Thus the words which in a straightforward sense denote a tragic situation are playfully adapted to love-in-separation. Māmāṭa, who is more scholastic and less imaginative than Ānanda, quotes the verse twice: once to exemplify the figure of speech tulyayogā (10, ex. 460), in which he is scholastically correct, and once (7, ex. 332) in order to reprove Ānanda. There is no obstructive factor here, Māmāṭa says, because a sickness is a natural state of love-in-separation. He thus misses the point of the verse, which Ānanda clearly saw. The "terminal malady" is entirely imaginary. It has been superimposed (samāropita) on the ordinary yearning of unrequited love in order to sharpen our visualization of the pangs of that love. Thus an element of an obstructive rasa (tragedy) has
been artificially created and then subordinated to the intended rasa (vipralambhāśrīgāra). I see no reason to object to Ānanda's distinction between artificial (fanciful) and natural subordination.

A There is also another method of achieving subordination. Two rasas or bhāvas which are mutually obstructive may become subordinated to the single main sense of the sentence, as that is the true subject matter (adhitāra); and there will be no fault of obstruction here. An example has been given in the verse “The women of the Triple City wept,” etc. How can we say that there is no obstruction here? Because the two mutually obstructive elements are both placed in subordination to a third. And if it be asked how the obstruction ceases even if the two obstructive elements are subordinated to a third, our answer is that the fault of obstruction occurs when the obstructive elements are placed in the predicate, not when they are contained in the subject. For example:

“Come here! Go!
Lie down! Get up!
Speak! Be still!”
Such is the way that the rich play with men
who are bitten by the demon of hope.

[Nārāyaṇa, Hitopadeśa p. 49]²

In this verse there is no obstruction (i.e., no contradiction of sense) because the contradictory elements are mentioned in the subject.³ The same holds of the verse on the women of the Triple City. For in that verse the love-in-separation due to jealousy and the element of tragedy⁴ are not predicated; because the overall sentence meaning is the extraordinary power of the enemy of the Triple City (viz., Śiva) and because these two elements are subordinated to that.

And it cannot be claimed that distinctions of subject and predicate do not apply to the rasas, for it is admitted that the rasas are a sentence meaning and the distinction of subject and predicate that applies to the directly denoted sentence meaning must apply also to the rasas that are suggested by those direct meanings. Even those critics who
deny that the rasas, etc., are, without mediation, the meaning of a poem, must at least admit that they derive from its meaning. So, even at that, there would be no obstruction in the verse.\(^5\)

Again, there is no obstruction because the apprehension of a specific emotion (bhāva) arises from the predicate portion of the sentence, that portion being helped to achieve its result by elements of rasa caused by the subject portion of the sentence; for it is seen in the world that a specific result can arise from a cause that is helped out by mutually obstructive auxiliaries.\(^6\) It is obstructive (contradictory) for a single cause at one and the same time to bring about mutually obstructive results, but not for it to have mutually obstructive auxiliaries.

If it be asked how the actor can represent on the stage such mutually obstructive elements, the answer is that he will proceed just as he does in representing comparable denoted (as opposed to suggested) elements in a subject. In this way the obstructiveness in the verse is explained away by making use of the distinction of subject and predicate.

1. See 2.5c A, above, where the verse was quoted as an example of rasavadalaṅkāra. In the discussion under the present Kārikā Ānanda will offer two interpretations. The first, according to which the erotic and tragic elements of the verse are subordinated to a predication of God's power, which in turn produces a feeling (bhāva) of love of God, is compatible with the Chapter Two explanation of the erotic and tragic elements as rasavadalaṅkāra. The second explanation (3.20d) finds the tragic to be the most moving element in the verse and treats the verse as an example of karuṇārasa. 2. Quite possibly the verse is borrowed by Nārāyaṇa, as are many other verses of the Hitopadesa. It is attributed to Vyāsa by the author of the Subhāṣītāvali (3168), by whose time it was well enough known to be used in the game of samasyāpūrṇā (see SubhA. 1228). Mammata (7, ex. 339) and Hemacandra (AC 3.195, Parikh p. 165) quote it, doubtless taking it from Ānanda. The usefulness of the verse to the present discussion is that its contradictions are vācyā, directly denoted rather than suggested, and so are obvious, as is their relation to the predicate. Ānanda will explain the contradictory suggestions of the verse of the women of the Triple City by analogy with this simpler example.

3. See above, 3.20 L, note 7. Ānanda is making use of Mīmāṃsā doctrine, for an explanation of which see Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa of Āpadeva, BORI 1937, p. 39 and Kunjunni Raja Indian Theories of Meaning, pp. 184-185. The Mīmāṃsā distinction between permissible contradiction in the subject and impermissible contradiction in the predicate is a valid distinction and accordingly is found in other systems of logic. A modern Western example would be: "John is in Boston and John is in Cambridge" is self-contradictory
and therefore false. "'John is in Boston and John is in Cambridge" is self-contradictory" is not self-contradictory and is true. 4. Ānanda here speaks of a "tragic element" (karunāvastu) rather than a tragic rasa because rasa derives from the sentence meaning. The rasa (or more strictly speaking, bhāva) of the verse, as Ānanda is now interpreting it, is a feeling of the power of God. The tragic element lies in the subject and does not achieve the state of rasa. Later he will offer a different interpretation, by which the tragic can be regarded as the rasa of the verse. 5. Ānanda takes into account two opinions and shows that by either of them there need be no contradiction of rasas in the verse on the women of the Triple City. According to the first opinion, a rasa is the kāvyārtha, the overall meaning of the poem. It differs from the vācyārtha (the directly denoted meaning) by being vyanīya, not vācya. But just as the denoted sentence meaning derives from the predicate, not the subject, so also the suggested sentence meaning or rasa. The second opinion holds that a rasa is not directly the suggested meaning of the poem but is caused or brought about by the suggested meaning of the poem, i.e., by the bhāvas, vibhāvas, etc., that the poem suggests. Here too the rasa must derive from a meaning that is expressed in the predicate, not the subject. 6. For example, cooked rice arises from the raw rice grains as helped out by the mutually obstructive properties of coldness and heat belonging respectively to the water and the fire on the hearth.

L Another method: this is the fourth method of avoiding obstruction. In the previous two methods an element of an obstructive rasa became subordinate to the rasa in hand, whereas now the elements of two mutually obstructive rasas become subordinate to a third: this is the difference. The women of the Triple City: we have explained the verse under 2.5 c. Now it may be objected that a thing's nature does not change by its being subordinated to something else and the obstruction that a thing presents is occasioned by its nature. With this in mind he says, And if it be asked, etc. The two obstructive elements: that is, obstructive in their very nature; the adjective furnishes the reason [for the objector's view that the obstruction will not cease]. Our answer is: What he has in mind here is that the obstruction or lack of obstruction in things occurs as they fall into particular causal combinations and not simply from their inherent natures, as may be seen by the absence of obstruction between hot and cold [in certain causal combinations].

In the predicate: as in "Do it! Don't do it!" By the word "predicate" he is saying that both actions are taken as predominant at the same time. That is why the Mīmāṃsakas (vākyavidah) say that the
two Vedic statements with mutually obstructive predicates: "They use the āsāsin cup in the Atirātra" and "They do not use the āsāsin cup in the Atirātra" amount to a prescribing of option.3

In the subject: i.e., when they are subordinate to something else. Since the statement of these mutually obstructive (contradictory) elements is subordinate to the portion [of the sentence that asserts the] playing [of rich men], it is a statement of elements which are made dependent [and give up their natural opposition] by their looking up to something else, like two feuding opponents standing in the presence of their king. It is thus a statement of expressions which, as we hear them follow one upon the other, do not allow our minds to rest on the nature of the things expressed, much less to worry about the mutual relation among those things by which contradiction could arise.4 [The] only effect of the contradiction is that the connection that might later be inferred between them from the sentence syntax by the principle discussed in the Arunādhikaraṇa, fails to be made because of their mutual obstruction.5

An objection arises. To predicate is to state something as the chief or predominant element of a sentence. If something is expressed as not predominant, it is in the subject. But you [proponents of dhvāni] will not allow a rasa to be stated [i.e., directly denoted] at all. Anticipating this objection, our author says, And it cannot be claimed, etc. What he means is that predicate and subject are concepts depending solely on predominance and non-predominance and they apply to what is suggested as well as to what is stated. It has been said that a rasa when it is presented as predominant is the final sense of a poetic sentence. So when a suggested sense appears as non-predominant, it stands to reason that the rasa will be in the subject. Or, we may say that the rasa is placed in the subject when it is suggested by vibhāvas and the like which stand in the subject. This is what he states in saying [the distinction of subject and predicate that applies to the directly denoted] sentence meaning, etc.

Or, let us not speak of contradictory elements being introduced by being treated as the subject; they can be introduced as auxiliaries. In this way there is no difficulty in finding a logically sound relation of predominant and subordinate. He shows this in the sentence, Even those critics who deny, etc. That they derive from its meaning: the meaning of a poem is a vibhāva or the like; the rasas are tan-nimittāh, i.e., have that as their cause: such is their nature.
The pertinence (sārīgati) [of these remarks to the stanza on the women of the Triple City] is this. We have the vibhavas and the like such as the “catching of their hands” mentioned in the subject and so subordinated to the main rasa. Caused by them are matters of rasa (rasavastu) or rasa-like matters (rasasajätīya) belonging to both tragedy and love-in-separation. And these are auxiliaries of what is predicated, namely the burning away of sins by the fire of Śiva’s arrows. From this [predicated burning of sin, so strengthened,] we apprehend a particular emotion (bhāva) called magnifying the power of God, which is the field of the figure of speech preyo’laṅkāra.6 We see in the world how two mutually obstructive properties, heat and cold, belonging respectively to fire and water, act as auxiliaries to a cause, e.g., grains of rice, from which a specific result arises, namely the softening of the grains into edible food. Indeed the process of cause and effect takes place in this manner [by means of auxiliaries] everywhere, even in seed and sprout, etc.7

At this rate it might seem that obstruction can never amount to anything [as it can always be explained away]. With this in mind he says, It is obstructive for a single cause, etc. Hence the maxim: there can be no cause of contradictory [results].8

Now [a difficulty presents itself]. When a sentence with mutually obstructive suggestions occurs in a poem that is to be acted out, if a total representation is given, how can the actor represent these mutually obstructive elements at one and the same time? With this in mind he asks how the actor can represent, etc. He answers the question by saying, just as he does, etc. The actor’s procedure will be just the same as it is in an instance where there is a comparably contradictory denoted meaning, as in “Come here! Go! Lie down! Get up!”

What is meant is as follows. In acting out the verse, “The women of the Triple City,” etc., the actor will begin by representing the meaning in hand [that is, the final or predominant meaning of the verse] by the use of frightened and distressed glances. Although the tragic as well [as the erotic] is subordinated to this, still the tragic is closer to the meaning in hand than is love-in-separation because the tragic is more pertinent to rendering the power of God and because love-in-separation is farther removed, being brought in only by the fancy or simile expressed by the word īva (“as it were,” “like”) in the phrase kāmīva (“like a lover”). Thus, up the phrase sāśrunetrotpalābhir [at the end of the third line], there should be used together with a representation that will be primarily pertinent to tragedy only a very slight
[representation] of love-in-separation, with indication being given of its similarity to tragedy. At the words कामिवा ("like a lover") the representation will be appropriate to a love quarrel, from which love-in-separation may be understood, but as this is immediately followed by the power of God, rendered with grandiose gestures as the words सदहातु दुरितम, etc., ("May this same fire burn away your sins") are to be enacted, the love-in-separation ends up by being subordinate to this [power of God] and there is no obstruction.

He concludes this [demonstration of the] avoidance of obstruction by saying, In this way, etc.

1. Hot fire and cold water combine to produce the cooking of rice.
2. Ānanda has used the singular विधाः, not the dual, to indicate the impossibility of contradictory actions by one person at one and the same time.
3. In order to maintain the meaningfulness of Vedic texts we are forced to interpret the predicate here as double: at one time they use the शोदासिन in the Atirātra; at another time they do not. The use of the शोदासिन thus becomes optional. The Atirātra is one of the five forms (समस्थाः) of the Jyotisṭoma sacrifice, so called from the name of the final verse-sequence (स्तोत्रम्) employed therein. The शोदासिन is a cup for holding soma. The apparently contradictory prescriptions for its use are discussed in Mīmāṃsā Sūtra and its commentary: 10.5.34ff.
4. Because the mind is hurried along to the chief matter of the sentence, the predicate.
5. In the ritual texts we are told that one should pay for the soma with a red, brown-eyed, year-old heifer (अरुणया पिन्गाक्ष्या एकाहायन्यां सोमम् क्रिनाति). In the Aruna Section of the Mīmāṃsā (MīmāṃsāS. pp. 673-698) the commentators show that the primary relation denoted by अरुणया, पिन्गाक्ष्या, and एकाहायन्या is that of instrumentality in the buying of the soma. Only later does one infer the identity of the substance referred to by these three adjectives. One does so from the grammatical agreement of the words plus the fact that their referents can be found in a single substance. In the case of the verse इही गच्छा, etc., such a posterior inference cannot be made. We cannot infer that one and the same man at one and the same time is told to come and go, lie and stand, etc.
6. See 2.5 a L. In the present interpretation, the magnification of एव is the predicate is taken as प्रेयोदानकारः; the suggestions of tragedy and love in the subject as रसवदंलकारः. Abhinava is using the terminology of Bhāmaha and Udbhāṭa.
7. Where the auxiliaries are earth, water and sunshine.
8. BP suggests reading उपादानम् for उपादानम्. Actually one can give instances of mutually contradictory effects arising from a single upādana (material source).
9. Perhaps the words अभिनयायह करणियायह have dropped out between विप्रलाम्भस्या and करुणेना. If not, they must at least be understood.
A  Furthermore, in descriptions of the exceptional power of some hero whose success is to be celebrated, the relish (rasa) of tragic events happening to his enemies will not bring distress to judges of literature but will rather prove occasions of the greatest joy. Because its force is thus blunted, there is no fault here in such an obstructive element. Accordingly, it is proper to call an element "obstructive of the rasa" only if it is obstructive of the rasa or bhāva that is the overall sense of the sentence and not when it has been subordinated to that sense.

L  He says that in other contexts the fault of obstruction may be explained away in a different manner: Furthermore, etc. Judges of literature: that is, an audience possessed of discrimination. Will not be distressed: that is to say, their hearts will not melt at such events, for their attention will not come to rest on the relish of compassion (karunāsvāda). Rather, the tragic here, resulting as it does from anger which is a transient state of the heroic, ends up, because of its suggesting its cause, simply as an increased relish of the heroic. As has been said, "the tragic rasa should be known as the effect of the cruel."[1] This is what our author says in speaking of occasions of the greatest joy. An example is the following:

O amaranth, you will lose the joy
of pressing close to our breasts;
O bakula vine, our sweet breath
will live only in your memory;
while you, the griefless asoka,
will be grieved without the touch of our feet.
Such are the words of his enemies' wives
as they flee their ancient city.

[Ratnākara][2]

Or bhāva: that is to say, the sthāyibhāva in that rasa, or a vyabhicāribhāva if it has become predominant, as yearning (autsukya) might become in love-in-separation.
1. The quotation (BhNŚ 6.40; Vol. 1, p. 295) is not quite appropriate. Bharata is there speaking of the close relation between raudra and karuṇa, rather than between vīra and karuṇa. Abhinava uses the quotation again in commenting on 3.24 Introduction. 2. The verse is ascribed to Ratnākara, the ninth century Kashmirian, by both Śarīg. 1269 and Subh. ā. 2564. It plays on the poetic conventions of the dohadas (whims of pregnancy) of flowers. In order to blossom the aśoka must be touched by a woman’s foot, the bakula must be sprinkled with wine from a woman’s mouth, and the amaranth (kurabaka) must be embraced. For the last of these conventions see Sattasai 1.6 and Saundaryalahari vs. 97. The verse quoted by Mallinātha on Kum. Sam. 3.26 presumably follows the same tradition, but in the NSP ed. the words ālokitah and āloditah have been reversed. My note in HOS Vol. 44, p. 111, para. 7 should therefore be corrected.

\[\text{§ 3.20e A}\]

Or we may say that in any context of the tragic, even if this tragic rasa is made predominant, the joining to it of an erotic element by some special turn of speech will work toward the strengthening of the tragic rasa. This is because of the fact that when things that are sweet by nature come to be objects of grief, they occasion an even greater access of grief if we remember the erotic charm that belonged to them in their former state. For example:

Here is the hand that drew off my belt,
that felt my full breasts,
that touched my navel, my thighs and loins,
that untied the knot of my skirt.

[Mahābhārata 11.24.17]¹

And so in the verse on the women of the Triple City, the fire of Śiva’s arrows acted “as a lover who has lately loved another.” In this way too one may say that there is no obstruction. So, no matter in which of many ways the verse is examined, no fault is to be found in it. The same is true of the following:

They walk the ground about a forest fire,
seeming to drip lac from tender feet
which are bleeding from the spikegrass;
and as their eyes drop tears and in their fear
they hold their husbands by the hand,
the women of your foemen seem to be
enacting once again their marriage. 2

In all such verses one should understand that there is no obstruction.

We have thus shown, so far, the various areas in which rasas and the
like may and may not be combined with obstructive rasas and the like.

1. The verse is the lament of the wife (not wives, as Abhinava says) of
Bhūriśravas as she stands among the dead warriors on Kuru Field. Arjuna
had cut off the hand of Bhūriśravas as that warrior was about to kill Sātyaki
(Mbh 7.117). This interference of Arjuna in what should have been single
combat is often held up to his reproach, a fact that also adds to the karunā-
rasa of the quoted verse. 2. The verse is found also in the KhandaPrāṣasti
attributed to Hanumān (The Pandit, Vols. 5-6) and in Mammaṭa (7, ex. 338),
etc. Each trait that is described of the now unhappy wives is likened by simile
or suggestion to the erotic context of their earlier marriage. So if we interpret
the verse according to the second interpretation given to the stanza on the
women of the Triple City, we will say that the rasa of the verse is tragedy,
which is heightened by the use of remembered love. If we interpret by the
method used in 2.20 d, the tragic element will be blunted by our delight in
the power of the king who is being praised. If we follow the line laid down
in 2.20 c, both the tragic and the erotic elements will be subordinated to the
panegyric (pryo 'lankāra) which is the main intention of the verse.

L Our author now uses a different method by which to explain
away the obstruction in the previously cited verse on the women of the
Triple City: Or we may say. What he has in mind is this. In his
previous explanation he stated that there was no obstruction because
love-in-separation and the tragic were both subordinated to something
else. Now he is making the love-in-separation subordinate to the tragic
and showing in this way that it cannot obstruct. Thus it has been
said that the tragic rasa arises from determinants (vibhāvas) such as
the destruction of one's loved ones (iṣṭajana, BhNS Vol. 1, p. 317) and
the property of being a "loved one" (iṣṭatā) depends on one's being
the recipient of the emotion love. So in the figure of fancy used in the
words "like a lover who has lately been unfaithful," the following is
suggested. In looking at the motions of Śiva's arrows of fire the women
are reminded of the events of former love quarrels. These quarrels,
being now utterly erased, become vibhāvas (determinants or factors
which reveal) the grief of the women. This is what our author is saying [when he speaks of joining an erotic element]. By some special turn of speech: He means, by bringing in some determinant (*vibhāva*) or symptom (*anubhāva*) in an elegant way, in words that lack vulgarity.

He gives an example of just this: "Here is the hand." This is the lament of the wives¹ of Bhūriśravas as they see his hand lying on the battle field. "That drew off my belt": that drew off my girdle on occasions of making love. Many verses are amenable to this method of explaining away obstruction. With this in mind he says, *The same is true*, etc. The "tears" could be caused by the smoke of the marriage fire or by grief at leaving the house of parents. Their "fear" could be the natural timidity of virgins.

Thus he has given this long but useful explanation of the portion of the *Kārikā* (3.20) that states "there is no fault in mentioning [these obstructive factors] if they are brought into a subordinate role." He concludes by saying, *We have thus shown*, etc. The word *tāvat* ("so far") shows that there are other matters still to be stated.

1. As Jacobi has pointed out (*ZDMG* 57, p. 35, note 4), only one wife is speaking in this *Mahābhārata* passage.

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A Now, in order to show the proper method of introducing these (*rasas* and the like) into a single extended work, the following is said:

*K* While it is well known that larger works contain a variety of *rasas*, a poet who seeks the excellence [of his works] will make just one of them predominant.¹
1. The antecedent of tesäm is not clear from the wording of the Kārikā, but in the VṛttiĀnanda takes it to be the rasāh expressed in nānārasa-. Abhinava says it is prabandhānām. Actually tesäm can be construed with both words (kākagolakanyāyena). Note that angi and kartavyas must be taken as separate words. If compounded, the long ī would be taken as the suffix cuī (Pān. 5.4.50), by which the meaning would be reversed ("just one of them must be made subordinate").

A In larger works, such as mahākāvyas or nāṭakas, many rāsas are found dispersed in major and minor functions. While this is well known, an author who aims at a high degree of beauty for his works will make just one of these rāsas, as being the intended rasa of the whole work, predominant over the others. This is the more proper way.

L He introduces those [other matters which, as we remarked at the end of the last section, remain to be stated]: Now, etc. Construe "method of introducing" with "these rāsas."

[Comment on the Kārikā.] Well known: having been described by the sage Bharata and others. Of them: viz., of his works.

[Comment on the Vṛtti.] Such as: the word ādi in mahākāvyādi means type; thus, "in works of the type of mahākāvya"; this refers to non-dramatic works; the second term refers to dramatic works. Dispersed: he means, among hero, villain, chief character of the patākā, chief character of the prakāri, and so on. In major and minor functions: that is, depending on the particular character to whom they belong. More proper: There may be no predominance of a single rasa in a samavakāra or a paryāyabandha and these works will still not be improper. However, the sort of work [where a single rasa is predominant], such as a nāṭaka or a mahākāvya, is a finer piece of literature. That is what he means by using the comparative degree of the adjective: "more proper."

1. Abhinava's interpretation is thus: "a poet who seeks the excellence of his works will make just one rasa predominant." 2. Patāka is a short interlude, prakāri a longer one; see 3.10-14 f. L, notes 7 and 9. 3. For paryāyabandha see above, 3.7 L and note 4. The samavakāra has not hitherto been mentioned. It was a dramatic performance in three acts, lasting for eighteen nādikās (somewhat over eight hours), exhibiting twelve heroes and a variety of love affairs and exciting events. The genre is described in BhNS
§ 3.22

A  But how can the predominance of a single rasa not be obstructed when a work contains many other rasas, all fully developed? In anticipation of this question the following is said:

K  The inclusion of other rasas will not harm the predominance of the rasa in hand if that rasa appears as an abiding factor.

A  In large works, if a rasa is first taken in hand and then constantly brought back, as an abiding factor that stretches throughout the entire work, its predominance will not be injured by the introduction of other rasas that occur in the intervals [of its appearance].

L  But how: What he means is this. How can a rasa be subordinate if it is fully developed? Or if it is not fully developed, how can it be a rasa? It thus appears that being a rasa and being subordinate are self-contradictory concepts. And yet if these other rasas are not subordinate, how can a single rasa be predominant?

The inclusion of other rasas: If the rasa that has been taken in hand extends throughout the whole plot and is fitted for predominance by this extensiveness, its predominance will not be harmed by the introduction, by the filling in, of other rasas brought in by the needs of the plot and running through only limited sections of the narrative. Rather than being injured, the predominance of the rasa which appears
as an abiding factor throughout the plot will be strengthened. In other words, the subsidiary rasas, although they attain a degree of charm by being fully developed each at its own stage by its own set of vibhāvas and the like, still do not attain such a charm that our apprehension will rest on them; rather, it will be carried on to some further delight. This is the process that is found everywhere in relations of minor and major. As the great master¹ has said:

The minor by being perfected goes to [the help of] the major, for in this way it works to the greater advantage of the major.

1. We do not know whom Abhinava means. Elsewhere he uses the term tatrabhavän of at least three persons: Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Patañjali, Bhartṛhari. The quoted verse is found also in Mammaṭa very near the end of the Seventh Book.

### 3.23 Introduction

**A** To demonstrate this, the following is said:

**K** As a single, abiding goal (kārya)¹ is demanded for a work, so also there is no obstruction (or contradiction) at all in demanding a single rasa.

1. Just what the Kārikā means here by kārya is hard to say: goal, line of action, or plot. Ānanda leaves the word as it is without a gloss or explanation. To Abhinava it carried the technical sense that it bears in BhNŚ, viz., goal as the third of the arthaprakṛtis. But Abhinava saw that this sense was too narrow. So by remedial interpretation he reads other senses into it as well.

**A** Just as a single, abiding goal is set up, extending throughout the body of the work with all its sandhis, without precluding its being
combined with other goals, nor is its predominance lessened by this mixture; just so is there no obstruction to a single rasa by its being mixed with others. Readers with a ready sense of discrimination, who are attentive and intelligent, will rather take a higher degree of pleasure in such a work.

§ 3.23 L] To demonstrate: he means, by furnishing an appropriate analogy. And the analogy stands to reason. For one must of necessity accept a single goal that sets the topic, that extends throughout the work, and that is helped out by other, occasional goals. And it is because of this [relation of major and minor] that the states of mind (cittavṛtti) of the chief characters, which depend upon these goals or objectives, themselves fall into relations of major and minor. There is nothing extraordinary about this. Such is the overall meaning.

Just so (tathā): exactly similar in its extending throughout the work. Or we can take the word eva to be displaced, understanding it to go with tathā rather than with na. The sense will then be: it follows by necessity that the rasas too should be arranged in just the same manner (tathā eva), viz., in a relation of major and minor elements, as is found in the goals or objectives.

Goal: [This includes] the bija (seed), which has been defined as “that which is of small compass at its first appearance but which spreads out in many ways.” [Hence it is spoken of as “extending throughout,”] Again, the bindu (drop) is that which binds together again whenever there is an interruption of purpose, all the way from the bija to the end of the work. So the “goal” in its form of the artha-prakṛti called the bindu extends to the denouement of the work. He indicates this by saying that it is abiding (anuyāya). Thus, by this word “goal” both the bija and the bindu are included. With other goals: This refers to the incidental goal resident in the fourth artha-prakṛti, called the patākā, which is defined as “not extending beyond the garbha or the vimarsa sandhi” and to the goals which characterize the still less extensive prakāra. In this way, what is said implies that the five artha-prakṛtis should be so introduced as to form part of a single whole, as is done in the Tāpasavatāraīja.

The Kārikā has thus done two things: it has given an analogy to the relation of principal and subordinate [that should exist among the rasas] and it has shown how this relation among the rasas follows from
the force of the plot. The text of the *Vṛtti* is likewise to be interpreted as having these two intentions.

1. Abhinava is here giving the word *tathā* of the *Kārikā* a double function. It acts as a correlative of *yathā*, but it also acts as an independent adverb: “in the demanding of a rasa that acts ‘so’ (viz., throughout the work), there is no contradiction.” 2. Abhinava takes *kārya* basically to mean the third of the five *arthaprakṛtis*, for an explanation of which see above, 3.10-14 f L, note 7. But he makes it include, in a secondary sense, the first *arthaprakṛti* or *bijā* (hence Ānanda calls it *vyāpakam*) and the second *arthaprakṛti* or *bindu* (hence Ānanda calls it *anuyāyi*). He then takes *karyāntaraih* to refer to the fourth and fifth *arthaprakṛtis*, which must be subordinated to the first three. 3. This is Bharata’s definition. BhNŚ 19.22. 4. BhNŚ 19.23, which lacks the words *bijāt prabhṛti* and ends *yāvat samāptir bandhasya sa binduḥ parikṛtitah*. 5. BhNŚ 19.24; for the five *sandhis* see above, 3.10-14 f L. 6. BhNŚ 19.25. 7. *Ekavākyatā* is a term taken from the commentators on Panini. It may happen that two statements are found separately given in Panini’s text but are to be taken as forming a consistent unit (*vākya*) with the *mahāvākya* or overall statement. *Vākyavākyavākyatā* comes to mean the consistency of smaller syntactic elements with an overarching whole.

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A Now it may readily be granted that a relation of predominant and subordinate can be established between rasas which are not mutually obstructive, as between the heroic and the erotic, the erotic and the comic, the cruel and the erotic, the heroic and the marvellous, the heroic and the cruel, the cruel and the tragic, or the erotic and the marvellous. But it may be doubted how such a relation can be achieved between rasas which are mutually exclusive, as between the erotic and the loathsome, the heroic and the fearsome, the peaceful and the cruel, or the peaceful and the erotic. So the next *Kārikā* says:

L That the erotic is not obstructive of the heroic appears from the fact that the fairest maidens are won by battle, boldness, and diplomacy. The comic clearly fits in with the erotic. Comedy, while not in
itself one of the aims of man, can become one by its increasing our
delight in the erotic when it forms part of it. It can even somehow
be made out that the cruel is not obstructive to the erotic, for it has
been said by Bharata that "they even make love with violence," where
he is referring by the word "they" to devils, demons, and violent men.
One need only avoid cruelty here as exercised against the heroine. The
heroic and the marvellous can combine because wonder is aroused by
the hero's unexpected deeds such as sweeping the earth clear [of all his
enemies]. As the sage [Bharata] has said, "the effect of the heroic is the
marvellous." The heroic and the cruel combine in a proud and noble
(dhiroddhata) hero like Bhīma because there is no obstruction between
anger and heroic energy (utsāha). Of the cruel and the tragic the sage
has said, "the effect of the cruel should be known as the tragic rasa." The
erotic and the marvellous can combine, as in the mirage of the
magician in the Ratnavali.

The erotic and the loathsome: How can there be a relation of
predominant and subordinate between two rāsas of which the one can
arise only by elimination of the other? Love takes the form of plunging
into the object of one's emotion; loathing the form of fleeing from the
object. If the two were to take the same object, the one would destroy
the natural inclination of the other. Fear and heroic energy must also
be said to be mutually obstructive. And there is obstruction of the
peaceful by either love or anger, for the peaceful takes its life from an
indifference to worldly objects brought on by a knowledge of truth and
so is void of desire, whereas love and anger live on one's attachment to
worldly objects.

1. BNś Vol. I, p. 322. 2. If one exhibits the demon Rāvana as in love
with Sītā, his nature must be portrayed by his cruel acts and words directed at
others. He must not beat or insult Sītā. In the classical drama Rāvana always
acts as a perfect gentleman toward Sītā. 3. BNś 6.41. 4. Krodha (anger)
is the sthāyi-bhāva of raudra, utsāha of víra. 5. BNś 6.40. 6. Ratn.
4.7ff. 7. Bhaya and utsāha are the respective sthāyi-bhāvas of the fearsome
(bhayānaka) and the heroic. 8. Rati and krodha are the respective sthāyi-
bhāvas of śṛngāra and raudra. 9. Śaṅkarācārya remarks more than once that
anger is nothing more than frustrated desire or love; see his Gitābhāṣya 2.62
and 3.37.
Whether the *rasa* that is introduced into the predominant *rasa* is [naturally] obstructive or non-obstructive, it should not be developed to its full extent; then it will not produce obstruction.

When a predominant *rasa* such as the erotic is to be suggested by a work, [any other] *rasa*, whether obstructive or non-obstructive, should not be developed to its full extent. Three principles of avoidance are here implied, of which the first is this. A non-obstructive *rasa* should not be more fully developed than the predominant *rasa*; because it will not obstruct the predominant *rasa* [not only if it is less fully developed, but] even if it is developed to an equal extent [with the predominant *rasa*].

As in this verse:

On one side his beloved weeps,
on the other the trumpet of battle sounds:
the soldier's heart swings to and fro
between love of wife and love of war.

She breaks the necklace from her neck
and tells it over like a rosary;
she pretends her girdle strings are serpent coils
to bind her thighs in yogic posture;
hers lips, which tremble with the syllables
of the silent spell, yet half reveal a smile,
for, jealous of the Lady Twilight,
she is mimicking the Lord of Cattle's prayers:
I pray you see the Goddess at that moment,
that her smile may ever bring you aid.

1. The question may be asked how we are to know which *rasa* is predominant (*aṅga*) and which is subordinate (*aṅga*) if both are developed (*paripṣita*) to an equal extent. The answer is that we must take into view the whole work. The predominant *rasa* is that which continues beyond the verse in which we have this temporary combination. But if the temporary *rasa*
is overdeveloped, we might become confused. 2. One should read ekkatto and annatto for ekanto and annanto; see Pischel, para. 197. The verse appears in Weber’s supplement to the Sattasai as number 966 and is quoted in Hemacandra’s Viveka, ex. 187 (Parekh’s ed. p. 168). 3. The source of this verse, in the meter and style of Bāna’s Candīṣataka, has not been found. One suspects it of being an insertion, as Abhinava does not comment on it nor is it quoted by Mammata or Hemacandra. It belongs to the type of benediction characterized in HOS Vol. 44, Section 1, para. 2 and Section 4, para. 20. It is the smile of the Goddess that forms the link between the divine incident portrayed in the first three and a half lines and the benediction of the final half line. The smile in the incident is, of course, mischievous. Pārvatī, as in Kum. Sam. 8.49, is jealous of her husband’s addressing prayers to another goddess and is mocking him by her imitation. He is telling over his beads as he recites the mantras and has bound his intertwined thighs with his attendant serpent, Vāsuki. Pārvatī uses her necklace and girdle strings in imitation. But a smile from the Goddess, however occasioned, is all that we mortals need in order to be blessed. The combination of rasas, à propos of which the verse is here quoted, is of śrīgāra, as revealed by the vyabhicāribhāva jealousy, and āsā as revealed by the mimicry. Badarināth Sarmā is mistaken in finding a combination of śrīgāra and sānta in the verse. The verse is adduced as an example of mutually non-obstructive rasas. Śrīgāra and sānta are mutually obstructive.

L [Commentary on the Kārikā:] Obstructive or non-obstructive: The intention of the alternative “or” is as follows. When an added rasa is made stronger than the predominant rasa, the added rasa will be objectionable even if it is non-obstructive. On the other hand, if it is made compatible by bringing it into subordination to the predominant rasa by some means, then even an obstructive rasa, being added on, as he will state,1 by such means as by attaching it to a different person, will not be censurable. So the question of obstructive or non-obstructive is of no consequence. What is important is to pay heed to the way in which the rasa is introduced.

Into the predominant rasa: The locative (aṅgini) is locative of despite.2 The sense is that a subordinate rasa should not be developed in despite of the given predominant rasa so that it puts that rasa down. It will not produce obstruction: the meaning is, it will be without fault.

[Commentary on the Vṛtti.] He speaks of three ways of avoiding overdevelopment in the passage beginning with the word tatra (“of which”) and ending with the word trītyaḥ (“the third way,” 3.24 a). But now,
one would have expected the *Kārikā* to state merely that the added *rasa* should be less developed. What possibility did its author envisage to make him say rather that it should not be more developed? The *Vṛtti* addresses this question with the words because even if it is developed to an equal extent, etc.

[After translating the Prakrit verse “On the one side,” etc., Abhinava continues:] The words “his beloved weeps” show a development of love (*rati*), the words “the trumpet of battle sounds” and “the soldier’s [heart]” show a development of heroic energy (*utsāha*). The words “swings to and fro” show an exact equality of the two. Here some have said that this [equality] can obtain only within the compass of a single verse, not throughout the extent of a whole work. But they are wrong. Because in the plot that forms the topic of a whole work the three goals of man (sensual enjoyment, power and religious merit) may all be equally predominant. For example in the *Ratnāvali*, from the point of view of what is accomplished by the efforts of the king’s minister, the basic goal of the play will be the king’s attaining sovereignty over the whole earth, while his gaining the most beautiful of maidens is only an incidental goal. But from the point of view of the king, the opposite is the case. Such then being the view of the minister and such the view of the king, by the maxim that success is achieved only by uniting the ministerial and the royal points of view, we end up uniting them and saying that each is predominant. Now it is a principle of practical government that success comes only from uniting the plans of the sovereign and his ministers. So [in this play] the two are united, which amounts to saying that ultimately they are of equal predominance. As has been said, “By the skillful effort of a poet [a goal is achieved] by all the chief characters in cooperation.” But enough of this side issue.

1. In 3.25. 2. Abhinava sometimes prefers to take a locative thus rather than as a locative of place; see 3.10–14 c *L*, note 1. 3. I have translated the plural of the text: “some have said they are wrong.” But Abhinava is doubtless referring, with intentional vagueness, to a single commentator, probably his favorite whipping boy, the author of the *Candrīkā*. The opinion that Abhinava here refutes has much to be said in its favor. It is on the face of it nonsense to speak of an *āṅga* and an *āṅgin* as being equal without qualifying the statement in some way. One may do so by saying that the *āṅga* and *āṅgin* may be equal for the space of a single verse, but that the *āṅgin* continues as fully developed in succeeding verses, whereas the *āṅga*
§ 3.24 a A ]

A The second [principle of avoiding overdevelopment of a rasa] is this. One should not introduce too many transient states (vyabhicārins) obstructive to the predominant rasa. Or, if one does introduce them, one should follow them quickly by transient states of the predominant rasa.

The third way is to be constantly watchful that a subordinate rasa which is being developed remains subordinate. Other principles along these lines can be imagined. But any rasa that is obstructive must be kept less developed than the predominant, as, for example, the erotic when the peaceful is predominant, or the peaceful when the erotic is predominant.

It may be asked how a rasa which is not developed can be a rasa at all. The answer is that we are here speaking of its development relative to that of the predominant rasa. It must not be developed as fully as the predominant rasa. This does not mean that it may not have such development of its own as is possible [within this limit]. And this imparting of a relative prominence to a single rasa in works which contain many rasas cannot be denied even by a critic who would not admit a predominant-subordinate (or whole and part) relation between rasas.

In this way, whether they are obstructive or non-obstructive, if rasas are added to a work in a relation of subordinate to predominant, there will be no obstruction. All this has been said from the point of view...
of those who hold that one rasa may act as a vyabhicārin (temporary state or variant) of another. Even in the opinion of others [who deny that possibility], one can take the sthāyībhāvas of the rasas to be referred to by the word rasa in its secondary sense and say that by the subordination of one of them to another, obstruction is avoided.

L Having thus described the first method, he states the second: One should not introduce, etc. Not introduce: viz., into the subordinate rasa. But at this rate, it might be objected, the subordinate rasa could not be properly developed. Anticipating this objection, he gives a different judgment: Or, if one does introduce them. The word “or” is here used to affirm the second judgment, not to offer it as an alternative.1 Thus only one method [is here recommended],2 whereas otherwise there would be two.3 A transient state which belongs [specifically] to the predominant rasa should follow, that is, should bring them into conformity. For example, in the stanza, “In anger she has bound him.”4 anger (krodha) has been expressed as subordinate to sexual desire (rati), which is the predominant bhāva of the stanza. A transient state [of this anger], indignation (amarṣa), has been introduced by the words, “bound him tightly.” But by the words, “she weeps” and “with a laugh,” this is quickly brought into conformity with such transient states of rati as jealousy, yearning, joy.

He states the third way: to be constantly watchful. One may take as example the Tāpasavatsarāja, in which the rasa of love-enjoyment, furnished by King Vatsa’s relation to Padmāvatī, [is always kept subordinate].5 Other principles: [For example,] one should not overdevelop the vibhāvas and anubhāvas of a subordinate rasa. If they are obstructive to the predominant rasa, one should not introduce them at all; or rather, if one does so, one should add to them vibhāvas and anubhāvas belonging to the predominant rasa. Where the vibhāvas and anubhāvas of an obstructive rasa are developed, one must be vigilant to keep them subordinate. One can readily supply such rules by oneself.

Having thus described the methods that are common to cases of obstructive and non-obstructive factors, he now speaks of a particular [means] which differs by its being a method for avoiding overdevelopment which is peculiar to cases of obstructive factors: But any rasa that is obstructive, etc.

As is possible: supply, : being obstructive to the predom-
And this [imparting of a relative prominence], etc.: There exists an opinion that there is no such thing as a relation of helper-helped among rasas because a rasa has no further effect than its own aesthetic delight (camatkāra); that otherwise it could not be called a rasa; and if it were not a rasa, how could it take part in a relation of predominant and subordinate rasas? But even those who hold this opinion must admit the prominence of a single rasa in a work. that is, its extension over a greater part of the work, while other rasas are found accompanying smaller sections of the work, for otherwise there could be no coherence of the plot (itiyāttā). If there is no coherence of the rasa that extends over the greater part of the work with the other rasas, there will be no coherence of the plot; while if there is coherence of the plot, this will amount to admitting a relation of helper-helped among the rasas. That there is no contradiction between the fact that the rasas end in their own aesthetic delight [and the fact that they may exist in a subordinate or helping relation] will be stated just below. So he says, even by a critic who would not admit, etc. What he means is that the critic may refuse to admit it in so many words, but will be forced to admit it in principle.

Now another [commentator] has given a different explanation. The passage beginning “and this imparting of a relative prominence,” he says, refers to the “second” opinion, according to which the relation of helper-helped does not exist among the rasas [but exists only among the sthāyibhāvas]. Even in that opinion, he says, there is predominance of one rasa by its extending over a greater section of the plot. This explanation is wrong. Because if we accept it, the author’s summary, which refers to only one opinion, as is clear from the word “all” in “all this has been said,” etc., and from his raising only later the second opinion with the words “even in the opinion of others”: [this distribution of the two opinions] would be illogical. But enough of this argument with an older member of my family.

Of those who hold: At the end of Bharata’s chapter on the bhāvas is this verse:

Of many rasas which are used in the same work the one whose form is [of] large compass should be considered the ‘abiding’ (sthāyin) rasa; the others, the ‘transient’ (sancārin) rasas.

According to what is stated in this verse, a state of mind (cittavṛtti) that extends over the basic plot must necessarily appear as “abiding,” whereas that which accompanies only an incident in the plot will appear
as “transient.” Thus there is no contradiction in an abider-transient [= principal-subordinate] relation between them at the time when they are relished in the form of rasas. This is how some people have explained the verse. Thus, even Bhāguri, after asking, “Are the rasas as well [as the bhāvas] to be regarded as abiding or transient?” answers it in the affirmative, saying, “Indeed they are.”

But others understand the verse to mean that that rasa [i.e., bhāva] which is listed as a sthāyibhāva may become a vyabhicāribhāva of another rasa,13 as anger (krodha) [which is listed as the sthāyibhāva of the cruel] may become a vyabhicārin of the heroic, while a rasa that is listed as a vyabhicārin may become the sthāyibhāva in another rasa, as indifference (nirveda) [which is listed by Bharata as a vyabhicārin of the tragic], when it is revelatory of a knowledge of truth, becomes the sthāyibhāva of the peaceful. Or we may take the verse to mean that that which is really a temporary state (vyabhicārin) may be relatively permanent as compared with other temporary states, as, for example, madness in the Fourth Act of the Vikramorvasī.14 The intention of the verse is to give all this meaning. Its literal interpretation is: “Of many bhāvas (emotional states) in their form of states-of-mind (cittavṛtti), that one whose form is found to be large is the sthāyibhāva (the abiding emotion) and it is a ‘rasa’ because it is capable of being made into a rasa; the others are called ‘transient’.” But with this permanence and transiency of the rasas the verse says nothing of their being related as predominant and subordinate. That is why still others read the term rasasthāyī as a compound,15 whether as a genitive tatpurusa (meaning “the abiding emotion of the rasa”), or as a locative (“the abiding emotion in the rasa”), or, on the authority of Pāṇ. 2.1.24, Vārt. 1, as an accusative.16 So he says, Even in the opinion of others, etc. By the word rasa: The reference is to the word rasa contained in Kārikā 3.22.

1. Abhinava is taking the word vā of the Vṛtti in the sense of “rather,” as he did in 3.9 L. 2. Namely, the second of the three principles announced in 3.24 A. 3. And consequently the vṛtti should have spoken of four principles in 3.24 A, not three. 4. See 2.18-19 e A and 3.20 b A and L. 5. For the plot of the Tāpasavatsarāja see above 3.10-14 g L. King Udayana’s love for Padmāvatī is always kept subordinate to his sorrow for the loss of Vāsavadattā. 6. As in commenting on 3.23, Abhinava here again emphasizes the dependence of the rasas on the plot. Just as a plot demands the introduction of various rasas, so the coherence of the plot demands an arāṅgāṅgībhāva or upakāryopakārakabhāva among the rasas. 7. Viz. by Abhinava, Text. p. 386.
lines 5–8. 8. The interpretation to which Abhinava objects was that of the Candrikā. It is certainly the natural interpretation of the passage. What Abhinava has against it is that if such was Ānanda's intention, he seems to contradict himself in the words that follow, when he says, “All this is according to the opinion that one rasa may act as the vyabhicārin of another.” To absolve his author from the charge of contradicting himself, Abhinava gives a more artificial explanation of the passage. The critic who “will not admit” the angāngibhāva (or the anugrāhyānugrāhakabhāva) of the rasas is not an upholder of the second opinion (viz., the opinion that the sthāyibhūvas rather than the rasas are subordinated to one another). He is a believer in the svacamatkāravivānti of the rasas, one who is so obstinate in that belief that he will not admit the angāngibhāva of the rasas although he really must believe in them. Thus the critic “who will not admit” the angāngibhāva of the rasas can be included in those who really believe that one rasa can act as the vyabhicārin of another. There is now no contradiction in saying that “all that we have said is according to the belief that one rasa may act as the vyabhicārin of another.”


10. BhNS 7.119 +1 (Vol. 1, p. 379). The verse is missing in the shorter version of Bharata. The translation that we give here understands the third quarter of the verse as sa mantavyo rasaḥ sthāyi, whether one reads it that way (as does the GOS ed. of BhNS) or whether one reads sa mantavya rasa-sthāyi (as does the Kashi ed. of the Locana) and understands a dropping of the visarga by Pāṇ. 8.3.36. Vārt. 1. If one takes the latter reading and regards rasasthāyi as a compound, a different translation will be needed. We give it in footnote 15, below. 11. In the term “some people” Abhinava apparently includes himself. 12. Nothing more is known of Bhāguri as a drama critic than what is furnished by this reference. The Bhāguri quoted in Lakṣmi-dhara’s commentary on Vādirāja’s Yasodharacarita 2.34 was a grammarian, if we are to judge from the nature of the quotation there given. It is possible, of course, that one man commented both on grammar and on the BhNS. 13. This first group of “others” differs from Abhinava in taking the word rasa in the verse to mean bhāva. Abhinava too believed in the interchangeability of sthāyin and vyabhicāribhāvas; cf. above, 3.20 L, note 4. But he does not understand the present verse to refer to it. 14. Madness (unmāda) is a vyabhicāribhāva of love-in-separation, but is so developed in the mad scene of the Vikramorvasī as to become practically the sthāyin. 15. For this third interpretation we must translate the verse as follows: “Of many [bhāvas] which are used in the same work, the one whose form is [of a] large [compass] should be considered as the ‘abiding’ bhāva of [or in, or with,] the rasa; the others as the ‘transient’ [bhāvas].” 16. Abhinava quotes the Vārttika as it is given in Patañjali and in the Kāśikā. Its sense is “To the list given as ‘śrita, etc.’ one should add gami, gāmin, and others.” The list is of words which may be compounded with an accusative noun. Thus, grāmagāmi “going to the
village." So here, rasaṁtāyī "abiding with the rasa." Stāyṛi is understood as anuṁtāyī and so can govern the accusative although the verb without prefix is normally intransitive.

A Having thus set forth the means of avoiding obstruction that are common to cases of naturally obstructive and naturally unobstructive elements when introduced into the predominant rasa of a work, it is now proposed to show one [means] that is limited in its use to the area of naturally obstructive elements. Thus, the Kārikā says:

K If an element, which would be obstructive to the abiding [rasa] because its belonging to the same base would be contradictory, is made to belong to a different base, it will be without fault if fully developed, even so.

A Obstructive (or contradictory) elements are of two sorts: obstructive because found in the same locus and obstructive because immediately successive. Of these, that which is obstructive to the predominant rasa that abides throughout the work, because its belonging to the same base would be contradictory to the rules of propriety, as the fearsome would be to the heroic, should be made to belong to a different base. The hero of the story is the base of heroism; so it should be introduced into his opponent If that is done, even if the element is naturally obstructive, one may develop it without fault. For if one shows an extreme degree of fear in the enemy, one will thereby suggest all the more of competence and bravery on the part of the hero. This is shown clearly in my Arjunacarita on the occasion of Arjuna's descent into the underworld.
By summing up the means that are common, he lays the ground [for describing] a means that is special: Having thus, etc. One: that is, a means of avoiding obstruction.

[Comment on the Kārika.] The adjectival compound viruddhaikāśrayo contains the cause.\(^1\) That abiding [state] that is naturally obstructive because its belonging to the same base with some other abiding [state] would be inconceivable, like fear with boldness, must be made to have a different base, that is, must be made to belong to the enemy of the hero. It [will be]: Even if it is naturally obstructive, if it is made thus, if it is constructed thus, its development will not constitute a fault because it will add to the prominence of the hero. This implies that it would actually be a fault not to develop it. The word api is displaced and is taken to be so by the Vṛtti as well [as by us].\(^2\)

[Comment on the Vṛtti.] Obstructive because found in the same locus: that is, by its very connection with the same base [regardless of time], as boldness with fear. In other cases, even if connection with the same base may be possible, an element may be obstructive because it follows immediately, without any interval, as indifference [will prove obstructive] to love [when it follows immediately].\(^3\) Is shown: in such passages as this:

And as the fearsome sound of Arjun's bow was heard,  
a panic rose within the city of the demons.\(^4\)

1. Abhinava means that viruddhaikāśrayo acts as a causal clause. "Possessing a contradictory belonging to the same base" means "Because its belonging to the same base would be contradictory." 2. Both Ananda and Abhinava understand the api with tasya [virodhiṇaḥ] rather than with pope: "There will be no fault even if the element is naturally obstructive" rather than "There will be no fault even if one develops fully a naturally obstructive element." 3. The distinction is thus. Some emotions can never share the same person. A hero is never afraid. Some emotions can occur in one and the same person, but not in immediate succession. A lover may become a saint; but not immediately 4. One hopes that a whole canto was not written in this thumping iambic meter. Bharata calls it māttaceṣṭita (BhNS 15.21). It is called bālagarbhiṇī in the Jānaśrayī Chandovicitti (4.22). Piṅgala does not mention it.
A An element that is naturally obstructive by its belonging to the same locus with the abiding rasa of a work can be made in one way or another non-obstructive by bringing it into subordination to the abiding rasa. Now that this has been shown, the next Kārikā goes on to show that with the second [type of naturally obstructive factor] the same thing may be achieved.

K A rasa that may belong without fault to the same base but is obstructive when following [some other rasa] without interval should be suggested by a wise author only after the intervention of a third rasa.

A That rasa which is not obstructive merely by inhering in the same locus but is obstructive when following [some other rasa] without interval should be introduced into a work only after the intervention of a third rasa. An example is the way in which the peaceful and the erotic are introduced in the Nāgānanda.

L The second [type]: viz., that which is obstructive by its following without interval. The same thing: viz., avoidance of obstruction.

The sense of the Kārikā is this. That rasa which is without fault, that is, without obstruction, by reason of its belonging to the same base [as another rasa], but which would become obstructive by reason of its following that other rasa without interval, must be made to fit by inserting a third rasa, which is non-obstructive to the other two, between those two.
Into a work: This is said out of regard to the majority [of instances], but the introduction can sometimes be made even within a single verse, for he will go on to say, “standing even in a single sentence” (3.27 K).

An example, etc. For in the Nāgānanda¹ the rasa of peace is presented² from the upakṣepa up to the nirvāhana.³ The upakṣepa (planting the seed) occurs with the lines [spoken by the hero on his first entrance]: “I know youth to be the house of passion, nor am I unaware that it is transient,” etc. (Nāg. 1.5) The nirvāhana (denouement) consists in his offering up his life for the sake of another. Now the hero’s love (śṛṅgāra) for Malavātī would be obstructive to this rasa of peace; so the poet, in order to make possible its breaking forth in succession to the peaceful, presents it only after inserting the rasa of the marvellous, which is unobstructive to either. He does this in the passage “Ah, what a song! Ah, what music!” (Nāg. 1.13 +1). And for this purpose the verse: “Clarity in all ten types of touch.” etc. (Nāg. 1.14),⁴ while it is almost without rasa of itself, is here presented, as it raises the degree of rasa by strengthening the marvellous. After which, the next rasa is shown to break forth with “There can be no harm in looking at an unmarried girl” (Nāg. 1.14 +9). As the Sāṅkhya philosophers, who are famous for their examination of how states of mind arise, have said:

As occasion is offered by causes and effects, [through the power of prakṛti, the psychic self takes up its different postures like an actor], aiming at the various goals of man.⁵

Then we have this erotic mood, which has been brought in by causes and effects, strengthened by the comic, which is roused by the actions of Śekharaka. In natural opposition to this and in support of worldly disenchantment and peace is the scene of viewing the bones of the dead Nāgas. But this is introduced only after the insertion of the heroic, aided by the transient state (vyabhicārin) of anger as expressed by the verses beginning with: “[Blackening out the sun with aerial chariots]/ that fly from every side [along the roads of heaven]” (Nāg. 3.15), these verses being spoken by Mitrāvasu, whose entrance is the occasion for Malayavatī’s exit.

1. What follows is a most interesting analysis of the Nāgānanda, which shows that from the point of view of at least one sensitive critic it was not the dramatic failure that most Europeans have thought it. The student will have to read or reread the play in order properly to judge Abhinava’s analysis. It
would be too cumbrous to relate the whole plot here in a footnote. 2. Lit., constructed; the word nibaddhah (Locana, line 7, p. 389) must be taken with śānto rasah in line 5 as well as with srīgārah in line 6. 3. The upakṣepa is the first sandhyāṅga of the first sandhi (the mukhasandhi); the nirvahāṇa is the fifth and last sandhi; see above, 3.10-14 f L 4. The whole line runs: vyaktir vyānjanadhatum ādaśandhenāpy atra labdhāmunā. I am not sure of the meaning. The verse praises the song and music of Malayavatī with a wealth of references to technical terms of music. 5. The quotation is of the first half of Sāṅkhya-kārikā 42, to which I have joined a translation of the second half in brackets (prakṛter vibhūtav Yogān natavad vyavatīsthate lingam). Abhinava quotes the verse in order to show that the state of mind of the chief character (and therefore the rasa of the play) is not immutable and that a skilled dramatist will make use of these “occasions offered by causes and effects” in order to bring about changes therein. Actually one might argue that this factor is as important as the insertion of the third rasa. The drunkenness of Sekharaka and the sight of the bones of the sacrificed Nāgas are later instances in the Nāgānanda. It is these external events which serve to alter the citrāntti and the rasa. Even by the aid of such events, of course, they cannot be immediately reversed. As with an automobile, one must first shift into neutral.

A And the peaceful is indeed apprehended as a rasa. It is characterized by the full development of the happiness that comes from the dying off of desire. As has been said:

The joy of pleasure in this world
and the greater joy of pleasures found i
are not worth a sixteenth of the joy
that comes from the dying of desire.

[Mahābhārata 12.168.36]²

1. Despite the fact that it is not mentioned as one of the rasaś in the oldest version of BhNŚ. 2. The verse is found quoted throughout Sanskrit literature; see references in the critical ed. of Mbh.

L But now, it may be objected that there is no such rasa as the peaceful and that the sage [Bharata] does not even mention a basic
emotional state (sthāyin) for such a rasa. Anticipating this difficulty, our author says, And the peaceful, etc. The peaceful rasa may be characterized as the full development into aesthetic enjoyment of a certain type of happiness (sukha) occurring as a basic emotional state. This happiness consists in the dying off, that is, the complete cessation, of desires, that is, yearnings for objects of sense, and may be called an indifference to worldly things (nirveda).

Is indeed apprehended: [first explanation] that is, it can indeed be imagined even within one's own experience, as at a time when all desire for some particular sensual object, such as food, as ceased.1

Others, on the other hand, imagine that the basic emotional state [of the peaceful] is a cessation of all states of mind (or thought-trends). But if the absence of desire is understood as a pure negation (prasajya-pratisedha) and means the absence of all states of mind, it could not be called an emotional state (bhāva) at all; whereas if it is understood as a limitational negative (paryudāsa), it will fit in with our position.2

Others consider the statement of Bharata:

The emotions arise from peace, each from its peculiar cause,
and when the cause has ceased, they melt back into peace,3

and on this basis say that the peaceful (śānta) is the basic nature common to all the rasas and that its basic emotional state is that state where no specific state of mind has yet arisen. This view is not far removed from ours.4 The difference is one of prāgabhāva (the non-existence of something before its origination) and pradhvamsābhāva (the non-existence of something after it has been destroyed). What is correct is to speak of [indifference to worldly things as] the posterior non-existence of [sensual] desires "because," as has been said, "we never see a man born without desire."5

Is indeed apprehended [second explanation:] The sage [Bharata] himself accepted it in saying, "sometimes peace," etc.6 Nor is there any need to describe its final stage, which, because of its complete cessation of action, could have no symptoms (anubhāvas) and so could not be [aesthetically] perceived.7 In its final stage we could say of the erotic too that it cannot be described.8 But in the previous stage [of the peaceful] there are activities of rules and restraints in their various forms—as is indicated by the [Yoga-] sūtras: "The mind's pure flow of peace comes from one's [repeated] will [to suppress thoughts of sense

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objects)" (YogaS. 3.10) and "In the intervals [of trance] various worldly cognitions arise because of old predispositions" (YogaS. 4.27)—or, in the case of men like Janaka, even though they were men of peace, one could have observed such activities as reigning over a kingdom. So there exist symptoms (anubhāvas) and transient states (vyabhicārins) which can be imagined among rules and restraints, from which this [rasa of peace] can indeed be [aesthetically] apprehended. If it be objected that it is not apprehended because it has novibhāvas, we deny the charge. It is apprehended; so there must be vibhāvas. Its vibhāvas (situations which reveal it) are such as the fruition of a character's former good deeds, his being favored by God, his close acquaintance with books treating of spiritual secrets and with men who are devoid of desire.

In this way we have demonstrated the existence of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicārins [of the peaceful] and have shown its sthāyin.

1. Most of us are not sufficiently enlightened to experience nirveda in its full extent, but we can all imagine it by analogy with the partial or specific nirveda that everyone occasionally experiences. 2. The distinction between prasajyapratisedha and paryudāsa is frequently discussed in the commentaries on Pāṇini; see Mahābhāṣya 1.1.43, 1.2.4, 1.4.57. Basically the first means a verbal negation, as in the sentence "One must not bring brahmans" (brāhmaṇa na netavyaḥ, where na modifies the verb-form netavāyaḥ), whereas the second means a nominal negation, as in the sentence "One must bring non-brahmins" (abrāhmaṇa netavyaḥ, where the negative a- modifies the noun brāhmaṇaḥ). But more than this lies in the distinction. A prasajyapratisedha is purely negative; it refers to nothing positive. A paryudāsa, on the other hand, refers to positive as well as negative. Abrāhmaṇa netavyaḥ means that one is not to bring brahmans but one is to bring others. These others, it is implied, have some properties similar to those of brahmans, for example humanity, for the sentence obviously implies that we are to bring men who are not brahmans, not that we are to bring horses or cattle. Thus the doctrine arises that a paryudāsa always implies a certain similarity of the enjoined entity to the forbidden entity. Now to come to Abhinava's point in the present discussion. To interpret trṣāṅkaṣaya (= trṣāṅkabhava) as a prasajyapratisedha results really in a self-contradiction. There can be no happiness, in fact no emotion at all, in something purely negative. One is not happy in not desiring; one is happy in non-desire, a positive state that is similar to desire in being an emotion but different from desire in not having sensual pleasures for its objects. 3. BhNS Vol. 1, p. 335. This forms part of the interpolated sānta passage at the end of Book 6. Even Abhinava, in whose version of the Nāṭyaśāstra they occur, may have realized they were not composed by Bharata himself. Like other insertions in BhNS the section is prefaced by the words atrāryaḥ. On
a similar preface (Vol. 1, p. 327) Abhinava says (in Abh.), "These āryā verses are to be taken together. They were recited by earlier teachers as a definition. The sage inserted them in the appropriate place to serve as a summary (tā etā hy āryā ekapraghattakatayā pūrvācaryar laḳṣaṇatrena paṭhitā muninā tu suktasamgrahāya nivesitāḥ). For a further discussion of the nature of such verses see Kane HSP p. 17. 4. The similarity would lie in the conception of nirveda as a positive emotional state. 5. Nyāyaś. 3.1.24, where the fact is taken as evidence of the previous existence of the soul. The point here is that the calm state before any of the eight sthāyābhāvas arise does not belong to any observable human. If the peaceful is to be achieved by the exhibition of its sthāyābhāva, we must take that sthāyābhāva to be the non-existence of sensual desire after destruction, that being the only sort of trṣṇābhāva that is observable and that can be represented. 6. The reference is to Bhāṣ. 1.108 (Vol. 1, p. 38), which occurs in the following context: traṅkasyāsyā sarvasya nātyam bhāvāntarātanam (= 1.107b): kvacīd dharmah, kvacīt kṛidā, kvacīt arthah, kvacīc chāmanah (= 1.108a), kvacīd dhāsyaṃ, kvacīd yuddham. kvacīt kāman, kvacīd vadhah (= 1.108b). "The theater is a representation of the bhāvas of all three worlds. In some plays [one will find] dharma; in some, delight: in some, material advantage; in some, peace: in some laughter: in some, war: in some, love: in some, slaughter." Clearly the beginning of the list is a reference to the four aims of man: dharma, kāma, artha, mokṣa. So the word bhāva should be interpreted very generally as the states or activities or occupations of the whole world. Bharata recognizes that mokṣa, or sānti which leads thereto, is a fit subject to be treated in a play. But in commenting on these verses in his Abh. Abhinava goes further. He identifies the items listed with the dramatic bhāvas (emotions) which underlie the various rasas and so would ascribe to Bharata recognition of sānti as a rasa. It is this view which he now follows in his second interpretation of Ānanda’s words “and the peaceful is indeed represented as a rasa.” 7. This is one of several passages where Abhinava seems to be directly refuting Dhanika. In his Avaloka on DR 4.35 Dhanika says, "We deny that āṇaḥ can be a sthāyīn in a play, for a play must of necessity be performed and āṇaḥ is not amenable to performance, because it consists in the dissolution of all activity" (sarva-ṛthā nāṭakādāv abhinirvāṭmanī sthāyītvam asmābhūḥ āṇasya nesyate. tasya samastavāparapropravilavārūpyasyābhīnirvāgatī). P. V. Kane has shown that Dhanika and Abhinava were contemporaries (HSP pp. 236-237). But it is possible that the view expressed by Dhanika and refuted by Abhinava goes back to some older source. 8. In the ultimate stage of sexual love all perception ceases in the pleasure of the climax. Compare Brhadāranyaka Upanisad 4.3.21: “Just as a man in the embrace of a beloved woman knows nothing outside or inside, ” From the woman’s point of view compare Amaru 101 (by the poetess Vikatanitambā; see SRK 572) “But when within his arms, I can’t remember who he was or who I was or what we did or how.” 9. The
sense of *samskāra* differs from one *sūtra* to the other. I have translated it in accordance with the commentaries.

10. We have the warranty of the *Gītā* (3.20) that King Janaka attained *mokṣa*.

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**A** Even if this *rasa* is not within everyone’s experience, one cannot on that account deny its existence as a separate state of mind among men of unusual greatness. And it is not proper to include it in the heroic because that differs by its being based on false notions of self, while this is found only in a form where egoism is set at rest. And if we were to imagine a unity of the two despite the existence of this distinction, we might just as well imagine a unity of the heroic and the cruel. There is no contradiction if we make a distinction in this fashion: that when certain states of mind such as the heroism of compassion and the like are entirely without egoism, they form a variety of the peaceful; otherwise they form a variety of the heroic. It is thus established that there exists a *rasa* of peace. Nor when we insert into it, in a work, a naturally obstructive *rasa*, if we do this with the intervention of a neutral *rasa*, will there be obstruction, as in the work to which we have just referred.

**L** But, says an objector, there is nothing in this [state of peacefulness] to appeal to the heart; so it cannot be something that is relished (*rasyamāṇa*). We answer: who can say it is not [something to be relished], when we have already said that “it is indeed [aesthetically] apprehended”? But the objector may continue: “Granted it is apprehended, still, it is not something that everyone admires.” At this rate, we reply, as the erotic is not admired by men devoid of desire, the erotic too will have to be dropped from the list of rasas.¹ So our author says, Even if, etc. Then, considering the possibility that the peaceful might be simply the heroic in which a religious element is prominent, he says, And it is not proper, etc. Because that: By “that” he means the heroic. Based on false notions of self: that is to say, it takes it life
from heroic energy, which appears in such form as the thought "I am such a person [as can do all things]." While this: By "this" he means the peaceful. The sense of the word ca ("and") is api ("although"), i.e., although they are diametrically opposed by the one's consisting in desire and the other's consisting in desirelessness. Between the heroic and the cruel, on the other hand, there is no such diametric opposition, for they have this in common that they are both useful in the pursuit of religion, wealth, and sensual pleasure.

But, it may be asked, what shall we call the heroism of compassion? Is it the heroism of religion, or the heroism of generosity? It is neither; it is simply another name for the peaceful. For the sage [Bharata] says that there are only three kinds of heroism according to tradition:

Brahmā said that the heroic is of three kinds: the heroism of generosity, the heroism of religion, and the heroism of war. [BhNS 6.79]

So our author says, when certain states of mind such as the heroism of compassion and the like. By the word ādi ("and the like") he anticipates an objection that the peaceful, insofar as it takes the form of revulsion (jugupsā) from objects of sense, might be included in the loathsome (bhātsā). But that [viz., revulsion] is a transient state (vyabhicārin) of the peaceful and does not become a basic emotion (sthāyin) because in the final stage of the peaceful it is eradicated.

The author of the Candrikā has said that the rasa of peace should not be used as the topic [i.e., as the predominant rasa] of a major work. We shall not discuss the matter here because its discussion belongs elsewhere. Suffice it to say that as the rasa of peace leads to mokṣa, which is the highest aim of man, it is the most important of all the rasas. This has been stated by my teacher Bhaṭṭāraka in his Kāvyakautukā and, with full discussion of the arguments for and against, by myself in my commentary on that work. For the present this is enough.

1. Abhinava is a bit carried away here by the heat of the argument. It is true that different persons have a special liking (hrdayasamvāda) for different rasas. In Abh. Vol. 1, p. 339, lines 11ff. Abhinava speaks of the special liking that enlightened persons have for the peaceful, adducing BhNS 27.58 in support (tusyanti tarunāh kāme mokṣesu atha vīrāgināh). But to say that the erotic is not admired by men devoid of desire, while it leads to a rhetorically effective reply here, goes against what Abhinava says elsewhere. On 2.7 he has told us that even as ascetic is struck by the charm of the erotic and his remarks on 3.40 will be in the same spirit: "A man devoid of desires does not misapprehend the bhāvas. The sound of a vīṇā does
not turn into the cawing of a crow in his ears.”

2. Either Abhinava’s text of the Dhv. lacked the word api (in -sadbhâve ‘pi’), or he overlooked its presence, for there is no need to assign the sense of api to ca if the word api is actually contained in the sentence. Commentators often assign the sense of api to ca; see Bhâskara, Brahmasûtrakâra 1.3.20, 2.1.30, 2.3.5. See also above, 2.1 d L, note 1.

3. Whereas the peaceful is useful only in the pursuit of the fourth aim of man, moksha.

4. The natural and correct interpretation of Ānanda’s meaning, in my opinion, is that dayâvira and the like, viz., dharma-vîma and dänavîra, are all three distributed into two rasas, viz., sánta and vîra, depending on whether they are void of or possessed of egoism. Abhinava does not take the natural interpretation and, as always in such departures of his, he has a reason. He wants to use the word dâdi in dayâvîrâdinâm as a prop to bring in a reference to jugupsâ. Abhinava’s interpretation is that out of dayâvira, dharma-vîma, and dänavîra the first, as being without egoism, is always equivalent to sánta. The latter two, as being possessed of egoism, are always varieties of vîra. He proves his point by a quotation from Bharata. The word dâdi in dayâvîrâdinâm is now free to refer to any other cittavrtī that is free of egoism. Hence it could apply to jugupsâ and jugupsâ could be suspected of belonging to sánta. However, it does not belong to sánta as a sustâyibhâva, as Abhinava will point out. But only as a vyabhicâribhâva. The preceding explanation will show, I think, that the invaluable BP for once is wrong in its interpretation. BP takes the words dâi-dgrañâna to have no connection with what follows and so is forced to supply the words, or actually to emend the text to read, dharma-vîma dänavîra sango ni-grahânam directly after dâdiyâna-śana. This contradicts Abhinava’s opinion and leaves the reference to jugupsâ entirely without support.

5. Compare the remarks of V. Raghavan in Number of Rasas, p. 22. “Evidently the Caudrikâkâra also held the view that Vîra and Śrîgôra are the Rasas in the Nâgânanda in accordance with the ending in the attainment of vidyâdharma-pravritti, the overlordship of the kingdom of Vidyâdharas, and the sustained love-theme, and that the sánta came in there as a subsidiary idea to give a new variety of Vîra called Dayâ-vîra.”

6. This statement is contrary to what Ānanda will say under 3.29, viz., that śrîgôra is the most important of the rasas. Masson and Patwardhan claim that it is also at variance with what Abhinava himself says in the Abâ. See Sântarasa, p. 103, note 1, where the first reference should be to BANŚ Vol. I, p 338.

7. Both the Kâvyakautukâ and Abhinava’s commentary on it have long been lost.
Between two rasas, standing even in a single sentence ceases by the intervention of a third.

That the opposition between two rasas standing in a large work will cease cannot be doubted since the opposition between two rasas even when they stand in a single sentence ceases in the above-mentioned way; as in the following sentence and others like it.

On bodies soiled with dust they looked,
they whose breasts were scented with the pollen
of garlands from the trees of paradise;
bodies seized greedily by jackals,
they whose bodies were now embraced by nymphs;
bodies fanned by the flapping, bloody wings of vultures,
they who were fanned with silken garments,
dipped in sandal ointment, from the wishing trees of heaven:
thus did the heroes then, reclining upon couches
in their flying chariots, look down with curious gaze
on their late bodies, pointed out by their companion damsels.
on the battle field. 1

Here the copresence of the erotic and the loathsome, or of their elements, is not obstructive because of the intervention of the heroic rasa.
1. This fine passage from some lost kāvyā is also quoted by Mammata (7, ex. 334-335). It comes from a description of a battle, where the dead warriors are pictured as being led to Indra’s heaven by the apsarasases who hover over battle fields for that purpose and who point out to the warriors amid their new luxury the mortal bodies which they have left behind. “Their breasts were scented”: the scent comes from the garlands of the apsarasases who are embracing them. The fault of tautology is avoided by the use of synonyms: bāhumadhya and bhujāntarāla, surarīgand and lalanā, upavīṣṭyamāna and samvijita.

L To confirm: he means, in the minds of students. The word even shows that the matter is well known so far as large works are concerned.

On bodies soiled with dust: the adjectives indicate how far removed and how difficult to imagine [as their own] these bodies were. And yet, by the phrase “look upon their bodies” we see that the warriors make the common correlation of body and self and so have been able to identify these bodies with themselves. Thus both [rasas] are given a single base, for otherwise, if they occupied different bases, there would be no obstruction to be avoided.

But it may be objected that the only rasa in the passage is the heroic, not the erotic or the loathsome and that what we have is love and loathing appearing as transient states (vyabhicārins) in the heroic. That may well be, but the passage will still serve as an example of the matter at issue. It is [to allow] for this [objection] that our author adds [the qualifying clause] or of their elements. By “their elements” he refers to their sthāyībhāvas.2

The heroic rasa: What our author has in mind is this. We understand the energy and other [heroic] qualities belonging to these [warriors] from the phrase “the heroes [looked down on] their bodies.” From this understanding we perceive [the heroic] in both agent and object as they run through the syntax of the whole sentence. Hence the heroic, although it is not explicitly expressed in the middle [of the two other elements] does in fact [implicitly] intervene.3

1. The expression asambhāvanāspada is strangely elliptical and one suspects that some word like svābhimaṇa or svāyatva has dropped out before it. I have translated according to BP. 2. The sthāyībhāvas of śṛṅgāra and bibhatsā are rati and jugupsā. Here they could be regarded as vyabhicārins of vīra. 3. The objection that Abhinava has in mind is clear enough. His
removal of it, though, would be difficult to understand without the *BP* or the commentators on Mammaṭa. The objection is that the word *vīraḥ* occurs only at the end of these verses, whereas the suggestion of the loathsome comes in the first adjective compound and the suggestion of the erotic in the second adjective compound. So how can one speak of the intervention of *vīraḥ*? The solution is this. We are told at the end of the sentence that "the heroes looked down on their dead bodies." From this we understand the heroism that attaches to these warriors and to the bodies they have lost in battle. The remainder of the sentence consists mostly in adjective compounds, one set describing the dead bodies, the other set describing the revived heroes. Now adjectives in Sanskrit are said to give rise to two cognitions: the first, of a property; the second, of a substance to which the property can belong. The doctrine is connected with the fact that there is almost no formal difference in Sanskrit (as there is in English) between an adjective and a noun; every Sanskrit adjective can function as a noun. In the sentence under discussion the first adjective compound, in its adjectival force (*visesanatayā*) gives us a suggestion of the loathsome. But right after this, by its reference to the substance (*visesyatayā*), viz., bodies, it gives us a suggestion of the heroic which attaches to those bodies. We then come to the second adjective compound, which gives us *visesanatayā* an immediate suggestion of the erotic, followed by a suggestion *visesyatayā* of the heroism attaching to its substance, viz., heroes. Such is the succession of rasas based on the order in which the words of the poem are heard. But this succession can occur only on the second or further hearing of the poem, for we must have heard the final half verse before the adjectives can furnish these heroic suggestions. So the succession may be given in the order in which one construes the words of the poem. In mentally construing, one places the subject first and the object after. By so doing we shall get the succession *śṛṅgāra, vīra, bibhatsā, vīra*, etc. In either case *vīra* intervenes.

§ 3.28 A ]

One should pay careful attention everywhere to obstruction and to the absence of obstruction in this manner; but especially in the erotic, for it is the most delicate.

A The man of taste (*sahrdaya*)¹ should pay careful attention, in accordance with the above definitions, to obstruction and to the absence of obstruction, both in large works and elsewhere; but especially
in dealing with the erotic. For, being the development of love (rati) and love being liable to damage from the slightest cause, the erotic is the most delicate of all the rasas and will not endure the intrusion of anything that is even slightly obstructive.

1. The word sahrdaya normally refers to the reader or audience, but we must here take it to refer to the poet, who also must be a man of taste, for the Kārikā, to judge from what follows (3.29), clearly has the poet rather than the audience in mind.

L And elsewhere: viz., in single verses and the like. The construction is: "for the erotic is the most delicate." Any member of the class of rasas is delicate; the tragic is more delicate; and the erotic is most delicate. Hence his use of the superlative suffix -tamap.

K A good poet must be especially heedful in rasa, for a mistake here is noticed immediately.

A In this rasa, because it possesses a greater degree of delicacy than all the other rasas, a poet must be heedful, that is, must take pains. For if he is careless here, he will quickly become an object of scorn to men of taste. For the srngāra-rasa, as it is regularly the object of the experience of humans and is therefore dear to them, is the most important of all the rasas.

1. Note that Ānanda speaks here of the rasa as being the object of ordinary experience. In Abhinava’s terminology this could be said only of the bhāva, rati.

L [No comment.]
1. Does Abhinava fail to comment because the text is easily understood, or because he disagrees with it? He has told us (3.26 b L) that in his opinion śānta is the most important of the rāsas.

§ 3.30 A ]

K That elements of the erotic should come in touch with a rāsa that is opposed to it is not a fault, if done for the purpose of attracting the attention of the audience (vineyān), or in order to give beauty to a poem.¹

1. The word vineyān, which we have here translated "audience," for it often has that meaning, in its literal sense means "those to be instructed or improved." Both Ānanda and Abhinava emphasize the literal sense. We have taken the word vā ("or") to express an alternative between attracting the attention of the audience and giving beauty to the poem. Abhinava takes it, less naturally, as expressing an alternative to all the methods of avoiding obstruction that have been previously described.

A That elements of the erotic should come in touch with a rāsa that is naturally obstructive to the erotic will not be a fault, not only when the [aforesaid] rule for avoiding obstruction are applied; because it will also not be a fault when done in order to attract the attention of the audience-to-be-improved (vineyān), or to give beauty to the poem. For such an audience, being attracted by elements of the erotic rasa, will more readily receive instruction for its improvement. For the sages have transmitted [rules for] entertainments such as plays, which take the form of instruction in good conduct, for the specific purpose of benefitting persons who need improvement. Furthermore, since the
erotic has a delight that charms all people, the introduction of elements of the erotic into a poem will furnish an addition to its beauty. So even if done in this way, the introduction of elements of the erotic into a rasa that is naturally opposed to it will not be obstructive. That is why there is no fault of obstructing the rasa in such verses as this:

Truly fair women are objects of delight
and truly wealth is fair;
but life is unsteady and as quickly gone
as the glance of a tipsy girl.1

1. The verse has already been quoted and discussed by Abhinava; see 3.1g L.

L This being the case: that is, since the erotic appeals to everyone. [Comment on the Kārikā] To it: that is, to the erotic. In rasas, such as the peaceful, which are opposed to the erotic, a touch that bears on elements of the erotic is not a fault. Vibhāvas and anubhāvas, even if they belong to another rasa, can be described by some such turn of phrase as has [elsewhere] made them belong to the erotic. As in a prayer of my own composition:

O moon-crested lord of my life,
at your sudden touch
after deep pain of separation,
my consciousness,
like a puppet carved from a moonstone,
melts and melts away.1

For in this verse even the vibhāvas and anubhāvas of the peaceful are described by an erotic turn of speech.2 The syntax of the Kārikā is this: "[A touch of the erotic] is not a fault if done in order to beautify the poem so as to attract the audience-to-be-improved." The word vā ("or") distinguishes this as a single alterantive [to the other methods described in 3.24-27].

[Comment on the Vṛtti.] Our author interprets in the same way [as we have just done], saying, not only when, etc.3 The following will explain his use of the word vā: Methods of avoiding obstruction, such as the avoidance of overdevelopment, etc, have been mentioned above; [Now] one may introduce obstructive elements for the beauty of the poem in order to attract the attention of the audience-to-be-improved, and not only [utilize] the methods above mentioned. But it is not the
case, as would follow from the comments of others, that beauty of a poem can exist without attracting the attention of the audience, and that no such beauty is ever found in the interposing or not interposing [a third rasa in the previously mentioned ways].

More readily: the sense is, with pleasure. But an objector may say that a poem is something playful like a game; how can we talk of its giving instruction, a function that belongs to Vedic texts? It is with thoughts of this objection that he speaks of good conduct. By “sages” he means Bharata and others. We have already described how plays and poems educate us in the manner of a wife, by means of pleasure, as opposed to sacred texts and history, which instruct us in the manner, respectively, of a master or a friend. So we shall say nothing on the subject here out of fear of repeating ourselves.

But is it only by describing the vibhāvas as if they belonged to the erotic that one can attract the attention of the audience-to-be-improved? No, there is another way, which our author describes by saying, Furthermore, etc. By an addition to its beauty, he means it will strengthen, or render more beautiful, particular figures of speech such as similes. For it is said that “the properties productive of beauty in a poem are the gunas; the causes of an addition to this beauty are the figures of speech.”

“A tipsy girl”: What is being described in this verse is the transience of all things and this is a vibhāva of the peaceful. This vibhāva has not been expressed by any erotic turn of phrase. Rather, by the word “truly” the statement enters directly into the listener’s heart, as though the speaker had said, “I am not proclaiming any false infatuation for indifference to the world, but I am telling you that life, for which all these things are sought, is itself transient.” In this statement the unsteady glance of a tipsy girl, which is an element referable to the erotic insofar as the glance can be considered either a vibhāva or an anubhāva, is used as a simile for transiency. For everyone takes delight in the sidelong glance of his beloved and so the hearer, who is to be improved, being started by this delight, will be led on to understand the true nature of things in an indirect way, just as a child is led on to take medicine by one’s putting sugar on his tongue, and so will end up in a state of disenchantment with worldly things.

1. The moonstone (candrakānti) is said to emit moisture under the rays of the moon. The moon-crested lord is Śiva. The melting of the consciousness refers to the yogic progress from discriminative cognition, where knower,
knowledge, and known are separate, to trance cognition (samādhi) where knower and knowledge melt into the known. 2. The ālambanavibhāvas, namely the worshipper and God, are portrayed as wife and husband. The uddipanavibhāva, meditation on God, is described as the husband’s touching his wife. The anubhāva, viz., the symptom of passage from dhyāna to samādhi, is described by a simile that would also be appropriate to the melting of a woman in her lover’s arms. 3. Ānanda certainly contrasts the permission furnished by the present Kārikā with the permissions extended under the different circumstances mentioned in 3.24–27. But it does not follow that he took the word vā to set the present permission off as a single alternative. In fact, the passage “Furthermore,” etc. (kim ca, text p. 399, line 2ff.) shows clearly that he took kāvyasobhārtham as an alternative to vineyān unmukhākārta. But Abhinava noticed a logical fault that would ensue from taking vineyān unmukhākārta and kāvyasobhārtham as separate alternatives. He was also aware that another commentator, presumably his bète noire the Candrikākāra, had taken the natural interpretation. To exculpate Ānanda from the fault and to get in a blow against the earlier commentator he forces on Ānanda an interpretation which Ānanda did not intend. 4. There are many different readings of the text. For labhyete [Kashi ed.] one must certainly read labhyate [KM ed.], of which kāvyasobhā will be the subject. Before labhyate one should probably read kvacit (so BP; KM reads kecit, which is senseless), which we have translated as “ever.” Thus appears the logical difficulty which has spurred Abhinava to his unnatural interpretation of vā. If one takes the natural interpretation, as did “the comments of others,” it would be logically possible for a poem to aim at kāvyasobhā without the alternative of attracting the audience; and it would be possible to use any one of the previously mentioned methods of avoiding obstruction without any intention of making the poem beautiful. 5. Cf. 1.11e L (near end) and 3.10–14f L (near beginning). 6. Here we have a second unnatural interpretation, provoked by the first. If the word vā does not contrast kāvyasobhārtham with vineyān unmukhākārta, we must find some explanation of the passage “furthermore, etc.” other than its natural meaning. Its natural meaning is that the introduction of erotic elements not only attracts the audience, but furthermore may add to the beauty of the poem. So Abhinava twists the meaning into the following. Not only does the introduction of erotic elements by treating the vibhāvas of śānta as if they were vibhāvas of śṛigāra beautify the poem so as to attract the audience; but furthermore, an introduction of erotic elements can strengthen an “addition to beauty,” that is, a figure of speech (alakāra, called an addition to beauty—śobhātisoya—because it causes an increase of beauty) and such figures of speech too will attract the audience. 7. The quotation is from Vāmana 3.1.1–2. 8. The sidelong glance of a tipsy girl is an uddipana vibhāva (stimulative factor) of śṛigāra. It can also be considered an anubhāva, a symptom of the girl’s affection. 9. It will help the reader
If we here set side by side the natural interpretation of Ānanda's words and the interpretation put on them by Abhinava. Ānanda: erotic elements may be introduced into an opposite rasa such as the peaceful, not only by means of the safeguards above mentioned (e.g., by inserting a neutral rasa between the two, etc.), but also when the purpose is (1) to attract the audience's attention, or (2) to beautify the poem. He quotes the verse "Truly fair women" (satyam manoramā rāmāḥ) as an example of (2). Abhinava: erotic elements may be introduced into an opposite rasa such as the peaceful not only by the safeguards above mentioned, but also when one wishes to beautify the poem in order to attract the attention of the audience. This may be done (1) by a turn of phrase that expresses a vibhāva, etc., of the peaceful as if it were a vibhāva, etc., of the erotic. As an example he quotes his own verse "O moon-crested lord" (tvam candracūdam). Or it may be done (2) by using erotic elements in a figure of speech. As an example of (2) he refers to the verse "Truly fair women," which employs in its second half the simile "unsteady as the glance of a tipsy girl." Note that in method (1) śringāra is so fused with sānta that it cannot be eliminated without damaging the sānta; whereas in method (2), as may be seen from the example, it is not quite fused and, even if it were eliminated, no harm would be done to the sānta. For example, one could change the second half of the quoted verse to read kintu padmapalāsthajālalolam hi jīvantam and the sānta would remain unaffected although the śringāra would be eliminated.

K Knowing thus the subject of obstruction and the avoidance of obstruction among the rasas and the like, a good poet never finds himself in difficulties.

A Knowing thus, that is, in the manner set forth just above, the subject of mutual obstruction and the avoidance of such obstruction among rasas and the like, that is, among rasas, bhāvas, rasābhāsas and bhāvābhāsas, a good poet, that is, one who possesses a high degree of genius in the area of poetry, never finds himself in difficulties in writing poetry.
Summing up the foregoing, he states the practical benefit of the whole topic: Knowing thus, etc.

As the usefulness has thus been shown of studying obstruction and its avoidance in the rasas and the like, it is now stated that in the study of the suggestive factors, viz., the denoted and the denotative elements within the same area, there is the same [usefulness].

The putting together of denoted and denotative elements with propriety so far as the rasas and the like are concerned is the chief task of a great poet.

The putting together of denoted elements, that is, the particulars of a plot, and denotative elements, that is, the words which denote these particulars, with propriety so far as the rasas and the like are concerned, is the chief task of a great poet. For the chief function of a great poet is the composing of words and meanings in such a way as to favor the suggestion of those rasas and the like which he takes as the chief meaning of his poem.

In the rasas: that is, in the area of the rasas. The study of the suggestive factors: viz., the denoted elements, vibhāvas and the like, and the denotative elements, nouns and verbs. Within the same area: viz., the area of the rasas and the like. The same: i.e., usefulness.
[Comment on the Kārikā.] The chief task: This is no more than what was said [in 1.9], "Just as a man who wishes to see," etc. Of a great poet: He speaks of the result as though it were a factor already given.\(^1\) For it is only thus that one becomes a great poet. That is what he means.

[Comment on the Vṛtti.] The particulars of a plot: The plot (iti-vṛtta) is what is denoted in a work and its particulars are what have been listed above in 3.10: "the forming of a plot that will be beautiful because of its vibhāvas, (sthāyi-)bhāvas, anubhāvas, and saṅcārins, etc." Which he takes as the chief meaning of his poem: Otherwise what would be the difference between the meaning of a poem on the one hand and the meanings of everyday speech and of scientific works on the other? The point has already been made in the First Chapter, where it was said that "just this meaning [viz., the suggested meaning] is the soul of poetry" (1.5 K).

1. Being a great poet is actually the result of composing words and meanings in a manner appropriate to the rāsas. But the phrase used in the Kārikā speaks of the poet as a factor already given (siddha), viz., as the agent of such composition.

\(^{\text{A}}\) To show that this composition of poetry with the ultimate purpose of [producing] rāsas and the like was well known to Bharata and other [ancient authors], the following is said:

\(^{\text{K}}\) The appropriate usage of words and meaning so as to conform to the rāsas and the like is the basis for setting up the two sets of vṛttis.

\(^{\text{A}}\) [This is so,] because usage (vyavahāra) may be called vṛtti (operation, employment). Of these [two sets], that which is based on
the appropriate use of expressed meanings (vācyā) in conformity with the rāsas is the set of vṛttis called kaiśikī, etc.; that which is based on the appropriate use of expressors (vācaka, i.e. words) is the set called upanāgarikā, etc.1 The vṛttis, when introduced for the ultimate purpose of [producing] rāsas and the like, lend a special beauty to a play or poem, for the rāsas and the like of both these [vṛttis] form the very life [of a play or poem]. Such elements as the plot are merely its body.

1. For kaiśikī, etc., see above, 3.6g L, note 1; for upanāgarikā, etc., see 1.1a A, note 4. It is natural enough to regard upanāgarikā, etc., to be based on vācaka, as the members of this set are characterized by specified amounts and types of compounding and alliteration, both of which belong to the category of expressors rather than expressed. The characterizing of kaiśikī, etc., as based on vācyā is more artificial and would be hard to justify in detail. One can best explain it as due to a desire for symmetry.

L This [composition]: viz., such as we have described. By the expression and other in “Bharata and other [ancient authors],” he implies that vṛttis such as paruṣā are given in works on figures of speech (alāṅkāraśāstreṣu).1 Of both these: He means, of both sets of usage which we call vṛttis. The very life: When Bharata says, “The vṛttis are the sources of poetry,”2 he is telling us that they must be based on plots that are appropriate to the rāsas and this implies that the rāsas are their very life.3 And Bhāmaha and others have said that those usages that we call the sabdavr̥ttis (the vṛttis dependent on words) have their life in the use that they may be to the rāsas. In Bhāmaha’s words:

People will put to use the meaning of a sentence if it is mixed with the sweet rasa of poetry. Children who have first licked honey can be brought to drink the bitter medicine.4

Their body: Bharata says, “The plot is the body of the drama” (BṛhNŚ 19.1). And the drama is just rasa, as we have said above.5

1. Paruṣā, komalā, etc., are varieties of alliteration defined by Udbhata (Indurāja 1.4ff. = Vivṛti 1.6ff.). They are not mentioned by Bharata. 2. BhNST, KM ed., 20.62: evam etā budhair jñeyā vṛttayāḥ kāvyamātāraḥ. But Abhinava seems to have used a manuscript which read kāvyamātrkāḥ “sources of poetry,” for he repeats the quotation in this form in his comment
on 3.47. He certainly did not follow the version that is found in the COS ed. of BhNŚ 20 72: evam etā budhār jñeyā vṛttayo nātyasamārayāh. 3. Abhinava's trend of thought seems to be this. The four nātyavṛttis (kaiśikī, etc.) are vitally connected with the rasas since they must be appropriate to the different rasas. So when Bharata says that these vṛttis are the sources (or mothers) of poetry, he means that the rasas suggested by these vṛttis are the source or essence of poetry. 4. Bhamaha 5.3. All the editions of Bhamaha read śāstram apy upayunjate in place of vākyārtham upabhunyate. 5. Viz., at 3.10-14 f L, in quoting his teacher, Bhaṭṭatauta.

A On this matter some people say:1 "The relation between the rasas, etc., and the plot, etc., should be spoken of as a relation of [inalienable] quality and substance rather than of life and body;2 for the expressed elements (vācyā, i.e., plot, vibhāvas, etc.,) appear as wholly united with the rasas, etc., and not as something separate from them."

To this we reply. If the expressed elements are wholly united with a rasa or the like, as a given body is united wholly [i.e., over its whole surface] with a light complexion, then just as that light complexion invariably appears to everyone whenever that body appears, so would the rasa or the like appear together with the expressed elements to everyone, to persons of no literary taste (asahrdaya) as well as to persons of literary taste. And that is not so, as has been stated in the First Chapter [1.7 K].

Or, it might be argued that the rasa-like nature of the expressed elements can be recognized,

as the genuineness of jewels is recognized
only by certain experts.3

This too would be wrong, for when a jewel is recognized as genuine, the genuineness is seen to be nothing other than the very nature of the jewel. By this analogy the rasas, etc., would be seen as nothing other than the expressed elements such as the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and the like. But this is not so, for no one supposes that the rasas are nothing more than the vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicārins. Accordingly, as
the perception of the rasas is impossible without a perception of the vibhāvas, etc., the two are distributed into the positions of cause and effect; and that is why an interval must be posited between them. This interval, it has been said,

is not noticed because of its short duration;
and that is why the rasas when suggested
are of unperceived interval.4

1. Here begins an immense digression, 56 pages of text in length. What prompts it seems almost accidental. The Kārikā has spoken of the close relation between rasas and vṛttis. This leads Ānanda to consider the relation between rasa on the one hand and vācyā and vācaka on the other; and this leads to a full-dress discussion of vyanjakatva (suggestiveness, suggestive power of operation) in all its varieties. Many points are brought up here that are nowhere mentioned in the Kārikās and that the Vṛtti failed to discuss at the beginning of Chapter Three or in Chapter One, in either of which places it would seem to have been more appropriately brought in. But one may overlook the fault of placement in view of the brilliance of the discussion. 2. By guṇa the objector means an essential or inalienable property. Life is not a guṇa in this sense; it is an activity that inheres in the body for a limited period of time. 3. These words form a half sloka and must be a quotation from some other author. 4. The printed texts misplace the opening quotation mark. The quotation begins with lāghavān na prakāśate and extends through rasādayah, thus forming the last three quarters of a sloka. The source of the sloka is not apparent. If the author is Ānanda himself, this would be the only instance in the book where he introduces a sankṣepa-sloka that is incomplete. On the other hand, one hesitates to ascribe such an explanation of rasadhvani to some earlier author.

L Should be spoken of as a relation of quality and substance: Because the two appear so intimately connected, they should be spoken of as property (dharma) and property possessor (dharmin). Rather than: the idea is that there is no interval between them. In the First Chapter: it was stated in the passage which reads: “[dhvani] is not to be found by a mere knowledge of grammar and dictionaries” (1.7 K).

But the statement that the property of a substance always appears to everyone when the substance appears is not without exception. The special property of a ruby that we call its genuineness is not invariably apparent to everyone when the ruby is seen. In order to state this
objection he says, it might be argued, etc. He then refutes it with
This too would be wrong, etc. In other words, in the syllogism
"[a property always appears to everyone when the substance appears,]
because it is a property" we must insert the proviso "so long as the
property is of an obvious nature." And the genuineness of a gem, un-
like its color, is not obvious, for its nature is well concealed. Now some
persons have interpreted the refutation to imply that [in the author's
opinion] the rasas are of an obvious nature. But our teacher has com-
mented as follows. In denying the nature of quality and substance in
the passage beginning "To this we reply," he is arguing as follows. If the
rasas are properties (dharmaḥ) of the expressed elements, one of two
alternatives must follow: they must be like [obvious properties] such as
color, or they must be like [hidden properties] such as the genuineness
of a ruby. The first is impossible because the rasas do not appear to
everyone. The second is impossible because they do not appear as in-
separable [from their substance] as does the genuineness of jewels. The
reason here given [for rejecting the second alternative] can be applied
with equal force against the first alternative. Our author states the
second alternative and its refutation in the passage running from "One
might argue" through the words "But this is not so."

He now substantiates what he has said: for no one [supposes], etc.
Accordingly, etc.: as the rasas, etc., are not perceived as properties of
the expressed elements and as the perception of the expressed meaning
never fails to be helpful [to their perception], we must posit a succession,
for of two simultaneous entities the one cannot aid [in the perception of
the other]. But this succession is not perceived by sensitive persons, as
has been remarked above (1.10 L), because of their lively imagination
(bhāvanā) and their literary practice (abhyāsa), although otherwise it
would be. As for him1 who has already said that a rasa is itself a
perception of a special kind, he too may speak of the perception of
a rasa by treating the rasa as a vyapadesin,2 as we have already said
elsewhere.3

1. By "him" Abhinava means himself. 2. For an explanation of vyapa-
desivadbhāva (= vyapadesivattva) see 3.6 g L, note 5. The rasas in Abhinava's
opinion do not qualify for the designation pratiti-vigaya, as they are forms of
pratiti itself. But one may speak loosely of rasasya pratiti as one speaks of
Rahōh śirah. 3. See above, 2.4 L and note 39 thereon.
An objection is raised that the word, as conditioned by context, etc., gives rise to our perception of both the expressed and the suggested meanings at the same time. So how can we hypothesize a succession of these meanings? Our reflection on its expressed meaning is not a prerequisite of a word's suggestiveness, for the rasas can be suggested by the words (or sounds) of songs or the like; and no reflection on the expressed meaning of these words is needed first.

To this we reply. We agree with the opinion that words as conditioned by context are suggestive. But this suggestiveness is sometimes the result of their phonetic form and sometimes of their expressive (denotative) power. In the case of those whose suggestiveness is bound to their denotative power, if the suggestion could arise without our perceiving what they denote and simply from our perceiving their phonetic form, their suggestiveness would no longer be bound to their denotative power. But if it is indeed bound to this denotative power, it follows that our perception of the suggested meaning must necessarily be posterior to our perception of the denotative process. It makes no difference if the succession is too rapid to be noticed. If a rasa or the like could be perceived by means of the mere word as conditioned by context, without any perception of its expressed meaning, hearers who know the context but are themselves ignorant of the relation between the word and its expressed meaning would also have this perception of rasa from a mere hearing of a poem. Moreover, if the two meanings occurred simultaneously, the perception of the expressed meaning could not aid in producing the suggested meaning; whereas if it does aid, it cannot be simultaneous. Even in the case of those words (or sounds) of songs and the like whose suggestiveness is brought about by our perception of their phonetic form, there must be a succession in which perception of the form comes first and perception of the suggested rasa comes after. But this succession of activities of a word is not perceived in the area of the rasas and the like, which differ from any other meaning in that they do not contradict the expressed meanings. The succession is not perceived because the attachment (ghaṭanā) of the result [i.e., the attachment of a suggested meaning] to the word,
§ 3.33 b L ]

a result which can be brought about by no other means, occurs so swiftly.2

1. Of the printed texts only that of Krishnamoorty gives the correct reading: evadharitaparakarananam, which fits the context, in place of anavadhariitaparakarananam, which does not. His reading seems to be based on the variant readings reported by the KM ed. and on his Moodabidre palm-leaf.

2. Abhinava understands the passage which I have translated in this last sentence very differently, as follows. "The succession is not perceived because the various styles (saṅghataṇā, that is, the phonetic form of the words and the qualities resulting from word-compounding, etc.), each of which produces its unique effect, bring about their effect so swiftly (that we are not aware that our perception of the rasa is preceded by our perception of the style and of the literal meaning)." I have rejected this interpretation, preferring what seems to have been the interpretation of the Candrika, for which Abhinava expresses heavy scorn at the end of his comment (see below). My reasons are that I can find no evidence of Ānanda's ever using ghaṭanā in the sense of saṅghaṭaṇā, nor can I find any example where bhāvin in such a compound as āsūbhāvin is used causatively. The interpretation of Abhinava leads to a very neat explanation of why the succession should be so swift, but I cannot believe that Ānanda had any such explanation in mind in writing this passage. It goes against the whole tenor of his remarks on style (saṅghaṭaṇā) under 3.5-9.

L An objector may say: "We grant that rasas and the like are separate from the expressed meaning, but you yourself have said that no interval is perceived between the two. We would add that there is no valid reason for even hypothesizing such an interval. By induction from positive and negative examples we see that a perception of a rasa can arise without any perception of expressed meaning, as when it is brought about by the aid of mere sound in songs and the like where we have a meaningless succession of syllables (svārālāpa) without words. So the expressed meaning and the so-called suggested meaning or rasa appear at the same time through one and the same set of conditions (sāmagri) and there is no use in assuming two operations, one of denotation and one of suggestion." Our author states this in the words, An objection is raised. Even where there is meaning to the words of a song, the understanding of that meaning is not necessary because we see that the rasa arises in accordance with the scale and mode, without regard to the suggested meaning. And although meaning may
be present, it is not seen by everyone. Our author states this, say­
ing, and no [reflection], etc. Of these [words]: viz., words of the
song, etc. By the word ādi ("etc.") he indicates the sounds of musical
instruments, or of wailing, etc.

We agree: he has in mind that he has said, "Where word or sense,"
etc. [Their suggestiveness] would no longer [be bound to their
denotative power]: for in that case the rasa would appear from the
words of a poem as it does in songs without any understanding of the
meaning of the words. But as this is not the case, we must admit
that the words have a denotative power also. And as this denotation
takes as its object the expressed meaning, we must admit that our
perception of the expressed meaning occurs before [our perception of
the rasa]. He says this in the words, But [if it is indeed bound], etc.
This: viz. denotative power. Denotative process: i.e., denotative
power. In other words, suppose even that the expressed meaning is not
suggestive of the rasas, etc., and that our perception of them comes
from the words (or sounds) themselves. Still, as the words necessarily
rely on their denotative power as an aid in producing our perception of
the rasas, it follows that the perception of the expressed meaning must
come first.

But it might be argued that the denotative power plays no part here
any more than it does in the words of a song; and that if there is no
perception of rasa after a poem has been heard, the reason is the lack
of the necessary cooperating causes such as the understanding of the
context. Our author guards against this argument by saying, If [a
rasa], etc. For one may ask just what an understanding of the context
means. Is the context a reference to the help given by [the phonetic
form of] other sentences, or to the expressed meaning connected with
[the phonetic form of] other sentences? Even if one should understand
both, the rasa will not arise without one's understanding the literal
sense of the central sentence. Themselves: what he has in mind are
persons who might have had the mere context explained to them by
someone else. And a man who would deny as a cause the perception
of the expressed sense, a factor that can be shown to be a cause by
positive and negative concomitance, and who would have recourse to
the presence or absence of some unseen factor [to explain the occurrence
or absence of rasa], is strengthening no argument except an argument
in proof of his own perversity. This is the intention of the passage.

But the objector may admit that the denoted sense is useful [to
the production of the suggested sense] and still ask what purpose is
served by adopting the theory of succession. A mere co-presence [of the suggested meaning], characterized by [that meaning's] being dependent on the same set of conditions [as the denoted meaning], can be the useful factor. Our author guards against this by saying, if [the two meanings occurred] simultaneously, etc. He means that to call such an entity a helper when it could give no help would be merely the inventing of a name without any substance. Even the objector has admitted the priority of the useful factor. Our author states this by saying, Even in the case of those words, etc. Our author's intention is by this very example to prove the priority of our perception of the expressed meaning [to our perception of the suggestion].

Now, if there is an interval [between the two perceptions] why is it not noticed? He addresses this question with the sentence. But this, etc. He states the nature of the interval to be a “succession of activities”: succession of activities. The two activities (kriye) are the perceptions of the expressed and the suggested meanings, or, if you will, of the denotative operation and of the suggesting or hinting operation. The temporal succession of these activities is not apprehended. The phrase in the rasas and the like refers to the area where [this lack of apprehension is found]. Of what sort are these rasas, etc.? By saying that they are different from other, expressed, meanings, that is, from any other meaning that is expressed, as they are altogether inexpressible, he implies that there must be an interval. And yet they do not contradict the expressed meaning, for if they contradicted it, the interval would be noticed. He states the reason why this [interval] is not noticed in the form of a locative of cause, “... āśubhāvinīṣu,” which itself contains a further cause in “ananyasaḍhyatatphalaghataṇā-su.” Here ghatanā refers to what were called mādhurya (sweetness), etc., in the section where the gunas (qualities) were described. They are tatphalāḥ, that is, they have perception of the rasas as their result and they are anyāsaḍhyāḥ; that is to say, whatever is accomplished by each such ghatanā is “not other,” is sui generis, for one will not get a perception of the tragic (karuṇa), for example, from a ghaṭanā of strength (ojas).

In other words, the interval is not noticed because, in a poem that possesses the gunas, style (sanṣṭhātanā) is used without any confusion of object [i.e., each style is used to produce a specific rasa]. But granted that there is a precise distribution of styles, we may still ask why the interval is not noticed. Hence he says, “because [the sanṣṭhātanās] bring about [their effects] so swiftly.” The sense is that without
waiting for our understanding of the expressed meaning, they imme-
diately set about building up the rāsas, giving us a foretaste (āsvāda)
of them. This is as much as to say that as the rāsas are suggested
by style (saṅghatana), the ground is laid for the relishing of a rasa at
the very beginning of the appropriate style before our understanding of
the meaning has come into play; and that it is on this account that the
rāsa, even at the later moment, after we have understood the expressed
meaning and when the rāsa has assumed its full flavor, does not appear
to have arisen later [than our understanding]. For wherever we have
experienced a conclusion many times, the passage from understand-
ing of the invariable rule to that conclusion goes unnoticed. Practice
works such wonders that we can arrive at a conclusion by force of habit,
without really paying attention, simply by being able to infer it. Thus,
when we have by heart the universal law that where there is smoke
there is fire, the only thing that is necessary [for the inference of fire]
is the knowledge that the minor term has smoke; and this knowledge
takes the place of the full "consideration" (parāmarsā). As soon as
the knowledge of smoke has arisen and has been aided by our memory
of the universal law, without any attention to contrary instances or
any perception of agreement, we pass without noticing any interval to
the knowledge of fire. So it is in this case too. But if the rasa were
contradictory to the expressed meaning, or if the style (ghatanā) were
inappropriate [to that rasa], the interval would be noticed.

The author of the Candrikā, who simply repeats what the text says
and who could easily fail to see an elephant in front of his eyes, com-
ments as follows. "Since the ghataṇā, that is, the formation, of the
result of the word (or, of this result), namely the literal and suggested
meanings, is produced by nothing else, that is, by no other power of the
word." We fail to see the slightest conception of the true meaning in
this explanation. But let me not argue at length with an elder member
of my family.

1. The reference is to 1.13 K. Abhinava does not here distinguish the
Kārikākāra from the Vṛttikāra. The point in his quoting this particular Kārikā
seems to be that it takes for granted a knowledge of the context (prakaraṇādi-
jjñāna), since both sabda and vācyārtha suggest the pratijñātārtha with the
help of the context and other factors; see 1.13 d A and note 2. 2. BP glosses
vācyaniṣṭhā by vācyavijñaykā, "and as this power takes as its object the ex-
pressed meaning." For niṣṭha used in this sense see below, 4.2 a L and note 1;
also Vakrūttī 1, vs. 125, Vṛtti, lines 1–2: ity avinayāntyā anuṣṭhanīṣṭham... abhidhyāyānām anauścītyam āvahati. 3. The view that rasa can arise from the mere sound of words in a poem is here put forward only as an abhyupagama, a tentative concession for the sake of argument, and will be followed by Abhinava’s approved doctrine that “there is no origin of rasa without knowledge of the meaning of the sentence involved.” In other sections of the book, however, Abhinava comes close to holding the tentative view. Under 1.18 (p. 193), he speaks of alliteration, even without aid from the expression of meaning, as being suggestive of rasa. He says much the same in his comment on 3.3. We may perhaps bring the various expressions of his views on the matter into harmony by the following statement. In certain cases of the alliteration of gentle or harsh phonemes the mere hearing of the alliteration, even without accompanying knowledge of the expressed sense, prepares the proper atmosphere for the apprehension of a particular rasa. The clear apprehension of the rasa, however, comes only after the perception of the expressed sense. In other words, alliteration only cooperates with the knowledge of the expressed sense in bringing about rasāsvāda and is not its principal cause. Compare the phrases āsūtrito rasāsvādah and paripūtaśvādayuktro ’pi toward the end of the present section (Kashi text, p. 409, lines 2–3). 4. The same set of conditions would be the particular word and its context, from which both the expressed and the suggested meanings arise. 5. Ananyasādhyatatphala-ghaṭanāsva śubhāvinīśu is interpreted as a locative of cause; cf. Pān. 2.3.36, Vārt. 6. It means, [they are not noticed] because their ghaṭanās are swift acting. Then the substantive portion of the locative construction itself contains a cause of that cause. The ghaṭanās are swift acting because each is capable of producing a unique result. 6. In what follows Abhinava takes ghaṭanā in an extended sense of saṃghaṭanā (style). By it he understands not only style of alliteration and compounding, but the qualities (guṇas) such as sweetness, force, etc. He supposes that this “style” gives us our first hint of the rasa to be suggested, a hint that is later rendered specific by our perception of the expressed meaning. 7. For the later doctrine of inference, see Ingalls, Materials, pp. 32–33. The instrumental cause of the inference “this mountain has fire” is a knowledge of the universal law “where there is smoke there is fire.” The operation (vyāpāra) of this instrument takes the form of a consideration (parāmarśa) in the form “this mountain possesses smoke which is vyāpāya by (i.e., included within the extension of) fire.” Now where we have often made the inference, Abhinava tells us, we can dispense with a certain amount of this process. Instead of the full consideration “parvato ’yam vahnivyāpadyadhūma-vān,” all we need is the knowledge “this mountain has smoke” (parvato ’yam dhūma-vān). The fact that the smoke is vahnivyāpāya is supplied by memory and needs no attention to contrary instances (vyātisāpyapanidhāna, e.g., to the absence of smoke in a locus of non-fire such as a lake) nor any perception of cases in agreement (anusorona-praṇīti, e.g., “there is smoke in other loci of fire
such as a kitchen hearth’’). We jump immediately from “there is smoke on this mountain” to “there is fire on this mountain.”

A In some instances the interval is perceived, as in our apprehension of the type of suggested meaning that is similar to a reverberation. If in these cases too the question is asked why, we would give this explanation. First let us consider the type of suggested meaning similar to a reverberation in its subtype based on the power of meaning. Here we have two apprehensions, one of the expressed meaning and the other of the meaning implied by it. Since the latter is different in kind from any expressed meaning, these two perceptions are utterly disparate. Hence their relation to one another as cause and effect cannot remain hidden and their succession in time is obvious, just as it is in the Prakrit verses quoted in the First Chapter to illustrate an “understood” [i.e. suggested] sense. In such instances, because of the utter disparity of the expressed and suggested meanings our apprehension of the one cannot be confused with our apprehension of the other.

Next let us look at the type of suggested meaning similar to a reverberation in its subtype based on the power of words, as in

May these rays [or, may these cows] of the blazing sun engender in your purified selves unending bliss.

[Mayūra, Sūryasataka 9] In verses such as this, where we have the verbal apprehension (sābbi pratitih) of two senses (“rays” and “cows,” etc.), the apprehension of a relation of simile and base between these two senses, since there is no word [such as “like”] directly expressive of the simile, is something implied by the capability of the situation. Here too the temporal succession of the apprehension of the suggested figure of speech to the apprehension of the expressed meanings is easily noticed.

Now to look at suggestion where the suggested meaning similar to a reverberation is of the type based on the power of words and where a single word [rather than a whole sentence] acts as the suggestor. Here there is the attachment [to two nouns] of an adjective [e.g., jāda] that is capable of two senses [“helpless, wretched,” when modifying asmi and
"insentient, cool," when modifying kūpa] without any joining word [e.g. "like," "and," "although"]). Although the attachment is non-verbal [as it is not denoted by a joining word], it is established by meaning. Just as in our previous example, the succession is here clearly marked. Here it is between the apprehension of the denoted meaning ["wretched," as applied to the speaker] and the figure of speech [si ile], but only that, which is thereby implied. Although the apprehension of the figure of speech derives from meaning, it can be considered as based on the power of a word because it is initiated (prasāvita) by the capability of a word [viz., jāda] that can be attached to two meanings.

In suggestion of the type where the expressed meaning is unintended, the revelation of another meaning is preceded by an apprehension that the words take no notice of their proper objects. A succession is therefore necessary. We gave no attention to the temporal succession of suggested to expressed meaning in this type for the very reason that the expressed meaning is [always] unintended here. Thus there is necessarily a succession from the expressed to the suggested meaning [of whatever type] just as there is a succession from the word that denotes to the meaning that is denoted, because in either case the latter is related to the former as effect to cause. But the succession is sometimes noticed and sometimes not for the reasons above stated.

1. In 3.33b Ānanda used the phrase abhidheyāntaravilāksaṇa ("different in nature from any directly expressed meaning") to describe rasa. He uses it here to describe the suggestions of alankāradhvani and vastudhvani. Jacobi, interpreting the phrase to mean "that which cannot be expressed by any other words," felt that the phrase was properly used only in the first instance. In the present instance he recommended emending it to abhidheyavilāksaṇatayā. But the phrase does not have so restricted a meaning. 2. The dhvani of these Prakrit verses is anuranānarūpavyaṅga, but it is not vivaksitānyaparavācyā. See the discussion of the whole verse under 2.21 e A. 3. The dhvani in this (and the next) example is both anuranānarūpavyaṅga and vivaksitānyaparavācyā. See the discussion of the whole verse under 2.21 e A. 4. Verbal apprehension (śābdī pratiṣṭhā): what is meant is an understanding derived from a verbal expression, as opposed to ārthī pratiṣṭhā, an understanding which derives from an implication or suggestion. 5. The description will become clearer by reference to the verse prātum dhanair ("If fate will have it," etc.) quoted under 3.1 d A. See also our note on that verse. 6. I have taken the simplest interpretation of the compound abhidheyatatsāmarthya-. Abhinava gives a different interpretation; see below. The word mātra ("but only that") is intended to rule out the rasa, which is also suggested by the denoted meaning but which is not perceived to be posterior.
Where style (saṅghaṭanā) plays no part in suggestion, the interval is perceived.\(^1\) He states this in the words, In some instances. He then raises the question why there should be this difference when there is a suggested sense in all cases: If asked why, etc.

Obvious: what lies back of this is the previous verse:

Either a word or a sentence may serve as the suggestor in the type of dhvani where the literal sense is not intended and, of the other type, in that subtype where the suggested sense resembles a reverberation [3.1 K]; for in this verse alliterative style and the like were not mentioned as suggestive factors. Prakrit verses: such as “Go your round freely, gentle monk” [1.4 b A], on which we have commented above.

[Where we have the] verbal apprehension: the meaning is, although it is verbal.\(^2\) Expressive of the simile: such as yathā, iva, etc. By the capability of the situation: as much as to say, by the capability of the sentence meaning.

Having thus discussed [sequential suggestion] based on the power of words where the suggestion is revealed by a sentence, he goes on to discuss the type that is revealed by a single word: where a single word acts as the suggestor.

An adjective: e.g., jada. Attachment: e.g., the bringing it in grammatical agreement with the well and with the speaker.\(^3\)

The compound abhidheyatatsāmarthyaṅkṣiptāṅkāramātrapatit' is to be analysed as: the two apprehensions of just the two figures of speech, namely that which is expressed and that which is implied by the capability of that.\(^4\) The succession between these apprehensions is clearly marked, that is, easily noticed. By saying “just,” that is, only, these two figures of speech, he indicates that in our apprehension of the rasa the temporal succession is not noticed.

But now it appears to be contradictory that we should have here a figure that both derives from meaning and that is based on the power of a word. Being aware of this, he says, Although the apprehension derives from meaning, etc. The truth of the matter is that there is no contradiction. As we have already discussed the matter at length,\(^5\) we will not repeat ourselves here.

Of their proper objects: The proper object of the word “blind” (andha) is a person whose sight has been destroyed.\(^6\) The being turned
away (vaimukhya) from that object means the taking no notice of that object. We gave no special attention: sc. by describing [that aspect of the type] in the name that we assigned,7 because it could not even be suspected that the two apprehensions were simultaneous in this type.

The rasas and the like are the life of those vrttis named kaisiki, etc., which form the plot element, and of those named upanāgarikā, etc., [which form varieties of style,] because the use of any one of the vrttis of either set is limited to a particular area by these rasas and the like. This is the subject matter [of the Kārikā] and in connection with it, in order to prove that the rasas and the like are something over and above the expressed meaning, our author has furnished the above discussion of succession. He now sums up the discussion by saying, Thus, etc. We have first an apprehension of that which denotes, i.e., of a word, and only after that an apprehension of that which is denoted. As the master [Bhartrhari] has said: “Words furnish no meaning until they are objects of our apprehension” (Vāk. 1.56); and again, “That is why, when we have not understood the form [of the words], we ask ‘What did he say?’” (Vāk. 1.57). Here too, just as with [inferences based on] universal concomitance, if we have made repeated use of the convention [that attaches a given meaning to a given word], we may not notice the succession.

1. As Abhinava has just (3.33 b L) included under style (saṅghatana) the qualities mádhurya, ojas, etc., which are forerunners in all cases of rasa, this statement amounts to saying that where the suggestion is other then rasa, the interval is perceived. 2. Abhinava’s gloss serves to contrast the sābāti prātiṣṭhā of the two senses of the word with the ārthī prātiṣṭhā of the alankāra. 3. aham: Abhinava takes the asmi of the verse as an indeclinable particle synonymous with aham. It is listed as such in the cādigana of Pān. 1 4.57. 4. In Abhinava’s gloss abhidheyaṁ and āksiptam are neuter because they modify the neuter word mātram. BP explains that the expressed figure of speech is zeugma (dīpaka) because the adjective jada is applied to two substantives; and that the suggested figure of speech implied by the zeugma is simile. This is doubtless a correct explanation of Abhinava. But it seems doubtful that Abhinava’s is a correct explanation of Ānanda. It is hard to see how Ānanda could have regarded dīpaka here as a directly denoted figure of speech when he has said (3.1 d 4) that the application of jada to kuṭa is suggested. 5. See 2.21 e L. 6. The example is taken from the verse quoted under 2.1 c. 7. What Abhinava means is that this type has been
A After we have described the varieties of suggestion (dhvani) in this manner by means of the concept of suggestive power (vyanjaka\-katva), an objector may take issue with us. “What is this suggestive power?” he may say. “[We put the question] because suggestive power is merely the revealing of a suggested meaning.¹ If the being suggested (vyangyatva) of a meaning is dependent on suggestive power and if the proof of suggestive power depends on having a suggested meaning, the two concepts rest on each other. By such circular definitions nothing is really defined.”

But we have already shown that the suggested meaning is something distinct from the expressed meaning; and then, as dependent upon that we established suggestive power. What is there to object to in this?

But [the objector may continue:] “This much is true, that you have proved by your arguments the existence of something which is distinct from a given expressed meaning. But why should that something be called a suggested meaning? In fact, where it appears as the predominant meaning [of the sentence] it would be reasonable to call it the expressed meaning because the sentence depends on it. That is why the operation of the sentence which reveals it must be denotative. What is the point of hypothesizing another power? Let us therefore say that the meaning which forms the object of the whole sentence is the primary expressed or denoted meaning. If we apprehend any other expressed meaning in the course of arriving at that object, its apprehension will be merely a means to the apprehension [of the sentence meaning], just as the apprehension of word-meaning serves as a means to the apprehension of sentence-meaning.”

¹. I follow the text as corrected by Krishnamoorty on the basis of his MB manuscript: kim idam vyanjakatvam nāma / vyangyārthapakāśaṇam hi vyanjakatvam / tad vyangyatvam cārthasya vyanjakasiddhyadīnam vyangyā-pekṣayā ca ....
At the beginning of Chapter Three it was stated that the nature of suggestion (dhvani) would be explained through an analysis of those factors which possess suggestive power. In summing up that subject now, despite the fact that the existence of suggestive power was already proved in Chapter One, he states an objection to its existence in order to fix its nature in the minds of his students by dealing with the subject all in one place. He begins with, After we have described, etc. An objector: viz., a Mimamsaka. What is this, etc.: the opinion about to be stated is that of the objector.

Already: that is, in Chapter One, in the passage where the nonexistence of dhvani was refuted. So it is not the case that the suggested meaning is proved to exist by proof of the suggestors, a process that would be open to the charge of circular definition; because it was proved by other reasons. This is what is meant. He puts it in the words, [then,] as dependent on that, etc.

But why should that something, etc.: We grant that there is a second meaning, [says the objector,] but if you give it the name of “suggested,” why could you not just as well give it the name of “expressed” (or “denoted”)? Or why not give the name of “suggested” to what you consider to be the denoted? For a word’s denotative power [lit., its property of being a denotator] is nothing more than a word’s having a meaning in so far as that meaning is understood. Denotative power should extend just as far as denotation extends. And since that chief meaning [of the sentence], which you have therefore described as the anointed king of suggestion, stands at the limit of this extent, it is proper that the power of denotation should extend to it. Our author states this in the sentence, [In fact,] where [it appears as the predominant meaning], etc.

[Of the sentence] which reveals it: of that sentence which necessarily reveals this meaning which you consider to be the suggested meaning. Merely a means: by this one expression he refers to the school of Kumārila, the school of Prabhākara, and the school of the Grammarians. For according to Kumārila,

In the working of these [varṇas, phonemes] toward our understanding of the sentence meaning, it is a prerequisite that they convey a knowledge of the word meanings, just as the burning of fuel is a prerequisite for cooking. [Ślokavārttika, Vākyādhikarana, vs. 343]
Thus [in his opinion] the meaning that is established as the final limit (tātparyena) by the word-meanings that we understand from the individual sounds is the sentence meaning and this is precisely what is denoted. In the view of the followers of Prabhākara, the [denotative] operation is a long one, extending all the way to the sentence meaning, which is the "caused element" (nimittin, i.e., the result). In their opinion the individual word-meanings, which are the causal element, have a metaphysical reality, whereas in the opinion of the Grammarians they have not; that is the only difference between them [in this matter]. But we have explained this at length in Chapter One [1.4 b L] and shall not take the trouble to do so again. We confine our remarks here to showing what the text is referring to. It is to these three opinions that the words of the objector refer.

1. The reference is to rasa as "the soul of dhvani."

A To this we reply as follows. Where a word in denoting its own meaning gives us to understand some further meaning, is there a difference between its nature as denoter of its own meaning and its nature as cause of the understanding of the other meaning, or is there not? It cannot be that there is no difference, for the two operations are perceived to have different objects and to be of a different nature. Thus, the operation in which a word is denotative has for its object the word's own meaning. The operation that is suggestive (gamaka) has for its object some other meaning. And the designation of the denoted and the suggested meanings as its own and as other cannot be rejected, because the former is apprehended as something connected with the word, while the latter is apprehended as something connected with that which is connected with the word. The denoted meaning is something directly connected with the word. The other meaning, being implied by the capability of the denoted meaning, is something connected with that with which the word is connected. If it were something directly connected with the word, we could not refer to it as something different. So between these two operations the difference in the object operated upon is perfectly clear.
The difference in the nature of the operation is equally clear. For the power of denoting is not the same thing as the power of suggesting, because we see that the sounds of a song or the like, although they are not denotative, may suggest such things as the rásas. The same point can be made from the fact that gestures and the like, which are not even sounds, are known to reveal particular meanings. Thus, a great poet in writing “Her face was bowed in shyness,” etc., has shown how a particular gesture can reveal a meaning.

Accordingly, both because of their difference of object and because of their difference of nature, a word’s power to denote its own meaning and its power to cause us to understand some other meaning are different. Now if there is a difference, then that other meaning, which we are led to understand by the inherent capability of the denoted meaning, cannot itself be called a denoted meaning. That it is the object of some activity of a word, however, we are quite willing to admit; but it is so as being suggested by the word, not as being denoted. And since we apprehend a second meaning [e.g., the purity of the village in the phrase “a village on the Ganges”] by the fitness of that meaning to the relation [viz., denotedness] of a well known denoter [e.g., the word “Ganges”], when that second meaning can be made the object of our apprehension by a different word [i.e., “purity”] denoting its proper object, it is right that we speak here of suggestion (prakāśanā) [rather than denotation].

1. The reference is to the verse quoted under 3.4 b A. 2. The syntax of this sentence has thrown all the translations which I have seen of it very wide of the mark. The correlatives are tasya arthāntamsya and yādvasyākaranam. In suggestion we apprehend that meaning which could be given directly by the use of denotative word A, indirectly by the meaning’s appropriateness to the denotation of word B. Purity, which could be denoted by the word “purity,” can also be apprehended by the word “Ganges,” because purity is appropriate to the Ganges. There is no need to emend the text.

§ 3.33e L) To this: sc., to the objection. We reply: that is, we furnish the correct view (siddhānta). Denotative power and suggestive power differ in nature and they differ in their objects, which are the word’s own meaning and a different meaning respectively. Here an opponent may argue as follows. “If the second meaning is understood from the first, how can it be termed a ‘different’ meaning? If it is not [understood from the first], how can it bear any relation to the word by which it
could be called an object of the word?" Our author guards against this objection by saying, And the designation, etc.

We could not refer to it: In the phrase vyavahāra eva na syāt the word order is irregular; what is meant is vyavahāra naiva syāt ("we could not possibly refer to it").

Here it might be objected that the denotative operation of a single word, if the word has several meanings like the word akṣan (the eye, a die, etc.), may work on different objects. To guard against such an objection he points out that the denotative and the suggestive differ in nature: The difference in the nature, etc. He shows that the matter is well known: For [the power of denoting] is not, etc. He furnishes a reason to convince any one who might still disagree: although they are not denotative, etc. If the power of denotation were the same as the power of suggestion, the power of suggestion could not belong to that which is not denotative, nor would it be possible for that which is suggestive to lack the power of denotation. But neither of these implications is true, for we see in the sounds of a song that a factor which cannot denote can produce a suggestion, while in the lowering of the head, the heaving of the breast, and the onset of tears, it is obvious that suggestive factors may be incapable of denotation. This is the overall meaning, which he then sums up by saying, Accordingly, both because of their difference of object, etc.

Then [that other meaning] cannot [be called a denoted meaning]: because to be a denoted meaning is to be the object of the denotative activity of a word and not to be the object of an activity, taken indiscriminately, of a word. As for its being the latter [i.e., the fact that the "other meaning" is the object of some sort of activity of a word], that merely proves what is already proved. Our author states this in the words, [That it is the object of some] activity of a word, etc.

Now the objector may say, "We will admit that there is no denotative force in songs and such like, but we insist that the word [of which we are here speaking] is denotative of this other meaning. For why should its denotativeness be cut short?" To guard against this objection our author says, And since we apprehend, etc. Where a given word takes for its object a meaning that belongs to another word, it is proper to speak of suggestion and not of the denotative power of the word. In the same case it is not proper to speak of the meaning as being denoted. This is because the power of denotation is the power of giving a meaning by convention, without any intervention, as we see in the case of that word in giving its own meaning. Our author says
this in speaking of a word's denoting its proper object. Because to be denoted [of a meaning] is to be given by force of convention without any intervention [of another meaning], just as the same meaning [that is here suggested] is given by some other word [viz. its proper denoter]. He says this in the sentence. And since we apprehend, etc. The compound prasiddhābhidhānāntarasambhandhayatvena is to be analysed thus: "(characterized) by a fitness consisting in, or a fitness for, the relation of being the denoted object of another word [e.g., "Ganges"], which is well known (inasmuch as it is denotative)." Now there is no such denotative power of the word here [e.g., in "Ganges"] toward the [suggested] meaning [e.g., purity]; and there is no denotation of this meaning by the word ["Ganges"]. If there is not, then how can the word be said to take this meaning for its object? He anticipates the answer by saying, "since we apprehend" it. Now if the meaning is apprehended without any denoter-denoted operation, the word's operation (or power) must be of a different character [from that of denotation]. This is what the argument amounts to.

§ 3.33 f A

1. Siddhasādhana, the proving of what is proved, is a fault of inference noticed by the Naiyāyikas. One does not infer the presence of an elephant by its trumpeting after one already sees the elephant.

A And it is not true that the relation of expressed to suggested meaning follows the analogy of the relation of word meaning to sentence meaning. For it is held by some scholars that our apprehension of word meanings is a pure fiction; and even those who do not admit the artificiality of this apprehension must take the relation of sentence meaning to word meaning on the analogy of the relation of a pot to its component causes [viz., the portions of the pot]. For just as when the pot is completed there is no perception of its component causes separate from itself, just so when a sentence or its meaning is apprehended [there is no apprehension] of the words or their meanings [as separate therefrom]. If there were a perception of them as separate, our understanding of the sentence meaning would disappear. This pattern
does not hold for the expressed meaning and the suggested meaning, for when the suggested meaning is apprehended our knowledge of the expressed meaning does not disappear, because that [suggested meaning] can be revealed only by the appearance of the expressed meaning.³ Accordingly, the analogy that applies here is that of a lamp and a pot. For just as when a pot is cognized by means of a lamp the light of the lamp does not disappear, just so the appearance of the expressed when the suggested is apprehended. As for the statement in Chapter One that "[the understanding of the suggested sense is preceded by understanding of the denoted sense] just as [the understanding of the sentence meaning comes] through the meaning of the words" [1.10 K], it was intended to show no more than that expressed meaning and word meaning are similar in both serving as means, [the first first to the suggested meaning and the second to the sentence meaning].

1. Ānanda here qualifies the statement of Kārikā 1.10. 2. “Some scholars” here refers to the grammarians who follow Bhartrhari. Bhartrhari held that words are essentially fictions invented by grammarians in order to analyse the meaning of sentences, the sentences being the only units that actually transmit information. For a discussion of this view see J. Brough, “Some Indian Theories of Meaning,” TPS 1953, p. 165ff. “ Those who do not admit the irreality of this apprehension” will refer to other grammarians and to the Mīmāṃsakas. The relation of a pot to its component causes is a concept derived from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The separate halves or portions (kapāla-va) of an Indian pot (ghata) were molded with a stick on a revolving wheel and were later joined together to make the pot. In analysing the causes of a pot the Naiyāyikas say that the instrumental cause (nimitta-kāraṇa) is the stick, the component or inherent cause (upādāna- or smaṇavāyi-kāraṇa) is the portions of the pot. The Nyāya always speaks of two portions (kapāla), but Abhinava here speaks of several portions (kapālāh) presumably in order to furnish a better analogy to the words of a sentence. The non-inherent cause (asamavāyi-kāraṇa) is the conjunction of the pot-portions. The potter is not a cause but the causer or agent (kartr). 3. It is obvious that the expressed meaning (e.g. a description of a vibhāva) does not disappear when a rasa is suggested. It may take more thought to realize that the expressed meaning does not disappear in other forms of suggestion. But even in avivakṣitavācyā of the atyatantaraskṛtya type a little thought will show that we must remain aware of the meaning that has been set aside even while we apprehend the suggestion. In the verse “Go your rounds freely, gentle monk,” the speaker does not intend the expressed sense. But if we, the audience, did not keep it in mind, we should not be amused by the verse. Badarināth Śarma makes a useful remark on this passage. The vācyā, he says, is not a component cause of
the vyāyāga as the pot-halves are of the pot, but an instrumental cause. The stick does not lose its identity in the completed pot; it is only the pot-halves that lose their identity in it. This is the reason why Ānanda shifts from the pot-halves and pot analogy to the lamp and pot analogy.

§ 3.33 f L ]

An objector might say, "Very well, we will grant that the denotative power is not [the conveyor of what you call the suggested meaning]; still, the final power of the sentence (tātparyāsakti) might well be." Anticipating such an objection, our author says, And it is not true that, etc. By some scholars: viz, grammarians. Even those who do not admit: viz., Bhaṭṭa Kumārila and his followers.1 He then explains the analogy: For just as, etc. Its component causes: by this expression he is referring to the portions of the pot which are its inherent causes [according to the Nyāya]. In the opinion of the Buddhists and the Sāṅkhya, of course, there is no existence of the components at the time when the pot is composed of them—in the Buddhist doctrine because the components [like all other entities] last only for a moment; in the Sāṅkhya doctrine because they cease to be manifested [as soon as their effect-form appears]—but in either opinion there is no perception of them at that time as separate from the pot; and so the example serves to this extent. Would disappear: he means, because it would have no unity of meaning.2

Having thus rejected the analogy of word meaning and sentence meaning that was [intended] to establish the power of overall sentence meaning (tātparyāsakti) in the area under discussion [viz., in the area of suggested meanings], he now applies to this area the analogy of the lamp and the pot in order to establish the power of which he approves, namely the power of revelation (or suggestion): Accordingly, etc. Since the analogy of word meaning and sentence meaning is not proper, he accordingly applies the pertinent analogy, after analysing it, to the situation which it will illustrate: For just as when a pot, etc.

But it was said above [1.10 K] that "the understanding of this matter [viz., the suggested sense] is preceded by understanding of the denoted sense just as the understanding of the sentence meaning comes through the meaning of the component words." One may ask why our author has gone to such pains here to reject this analogy. Seeing that such a question is likely, he says, As for the statement in Chapter One, etc. It [was intended to show], etc: he means that the two matters are not analogous in all respects.
Compare Abhinava’s remarks on 1.4 b and 3.33 d. It is a common postulate of grammar, Mīmāṃsā, and Nyāya that a sentence has only one meaning. Although the three schools differ in the way they analyse sentence meaning, they would all agree that if meanings are apprehended as separate, they cannot form one sentence.

But at this rate, it will be said, we have arrived at giving two meanings at one time to a sentence; and that being the case, its nature as a sentence is destroyed, for this is defined as the having of only one meaning.1

We reply that there is no such fault here, because the two meanings are distributed as principal and subordinate.2 Sometimes the suggested sense is predominant and the expressed sense subordinate. Sometimes the expressed sense is predominant and the suggested sense subordinate. Of these alternatives, where the suggested sense is predominant we have what is called suggestive poetry (dhvani). Where the expressed sense is predominant we have a different type of poetry that will be described in what follows. Accordingly, it stands established that even when the suggested sense is predominant in a poem, this suggested sense [although it is the main sentence meaning] is not denoted but suggested.3

However, where the suggested sense is not intended to be predominant, even you [Mīmāṃsakas] should admit that it is not expressed, for the word [that reveals it] is not directed toward that [final sentence meaning]. To this extent then the suggested forms a certain area of a word’s operation. So even when the suggested sense is predominant, why should it then forswear its nature? Thus, [by the arguments given] so far, [it would appear that] the denotative operation is different from the suggestive operation. But there is this other reason why the suggestive differs from the denotative, namely, that the denotative is based solely on words whereas the other is based on both words and meaning; because we have already shown that both words and meanings act as suggestors.
§ 3.33 g L ]

1. See above, 3.33 f L, note 2. 2. That is to say, a sentence that contains a suggestion is a complex semantic unit. 3. Here at last we have the conclusive answer to the objection, raised in 3.33 d, that where a suggested meaning appears as the predominant meaning of a sentence it should be called the expressed meaning "because the sentence depends on it."

L  [Mīmāṃsaka objection:] At this rate: he means, by [following] the pattern of the lamp and the pot, both of which appear [separately] at the same time. This: viz., the nature of a sentence. A sentence is defined as having only one meaning, because it is stated [inMīmāṃsāS. 2.1.46] that a sentence is [known to be] one from its having just one meaning. For when a word is heard once, it rouses our memory of its conventional attachment to a given meaning and that meaning is what is understood by the word. Since there is no activity [of the denotative power] after it has ceased and since there cannot be a simultaneous recall of several conventions, what chance is there for two different meanings? On the other hand, if [the word is] repeated or later remembered, it is not the same word. 1 Such is the [objector's] meaning.

[Ānanda's reply:] The two: sc. the two meanings. Of these: the sense is, if we take the first of these alternatives. A different type: sc. that which is termed guṇibhūtvānyāgāya ("in which the suggestion is subordinated"). Suggested: i.e., revealed (prakāśya).

Now since that toward which a word is directed (yatparah śabdah) is the word's meaning, it might follow that when the suggested meaning is predominant it [will be the meaning toward which the word is directed and so] should be called the expressed meaning. But what about the case where that meaning is not predominant? If you designate the meaning as suggested in that case, we have won our argument. He states this in the sentence, Moreover, etc. But the objector may hold out against calling the meaning suggested when it is predominant. So our author says, So even when, etc. What he means is that the necessary conditions for being a suggested meaning are these: the meaning must be different from [the expressed meaning]; it must be connected with that [viz., the direct meaning] with which the word is connected; and it must not have been arrived at by using the convention [e.g. by using the dictionary]. As these conditions are found where the suggested meaning is predominant just as well [as where it is not], there is no reason to suppose that it changes its nature [from the one case
to the other]. He sums the matter up by saying, Thus, sc., because it differs in its objects and in its nature.

So far (tāvat): this expression lays the ground for a further argument.² He proceeds to give it in the words, But there is this other reason, etc. By these words he shows that as there is a difference in the complex of conditions [necessary to produce these two types of meaning], there must be a difference in their causes. But we have shown this matter at length in Chapter One, on the definition of dhvani, when explaining the use of the word vā and of the dual form vyāṅktah in the passage “whenever a meaning or a word,” etc. (1.13 L). So we do not enter into details here.

1. Thus the Mīmāṁsaka would analyse what we should call a sentence containing a pun as two sentences, in the first of which the ambivalent word or phrase gives the meaning that best suits the context and in the second of which the word or phrase is repeated (or, as we should say, “supplied”) or remembered; but this second occurrence is not really the same word or phrase, so it can give a different meaning. 2. Abhinava has explained the force of tāvat in much the same way before; see 3.20 e L, end.

A It is true that secondary usage (guṇavṛtti), whether metaphorical (upacāra) or relational (laksanā),¹ is also based on both [word and meaning]. But from secondary usage also, suggestiveness differs both in nature and in object.

To speak first of its nature: it is obvious that secondary usage is a non-primary (amukhya) operation of a word whereas suggestiveness is a primary (mukhya)² operation, for not the slightest hint of a non-primary nature can be observed in our apprehension of any of the three types of suggested sense that arise from meaning. Then there is this other difference of nature: that secondary usage may be called a denotative operation applied in a non-primary way, whereas suggestiveness is entirely different from denotation, as we have already explained.³ And still another difference of nature is this: that in secondary usage a meaning that indicates a second meaning becomes transformed into that indicated meaning, as in gaṅgāyāṁ ghosāḥ ("a village on the
Ganges’); whereas in the process of suggestion the meaning that suggests a second meaning is apprehended to reveal that second meaning only by revealing itself at the same time. It acts in this respect like a lamp, as may be seen in such examples as “Pārvatī counted the petals of the lotus in her hand.” If we were to give the name relational usage (laksanā) to an operation where one meaning indicates another without our setting aside the apprehension of the first meaning, we would be making relational usage into the primary operation of words. For almost every sentence reveals a meaning, the object of the tātparya (the overall sentence operation), which is different from its expressed meaning.

“But even in your view,” the objector may ask, “what sort of operation of the word can you hypothesize when a meaning suggests one of your three types of suggestion?” We answer this by saying: since this sort of suggestiveness attaches to meaning only by force of some word as conditioned by context, it cannot be denied that the word in question plays a useful part in the process.

1. For discussion of these terms see 1.1 K, note 2. 2. Here “primary” means based upon the literal sense and “non-primary” means deviating from the literal sense. In gangāyām ghosah (“a village on the Ganges; see 1.4 b L, note 6) the suggestion of coolness and purity carried by “Ganges” comes directly from the literal sense of India’s holiest river, whereas the application of “Ganges” to the bank which borders the river is a deviation from the literal sense. 3. In gangāyām ghosah we are denoting the bank of the river, but in a roundabout way, viz., by directly denoting something contiguous to it. But we are not denoting coolness and purity at all; we are suggesting them. 4. The meaning of gangā becomes transformed into the meaning gangātatah (bank of the Ganges) for the purpose of locating the village. But its proper meaning, must also remain before our minds in order for the suggestion of coolness and purity to take effect. 5. The example has been discussed under 2.22 A. Whether we consider the suggested meaning to be a vyabhicārībhava or a rasa, the primary meaning remains clearly before our mind at the very moment that we apprehend the suggested meaning. 6. Abhinava fails to comment on this sentence. I take it that it means little more than “every sentence carries a meaning other than the expressed meaning of its words.” Denotation and suggestion are the primary operations of a word. Gunavrūti is secondary and unusual. 7. The point of the final objection and answer of this section is not clearly brought out by Abhinava. The objector is hoping to show that viṣayakātva is not a property of the word at all because it is the meaning (arthā) that is responsible for the suggestion; the word is simply denotative or secondary as the case may be. Ánanda’s reply is that the
suggestion furnished by the meaning would be impossible without the help of
the word. This implies that 

Having thus shown that the suggestive operation is different
from the primary operation of denotation on the grounds of difference
of object, nature, and cause, he foresees a question as to what difference
there can be between the suggestive and the secondary operations since
the two are alike in being based on both word and meaning. To show
that the suggestive is different from the non-primary (i.e., secondary)
operation he now says, It is true that secondary usage, etc. Based
on both: viz., both word and meaning. The natures of metaphor
(upaśāra) and of relational secondary usage (laksanā) have been
distinguished and explained in Chapter One, so we shall not repeat the
matter here. Is a primary operation: i.e., is of non-stumbling gait
(askhaladgati).1 The three types of suggested sense: viz., vastu
(fact or situation), alaṅkāra (figure of speech) and rasa. A denotative
operation: for even here there is still an employment of convention.2
As we have explained: viz., just above. Transformed: so that it
no longer appears in its proper form.

What sort of: i.e., primary or non-primary, for there is no other
sort. If you assign to the suggestive word a primary [operation], then
it is denotative. Otherwise it is secondary. The term gunaṃurtti (sec-
ondary operation) is to be explained as the operation of a word when
its function (urtti) is through some guna, that is, some special cause
(nimitta) such as similarity (of some other object to the proper object
of that word), etc. Now, our author's intention is that suggestiveness
is a primary operation but that it differs from denotativeness because
its set of conditions (sāmagrī) differs from that of denotativeness. Ac-
cordingly he says, We answer this, etc.

1. See 1.17 K and 1.4 b L, note 17. 2. One could not apply "garga" to
gargātataḥ if it were not for the dictionary meaning of "garga." On the
other hand, one could suggest purity by words with quite other dictionary
meanings.
A The difference in the area of secondary and suggestive operations is likewise perfectly clear. For the three areas within which suggestiveness operates are: the rasas and the like, certain types of alaṅkāras, and facts or situations provided that they appear in suggested form. Of these, no one caims, nor could he claim, that our apprehension of rasas and the like is due to secondary operation. The same holds for our apprehension of suggested alaṅkāras. A suggested [fact or situation] is one which is intended to be conveyed without taking the help of the proper denotative words, in order that we may apprehend some special beauty [in that fact or situation]. This does not wholly coincide with the area of secondary operations, for we see that words are used metaphorically [not only to achieve beauty but] also because of idiom or conformity [to convention]. This has already been stated. And even if an instance does fall within the area of secondary usage, this is only because of an admixture of suggestiveness. So we see that suggestiveness is radically different from secondary operation.

While suggestiveness is different from the denotative and secondary operations, it has a distribution that includes dependence on both of them. For suggestiveness sometimes depends on the denotative operation, as in that type of suggestion where the expressed meaning is intended as leading on to another meaning (vivakṣitānyaparavācya); and sometimes it depends on secondary usage, as in that sort of suggestion where the expressed meaning is not intended (avivakṣitavācya). And it was in order to show this double dependence that the very first analysis of dhvani was into these two divisions. Inasmuch as suggestiveness depends on both, its nature cannot be said to be that of either. It cannot be of the same nature as the denotative operation, because some of its occurrences depend on secondary (or relational) use (laksanā); and it cannot be of the same nature as laksanā, because in other occurrences it depends on the denotative operation. Nor is this double dependence the only reason that its nature cannot be that of either. There is a further reason, namely that we find suggestiveness occurring as a property of sounds that are devoid of denotative or secondary power. Thus, the sounds of a song can also be suggestive of the rasas.
and the like, whereas no denotative or indicative power can possibly be found in these [sounds]. As we find suggestiveness in areas even outside of sounds, it is clearly improper to speak of it as a mode of some such verbal property as denotativeness and the like. And if, despite the fact that suggestiveness differs in nature from the mode of operation of the well-known properties of words, namely power of denotation and laksanā, etc., you would still imagine it to be their mode of operation, why not just as well imagine it to be a mode of operation of the word itself?5

Thus, in the matter of verbal communication [we may speak of] three modes of operation: the denotative (vācakatva), the secondary (guna-vrtti), and the suggestive (vyanjakatva). Of these, where we find suggestiveness, if the suggested sense is predominant, we have dhvani, of which the two main varieties were given at the outset as that where the expressed meaning is not intended (avivaksitavācyā) and that where the expressed meaning is intended but as leading on to a further meaning (vivaksitānyaparavācyā); and both these varieties have been described in detail.

1. viṣaya: area (range) of operation, or objects operated upon. 2. I have taken the iti in guna-vrttir iti as a mark of cause, understanding the whole phrase as equivalent to guna-vrtteh. 3. Viz., in 1.14 A. 4. That is, if some fact or situation which is rendered in secondary terms (by metaphor, metonymy, etc.) happens to be beautiful, this is because of the suggestiveness of the phrase, not because of its secondary usage. 5. This sentence has given trouble to all commentators and translators. BP tries to make sense of the passage by taking sabdapra-kārāṇām as a genitive of limitation (“among”), but this does not go far enough. Jacobi emended by reading sabdadharma-pra-kārāṇām in place of sabdapra-kārāṇām. V. Patwardhan suggests changing the order of the words so as to read: yadi ca vācakatvalaksanādinām prasiddhānām sabdapra-kārāṇām vilaksanatve ’pi. My translation embodies both these suggestions. Abhinava’s remarks (see below) I find to be of no help.

L Thus suggestiveness, because of the three modes in which it operates, to wit, without stumbling in its march [from word to meaning], without the slightest aid from the conventional [or dictionary meaning], and with a [continuing] appearance [of the expressed meaning] as separate [from the suggested meaning], is different in nature from secondary operation, which is carried on in the reverse of these three ways. Our author, having explained this difference, now states
the difference in its area of operation: The difference in the area, etc. As facts and situations are also in the area of secondary operation, he makes a distinction: provided that they appear in suggested form.

The area of suggestiveness is not the area of secondary usage and further differences [viz., those discussed in Chapter One] from the area of the latter may be added.

He begins by speaking of the first variety [of suggestiveness]: Of these, etc. Nor could he claim: because in this [perception of the rasa] the set of conditions for secondary usage is lacking, as has previously been stated. The same holds: he means that secondary usage is impossible here also. He then explains the qualification he has just given of a fact or situation: that we may apprehend some special beauty, etc. In saying that this does not wholly [coincide], he means that there is a partial coincidence. For example in the line “and like a mirror blinded by breath" [the word “blinded” is used both as a secondary meaning and as a suggestor]. As has already been stated, “secondary usage can sometimes be an adventitious characteristic of a certain type of dhvani” [1.19 K]. Because of idiom: for example, such words as lāvanya (literally, “saltiness," idiomatically, “charm”). Because of conformity: that is, because of conformity to past practice (vṛtta) or conformity to current convention (vyavahāra), as in such phrases as “this lotus-petal couch speaks.” Already: viz., in Chapter One, in the verse, “Words which are used idiomatically,” etc. He now clarifies, along the lines of our explanation above, what he meant by [calling the areas] “not wholly” coincident: And even if, etc. From secondary usage: the word gunavṛtter is ablative.

He now shows that suggestiveness differs from both denotative operation and secondary usage by showing in turns its difference from the former because of its being given life by the latter and its difference from the latter by its being given life by the former: [While suggestiveness is different] from the denotative, etc. The particle ca has the sense of restriction and is in irregular position, as is also the particle api. That is, not only do the previous reasons go to form a syllogistic proof of the difference [of suggestiveness] from denotative operation and secondary operation, but so also does its distribution into instances based on both. that is, based on the primary and based on the secondary operation. So the general sense of the sentence is: it is different from either of these, because instances can be found which are based on the other.
He distinguishes these [two forms of suggestiveness]: For suggestiveness [sometimes depends], etc. The very first: viz., as given in Chapter One in the passage, “And it is [in general of two sorts,]” etc. [1.13 m A]. He now indicates another reason: and it cannot be. The indicated reason is that the place of its occurrence differs both from denotation and from secondary usage. He makes the point clear: Thus, the sounds of a song, etc. In these: in the sounds of songs. He now indicates another reason: As [we find suggestiveness in areas] even outside of sounds, etc. The reason here indicated may be given in syllogistic form thus: Suggestiveness is different from denotative and secondary operations because it occurs in areas even outside of sound, like the property of being knowable.8

Now the opponent might say, “I grant that the suggestiveness that occurs in something that is not denotative is different from denotativeness,9 but I still insist that the suggestiveness in that which is denotative is not different.” To guard against this our author says, And if, etc. By the word ādi (“etcetera”) he includes gauna (secondary usage in the specific form of metaphor) [in addition to laksanā, the relational form of secondary usage]. Of the word itself: if “suggestiveness” and “denotativeness” are imagined as synonyms, why not imagine “suggestiveness” and “word” to be synonyms?10 For there is no obstacle to wishful thinking. But, when we have shown the nature of suggestiveness to be distinct, how can one misassign this property to an area not its own? The sense is that at this rate one could say that smoke on a mountain does not derive from fire [but rather from water or rocks]. Now he sums up the distinction [of suggestiveness from denotation and secondary usage]: Thus, etc. By the word communication he rules out the roar of the sea and such like.

1. The set of conditions for laksanā is that the primary meaning must be blocked, that the secondary meaning must be related to the primary meaning in one of certain ways, etc. See Abhinava’s comment on 1.17 2. See Abhinava’s remarks on this question, 2.1 c L. 3. See above, 1.14 A. 4. The reference is to 1.16 K. 5. By “the sense of restriction” is meant the sense of eva; see 2.10 L, note 3. So Abhinava is interpreting the sentence to mean: vācakatyagunavṛttīvi-laksanasyaiva tasya ... vyavasthānam api. 6. The syllogism would be in the form: vyañjakatvam vācakatyagunavṛttīvilaksanam pūrvoktahetukalāpāt. For the portion pūrvoktahetukalāpā that forms part of (is a ghaṭana of) the vyāpti of this proof, one may substitute ubhayāśraya-tvena vyavasthānāt. 7. Literally, “it is different from ubhaya because it is distributed into instances that are based on ubhaya.” Logic and idiom forbid
one to translate *ubhaya* here by its dictionary meaning of "both." 8. The proof derives from the fact that the minor term (*paksa*, here = *vyanjakatva*) is of wider extension than *vacakatua* and *gunavrtti* with which the opponent seeks to equate it. Accordingly, the property of being knowable (*prameyatva*) is chosen as the example (*udāharana*), this being a property of the widest extension possible. *Prameyatva*, according to the Nyāya, occurs in everything, for everything is knowable, if not by us at least by God. 9. To be strictly logical, in line 4 of L on Text, p. 428 we must either emend *avācakē* to *avācakāda* or emend *vācakatvāder* to *vācakatvāya*.

10. Clearly Abhinava takes the apodosis of Ānanda's sentence (viz., *tac chabdasyaiva prakāratvena kasmān na parikalpyate*) to be an outrageous suggestion, just as the protasis is outrageous. Hence his analogy to regarding smoke as produced by non-fire. But it would seem to me that the apodosis actually embodies Ānanda's accepted view, for Ānanda continues in his next sentence by stating that the *vyanjakatva* is one of the three modes of a word. I hesitate to say that Abhinava is wrong, however, because the reading and meaning of the first part of Ānanda's sentence, on which Abhinava is here commenting, are obscure. See above 1.33 j A, note 5.

A To this someone might object.1 "We grant you," he might say, "that there is no secondary operation in that type of suggestion where the expressed meaning is intended but leads on to a further meaning, just as you have said. For how can we speak of a secondary operation where our apprehension of a second meaning is preceded by an apprehension of a denotative word and its expressed meaning? For in secondary usage it is impossible that the expressed meaning should be intended.2 This is true of both types of secondary usage: (a) where a word because of some special reason is superimposed on a foreign object, the native sense of the word being completely set aside in the process, as in such phrases as 'the brahmin boy is a fire';3 and (b) where a word holds on to a part of its native sense and by means of some connection [of the foreign sense] with that [native sense] passes on to the foreign sense, as in such phrases as 'a village on the Ganges.'4 And so it stands to reason that we should speak of suggestiveness in that type of *dhvani* where the expressed meaning is intended as leading on
to a second meaning, for there we not only apprehend the nature of the denotative word and its expressed meaning but we also understand a [second, suggested] meaning. That which casts light on something else in the very act of revealing its own self is called a suggestor. As it is only a denotative word [and never a metaphorical or indicative word] that can be suggestive in such a case, we can never speak of secondary operation here. But where the expressed meaning is unintended, how does your dhvani differ from secondary usage? For if its two subtypes we see the two types of secondary usage."5

To this we reply that here also there is no fault; because while the type of suggestion where the expressed meaning is unintended relies on the path of secondary usage, it is not itself secondary usage. Secondary usage can also be found [in instances that are entirely] without suggestiveness. Again, suggestiveness is found nowhere without the suggested meaning's being a source of beauty as we have stated, whereas secondary usage may come into being in the form of a metaphorical identity resting on a property belonging to the expressed object and on a suggested meaning of any sort [not necessarily a beautiful meaning].6

For example, [we call] the young brahmin a fire because of the sharpness [of fire];7 we speak of a woman's face as a moon because of the delightful [ness of the moon]. The same is seen in the line, "there is no tautology in lovers."8

And that variety of secondary usage which is relational (laksanarūpā) can occur without our apprehending any beautiful suggestion, simply by making use of some connection [of the expressed object] with the indicated object, as in such examples as "the benches cry out."9

1. The objector here is closer to Ānanda’s views than were the previous objectors. Most of his speech is an explanation of why gunavṛtti is impossible in vivakṣitānyaparāvācyadhvani, a view which Ānanda shares. Only at the end of his speech, when he comes to anivakṣitavācyadhvani, does he disagree. 2. The structure of the sentence is obscured by the mispunctuation of the Kashi text. The structure is: na hi gunavṛtti yadā ... yadā ca ... tadā vivakṣitavācyatyam upapadyate. 3. The meaning of the phrase is that the boy is quick to anger. The reason for the superimposition is similarity: both the boy and fire flare up quickly. The example is thus of the variety of secondary usage called gauri (metaphorical). Mammaṭa and later authors further analyse the type into two subtypes. In the first, called sdṛopā, the metaphorical word (fire) is superimposed on its base (the brahmin boy as in the present example). In the second, called sādhyāvāsānikā, the metaphorical word “swallows” its base. An example is agnir uṇāyam, “he is a real fire.” One
may note that the "metaphor" of Greco-Latin rhetoric shows a still greater degree of swallowing: "The fire of Rome spoke to the senate," meaning that Cicero spoke. 4. This is an example of the relational or non-metaphorical variety of secondary usage, called *suddhā lakṣaṇā* by Mammata. This particular example is based on the relation of proximity between the Ganges and its bank. See 1.4b L, note 6. We may now turn to a difference between Ānanda and later writers in the interpretation of this famous example. Later writers regard *gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣah* as an example of *jahātsvārthā lakṣaṇā*, a secondary use of a word which abandons its native sense. The stock example of the opposite, *ajaḥallākṣaṇā*, is *kuntāḥ praviśanti* "the spears enter (the city)," where what is meant is spearmen. Here it is clear that the native sense is not wholly abandoned, because the spears do come into the city together with the spearmen. Ānanda, on the other hand, regards *gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣah* as an example of *ajaḥsvārthā lakṣaṇā*. What led him to this view was probably the fact that even in its secondary use here *gaṅgāyām* does not mean just any river bank. It means specifically the bank of the River Ganges. So the native meaning of *gaṅgā* appears in a subordinate or shadowy form. However, as the full native sense of *gaṅgā* is not present, one may properly designate the example as *avivakṣita-vācya*. 5. By the two subtypes of *avivakṣita-vācya-dhāvani* the objector means the *atyaнтātirakṛta*, as in *agnir mānavakah*, and the *orthāntarasahkramita*, as in *gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣah*. By the two types of secondary usage he means the *gaṇi* and the *lākṣaṇikā*. 6. There is a trick of terminology here that Abhinava in his comment does not cure. It is implied by 1.17 K that wherever there is *guṇavṛti* there must be a *vyāgya*. Logically it follows that the word which furnishes the *guṇavṛti* must also possess the power of *vyāga* but Ānanda says no. When he speaks of *vyājakata*, he means only the power to produce a beautiful *vyāga*. In the conventional and unbeautiful instances of *vyāga* which he here adduces, the *vyāya* is merely a by-product of the *guṇavṛti*. It requires no separate *vyāpāra* of the word for its explanation. I call this a trick, because it assigns a wide meaning to the root *vyājū* when used in one derivative (*vyāya*) and a narrow meaning when used in another (*vyājakata*). Ānanda uses the same trick later on (see 3.33 m A, note 1). If I were a Mimāmsaka, I should call the trick unfair. 7. In *agnir mānavakah* the suggested sense (*vyāya*) is the sharpness (the quickness to flare up) of the boy. This suggested sense is assumed to be identical with, and so rests on, the well-known property of sharpness in fire, fire being the expressed sense of *agni*. But there is no particular charm or beauty given to the sentence by this suggestion. Clearly this lack of beauty is felt by Ānanda in all three of the examples here given. In the third example the English reader might take issue with him, but that is because "tautology" is a rarer and more striking word in English than *pauruṣottam* in Sanskrit. Badarināth Śarmā quite misunderstands the passage. 8. The quotation is from the verse quoted in 1.14 A. The tertium comparationis in
the last example would be tedium or unattractiveness. 9. The quotation in slightly different form, viz., mancā hasanti ("the benches laugh"), goes back to Mahābhāṣya on 4.1.48, Vārt. 3 (Vol. II, p. 218, line 16), which even there served as an example of secondary usage. Nyāya S. bhāṣya 2.2.62 quotes the sentence as we have it here, mancāḥ kroēanti, again as an example of upacāra. In view of the Mahābhāṣya quotation, the reference was doubtless originally to persons sitting on the benches of a theater. For manca in this sense see BhāgPur. 10.12.35 and 38. Later commentators, forgetting the original context, sometimes speak of the watchers on field platforms or even of children crying in their cradles.

An objection may be raised to the two reasons that have been given (for the difference of suggestiveness from secondary operation), namely that it is given life (in some instances) by a denotative operation and because it is given life (in other instances) by a secondary operation. These reasons do not hold in that division of suggestiveness where the expressed meaning is not intended, because the instances of that division are nothing more than secondary meanings. In order to show this point of view, our author begins, To this someone might object, etc. Although the problem has already been solved by his saying that suggestiveness (as a whole) depends on both [the other types of operation], he proceeds as he does in order to remove all doubts for one who finds the difference hard to distinguish between secondary usage and suggestiveness of the type where the expressed meaning is not intended. So he directs the objection against the second type only, after admitting the difference in suggestiveness of the first type. In the passage beginning, [We grant you] in that type where the expressed meaning is intended but leads on to a further meaning, etc., the objector is shown as conceding a point to his opponent. In order to show why one cannot speak of secondary usage [in this type] he shows just where secondary usage does occur: For it is impossible, etc.

Gunaurtti means a vṛtti, that is, a semantic operation (vyāpāra) that occurs because of the presence of some guṇa (i.e. some special reason). And when because of some special reason (guṇa = nimitta), such as similarity, a word operates on a foreign object, we get a case of apposition [between the two words and identification of their senses]. Hereby he shows the gauna type. He then shows the laksānā (relational type) with the words, or when a word holds on, etc. By these two types he shows that he accepts the fact that suggestion where the expressed
meaning is not intended is of two types. That is why he mentions the two types specifically in the words, the native sense of the word being completely set aside and [where the word] passes on to a foreign sense.¹

And so [it stands to reason]: because there are not the aforesaid causes to justify the name of secondary usage. He then shows that his argument is consistent with everyday usage: [That which casts light while revealing] its own self, etc. Is called: as for example a lamp. On the other hand, the physical senses [sight, hearing, etc.] are not termed suggestors, because they are the instruments, not the suggestors (or revealers), of our perception.²

Having thus expressed the matter on which he agrees, the opponent now shows his objection: But where the expressed meaning is unintended, etc. The word “but” distinguishes this type from the preceding. For in its [two types], etc.: the sense is that in the two types of suggestion where the expressed meaning is unintended the two types [of secondary meaning], namely the metaphorical (gauna) and the relational (lāksanīka) are observed, that is, stand revealed.

Our author now disposes of the criticism: Here too [there is no fault]. Gunavṛttimārgāśraya (that which relies on the path of secondary usage) is to be analysed as: that of which the basis (āśraya) is the mārga, that is, the two varieties, of secondary usage. Here the word “basis” refers to a factor which plays a causal part only in the earlier stages of the process. This process has already been described.³ He states the reason why they cannot be of the same nature: Secondary operation, etc. He means both metaphorical and relational.

But how can secondary usage occur without there being a suggestion? For it has already been said that “When a word abandons its primary operation and reveals an object by secondary usage, the purpose for which this is done is one to which the word moves without stumbling.” [1.17 K]. So you have said that there is no secondary usage without a purpose and that the operation which is responsible for [showing us] this purpose is the suggestive operation.⁴ It is in expectation of such an objection that he says that the suggestiveness that is here intended is one that arrests the attention⁵ and that in these [examples] there is no such suggestiveness. He says this in the sentence beginning, Again, suggestiveness, etc.

A property belonging to the expressed object: the meaning is that secondary usage can occur on the basis (āśrayena) of denotation, that is, in order to strengthen denotation, which is a property [i.e., a
power of words] which conveys the literal meaning; because the “other” [or secondary] meaning is in the last analysis simply a way of making sense (upapādāya) of the literal meaning, as in śrutārthāpatti (material implication).6

Of these [secondary usages] he gives an example of the metaphorical type: For example, etc. He proceeds to show the second [non-metaphorical type] in an instance devoid of suggestiveness, with the words, And that variety, etc. By beautiful he means one that holds our attention. Without that, the power of suggestion cannot unfold, because our attention turns back and comes to rest on the literal sense, like a common man who catches a glimpse of divine wealth only to lose it the next moment.

1. Abhinava means that the obj ector has associated the gauna use of a word with the subtype of avivaksita suggestion called atyantatiraskṛta and has associated the lakṣana use with the subtype called arthāntarasanāṅkramaṇa. 2. The analogy of a lamp naturally brings up the subject of the senses. One must remember that vyānjaya can mean to manifest or reveal as well as to suggest. In verbal perception a suggestive word or phrase, for example a description of anbhāva, suggests or reveals an extra meaning, for example a rasa, by its very revealing of itself. In the same way in ocular perception a lamp reveals to us a jar by its very revelation of itself. But could we not say that our eye reveals the jar? No. Our eye is the instrument that perceives the jar; it is not the vyānjaka. So likewise in verbal perception: the ear and mind are the instruments. The ear perceives the sound and the mind perceives the sense. 3. At 1.4 b L (Text pp. 58–59, Translation pp. 86–87) and 1.13 m L (Text p. 140, Translation p. 173). 4. The objector has logic on his side. See 3.33 j A, note 6. 5. Literally, one on which [the heart] comes to rest; that is, one which takes our attention away from other verbal operations. 6. The stock example of śrutārthāpatti is pīnō devadatto divā na bhunkte, “Fat Devadatta does not eat by day.” In order to make sense of this statement we assume that Devadatta eats at night. So, when we hear agnir mānāvakaḥ, in order to make sense of the statement, we resort to a secondary operation which shifts the meaning of agni from fire to a property of fire.
But where secondary usage is the cause of our apprehension of a beautiful suggested meaning, this is because suggestiveness is involved. In this respect secondary operation is similar to the denotative operation. And where we make use of an impossible [literal] sense, as in “These men reap the earth of its flowers of gold,” it is the [desire to bring about an] apprehension of a beautiful suggested sense that provokes [the use of the metaphor]. So in similar cases also, even though there is the use of a secondary sense, it stands to reason that we may speak of dhvani. Thus in both types of suggestion where the expressed sense is not intended [we may have] a secondary usage that is intertwined (āvista) with some particular suggestive operation but is not identical therewith, because, while it is apprehended as delightful by the hearts of men of taste, it is [only] the cause of our apprehension [of the beautiful meaning] and because we can find other instances of secondary usage which lack this [delight]. All this has already been pointed out, but is restated in order to give the reader a clearer understanding.

1. See 1.13 m A. The literal sense here is more than blocked (bādhi-ta), by the surrounding context; it is inherently impossible. The flowers of this earth are not made of gold. Whenever a literal operation is blocked, a secondary operation will come into play. But where the literal sense is inherently impossible, it is obvious that the speaker never would have chosen such words except out of a desire to give beauty to his expression. 2. The suggestion of the whole verse according to Abhinava is that the courageous, the wise, and the faithful are worthy of praise. See 1.13 m L. 3. pratītihetu must have the same meaning here that it had at the beginning of the section. What is meant here is therefore vyāngyapratītihetutvāt.

Now how shall we handle cases [of secondary operation] where our mind comes to rest on the suggested meaning? He addresses this question with the words, But where, etc. The sense is that in such cases there is clearly a separate suggestive operation. He uses an
example that is acceptable to the opponent: similar to the denotative operation. What he means is this. Even you have accepted a suggestive operation in cases where a denotative operation [precedes] this follows from your having made no objection to the first type of dhvani.¹

Moreover,² upon one thing that is possible in the world in its primary sense [e.g., a boy] a second thing which is also possible in its primary sense [e.g., a fire] can be superimposed [that is, fire can be superimposed on a boy who is quick to flare up], and we speak of superimposition simply because the area of application has been shifted [from fire to boy]. This is the essence of the metaphorical process. But flowers made of gold are inherently impossible, so how can we speak of superimposing the notion of harvesting upon these imaginary flowers in the verse in question? So, as there is indeed a superimposition in the phrase “the earth’s flowers of gold,” we see that the suggestive operation is predominant here rather than the use of superimposition. The latter arises only in order to help the suggestive operation. Our author states this in the words [where we make use of] an impossible [sense], etc. That provokes: for it is the suggested meaning only, whose nature it is to provoke [the superimposition], that brings our attention to a halt. One cannot even imagine that the attention would come to rest on the superimposed meaning, which is impossible.

Even though there is: he means, although the secondary sense serves us as a temporary prop in order to attain the suggestive operation. Thus: [the secondary sense is] unqualified (avisiṣṭa)³ by a variety (viṣeṣa) in the form of suggestiveness, where “unqualified” means not possessing a variety (viṣeṣa = bhedana) of that sort. In other words suggestiveness is not a variety of secondary operation. Or [by understanding the final member of the compound as avisiṣṭa], we can take the passage to mean that the secondary sense is pervaded throughout (ā = samantāt) in such a way that its own nature is subordinated to (u = nyakṛtam, + sīṣṭa) a particular suggestive operation.

But is not identical: here tadekarūpā means that of which the nature is one with that, viz., with what is called suggestiveness; secondary operation is not of this sort. Suggestiveness is separate from secondary usage in that type of dhvani where the expressed sense is not intended, because the suggestiveness is the cause of our apprehension of beauty, just like the suggestiveness in that type of dhvani where the expressed meaning is intended; for the secondary operation does not cause the apprehension of beauty.⁴ This our author shows in the words
[because we can find] other instances, etc. "The boy is a fire" is such an instance. Already: viz., in Chapter One [1.18 K and A].

1. Viz., the vivakṣṭānyaparavācya type; see 3.33 j A, beginning. 2. The words kaṁ ca (moreover) gloss the word ca in the sentence beginning asambhavind cārthena ("and when we make use of an impossible literal sense"). In the passage that follows Abhinava shows that metaphors which employ words with an inherently impossible literal sense can be brought into use only by a desire to produce a beautiful or striking suggestion. 3. Abhinava's text read visesdvistā where in our translation of A we chose the reading of KM, visesdvistā. Accordingly, he is faced with a difficulty. He cannot allow the passage to exhibit the normal meaning of avisistā, for it would then say that guṇamṛti is indistinguishable from, that is, identical with, vyanjakavaniśa and this is precisely what Ānanda is seeking to disprove. So Abhinava offers us a choice of two extraordinary interpretations, the first etymologyzing avisista and the second visesdvistā. Both are far-fetched, but they both furnish a meaning that is compatible with Ānanda's views. 4. Abhinava's text must have been different from ours.

§ 3.331 A

Furthermore, the property of words and meanings called suggestiveness is in conformity with a generally recognized relationship and cannot be called contrary to the doctrine of any school.1 Between words and meanings it is generally accepted that there exists a denoter-denoted relation. Quite in conformity with this but connected with a different set of conditions is an operation accidentally attaching (aupādhika) to word and meaning called suggestiveness; and on this account it is different from the denotative power. A denotative power is the very self of each individual word, bound to it from the time of our first understanding the word, for the word is never known to be without it. But suggestiveness is not bound to the word, but accidental, for our apprehension of it is conditioned by context, etc. and it is not apprehended in the absence of those conditions. If it be asked why we bother to study its nature if it is not essential, we answer that we are not at fault, because while it is accidental to the word [which carries it] it is not accidental to its object, which is
its suggested meaning. A suggestor in this respect is seen to act like the \textit{liṅga} (middle term) of an inference. Just as the property of being a \textit{liṅga} appears irregularly in the entity which possesses it, as it depends on one's desire [to infer], and yet is invariable in its relation to what it works toward, [viz., the \textit{sādhyā}, the major term or \textit{probandum}], so is the suggestive power, as we have described it, [accidental to the word but invariable in relation to what it suggests]. From the very fact that it is not bound to the word, it follows that it cannot be taken as a mode of the denotative power. If it were a mode of the denotative power, it would be bound to its word, just as the denotative power is.

And this sort of accidental property of words must necessarily be assumed by him [viz., the Mimāṃsaka] who holds that there is an inborn (\textit{autpattika}) relation between words and meanings. He is an expert in the meanings of sentences and claims that there is a difference between human and non-human sentences. For if he did not assume such a property, he could make no distinction between what is stated by a non-human and by a human sentence, since the connection between the component words and meanings is the same in both cases. If he does assume such a power, however, he can explain how human sentences can be false by possessing an accidental operation, other than the denotative, superimposed upon the words in accordance with human desire, despite the fact that the words never abandon their connection with their denoted objects.

We see that there are entities in the world which, without abandoning their essential nature, may act in contrary ways by some accidental operation imparted to them by various combinations of conditions. For example, such an entity as the moon possesses a coolness that refreshes all living beings, and yet it is well known that it can cause pain when viewed by men whose hearts are burning with the pain of separation from their beloveds. Accordingly, one who would explain the falsity of human sentences despite the inborn connection [of their words] with the objects [of those words] will clearly have to posit an accidental property of some sort in addition to the power of denotation. And this property is nothing other than suggestiveness (\textit{vyanjakatva}), for suggestiveness is simply the revealing of a suggested sense (\textit{vyanāgya}) and human sentences regularly reveal a human intention (\textit{purusābhīprāya}). The sense is suggested, not denoted, because the words are not connected with this [intended or suggested sense] by a relation of denoter to denoted.
1. The present section (3.331) is an attempt to bring the operation of suggestion, and thus the doctrine of dhuani, into harmony with the views of the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya. The Mīmāṃsā too posits a verbal operation in addition to vācakatva and gunavṛtti. It is forced to do so in order to explain how the meanings of sentences made out of words with invariable meanings can ever be false. They are so because a final sentence operation (tātparyavṛttī) is given to these words by human intention (vaktrabhīprāya) whereas the denotative power does not derive from human source but is eternal. The Nyāya, on the other hand, posits a property, liṅga, which belongs to an object (e.g., smoke) when, at the prompting of our mind, it serves as an inferential means for our reaching a probandum (e.g., fire). Ānanda will here show that his vyanjakatva (suggestiveness of a word) is analogous to the tātparya of the Mīmāṃsā and to the liṅga of the Nyāya. In later Sections he will make it clear that this is only an analogy, not an identity. 2. Liṅga and vyanjakatva are relational abstractions; see Ingalls, Materials, pp. 44-47. They are not properties essential to an entity but properties that appear in an entity under certain conditions, or when the entity is set in a certain relation. The entity smoke possesses liṅga (the property of being a signpost or middle term) to fire only under the double condition that (a) we do not already know of the presence of fire and (b) we wish to infer the presence of fire. The word gangā possesses suggestiveness of coolness and purity only under certain conditions, not, for example, in the sentence gangāyāṁ bahavo matsyā jīvanti “there are many fish in the Ganges.” But when the conditions are present, it invariably gives those suggestions. It is important to note that Ānanda is likening a vyanjaka to a liṅga only in this one respect. Later, in arguing with the Nyāya (3.330 A), he will show that the vyanjya-vyanjaka relation is in other respects different from the liṅga-liṅga relation. 3. Cf. MīmāṃsāS. 1.1.5: autpattikas tu sabdasyāthena sambandhah. 4. It is only in putting the sentence together and in what he intends by his sentence that the human speaker differs from the inhuman source of the eternal Vedic text. The accidental property of his sentence, its tātparya, will reflect his limited knowledge and fallibility, even though each word faithfully denotes its object just as it does in the Veda.

$L$ He now shows that suggestiveness, which by being accidental is unbound, must have a different cause from the denoter-denoted relation, which is bound. Furthermore, etc. Accidentally attaching: he means that it is thus because of the complex character (vaicitryā) of suggestiveness that has been mentioned; and this is as much as to say that on this account it is different from the denotative power, which is bound by convention. He makes this clear with This is why, etc.
He shows just how suggestiveness is accidental by saying, [for our apprehension of it is conditioned by] context, etc.

Why we bother: he means that something unbound or unregulated can be imagined as one wishes and lacks any reality. There is no point in studying a nothing. To the word: to the particular word-form which carries the convention. In the entity which possesses it: because smoke is not always informative of fire, as we see when it is sometimes informative of something else and sometimes is uninformative of fire.2

Depends on one’s desire: desire here includes the wish to know the paksadharma (e.g., that smoke is actually on the mountain), the desire to remember the universal law (e.g., “where smoke there fire”), etc. In relation to what it works toward: it never fails to gain its proper goal once the triple condition (trairūpya) has been apprehended within itself and within that toward which it works (i.e., within the linga and the sādhyā).3

He now clarifies what he said above, that his theory does not run counter to anyone’s doctrine: And this sort, etc. By “this sort” he means characterized by suggestiveness. An inborn (autpattika) relation:4 autpattika, which denotes primarily that which belongs to the first bhāva (stage of life), namely birth, here indicates in a secondary sense the second stage, existence, because of the proximity of existence to birth. Or, we can take the word by a relational secondary usage, indicating the contrary,6 to mean that which is not born [but is constantly present]. Or, we can take autpattika to be used idiomatically7 as a synonym of nitya (constant, eternal). The sense is that the Mīmāṃsaka, who posits an eternal relation between word and meaning, which he calls [the word’s] power, must admit this sort of property.

He could make no distinction: because in that case the entry of human shortcomings would bring about no change and the invalidity of human sentences, which depends on these shortcomings, could not be explained. If we say that what is understood is like that [i.e., is false], because it is [the understanding] of a faulty listener, it would follow that the sentence itself is faultless. So how could we call it invalid? And even Vedic sentences would be invalid because of the faulty comprehension of the listener.

But now, even if we accept another property (viz., tātparya or vyāśya-katva), how can human sentences become false, for the word will not abandon its inherent nature of revealing the object? He addresses this question in the passage, We see [that there are entities], etc.
[And human sentences] regularly [reveal]: as has been stated
[in Šābara’s Bhäsya], "This is what this man thinks' is what we un-
derstand [from human sentences], not ‘this is actually the case.’ And
so it is that the knowledge we receive from other valid means [such
as perception] may be contradicted [in a human statement], while the
relation of word to meaning is not abrogated. That is why such state-
ments as “aṅgulyagre [karivarasaṭam]” can be said to be false only by
bringing into consideration the intention of the human speaker.

With this: what he means is that due to uncertainty [of the relation
between the words and their suggested sense, viz., the human speaker's
intention], there is no inherent [or invariable] connection between them.

1. Just what Abhinava means by vaicitrya is hard to say with certainty.
BP’s suggestion (vācyavācaḥkayor guṇaprādhaṁ) is unlikely. More likely
Abhinava is referring to the prakarāndhyavaccheda which Ānanda mentioned
at the end of 3.33 b. That would include the conditions of context, speaker,
person addressed, etc. 2. The Nyāya examples of the former would be:
when we use the presence of smoke to infer the presence of fireness (vahni
rather than vahnī), or of the opposite of coldness, or of wet fuel; of the latter,
when we already know that the fire is there, or when we are inattentive, or
simply do not wish to make an inference. 3. It is most unlikely that Ānanda
intended the compound svavisāya as a dvandva. But by so analysing it Abhi-
nava renders Ānanda's statement far more precise. The “triple condition” of
liṅga and sādhya is: paksadharmatā, sapaksavṛttitva, apaksāvṛttitva. In the
stock example of inferring fire from smoke, the smoke must indeed occur on
the mountain; it must occur in similar loci of fire (kitchen hearth, etc.); and
it must not occur in dissimilar loci (a lake, etc.). 4. Abhinava takes the
literal sense of autpattika to be “connected with birth” (utpatti = janma).
The difficulty then presents itself that an autpattikaḥ sambandhah, if taken
in the literal sense, would cease directly after birth. So Abhinava offers us
three ways of taking the term in a secondary sense. The first is from Šābara
on MīmāṁsāS. 1.1.5. The real source of the difficulty is that Pāṇini has not
given a specific sense to the suffix thak that would suit its present employment
in the word autpattika. 5. Yāska, Nirukta 1.2, lists the stages as jāyate, as-
ti, vardhāte, viparinamate, apakṣiyate, vināṣyati. 6. Viparītakāsaṇā is the
secondary sense commonly seen in irony, e.g., śūro yam, “he is a great hero,”
when we mean “he is a coward.” 7. Rūdhya: that is, without reference to
madākṛṣṭa verse. It is usually used as an example of absurdity; see 1.4 b L,
note 9. But the absurdity depends on the intention of the speaker. If he
means, “a hundred fine elephants are on the tip of my finger,” that is absurd.
is absurd. But if he means, "a hundred fine elephants are in front of my finger, i.e., I am pointing at them," that may be true.

3.33 m

A But at this rate the term dhvani (suggestion, suggestive poetry) must be applied to every human sentence, for all these sentences are suggestive in the way just described. That is true. But the suggestiveness that comes from the revealing an intention on the part of the speaker is common to all human sentences without distinction. It is not apart from the denotative power, for that which is suggested in this case is inseparably present with it. This, however, is not true of a suggestion which the speaker wishes to convey (vivakṣita). It is where what is suggested stands as intended to be conveyed that the suggestiveness of the sentence can prompt us to call it dhvani (suggestive poetry).¹

A suggested sense which is revealed by word and meaning, if it is a specific intention, becomes a vivakṣita (something that the speaker wishes to convey), when it is revealed as the tātparya (final sentence meaning). However, this alone will not explain the term dhvani, which covers an immense area, because it is insufficient. Rather, it is a suggested element in any of the three forms, [vastu, alāṅkāra, or rasa], whether in the form of the speaker's intention or not,² if it is suggested as the final sentence meaning, that justifies the term dhvani, as we said in defining dhvani in terms of the aforesaid types of suggestiveness. Our definition was neither too wide nor too narrow.

So it appears that a verbal suggestion characterized by suggestiveness does not conflict with the doctrines at least of the experts on sentence meaning [sc. the Mīmāṃsakas]. As for those scholars who have exactly determined the nature of brahma as it appears in speech [sc. the Grammarians], we adopted the term dhvani from their philosophy,² so the question whether or not we are in conflict with them does not arise. Among the masters of argument [sc., the Naiyāyikas⁴], who regard the connections of word and object as artificial constructions, the fact that words, like other things, can be suggestive, is proved by experience and uncontradicted [by other means of knowledge]; so it does not fall among those concepts which they reject.
1. The distinction made in this paragraph is between a suggested element (vyangya) in the form of vaktrabhiprāya (the speaker's intention to convey the information embodied in the sentence) and a suggested element that the speaker wishes to convey (vivakṣita) as a suggested element. The former sort of suggestion is present in every sentence. The latter sort is present only in poetically suggestive sentences (sentences which possess vyafijakatva). Here again (cf. 3.33j A, note 6) Ananda assigns a very wide meaning to the root vyāṅjū as used in one derivative (vyangya) and a narrow meaning as used in another (vyāṅjaka). This distribution allows him to eat his cake and have it, as the saying goes. In 3.331 A he used purusābhiprāya (= vakrabhiprāya) to show that his vyāṅjakatva was no more than what the Mīmāṃsākās are forced to admit. Human sentences are distinguishable from Vedic sentences by their suggesting vaktrabhiprāya. Now he denies that the suggesting of vaktrabhiprāya is a case of real dhvani and thereby clears his criterion of poetry from the criticism that the Mīmāṃsā concept would incur if so used.

2. The vyangya need not be intended by the speaker. A naive girl, to give an example not seldom used in Sanskrit poetry, may make a suggestion of which she is quite unaware and which she is so far from intending that she would avoid it if she were. The figure of speech apahnuti often contains such an unconscious suggestion, which is then denied as soon as it becomes apparent to the speaker. 3. See 1.131 A. 4. Possibly Ānanda would include the Buddhists also; so Abhinava.
conflict with the Grammarians, with the words, As for those scholars who have exactly determined, etc. The compound *pariniscita-nirapabhrmasisabbrahmanām* is to be analysed as follows: those by whom *brahman*, which is unimpaired (*nirapabhrmasa*), that is, without any latent impression of *avidyā*, because of its being devoid of all dualities, and which is in that form of revelation and reflection called speech, has been completely (*pari*) determined (*nisćita*), that is, has been established by valid means of proof. Here *brahman* is derived from the root *brh* “to increase,” because it is great (*brhat*) through its wide extent, because it is swollen (*brhmhita*) with a wealth of special powers, and because it is an instrument of increase (*brhmhana*) through Brahma’s being the god who has the power of creating the universe. This is as much as to say that the Grammarians, while they admit no other factor in the state of pure *brahman*, so there can be no question of denotative and suggestive power there, do admit a further operation in the phenomenal world (*avidyāpade*). We have explained this at length in Chapter One.

Having shown that both the scholars of sentences (Mīmāṃsakas) and the scholars of words (Grammarians) fall within the area of agreement, he proceeds to show that there should be no conflict with the Logicians, who know the principles of the means of knowledge. Artificial constructions: Those who hold that the connection between word and meaning is an artificial construction are the Naiyāyikas, the Buddhists, and the like. Thus we have the statement, “No, [the relation of word to meaning is not like the relation of *hetu* to *sādhyā*], because the idea we have of a thing from a word is conventional” (*NyāyaS. 2.1.55*). Again, “Words give a conventional sense” (*Dharmakīrti, PV. 3.91; ed. Gnoli 1.92*). Like other things: e.g., such things as a lamp.

Now we might prove by experience [of an astygmatic observer] that there are two moons and this could well form a subject for disagreement. To guard against such a possibility our author adds, and uncontradicted. Uncontradicted is that to which there is no obstruction, no sublation by a second [corrective] cognition. So the sense is, that it is both proved by experience and not sublated. That which is proved by experience is not to be rejected, any more than the denotative power.

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1. Abhinava here expands on Ānanda’s basic distinction of *vaktabhibhāpraśavaṇga* and *vivakṣitaśavaṇga*. He equates the former with the literal meaning of the sentence, to which it is invariably bound, and makes a distinction between literal sentences, which refer to such matters as taking or
§ 3.33 n A ]

bringing a cow, and poetically suggestive sentences, which speak about vi-
bhāras, etc. 2. Bravi-mahi vrddhau, DhP 1.664-665. 3. The first and
third of these etymologies are given by Vācaspati Miitra in a verse: bhāttvāt
bhṛmhaṇaṭvād va ātmā brahmeti giyate (Bhāmati, Intr. to 1.1.1, p. 5, line 2).
4. See 1.4b L (Translation p. 90) and 1.131 A and L (Translation pp. 169-71).
5. The Naiyāyikas hold that the connection (sambandha) is determined by
God, the Buddhists that it is determined by men. 6. Gnoli was the first to
identify this quotation. Abhinava quotes the verse in full in 4.7 a L. 7. We
should not say in English that a lamp "suggests"; we should say that it "re-
veals" its objects. But vyānakti has both meanings.

A Let the Logicians disagree about denotative power, arguing
on such questions as whether it is an inherent power of words or a
power imparted to them by convention. On the matter of suggestive
power, which follows behind, which is common to other entities besides
words, and which they admit as something well known in the world,
what occasion is there for them to disagree? For it is with matters
beyond worldly experience that all the arguments of the Logicians are
concerned, not with matters of ordinary experience. We do not see
them disagree on a matter that lies within everyone's sense perception
and that is free of obstacle, such as the identity of what is blue, or
sweet, or the like. If one says of a blue object that is open to view, "It
is blue," another does not contradict him by saying, "It is not blue; it
is yellow." So who can deny the suggestive power, which belongs to
denotative words, to such non-denotative sounds as those of songs, and
to non-verbal gestures and the like, and which is proven to exist by the
experience of everyone? For various occupations and activities, both
sustained and isolated, which suggest a beautiful non-verbal meaning,
are found to be honored in assemblies of the skillful.1 What man of
sense, if he would avoid exposing himself to ridicule, would scorn them?

1. The reading of our text vyāhārās is apparently supported by no manu-
script (see Krishnamoorty). The MSS read vyavahārās and from his comment
on the next sentence it appears that this was Abhinava's reading also. For
nibaddha in the sense of a large, sustained literary work, as opposed to ani
baddha (=muktaka, isolated stanza), we have the authority of Vāmana 1.3.27
and 29 and the Kāmadhenu commentary thereon. I suppose that the occu
pations and activities could include pantomimes, painting, the cutting out of
symbolic figures and ornaments (pattracchedya, višeṣakacchedya, cf. KāmaŚ.
1.3.16) and other such pastimes.

L An objector may claim that the Naiyāyikas do argue about
the denotative power. But that is not really the case. Their argument is
not about the existence of denotative power but about whether it is an
inborn or acquired property. So our author says, Let the Logicians
disagree, etc. Now it might be suspected that the suggestive power
too could be brought into debate through [a similar argument over]
some other property. So he says, On the matter of suggestive
power, etc. Common to other activities: When he sees that the
ability to give signals by winking, etc., is an inborn aptitude of the
eyes, etc., he will say to himself, “Let there be doubt in regard to a
word’s revealing of objects by denotation [as to whether this power is
inborn or acquired], the suggestive power, at least, must be of the same
nature [viz., inborn] in the object we are studying [viz., words] as it is
in other things.” When this unitary nature has been determined, what
room is left for doubt?

For philosophers do not argue over something blue, saying, “it is not
blue,” but over matters outside worldly knowledge, such as the origin
[of this blue object], whether it came from the pradhāna, or from atoms,
or from pure consciousness, or from nothing.1 To denotative words:
as in the examples of dhvani [that have been given]. Non-verbal: that
is, without a touch of denotative operation. Which is beautiful: that
is, which becomes beautiful by the very fact of being hidden in this way.
He thus implies that the purpose in having the meaning suggested is to
produce a striking impression. Sustained: well-known. Them: viz.,
occupations [and activities]. What man of sense would scorn: that
is, would fail to honor. The satrādesā (the participial substitute for the
personal ending) is used adjectivally to characterize the actor [cf. Pān.
3.2.126]. The sense is: a man characterized by avoiding ridicule of
himself (an objective genetive). In other words, a man who seeks to
avoid such ridicule.
1. The four alternatives represent the doctrines of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Vijñānavāda Buddhists and the Śūnyavāda Buddhists respectively.

A Here an objection might be raised. “There is good reason to scorn them. The suggestiveness of words is informative (gamaka) and to be informative is to be a liṅga (inferential mark, as smoke is informative of fire) of an inference. Accordingly, the apprehension of a suggestion is simply the apprehension of an inference and the suggestor-suggested relation of words is nothing other than a marker-probandum relation. For this reason too you will have to accept our point of view: because you have just now explained that suggestiveness is with reference to the speaker’s intention. Now the speaker’s intention is essentially an anumeyya (an inferendum, a fact to be arrived at by inference).”

To this we reply: Come now, even if things were as you say, what harm would that do us? What we are insisting on is the existence of a verbal operation other than denotative and secondary operation, one that is characterized by suggestiveness. Even if the operation were as you say, our thesis would not suffer. Let the suggestive operation be the operation of an inferential mark or let it be something else: in any case, it will still be within the area of verbal operations and yet different from the other known verbal modes. So there need be no argument between us.

But it is not really true that the suggestive operation is simply an inferential operation, nor that our apprehension of a suggested meaning is always the apprehension of a liṅgin (probandum of an inference). As you have repeated our words in order to prove your own point, claiming that since we admitted the speaker’s intention to be something suggested, the words that reveal this intention must act as inferential marks, we shall go over what we said, making some needful distinctions to which we invite your attention.

The area of words is of two sorts: the area that can be inferred (anumeyya) and the area that can be communicated (pratipādyya). Of
these the area of inference is that of *vivākṣā* (the speaker's desire to say something). And this *vivākṣā* is of two sorts: a desire to manifest speech-sounds and a desire to manifest a meaning by means of these sounds. The former of these is not a part of verbal communication. It merely results in our knowing that the speaker is a living being. The latter is ultimately responsible for the speaker's limiting himself to particular sounds [i.e. certain words] and it is also the cause, at one remove, of his communication by words. Both these desires fall within the inferable area of words. As opposed to this area, the objects that can be communicated consist in the meanings which the user wishes to communicate. Now these also are of two sorts: those to be expressed (or denoted) and those to be suggested. For sometimes the user chooses to reveal his meaning by means of the word naturally attached to it and sometimes, out of regard to some special prompting, he chooses to reveal it as not denoted by its natural word. This twofold area of what can be communicated does not itself appear as a probandum (*lingin*, something inferred) but as a term in some other sort of relation, either an artificial or a natural one. The fact that the meaning is something that the speaker intended to communicate is apprehended as a probandum from his words, but the meaning itself is not so apprehended. If the operation of words in this area [viz., in communicating their meanings] were as inferential marks, there would be no disagreements as to the truth or falsity of a word's meaning any more than there is in other cases of inferring a probandum [like fire] from a mark like smoke.

And the suggested meaning, being implied by the capability of the expressed meaning, must be connected with the word, just as is the expressed meaning. Whether the connection is direct or indirect makes no difference; and we have already shown that the suggestive power depends on the relation of the word to its denoted meaning. Therefore, to sum up: words operate like inferential marks only when the suggested element is in the form of the speaker's intention; but when the suggested element is turned into object of the speaker's intention, they operate as things to be communicated.

Now when this communicated sense is understood (rather than directly expressed), both when it is in the form of intention and when it is not in the form of intention, is the verbal activity a denotative operation or is the operation through some other connection? It has already been stated [3.33 e A; Text p. 418, lines 3-4] that it cannot be a denotative operation in this case. If it acts through some other connection, it must be suggestive.
Moreover, that which is a suggestor (or revealer) cannot be identified with that which is an inferential mark, because one sees that such is not the case with a lamp, etc. It follows that no communicated object of words is related to them as a probandum is related to its mark, any more than the expressed object is so related. For that which is related to words as their probandum, namely the object which we have so described [the speaker's intention, his desire to use words, etc.] is not understood as something denoted but as an accidental attachment (upādhi). If the communicable object were a probandum, there could never be the disagreements regarding it that people are seen to engage in. This too has been stated.

1. Actually this is true only when the suggested meaning is vaktrabhiprāya, the fact that the speaker has an intention. 2. Ānanda admitted the vaktrabhiprāya to be vyanjya (3.331 A; Text p. 440–441). He also admitted that in one respect, at least, a suggestive word acts like a liṅga (3.331 A; Text p. 437, line 3 to p. 438, line 1). 3. Viṣaya (area) here means the area in which words can serve any purpose as informing us of anything. It includes both their objects (their expressed, indicated, and suggested meanings) and also the facts that can be inferred from our using words. 4. Read -āvasitā and separate from the following vyavahita. Thus, if we follow the psychological process sequentially, we shall find that the second-mentioned desire comes first. We first wish to manifest or transmit some meaning. We then decide to employ speech sounds to do so. 5. If a man says, “I am your friend. You have nothing to fear,” we will have no doubt of his intention, which is inferable. But we may well doubt the truth of what he says (the verbal object of his intention), which is communicable. 6. See 3.33m A and note 2. 7. A lamp is vyanjaka of pots and cloths; it is not a liṅga of pots and cloths.

L There is [good reason]: there is no denying suggestiveness here; but it adds nothing; it is simply the relation between the marker (liṅga) and the result (liṅgin) of an inference. just now: that is, in bringing up the Mīmāṃsaka objection. Even if things were as you say: by this he shows that even if he were to put on a bold face and accept the objection, his thesis would not fail.1

Within the area of verbal operation: [Such is our translation of śabdavyāparaviṣayatvam, but Abhinava takes the compound differently, as follows]: being the operation of a word, it is also an object of our apprehension. Others have taken viṣaya here to mean višeṣa and have explained the compound as “a particular verbal operation.”
But it is not really true: The relation of a lamp, or of sunlight [to the objects they reveal], is a vyaṅga-vyanjaka (revealer-revealed, suggestor-suggested) relation while being in no sense an inferential relation. As the inferential relation does not pervade the vyaṅga-vyanjaka relation, the latter cannot be essentially the same as the former.

The area of words: by a word’s visaya is here meant everything that we apprehend upon the pronunciation of the word. Both types of vivakṣa, the desire to use speech sounds and the desire to transmit a meaning [by means of these sounds], are inferable. But that which is the object in the speaker’s desire to transmit meaning [i.e., the meaning that he wishes to transmit] is something for [the understanding of] which the word serves as instrument; and this something is not inferable. All that we can infer is that the speaker had a desire to transmit it. Where the word is used as an instrument there is not found the modus operandi which is found in the working of a liṅga, such as our perceiving that it occurs in a minor term [e.g., as smoke occurs on a mountain], but rather a different modus operandi, such as the activation [in our memory] of the convention [that connects the word with its meaning]. So the word here cannot be an inferential mark. And we may note that the modus operandi [where a word transmits a meaning] is of two sorts: by the one, the word engages in the activity of denotation; by the other, it engages in the operation of suggestion. Our author states this in the passage, Of these, etc. Out of regard to some [special prompting]: what is meant is, out of an intention or wish to obtain some special effect of hidden beauty or the like. Of a word’s meaning: this is so because the nature of an inference is precise.

As an accidental attachment (upādhi): The desire of the speaker appears only as a qualification of the expressed or suggested meaning. The communicable object: to wit, the suggested object. A probandum: i.e., inferable. That people are seen to engage in: people do not disagree about our wishing something. Their disagreement is about what we mean.

1. With the text as printed, the use of sva to refer to the opponent’s doctrine is very awkward. Furthermore, the point is really not that the opponent fails but that the siddhāntin does not fail. I suspect that siddhyatītiti is a scribal error for chidyata iti and have translated accordingly. 2. Tādātmya does not quite mean identity; it means identity of essence. A simśupa tree has tādātmya with (a) tree. This is because treeness (vrksatva) pervades simśupatva. “Pervades” (vyāpnoti) means that it occurs in every substance in
which simśupatva occurs. The inferential relation does not pervade vyariga-vyarijakabdhāva in this way. So suggestiveness cannot be essentially identical with (cannot be a variety of) the inferential relation.

§ 3.33 p A

A  As in the area of expressed meanings it sometimes happens that their accuracy is apprehended by recourse to some other means of knowledge, yet even when they have been found to fall within the area of that other means of knowledge it is not denied that they were objects of a verbal activity, so also should it be with suggested meanings. Furthermore, in the area of poetry an inquiry into the truth or falsity of suggestions is useless; so the testing of the suggestive operation by other means of knowledge [like inference] is a laughable occupation.¹ Thus it cannot be said that the apprehension of a suggested meaning is in all cases the apprehension of an inferable result. The sort of suggestiveness of a word which has for its object a suggested meaning that is also inferable² is not the sort to which one could apply the term dhvani (poetic suggestion). It was mentioned by us, however, in order to show that an operation of words-characterized by suggestiveness must be admitted even by those [Mīmāṃsakas] who posit an inborn connection between words and meanings, for our whole effort has been to show that the suggestiveness of words, whether of denotative or non-denotative words, whether by an inferential process or by any other process, is something that no school of philosophy can deny.

Thus suggestiveness must of necessity be held to be different at least from such verbal modes as the secondary (metaphorical) and the denotative. Although there are some who insist on forcing suggestiveness into those categories, this treatise on the special type of suggestiveness called dhvani, which has been composed for the removal of disagreement and for the enlightenment of men of taste, should not be scorned. Because definitions of particulars that are useful must not be rejected in favor of a definition of the whole, lest upon our defining existence we should find all definitions of existing things to be superfluous. And so,
That which was a subject of controversy, never fully understood by the wise, that type of poetry which is called dhvani, has here been revealed.

1. This sentence is repeated almost verbatim in the Vyaktiviveka, p. 75: काव्यविषये का वाच्यवायग्याप्रतितिनाम सत्यासत्याविचारो निरुपयोगा एवं इति तत्र प्रमाणांतरावरणकोपहार्यायाः सम्पद्याते. 2. Such a suggestion, for example, as the fact that the speaker desires to communicate something.

L Now it may be objected that after the suggested meaning is understood, its truth can be determined only by another means of knowledge, namely inference. So here again, the suggested meaning turns out to be inferable. But the objection is groundless. Of an expressed meaning also the truth can be determined only by inference. As [Kumārila] has said,

If [you claim that] an inference is present there [viz., in cognitions of sentence meaning], namely, an inference drawn from the property of accuracy common to other statements of a reliable person, that does not prove that our understanding of the expressed sense is known from inference, but that the truth which belongs to the expressed sense and is something in addition to it, is known from experience. The same should hold for the suggested sense also. Our author says this in the passage beginning, As in. But he has stated this [inferability of the truth of a suggested sense] only as a concession to the opponent. In fact, [if there were such inferability], it would be useless to us. So he says, Furthermore, in the area of poetry, etc. Useless: because from the sentences of poetry we do not seek for the performance of certain acts on the basis of the transmission by the sentence of a meaning that is true, as we do from such Vedic sentences as “agnistoma/m juhuyat/” (one must offer a fire sacrifice). This is because the end of poetry is pleasure, for it only by pleasure, in the form of an otherworldly delight, that it can serve to instruct us. We have spoken of this above at some length. A laughable occupation: The laughter consists in this, that the person who follows it is not sensitive to poetry, but has a heart so hardened by his efforts at logic that he cannot understand pleasure.
Very well, the opponent may say, we grant that we do not have inference wherever we have suggestion. But how can one deny that we have suggestion wherever we have inference? In view of such an objection, he says, [The sort of suggestiveness that has for its object a suggestion] that is inferable, etc. He means that such suggestiveness does not characterize dhvani, because such suggestion does not operate on any object outside the intention of the speaker. But, the opponent may say, if the suggestiveness which has for its object the intention of the speaker, and is equivalent to an inference, does not deserve to be called dhvani, why did you mention it? He answers by saying, It was mentioned by us, however, etc. He examines this [purpose] briefly with the words, for our whole effort, etc.

Inasmuch as we see that the suggestive (or revelatory) operation is aided: sometimes, as in the case of its suggesting the speaker’s intention, by inference; at other times, as when lamplight reveals [the objects in a room], by perception; sometimes, as when the sounds of a song [reveal a rasa], by causality; sometimes, as in that form of dhvani where the expressed meaning is intended as leading on to a suggested meaning, by denotation; sometimes, as in that form of dhvani where the expressed meaning is not intended, by the secondary operation; it follows that we can prove its nature to be different from all these auxiliaries. He states this in the words, Thus [suggestiveness must be held different], etc.

The opponent may ask why we reduce the nature and extent of such well-known entities as the denotative and secondary operation. Why not say that suggestiveness is exactly of their nature but distinguished by subjection to a different set of conditions? He addresses that question with the words, [Although there are some who insist on forcing it] into those categories, etc. What he means is that he does not begrudge their giving it whatever name they wish. Disagreement: viz., the view that there is no such type [of suggestiveness as dhvani]. Enlightenment: the removal of doubts and ignorance. Because definitions, etc.: in upayogiviveśaśalakṣaṇānām, the word upayogi modifies viveśa. By the use of the word upayogi (useful) he rules out the useless, such as [definitions] of crows’ teeth. Lest [upon our defining]: We might define all substance, quality and action [as the Vaiśeṣikas do] by saying “existence is the common character of these three categories,” and by this put an end to all the works that are useful to life on earth: scripture, tradition, works of medicine, military strategy, and the rest.
He gives the reason for the disagreement: never fully understood [by the wise]. That is why, in order to show that now, from this moment onward, there will be no disagreement, he says, “which was.”

1. This is the first half of Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika 7 (Vākyādhiyakarana), 243. The word sāmānya has been added here, making the sense clearer but destroying the meter. The whole verse, as Kumārila wrote it, runs thus: “óptavādāsamvādād atra ced anumānatā / nirmayas tāvatā siddhyed buddhyut-pattir na tatātā.” If [you claim that] an inference is present there [viz., in cognitions of sentence meaning], namely, an inference drawn from the accuracy belonging to statements of a reliable person, that inference merely proves that we judge [the sentence meaning]; it has nothing to do with our cognition of it.” Kumārila’s argument is directed against the Buddhists. The Buddhists claimed that there is no separate verbal means of knowledge (pramāṇa). You can know that there are mango trees by the river in only two ways: by perception, i.e., by going to the river and seeing them, or by inference, as when someone informs you that they are there. For if someone tells you, “There are mango trees by the river,” it is by inference that you gain your knowledge. The inference will run thus: “There are mango trees by the river, because this sentence shares the property of being accurate with other sentences of speakers whom I have found to be reliable.” Kumārila points out that establishing the truth of a sentence is distinct from understanding its meaning. The anti-Buddhist thesis is most clearly put by the verse which immediately follows: anyad eva hi satyatvam òptavādatvahetutvam / vākyārtha anya eveti jñātah pürvataras tatah. “The truth of the sentence is one thing and has its cause in its being the statement of a reliable person; the meaning of the sentence is something else, which must be known before its truth can be known.”

2. Viz., 3.10–14 f L (Translation pp. 437–8) and 3.30 L (Translation p. 533).

3. Pratīti in older texts (e.g., the Rāmāyaṇa) often means pleasure, but I rather think that here we have a misreading for pritiṃ. 4. E.g., intelligence on the part of the listener, his knowledge of the special character of the speaker, etc. 5. Crows have no teeth.

K A different type of poetry is found, called poetry of subordinated suggestion (gunabhūtavyanīgya), where the beauty of the expressed meaning predominates in connection with a suggested sense.
A The suggested sense, which has been described as comparable to the charm of a beautiful woman, has been called dhvani when it predominates [over the expressed meaning]. But now a type of poetry is envisaged where this sense is subordinated, the expressed meaning being more beautiful. This is called guniḥbhūtabhayāniga. In this type, the suggestiveness of a subordinate element belongs sometimes to a suggested fact or situation which is understood from an expressed meaning that is set aside (tiraskṛta), but where the suggested element is still subordinate to the sentence meaning which is directly expressed. For example, the following:

What an unique river of allurement is this, where waterlilies float together with the moon; from which arise an elephant's cranial lobes, and where new trunks of plantain trees and stems of lotus fiber grow.

[Attributed to King Vikramāditya]¹

In other cases the suggestiveness may belong to a meaning that is understood from the expressed meanings which are not set aside (tiraskṛta), but where the suggested meaning is subordinate in respect to the beauty of the poem because of the predominance of the expressed sense. An example is such a stanza as that already quoted [at 1.13 e A]:

The sunset is flushed with red, the day goes ever before. Ah, such is the way of fate that never the two shall meet.²

A subordinate nature of the suggestion also results from the revealing of the very same thing by express words, as in the example [quoted at 2.22 a A]:

Knowing that her gallant had set his heart on a rendezvous, the subtle lass smiled and to show her meaning folded the petals of the lotus in her hand.³

The subordinate use of a suggested meaning in the form of a rasa and the like has previously been shown to be in the domain of the rasavat figure of speech (2.4–5). In this domain the subordination of these [rasas and the like] to the principal sense of the sentence is like a king's following after his servant in the servant's wedding procession. Where a suggested figure of speech is subordinated [to the expressed], we have the domain of such figures as dipaka (see 1.13 f L and note 1).
1. The attribution is found in SRK 426 and SüktiM. 49.17. The verse is frequently quoted; see SRK text volume, under no. 426. The suggestions are very nearly the same as the secondary senses of the words, viz., a woman, her eyes, her face, her breasts, thighs, and arms. See Abhinava's remarks and note 4 thereon. 2. Ānanda quoted the stanza at 1.13 e as an example of the figure of speech äksepa. Abhinava preferred to identify the figure as samäsokti. Whichever we choose, the suggestion (of two lovers prevented by adverse fate from ever joining) is regarded as subordinate because it forms a figure of speech. Here the words sunset and day are clearly used in their literal sense, so the suggestion arising from them is atriäṣkrta-vācya. The word anuräga, however, presents a problem, for which see Abhinava's comment. 3. The stanza has already been quoted, 2.22 a A. The woman is hinting that her lover must wait to visit her until nightfall. But the suggestion is subordinated (or should we say spoiled?) by its being given away through a direct expression, "to show her meaning." Again, see Abhinava's comment.

L After setting forth [in Chapters One and Two] the essential nature of dhvani together with its types and subtypes, and after giving [in the first part of Chapter Three] its forms from the viewpoint of the various possible suggestors, our author composed a section [viz., the Vṛtti on 3.33] establishing the doctrine of suggestiveness in order to instill in the minds of students in a single lesson an understanding of the all-important relation of suggestor to suggested. Thus he has said all that need be said with regard to dhvani. But now, in order to justify the doctrine that the suggested sense is the soul of poetry by the [a fortiori] argument that this sense even when it is subordinated beautifies the words of a poet, he says. A different type, etc. What he intends is that [in this type of poetry] the connection with the suggested sense ornaments the expressed meaning.

Which has been described: viz., in the verse, "on the other hand, the suggested is something different," etc. [1.4 K]. Has been called: viz., in the verse, "The type of poetry which the wise call dhvani," etc. [1.13 K].

The suggested sense is of three sorts: a fact or situation (vastu), a figure of speech, and a rasa or the like. From among these, our author now demonstrates in succession the subordinate use of the varieties which have been described of suggested fact or situation: In this type.

What an unique river of allurement is this: This is the speech of a certain young man, which contains desire and wonder. In it
the word "river" suggests the fullness [of a lady's beauty], the word "waterlilies" the sidelong glances of her eyes, "the moon" her face, the words "elephant's cranial lobes" her breasts, "trunks of plantain trees" her thighs, and "lotus stems" her arms. As the literal meaning of these words is wholly impossible, it is set aside in the manner that the literal meaning of "blinded" was set aside [in the example of "a mirror blinded by breath"]. These meanings, although they are suggested, attain beauty [only] in the literal portion "what an unique [river] is this," because here the literal meaning by emerging [in a single inclusive image] has submerged all the [individual] suggestions. Its beauty arises first from its becoming a stimulant (vibhāva) of wonder through its being a collection achieved by the coming together in one beautiful place [viz., the wondrous river] of a number of the most precious objects in the world, such as waterlilies and the like, whose coming together can scarcely be imagined; in the second place, by its then being ornamented by the suggested meanings and thereby made delightful (vicitra), so that as this literal sense raises itself up it becomes a stimulant of desire (abhilāsa) and the like [which lead to srngāramśa]. That is why, although there is to this extent a predominance here of the literal sense, this sense assumes a subordinate position to rasadhvani. This statement will be found to apply to the mode of operation in all cases of gunibkūtyāṅgya; and that is why we have said over and over again that dhvani is the soul [of poetry].

Other sensitive readers have explained the stanza as a speech referring to a river which is beautified by the flowing charm of a number of young women who have entered it to play in the water. Even if one accepts this, the interpretation will be along the lines we have stated. Still another explanation is that it refers to a young woman who has come down to bathe and is standing by the river. But in all cases there is subordination of the suggested meanings since the suggestive activity occurs to this extent only because of the wonder [excited by the literal sense] which is primary.

Already quoted: this example was explained in Chapter One. Our author has called the stanza an example of a suggestion where the primary sense is not put aside (attraskṛta). He does so with the understanding that the word anurāga (etymologically, "redness"), which applies to desire (abhilāsa) because of its secondary sense of "being colored by redness," is here used directly for passion as the word lāvānya [is used directly for beauty].
The very same thing: viz., the situation (embodied in the suggestion). Rasa and the like: by the term "and the like" the dhāvas, etc. are meant. By the term rasavat; figures of speech such as prayasvin are also intended.

But now, how can a rasa, which is the very chief element of poetry, become subordinate, or if it did become subordinate, how would it not cease to be beautiful? Anticipating such questions, our author shows by a well-known example that on the other hand it remains beautiful: In this domain, etc.; that is, in the rasavat and such figures of speech.

Having thus shown how a suggested situation or rasa can be subordinate, he shows the same capability of the third variety of suggested sense, a figure of speech: Where a suggested figure of speech is subordinated, etc.: viz., a simile or the like.
arising out of the words sindhu, utpala, sasin, etc., become finally subordinated to the rasadhvani in the form of the suggested abhiläsaratī of the speaker of the stanza for the beautiful woman in question. Under the second explanation the stanza is primarily a description of a river in which a number of beautiful women are swimming and playing. Under this explanation the gunībhūtavyāṅga does not arise out of the word sindhu (as there is no jahallakaśandā in it), but it does arise out of the remaining words like utpala, sasin, etc. Here the gunībhūtavyāṅga arising out of the words utpala, sasin, etc., becomes subordinated to the rasadhvani in the form of the suggested abhiläsaratī of the speaker for all the beautiful women. Under the third explanation the stanza is a description of a single beautiful woman standing near a river and wishing to make a plunge into it. Under this explanation, as under the first, all the words sindhu, utpala, sasin, etc., give rise to gunībhūtavyāṅga, which then becomes subordinated to the rasadhvani in the form of the abhiläsaratī of the speaker of the stanza for the beautiful woman in question. Abhinava introduces these three explanations without expressly showing his preference for or disapproval of any one of them. The Bālapriyā commentary, however, suggests that Abhinava is in favor of the first and third explanations and disapproves of the second because under that explanation the blue waterlilies, the moon, etc., coexist not in a beautiful woman but in a river, which means that under the second explanation the stanza is a glorification of a river and not of a beautiful woman. The point likely to be raised by some that under the second explanation there is the suggestion of the speaker’s abhiläsaratī for several women and hence it is inferior to the other two, is not important, as there is nothing improper (anucita) in a man’s entertaining abhiläsaratī for several women. Even supposing that there were impropriety in such a case, it would still become an example of abhāsa of abhiläsaratī, which is aesthetically as enjoyable as abhiläsaratī. 9. See 3.34 A, note 2. While the words sunset and day can suggest a lady and her lover without abandoning their primary meanings, it would seem that anurāga can suggest the passion of the lady only by a metaphorical shift of anurāga from its etymological sense of redness. If so, the suggestion should be called tiraskṛtaudvaya (one where the primary meaning is set aside). Abhinava admits the shift from the etymological meaning, but says that anurāga is like the word lāvanya (see 1.16 K and 3.1c L, note 2) in being a frozen metaphor. On hearing it we have no sense of its etymological meaning. The primary sense may therefore be said not to be set aside.

10. preyasvin is another name for preyo’larikāra, for which see 2.4 L, note 1 and 1.4e A, note 1._
A  And so,

K  To poems of which the words are clear and deep and which bring him delight, a man of intelligence will attach just this character.  

1. Yojyah is here almost equivalent to jñeyah. In these poems a man of intelligence "will recognize" this character, viz., of "a poetry of subordinated suggestion."

A  To all poems which are charming because of meanings of this sort [viz., of subordinated suggestion] and so bring pleasure to men of discrimination, although these poems appear to be of infinitely varied natures, one should attach this character. For example:

With Lakṣmī for daughter and Viṣṇu for son-i
with Ganges for wife,
with ambrosia and the moon for two other children:
ah! what a family does the Ocean possess.  

1. For tamsa read t sa; for dhariniā, ghariniā (cf. Sattasai 5.9); for āmīa, amia.

L  Having demonstrated the subordinate use of the three types of suggested sense [situation, figure of speech, rasa], now in order to show the very wide area in which they are found, he says, And so.

[Comment on the Kārikā:] Of which the words are clear because possessed of the quality of prasāda (clarity) and deep because of their hinting at suggested meanings. Which bring him delight: he means
that the cause of beauty is just this character [of subordinated suggestion]. A man of intelligence: what he means is that a man who cannot attach this character to such poems will be laughed at by people, saying that he closes his eyes in a wholly false pretense of being a connoisseur.

[Comment on the poem quoted by the Vṛtti:] Lakṣmī [the goddess of wealth, or wealth itself], the object of every man’s desire, is his daughter. His son-in-law is Viṣṇu, who ever exerts himself in the granting of all enjoyments and of final release. Then, too, his wife is the Ganges, who is the irresistible means of attaining all desirable things. Ambrosia and the moon are his children.1 Here ambrosia means wine. As it is from bathing in the Ganges and worshipping the feet of Viṣṇu that one gains lakṣmī (wealth) and from wealth that one attains the chief goal [of life on earth] characterized by the enjoyment of drinking parties at moonrise, we understand his preeminence throughout the three worlds. Ah! what a family does the ocean possess! The suggestion takes a subordinate position because of the word “ah.”2

1. They were born from the ocean when it was churned by the gods and demons. 2. The exclamatory word points expressly to the wonders suggested by the rest of the stanza and so shifts the suggestions from the category of dhvani to that of gunībhūtyānāgīya just as the words “to show her meaning” shifted the category of suggestion in the last example under 3.34 A.

\[ K \] All the expressed figures of speech are seen in poetry generally to attain the highest beauty when accompanied by a suggested element.

\[ A \] Those who have defined [the figures] have shown in part (eka-
deśena) how the expressed figures of speech attain an extra degree of beauty when accompanied by a suggested element, whether a situation or itself a figure of speech as the case may be. But in general all these [figures of speech], if they are carefully examined in poetic literature, are seen to be of this sort. Thus, just as dipaka and samāsokti,1 other
figures also are generally seen to be associated with a further suggested figure or suggested situation. For one thing, first of all, every figure of speech can be made to contain some hyperbole; and when so constructed by great poets, it blossoms with a special poetic beauty. For how could the attachment of hyperbole, if managed with propriety to the subject matter, fail to impart a superiority to the poem?

In defining hyperbole, when Bhāmaha says:

This is the whole of figured speech;
by it the meaning is exalted.
A poet must take pains with it,
[for] what figure of speech is without it?

[Bhāmaha 2.85]

we must here understand his meaning to be that inasmuch as there is extra beauty in any figure of speech over which, through a poet's genius, hyperbole presides, whereas another [which lacks hyperbole] is a mere figure of speech, [we see that] hyperbole is able to incorporate itself in all figures of speech; hence by a metaphorical use of identity, [Bhāmaha can say that] it is every figure of speech. Now this mixture of hyperbole with another figure is sometimes done expressly and sometimes by suggestion. Furthermore, when it is suggested, it is sometimes predominant and sometimes subordinate. The first of these [three types] belongs to the expressed figures, the second to dhvani, the third to gunībhūtavyaṅga.

1. See 1.13d A and L; also 1.13e A and note 3.

L Having thus stated that a poem within the area of those without figures of speech, although it may appear empty from a superficial point of view, is made beautiful by the inner meaning [arising from subordinated suggestion], he now shows that an [expressed] figure of speech is made more charming by the same means: [All] the expressed [figures of speech], etc. Being an element of something means being subordinated to it.

In part (ekadeśena): by this term he refers to partial metaphor.¹ So what he means is as follows. In a partial metaphor, such as,

The pond-kings were fanned by autumn
with her wild geese

[Udbhaṭa, 1.12 Indurāja = 1.24 Viśṛti]
inasmuch as those who have defined the figures have shown that [the suggested metaphor that] the geese are fly-whisks becomes subordinate to the expressed [metaphor], kings, they have hereby indicated this sort [of subordinated suggestion]. Others have explained the word ekadesena as referring solely to the complex character of the literal portion [of an ekadesavivartin rūpaka or partial metaphor] and thus their explanation is not sufficiently developed (anudbhinna).

[Seen to be associated, etc.:] The word vyangyālankārāntara-vastvantarasamsparśino means, [are seen] as being those which touch upon, that is, cling to for their own ornamentation, some other, suggested, figure of speech or some other suggested situation. Great poets: Kalidāsa, etc. He now gives the reason why such [a figure of speech] blossoms, as he has said, with poetic beauty: For how could, etc. The particle hi expresses cause. How could the attachment of hyperbole fail to impart a superiority: he means that such [a failure of hyperbole] is not found in poetry, if only the poet constructs the hyperbole while keeping in mind what is appropriate to his subject.

Thus, to take an example of Bhaṭṭendurāja:

A tremulousness of the eyes,
hesitating in mid-glance;
limbs daily growing thinner
like severed lotus stems;
and cheeks so pale they seemed
to imitate white dūrva grass:
such was the costume put on by the gopīs
as they and Krishna came of age.

Here the hyperbole is justified, as its object is the beauty of the Blessed One whose form was that of the love-god. Accordingly, the figure exhibits an otherworldly beauty in the poem. But when inappropriate, the beauty fails. For example:

God made space too small;
for he reckoned not
that such would be the future
expansion of your breasts.

Now it may be asked just how hyperbole is latent in suggested form— in every figure of speech. For [an opponent may urge that] Bhāmaha spoke of hyperbole as being a generic character of all figures of speech. Now a generic character does not appear from a word separately and at a later time than one's perception of its particularity. So how can
hyperbole be suggested? Anticipating this question, our author says, Bhāmaha says, etc. Here we must construe together words which are separated from one another, thus: "when Bhāmaha says ... , we must here understand his meaning to be ... " And what does Bhāmaha say? This is [the whole of figured speech], etc. That which has been defined as hyperbole is the whole of figured speech, that is, is every sort of figure of speech, for Bhāmaha has said:

An unusual or striking form of word or meaning (vakrokti) is considered an ornament (alānikrti) of poetic utterance.®

For the "bent" (vakra) form of a word or of a meaning (ukti) is its presentation in an unusual or striking form (lokottirnena rūpena) and thus constitutes the ornament of a figure of speech (alānikārasyālānikārah). Now hyperbole is precisely the property of being unusual or striking (lokottaratā). Hence hyperbole is a common property of all figures of speech. Thus, [to explain the second quarter of Bhāmaha 2.85 quoted by the Vṛttikāra: "by it the meaning is exalted (vibhāvyate)" ] it is by this hyperbole that a meaning which has been worn out by everyone's use of it can be given new variety and interest [vibhāvyate = vicitratayā bhāvyate]. Again, it is hereby that pleasure gardens and the like can be turned into vibhāvas (i.e., stimulants of the rasa of love) [vibhāvyate = vibhāvatām niyate]. And the matter is hereby endowed with a special property, i.e., is given a content of rasa [vibhāvyate = visesena bhāvyate]. This is what Bhāmaha actually said.9 As to what he meant here, our author continues, by a metaphorical use of identity [Bhāmaha can say that] it is every figure of speech.

Our author states the relation which furnishes the cause10 of the metaphorical usage by saying, [hyperbole is able to incorporate itself] in all figures of speech. He states the purpose (prayojana) of the metaphorical usage in the clause running from inasmuch as there is an extra beauty to another is a mere figure of speech. He points out also the blocking of the primary sense (mukhyārthabādha) in the words through a poet's genius, etc.11

What our author has in mind is the following. To begin with, if hyperbole were a generic character in all figures of speech, it would in effect be essentially identical with them and no figure of speech would be without it. Such being the case, no poetic genius would be needed in [constructing] it and no "mere figure of speech" [i.e., figure lacking hyperbole] would be found to exist. On the other hand, if what is meant [by Bhāmaha] is that hyperbole is the life of poetry, then it might be
inhibited by a lack of propriety. Now if hyperbole constructed with propriety is the life of poetry, then, since nothing else can regulate this propriety than the rasas, bhāvas, and the like, we shall have to admit that it is they (the rasas, bhāvas, and the like) that are the chief inner life of poetry, not hyperbole. [Incidentally], this refutes those critics who say, "When a poem consists in beautiful words constructed with propriety, what is the use of another factor called dhvani, as the soul of poetry?" For this saying, of which they are so proud, witnesses their admission of the existence of dhvani. Accordingly, this [statement of Bhāmaha that hyperbole is all the figures of speech] is a metaphor, because [we see that] the primary sense is blocked and [that] there is both a cause and a purpose of the metaphorical usage of identity. Accordingly, it is correct to say that hyperbole is suggested.

Our author now divides into three types the joining to itself by hyperbole of another figure of speech, [a mixture] of which he has just spoken: [Now this mixture] of hyperbole, etc. Expressly: that is, the hyperbole may be expressly stated, as in "what an unique river of allurement is this" (cf. 3.34 A). Here we have hyperbole attaching itself to the literal meaning of the words in a metaphor. Our author now distinguishes the areas [of the three hyperboles]: [The first] of these. What is meant is, the first among the three types.

1. Thus, Abhinava understands Ānanda to say that the older critics showed how a suggested figure of speech could give an extra beauty to an expressed figure by [their exposition of] partial metaphor. This interpretation, I think, wrongly restricts Ānanda's meaning. The older critics certainly recognized the suggestions implicit in dīpaka, samāsokti, and other figures besides that of metaphor. 2. That the geese are fly-whisks is obviously subordinate, as the suggestion would never occur to us without our understanding the expressed metaphor that the ponds are kings. 3. Abhinava often refers to the Candrikākāra by a plural pronoun. Here he may be simply criticizing the comment of a single predecessor. 4. vaicitrya: the word should have the same sense here that it bears in 3.331 L (Text, p. 436, line 4 of Locana). Thus, the "other" interpretation would be that Udbhaṭa and others pointed out the suggested figure in speaking of the complex character of ekadēśa-vivarṭin metaphors. 5. Because the other commentator(s) failed to make any reference to the subordination of the suggested metaphor. And indeed neither Udbhaṭa nor the other older writers do make any such reference. "Insufficiently developed" seems to me a better rendering of anudbhīna than BP's "unclear" (aspastārtha), although the word does also have that sense. 6. Abhinava has already quoted this verse of his teacher at 1.4g L, where
he commented on other aspects of it. 7. The opponent’s point is this. By saying that all figures of speech are just hyperbole, Bhāmaha is making hyperbole the sāmānyya of the viśeṣas represented by simile, metaphor, etc., just as bovinity (gotva) is the sāmānyya (generic character) of all cows. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine is that a sāmānyya inheres in its viśeṣas; it is inseparable from and synchronous with them. Bovinity is perceived together with and synchronously with our perception of a cow. Such is the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine; we need not here question it by means of modern experiments in epistemology. So how can the Vṛttikāra say that hyperbole is a suggested meaning, which arises after and separately from our understanding of the expressed simile or metaphor?

8. Bhāmaha 1.36, quoted above at 1.1 c L and see note 4 thereon. 9. The word tāvat implies that he did not say that vakrokti was the generic character inhering in the particular alaniṅkāras as the opponent just argued.

10. For nimitta (cause) as one of the three conditions of the metaphorical or secondary operation, see 2.1 L, note 2 and 2.1 b L. The nimitta is actually the relation between the expressed object and the object of the secondary usage, here the relation between hyperbole and all figures of speech, viz., a relation of soul and body. 11. Prayojana and mukhyārthabādha are the other two conditions for metaphorical operation; see 2.1 L, note 2. Abhinava will demonstrate in what follows just how the word kauprattabhāvaśāt shows the blocking of the primary sense. 12. Supplied by BP. 13. These critics must be predecessors of Kṣemendra, who in his Aucityavacārāsacā has propounded the hypothesis that aucitya is the soul of rasa. See Kārikā 3 of that work: aucitvahyā namakārakārīnas cāruacakvane / rasajvakhūtasya vicāram kurute 'dhunā. 14. It witnesses it because the “propriety” of which it speaks is regulated by the rasas and the like, which can be suggested only by rasadhvāni. So BP. 15. (Patwardhan) The hyperbole in the stanza under discussion arises from the use of the words aparā eva and it is therefore expressly stated. It is the kind of atisāyokti which Mammata 10, p. 628, characterizes as prastutasya yad anyathām, i.e., as representing the matter under discussion as something altogether different from its own self, as being out of the ordinary. Abhinava’s remark that in this stanza there is a rūpaka (metaphor) is to be explained as follows. When it is said, “iyam (purah, sthātyā) aparā eva lāvanyasindhuh,” there is clearly a superimposition (āropa) of the upamāna (lāvanyasindhuh) on the upameya (iyam) and so the presence of rūpaka cannot be denied. The BP’s explanation is half right and half wrong. It is right in saying that the atisāyokti is located in the words aparā eva. It is wrong in stating that the rūpaka consists in the representation of the eyes, face, breasts, thighs, and arms of the lady as waterlilies, moon, elephant’s cranial lobes, plantain trunks, and lotus stems. For according to Abhinava (3.34 L) the words “waterlilies,” “moon,” etc., are cases of laksanā (secondary metaphorical operation) based on the suggestion of a prayojana and are not
cases of rūpaka at all. When once the words "waterlilies," etc., are adjudged to be loci of laksanā and cases of gunībhūtavyāngya, they cannot be regarded any longer as loci of rūpakas. The seat of the rūpaka in the stanza is the phrase iyam lāvanyasindhuh; the seat of the atiśayokti is the phrase aparā eva.

A And this method of operation [sc., by subordinating itself to a second figure] is found among other figures of speech as well; but other figures cannot subordinate themselves to the whole range of figures. Hyperbole can be subordinated to all figures; that is its peculiarity. Among those figures which receive their title as figures from a notion of similarity, that is, among metaphor, simile, tulyayogīta (equal pairing),1 nidarsanā (demonstration, instruction),2 and the like, we may say that all these figures when they partake of an exceptional beauty are loci of subordinated suggestion (gunībhūtavyāngya).

In samāsokti,3 ākṣepa,4 paryāyokta,5 and the like, inasmuch as they cannot gain their title to these figures without the suggested element, their containing of subordinated suggestion is obvious.

In this matter [of subordinated suggestion], some figures of speech are limited to the suggestion of only certain other figures of speech. For example, trick praise (vyājastuti)6 must contain [as a suggested element] complimentary address (preyo'laṅkāra)7 For some figures of speech [on the other hand] the rule is merely that they shall contain some [suggested] figure or other. For example, poetic doubt (sandeha) and the like may contain simile [or other figures].8 Some figures may suggest one another, as dīpaka (zeugma) and simile. Here it is well known that dīpaka regularly contains a suggestion of simile;9 but a simile may occasionally join to itself a touch of dīpaka, as in a garland simile (mālopamā). For example a touch of dīpaka is obvious in such verses as the following:

As by its flame of glorious light a lamp, 
as by the Milky Way the path of heaven, 
as by his Sanskrit speech a learned man, 
so by Pārvati her father
was both sanctified and given beauty).10
1. See 1.13f. L, note 1.  2. See 2.18-19g L, note 4.  3. See 1.13d A and L.  4. See 1.13e A, note 3 and 1.13e L, note 1.  5. See 1.13b L and note 1.  6. See 1.13k L, note 1.  7. See 2.4 L, note 1.  8. For sandeha see 1.13i L, and note 7; also 2.26 A, note 1. Sandeha may suggest the further figure of upamā or rūpaka or atisayokti. For this reason and also in order to bring out the contrast between alaṅkāramātra and alaṅkāra-vaśeṣa, we must follow Abhinava in reading upamādigarbhātve in place of upamāgarbhātve (Text, p. 471.5).  9. See 3.27 A.  10. KumSam. 1.28. Pārvati’s father is the Himalaya Mountain. In each flower of the garland the notion of zeugma is present. Sanskrit being the sacred language and also the most beautiful of languages, a learned man is both sanctified and given beauty by his use of it. The Milky Way, in Indian mythology, is the Ganges of Heaven. As the Ganges washes away all sins and as the Milky Way is beautiful, the same zeugma applies to the night sky. Fire purifies, and so a lamp is sanctified as well as rendered beautiful by its flame. For the close connection in Kālidāsa’s mind between beauty and holiness, see Ingalls. Kālidāsa and the Golden Age, pp. 19-20.

L  But now, if hyperbole alone is like this [viz., present in all other figures of speech], with response to what [else] was a hierarchy suggested [by the Vṛtī] in its saying, “first of all” [3.36 A]? Anticipating this question, our author now says, And this, etc. This [method of operation through subordinated suggestion] which has just been described comes into consideration in other figures of speech as well. Even so, by what superiority was hyperbole said to be “first”? Anticipating this question, he says, but other figures, etc. Thus, since he has said that there is a touch of suggestion in every figure of speech, he distinguishes just what suggested [figure] can appear [from each expressed figure]: Among those figures

The definitions of metaphor, etc., have already been stated. Nidarsanā is defined thus by [Bhāmaha 3.33]: “Nidarsanā is the teaching of a given matter by means of an action [belonging to some inanimate object].” An example is:

The sun with lessened splendor
passes to its setting,
informing men that of the glorious
their rise leads ever to their fall.

[Bhāmaha 3.34]
Complimentary address: because trick praise (vyājastuti) ends up in a clever compliment [although it begins with what seems to be censure]. We have exemplified trick praise in Chapter Two.

May contain simile: here the word “simile” includes all such varieties as metaphor, etc.; or, since a similarity is common to all these figures, we may take them all to be implied.

Is obvious: In the phrase “by Pārvatī her father was both sanctified and given beauty,” a dīpaka, because it illuminates after the fashion of a lamp (dīpa), is brought in as something suggested, for this phrase is a statement of the common property underlying the simile by the clear method of direct designation.

1. The pronoun sā must refer to vyājastuti, not to preyo’laṅkāra. So either we must emend to sa codārta eva, making the pronoun refer to preyo’laṅkāra, which Abhinava exemplified in Chapter Two (2.5 a L), or we must suppose that Abhinava’s memory has played him false. He exemplified vyājastuti in Chapter One (1.13 k L), not Chapter Two. 2. That is, the simile (actually four similes, which together compose the garland simile) is directly expressed in all its members, but the dīpaka is only suggested. If the poet had not used the word “as” (iva) in the first three lines, we would have a directly expressed dīpaka with a suggested garland simile.

§ 3.36 b A

A Thus metaphor and other figures of speech, when they attain unusual beauty by the touch of a suggested element, are all of them a path to gunibhūtavyaṅga, and the ability to carry subordinated suggestion is common to all figures of this sort, both those which I have mentioned and those which I have not. If one defines subordinated suggestion, all these [figures] will be well defined, while if one simply recites the peculiarities of particular figures without any general definition, they cannot be truly understood, any more than grammar can be understood by enumerating a list of words, for they are endless. Countless are the forms of speech; and the figures of speech are simply varieties of those forms.

There is also an area of subordinated suggestion in a different way [from the the suggestion of a figure of speech], namely, by [the poet's]
accompanying [the expressed statement] with a suggested fact or situation. This second form of the derivative of dhvani, which has been used by the great poets and can be extremely beautiful, should also be studied by sensitive readers. There is absolutely no form of poetry that charms the hearts of the sensitive, in which beauty does not arise from some touch of suggested meaning. Those who are wise will honor it as the ultimate secret of poetry.

1. One must read pratipadapāthena, as in Mahābhāṣya, Vol. 1, p. 5, line 23. 2. Cf. 1.1c A.

L  To all figures of this sort: that is, to all figures that are outstandingly beautiful.

Will be well defined: because the form of these figures as devoid [of subordinated suggestion] is of no use at all to poetry. Thus we have [mere] simile in “A wild ox is like a domestic ox”; metaphor, in “The khalevali is a sacrificial post”; double meaning (śleṣa), in the technical repetition of [dvirvacane] employed in “dvirvacane ‘ct.” We have [an unpoetic use of] sequential ordering in “tūḍiśalāṭura,” of zeugma (dīpaka) in gām aśvam; of embodiment of doubt (sasandeha) in “it may be [a man] or a post”; of denial (apahnuti) in “This is not silver”; of periphrasis (paryāyokta) in “the fat man eats not in the daytime”; of equal pairing (tulyayogī) in “sthā-ghvor ic ca”; of aprastutaprasamsā in all those [enunciations of Panini] which are indicative [of some extraneous fact], as for example his use of the word anta in 1.4.14 in defining the technical designation “word,” for this use implies that the principle of tadantavidhi cannot be applied when a suffix is used in the defining of a technical designation. We have āksepa (a hint in the form of a denial) in the double options (ubhayatruvibhāṣāḥ) [of Panini], because, in order to prescribe particular options, he denies even that which he seeks before prescribing it, on the principle that after [the whole area] is levelled by a prohibition, [the particulars may be reconstituted]. We have hyperbole in “The bowl is an ocean,” or “The Vindhya Mountain grew so high it seized the path of the sun,” and other figures in like fashion.

As such [examples] are of no use to poetry, it is subordinated suggestion, the heart of figurative speech, which, when defined, defines the figures properly. By it they are completely defined, that is, contained; otherwise, our definitions must surely fall short of the mark.
Our author states this in speaking of reciting the peculiarities of each particular figure. There can be no general definition of hyperbole, *vakrokti* (striking expression)\textsuperscript{16}, si ile, and the like, if they lack beauty. So it is this subordinated suggestion, since the beauty [of a figure] is dependent on it, that furnishes the general definition.

Furthermore, the beauty of a suggested meaning is no more than its ability to manifest *rasa*, and since *rasa*, as the end product of the aesthetic process, is itself bliss, there is no infinite regress here.\textsuperscript{17}

For they are endless: We have explained this in Chapter One in commenting on our author's statement that "the possibilities of speech are endless."\textsuperscript{18}

But now, it is not the case that a second [subordinate] figure appears in every figure of speech. So how can all figures be included by defining subordinated suggestion? The objection is needless. The suggestion which is subordinate may be a fact (or situation), or it may be a *rasa*. Our author states this in the words, There is also an area of subordinated suggestion, etc. In a different way: that is, by the suggestion's being of a fact or of a *rasa*.

Or, one may lay the ground for the author's remark in a different way, as follows. It might be objected that if the figures of speech are to be defined by means of subordinated suggestion, why is that definition not now given? To which the author replies by saying, There is also an area of subordinated suggestion, etc. Here the word "area" will mean area to be defined. And how is it to be defined? By defining it as a type, different from that of *dhvani* (predominant suggestion),\textsuperscript{19} where the poet accompanies the expressed statement by the suggestion of a fact or situation. So, when suggestion (*vyanigya*) has been defined, and the subordinate variety of it has been described, what further definition is there to give? This is the final meaning.

Having thus established that suggestion (*dhvani*) is the soul of poetry, he sums up with the passage that begins with "This [second form]" and ends with "some touch of suggested meaning." Then, to show that this suggestion, as it is the secret of the poetry of all great poets, is no matter of deception or idle praise, he says, Those who are wise ill honor it, etc.

1. This is the standard Nyäya example of *upamäna*, *NyäyaSBhäsya* 1.1.6.
2. *Thetkholevali* is the wooden post in the center of a threshing floor. To it is tied the ox who tramples out the grain. 3. Pāṇ. 1.1.59. The Kāśikā'ś Vṛtti on this sūtra is *dvirvacanani itte 'ct ajādesaḥ sthāniyad bhavati dvirvacana*
eva kartavye, "when there follows directly a vowel (i.e. a suffix beginning with a vowel) which causes reduplication, [the substitute for a vowel acts like its base form] while the reduplication is to be made." Thus it takes the word dvirvacane twice, each time in a different sense. The Siddhântakaumudï has a different interpretation, but also takes the word dvirvacane in two different senses (as dvirvacananimitte and as dvirvacane). The double meaning is necessary, as the sūtra must express two conditions if correct forms are to be generated from it. 4. Pāṇ. 4.3.94. The full sūtra is tūdisalāturavarmatīkucavāradhakchandhañyakak, "To tūdi, salātura, varmatī, and kucavāra are appended respectively the suffixes ḍhak, chaṇ, ḍhaṇ, and yak." 5. The words are possibly taken from a verse quoted in the Mahābhāṣya under 2.2.29, Vārt. 1: ahaḥ nayamāṇo gām aśvam puruṣām paśuṁ/ vaivasvato na tṛpyati surāyā iva durmadā, "Though every day consuming ox, horse, man, and beast, death is no more slaked than is a drunkard by his rum." As the word nayamāṇo is construed with both gām and aśvam, the sentence qualifies as a dipaka. 6. The logicians' stock example of doubt. 7. Another example taken from the logicians. After the erroneous perception that "this is silver," the correction, if it occurs, takes the form, "This is not silver." 8. For definitions of paryāyokta see Bhāmaha 3.8, Dāndin 2.295, Udbhata with Indurāja 4.6. The definitions of Bhāmaha and Dāndin will apply to any roundabout way of conveying information and so would include the here quoted sentence, which may be regarded as simply a periphrasis of "the fat man eats at night." The same statement has been quoted before by Abhinava (1.4 g L and note 21) as the Mīmāṃsaka's stock example of material implication (arthāpatti). 9. Pāṇ. 1.2.17. The sūtra prescribes the effect of certain suffixes on the verbal root sthā and on those roots which are technically called ghū. As both sthā and ghū refer to entities within the same area of discourse (both are verbal roots), the figure is here identified as tulyayogītē, not dipaka. Compare what was said in 1.13 f L, note 1. 10. See 1.13 j A and note 1. 11. Normally, in Pāṇini's work we are to interpret a mere suffix as referring to a word ending in that suffix. This rule of interpretation is called tadantavyādhi. But the rule does not hold in the defining of technical designations. Pāṇini does not state this exception explicitly, but gives us an indication of it by defining "word" as "that which ends in a case-ending or personal ending" (suptini tam padam), for if there were no such exception, he would have omitted the word anta ("which ends in"). 12. See 1.13 e. A and note 3. 13. An ubhayatrasvabhāṣā is a pratīṣedhapūrvaka-vikalpah "an option preceded by a prohibition," just as the figure of speech āksepa is a pratīṣedhapūrvako viśeṣapratisipattih "the conveying of a particular, preceded by a prohibition." Hence the illustration furnished by Abhinava. An explanation of why an ubhayatrasvabhāṣā came to be regarded as a pratīṣedhapūrvako vikalpah cannot be given briefly and a reader who is intimidated by Sanskrit grammar is advised to skip the rest of this note. Pāṇ. 1.1.44 defines
the term vibhāṣā thus: na veti vibhāṣā. The Kāśikā, following the guidance of Patañjali, interpreted this to mean “[If the operation may either] not [take place], or [take place], [the situation shall be called] “vibhāṣā” (option). Paul Kiparski (p. 228) has shown that this is certainly not what Pāṇini intended, but the interpretation has become standard among Sanskrit grammarians and is said to explain why Pāṇini did not use the simple word vā (“or”) in many instances of option. The argument runs thus. Options are of three sorts. A prāpta-vibhāṣā is where something already prescribed is made optional. For example, of the root śrī, to swell, we are told that the śrī must convert to u before weak endings (6.1.15). Thus one generates the form suśuvatuh, “they both swelled.” However, the form without contraction, śūniyatuh, must also be allowed. Such an option will be a prāpta-vibhāṣā, for it makes a previous rule only optional. It will be seen that a prāpta-vibhāṣā is in effect an optional rejection of a rule. On the other hand, before strong endings there is no rule for contraction of śrī in śrī. Thus we generate the form suśūṣaya “he swelled” (with strengthening of the vi to vāy by Pāṇi. 7.2.115). But the form suśāva (with vi contracted to u, which is then strengthened to āv) must also be allowed. This will be an aprāpta-vibhāṣā, for it is an option to follow a procedure (contraction before a strong ending) for which there exists no rule. It will be seen that an aprāpta-vibhāṣā is in effect an optional prescription. Now if Pāṇini, when he came to allow these options in 6.1.30, had simply said vā śveh, “[contraction] of śrī may occur [in the perfect tense],” we might understand either that the prāpta-vibhāṣā was allowed, or that the aprāpta-vibhāṣā was allowed, but not both, because, so say the commentators, the force of vā would be used up in making the one type of option and would no longer be available for the other. Hence Pāṇini invented the special term vibhāṣā to permit a third type of option, the double option (ubhayatratva-vibhāṣā). The force of this word vibhāṣā, says the Kāśikā, is first to prohibit (pratisedha) contraction of śrī by leveling the whole area (samikrte visaye), and then to inaugurate a particular option. Thus the technical term “vibhāṣā,” or its referent, a double option, is in effect an option preceded by a prohibition. 14. The first of these examples is frequently used in the Mahābhāṣya (e.g., on 1.4.24, 2.3.50, 2.3.67, 3.2.110). In all cases it is followed by vindhyo vardhitakam, “The heap of rice is a Vindhya.” It is not clear to me why Abhinava has changed the second example. 15. Literally, “otherwise there would be an avyāpti,” that is, a definition of insufficient extension. J. Masson is tempted to emend to ativyāpti. The trouble with the traditional definition of simile, he says, is that it is too wide, not too narrow. It includes such mundane statements as “a wild ox is like a domestic-ox,” as well as the poetic uses. This is true, but only from the viewpoint of particular definitions. They are too wide. But from the viewpoint of a general definition, the traditional work of the ālaṁkārikas is too narrow. Even if we add up all their definitions of the figures, we never arrive at the heart of figurative speech, at that quality of it which
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K  Of the words of great poets, even if they contain [other] ornaments (figures of speech), this luster of the suggested is the foremost gem, like bashfulness in women.

A  By means of it even a trite subject is brought to a special kind of beauty. For example:

Prompted by intimacy and by Love's command,
the soft-eyed damsel uses graceful gestures
which are indescribable and come forth ever new.
I must find some solitary spot to ponder them
with my whole thought in constant meditation.

The literal sense of the word ke 'pi is "indescribable." What beauty is not given by the easy and endless suggested sense arising from this?

1. The suggestion, as BP points out, is that the gestures must be utterly delightful since they are incapable of being defined.

L  The words foremost and gem go together [although in the Sanskrit they are separated]. The phrase "even if they contain [other]
ornaments” [means also by implication] “even if they are devoid of ornaments.” The luster, that is, resplendence, brought about by what is suggested is like bashfulness,¹ as they both come to life from a beauty the essence of which is concealment. Bashfulness is the chief gem of ladies even if they are wearing jewels. Bashfulness is that by which a luster is suggested² in the form of that beauty of the heart which bursts forth from inner emotion, for bashfulness is a manifestation of emotion in the form of a desire to hide the workings of love which are bursting forth from within. For we see no trace of bashfulness in ascetics who are devoid of the emotions of love, even if their loincloth is taken away. For an example [of bashfulness] see the stanza of a certain poet, “She freezes like a deer.”³

Also [one may take pratiyamānacchāyā lajjā to mean] bashfulness which gives beauty to the suggested yearning, beseeching, and hurt pride of one's beloved.⁴ For the ocean of love, meeting with the embankment of bashfulness, constantly throws forth amorous gestures in the form of mutual alterations of eyes and limbs; all this is the working of bashfulness, which is a beauty the essence of which is concealment.

Prompted by intimacy: The command is imperative, being given by the holy teacher, Love, whose rule is honored throughout the world and who can therefore dispel bashfulness and timidity. The gestures are presented at the time of intimacy, that is, at the time of love-play, when the command is obeyed, as it must be, by the dropping of fear and bashfulness. The gestures are of a soft-eyed damsel; this shows that they are rendered pure by glances appropriate to her being overcome by the genuine enjoyment of love-play. By gestures are meant all the other amorous alterations of eyes and limbs; hence they are said to be aksunnāh, that is to say, they flash forth at every moment in new forms. They are to be meditated upon —here the gerundive has the sense of “can be” and “should be”⁵—with one's whole (thought), that is, with no other object of attention, by one who has retired to a solitary spot. This is because they are “indescribable”; they cannot be understood in any other way.

1. In this analysis of pratiyamānacchāyā lajjā, Abhinava takes pratiyamānacchāyā as a madhyamapadalopi karmadhāraya, with pratiyamānacchāyā as the upameya and lajjā as the upamāna. 2. Here Abhinava is taking pratiyamānacchāyā as an instrumental bahuvr̥hi modifying lajjā. 3. The
complete stanza is printed at the foot of p. 476 of the Kashi edition of our text. In English one may give it thus:

She freezes like a deer fascinated by a song;
she asks her friend to tell again the tidings of her dear one;
she daydreams without sleeping: O, I know the signs;
Cupid has begun to water the new flower in her heart.

The point of Abhinava's quoting the verse is that it expresses how bashfulness restrains the passion springing from the heart. The stanza is quoted by Mammata and Hemacandra and is attributed by SūktiM. to Trivikrama-bhaṭṭa. Trivikrama was the author of the Nalacampū and the Madālasacampū; see Raghavan, Bhaja's SP, pp. 783, 801. There exists an inscription of A.D. 915 composed by him. The stanza in question might well be placed in the mouth of the heroine's confidante.

4. Literally, "bashfulness by which there arises a luster of the suggested yearning," etc. This third interpretation is like the second in taking pratīyamānacchāyā as a bahuvrīhi, but this time the bahuvrīhi is regarded as ṣādhiḥ. The word anunāthana seems to have been forgotten by the dictionaries. Here, as in Kathāsārītāgara 2.6.89 (kupitānāthānāni), it means beseeching, conciliation, begging for forgiveness.

5. Pāṇ. 3.3.169 and 172.

K The understanding of a different matter that may appear by a change of voice (kāku), it being subordinate, belongs to this variety of suggestion.

A The understanding of a different matter that appears by a change of voice, if the suggested matter is subordinate [to that which is denoted by the words], belongs to this variety of poetry characterized by subordinated suggestion. As i "They will be safe, the Dhārta-rāṣṭras, while I am alive?"

Or as in:

So I am an adulteress? Come off it, chaste wife!
You have not sullied your character?
But I am not like the wife of a somebody
who is making love to a barber;?

[Sattasai 5.17]
because it is primarily the direct force of the words, which is only helped out by the change of voice which one may infer from the inherent capability of the denoted meanings, that is here the cause of our understanding the particular [suggested] meaning; not the change of voice alone. For if we were to change the matter of which the words speak, no change of voice that the speaker might invent could give us an understanding of such a meaning.

As the meaning is obtained from the inherent capability of the [directly denoted] meanings, although it is strengthened by the operation of the words in conjunction with a particular change of voice, it belongs to the type called suggested meaning (vyañgya); and when we apprehend the meaning of a denotation of this particular sort [viz., of the sort qualified by change of voice], as following upon the direct designation, we refer to the poetry which suggests such a meaning as the poetry of subordinated suggestion (gunibhūtavyañgya). For any poem which states a direct meaning qualified by a particular suggestion is a case of subordinated suggestion.

1. Venīsamhāra 1.10 (Madras), 1.8 (Poona). The words are Bhīma's and so imply the opposite. We would attain the effect in English by raising and accenting the word "I," and not dropping the voice at the end of the sentence.
2. Abhinava will explain the tone used in each phrase and the suggestions.

L [The Kārikā] furnishes another example of subordinated suggestion: The understanding of a different matter, etc. The word kāku¹ is derived from the verbal root kaka "to be greedy" (Dh. P. 1.90). The derivation from greediness is because a word by being enunciated in the expectant or non-expectant [tone] seeks for [i.e., is greedy for] a meaning over and above its ordinary sense. Or, the derivation may be from ku in the sense of "a little, slightly," with the substitution of kā for ku (by Pāñ. 6.3.105) [plus ku meaning earth or ground]. Thus, kāku is the "slight ground" by which we apprehend the matter that is in the speaker's heart. Now, the type of poetry where we "understand a different matter" by means of this "slight ground" belongs to the type of subordinated suggestion. The reason why it belongs to this type is that the suggested sense is here subordinated. By the phrase "the understanding of a different matter" the Kārikā is referring to a poem; it does not mean that the understanding itself is subordinated suggestion. Or, [one may say that] a poem is so described [viz., as
subordinated suggestion] because of the understanding [through kāku of some further sense subordinated to the poem’s literal sense].

Others explain that this variety [gunaḥāvataryāgya] occurs only when the sense suggested [by kāku] is subordinated,² saying that otherwise we should have dhvani proper. This is wrong, for when kāku is used, the suggestion that unfolds from it is always subordinate because it is touched upon (or revealed by) a word. This is because, as kāku is a particular property of a word, [the suggestion] which the kāku touches upon is merely aided (anugṛhiḥ) by it, just as the suggestions are aided by an [additional] word in “Thus did the Gopi once express a hint to Hari” (2.21d A), or “The subtle lass smiled and to show her meaning folded the petals of the lotus” (2.22a A).³ That is why, if we were to add kāku to the verse, “Go your rounds freely, pious monk,” that verse would become subordinated suggestion [rather than dhvani], for everyone would take its suggestion as hereby being made obvious.

They will be safe: The tones on the separate elements of this line: svasthāh, bhavanti, mayi jivati, Dhārtarāstrāh, are varied by being expectant, fiery, interrupted, high-pitched, rising, and falling.⁴ The tone touches upon the suggestion that the thing is impossible, that it is utterly wrong, and being aided by this suggestion transforms the denoted sense, now embellished by the suggestion, into a symptom of anger.⁵

So I am an adulteress: [Abhinava translates the Prakrit verse into Sanskrit and then comments:] “So I am an adulteress” has the tone of an admission but is expectant and spoken with ridicule. Come off it: as this is delivered with non-expectant tone, it carries a hint.⁶ Chaste wife: with fiery tone and a sneer. You have not sullied your character: in expectant and interrupted tone.⁷ But I am not like the wife of a somebody who is making love to a barber: that is, to an outcaste. This is delivered in non-expectant tone, interrupted and with ridicule. The whole stanza is addressed to a lady of good family but who is in love with a barber, by the speaker, whose adultery the lady had seen and ridiculed. The stanza furnishes ridicule in return. What is important in the stanza is the tone (kāku) in which it is spoken.

In order to show the subordination [of the suggestion] he proves first that it is touched by [i.e., forms an object of] the component words: [because it is] the direct force of the words, etc. But then, one may ask, how can the meaning be “suggested”?⁸ Anticipating this question, our author says, As the meaning is [obtained], etc. Next he shows that [this suggested meaning] is subordinate: [and when
we apprehend the meaning as following upon] the direct designation. The process of suggestion follows upon and is therefore subordinate to direct designation. As we apprehend [in cases of kāku] a direct meaning as qualified by a particular suggestion, it is assumed that the poem is revelatory of just that [viz., of a particular suggestion] and it takes its name [viz., the poetry of subordinated suggestion] from that. It follows that wherever we find kāku, we have subordinated suggestion. So those who would speak of a metonymy of reversed sense (*uparita-lakṣaṇā*) in such a line as “I will not crush in my anger a hundred Kauravas in battle” have not judged the matter properly. For we understand the negative here as being itself negated by force of the fiery, high-pitched, interrupted and expectant tone on na kopāt (“not ... in my anger”), which we apprehend at the very time that the words are pronounced and which is [placed on these words] because of [Bhīma’s] feeling that the peace policy pursued by Yuddhīṣṭhīra is insufferable. As none of the obstacles is here present, such as blocking of the primary meaning, which require resorting to metonymy, what chance is there for metonymy to come into play? In a Vedic phrase like “one must sacrifice on the *dārśa,*” as there is no other means available such as change of tone, there may well be metonymy by reversed sense. But enough on an incidental matter.

§ 3.38

1. In the commentary which now follows Abhinava combines the sense which kāku bears in the works of the Ālāṅkārikas (a change of voice indicative of some extra meaning) with the sense which it bears in Bhūṣṇa 17.102ff. To Bharata kāku is one of the properties of enunciation along with pitch, place of utterance, phonetic content and concatenation. Tone in general rather than change of tone seems to be what Bharata has in mind. He divides kāku into expectant (*sāpeksa*) and non-expectant (*nirapeksa*). As so used, “expectant” means an interrogative tone, “non-expectant” a declarative tone. These terms have a different sense in the grammatical literature; see *Mahābhāṣya* on 2.1.1. V. M. Kulkarni, *The Treatment of Intonation*, gives a useful summary of the views of later Ālāṅkārikas on kāku. But he says nothing of the varieties other than *sāpeksa* and *nirapeksa*, for which see note 4 below.

2. The normal meaning of the *Vṛtti*s phrase *guṇībhāve sati* would certainly be the sense given by these “others,” viz., so long as, or only where, there is subordination. But Abhinava has noticed that neither Kārikā nor Vṛtti ever gives an example of kāku functioning as predominant suggestion or dhvani. Accordingly, he interprets the phrase to mean “since there is subordination.” Thus by a dubious interpretation he improves on his author.

3. One must not push Abhinava’s analogy too far. All he means to do is to reinforce the
fact that the word on which käku is placed takes as object the very same suggestion that is unfolded by the käku. The käku does not, however, "give away" the suggestion in the way that the words salesam and arpitākütam give away the suggestions in his analogies. Without the words svasthāḥ, bhavanti, etc., we would not know at all to what the impossibility referred. In Abhinava's analogies on the other hand, the suggestion is already presented, at least to a trained audience, before the words salesam and arpitākütam are added.

4. Of these six adjectives we have already spoken of "expectant" in note 1 above. "Fiery" (dīpta) is what Bharata calls an ornament (BANŚ 17.113) by which he means a special type of tone. "Interrupted" (gadgada) is a term not used by Bharata; see note 7 below. "High-pitched" is a term for the top two notes of the scale (Abh. Vol. 2, p. 398, line 8 of commentary). "Rising" (dipana) and "falling" (prasāmmana) are types of concatenation (BhNŚ 17.130). What is meant by the last two terms refers probably to volume rather than pitch. How these varieties of tone are to be distributed among the words of the stanza, one will have to imagine as best one can, for Abhinava is silent on the matter.

5. The process as envisaged by Abhinava is this. The context of the sentence (its being spoken by Bhima, who hates the Dārtarāstras) suggests to us that the literal sense of the sentence is something impossible. The tone (with its particular varieties, pitch, and concatenations) strengthens this suggestion and so transforms the literal sense of the words "They will be safe, the Dārtarāstras, while I am alive," which is already embellished by the suggestion that this is something wrong or impossible, into the emotion anger. As anger (krodha) is the basic emotion (sthāyibhāva) of raudrarasa, the use of käku, although an instance of subordinated suggestion, leads ultimately to the highest poetic goal, rasa. 6. Any sort of käku carries a hint, but none of the commentators tells us what the hint may here be. Possibly the words hint at the angry argument that must have gone before. 7. Sagadgada usually refers to a voice interrupted by sobs. I suppose, though, that it here refers to interruption by laughter. It would then be a type of concatenation (anga).

8. One might think rather that the meaning is directly expressed. 9. For viparītalaksanā see Translation pp. 64, 85, 190, 580.

10. Venīśāṁhāra 1.17 (Madras), 1.15 (Poona). 11. One would expect darsē to mean on the day of the first seeing (from dṛś, to see) of the moon. The common opinion of the Śrutasūtras, however, is that one should perform the darsā sacrifice on the day of the dark of the moon (amāvasyām). Accordingly; various improbable explanations were found for taking darsē to mean amāvasyām. The present explanation, that darsā means its opposite, viz., the day on which the moon is not seen, is used by Kṣirasvāmin on AK 1.3.8. Dhūrtasvāmin on Āpastambha Śrutasūtra 1.1 says that the darsā is the day on which the moon is seen by the sages to be in conjunction with the sun. The Matsyapurāṇa, as quoted by Śabdakalpadruma s.v. darsā explains it as the day when the moon and sun see each other. 12. The incidental matter
is the interpretation of the Vedic \textit{darsa yajeta}. The distinction of kākvā 
\textit{guntībhūtavyanīga} from \textit{viparītalakṣaṇā} is pertinent and important.

\textit{K} And the sensitive reader should not assign the name of dhvani 
to that area which can reasonably be perceived as belonging to this 
[subordinated] variety [of suggestion].

\textit{A} For the paths of dhvani and of subordinated suggestion are 
sometimes found merged in a poem. That one of the two which has the 
benefit of reason should give its designation to the poem. One should 
not be unduly partial to dhvani in all cases. For example:

"With this, touch the moon in your husband's crest," 
was the laughing benediction spoken by her friend 
after lacquering her foot; to which Pārvatī 
said not a word but struck the girl with her garland.\footnote{[KumSam. 7.19]}

Or again:

Her lover, reaching her high flowers from a branch 
had called her by another woman's name. 
The lady stood, her eyes suffused with tears, 
saying nothing, scratching with her foot the earth.\footnote{[Kirātārjuniya 8.14]}

In both stanzas, as the phrases "without a word" and "saying nothing" appear by their negatives to denote to some extent the suggestion 
furnished by the remainder of the stanza, it seems best to take the 
suggestion as subordinated. It is when the suggested meaning appears 
as the sentence meaning without any indirect statement [to the same 
effect]\footnote{[KumSam. 7.19]}
that we can speak of that [meaning] as predominant, as in 
"While the heavenly visitor was speaking."\footnote{[KumSam. 7.19]} But here there is a literal 
statement, at least in an indirect way (bhanīgā), so the literal statement also is important (literally, "predominant"). Accordingly, 
we should not designate these stanzas as dhvani of the type where 
the [literal sense is subordinated to a] suggestion [which] resembles a reverberation.\footnote{[KumSam. 7.19]}

\[ \textit{KumSam. 7.19} \]
1. Pârvati's attendant friend is decking her for her wedding to Śiva. Abhinava will point out the suggestions. The flowers had grown too high for the lady to reach. For references in Sanskrit poetry to the reaction of a woman to being addressed by another woman's name, see Ingalls, An Anthology, Intro. to Sect. 21, Para. 5. The lady is here hurt but too proud to remark on the error. Scratching the ground with the toe is often given as a symptom of sadness; cf. BhāgP. 3.23.50, 10.29.29. 2. Two of the NS MSS read tasmād yatroktam vinā in place of yadā vaktroktim vinā and their reading is accepted by Jacobi and Badarināth Śarmā. But it is easier to see how the latter reading with its unusual use of vaktroktim might have been changed into the former than vice versa. Furthermore, vaktroktim is just the right expression, for it is not a question here of what is clearly an ukti, but of what is indirectly (vakrena) or indistinctly an ukti. 3. KumSam. 6.84; see above, 2.22.A. 5. See 3.1 K.

Our author now distinguishes an area where there is a mixture of the characteristics of dhvani and of gunibhūtasyaṅgya: And the sensitive reader should not, etc. In saying reasonably, he means by reason of apprehending [a greater] beauty.1 With this, etc.: Her friend says, With this, [may you touch the moon], etc., for the moon will attain a greater beauty by being tinged with lacquer; and by this she instructs the bride not to give in straightway to what her husband will desire but to do so only after he has placated her by frequent obeisance at her feet. The crescent of the moon is borne on Śiva's head. By praying that she conquer it, the suggestion is that she will overcome her fellow wives.2

Without a word [she struck the girl]: Although this [action] suggests such things as shyness, bashful concealment of emotion, joy, anger, fear, pride of beauty, still these suggestions act only to supplement the meaning directly expressed by "without a word," namely the lack, appropriate to maidens, of a ready reply. It is the [direct] meaning as supplemented by these suggestions that goes toward forming the śīṅgārārasa.

Her lover, etc.: By high flowers the poet means those which the lady could not reach herself and so had asked him to pick. But my teacher3 has said that uccaiḥ [does not go with the word kusumānī, "flowers," but] means "in a high or loud voice." Her lover had said, "These are beautiful flowers, so-and-so, take them, take them," and calling thus in a high voice had presented them to her with a great
show of honor. And that is why the poet says that she was lambhitā, made to receive or suffer [the other woman’s name].

Saying nothing: The suggestion [of the stanza] that it would not be proper for the lady to show her hurt pride at his remembering another beloved on such an amorous occasion and that this [reticence] adds to her burden of grief, simply beautifies the direct statement which negates her speaking. This is what our author will say in here there is a literal statement, at least in an indirect way.

Of that: he means, of that suggested meaning. But here: he means, in the verse “With this, touch the moon,” etc. The word also should be taken as out of order, [i.e., it goes with “predominant” rather than with “statement”]. He means that the direct statement is predominant in and by itself, while remaining subordinate with respect to the rasa, etc., which is developed. That is why he specifies, in the last sentence of his comment, that the dhvani from which it differs is a resemblance to reverberation.4

1. That is, if he judges the direct statement to furnish a greater beauty, he will designate the passage as subordinated suggestion; if the suggestion strikes him as more beautiful, he will call it dhvani. 2. This is a more tasteful interpretation, and I think more in accord with Kālidāsa’s intent, than that of Mallinātha, who sees in the benediction only a reference to the sexual gymnastics soon to be practised by the newlyweds. 3. The reference is probably to Bhaṭṭendurāja, but could be to Bhaṭṭatauta. This is the only passage in the Locana where Abhinava seems to favor an interpretation that we are told is different from that of his teacher. The teacher’s interpretation here seems to me ridiculous, but it was followed by Mallinātha. 4. It is doubtful if such was Ānanda’s intention. He probably meant no more than that in cases like these the literal statement is as important as the suggestions, and that it is therefore to our aesthetic judgment to decide which is the more beautiful; on that basis we are to apply the designation dhvani or gunībhūtavyāṇīga. The only reason he specifies anuraṇanarūpavyāṇīga is that that is the type of dhvani to which one would assign the stanzas if one regarded the suggestion as predominant. They would then be placed in the same category with the stanza, “While the heavenly visitor was speaking” (2.22 A). But by taking the word prādhānyam literally and shifting the position of api Abhinava allows the two stanzas quoted in this section to qualify more logically as rasadhvani (see the next Kārikā), for although the literal meaning is predominant over the suggested, it is subordinate to an immediate (asamlaksyakrama as opposed to anuraṇanarūpavyāṇīga) realization of śṛiṅgārārāsa.
This type of poetry also, where the suggestion is subordinated, may take on the nature of dhvani when regarded from the viewpoint of its final meaning, if that meaning is a rasa, etc.

Even the type of poetry where the suggestion is subordinated may again turn into dhvani when regarded from the viewpoint of rasa, or dhāva, etc., furnished by the sentence meaning. Such is the case in the two stanzas just quoted, as also in:

"Rādhā is hard to please, most favored sir, since her tears have been falling even as you dry them with that skirt from your beloved's loins. Women are hard-hearted, and so enough: leave off your blandishments." May Hari, so reproved in his solicitations, bring you wellfare.¹

Such being the case, one may say of the words in the stanza "It is already a humiliation" (cf. 3.16 A) that although they furnish a literal sense qualified by [subordinated] suggestions, they are suggestive [just like dhvani] with respect to the rasa that forms the ultimate meaning of their sentence. One should not mistake them for furnishing that type of dhvani where the literal meaning is shifted to some other sense,² because the words here preserve their literal sense. In them we apprehend a denoted meaning as qualified by suggested meanings, not as altered into a suggested meaning. Accordingly, the sentence as a whole is an instance of dhvani; the words are instances of subordinated suggestion. And it is not only words containing subordinated suggestion that may reveal alaksyakramavyaṅgyadhvani (that type of dhvani where the passage to the suggested sense is imperceptible). Words instancing a type of dhvani where the literal meaning is shifted to another sense may likewise reveal it.³ For example, in that same stanza the word Rāvana is of this other type and is similarly revelatory. But where the final meaning of the sentence is not a rasa, although the individual words may
suggest it, one can only say that subordinated suggestion is a property of the group of words. Examples are such verses as the following:

They serve even kings,
they enjoy even sense-obj
and they love women:
men must indeed be clever creatures!

One should devote great care to distinguishing the predominant and the subordinate among the literal and suggested meanings in order to recognize clearly the true areas of dhvani, subordinated suggestion, and the figures of speech. Otherwise, one will fall into confusion over the areas of even well-known figures of speech. For instance, take the following stanza:

He reckoned not expense of beauty's substance
nor the infinite pains that he employed;
nor did he stick at firing the hearts of men
who heretofore had dwelt without constraint.
And yet, poor lady, she's undone
from lack of lover matched in quality.
What purpose had the Creator
in making the body of this slender maid?

There is a commentator who has interpreted this stanza as containing the figure trick praise, but this is not sound, for it does not fit well to have what is said here end up as no more than a figure of speech. In the first place these cannot be the words of a lover, for the words, “poor lady, she’s undone from lack of lover matched in quality” would be impossible for such a speaker. Next, they cannot be spoken by an ascetic, for his whole way of life would be opposed to such notions. Furthermore, the stanza is not reported to come from any larger work, by which we might imagine a meaning pertinent to its context. Accordingly, it must be an allegory (aprastutapraśamsā), for by the subordination of the literal sense there appears [the suggestion] of a lament by a man puffed up with pride in his uncommon talents, on seeing that others fail to recognize his qualities because he has fired their jealousy by the degree of his brilliance. What is more, the verse is commonly ascribed to Dharmākūrti and this is just as one might expect, for in this other stanza he reveals the same intention.
My philosophy, into which the brightest minds
have not trusted themselves to plunge,
of which the ultimate truth has not been s
by their greatest effort, has failed to find i
a philosopher worthy of its challenge:
it will grow old within myself like the unplumbed
waters of the sea within the sea.

[DHARMAKRITA]10

1. Hari (Krishna) has returned from some other amour to find his Râdhrâ weeping. He tries to appease her, wiping away her tears with his skirt, without realizing that on arising from his recent bout of love he had donned the skirt of the girl with whom he had been lying. In a culture where men and women wore skirts of similar cut, such confusions did not seem improbable. They figure not seldom in Sanskrit erotic poetry; see SRK 847 and Subhâ. 1441, 1442, 1443. The stanza here is in the form of a benediction, to which a rasa (rasavadalarâkâra) is subordinate, as in “The women of the Triple City.” Ānanda and Abhinava are not concerned, however, about the relation between the rasavadalarâkâra and the ultimate meaning of the verse (viz., a vastudhvani of the loveableness of Krishna and thence the rasa of the poet’s love of God). They are concerned rather with the relation of the suggestions of the individual words to the rasa of the rasavadalarâkâra. This rasa is the flavor of love-in-separation, where the separation is caused by jealousy (IRSâVIPRAKâMBHAGâRâ). It is primarily suggested by the literal sense of Râdhâ’s words taken as a whole, but is helped out by the subordinated suggestions of the individual words. These subordinated suggestions are enumerated by Abhinava in his comment. Ānanda will point out that the relation between these two sorts of suggestion, i.e., between the gunâbhûtavyânga of the individual words and the rasadhvani of the sentence, is the same as in the stanza “It is already a humiliation” (3.16 A). 2. That is to say, the stanza does not exemplify the arthântarasamkrâmitavâcya variety of avivakshitaavâcya-dhvani, for which see 2.1. 3. The sentence is awkward in Sanskrit because of the repetition vyanâga, vyanâja, vyanâjakâni, and more awkward still in English. What Ānanda means is this. Not only words containing a subordinate suggestion, such as me yad arayah, tatrâpy asau tâpasah, etc., but also words containing dvani, such as “Râvana” (for “Râvana” here is an instance of arthântarasamkrâmitavâcya, which has been categorized as a type of dvani), are capable of embellishing the literal sense and so leading ultimately to rasadhvani. 4. In such cases the subordinated suggestions do not qualify or embellish the literal meaning so that it may lead on to rasa. 5. The suggestions are that it is impossible to do these things without receiving the opposite of what one seeks. Accordingly, Abhinava claims that
one apprehends from the stanza nirveda, indifference to worldly things which is the basic emotion of the rasa of peace. But the chief charm (camatkāra) of the stanza lies not in the rasa but in the neat presentation of the literal meaning. We have not been able to trace the source of the stanza. In the second pāda the reading of the Kashi text (viṣam apya upayunjate) makes nonsense. Viṣam apy upabhunjate, found in one NS MS, is not much better.

J. M. has suggested the emendation which we here translate: viṣayam api bhunjate. It is clear that Abhinava read two occurrences of api in the stanza.

6. Ānanda (see below) believed the stanza to be by Dharmakīrti. It is ascribed to Dharmakīrti by the anthologies: SRK 454, Subhā. 1472, SubhM. 50.9, and by Kṣemendra, Aucityavāricāracarā 11. In most of the quotations the stanza is regarded as simply referring to a young woman. Such was clearly Kṣemendra’s opinion, while the anthologies always place the stanza under the category of women or young women. Ānanda and Abhinava, and much later Appayya Diksita (Kuvalayānanda 72) take it as an allegory. Their arguments in favor of allegory are set forth in what follows.

7. That is to say, by appearing to censure the lady through censure of her creator, one is made aware of the extraordinary beauty of which she is possessed.

8. For trick praise (vyāja-stuts) a knowledge of the context is indispensable. But for aprastutaprasaṁśad when it is used in an isolated stanza (a muktaka), a knowledge of the context is not necessary, as, in fact, there is no context in the case of such stanzas.

9. “For by the subordination of the literal sense there appears a suggestion” (vācyena ृष्टंबूहत्मानः). This phrase explains the pertinence of Ānanda’s exemplar stanza, which has been questioned. It was quoted to illustrate the importance of distinguishing which is predominant and which subordinate among the literal and suggested meanings, so that one will not confuse the areas even of well known figures of speech. Now in aprastutaprasaṁśad of the fifth type (where like suggests like, i.e., allegory) Ānanda has said (1.13 j A) that we may have either dhvani (where the literal is subordinate) or a mere figure of speech (where the literal is predominant). In the exemplar stanza the literal is subordinate, so we have a case of dhvani. On the other hand, in trick praise Abhinava has said (1.13 k L, which doubtless reflects correctly Ānanda’s view) that the literal meaning is merely embellished by (i.e., not subordinate to) the suggestion. Thus it is a mere figure of speech. So if we take the view of Ānanda’s opponent, the exemplar stanza will be merely a figure of speech, while if we take Ānanda’s view, it will constitute dhvani. This distinction is not made by Mammata, according to whose categories both trick praise and allegory are instances of the type of suggestion which he calls vācyasiddhyāgavyayaigya (Mammata 5.126–127, a suggestion which is necessary in order to make sense of the literal). If one follows Mammata’s categories, one will suppose that Ānanda has chosen an impertinent example.

10. Quoted in K. Anu., Viveka 553. Other laments of Dharmakīrti on the lack of understanding shown for his works will be found in SRK 1726, 1729.
Carrying this line of argument to its conclusion, he brings into full light the doctrine that dhvani is the soul of poetry: This type of poetry, etc.

The two stanzas: he means in the two stanzas of similar color, "With this, touch the moon," etc., and ["Her lover, reaching," etc.]. By the word "two" he excludes the stanza "While the heavenly visitor was speaking."

Rādhā is hard to please: Rādhā had become angry without reason. Her lover had fallen at her feet and said to her, "You will not forgive me. Ah, you are hard to please. Do not weep." And now he wipes away her tears. This is her speech, admitting that she is unappeasable. Much favored sir: this suggests "since your other sweetheart cannot part with you for a moment without leaving you with some ornament from your intercourse." With that skirt: she means, "Just look at it, that skirt, which you so prize that without any shame you are wearing it." As you dried them: from this we see that the tears are falling in a thousand streams. And your heart is so far gone that you forget me and are thinking of her, that she is angry. Otherwise you would not act as you are acting. Have been falling: the sense is that the time for my weeping is now past. And if you ask why I do not give up my anger with your showing me so much honor, the answer is that women's hearts are hard. The word "women" here refers to the mere object without any connection with love; and such is its nature. As applied to herself, the words suggest that the phrase "young women are tenderhearted" is nonsense. Their heart must be harder than a diamond if it doesn't break into a thousand pieces at a discovery of this sort. Blandishments: which you use only out of politeness. Solicitations: the plural suggests that this lover of many women must assume this posture time and again, that he is extremely well favored in love.

Such in essence are the suggestions which ornament [and so are subordinated to] the denoted sense of the words. But the denoted sense so ornamented becomes itself a component of [and so subordinated to] the true rasa of love in separation in its variety of jealousy.

As for a commentator who has explained that in these three stanzas the suggested senses [of the individual words] are a component of rasa, he has sold the image of the god to get enough money for its festival; because at this rate the subordination of suggestion [to the literal sense], which is the matter under discussion, would be wholly
destroyed. For in the case of a suggested meaning other than a rasa, etc., [i.e., in the cases of vastudhvani and alankāradhvani], the suggestion's being a component of rasa, just that and nothing else, makes it predominant [over the literal meaning]. But enough of arguing with an older member of my family.1

Such being the case: the sense is, since a difference has been established between dhvani and subordinated suggestion in the manner just stated. Then, to explain the word "also" in the Kārikā, our author says, And it is not only, etc. The stanza [to which he is referring, namely, "It is already a humiliation," etc.] has been quoted before, so he does not here write it out in full.

But where, etc.: although we apprehend here [viz., in the stanza, "They serve even kings," etc.] the rasa of peace, which is identifiable with a disinterest in worldly things, the charm of the stanza lies in the literal sense. The suggestions, namely that the actions [expressed in the stanza] are impossible or bring about the opposite [of what one intends], merely follow along with the literal.2 They are already touched upon [i.e., prematurely revealed] by the two words "even," of which each is to be doubly construed,3 by the word "and," which construes with three clauses,4 by the word "indeed," which is doubly construed [with "clever" and with "men"], and by the word "men."5 And so these suggestions are subordinated. Our author shows that a consideration of this distinction [between dhvani and subordinated suggestion] is not without use: One should devote great care, etc.

And the figures of speech: Where there is no suggested element at all, the predominance is of pure figures of speech. Otherwise: that is, if one does not make an effort. The force of the word even is this, that all the more surely is there ground for confusion in the type of suggestion to which he has just referred.

By the word substance is suggested that it was his most precious wealth, which had been useful to him in many creations.6 He reckoned not: on the other hand, one who spends his wealth slowly and not in a flash like lightning does of necessity reckon it. But the Creator, although he had been at work for endless years, used no consideration at all. Thus God showed no forethought. . . . And so the poet speaks of infinite pains. Who had dwelt without constraint: that is, unchained [by desire]. And yet, she: the words "and yet" (api and eva) suggest that it is a great crime to destroy the very thing one has created. What purpose: the sense is none, for himself, for the world, and for what he had created.
For such a speaker: For a lover the expressions "poor lady" and "she's undone" would be unseemly, the first because it would contain disparagement, the second because it would be inauspicious; while the words from lack of lover matched in quality would cast unseemly aspersion upon himself. If he could not find the possibility of that role in himself, he would be no better than an animal to keep on loving her.

To this argument, however, there are possible objections. Why should these not be the words of a lover who has for some reason undertaken a vow of abstinence for some time, or who might be like Rāvana with respect to Sītā, or who might be like Dusyanta with respect to Śakuntalā before he knew to what caste she belonged; in which case the words could admit of a pride in his own qualifications as a lover and of his praise of the lady. Neither are the words impossible for an ascetic, who might see the lady, although with impartiality, as she really is through the influence of his memory of passion experienced from the endless span of his former births. After all, he who has put aside passion does not see things topsy turvy. The notes of a lyre do not sound to him like the cawing of a crow. Accordingly, if the stanza is taken to be about the subject which it states, the words would be possible for either [lover or ascetic]. If you take it as an allegory, you must show that the unintended subject [the matter actually stated] is something possible [of the intended matter]. For one cannot have an allegory about light that says, "Ah, curses on you for your blackness." As the allegory (aprastutapraśamsā) is dependent on the stated matter, there must be nothing in that matter which is impossible [in the allegory].

With these objections in mind our author states: Furthermore, the stanza is not, etc. By the four sentence-elements niḥsāmānya (uncommon), nijamahimā (his brilliance), viśeṣajñāna [napaśyataḥ] ([seeing that others fail] to recognize his qualities), and paridevitam (a lament), our author explains the [suggested] meaning of each successive line in the stanza. But what proof is there of this interpretation? Our author proceeds to answer the question: What is more, etc. But the objector may say, what if the stanza is [commonly ascribed to Dharmakīrti]? With this in mind, our author shows how the meaning furnished by a verse indubitably written by Dharmakīrti agrees with the meaning of this stanza: and this is just as one might suspect.

In which they have not trusted themselves to plunge: how much less have they really acquired it! The ultimate truth, beyond even such precious objects as the Kaustubha jewel, has not been received. Has failed to find: has not obtained, despite [my] strenuous efforts, a
pratigrāhaka (one who understands in return for being taught) worthy of it, just as the sea has not found a worthy counter-creature [prati-grāha] to any of its sea-born beings such as Airāvata, Ucchajīravas, and Dhanvantari.\textsuperscript{10}

The very same notion: he means, a lament. The literal sense so far [in the two stanzas just adduced] shows two figures of speech, allegory [in the stanza "He reckoned not expence," etc.] and simile [in the stanza "My philosophy," etc.]. But [in the case of the prior stanza], immediately after [apprehending the figure of speech], one becomes filled with amazement at the speaker himself, and so the aesthetic sense [of the reader] comes to rest in the \textit{rasa} of wonder. Of the second stanza one should judge thus: that its point of rest is the \textit{rasa} of heroism, for it touches on a moral hero (\textit{dharma-vīra}) by its showing the benevolence of the speaker when one thinks that such [a philosophy], which is of great benefit by its producing heroic energy in the hearer because of its awesome reputation and the fact that it can be understood only with difficulty, has been made to favor a few select persons.\textsuperscript{11} Otherwise, what would a mere lament amount to? If you claim that he is informing us that he acted without thinking of the consequences, what would that prove, as such a lament could be of no use either to himself or to others? So enough of the matter.

1. What Abhinava objects to in his older relative's interpretation of the stanza is that the \textit{Candrīka}, the commentary written by this older relative, made the individual word meanings directly subordinate to the \textit{rasa}, instead of directly subordinate to the sentence meaning which furnishes the \textit{rasa}. 2. Compare 1.13 A (Summary Verses 1 and 2). 3. Abhinava would interpret the literal sense as: "They even go into service and they even serve kings; they even enjoy and they enjoy even sense-objects." This sense by itself goes a good way toward expressing the difficulty or impossibility of what men do. 4. The literal sense by its accumulation of three activities shows the difficulty of what men do. 5. That men (the word denotes a being who is not super-human) should do these difficult or impossible things implies in itself without any need for suggestion that they will not attain their object. 6. That is to say, the Creator had been drawing on his stock frugally whenever he wished to make a beautiful creature. 7. Thus, "Curses on your blackness" could serve as the \textit{aprastutārtha} only in an allegory where the \textit{prastutārtha} was some such object as a villain, a false doctrine, etc. 8. Each successive line is given by a couplet of lines in the English translation. 9. Abhinava is continuing the suggestion thrown out by plunging or diving. The Kaustubha jewel was one of the precious objects hidden in the ocean.
10. Abhinava sees a play on words in *pratigrāhaka*, thus concluding the oceanic suggestions with which the stanza begins. The three creatures named were respectively the elephant, horse, and physician, among the precious objects churned up from the sea by the gods. 11. Abhinava has two reasons in mind for assigning the final effect of the stanza "My philosophy," etc., to *vīramā*. (1) The stanza shows Dharmakīrti to have been a *dharmavīra* in composing a work so beneficial to others. (2) His philosophy rouses heroic energy (*utsāha*, which is the *sthānyibhāva* of *vīramā*) in its hearers. The syntax by which he joins the two reasons is awkward.

A And there are three ways of writing an *aprastutapraśamsā* (here = allegory). Sometimes the literal sense is intended by the speaker, sometimes not intended,1 sometimes partly intended and partly unintended. Of these an example where the literal is intended is this:

It suffers pressure for others' sake; is sweet when broken;
even in altered state it is prized by all.
What if it fails to grow if cast on barren land:
is this the fault of the sugar cane or of the hostile desert?
[Bhallata-sataka 56]²

Another is my own verse:

These things which seem so beautiful achieve
their purpose surely by becoming objects,
if but for one brief moment, of the eye:
that eye, which in a world devoid of light
has now become the equal, or less, alas,
than equal, of the body's other parts.³

In these two stanzas the sugar cane and the eye, although intended in the literal sense,⁴ are not the subjects that the poet has in mind. What he does have in mind is through the final meaning to describe a man of great virtue who has not received high reward because he has fallen into the wrong situation.
An example where the literal sense is unintended is:

"Who are you, sir?" "I will say it; I am a thorn tree brought to misery by fate."
"You speak as if disgusted with the world."
"You've guessed aright." "But why do you speak thus?"
"You see that banyan on the left, which every traveler honors with attendance?
I too stand by the wayside, but to help a guest I have not even shade to offer."

As questions and answers with a species of tree are impossible, the literal sense is unintended and we understand the final meaning of this stanza to be the lament of some poor man of intelligence in the presence of an evil man who is rich.

An example where the literal sense is [partly] intended and [partly] unintended is this:

For putting a fence around this badari
that grows in an out of the way spot,
is ugly, and lacks flower, leaf, and fruit,
every one, O peasant, will laugh at you.

In this stanza the literal meaning is not wholly possible nor is it possible.

Accordingly, one should note with care whether the literal and the suggested senses of a verse are predominant or subordinate.

1. By "intended" Ánanda means inherently possible. 2. The stanza was quoted under 1.14 A, which see together with note 6 thereon. 3. This stanza also is in Bhallata as number 68. As remarked above (1.14 A, note 6), the Bhallataśataka is an anthology drawn from many authors. The allegory is this. A great poet, like a man's eye, can reveal the beauty of the world. But if he lacks a patron, or an audience, his activity is of no more use, in fact of even less use, than that of any other man. 4. Since what is said of them is inherently possible. 5. The verse is frequently quoted but without ascription of author: Sārīg. 1046, Subh. A. 822, Dhanika on DR 4.9, Mammata 10.99 (verse 447), Kuv. ad 67. 6. This anonymous Prakrit stanza is given by Hemacandra. Alankāracūdāmani 546 (KAnu. p. 360), together with a word for word repetition of Ánanda's and most of Abhinava's comments. The badari (Zizyphus jujuba, Hindi ber) is a thorn tree, which in favorable circumstances produces a small, edible but rather tasteless fruit. The literal sense of the stanza is certainly possible, but Ánanda apparently considered it improbable that a peasant would do anything so foolish. Hence he regards the literal
sense as intended and unintended. The suggestion, for which see \( L \) below, arises from the fact that the word \textit{badari} is feminine.

\( L \) Now it may be objected that we may well choose an allegorical interpretation where the literal sense will not fit, but here [in the stanza “He reckoned not expense,” etc.] the literal sense fits. With this in mind, our author shows that we may have allegory even when the literal sense does fit. To show it, he begins: And there are three ways, etc.

[These things which seem surely: the poet means those things by which the world is beautified. The construction [of what follows] is: that eye, of which these things, having become for a moment the object, attain their purpose. Devoid of light: devoid of discrimination. Less than equal: for the hand is still useful for touching or taking things. Other parts: he means even those which are most useless. The compound \textit{apr\=aptaparabh\=agasya} is to be analysed as: of a man by whom high, that is, outstanding, reward—in the form of receiving wealth or of becoming famous—has not been received.

I will say it, etc.: this is the reply. The suggestion is this: that I really should not tell you, for it will distress you to hear it; but if you insist, I will say it. As if disgusted: the disgust is suggested by the tone of voice and by the words “brought to misery by fate.” You’ve guessed aright: this is the second reply. Why: the question is as to the cause of disgust. [Why do you] speak thus: [the suggestion is that] the answers began with a painful recollection and that what was stated was stated with difficulty. On the left: the sense is that it is characterized by such faults as inferior birth. Banyan: a tree which is proud simply because of its shade, although it is devoid of fruit or flower. Even shade: because the \textit{sak\=hotaka} thorn-tree [as it grows in burning-grounds] has its branches and leaves scorched by the funeral fires.

Our author states the reason why the literal sense is not intended here: as questions and answers are impossible.

An evil man (\textit{asatpuru\=sa}) who is rich: If one takes the reading \textit{satpuru\=sa}, one will have to understand the meaning to be a man who is good so far as mere wealth goes but not good in virtue.

Is not entirely: We cannot say that there is no basis for the existence of the literal sense, because the suggested sense [which is just as improbable] does exist. Thus, where it is said that the tree “grows in
an out of the way spot," [it is suggested that] the woman is not born of a good family. That it is ugly [suggests that] she lacks charm. It is said that the tree lacks fruit, flowers, and leaves. This suggests that even a woman of this sort [i.e., low-born and ugly] might be protected if she had sons, or if, through her brothers, etc., she had a group of relatives to care for her. O peasant, by putting a fence around this bādārī you will be laughed at by everyone; this is the sense.

Having thus described the figure of allegory (aprastutapraśamsā) since the occasion presented itself [in connection with the verse "He reckoned not expense," etc.], he now sums up the matter that was at issue: Accordingly. The sense is: because we see that people are confused in regard to the figure of allegory in the stanza "He reckoned not expense," etc.

1. The pratika seems to be wrongly given. One wants "ami ye drṣyanta iti" in place of "nanv iti." 2. Of the recorded manuscripts none has this reading. 3. I am uncertain of the translation of this sentence. The double nāsti in our text is surely a printer's error of dittography. K.M. reads vācy eva niyamo nāsti; the Vidyabhavan edition reads vācyabhāvaniyamo nāstiḥ. J. Masson would emend to vācyabhāvaniyamo 'sti nāstiḥ. Patwardhan would omit the whole phrase, as it is absent in Hemacandra (see above, 3.40 a A, note 6). If we keep it, as I (D.I.) have done, there is a question of what Abhinava can mean. In all cases of aprastutapraśamsā there is a suggested meaning. In itself this does not rule out the literal meaning as being intended also. It seems to me, therefore, that he should mean that the literal meaning is improbable, but no more improbable than the suggested meaning. That is why the verse is not "wholly possible or impossible." It may be that some lines have dropped out of the text, as there is no other Prakrit verse in the book where Abhinava fails to give a chāyā.

§ 3.41-42 K

By reference to the predominance or subordination of the suggested meaning the two types of poetry have thus been assigned their places. What is other than these is called citra (display).¹ Citra is assigned to two types depending on word and meaning. Of it one type is verbal citra; the other is semantic citra.
Where the suggested meaning is predominant we have the type of poetry called dhvani; where it is subordinate, we have gunibhútavanyāga (the poetry of subordinated suggestion). That which is different from these, namely poetry which lacks rasa or an emotion (bhāva) as its final meaning, which lacks the power to reveal any particular suggested meaning, which is composed only by relying on novelties of literal sense and expression, and which gives the appearance of a picture, is citra. It is not real poetry (just as a picture is not the real thing), for it is an imitation of poetry. One type of this citra is verbal citra, such as difficult arrangements,1 yamakas (echo alliterations),2 and the like. Semantic citra differs from verbal citra and may be exemplified by poetic fancy (utpreksā) and such figures, when they carry no suggested sense and lack any final meaning of rasa, etc. because of predominance of the literal meaning.

But what is this thing called citra, where there is no touch of a suggested meaning? For suggested meaning has already been shown to be of three sorts. Now we may let the word citra apply to that case where there is no suggestion of a thing (or situation) or of a figure of speech. But where there is no reference to the rasas, etc., there cannot be any type of poetry at all. Because poetry cannot be about nothing; and everything in the world necessarily becomes a constituent of a rasa or a bhāva, if only by its ultimately being a determinant (vibhāva) thereof. This is because the rasas are particular states of mind and there is nothing that does not produce some state of mind. If there were, it would not be in the area of poetry. And here you have described a certain area of poetry as being citra.

1. See 2.15 L, note 1. It is doubtless from these difficult pictorial arrangements (citrabandha) rather than from the factitious nature of pictures that the term citra actually originated. Stanzas were arranged in the shape of swords, drums, wheels, etc. Examples may be found in Ânandavardhana’s Deviśatakam, in Kirātārjunīyā, canto 15, and in Māgha’s canto 19. Similar tricks may be found in Greek in the Anthologia Palatina, Book 15, where they are known as technopaignia. What characterizes the citrabandha is an interlocking of the syllables which outline the various parts of the object represented. It is therefore difficult to compose. English pictorial verses, sometimes called topiary verses, usually depend for their effect on typographical arrangement. They
may be amusing, like the tale (tail) of a mouse in Alice in Wonderland, but they are not difficult to compose. 2. See 2.15 L, note 1.

§ 3.41-42 L

Having thus described the nature of suggestion, what is there to say of passages that entirely lack it? To treat of this subject we are given two Kārikās: By reference to the predominance, etc.

Verbal citra: this is well known as containing such pictorial effects as yamaka, cakrabandha,1 etc. Semantic citra may be conceived as similar [in lack of suggestion, etc.]. This is what he means. The appearance of a picture: that is, it lacks the vitality of the rasas and is like the imitation of a real thing.

But what is this thing: viz., this notion that is about to be stated in the objection. The question is answered [i.e., the reprehended notion is given] by the words: where there is no touch, etc. The objector gives his own opinion in the words: For suggested meaning, etc.

About nothing: he means that poetry cannot be nonsense, like the string of syllables ka-ca-ṭa-ta-pa, or meaningless from lack of syntax, like "ten pomegranates, six pancakes." etc.2

An objector now anticipates an explanation, viz., that citra may very well not be within the area of poetry: [And you have described] a certain area of poetry, etc. He means that although citra has not been directly identified as poetry, the author must still admit that it falls in the scope of poetry because it would be as out of place to speak of anything other than poetry here as it would be to tell stories of Vāsuki.3 Now if it does lie within a poet's scope, it must give rise to delight and that ends up as simply the vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicāribhāvas.4

1. A stanza written in the form of a wheel. An example is Śiśupāla 19.120, where the first three lines, each divided in half, may be written as six spokes, and the fourth line as the rim, of a wheel. It follows that every fourth syllable of the rim must form the initial syllable of one of the spokes, while the hub consists of the common central syllable of the first three lines. 2. See 1.4 b L, note 10. 3. Vāsuki, the king of snakes, lives in the nether world. Hence his adventures are taken as an example of that which has no pertinence to the matter of this world which the author has in hand. 4. For it is the combination of these factors that furnishes rasa, the sole source of aesthetic delight.
A To this we may say the following. It is true that there is no species of poetry where there is no apprehension of the rasas, etc. When, however, a poet, having no intention of revealing by his words a rasa, or bhāva, etc., composes mere figures of sound and sense, we may regard his composition from the viewpoint of his intention as being without rasa, etc. For the meaning of the words in a poem is greatly strengthened by the author’s intention. By force of the inherent capability of the literal sense there may be an apprehension of rasa, even though the author had no intention of revealing it; but that apprehension will be very weak. In this way too we may regard such a composition as without rasa¹ and so assign it to the area of citra.

The matter is stated as follows:

That is the area of citra where the author’s intent is not to write on the subject of rasas or bhāvas, etc., but to compose figures of speech.

But when the intention of the author, as the final sense of his composition, is the rasas, etc., one may say that there is no poetry that is not in the sphere of dhvani.²

We have set up this citra from our observing the way in which some poets of unconstrained speech have gone about the writing of poetry without regard to making the rasas, etc., their final meaning. But for modern poets, now that correct guide rules are being established, there is no sort of poetry other than dhvani. For the performance of mature poets has no beauty unless its final goal is the rasas, etc. When the rasas, etc., are the final goal, there is nothing that can be brought into connection with the intended rasa which does not gain in beauty thereby. There is even no insentient thing which cannot, either through its forming, as each case may require, some contextual factor (vibhāva), or by one’s ascribing to it a sentient activity, be brought into connection with a rasa. And so it is said:
In poetry’s endless worlds
the poet alone is God;
the universe revolves
according to his nod.

If the poet writes of love,
the world assumes its flavor;
if he becomes dispassionate,
all things lose their savor.

A true poet may treat unliving t
as living, and living as unliving;
his wish sole master of all properti
by his withdrawal or his giving.3

1. One of the meanings listed for the negative in Sanskrit is “very little.”
The meanings are fisted in the following verse: sādrṣyam tadabhāvaś ca tadd-
anyatvam tadalpatā / aprāṣāstyam virodhas ca nañarthāh sāt prakāṣītāh //
The Mahābhāṣya on 1.4.24, Vārt. 3 (Kielhorn 1.327.20) gives as examples of
the negative used in the sense of very little alomikaidikā (a goat with no hair,
that is with very little hair), anudarā kanyā (a young girl with no belly, that
is with a slender belly). See also Mallinātha on KumSam. 4.33. 2. Abhin-
ava attributes these two verses to the author of the Vṛtti. 3. These verses
too are doubtless by Ānanda. Abhinava quotes the second stanza in ABh
Vol. 1, p. 294, specifically attributing it to Ānandavardhana. The first two
stanzas are quoted, without attribution, by Agnipūrṇa 339.10–11; see Kane
HSP pp. 7–8 and Raghavan, Bhoja’s ŠP, pp. 479–80.

L When, however: he means, when an author does not apply
the sort of circumspection in introducing figures of speech that was spo­
ken of in the verse: “The intention must be to keep them subordinate
and never acting as the chief element,” etc. (2.18 K).

As being without rasa: he means, that one will find no taste
(rasa) in it, as in a meat dish concocted by a cook ignorant of the
culinary art. Here it might be objected that from the beauty of the
thing itself there must be some relish of it, just as there is of a si-
kharṇī,1 even if prepared by one without skill. With this in mind, our
author says, By force of the inherent capability of the literal
sense, etc.

In this way too: Previously he had been speaking of a complete
lack; now he is speaking of a weakness of rasa. Such is the sense given
by the word “too” (api). Furthermore, if a sikharinī has been prepared by one who is ignorant, there will be persons who will not exclaim in wonder at his art, “Ah, what a sikharinī,” but who will say, “This is an unpleasant mixture of curds, sugar, and pepper.”

Is stated: he means, by himself. [To compose figures of speech:] he means, to compose figures of sound and figures of sense.

But, an objector may ask, what was the point in specifying that “what [is other than that] is called citra” (3.41 K), since you have already said that it is not poetry at all? If you claim to have pointed it out as something to be avoided, you should also state that by making pots one does not become a poet. With such an objection in mind, our author explains that poets have indeed written this [type of literature] and on this account he points it out as something to be avoided. Thus, We have set up this term, etc.

Mature poets: that is, poets whose maturity is shown by their choice of words and meanings appropriate to [the intended] rasa. Even the definition [of maturity by Vāmana], “when the words of the poem [being perfect] can no longer be changed,”3 must be said to be aiming at appropriateness of words to the rasa, for otherwise it would have no point.

Endless [worlds]: that is, without beginning or end. He then explains how the universe revolves at the poet’s wish: If the poet writes of love, etc. A poet writing of love is one who takes delight in relishing the vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicāribhāvas which have been ascribed to śīrigārarasa, not a man who is addicted to women. This is why the sage Bharata uses the word “poet” [and “poetry”] as primary [examples of the locus of the bhāvas and rasas], when he says [that the bhāvas transmit] “the state of mind (bhāva) which is in the poet,”4 or that the bhāvas “transmit the matter of poetry,”5 I have commented on this in my discussion of the nature of the rasas.6

The world assumes: the sense is, because it is plunged in rasa. The word “love” is used as representative of all the rasas. If he becomes: the sense is that as soon as he ceases to be a rasika (one inspired by the rasas), the various bhāvas that are seen, although they transmit everyday pleasure, pain, folly, or neutrality, will not form, without the strengthening of a poet’s description, a basis for the transcendent relishing of rasa.

1. Śikharinī is a preparation of curdled milk and sugar. The rationale of the si ille is that in preparing a meat dish the skill of the cook is important,
§ 3.41-42 b A

Accordingly, if a poet is wholeheartedly intent on a rasa, there is nothing whatsoever which he cannot, if he wishes, form into an integral part of that rasa, or which, being so integrated, will not increase in beauty. All this is seen in the poetry of great poets. Even in my own works it can be seen as occasion arises. This being the case, no type of poetry falls outside the nature of dhvani. As has been said above, even that type of poetry which is characterized by subordinated suggestion, if the poet has regard to [its ultimate goal of] rasa, etc., forms part of this [general category of dhvani]. But even where the rasa, etc., assume a subordinate position, as in clever verses or prayers to the gods, etc.; also where the literal sense as qualified by some suggestion is the predominant element, as it is in hrdayavati verses¹ written by clever authors² in gāthā meter; in these cases also we must see subordinated suggestion as a derivative of dhvani.³ This we have already said. So now that instruction is being offered to modern poets in the true principles of poetry, while citra may be much used in the efforts of beginners...
who are seeking practice, it is established for mature poets that dhvani alone is poetry. The following verses sum up the matter.

Where a rasa or a bhāva or the like appears as the final meaning, where a fact or figure of speech is suggested in a hidden way: along that road of poetry, the sensitive critic will recognize that dhvani has its realm, being simply the ultimate predominance of the suggested sense.

1. Prakrit riddle verses; see Abhinava below (3.41-42 b L) and note 2 thereon. 2. Read satprajñakagāthāsu. The word satprajñaka is the Sanskrit form of Prakrit chappannaya, a term regularly used for the clever authors of riddle verses. See A. N. Upadhye, “Chappannaya-gāthā or the gāthā-kosa,” JOIBaroda 9.387-88. 3. One should read dhvaninisyanda as in 3.36 b A (Text p. 474, line 2), rather than dhvaninispaṇḍa.

L The construction here is: "there is nothing which will not increase in beauty." In my own works: such as the Viṣamabāṇalilā. In hrdayavatī verses: that is, in verses called hiāliā, which teach us cleverly the means to the ends of man and which are well known in gatherings of Prakrit poets. Clever authors: authors of literary sensitivity are so called. Their verses are like the following by Bhaṭṭendudrāja:

When she blessed the farmer, saying
"May your phalāti plants
grow higher than the sky,"
his neighbor also was delighted. 5

In this verse, by a woman's granting a blessing to a farmer with the words "May your cotton plants grow higher than the sky," his neighbor was brought to happiness. It is the literal sense that is charming, qualified as it is by the suggestion of desire for stolen intercourse.

When the many rose-apples ripen in the thickets on the bank of the Godāvari,
the farmer's wife puts on a dress
as purple as rose-apple juice. 7

In this verse, by its saying that when the many rose-apples ripen in the thickets on the bank of the Godāvari the farmer's wife puts on a dress as purple as rose-apple juice, there is a subordinate suggestion of her hiding any possible spots that might come from her dress being
reddened by the juice of the fruit, as might occur from her hasty, stolen intercourse with her lover. This should be explanation enough.

**Dhvani** alone is poetry: What our author means is that in reality the soul and the body are the same, but for the purpose of analysis one may make a distinction.

By the use of the [second] word vā ("or") our author includes the false or improper rasa and bhāva that were mentioned before (e.g., 2.3 K′). In a hidden way: such that it receives beauty by being hidden. Along that road of poetry: on that path of poetry. Has its realm: as much as to say that the [whole] path of poetry is the realm of the three kinds of dhvani.

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1. See Introduction, p. 10. 2. hiāliyā seems to have been Abhinava’s original reading. The MSS read aaliyā, which our text has mistakenly corrected to haiālaiā. The word hiāliyā is the Prakrit equivalent of hṛdaya-vatī [gāthā], “a stanza which has a heart, i.e., a second meaning, underlying the literal, apparent sense; a riddle, an enigma” (M. V. Patwardhan, Vajjālagga, notes, p. 550; Section 64 of the Vajjālagga is entitled hiāli-vajjā). 3. The sections of the Vajjālagga are in general divided in subject matter into dharma, artha, and kāma, but of the hiāli-vajjā all the gāthās except one deal with kāma. 4. Following the Vṛtti, we should read ṣatprajñākāh. See 3.41-42b A, note 2. 5. I have emended the text on the basis of BP’s statement of a variant in Abhinava’s explanation. It says: “A variant reading in the Locana is prātiṣeṣyākā nirvṛtiṃ prāpitāḥ. This is better. The Prakrit verse and its translation should be emended accordingly.” My emendation, then, is: laṅghìgāgaṇā phalākī-lāśā hontu tti vaddhaantxe / haḷaṭṭā āśisam pāliṣeṣiyako vi niśvūḍī // Hereby the riddle of the verse will be why the neighbor should be delighted by a blessing directed to another man. The answer will be that the woman speaking the blessing is giving a hint that the tall phalākī plants will make a good place for the neighbor and her to make love. If one keeps Abhinava’s text as the editions print it, the Prakrit verse will end with pāliṣesavahudā vi niśvūṭiā, “the neighbor’s wife was also delighted.” But the riddle and its answer are no longer neat. An unspecified woman gives the farmer a blessing and his neighbor’s wife, lusting presumably for the farmer, is delighted. Abhinava glosses phalākī by karpāsa (cotton), but a cotton field, at least such as we have in Virginia, would make a poor place to hide one’s love-making. I take niśvūḍiḥ as ppp. of a denominative from niśvuda = nivrūta. 6. The translation follows BP’s variant reading. See note 5, above. 7. The jambū (Eugenia jambolana, the Anglo-Indian “rose-apple”) is regularly associated by the poets with the Vindhya hills (see note on SRK, Translation, 157a) and so, as here, with the Godāvari River. The Kaḍambari (p. 37, line 11, to p. 38, line 1) notes that its juice is black-red and
astringent but sweet (-nilapatalah kṣāyamadhurah jambūphalaraśah). In the verse the syllable su is to be connected with pacyamāṇā- as its inflection but goes metrically with the second half verse. 8. Paramāṇa here means “contrast” (cf. 2.1 a L, note 1), and hence contrasting color, spot. 9. BP explains that she would naturally spread her dress on the ground for her lover and herself to lie on.

10. Abhinava means that real poetry is inseparable from dhvani (in its largest sense, that is, whether the suggestion is predominant or subordinate), just as body and soul are inseparable. Kārikā 1.1 stated that dhvani is the soul of poetry and Kārikā 1.5 that rasa (to which dhvani leads) is the soul of poetry. Thus, it has analysed dhvani and poetry into distinct entities comparable to soul and body. But as dhvani is invariably associated with real poetry, we can speak metaphorically (upacārena) of identity between them, as between soul and body. 11. Suggestion of a fact, of a figure of speech, or of a rasa, etc.

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K Dhvani appears by fusion (saṅkara) and association (saṃsrṛṭi) with its own varieties, as well as with subordinated suggestion and with the figures of speech; and furthermore in many ways.

A And many varieties are seen in literature where a fusion or association of this dhvani is made with its own varieties, with subordinated suggestion, or with expressed figures of speech. Thus we see:

dhvani fused with its own varieties,
dhvani associated with its own varieties,
dhvani fused with subordinated suggestion,
dhvani associated with subordinated suggestion,
dhvani fused with one of the expressed figures of speech,
dhvani associated with one of the expressed figures of speech,
dhvani fused with figures which are themselves associated,
dhvani associated with figures which are themselves associated.

Thus dhvani appears in many ways.
Among these ways, the fusing [of an instance of] dhvani with one of its own varieties is sometimes by a relation of assisted and assist or ‘anugrāhānu grāhakabhāvena), as in the stanza “While the heavenly visitor was speaking,” (see 2.22 A and note 1) for in it we apprehend a variety of dhvani where the passage to the suggested meaning is imperceptible [viz. a rasadhvani], which is assisted by a type of dhvani based on the power of the situation, where the suggested meaning is at a perceived interval and is like the reverberation of a bell.

Again, there may be a fusion of two varieties of dhvani by a relation which puts us in doubt [as to which variety prevails] by the falling together of the two (prabhādāvyasampātāsatēnāna); as in:

Brother-in-law, your wife
has said something to your holiday guest
so that she sits weeping
in the loft behind the house.
Go-comfort the poor girl.3

In this stanza we might take the word “comfort” as shifting the literal sense to another meaning [viz., to “make love to”],4 or we might take it as intended in its literal meaning but subordinated to a suggested sense [viz., that you really love her and have ceased to love me]5 No is there any decisive reason for choosing one interpretation rather then the other.

But by a relation of entering into the same suggestive unit it is very common for a suggestion of the type where there is no perceived interval to fuse with some other variety of its own type. An example is the stanza “White herons circle against dark clouds” (see 2.1 a A).6 A case of association of dhvani with one of its own varieties is offered by the very same verse. In it there is the association of that type of dhvani where the literal is shifted to another meaning with the type where the literal is entirely set aside.

1. The term “expressed figures of speech” is used, as Abhinava will point out (3.43 b L), in order to exclude the suggested figures of speech, which are included in dhvani or in subordinated suggestion. 2. Ānanda might easily have added two more categories where the figures of speech are themselves fused. But obviously these multiple combinations can be increased at will. Abhinava disregards them. By way of compensation he elaborates very considerably on Ānanda’s first six categories. 3. Author unknown. The word padohara, or more correctly parohada is probably derived from Sanskrit paro-grha and means back yard (gharavādayam); see Patwardhan, 1āṇālagga, note
on vs. 523. The word occurs in several verses of that work. 4. The suggestion would thus belong to the first variety, viz. arthāntarasāṅkrāmantavācya, of the first type, anuvaśītavācya. 5. The suggestion would then belong to the first variety, viz. alaksyakramavṛṣṭya, of the second type, vivakṣitāntavācya. 6. Here we have a fusion of rasaḥvani and bhāvaḥvani, as Abhinava will explain. Both of them belong to the type alaksyakrama-vṛṣṭya. Ānanda's quotation of the stanza in 2.1a A was in order to point out a different sort of suggestion, which he now takes up in the next sentence.

L Having stated a summary of the matter by means of the two stanzas [at the end of 3.41-42b A], our author recites the following, which shows the manifold varieties of dhvani: Dhvani appears in many ways. The general meaning of the sentence is that the varieties of dhvani are endless by its fusion and association with its own varieties as well as with subordinated suggestion and with the figures of speech. He demonstrates its manifoldness by Thus, we see, etc.

There are three types, as it combines with its own varieties, with subordinated suggestion, or with the figures of speech. In each of these types the combination may be by fusion (sāṅkara) or by association (sāṃsrṣṭi), thus making six types. Then there are three varieties of fusion, as the fused elements may stand in a relation of assisted and assistor (anugrāhyānu-grāhakabhāvena), or may be related in a manner that gives rise to doubt [as to which element prevails] (sandēhāspadatvena), or may be related by their both entering into the same suggestive unit (ekapadānapraveśena).² Hereby we arrive at twelve types. Furthermore, the varieties of subordinated suggestion are to be counted as thirty-five, just as are the varieties [of dhvani proper] which were listed above (viz., in 2.31 L). The varieties of dhvani proper being thirty-five and the figures of speech being taken as a single unit, gives seventy-one [varieties with which a combination may be made]. Multiplying this figure by the three types of fusion plus the one type of association gives 284. Multiplying the primary types [which enter into combination] by this figure gives 7,420.³ But as the number of figures of speech is endless, the total number of combinations is innumerable.

Desiring to give examples of a few of these varieties by way of explanation, our author proceeds with four examples of the combination of one variety of dhvani with another, these combinations being the most important, as may be seen by the fact that in the Kārikā the word prabhēdaiḥ (“with its own varieties”) is the exocentric noun [which the
The word *ksana* means a festival or holiday. To the woman whom you invited for the holiday [i.e., to your sister-in-law, O brother-in-law, your wife said something, so that she sits weeping in the empty loft in the back yard of the house. Go comfort the poor girl. The woman here spoken of is in love with her brother-in-law and has been addressed sharply by his wife who has learned of the affair. The woman speaking the verse is secretly in love with this “brother-in-law” and has discovered the situation. She speaks about it in order, by indicating that his wife knows about his affair [with his sister-in-law], to cause a quarrel between him and his wife. Here the literal meaning of “comfort her” is shifted to the suggested sense of “comfort her by sexual intercourse,” as would be natural in such a private place. Or, we may take the literal sense of “comfort her,” intended only as leading to a suggestion of jealous anger, which gives the literal meaning to the words, namely, that you are in love with just her. The speaker intends the comfort literally, meaning that the visiting woman is now the proper and uncensured object of his love, but only as leading on to the suggestion that “I have now become an object of scorn.” As either of these suggestions serves to reveal the intention of the speaker [viz., her own love for the man addressed], there is no decisive reason for choosing the one or the other. [They are indeed two different forms of *dhvani*, for in the latter case the literal sense of comfort remains, pointing on to the further suggestion, while in the former the shift causes it to assume the very form of the suggestion.

Or, [we may explain in a different way, by saying that] the verse is spoken by a woman who is in love with her brother-in-law and who speaks to him thus after having seen him making love to another woman. This would follow from the use of the vocative, “O brother-in-law,” whereas in the previous explanation we have to explain the vocative as used with reference to [the man’s relation to] the other woman [rather than to the speaker].

It is very common: Everywhere in poetry the final goal is the *rasas*, etc. Here we find the manifestation of *rasadhvani* and of *bhaavadhvani* by fusion into the same suggestive unit, for in the stanza “White
herons circle against dark clouds" we relish both the rasa of love and its transient state of mind (vyabhicārin), the distress of sorrow.

Having thus explained the three sorts of fusion, he now gives an example of association: [A case of association ] with one of its own varieties.

In it: in such words as lipta (lit., “anointed”; here used as “covered, painted with”) the literal meaning is set aside; while in such as “Rāma” it is shifted.

1. We accept BP's v iant sammiśryate for the prakāsyate of the text.
2. These are the three basic types of sankara listed by Udbhāta (Vivriti) 5.20–26. Udbhāta makes a double type of the last, depending on whether both members of the pair occur in one sentence or in one vākyāmā. 3. Every careful reader has noticed the discrepancy of this figure; see BP, p. 500, or Tripathi, p. 1241. The multiplication of 284 by 35 actually gives 9,940, not 7,420. Abhinava has multiplied by 212, not by 284. Can it be that he regarded two types of fusion (that which gives rise to doubt and that where both members of the pair enter into the same suggestive unit) as impossible between a variety of dhvani on the one hand and a subordinated suggestion or figure of speech on the other? This would reduce the total by (35 + 1) x 2 x 35 = 2,520, and would result in the figure which he gives. But if he made such a reduction on this or other grounds, he should have told his readers. 4. This 1 t explanation is certainly the most natural one. It was probably Abhinava's own view, as commentators generally, though not always, put their favored view 1 t. 5. Compare what Abhinava said of the verse in 2.1 a L.

A There is fusion of subordinated suggestions (with dhvani) in such a stanza as "It is already a humiliation that I should have oppo-

cents" (see 3.16 A); or in
Where is the proud cheater of the dice game,
be who set afire the house of lac,
was prompt to seize the hair and dress of Krṣṇā,
and who called the Pāṇḍavas his slaves?
Where is the ruler of Duḥśāsana,
the elder mentor of a hundred brothers;
where is Karna's friend, Duryodhana?
Tell him we have come not in anger to see him.¹

§ 3.43 a A ]

For here the final meaning of the stanza, which is a dhvani of the type where the suggested sense is without perceived interval [from the literal sense], is mixed with [subordinated suggestions expressed by] words which give a literal sense qualified by suggestions. And that is why there is no contradiction when a subordinated suggestion resting on the meaning of a word is fused with a dhvani that rests on the meaning of the whole stanza; just as [there is no contradiction in the fusion of dhvani] with one of its own varieties. For just as different types of dhvani can be fused with each other and, by their resting on word meaning and sentence meaning respectively, give rise to no contradiction, [so also here].

Furthermore, while there would be contradiction between predominant and subordinate if they rested on the same suggested sense, there is no contradiction when they rest on different suggested senses. For that reason too then there is no contradiction. And just as one may speak of fusion and association of several elements with one without contradiction in a relation of denoted and denoter,² we may consider the same absence of contradiction to obtain in a relation of suggested and suggestor.

On the other hand, where some words of a sentence are expressive of a suggestion of the type where the literal sense is unintended and others express the type where the suggestion follows like a reverberation, there we have association [rather than fusion] between dhvani and subordinated suggestion. An example is the stanza "Say, happy friend, if all is well still with the bowers" (2.5 f A). In it the words "companions to the dalliance" and "witnesses of Rādhā's love" carry a variety of dhvani, while the words "they" and "I know" carry a subordinated suggestion.
1. The last sentence of the stanza is intentionally ambiguous. The natural way of taking the literal sense of the Sanskrit would be, "Tell him that we have not come in anger, but to see him." Given, however, the situation of the play, the character of the speaker Bhima, and the reproaches contained in the preceding lines, the suggested way of taking the sentence is that we have come in anger not to see him but to kill him. 2. The sense is that just as two or more figures of speech (which are vācyā) may combine in one word (which is vācaka), so may two or more suggestions (which are vyañgya) combine with one suggestor (vyañjaka).

L Having thus exemplified the four types of connection between dhvani and one of its own varieties, he proceeds to illustrate them as they occur between dhvani and subordinated suggestion: There is fusion of subordinated suggestions, etc.

For here: viz., in these two examples. Where the suggested sense is without perceived interval: viz., is of the rasa of fury (raudra). Qualified by suggestions: the term shows that the suggestions are subordinate. With words: this is an instrumental of characteristic; the meaning that is so characterized occurs as a subordinated suggestion; with this there is mixture, that is, fusing, of the dhvani. And since fusion may occur as a relation of assisted and assistant, or as a combination subject to doubt, or as the entrance of two varieties into the same suggestive unit, it should be assigned to whichever type is possible when it occurs in these two exemplar stanzas. Thus, in the stanzas "It is already a humiliation that I should have opponents" and "Where is the proud cheater," the aesthetic relish of fury is aided by all the word meanings by their functioning as stimulants (vibhāvas), etc.

In the stanza "Where is the proud cheater" one can see a suggestion in every word, every clause, and every compound. So I have not troubled to list them all. The words Pāṇḍava yasya dāsāḥ (lit., "whose slaves the Pāṇḍavas are") are an echo of Duryodhana's own words. Here we can find a subordinated suggestion to conjoin, because it is the literal meaning here (as qualified by a suggestion) that furnishes a stimulus (uddhāna-[vibhāva]) to Bhima's anger. At the same time, the suggestion that slaves, who serve a master, must of necessity come to see him, is a case of dhvani (where an interval from the literal sense is perceived) like the reverberation of a bell. As there is beauty in both these suggestions, there is no valid reason for choosing the one over the other.
[The third type of fusion, namely] the entrance of both members into the same suggestive unit, [is also found in these stanzas,] because the same words furnish subordinated suggested meanings and also, through their manifesting its vibhāvas, etc., the rasa which is predominant in the stanza.

And that is why: [The initial] sense is, because [such a combination] is seen in the examples [just adduced]. But an objector may insist that a subordinated suggestion and a predominant one are mutually contradictory and that even if it is seen, the combination, because it is contrary to reason (ayuktatvāt), will not be believed. With this in mind, our author shows that there is no contradiction, because the suggestive units are different: that is why, etc.

With one of its own: As he has already given examples of dhvani joined by fusion to one of its varieties, he now uses them to illustrate [the point here at issue, viz., the lack of contradiction]. He explains: For just as, etc. We must supply “just so here” at the end of the sentence. Or we may read tathā hi (“for just so”) in place of yathā hi (“for just as”).

While contradiction may be avoided by a difference of suggestive units when the fusion is one of the first two types, an objector may ask how it can be avoided in the third type, where both suggestions are present in the same suggestive unit. In response to that question our author gives the definitive reason for avoidance: Furthermore.

For that reason too: as the subordinated suggestion is one thing and the predominant is another, what contradiction could there be? But here an objector may say that he has heard these terms fusion and association used with reference to figures of speech but never to suggestions, With this in mind, our author says, And just as, etc. We should consider: he means that by considering, by understanding, we should decide the matter to be so [i.e. without contradiction], for understanding is our final recourse in both cases.

Having thus illustrated the three forms of fusion of dhvani with subordinated suggestion, he proceeds to illustrate association: On the other hand, where some words, etc. By the word “some” he rules out fusion. [In the stanza “Say happy friend”] we have dhvani of the form where the literal is unintended in the words “companions” and “witnesses.” By the word “they,” although a host of special qualities is suggested, the suggestion is subordinated because the beauty of the stanza derives primarily from remembered love, which is given by the literal sense, [as the word “they” denotes directly the remembered
fronds of the love bowers]. As for the word “I know,” although it suggests an endless number of fancied qualities, its literal meaning in the form of knowing or fancying is primary.

Thus he has completed his illustration of the four types of combination of dhvani with a subordinated suggestion.

1. Abhinava hereby corrects the inexact phrasing of Ananda. The fusion, strictly speaking, is between the dhvani and the subordinated suggestions (not the words that give them). Thus he rejects the natural interpretation of padash sammiśrutā (“a mixing with words”) for the interpretation “a mixture that has words,” as we might interpret “an ox with horns” to be an ox that has horns. 2. Thus in these cases we have fusion of the first type, that is, through a relation of assisted and assistor. 3. That is, Durjoydhanā had originally said, “The Pāṇḍavas are my slaves,” and Bhīma now repeats his words, changing only the form of the pronoun. 4. Anger is the sthānyabhāva of the mudravasa which is predominant, as being the ultimate suggestion of the stanza. 5. That is to say that one and the same phrase, Pāṇḍava yasya dāsāḥ, can be regarded as a case of gunībhūtavanyāga or of arthaśakty-udbhavānurañanarūpadhvani. These are mutually contradictory in a single phrase, as the one is from a subordinate category and the other from a predominant. So we should choose one or the other. But as we are left in doubt which to choose, their fusion with the final dhvani of the stanza is of the type “subject to doubt.” 6. BP notices Abhinava’s odd method of procedure here: “First he comments on the words ata eva and then he gives an explanatory introduction to the whole passage from ata eva to na virodhah.” 7. Because in fusion the two elements must join in the same locus. As he here speaks of some words carrying one sort of suggestion and others another, the two sorts can be joined only by association. 8. In their literal sense the words suhrḍ (friend) and sākṣin (witness) can denote only sentient beings. In the stanza in question suhrḍ (“companions”) is used metaphorically (lakṣaṇavyāga) to indicate the helpfulness of the bowers to the cowherdesses by offering a secret and lonely place for their trysts, while the word “witnesses” indicates that they were present at Rādhā’s love-making with Krishna. The purpose of the metaphorical usage is to suggest the special degree of helpful presence. Thus the dhvani furnished by these words is anvākṣṭavādyya of the arthāntarasāṅkramita variety. 9. The word jāne is a close relative of manye (“I fancy”), śaṇke (“I doubt, I might almost think”), etc., which are standard introductions to poetic fancy (utprekṣā); cf. Daṇḍin 2.222.
That there is fusion of express figures of speech with dhvani of unperceived succession is well established in all poetry of rasa that makes use of the figures. There is also fusion of the figures with some of the other varieties of dhvani, as in this verse of mine:

I am weary from much painting of the world,
for though I used the new and wondrous sight of poets
which busies it if in giving taste to feeling,
and used the insight of philosophers
which shows us objects as they really are,
I never found, O God recumbent on the Ocean,
a joy like that which comes from love of thee.

Here the type of dhvani in which a literal meaning is shifted is assisted by the figure known as contradiction.¹

1. The literal meaning of the word drṣṭi is shifted by metonymy to the meaning “poetic imagination.” There is an apparent contradiction so long as one holds to the literal meaning (for sight cannot busy itself with taste), which is removed as soon as one accepts the shift. As one makes the shift because the contradiction blocks the literal meaning, the shift is assisted by the contradiction. The first three pādas of the verse are plagiarized by the Yogavāsiṣṭha, Chapter on Nirvāṇa, second half, sarga 190, vs. 89 (p. 1521), as was first pointed out by V. Raghavan, JOR 13, pt. 2 (1936).

He now exhibits the varieties of combination of dhvani with the figures of speech: [That there is fusion of express] figures of speech. The reason for using the word “express” is that if a figure is suggested, it will be included in the eight varieties [of combinations with suggestion] already described. Poetry: for poetry is always of this sort [viz., a poetry of rasa]. Well established: The three varieties of fusion, as well as association, can be found in the examples adduced in the Second Book under the Kārikā which begins, “The intention must be to keep them subordinate” (2.18 K).¹ In the stanza “Many times you touch the trembling corner of her eye” (2.18–19 A),
the figure metaphor-contrast (rūpakavyatireka), previously explained,\(^2\) functions as assistant to the śṛṅgārarasa,\(^3\) while the figure svabhāvokti (naturalistic description) [inasmuch as it pervades the whole stanza] enters the same locus with the śṛṅgārarasa.\(^4\) In the Prakrit stanza “For putting a fence around this badarī,” (3.40 a A) we may have either a naturalistic description of a peasant or an instance of dhvani. As we are given no context, there is no decisive reason for favoring the one or the other.\(^5\)

Although a figure of speech must help the rasa, fusion of the two cannot take place in the examples illustrating the principle that “[the figures] should never be oversustained” (2.18 K, with examples given in 2.18–19 e, f A). Hence (what we have there is) association of rasa-dhvani with the figure, as in the stanza “In anger she has bound him” (2.18–19 e A).\(^6\)

The other varieties: that is, the varieties other than rasa-dhvani.

Which busies itself: We have said that a rasa consists simply in its own arousal.\(^7\) In arousing it, poetic imagination is constantly engaged in the business, that is, activity, of a description consisting in the combination of the vibhāvas, etc., and then in the construction [of the various suggestors], beginning with phonemes and ending with sentence structure.\(^8\) To feeling (in Sanskrit, rasān, “to the rasas): the sense is, in making the sthāyibhāvas, which are the essence of what is tasted, to be tasted, that is, in making them fit to be aesthetically relished.\(^9\)

Wondrous: for it comes awake by transcending the stage of perception of things which fall to a normal course of life. It is on that account that poets are called kavayah: from their being able to describe [in this wondrous way].\(^10\) New: that is, constructing worlds at every moment with ever new and delightful variations. Sight: that is, in the form of poetic imagination (pratībhā). Here we have the figure of speech, contradiction, as if sight, that is, [literally] ocular perception, should give taste to sugar-cakes. Hence it is called “new.” The dhvani in the word “sight”\(^11\) is assisted by this figure. For ocular perception is not entirely unintended, as it is not impossible.\(^12\) Nor is the word “sight” intended only as subordinate to some further [suggested] sense;\(^13\) rather, it is shifted to another sense, to the sense of imagination which blossoms forth from the constant practice of ocular perception. The contradiction assists in the shift. Our author will say just this further on in the words “is assisted by the figure known as contradiction.”

[Two analyses are now given of the compound parinistẖitārthāvīsayonmesa.] That same sight, being parinistẖita, that is, steady or
firm, had its vision opening upon arthavisaya, that is, the objects to be discriminated. We may also take the compound to mean: that sight which had its vision opening upon pariniṣṭhita objects, that is, objects known in the everyday world, rather than upon novel (and fanciful) objects such as would be objects for poets. This insight of philosophers (vipaścit) is called vaipaścitī. In saying that he has used both, by his use of the two words kavinām ("of poets") and vaipaścitī ("of philosophers") the author as much as says that he is not really a poet or a philosopher, and so suggests his modesty. His sense is that he borrowed these two sorts of sight from elsewhere, as a poor man might borrow provisions to serve [a guest]. "Both these," for one cannot carry out a description or portrayal [of the world] with one sort of sight. The world: everything. [Much painting: the Sanskrit is literally "constantly describing or portraying"]; that is, again and again, without rest; describing it by portrayal and picturing things exactly; deciding by consideration, inference and such means that this is thus and that that is such; cogitating on the smallest details to discover what is the essence here. For when something is portrayed, the portrait is only perfect if the sight is sometimes busily active and sometimes rests motionless with fixed gaze upon one detail or another. I: who was wholly addicted to seeking fanciful and actual visions. Am weary: he means that not only has he failed to find the essence, but quite to the contrary, has found only weariness. The word ca, "and" (in "and I found") has the sense of tu, "but." Recumbent on the ocean: in yogic sleep. Thou therefore knowest the true nature of the essence; thou hast come to rest in that true nature. Such is the sense. One who is weary will have reverence for one who is at rest. Love of thee: of thee in thy highest form as highest self and essence of the universe; love (bhaktī), that is, absorption in thee, an absorption born of successive acts of worship performed with such [preparatory virtues] as faith. Nothing even like that have I found, much less anything equal to it.

Accordingly, this stanza represents the words of a man who first took part in devotion to God, then, out of mere curiosity, lived the life of both a poet and philosopher, only at the end to realize once more that repose in the love of God is best. Above the joy that comes from having determined the nature of all objects by every valid means of knowledge, above the joy that is found in relishing transcendent aesthetic flavor, is put the bliss of repose in God the all-highest, for the relishing of aesthetic flavor is no more than the reflection of a drop of that ambrosial bliss. We have said all this before. The final sense is
that everyday joy is generally even lower in value than this, for such joy is contaminated with an even greater amount of pain.

In this same stanza we may [also] find, by reference to the word *drṣṭi*, fusion [of the third type], where both members of the pair [viz., *dhvani* and the figure, contradiction] enter the same suggestive unit.\(^{18}\) By other interpretations we may either take the figure of contradiction to lie in the phrase “making use of sight” as opposed to the description (or painting of the world), or we may take the *dhvani* in *drṣṭi* (“sight”) to be of the variety where the literal is wholly abandoned, after the manner of [the literal sense of] the word “blind” [in the stanza “The sun has stolen our affection for the moon” adduced in 2.1 c A]. Of these interpretations there will be no valid reason for preferring the one to the other, as both are equally charming.\(^ {19}\) But this [doubt] cannot be applied to the first interpretation which we gave, for there the word “new” by its verbal suggestion similar to a reverberation completely supports the presence of contradiction [rather than a *dhvani* where the literal sense is abandoned].\(^ {20}\)

1. In what follows, however, Abhinava illustrates only two of the varieties from the examples of that section. 2. In the previous explanation (2.18–19 L) the recognizing of this figure in the verse was attributed to “others” with whom Abhinava seemed to disagree. The present remark does not mean that he has changed his mind. All he means is that if the presence of *rupakavyatireka* is accepted, the stanza would be an example of anugráhyánugrāhakabhāvasanikara, whereas if one accepts the presence of *svabhāvoctī* it would be an example of ekavāṇījakaṇūnarvaśasanikara. 3. The fusion of the *dhvani* with the figure *rupakavyatireka* is therefore of the first type. 4. The fusion of the *dhvani* with the figure *svabhāvoctī* is therefore of the third type. 5. Accordingly, the fusion of the *dhvani* with the figure of speech is here of the second type. 6. (Patwardhan) Abhinava here claims that when a figure of speech is left imperfectly developed and is not pursued to its logical end, there cannot be anugráhynugráhakabhāvasanikara between the figure of speech and the *rasadhvani* arising from the stanza as a whole, in view of the phrase *nātīnirvahānaistā* in 2.18. The claim is not convincing. For the rule against pursuing a figure of speech to its logical end has been laid down in 2.18 only with the object of promoting the development of rasa in a poem. Consequently, the imperfectly developed figure can very well be said to be congenial to the development of rasa, which means that an imperfectly developed phrase can be regarded as anugráhaka (an assistant) of the rasa. Further, the statement here by Abhinava that there can be *samsṛṣṭi* (association) between an imperfectly developed figure and *rasadhvani* is not correct. A *samsṛṣṭi*, according to Ánanda (3.43 c A), occurs when the two elements
joined together occupy separate and independent parts of an ásrayabheda (a poetry-unit, i.e. a stanza). But in a case where there is a partially developed figure and rasadhvani, the partially developed figure occupies only a part of the stanza and the rasadhvani pervades the whole of the stanza, covering even that part of the stanza where the partially developed figure is located. Here the two elements (viz. the partially developed figure and rasadhvani) cannot be said to be occupying two separate and independent poetry-units. 7. A rasa is nothing but its own arousal (nispadana). Bharata had spoken of the nispatti (arising) of the rasas from a combination of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicārans. In 1.18 L Abhinava discusses this nispatti and shows that it differs from the activity which proceeds from a normal cause and results in a normal effect, for a rasa is nothing but the arousal itself: it is the process of relishing, not a manufactured relish. 8. Apparently the word varma has dropped out before prabhṛti, probably by haplography caused by the preceding varnand. The reference in the second half of the sentence is almost surely to 3.2 K, where the suggestors of alaksyakramanyakyadhvani are enumerated. The employment of appropriate guṇas and alaṅkāras would also be covered by ghatanā (cf. Locana text p. 59.6; 88.1; 104.7; 188.4). 9. In 2.4 L Abhinava remarked: "To say that 'rasas are perceived' is a turn of phrase as when we say, 'he is cooking the rice pudding' [where to be more precise we should really say 'he is cooking the rice grains']." The present passage is analogous. Where Ānanda speaks of a poetic vision that makes the rasas have taste, Abhinava takes the real meaning to be a vision which makes the sthāyiḥbhāvas into rasas. 10. The word kaviḥ, "poet," is derived by Indian tradition from the verbal root ku, "to speak," (kuṇ śabde); so Abhinava 1.1 b L (Translation, p. 59 "poetry must be spoken") and 4.6 L (Translation p. 703). Kṣirasvāmin on AK 2.7.5 derives the word precisely as Abhinava does here: kavate varṇayati kaviḥ, "One is called a poet because he speaks, he describes." 11. The dhvani is of the arthāntarasakramitavacya variety. The meaning is shifted to a metaphorical (laksānīka) sense of the word. The purpose (prayojana) effected by using the word drṣṭi in that metaphorical sense is to suggest the extreme clarity of poetic vision. (pratibhanasyātisphutatvam). This is the dhvani that resides in the word drṣṭi. 12. Observation of the already existing world is a possible and useful activity of the poet. Abhinava says this is in order to show that the dhvani resident in the word drṣṭi is based on a shift of the literal meaning. It belongs to the variety arthāntarasakramitavacya, not to atyanatirakstavacya. 13. It does not belong to the type of dhvani called śvaksitānāyaparavacya. 14. The poetic vision is unreal (mithyā) in reference to the everyday world. Compare the stanza quoted by Ānanda in 4.3 A. 15. In which God contracts the universe into himself. In this state he knows the true essence of the phenomenal world to be identical with the highest brahman, for he is it. 16. It is tempting, but by no means safe, to infer that these remarks furnish valid biographical information about
Anandavardhana. A poet does not always write in propria persona. Ānanda could have portrayed such a man without being one. Again, the character of the speaker, as drawn by Abhinava, is well known in Indian tradition. It would fit Bhartrhari or Dharmakirti as well as the speaker of this stanza. We know nothing of Ānanda's life, from which to verify his identification with the man whose emotion he here portrays. And yet I would like to believe it. 17. Unfortunately, Abhinava does not tell us where. Certainly not in the Locana or the Abh. 18. (Patwardhan) It is all right to say that there is arthāntarasankramitavācyadhvani in the word drṣṭi. But it is not correct to say that there is virodha in the word drṣṭi. The virodha is between drṣṭi (physical sight) and the idea of its enabling one to enjoy such things as sugar cakes. A virodha can exist only between two things. If here it is said to be located in the word drṣṭi, that is only a loose expression. What Abhinava means to say is that there is not only anuvrāhynuṛvrāhakahāvāsankara between the dhvani and the virodha in the first two lines of the stanza, as explained above (viz., in Translation, in the sentence that contains reference to note 11), but also there is ekapadānupravesasanākara between the same two elements. 19. Accordingly, the fusion of the dhvani with the figure of speech would be of the second variety, subject to doubt (sandehāspada). But the interpretation by which Abhinava justifies finding this type of fusion in the stanza is not a happy one. BP in explaining it is forced to say that by using sight one sees; to say that “by using sight one describes” is contradictory. Patwardhan writes as follows. “Actually in the third line of the stanza there is mention of both the visions (viz., of the poet and of the philosopher) and not of one vision only. Further, there is no virodha at all in the statement that poets describe the entire world by resorting to the two visions. Moreover, in the third line there is no question of atyantatiraskṛtavācyadhvani in the word drṣṭi, as the third line speaks of the two separate drṣṭis, and there is no blockage of the literal sense of the word drṣṭi. Since there is neither virodha nor atyantatiraskṛtavācyadhvani in the third line, the question of the presence of sandehasānkara between them does not arise at all. Abhinava’s attempt to show that there is sandehasānkara in the third line is anything but successful. In the next sentence he says that the stanza in question is an example of all the three kinds of sānkara. But it is doubtful that Ānanda intended this. What he seems to have intended is that the stanza exhibits only one kind of sānkara, viz. that based on anuvrāhynuṛvrāhakahāvā.”

20. Let us divide the explanation of this difficult sentence into two parts, explaining first what Abhinava means by it and, second, treating the question of whether the sentence, when understood, is justifiable. First, then, Abhinava means that if we see the contradiction (virodha) in the stanza to be between the word “sight” and “gives taste to the rasas,” we cannot assign to the word “sight” the sort of dhvani where the literal sense is wholly abandoned (atyantatiraskṛtavācyadhvani). The word “sight” must preserve some part of
its literal meaning in order for the contradiction to occur. Now, if we are faced with a choice between virodha and atyantatiras-ktavacyyadhvani, there is indeed a valid reason for choosing virodha. That reason lies in the word “new” which qualifies the word “sight.” This word suggests something fanciful and beyond normal experience and by this suggestion resolves the contradiction. The virodha must have been present for the sadasaktyanurananadadhvani in the word “new” to resolve it. So there is virodha here but no atyantatiras-ktadhvani and no fusion at all. On the second question, namely whether Abhinava is justified, Professor Patwardhan writes as follows. “Actually it is not correct to say that there is verbal suggestion (sadasaktyanurananadadhvani) in the word navā (“new”). For it has one meaning only, viz. novel, i.e., wonderful, and that is directly expressed and not suggested. Further, the fact that there is virodha in the first two lines (between physical sight and its enabling one to enjoy tastes (rasān) has been already stated and it has been already shown that the virodha is set aside when the word drṣṭi is understood in the sense of poetic vision. Where is the need now to say that the virodha in the first two lines is definitely supported by the word navā (which is in fact not the case as we have just shown)?”

§ 3.43 c A

We have an association (samsrṣṭi), however, of dhuani with an express figure of speech only with reference to single words, for it is where some words carry an express figure of speech and some carry a variety of dhuani [that we have it]. For example:

There, from the Siprā, every dawn a breeze,
reddenèd by its friendship with the nectar
of opening lotuses, prolongs the sharp,
sweet cry, amorously indistinct,
of paddy birds; and by its soothing motion
along the limbs of women, like a lover,
carryes off their lassitude from love
and makes a flattering request for more.

[Kālidāsa, Meghadūta 31]

For in this stanza the word “friendship” (maitrī) carries the type of dhuani where the literal sense is unintended, while other words in the stanza carry various figures of speech.
Having thus illustrated the three varieties of fusion, our author illustrates association: We have an association, etc. If a figure of speech, and if the suggested sense also, provided it is predominant, resides in the sentence as a whole, we then have fusion of the type where the terms are related as assisted and assistor. But in the absence of this, the two will not come together and so we must have either the figure of speech or the dhvani singly, or both at the same time, attached to individual words. These are the three types. Our author makes a restriction among these [three types]: only with reference to single words. He proceeds to illustrate the third type, where there can be no suspicion of a relation of assisted and assistor: for it is where, etc. Because it is only where some words carry a figure of speech and where some carry dhvani, as in the stanza “There, from the Siprā,” that we have an association of dhvani with an express figure of speech with reference to a single word. These words [boldface in the translation] must be repeated from the previous line of text and brought into the syntax. For in this stanza: here the word hi (“for”) should be placed after the term maitrīpadam. Such is the connection of the passage.

[Comment on the stanza “There, from the Siprā”] Prolongs: for that sound is carried far by the breeze from the Siprā; furthermore, the birds keep up their calling for a long time, being delighted by the delicate touch of the breeze; and the birds’ cry, being mixed with the soft sound rising from the waves of the Siprā stirred up by the breeze, is prolonged by that fact too. Sharp (paṭu): thus that gentle breeze does not drown out the cry of the paddy birds, but rather, by acting in cooperation, sharpens it. Nor is this sharpening without benefit, for the cry is sweet and amorously indistinct and so is worth hearing. Every dawn: it is dawn that offers the right time for service of the sort [about to be mentioned]. The plural indicates that this kindliness of the breeze is constant. Opening lotuses: they are sphuṭitāni, that is, bursting with the load of nectar which they contain; at the same time sphuṭitāni, that is, in full bloom and so a delight to the eyes. Friendship with the nectar of these lotuses suggests the gaining of mutual harmony that comes from a continuity of close contact. From this friendship the breeze is kaśāya: both enamored, and colored red, by the nectar. Of women: the breeze, which does this to everything of this sort which is most beautiful in the world, carries off the lassitude, the weariness,
of those who have been engaged in sexual intercourse; and it carries off the lassitude in this regard\(^6\) by sharpening the appetite of the lovers for renewed intercourse. It does this not violently or roughly, but following their limbs smoothly, with delightful touch and with acceptance by their hearts. It causes a woman to make flattering requests in this regard\(^8\) of her lover. The lover too, his appetite for intercourse aroused by the touch of the breeze, makes flattering requests. As this is done by the breeze, it becomes love’s most precious gift, for love takes its life from mutual passion. And this is to be expected, for that breeze, being associated with the Siprā, is a sophisticated gentleman and not like a country bumpkin. This is what is meant.

A lover too,\(^10\) after love-making, is attentive to the body of his partner by massaging her limbs and makes flattering requests. In this way he carries off her lassitude from intercourse. He prolongs her cries, that is, the sweet sounds with which she protests. And as he is flattering her, he becomes kaśāya, that is, enamored, by his “friendship” with the perfume, that is, his acquaintance with the natural fragrance, of her face which bears the resplendence of a fullblown lotus. He [too] follows the limbs, viz. the sixty-four manners of action in love-play.\(^11\)

The stanza as a whole is spoken by the lover to the cloud in the Meghadūta to the effect that the cloud should surely visit this place [Ujjayini] where there are such delightful sounds, sights, scents, and objects of touch, and where even the breeze is such a polished gentleman.

Our author applies his definitions to his example: for here the word “friendship,” etc.: We have already said that the word “for” (hi) should be placed after. Various figures of speech: in order of occurrence they are:\(^12\) poetic fancy (utprekṣā), naturalistic description (svabhāvokti), metaphor (rūpaka), and simile (upamā).

1. That is to say, there are three other possible distributions: (a) the figure of speech may reside in a single word, while the dhvani pervades the whole stanza; (b) the dhvani may reside in a single word, while the figure of speech pervades the whole stanza; or (c) the figure and the dhvani reside in separate words. 2. Actually, types (a) and (b) of the distributions listed in note 1 will be cases of fusion (saṁkara). So Ānanda, intending to illustrate association, rules them out. 3. Presumably Ābhinaṇa feels that by so shifting the particle the sentence will emphasise the fact that the dhvani lies in a single word. But really it makes little difference in which of the two positions hi is placed. 4. The sound seems to come from as far off as the farthest source of the plashing of the waves. Thus three reasons are suggested for the
spatial and temporal lengthening of the birds' cry. 5. BP supposes that Abhinava took the word patu as an adverb, meaning skilfully, rather than in its normal adjectival meaning of “sharp.” The breeze would prolong the cry skilfully by not overcoming it but rather making it more delectable. Aside from the fact that I think Kālidāsa meant the word as an adjective, Abhinava’s use of dipayati (excites, sharpens) and dipanena seems to show that he too understood patu in an adjectival sense. 6. Abhinava gives a double meaning to kasyya: “enamored,” to fit the simile of a lover, to be introduced in the last line of the stanza, and “colored by the nectar,” to fit the breeze. As a color, kasyya is yellow-red, the color of the Buddhist robe. See also below, 4.7a A, note 1. 7. BP explains: By saying “everything,” Abhinava explains the plural in “women.” “Of this sort”: i.e. of feminine gender. By “most beautiful in the world” he shows what is suggested. 8. tadvisayām could mean lassitude toward intercourse (so BP), or it could mean the lassitude that takes place in them, viz., women. The former is perhaps better, as tadvisaye surely has that meaning three lines below. 9. i.e., with regard to intercourse.

10. Abhinava here turns to the simile, which he carries out by suggestion in far greater detail than what is given by the literal sense of the stanza. 11. These were mentioned by Abhinava in 2.12 L, on which see note 2. The whole science of love in enjoyment has eight divisions, each of which has eight angāni or prayogāḥ. 12. Patwardhan finds fault with the inclusion of poetic fancy in this list and he points out (against BP) that samsṛṣṭi can exist only between the dhvani resident in mātrī (in line 2 of the stanza) and the simile in line 4. He writes as follows. BP says that the word rūpaka is used by Abhinava here in the sense of rūpakātiśayokti. This is another name for nigirya adhyavasāna atiśayokti; see Kuvalayānanda under rūpakātiśayokti (Kārikā 36). BP claims that this figure occurs in the word kamala (line 2), which also meansvadana-kamala. It also says that there is a gamyotprekṣā (implicit utprekṣā) in dirghākūrvan which (according to BP) stands for dirghākūrvan uva. But this goes against the elaborate explanation of dirghākūrvan given above by Abhinava, which clearly shows that dirghākūrvan is a factual statement, not a statement based on fancy. According to BP svabhāvokti occurs in the second line of the stanza. It would, however, be more correct to say that svabhāvokti pervades the entire stanza, which is a life-like description of the breeze from the River Siprā blowing over Ujjaṅa. There is no doubt that upamā occurs in the fourth line (siprāvātah priyataṁ uva). Since Ānanda says that there is avivaksītavācyadhvani in the word maitri (line 2), and since this stanza has been cited as an example of samsṛṣṭi of dhvani with vācyā alāṅkāra, we must suppose that the samsṛṣṭi occurs between the dhvani in the word maitri (line 2) and the vācyā upamā (line 4). Ānanda should have said: “padāntaresu alāṅkārāntarāni, teśām madhye upamayā soha avivaksīta-vācyadhvaneḥ samsṛṣṭīḥ.” By alāṅkārāntarāni Ānanda perhaps meant only
svabhāvokti, rūpaka (i.e., rūpakātiśayokti, i.e., atiśayokti) and upamā. By alāṅkārāntarāṇi he could not have intended utpreksā in addition to the three alāṅkāras mentioned above, as utpreksā is non-existent in the stanza. But even out of the three alāṅkāras mentioned above, there is no question of the samsrṣṭi of the avivaksitavācyadhvani in the word maitri in line 2 with svabhāvokti or with rūpaka. For the areas occupied by avivaksitavācyadhvani on the one hand and by svabhāvokti and rūpaka on the other hand, are overlapping and not distinct from one another, as required by the definition of samsrṣṭi given by Ānanda (3.43c A, text pp. 510-511). Thus it is clear that although Ānanda speaks of the presence of several alāṅkāras in the stanza, he could have found samsrṣṭi of the avivaksitavācyadhvani (in line 2) only with upamā (in line 4) and not with either svabhāvokti or rūpaka.

A An example of dhvani fused with [a figure of speech] that is associated with another figure of speech is the following.

The marks of teeth and claws, given
by the lion’s mate eager for your blood
with loving heart
to your body now bristling with joy,
are seen by even saints
with passionate envy.¹

For there appears here a dhvani, of the type where no interval is perceived [i.e., rasadhvani], fused with the figure of speech contradiction (virodha) which is associated with compressed statement (samāsokti), for the real object [described] in the stanza is a hero of compassion.²

An example of the association of dhvani with a figure of speech that is associated [with another figure of speech] is this:

On these days that rumble with fresh clouds
for persons with a taste for dramatic performance,
and are dark as night for travelers,
namely, the audience of travelers,
beautiful is the dance of peacock
with their outstretched necks.³
who pour forth their song.
for in this stanza we have the association of dhvani, of the type like a reverberation and where the suggestion arises from the power of words, with (the mutually associated figures) simile and metaphor.\(^4\)

1. The author of the stanza is unknown. It is quoted by Mammata \(7\) vs. \(337\) (p. \(453\)) and by Hemacandra. AC, vs. \(196\) (p. \(167\)). On the stanza the Viveka quotes Abhinava's comments verbatim, without attribution. For interpretation see note 2. 2. The dhvani is the suggestion of sántāraśa roused by the portrayal of the Bodhisattva’s virtue. The contradiction lies in the fourth line in the incompatibility of sprhä (passion or envy) with munibhiḥ (saints). For sāmāsokti, see 1.13 \(d\) \(A\) and \(L\) and 1.13 \(j\) \(A\), note 1. It consists here in our superimposing the behavior of a nāyikā on the action of the lioness. The lady would have responded to her lover's caresses with the love bites and scratches prescribed by the Kāmasūtra and would have left his body in a gooseflesh of excitement. In developing the sāmāsokti one will take raktamanaś to mean "with loving heart," and mṛgaraśā ("lion king") to mean "royal king." The lady (nāyikā) would thus be one of the king’s wives. As the sāmāsokti occurs only in the third line and the contradiction only in the fourth, these figures of speech are associated, not fused. As the dhvani derives from the whole stanza, its area includes that of both figures of speech, with which it is therefore said to be fused, not associated. 3. The verse is a derivative of Sattasai 6.59, the words being slightly altered and transposed to permit of double meanings. 4. This stanza, or the stanza from the Sattasai on which it is based, has been variously analysed by Ālānākārikas, always with results different from Ānanda's. The dhvani arises form the double meanings of the words paoa (= payoda or prayoga), sāmāiesu (= śyāmāyiteśu or sāmājikēṣu), and giānam (= grivānām or giśānām); and there is an interval of time before we recognize it, so it is rightly called sabdasaktyuddhau nararupā. Now if we take this dhvani as a whole, we must say that it occupies the space (viz., the word sāmāiesu) occupied by the simile and metaphor. Accordingly, it would not be associated with them but fused. To justify Ānanda's analysis we must consider only the portion of the dhvani arising from paoa or from giānam. We may then say that that dhvani is associated with the figures. The simile (upamā) resides in sāmāiesu if we understand that word as śyāmāyiteśu (= śyāmā + kyac + kta, literally, "which act like night, or like the night of doomsday" to travelers), because the suffix kyac is prescribed by Panini (3.1.10) to be used "after a stem which serves as a simile." The metaphor resides in sāmāiesu if we understand that word as sāmājikēṣu, because pathika-sāmājikēṣu ("to traveler-audiences," i.e., audiences which are travelers) is a rūpakasamāśa justified by Pan. 2.1.72. But the question arises how these two figures can be said to be associated rather than fused. Viśvanātha (SD 10.99) takes them as fused by the third type of fusion, where two figures reside in the same word. Others have taken them as fused by the
second type of fusion, where there is doubt as to which figure is present. No one other than Ānanda (and Abhinava, who piously refrains from disagreeing with him here) takes these figures to be associated. In fact, it is a wrong analysis.

L  So far our author has explained and given examples for the portion of Kārikā 3.43 that reads “Dhvani appears by fusion and association with its own varieties, as well as with subordinated suggestion and with the figures of speech.” He now proceeds to explain the words “and furthermore” and to give examples [of what is thereby intended]: An example of dhvani, etc.

The meaning of the word “furthermore” is this. Not only is it intended that dhvani fuses and is associated with its own varieties, etc., but [it does so also] with varieties, etc., which are fused or associated with each other. However, as it is hard to find the fusion and association of dhvani with such varieties of itself and such subordinated suggestions as are already fused or associated with each other, no clear example can be given. So he is forced to illustrate [only] the fusion and association with dhvani of a figure of speech which has already been fused or associated with another figure of speech. Of this situation there are four varieties, of which he illustrates the first by the stanza "The marks of teeth?" etc.

Here someone speaks a flattering description of a Bodhisattva who has offered his own body to a lioness who was about to eat her cubs [out of hunger]: a body on which has arisen a thick-set horripilation from the great bliss born of his success in helping others. Raktamanas means one whose mind has an appetite for blood; also one whose heart is full of love. There is contradiction when saints are spoken of as recipients of aroused passion. “With envy” suggests that their fondest wish takes the form, “May we too at some time rise to such a height on the pathway of compassion; then we should truly be saints.” The figure samāsokta (compressed statement) is present because of our apprehension here of the behavior of a loving woman (nāyikā).

A hero of compassion: The term “hero of compassion” is used for a moral hero (dharma-vīra), as morality is needed for an act of compassion. The rasa here is the heroic rasa (virarasa) because energy (utsāha, here the energy of doing good for others) is the basic emotion (sthāmyābhāva). Or, we may say that by the word dayāvīra the rasa is indicated to be the rasa of peace (sāntarasa).
This rasa is perceived [as fused] with a figure of speech that is already associated [with a second figure of speech]. For the following sense is achieved by power of the figure samāsokti. Just as a man, at the time of his union with a beloved woman whom he has sought in all his wishes, will break out in horripilation, just so does it happen with you on your giving your own body for another’s sake. And hereby a high degree of compassion is stimulated by the coming together of symptom (anubhāva, here the horripilation) and determinant (vibhāva; here the lioness forms the ālambanavibhāva while the bites and lacerations form the uddipanavibhāva).

He now illustrates a second variety: An example of the association of dhvani, etc.

On these days in which there is a rumbling of fresh, that is, beautiful, clouds and which are as dark as night for travelers, that is, which act like night inasmuch as they cause the stupor of travelers. Or, we may interpret as “days from which (i.e., because of which) there arises the travelers' dark complexion (syāmikā) from pain.” Beautiful is the dance of peacocks with their outstretched necks.

[As the Prakrit words of the stanza are susceptible of a different Sanskrit rendering, the following sense is suggested.] There being an audience of travelers with a taste for dramatic performance, beautiful is the dance of the peacocks with their prasārita song, that is, whose song follows upon a prolonged keynote (?) (sārana), or whose necks (grīva) are stretched forth for a grivāreca. The suffix kyac is used in the sense that these days behave like nights to the travelers. Thus an elliptical simile is indicated by the suffix. As the word pathika-sāmājikesu is clearly a karmadhāraya compound, it furnishes a metaphor. Our author’s meaning is that these two figures of speech (viz., simile and metaphor) are associated with the suggestion (dhvani).

As the two remaining varieties may be illustrated by this very stanza, our author has not furnished another example.

To explain: Since the vyāghrādi group of words [which are permitted by Pāṇini 2.1.56 to act as simile words when placed last in a compound] is an open-ended group, the compound pathika-sāmājikesu is subject to doubt whether it contain a simile or a metaphor; hence these figures are fused with each other in it. With these fused figures the [dhvani or suggestion] arising from the power of the words [viz., ahināapavarasiesu and pasārīgītām] to suggest respectively abhinayaprayoge rasikesu and prasāritagītānām is connected only by association, [not by fusion] because the suggestion is not assisted by those figures. On the other
hand, the dhvani (suggestion) arising from the power of the words pahiasämäiesu [to suggest pathikasämäjikesu] is fused with these same fused figures because the dhvani and the fused figures occur in the same words. Thus the two remaining varieties, viz., association of dhvani with fused figures of speech and fusion of dhvani with fused figures of speech should be understood [as also present in this stanza].

1. For dhvanînâm (text p. 514, line 1 of Locana) we must read dhvaninä with BP. Likewise, to produce normal syntax, we should read dhvaninä in place of dhvanau in line 3 of the same page. 2. In fact one's immediate apprehension on hearing the first three lines of the stanza is exactly that. Only in the fourth line do we see that a very different matter is the true subject (prakrtdrtha) of the stanza and that the suggestion of queenly passion is aprukrta (not the subject in hand) and so forms the figure samdsokti. 3. Abhinava's explanation is occasioned by the fact that BhNS makes no mention of dayavira, which seems to represent a preeminently Buddhist concept. The three types of hero listed by BhNS (6.79) are dänavira (a hero of generosity), dharmavira (a moral or religious hero), and yuddhavira (a military hero). One may note that likewise in the Mahâbhârata's long list (13.74.23-27) of twenty-one types of hero (sûra), there is no dayâvira. 4. See Abhinava's discussion in 3.26 a L. 5. Abbinava gives the prescribed meaning of upamänäd âcäre ("in the sense of behaving like that, when suffixed to a simile-word") to the suffix âyac = (âya in syâmâya; see Pan. 3.1.10). The days of the monsoons cause the travelers moha, because this is the season when lovers long to be together and because travelers in Sanskrit poetry are always supposed to be traveling without wife or sweetheart. 6. For the primary meaning, the rendering will be: Abhinava-payoda-rasesu pathika-syâmâyesu dvasesu / sôbhate prasârita-grivânâm nrtymayûramändânâm /// For the suggestion, the rendering will be: abhinaya-prayoga-rasese pathika-sâmäjikesu / sôbhate prasârita-gitdndânâm mayûravändânâm /// 7. Both saranâ and sdrana seem to be used in this sense. See PW and SRK 1737c and note. 8. We do not know just what Abhinava means by this term. BhNS defines grivârecita at 8.173 as a shaking or twisting of the neck used in dramatic performance. The ABh on Book 8 is lost, but Abhinava quotes 8.173 in a different form in commenting on 4.67 (Vol. 1, p. 99). He finds fault with the verse as quoted, but his correction is not intelligible to us. 9. See note 5, above. 10. A simile is full (pûrma) when all four of its members are present: the simile proper (upamäna), the base (upameya), the common quality (samâno dharmaḥ) and a simile-denoting word (au-upamâyacaka); for example, "her face is delightful as the moon" (candra iva âhlâdakam mukham). Where one or more of these members is absent the simile is elliptical (luptâ). According to Mammata, in a simile expressed by means of a word bearing the suffix âyac, the aupamâyacaka is absent (Book 10, comment on sûtra 127; cf. verse 403
and Jhalkikar, p. 570, lines 18-20). Other Āḷāṅkārikas say that the aupomya-vācaka may be understood in these cases from Pāṇini's sūtra 3.1.10 and that it is the samāno dharmaḥ or sādharmya that is absent (cf. SD on 10.19.).

11. Abhinava's expression is abbreviated. The word pathika-sāmājikēṣu as it occurs in the stanza (if we so render the Prakrit pahia-sāmālīesu) is actually a bahuvrīhi compound modifying divaśeṣu, but it is based on a karma-dhāraya: days in which there are traveler-audiences (yeṣu pathikasāmājikās teṣu divaśeṣu). This formation, permissible by Pāṇ. 2.1.72, is a rūpakasamāsa (metaphor compound), meaning audiences which are travelers. 12. Viz., the association of dhvaṇi with two ālāṅkāras which are fused with each other; and the fusion of dhvaṇi with two ālāṅkāras which are fused with each other. 13. That is to say, the group vyāghra, etc., listed in the Gaṇapātha may be added to. Not only may we say puruṣa-vyāghra "a tiger of a man," i.e., a man who is like a tiger, or puruṣa-simha, etc., but, according to Abhinava, we may say pathika-sāmājikēṣu, meaning travelers who are like an audience. Thus the compound need not be explained as a metaphor compound (see note 11 above), but might be a simile compound. As usual, Abhinava is grammatically correct, but the interpretation as a simile compound is most unnatural. 14. That is, pathikasāmājikēṣu may mean "for travelers who are like an audience," or "for an audience which is [i.e., which consists of nothing but] travelers."

So who could ever enumerate the varieties and subvarieties of dhvaṇi? We have said this much only to indicate the general direction in which they lie.

For the varieties of dhvaṇi are endless. We have said this much only to indicate for the instruction of sensitive readers the general direction in which these varieties lie.

He sums up: So, etc. The meaning is clear.
K Good men, using their effort correctly, should study dhvani carefully as we have here defined it, if they are eager to compose good poetry, or to recognize it.¹

1. One may either supply a correlative sa before vivecyah, or take the reading "(a)yam" in place of "yo," which is reported by Abhinava as that of "others." Either method will furnish a syntax simpler than that recommended by Abhinava, who takes kāvyatattvam etad (in 3.46) as correlative with yo dhvaniḥ (in 3.45), thus making 3.45-46 into a single sentence.

A Because good poets and sensitive readers, if they are adept in discerning dhvani as of the nature here described, will surely attain the highest position in the realm of poetry.

L [See L’s comment on 3.46.]

K It was persons unable to analyse the true nature of poetry as here given, for it appeared to them [only] unclearly, who propounded the doctrine of “styles” (ritayah).¹

1. See 1.1 A, notes 5 and 6.

A The Vaidarbhi, Gaudī, and Pāncālī styles were set up by persons unable to give a clear idea of the true nature of poetry, for this true nature, which we have analysed by using the concept of dhvani, appeared to them unclearly. For it appears that those who set forth the definitions of the styles did have some slight, but unclear, notion of the true nature of poetry. But as we have here demonstrated this nature clearly,¹ any other explanation, as by means of the styles, becomes worthless.
1. The KM reading sampradarśitam iti is obviously preferable to sampradarśitena.

L It is with a view to showing that the promise indicated in the words “in order to delight the hearts of sensitive readers” (1.1 K) was no idle boast, but has now actually been carried out, that [the Kārikā-kāra] says [of dhvani that it should be studied] as we have here defined it. This statement is connected with the following Kārikā (3.46). The “styles” were propounded by definers of figures of speech who were unable to analyse the true nature of poetry by describing its full extent as here given, a nature which is simply dhvani, namely, that which one should study carefully as we have defined it. But others read ayam in place of the word yo (in 3.45), [thus making separate sentences of the two Kārikās]. The highest position: he means, either in composing or in judging poetry. He gives the reason for others’ being unable to analyse [the true nature of poetry]: for it appeared to them unclearly. This is because “style” is ultimately a matter of the gunas (poetic qualities). As [Vāmana] has said,2 “style is a special way of combining words; the specialty consists in the gunas.” And the gunas are ultimately a matter of rasa, as our author has said above, when explaining the nature of the gunas in the passage, “It is just śṛṅgāra that is the sweetest rasa” (2.7).3

1. I read ālāṅkārikaih in place of alāṅkāraih, following the suggestion of Pāṭhak in his Hindi trasnslation. 2. Vāmana 1.2.7-8. 3. The view that the gunas depend on rasa was stated in 2.6 A. In 2.7 A it was stated that the guna, mādhurya, is ultimately nothing but the rasa, śṛṅgāra.

K The vṛttis also, those which depend on the nature of words or sound and those which are connected with the nature of meaning, will appear [in their true nature] once this doctrine of poetry is known.
Once this doctrine of poetry, which is based on an analysis of the relation between suggestor and suggested, is known, both those well-known vṛttis such as the upanāgarikā, which are based on the nature of words or sounds, and those, such as the kāśikī, which are connected with the nature of the meaning, will follow precisely the same path as the rātis.1 If this were not so, the vṛttis, like invisible things, would be things we could not believe in and would not be validated by experience. So the true nature of dhvani must be clearly defined.

The definition of dhvani, given by a certain critic, is wrong and should not be given, when he says, "We may speak of dhvani whenever an ineffable beauty of certain words and certain meanings is perceptible only to special cognizors, just as the rarity of certain gems is known only to special experts."2 For the special [virtue] of words, so far as their phonetic form is concerned is that they be pleasant to the ear and not repetitious. Their special [virtue] as denotative units is that they be clear [in their literal sense] and suggestive [of a further sense]. The special [virtue] of meanings is that they appear clearly and be subordinate to a suggested meaning [as in dhvani] or be qualified by a suggested element [as in subordinated suggestion]. These special [virtues] of words and meanings can be explained and have been explained in many ways. To imagine that there is some ineffable virtue over and above these is to admit that one's power of analysis has ceased. For ineffability, in the sense of being beyond the range of all words, cannot be predicated of anything, because in the last analysis a thing can be designated by the word "ineffable." As for the definition sometimes given of ineffability, that it is the appearance of a thing [viz., of a unique particular] which cannot be referred to by a word for a mental construct (vikalpa) which is based on (samsparśi, lit., which touches upon) the general or universal,3 this can no more apply to the special virtues of poetry than it can to the special virtues of gems. For the virtues of the former have been analysed by literary critics, while no estimate can be made of the value of a gem by reference merely to the general or universal. It is true, however, in both cases that these special virtues are recognizable only by experts. For only jewelers are knowers of gems and only sensitive critics (sahrdayāḥ) are knowers of the rasa of poetry. On this point no one will argue.

In regard to the well-known doctrine of the Buddhists that ineffability is predicable of everything, I plan to write an exposition in a book which
will examine their theories. As it would give offense to literary critics to set forth here details which may be learned from another book, I shall not do so. Or, we may let our definition of dhvani stand just as the definition of perception stands in Buddhist doctrine.

Accordingly, as no other characterization of dhvani [in the sense in which we have been using it] stands to reason, and as this [sense] is not the literal meaning of the word ["dhvani"], the correct definition is the one which we have given. This is stated [in verse]:

To say that it appears as an ineffable element is no definition of dhvani, inasmuch as its sense can be explained. The correct definition is the one here given.

Here ends the Third Book of the Sahrdayāloka composed by the teacher Śrī Rājānaka Ānandavardhana.

1. I.e., they will appear in their true nature as being no more than ways in which the āyus are employed and thus as being ultimately a matter of rasa. 2. The original form of what the critic said should be closer to that given in 3.33a A (Text p. 403, line 1), because the words there formed a half śloka. But in that passage Ānanda attributed the objector's simile to rasa, not to dhvani. The ineffability of dhvani is a view which was mentioned in 1.1e A. 3. The passage is translated in accord with Abhinava's interpretation, with the component samsparsi modifying vikalpa. In the Buddhist epistemology of Dignāga and Dharmakūti, later borrowed in part by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, it is supposed that of all objects of knowledge we first have an indeterminate perception (nirvikalpaka jñāna), a perception that contains no mental construction (vikalpa) but that responds to the mere that-ness which confronts our senses. In the determinate perception (savikalpaka jñāna) which follows, we identify the object with some universal, that of horse, man, or as the case may be. All our words refer only to these determinate perceptions. Where the Buddhists disagree with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is in their holding the unique and momentary particular (avalakṣaṇa) of our indeterminate perception to be the sole reality. The mental construct, which permits us to speak of it, at the same time falsifies it. Hence the extreme Buddhist position, to which Ānanda next refers, that every real thing is ineffable. 4. This book, the Dharmottaravirtti, was still available to Abhinava. It is lost to us. 5. Perception of the true nature of things is unverbalizable according to the Buddhist idealists. This did not prevent them, however, from giving highly useful definitions of correct and false perception on the level of vyavahāra (the give-and-take of the world, as opposed to ultimate truth). 6. I.e., dhvani cannot be characterized by bhakti or by abhidhā or by tātparyaavrtti or by anumāna or by saying that it is indefinable. 7. I.e., it is not literally a "tone" or "reverberation."
§ 3.47 L

L Will appear: that is, they will become established by experience as being [included] in the life of poetry.

The same path as the rūtis: because they will be like the rūtis in being ultimately a matter of rasa. Or, we may take the variant reading pratītipadavīm, they will enter "the path of our perception." For that alliterative vṛtti which has [its name from its] similarity to a sophisticated lady terminates in such rasas as the erotic (sṛngāra); the harsh vṛtti terminates in fiery rasas such as the rasa of fury (raudra); the soft (komala) in such as the comic (hāṣya).1 Similarly, when the sage [Bharata] states that "the vṛttis are the sources of poetry,"2 he uses the word vṛtti for a kind of behavior [attitude, costume, bearing] appropriate to the prevailing rasa. He states this [explicitly] in the following words:

The Kaiśikī [vṛtti], which makes use of charming costume, is born of [i.e., appropriate to] the erotic rasa.3

By his words here our author has accepted to some extent the concepts that were announced in the words, "The vṛttis and the rūtis have reached our ears; what is this thing called dhvani that it should differ from these?" (1.1 a A), these words having been given under the alternative views possible for those "who say that dhvani does not exist" (1.1 K). But he has also criticized them, in saying that [the true nature of poetry] "appeared unclearly" [to those who employed these terms] (3.46 K, A).4

He now criticizes the objection that dhvani "lies outside the scope of speech" (1.1 K), although he has already criticized it in Book One, for he feels that after all the detailed discussion [of dhvani which he has furnished], the view that it is ineffable becomes simply impossible.

Pleasant to the ear: without harshness to the ear. Not repetitious: not tautologous. These special virtues: viz., those of word and those of meaning. When the power of analysis ceases, one finds the state of nirvīvekatva (analytic incompetence). Sāmānyasparśivivekāśabda: a word for a determinate knowledge corresponding to our indeterminate knowledge.

He now shows that ineffability cannot be predicated even of the example: to the special virtue of gems. But it may be objected that not everyone can cognize [these special virtues]. He admits this objection by saying, in both cases, etc. He means, in the case of gems and in the case of poetry.
But one may ask how it is said that things are ineffable in [such Buddhist statements as] "Words do not touch the real object" and "[it is] informative of the unnamable." To this our author replies, In regard to the well-known doctrine. What he has in mind is that at that rate ineffability would be too wide a definition for dhvani, for by it dhvani would be the same, as regards what one could say of it, as everything else. From another book: There exists an “Explanation” (vivrti) written by our author on the Dharmaottari, which is a commentary on the [Pramaṇa-] Viniscaya. In that book he has explained the matter.

This is stated: he means, is stated by himself, to serve as a summary. That there appears in a poem an element that is ineffable is no sufficient characterization of dhvani; such is the syntax. He gives his reason: inasmuch as its sense can be explained, that is, because one can state it (vaktum) distinctly (nīs). Another commentator has taken the prefix nīs in nirvācyathatayā would mean “because its sense cannot be stated” and takes this as giving the reason why the element is ineffable. But this is awkward, for the reason would not differ from what it was intended to prove. So the explanation we have given is the only correct one.

[May my words prove] auspicious.

This Eye, by surveying all the varieties of dhvani spread out in this Light of Poetry, will furnish men now with their sought-for goal.

I praise the Mediating Power, the great goddess dear to Śiva, who gives clarity to those differenc which were previously prepared.

Here ends the Third Book of the Sahrdayalokalocana, an exposition of dhvani, revealed by the great Śaiva master, the revered teacher, Abhinavagupta.

1. See 1.1a L, notes 3 and 4. 2. See 3.33 L, note 2. 3. Cf. 3.6g L, note 1. The quotation cannot be traced in Chapter 20 of BhNS, which deals with the vṛtti, either in the KM or GOS edition, although verses 53, 54, and 73 of the GOS edition contain the phrases śāksanepathya, śrīgārābhinaya, and hāṣyaśrīgārabahula. The quotation given by Abhinava must have formed part of the description of kauśiki vṛtti in the MS used by him. 4. In fact Ananda has accepted the concepts of vṛtti and rīti as useful notions in poetic analysis if they are understood in the context of the doctrine
of dhvani and rasa, but criticizes them if they should be used as a substitute for those doctrines. With the statement katham cid abhyupagamaḥ kṛtaḥ katham cid dūṣanam dattam compare the similar phrase, Text p. 84. lines 1-2 of Locana (= 1.4 g L, near end) dviṣiyas tu katham cid dūṣtaḥ katham cid anigūtṛaḥ.  
5. The quotations form pādas in śloka meter, perhaps from the Pramāṇaviniścaya. They do not occur in the Pramanavārttika.  
7. See 1.19 L, note 5. In the madhyāma (intermediate or mediating) stage of metaphysical evolution, the objects of the world are clearly separated but not yet sensible. In linguistic evolution, the words are formed with their final succession of phonemes. All that is lacking is a physical apparatus (breath and organs of articulation) by which to render the words communicable.
CHAPTER FOUR

A Having thus defined dhvani in detail in order to remove the disagreements concerning it, the author now states a further purpose of this explanation.

L I bow to Śāṅkara Śakti,
than whom God needs no other aid
in the performing of his fivefold function.¹

To make clear the connection of this Fourth Chapter with the preceding, the author of the Vṛtti says, Having thus, etc. A further use: Although the purpose was already stated by the words, "in order to delight the hearts of sensitive readers" (1.1 K), and although this same purpose was somewhat clarified toward the end of the Third Chapter by the words, "in order to compose good poetry or to recognize it," an effort will now be made to clarify it further. He uses the words, a further purpose, because the purpose will now appear so precise that its description will seem other than the imprecise description which preceded. Or, we may take the passage differently, as follows. We will state something further, viz., a distinction between the said two purposes; we will describe the usefulness of dhvani in composing good poetry and its usefulness in recognizing good poetry. Of these, the way in which dhvani works in composing good poetry must be stated first, for we can recognize only what has first been created.² So the Kārikā now states: By this road of dhvani, etc.
1. Śāṅkara Śakti is here used as a name of Māyā. The components of the fivefold function (kṛtyopanīcaka) are listed in a verse attributed to King Bhoja in the Sarvadarśanasarāgraha 7.77-78. They are: srṣṭi (creation), sthiti (maintenance), samhāra (dissolution), tirobhava (concealment, illusion), and anugraha (the favoring of his devotees). 2. Abhinava's second explanation is not a happy one. The distinction between the way in which the dhvani theory helps in composition and the way in which it helps in recognition is not given anywhere in the Fourth Chapter. What is shown, and in considerable detail, is how the knowledge of dhvani helps the poet to compose good poetry. One must therefore suppose that the second aim, the recognizing of good poetry follows automatically. The "distinction" would thereby be obliterated.

K By this road of dhvani and of subordinated suggestion, which has been shown, the imagination of poets can be indefinitely extended.

A Of this path of dhvani and subordinated suggestion, which has been revealed, a further result is an infinite extension of the poet's imagination (pratibhā). If one asks how this is achieved, [the next Kārikā gives the answer].

L Now it may be objected that to say that an infinite extension of imagination comes from the varieties of dhvani is to confuse the loci [of cause and effect]. With this in mind, our author says, how is this achieved?

1. The varieties of dhvani reside in poetry; the extended imagination resides in the poet. The solution of this difficulty, of course, is that the extended imagination of the poet actually comes from his knowledge of the varieties of dhvani. Knowledge and imagination share the same locus (samanādhikaranā).
§ 4.2 A ]

K For hereby, when ornamented by even one of the varieties [of dhvani], speech acquires a fresh color, even though it follows a subject matter that is old.

A Hereby, when ornamented by even one from among the stated varieties of dhvani, speech acquires a fresh color, even though it takes for its subject a matter that has been treated by poets of the past. Thus, a freshness derives from use of the two varieties of dhvani where the literal sense is unintended, even where an old subject is treated, as in the following stanza.

Her smile is half innocent,
her wealth of glances tremulous and sweet;
the quaver of her voice is moist
with a new wave of dalliance;
the motion of her gait
is perfumed with budding grace:
what is not charming in a fawn-eyed maid
as she touches adolescence?

[Bhartṛhari 93]¹

A fresh color appears here by the use of that type of dhvani where the literal meaning is set aside, despite the fact that there are [older] stanzas such as:

Her beautiful opening smile,
her flashing eyes, tremulous speech,
and her gait langorous with weight of hips:
what is not endearing in this damsel?

In the same way, in the following stanza:

He who is first is first indeed.
And so the lion,
eating the mounded meat
of his slaughtered elephant,
is a lion to other beasts.
Who is there that can put him down?²
there appears a freshness by the use of that type of dhvani where the literal meaning is shifted to another sense, despite the fact that there are older stanzas such as:

He who has bought his greatness by his valor
is overcome by none.
Is the lion ever defeated
by elephants for all their size?

1. Both this stanza and the stanza quoted just below are svabhāvoktis, or naturalistic descriptions. The Bhartrhari stanza is quoted by SRK 367 and by other anthologies. It is also quoted by Abhinava in his Abh. on BāṅŚ 22.11. Abhinava will point out below the words of the stanza which carry atyanta-tiraskṛtvāvācyadhvani. 2. We do not know the origin of this stanza or of the one quoted just below. Both are arthāntaranyāsas (substantiations, see 1.13 i, L and note 8). The present stanza certainly gains a novel effect by its use of arthāntarasāntakramitavācyadhvani. But one may note that the second illustration also is not devoid of dhvani. The word kṛita (bought) is certainly used metaphorically, a fact that would force Ānanda to recognize that some suggestion was envisaged by the poet. Presumably he felt that the suggestion was not sufficiently charming: compare his words in 1.14 A: vyāṇyakṛtam mahat sausthavam nāsti. One may also remark that the “greatness” (mahimā) is given away (svaśabdaniśedita) by what follows in the second half of the stanza, thus destroying the effect of the suggestion.

L Herewith the answer [to the question just posed]: Hereby, etc. The force of the word “even” [in its first occurrence] is this: that granted there are many varieties, the effect occurs by even one of them alone. What is here stated amounts to the following. Poetic imagination (pratibhāna) is a special insight (pratijñā) into the matter1 to be described. Because of the limited number of things worthy of description and because these have been touched on by the first poet [Vālmiki], a poetic imagination that takes these things for its object would be the same as his; and the poetry resulting therefrom would be the same. Accordingly, the profession of poet would by now have become obsolete. But by the multiplicity [of dhvani], of which we have spoken, these same things become limitless; hence there arises an infinity of poetic imagination taking them as its object. The Kārikā explains the result which is attained by this infinity of poetic imagination by saying, speech acquires a fresh color. By this, the speech of poetic literature, at least, acquires a fresh color. This can come about
only if the poetic imagination is endless; and that only if the objects to describe are endless; and that only because of the variety of dhvani. 2

Our author illustrates the first in order of these varieties, namely that where the literal sense is wholly set aside: her smile, etc. Here the literal meaning of mugdha (confused, simple), madhura (sweet), vibhava (wealth), sarasa (moist), kisalayita (budding), parimala (perfumed), sparśana (touching), are wholly set aside. These words [in their metaphorical use] carry the following suggestions. Her "mugdha smile" suggests its unaffected beauty. That her glance is "sweet" suggests that it is lovable to everyone. Her "wealth" of glances suggests their inexhaustible artillery. That her voice is "moist" suggests that it assuages the heat of fever and gives delight. "Budding" grace suggests its delicacy. That her gait is "perfumed" with such grace suggests the continuance of its impression for all time. That she is "touching" adolescence suggests that in spite of herself she is meeting with something desirable. 3 As soon as a smile, which is a well known object, becomes endowed with a property other than those properties placed in it by old Brahma, it becomes something new. The same principle holds in all the other cases.

The word asya (Text, p. 524, line 1) construes with the words apūr- vam eva pratibhāsate (p. 524, lines 4-5) [literally, "of this (stanza) a fresh color appears"]). In the following instances also, where the word asya precedes a quotation, it is to be construed with the word navatvam which follows the quotation.

[He who is first:] The second instance of the word first suggests a sense that is shifted to something other [than the literal], namely, to such suggested properties as irresistible supremacy and uniqueness. In similar fashion [the second instance of] the word lion suggests a sense shifted to such properties as heroism, autocracy, and the calling forth of wonder.

1. Vastunīṣṭhaḥ, i.e., vastuvīṣṭayakah.; see 3.33 b L, note 2. 2. The causal chain is as follows: dhvanibhedā or dhvanīvaicitryā gives rise to ar-thānāntyā, which gives rise to kauṇprathībhānāntyā, which gives rise to kāṇya-vākyāṇām navatvam. What is notable here is that the variety of suggestiveness is placed outside the human mind; it is the cause, not the result of poetic imagination. It is as though our authors thought of the objects of the world as existing in a pattern which rendered them amenable to mutual suggestions when viewed by a great poet. The poet's imagination, in this view, would be the medium, not the primary cause, of the creation of new worlds. The worlds would be already there through the magic which underlies dhvani. Such a view
is in harmony with the origin of the Sanskrit word for poet, kāvi. A kāvi is a seer, a revealer. 3. Abhinava jumps directly from the literal senses to the suggested senses without mentioning the metaphorical (bhākta, gauna). One may supply them as follows: innocent, pleasing, abundance, soothing, beginning to manifest, rendered attractive, its encountering.

4. A fresh color may appear in a verse by use of one of the described varieties of dhvani where the literal is intended but is subordinate to a second meaning. As an example, take the stanza:

The bride has lowered her lips to her beloved's face, but afraid of waking him, for he pretends to sleep, she checks the relish of her kiss and hesitates with watchful turning; he too continues motionless, fearing that in shame she may wholly turn aside. In such a moment these two hearts, caught in the state of their anticipation, have reached the peak of love.¹

A freshness appears in this stanza although there are [older] stanzas like the following:

Seeing that the attendant had left the bedroom, the young wife rose half upright from the bed and gazing long upon her husband's face as he lay there feigning sleep, at last took courage and kissed him lightly, only to discover his feint by the rising flush upon his cheek. When then she hung her head in shame, her dear one seized her, laughing, and kissed her in full earnest.

[Amarū Collection 82]²

In the same way, the stanza, “Its waves are her frowns,” etc., shows originality when compared with the stanza beginning nānābhaṅgibhra-madbhrūḥ (“with its many curling waves for frowns”).³
1. The author remains anonymous. I have translated in accordance with Abhinava’s comment, who in páda b overlooks the word api and gives to dhogalolam the sense of “hesitatingly turning (to examine whether he is asleep).” But I think a more likely interpretation would be “although (api) she had checked the relish of a kiss, she is waiting (sthitä) in eagerness (lolam) to enjoy it (dbhoga = bhoga).”

2. Both stanzas contain dhvani of the type vivakṣitānyaparavācya, subtype asamlaksyakrama, leading to īrīgārārasa. So Ānanda adduces the examples not as showing the presence and absence of dhvani, but as showing that any subject, whether or not dhvani has already been used in its treatment, can appear fresh by a new application of dhvani. The first stanza is more subtle than the second, for in it a kiss is only anticipated, not consummated, and the vyābhicāribhāva, shame or embarrassment, is only hypothetical, whereas in Amaru’s verse it is directly expressed. Finally, the first stanza exhibits a special harmony of mood between the two lovers. For these reasons Abhinava prefers it, although he does not deny rasa to the second, which, because of its simplicity, a modern reader may actually prefer.

3. The first of these quotations is from the stanza of Kalidása’s Vikramorvasiya, quoted in 2.5 f 4. We do not know the source of the second. From what Abhinava says at the outset of his comment on 4.3, he must regard the quotation from Kālidāsa as an example of the fourth variety of dhvani, samlaksyakramadyotita.

§ 4.2 a L

L Having thus exemplified the two varieties of the first type of dhvani,1 he now prepares to give examples of the second type, where the literal is intended [but is subordinate to a second meaning].

[The bride has lowered:] nidrākaitāvā, lit.; a pretender in sleep; that is, his sleep is false. Has lowered her lips to his face: she cannot renounce the heavenly joy that arises from the touch of his face; that is why he is called her beloved.

The bride: that is, newlywed. She is forcibly checked by fear of waking, that is, of waking her beloved. Time and again she starts forward, only with difficulty to check for the smallest instant her desire to kiss him. That is why she remains hesitant with turning, that is, examining again and again whether he is asleep. But still she cannot turn back altogether from her would-be kiss. While her dear one for his part makes no motion to kiss her, fearing that if he were to kiss her as she now is, she would be covered with shame and would turn away.

Their hearts are caught in the state of their anticipation (hrdayam sākāṅkṣāpratipatti nāma): [The literal sense of the bahu-vr̥thi adjective is that] their hearts are such that their state is one of sākāṅkṣā, anticipation or yearning; that is, agitated by love-longing
rather than satisfied by the accomplishment of their desire. They have, however, achieved the ultimate bliss which consists in regarding one’s partner as the all-in-all of life, a bliss which has not required any plunge through physical experience; and hereby their love (śrīgāra) has become perfect. 2

In the second stanza the kiss is achieved and the shame (or embarrassment) directly expressed. Although the love is strengthened by the words “he kissed her [in good earnest],” still, in the first stanza the passion, without there appearing any possibility that the mutual restraint of their burgeoning desires should cease, bespeaks the union in a single state of mind of the two lovers, and so the love is strengthened to a greater degree.

1. That is, the varieties atyantarātirakṣita and arthāntaraśaṅkrāmita of the type avivaksitavācyā. 2. The metaphor underlying the sentence is of the river of transmigration into which one is plunged and from which one may reach the farther shore (pāram), where lies the sumnum bonum (parinirvṛtti = parinirvāṇam). As for the final word śrīgāra, it is hard to say whether Abhinava is thinking more of the quality of love exhibited by the lovers, or the aesthetic enjoyment of śrīgārarasa by the reader.

_K_ In this way the manifold complexity of the rasas, etc., should be sought out. The path of poetry, although [it seems to be] limited, will extend to infinity by this aid.

_A_ As has been said above, the area of the rasas, bhāvas, improper rasas and bhāvas, and the cessation of these four elements, is of manifold complexity if one calculates the variety of vibhāvas and anubhāvas that belong to each. This whole area should be sought out [or put to use] in this way so that by use of the rasas, etc., the path of poetry, which seems to be limited by its having been trodden by so many thousands, or really a countless number, of poets, may extend to infinity. For the rasas, bhāvas, etc., are limitless through the connection
of each of them with the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas. Through the use of each one of them an event of the world, whatever it may be, can be made by a good poet at will to appear other than as it is. This too was stated above in our discussion of citra poetry (3.41-42 a .4, final verse). A great poet also has composed a stanza on the subject:

Victorious is the goddess Speech,
enlarger of the poet's field,
who many a matter, though it be not such,
can fit within our heart as if it were.

Thus it is well established that through recourse to the rāsas, bhāvas, etc., the subjects of poetry are endless.

§ 4.3 L  
Having thus exemplified the four basic types [of dhvani], our author, by extrapolation of the character found in the alaksyakrama type, makes a statement that holds for every variety:¹ In this way, etc. Should be sought out: should be illustrated.
As has been said: viz., in the words:

The varieties of the elements subordinate to this (rusa or the like] and the varieties within itself, when one imagines all the possible combinations with one another, are infinite. [2.12 K]

This too was stated: The word ca is here used in the sense of api and is placed in abnormal position. What is meant is "this too was stated" (etad api pratipāditam), viz., in the words, "may treat unliving things as living, and living as unliving" (3.40-41 a A, final verse).

Though it be not such: this refers to the external (reality). As if it were: the sense is that the created vision is of the most wondrous form, because, as shown by the word iva ("as if"), the mind cannot come to rest on either one or the other (viz., the reality or the vision).
Within our heart: that is, on the touchstone for testing the true gold of all the bhāvas. Can fix: that is, can place it immovably within the heart of whoever has a heart. Hence these [visions] are different from everyday matters; they become a special sort of matter. And it is only when they have been fixed in the heart that they become so; and not otherwise.² Victorious: she is superior to the creator gods of limited powers. By her grace the poet's field, that is, the objects which he describes, become enlarged, limitless.
1. Abhinava's reasoning seems to be as follows. It is only in the asam-laksyakrama type (the type where no sequence is observed from the denoted to the suggested meaning) that the rasas, etc. are prominent, and it is in the rasas, etc., that the manifold complexity is found. However, one may use this manifold complexity to explain how other varieties of dhvani also may impart an endless variety to poetry. 2. Here again, as in his introductory stanza to the Locana, Abhinava emphasises the importance of the audience. Compare also his remarks on 2.27. Poetry requires an auditor as well as a poet.

4.4

[There is no new Kārikā at this point. The stanza which Ānanda here introduces, as is obvious from the fact that he does not comment on it, is either a saṅgrahāśloka (summarizing stanza) or a parikārasāloka (supplementary stanza). But we have thought it best not to disturb the traditional numeration.]

A

To explain the same point, the following is said:

By use of the rasas, things that have been long seen appear as if new, like trees at the coming of spring.

Thus there may be a fresh color by use of that type of dhvani where the literal sense is intended but where there is [subordination to] a suggestion, in the variety where the suggestion arises like a reverberation from the power of words; as for example in the passage:

You are now all that is left.
You are now the world-serpent Śeṣa.

[Bāna, Harṣacarita]¹

although there exist such stanzas as the following:

Śeṣa, Himālaya, and you are great,
are dignified and firm:
you three hold steady the shaking earth,
ever transgressing the law.

[Bhāmaha 3.28]²

There may be a fresh color by use of the same [type of dhvani] in the variety where the suggestion arises like a reverberation from the power of meaning. As for example in this stanza:

While the heavenly visitor was speaking, etc.

[Kālidāsa, Kum. Sam. 6.84]³
although there exist verses like the followi

\begin{align*}
\text{When the talk} \\
\text{turns to news of the bridegroom,} \\
\text{maidens show their yearning} \\
\text{by their bristling flesh,} \\
\text{although their faces are lowered} \\
\text{in shyness.}\end{align*}

There may be novelty because of the embodiment, in an imaginative expression of the poet, of the variety where the suggestion arises like a reverberation from the power of meaning, as in:

\begin{align*}
The\text{ fragrant month prepares, etc.}\end{align*}

although there exist such verses as:

\begin{align*}
\text{As the sweet-smelling season begins,} \\
\text{the lovely longings of lovers} \\
\text{break forth with the mango buds.}\end{align*}

There may be freshness because of the embodiment, in an imaginative expression of a character created by the poet, of the variety where the suggestion arises like a reverberation from the power of meaning, as in:

\begin{align*}
\text{Attentive youth} \\
\text{has lent a hand to your breasts} \\
\text{that they might rise as it were to} \\
\text{the visitor Love.} \\
\text{[Cf. 2.24 A, above.]}\end{align*}

There is no redundancy of this stanza with the sense of the followi

\begin{align*}
\text{As the slender chest of young girls} \\
\text{swells out with budding breasts,} \\
\text{Love, finding a place to live,} \\
\text{enters into their hearts.}\end{align*}

In the same way there is no triteness of the stanza, "Ah, merchant, how should we have ivory," etc. [cf. 3.1 h A], because of the existence of such verses as:

\begin{align*}
\text{My son, who once with a single shaft} \\
\text{could widow the elephant herd,} \\
\text{by cursed daughter-in-law is brought to bearing a basket of arrows.}\end{align*}
The subject matter of poetry will acquire freshness by recourse to the varieties of suggestors, just as it does by the variety of suggested meanings. But I have not given [examples of] this out of fear of extending my book too far. The sensitive reader can supply them himself.

1. The passage has already been quoted at 3.1.e A. 2. In the last quarter we must read bibhrtha with all the editions of Bhāmaha. Two of the NS MSS of Dhu read bibhrthāh, which makes a non-sequitur as well as a solecism. The reading of the Kāshi and Vidyābhāvan editions, bibhrate, falls into the latter of these faults. The snake, the mountain, and the king support the earth not for their own benefit but for that of others. The voice should therefore be parasmipada. The verse is presumably by Bhāmaha himself, who was a good grammarian. The stanza raises a problem of chronology, as Bāna's Harṣacarita must have been written about A.D. 640, whereas Bhāmaha, since he mentions the Nyāsakāra, can scarcely be placed before 700. P. V. Kane deals with the problem, HSP pp. 116–117. He offers two possible explanations: (a) that Ananda was not concerned with the chronology of his examples, wishing only to show that a passage could be fresh and charming by the use of dhvani, although there might be many other passages in one's library on the same subject; (b) that Ananda was ignorant of Bāna's date. In the second quarter of the stanza there are puns in guravah (dignified, of the king; heavy, of the snake and mountain) and sthirāh (firm-minded, of the king; steady, of the snake and mountain). 3. The stanza is quoted in full and discussed in 2.22 A. See also 3.39 A and 3.43 A. 4. The stanza states directly what is only suggested in the stanza of Kālidāsa. Thus it fails to achieve rasa. 5. For the complete verse and for discussion of this type of dhvani, see 2.24 A, L. 6. Anonymous. The verse is not good. It deserves the jingling alliteration that I have given it. 7. The passage which follows in the Kāshi and Vidyābhāvan editions makes no sense, because the stanza "Ah merchant, how should we have ivory," etc. (vānīa haṭṭhīdaṅtā) is not an example of the kaviṇbaddhavakṛṣṇaprāṇaḥkritmāṃsamplepanna variety but of the svataḥsambhava variety of dhvani. What has happened is that some lines have dropped out. They are preserved, with a small lacuna, by the NS edition. After sarīratavena navatvam it continues as follows: yathā "sāra-vaṁṇa-joṅvaṇha-haṭṭhālambhaṁ samunnamamteṇhim / abhūṭṭhaḥaṃm iva mambhāhassas dinnam tuḥa thaneṃ /" [cf. 2.24 A] asya ca gathasya "udhi... kaḥbhāḥ [? ubhāṇṇa-kuṭābhod] jaha jaha thanaā vinanti bālaṇām / taha taha laddhavās ova mammhova hisam āūsai / /" etatgathārthena na paunaruktyam / yathā vā. Then follows "vāṇīa haṭṭhīdaṅtā," etc., as in the other editions. I have translated the NS version. 8. This strophe lacks such imaginative expressions as "attendant youth" and "rise up to greet," found in the preceding verse. 9. The hunter with his new wife
§ 4.4 L }  

is a favorite exemplum in Prakrit poetry of the debilitating effect of sexual indulgence. See Vajjālagga 206–214.

L [First interpretation, on the presumption that the verse “By use of the rasas,” etc., forms a new Kārikā.] As the endlessness of poetic imagination and speech which is brought about by dhvani has been insufficiently explained, the [following] Kārikā describes it in a new way [viz., by the use of analogy]. Accordingly, the Vṛttikāra says, To explain the same point. By “explain” he means, to set it forth with a substantiating argument. What he has in mind is that while the author of the Vṛtti has stated it [viz., dhvani] to be the cause for the endlessness of meanings, the author of the Kārikās has not [yet] done so.

[Second interpretation.] Or rather, his intention is to quote a summary stanza (saṅgrahaśloka). This will explain why there is no comment on the stanza in the Vṛtti.

Things that have been long seen: one may supply “by external means of cognition such as perception,” or “by poets of the past.” Poetry here acts the part of the month of spring.

What charm can there possibly be in naming such things directly as yearning, shyness, longings of lovers?

The examples [here given which contain dhvani] have been fully explained previously. There is no point in repeating here their explanation. For the present passage of the Vṛtti intends no more than to show that there is indeed a freshness [in these examples] thanks to the varieties of dhvani, even though the themes have been touched upon by older writers.

[Abhinava gives a Sanskrit translation of the Prakrit verse, “My son, who once with a single shaft,” etc. He follows it by saying:] The meaning is obvious. One should connect syntactically the words of this stanza and there is no triteness.¹

¹. In the Sanskrit the two phrases are separated by the verse.
And now, although it has been stated that the point is repeated because it is so essential:

While this relationship of suggestor and suggested is capable of great variety, the poet should concentrate on that one type that achieves rasa.

While words are capable of a varied relationship of suggestor and suggested and this is the source of their infinity of meaning, the poet who seeks to obtain an original meaning should concentrate his effort on the one relation which achieves rasa. For all original poetry is achieved by a poet whose mind attends closely to a suggested sense consisting of a rasa, bhāva, or the false or improper correlate (ābhāsa) of one of these, and on the suggestors, as we have described them, in the form of words, sentences, texture (rasanā), or complete works. And so it is that in such works as the Rāmāyana and Mahābhārata the battle scenes, etc., although they occur repeatedly, always appear new. Furthermore, one primary rasa, being woven into a work, gives it special meaning and extra beauty. Do you ask for an example? As in the Rāmāyana and the Mahābhārata.

In the Rāmāyana the karuṇarasa (flavor of compassion or tragic mood) is prepared by the first of poets himself, where he says that his “grief became verse.” He carries out the same rasa throughout his composition up to Rāma’s final, irreversible separation from Sītā.

Again, in the Mahābhārata, which has the form of a didactic work although it contains poetic beauty, the great sage who was its author, by his furnishing a conclusion that dismays our hearts by the miserable end of the Vṛṣṇis and Pāṇḍavas, shows that the primary aim of his work
has been to produce a disenchantment with the world and that he has intended his primary subject to be liberation (mokṣa) from worldly life and the rasa of peace. This has been partly revealed indeed by others in their commenting on the work. The most compassionate of sages [Bhīṣma] himself asserts the same when he seeks, by imparting the light of his pure knowledge, to rescue the world from the cruel illusion in which it is plunged. He expresses it in many ways, as in the following:

\[\text{[Mahābhārata 12.168.4]}\]

The ultimate meaning of the Mahābhārata thus appears very clearly: the two subjects intended by the author as primary are the rasa of peace and the human goal of liberation. The other rasas and other human goals are subordinated to these; and how there may be a relation of principal and subordinate among the rasas is a matter we have already explained. It is no contradiction to this to concede that if we disregard the ultimate inner truth, there may be beauty in a subordinate rasa or human aim (in the Mahābhārata) regarded for the moment as paramount, just as there is beauty in the body (although it is in truth subordinate to the soul).

An objection may be raised that all the contents of the Mahābhārata are summarized in the Introductory Summary (anukramanī) and that these subjects (mokṣa and śāntarasa) are not mentioned there. Rather, it is specifically stated in that Introduction that the Mahābhārata will inform us of all human aims and that it contains all the rasas. To this it may be replied. It is true that the predominance of the rasa of peace and the predominance of mokṣa over other human aims are not specifically stated in the Anukramanī. But they are shown by suggestion, as in this sentence:

\[\text{And the blessed Vāsudeva,}
\text{the everlasting, is here glorified.} \]

[Mahābhārata 1.1.193 ab]

For the meaning intended to be hereby suggested is as follows. The adventures of the Pāṇḍavas and others which are here recounted, since they come to a miserable conclusion, represent the elaboration of worldly illusion, whereas it is the blessed Vāsudeva, representing ultimate truth, who is here glorified. Purify your minds, therefore, in blessed
God, the all-highest. Form no passion for insubstantial glories, nor let your minds dwell whole-heartedly on virtues such as statesmanship, modesty, courage, or the like, so as to regard them as sufficient in themselves. The word "and," graced with the full powers of a suggestor, appears clearly to be hinting that one should look farther [in the book] and see the worthlessness of all worldly life. The verses which immediately follow, "for He is the truth," etc. [MBh. 1.1.193c] are seen to reveal within themselves the same sense.

This sense is beautiful because it is concealed. The poet-creator Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana has made it perfectly clear, however, by composing the Harivamsa as a conclusion to his Mahābhārata. Since this sense stirs us toward an intense devotion (bhakti) to that other truth that lies beyond worldly life, all worldly activity appears now as a preliminary goal, to be rejected. He describes the power of gods, places of pilgrimage, and of asceticism, only because these are the means of attaining the highest Brahma, because the various gods and sacred objects are epiphanies of that Brahma. Even the narrative of the adventures of the Pāṇḍavas, since its purpose is to generate a disenchantment with the world, since this disenchantment is a cause of liberation (mokṣa), and since mokṣa has been described in the Gītā and other works as the chief means of attaining the Blessed One: even this narrative is indirectly a means of attaining the highest Brahma.

What is intended [by the word Vāsudeva in the Mahābhārata verse just quoted] is the highest Brahma, the abode of unlimited power, known under such designations as "Vāsudeva" and made famous under that name in the Gītā and other passages; the original whole, which possesses all the forms which were copied by the appearance at Mathurā. But the appearance at Mathurā, being a partial incarnation, is not meant, as it is excluded by the adjective "everlasting." And [there is no reason for limiting the epithet Vāsudeva to the son of Vasudeva], because we find the epithet used in such works as the Rāmāyana of a still different incarnation. Furthermore, this sense [of the epithet as referring to an eternal entity] has been determined by the grammarians themselves.

By that [one] sentence exhibited in the Anukramani, which shows that everything other than the Blessed One is transient, we are already informed that the Mahābhārata as a work of doctrine (sāstranaye) considers the one supreme goal of man to be mokṣa and as a work of poetry (kāvyanaye) intends the rasa of peace, which is a strengthening of the happiness that derives from the cessation of desire, to be the
predominant rasa. As this matter is most essential, it is given by suggestion rather than by direct statement, for an essential matter carries far greater luster by not being stated in so many words. For it is common knowledge among intelligent and well-educated circles that one should suggest rather than state in so many words the matter which one has most at heart.\textsuperscript{17}

Accordingly, it is clear that in writing a poem one gains freshness and a large measure of beauty for the work by means of such factors as the predominant rasa. That is why we may see in literature a composition possessed of great beauty if it assembles its matter in harmony with a rasa, even if it lacks any particular figures of speech. For example:

Victorious is the great sage,
the prince of yogis, born of a water jar,
who in one cupped handfull saw
the Divine Fish and the Divine Tortoise.\textsuperscript{18}

Here the vision of the fish and the tortoise in the palm of Agastya's hand, being in conformity with the rasa of wonder, adds a great beauty to the stanza, for the vision of the divine fish and tortoise, being an original touch, is more in conformity with the rasa of wonder than the [suggested] presence of the whole ocean in one palm of his hand. For a matter that is trite through being known to everyone, though it may be a marvel, does not give us a sense of wonder. Nor need the mention of an original trait in harmony with the rasa be limited to the rasa of wonder. It may harmonize with other rasas. For example,

Lucky man! Her side,
which you accidentally touched
as you brushed past her on the street,
still perspires, bristles, trembles.\textsuperscript{19}

From this stanza, as one thinks about it, there arises a perception in the highest degree of rasa, which would not appear at all from the mere fact, being perceived, that the lady after touching you perspires, bristles and trembles.

We have thus described how a fresh color is given to the matter of poetry by use of the various types of predominant suggestion (dhvani). A freshness of the poetic matter may also arise from using a subordinated suggestion of any of the three kinds.\textsuperscript{20} But I have given no example of these in fear that my book would become too long.\textsuperscript{21} The sensitive reader can easily supply them for himself.
1. Viz., in 3.2 and 3.16. 2. (J. Masson) Ānanda’s view is that what makes the battles, for example, seem original each time is not merely the use of dhvāni in the descriptions, but also their subordination to a more general aesthetic goal. In the Mahābhārata the more battles that are described, the more distasteful war becomes and the more firmly grounded becomes our feeling of detachment, of world weariness (vairāgya). So in the case of the Rāmāyana, the constant expressions of pain, sorrow, separation, all conduce to the overall end of the work, a feeling of kārūnya. 3. Rām. 1.2.39; see also above, 1.5 K and note 1. 4. If the plot had admitted of an ultimate reunion, the rasa would have been vipralambhasṛṅgāra; see 2.5 c L. 5. Lokanātha must here be used as an epithet of Bhīṣma, who speaks the verse which follows to the grieving Yudhiṣṭhīra. Normally the word is used of God, that is, of Brahma or Viṣṇu, or by the Buddhists of the Buddha. But the MBh. itself uses the term once of Bhīṣma (9.2.30). In Ānanda’s use of the epithet here, it may have been chosen for its alliterative effect. 6. Viz., in 3.20ff. 7. MBh. 1.1.65ff. The Anukramanī is doubtless a summary of an earlier Mahābhārata than the hundred-thousand-sūkṣma version that we now possess. It refers to very little of Book 3 and to nothing after Book 11. As the Mokṣaparva is in Book 12, it does not figure in the Anukramanī. 8. uddeśā: the preliminary mention or listing of matters before they are discussed. 9. The same view of the MBh. is shared by Nīlakanṭha. See his remarks on MBh. Vulgate 1.1.275, which he concludes by saying, “One should therefore elicit the substance from the whole book and leave the rest.” 10. The sense is that these virtues are worthless if they are kevala, that is, alone, or independent of an effort to attain to God. There is a pause between rāgino and guneṣu that might be represented by a comma. 11. ca sābdah (Text 532, line 1) should be read together as a compound, meaning “the word ‘and,’” as used in the quotation just given from the MBh. 12. vābhūtayah: The word “epiphany,” as popularized by Mircea Eliade, denotes a place where the sacred appears or becomes sensible to the worshipper. In this sense the word is a more precise translation of vābhūti than “manifestation.” 13. Only K. Krishnamoorthy among editors has given the correct reading, which he takes from two BORI MSS. The word aṃśirūpam should be inserted between sakalasvarūpaṃ and vivaksitam. By “the appearance at Mathurā” is meant the incarnation as Krishna. Brahma is the aṃśin, the whole, whereas Krishna, Rāma, and other incarnations are aṃśas, parts. 14. In Rām. 1.39.24 (Vulgate 1.40.25) “Vāsudeva” is used as an epithet of Kapila. At the beginning of that chapter Vāsudeva is said to have incarnated himself in Kapila. 15. It is a bold move to appeal to the grammarians on this matter, for Pāṇini explains such words as Vāsudeva merely as patronymics; in this case, as the son of the sage Vasudeva of the Vṛṣṇi clan (Pāṇ. 4.1.114). Abhinava supposes that Ānanda is here referring to the Kāśikā’s comment on that sūtra, for he embodies a portion of that comment in his own remarks (see below under
“How,” asks the Kāśikā “can words which are eternal be assigned to a formation by reference to objects which are not eternal such as the family members of the Andhaka, [Vṛṇi, and Kuru] clans?” The first explanation of the Kāśikā is this: “It so happens that a good many names like Nakula, Sahadeva [and Vasudeva] occurred somehow, merely by chance, in exactly that form among the Kuru, etc., clans. Panini included them in writing his grammar.” One might infer from this that the author of the Kāśikā supposed the name “Vasudeva” to have once referred to an eternal entity before it was accidentally applied to a human. But I see no logical means of inferring from the Kāśikā’s remarks that “Vasudeva” also once referred to a non-human being. How could it when the only etymology of the word given by the Kāśikā or Panini is as “the son of Vasudeva”? To justify Ānanda’s view one needs a wholly different etymology of “Vasudeva,” which one will find in religious texts (e.g., Viṣṇupurāṇa 1.2.12), not in the grammarians. The same phrase is used at 3.26 a A (Text p. 390), on which passage Abhinava makes it clear that trṣṇāksayasukha is the sthāyībhāva of śāntarasa. 17. See J. Masson, “Telling not Conveying,” JIP 1 (1973), 144-155. 18. The prince of yogis to whom the stanza refers is Agastya, of whom many marvels are related. He is called kumbhodbhava (born of a water jar) in accordance with a myth related in Brhaddevatā 5.149. At a sacrifice the gods Mitra and Varuna, upon seeing the beautiful nymph Urvasī, involuntarily ejaculated their semen, a part of which fell into a water jar, where it generated Agastya. The reference in the second half of the stanza is to Agastya’s drinking up the ocean, which he is said to have done by his yogic powers in one sip from his cupped hands. He performed this miracle to help the gods, who sought to destroy the Kāleya demons, who had been hiding at the bottom of the ocean. This myth is told in MBh. 3.100-103 (Bombay Vulgate 3.102-105) and is often referred to by later poets. But the notion of Agastya’s having a vision of the two incarnations of Viṣṇu, the fish and the tortoise, as he took the sea in his hands, is new. The former is that gigantic fish who rescued the earth from the deluge; the latter, the tortoise on whom the ocean rests. The reference in the second half of the stanza is to Agastya’s drinking up the ocean, which he is said to have done by his yogic powers in one sip from his cupped hands. He performed this miracle to help the gods, who sought to destroy the Kāleya demons, who had been hiding at the bottom of the ocean. This myth is told in MBh. 3.100-103 (Bombay Vulgate 3.102-105) and is often referred to by later poets. But the notion of Agastya’s having a vision of the two incarnations of Viṣṇu, the fish and the tortoise, as he took the sea in his hands, is new. The former is that gigantic fish who rescued the earth from the deluge; the latter, the tortoise on whom the ocean rests. The verse is often quoted by later authors as an example of the figure of speech bhāṅkā (so by Ruyyaka, p. 228, and by Viśvanātha, SD 10.94), but the older Ālaṅkārikas regard bhāṅkālāṅkāra as a figure applicable only to complete works, not to single stanzas. Ānanda and Abhinava certainly do not see bhāṅkā in the stanza. Abhinava sees rasaavadalāṅkāra (cf. 2.4 Introduction A and note 1), because the rasa of wonder is subordinate to Agastya’s love of Viṣṇu. What is remarkable about the verse, however, and the occasion of Ānanda’s here citing it, is that the freshness and charm is given to it by a direct statement (vācyo ‘rtthah) of the vision of the fish and tortoise, rather than by a suggested meaning, viz., that Agastya held the whole ocean in his palm. This is because the direct statement is both original and harmonious with the rasa, whereas the suggestion is trite (ksunna), as it can be found in a hundred other verses.
about Agastya. 19. The verse is spoken by a lady's confidante to a gentleman with whom the lady would have a rendezvous. Again, the suggested meaning that the lady has fallen in love with him is trite. Classical Sanskrit is full of ladies who perspire and horripilate at the touch of their lovers. But the direct statement localizing the symptoms in that side of her that he brushed against in the street is original and effective. The version of the text in our edition limps. One needs the word tī between suhaa and jenöst; see KM edition. Subhadranāth Śāstrī gives a literal (unmetrical) gloss thus: svidyati romäncati vepate rathyātulāgrapratilagnah / sa pārśvo 'dyāpi subhaga tasyā yenasy atigatah // For tulagga (= kākatāliyya) see Patwardhan's glossary on the Vajjulagga. Tī is a shortened form of tīe, Sk. tasyāḥ; see Hemacandra, Grammatik 3.64. Volīno is from Sk. vyapacalitah; see Turner 12167.

20. The reference is to vastudhvani, alankāradhvani, and rasadhvani. See 1.13 m L. 21. All editions and recorded MSS read vi3tära. But the a should be short by Pān. 3.3.33, as Abhinava has it, vistāra.

L [Irreversible separation from Sītā]: By the word “irreversible,” that is, unconditional, he rules out the possibility of the rasa of love in separation. [The miserable end of the Vṛṣṇis and Pāṇḍavas]: the destruction of the Vṛṣṇis in civil war, the unseemly fall of the Pāṇḍavas on the great pilgrimage, the end of even Krishna by means of a hunter: everyone comes to a miserable end. The primary end: Although it is stated that the Mahābhārata contains whatever exists “and in dharma and in artha and in kāma and in mokṣa,” the four words “and” in this verse suggest the following. Although there is here no wealth of dharma, artha, and kāma that cannot be found elsewhere, it is in this work that you can see the miserable end to which they come. On the other hand, that element which consists in mokṣa should be considered the essence of the whole.

The more: The word lokatantram (the world's affairs) may be etymologically explained as that which is set in order (tantrayamāna) by people (loka), that is, carefully gathered, viz., dharma, artha, and kāma, and the means of attaining them. These things, although they are regarded as valuable, still, in whatever way one meets them, that is, in gaining, preserving, or losing them, [they prove to be] insubstantial and empty as a mirage. Go wrong: that is, turn out to the contrary. He means that there can be no thought of their being substantial. In all these ways will disenchantment with them, viz., with the world's affairs, grow. By the author's here suggesting the indifference (nirveda) to worldly things which arises from knowledge of
their true nature and which is the persisting emotion (sthāyībhāva) of the rasa of peace, and by his stating the insubstantiality of all else, he has made it clear that this rasa is predominant.

Our author anticipates an objection that a beauty of the erotic, the heroic, and of other [rasas] also appears in the Mahābhārata, saying: It is no contradiction, etc. Although a rasa may be subordinate, persons who are given to pleasure and subject to worldly passions will fix upon it erroneously, as others will fix upon the body as the cognizing self although it is merely the seat of the sense organs for the experience of the cognizer.

As sufficient in themselves: He means that on the other hand there is no harm if these virtues serve to promote one's devotion to God. One should construe the words vibhūtiṣu rāgino guṇeṣu ca5 with nivṛṣṭadhiyo mā bhūta. One should look farther: that is, at what comes in the Mahābhārata after the Anukramani.

Anticipating an objection that "Vāsudeva" refers to a son of Vāsudeva and not to God the highest, the supreme self, Mahādeva, he says: [What is intended] under such designations as "Vāsudeva," etc. In such passages as:

At the end of many births, the man of knowledge will come to me, knowing that Vāsudeva is universal.6

the meaning is clear: that the entity designated by the name "Vāsudeva" is this [highest Brahman] in its form of the whole.

Has been determined: The sūtra 4.1.114 rṣy-andhaka-vṛṣṇi-kuru-bhyas ca (Pān. 4.1.114) is prescribed, because these words, while they are eternal, were later assigned by chance.7

As a work of doctrine: Insofar as one seeks in it the aims of man without being concerned with aesthetic taste, this designation is appropriate;8 but the designation of rasa applies to it as it is furnished with the means of aesthetic pleasure. Such is our author's intent, which he has stated at length in his Tattvāloka.9 Since it is not the main subject here, we do not discuss it.

Far greater luster: He gives the reason for this statement, saying: For it is common knowledge, etc. The word ca here has the sense of yasmāt ("because"). Since the matter [here referred to] has been in common knowledge from the earliest times, it follows that this was what the blessed Vyāsa also and his followers had in mind in expressing matter indirectly.10 Otherwise, [that is, if Vyāsa had written in disregard of convention.] we could have no assurance on reading "Having
paid homage to Nārāyaṇa, the author intended us to construe the verb with its object, or of any similar convention. This is what our author intends. In using the words intelligent and well-educated our author follows the distinction he has made of “a work of doctrine” and “a work of poetry.”

After this incidental discussion of the construction of the Mahābhārata, he now summarizes the matter stated above in the words of the Kārikā, “The poet should concentrate his attention on that one type that achieves rasa”: Accordingly, it is clear, etc.

That is why: because the matter is clearly established. That is why what we see in literature (viz., that the composition possesses great beauty if its material is in harmony with a rasa) is reasonable. Otherwise it would not be reasonable. And it is not unreasonable, because we experience it as being beautiful; and the sole cause of this experience is that the material harmonizes with a rasa. This is the sense. Any particular figures of speech: The word antara (literally, “other”) here means viśeṣa (“particular”). Or, since the example he is about to give actually contains the figure rasavadalāṅkāra, the compound alāṅkārāntara may mean a figure of speech other than that.

[Victorious is the great sage, etc.:] It may be objected that his seeing the fish and the tortoise suggests the presence of the whole ocean in the palm of the sage’s hand and from this we conceive the sage’s greatness, but that there is no beauty added to the stanza by word-meanings that are harmonious with the rasa. Anticipating this, our author says, Here the vision, etc. But the objector may rise again. “We are willing to grant,” he may say, “that the suggested sight of the ocean is in harmony with the rasa of wonder, but how can your example be illustrative in that portion of it where ‘that which is in harmony with the rasa’ is the literal meaning [of ‘fish’ and ‘tortoise’]?” In answer to this our author says, For in this stanza, etc. For a matter that is trite: The sense is of something that has lost its substance by being described and portrayed time and again, being like twice-pounded grain. He shows that this principle applies to many passages of literature: Nor need the mention, etc.

Lucky man, etc.: That side of her next to you, touched tulāgrena, that is, accidentally, as you passed by in the street, lucky man, still perspires, etc. The perception of rasa: the perception of the love that they feel for one another. He emphasises that the meaning here is in harmony with the rasa by giving the contrary: that the lady after touching you, etc.
The first Kārikā of the Fourth Book contained the words, “by this road of dhvani and of subordinated suggestion.” Our author now summarizes the portion already explained, which states that by the road of dhvani poets may gain an endless stretch of imagination, by saying, We have thus described, etc. He then explains the portion that concerns subordinated suggestion by saying, [A freshness from using] a subordinated suggestion, etc. Of the three kinds: he means, by subordinating to the literal meaning a suggested meaning in the form of a fact or situation (vastu), a figure of speech, or a rasa. In this area an endless variety [is possible] by the subordination of all the different varieties which exist of dhvani. He indicates this in speaking of his book’s becoming too long.

[The reader can supply them] for himself: A stanza of my own will furnish an instance where a suggested fact, by being subordinated, gives a fresh color, although it is close in matter to an older verse.

This is well done. O champion of those who tremble in fear:
that you give not a moment of rest
to the money that seeks you for refuge.14

Here a fact, namely the generosity [of the addressee], being suggested by his constantly giving away his money, embellishes and gives freshness to the literal sense, although the sense is close to that of an older poet:

- Coins, whose bodies are weary
  of running from hand to hand of the generous,
  regain their health as it were
  when they sleep in the house of a miser.15

Freshness may be achieved by embellishing the literal sense with a suggested figure of speech, as in this verse of mine:

Your hair was once well fitted for love’s increase,
when it was black as a cluster of bees in springtime.
How can it now, when it has turned as grey
as ashes on the graveyard, not bring dispassion?16

Here the suggested figures of ākṣepa and vibhāvana17 which embellish the literal sense give a fresh color, although the stanza is built on an old idea. For there is an old verse which runs as follows:

Hunger, thirst, lust, envy, and a fear of death:
all five increase in old age, even among the wise.
A suggested rasa, subordinated by its acting as an embellishment of the literal, may give freshness, as in my verse:

This is not age; the angry snake of Death
is spitting and has scattered his white venom
on a man’s head.
That the man can see this and yet seem happy
in his heart, nor seek the goal of Śiva:
ab, how brave he is!1

Here the literal sense, being embellished by the rasa of wonder, becomes charming, for [the wonder] is subordinated to furnishing the rasa of peace. Thus a freshness is achieved in the presence of an old verse like the following:

That disenchantment does not arise
in one whose body is broken with age,
surely that man must believe in his heart
that death does not exist.

1. The mahāpatha, lit., "great road," is the pilgrimage of self-destruction. One walks north into the Himalaya until one perishes. The mahāpatha of the Pāṇḍavas is related in the 17th Book of the MBh. 2. MBh. 1.56.33
3. Perhaps the rationale of this suggestion is based on the emphatic effect of repeating the word ca. If we say Rāmāyanaṁ ca Mahābhārataṁ ca tasya hṛdayamgate "He has memorized both the Rāmāyana and the Mahābhārata," the suggestion is that others may have memorized the Rāmāyana, but he is outstanding in having memorized the Mahābhārata also. But the suggestion is farfetched. 4. By yena yena prakāreṇa Abhinava is glossing yathā yathā. 5. Apparently Abhinava read ca in place of vā. 6. Gītā 7.19. The completion of the verse is: iti sa mahātmā sudurlabhah. 7. See above, 4.5 A, note 15. 6. Read sodaraḥ, as given by S. K. De, "The Text of Kāvyāloka-locana iv," p. 251. Two lines later we must read vitatyoṅktaṁ in place of vitaktyoṅktaṁ. 9. See Introduction, p. 11.
10. What they had in mind was that their readers, following the convention, would take that which was indirectly expressed as most important. 11. The first words of the Mahābhārata in the Northern Recension. 12. See above, 2.4 Introduction A, and note 1. 13. Ānanda’s thesis has been that rasa, the chief element of beauty in poetry, is achieved only by suggestion. The objector’s point is that it seems to go against that thesis to say that the beauty of a poem can be greatly increased by a literal meaning, not a suggested meaning, which harmonizes with the rasa. The answer is that if the suggestion is stale and trite, anything harmonious with the rasa which lifts the suggestion out of its triteness and gives freshness to the poem, will
bring about an increase of beauty. The importance of suggestion is not hereby abandoned, but is made less rigorous and exclusive. 

14. (J. Masson) Abhinava’s point is that the suggested idea of the generosity of the king embellishes the literal sense by rationalizing it and thereby becomes subordinate to it. This is always the case in that kind of vyājasṛuti where the literal sense is a censure, eventually ending in a suggested compliment. 

15. The second half of the stanza should read: atthā kīvinagaratthā sathāvathā suvanti viva. Note that the stanza, when translated into Sanskrit, is metrically perfect: tyāgnijana-kara-parampāram-saṅcīrana-kheda-nīsaha-sārīrā / arthāh kṛpana-grhasthāh svastāvastāhāh svapantīvā //

It would seem that the author composed the stanza in Sanskrit and converted it only later into Prakrit. 

16. As Abhinava says that the stanza is built on the same idea as the next stanza, the subject addressed must be a man and both rāgavrddhaye and viraktaye must refer to that man’s reactions. As BP says, “these are the words of someone addressed to a friend.” 

17. Ākṣepa here means “hint of a simile,” as Abhinava has explained in 1.13e L (see note 2 thereon). The simile is, that just as the color of his hair might have influenced the man in youth, so ought it to influence him now. The figure vibhāvanā is the imagining of an effect as existing without a cause: see Bhāmaha 2.77, Daṇḍin 2.199, AlSrav. p. 157, SD 10.66 and 67. Daṇḍin’s definition is “Whenever in the absence of a well-known cause we must imagine some other cause, or imagine that the thing is self-caused, we have the figure vibhāvanā.” To apply the definition to the present verse: The man continues to be eager for love, although the normal causes of this affection, youth and a handsome appearance, are absent. So we are forced to imagine another cause, viz., that which is explicitly stated in the “old verse” which follows: men are even more subject to vice in their old age than they are in their youth. 

18. kālaḥbhujagakah: the snake which is death, or the black snake, i.e., cobra. śivopāya: the means to his welfare, but Abhinava uses uḍāya regularly to mean a path to mokṣa; see the chapter headings of his Tantrāloka. The literal sense of the stanza must be close to that of the “old verse” quoted below. It is simply that a man (representing most men) does not prepare himself for death when it draws near. This sense is here embellished by the fancy that the snake of Death is already on the man’s head; the white hairs are the snake’s venom. That the man pays no heed even under such circumstances suggests the rasa of wonder. The final words, or as we should say, the punch line, is ironical. J. Masson says of himself that “he feels that the older verses [quoted in this section] are more virile than Abhinava’s, which strike him as too self conscious and overly written. He has the impression that Abhinava might have written these verse expressly for the occasion of illustrating his thesis.” The impression may well reflect the truth, but on the value judgment V. P. and D. I. disagree. The “old verses” are like a hundred others in the Cāṇakya collections and in the 12th Book of the MBh.
They become tedious. Abhinava's verses stir one's interest and so are more persuasive.

\[ § 4.5 \]

K In this way, by the help of dhvani and subordinate suggestion, the matter of poetry is without end, if the poet has the gift of imagination (pratibhā).

A Even if there exist products of earlier poets [on the same subject, but only] if the poet has the gift of imagination. For in the absence of that, there can be no subject matter whatsoever of poetry. Even beauty of style (bandhacchāyā), which is the employment of words appropriate to the two meanings [viz., dhvani and subordinated suggestion], is impossible if there is no imagination in regard to the meanings. To suppose that beauty of style can consist in the choice of sounds without regard to any particular meaning is to suppose something in no way close to [the view of] sensitive readers. For at this rate the stringing together of words that are clever and sweet regardless of sense must be called poetry. If it is asked how such a composition could be called poetry at all in view of the fact that poetry is defined as the combination of words and meanings, we would remark that just as a composition built on the subject matter of another poet is called the poetry of that [other poet, regardless of the words which it contains], so would a construction of poetry of this sort [viz., with a novel arrangement of words regardless of meaning, also be called poetry].

1. The question is the natural reaction of a reader to the exaggeration of the preceding sentence. It is answered by explaining the exaggeration as an extended or metaphorical use of the word poetry. 2. Note that the pronoun tat in tatkāvyatva must refer to the para in paropanibaddha; so L, BP, and Badarināth Śarmā. Jacobi, followed by all translations into English which I have seen, took the word tat as referring to the later poet. But that is syntactically impossible.
§ 4.6 L ]

Even if there exist, etc.: our author fills out the Kārikā. Assuming that the first three quarters are clear, he comments on the fourth: [but only] if. The sense is: if this gift of imagination is present, the matter of poetry may grow in the manner stated; but not if it is wholly lacking. [In the absence] of that: of that gift of imagination, which has become endless. No subject matter whatsoever: for every subject has been handled by some poet of the past; what is there now left on which the poet may exercise his faculty of description? Well, even if there is no new subject to describe, a beauty of style, also known by the synonyms ukti (expression), paripāka (perfect ripeness),1 gumphā (weaving), ghatanā (arrangement, texture),2 can be constantly new. By its use there will be a chance for the poetry of later times. Anticipating this thought, our author says, Even beauty of style, etc.

Two meanings: a suggested meaning which is subordinate and one which is predominant. In no way close: he means, it will not find ready acceptance in their hearts. He gives the reason by saying, For at this rate, etc. Cleverness (caturatva) is the [skillful] forming of compounds; sweetness is lack of harshness.

Poetry of this sort: that is, possessing a new style. Since we call a poem that is built on a meaning that has been used by another poet a poem of that other poet, one should strive for originality of meaning. A kāvyā (poem) is that which is spoken (ku + suffix nyat); kāvyatva (poetry) is the abstract noun derived from that (kāvyā + tua). Thus there is no fault here of appending an abstract suffix to an abstract suffix.3

1. Pāka or paripāka refers to the choice of the mot juste. As Vāmana says (1.3.15) “pāka is when the words are incapable of being changed.” Rājaśekhara deals with the subject in Kāvyamimāṃsā, Chapter 5 (especially p. 20). See S. K. De, HSP, II, pp. 240-242. 2. The usual term is samghata-nā. See 3.33 bL, note 6 3. Pāṇini says nothing about redundant suffixes, but they come under the censure of Patañjali (on 3.1.7, towards end). Hence Abhinava’s etymology of kāvyatva, which avoids the apparent redundancy and from a historical viewpoint is certainly wrong.
A In order to convey [to the reader] that the endlessness of poetry depends not only on the suggested meaning but also on the literal meaning, it is now said:

K An endlessness arises of the literal meaning too, even taken by itself, as its nature differs according to the particulars of state (avasthā), place, time, etc.

A An endlessness arises of the literal meaning, taken by itself, that is, even without regard to the suggested meaning, by its very nature. For the nature of the things directly expressed, whether they are sentient or insentient, becomes endless from differences in state, differences in place, differences in time, and differences in individuality (svālakṣanya). By making these objects, varied in this way, into the subjects of a poem, even if it is a svabhāvokti (naturalistic description) which portrays faithfully their many well known characteristics, the matter of the poem becomes limitless.

As an example of endless poetry achieved by a difference of state, we have the goddess Pārvati in the Kumārasambhava. The first description of her ends with the stanza (1.49) “sarvopamādravyasamuccayena.” [The complete stanza runs:

The creator used painstaking care,
setting in place each ideal form,
as though in making her he had wished to s
all beauty gathered in one person.]
Next, as she approaches the eyes of Śiva, she is described in a different way as the assistant of the God of Love, wearing "jewelry of springtime flowers" (3.53). [The complete stanza:

The ājoka shamed the ruby's red,
the karnikāra the luster of gold,
the śinduvāra formed the necklace of pearls
in her jewelry of springtime flowers.]

Then when she is ornamented for her marriage, her beauty is described in still a different way in verses that begin (7.13):

The matrons placed her facing east
[and stood before her; but they tarried
with ornaments all ready, for their eyes
were captured by her natural beauty.]

The manner of this poet of frequently describing a single person never seems repetitive or without a wealth of fresh matter.² This has been shown in my Viṣamabāṇalīlā.³

The winning gestures of loved women
and the matter of great poets
have no limit, nor do they seem
in any way to be repetitive.

There is another method of differentiation by states, inasmuch as of all insentient objects, such as the Himalaya and the Ganges, there is a sentient form, known as its presiding deity. Such an object appears entirely different when treated by joining it to the form belonging to the appropriate sentient being. As in the Kumārasambhava again, the Himalaya is [first] described in its form as a mountain (Kum.Sam. l.lff.); then, in the complimentary addresses of the seven sages (6.66ff.), when its sentient form is shown, it appears entirely new. This is a well known procedure of great poets and this path has been described in det 1 for the instruction of poets in the Viṣamabāṇalīlā.

1. See 2.4 L, note 33. Ānanda seems to be using the term here of a stanza lacking both figures of speech and dhvani. But Abhinava will not agree to this. As for the svabhāvokti stanzas of the anthologies, some of them carry dhvani and some do not. See SRK, Section 35, translated in HOS Vol. 45.

2. Probably one should drop the negative a from aprunarkatāvena and read vānavana together. Krishnamoorthy notes two MSS which add a na before pratibhāsate, which would have the same effect. To take the first na with ekatra (so Jacobi) is unnatural. Furthermore, ekatra should mean not "in one
place," but "about one subject," viz., Pārvatī. After all, the point is that
one can write endlessly about a single person if one makes use of different
avasthās, etc. 3. See Introduction, p. 10.

In order to convey: one should supply "incidentally." Or, if our author's intention is that the literal is merely auxiliary to the various suggested meanings and that by force of its being endless the suggested meanings become endless, this [conveyed information] may be pertinent.1

Taken by itself: the intention is, that it is endless in itself without any touch of that process by which it becomes subject to the suggested meaning; but that afterwards, while being endless in its own nature, it manifests the suggested meaning. To suppose that the suggested is not in play at all would rob the result of the name of poetry, for it would lack that which is the soul of poetry. And so it is that in the examples [about to be adduced] there does exist rasadhvani.

Our author specifies what is meant by "etcetera" in the Kārikā: Difference in individuality; that is, in the particular nature of the thing, as color and touch [which may be individually differentiated although occurring] in the same degree of intensity in one substance at one and the same time.2

[Abhinava translates the Prakrit stanza, "The winning gestures," etc., into Sanskrit, then continues:] The use of the two particles ca suggests extreme wonder.3 In any way: Being considered with the greatest care, no trace of repetition is observable. Of loved women: One like Krishna who is lucky in love, even in enjoying his many beloveds in his good fortune of sexual enjoyment, does not notice any repetitiousness at that time. As has been said:

To be at each moment ever new
is the very nature of loveliness.

[Māgha, Śiśupālavadha 4.17]

Loved women: What is more, although these graceful gestures (vi-bhrama)4 of beloved women have been exercised since the beginning of time, they appear ever new. They are not a ritual taught by some one, like the laying of a Vedic fire, by which they might become repetitive from imitation of the teacher. Rather, they spring into appearance solely from the natural budding of the surging intoxication of love, and so are ever new. In just the same way, the matter of poetry flows forth
from the poet's own gift of imagination without foreign i
This is the general intention.

1. Pertinent (prakṛti), is opposed to incidental (prasaṅgāt). Ānanda makes no reference to the subordination of vācyayā vyaṅgya in the svabhāvokti stanzas of which he speaks or in his citations from the Kumārasambhava. But as the thesis of his book is that dhvani is the soul of poetry, Abhinava feels that it must be brought in here. 2. Abhinava is thinking of properties, of a mango fruit for example, which are observed together as they undergo parallel development in the course of the ripening of the fruit. Even they can be distinguished. 3. The use of the double ca is emphatic: "They both have no limit and they do not seem to be repetitious"; see 4.5 L, note 3. I suppose the emphasis could suggest wonder. 4. vibhrama: "a swift, graceful motion, usually coquettish, that tricks or intrigues the eye of the beholder," Ingalls, "Words for Beauty," p. 104.

A It is well known that great poets achieve originality by distinguishing the states of sentient beings into childhood and so on. Even within a single state of sentient beings many subsidiary states can be distinguished: as, of young girls there are those whose heart has been pierced by the God of Love and there are others; and even among these there are those who are nice and proper (vinīta) and those who are not. And among insentient things the individuality of each different stage from origin onward, if described in a poem, will produce endless variety. For example:

These buds, which being swallowed by the wild geese,
in rolling down their sweetened throats, produce
a new and limpid beauty in their cry,
are pushing up now from the lotus bulbs
like tender tusks of young she-elephants.

[Kamalāyudha]¹

One may follow the line thus indicated in treating of other [objects] also. Variety of insentient things, to begin with, is well known to arise from differences of place, as of winds that travel over different countries and regions; of other objects too, such as waters and flowers. Among
sentient beings, such as men, animals, birds, there is obviously a great
difference between those who have been raised in villages, forests, rivers,
or the like. If one makes these distinctions in writing of them, one will
find an endless store of material. Thus, to take only humans, who could
ever exhaust the manifold variety of customs and activities of persons
from different countries and regions, especially of young women? All
this is material for the composition of a good poet according to his
genius.

There is a variety also from differences of time, as of insentient things
such as the horizons and heavens and rivers, from the various seasons;
while of sentient beings it is well known that such emotions as the
yearning of lovers depend upon the time of year. And it is obvious that
there can be a different description [in poetry] of everything on earth
according to its individuality. These matters, if only they are brought
into one’s composition each as it truly is, will lead to an endless stock
of material.

On this point there are those who might object. The facts of the
world, they might say, come into denotation in their general, not their
particular, forms. For poets superimpose those states of mind like hap­
piness which they themselves have experienced, as well as the causes
of these states, upon others, and in this way bring the facts of the
world into their works only by recourse to that form of the facts which
is common to the experience both of the poet himself and of others.
They are not, like yogis, able to perceive such things as the thought of
others in the past, present and future. Furthermore, the general form
of intelligible experience, which is common to all readers, is limited in
extent and has been already surveyed by the ancients, for it is impos­
ible that it should not have fallen within their range. Accordingly, the
particular variety of facts which is taken by modern poets as [offering
them scope for] originality is a delusion on their part. The only variety
lies in the manner of speech (bhaniti).

1. I have corrected my translation from that which I gave in SRK 284,
where this stanza appears, attributed to the poet Kamalāyudha. There are
three words “kasāya” in Sanskrit with the distinct meanings of “red,” “as­
tringent,” and “sediment or impurity.” It is the first of these that the poets
make use of; and since rukta (“red”) also means passionate, kasāya extends its
meaning in the same way. Sweet-voiced birds are called kasāyakantha (Kum-
Sam. 3.32, Mālatīmādhava 7.1 +30, and the stanza here quoted), whatever
color their throat may be. The throat of the grey goose (kalahamsa, either
Anser anser or Anser cinerale), of whom the term is here used, is grey
or blue-grey, not red. In the compound kasāya-kanṭha commentators often gloss kasāya as madhura (sweet) or manohara (charming) and the compound is indeed about equivalent to "sweet-throated." As for the elephant tusks, those of the females are whiter than the tusks of the bulls. On a young female elephant they might well look like lotus shoots. The stanza is quoted by Kuntaka as an example of delightful charm (Vākrokti 1.23.73). There is a prose passage closely resembling our stanza in Bhavabhūti's Mālatīmādhava (7.1 +30). As Kamalāyudha, apparently the teacher of Vākpatirāja, should be placed in the late seventh century, Bhavabhūti (early eighth century) would seem to be the borrower. The passage runs: kava- 
liaśravinda kesara kasāya-
kanṭha kalahamsa ghosagharakkhaligambhirabhāradi, "a deep voice, limpid and stuttering as the voice of kalahamsas whose throats are kasāya from the filaments of aravinda lotuses which they have swallowed." Bhavabhūti doubt-
less intended to give kasāya a double meaning here, for the aravinda lotus is red. The birds will have acquired their kasāya (passionate, sweet) voices from the kasāya (red) flowers. 2. In the descriptions of Sanskrit poetry longing increases during the rains, whereas, as with us, new love blossoms in the spring. 3. We follow here the reading of the KM edition, paracittādi. But the Kashi edition reading, if a vowel is lengthened to agree with BP, is not impossible: cāparlicitādi. The sense would then be "are not able to perceive things past, present, and future with which they have no direct acquaintance."

L  To begin with (tāvat):1 Granted that they will reach the highest degree of variety at a later moment by the touch of a suggested sense, still, there is variety by their very own sense.

The cause of these states: i.e. the seasons, garlands, etc.2 Of the poet himself: by recourse to what is common to the experience of himself and to the experience of others, just that, without any further particulars. They are not able: sc., poets; this is said in order to show the utter impossibility. And even if they could perceive such things, arguments such as the following show that words touch only the general forms:

Words give a conventional sense;
this sense is for communication.
The particular does not exist at the time [of communication];
the convention therefore has no connection with it.

[Dharmakūrti]3

1. By tāvat Ānanda doubtless meant "to begin with from among the various factors (viz., states, time, place, etc.) listed in Kārikā 4.7." Abhinava's is a tendentious interpretation employed in order to preserve the book's
doctrines of the predominant importance of suggestion. See 4.7 L, note 1.

2. The spring season and garlands would be stimulants of sexual desire (rati).

3. The verse is 1.92 of Gnoli's edition of the Pramāṇavārttikā. 3.91 of the edition with Manoratha's commentary. The identification of the quotation was first pointed out by Gnoli, The Aesthetic Experience, p. xxxii. The probative force of the stanza rests on the Buddhist doctrine of the momentariness of all things. From this it follows that anything which we experience has ceased before we can verbalize it. We can only verbalize its general aspect (sāmānya), which does not really belong to the particular but is superimposed on it by our mind.

A To this we would reply. "If poetry relies on general traits only, what of the varieties of poetry shown, arising from [the description of] particular states, etc.? Must we say they are simply repetition? And if not, then how should there not be endlessness in poetry?" It is wrong to say that poetry relies on general traits only, and that, since these are of limited extent and have therefore been employed by the ancients, there can be no originality of poetic material. For if poetry relied on general traits only, how should we explain the profusion of poetic material in the works of the great poets, or how ascribe the name of poet to any one other than Vālmiki, as there would be no poetic material other than general traits and these would have been revealed by the very first poet? If you would remove this difficulty by [reference to] the variety of expression (uktī), we would ask just what this variety of expression is. For expression is the speaking of words which convey the particulars of a meaning to be denoted. If the expression has variety, how should the denoted meanings not have variety also, for there is invariable concomitance between denoter and denoted? The form in which the denoted senses appear in a poem is taken to be identical with the particulars of the external thing. Accordingly, he who speaks of variety of expression will be forced even against his will to accept a variety of denoted meanings also. The matter is summarized as follows.

If it is admitted that one poet at least besides Vālmiki possessed imagination, then the endlessness of poetic matter is safe.
What is more, the statement that variety of expression is a condition (nibandhana) of poetic novelty is quite in accordance with our view, for all the modes [of existence], which we showed above to be the cause of endlessness in poetic material, again become doubled through variety of expression. The well-known figures of speech, classified as [figures of sense] such as simile and [figures of sound] such as double meaning, being themselves limitless, multiply [the material] a hundredfold when they are brought into a poem through variety of expression.

Furthermore, an expression framed in a different language may bring about a further endlesssness of poetic material, as caused by the variety of meaning current in the respective language. An example is a verse of mine:

A man spends all his time saying "mahumahu";
and yet the god Krishna
never occurs to his mind.

1. The passage between asterisks translates the following words. Yadi sāmānyamātrāsrayena kavyapratīttis tat pradarśitaprakāraṁ kāvyavaiscītyam avasthādivīsāt kim, punaruktam evāstā, na cet tathā tat kathā na kāvyānantiṁ. This passage is found in the KM edition, is reported by BP as occurring in this position in "a certain text" (kvacid granthe), and is necessary to furnish the pratikas, viz., kim its and na ced its in Abhinava's commentary. It could easily have fallen out by haplography, the scribe's eye jumping from the first occurrence of sāmānyamātrāsrayena to the second. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine why it should have been added. 2. That is, between linguistic expression and thought. 3. The Kashi reading aksayam must be changed to the KM reading aksatam. To say that "endlessness is inexhaustable" (ānāntyam aksayam) would be inexcusable tautology. 4. The stanza, which is corrupt in the printed editions and MSS, is composed in the Apabhramśa or, as Abhinava calls it, Sindhī language, in which mahu means "mine." Abhinava also tells us that the expression Mahumahu [in the same language] may mean Madhumathana, an epithet of Krishna. The point of the verse depends on the double meaning. A man may have the name of God ever on his lips, but if he is filled with selfishness and attachment to wealth (ever saying, "mine, mine"), God is not in his heart. The verse has been much discussed; see Jacobi's note and Krishnamoorthy's note ad loc. Without pretending to a knowledge of Apabhramśa or SINDHI, I propose altering slightly Pischel's emendation (Die Prakrit Sprachen, para. 14. note 2) to produce a rhymed stanza in the form of 14-12-14-12 mātrās, as follows. Mahumahu itti bhanantaahu vajjai kālu jañassu / to vi na deu jañaddanau
goartci maṇassu // The form ḍhanantāahu is a present participle extended by a -ka suffix inflected in the genitive. For a Sanskrit translation, see Abhinava below.

What of: he means, how is it then that men of authority admit to feeling no repetitiousness of matter [in this poetry]? He explains further: and if not, etc.

For expression is, etc. The intention is this. If a particular expression were no more than a synonym and the matter could be fully expressed by other synonyms, we would lack the impression of non-repetitiveness. Accordingly, the particulararity of an expression is simply its power to convey a particular denoted meaning. With the particulars of the denoted thing: that is, as identical with the particulars of the thing which is grasped by such cognitive means as perception.

The point is this. Linguistic convention may bind a word to a universal, or to that which possesses a universal, or to an apoha (elimination of what a thing is not), or to what all else; why argue? That a particular instance of this [universal, etc.] is understood from a sentence is a matter on which no one disagrees. In all theories of sentence meaning, e.g., the anvitābhidhānavāda, its opposite (viz., the abhihitānvaya-vāda), the samsarga theory, or the apoha theory, there is never a denial that a particular [is what is finally understood]. Furthermore, it has been shown that variety of expression is not caused by the mere use of synonyms. As for variety of expression caused otherwise, it serves to further our thesis. Our author says this in the passage: What is more.

Again [become doubled]: furthermore [become doubled]. For simile becomes varied by such expressions as nibha (in likeness of), pratima (being an image of), chała (in the guise of) pratibimba (being a reflection of), praticchāya (mirroring), tulya (equivalent to), sadrśa (similar to), ābhāsa (appearing to be), because there exists a real difference of meaning underlying these expressions. One should say that the word nibha is properly used in connection with an appearance (bhāna), the word pratima where there is an imitation, and so on in each case. To regard these words as synonyms is an error which arises from the mischief of reading commentaries on poetry that are useful only for the young. This is the intention. In this way an endlessness of matter and an endlessness of figures of speech arises from variation of expression.
Our author now shows how this [endlessness] may arise [from varied expression] in another way. The word \textit{pratiniyatabhāṣāgocarārthavaicitryanibandhanam} is [a \textit{bahuvrihi} compound] to be analysed as “of which, sc., endlessness of figures of speech and of poetic material, the \textit{nibandhana}, that is, the cause, is a variety (\textit{vaicitrya}) brought about by the meaning (\textit{artha}) current in (\textit{gocara}) the respective language (\textit{pratiniyatabhāṣā}).” The construction of the sentence is, “A variety of expression (grammatical subject) brings about that endlessness (grammatical object).” The cause is set forth by that [\textit{bahuvrihi} compound] which qualifies the grammatical object.

[Abhinava translates the Apabhramśa stanza A man spends all his time, etc., thus:] 

\textit{Mama mama iti bhanato vrajati kālo janasya /}
\textit{tathāpi na devo Janārdano gocaro bhavati manasah //}

How should God not be present to the mind of one who constantly says “Madhumathana” (a name of Krishna)? This seems to be a contradiction. [The puzzle] is solved by the expression “mahumahu” in the Sindhī language [which means both Madhumathana and “mine, mine”].

1. \textit{Samaya} is the convention which binds a given word to a given meaning. The schools of philosophy differed as to the nature of the meaning in this dyadic relation. The Māmāsakas, as a result of believing the words of the Veda to be eternal, held that the meaning with which a word is connected, is likewise eternal. It is therefore a universal (\textit{sāmānya}), not a transient particular. The older Naiyāyikas held that the meaning is a particular as possessed of a universal, for if told to “bring cow” (Sanskrit has no definite article), a boy brings a particular cow, not the universal, bovinity. The Buddhist idealists held that the meaning of a word is an \textit{apoha}, for what is meant by such a word as “cow” is simply the denial of all things which are not a cow. All these schools agreed, however, that the meaning of a sentence, as opposed to that of a word, is a particular. Again, they differed in their analysis of the particular, the Māmāsakas, for example, regarding it as an action or state qualified by nominal conditions, the Naiyāyikas as a nominal subject qualified by an action, etc. But these arguments do not affect the point here at issue.

2. For the \textit{anvitàbhidhānavāda} of Prabhākara and the \textit{abhihitänvayaavāda} of Kumārila, see 1.4 b \textit{L}, notes 3 and 30.

3. This refers to the Nyāya theory, according to which sentence meanings are analysed as particular relations. Thus, “The pot is on the ground” is analysed as “[There exists] a relation of conjunction of which the \textit{pratiyogin} is pot and the \textit{anuyogin} is ground.”

4. The reason for Abhinava’s glossing the word \textit{panar} by \textit{bhûyas} is to show
that it is a separate word and does not form a compound with the following word ukṛti so as to give rise to the word punarukti (repetition).

A In this way poetic material, in whatever manner we describe it, finds no limit. But the following is said:

K The use of literal meanings, varied according to the state, etc. [of an object],

A as shown above,

in literature;

this cannot be denied;

K but this use really shines only by recourse to rasa.

L The Kārikā consists of the following: "The use of literal meanings, varied according to the state, etc., is often found in literature; but this use really shines only by recourse to rasa." The other words are supplementary insertions [by the Vṛtti].¹
1. The disentangling of the Kārikā from the Vṛtti would be useful in any case because it might not have been indicated in a manuscript, but it is especially useful here, where the last portion of the Vṛtti is metrical and could easily be mistaken for the concluding quarter of the Kārikā.

§ 4.9–10

Abhinava refers to these ślokas as "two kārikās." But there is no inherent reason for ascribing these sankṣepāślokas to the Kārikās proper, any more than there is for giving the Kārikās the sankṣepāślokas furnished under 1.13 k A, 2.5 d A, and 3.41–42 a A. It seems to me clear that both these so-called Kārikās are part of the Vṛtti. But I have kept the traditional numeration in order to avoid confusion.

A The matter is here summarized for the instruction of good poets:

[K] If the subject matter [of poetry] is connected with the rasas and bhāvas, if it follows the principle of propriety and takes account of such differences as those of time and place.

then, not to speak of other poets of limited powers,

[K] in writing up [this subject matter] not even Vācaspati, in a thousand efforts, could exhaust it, any more than he could exhaust the nature of the universe.

A For just as the nature of the universe, although it has manifested this marvellous proliferation of matter through the succession of past ages, cannot be said now to be worn out and unable to create anything new, just so is the situation in poetry, which, although it has been worked over by the minds of countless poets, is not thereby weakened, but increases with ever new artistic abilities.
Here [viz., in 4.9–10] the author, after having merely referred to the sense of the first three quarters [of Kārikā 8], states the meaning of the fourth quarter, as it is something new. The section from then to limited powers is supplementary material between the two Kārikās [viz., 4.9 and 4.10]. Our author goes on to comment on the fourth quarter of the second Kārikā [viz., 4.10].

\[K\] coincidences [of thought] are likely among great minds.

It is clear that the minds of intelligent men are in agreement. However,

\[K\] a critic should not judge all these coi sort.

If it be asked why, [the next ill give the answer].

The first half of the Kārikā begins with coincidences (sāmvādās): the second half with a critic (naikarūpatayā vipaścitā). Fearing that this statement might be considered too dogmatic,¹ our author asks, why. The answer is given in the Kārikā which follows.

1. Literally, “fearing that this might be like a royal order.” Royal orders state what is to be done; they do not furnish reasons.
A coincidence is a similarity to something else. As with persons, it may be like one’s mirror image, or like one’s portrait, or like the body [of a person] which resembles one’s own.

For we call that a coincidence of poetic material which is similar to other poetic material. Here we may distinguish three types, as the material is like the mirror image of a person, or like his portrait, or like someone’s body which resembles his. Some poetic material is like other material in the way that a mirror image is like a person, some in the manner of a portrait, and some in the way one person resembles another.

[Abhinanda quotes the entire Kārikā and then adds:] The Kārikā is explained by the Vṛtti section by section. It shows that one is to supply the word “person” with each clause. Of a person: he means, like the body of the primary person, whose form we have clearly cognized.

Of these the poet should avoid the first, which has no soul of its own, and the next, which has a worthless soul; but not the third, which has a soul indeed, although it is like something else.

One who is wise should avoid the first type of poetic material here, which is like a mirror image, because it has no soul of its own, that is, it lacks any real substance. He should [also] avoid the next
type, which is like a painting, for, although it has a substance similar to another's, its soul is worthless. But a poet need not avoid the third type of poetic material, if it has a separate body which is beautiful, merely because it agrees with other poetic material. You cannot say that a person is the same because he happens to resemble another person. The next Kārikā is spoken in order to explain this.

L [Abhinava quotes the entire Kārikā and adds:] Of its own: That which owes its soul or nature to a poem of prior composition has no soul of its own. The form by which it assumes beauty was conceived by a previous poet, so that it is simply an image of that form. As to what it is in itself, our author says, it lacks any real substance. For nothing new has been imagined here by the later poet; it is just like the reflection in a mirror.

Having thus explained the first type, he goes on to explain the second: The next type, etc.: that is, the second. [The word anyasāmya is a bahuvrīhi compound, meaning literally "which bears a similarity to another." Its soul is worthless: In an imitation we are aware only of what is imitated, as in a painting or a manuscript. There is no conscious awareness of the minium and other paints [in which it actually consists]. And this [awareness] too [i.e., like our awareness of the first type] does not lead to our prizing it.]

In order to explain this: viz., that one need not avoid the third type.

1. Abhinava, like Ānanda, is here considering a painting only as a representation, not as a source of aesthetic pleasure in itself. One could argue that in viewing a great painting we are aware of the material itself as well as of what it represents. But such a painting would not be purely representational.

K The poetic material, if it has a soul of its own, even if it follows a previous prescription, will shine all the more, as does the face of a damsel which resembles the moon.
§ 4.15 K

A The poetic material, if it has an essential substance, a soul, of its own, even though it follows a previous pattern, will shine all the more. For poetic material, if graced by a resemblance to the ancient and the beautiful, attains the highest splendor, as does a body. Nor will it appear to be repetitious, any more than the face of a damsel which resembles the moon.

L [Abhinava quotes the entire Kārikā and adds:] The Kārikā is broken up and quoted section by section in the Vṛtti; but in some manuscripts the Kārikās appear in unbroken form.¹ Our author explains the word “soul” by the words “essential substance” which he prefixes to it.

1. As regards the present Kārikā, all the traditions and the MSS of which we have record are of this second type.

A Thus the lines have been drawn between [the different types of] similar sentence meanings, which are meanings of compound structure. The next Kārikā is stated in order to show that poetic material in the form of word meanings [of uncompounded structure] are not at fault from being similar to other material.

K Where an old arrangement of [word] meanings¹ is used, just as where an [old] arrangement of syllables, etc., is used, there is obviously no fault if new poetic material appears.
1. Vasturacanā is an imprecise term for padārtharacanā. The precise term is furnished by the Vṛtti and by Abhinava. The stanzas of both Kārikās and Vṛtti from here to the end of the work are in Classical meters.

A Not even Vācaspati could put together new syllables or new words. Even if these are the same old ones that are now put into literary form, they do not hinder originality in poetry or other literature. The same holds for elements of meaning such as word meanings that consist of puns, etc.

L [Of similar sentence meanings]: We are taking the reading saśasamvāḍānām. If one takes the reading samvāḍānām (noun instead of adjective), the construction will be of words which are not in grammatical agreement, viz., “[the different types of] similarity of compound structures in the form of sentence meanings.”

[In the Kārikā] the word vastu [in vasturacanā] means one or two or three or four or more word meanings. Even if these: viz., syllables or words. Are still the same: i.e., still bear their old form without having undergone the slightest difference. Having explained the portion that consists of the illustration, contained in the words [of the Kārikā, viz.,] “just as where an [old] arrangement of syllables, etc., is used,” our author connects it with the subject which is illustrated: The same holds, etc.

That consist of puns, etc.: that is, which have puns as their nature. For the words sadvṛttā, tejasvin, guṇa, dvija, etc., have been used punningly by thousands of poets from the most ancient past, and objects like the moon have been used as similes. After the words tathaiva padārtharūpāni, one should supply the words of the previous sentence from nāpūrvāṇī ghaṭayitum sākyate to viruddhyanti.2

1. sadvṛttā: of good conduct, or perfectly round. tejasvin: possessing light, i.e., the sun or fire, or possessing military charisma, i.e., hero or king. guṇa: string, or virtue. dvija: brahmin, or bird, or tooth. 2. I.e., “In the same way word meanings cannot be invented; although they are the same old ones, they do not hinder originality in poetry.”
Anything is beautiful if a person’s mind rises that something special has suddenly flashed before him.

"Here is a flashing forth of something special": such is the sudden delight (camatkṛti) which arises in a sensitive reader (sahṛdaya).

1. The only occurrence of this word in Ānanda. One may note also that he never uses the synonym camatkāra, which is so frequently used by Abhinava and later authors.

By composing such a thing, even if it resembles something old, a good poet incurs no reproach.

If a good poet of this sort puts such matter, although it resembles something old, into his verse in a form of composition which combines words capable of furnishing the denoted and suggested meanings that he intends, he does not incur reproach.

Our author explains the word “person” by “sensitive reader.” Rapture: a perception (buddhi) which consists primarily in a relishing (āsvāda) [of the rasa]. He explains “rises” (abhyaṣjjihite) by “arises” (utpadyate); the sense is “goes up.” He shows the form which the perception takes: “Here is a flashing forth,” etc.

[Abhinava now quotes the entire Kārikā and adds:] The Vṛtti quotes the Kārikā, breaking it [into two sections].
Let his words flow forth with balanced variety of matter and ambrosial rasa. Poets should not despair of a blameless subject matter of their own.

1. nimüa: a rare word. Kāśikā 3.3.87 takes it as meaning "balanced," and BP takes it here in that sense, which is appropriate to the context.

worrying that since fresh poetic materials exist, it is no virtue of a poet to put together materials that have been used by others.

For the great poet whose mind is averse to taking the property of others, the blessed Sarasvatī alone will furnish the material that he seeks.

The blessed Sarasvatī will furnish the material he needs to the great poet who is averse to taking the property of others. Great poets who perform with a ripeness of previous merit and practice and who are without greed of appropriating materials used by others need make no special effort of their own. The blessed Sarasvatī alone will reveal the material which they desire. This is what it means to be a great poet. Amen.

Subject matter of their own: the sense is, that which flashes before them as something of their own time [i.e., new or modern]. After making a supplementary remark, the Vṛtti goes on to quote the second half of the stanza. The third quarter of the stanza is "For the great poet whose mind is averse to taking the property of others."
§ Conclusion A |

Anticipating a fear that the poet, knowing not whence to obtain something new, may give up all effort, or may make a livelihood out of others' works, [the Kārikā] says, the blessed Sarasvatī, etc. [The Vṛtti] takes the term "great poet" in the Kārikā as a generic singular and explains the sentence by saying, Great poets, etc. He makes clear [who these poets are] in the passage beginning "who perform with a ripeness" and ending with "they do not." Will reveal: the sense is, will bring forth the new [material].

1. Apparently the negative was placed before tērām rather than before kvaicit in Abhinava's text.

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Conclusion

A  There is a garden of the gods called poetry, from which residence of all delights, as it bears a wealth of quality and ornament befitting the recipient of unblemished rasas, the deserving gain whatever they may wish. In this garden has been shown the wishing tree of dhvani: may the pure of soul enjoy it.¹

The right path to the essence of true poetry for long lay as one might say asleep in the minds of men of ripened thought. That path the far-famed Ānandavardhana has explained for the benefit of connoisseurs.

- Here ends the Fourth Chapter of the Sahrdayāloka² composed by the master, Śrī Rājānaka³ Ānandavardhana.  

ished.
Conclusion A

1. By metaphor and by a series of double meanings Ānanda likens poetry to the garden of Indra's heaven, and likens dhvani to the wishing tree of that garden from which the elect may pluck all objects of their desire. The double meanings will be pointed out by Abhinava. Note that the long compound in the first pāda ending in bhrto is ablative in agreement with yasmāt. Yasmāt surely refers forward to kāvyākhya udyaśe, as Abhinava takes it, not to dhvani. Not only would the latter construction be extremely awkward, but dhvani cannot be said to be gunālānākārasobhābhṛt. 2. The Kashi text here prints dhvanyāloko. All but one of the recorded manuscripts, however, read sahrdayāloke. The one exception reads sahrdayalokānāmni kāvyālānākāre. See Introduction, pp. 12-13.

3. "Rājānaka" was a title, originally given in Kashmir and Trigarta-Kāṅgra for service to the king. It was held by many Kashmiri authors and continues in the family name Rāzdān frequent among Kashmiri brahmins even now. See Stein's note on Rājatarangini 6.117.

L  [In this garden has been] thus [shown]: that is, has been revealed by the exposition of the Kārikās and the Vṛtти thereon. [As it bears a wealth of qualities, etc.:] that is to say, as poetry, which has a wealth of qualities and figures of speech which are appropriate to a dwelling place of unblemished rasa. Also [in the literal sense] a garden bears a wealth of beauty by the rendering perfect (alāṅkāra) of such qualities as delicacy, color and fragrance, a perfection due to its being a recipient of timely (aṅklistha) moisture (rasa) occasioned by irrigation, etc. From which: that is, from the garden that bears the name of poetry. Whatever matter they may wish: what is meant are instruction, fame, delight. As we have stated this previously in some detail (cf. Lie L), we limit our explanation here to the [immediate] sense of the stanza. The deserving: those who can enjoy these desired fruits of poetry without painful instruction. The home of pure delight: the dhāman, that is, the one center, of unbroken (akhila) delight, that is, delight uninterrupted by any touch of pain. The author has in mind that it is difficult to find anything on earth that is wholly delightful and wholly beneficial. A garden of the gods: Nandana. “The deserving” [in another sense] refers to those who have performed such ceremonies as the Jyotiṣṭoma by which they attain their reward [in heaven]. Vibudhāḥ [in addition to meaning the gods] means the enlightened, those who know the essence of poetry. Has been shown: being existent, it has been revealed, for if something is not revealed to us, how can it be enjoyed? The wishing tree: The
compound kalpatarūpamāṇamahimā is a bahuvrīhi compound containing a second bahuvrīhi. Its literal analysis is: [dhwani] of which there is a glory (mahimā) of a sort of which a likeness is only with the wishing tree. For the attainment of everything one desires in poetry depends on it [viz., dhvani]. This too we have [previously] stated in detail.

[The right path: Abhinava quotes the first three quarters of the stanza and then adds:] In these lines the connection, the nature of the book, and the purpose,² are summarized.

In this world a person usually takes up a matter only if he believes in a possibility [of success], a belief brought about by the reputation in the world [of his informant or teacher]. Now this confidence in such a possibility arises from his hearing the name [of his informant] and his consequent memory of the qualities for which the informant was well known: his conduct, his knowledge of poetry, etc. For example, suppose a man understands the following. "This book was written by Bhartrhari. This metrical composition is the work of a man of whom there was this [well-known] nobility of character and of whom there is seen to be such a proficiency in this science [of grammar]³ Accordingly, it deserves respect." Such a man will be seen to take up [the study of that book]. Now people must be brought to take up [the study of a book] if the purpose which it proposes is to be achieved. So the authors of books mention their names as part of an effort to bring their audience, whom they would help, to take up the book. It is with this intention that our author gives his name, Ānandavardhana. The word "far-famed" conveys just this: that while the hearing of his name may turn some readers away, that may be ascribed to the working of their jealousy and is a matter of no account. For on hearing that the purpose of a book is salvation, if some man of passion should turn away from it, what of it? We certainly cannot say that the purpose of the book has been rendered void. So it stands proved that a famous name is part of winning over those who are seeking [the goal which an author has to offer].

I praise the Fourth Power, which enabl
the clarified variety of things
to flow forth into the external world,
the power which shows us the objects of perception.⁴
The Eye which was here employed, revealing all true objects that arise before it, and which is of an excellence that may be judged by its having brought together the essential meaning of that brilliant Light of Poetry springing from the judgment of Ānandavardhana, is that of Abhinavagupta.\(^5\)

Having his small intelligence refined by the mind of Bhaṭṭendurāja, a mind perfumed by the lotus feet of Śrī Siddhicela, delighting in the study of books by the masters of Mimāṃsā, Nyāya, and of Grammar, he wrote this comment on the matter of suggestion\(^6\)

This poet does not ask it of the good —does he ask it of the moon?—to give delight; nor does he keep reviling the ill-willed —does fire, even if reviled, grow cold? But if your heart is filled with Śiva, the auspiciousness of Śiva will be everywhere and nowhere will there be malignancy; so may your state be filled with Śiva and auspicious.

Herewith the Fourth Chapter of the Kāvyālokalocana composed by the great Śaiva master, Abhinavagupta.\(^7\)

This book is finished.

1. The literal sense of sukṛti-bhīḥ ("the deserving") is "those of good deeds." The implication is that the good deeds of their past lives enable them in this life to compose and to appreciate poetry without a long and arduous training. 2. sambandhāḥ bhīdhaya-praya-jojanāḥ: These three anubandhas have been explained in 1.1 L, note 1. The purpose (praya-jojana) of the book is explicitly given by the third pāda of the present stanza, viz., to explain the path of dhvani "for the benefit of connoisseurs." The abhidheya (nature of the contents) is furnished by the first quarter: "the right path to the essence of true poetry." That the sambandha (connection) between the book and its contents is one of pratipādīya-pratipādākabhāva (the relation between the communicating instrument and that which is communicated) may be readily inferred. 3. The reference is to Bhatṛhari’s Vākyapadiya. 4. See 1.19 L, note 5. The fourth power (turuṣṭā sakti) of God is that by which the world becomes sensible and perceptible. As a stage in the evolution of speech, it is equated with the turīyaṃ padam of RV. 1.164.45, or with the vaikhari, by
which speech is given its articulatory apparatus and becomes communicable.

5. The Eye (vilocana) refers to the title of Abhinava’s commentary. The Light of Poetry (kāvyāloka) is an alternate title of the Sahādayāloka (Dhvanyāloka).

6. I am not sure how to take the first quarter. The name Siddhicela occurs nowhere else to my knowledge. De (“The Text of Kāvyāloka-Locana iv”) records a variant reading, Śri Mantrisiddhi, likewise unknown. Both names may be corruptions. Furthermore, one might construe the compound to refer to Abhinava “who was perfumed by the pollen, etc., and by the mind, etc.,” so that we cannot be sure whether the obscure or corrupted name refers to a teacher of Abhinava or to his teacher’s teacher. In the third quarter, the reading of the Kashi text, vákya, seems to me preferable to De’s reading, kāvyā, because the terms vákyapramānapadavedi agree with the terms which Abhinava has already used in referring to these groups of scholars; see 3.33 m L, where Mīmāṃsakas were called vákyavidhah, Grammarians pada­vidhah, and Naiyāyikas pramānatattvavidah. One must take De’s reading guru (in compound) in place of Kashi’s guruḥ.

7. The colophon of the Fourth Chapter differs from those of the first three in naming the commented text Kāvyāloka instead of Sahādayāloka and in omitting ācāryavārya (the best of teachers) from Abhinava’s titles. This bespeaks a separate manuscript tradition and indeed almost all manuscripts of the first three chapters lack the fourth.
ABBREVIATIONS AND WORKS CITED

CORRECTIONS OF THE KASHI TEXT

INDEX OF FIRST LINES
(TRANSLATIONS)

PRATĪKA INDEX OF VERSES
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GENERAL INDEX
ABBREVIATIONS AND WORKS CITED

Where the names of books have been abbreviated in the translation and notes they are here listed under those abbreviations. For other works to which reference has been made, those in Sanskrit are here listed under the title, those in Western languages under the author. Cross references are given where it appeared that they would be helpful.

Entries for editions of Sanskrit texts give the titles of texts and commentaries and the names of their authors in the transliterated form of their standard spelling. The names of modern Indian editors are given in the form in which they appear on an English title page if one exists, omitting titles other than those inseparable from the scholar's name (such as the title "Śāstri" in "Subbā Śāstri") and the titles abbreviated here as "MM." (Mahāmahopādhyāya) and "Pt." (Paṇḍīt).

A: Ānandavardhana's vṛtti in the Dhv., as translated in the present volume.
Abh.: Abhinavabhāratī of Abhinavagupta. See BhNŚ.
Abhinanda: see Kādambarikathāsāra.
Abhinavagupta: see BhNŚ, Dhvanyāloka, Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśini, Īśvarapratyabhijñāvīrtivimarśini, Paryantapaṇcāśikā, and Tantraāloka.
AC: Alāṅkāravimāṇa. See K.Anu.
Alāṅkāravimāṇa: see K.Anu.
Abbreviations and Works Cited


Ānandavardhana: see Dhūntasvarīmin and Devisataka.


Āpadeva: see Mīmāṁsāyaïaprakāśa.


Appayadīkṣita: see Kuvalayānanda.


ASS: Ānandaśrama Sanskrit Series, Poona.


Bāśa: see Harṣacarita and Kādambarī.

Bhagavadgītā. With the Śaṅkarabhāṣya comm. and the subcomm. of Ānanda-giri, the Nīlakāṇṭhī comm., the Bhāṣyotkārādīpikā comm. of Dhanapati, the Śrīśurī comm., the Gitārthaṅgṛaha comm. of Abhinavagupta, and the Gūḍhāarthadīpikā comm. of Madhusūdana with the Gūḍhārthatattvāloka subcomm. of Dharmadatta (Bacchāśarman). Ed. Wāsudev Lexman Shāstrī Pansikar. Bombay: NSP, 1912.


Bhāmaha: see Kātyālonāra of Bhāmaha.

Bhāmatī: Brahmaśūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya. With the Bhāmatī of Vācaspati Miśra,

Bharata: see *BHNŚ*.

Bhāravi: see *Kir. Arj*.

Bhartṛhari: see *Nitisāataka* and Vāk.

Bhāskara: see *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*.

Bhāskari: see *Śivarupatyabhijnāvīmārṣini*.


Bhīmaśeṇa Dīksīta: see *Sudhāsāgara*.


Bhoja: see *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* and *ŚP*.

Bhoja’s *ŚP*: see Raghavan, V.

Bilhana: see *Caurapāṇḍava*.


*B*: Bhāṭṭanāyaka as quoted by Abhinavagupta.

*BORI*: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.

*BP*: *Bālapriyā* of Śrī Rāmaśāraka, commentary on *Locana*. See *Dhvanyāloka* (Kashi edition).


Abbreviations and Works Cited


Dandin. Unless otherwise specified, references are to his KA (Kāvyādārśa).


Dhanāñjaya: see DR.

Dhanika: see DR.

Dharmakirti: see PV.


Dhu.: Dhvanyāloka. See the following entries.


Dhvanyāloka: For editions and translations other than those listed above, see Krishnamoorthy, Kaumudi, and Jacobi.

Didhiti: see Dhvanyāloka (Haridas edition).

Abbreviations and Works Cited

Bombay, NSP, 1897, and frequently reprinted.
Ekāvali of Vidyādaḥara. With the Tarala comm. of Mallinātha. Ed. Kamalā-
Gautama: see Nyāya S.
GGA: Göttinger Gelehrte Anzeiger, Göttingen.
Gītābhāṣya of Abhinava (Gītārthaśaṅgrahā): see Bhagavadgītā (NSP, 1912).
Gītābhāṣya of Śaṅkara: see Bhagavadgītābhāṣya.
GOS: Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, Baroda.
Hanumannāṭaka, Eastern recension: see Mahānāṭaka.
Harṣa(deva): see Nāgānanda and Ratn.
Hemacandra: For other works of this author, see Abhidhānacintāmaṇi, nāmamālā, and K. Anu.
HSP: History of Sanskrit Poetics. See Kane, P. V., and see also De, Sushil Kumar.
IHQ: Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta.

Indurāja: see Kāvyādānākārasūtrasaṅgraha.


Īśvarakṛṣṇa: see Sāṅkhya Kārikā.


Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja: see RG.

Jaimini: see Mīmāṁsā S.


Jinendrabuddhi: see Nyāsa.

JAOS: Journal of the American Oriental Society, New Haven, Conn.
JOIBaroda: Journal of the Oriental Institute of Baroda, Baroda.
JOR: Journal of Oriental Research, Madras.
Joshi, S. D. Mahābhāṣya translations; see Mahābhāṣya.
K: the kārikās of the Dhw., as translated in the present volume.
Kalhana: see Rāj. Tar.
Kālidāsa: see Kum Sam., Megh., Ragh., Śāk., and Vikramorvāṣya.
Kalpalatāviveka, an anonymous work published as No. 17 of Lālbhai Dalpatbhai Bharateeya Samskriti Vidyāmandir, Ahmedabad, 1968. We know of it only through Krishnamoorthy, p. xiv.
Kane, P. V. The Sāhityadarpana [SD] of Viśvanātha (Paricchedas 1, 2, 10), with exhaustive notes and The History of Sanskrit Poetics [HSP]. Third ed. Bombay: NSP, 1951.
Abbreviations and Works Cited


Kashi edition: see Dhvanyāloka.


Kautilya: see Arthasaśāst


Kāvyālālikārasūtravṛtti: see KASV.


Kāvyamimāṃsā: see Kāv. M.

Kāvyaprakāśa: see KP.

Kiranāvali of Udayana: see Padārthadharmasaṅgraha.


KM: The Kāvyamālā Series, published by the NSP, Bombay; Original Series for short works, Guccchakas 1-14, 1886-1904; Main Series for larger works,
Abbreviations and Works Cited

Vols. 1–95, 1886–1913.


For other commentaries we have referred to Kāvyaprakāśa with the commentaries of Govinda Thakkura and Nāgojī Bhaṭṭa, ed. Vāsudev Śāstri Abhyaṅkar, ASS 66 (Poona: Anandārama Press, 1929); and Kāvyaprakāśa with the commentary of Śrīdha, ed. Sivaprasad Bhattacharyya, Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series Nos. 7 and 15 (Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1959, 1961).


Krishnamoorthy, K. *Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana*. Text, translation, and notes. Dharwar: Karnataka University, 1974.

Ksemendra: see *Aucityavicāraçarca*.

*KSS*: Kashi Sanskrit Series, Benares.

*KST*: Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, Srinagar, Allahabad, Bombay.


Kumārila: see *Ślokavārttikā*. See also *Mīmāṃsā S.*


Kuntaka: see *Vakroktijīvita*.

Kuppuswami Sastri: see *Kamudī;* see also *Āścaryacūḍāmani*.


*L*: the *Locana* of Abhinavagupta, as translated in the present volume.


Māgha: see *Śiṣupālavodha*.

*Mahābhārata*: see *MBh.*


Mahimabhaṭṭa: see Vyaktiveka.

Mammata: see KP; see also Śabdavyāpāraścara.


Mātaṅgamuni: see Brhaddeśī.

Mātrarāja: see Tāpasavatsarāja.

Mayūra: see Sūryaśāṭaka.


Mimāṃsā S., Mimāṃsā Śūtra: Mimāṃsādarsana of Jaimini. With the Śābārabhāṣya comm. of Śābara and with the Prabhā subcomm. (on 1.1, pp. 1-104) of Vaidyanātha Śāstrī, the Tantravārttika subcomm. of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (on Books 1.2-3.8, pp. 105-1140) and the Tūpīkā subcomm. (on Books
ABBREVIATIONS AND WORKS CITED

Mukulabhaṭṭa: see Abhilāhuttimārtkā.
Nāgojī (Nāgĕsa) Bhaṭṭa: see Paribhāṣenduśekhara and KP.
Namisādhū: see Kāvyālāṅkāra of Rudraṭa.
Nārāyaṇa, Bhaṭṭa: see Venīsāṃhāra.
NVTT, Nyāyuvaṭṭitakaṭātparyāṭikā of Vācaspatimiśra: see the following entries.
Nyāya S.: Nyāyasūtra of Gautama. Included in Nyāyasūtra; see NVTT (Calcutta edition).
Nyāya S. bhāṣya: Nyāyasūṭrabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana. Included in Nyāyasūtra; see NVTT (Calcutta edition).


Patañjali: see Mahābhyāsa and Yoga S.

Pāṭhak, Jagannāth: see Dhuṇyāloka (Vidyābhavan edition).


Patwardhan, M. V.: see also Masson and Patwardhan.


Pischel, Richard: see also Hemacandra, Grammatik der Prakritsprachen.

Praśastapāda: see Padārthadharmasāṅgraha and Upaskāra.
Abbreviations and Works Cited


Pratibhārendurāja: see Kāvyālaṅkārasūtraśodraḥa
Pravarasena: see Setubandha.


Raghavan, V. New Catalogus Catalogorum: An Alphabetical Register of Sanskrit and Allied Works and Authors. Madras: The University of Madras, 1949–. [So far eleven volumes of this work have been published.]


Rāja: see Kunjunni Rāja.

Rājaśekhara: see Bālarāmāyaṇa, Karpūranaṁjari, and Kāv. M.


must be reduced by one to fit all non-Bengali editions.


Rudraṭa: see Kâvyâlankârâ of Rudraṭa.

Ruyyaka: see Al. Šarv.

Šabara: see Mâmâsa S.


Śaktibhadra: see Āścaryacûḍâmâni.

Šâkara: see Bhagavadgîtâbhâsya, Saundaryalahâri, and Tait. Up.

Šâkara Misra: see Upâkâra.


Śântarasa: see Masson and Patwardhan.


Śârmâ, Badari Nâth: see Dvânyâloka (Haridas edition).


Sattasai: see also Weber, Über Das Saptacatakam des Häla.

Saundaryalahâri, or Flood of Beauty, traditionally ascribed to Śâṅkaraśârya. Edited, translated, and presented in photographs by W. N. Brown. HOS
Abbreviations and Works Cited


SD: Sāhityadarpana of Vīśvanātha. For Book Ten we have used the edition of P. V. Kane. third ed., Poona, NSP, 1951. For other parts of the work we have used the edition of Pt. Krishna Mohan Thakur (with his Lakṣmi comm., 2 parts, KSS 145. Benares, 1947-1948).


Siddhahemacandra: see Hemacandra, Grammat der Prakritsprachen.

Simhabhūpāla: see Rasārnavaśudhākara.


Śrīhardtāda: see Sadukti.

Śrīharṣa: see Naiṣadhiya.


Subrahmanya Iyer, K. A. “The Doctrine of Sphoṭa.” Journal of the Gan-
Abbreviations and Works Cited

ganatha Jha Research Institute 5.2 (1947), pp. 121-147.
Tantravārttika of Kumārila: see Mīmāṃsā S.
TPS: Transactions of the Philological Society, London.
Udbhaṭa: see Kavyālāṅkārasūtrasaṅgraha; see also Gnoli, Udbhata's Commentary.
Upalocana: see Kaumudi.
Utpala: see Īśvarapratyabhijnā.
Vācaspāti Miśra: see Bhāmaṭi, NVTT, and Yoga S.
Vajjālagga: see Patwardhan, M. V.
Abbreviations and Works Cited

Vākpati: see Gaūdavaho.
Vallabhadra: see Subh.Ā.
Vālmīki: see Rām.
Vāmana: see KASV.
Vātsyāyana: see Kāma S.
Vātsyāyana (Paksilasvāmin): see Nyāya S. bhāṣya.
Vetālapancavimsati: Die Vetālapancavimsatikā in den Recensionen des Čiva-
Vidyābhavan edition: see Dhvanyāloka.
Vidyādham: see Ekāvalī.
Vidyākara: see SRK.
Vidyānātha: see Pratāparudriya.
Vijñānabhikṣu: see Yoga S.
Viṣvanātha (Kavitāja): see SD.
Viṣvanātha (Nyāyapāṇḍācānana): see NVTT (Calcutta edition) and Nyāya-
siddhāntamuktāvalī.
Viveka: see K. Anu.
Vivrti, see Kāvyālokaśūtrasaṅgraha.
VS: Vaiśeṣikasūtra. See Upasthāra.
Vyāsa: see Yoga S.
Abbreviations and Works Cited

Weber, Albrecht: see also Sattasaṭ.
Yāska: see Nirukta.
CORRECTIONS OF THE KASHI TEXT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Line</th>
<th>In place of:</th>
<th>one should read:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Loc. 3</td>
<td>arthattväyogät</td>
<td>arthavattväyogät</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Dhv. 1</td>
<td>tadabhävädinām</td>
<td>tadabhävädinām</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Loc. 1</td>
<td>(smeread type)</td>
<td>tathā dhvanir api</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>tadanatirikta</td>
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<td>tathā by anupräsānām</td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Loc. 5</td>
<td>[Delete comma. Place danda after prabhedaau.]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Loc. 2</td>
<td>mātreneti</td>
<td>mātreneti</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Loc. 5</td>
<td>[Place danda after hetutā.]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Loc. 2</td>
<td>svābhyyupagamaprasiddhi</td>
<td>svābhyyupagamapraṣi</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>Loc. 6</td>
<td>prayogārthah</td>
<td>prayogah</td>
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<td>49</td>
<td>Dhv. 4</td>
<td>lāvanye</td>
<td>lāvanam</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(nirvarnya)mānam-nikhilā</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(nirvarnya)mānanikhilā</td>
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<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Loc. 4</td>
<td>[Delete danda, or replace by comma.]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Loc. 7</td>
<td>na (caivam)</td>
<td>Begin new paragraph.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Loc. 4</td>
<td>ye 'py avibhaktam</td>
<td>Begin new paragraph.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Loc. 2</td>
<td>bhūrviratva</td>
<td>bhūrviratva</td>
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<td>kevalārthasāmartyaniśedhā</td>
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<td>kevalārthasāmartyaṃ nisēdhā</td>
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<td>77'</td>
<td>Loc. 6</td>
<td>[Delete sahasvety api ca tadviṣayam vyāṇgyam.]</td>
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<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>Loc. 3</td>
<td>[Place danda after bhāvābhāsah.]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Loc. 7</td>
<td>[Place danda after vá.]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Dhv. 3</td>
<td>kāvyāsatmā</td>
<td>kāvyāsatmā</td>
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<td>kāvyāsatmeti</td>
<td>kāvyāsatmeti</td>
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<td>87</td>
<td>Loc. 1</td>
<td>karuṇarasamuccalana</td>
<td>karuṇarasasamuccalana</td>
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<td>88</td>
<td>Loc. 3</td>
<td>[Delete semicolon.]</td>
<td></td>
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<td>91</td>
<td>Dhv. 3</td>
<td>tat vastutattvam</td>
<td>tadvastutattvam</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>kāvyatmatam</td>
<td>kāvyatmatam</td>
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<td>94</td>
<td>Loc. 4</td>
<td>dvāvimsati</td>
<td>dvāvimsati</td>
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<td>96</td>
<td>Loc. 3</td>
<td>svarūpabhedenā</td>
<td>svarūpāvishayabhedenā</td>
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<td>109</td>
<td>Loc. 4</td>
<td>samāsokti</td>
<td>samāsokti</td>
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<td>110</td>
<td>Loc. 1</td>
<td>rātryā</td>
<td>tāyā rātryā</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[Delete semicolon.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>Dhv. 2</td>
<td>[Place danda after cārutvam.]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

vākyārtha vācyārtha

749
Corrections of the Kashi Text

In place of: one should read:

tatropasarjanā  tatropasarjanī
delet danda after iti; place danda after chāyāntareṇa.
ramayase  sma ramase
pahṇusai  pahnavai
cande piāmuhē  cande na piāmuhē

125  Loc. 6  prastutam, prastutam  prastutam aprastutam
126  Loc. 9  mahumahassa  mahumānāssa

[Delete semicolon.]

127  Loc. 12  yadavajñāyate  yadāvajñāyate
129  Loc. 15  apratibandhas tu  apratibaddhena

130  Loc. 1  apratibandho  apratibaddho
4  kam  kim

131  Loc. 2  deā pasiajiātāsu  de ā pasia nivattasu
5  saṅkāraṅkākāre  saṅkarālaṅkākāre

134  Loc. 3  (broken type)  śvapi satsu
8  bhede  bhedam

[Place danda after svātmā.]

140  Loc. 6  [Delete danda. Place danda after pratipatteh.]
143  Dhu. 7  asahuttam  saahuttam
8  pio jano  pie jane

144  Dhu. 3  savattinam  savatiṇam
145  Dhu. 2  pīdābha  pīdāma

148  Loc. 3  viśayayodharma  viśayyor dharma
149  Loc. 4  laksānalaksanāyā  laksātalaksanāyā

151  Loc. 7  (first word) kāra  prakāra
[Delete danda after ityarthāḥ.]

8  (first word) pasamharati  dupasamharati
9  (first word) -ārityarthāḥ  -dhhetor ityarthāḥ
10  (first word) tivyāptim  mātivyāptim

[Place danda after svāthā.]

152  Dhu. 1  [Delete danda.]

155  Loc. 1  svātha  svārtha
156  Loc. 4  [Close quote after vijñānārthāḥ.]
158  Loc. 1  na tvayam  nanvayam
5  [Delete second danda. Put danda in place of semicolon.]

159  Loc. 1  [Place danda after lokaḥ. Delete semicolon.]
161  Loc. 3  pratyāyitum uttam  pratyāyitum uktam
166  Loc. 1  prakāsitāḥ  prakāsītasya
8  gato laksyamāno  gato 'laksyamāno
169  Loc. 7  anudbhi viśesatvena  anudbhinnaviśesatvena
170  Loc. 5  bādhānimittam  bādhā nimittam
172  Loc. 2  [Delete both dandas. Put dandas in place of the dashes.]
### Corrections of the Kashi Text

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Line</th>
<th>In place of:</th>
<th>one should read:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>173</td>
<td>Loc. 12</td>
<td>vivakṣā tadabhāvayor</td>
<td>vivakṣātadabhāvayor</td>
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<td>176</td>
<td>Loc. 7</td>
<td>vyabbicī ināḥ</td>
<td>vyabbicārinōḥ</td>
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<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>sumṭhipi āṭim</td>
<td>sumbiśe</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>vibbhāvānubbāsāc</td>
<td>vibbhāvābbāsāc</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>[Place danda after bandhābhāvāt.]</td>
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<tr>
<td>179</td>
<td>Loc. 4</td>
<td>prayojakamevamamsāṃ</td>
<td>prayojakamekamamsāṃ</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>māsyādi</td>
<td>māṃsyādi</td>
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<td>180</td>
<td>Dhv. 5</td>
<td>hetunāṃ</td>
<td>hetūnāṃ</td>
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<tr>
<td>181</td>
<td>Loc. 2</td>
<td>[Delete second danda.]</td>
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<td>186</td>
<td>Loc. 11</td>
<td>[Delete semicolon.]</td>
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<td>190</td>
<td>Loc. 3</td>
<td>pratipādānābhyāṃ</td>
<td>pratipādanābhyāṃ</td>
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<td>192</td>
<td>Loc. 5</td>
<td>bhāvālaṅkāra eva</td>
<td>bhāva eva</td>
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<td>194</td>
<td>Loc. 5</td>
<td>tathā</td>
<td>yathā</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>[Delete danda.]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>195</td>
<td>Loc. 1</td>
<td>ityathāḥ</td>
<td>ityarthāḥ</td>
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<td>201</td>
<td>Dhv. 7</td>
<td>tāṅbī</td>
<td>tanvī</td>
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<td>202</td>
<td>Dhv. 1</td>
<td>cintā maunam</td>
<td>cintāmaunam</td>
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Corrections of the Kashi Text

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In place of:

parinyaso  
parāthatvān  
hi

[Put danda in place of first comma.]

yathā tattvām  
punarābdha  
nivaddhaḥ  
jāgrate/

[Delete danda.]

yathā tattvām  
punarābdha  
nivaddhaḥ  
jāgrato

[Delete danda.]

līlādādhā śuddhyuddhā  
mañimandalasāci  
kīmaśuśunāharatujjāīi  
āngammi

miavahāṇḍi  
avivea  
savina vi tuminmi puṇo-  
vanti a atanti puṃmas-

imi

347 Dhu. 4  [Delete danda.]
348 Loc. 2  [Place comma before yadi vā.]
4  [Delete danda.]
6 babuvacanam  
pau śakathā
7  babuvacanam ca (?)  
pauruśakathā

349 Dhu. 8  [Delete danda.]
Loc. 1 hanyamānatatāyā  
grāmatiketi svārthika
5  hanyamānatayā  
grāmatiketyalpārthika

351 Dhu. 4  sīnjadvaya  
avasara roum
7  sīnjadvalaya  
osara rottum
8  damsamanamettummet-  
tebeim jahim  
rundhiō
ambea niricchāō  
hā antām kim mām  
puloesieam
viāṇa  
[cia  naï]

sambandhitādam  
nirātapatārdharamyāiḥ  
viśvāsopagabhād  
samasi  
manupya
sambandhi tādam  
nirātapatvaramyaiḥ  
viśvāsopagamād  
tamasi  
manusya
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## Corrections of the Kashi Text

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Corrections of the Kashi Text

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500 Dhu. 3
Loc. 1-2 prātivesyakavadbukā prātivesiko
2 prāpitā prāpitā
4 [The final su belongs metrically in the next line.]
6 [Delete danda.]

501 Dhu. 2
Loc. 2 labdhasaundharya ty- arthah labdhasaundaryamity- arthah
2 prabbedah prabbedah

Corrections of the Kashi Text

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<td>[Shift danda from before to after raudrasya.]</td>
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<td>mitho</td>
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Corrections of the Kashi Text

Page Line | In place of: | one should read:
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526 Dhv. 3 | prâptâḥ | yâti
 | 7 | mitho | mito
528 Dhv. 7 | bibbrate | bibbirtha
 | 12 | satsvarthaåakti | satsu / arthaåakti
Loc. 2 | [Put danda in place of first comma.] | |
4 | [Place danda after punaruktyâ.] | |
529 Dhv. 1 | [Large omission after first danda. See Translation, 4.4 A, note 7.] | |
12 | vicitraûm | vicitre
530 Dhv. 2 | rûpam | rûpe
5 | [Delete hyphen at end of line.] | |
Loc. 8 | [Delete both dandas.] | |
10 | [Delete danda.] | |
531 Dhv. 18 | [Delete dash between câgre and pasiyyata.] | |
532 Dhv. 1 | ca sabdah | caسابدح
 | 11 | [Shift danda to follow paramparayâ.] | |
13 | svarûpam | svarûpam amśirûpam
533 Loc. 4 | sâda(rah) | soda(rah)
 | 6 | ktyoktam | tyoktam
535 Dhv. 4 | sopâso ajjâ vi suhâa | so pâso ajjâ vi suhâa tîm
 | 9 | vistâra | vistara
Loc. 1 | rathyâyântulâgrena | rathyâyâm tulâgrena
8 | guṇîbhûtetyâhinâ | guṇîbhûtetyâdînâ
12 | mallasaranâgaanaaṭṭhââna | malla saranâgaanaaṭṭhââna
536 Loc. 2 | khe a | khea
 | 3 | ramthyâ | ratthâ
 | 5 | kala | kila
6 | kathantadetena | katham tadete na
15 | śivo pâyannecchan | śivopâyam necchan
537 Loc. 2-3 | [jarâjirñasarirâsyâ, etc. should be printed as verse.] | |
538 Loc. 2 | [Place danda after yuktânâm api.] | |
7 | [Place danda at end of line.] | |
539 Dhv. 7 | apunaruktatvena vâ navâ- | punaruktatvena vânava-
 | navâ | navâ
 | 14 | cetana | sacetana
541 Dhv. 12 | sâbhânyâ | sâmânyâ
15 | paricitâdi | paracittâdi
17 | tasyâ viṣayatvâ- | tasyâviṣayatvâ-
Loc. 2 | vicitre | vicitrateti
542 Dhv. 2 | [Place danda after mātrameva.] | |
3 | [Large omission after tatrocyaîte. See 4.7 b A, note 1.] | |
Corrections of the Kashi Text

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<td>[See Translation, 4.7 b A, note 4.]</td>
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<td>[Place danda after mahimā and delete danda after chāstre.]</td>
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INDEX OF FIRST LINES

This index gives the first line of each of the poetic translations in the present volume. The index includes poetic passages from the prose kāyas, but does not include passages of prose dialogue from the Sanskrit plays. The Kārikā verses of the Dhvanyālōka have been excluded, as have the more prosaic of the expository verses from the treatises on poetics, such as those that merely state a definition of a figure of speech.

For each entry the opening words of the original text are supplied in parentheses. Numbers in bold type refer to pages on which the translation of the verse appears; other numbers refer to further pages on which the verse is discussed or referred to.

 Readers seeking verses remembered in their original language should first consult the Pratīka Index of Verses, which provides cross-references to the corresponding entries in this index.

A fool will take a poem that has no content, (yasmin asti na vastu) 61, 62-63.
A jewel placed against the whetstone, (manih sānollidhah) 146.
A man spends all his time (mahumahu itti bhanantaahu) 711, 713.
A scoundrel aims at his own interest, (yad vaṇcanāhītamātir) 468, 469.
A timid deer ran about among the tents. (trāsākulaḥ paripatan) 343, 345.
A tremulousness of the eyes, (yad viśramya vilokitesu) 108, 109, 603, 605 n6.
A true poet may treat unliving things (bhāvān acetanān api) 639.
Ah merchant, how should we have ivory (vāṇiaa hattidantā) 385, 687, 688 n7.
Ah verily, your courage must be envied! (aho batāsi srpanīyavīryah) 467, 468.
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With a newly flowered vine (ajjæm paharo) 179, 181.
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With its enraptured sound of doves and eager peacocks, (madamukhara-kapotam) 465 n2.
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With locks engoldened by the pollen (mandhärakawumarenupinjaritalakä) 403.
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The entries are listed in Sanskrit alphabetical order. The pratikas conform to the readings accepted in the present volume, as given in the Corrections of the Kashi Text and in the notes on the passages in question.

ankuritaḥ pallaṅitah The mango tree
angulyagre kari- There are a hundred
ajjām mohāro With a newly flowered
annatā vacca bālaa Go somewhere
sthāatithie vi- Victorious is the goddess
atiṃstasukhasā kalāh All times of
āttā ēttāa Mother-in-law sleeps here
ātrāntare kusumā- Meanwhile the
anadhyaavasitāva- My philosophy
anarātanayanāna- Who would not
anurāgavatī sandhyā The sunset is
apāre kāyaśaṃsāre In poetry’s
apūrvaṃ yad- Victorious is the Muse’s
ambā ētte ‘tra That’s where my aged
āmsī ye drāyante These things which
ānum kanaṅavarnābham How can you
āyam sa rajanot- Here is the hand
āyam ekapade tayā I cannot bear
āyam mandadyutār The sun with
ālam ssthītā śmaśāne Stay not at
ālpam nirmitam ākāśam God made
avyāññayāpy ayacchādyā He who shows
āsokaniḥbhārtitā- The asoka shamed
āhām tvām yadi If in my longing
ahkanapocarasieṃ On these days that
aho batām sṛṣṭiṇīya- Ab verily, your
aho samsāranaśīrī- Ab, the cruelty
ākṛtādāḥ stantair My groans are like
ādītya ‘yam ssthito The sun still
ānandavardhanā- The Eye which
āma asaṅ go I am an adultress?
āsīn nātha paṅmāhī The great earth
āsutrātām I praise the mediating
āhūto ‘pi sa- Although his friends
āṣṭāṅgarasā- There is a garden
ādivarodyuti yadā Even if he bore
āṣṭākalusassā vi- Although your face
uccinasu paṅsā- O farmer’s bride
uṭkatāṃ pheśo bhaya- You were trembling
uddāmatkalikām It is bursting
unnatāḥ pralāsod- They are high
upeyāsām api duvaṃ The authors of
uppahajāde asohinie For putting a
upogharāgena vi- The reddening moon
ubbhinākūbhāḥ As the slender chest
ekasmin śayane They lay upon
ekākini yad abalā As I am a weak
ekatāt ruvāi pīśa One one side his
etat tasya mukhāt It is not so much
ema jano tussā Let others compare

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evamvâdini While the heavenly
ehi gaccha patottiṣṭha Come here!
aindram dhanuḥ Lady Autumn
osara rottum cia Go away! Don’t
osurushumhiṣe He who has kissed
aucityam vacasāṁ Words appropriate
kah sannaddhe When you put on
kaṇṭhāc chittvāksamolā She breaks
katham api kṛta She had suffered
kamalāra na maliā The lotuses have
kapole pattrāi Your palm erases
karinivehawaaro My son, who once
karpūra iva dagdho I give my praise
kas tvam bhoh Who are you, sir?
kassa va na hoi Who wouldn’t be
cakrábhīṣṭa- By the imperious
cancadāhūbhamamsta- The brutal
candanaśaktabhujagā- In sprang the
candamaeṣehi niṣā Night is enobled
camahamānasakānca- Whose war
calōpāṅgām āṣṭim Many times you
cāsana karaparampara- Coins, whose
cumbijjaśu saahuttam You kiss a
cūrukāvramaṁ The face of early
jārājīmaśarīrasya That disenchant-
jārd neyam mūrdhni This is not age
jājeja vanuddeśe I would rather be
jjotsnāpūraprasara- On this sand

ti kanakacit

dhundullanto marūhini Flying about

tathābhūte tasmin When the sage’s
tad geham notabhūṭa That house with
tadvaktrenduvaniokena I have spent

tarangabhṛūḥangā It waves are
tava satapatriapuramṛdu Your foot
tasyā pāṇir iyam nu Is this her hand
tasyā unāśi hāreṇa As even without
tasyās tan mukham When we have
tām prāṁ Mukhim tatra The matrons
tāla jāanti guṇā Virtues blossom
tālaś śījāvalaśyā On which your

tin tair apy upa- As some lover
tvisākulah paripatā- A timid deer
tvam candracūdam O moon-crested

dattānandāḥ prayānām Giving joy
dantaśatāṁ karajaiś ca The marks
dayitay grathitā  I have kept this
dirghikurvan patii The there, from the
durârâdhâ râdhâ Râdhâ is hard to
dürâkarsanamoha- I merely heard
dhrstapûni apī By use of the rasas
dharmādharaṇāyādhanâ In this great
dhrśiḥ kṣamā Firmaeness, forbearance

dukham nakhagreṇa Rubbing one nail
na ceha jivitaḥ kaścit Whether bateful
na muddhe pratyetum Sweet lady,
nândhābhanyabhramadbhū With its
many
nārāyanam namaskrtya Having paid
nidrākṣatavināh The bride has
nidrārdhanimūta- With half-closed
nirvânatâmsthām Then came the
nîrârâdhā sukagarbha- Rice grains lie
devâvarttamānāsaya If I slept
devavarttamā phale Since fruit

dhṛtathā râdhi Râdhâ is hard to

durstapūni apī By use of the rasas
dhṛstir nimrtavarsini Did not your
dhrṣṭiyē kesava O Keśava, my eyes
devâvarttamānāsaya If I slept
devâvarttamā phale Since fruit

bhūnām janmanām ante At the end
bhaavâhalarukhanekaka- This is well
bhagavān vârudevaś And the blessed
bhâttendurâjā- At Bhaṭṭendurājā’s
bhâma dhammā Go your rounds
bhāvârûṣa hâthâj Troop of delights,
bhāva acetanām apī A true poet may
bhūrenudighâdān On bodies soiled
bho bhōh kim kim “My dear traveler
bhramim aratim The cloud serpents

manīḥ sānolīḍhaḥ A jewel placed
mathnāṁ kaurava- I will not crush
madamukhârakapota With its erem-
manuvarttyā samupā- So human
manḍhârakusumarenu- With locks
mahumahu ittī A man spends all
mā niśāda May you never find
mā pântam rundhi no Don’t block
mā bhauvantam analah Not fire or
munir jayati Victorious is the great
muhurangulisamurtâ She turned her

yam sarvasādâh The mountains made
yāḥ kālāgurupatra- On this reservoir
yāḥ prathamah prathamaḥ He who is
yoc ca kāmanukham lake The joy of
yatra ca mātānāgī- Where the women
yathā yathā viparyeti The more the
yatheyam grīṣmaya- The shoreline
yadi na syāt [But] if it were not thus
yadi nāmāsaya If what is within
yad vānconāhātmatīr A scoundrel
yad vārāmaya vi- A tremulousness
yasmīn asti na vastu A fool will take
yāḥ yāḥ brahmaḥ He who destroyed
yāḥ yāḥ dâvâvatīm When Madhu’s foe
yāḥ niśā sarvā- In what is night
yāḥ yāḥ bhūvaḥ na Until he is filled
yā yâyāpavatī raśi- I am weary from
yāḥ māryaṁañā Ṭ přaise the magic
yāḥ yânty abhyudaye They who take
yāḥ yāḥ ś trim Whatever man

phainetām moi kēno He seems to me

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yāḥ yânty abhyudaye They who take
yāḥ yāḥ ś trim Whatever man
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vaktas tvam nava- You are raktam You are raktam
umya sti prapta- Where young men
vuvantratrasaubhogan The sun has
gasyaspadam sty I know youth
rajahamsair avijyanta The pond-kings
rjana aps evanta They serve even
rama iwa dasarutha Dasaratwa was
anghiogaan When she blessed
da vuhi duijma With Lakshmi
avanakantipari Truly insensate
avanvistapada sauvanyas The sun has
igasyispadam ity I know youth
ijahamsair avijyanta The pond-kings
ajnapi sei sevante They serve even
do ivo dasara do Daiaratha was
anghiogaan When she blessed
acchha duhida jamiu With Lakshmi
ivanyakintipari Truly insensate
ivanyadmvinoxryo He reckoned not
ivanyasindur apa What an unique
ididhagguvdha How can it be
iacea maha wia Go, and let the sighs
latse mi gi visidam My child, come
lasantamattilipamm Your hair was
lasantapuspibhamnam The
asoka
lastutas sivamaye But if your heart
ligdhenur dugdha Prompted by the
toa hattidanti Ah merchant, bow
linimkudàngoddina As the young
lilmikivyatiriktasya If it is admitted
rimatitrisayo ya isin That which was
riminaparyanka Thus did the heroes
liirambhotthi Prompted by intimacy
risamakindakutvmbaka - 0 foremost of
ritornato / kina vi The passing
lirinim ramai The eyes of warriors
rrtte'smin mahi In this great
ryaktir vyanjanadhituni Clarity in
rridiyogin nata- Her face was bowed

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samsarpadbhish samantat Blacking out
soggam aparajitam I remember before
sanketakalamanasam Knowing that
saajjanan kavir asau This poet does
sajjehi surahimasio The fragrant
satkasyatattvaunaya The right path
satyam manoramah Truly fair women
samavisamanvivesa The levels food
sa poitu vo yasya May be protect you
samawija ira She was the meeting
sastagunasampa da If all poetic
samuthite dhanurdhanau And as the
saraya anuvaddhan The pond lily
saraihamsa saiv In autumn lakes
sarvatra yuhte sa The rooms are
sarvaikasaranam Bow down to the
sarvopamadrunya The creator used
sa vaktam akhilan He can express
savahramasmitodbdh The beautiful
saonita krauva Bodies fanned
sa hi satyam For He is the truth
saaruvinnajowana- Attentive youth
sijjai romanicijai Lucky man! Her
shhipcchakannapur The hunter's
surabhisamaye pravittte As the sweet-
suvarnapupapam prthiwm Three men
sa sa saivasa saiva This is the whole
sriyo nampaton Women, kings,
sngdhasyamalakanti White heros
shpufaktartara Clarity in
dakshajahϰ萨 The passing
sma javanavadisin We have seen lovers
smar smaram iwa Remember as
sma sama samasmasa I call to mind
sma smasmanda smasmanda Smiling of
hainsinim ninadesa yaih These buds
hams tu kincit But Siva, stirring
hiasatthahamanum O clever lover
humi avahatthireho Though I may
helapi kasyadic The playful gesture
hoi na gunanurau The masses have

hamsamām ninadesu yasi These buds
haras tu kñcit But Siva, stirring
hiasatthahamanum O clever lover
humi avahatthireho Though I may
helapi kasyadic The playful gesture
hoi na gunanurau The masses have
Numbers refer to pages. Technical terms are given in both Sanskrit and English with cross-references from one to the other. Page references are usually listed only under the Sanskrit term.

A mere list of all occurrences of such a term as dhvani or rasa would be of little use, as nearly half the pages of the book would be listed under each term. Accordingly, I have tried to analyse by inset headings under such a term the types and varieties of the concept which it denotes and the content of statements made concerning it.

The abbreviation "n" following a page number refers to a note on that page; "(q)" following a page number means that the author or work named in the entry is quoted on that page. The abbreviation "q.v." after a word means that one will find further information and page references under that word.

Note that in the transliteration of Sanskrit words nasals are assimilated within a single word, wherever permitted, to the following letter. Thus, for example, one should look for Śaṅkara, sanjñā, sandhi, not Samkara, sanjñā, sandhi.

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